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34-386 2007

PREPARING FOR EMERGENCIES: IS NORTHERN

NEW JERSEY READY?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY 

PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, 

AND TECHNOLOGY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 26, 2006

Serial No. 109-88

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

SUBCOMMITTE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington, Chairman 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, FLORIDA

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress For the State 

of Washington, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 

Science, and Technology ...................................................................................... 1

The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress For the State 

of Pennsylvania, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and 

Technology ............................................................................................................ 3

The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress For the State 

of New Jersey ....................................................................................................... 3

WITNESSES 

Jerry Speziale, Sherriff, Passaic County, New Jersey: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7

Armando Fontoura, Sheriff, Essex County, New Jersey: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10

Michael Postorino, Fire Chief, City of Paterson, New Jersey: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12

2Prepared Statement ........................................................................................... 14

Joseph Rotonda, Chief of Police, Township of Belleville, New Jersey 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 16

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18

Richard Canas, Director, Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 20

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22

Walter Gramm, Executive Director, New Jersey Business Force, Business 

Executives for National Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 36

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 38

Steve Kempf, Regional Director, Region II, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 39

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 41

Timothy Beres, Director, Preparedness Programs Division, Office of Grants 

and Training, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 46

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 48

(1)

PREPARING FOR EMERGENCIES: IS 

NORTHERN NEW JERSEY READY? 

Monday, June 26, 2006

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 a.m., in the Auditorium of Passaic County Public Safety Academy, 300 Oldham 

Road, Wayne, New Jersey, Hon. Dave Reichert chairman of the 

Subcommittee presiding. 

Present: Representatives Reichert, Dent and Pascrell. 

Mr. REICHERT. Well, good morning. 

Before I gavel, I just want to say just a couple of quick—can you 

hear me in the back OK? Great. I used to be, I was the Sheriff in 

Seattle the last eight years, this is my first term in Congress, I was 

a Deputy Sheriff for 33 years, and so it’s a pleasure to be here with 

you today. 

I’ve learned that there’s a certain formality about hearings in 

Washington, D.C., and that it can make people nervous, and especially the witnesses when they start to get quizzed, but I know they 

all know Bill, and he’s such a soft, easy-going guy that nobody is 

going to be nervous. But, I just kind of wanted to say that we want 

to make this relaxing and comfortable. We want to make this a discussion with the group, and I know that’s the way Bill would like 

it, too. It’s just wonderful to be in your community and have a 

chance to be here. It’s a great opportunity to learn about what you 

are doing as far as planning and training, and in communications 

in regards to responding to emergencies. 

And, I know now you are dealing with some flooding in your 

neighborhood, because I got in late this morning, early this morning about 2:00 in the morning, so I slept in my suit. 

All right. This hearing of the Homeland Security Subcommittee 

on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology will come to 

order. The Subcommittee will hear testimony today on preparing 

for, and responding to, and preventing terrorist attacks, and natural disasters and other emergencies. 

I would like to thank everyone, the witnesses and the public, for 

attending this morning’s important hearing, and then they give me 

a formal written statement to read, so you’ll just all be excited 

about hearing about this. 

I would like to thank Mr. Pascrell, that’s the most important 

piece in this whole statement that I’m going to make today, be-
2

cause we are working as a team. I think that a lot of people wonder 

whether or not the Democrats and Republicans can team up together and actually succeed in their efforts in Congress, and I 

think Bill and I are a team that’s been able to do that. We are moving some important legislation, and for the past five months have 

been working on some important legislation that we hope to see on 

the floor in the next few weeks. 

But, I thank Bill for his friendship and his guidance and support 

in working for America, and that’s what he does. 

This is the second field hearing we’ve done together, with the 

first one being in my home district, which is in Washington State, 

which borders the City of Seattle. Although Bill and I hail from opposite coasts and belong to different political parties, we, nonetheless, share a common vision for a safer America. 

There are few members of Congress as passionate as Bill on 

issues to homeland security, and as one of the few former Mayors 

serving in the House of Representatives Bill brings leadership and 

expertise on the needs and concerns of those in the front lines of 

our first responders. 

Bill and I have been working on comprehensive legislation to fix 

the most serious deficiencies within our National Disaster Response System, as made evident by the government’s poor response 

to Hurricane Katrina last year. 

Since taking over as Chairman of the Subcommittee, we’ve held 

five hearings on interoperability and emergency communication. As 

a first responder myself for over 30 years in law enforcement and 

the former Sheriff of King County in Washington, I know the importance of having situational awareness in the field when responding to an event. 

I was proud to work with Bill in drafting H.R. 5351, the National 

Emergency Management Enhancement Act of 2006. This legislation 

will, among other things, establish an Office of Emergency Communication and consolidate the SAFECOM program, the Integrated 

Wireless Network Project, and the Interoperable Communications 

Technical Assistance Program within this new office. 

It was clear from witness testimony during our hearings for the 

need to hold one person accountable for interoperable communications in the Department of Homeland Security. H.R. 5351 will also 

make much needed structural improvements to FEMA, but keep it 

within the Department of Homeland Security. 

As many of you know, there is an ongoing debate whether to remove FEMA from the Department of Homeland Security. This legislation will restore the nexus between preparedness and response, 

give FEMA direct reporting authority to the President during a catastrophic event, and put safeguards in place to prevent the Secretary of Homeland Security from taking vital resources away from 

FEMA. 

I am proud to say this legislation has strong backing, and the 

first responder community groups supporting this legislation include the National Sheriffs Association, the International Association of Firefighters, the National Volunteer Fire Council, and 

countless others. We worked with all these groups in drafting this 

legislation, and it represents a 21st Century approach to emergency management. 
3

The purpose of this hearing is to help us gain a more thorough 

understanding of what Congress can do to better assist New Jersey, and the region, and their efforts to enhance it’s all hazards 

preparedness. Specifically, we will examine the state of the region’s 

coordination, cooperation, and the planning for catastrophic events, 

whether manmade or natural, and how well the Department of 

Homeland Security is working with your state and our states 

across this country and local governments. 

The Department of Homeland Security recently announced their 

grant awards for Fiscal Year 2006, and while Jersey City, Newark 

area, saw an increase in urban area security initiative funding 

there has, nonetheless, been much controversy surrounding these 

grants, including the use of the new peer review system. 

As the Subcommittee and Congress, with direct oversight of first 

responder grants, I’m hopeful the controversy surrounding these recent grant announcements will bring the Senate to the table to finally pass the faster, smarter funding for the First Respondents 

Act. Congress needs to continue to show strong support and strong 

oversight for the Department of Homeland Security, and this needed legislation will make first responder grants truly risk-based. 

We are fortunate to have the opportunity to hear from so many 

hard working, dedicated and expert public servants on the state of 

our emergency preparedness. Your appearance today is vitally important to the work of the Subcommittee, and no doubt the Department, and to the country, and I’d like to thank our witnesses and 

audience for being with us today. 

Before we proceed any further this morning, as Chairman I need 

to take care of some housekeeping issues. Because this is an official 

congressional hearing, as opposed to a town hall meeting, we must 

abide by certain rules of the Committee on Homeland Security, as 

well as the House of Representatives. Therefore, I kindly ask that 

there be no applause of any kind or any kind of demonstration with 

regard to any testimony, and it is important that we respect the 

decorum and the rules of the Committee of the House, and thank 

you in advance for your understanding, and the Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you very much. Here comes our brother 

from Pennsylvania. He just came through the water and the rain. 

Welcome aboard, Congressman Dent. 

Mr. REICHERT. It’s good to have you here. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. REICHERT. He was escorted in by the Sheriff. 

Mr. PASCRELL. That’s right, escorted by Sheriff Speziale, very 

good. 

I want to begin today by, I want to thank some people. This is 

a pretty big thing when a congressional hearing is not in Washington, it’s in part of the country, because there’s a lot of things—

bureaucracies, you have to put together, you just don’t say let’s 

have a hearing and it happens. It doesn’t work that way. 

I want to thank the President of the Passaic County Community 

College, Steve Rose, for permitting us to be here, the Deputy Chief, 

Tom Lyons, for setting up the hearing, the Passaic County Sheriff, 

Jerry Speziale, and his department for handling all transportation 

for today, our Passaic County Prosecutor, James Vigliano, all of our 
4

police and fire chiefs who are attending, many of them are here, 

all of the police, fire and EMS that are here. 

Just a few moments ago, we went over to the fire house and saw 

the recruits that are here at the Fire Academy. Freeholder Terry 

Duffy was kind enough to shake loose from his important schedule, 

busy schedule, New Jersey State Fire Marshal Larry Petrillo, and 

all the representatives that came up from Fort Monmouth, we really appreciate this. 

To all of our witnesses, who our Chairman will introduce in a 

few moments before we get going, on both of our panels, we have 

a lot to cover today, and I want to thank the Chairman for coming 

to New Jersey, you know, this afternoon we leave and go back to 

Washington for another week, hopefully, of work. 

I want to welcome my good friend Charlie Dent from Pennsylvania. These are two good guys. We are not in the same party, but 

we have—we made a commitment in the very beginning that we 

were going to get over party differences and do what we had to do 

for the American people, and we are not going to be dissuade from 

that. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for their participation. Local 

first responders, state security experts, and the officials from the 

Department of Homeland Security, they are going to discuss their 

efforts to protect our citizens. 

The title of the hearing is, ‘‘Preparing for, Responding to, and 

Preventing Terrorists Attacks, Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies: Is Northern New Jersey Ready?’’ We know that there are 

an abundance of risks and vulnerabilities associated with our region, and this official congressional committee hearing will delve 

into the various security endeavors our local, state and Federal 

Governments have taken, undertaken, engaged the levels of success so far. Look how many people have come out on this, citizens, 

as well as first responders, because we are inevitably all first responders, and I want to thank you for your interest in what we do. 

New Jersey is, after all, the most densely populated state in the 

Nation. Due to its unmatched collection of critical transportation, 

utility, petro chemical, pharmaceutical infrastructure, New Jersey 

functions as a critical global choke point of people or people and 

product. Our state ferries tens of millions of passengers to global 

destinations, and it ushers delivery of a vast quantity of goods to 

markets in the northeastern, southern, western United States, 

Canada, as well as Europe and the Far East. 

So, disruption to New Jersey’s key transportation infrastructure, 

as precipitated by an act of terrorism, or a natural disaster, would 

severely affect both the national and international economic stability. We are not simply talking about the State of New Jersey. 

The seaports of Newark and Elizabeth process nearly 10 percent 

of our Nation’s total freight, just that one area, 850 million tons 

per year come through those ports. 

A terrorist incident, or a natural disaster, would have the effect 

of placing vessel traffic at a standstill, resulting in a loss of billions 

of dollars of potential revenues daily from our economy. In addition, the surrounding superstructure of Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor, the Newark Liberty International Airport, as well as the 

densely populated communities just south, whether it be 
5

Woodbridge, Edison, Linden or Rahway, would compound the humanitarian and economic disaster. Should any activity close the 

New Jersey Turnpike, for any duration, the result would be extreme gridlock in the Northeast Corridor. The trucks moving goods 

and supplies through to the Northeast would be shut down. 

We rank third in the Nation, New Jersey does, in terms of chemical production. There is almost 100 sites in New Jersey where 

large quantities of highly-toxic, highly-volatile chemicals are stored 

and used. Any of those sites have the ability to cause significant 

numbers of fatalities and serious illnesses, and we are going to 

have people on the second panel from the business community see 

what they are doing, because if this isn’t a partnership, if you 

think that the Federal Government can do all of these things, you 

are wrong, we don’t believe that. We know our responsibilities, and 

we’ve got to make sure that those responsibilities are carried out. 

So, any of these sites could mean significant amount of fatalities, 

serious illnesses, as a result of a terrorist attack or a natural disaster, and we must do everything we can to prevent, to prepare, 

and respond. We must remember this fact, if and when terrorists 

or natural disasters strike our homeland, it will be those on the 

local level that are most affected, and we saw when we went, not 

too long ago, to London, Madrid and Rome, all of those three places 

that have been bombed in the last several years, and talking in 

London, where they understand, really, I don’t believe we understand it, we in Federal Government understand it, what boots on 

the ground really mean. 

In London, for instance, most of the information they gather in 

intelligence is not done from the top, it’s done from the soldier, so 

to speak, the police officer from Scotland Yard and New Scotland 

Yard. This is something we have to get tuned into for folks who are 

already in the community that can provide intelligence up the ladder. 

Homeland security must begin at home, in our communities, in 

our cities, our towns. It is imperative that our men and women on 

the front lines are fully coordinated with the state and Federal 

Government, that robust communication, that robust cooperation, 

and integration throughout the varied spheres of our security apparatus do exist. 

I want to help ensure that the Department of Homeland Security, and I think my two colleagues would admit, it’s come under 

a lot of battering in the last couple of months, and we have people 

saying that we are on the forefront of creating the Department, not 

have second thoughts. You put 22 Federal agencies together, 

180,000 people, people are having second thoughts about that, 

whether we created a dinosaur. 

I want to help ensure that the Department is effectively working 

with state and local agencies in addressing the challenges of developing and implementing emergency preparedness response, and I 

think we all three of us want to hear that from our local communities if you are not getting the cooperation. 

I’m also looking forward to hearing from an array of emergency 

management and first responder officials. I’m interested to learn 

what they believe are the greatest impediments to their success. 
6

So, I welcome everybody here today. I welcome the two Congressmen, who have come from somewhat relative distances from the 

other side of the world to come to our area. We are proud in the 

8th Congressional District, this district extends from Pompton 

Lakes all the way down to Livingston, it’s a long district of 21 

counties. 

So, thank you all for coming, and thank you, our panelists, first 

panel and second panel, and, Chairman, thank you again for all 

that you’ve done to make sure that safety is first and we protect 

our public. 

Thank you, Mr. Pascrell, and the Chair will recognize Congressman Dent for any statements he might want to make. 

Mr. DENT. Yes, and I’ll be very brief, I just want to thank the 

Chairman for bringing this Subcommittee to Northern New Jersey, 

and also thank Ranking Member Pascrell for his strong leadership 

on homeland security issues, and it’s just great to be here. 

My main interest here is, not just as a member of the committee, 

but I’m also selfish, in that my constituency is in the Lehigh Valley 

of Pennsylvania, Allentown, Bethlehem and Easton, we are just on 

the other side of the Delaware River, and how northern New Jersey responds to disaster, whether it be manmade or natural disaster, impacts my constituency significantly, since large numbers of 

my constituents make their livelihoods over here in northern New 

Jersey and the New York Metropolitan Area. Large numbers of 

people from eastern Pennsylvania travel on Interstate 78 and 

Route 80 into the New York Metropolitan Area every day. 

So, what happens here truly will have an enormous impact on 

my constituency, so that’s why I want to learn about what you are 

doing here in northern New Jersey, and I want to learn about how 

you are going to prepare and respond. 

Also, I always worry, too, in that should there ever be, heaven 

forbid, some type of a major evacuation out of the New York Metropolitan Area, that will have an enormous impact on my constituency, because most people will be heading west on those interstates, and we talk about that quite a bit in my community. It’s 

something that we think about. 

So, without any further commentary from me, I just want to hear 

from our presenters today, and I truly thank you for this opportunity to allow us to participate here in Northern New Jersey. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. DENT. I will call our first panel. 

With us on the first panel are Hon. Jerry Speziale, Sheriff of Passaic County, New Jersey, Hon. Armando Fontoura, Sheriff of Essex 

County, New Jersey, Mr. Joseph Rotonda, Chief of Police, Belleville 

Township, New Jersey, Mr. Michael Postorino, Fire Chief, City of 

Paterson, New Jersey, and Mr. Richard Caas, Director, Office of 

Homeland Security and Preparedness, State of New Jersey, and 

the Chair now recognizes Sheriff Speziale. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY SPEZIALE, SHERIFF, PASSAIC 

COUNTY, STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Mr. SPEZIALE. Good morning. 

Mr. REICHERT. Excuse me, just before you get started, you don’t 

have to read your entire statement if you don’t want to. 

Mr. SPEZIALE. Yes, OK. 
7

Mr. REICHERT. You have five minutes, so, you know, just whatever you feel like, whatever moves your spirit. 

Mr. SPEZIALE. Very good. 

Good morning. As the Sheriff of Passaic County, I want to welcome this important committee to Passaic County. I want to first 

thank your Congressman, Bill Pascrell and the other Congressmen, 

you, Congressman Reichert, and Congress Dent, for being here for 

this very important meeting. 

Last month, myself and my compatriot here, Essex County Sheriff, Armando Fontoura, attended a Senate Homeland Security Conference and met with members of the New Jersey Delegation, to 

talk about some of the issues we had here in Passaic County. And, 

rest assured, here in Passaic County the public safety community, 

the fire, the EMS, the police, the prosecutor, and the chiefs of police, we all have an extremely close working relationship, which is 

founded on mutual respect, trust and friendship. Passaic County 

public safety here works as a team. The territorial touchiness no 

longer exists. 

However, the biggest problem that we have here is funding, and 

communications, and some of the things that are faced throughout 

the Nation that really need to be brought to the forefront so that 

we can get the equipment that we need, instead of just having the 

shirts on our back. That’s really what we are faced with here in 

New Jersey, and I believe that’s pretty much throughout the country. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Sheriff Speziale follows:]

Retained in the Record

Mr. REICHERT. You yield the rest of your time, Jerry? 

Mr. SPEZIALE. Yes. 

Mr. REICHERT. That’s pretty unusual for a Sheriff to be that 

short, I know. 

Mr. SPEZIALE. I give it to my buddy here. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Sheriff. The Chair now recognizes 

Sheriff Fontoura. 

STATEMENT OF ARMANDO FONTOURA, SHERIFF, ESSEX 

COUNTY, STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Mr. FONTOURA. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Dent, Congressman 

Pascrell, thank you very much for being here. We appreciate the 

opportunity for Bill Pascrell, one of the most steadfast supporters 

of law enforcement and public safety personnel, we thank you for 

all the work that you do on our behalf. 

I’m not only the Sheriff in Essex County, I’m also the Emergency 

Management Coordinator for that County. 

Essex County is also one of the core members of the UASI area 

for this area, the Urban Area Security Initiative. 

Counter-terrorist experts say they have two miles along our 

County, the two most dangerous miles in America. Rest assured 

that we don’t disagree with that categorization. The metropolitan 

area is the busiest airport, one the world’s largest seaports, as Congressman Pascrell pointed out, and the State’s largest railroad station, all located in Newark. We also have an intricate and vulnerable ground transportation network. 
8

Other potential terrorist targets in Essex County include chemical refineries, propane gas farms and natural gas storage facilities, 

the New Jersey Performing Arts Center, malls, medical centers, 

universities and New Jersey’s largest and busiest Superior Court 

system, and one of the largest District Courts, Federal Courts, in 

the country. 

Captured documents reveal that Newark’s Prudential complex, 

Prudential Towers, have been of particular interest to Al–Qaida 

terrorists. Because of this threat, law enforcement surveillance continues at Prudential. 

With these targets simultaneously in play, we have intensified 

our vigilance analyzing and investigating every lead, and shared all 

the intelligence as it relates to threats upon us. We continue to 

conduct Weapons of Mass Destruction and Counter–Terrorism seminars. We constantly rehearse through effectiveness of water, food 

and medicine. We have practiced searching for nuclear devices in 

our training first responders in vehicle-borne and suicide bomber 

detection. With the threat of the Avian Flu, we are conducting regional exercises so that we may effectively respond to pandemics. 

Our preparedness exercises and training are in place because 

Northern New Jersey is no stranger to incidents of terrorism. 

In 1994, our Bomb Squad was called to investigate a North 

Caldwell resident who was killed when he opened a mail bomb sent 

by the notorious Unabomber. 

Jersey City, and we all know was the headquarters for the scalled ‘‘Blind Sheik,’’ Omar Abdul Rahman, who staged a ground 

1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. 

Many of the victims of the 2001 terrorist attack on the trade center were from Northern New Jersey, including more than 40 from 

our own County. 

The investigation of the 2001 attack verified that as many as 11 

of the terrorists assimilated to our culture right here in this neighborhood. Nineteen of the 21 terrorists traveled through Northern 

New Jersey, as we all know, while they plotted, and one of the 

planes left from our own airport. 

As to future threats, our boots are on the ground, and our First 

Responders are training, exercising and watching. 

We thank our Federal partners for their financial support, allowing us to acquire vital communications, protective gear, and other 

counter-terrorism hardware. 

Of major concern to us is the target-hardening of our critical infrastructure. We have a wealth of targets and a population that 

would be severely at risk in the event of a major disaster. 

More funding must be expended on high security fencing, motion 

detectors, surveillance cameras, security barriers. Funding must be 

provided for our private-sector partners, who manage over 85 percent of our country’s critical infrastructure facilities and sites. 

Since 2004, Federal Homeland Security funding for Northern 

New Jersey, while generous, has been reduced. Our 2005 and 2006 

funds have almost exclusively been earmarked and expended on 

target-hardening. Congress must enact legislation mandating that 

vulnerable, yet profit-making industries, adhere to 21st Century security standards. 
9

As we analyze the potential threats to Northern New Jersey, additional Federal funding is needed for hospital bedding, emergency 

medical supplies, such as those our hospitals would need for a tremendous surge of incoming patients due to disaster. 

Our best defense and response mechanism for disaster are 

trained First Responders, who would conduct de-contamination operations and distribute mass medication. 

Terrorism is not our only concern, catastrophic weather would 

also severely put us to the test. 

While Essex County has an Emergency Operations Center, the 

facility is inadequate. Essex County’s Operations Center does not 

contain state-of-the-art interoperable communications, nor does it 

have the capacity to serve as the alternate seat of government. 

The New Jersey Transit Office Emergency Center is located next 

to Newark’s Penn Station and the Port Authority is adjacent to the 

Holland Tunnel. 

Catastrophic weather or other disasters could force the closure of 

both of those centers. As their nearest neighbor, both agencies 

would turn to Essex County. Regretfully, we would also be unable 

to meet their needs at this time. 

The New York State Police’s north regional Office of Emergency 

Management is located in Essex County. It would seem to make 

great sense to fund and construct a coordinated Emergency Operations Center with the State Police as our partner. 

Catastrophic weather or a terrorism event would also put our 

ability to evacuate and shelter a large group of people to the test. 

The low-lying, Ironbound section of Newark, my home town, would 

be severely impacted by a hurricane on the scale of Katrina. A terrorist incident in New York City could force the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people that would pass through or be sheltered in Essex County. 

At this time, Essex County is incapable of evacuating or sheltering hundreds of thousands of disaster victims. 

Also, contingency plans such as reverse lanes of traffic to accommodate an evacuation have never been tested. These contingencies 

should be funded so that we may study these problems and conduct 

appropriate exercises. Disaster could jeopardize continuity of operations and continuity of government. 

Currently, no plan is in place to transfer and store vital government records. Again, feasibility studies and operational exercises 

should be funded and conducted. First Responders are stretched to 

the limit, while we attempt to do more with less, and realize the 

importance of our mission. We will soon approach a point of diminishing returns for our efforts. It is not a matter of ‘‘if’’ we will be 

attacked, but when we will be attacked. 

Funding must go to where the threats are greatest and to where 

the population is most vulnerable. When you have terrorists operating in our community, as they have operated here in Northern 

New Jersey, ‘‘beat cops’’ with training are in the best position to 

find them. I firmly believe that it is from the hood of a police car 

that terrorism will be stopped. 

Those of us who live in Northern New Jersey expect future blackouts, blizzards, ice storms and nor’easters. To facilitate our effec-
10

tive response, we must have the operational ability and related 

hardware in place and at the ready. 

More than 21 million people live in the metropolitan area. Locally, the stakes are extremely high. We urge you to support and 

fund our needs. 

I thank you for the opportunity to be here. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fontoura follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ARMANDO FONTOURA

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of Congress, ladies and gentlemen. 

My name is Armando Fontoura and I am the Sheriff of Essex County, New Jersey 

and Coordinator of the Essex County Office of Emergency Management. 

Thank you for this opportunity to appear today before you and the House Homeland Security Committee’s Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and 

Technology. 

For those who are unfamiliar with northern New Jersey, please know that Essex 

County is a core county member of the Urban Area Security Initiative, commonly 

known as UASI. 

As reported in the New York Times, federal counter-terrorist officials have categorized parts of Essex County, the financial, industrial and cultural capital and the 

transportation hub of New Jersey, as ′′America’s Two Most Dangerous Miles′′. 

Those of us charged with protecting the people of our community and our critical 

infrastructure do not disagree with the ′′Most Dangerous′′ classification. 

Essex County is home to the busiest international airport in the New York/New 

Jersey metropolitan area, one of the world’s largest and most active seaports and 

New Jersey’s largest and busiest railway station. 

As one of our nation’s most densely populated regions, Essex County is also home 

to a wide variety of potential terrorist targets, including chemical refineries, propane gas farms, natural gas storage facilities, pharmaceutical companies, the New 

Jersey Performing Arts Center, Riverfront Stadium, major shopping malls, many 

colleges, universities and hospitals, an intricate and interdependent network of 

highways, rail lines, bridges and tunnels, and New Jersey’s largest and busiest Superior Court vicinage and our federal courts. 

Captured documents specifically reveal that Newark’s Prudential complex has 

been of particular interest to Al-Qaida terrorists. Because of this 2004 threat, law 

enforcement surveillance at Prudential continues. 

With these many targets simultaneously in play, local, regional and state Homeland Security personnel and law enforcement agencies have intensified our vigilance, analyzed and investigated every potential lead and shared all intelligence as 

it relates to threats upon us. 

Steadfastly, we continue to conduct Weapons of Mass Destruction and CounterTerrorism seminars, Water, Food and Medicine Distribution rehearsals, Nuclear Device Search and enhanced Explosives Detection exercises, specifically training First 

Responders in vehicle-born and suicide bomber detection. And now, with the threat 

of Avian Flu, we are conducting regional exercises so that we may effectively respond to pandemics. 

Our preparedness exercises and training are in place because Essex County and 

our neighbors are no strangers to incidents of terrorism. 

On December 10, 1994, Mr. Thomas Mosser of North Caldwell, was killed when 

he opened a mail bomb sent by Ted Kaczynski, the notorious Unabomber. 

Jersey City was the headquarters for the so-called ′′Blind Sheik′′, Omar Abdul 

Rahman, and staging ground for the 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. 

Many of the victims of the 2001 terrorist attack on the trade center were from 

northeastern New Jersey, including more than 40 Essex County residents. 

The follow-up investigation to the 2001 attack documents that 19 of the 21 terrorists traveled through northern New Jersey, plotting their assault right in our own 

backyard, and as many as eleven of the terrorists assimilated our culture and lived 

among us. 

As to future threats, our boots are on the ground. Thousands of law enforcement 

officers and other First Responders are training, exercising and watching. 

We thank our federal partners for their technical expertise and past financial support to acquire vital protective gear, communications, rolling stock and other 

counter-terrorism hardware. 
11

Of major concern to those of us in northern New Jersey is the target-hardening 

of our critical infrastructure. As noted earlier, we have a wealth of tempting targets 

and a population that would be severely at-risk in the event of a manmade or natural disaster. 

More funding must be expended on items such as high security fencing, motion 

detectors, surveillance cameras, security barriers and training for our First Responders and our private-sector partners who manage over 85% of our county’s critical infrastructure facilities and sites. 

Since 2004, federal Homeland Security funding to northeastern New Jersey, while 

generous, has been reduced. Our 2005 and 2006 funds have, almost exclusively, 

been earmarked and expended on target-hardening. 

However, in order to support this public-sector financial investment in our safety, 

Congress must enact legislation, mandating that vulnerable, yet profit-making, industries, whether chemical, petroleum or nuclear power, for example, adhere to security standards that meet the needs of the 21st century. 

As we look forward and calculate the potential for manmade or natural threats, 

additional federal funding is needed for HAZMAT detection equipment, hospital bedding and emergency medical supplies, such as X-ray machines, MRI’s and sterilization equipment, specifically the equipment that our hospitals and health care facilities would need in the event of a tremendous surge of incoming patients as a result 

of a catastrophic natural disaster or terrorist incident. 

The best defense against terrorist and the first line of response to natural disasters are trained law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical technicians and hospital personnel who would be charged with a major surge of incoming 

patients and the distribution of mass medication and prophylaxes. 

A terrorist attack is not our only concern. A catastrophic weather event, such as 

a hurricane on the scale of Katrina, would severely put us to the test as would an 

airline crash in our densely populated urban area or a major HAZMAT incident. 

While Essex County has an Emergency Operations Center we believe this facility 

to be inadequate to meet our needs. A viable EOC should contain state-of-the-art 

interoperable communications and have the capability to serve as the alternate seat 

of government. 

The EOC for New Jersey Transit is located next to Newark’s Penn Station and 

the EOC for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is located just outside 

of the Holland Tunnel. 

A catastrophic weather event could force the closure of either center. As their 

nearest neighbor, both agencies would turn to Essex County. Regretfully, we would 

also be unable to meet their many needs. 

The New Jersey State Police’s north regional Office of Emergency Management 

is located in Essex County. It would seem to make great sense to fund and construct 

a coordinated Emergency Operations Center with the State Police as our partner 

in Essex County. 

A catastrophic weather event or terrorist event would also put our ability to evacuate and shelter a large group of people. The low-lying, Ironbound section of Newark would be severely impacted by a hurricane. A terrorist incident in New York 

City could force the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people who would pass 

through or be sheltered in Essex County. 

At this time, Essex County could cope with an evacuation and sheltering of hundreds of victims but not thousands or tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands 

of people. 

In the event of such a major disaster, contingency plans, such as reverse lanes 

traffic to accommodate an evacuation, have never been tested. These contingencies 

should be funded so that we may study these problems and conduct appropriate exercises. 

Weather, terrorism or any other significant disaster could also jeopardize Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government. Currently, no plan is in place 

to transfer and store vital government records and documents. Again, feasibility 

studies and operational exercises should be funded and conducted. 

Right now, the boots we have on the ground are stretched to the limit. We are 

all doing more with less. We all realize the importance of our mission. However, we 

will soon approach a point of diminishing returns for our efforts. 

UASI members know it is not a matter of ′′if′′ we will be attacked. but where and 

when. 

The pork barrel must be taken out of the funding formula. Funding must go to 

where the threats are greatest and to where the population is most vulnerable. 

When you have terrorists operating in the community, as they have operated here 

in northeastern New Jersey, in Canada, in London and in Spain, ′′beat cops′′ with 
12

training are in the best position to find them. I firmly believe that it is from the 

hood of a police car that terrorism will be stopped. 

We who live in northern New Jersey expect to experience future blackouts, blizzards, ice storms and nor’easters. To facilitate our effective response to such incidents, we must have the operational ability and related hardware in place and at 

the ready. 

More than 21 million people live in the metropolitan area. Locally, the stakes are 

extremely high. We urge you to support and fund our needs. 

I thank Representative Pascrell for bringing this important hearing to our district 

and I thank the Chairman for this opportunity to appear before you today.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Sheriff. The Chair now recognizes 

Chief Postorino. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL POSTORINO, FIRE CHIEF, CITY OF 

PETERSON, STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Mr. POSTORINO.. Thank you. 

Let me express what an honor it is that I was asked to participate in this Homeland Security Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee hearing. First, I would like to recognize and than Hon. 

Members of the Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology 

Committee, Congressman Reichert, Congressman Pascrell, and 

Congressman Dent, Committee members. 

Two areas which are always at the forefront of emergency/disaster responses are: [1] Command & Control, and [2] Communications. 

Regarding Command & Control, fire departments in general are 

usually the most adept at working within a structured Incident 

Command System. Prior to Executive Order No. 50, issued by the 

State, as per the New Jersey Division of Fire Safety, all members 

of the Department are required to participate and receive Incident 

Command Training. Additionally, every service call, which in our 

case for the City of Paterson totals over 6,000 fire and 26,000 EMS 

calls, results in the Incident Command System being utilized on a 

daily basis. 

Unfortunately, experience has shown that when we are involved 

in large-scale incidents, which require a ‘‘Unified Command Structure,’’ a large number of other agencies which may have a ‘‘classroom understanding’’ of the Incident Command System lack a 

‘‘working knowledge’’ of the system. As an incident escalates, and 

in particular where a Federal, State and local response is mandated, failure of such respective agencies to have a working knowledge of NIMS and the Incident Command System will present 

major coordination and control problems. 

Consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD 

5, and State of New Jersey Executive Order 50, the Paterson Fire 

Department has taken the initiative and completed the required 

Incident Command and NIMS training mandated for Fiscal Years 

2005 and 2006, and we will continue to meet the training requirements for Fiscal Year ‘07. 

Regarding communication, the biggest challenge in particular 

when a Federal, State and local response is warranted deals with 

interoperability. While efforts are being made to improve on the 

interoperability, it doesn’t appear that such efforts are moving fast 

enough. During our various emergency drills, the same complaints 

resurface about different agencies not having the capabilities of 

communicating with each other, or sharing data. Again, while im-
13

provements are being made, some of the same communications 

issues identified post 9/11 are still quite evident today. 

While events of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina, 9/11 or 

Oklahoma City are not every-day occurrences, thank God, many 

events that do occur on a daily basis, such as building fires, rescues, chemical spills, train derailments, and highway incidents require different agencies for jurisdiction to communicate with one 

another to provide the necessary equipment and manpower to mitigate the incident. 

What I ask is, are we really better prepared or are we just more 

aware? 

I’ll give you a couple examples of the City of Paterson, blackouts, 

back in 2003 we had the blackout of the Northeast. We lost power, 

we lost all ability to phone service, no redundancy for our computer 

systems, no ability for our firefighters to respond unless they 

manually were able to do it using their cell phones. This is unacceptable in today’s day and age. We have yearly storms. Extrication 

gets hindered by lightning strikes, which in the case of Passaic 

County would knock out our radio tower. This radio tower can only 

be restarted if one individual—by an individual who has the key 

to go up to an off-site, unlock it, and manually start the generator. 

How can that be in today’s day and age? 

Just last month, the City of Paterson had a train derailment. 

While the Fire Department worked in conjunction with the Passaic 

County Sheriff’s Department to help the Department, the Paterson 

OEM, Paterson Police, New Jersey State Police, New Jersey Task 

Force One, one of the simplest functions, being able to communicate, can only be done using either our cell phones or face to face. 

How is it that we can talk to people on the moon, but yet within 

one block we cannot communicate with our radio system? 

Some solutions, we need to invest in solar power for redundant 

back-up power. We need alternative antenna repeater sites. We 

need to regionalize our radio frequency bandwidth, so that all 

emergency responders can communicate. We have to prevent the 

FCC from allowing commercial vendors from purchasing low-powered systems which cause bleed overs during our emergency operations. 

I can give you an example of how we’ll be working on an emergency scene, we have a limousine company that will come in and, 

basically, bleed out our members while we are giving out orders, 

while they are giving their directions for where they need to go. We 

need to upgrade our infrastructure so that the technology that’s out 

there today can be supported. 

As far as funding goes, fire departments have to compete with 

other city agencies, with different demographics, for gas tax dollars. Funding cycles must be planned far in advance for changes 

or upgrades of costly equipment. One of the major problems we run 

into is that by the time the budgets get approved the technology 

is almost already out of date, and this causes—and the manufacturer no longer can support the technology. 

Some solutions, funding assistance from Federal sources must be 

consistent in order to provide necessary training, continuity of operations of instituted programs, and replacement of necessary manpower and needs. 
14

In conclusion, while there is new awareness regarding the 

threats which emergency responders face today, and while efforts 

are being made to prepare for such threats, the sad reality is that 

first responders still lack the necessary training and equipment to 

handle the emergencies of any large-scale incident. 

Again, I would close with what I opened, are we better prepared 

or are we really just more aware? 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Postorino follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL POSTORINO

Let me express what an honor it is that I was asked to participate in this Homeland Security Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee Hearing. 

First I would like to recognize and thank the Honorable Members of the Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology Subcommittee: Congressman David 

Reichert, Subcommittee Chairman; Congressman Bill Pascrell, Jr., Subcommittee 

Ranking Member; and Congressman Charles Dent, Subcommittee member. 

Committee Members: 

Two areas which are always at the forefront of any Emergency/Disaster Response 

are: (1) Command & Control and (2) Communications. 

Regarding Command & Control, Fire Departments in general are usually the 

most adept at working within a structured Incident Command System. Prior to Executive Order # 50 being issued, as per the New Jersey Division of Fire Safety, all 

members of the Department were required to receive Incident Command Training. 

Additionally, every service call, which in our case totals over 6000, results in the 

Incident Command System being utilized on a daily basis. Unfortunately, experience 

has shown that when we are involved in large-scale incidents which require a 

′′Unified Command Structure′′, a large number of other agencies which may have 

a ′′classroom understanding′′ of the Incident Command System lack a ′′working 

knowledge′′ of the System. As an incident escalates, and in particular, where a Federal, State, and local response is mandated, failure of such respective agencies to 

have a ′′working knowledge′′ of NIMS and the ICS will present major coordination 

and control problems. 

Regarding Communications, the biggest challenge, in particular, when a Federal, 

State, and Local response is warranted, deals with interoperability. While efforts 

are being made to improve on the interoperability, it doesn’t appear that such efforts are moving fast enough. During our various emergency drills, the same complaints resurface about different agencies not having the capabilities of communicating with each other. Again, while improvements are being made, some of the 

same communication issues identified ′′post 9/11′′ are still quite evident today. 

While events of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina, 9/11, or Oklahoma City are 

not everyday occurrences; Many events that do occur on a daily basis such as building fires, rescues, chemical spills, train derailments and highway incidents require 

different agencies or jurisdictions to communicate with one another to provide the 

necessary equipment and manpower to mitigate the incident. 

Are we better prepared, or are we just more aware?

Examples of Everyday Occurrences: 

Blackouts: No backup power, lost phone service, no redundancy in computer systems and radio systems. Only 3 of the 7 firehouses have backup generators. These 

generators are over 25 years old and need replacement. We have applied for solar 

powered electrical backup units for all firehouses via the 2006 Fire Act Program. 

Yearly Storms: Common occurrences such as extraction of residents in low lying 

areas near Passaic River. Radio tower was struck by lightning knocking out power, 

rendering all communications unusable. Backup generator is a manual start unit 

which necessitates someone going to the site to start it. 

Train Derailment: The Paterson Fire Department worked in conjunction with the 

Sheriff’s Department, Health Department, Paterson O.E.M., Paterson Police, NJ 

State Police, Department of Pubic Works, NJ Task Force One, and the Susquehanna 

Railroad Company. There was no communications due to the lack of radio interoperability.

Solutions: 

Investment in solar power for redundant backup power. 

Alternative antenna repeater site. 

Regionalization of radio frequency bandwidth. 
15

Have the FCC prevent commercial vendors from purchasing low powered systems 

which cause bleed over and distortion on our public safety primary stations. 

Provide a trunked radio system and training in proper operation procedures. This 

will provide no delay in being able to communicate with other agencies. 

Upgrade wiring in building infrastructure to support new technology.

Funding Sources: 

The Fire Department has to compete with other city agencies for scarce tax dollars. 

Funding cycles must be planned far in advance for changes or upgrades of costly 

equipment. 

One of the major problems we run into is that by the time the budgets get approved the technology is out of date and in many cases the manufacturer no longer 

supports the technology.

Solutions: 

Funding assistance from federal sources must be consistent in order to provide 

necessary training, continual operation of instituted programs, and replacement of 

manpower.

Grants Procured by the Paterson Fire Department: 

(Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program Awards)

2001 AFG grant for Personal Protective Equipment 

$244,933.00—SCBA’s,Turnout Gear

2002 AFG grant for Fire Operations and Firefighter Safety 

$117,331.00—Portable Radios, SCBA Voice Amplifiers

2003 AFG grant for Fire Operations and Firefighter Safety 

$136,751.00—Firehouse Air Filtration Systems & Decon Washer/Dryer

2004 AFG Fire Prevention and Safety Program for General Prevention Awareness 

and Multi-Hazard Prevention Programs 

$216,639.00—Fire Companies with Notebook Computers to interface with Fire Inspection Program, hire 2 inspectors

2005 AFG grant for Rescue Truck Purchase 

$280,000.00—Rescue Truck Purchase

2005 SAFER ′′Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response′′ grant to hire 

personnel. 

$6,374,080.00—Hire 64 Firefighters

The seven city firehouses average 40 years of age with antiquated mechanical and 

electrical systems; in most cases the wiring is inadequate for today’s power needs. 

Security systems are non existent. We have installed new fencing and installed new 

locks but if the terror alert is raised, we have no other security measures in place. 

In the past the Paterson Fire Department applied 3 times for a rescue truck before being successful. This, after showing that the City had not been able to procure 

a new truck since 1984. 

Consistent with Federal & State requirements, the Paterson Fire Department 

maintains and updates the Fire/Rescue, Hazmat, and EMS Emergency Annexes, 

which in part comprise the City of Paterson Emergency Operation Plan. In addition, 

the Paterson Fire Department will be presenting an addendum to the Evacuation 

plan, which is maintained and updated by the Paterson Police Department. 

Consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, and State of 

New Jersey Executive Order # 50, the Paterson Fire Department has taken the initiative and completed the required Incident Command and NIMS training mandated 

for Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006, and will continue to meet the training requirements 

for Fiscal Year 2007. 

The Paterson Fire Department has and will continue to partake in various emergency disaster drills designed to identify any areas of concern, which need to be addressed. 

In conclusion, while there is a new awareness regarding the threats which emergency responders face today, and while efforts are being made to prepare for such 

threats, the sad reality is that first responders still lack the training and equipment 

required to handle such large-scale incidents.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Chief. The Chair recognizes Chief 

Rotonda. 
16

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH ROTONDA, CHIEF OF POLICE, 

TOWNSHIP OF BELLEVILLE, STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Mr. ROTONDA. Good morning, Honorable Chairman, Honorable 

Charles Dent, and my Congressman, the Ranking Member of this 

committee, Hon. William Pascrell, Jr. Thank you, gentlemen, for 

inviting me and giving me the opportunity to appear before this 

committee and address the topic at hand. 

Let me start off by noting, that with the exception of our sister 

state New York and Virginia, no other state has suffered both the 

human tragedy and financial loss as New Jersey has, from the terrorist attacks of September 11th. 

In the hours, days and weeks after September 11, New Jersey’s 

law enforcement community assisted and provided security to protect important infrastructure. For example, within the first week, 

Belleville’s Mobile Command Unit was loaned out to the Secret 

Service as the Command Post, used to recover the remains of those 

who lost their lives on 9/11. During this initial period and up to 

the present day, to the best of our abilities we assess possible terrorist targets, to the extent we were and are currently able to do. 

However, with limited resources we have attempted to be as prepared as we could be for the type of attack that the Federal Government warned us about. 

However, such measures in the name of homeland security have 

not come cheap. They have consumed large amounts of tax dollars 

earmarked for other governmental programs and services. It goes 

without saying for the record, that has been no small task. In the 

near and distant future, the challenges will only grow, especially 

in a state like New Jersey, which has the dubious distinction of 

having the highest property taxes in the Nation. 

If I may, I would like to describe the Township of Belleville with 

respect to this issue, as most other New Jersey communities we 

just do not have the local resources to fund all necessary equipment, manpower and continuing training. 

The Township of Belleville, Essex County, is located directly 

north of the City of Newark, within ten miles of New York City. 

Our population is approximately 36,000 people. Our police department consists of 113 sworn police officers and 41 civilian employees. Currently, 74 percent of total valuation is placed on residential 

property owners. 

At close proximity to New York City, and bordering the City of 

Newark, both of whom remain likely terrorist targets, has placed 

an additional strain on communities such as Belleville. As the chief 

law enforcement executive, I have an obligation to protect the citizens of my Township, as well as ensuring the safety of officers 

under my command. I cannot do this without the assistance of the 

Federal Government in providing additional manpower, equipment 

and training. 

The Township has valuable infrastructure targets, major water 

lines, the transcontinental gas lines, telephone transfer stations, a 

direct highway that leads to lower Manhattan, a bridge, major 

medical centers, two mental health facilities, and a light rail that 

runs directly into Penn Station in Newark and then directly to 

New York City. In 2003, the New Jersey Office of Counter–Terrorism classified the Belleville Interconnection as one of the 104 
17

critical infrastructures in the state. This infrastructure is considered a target of interest to terrorists. Damage to one of the main 

aqueducts, while supplying drinking water to several municipalities in Northern New Jersey, including the cities of Newark and 

Jersey City, two largest cities in the State of New Jersey, and any 

level of disruption would have the potential of widespread destruction, fear and loss of life. 

Yet, currently, the security around this facility consists of an old 

damaged fence with very poor exterior lighting and no security 

monitoring systems. Financially, we cannot afford to purchase the 

necessary security systems to address these concerns. Additionally, 

we do not have the manpower to station personnel at this site, 

again increasing our security concerns. 

In early 2003, the Township of Belleville established an Emergency Response Team. We do not have a very large staff, so utilizing law enforcement officers in this capacity has its ramifications. For example, manpower shortages to normal police operations, and the need and requirement for specialized training and 

equipment. 

Also in 2003, the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office, in conjunction with the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, created the Essex County Rapid Deployment Team. 

Currently, several of my officers also serve on this team. Once 

again, we face manpower shortages, when our members are deployed, such as last summer during the London terrorist attacks, 

whereby our officers patrolled our light rail system from Belleville 

to Penn Station in Newark. We just do not have the funds allocated 

to cover overtime, compensation time, and equipment. 

In 2003, the Township of Belleville established a Community 

Emergency Response Team, comprised of local citizens who have 

received designated training to qualify as members. As CERT 

members, they are trained to assist our first responders in the 

event of a terrorist attack and/or natural disaster. However, since 

its inception, our local officials have not earmarked a budget to 

provide for the cost of training, equipment and necessary resources. 

To this point, we have maintained our CERT team through private 

organizational donations. Yet, without adequate funding, we cannot 

offer proper training, equipment and resources that are truly necessary. 

Early in 2003, one year after 9/11, we were fortunate enough to 

be able to purchase gas mask canisters to protect our staff from 

terrorist attacks involving biological, chemical and other agents. 

However, we are now starting to question whether or not we will 

have proper funding to purchase new canisters, gas masks, and/or 

equipment necessary to maintain properly-functioning, life-saving 

equipment. 

This equipment requires yearly fit testing, equipment checks and 

maintenance records. Yet, I do not have the resources available to 

purchase the necessary testing equipment for all the mandatory 

OSHA regulations. Even if I had the resources, without a stockpiling, how much time would it take us to retrieve them, to address 

an imminent or emerging crisis. 

Gentlemen, I do not have the answers to these questions, which 

leads me to my final thoughts, and in conclusion I would like to 
18

note for the record that Belleville has been fortunate to receive 

some funding through the State of New Jersey and the Federal 

Government. They have truly helped us in our efforts, but, gentlemen, as I have noted, it is clearly not enough for us to properly address being prepared and capable of handling some of the potential 

emergencies we could face. To make this work, first responders, 

emergency personnel, local officials and citizens understand the 

needs of their communities better than anyone. They, most of all, 

need to be an integral part of decisions regarding future funding 

decisions. 

Again, I would like to thank Hon. Chairman and his committee 

for giving me the opportunity. It has been an honor and a privilege 

to serve the community, State and Nation. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rotonda follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH ROTONDA

Good morning, Honorable Chairman, David G. Reichert, Honorable Charles Dent, 

Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, and my Congressman, the ranking member of this 

committee, the Honorable William Pascrell Jr. Thank you, Gentlemen, for inviting 

me and giving me the opportunity to appear before this committee and to address 

the topic at hand. (′′Preparing for, responding to, and preventing terrorist attacks, 

natural disasters, and other emergencies: Is Northern New Jersey Ready?′′) 

Let me start off by noting, that with the exceptions of our sister state New York 

and Virginia (Washington, D.C.,) no other state has suffered both the human tragedy and financial loss as New Jersey, has from the terrorist attacks of September 

11, 2001. 

In the hours, days, and weeks after September 11, New Jersey’s law enforcement 

community assisted and provided security to protect important infrastructure. For 

example, within the first week, Belleville’s Mobile Command Unit was loaned out 

to the Secret Service as the Command Post, used to recover the remains of those 

who lost their lives on 9/11. During this initial period and up to the present day, 

to the best of our abilities, we assessed vulnerabilities. To the extent we were and 

currently are able, however, with limited resources, we have attempted to be as prepared as we could be, for the type of attacks that the federal government warned 

us about. Clearly, our great state has been willing to bear more than its fair share, 

in our war on terrorism. 

However, such measures in the name of homeland security have not been cheap. 

They have consumed large amounts of tax dollars, earmarked for other governmental programs and services. It goes without saying, for the record, that it has 

been no small task, in terms of marshalling the staff, equipment, and other resources needed. In the near and distant future, the challenges will only grow, especially in a state like New Jersey, which already has the dubious distinction of having the highest property taxes in the nation, if local governments do not get the resources, i.e. funding, equipment and proper training. 

If I may, I would like to describe the Township of Belleville with respect to this 

issue, as most other New Jersey Communities, we just do not have the local resources to fund all the necessary equipment, manpower, and continued training. 

The Township of Belleville, Essex County, is located directly north of the City of 

Newark, on the western bank of the Passaic River, within ten miles of New York 

City. Our population is approximately 36,000 with a density of approximately 11, 

000 people per square mile. Our police department consists of 113 sworn police officers and 41 civilian employees. The community is part of the heart of New Jersey’s 

rust belt. Our township is considered an Urban Aid Community with an increasing 

tax burden; currently 74% of total valuation is placed on the residential property 

owners, due largely to the migration of businesses and manufacturing industries 

from the township. 

Our close proximity to New York City and bordering the City of Newark, both of 

who remain likely terrorist targets, has placed an additional strain on communities 

such as Belleville. As the Chief Law Enforcement executive, I have an obligation 

to protect the citizens of my township as well as insuring the safety of the officers 

under my command. I cannot due this without the assistance of the Federal Government in providing additional manpower, equipment and training. 
19

The township has valuable infrastructure targets, i.e. major water lines, the 

transcontinental gas lines, telephone transfer station, a direct highway that leads 

into lower Manhattan (Route #7 leads to the Holland Tunnel,) a bridge, major medical center (Clara Maass Medical Center,) two mental health facilities used for both 

educational purposes and rehabilitory needs for people with cerebral palsy, and a 

light rail line that runs directly into Penn Station, Newark, New Jersey, then to 

Grand Central Station, New York. NY. With respect to homeland security issues in 

2002, with the passage of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness 

and Response Act, the Environmental Protection Agency developed baseline threat 

information, to use in conjunction with vulnerability assessments pertaining to contamination threats, such as the release of biological, chemical, and radiological substances into our water supplies. In 2003, the New Jersey Office of Counter-Terrorism classified the Belleville Interconnection, as one of the 104 critical infrastructures in the state. This infrastructure is considered a target-of-interest to terrorists. 

Damage to one of the main aqueducts, which supplies drinking water to several municipalities in Northern New Jersey, including the Cities of Newark and Jersey City 

(the two largest cities in the State,) and any level of disruption, could have the potential of widespread destruction, fear and loss of life. Yet, currently, the security 

around this facility is an old damaged fence, with very poor interior/exterior lighting, and no security monitoring systems, i.e., C.C. T.V. 

Financially, we cannot afford to purchase the necessary security systems to address these concerns. Additionally, we do not have the manpower to station personnel at this site, again increasing our security concerns. As I stated earlier, my 

community’s leaders have allowed the police/fire/first responders to take measures 

to address our homeland security concerns from our perspective and needs. In early 

2003, we established an Emergency Response Team. You must, however, keep in 

mind we are not a major city such as Newark, Jersey City, Paterson or Trenton. 

We do not have a very large staff, so utilizing law enforcement officers in this capacity has its ramifications, i.e., manpower shortages to normal police operations, the 

need and requirements for specialized training and equipment such as automatic 

weapons. Prior to the creation of this team, our department did not have a single, 

automatic weapon or a law enforcement, officer capable and qualified to use such 

a weapon. Now, we all know the terrorists have them, so this is a positive thing, 

but again, it has become very costly. Also in 2003, the Essex County Prosecutor’s, 

Office in conjunction with New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, created the Essex County Rapid Deployment Team. Currently, several of my 

officers also serve on the RDT. Again, I emphasize, we did so to help do our part 

in accomplishing the goals and objectives of this multi-agency effort, to prepare and 

respond to a terror attack, natural, or manmade disaster. Once again, we face manpower shortages, when our members are deployed, such as last summer, during the 

London terrorist attacks, whereby our officers patrolled our light rail system, from 

Belleville to Penn Station, in Newark N.J. 

We just do not have the funds allocated to cover overtime, compensation time and 

equipment needs. Additionally, in October of 2003, in an attempt to encourage community/citizen involvement in our efforts to prepare for, respond to, and prevent terrorist attacks and natural disasters, we instituted the Community Emergency Response Team, comprised of local citizens, who have received designated training to 

qualify as members. As C.E.R.T. members, they are trained to assist our first responders in the event of a terrorist attack and/or a natural disaster; however, since 

its inception, our local officials have not earmarked a budget to provide for the costs 

of training, equipment, and necessary resources, To this point, we have maintained 

our C.E.R.T., through private organization donations, (citizens willing to donate 

their time and money to purchase some of the necessary equipment.) Again, this 

highlights the fact that we have attempted to take the proper steps to prepare not 

only our first responders but also our citizens. Yet, without adequate funding, we 

cannot offer proper training, equipment and resources that truly are necessary. 

Lastly, in early 2003, over one year after 9/11, we were fortunate enough to purchase Dragger Gas Masks/Canisters to protect our staff from a terrorist attacks involving biological, chemical, and other agents; however, we are now starting to question whether or not we will have proper funding to purchase new canisters, gas 

masks and/or equipment necessary to maintain properly functioning life saving 

equipment. Currently, I have to serve two masters as an employer: OSHA Worker 

Health Safety Rules/guidelines, which require yearly fit testing, equipment checks, 

and maintenance records. Yet, I do not have the resources available to purchase the 

necessary testing equipment for these mandatory OSHA Regulations. Thus, it is 

issues such as this, that leave one wondering in a hypothetical situation, what happens if we were to have a terrorist attack, which involved bio- hazardous materials 

and numerous members of our personnel responded and are then required to relin-
20

quish their equipment for HAZ-MAT decontamination. We currently do not have 

enough resources to replenish these vitally necessary life saving equipment. Even 

if we had the resources, without a stockpile, how much time would it take us to 

retrieve them, to address an eminent and/or emerging crisis situations? Gentlemen, 

I do not have the answers to these questions, which leads me to my final thoughts. 

This is clearly only part of addressing our homeland security target-hardening 

agenda but are we really addressing the problem? I wonder what the public would 

think, if they knew. Would they accept this? This in turn, leads me to my next observation. It appears to me, that the public perception is our federal government 

since, 2001, has become complacent, which has helped to increase the fears of both 

the public and America’s First Preventers. 

In conclusion, I would like to note, for the record, that Belleville has been fortunate to receive grants through the state of New Jersey and the federal government. 

They have truly helped in our efforts: but, Gentleman, as I have noted, it clearly 

is not enough for us to properly address being prepared and capable of handling 

some of the potential emergencies we could face. To make this work, first responders, emergency personnel, local officials, and citizens understand the needs of their 

communities better than anyone. They, most of all, need to be an integral part of 

decisions, regarding future funding decisions. 

Again, I would like to thank the honorable chairman, Reichert and his committee 

for giving me this opportunity. It has been an honor and a privilege to serve this 

community, state and nation.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Chief. The Chair recognizes Mr. 

Canas. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD CANAS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND PREPAREDNESS, STATE OF NEW 

JERSEY 

Mr. CANAS. Thank you very much, Chairman Reichert, Congressman Dent and Congressman Pascrell. I appreciate the opportunity 

to address your Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science 

and Technology. 

This morning, I want to outline the responsibilities of my new office and provide you with my own perspective on Northern New 

Jersey’s preparedness for the various risks we face. 

Before I begin, I want to set a context for your expectations. I 

have been at my job in New Jersey for a little less than three 

months, and there still are large areas of New Jersey’s culture, history, politics and law that I am still absorbing. If I cannot answer 

your questions today, I will get back to you with responses as soon 

as I can. 

Just about three months ago, here in New Jersey, Governor 

Corzine signed Executive Order 5, creating the New Jersey Office 

of Homeland Security and Preparedness as a Cabinet-level position. According to the Executive Order, our responsibility is ‘‘to administer, coordinate, lead, supervise New Jersey’s counter-terrorism and preparedness efforts.’’

We are charged with coordinating emergency response efforts 

across all levels of government, law enforcement, emergency management, non-profit organizations, other jurisdictions, and the private sector, to protect the people of New Jersey. 

The Executive Order also requires that we function as the Governor’s clearinghouse for all legislation, both state and Federal, related to counter-terrorism and preparedness issues. 

I come here today believing we will also build a strong relationship with you, our Representatives in Congress, just as we are developing a strong working relationship with the state legislature. 
21

My job is to bring all of New Jersey’s homeland security efforts 

into a coordinated and unified whole. While doing this, I am focusing on three watch words, inclusiveness, regionalization and transparency. Inclusiveness means that all relevant agencies, state, Federal, local and private sector, must have a seat at the table. 

Regionalization refers to concerns that overlap between municipalities and counties, even between New Jersey and our neighboring states. 

As you know, our Urban Area Security Initiative, or UASI, region already follows that regional approach. The funding allotted to 

Newark and Jersey City does not just pay for initiatives in those 

cities. Instead, it is shared among those counties and the six surrounding counties—those cities and the six surrounding counties. It 

is invested with the awareness that a regional boundary crossing 

approach is the best way to protect northeastern New Jersey. 

The Federal Government’s revised strategy for 2006 appears to 

validate the cooperative regional approach that New Jersey has 

been following. 

My third watch word is transparency. It means simply enough 

that the people of New Jersey and you, our Federal partners, must 

be able to understand what my office does. Our actions must be totally open, explainable to the average person, and understood by 

everyone, in short, making us the single-stop shopping and honest 

broker for homeland security in the state. 

We work closely with the Office of Emergency Management, 

which is still directed by Colonel Rick Fuentes and still falls under 

the New Jersey State Police. In that regard, the role of my office, 

in short, is to make sure the OEM office of New Jersey does its job 

properly and has the appropriate resources it needs. 

Since I took office, we have been involved in a number of key 

issues, including hurricane preparedness, pandemic, flu preparedness, interoperability, continuity of operations, and continuity of 

government, and, of course, our Federal Grants Program. The 

grant programs, in particular, are an issue I would like to discuss 

with this committee in greater detail. 

As you are well aware, my office is preparing to distribute Federal homeland security grants throughout New Jersey. Our Federal 

partners have given us good news and bad news this year. We are 

receiving a large share of a smaller pie. Funds for our UASI region, 

covering Jersey City, Newark and the counties of Bergen, Essex, 

Hudson, Morris, Passaic and Union, is up approximately 77 percent 

from the year before, to $34.4 million. Last Friday, I met with the 

UASI Steering Committee to discuss our spending plans. 

Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to discuss in more detail some of 

the programs within the northern region at this time, or offer it as 

an addendum for the sake of brevity. 

But, New Jersey’s preparedness needs are not limited to the 

UASI region. They cover our entire state, and this year we will 

only receive $17.7 million in homeland security grant funds to be 

distributed statewide. This is a decrease of more than 52 percent 

from the year before. 

I am aware that New Jersey’s homeland security needs will always exceed the availability of funds, but it is very disappointing 
22

that the entire pot of Federal funding to the state shrank by almost 

30 percent this year. 

I certainly do not believe we are less at risk today than before 

9/11. It has been our increased vigilance and preparedness that has 

made us safer against this national threat, not because the enemy 

has stopped planning against us. This is the wrong time to reduce 

homeland security funds. I plan to work with you to reverse this 

Federal trend. 

Now, this hearing has been called to discuss the extent to which 

Northern Jersey is prepared for a catastrophe. As a newcomer, I 

am still learning, but I’m also able to see objectively and with an 

outsider’s perspective. Since taking office, I have worked extensively with OEM and the State and the Federal enforcement and 

intelligence community. I must say that in all my years in government I have not seen the level of information sharing that we are 

experiencing today. This is a tremendous positive. 

However, there are some gaps in our response capabilities and 

the areas that still need improvement. Several of these areas have 

to do with the difficulty in evacuating large numbers of residents, 

identifying adequate emergency sheltering, and the exact location 

of special needs people, but we are working with the county OEMs 

to address these issues. 

It is my belief that New Jersey’s emergency responders in the 

northern part of the state have made unprecedented regional use 

of Federal funding, and as a result are well prepared to handle virtually any crisis. 

In closing, let me say that in creating the new Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, and asking me to head it, Governor Corzine has given me the opportunity to make a difference 

in the lives of New Jersey’s almost 9 million citizens. I relish the 

opportunity, and pledge to work with your Subcommittee towards 

ensuring that all our goals are met. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Canas follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD CANAS

Thank you very much Chairman Reichert, Congressman Dent and Congressman 

Pascrell and members of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science 

and Technology. 

This morning I want to outline the responsibilities of my new office and provide 

you with my own perspective on northern New Jersey’s preparedness for the various 

risks we face. 

Before I begin, I want to set a context for your expectations. I have been at my 

job in New Jersey for a little less than three months and there are still large areas 

of New Jersey culture, history, politics and law that I am still absorbing. So, I ask 

for your patience. 

If I cannot answer your questions today, I will get back to you with responses as 

soon as possible. 

As you know, Governor Corzine signed Executive Order #5 in March, creating the 

New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness as a cabinet-level agency.According to the Executive Order, our responsibility is ′′to administer, coordinate, 

lead and supervise New Jersey’s counter-terrorism and preparedness efforts.′′

We are charged with coordinating ′′emergency response efforts across all levels of 

government, law enforcement, emergency management, nonprofit organizations, 

other jurisdictions and the private sector, to protect the people of New Jersey.′′

The Executive Order also requires that we function as the Governor’s clearinghouse for all legislation—both state and federal—related to counter-terrorism and 

preparedness issues. 
23

I come here today believing we will also build a strong relationship with you, our 

representatives in Congress . just as we are developing a strong working relationship with the State Legislature. 

For example, Assemblywoman Joan M. Quigley, chairwoman of the Homeland Security and State Preparedness Committee—joined me on a tour of one of this region’s critical infrastructure sites—a chemical manufacturing facility in her district. 

And I have met Assemblyman Frederick Scalera, the committee’s vice chair . on 

several occasions, drawing on his role as a Legislator and as a Deputy Fire Chief 

who plays a key role in our Urban Area Security Initiative—or UASI—region. 

You should know that my door is always open. I invite you to contact me directly 

or through my office’s Legislative Liaison, Nick DiRocco. Nick will be spearheading 

our review of legislation, and helping us make the appropriate recommendations to 

the Governor. 

My job, then, is to bring all of New Jersey’s homeland security efforts, at all levels, into a coordinated and unified whole. 

While doing this I am focusing on three watchwords: Inclusiveness, Regionalization and Transparency. ′′Inclusiveness′′ means that all relevant agencies—state, federal, local and private 

sector, must have a seat at the table. ′′Regionalization′′ refers to concerns that overlap between municipalities and counties,even between New Jersey and our neighboring states. 

As you know, our UASI region already follows that regional approach. 

The funding allotted to Newark or Jersey City does not just pay for initiatives 

in those cities . instead it is shared among those cities and the six surrounding 

counties. It is invested with the awareness that a regional, boundary-crossing approach is the best way to protect Northeastern New Jersey. 

The Federal Government’s revised strategy for 2006 appears to validate the cooperative, regional approach that New Jersey had been following. 

My third watchword, ′′transparency′′ means—simply enough—that the people of 

New Jersey and you, our federal partners, must be able to understand what my office does. Our actions must be totally open, explainable to the average person and 

understood by everyone - in short, the single-stop shopping and honest broker for 

homeland security in the state. 

To serve these needs . our office has a Division of Operations and a Division of 

Preparedness. Our Deputy Director for Operations, Mr. John Paige, will join us during the first part of July. Mr. Paige is a veteran FBI Special Agent and 

counterterrorism expert from Northern New Jersey. I will shortly be naming the 

Deputy Director for the Preparedness Division. 

We work closely with the State Office of Emergency Management—which is still 

directed by Colonel Rick Fuentes, and still falls under the New Jersey State Police. 

In that regard, the role of my office—in short—is to make sure NJOEM does its 

job properly, and has the appropriate resources it needs. 

That coordination and leadership role is similar to what the Office’s response 

would be to any emergency—a flu pandemic, for example. 

In that case, the New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, under 

Commissioner Fred Jacobs, would lead the state’s response to the human health 

issues. 

And the New Jersey Department of Agriculture, under Secretary Charles 

Kuperus, would lead the response to animal health issues. 

My job is to make sure that all state agencies are working together correctly during such emergencies. 

Since I took office we have been involved in a number of key issues—including 

hurricane preparedness, pandemic flu preparedness—interoperability . COOP and 

COG, or Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government . and of course our 

federal grant programs. The grant programs, in particular, are an issue I would like 

to discuss with this committee in greater detail. 

As you are well aware, my office is preparing to distribute federal homeland security grants throughout New Jersey. 

Our federal partners have given us good news and bad news this year: We are 

receiving a large share of a smaller pie. 

Funds for our UASI region, covering Jersey City, Newark and the counties of Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Morris, Passaic and Union, is up approximately 77 percent 

from the year before, to $34.4 million dollars. Last Friday I met with the UASI 

steering committee to discuss our spending plans. 

But New Jersey’s preparedness needs are not limited to the UASI region—they 

cover our entire state. And this year we will only receive $17.7 million in homeland 

security grant funds to be distributed statewide. This is a decrease of more than 

52 percent from the year before. 
24

I am aware that New Jersey’s homeland security needs will always exceed the 

availability of funds . but it is very disappointing that the entire pot of federal funding to the states shrank by almost 30 percent this year. 

I certainly do not believe we are less at risk today than before 9-11. It has been 

our increased vigilance and preparedness that has made us safer against this national threat, not because the enemy has stopped planning against us. This is the 

wrong time to reduce homeland security funds. I plan to work with you to reverse 

this federal trend. 

Now—this hearing has been called to discuss the extent to which Northern New 

Jersey is prepared for a catastrophe. 

As a newcomer I am still learning—but I am also able to see objectively, and with 

an outside perspective. 

Since taking office I have worked extensively with NJOEM and the state and federal enforcement and intelligence community. I must say that in all my years in 

government, I have not seen the level of information sharing that we are experiencing today. There are some gaps in our response capabilities and areas that need 

improvement. 

Several of these areas have to do with the difficulty in evacuating large numbers 

of residents, identifying adequate emergency sheltering and the exact location of 

special needs people, but we are working with the county OEMs to address these 

issues. 

It is my belief that New Jersey’s emergency responders in the northern part of 

New Jersey have made unprecedented regional use of federal funding and as a result are well prepared to handle virtually any crisis. 

In closing, let me say that in creating the new Office of Homeland Security and 

Preparedness and asking me to head it, Governor Corzine has given me the opportunity to make a difference in the lives of New Jersey=s almost nine million citizens. 

I relish the opportunity and pledge to work with your subcommittee towards insuring that all our goals are met. Thank you.

Mr. REICHERT. 

Well, thank all the witnesses for their testimony. This is an impressive group. I have had the opportunity to work with sheriffs, 

and police chiefs, and emergency managers across the Nation when 

I was a Sheriff in King County in Seattle, and it’s great to see a 

couple sheriffs, and police chiefs, and fire chief here, and Emergency Management Director, all with us today. All of your testimony is—we were taking notes, and I always, as a police officer, 

a detective, and a sheriff, I always remember the Federal Government, you know, wanting to help. I mean, they came to us and 

said, we are from the Federal Government and we are here to help. 

I’ve only been in Congress 18 months, and now I find myself on 

the other side of that saying, we are from the Federal Government, 

and we are here to help, and Bill, and Charlie and I, my two partners up here today, are still—we do want to help, we are trying to 

figure out what the role is. We know the job happens in your communities, in your local communities, the cop on the beat, the firefighter, he or she, and their fire trucks are out there protecting our 

communities every day, and what I hear you say today are words 

that we’ve heard over and over again as we’ve held hearings. 

And, I just want to list off a few of those, and I’ve heard over 

my whole career as a law enforcement officer in the Seattle area, 

equipment, training, funding, and now personnel is the big deal. I 

mean, we all talk about the cops office getting cut, and now some 

of the emergency training for firefighters are laid on the table and 

we’re fighting to keep those fundings. The Federal Government is 

always reaching out and saying, we want your help, we need your 

help, we want you to be there, you are a part of the team, help us 

protect this country, protect our community, keep our citizens safe, 
25

but on the other hand we are taking money away from the local 

people in order to get that job done, and it’s wrong. 

The biggest thing I see out here too is the relationships, and the 

Sheriff mentioned that in this area of the country the turf wars 

don’t seem to be a problem, and that’s great to hear. We still battle 

with that back in the Seattle area. 

One of the things I want to focus on in my line of questioning 

to begin with is interoperability. When I held my first hearing as 

the Subcommittee Chairman a few months ago, I remember someone from the Federal Government who was testifying saying, ‘‘Mr. 

Chairman, we’ve been struggling with the issue of interoperability 

for ten years, trying to find a way, something to do,’’ and Bill was 

there. 

And, I said, ‘‘Interoperability has not been a problem for ten 

years, it’s been a problem since 1972 when I became a cop, I can 

remember trying to get my radio to work and wrestling with the 

man that had a knife that was trying to stab me and I couldn’t get 

help.’’ So, interoperability and the ability to communicate is something that first responders have been dealing with and struggling 

with for a long, long time, and it’s time we do something about it, 

and we are doing something about it. We have some legislation. 

But, I want to ask—but, I hope it will spur this movement to get 

somebody motivated in the Department of Homeland Security, and 

someone held accountable, to get the issue of operability and interoperability on its way to a resolution. 

But, I just have a couple of questions for anyone on the panel, 

since it applies to all of you. Has your county conducted or participated in a statewide baseline study of your state’s interoperable 

communications? Anybody who wants to—has there been a study 

of what exists today? 

Mr. SPEZIALE. Mr. Chairman, let me first let you know this will 

be one Sheriff that won’t be going to Congress, that’s for sure. I 

wish you well. 

Mr. REICHERT. Don’t ever say never. 

Mr. SPEZIALE. I don’t know why you did that. 

As far as our state goes with interoperability, it becomes a situation where at least in this county there is a two-prong situation. 

We have to worry about operability, as you heard from Chief 

Postorino, and we also have to worry about interoperability. The 

situation as we have right now, as far as operability goes, we have 

so many aspects of voice over IP, there’s so many different aspects 

that we could really investigate and deal with, satellite transmission, God forbid we lose power, or there’s certain aspects of 

radio systems that are out there, we don’t have that here. We have 

a situation where interoperability is not something that I can talk 

to the Paterson Fire Department, although we have a coordinated 

team effort here in Passaic County, where we all work together 

very closely. 

Mr. REICHERT. Right. 

Mr. SPEZIALE. We cannot communicate together. 

The best we can do is on our cell phones. We have satellite 

phones, should we have to talk, but that’s me, the Prosecutor, and 

possibly each of the Chiefs. 

Mr. REICHERT. Do you have 800 megahertz? 
26

Mr. SPEZIALE. We have 800 megahertz, but we do not have a 

truncated system. 

Mr. REICHERT. OK. 

Mr. SPEZIALE. And, here’s what I’m faced with. Last—two weeks 

ago, I was in a situation where in the middle of the night one of 

our repeaters went down. We were unable to have our patrol cars 

communicate with our dispatch center, our emergency 911 center, 

from outside the vehicle. They could communicate on a low-band 

radio, which we had as a back-up system, an old antiquated system, and I had to, in the middle of the night at 4:00 in the morning, get my partner from Essex County to send me a part for the 

repeater so that somebody could climb the tower and just get us 

up in a band-aid approach. That was just on an every-day situation. Imagine if we were in a disastrous situation what we would 

have been faced with if I couldn’t get Armando to get me the piece 

to get up in the tower and get us back communicating. 

Mr. REICHERT. We have the same problem in the east side of our 

county, King County, our deputies have to carry two cell phones, 

plus their radio, in case they run out of coverage. 

Mr. SPEZIALE. And, I don’t think that the world realizes that we 

all talk about having those cell phones on us, but I’m a former—

I’m retired from the New York City Police Department, I was there 

for the ‘93 bombing, I was there for the World Trade Center disaster, the cell phone towers went down, the telephone lines went 

down. We were unable to communicate period. We had no way. 

There was confusion. We had to talk face to face, that was the only 

way we were able to communicate. 

We have to come up with a system with today’s world, with like 

I said, voice over IP. All the things that we have available to us 

with satellite communications, we have to come up with a new system that all of us in this field, and in this arena, can communicate, 

because there’s going to come a time that it’s just a matter of 

when, and these aren’t going to cut it. 

Mr. REICHERT. Right. 

Sheriff, do you want to respond, and then we’ll go to Mr. 

PASCRELL. Mr. FONTOURA. We are probably making a little more progress 

in the interoperability area than Passaic has. We have, in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security, State Police and 

the Attorney General, we have been able to work—the interoperability person that is handling it for them happens to be working 

us, which is Lieutenant Maley, also happens to be the FCC Commissioner for the entire East Coast, which is a nice thing to have 

in your office, as you know. 

Mr. REICHERT. 

Mr. FONTOURA. But, we’ve done well, we are able now, we started the first part of that program, where the Jersey City Fire Department, Newark Fire Department, our Department, Newark Police Department, we are able to communicate with one another, 

and, hopefully, we are going to bring that sort of the beginning, if 

you will, we are going to bring that to the rest of the state and 

work it in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security 

more—additional funding, we need an awful lot of additional funding, but we are making some progress. That is a priority for us, pri-
27

ority for the state, it’s a priority for the rest of us, and we intend 

to continue and make some progress in the interoperable because 

it’s very crucial for all of us, obviously. 

Mr. REICHERT. I have other questions in this area, but I’ll reserve those now and recognize Mr. Pascrell for his questions. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The question of interoperability, as the Chairman pointed out, 

has been at the center of a lot of discussion in the Congress of the 

United States, and I’m glad that—I think it was you, Chief 

Postorino, that mentioned the importance and significance of getting the cooperation from the FCC. We had them before us in Committee. They have ignored this, forget about, you know, what happened before 9/11 is an indication of their being deaf to the entire 

situation. You know, this is serious business, spectrum, broad spectrum. 

These local—I mean, you heard the Chief talk about limousine 

service cutting in on your communication, I mean, this is ordinary 

communication. When you start to talk about interoperability between the agencies, we have a major problem throughout the 

United States of America, and we are imploring the FCC to come 

forward and help us in that regard. 

I know it’s important as to what four letter words are out on the 

TV and the radio, that’s critical, this is more critical. This defense 

is going to determine life and death. This is going to determine life 

and death. 

Mr. Canas, you just got your job, and I want you to tell the audience here, and the other Congressmen, just one sentence, give us 

a brief background of where you came from. 

Mr. CANAS. Thirty-four years of law enforcement at the Federal 

and local level, as well as intelligence, four years at the White 

House as Director of Counter–Terrorism and Counter–Narcotics, a 

year as Special Assistant to the CIA, and two years as Director of 

the National Drug Intelligence Center, that’s what got me here. 

Mr. PASCRELL. So, you bring a wealth of experience to this particular position, and we are very fortunate that the Governor made 

that decision to bring you to New Jersey. We are looking with excitement to the future. 

But, you said something very interesting in your testimony about 

the issue of transparency, and the question, you want homeland security in New Jersey to be a transparent operation for the public, 

so that the public understands what’s going on for most part. 

How important do you think that is? 

Mr. CANAS. I think it’s critical. I think that recently I toured the 

southern states in preparation for a hurricane, and I found glaring 

apathy among the public. I think it’s critical that in a congested 

area as the northern part of New Jersey is, with the multitude of 

languages that are out there, and cultures that are out there, that 

our policies and our procedures are clear to the public. 

I think that during an evacuation, for example, which is something that we’ll probably face during any calamity, communications 

with that public, and I’ve always equated public service with public 

trust, and that means if you have to get these citizens to trust you, 

and be clear as to what the procedures are. 
28

Mr. PASCRELL. Well, you know, we are living in a very peculiar 

time in Washington, and that is the subject of debate many times 

has been transparency. Members of the Congress don’t know what’s 

going on half the time, and the question is, what do we want the 

public to know and what does the public have a right to know. I 

think that the public has a right to know a lot more than we provide them, and a lot is being protected under the guise of secrecy 

and classified information, that’s a lot of bologna. We read about 

it in News Week magazine, after coming from, you know, a classified meeting many times. Is this what you are talking about? 

Mr. CANAS. That’s part of it, Congressman. You know, prior to 

joining the state team, I was in the private sector for a long time 

working on public information, the synthesis of public information, 

and you are absolutely correct, some people claim that 99 percent 

of the information that we need to know to do our job is out there 

in open source, and that means it’s available, readily available, to 

the public, it just needs to be credible, and it’s for us to stamp it 

with a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval that this is credible information that the public should know. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Chief Rotonda, what do you think is the proper 

role of the Federal Government in dealing in terms of responsibilities, overall responsibilities, with protecting the public, in your estimation? 

Mr. ROTONDA. I’d like to take it from a municipal point of view. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Put the microphone closer to you, please. 

Mr. ROTONDA. I’m sorry. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you. 

Mr. ROTONDA. The role—I feel the role of the Federal Government in protecting the public, I feel that the public feels let down 

right now with the first responders, or I just feel that they really 

don’t know everything that’s going on, and I feel we have to at 

some point let the public know. 

Funding that is available, are we capable of doing the job? I don’t 

think they really know, the public really knows exactly what the 

Federal Government is doing, and what we are even doing on a 

municipal level. I think they feel more secure than they really 

should be. 

Mr. PASCRELL. We’ll have a second round, I guess, right, Mr. 

Chairman? 

Mr. REICHERT. Yes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Second round of questions. 

We have, just in conclusion for this first round, when you look 

at the infrastructure of the State of New Jersey, when you look at 

the transit system in the northeast, and you look at the Turnpike, 

or the Amtrak, or Ports of Elizabeth and Newark, the critical utility infrastructure, 21 percent of the fuel consumed nationally comes 

through that area that we referred to before, the area down in Linden, that process. It processes over 40 percent of the jet fuel used 

in commercial airports. The fallout from a terrorist attack would be 

unbelievable. 

When you look at the petroleum industry in the State of New 

Jersey, you are talking about heavy duty, critical industries. When 

you are dealing with the chemical, as I said before, or the pharmaceutical industry, there’s 70,000 people working in the pharma-
29

ceutical industry in the State of New Jersey. There’s a major portion of our infrastructure, and I have one question to each and 

every one of you. 

I mentioned seven areas, just yes or no, are we prepared right 

today to protect those seven areas? 

Mr. Canas, yes or no? 

Mr. CANAS. Yes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Rotonda? 

Mr. ROTONDA. No. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Chief Rotonda? 

Mr. ROTONDA. No. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Chief? 

Mr. ROTONDA. No. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Chief Postorino? 

Mr. POSTORINO.. No. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Sheriff Fontoura? 

Mr. FONTOURA. Somewhat, but not exactly. If Roger Clemens 

could throw a grenade from the Pulaski Skyway and hit a major 

area that would create a lot of problems for all of us. 

Mr. PASCRELL. There’s a future Congressman. 

Mr. REICHERT. There’ a future Congressman, if I ever heard one. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Sheriff Speziale. 

Mr. SPEZIALE. I agree with Armando. We are not there yet. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Dent. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Chief Rotonda, you 

mentioned that New Jersey has the highest property taxes in the 

Nation, and, in fact, just the other day, we have many New Jersey 

residents, former New Jersey residents, who now live in Pennsylvania, and we’re the fastest growing region in the State, and my 

friend said to me from New Jersey that his property taxes in Pennsylvania were as high as they were in New Jersey. 

Looking at his mansion, I said, yes, but your house is now three 

times as large. I had to get that off my chest. 

First, Mr. Canas, how large is your office? In Pennsylvania, our 

Homeland Security office is quite small, just a handful of people. 

How many people do you have working in your office? 

Mr. CANAS. I think after this budget, if we get one through, it 

should be a little under 100. 

Mr. DENT. OK, that’s considerably larger than Pennsylvania, I 

mean, much, much larger. 

Who administers your counter-terrorism funding? Do you handle 

it, or does your State Office of Emergency Management process 

those homeland security grants and terrorism preparedness grants 

that come down? 

Mr. CANAS. The Federal grant program is administered by my office. I distribute it, I oversee it, and I coordinate with the counties 

their grant programs. 

Mr. DENT. OK. 

In my state, and in many states, I’m not as familiar with New 

Jersey, but last time I checked around 80 percent of the Federal 

terrorism preparedness grants that had been appropriated over the 

last three or four years had not been drawn down. Some of the 
30

monies may have been obligated or allocated, but they had not 

been drawn down by the states. 

What’s the status in New Jersey? 

Mr. CANAS. I don’t know, Congressman, I’ll have to get back to 

you with the exact numbers. I do know that the majority of it has 

been obligated, and for the most part has been drawn down. 

Mr. DENT. Nationally, about one third of those terrorism preparedness grants, that would be the UASI fund, the state homeland security grants, and law enforcement grants, those dollars, I’m 

told about a third of those grants that had been drawn down by 

the states have been spent on interoperability. Is that about where 

you are in New Jersey, are you using—where are you spending 

most of that money today? 

Mr. CANAS. Again, my guess, because I’m new to the process, 

probably Sheriff Fontoura could answer that, but in the UASI regions my understanding is that a major chunk of that money has 

gone to the interoperability problem. 

I don’t know if you have a comment on that. 

Mr. DENT. Nationally, it’s supposed to be about a third of the 

monies that have been spent. 

Mr. FONTOURA. That’s probably about accurate, somewhere between 25 and 40 percent. 

Mr. DENT. And, perhaps, one of the——

Mr. FONTOURA. I might also add that every penny that we have 

gotten from Essex County, through the graces of your committee 

and Congressman Pascrell, we spend our money. When we get it 

figured out, Chief Rotonda gets his share, and we make sure everybody gets their share, but there’s nothing in the bank, I can assure 

you. Whatever we get we spent, we spent it well, on behalf of the 

public of this county. 

Mr. DENT. And, with respect to interoperability, and one of the 

sheriffs or chiefs might be able to answer this, in Pennsylvania I 

have the northeast Pennsylvania Counter–Terrorism Task Force in 

my region, several counties, and we talk about these issues of 

interoperability. And, one thing that keeps coming up is that it’s 

hard for us to get as interoperable as we’d like for topographical 

reasons, geographic reasons, if some counties have lots of mountains and, of course, their systems won’t function as well as some 

of the folks down in the urban areas. Do you have those same types 

of issues here in Jersey? 

Mr. FONTOURA. Yes, we do, particularly, here. 

Mr. SPEZIALE. We have a—I was a chief in Bucks County after 

I retired from New York City, so I understand the complexity of 

Pennsylvania as well, but we have a situation here in New Jersey 

where we are on all different bands, from low band, to VHF, to 

UHF, to 800 megahertz, because of the terrain. That’s why I say 

we have to come up with a truncated system so that we can all talk 

and communicate together. That’s what really needs to be developed, and with the technology that’s out there, Congressman, I 

mean there’s just so much new technology out there, that we can 

communicate with someone on the moon, but I can’t talk to the fire 

chief down around the corner. 

Mr. DENT. One thing, too, and I should probably go back to Mr. 

Canas, it was pointed in your testimony that the UASI funding this 
31

year, this Newark, New Jersey Metropolitan Area received a significant increase in UASI. What do you attribute that increase to? 

AS you know, our friends across the Hudson River received a significant reduction in New York, what do you think, what was it 

about your proposals that led to this increase? 

Mr. CANAS. My guess, Congressman, and I say it’s a guess because we don’t have all the information from the peer review process, we are still waiting for that, but our early analysis indicates 

that the majority of the emphasis is because of the high risk area 

that Northern New Jersey reflects. We are locked at the hip with 

New York. 

Mr. DENT. Right. 

Mr. CANAS. We are a threat to New York City, and the high density of population, I’m sure that was factored in, the high number 

of chemical plants. So, I would say risk, number one, but I also 

need to point out that they have done an admirable job in the process. They reflect less than 1 percent in salaries and overtime in 

their grant submissions, that means their sustainability is very 

credible. Their ability to merge their grant submissions into ongoing state programs, which gets high marks also with DHS, is another reason that they did a total turnaround from last year’s numbers to this year’s. I think they’ve done a very credible job in the 

UASI region. I wish I could say the same for the rest of the state, 

but for the UASI, certainly in the northern part, I think a lot of 

the credit goes to the administration of the UASI grant program. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, I’ll yield back. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Dent. 

I just have a follow-up question on the concept of the Federal 

Government’s role. Most say, the vast majority of first responders 

agree that they don’t want the Federal Government to come in and 

take over a disaster response scene, but was it—it would just be 

interesting to hear, we know it has to be a partnership, Federal 

Government and, you know, we always hear this thing from the 

Federal, especially FBI or U.S. Attorneys, you know, they always 

come in and say, this has to be a Federal, state and local partnership, but I’m not sure they really understand it. 

And, I just am curious to know from the panel’s point of view, 

what’s the appropriate role of the Federal Government when it 

comes to training, and planning, and interoperability, is it setting 

standards? We know that funding has a lot to do with helping you, 

but what’s the role the Federal Government can really play to help 

you? 

Mr. FONTOURA. Well, I think that the Federal Government has 

a very critical role, and here, speaking just for our area, we have 

a Joint Terrorism Task Force that we work with our Department 

of Homeland Security, and it was a little shaky before Mr. Canas 

came on board from that perspective, but it’s been good with our 

local folks, you know. 

The FBI here in our state works well with us, the U.S. Attorneys 

Office, you mentioned turf wars back in your area, perhaps, you 

are still a little bit stuck in that. You know, we’ve come to the realization that we are all in the same army, fighting the same war, 

so the turf wars, if they existed once when I was with the New 
32

York City Police Department, yes, I experienced turf wars with the 

feds and everyone else. 

Mr. REICHERT. Yes. 

Mr. FONTOURA. They are no longer here in this area, I don’t believe we have turf wars. I think when we all come to the table, we 

all come to the table prepared to do the best that we fan on behalf 

of our citizens, and the Federal Government has a role to play. Obviously, the information that they develop, which is very critical for 

us to have, you know, they are always very reluctant to let go of 

it, I think now it’s important that they understand that we know 

when they know. So, I think by and large we are getting the information as quickly as we possibly can, so from that respect I think 

working together is very critical and very crucial. 

I believe here the Federal Government understands that, and 

we’ve been doing that, and I expect it’s going to continue to even 

a greater degree now with Mr. Canas and his philosophy. 

Mr. REICHERT. What about a national clearinghouse for this technology? There’s 800–900 vendors out there we know that have 

some sort of a solution, a piece of the solution to interoperability 

and operability, some standard that may be set by Congress across 

the country for interoperability, not to say that any one jurisdiction 

has to have a particular plan, because they all have to be different 

for every neighborhood and community, we recognize that, but a 

clearinghouse to help police agencies, fire agencies, emergency 

managers, weed through some of this technology that’s out there. 

Mr. SPEZIALE. Myself and Sheriff Fontoura were at the Homeland Security Summit that was handled by Senator Clinton. I don’t 

think there’s an emergency management manager here in this audience that does not have a plan. The problem is, we need someone 

to make Washington understand how serious this is country-wide, 

whether it be a communication tsar, whether it be one individual, 

or whether it be a collective team, we need interoperability, somebody needs to realize that we have to get the vendors and the players all together in one room to get this problem resolved. 

Mr. REICHERT. Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Sheriff Fontoura, you mentioned an evacuation plan, this is important, this is critical. You heard the gentleman from Pennsylvania mention it also, because, you know, in our area it would be 

go west, go west. 

Are we prepared, God forbid, if there’s a major attack, or if 

there’s a major natural catastrophe in New York, are we prepared 

to handle those folks that would come across and through the tunnels and bridges? 

Mr. FONTOURA. To a limited degree, yes, but I think that as I 

mentioned during my testimony, I think if it becomes a real serious 

problem where hundreds of thousands of people are coming across, 

no, we are not prepared. There’s not enough sheltering, there’s not 

enough, you know, we’ve marked our escape routes, as all of you 

know, and people always ask me, I see you have evacuation, but 

where is it going, where it is going? I said, well, part of that plan 

is, I tell people, I remind people that there will be an officer or a 

CERT, Community Emergency Response Team member, to tell you 

where you are going to go, because we really don’t know. We don’t 
33

know what type of emergency it’s going to be, it may be a school 

auditorium in Livingston, it may be in the Meadow Lands Arena, 

we don’t know, but there will be people—you just follow the signs 

and at some point you will see an officer if the plan goes according 

to the way we’ve drawn it up, you should see a police officer, firefighter, or a CERT member, to direct you which way you should be 

going. 

Do we have enough? No. On a limited basis. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Chairman, excuse me, we really didn’t focus 

on the problem of evacuation, until we saw what was being done 

and what was happening in New Orleans, and with Hurricane Rita 

in the Houston area, the Galveston area, a very serious problem of 

turning all roads one way so people could get out of there, nothing 

like we have down on our own shores when there’s a major storm 

approaching. 

The other thing you said, Sheriff Fontoura, was about the business community stepping up to the plate. We are going to have 

someone on the second panel that is going to tell the audience and 

members of the Congress what the business community in Jersey 

is doing in partnership with the state and Federal Governments 

and local governments, to provide security for the very infrastructure that exists in our state. And, I hope you’ll be able to stay for 

that. 

Sheriff Speziale, I’m very interested, as you well know, in intelligence gathering, and I’m very disappointed, not with our intelligence community, but in the fact that it has been warped by Federal policy. Is intelligence gathering, disseminating intelligence, a 

Federal responsibility, or should state and local governments play 

a larger role in that gathering of intelligence? 

Mr. SPEZIALE. Well, I think, Congressman, it goes back to that 

we all have—we all have one common goal, to protect our citizens, 

and as Armando said, it may come from the hood of a patrol car, 

it may come from the informant in the jail, it may come from the 

Federal intelligence agency that provides the information. I think 

that we all have to collectively work as a team to make sure that 

we share in intelligence. It can’t be a one-way street, it cannot just 

be one agency, we have to work collectively as a team to make sure 

that information is disseminated. 

I am fortunate, because I still consult for the Department of Justice in regards to wire tap investigations, so I have that top secret 

clearance. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Right. 

Mr. SPEZIALE. However, there are other chiefs throughout the 

communities that don’t get that top secret clearance, and there is 

a problem with that information sharing because as you know 

there are certain sensitivities in that information that can’t go to 

certain levels of secret and top secret, and there’s areas that can’t 

be shared, but we have to share this among everybody. 

Mr. PASCRELL. The basis of my question was, what is happening 

in London, not only since the subway bombing, but before that, 

there is a very different system that exists in the United States of 

America, in London those foot patrol are a very key part of the intelligence gathering. 
34

I don’t see that. I see more of a top-down situation in our country, and which I think is very dangerous, to be very honest with 

you. 

Mr. SPEZIALE. And, you are absolutely right, where we have to 

realize that the police officer on the street is the person that interacts more with the public, recognizes what’s going on and what are 

the changes in the neighborhood that that person is patrolling, and 

that is the person that will be able to provide that first tier of intelligence to come up the chain of command, instead of the tiers going 

down the chain of command. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Let me ask you——

Mr. FONTOURA. Can I? 

Mr. PASCRELL. Sure, go ahead. 

Mr. FONTOURA. The public has a very definite role, probably the 

most crucial role. If you think back to the Prudential, the intelligence that we’ve been able to get since the Prudential threat 

came along is that there were a couple of people that were casing 

the Prudential building for about three months. They were having 

coffee in a luncheonette right across the street, which by the way 

I go by almost twice a week. There are officers there, there are cops 

there, but no one, these fellows were making notes, writing things, 

taking pictures, taking photos of the building, the garage entrance, 

but yet no one thought enough, and their conscience wasn’t raised 

enough to say, let me let the police, there’s police officers there all 

the time, let me just tell this cop what I think is going on here. 

Either they thought, well, I don’t want to be a pain, or I don’t 

want to, you know, get involved with this. This is nonsense. You 

are going to see it before we see it, so if you see something out of 

the ordinary, if it doesn’t fit, give us a call. The worst that could 

happen is, it’s nothing, we’ll put your mind at ease. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Chief Rotonda? 

Mr. ROTONDA. I was saying, Congressman, it has gotten better 

since 2001 for the foot patrol officer. We do have resources now, we 

have places where we can report suspicious activity. That wasn’t 

the case before 2001. 

So, it’s not at its greatest level, but it is better. However, I do 

feel that it’s the Federal Government’s responsibility ultimately to 

disseminate information down to the police departments. 

As the Sheriff had said, we can’t all get top secret clearance. I 

attempted myself and they said it wasn’t necessary for me to have 

it. So, you know, again, back to your question, it is better now. 

Could it get much better? Yes, it can, but it is an improvement. 

Mr. REICHERT. Mr. Dent? 

Mr. DENT. Just a quick comment on the quality of information 

you are getting from Washington. We all talk about the information sharing, intelligence sharing, and I think we’ve done a better 

job of that horizontally at the Federal level. And, it’s clear that you 

are doing a very good job of it here in New Jersey among yourselves. 

But, I’m worried about this vertical level of information sharing. 

In Pennsylvania again, my State Homeland Security Office is often 

talking to me or complaining to me about the types of information 

coming down from Washington, from the ESOC, Elementary Security Operations Center, down to them, it’s often—it’s in large quan-
35

tity, it’s not well qualified, it’s not as credible as it needs to be, and 

consequently, it’s not a very useful interaction. 

And, I was just curious what your thoughts were, Mr. Canas, on 

that issue. 

Mr. CANAS. I couldn’t agree more. The information we get from 

Washington, specific to New Jersey, tends to be Pablum. We don’t 

get enough specifics, but, you know what, I don’t believe there are 

a lot of specifics at the Federal level. Having worked in that environment, I can tell you that the intelligence community does an 

outstanding job looking outward, but looking inward, because of 

legal implications and practical implications, there is no CIA that 

looks inside the United States. That’s these gentlemen here. They 

are the people that need, from the bottom up, to synthesize that 

information. 

I can also tell you that here in New Jersey we could not agree 

more that all information and all intelligence, like politics and 

emergencies are local, and it starts with the municipalities reporting in to a central location. I don’t think the Federal Government 

can help us with that. I think that’s something we need to do ourselves, and we are prepared to invest money, state money, to make 

that happen. 

Us feeding, at the local level, the information upward, the Federal Government then can synthesize that information, put it in 

context for us, and get it back to us, but it has to start from the 

bottom up, and I think that’s what we are doing here in New Jersey, and I think that’s what everyone should be doing. 

Mr. DENT. Well, I have no further questions, I just want to thank 

you, gentlemen. I find that these interactions are very helpful to 

me. I learned a great deal from the local and state officials about—

we are in Washington, and we are looking at this issues sometimes 

at 60,000 feet in the air, you are where the rubber meets the road, 

so your observations are really very helpful to me. 

So, thank you. 

Yield back. 

Mr. REICHERT. So, I thank the witnesses for your testimony, 

thank you for being with us here this morning. We know you have 

busy schedules and a job to do, but it is important that you share 

your incites with us and your testimony. The citizens here in your 

region are fortunate to have you as leaders in their community, 

and I think that after hearing what you had to say today they can 

feel much safer. 

Again, thank you all so much for everything that you do for your 

community, your neighborhoods, and our country. This panel is excused and we’ll call up the second panel. Thank you all very much. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. REICHERT. Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Yes, I would ask as many of you to stay for the 

second panel, which is going to be a humdinger, we have FEMA, 

we have the DHS here, so please, if you can, hang on. 

Thank you to the panelists, we really appreciate it. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, let’s give them a nice round of applause. 

Mr. REICHERT. We’ll begin the second round of hearing the second panel. Mr. Walter Gramm, the Executive Director, New Jersey 
36

Business Force, Business Executives for National Security, Mr. 

Steve Kempf, Regional Director, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, Mr. Timothy Beres, Director, Preparedness Programs Division, Office of Grants and Training, Department of Homeland Security. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Gramm to testify. 

STATEMENT OF WALTER GRAMM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NEW 

JERSEY BUSINESS FORCE, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR

NATIONAL SECURITY 

Mr. GRAMM. Well, good afternoon, Chairman Reichert, Ranking 

Member Pascrell, and Congressman DENT. It’s an honor to be here 

today to help address the question at hand, are we ready? 

I’m here on behalf of the Business Executives for National Security, or BENS, a D.C.-based national, non-partisan, non-profit organization, comprised of more than 500 business executives committed to volunteering their time and talents to improve the Nation’s security. BENS has a 24-year track record of applying business skills and best practices to achieve measurable improvements 

in government practice. 

I am the Executive Director here in New Jersey for the BENS 

Business Force initiative. The National Business Force initiative, 

I’m proud to say, had its genesis here in New Jersey and has been 

providing a template for the formation of regional public/private 

partnerships across the Nation. It was launched in 2003 with the 

recognition that government alone cannot adequately prepare for 

nor respond to catastrophic events. In short, it takes a village, a 

local village, as you pointed out, Mr. Pascrell, and business is a 

principal citizen of that village. 

When facing the threat of any catastrophic event, businesses 

have two kinds of responsibilities. The first is saving themselves. 

Self-preservation or business continuity and planning to make 

business operations resilient enough to survive any event. 

While business continuity is important to a company, its customers, employees, suppliers, and ultimately our economy, a second 

critical responsibility is helping our communities. In that spirit, as 

well as out of humanitarian concern, companies responded admirably during 9/11, Katrina and other catastrophic events. But, business/government collaboration in the midst of crisis has often been 

chaotic, with little or no advanced planning, training or exercising. 

And, that is the Business Force mission, to mobilize and organize 

the resources and expertise of the business community in advance. 

Business and government need such a partnership to better prepare for threats and an all-hazards approach prior to a terrorist attack, flu pandemic, or natural disaster. The White House’s Katrina: 

Lessons Learned report encouraged expansion of the BENS Business Force model, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

has provided partial funding. 

Specific Business Force projects that mobilize private sector support fall into four major categories. The first is organized collaboration. Businesses link to state and local government emergency operation centers and information fusion centers to improve communications before, during and after a crisis. 
37

Second is surge capacity and supply chain management. Businesses pledge their resources, like warehouse or office space, 

trucks, equipment, skilled personnel, on a pro bono basis through 

the Business Response Network. 

The third is mass vaccination and treatment. Business Force 

companies contribute volunteers and skilled management to assist 

state and local governments in the design, testing and execution of 

plans to dispense vaccines and medical supplies, in the event of a 

pandemic or biological attack. 

And, the fourth area is leadership and strategic support. Business Force partnerships offer best business practices and civic leadership from some of the Nation’s top executives to help government 

improve homeland security capabilities. 

And, crisis information in New Jersey, citizens—here in New Jersey the Business Force is taking an all-hazards approach, especially as it relates to communications and public awareness. For example, with the New Jersey Public Television and Radio, NJN, one 

of our key member organizations, we have been working to provide 

accurate, actionable, authoritative and available New Jersey-specific preparedness and crisis information to New Jersey citizens 

and business who live within media markets predominantly centered on New York City and Philadelphia. 

This gets to the transparency issue outlined by Director Ca/as. 

Our member organizations have been enhancing their own security, business continuity, and communications capabilities through 

the use of advancing technology. 

As a New Jersey citizen, I am proud of the role our state has 

played in helping other states in times of crisis. The recent deployment to the Gulf Coast Region in the wake of Katrina and Rita, 

coordinated and managed by the New Jersey State Police, confirmed that the public sector and individuals responsible for our 

protection and recovery from future catastrophic events are among 

the top professionals in the Nation. BENS is proud of the progress 

that we have made in building the public/private partnership here 

in the state, and look forward to expanding that partnership under 

Governor Corzine’s and Director Ca/as’ leadership. 

Some opportunities ahead that will help in continuing to forge efficient and effective partnerships are the opening of the new Regional Integrated Operations Center that Director Ca/as talked 

about, and it’s a chance to better integrate the private sector into 

preparedness and response efforts. Business and government leaders must learn to communicate effectively and make sound decisions during an event. 

Second is the continued New Jersey State endorsement and subsequent integration of the Business Response Network into OEM’s 

EPINET system. 

The third is the need for pandemic flu readiness planning, which 

has given us a new urgency to the partnering already underway 

between private companies and New Jersey’s State health officials. 

Business does not have all the answers, but it is clear, especially 

during times of crisis, that our Nation needs the vast resources, expertise and capabilities of the private sector. We cannot overstate 

the value of building trust and creating a sturdy bridge between 

business and government in advance. BENS will continue to work 
38

with our government partners to strengthen prevention, preparedness and response capabilities. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gramm follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WALTER GRAMM

Good afternoon. It is an honor to be here today to help address the question: ′′Is 

Northern New Jersey Ready?′′ I am here on behalf of Business Executives for National Security, or BENS, a national nonpartisan, nonprofit organization, comprised of more than 500 business executives committed to volunteering their time and talents to improve the nation’s 

security. BENS has a 24-year track record of applying business skills and best practices to achieve measurable, demonstrable improvements in government practices. 

I am the Executive Director here in New Jersey for the BENS Business Force initiative. The National Business Force initiative, I am proud to say, had its genesis 

here in New Jersey and has been providing a template for the formation of regional 

public/private partnerships across the nation. It was launched in 2003 with the recognition that government alone cannot adequately prepare for nor respond to catastrophic events like terror attacks or pandemic flu. In short, ′′it takes a village′′ and 

business is a principal citizen of that village. 

When facing the threat of any catastrophic event, businesses have two kinds of 

responsibilities. The first is saving themselves. Self-preservation, or business continuity planning, includes developing emergency response capabilities to protect employee health and safety, as well as taking steps to make business operations resilient enough to survive a catastrophic event. Business preparedness helps protect 

critical infrastructure, ensure availability of urgently needed goods and services, 

and strengthen economic stability. 

While business continuity is important to a company, its customers, employees, 

suppliers, and ultimately our economy, a second critical responsibility is helping 

their communities. Business understands that it needs to help maintain ′′continuity 

of community′′ in order to ensure its own business continuity. In that spirit, as well 

as out of humanitarian concern, companies responded admirably during 9/11, 

Katrina and other catastrophic events. But business-government collaboration in the 

midst of crisis has often been chaotic, with little or no advanced planning, training 

or exercising. 

That is the BENS Business Force mission to mobilize and organize the resources 

and expertise of the business community in advance, to improve security capability 

in states or regions, where it is most needed. Business and government need such 

a partnership to better prepare for threats in an all-hazards approach prior to a terrorist attack, flu pandemic or natural disaster. The White House’s Katrina: Lessons 

Learned report encouraged expansion of the BENS Business Force model, and the 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has provided partial funding. 

Specific Business Force projects that mobilize private sector support fall into 4 

major categories: 

1. Organized Collaboration: Businesses link to state and local government emergency operations centers and information ′′fusion centers′′ to improve communication 

before, during and after a crisis. This collaboration helps identify threats and minimize bureaucratic roadblocks to get the right resources to the right places faster; 

2. Surge Capacity/Supply Chain Management: Businesses pledge their resources 

(warehouse or office space, trucks, equipment, skilled personnel, etc.) on a pro bono 

basis through the Business Response Network (BRN) , a web-based registry that 

can be quickly tapped by emergency management officials; 

3. Mass Vaccination/Treatment: Business Force companies contribute volunteers 

and skilled management to assist state and local governments in the design, testing, 

and execution of plans to dispense vaccines and medical supplies in the event of a 

pandemic or biological attack; 

4. Leadership and Strategic Support: Business Force partnerships offer best business practices and civic leadership from some of the nation’s top executives to help 

government improve homeland security capabilities. 

Here in New Jersey the Business Force is taking a ′′High Point to Cape May′′ allhazards readiness approach, especially as it relates to communications and public 

awareness. For example, with NJN Public Television & Radio, one of our key member organizations, we have been working to provide accurate, actionable, authoritative, and available New Jersey-specific preparedness and crisis information for 

New Jersey citizens who live within media markets predominantly centered on New 

York City and Philadelphia. 
39

Our member organizations have been enhancing their own security, business continuity, and communications capabilities through the use of advancing technology. 

Leading edge screening, security, medical, and information sharing systems such as 

NJN’s DigitalSecure datacasting system, NC4’s National Incident Monitoring Center, and several other innovative programs are being rapidly deployed.As a New Jersey citizen, I am proud of the role our state has played in helping other states in 

times of crisis. The recent deployment to the Gulf Coast Region in the wake of 

Katrina and Rita (coordinated and managed by the New Jersey State Police) confirmed that the public sector individuals responsible for our protection and recovery 

from future catastrophic events are among the top professionals in the nation. 

BENS is proud of the progress that we have made in building the public-private 

partnership here in the State and look forward expanding that partnership under 

Governor Corzine’s and Director Richard Canas’ leadership. 

Some opportunities ahead that will help in continuing to forge efficient and effective partnerships: 

1. The opening of the new Regional Integrated Operations Center (RIOC) at the 

New Jersey State Police campus in West Trenton later this summer provides a 

chance to better integrate the private sector into preparedness and response efforts. 

Business and government leaders must learn to communicate effectively and make 

sound decisions during an event. To this end, business representatives should actively participate in the state emergency operation centers and information fusion 

centers. 

2. Continued New Jersey State endorsement and subsequent integration of the 

Business Response Network into OEM’s EPINET system will allow for the broad expansion of the asset base available for emergency response. 

3. The need for pandemic flu readiness planning has given a new urgency to the 

partnering already underway between private companies and New Jersey State 

health officials. We are looking forward to expanding the role of business and business volunteers in the design, testing, and execution of response plans, including the 

dispensing of medications. 

Business does not have all the answers, but it is clear, especially during times 

of crisis, that our nation needs the vast resources, expertise and capabilities of the 

private sector. We cannot overstate the value of building trust and creating a study 

bridge between business and government in advance. BENS will continue to work 

with our government partners to strengthen prevention, preparedness and response 

capabilities. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee and for your courtesies. 

I look forward to your questions.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Gramm. The Chair recognizes 

Mr. Kempf. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN KEMPF, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,

REGION II, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. KEMPF. Good afternoon, Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell, and, of course, the senescent Congressman Dent. 

My name is Stephen Kempf, Jr., and I am the Regional Director, 

Region II, Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency 

Management Agency. 

I’m also a New Jersey native, first responder, disabled fireman, 

former Fire Commissioner. I’ve been ten years in the radiological 

emergency preparedness community, and this is my second tour as 

Regional Director. So, I’ve been around a little while. 

On behalf of FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security, 

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 

today on FEMA’s efforts with regard to disaster readiness and 

planning in the State of New Jersey. 

We who live in New Jersey and within FEMA Region II have certainly witnessed their share of disasters over the years. These 

range from hurricanes to major snowstorms, nor’easters, and, of 
40

course, the World Trade Center disaster in 2001, as well as the 

emergency for the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. 

Emergency preparedness in New Jersey, as in all parts of the 

country, is the responsibility of State and local emergency managers. As we enter this hurricane season—already having had one 

tropical storm, Alberto—I cannot stress this enough, and we commend the efforts of the State and locals to prepare for future 

events. In addition, planning for a disaster is the responsibility of 

an even more basic unit, the family and the individual. Citizens 

must be prepared to be self-sufficient for up to 72 hours after a disaster. This gives local, State and Federal authorities the time to 

complete life-saving missions. 

I would like to point out that New Jersey does lead the Nation 

in the number of active Community Emergency Response Teams, 

or CERTs, allowing for greater citizen support in a major event. 

I know you are aware that FEMA derives its primary authority 

from the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. Simply put, this Act provides the authority for mitigating 

the effects of natural and manmade disasters through awarding 

grants to states, assisting in readiness planning with our Federal, 

State, local and federally-recognized tribal and private sector partners, in coordinating the Federal response, providing recovery assistance, and establishing the role of the Federal Coordinating Officer. 

Through FEMA’s mitigation grant programs, Pre–Disaster Mitigation, Flood Mitigation Assistance, and the post-disaster Hazard 

Mitigation Grant Program, FEMA provides funds and technical assistance to develop State and Local Mitigation Plans, which assess 

the communities’ risks and vulnerabilities and proposes mitigation 

solutions to reduce those risks. Mitigation planning should be included as part of a community’s overall planning effort. By having 

an LMP, communities have a better understanding of their risks 

and an awareness of the infrastructure and properties vulnerable 

to those risks, and can apply for mitigation funding when it is 

made available under the Mitigation Grant Programs mentioned 

before. Mitigation Grant Programs are funded on a 75 percent Federal, 25 percent State or local cost-share basis. 

The role of FEMA, the Department of Homeland Security, and 

other Federal, State, local, tribal, and private sector partners is 

further outlined in the National Response Plan, the Nation’s alldiscipline, all-hazard plan for establishing a single, comprehensive 

framework for the management of domestic incidents. 

The New Jersey Office of Emergency Management has also organized their operations consistent with the National Response Plan 

and NIMS, and will be in a position to respond to future events 

with full integration into the overall Federal response. 

FEMA’s Region II, which includes New York, New Jersey, Puerto 

Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands, continuously supports all hazard 

emergency response planning, and is acutely aware of the importance of catastrophic emergency response planning. As you well 

know, the recent history in this region, especially the tragic events 

of September 11th, have inspired in all the state, local and tribal 

governments an enhanced sense of importance on the issue of regional disaster planning. 
41

This regional approach was validated at the recent Catastrophic 

Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government, otherwise 

known as COOP/COG, Planning Conference held the first week of 

April, 2006. During this conference, representatives from FEMA’s 

Regions I and II worked with the states represented by these regions to develop common planning priorities. 

There are numerous examples of coordination between the states 

in Region II and FEMA including the following: FEMA has been 

working directly with New Jersey State and New York City planners on the significant issue of commodity distribution, evacuation, 

and sheltering after a major event. 

Together, FEMA and the State of New Jersey conducted a statewide hurricane awareness session on June 2, which was attended 

by over 150 local and state responders to discuss critical issues responding to a significant hurricane surge typical of the 1938 hurricane that impacted the Northeast. 

New Jersey officials recently participated in a two-day Department of Homeland Security and FEMA catastrophic hurricane exercise with all the Northeast States, because of the interrelationship of all, testing the NRP and the important relationships with 

the Principal Federal Official responsible for hurricanes this season 

throughout the Northeast. 

The State of New Jersey is completing construction of one of the 

Nation’s first fusion Emergency Operations Center, totaling almost 

78,000 square feet that will incorporate all State operations, as 

well as providing space that will allow Department of Homeland 

Security, FBI and FEMA officials to be fully integrated into any response. 

Sir, I have a rather lengthy testimony, but given the five minutes 

I will provide you with my written statement and certainly will address any questions that you might have. 

Thank you very much. Thank you for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kempf follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN KEMPF

Good morning Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell and members of the 

Committee. My name is Stephen Kempf and I am the Regional Director, Region II, 

of the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA). On behalf of FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), I 

would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on FEMA’s 

efforts with regards to disaster readiness and planning in the State of New Jersey. 

This discussion will include FEMA’s general authority to mitigate, prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters of all types, FEMA’s role and activities in emergency planning in New Jersey, and FEMA’s specific activities associated with preparing for the 2006 Hurricane Season. 

Those living in New Jersey and within FEMA Region II have certainly witnessed 

their share of disasters over the years. These range from Hurricane Floyd in 1999 

to major snowstorms and nor’easters and, of course, the World Trade Center disaster in 2001, as well as the emergency for the World Trade Center bombing in 

1993. 

Emergency preparedness in New Jersey, as in all parts of the country, is the responsibility of State and local emergency managers. As we enter this hurricane season - already having one tropical storm, Alberto - I can not stress this enough, and 

we commend the efforts of the State and locals to prepare for future events. In addition, planning for a disaster is the responsibility of an even more basic unit - the 

family and the individual. Citizens must be prepared to be self-sufficient for up to 

72 hours after a disaster. This gives local, State and Federal authorities the time 

to complete life saving missions. I would like to point out that New Jersey does lead 
42

the nation in the number of active Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), 

allowing for greater citizen support in a major event.

FEMA’s Role and Statutory Authority to Support State and Local

Governments 

FEMA derives its primary authority from the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 

and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq. Simply put, this act provides 

the authority for mitigating the effects of natural and manmade disasters, through 

awarding grants to States; assisting in preparedness and readiness planning with 

our Federal, State, local, Federally-recognized tribal and private sector partners; coordinating the Federal response; providing recovery assistance; and establishing the 

role of the Federal Coordinating Officer. 

Through FEMA’s mitigation grant programs—Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM), 

Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) and the post-disaster Hazard Mitigation Grant 

Program (HMGP)—FEMA provides funds and technical assistance to develop State 

and Local Mitigation Plans (LMP), which assess the communities’ risks and 

vulnerabilities and propose mitigation solutions to reduce those risks. Mitigation 

planning should be included as part of a community’s overall planning effort. By 

having an LMP, communities have a better understanding of their risks and an 

awareness of the infrastructure and properties vulnerable to those risks and can 

apply for mitigation funding when it is made available under the mitigation grant 

programs mentioned. Mitigation grant programs are funded on a 75 percent Federal 

and 25 percent State or local cost-share basis. 

The role of FEMA, the Department of Homeland Security, and other Federal, 

State, local, tribal and private sector partners is further outlined in the National 

Response Plan (NRP), the nation’s all-discipline, all-hazard plan for establishing a 

single, comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents. 

FEMA and DHS’ new Preparedness Directorate coordinate initiatives that include 

planning and technical assistance for State, local and tribal governments, and provide support to National Incident Management System (NIMS) implementation and 

the National Emergency Management Baseline Capability Assessment Program. 

Further, FEMA operates the Emergency Management Institute (EMI), a national 

training center for emergency planning, exercise design, and incident command operations for Federal, State, local, tribal and private sector individuals. The New Jersey Office of Emergency Management has also organized their operations consistent 

with the National Response Plan and NIMS and will be in a position to respond 

to future events with full integration into the overall federal response.

FEMA Region II Support and Coordination Activities 

FEMA’s Region II, which includes New York, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, and the 

U.S. Virgin Islands, continually supports all-hazards emergency response planning, 

and is acutely aware of the importance of catastrophic emergency response planning. As you well know, the recent history in this region, especially the tragic events 

of September 11th, have inspired in all of the State, local and tribal governments 

an enhanced sense of importance on the issue of regional disaster planning. This 

has made my job, and the job of my staff, much easier, as we have found receptive 

and eager partners in our planning efforts. 

This regional approach was validated at the recent Catastrophic Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government (COOP/COG) Planning Conference held during 

the first week of April 2006. During this conference, representatives from FEMA’s 

Regions I and II worked with the States represented by these Regions to develop 

common planning priorities. 

There are numerous examples of coordination between the States in Region II and 

FEMA including the following:

FEMA has been working directly with New Jersey State and New York City planners on the significant issue of commodity distribution, evacuation, and sheltering 

after a major event; 

Together, FEMA and the State of New Jersey conducted a State-wide hurricane 

awareness session on June 2, which was attended by over 150 local and State responders to discuss critical issues responding to a significant hurricane surge typical 

of the 1938 hurricane that impacted the Northeast. Future sessions are planned for 

Long Island and Westchester County, New York; 

New Jersey officials recently participated in a two day DHS and FEMA catastrophic hurricane exercise with all the Northeast States testing the NRP and the 

important relationships with the Principal Federal Official (PFO) responsible for 

hurricanes this season throughout the Northeast; and, 

The State of New Jersey is completing construction of one of the nation’s first fusion Emergency Operations Center, totaling almost 78,000 square feet that will in-
43

corporate all State operations, as well as providing space that will allow DHS, FBI 

and FEMA officials to be fully integrated in any response.

Protocols and Coordination in a Disaster: Chain of Command 

As I have described earlier in this testimony, under the Stafford Act, FEMA is 

authorized to supplement the efforts and available resources of State and local governments and disaster relief organizations for an emergency or major disaster declared by the President. We lean forward and move Federal teams, commodities, 

and equipment to Federal facilities. However, we cannot actually provide assistance 

under the law, unless the Governor asks, certifying that the event is beyond the 

State’s capability and the President declares an Emergency or Major Disaster. Nevertheless, commodities and equipment that may be necessary and made available 

are pre-positioned in a number of logistics centers and mobile support locations, 

strategically placed across the nation. 

The Stafford Act acknowledges the constitutional authority of the Governor to respond to incidents affecting New Jersey through the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management (NJOEM), which incorporates the States’ mutual aid system and 

principles of the ICS and provides the structure through which State and local government agencies respond. NJOEM coordinates the overall management of an emergency to include requests for support and resources from other State agencies, other 

States under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), and supplemental assistance from the Federal government. In addition, DHS has recognized 

New Jersey as one of the first States to involve the private sector in their operational planning. 

In advance of a hurricane, Region II follows existing protocols to activate the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) including Emergency Support Function (ESF) personnel as appropriate, and to deploy the State Liaison Officer (SLO) 

and Emergency Response Team Advanced (ERT-A) personnel to begin pre-landfall 

coordination with State emergency management officials to address life saving and 

life sustaining response requirements. The ERT-A will work with their State counterparts to assess State resource needs, and commodities may be pre-staged at the 

Federal staging area in anticipation of need. The RRCC works with the affected 

State to identify critical facilities such as potable water, power and sewage; and 

needs for assistance or commodities including evacuation, housing, and food. This 

process is facilitated by the ESF leads, for example, the Department of Transportation provides transportation and evacuation support, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provides assistance with debris and other public works and the Department 

of Health and Human Services provides health and medical support. 

Several additional FEMA teams may be activated, including the Agency’s National Response Coordination Center Team, the Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT), and 

the five Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments. The FEMA/National Weather Service (NWS) HLT, established in 1996, coordinates communications between the NWS’s National Hurricane Center, FEMA, and the emergency 

management community primarily at the State level. The HLT is activated a few 

days in advance of any potential U.S. hurricane landfall. The HLT provides an excellent way to communicate with the large number of emergency managers typically 

impacted by a potential hurricane. This is a critical effort to ensure emergency managers and first responders know what to expect from the hurricane. 

FEMA headquarters may deploy an Emergency Response Team National (ERTN) to supplement Regional staff, and may alert National Disaster Medical System 

(NDMS) and Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams to prepare for deployment. 

Once an event has occurred, the Rapid Needs Assessment (RNA) team may deploy 

to determine critical needs or issues in the State. When a facility is available and 

prepared for staff, a Joint Field Office (JFO) would be opened to support the disaster response and recovery efforts. FEMA’s Stafford Act recovery programs would 

be carried out throughout this process. 

As part of this planning effort and consistent with the States plans and priorities, 

FEMA will continue to work with other Federal agencies, the State and other stakeholders to:

Improve Federal support to the emergency management response capability of 

local, State and Federal agencies to rapidly respond to emergencies, major disasters, 

and Incidents of National Significance. 

Ensure unified command and unity of effort through rigorous adherence to the 

principles of NIMS. In preparation for this upcoming hurricane season, but with the 

additional benefit of being ready for any disaster, Secretary Chertoff has pre-designated a PFO and a Federal Coordinating Official (FCO) for Regions I and II. The 

PFO for this area will be Rear Admiral David P. Pekoske, First District Commander, U.S. Coast Guard; the Deputy PFO will be Joseph Picciano, FEMA Region 
44

II Deputy Director; and the FCO will be Phil Parr, a seasoned FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer. Meetings have been held with key New Jersey State, local and 

emergency management officials, which have included either the designated PFO or 

DPFO, where discussions that have incorporated explanations of the PFO role. 

Streamline national level emergency contracting procedures and plan to ensure an 

adequate inventory of response and recovery assets are strategically pre-positioned 

throughout the country.

2006 Hurricane Season Improvements 

The historic 2005 hurricane season challenged FEMA as never before. The agency 

supported the largest evacuation in U.S. history, coordinated the delivery of approximately four times the amount of water and two times the amount of ice delivered 

for all four Florida hurricanes combined in 2004, coordinated the rescue of 36,000 

individuals with U.S. Coast Guard and FEMA Urban Search & Rescue teams and 

provided temporary housing assistance to an unprecedented 825,000 families displaced from their homes. While catastrophic Hurricane Katrina resulted in a record 

response from all levels of government, the lessons learned from FEMA’s response 

will prove invaluable for the improvement of future major disaster responses. 

FEMA approaches the 2006 hurricane season with a renewed sense of commitment and urgency to improve our service to the Nation by building on a solid foundation of experienced professionals and the lessons learned from last year’s unprecedented disaster response activities. Techniques and technologies that were employed 

in the response to Hurricanes Rita and Wilma in the 2005 season to improve response coordination have been institutionalized. And, as a result of intensive collaborative analysis of response and recovery programs post-Katrina, FEMA is implementing multiple new measures designed to strengthen essential functions so the 

agency can more effectively respond to all disasters. These improvements are designed to supplement the experience and skills of FEMA employees with 21st century tools and technology—maximizing the agency’s performance regardless of disaster size, cause or complexity. 

Following are some examples of some of the national initiatives for improvement 

that will be in place for the 2006 hurricane season. 

Improving Federal coordination in the immediate response, by increasing the level 

of coordination with the Department of Defense. A Defense Coordinating Officer 

(DCO) and support staff are anticipated to be stationed at FEMA Region II to 

smooth and expedite the provision of Department of Defense support. The identified 

DCO has met with Regional staff and briefed the States at the recent Catastrophic 

COOP/COG Planning Conference. In addition, the Region maintains close coordination with the Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) staff. FEMA 

headquarters has been working with DOD to shorten the time from request to delivery of assets by pre-identifying military capabilities and developing the scope of 

work and cost information for support in communications, ground transportation, 

air transportation, medical support and search and rescue. 

Improving situational awareness and communications interoperability, through 

development of the DHS Secretary’s Situational Awareness Teams, and augmentation of survivable and interoperable communications capabilities. Region II has actively coordinated with other States to include New Jersey on issues of communications interoperability. Emphasis has been placed on types of equipment, frequency 

management and cross-coordination of support capability in any operational situation. 

As an element of FEMA’s increased ESF-1 and ESF-13 capability, TSA is in the 

final stages of publishing a Natural Disaster Plan that forms teams of TSA personnel from across the country to respond to natural disasters with 24 hours notice. 

These teams consist of scaleable numbers field personnel as well as command and 

control elements to support the on scene commander. The teams also include a Federal Air Marshal element that is also scaleable to assist local and federal law enforcement personnel in accomplishing their tasks. These teams will provide continuation of transportation commerce where and when needed, including the replacement of transportation security specific personnel who may be personally affected 

by a natural disaster, once again to permit the continuation of commerce or evacuation, as required. 

Hiring, training and developing the two FEMA Incident Response Support Teams 

(FIRSTs) to support the Federal response to Incidents of National Significance. 

These are small, rapidly deployable teams that can provide support directly to State, 

local and tribal governments on scene, providing technical advice, situational awareness, communications and assistance in requesting and employing lifesaving Federal 

assets. They are intended to deploy within two hours of notification, to be on-scene 

within 12 hours, and are a forward component of the ERT-A. 
45

Improving logistics and commodity preparations by replenishing and restocking 

essential disaster commodities at logistics and staging areas and working in advance with vendors. FEMA headquarters will have enhanced logistics support from 

the Defense Logistics Agency to ensure available stockpiles of emergency meals, 

water, tarps, plastic sheeting, medical equipment and essential pharmaceuticals. 

FEMA is actively improving the visibility of disaster assets and commodities from 

requisition to arrival at disaster locations, thus enhancing logistics management. 

FEMA headquarters is improving delivery of disaster commodities within States 

and implementing a commodity tracking initiative, the Total Asset Visibility Project: 

Phase I, which will provide FEMA with an improved ability to manage its inventory 

of certain commodities and to track the location of trailers carrying commodities. 

Phase I will address commodities leaving the logistics warehouses in Atlanta, GA 

and Fort Worth, TX, regardless of where the disaster occurs. 

As part of the national evacuation planning initiative, we recognize that given the 

small size of Region II, an evacuation in catastrophic disaster conditions would require close coordination among all States, both for transportation routing and sheltering of evacuees. The experience gained by FEMA Region II and the State of New 

Jersey in housing and caring for Katrina evacuees has provided valuable insight. 

In addition to assisting with local sheltering needs, FEMA Region II deployed a 

large number of staff to the Gulf States in support of Hurricane Katrina and 

learned many valuable lessons through that experience. We would also like to commend New Jersey for the significant effort it has made over the past year to expand 

hurricane evacuation planning activities. 

Strengthening our emergency medical response. Disaster Medical Assistance 

Teams (DMATs) have served with distinction in responses to many incidents, including natural disasters throughout the U.S.; the World Trade Center attacks in 

New York on 9/11/2001; the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Utah; and a wide range 

of National Special Security Events. 

Strengthening our search and rescue response. FEMA headquarters continues to 

work with numerous Federal agencies including FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue 

elements, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of the Interior (Park Service) 

to agree on roles, responsibilities, and available resources for structural collapse rescue, water rescue, and wilderness rescue. Although New Jersey’s Urban Search and 

Rescue team is not presently part of the FEMA national system, they are recognized 

by states in the northeast region and elsewhere in the nation and have served admirably including supporting NYC during 9/11. 

Developing the 2006 Concept of Operations for Hurricane season: FEMA headquarters has been working with the primary and supporting ESF agencies in identifying the tasks that should be done starting 96 or more hours out, then 72 hours, 

48 hours, etc. to ensure we have all Federal supporting and operational functions 

synchronized in the response. FEMA plans to activate more assets (teams and commodities) sooner and place them closer to anticipated landfall, while keeping them 

safe, though we recognize that with the variables of hurricanes this can be problematic. 

Improving customer service and expediting help to disaster victims by improving 

shelter population management and doubling registration capacity to 200,000 persons per day. We will also deploy mobile registration intake centers (MRICs), recognizing that many disaster victims may be stranded or in congregate shelters with 

no communications and unable to register for assistance. We are also enacting 

measures to cut down on the incidences of waste, fraud and abuse, taking such 

steps as improving our identity verification process during registration, suspending 

the use of debit cards, providing more information on the intended purpose of disaster assistance, and developing safeguards on the use of new technologies to both 

improve our stewardship responsibilities of Federal taxpayer dollars while simultaneously reducing the delays associated with disaster victim identity verification. 

Expanding our home inspections capacity and improving the speed and suitability 

of temporary housing, and enhancing the debris removal process. 

FEMA plans to increase our disaster workforce and is expanding training of employees for disaster readiness.

Looking Ahead 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, while the Department, Region II, 

and the State of New Jersey are making great strides to strengthen essential functions to improve our 2006 readiness, I would be remiss if I did not mention some 

of the major areas that will require long term commitment in conjunction with the 

State. These areas include: 

evacuation planning as identified through the Nationwide Plan Review Report 

dated June 16, 2006, prepared by DHS and the Department of Transportation (this 

planning also encompasses the impacts on surrounding States) 
46

further communications enhancement; 

addressing the emergency needs and requirements for the elderly, the disabled, 

and other special needs populations; 

disaster commodity inventory tracking systems and distribution centers to result 

in more effective delivery or relief supplies to disaster victims; and 

refining the coordination of all levels of government. 

Finally, as Federal, State, local and tribal governments become better prepared 

in anticipation of this hurricane season, it is vitally important that individuals and 

families also be prepared. New Jersey has not been directly hit by a significant hurricane event in many years, potentially resulting in a lack of individual preparedness. I recognize that States generally hold public awareness campaigns at the start 

of hurricane season, and encourage that they continue that practice and encourage 

strong public awareness campaigns. As I mentioned before, New Jersey does lead 

the nation in Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) allowing for greater 

citizen support in a major event. FEMA Region II public affairs staff will coordinate 

with and support the States to ensure a unified message. 

Of course, preparation for improved emergency management must be a consistent 

process. FEMA will continue to make other significant enhancements beyond this 

hurricane season to help further strengthen the Nation’s preparedness and ability 

to respond and recover from disasters, whatever their cause. We look forward to 

continuing our partnerships with the State of New Jersey, tribal and local governments, as well as the private sector, community organizations and individuals in 

identifying their roles and responsibilities. Together, we will strengthen our ability 

to prepare for, protect against, respond to, and recover from catastrophic events. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you 

may have.

Mr. REICHERT. The Chair recognizes Mr. Beres. 

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY BERES, DIRECTOR, PREPAREDNESS 

PROGRAMS DIVISION, OFFICE OF GRANTS AND TRAINING, 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BERES. Thank you, Chairman Reichert, Congressman 

Pascrell, and Congressman DENT. Thank you for this opportunity 

to discuss homeland security and the support the Department of 

Homeland Security has provided to New Jersey. 

My name is Tim Beres, and I’m the Director of Preparedness 

Programs in the Department’s Office of Grants and Training. Since 

1998, I have worked to develop national homeland security programs to prepare our Nation’s public safety community to deal effectively with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. 

During my tenure, I’ve had the opportunity to establish the first 

National Training Center for Civilian Terrorism Preparedness, and 

I’ve established an advanced educational program which has educated current and future leaders in the field of homeland security. 

In addition, I’ve led the development and evolution of the Homeland Security Grant Programs, including the Urban Area Security 

Initiative to allocate finite Federal Resources that support strategic 

direction of the Department and the national preparedness goal. 

The Department’s mission is to make our entire Nation safer and 

more secure, by managing risk in a way that lessens the vulnerability of the entire country. As Secretary Chertoff has pointed out, 

we will never have the resources to protect every single person, and 

every single place, at every single moment in America. Our responsibility at DHS is to determine how to most effectively use limited 

Federal resources to maximize security throughout the country. 

In allocating 2006 Homeland Security Grant funds, we used an 

approach that expands our understanding of what constitutes risk, 
47

while taking into account congressional guidance encouraging our 

Nation to move away from reaction to strategic preparation. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the combined region of New Jersey—of Jersey City and Newark, was one of the highest ranked 

areas for relative risk in the fiscal year 06 analysis. More than 

2,000 assets were considered in the analysis for this urban area, 

and the combination of the two cities in the program had a significant impact in its overall ranking of relative risk. 

Since 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security has provided 

more than $320 million to the State of New Jersey. While the State 

of New Jersey saw an 8 percent decrease in funding from last year, 

as you know, Mr. Chairman, funds appropriated for the Homeland 

Security Grant Program were cut by more than 25 percent. The 

State of New Jersey’s total award of nearly $52 million represents 

approximately a 30 percent greater slice of the national pie. 

The Jersey City/Newark area has received on average approximately 3 percent of all funding through the Urban Area Security 

Initiative since the program’s inception, and has received more 

than $97 million overall since 2003. This year’s Urban Area Security Initiative allocation of $34.3 million was nearly 5 percent of 

the total funds available, an almost 80 percent increase from last 

year. 

As we look at how to strategically invest Federal dollars, we are 

seeking investments that promise to increase the overall capability 

of a region through funding such things as technology and specialized training. 

The State of New Jersey and its partners have worked hard in 

this regard. As a result, the Homeland Security Grant Program 

funding from prior years has had a significant impact on the successful implementation of several important Homeland Security 

initiatives across New Jersey. These include a regionalized explosive detection response capability, creation of a large-scale emergency medical response capability, and working towards implementing a state-wide interoperable communication system. 

Mr. Chairman, it is these kinds of large-scale, long-term capability-based improvements that the Homeland Security Grants Program were designed to support. The process used to allocate fiscal 

year 06 Homeland Security Grants reflects this emphasis, as well 

as our improved understanding of nationwide risk and ability to 

evaluate risk, mitigation strategies against the National Preparedness priorities. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the Department believes that the 

2006 Homeland Security Grants Program resulted in a dynamic 

and objective funding process that will sustain improvements in 

our homeland security over the long term. However, we will continue to solicit feedback on improving our grant processes from this 

Subcommittee, from other members of Congress, and especially 

from those on the front lines who work every day to protect all of 

us. 

With billions of dollars at stake every year, we take this issue 

very seriously, and believe that healthy debate will only make our 

process better, more transparent, and result in the improvements 

needed to secure our Nation from terrorism and other threats. 
48

I can assure you that myself, and my staff, and everyone that 

works with us, all think of ourselves as citizens and not necessarily 

Federal bureaucrats, and realize that it’s the first responders that 

are on the front line, our law enforcement, public works, public 

health, firefighters, everyone, that we are looking forward to, to 

protect our families in times of crisis, and we are doing our best 

to make sure that we are providing them with the resources that 

we have to make ourselves and all their families safer, too. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to be here today 

and address you. Thanks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Beres follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY BERES

Chairman Reichert, Congressman Pascrell and Members of the Committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Homeland Security 

Grant Program, and specifically, the support that the Department has provided to 

the State of New Jersey. 

Let me start by stating that while the focus of today’s hearing, ′′Is Northern New 

Jersey Ready to Respond to a Disaster′′, is an all-hazards discussion, the focus of 

my statement is on financial, training, and exercise support to prepare New Jersey 

to prevent, detect, respond and recover from acts of terrorism. This information will 

supplement the hurricane preparedness testimony delivered from my colleagues at 

FEMA to provide an overall view of the state of preparedness in New Jersey. 

There has been much debate and discussion during the past several weeks. Some 

of the information presented in public has been accurate and some has not. The debate itself is positive - it is welcome and necessary for us to be engaged in discussion 

over homeland security priorities and funding. 

One thing however is very clear: the discussion on funding should not be an issue 

of placing the safety and security of any one person, community or State in America 

ahead of another. This is very much about making our entire nation safer and more 

secure by managing risk in a way that lessens the vulnerability of the entire country. 

The safety and security of each and every American lies at the core of the mission 

of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and it is a mission that the men 

and women of the Department take seriously. 

However, a safer and more secure America is not an exclusive mission of the Department of Homeland Security. America’s safety and security is a shared national 

responsibility. It is a mission that is shared among local, State and Federal agencies, the public and private sectors and the American people. In the context of terrorism, it requires an unprecedented mix of efforts - border and immigration controls, security in our ports, and airports and protection of critical assets and infrastructure, including transportation, communication, financial and energy. Homeland 

security is about managing risk for the entire nation based on a comprehensive national approach; it is about applying limited resources most effectively based on our 

understanding of America’s overall risk. 

Let me be very clear, there is a critical distinction to be made: Threat is not synonymous with risk, nor is risk analysis synonymous with risk management, as I will 

discuss later. 

There are many tools employed every day and in every way to keep our nation 

safer and more secure from the threat of terrorism and a host of other hazards and 

threats that comprise our national risk continuum. Today, I would like to focus on 

the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP). 

The HSGP is the Department’s primary means of homeland security assistance 

to the states and local communities, and it includes the State Homeland Security 

Program (SHSP), the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), 

and the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). As such, HSGP is one of the Department’s most important and visible mechanisms to manage national strategic 

risk. 

Today’s testimony will focus on the method DHS utilized to evaluate the risk of 

terrorism to States, territories, and Urban Areas; the peer review process we employed to determine the expected effectiveness of proposed solutions, and ultimately, 

the risk management techniques we used to determine allocations for Fiscal Year 

(FY) 2006. I will go into great detail regarding how the Department strived to em-
49

ploy an objective, comprehensive, and fair process for allocating FY2006 HSGP 

grants to improve nationwide terrorism preparedness. 

The debate about ′′who got how much′′ has overshadowed the more important discussion about the best way to use limited financial resources to increase America’s 

security. We used an approach this year that expands our understanding of what 

constitutes risk while taking into account Congressional guidance encouraging our 

nation to move away from ′′reaction′′ to ′′strategic preparation.′′

As Secretary Chertoff said in recent remarks pertaining to this program, 

′′We cannot protect every single person at every moment in every place against 

every threat. What we have to do is manage the risk, and that means we have to 

evaluate consequence, vulnerability, and threat in order to determine what is the 

most cost-effective way of maximizing security.′′

The Department’s grants programs have traditionally provided financial assistance to all 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 

and the U.S. Territories. By the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, states and localities 

will have received over $18 billion in assistance and direct support from the Department of Homeland Security since September 11, 2001. This does not account for the 

additional billions made available from the Departments of Health and Human 

Services and Justice. 

The Department is making significant, important, and vital changes to HSGP, 

both with the analytic capabilities that support the program and the management 

techniques we use to determine allocations. And, as we have all seen from the reaction to our FY 2006 allocations, implementation of risk management will not necessarily be an easy or a popular shift. However, it is an important shift and one 

that we take seriously. We have and will continue to solicit feedback on our processes and are willing to listen to criticism and suggestions for improving our processes. With billions of dollars being allocated each year, this is a serious business 

- and we believe that healthy debate about risk management principles will only 

make these processes better and more transparent. Despite recent successes globally 

in the war on terror, America’s security will be a marathon and not a sprint. We 

need an objective funding process that will sustain improvements for the long- term. 

Today, I hope to articulate the following policy considerations: 

1. The objectives of the Homeland Security Grants are to enhance capabilities to 

prevent, deter, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism, to be allocated based 

on risks, threats, vulnerabilities, and unmet target capabilities. It is long-standing 

Administration policy that the limited pool of Federal grant resources should be primarily used to improve long-term capabilities that provide a maximum return on 

investment, instead of to finance day-to-day occurring local personnel operational 

costs. 

2. The new DHS risk analysis process incorporates the tremendous increase in 

relevant individual risk of urban communities, this risk in relation to other communities, and the distribution of risk across our entire nation. 

3. In applying risk management to the grant process, DHS has emphasized the 

principle of risk reduction, including the peer-review assessment. This includes the 

likelihood that Federal resources can help reduce long-term risk and address short 

falls in capability. The new allocation formula, based on risk and effectiveness, 

strives to provide an objective process that is flexible to account for improved information on a national scale.

FY 2006—A Transition Year 

In past years, DHS’ risk analysis was largely driven by both population size and 

density. But over time we have been able to develop enhanced techniques to analyze 

risk. In FY 2006, the risk analysis considered three primary components: Threat, 

Vulnerability, and Consequence. The Threat component represents an adversary’s 

intent to attack a specific target and its potential capability to execute the attack; 

the Vulnerability component embodies the susceptibility to an adversary’s attack 

and the likelihood that it will achieve an impact; and the Consequence component 

measures the possible impact from such an attack. 

With the enhanced methodology and broader set of data inputs, we were able to 

capture a truer estimation of relative risk for all urban areas. The footprint used 

to analyze the risk to both assets as well as geographic areas and populations was 

adjusted this year. This adjustment more accurately reflects the regional context in 

which these jurisdictions operate and the critical infrastructure that provides higher 

potential targets and requires protecting. There is better data about not just New 

York City, but about the entire region, including the Jersey City/Newark area and 

across a broader range of sectors. As a result of these improvements, many areas’ 

risk scores changed significantly, a reflection of an enhanced analytical approach to 

gauging the risk urban areas face relative to one another. 
50

It is important to understand the downstream impact of these changes in relative 

risk. For example, New York City does not suddenly have less risk in an absolute 

sense; in fact, it continues to be among the highest risk Urban Areas. However, the 

relative values for virtually all other candidates increased this year due to our better understanding of their risk and its analysis. The relative differences among the 

higher risk candidates is what changed from last year to this year. Indeed, Urban 

Areas such as the Jersey City/Newark area, Los Angeles, and Chicago saw their 

share of national risk relative to New York City increase considerably, in some cases 

doubling or tripling compared to previous analysis. These changes in relative risk 

were key drivers in the changes in funding allocations. 

FY 2006 also marks the first HSGP grant cycle in which the Interim National 

Preparedness Goal is in place to identify National Priorities and help focus local and 

state expenditures. This common planning framework, and the tools that support 

it, allow us individually as communities and states and collectively as a Nation to 

better understand how prepared we are, how prepared we need to be, and how we 

prioritize efforts to close the gap. The absence of this type of consistent preparedness target is at the forefront of many of our national shortcomings over the past 

25 years. The Interim National Preparedness Goal demands that we focus attention 

on ′′raising the bar′′ of preparedness across the country to establish minimum capabilities and be prepared for the risks we face. This, along with measurement of risk, 

gives us an important management consideration for our grant programs. 

Accordingly, the Department of Homeland Security has been aggressive in: 

1. improving the risk analysis tools used to determine a National risk profile, so 

that we can target funding at higher risk locations, and 

2. clarifying the risk management objectives for the HSGP, within the context of 

the Interim National Preparedness Goal 

This year we have also implemented another significant change in how funds 

under the HSGP are allocated. In previous years, States and Urban Areas knew 

their funding allocations prior to submitting grant applications. Based on substantial input from the national preparedness community Congress, and our focus on 

risk management, Department has moved towards a risk-based approach that incorporates a competitive analysis element to allocating funds for HSGP. This is a critical step in achieving a Homeland Security Grants Program that emphasizes riskinformed grant making, increased accountability and is focused on maximizing the 

return on investment of federal grant funds.

Risk-Based Analysis and Management 

I would like to explain how we analyzed risk for determining the 2006 grant funding.The Department of Homeland Security has many risk management resources at 

its disposal people, technology, and funding are just a few. The HSGP is among the 

most valuable of these tools because it allows us to partner with our States, Territories and Urban Areas and First Responder communities, and support national preparedness goals. 

The Administration, Congress, State and Local stakeholders, first responder organizations, and industry groups have called for more risk management approaches 

to inform homeland security grant allocations. There has been a clear recognition 

that our national approach requires that we apply federal funding resources in a 

way that maximizes resources to benefit all Americans. 

Key to this year’s process is a much better understanding of our national risk.In 

our effort to improve our methods for risk management of the terrorist threat we 

considered several key factors. 

1. Ultimately, it is the States, Urban Areas and Territories that own the risk in 

their respective areas, and they must make investments locally that will build needed capabilities and address identified risk. DHS’s risk management job is to provide 

them guidance, and within available resources, financial assistance to make these 

investments. In this program, we have been directed to invest in initiatives that 

promote unity of effort at the community, regional, state, and national levels. They 

must continue to provide tangible benefits beyond the flow of Federal dollars. 

2.When managing risks, we must rely on analysis of risk to inform our management process, but be cognizant of the inherent uncertainty of this analysis. Consider 

this definition of risk analysis from the Society for Risk Analysis: 

′′Risk analysis uses observations about what we know, to make predictions about 

what we don’t know.′′

I think this sums up risk analysis in the context of homeland security quite nicely. We have carefully considered the factors that experts believe lead to risk, and 

we have confidence in our approach. But we are realists and we understand that 

risk in the terrorist context is new, constantly changing, and lacks the measuring 

history of data flow found in other hazards. 
51

Terrorist threat cannot be predicted with the reliability of hurricanes or floods, 

or mechanical failures. No matter how much we invest in scientists and algorithms, 

we cannot measure terrorism risk in an absolute sense. Therefore, we emphasize 

building capabilities to manage risk nationwide based on the best estimations possible. Our profile is built on an analysis of relative risk based on what is known. 

3.Risk Analysis DOES NOT EQUAL Risk Management. In fact, the Society for 

Risk Analysis definition makes this point better than I can: 

Risk analysis seeks to inform, not to dictate, the complex and difficult choices 

among possible measures to mitigate risks. 

As this indicates, the risk analysis is only one input to the risk management process that should be considered for Homeland Security. In any risk context, risk management typically involves considerations beyond the quantifiable analysis. Risk 

management includes many other considerations such as management objectives, 

fiscal constraints, one’s ability to actually impact the risks one faces, and the strategy that best serves our overall national interests. The primary risk management 

objective of the HSGP is to: raise the bar of preparedness across the at-risk states, 

territories and Urban Areas as part of an interdependent national effort by directing 

funds to areas of greatest risk and those implementing the most effective risk management solutions. 

These two objectives announced by Congress require the Department to balance 

the desire to focus resources on areas at relatively greater risk, with the desire 

topromote use of federal resources for strong solutions that ′′raise the bar′′ of national preparedness and address national risk. 

Thus, common sense dictates that managing risk through the HSGP program involves much more than just distributing dollars in proportion to the relative risk 

data that we generate each year. Rather, it is viewed as a means for reducing risk 

and promoting national objectives. 

As previously noted, DHS defines risk by three principal variables: Threat, or the 

likelihood of a type of attack that might be attempted, vulnerability, or the likelihood that an attacker would succeed with a particular attack type, and consequence, 

or the potential impact of a particular attack. The risk model used as input to the 

HSGP process includes both asset-based and geographically-based terrorist risk calculations. DHS combines these complementary risk calculations to produce an estimate of the relative risk of terrorism faced by a given area. 

Our enemies still wish to inflict both physical and economic harm on the United 

States. Recognition of this threat is underscored by both the Administration’s and 

Congress’s desire to assess and categorize our national assets - things such as key 

transportation hubs, financial processing sites, nuclear power and chemical plants, 

priority communication and energy systems. These are sites that, if attacked, would 

have an extraordinary impact not only on the surrounding population and community, but in some cases, the nation as a whole. In the first year of this grant program we had categorized approximately 200 sites, in 2004 some 1700, in 2005 approximately 11,300. This year, we further expanded the number of sites to include 

many considered to be ‘high risk’ by the surrounding state and local jurisdiction, 

which brought the total number of sites in the analysis to over 260,000 sites. 

This asset-based approach uses strategic threat estimates from the Intelligence 

Community of an adversary’s intent and capability to attack different types of assets 

(such as chemical plants, stadiums, and commercial airports) using different attack 

methods. DHS analyzes the vulnerability of each asset type relative to each attack 

method to determine the forms of attack most likely to be successful. Additionally, 

DHS estimates the consequences that a successful attack would have on each asset 

type, including human health, economic, strategic mission, and psychological impacts. This analysis yields a relative risk estimate for each asset type, which DHS 

applies to a given demographic area, based on the number of each asset type 

present within that area. 

The geographic-based approach allows DHS to consider general characteristics of 

a geographic area mostly independent of the assets that exist within that area. 

First, DHS evaluates threats, law enforcement activity, and suspicious incidents reported during the evaluation period. 

Next, DHS considers vulnerability factors for each geographic area, such as the 

area’s proximity to international border. 

Lastly, DHS estimates the potential consequences of an attack on that area, including human health, economy, strategic mission, and psychological impacts. 

DHS’s ability to analyze risks to the Nation is improving each year in both 

breadth and sophistication. Despite the known limitations of the Department’s analysis, the results confirm two fairly intuitive points: 
52

1. The majority of the risk is contained in a handful of locations throughout the 

country. This is the argument so strenuously made by that handful of localities. 

However, 

2. There are risks to other urban areas that we have begun to assess more accurately. These areas have previously received relatively small amounts of grant funding. The HSGP risk analysis considered much more than the final number of cities 

that made the Urban Area list. Those that made the list did so because they had 

a level of risk. In this case, the urban areas under UASI contain 85% of our national 

urban area risk. Attachment A reflects both the funding and risk curve and you can 

see these correspond. 

Given these two results, and drawing on intuition and common sense, it seems 

reasonable that while we must fortify higher-risk locations, we cannot ignore the 

risks in the other locations.

Effectiveness 

For FY 2006, States and Urban Areas submitted grant applications, called Investment Justifications, to formally request FY 2006 HSGP funding in support of their 

strategies and related program planning documents. These applications were reviewed through an intensive peer review process. The FY 2006, competitive grant 

process to allocate funds to States and Urban Areas was based on two factors: 

1. The relative risk to assets and populations within the eligible applicant’s geographic area, and 

2. The anticipated effectiveness of the individual investments comprising the Investment Justification, in aligning to the Interim National Preparedness Goal and 

addressing the identified homeland security needs of each applicant. 

Finding the right balance between these two factors is the central risk management challenge. It requires us to conduct extensive analysis of relative need and 

risk, thoroughly review applications, and rigorously analyze the potential effectiveness of the grant funds. The Department of Homeland Security conducted an unprecedented amount of analysis to arrive at decisions about grants funding. We took 

into consideration alignment with other national policy initiatives and statute objectives, as well as ensuring consistency of approach both over time and between the 

HSGP programs. 

The major considerations of project requests were the following:

Relevance—Connection to the National Priorities, Target Capabilities List, State/

Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy goals and objectives, and the Enhancement 

lan.Regionalization—Coordination of preparedness activities across jurisdictional 

boundaries by spreading costs, pooling resources, sharing risk, and increasing the 

value of their preparedness investments. 

Impact—The effect that the investment will have on addressing threats, 

vulnerabilities, and/or consequences of catastrophic events. 

Sustainability—The ability to sustain a target capability once the benefits of an 

investment are achieved through identification of funding sources that can be used 

beyond the current grant period. 

Implementation Approach—The appropriate resources and tools are (or will be) in 

place to manage the Investment, address priorities, and deliver results.

States and Urban areas each submitted up to 15 investments for consideration. 

These investments were submitted with an Investment Justification, which allowed 

them to describe specific funding and implementation approaches that would help 

achieve initiatives outlined in the Statewide Program and Capability Enhancement 

Plan. This plan developed in the Fall of 2005 establishes how Urban Areas and 

States will work to develop their individual capabilities as part of a broader national 

effort. The Investment Justification allowed the States and Urban Areas to request 

funding for allocation to their near-term priorities, consistent with the National Priorities articulated in the Interim National Preparedness Goal. 

The effectiveness review is a method to evaluate a state or Urban Area proposal 

in relation to others submitted and against the grant program criteria provided. It 

is not, I repeat it is not an evaluation of how well an initiative is or is not performing in a particular State or Urban Area. This element, added with Congressional direction and support, is designed to encourage uses of funds in accordance 

with pre-announced program guidelines and that will both enhance community, 

state and national preparedness beyond a grant period.

Peer Review Process 

Our risk management objective was to determine the ′′anticipated effectiveness′′

of the investments contained in the Investment Justification. Thus, DHS convened 

a panel of a cross section of representatives from States, Territories, and Urban 

Areas, and from a variety of Homeland Security and Emergency Management disciplines. 
53

States and Urban Areas sent high ranking officials to be reviewers; for example, 

three States sent their most senior Homeland Security Directors. From the Fire and 

Rescue community, an Assistant Deputy Fire Chief, Battalion Chief, Fire Operations Chief, and a Fire Emergency Management and Communications Chief participated, from Law Enforcement, an Assistant Chief of Police, Captain of a Sheriff’s 

Department, Commander of a Special Response Team, and a Lieutenant from a 

Homeland Security and Tactical Operations unit. All used their knowledge and experience to evaluate the anticipated effectiveness of proposed solutions from their 

peers. These examples are only a subset of the vast experience of peer reviewers 

who participated in the HSGP process. 

Peer review panels were made up of reviewers from varied backgrounds and experience - and to avoid potential conflicts of interest - diversity was emphasized. Each 

panel included a balance of representation from each region (Eastern, Central, and 

Western). The peer review panels reviewed and scored each individual Investment 

included in the Investment Justification as well as the Investment Justification submission in its entirety. The peer review panels also reviewed the Enhancement Plan 

to ensure alignment among Initiatives from the Enhancement Plan with proposed 

Investments. 

The peer review process provides a significant incentive for States and Urban 

Areas to spend the limited pool of Federal resources on projects that will provide 

a meaningful return on investment and a lasting impact on reducing the risks of 

terrorism.

HSGP Guidance to All Communities 

Prior to the release of the HSGP guidance, DHS provided extensive assistance to 

States and local governments in their development of updated Homeland Security 

Strategies and the Capability Enhancement Plans, which link investment planning 

to the National Priorities outlined in the Interim National Preparedness Goal. This 

guidance for the development of Enhancement Plans was a critical precursor to the 

development of successful Investment Justifications that meet the criteria assessed 

by the Peer Review Panel during the HSGP application process. 

Between the time that the FY2006 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) 

guidance was released on December 2, 2005, and the application due date of March 

2, 2006, the DHS Grants and Training (G&T) Preparedness Officer for both the 

State of New Jersey (NJ) and the Newark/Jersey City Urban Area was in frequent 

contact with the State and Urban Area. The officer was available to answer technical questions regarding the process. Due to the competitive nature of the application process, G&T staff members were not able to discuss or offer advice regarding 

specific program or budget proposals that may unfairly benefit one application over 

another. 

G&T provided technical assistance to assist with the Program and Capability Review (PCR), which was the core planning process each State was required to conduct 

prior to submitting proposals. The PCR justified how any FY 2006 funds would be 

invested. Approximately 110 representatives from the State of New Jersey, including representatives from the Jersey City/Newark urban area, participated in the 

PCR technical assistance session on January 10, 2006. The session stressed the 

need to emphasize broad regionalization and include additional stakeholders, such 

as other local regions and the private sector, in the program planning process.Q02

Allocation 

To support the management objectives of HSGP, we investigated several allocation techniques, and ultimately selected a two-by-two matrix approach that allows 

us to evaluate Investment Justifications based on the Relative Risk to the Applicant 

vs. the anticipated Effectiveness of the Investment Justification submitted by that 

applicant. 

This two-by-two matrix approach provided us with the following benefits:

It allowed us to assemble a picture of the challenge recognizing that the two factors we value: Relative Risk and anticipated Effectiveness are distinct and not inherently correlated 

It gave us a relatively simple lens through which to view the decision space as 

policy makers, while still allowing a known model to drive final allocations.

To generate final HSGP allocations, we assembled two of these matrices: one for 

States and Territories subject to SHSP and LETPP dollars, and one for Urban Areas 

subject to UASI dollars. The matrices worked the same. Each applicant was plotted 

in the matrix by using their relative risk score and their Investment Justification 

Effectiveness rating.Once plotted in the matrix, each applicant fell into one of four 

quadrants:

Quadrant 1: higher relative risk/higher anticipated effectiveness 

Quadrant 2: higher relative risk/lower anticipated effectiveness 
54

Quadrant 3: lower relative risk/higher anticipated effectiveness 

Quadrant 4: lower relative risk/lower anticipated effectiveness

Once allocations were determined for each of the four quadrants, final dollar allocations were determined. For that, Relative Risk was weighted two-thirds and anticipated effectiveness was weighted one-third to emphasize the risk-based nature 

of the programs while recognizing strong program solutions. Using our analytic 

model, we generated the final allocation results you have seen, and which are illustrated by the chart below.

Urban Area Allocation 

AZ—Phoenix Area* ....................................................................................................................... $3,920,000

CA—Anaheim/Santa Ana Area ..................................................................................................... 11,980,000

CA—Bay Area ............................................................................................................................... 28,320,000

CA—Los Angeles/Long Beach Area .............................................................................................. 80,610,000

CA—Sacramento Area* ................................................................................................................ 7,390,000

CA—San Diego Area* .................................................................................................................. 7,990,000

CO—Denver Area .......................................................................................................................... 4,380,000

DC—National Capital Region ...................................................................................................... 46,470,000

FL—Ft. Lauderdale Area .............................................................................................................. 9,980,000

FL—Jacksonville Area ................................................................................................................... 9,270,000

FL—Miami Area ............................................................................................................................ 15,980,000

FL—Orlando Area ......................................................................................................................... 9,440,000

FL—Tampa Area* ......................................................................................................................... 8,800,000

GA—Atlanta Area ......................................................................................................................... 18,660,000

HI—Honolulu Area ........................................................................................................................ 4,760,000

IL—Chicago Area ......................................................................................................................... 52,260,000

IN—Indianapolis Area .................................................................................................................. 4,370,000

KY—Louisville Area* .................................................................................................................... 8,520,000

LA—Baton Rouge Area* ............................................................................................................... 3,740,000

LA—New Orleans Area ................................................................................................................. 4,690,000

MA—Boston Area ......................................................................................................................... 8,210,000

MD—Baltimore ............................................................................................................................. $9,670,000

MI—Detroit ................................................................................................................................... 18,630,000

MN—Twin Cities Area .................................................................................................................. 4,310,000

MO—Kansas City Area ................................................................................................................. 9,240,000

MO—St. Louis Area ...................................................................................................................... 9,200,000

NC—Charlotte Area ...................................................................................................................... 8,970,000

NE—Omaha Area* ....................................................................................................................... 8,330,000

NJ—Jersey City/Newark Area ........................................................................................................ 34,330,000

NV—Las Vegas Area* .................................................................................................................. 7,750,000

NY—Buffalo Area* ....................................................................................................................... 3,710,000

NY—New York City ....................................................................................................................... 124,450,000

OH—Cincinnati Area .................................................................................................................... 4,660,000

OH—Cleveland Area ..................................................................................................................... 4,730,000

OH—Columbus Area ..................................................................................................................... 4,320,000

OH—Toledo Area* ........................................................................................................................ 3,850,000

OK—Oklahoma City Area* ........................................................................................................... 4,102,000

OR—Portland Area ....................................................................................................................... 9,360,000

PA—Philadelphia Area ................................................................................................................. 19,520,000

PA—Pittsburgh Area .................................................................................................................... 4,870,000

TN—Memphis Area ....................................................................................................................... 4,200,000

TX—Dallas/Fort Worth/Arlington Area .......................................................................................... 13,830,000

TX—Houston Area ........................................................................................................................ 16,670,000

TX—San Antonio Area .................................................................................................................. 1,460,000

WA—Seattle Area ......................................................................................................................... 9,150,000

WI—Milwaukee Area ..................................................................................................................... 8,570,000

*Sustainment Urban Area.

The allocation process used this year to distribute the nearly $711 million in 

UASI funding, $125 million less than FY 2005 (overall HSGP funding was reduced 

$343 million below the President’s request), to 46 metropolitan areas was structured 

to take into account both the risk and effectiveness of the proposed investments.

DHS Support for New Jersey and the Jersey City/Newark Areas 

The combined region of Jersey City/Newark was one of the highest-ranked urban 

areas for relative risk in the FY06 analysis. More than 2,000 assets were considered 
55

in the analysis for the urban area, and the combination of the two cities had a significant impact in the overall ranking of relative risk. The Jersey City/Newark area 

has received, on average, approximately 3 percent of all funding through the Urban 

Areas Security Initiative since the program’s inception, and has received more than 

$97 million overall from the UASI program since 2003. This year’s UASI allocation 

was nearly 5 percent of the total funds available, which amounts to nearly an 80 

percent increase from last year. 

As we look at investing Federal dollars, we are seeking investments that promise 

to increase the overall capability of a region through funding such things as equipment and specialized training. Jersey City/Newark and its partners have worked 

hard in this area. HSGP funding from prior years has had a significant impact on 

the successful implementation of several homeland security initiatives across New 

Jersey. For example: 

New Jersey has developed Regionalized Explosive Detection/Response Capability—Over the past three fiscal years funding has been used to support a dualpronged initiative entitled the Explosive Detection & Render Safe Task Force to address rapid responses to suspected improvised explosive devices (IED’s). 10 bomb 

squads and 26 canine units have become more fully integrated and interoperable 

through similar equipment, common training and a written plan providing a bomb 

response capability across the state. 

Implemented USAR Task Force—Beginning in 2004, funds were used to implement an Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) strike team to provide the six-county 

UASI region with a rapid, first response to disasters that involve structural collapses. Nine fire departments participate on the strike team and have been outfitted 

with a modern rescue vehicle, heavy rescue tools, and confined space communication 

equipment. This effort complements Northern New Jersey’s long standing commitment to USAR. 

Created Large Scale EMS Response Capability—The UASI, Central, and Shore regions have created EMS Task Forces to provide disaster related emergency medical 

services during large mobilization efforts. 11 medical trailers filled with medical 

supplies have been funded in these regions and been assigned to specific EMS 

teams. 

Additionally, the funds provided as part of the FY06 HSGP award will have a tremendous impact on several initiatives currently in progress, including:

Achieving a Statewide Interoperability Communications System—The state is 

working to provide both tactical and wide area communications for federal, state, 

and local public safety agencies. Interoperability equipment and infrastructure such 

as 20 interoperability channels, 520 cache radios, and mobile communications equipment are being procured to allow for statewide interoperability. 

Achieve ′′E Team′′ Capability in Each County—′′E Team′′ is a collaborative crisis 

management system that provides management support in areas of emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. The system is being implemented in all 21 counties. 

Achieve Statewide Intelligence Management Systems (SIMS) in Each County—

SIMS is used to accumulate, manage and analyze intelligence data accumulated 

from numerous internal and external sources. SIMS is being implemented in all 21 

counties.

Needless to say, building these capabilities within the State of New Jersey and 

the Jersey City/Newark Urban Area increases prevention, deterrence, response and 

recovery capabilities not only of the State and Urban Area, but also of the region, 

particularly the Greater New York metropolitan area. Law enforcement and emergency management activities in New Jersey and the Jersey City/Newark Urban 

Area help mitigate the risk to the entire region, and increased capabilities in New 

Jersey help relieve the burden on New York and neighboring areas. 

In addition to providing grant funds, training, and exercise support, the Office of 

Grants and Training (G&T) has made great strides in building relationships with 

key homeland security officials in New Jersey and cooperative efforts with FEMA 

Region II. 

G&T’s Washington, D.C.—based Preparedness Officer for New Jersey has maintained his role for the past 2.5 years, allowing for a successful relationship to become established. He is intimately familiar with the operations of homeland security 

in New Jersey and its two Urban Areas. 

G&T has a full-time Preparedness Officer located onsite at FEMA’s Region II office in New York City. While the focus of this individual is specifically G&T’s Emergency Management Performance and Metropolitan Medical Response System grants, 

she maintains an active professional relationship with her federal FEMA counterparts in the New York/New Jersey area. 
56

Representatives from FEMA Region II have attended various meetings in partnership with G&T. Most recently, FEMA representatives attended and participated in 

each of the regional conferences we hosted at the outset of the FY06 HSGP process. 

Finally, New Jersey was one of the sites of the TOPOFF 3 Exercise in the Spring 

of 2005. G&T staff worked with NJ officials, state agencies and other federal partners, and of course FEMA, for many months in preparation for this significant 

event.

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman it is essential to recognize the distinction between risk and threat. 

Although threat is a large component of risk, risk does not equal threat, but considers it along with vulnerability and consequences. Likewise, risk analysis informs, 

but does not equal risk management. We now have a much better understanding 

of nationwide risk then we have in the past, along with the ability to evaluate risk 

mitigation strategies. As a result we now have a dynamic process for managing risk 

that reflects the Nation’s priorities. We have come a long way in our understanding 

of risk and as we learn we will continue to improve this still evolving process. 

Managing risk is a national responsibility. We would not be acting responsibly if 

we simply looked at each individual state or Urban Area as its own entity in making 

risk-based decisions. America’s security requires a comprehensive approach and the 

federal government has an obligation to protect the entire nation. We must take 

steps necessary to ensure that all of our high risk areas increase their levels of capability. The grants allocation process is not about making Omaha safe at the expense of the New York area, rather, it is about building capabilities across the nation, such as those in New Jersey and the Jersey City/Newark Urban Area, that 

make all of America—including New York and Washington, D.C. safer and more secure. 

Moreover, providing grants to the states and Urban Areas is just one aspect of 

managing risk. Whether it’s through border security, ensuring the security of nuclear plants, food storage facilities, financial centers across the country or cracking 

down on illegal immigrants, what we do in one area of the country will make a difference everywhere else. 

Terrorists are working hard to exploit gaps in our efforts and the American people 

deserve no less than our very best effort to thwart those who would do us harm. 

I am confident in our ability to work together to do just that. 

I would like to thank the committee for its time today and I appreciate this opportunity to bring further transparency on this process.

Mr. REICHERT. I thank all the witnesses for their testimony, and 

I’ll begin with just a couple of questions, and then we’ll move on 

to the other members of the committee. 

I don’t think anyone will disagree that the money from the grant 

process that’s been allocated across the country since September 

11th has not been useful to most agencies across this Nation. 

As the Sheriff from Seattle, I know I was the recipient of many 

Federal grants from the Homeland Security Grant System, and 

also from the COP system, and I know it benefitted the Sheriff’s 

Office tremendously, and also the entire region. 

But, we know there had to be some evolution to this process and 

a learning curve, and I sometimes compare our response to homeland security to a very tragic occurrence in our Nation, and that’s 

Columbine. And, police departments and sheriffs’ offices across the 

country responded to Columbine incidents in a much different way 

pre that tragic day, and it caused people in law enforcement across 

this Nation to take a whole different look as to how we were to 

solve a problem that presented itself in that way. 

No longer could you stand around on the outside of the building 

and negotiate with the person, because that person now today is 

in there, not negotiating, but killing people, and hurting people. So, 

you had to come up with a new plan, and you had to come up with 

new equipment, and new training, and that’s what the need is for 

today, a new plan, new equipment, new training, for protecting our 
57

entire country, and it’s a mind set, it’s a cultural change that has 

to take place. 

And, I know just recently we had the Secretary, and we also had 

Mr. Forsman testify in front of our committees and Subcommittee, 

and I remember one comment that was made, I think it was by Mr. 

Forsman, is that the grants process is an evolving process. And, we 

heard testimony from Commissioner Kelly and Mayor Bloomberg, 

and their testimony referred to the need for training, equipment 

and communication equipment, but they also continually referred 

to, and we heard today, personnel. 

As you see the grants and training process evolving, do you see 

it evolving into possibly discussing the need for supporting personnel across the country in some of the non-traditional roles that 

Homeland Security now has caused us to, those in First Responder 

uniforms across the Nation take on? 

Mr. BERES. I think you make some very good points, Mr. Chairman. I think this whole issue, I mentioned in my testimony that 

I’d been working on it since 1998, has evolved considerably, and I 

think one of the best ways of looking at it is sort of to criminal justice, and the criminal justice system in the early ‘70’s, before we 

were looking at it as a system of systems, you had law enforcement 

separated from COP, separated from—separated from courts and 

separated from corrections. I think now at Homeland Security, we 

are finally starting to see how it is a system of systems in taking 

a look at what are the needs of those individual systems as they 

operate within the overall broader context. 

I think one of our challenges at the Federal side is determining 

what are some of those things when we are working with state and 

locals in a national security problem, a national security issue, 

what are those things that are the Federal responsibility to fund 

and/or do, and what are those things that are state and local responsibilities to fund and/or do in a national security context. 

Mr. REICHERT. I want to follow up with just a quick question. 

Mr. BERES. Sure. 

Mr. REICHERT. Because I don’t want to go over my time, and I 

know where you are headed with this. 

But, the COPS grants have been slowly, you know, quickly, more 

quickly, being cut, cut, cut, and when we get to the point where 

we know we have equipment, we know that training is in place, 

and you are supporting us with that, there’s a point where most 

chiefs, and sheriffs, and fire chiefs across the country, and emergency managers will say, we need help hiring people. Do you see 

the grant process going in that direction at all, or at least the discussion beginning? 

Mr. BERES. I think there will be a discussion that begins on that, 

and I think it also starts with you all in your committee also. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. 

Mr. PASCRELL. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gramm, thanks for joining us today. I’ve read your testimony 

very carefully, and then listening to it, there have been many instances when private industry has been hesitant to detail their 

emergency preparedness plans because of propriety concerns. 
58

How do your members balance your private sector concerns in 

emergency preparedness? You had major problems in New Jersey 

getting the chemical industry moving, when they didn’t see the 

Federal Government doing anything. 

Mr. GRAMM. Well, I think there’s a couple different levels that 

you deal with. There’s certainly a body of information that business 

has that’s proprietary, that’s very sensitive, that the marketplace, 

for example, the stock markets are very sensitive to some of those, 

some of that information and some of those plans. 

But, where our companies have been working together closely is 

to try to sort out what’s generic security from what is business-specific and business-sensitive information. 

We started off with non-disclosure agreements, for example, but 

over time it’s become apparent that they are not so important as 

they were initially thought to be, because, again, there was a generic—there’s a generic body of information that the companies, as 

they get together and develop that, are willing to share it with 

business in general. 

There is a little bit of a tension between the public sector and 

the private sector, because of a regulation culture. You mentioned 

the chemical industry, for example, and I think where business begins, and part of what the first panel, one of the things that the 

first panel mentioned, I think it was Sheriff Fontoura, was that he 

was looking for standards to be legislated. 

Where business began with this sense of cooperation after 2001 

was with a spirit of collaboration, and I think we want to be careful 

not to undermine that by mandating—by making legislation so isolated, perhaps, or isolated from business participation in developing, helping to develop that legislation. It gets to a non—that we 

continue in a collaborative environment. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Well, we on a Federal level are seeing we have 

to move when we don’t see private industry moving, you know, we 

are talking about a dangerous strip here in the State of New Jersey, and the chemical industry, you know, were reviewing and examining to see what they’ve done to step up to the plate, they’re 

looking at it to see what the Federal Government is going to do, 

and there is that tension there that exists, and yet, I think the 

overall objective should be that we ought to get off our duffs and 

get something done. 

Mr. Kempf, you know, your agency has come under a lot of attack. The last guy got bounced, found out didn’t have any experience whatsoever. I have a great respect for Director, the present 

Secretary Paulson, I think he’s going to do a great job. The first 

time that anybody has ever come from the ranks, though, first time 

that anybody was a firefighter, from the point of the fire agencies 

that we brought it. This is what I talk about with boots on the 

ground, so that bureaucrats are not telling us how to operate in our 

local communities. That’s what’s been going on. 

What is FEMA and the Department doing to ensure that governments are prepared for vast evacuations, and mass evacuations, of 

those that do not have the ways or means to evacuate themselves, 

or those that are dependent on others for evacuation, such as those 

confined to hospitals, nursing homes, assisted living facilities? We 

lost people, when looking back at Katrina, we lost people because 
59

there was either no central command or we couldn’t get off the 

dime to make a decision. So, we left people in those hospitals and 

they died. 

Now, we are not that far from September, since last September, 

what have we done in the meantime to improve a lot so we can protect people and save their lives? 

Mr. KEMPF. Well, as you’d said before, one thing that’s most important to remember is that emergency management like politics is 

all local. So, we have to work with the State Office of Emergency 

Management, who then work with their local counterparts in the 

counties and municipalities, and, of course, within nursing homes, 

hospitals and so forth, to make sure that they have plans and preparedness to move people. 

Now, some of the things that come under consideration, of 

course, is people who are in weakened health conditions, there 

needs to be some medical judgments as to whether they should be 

moved relative to the risk that’s facing them. For example, somebody is on a life support system, things of this nature. So, those 

all must be considered. 

Our agency, Region II, we just finished off on June 2nd one of 

our series of meetings with the Office of Emergency Management, 

Director Ca/as was there with us, State Police Colonel Fuentes and 

his staff, and one of the things we had addressed is the need for 

special needs populations. I’m very attuned to that being handicapped myself, and what are the types of needs that we would require to move people out, considering everything from early notice 

to move the people out of harm’s way before things come in, beyond 

what we would do with the average public, if you will. 

Mr. PASCRELL. But, whether it’s manmade or whether it is nature itself, it would seem to that when a situation is so overwhelming that the Federal Government has a great responsibility, 

if you want to look at priorities. 

And when you say, well, we’ve got to work with the locals, we 

know that you have got to work with the locals, that should be 

done beforehand. 

Mr. KEMPF. Which we are doing, that’s right. 

Mr. PASCRELL. And, you know, I’m sure we’ve learned from 

Katrina, but there’s a lot of learning that has to go on here. I do 

think the Department is educable, and I do think that you have a 

good Director right now, and I thank you for answering the questions. 

And, I’ll get to Mr. Beres when we get back around again. 

Mr. REICHERT. Mr. Dent. 

Mr. DENT. Yes, Mr. Beres, I had talked to the previous panel, I 

don’t know if you were here for that discussion. 

Mr. BERES. I was. 

Mr. DENT. OK. 

Some of the questions I had dealing with states like mine, of 

Pennsylvania, I’m not as clear on New Jersey, but the question 

was, you know, what, in your estimation, is the reason why so 

many of the states have not drawn down a large amount of their 

terrorism preparedness grants from those three funding programs, 

UASI, the State Homeland Grant Program, and the Law Enforcement Grant Program, what do you see as the reason for that bottle-
60

neck, and are they still using a large amount of those dollars, 

about a third as I last recall, for interoperability programs? 

Mr. BERES. Just the first question. There are several different 

issues that involve the drawn down of the dollars. Several of them 

have to do with primarily local procurement issues, with being able 

to actually get contracts out the door. Some of them are restricted 

to——

Mr. DENT. What is that bottleneck, though, is that occurring in 

the state offices? 

Mr. BERES. That will occur at the actual local level, after the 

state has made a sub-grant award down to the lowest level. There’s 

also issues at the state level, where many of the dollars that are 

granted to them have to go through an appropriations process at 

the state level, so before they can use them they have to be appropriated. 

But, I think overall, and this was mentioned in an Inspector 

General’s report a year and a half ago, draw down itself is not a 

good indicator of the use of the funds necessarily. Director Ca/as 

here had mentioned that most of the funds, even at the local level, 

that they had sub-granted down, were obligated, so most people 

would not draw down any of the funds until they had actually 

taken receipt of the equipment or had conducted their exercise to 

pay their contractors, and these are two-year grants that involve 

planning, exercise and training, too, so you wouldn’t expect all of 

the money to be drawn down until the end of that time. 

Mr. DENT. Can you talk a little bit about the trend in Homeland 

Security funding requests? Are these traditional equipment requests, other than interoperability, communications going down? 

And conversely, are you seeing more funding requests for planning, 

training and exercises? 

Mr. BERES. I have not—let me just put it this way, from ‘03 to 

‘05 about $2 billion has been spent on interoperable communications. 

Mr. DENT. $2 billion? 

Mr. BERES. About $2 billion. 

I would have to go back and look at our data and run the data 

into different categories to answer that question thoroughly, and 

I’m happy to do that. 

Mr. DENT. OK. 

And, to Mr. Kempf, my only comment would be to you, I think 

Ranking Member Pascrell has talked about it, we all worry about 

this evacuation of the New York Metropolitan Area, and maybe 

Northern New Jersey, you know, can you just give us your observations as to where we are, and where we—or where we should be 

with respect to a major evacuation in this region, and what communities ought to be doing better than they are now? 

Mr. KEMPF. Well, it’s got to go without saying that any mass 

evacuation, especially the northern parts of New Jersey and the 

New York City confluence, is going to be quite difficult. 

The roadways will permit just a certain amount of vehicles to 

transport itself over a certain amount of time. The state has instituted reverse lane strategies and all the other types of strategies 

you would necessarily need. 
61

But, I think that the key thing that we have to look at here is 

the early notice and the confidence of the public to evacuate when 

it needs to. One of the misfortunes we have up in this part, especially with a hurricane, is that it will move very, very quickly, and 

people have to be willing to take an evacuation notice or order 

much earlier than we would otherwise anticipate in the southern 

regions, and that goes without saying for any fast moving terrorism 

attack or things of that nature. 

I do believe to the extent that it’s humanly possible within the 

State of New Jersey that the State Police Office of Emergency 

Management has very effective plans and can handle a large-scale 

evacuation. Whether it’s going to be able to so-called empty the 

area in 24 hours, I doubt that, because of the limits of the roadway 

capabilities. 

But, for everything that can be done I believe, and I’m confident 

that they have done that. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Dent. 

I have just a couple quick questions, Mr. Beres first. 

Secretary Ridge, in June of ‘04, recommended that the Department of Homeland Security institute, in coordination with state, 

county and local governments, municipal tribal governments also, 

a grant tracking system, automated grant tracking system. Is that 

in place today? 

Mr. BERES. We have a grant tracking system that collects immense amounts of data on expenditures, what people are spending 

their dollars are, who are—where they are spending it, who are the 

beneficiaries of it. 

What is missing, I believe, and Secretary Forsman testified to 

this in his last hearing, is actually, basically, a real-time accounting system to determine where dollars actually are within a pipeline at any given time across the country. 

Mr. REICHERT. And, when would that be expected to be in place? 

Mr. BERES. I do not know. We are working on developing right 

now a more formalized grant processing system, but I do not believe that will end up solving the problem of knowing exactly where 

all expenditures are throughout the pipeline. That really requires 

everyone to be pumping into the same accounting system nationally. 

Mr. REICHERT. Would this be a critical part of the next evaluation of who gets grants and how grants are distributed across the 

country? 

Mr. BERES. I think we would more likely take a look at actual 

obligations we track, and then the types of things the funds are 

being used for. 

Mr. REICHERT. OK. 

Mr. Kempf, preparedness is something that we, in the First Responders arena, do every day, we prepare, and as you know, as Mr. 

Chertoff took office, he separated response and preparedness. How 

do you see that, that reorganization, is that something that’s a benefit, or should we go back to putting response and preparedness 

back together again? 
62

Mr. KEMPF. Well, I still think, given the enormity of the task, 

and the vast amount of resources, and the new challenges that we 

face today, there probably are some very, very strong arguments to 

be made to keep response and preparedness within FEMA as a separate agency, just as there are for the current structure that Secretary Chertoff has developed. 

I think that the real key to—regardless of where it is, is the one 

that was discussed earlier, and that’s the one of the relationships 

within organizations, whether we are attached to another organization, whether we are independent, doesn’t really matter. When we 

have to work with other organizations, such as the Department of 

Defense and so on, we have to have those mechanisms in place, the 

relationships in place so that we can effectively move those resources and have a very, very clear picture and understanding of 

where we are taking those resources to. 

One of the effective things we’ve done under this current structure is to develop what’s called the PFO, Principal Federal Official 

structure, and I also have with me a Deputy Principal Federal Office, Joe Peshano, who has been with the agency for, I think, 30 

years and is Deputy Regional Director. 

We work with Admiral Pekosky from the U.S. Coast Guard, who 

is the lead PFO, and we all recognize that regardless of what structure we are working on, if we didn’t have those plans in place, the 

preparedness thinking if you will, and the relationships to call up 

and say we need this, this is what’s happening, it wouldn’t work 

no matter what the structure was. 

So, I think it really comes down to, Mr. Chairman, is that it’s almost a matter of perspective. You know, it’s a glass half empty, 

glass half full type of an argument. I think some of the locals that 

I talk to all the time, some found this to be very effective and a 

very good way for them to get information, others like the comfort 

of the old system that they had worked on. 

Personally, I can work with this agency as it is structured today. 

We’ve been able to bring information down through our region, 

from Headquarters effectively into the state, and, sure, we have 

questions that we have to answer every once in a while, but we 

seem to be able to bridge those as we are learning through this system. 

Mr. REICHERT. Great, thank you. 

Mr. PASCRELL. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Before I get to the funding, Mr. Chairman, I want 

to say to Mr. Kempf, I think it is the most ridiculous idea I’ve ever 

seen since I’ve been in the government that we have separated preparedness and response. Every time Mr. Chertoff explains to us it 

only gets worse. I think the sentiment, correct me if I’m wrong, Mr. 

Chairman, the sentiment is that we bring them together, and that 

they work together so that one hand knows what the other is 

doing. I think that this is a very, very important and critical point 

in discussing FEMA and where it works and where it hasn’t 

worked. We know that FEMA can work, and it’s done—a lot of people are hard-working people, as yourself, as like yourself, but I 

think if policies and the strategies from the top are wacky, and I 

hope you bring that back to Mr. Chertoff, although I’ve already told 

him to his face. 
63

Mr. KEMPF. As long as they don’t kill the messenger, sir. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I want to talk about funding, Mr. Chairman. Mr. 

Forsman has spoken before the Congress, and now Mr. Beres, you 

guys are the messengers, so what I have to say has nothing to do 

with your service to your country. I respect it and thank you for 

it. 

But, the funding mechanism that is before us we need to understand, the public needs to understand, how it works. First of all, 

when you ask the question and we talk about draw down, this is 

a very different kind of program for Homeland Security, in that you 

have to spend the money first before you get it. That’s the program, 

it’s in the law. 

And so, much of the money is in the pipeline waiting to be delivered, but the municipality has not gotten what they paid for yet. 

They have applied to the Homeland Security for reimbursement, 

it’s almost a reimbursement program. 

What would you think of this, Mr. Beres, that instead of this 

foolish program that we kept on debating in the Congress, that we 

use the program and we use the model of the Fire Act, or the 

COPS program, where the money goes directly to the municipality 

on a competitive based, based upon risk and vulnerability? We believe that much of the money should be based upon risk and vulnerability, and not population, and we still have a system where 

folks in Wyoming are getting more Homeland Security money per 

capita than we are in New York. That doesn’t make any sense. I 

don’t know how you justify it. 

I love the people in Wyoming, I want them to be protected, and 

we want to help them be protected, and the Federal Government 

has a responsibility to them. Don’t tell me that we have to sacrifice. 

You know, the numbers in New York are astounding. You slashed their budget from $207 million to $124 million. I want to 

know how that makes New Jersey safe. 

Now, you approved, you increased the money to the Newark/Jersey City region, and, of course, the ten mile parameter around it. 

Of course, you reduced the money for the entire State, so you have 

to tell people that. So, we come out with less money than even the 

same amount of money. 

I mean, you are not going to play games with these numbers 

anymore. What I find astonishing, what I find astonishing is, that 

many people lose cite of the fact that we shrunk the bottom line, 

we have a smaller pie to deal with. And, you’ve got to come up with 

ways to get the money, even though it’s less money in totality, to 

as many communities that are vulnerable as possible. 

I understand that, we all understand that, but I also understand 

one thing, if New York isn’t safer we are not safer on this side of 

the river, and I understand that, and I’m going to fight every possibility and every chance that I get to make sure that that funding 

is restored, because it’s a matter of priorities. 

I want you to take this back to Mr. Chertoff, who comes from the 

State of New Jersey, who I supported when he was nominated for 

the job in the first place. But, you take this back to him, that I 

would rather provide—provide, the technical state of the art for our 

police and fire, the interoperability for our police and our fire, the 

training for our police and our fire, rather than give Barry Bonds 
64

a $72,000 tax cut. If everything is a priority, nothing is a priority, 

and to me there is no greater priority than homeland security, you 

work on it every day, you do a great job. If I didn’t feel so, I would 

tell you that, you know that. 

Mr. BERES. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. PASCRELL. But, I am telling you, you’ve got to take it back 

to your boss, we’ve got to have him in front of our committee again. 

It’s been a long time since he’s been here, Chairman, and we’ve got 

to ask him those tough questions. I realize you can’t even answer 

those questions. 

But, when everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. If this 

is a priority, if the safety of our public safety people out there every 

day, and we thank them all for their service, if that isn’t a priority 

to us I don’t know what is. I don’t know what is. 

So, we don’t have—do you know how the Federal budget was cut? 

Tell everybody here how much the Federal budget was cut, in 

terms of homeland security, the bottom line. 

Mr. BERES. The programs that I administer——

Mr. PASCRELL. No, not just what you administer, the bottom line 

budget. 

Mr. BERES. I’m not sure what the total bottom line budget on all 

of homeland security is in that number, but the amount of dollars 

that we ended up being appropriated was $500 million less for the 

Homeland Security Grant Program. 

Mr. PASCRELL. $1.4 billion less when you add in all the——

Now, let me ask you this final question, Mr. Chairman, if I will, 

are we less vulnerable and less at risk now, and is that why we 

cut those budgets? 

Mr. BERES. I don’t think we are less at risk, no. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I have no further questions. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. DENT. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

Mr. Gramm, I’m just curious to hear your comments on what 

some of your members are doing. I know in New York, for example, 

CitiBank has an enormous security operation. I believe they may 

be the largest private sector employer in the City of New York, and 

I was just curious, you know, how you feel the level of interaction 

is between various major businesses in this region with the Homeland Security and public sector officials who are charged with keeping us safe. 

Mr. GRAMM. Yes, and a lot of our businesses, based on their experience in New York, have gotten very, very aggressive and professional at the level of security and health concern kind of things 

that they are providing for their employees to protect the business, 

as part of the business continuity plans. 

We started out in New Jersey with some of those companies that 

have offices both in New York and New Jersey, and the initiation 

of the Business Force concept started with our meeting with state 

officials and the Attorney General’s office, the Governor’s office, Department of Health, New Jersey State Police, and asked them specifically what kinds of things did they see the private sector being 

involved with that could be helpful in the development of an effective partnership. 
65

They gave us certain things to do. We went out and our member 

companies in New Jersey are about 30, 32, and those companies 

funded initiatives, both in staff, and development of software, and 

processes and procedures, and then tested those out, and we are 

now in a position where we are ready to roll a lot of those things 

out through our members to the entire business community. 

So, the partnership is a growing one, and especially these days 

in light of pandemic flu, that this is getting a lot of attention from 

our Public Health officials, developing that partnership with the 

private sector companies, in order to help with things like distribution of medications. 

Mr. DENT. With respect to pandemic flu, do you notice that a lot 

of your members are stockpiling kamma flu and other antivirals or 

vaccines? 

Mr. GRAMM. Not a lot at this point in time, but it is a consideration that’s been talked about, yes. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back, have no further questions. 

Mr. REICHERT. Well, I want to thank the witnesses, and I just 

want to comment, when I was the Sheriff I had the opportunity to 

sit on the panel and be quizzed by what we call in King County 

the County Council Members, and they are called—what are they 

called here—freeholders, and sometimes the freeholders or the 

County Council Members or Commissioners, in some areas of the 

country where there can be—they can offer some pressing questions. And so, when you are sitting over in this seat sometimes it 

can get hot. Some of you may have been in that position before, I 

just want to say thank you for being here, because I know sometimes you have tough questions to answer, but as Mr. Pascrell said, 

we appreciate you being here, we appreciate the service that you 

provide to our country and to our communities across the country, 

and good job. 

Thank you. Thank you all for being here, and without further objection this ends our hearing. 

[Whereupon, the subcommittee was adjourned].

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