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Toward a Euro-Atlantic 

Strategy for the Black Sea Region
Toward a Euro-Atlantic 

Strategy for the Black Sea Region

by Eugene B. Rumer and 

Jeffrey Simon

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Occasional Paper 3

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

April 2006
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Contents

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

First Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Final Frontier. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The Black Sea Security Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Competition of Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Elements of a Black Sea Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Enhancing Regional Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Bottom Line:

Ownership Is a Two-Way Street . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Toward a Euro-Atlantic 

Strategy for the Black Sea Region
Summary

The Black Sea region is increasingly important to Europe and the 

United States as a major east-west energy supply bridge and as a barrier against many transnational threats. The security environment in the 

region is a product of diverse interests of littoral states and their neighbors. Some of these interests coincide with those of North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) members, while others reflect a unique regional 

security agenda.

As the continent’s principal security organization, NATO must 

address that regional agenda if it is to succeed in its goal of building 

bridges to the region and erecting secure barriers to threats emanating from it. While the European Union (EU) is not considering expansion across the Black Sea, it, too, cannot ignore the security situation 

in the region.

This environment warrants a Euro-Atlantic strategy to bolster 

institutions and activities initiated by Black Sea littoral states as a means 

to temper regional suspicion and rivalries inimical to stability and 

broader mutual interests. This strategy should ensure local ownership by 

littoral states and constructively engage Turkey and Russia.

NATO governments could engage partners in a Euro-Atlantic 

Partnership Council/Partnership for Peace (PFP) Working Group comprised of littoral states and others in the greater Black Sea region to 

identify common security concerns and to develop ideas for practical 

cooperative activities, including better integration of existing PFP and 

relevant EU programs.

Certain littoral states could be encouraged to take the lead in various 

sectors:

n Supporting Turkey’s Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group 

and Black Sea Harmony initiatives and linking them to relevant 

NATO operations in the eastern Mediterranean seem prudent.

n Airspace reconnaissance offers another means for building 

regional cooperation, but it is costly and will require a longterm effort. The United States could use its evolving presence 

in Romania and Bulgaria, and military relations with Turkey, to 

encourage regional cooperation in this sector.

n Border controls and coastal security offer near-term opportunities 

for NATO and EU governments to support counterdrug/-crime/ 

-terrorism cooperation with regional grouping in southeastern


Europe, the Black Sea, and central Asia. Romania and Bulgaria 

would readily take the lead here.

n Growing civil-military emergency planning cooperation in southeast Europe might be deepened by creating a Regional Civil 

Protection Coordination Center and then widening it to the 

Black Sea region. Ukraine might take the lead in this sector.

Introduction

What kind of strategy should the United States and its European 

allies and partners pursue for building greater stability in the Black Sea 

region? This question looms large given the region’s growing importance 

as a major crossroads of energy, commerce, and criminal and terrorist activity. The enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) and the European Union (EU) also shows the area’s increasing significance. The goal of Europe whole, free, prosperous, and secure 

was pursued by successive U.S. and European governments through the 

policy of twin enlargement, which opened doors of existing European 

and Euro-Atlantic institutions to new members in Eastern Europe.

But the second round of NATO enlargement also raised questions 

about the Alliance’s geographic scope. Does NATO’s open door policy 

apply to all aspirants regardless of their geographic location? Are some 

nations on the periphery of Europe, or even outside of Europe, eligible 

for membership? And finally, how should the Alliance build cooperative partnerships with states that are not likely ever to be members, 

that do not aspire to membership, or that even view NATO expansion 

as a constraint on their freedom of action? EU governments, while 

not considering expansion across the Black Sea, cannot ignore the 

security situation in the region.

For the Black Sea’s littoral states, these all are portentous questions 

that have acquired more urgency since the 9/11 attacks, as the Alliance now confronts threats that originate far from Europe’s periphery 

and Eastern Europe’s integration into NATO and the EU has assumed 

growing importance. After all, without partnerships to the south and 

east, the task of erecting new barriers to transnational threats would 

have been impossible. At the same time, that task forced NATO and 

EU governments to confront yet another difficult issue: how to ensure 

that barriers to new threats do not block bridges that they are building 

to their newest members, partners, and aspirants.

	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 3
First Response

The Alliance response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was immediate 

and unprecedented. For the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that “an armed attack against 

one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered as an attack against all.”1

 Most subsequent steps, however, fell in the 

category of barriers, intended to shield NATO members from new 

threats.

Operation Active Endeavor, launched in October 2001, entails use of 

allied and partners’ naval assets to conduct maritime surveillance, interception, and boarding operations against suspected terrorist activities in 

the Mediterranean. Offers of assistance from individual allies and partners to the United States in support of Operation Enduring Freedom starting on October 2001 ranged from use of airspace to intelligence-sharing

to military participation in the U.S.-led alliance against terrorism.2 Following the Bonn agreements among various Afghan factions, the Alliance committed to help the new post-Taliban government of Afghanistan 

maintain security for reconstruction and train Afghan security forces.3

The Alliance also took on the task of conceptual adaptation to 

the new post-9/11 environment. At the 2002 NATO Prague Summit, 

member states endorsed the new Military Concept for Defense Against 

Terrorism that identified four broad roles for military operations with 

concrete actions:

n antiterrorism (enacting defense measures to reduce vulnerabilities 

to attack)

n consequence management (dealing with and reducing the effects 

of an attack after it has occurred)

n counterterrorism (taking offensive military action to reduce terrorist capabilities where NATO plays a lead or supporting role)

n military cooperation (coordinating military and civil authorities—such as police, customs, and immigration, ministries of 

finance and interior, and intelligence and security services—

to maximize effectiveness against terrorism).

Specifically, the Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism calls 

for “improved intelligence sharing and crisis response arrangements 

[and commitment with partners] to fully implement the Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Action Plan . . . against possible attacks by . . . 

chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) agents.”4

TOWARD A EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION 
Also at Prague, on November 22, 2002, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) approved a Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism (PAP–T) that developed an agenda for partners to combat terrorism 

at home and share information and experience abroad. The initiative 

called on partners to intensify political consultations; share information 

on armaments and civil emergency planning; promote security sector 

reforms; enhance exchange of banking information; and improve border 

controls and customs procedures to impede weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD), as well as small and other conventional arms trafficking. NATO 

also pledged to assist partners’ efforts against terrorism through the Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) Clearing House mechanism 

and establishment of a Partnership for Peace (PFP) Trust Fund.5

But above all else, the attacks of 9/11 demonstrated to NATO governments that new members, and even more so partners and aspirants, 

required concrete assistance to develop both national capabilities and 

regional cooperation to deal more effectively with transnational threats, 

secure their borders, and act as a barrier to new challenges facing the 

Euro-Atlantic region. Meager resources, weak domestic institutions, 

and the lack of a clear external threat left NATO’s newest partners illequipped to handle such threats as transnational terror networks and 

WMD proliferation. The Alliance thus acquired an even more compelling rationale for building bridges to these new members and aspirants 

and extending the Euro-Atlantic security framework to them.

The Final Frontier

NATO’s initial response to the 9/11 attacks did not fulfill the need 

for a long-term vision to guide Alliance and partner efforts to meet the 

new security challenges, while overcoming the legacy of old divisions. 

Nowhere is this deficit felt more acutely than in the Black Sea region.

In northern and central Europe, NATO enlargement has reached its 

natural limits. In the north, Russia remains an unlikely candidate, while 

Finland and Sweden are already integrated in the Euro-Atlantic structures through their active participation in the PFP program and membership in the European Union. All other countries on Europe’s northern flank are in NATO. In central Europe, Belarus, whose fortunes are 

closely tied to those of Russia, remains the lone holdout.

The situation is different, however, in the region surrounding the 

Black Sea, where NATO maintains active relations with a new generation

of partners and aspirants. In practical terms, the question of NATO’s 

	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 3
open door policy, geographic scope, and direction translates into whether 

the Alliance will admit new members and extend its security framework deeper into the Black Sea region and beyond. The open door 

policy is really one of receptiveness to prospective members in the 

Black Sea region, the final frontier of Euro-Atlantic security.

Why not then simply rely on the policy of open doors as one of the 

founding principles of the Alliance that has served its members so well? 

To start with, after two rounds of enlargement and after the emergence 

of new threats to its members, NATO activities and partnerships reach 

and exceed the geographic boundaries of Europe and the Euro-Atlantic 

region. The Alliance has been pursuing cooperative relationships well 

beyond the geographic boundaries of Europe—with Kazakhstan and Pakistan, for example—and has engaged in operations in Afghanistan.

Second, the Alliance is facing the issue of membership by nations 

that did not even exist in 1949, when the North Atlantic Treaty was 

signed. The Alliance already includes several new members that were 

not on the map in 1949—Slovenia and Slovakia. Others—Georgia, 

Ukraine, and Azerbaijan, for example—have made their aspirations for 

membership well known. Does the Alliance automatically build on the 

established precedent and extend its open door policy to them as European states? And would its failure to do so erect barriers to Euro-Atlantic 

integration by nations on the frontlines of European security?

By extending a welcome to Georgia or Azerbaijan, the Alliance will 

close a major gap in Euro-Atlantic security architecture. But NATO’s 

policy of open doors to the nations of the south Caucasus should not be 

mistaken for ambitions of limitless expansion—a caveat that the Allies 

should clearly articulate.

While the south Caucasus may represent the natural limit to NATO’s 

potential membership roster, the former Soviet states of central Asia lie 

beyond it. These countries are well outside the geographic or political 

definitions of European or Euro-Atlantic regions, have shown little commitment to the Alliance’s fundamental shared values, and are oriented 

toward the major Asian powers—Russia, China, and India—that will 

most likely play important roles in the fate of central Asia in the future. 

NATO can and, depending on its interests and concerns, should maintain 

productive security relations with central Asia, as well as political dialogue through its already established fora—EAPC and PFP—but holding 

out the prospect of membership to these countries would be misleading 

and even counterproductive.

TOWARD A EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION 
	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 3

If the Alliance stands by its founding principles and holds its doors 

open to membership by Georgia or Azerbaijan, however, it must do 

so with a full understanding of the new burdens it will have to shoulder.

Cooperation with the EU in this context is a necessary precondition for success. The two organizations have a huge stake in realizing the 

bridge/barrier vision for the Black Sea region. Failure to do so could have 

long-term negative effects on the member countries of both organizations. Although the EU does not currently consider expansion across 

the Black Sea, it ignores the security situation in the region only at its 

peril. From energy security to dealing with transnational threats to completing Romania’s and Bulgaria’s successful accession to the European 

Union to managing relationships with Turkey and Ukraine and their 

respective bids for EU membership, the future of the Black Sea region 

is an issue the EU cannot ignore. Moreover, each organization—NATO 

and the EU—brings unique and critical resources to the region, which 

will be indispensable in its quest for stability and security. The Black 

Sea region is uniquely positioned to benefit from coordinated and 

mutually reinforcing efforts by the EU and NATO.

The Black Sea Security Environment

The Black Sea littoral is a region where NATO and the Warsaw 

Pact tensely watched each other across land and maritime boundaries during the Cold War; where the Iron Curtain was superimposed on 

an ancient mosaic of ethnic, political, and religious fault lines; where 

current borders are a product of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and centuries-old Ottoman and Russian imperial conquests; and where, after 

the second round of enlargement in 2004, NATO has emerged as the 

preeminent security organization.

Three out of six littoral states—Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania—

are members of the Alliance; Ukraine and Georgia have at different 

times declared their interest in joining it and are actively participating in the Partnership for Peace; and Russia, while opposed to Alliance 

expansion, is developing its own security relationship with it.

 Big changes in the economic and commercial life of the Black Sea 

region have occurred in the past two decades. With economic transition 

and return to economic growth throughout the former Soviet bloc, commercial traffic across, into, and out of the Black Sea took off.6 The revival 

of tourism has resulted in new flows of Russian, Ukrainian, and other 

nationals from former Soviet lands to the ports and tourist attractions of 
the Mediterranean.7

 Two new pipelines built in the 1990s—one from Baku, 

Azerbaijan, and another from northern Kazakhstan8—pump Caspian oil 

to Black Sea ports in Georgia and Russia, whence it is carried by tankers to 

markets in Europe and elsewhere (see figure 1).9 The Blue Stream underwater gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey opened officially in November 

2005 (see figure 2). In essence, the Black Sea has been transformed into 

a busy commercial thoroughfare connecting Europe’s heartland, via its 

southeastern shores, to the Caucasus and other parts of Asia (see figure 3).

But this transformation of the region has not come without cost. 

Black Sea traffic has included illegal immigrants bound for Europe from 

countries well beyond the region. Along with commercial cargo from the 

littoral states, Black Sea traffic has included weapons, military equipment, 

and ammunition from Cold War–era depots and factories still producing hardware that few of the militaries in the region need or can afford 

to procure. Loose or even nonexistent customs and border controls in 

many of the post-Soviet lands, including some unrecognized breakaway 

territories in the vicinity of the Black Sea, make it an ideal gateway to or

Figure 1. Black and Caspian Sea Oil Pipelines

Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, “Caspian Sea: Maps,” Country Analysis Briefs, 

September 2005, <www.eia.doe.gov.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/Maps.html>.

TOWARD A EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION 
	 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 3

Figure 2. Black and Caspian Sea Gas Pipelines

Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, “Caspian Sea: Maps,” Country Analysis Briefs, 

September 2005, <www.eia.doe.gov.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/Maps.html>.

from Europe and much of Asia for illegal arms merchants and smugglers 

of drugs, people, and various other kinds of cargo commonly associated 

with globalization’s dark side.10

Competition of Interests

For NATO, the challenge of promoting a durable and effective 

security regime around the Black Sea is compounded by the fact that the 

region is home to a collection of countries with diverse and often competing interests, security agendas, and urgent problems. These interests and 

agendas cannot be overlooked, for the Alliance’s ability to address them 

will be critical to its ability to enlist the support and cooperation of the 

states that comprise the region. 

Turkey’s Agenda

The end of the Cold War has had a profound effect on Turkey’s 

regional agenda and standing. Long a pivotal member of NATO, 

it was presented with an opportunity for regional leadership, based on
TOWARD A EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION 

Figure 3. Proposed Black Sea Bypass Routes

Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, “Caspian Sea: Maps,” Country Analysis Briefs, 

September 2005, <www.eia.doe.gov.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/Maps.html>.

geographic position, multiple historic ties, and strategic heft. While its 

special relationship with the United States is a matter of public record, 

an expanded American, as well as NATO, role in the Black Sea region 

would risk complicating Turkey’s own role there.

Despite longstanding historical and strategic differences, Turkey deepened its economic and political relations with Russia after 

the end of the Cold War, a relationship that has a powerful constituency inside Turkey. Russia currently ranks as Turkey’s third largest 

source of imports, ahead of the United States.11 Russian-Turkish trade 

is worth billions of dollars and includes natural gas (imports from 

Russia account for close to 70 percent of Turkish gas consumption),12 

construction, and tourism. The Blue Stream gas pipeline, built under 

the Black Sea according to a 1997 agreement between Ankara and 

Moscow, was in direct competition with the East-West energy corridor from the Caspian to the Mediterranean, which Ankara labeled 

its top strategic priority in the region at the time and which it pressed 

Washington to support.
10 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 3

But other factors are likely to affect Turkey’s policy with regard 

to U.S. involvement in the Black Sea region. These include, but are not 

limited to, tensions in bilateral U.S.-Turkish relations over the Iraq war 

and its aftermath; Turkish concerns about the impact of developments in 

Iraq on Turkey’s own Kurdish population; and Ankara’s reluctance to take 

a back seat to the United States in regional activities that directly affect 

Turkey’s national interests.

While Turkey is bound to play an important role in any U.S. or 

NATO policy in the Black Sea region, it is not content to serve merely 

as a conduit of U.S. and NATO policies in the far southeastern corner of 

Europe, or as the bridge between the Euro-Atlantic community, the south 

Caucasus, and beyond. Thus, there is no substitute for direct U.S. and 

wider NATO involvement in the region.

Romania and Bulgaria

Romania and Bulgaria share the experience of having been Soviet 

satellites and Warsaw Pact members during the Cold War. Both have successfully navigated a course toward NATO membership in 2004 and are 

well on the way toward EU membership in 2007.

However, these similarities do not mean that their motivations and 

future behavior are likely to be the same. The two countries pursued very

different paths during the Cold War. Bulgaria was the Soviet Union’s loyal 

ally, at times bordering on joining it. Romania, by contrast, sometimes 

pursued a different course from the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia, 

including opposing the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and maintaining diplomatic ties with Israel.

Thus, the shared past and recent experiences of these two nations 

do not guarantee identical patterns of behavior in the future. For example, 

Bulgaria’s proximity to and history of difficult relations with Turkey 

could affect its policy toward Russia, which historically sided with the 

fellow Slavs in Sofia to protect them from Turkey. At the same time, 

Romania’s interest in neighboring Moldova and the latter’s difficult relationship with Russia, which has long backed the Russian separatist regime 

in Transniestria, would likely cast a shadow on Romanian attitudes 

toward Moscow.

Despite these differences, Romania and Bulgaria see themselves as 

part of both the NATO and EU bridge to trade and energy and the barrier to transnational threats emanating from the Black Sea region. Both 

want to be part of the solution and are apprehensive about the risk of 

exposure to such threats as NATO’s new “southeastern front.” While 
TOWARD A EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION 11

they have cooperated well with Turkey on subregional initiatives over 

the past decade, they are also apprehensive about the prospect of dealing with Turkey by themselves. Both would welcome a wider NATO/EU 

role. To compound the problem, both countries suffer from some of the 

same problems, such as corruption, smuggling, and weak rule of law, that 

plague many of their neighbors further east. They will continue to need 

assistance from NATO and the EU in addressing these problems, but 

their wider engagement in the Black Sea could help their development 

and offer lessons learned in the transition to their neighbors.

The Question of Russia

No nation in the Black Sea region has seen a greater reversal of 

its fortunes in the past two decades than Russia. The Soviet Union, 

through its control of Warsaw Pact allies Romania and Bulgaria, as well 

as possession of Ukraine and Georgia, had a presence on the Black Sea 

coastline from one Turkish border to the other. Russia, by contrast, 

has been reduced to a relatively narrow strip of the coast on the northeastern shores of the Black Sea and a handful of naval facilities leased 

from Ukraine in Crimea. Although Russia’s footprint in the Black Sea 

has shrunk, its interests there have not. The region’s lofty position on 

Moscow’s economic, foreign, and security policy agenda is secure. The 

fall of the Iron Curtain has led to significant growth in Russian-Turkish 

commerce.13 The critical role of energy exports in the economic recovery 

of Russia further underscores the importance of its oil export facilities in 

Novorossiysk (see figure 4).14

The Black Sea region is unequalled on the Russian national security agenda. Top among the concerns is the long-running insurgency 

in Chechnya. Its consequences have been felt throughout the Caucasus, 

where the threat of the Chechen conflict spilling over into Dagestan 

or Georgia is fraught with dire external and internal consequences for 

Russia and other countries in the region.

Although the active military phase of the Chechen war has long 

ended and the Russian government has embarked on a political strategy 

toward normalization of the situation, including elections of legislative 

and executive organs, the conflict is far from over. A series of terrorist attacks in recent years—in Moscow, Beslan, and Nalchik—involving Chechen terrorists, as well as members of other ethnic groups from 

the Caucasus region, suggests that the conflict has not been localized 

despite all the Russian government’s efforts to contain and extinguish it. 
12 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 3

Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, “Russia: Oil Exports,” Country Analysis Briefs, January 

2005, <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Oil_exports.html>. An 89 percent capacity factor for shipping is used. 

Moreover, it threatens the rest of the north Caucasus—a worrisome development reportedly recognized even by senior Russian officials.15

The Chechen conflict has cast a long shadow over Russia’s alreadytense relations with Georgia, which Moscow has accused of sheltering 

Chechen fighters and exercising insufficient control over its borders. 

Russian-Georgian tensions, however, predate the Chechen conflict and 

include a wide range of issues—from residency permits and visa regimes 

for Georgian laborers in Russia, to Russian military bases in Georgia, to 

Russian support for and involvement in the breakaway Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and North Ossetia. In light of this, Georgia’s stated 

objectives of NATO membership and a close security relationship with 

the United States and NATO have no doubt been an irritant for Russia.

Russian-Azerbaijani relations have seen their share of tensions in 

the past as well, focusing on alleged Azeri support for Chechen fighters 

and Baku’s pursuit of oil export routes that bypass Russia. In recent years 

the relationship has normalized, although Azerbaijan has stated its intentions of joining NATO and maintaining a close security relationship with 

the United States. million bbl/d

Figure 4. FSU Black Sea Exports by Point of Origin

5.0

4.5

4.0	 	 	 	

Total Black Sea Exports

3.5	 	

3.14

3.0	 	

2.68

2.5	 	

2.01

2.34

2.0	

1.53

1.72

1.5

1.0

	 0.5

	 0.0

	 	 1999 2000	 2001 2002 2003 2004

Black Sea Ports

¢ Supsa

¢ Sevastapol

¢ Batumi

¢ Feodosiya

¢ Tuapse

¢ Odessa

¢ Novorosiisk
TOWARD A EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION 13

With Georgia and Azerbaijan pursuing active engagement policies 

with NATO, Armenia has emerged as Russia’s sole strategic partner in the 

South Caucasus. The stalemate in Nagorno-Karabakh and the longstanding animosity between Armenia and Turkey have made Russia Armenia’s 

principal strategic partner—a historic relationship that has its roots in the 

19th century and that retains considerable importance for Russia in the 

present day.

Traditional—some would say archaic—Russian notions of security 

in the Caucasus region originate in the experience of the 19th century, 

when Russia fought against Ottoman Turkey, Persia, and local princes and 

warlords. These notions call for establishing two lines of defenses—north 

and south of the Caucasus ridge—in effect cutting off the difficult region 

from external support in the south and securing the plains of southern 

Russia from the troublesome north Caucasus.

Russian-Turkish and Russian-Iranian relations have improved, but 

the need for securing a dual line of defense north and south of the Caucasus ridge has not gone away. A major Russian contention regarding 

the conflict in Chechnya has been that the insurgency and the terrorist 

activity there and elsewhere in the north Caucasus have been fed by foreign support—from the Middle East, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and others. 

According to this logic, the weak states of the south Caucasus cannot 

provide Russia with the secure shield against foreign infiltrators that it 

needs to combat what Russian authorities have described as the “counterterrorist operation” in Chechnya and to stabilize the north Caucasus 

region. Russian security, therefore, is too important to be left to Georgia 

and Azerbaijan, while Armenia represents the essential Russian foothold 

in the south Caucasus.

In this light, Russian authorities are likely to view stepped-up NATO 

and U.S. involvement in the south Caucasus region as inimical to Russian 

interests and counter to the goal of establishing control over the south 

and north Caucasus. Putting aside the issue of general Russian resistance 

to NATO involvement in the affairs of the former Soviet bloc, Russian 

perceptions of this involvement are certain to be shaped by the experience of the “rose,” “orange,” and “pink” revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, 

and Kyrgyzstan, which Russian official and unofficial security analysts 

have perceived as detrimental to Russian interests, designed to undermine 

Russian influence, and generally destabilizing.

Russian notions of security in the Caucasus region do not seem as 

retrograde as they might first appear when compared with NATO’s and 

Washington’s post-9/11 security concerns in the Black Sea region—control
14 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 3

over land, air, and maritime traffic, secure borders and communications—reflected in the dual bridge/barrier approach to regional security. There is, however, one important difference: while Russian and 

U.S./NATO objectives may be similar, they differ on the means. While 

the United States, NATO, and the EU promote democratic change in the 

region as key to long-term stability, it is viewed as destabilizing by Russian 

authorities, who tend to emphasize concrete interests and physical control 

rather than abstract principles and institutional development.

Thus, the challenge for the United States and the Alliance as a whole 

is to find the right posture in the Black Sea region that keeps Russia and 

Turkey actively and constructively engaged, yet demonstrates direct, 

hands-on U.S. and NATO involvement. No viable Black Sea strategy for 

the Alliance can be implemented without the region’s two biggest economic and military powers. Russia is likely to resist NATO’s stepped-up 

involvement in the region. However, the United States and the Alliance as 

a whole have considerable leverage with Turkey, whose active, constructive participation would thus become a necessary, pivotal condition for 

a successful NATO strategy. Once such a strategy is in place and gaining 

momentum, Russia too may find that its own interests are being served.

Moreover, if Russian authorities find their efforts to stabilize the 

north Caucasus unproductive, their attitude toward NATO and U.S. activities in the south Caucasus may shift, especially if these activities bring 

tangible results to the participants, are fully transparent to Russia and are 

not intended to undermine its security and isolate it, and hold the door 

open to Russian participation in the economic and security spheres.

Ukraine: Going West

Ukraine is certain to be a more cooperative partner to NATO in 

the Black Sea region than Russia, reflecting the young country’s unique 

interests and priorities. Its Euro-Atlantic orientation has been a staple of 

its foreign policy throughout the Leonid Kuchma and Victor Yushchenko 

administrations and has withstood the test of political changes in Kyiv, as 

well as severe crises in U.S.-Ukrainian, NATO-Ukrainian, and RussianUkrainian relations. Ukraine has been an active participant in PFP from 

its earliest days. Ukrainian troops have taken part in numerous peacekeeping operations, including in the Balkans and Iraq.

Yet Ukraine has had to tread carefully in pursuit of its key security policy objectives. The principal reason for its NATO membership aspirations is to secure its independence from Russia and emerge 

from its shadow. In that respect, Ukraine’s rationale for seeking NATO 
TOWARD A EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION 15

membership is no different from that of some other former Soviet and 

Warsaw Pact states where the memory of Soviet and Russian occupation 

is alive and well.

At the same time, the prospect of Ukrainian membership in the 

Alliance is met with apprehension by a substantial segment of Ukrainian 

citizenry of Russian origin, whose ties to Russia remain strong and whose 

outlook on Ukrainian foreign policy is influenced by the inertia of Cold 

War propaganda. These sentiments are reinforced by Russian opposition to NATO’s enlargement. Thus, support for NATO membership 

among the Ukrainian public in general remains quite low, ranging from 

15 to 25 percent.16

In the ranks of new NATO members and aspirants, none can match 

Ukraine’s legacy of long and close association with Russia, including 

geographic, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, economic, and many other ties. 

None of this disqualifies Ukraine from Alliance membership. But the lack 

of strong domestic grassroots support, let alone pressure, for membership in NATO, combined with turbulent domestic politics in the wake of 

the orange revolution, suggests that Ukraine’s domestic reforms agenda, 

which is far more important for the country’s stability and security, ought 

to take precedence over NATO membership on the policy agenda of the 

Yushchenko administration.

This, in turn, bodes well for Ukraine’s prospects for participation in Black Sea cooperative regional security programs. None of these 

programs require membership in the Alliance; most seek to build and 

improve indigenous and cooperative capabilities that participant countries

need to develop regardless of their relationship with NATO; and all of 

them should be open to and transparent to Russia, whether or not it 

decides to participate in them.

Georgia: A Matter of Sovereignty

Each of the three south Caucasus states discussed in this section 

brings a uniquely difficult set of considerations to the task of building cooperative security arrangements in the Black Sea region. Topping 

Georgia’s list of interests and concerns are the twin strategic goals of 

restoring its sovereignty and securing a good neighborly relationship 

with Russia—while maintaining Georgian independence and freedom of 

strategic choice.

For Georgia, participation in Black Sea regional security activities, 

participation in PFP, and aspirations for membership in NATO are inseparable from its main security challenges: restoring its sovereignty over 
16 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 3

Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both depend to a large degree on Georgia’s 

relationship with Russia, which has supported both breakaway regions 

and is likely to oppose Georgia’s pursuit of NATO membership. This tension between Georgian objectives and Russian perceptions of its security 

needs represents one of the biggest challenges for Georgia’s foreign policy.

This tension also presents a dilemma for the Alliance. Its active 

involvement in south Caucasus security affairs is a precondition for success of its Black Sea regional initiatives. Yet this involvement is also the 

main obstacle to those initiatives if they are to include Russia, which is 

firmly opposed to NATO’s stepped-up role in the region. With Georgia 

as the crossroads of these complex relationships, it appears the Alliance 

has no option but to engage Russia in a focused and difficult dialogue 

about the way ahead in a region where both have interests.

Armenia: Proceed with Caution

Armenia’s attitude toward Black Sea regional security activities 

is likely to be a product of its own unique security requirements and 

its strategic alliance with Russia. Armenia’s military victory in Nagorno-Karabakh has yet to produce the political recognition and real 

sense of security that the embattled country needs to survive and prosper in a region where security rests on the legacy of centuries-old 

Russian, Turkish, and Persian imperial competition and stalemated 

post-Soviet conflicts.

Armenia is the one country in the region that knows isolation 

first-hand, as a result of being cut off from the outside world during its 

war with Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. Thus, pursuit of broad international acceptance and close relations with key political and security 

organizations, which happen to be Euro-Atlantic—NATO, EU, and the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—would appear 

to be a logical priority for Armenia. Ironically, Armenia’s Euro-Atlantic 

integration—the antidote to regional security problems pursued by its 

neighbors Azerbaijan and Georgia—is limited by its relationship with its 

historic protector Russia and its historic adversary Turkey.

For Armenia, wedged between long-time enemies Turkey and 

Azerbaijan, Georgia and Iran have provided critical links to the outside 

world. Neither Georgia, mired in its own domestic troubles and often 

teetering on the brink of chaos in its first decade of independence, nor 

Iran, itself isolated in the international arena, makes for a reliable strategic partner for Armenia. Russia, Armenia’s traditional protector against 

the Ottomans and the only major power to have taken an active interest 
TOWARD A EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION 17

in the Caucasus region, is Armenia’s principal interlocutor in security 

matters almost by default.

Russian-Armenian relations are not as simple as the preceding 

exposition would suggest, however. Russia’s limited capability for playing the role of regional security manager has not escaped the attention 

of Armenian leaders. Moreover, Moscow’s support for Azerbaijan during 

the war for Nagorno-Karabakh has not been forgotten in Armenia.17

At the same time, the United States has been a supporter of Armenian independence and is by far the biggest donor of aid to Armenia. 

NATO has emerged as the principal security organization in all of 

Europe. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia have been pursuing active political

and security relationships with the United States and NATO. For Armenia

to be left out of this expanding web of relationships would only underscore its isolation.

Thus, Armenia must proceed cautiously in developing its relations 

with NATO. The Alliance still has the misfortune of being closely associated with Turkey in the minds of many Armenians. And Russia, despite 

its diminished capabilities, is still the key partner whom Armenia can ill 

afford to antagonize.

Nonetheless, these complex circumstances bode well for Armenian participation in Black Sea regional security initiatives, especially if 

Russia is participating as well. Their multilateral nature, transparency, 

and regional origins and ownership would make this the right venue for 

Armenia’s cautious progress toward Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Armenia’s attitude to expanded NATO involvement in regional 

security affairs—including the issue of “frozen conflicts,” of which none 

is more important for Caucasus security and stability than NagornoKarabakh—would likely be less forthcoming. Turkey’s role in the Alliance 

would automatically make Armenia suspicious of NATO’s activities and 

its potentially more prominent role in the south Caucasus.

Azerbaijan: Beyond the Pipelines

By contrast, Azerbaijan has been and probably will continue to be a 

more willing partner for the Alliance with a large stake in Black Sea security despite its location at the opposite end of the Caucasus ridge. As the 

region’s key oil exporter, Azerbaijan’s fortunes are closely tied to the Black 

Sea’s continuing ability to play the role of a bridge to European markets. 

With the goal of building multiple pipelines for its oil to bypass Russia on 

the way to world markets now safely within reach, Azerbaijan’s top foreign and security policy priority is the return of Nagorno-Karabakh.
18 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 3

Having lost the war for Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, Azerbaijan 

is also keenly interested in mustering international support for its claim 

to restore its territorial integrity. The combination of Azerbaijan’s close 

partnership with Turkey and Russia’s belated support for Armenia has 

made Azerbaijan a willing partner with the Alliance. Just as Armenia’s 

reluctance to move closer to NATO is a product of its fears for Nagorno-Karabakh and its ability to retain it, Azerbaijan’s interest in NATO 

and Euro-Atlantic integration is driven by its desire to regain control of 

Nagorno-Karabakh and enlist the support of the Euro-Atlantic community on behalf of its cause.

Moldova:The Forgotten Neighbor

Few countries in the Black Sea region can compete with Moldova 

for the title of the most difficult strategic predicament of the post–Cold 

War era. Moldova’s security environment is a product of centuries-old 

Russo-Turkish imperial rivalries, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, Soviet 

occupation of Europe after World War II, and the Soviet collapse in 1991. 

All of these factors left a legacy that the small and impoverished country—the poorest in Europe—is struggling to overcome to the present day. 

The separatist conflict in Transniestria is stalemated with no hope for 

resolution in sight.

Relations with Russia are strained; Russia retains considerable leverage over Moldova as its energy supplier and supporter of the separatist 

regime in Transniestria. Russia has also stalled on carrying out the 1999 

pledge to withdraw the remaining weapons, ammunition, and equipment 

of the former Soviet 14th Army headquartered in Moldova during the 

Soviet era.

Neither of its immediate neighbors—Ukraine and Romania—has 

been willing to play the role of Moldova’s strategic partner. Ukraine has 

been undergoing a turbulent transition of its own. Romania, despite early 

post–Cold War talk of unification with Moldova, also has gone through 

a difficult transition and has lacked the weight and recognition in the 

international community to take up Moldova’s cause. Moreover, Romania’s activism on this issue would run the risk of rekindling the lingering suspicions of Transniestrian separatists about Moldovan-Romanian 

unification.

Europe and the United States have assisted Moldova with domestic reforms, as well as with the standoff with Transniestria. Neither has 

shown sufficient interest in this country, however, to take up its cause and 
TOWARD A EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION 19

actively promote a settlement to its internal conflict, which remains its 

principal security challenge.

Moldova is a PFP member and participates in other regional fora 

(Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative, Southeast European Defense 

Ministers), as either a member or an observer. With Transniestria as its 

principal security challenge, its activities in PFP and other organizations 

no doubt are subordinated to the goal of mobilizing international support 

to help resolve the impasse with the separatists. Most likely, Moldova will 

be a willing partner in various Black Sea regional activities.

Its interest would be reinforced by the fact that Transniestria 

reportedly has been a source of conventional arms and munitions from 

Chechnya to the Balkans.18 A regional effort to crack down on arms trafficking would weaken the separatist regime in Transniestria and boost 

Moldova’s international standing. Although Moldova has few, if any, 

resources to contribute to region-wide maritime efforts in the Black Sea, 

its proximity to Transniestria and cooperation could play an important 

role in containing trafficking from the breakaway province. Moreover, its 

position next to Romania, slated to join the EU in 2007, is bound to focus 

Europe’s attention on this troubled country, as both an EU neighbor and 

a frozen conflict on its doorstep. Romania’s membership in the EU is thus 

likely to benefit Moldova.

Moldova’s biggest challenge, then, will be forging a modus vivendi 

with Russia in its capacity as an informal protector of the Transniestrian 

regime. Its participation in Black Sea regional security activities is likely 

to be helpful in this regard as both an additional channel for dialogue 

between the two countries and as a venue in which Russia would be confronted with further evidence that its support for Transniestria is fraught 

with dire consequences at home—in the north Caucasus.

If these competing rationales on the surface pose insurmountable 

odds to NATO’s involvement in the greater Black Sea region, they also 

present opportunities for creative and dynamic diplomacy. This is likely 

to be especially true if all parties recognize that the status quo is neither 

satisfactory nor sustainable and that the alternative to Euro-Atlantic 

integration is isolation.

Elements of a Black Sea Strategy

NATO needs to be more explicit about a Black Sea strategy, precisely 

because a serious commitment to extending its security framework into 

this region cannot follow the model of NATO’s enlargement in eastern 
20 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 3

and central Europe. The Black Sea region’s patchwork quilt of simmering conflicts, new states, old imperial rivalries, and religious and ethnic 

tensions (combined with abundant but poorly secured arsenals of small, 

conventional, and nonconventional weapons) means that without a wellcalibrated strategy and resources to implement it, the Alliance will simply 

stumble into the neighborhood.

To its credit, NATO did not come to the Black Sea shores in the 

aftermath of 9/11 unprepared. The Alliance already had the successful experience of extending its security framework into central and 

southeastern Europe. The prospect of integration into the transatlantic 

security structure proved to be a powerful incentive for a successful 

post-Communist transition. The promise of “membership in the club” 

can have important domestic political benefits in a transitioning country, 

as well as keep the “club” itself actively engaged in the aspirant’s affairs. It 

was thus natural for the Allies to carry on in the Black Sea region with the 

same approach that has worked well elsewhere in Europe.

The most difficult question for NATO to resolve is that of will and 

capacity. Does the Alliance have the will and the means to commit itself 

to the task of securing the south Caucasus region as it did with eastern 

Europe? The challenges in the south Caucasus will be far greater for 

reasons discussed earlier—conflicts in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, 

and South Ossetia represent tests that are well beyond the capabilities of 

Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to overcome. The Alliance will have to 

get involved and stay involved for a long time, just as it did in the Balkans.

Whether NATO takes on the challenge of the south Caucasus is 

not likely to be a matter of resources. The Alliance is comprised of the 

world’s richest nations, and a superficial tally of their military and economic means suggests that even a price tag in the tens of billions of 

dollars would not break the bank. Rather, the deciding factors will be 

NATO’s political will and strategic vision. Will the Alliance’s leaders 

develop and articulate the latter to mobilize the former and generate the 

support for NATO’s newest mission? This remains to be seen. To date, 

NATO’s efforts in the Black Sea region have been limited and ad hoc, 

hampered by many longstanding regional fault lines. These problems 

cannot and will not be overcome until the region can realistically aspire 

to become integrated with the continent to which it rightfully belongs. 

And until such commitment is made and such vision is in place, NATO 

will lack a critical ingredient in its effort to build a stronger system of 

transatlantic and European security.
TOWARD A EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION 21

Enhancing Regional Cooperation

As NATO members seek to determine whether they can muster the 

will, vision, and resources to take on challenges looming in the greater 

Black Sea region, it is important to point out that regional cooperation 

is by no means a blank slate. The fact that the area already has hosted 

several regional groups and activities provides a useful foundation for 

the Alliance to build on as it strives to build bridges to new partners and 

aspirants in the region and erect firm barriers to new threats.

Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was created in 1992 

to promote regional cooperation on economic, transportation, energy, 

and environmental issues. BSEC membership includes the six littoral 

states—Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria—as well 

as Albania, Armenia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Greece, and Serbia-Montenegro.19 In 1998, it established a working group to combat crime and 

deal with natural disasters. In 2002, BSEC established working groups to 

deal with border controls, crisis management, and counterterrorism, and 

in early December 2004, its ministers of interior agreed to create a network of liaison offices. BSEC also provides a forum for the 12 Black Sea

foreign ministers to discuss security issues. In 2005, the United States 

applied for and was granted an observer status at BSEC.

BLACKSEAFOR

The Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR), 

comprising the six littoral Black Sea states, was formally established 

in April 2001 with tasks of search and rescue operations, humanitarian assistance, mine countermeasures, environmental protection, and 

goodwill visits. Since August 2001, BLACKSEAFOR has convened 

annual 30-day maritime activation exercises under rotating national 

command. In 2004, with Turkey in the lead, member nations decided 

to transform their annual exercise into a more dynamic undertaking 

better suited to deal with contemporary maritime threats. They agreed 

to establish a permanent operation control center; draft a multilateral 

memorandum of understanding for information exchanges among member states; and carry out unscheduled activations to shadow and trail 

suspicious ships. In March 2005, BLACKSEAFOR further expanded its 

mandate to fight terrorism, as well as WMD proliferation, by adopting a 

document entitled “Maritime Risk Assessment in the Black Sea.”
22 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 3

Black Sea Harmony

In March 2004, the Turkish navy launched a new operation—Black 

Sea Harmony—with the same objectives as NATO’s Operation Active 

Endeavor in the Mediterranean: to establish maritime presence along 

the sea lines of communication and to shadow suspicious ships. Turkey 

extended an invitation to other littoral states to join Black Sea Harmony.

Ukraine and Russia have declared their intention to join.

These nascent institutions offer an important point of departure for 

any new Black Sea strategy. While the states of the region lack a strong 

common identity, possible new forms of cooperation are most likely 

to take root if they build upon, rather than supplant, current activities. 

By the same token, the region’s frozen conflicts remain a major stumbling block to such patterns of regional cooperation actually evolving. 

This factor suggests that new forms of cooperation should be tailored 

to take advantage of opportunities to mediate or resolve problems. 

Finally, any regional cooperation must be (and perceived as) locally 

developed and owned and not imposed from the outside. This last factor may be the more challenging for NATO, since the Alliance will have 

to consider ways and means of deflecting reactions by some who will 

portray its involvement in the Black Sea region in precisely those terms.

Within the contours of the foregoing considerations, the modalities 

of future cooperation fall into four categories.

Maritime Activities

Multinational security cooperation in the maritime domain 

is currently dominated by Russia and Turkey under the banners of 

BLACKSEAFOR/Black Sea Harmony activities. Neither country has been 

receptive to the idea of allowing NATO-sponsored Operation Active 

Endeavor into the Black Sea. The reasons for this on the Turkish side 

are complex and are woven into issues that extend beyond the Black Sea 

arena. Some have portrayed the 1936 Montreux Convention provisions 

regarding transits through the Bosporus and Dardanelles as a distinctive 

impediment to naval cooperation, but whatever restrictions they may 

impose, the issue is ultimately a political one—Turkish attitudes toward 

the use of the straits it controls—and must be engaged on that basis.

According to some assessments, only 10 percent of illicit trafficking through the region passes aboard maritime traffic. If so, the maritime status quo might be acceptable from a security perspective.20 From 

a confidence- and security-building perspective, however, Bulgarian 
TOWARD A EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION 23

and Romanian (as well as Georgian and possibly Ukrainian) confidence 

could waver, unless the United States (and NATO) provided alternate 

enhancements—air, coast guard/border defense, and civil protection—

as a counterbalancing gesture.

Air Reconnaissance

The concept of joint air reconnaissance and interdiction, though 

more operationally challenging in some respects, might be a more productive venue for building regional cooperation. The major constraints in 

the region include a lack of capabilities, coordination among numerous 

initiatives, and the difficulty of breaking old habits of competition.

Though many different Black Sea national air security systems 

exist, both NATO and non-NATO, there are prospects for interoperability and software adaptations. Current shortfalls to be overcome involve 

developing some compatibility among the different national systems, 

doctrines, and standards. In addition, numerous capabilities gaps need 

to be addressed—with radars, communications and information systems, identification friend or foe, interception, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and information exchanges. Although all three NATO 

members have air sovereignty operations centers (ASOC), problems still 

exist with radars, command and control, National Military Command 

Center connectivity, reconnaissance, and interdiction.21

Another possible entry point for U.S. involvement is the contribution and basing of unmanned aerial vehicles for air reconnaissance and 

border defense. This could be presented as a short-term solution until the 

six Black Sea littoral states can agree on a more permanent arrangement. 

If all three Black Sea allies had sufficient ASOC integration with NATO, 

this would only cover altitudes above 10,000 feet. Hence, lower flying 

aircraft would remain invisible to detection. Finally, even if all this were 

implemented and operational, the three members would be unable to 

exchange information with their partners on the Black Sea.

The path ahead can now only be sketched as an ideal objective with 

the following requirements: participation of all six littoral states in Black 

Sea air reconnaissance; modernization and compatibility of national and 

NATO capabilities, combined and joint training, and common SOPs 

compatible with NATO; and capacity to develop a common air/maritime 

picture and coordinate decisionmaking procedures.
24 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 3

Coast Guard/Border Defense

With U.S. initiative and support, the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) was launched in December 1996 to encourage 

cooperation among the states of southeastern Europe on economic, transportation, and environmental matters as a way to facilitate their European 

integration. Now linked with the European Police Office, the SECI Center 

in Bucharest, Romania, comprises 12 members (all 10 Balkan countries 

from Slovenia to Turkey, plus Hungary and Moldova) and 13 permanent 

observers.22 All 12 members maintain 24 police and customs officers 

at the SECI Center. In October 2000, SECI broadened its activities to 

combat transborder crime involving trafficking of drugs, weapons, and 

human beings, as well as money laundering. In 2003, it added task forces 

on antismuggling, antifraud, and antiterrorism to include small arms and 

light weapons and WMD.

While SECI has demonstrated some impressive successes, many limitations remain. For example, of 500 human traffickers arrested as a result 

of SECI cooperation by the end of 2004, only 50 went to trial, and only 

5 were convicted.23 This clearly demonstrates the “limited institutional 

capacities and weaknesses” among some of its member countries, demonstrating why SECI in cooperation with its members’ judicial authorities 

(for example, its Prosecutor’s Advisory Group) adopted general guidelines 

for activities and competence in December 2004. Also, it demonstrates

the importance of NATO’s Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building (PAP–DIB) adopted at the Istanbul Summit and the EU 

(which should count Bulgaria and Romania among its membership 

in January 2007) good neighbor policy.24

SECI, though, is also limited by the fact that some Black Sea littoral states (for example, Russia and Ukraine) do not participate, further 

degrading border defense capabilities. SECI, though, provides a model 

for GUAM members—Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova—to 

build a similar law enforcement center to cover (without Russia) the 

northern Black Sea littoral. In addition, in November 2004, representatives from the five central Asian states, Russia, and Azerbaijan met in 

Tashkent, Uzbekistan (with Interpol, EU, and the 12 SECI members as 

observers), to discuss establishing a Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC) for the purpose of monitoring 

and tracking the estimated 700 tons of heroin flowing from Afghanistan 

through Azerbaijan.25 Following project team meetings in January and 

March 2005, on May 30–June 1, 2005, CARICC finalized a number of 
TOWARD A EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION 25

documents that included an agreement to be signed by heads of states, a 

set of regulations, the CARICC organizational structure, and concepts on 

information-sharing, the role and responsibilities of liaison officers, and 

observer status accreditation.

Although the SECI does not yet provide coverage of the entire 

Black Sea littoral, the six Black Sea littoral-state coast guards established 

the Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Center (BBCIC) 

in Burgas, Bulgaria, in 2003, which provides important information 

regarding illegal Black Sea activities. In the past 18 months, the Black 

Sea littoral coast guards have exchanged information more than 400 

times. While most BBCIC cases have involved different sorts of illegal 

activities with no apparent systematic pattern, none yet have involved 

terrorism or WMD proliferation. While the BBCIC has great potential 

for maritime border protection, it is not yet connected to, nor coordinated with, the SECI Center. Obviously, this weakness needs to be 

corrected and should become a high priority.

In summary, NATO allies Romania and Bulgaria, who host the 

SECI and BBCIC, provide a bilateral core for coordinating NATO and 

EU programs in promoting border security and coastal defense along 

the western Black Sea. With U.S. sponsorship and likely future presence, 

and further U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) support, the two 

countries could become the platform needed for a coordinated regional 

border and coastal control system that might be broadened eventually 

to include more Black Sea littoral states. As a NATO member, Turkey 

should be drawn into this arrangement, but Bulgaria’s and Romania’s 

impending EU membership provides them with leverage that they 

presently do not enjoy with Turkey on maritime security.

This strategy suggests that USEUCOM, in coordination with NATO 

and the EU, would need to focus more attention and assistance on Bulgarian and Romanian border controls and Coast Guard elements, rather 

than providing naval support. One of USEUCOM’s potential drawbacks, 

though, is that compared with its impressive blue-water naval capabilities and experience, its brown-water coast guard capacities are more 

limited, while the EU has comparative advantages in border control 

management. This points to the need for integrated NATO–EU planning.

Civil Protection

Some progress can already be marked in civil emergency planning 

in southeast Europe. In 1996, annual meetings of the Southeast European 

Defense Ministers (SEDM) commenced to enhance transparency and 
26 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 3

build cooperation in southeastern Europe.26 In 1999, the SEDM approved 

the creation of the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG), with headquarters now in Constanta, Romania, that comprises a 25,000-troop 

force that can be assembled as needed to support peace support operations under NATO or the EU. In April and October 2004, respectively, 

Joint Forces Command in Naples certified (albeit noting some shortfalls) 

SEEBRIG with initial operational capability and full operational capability. In addition, SEEBRIG has begun focusing on developing disaster 

relief capabilities. In light of these developments, it is now time to build 

upon SEDM and SEEBRIG successes to deal with the new risk environment consistent with NATO guidance. The SEDM should be broadened 

to include interior minister participation as SEEBRIG begins to move into 

emergency planning.

In April 2001, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia formalized the Civil-Military Emergency Planning Council in Southeastern 

Europe (CMEPCSEE). The council’s role is to facilitate regional cooperation in disaster management through consultation and coordination among its members. Open to other members sharing the Council’s 

objectives, Romania joined in 2002 and Turkey in 2003. The members 

have agreed to develop common standards for planning and responding 

to regional disasters or emergencies; create emergency response databases and digital maps of southeastern European countries’ roads, rails, 

pipelines, and airports; establish emergency operating centers in each 

country with common communication procedures; and conduct national 

and multinational exercises. Bulgaria, for example, hosted a civil-military emergency planning field exercise comprising all council members 

(with observers and visitors from Moldova, Greece, Serbia-Montenegro, 

and the United States) with the aim of improving the collective ability to 

respond to disaster.

The recent evolution of southeastern European civil-military emergency planning is also a positive development. The CMEPCSEE is 

important in that it not only incorporates military and civil institutions 

fostering necessary coordination and cooperation at the national level, 

but also pushes planning to the regional level. For this effort to become 

sufficient, the CMEPCSEE might consider merging with SEDM (which 

would require accepting Albania as an observer or member) and creating a Regional Civil Protection Coordination Center to harmonize 

training procedures, establish a regional training plan, and explore, with 

SEEBRIG, ways in which that organization might address issues of civil 
TOWARD A EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION 27

protection. Such a union of interior and defense ministers would formalize the necessary conditions for further advancing regional cooperation.

Could this CMEPCSEE–SEDM civil-military emergency planning model be extended to the Black Sea region? The BBCIC in Burgas, 

Bulgaria, provides the key to building such cooperation and for planning priorities among the six Black Sea littoral states. To have any chance 

of success, the BBCIC needs to be linked to SECI.

Bottom Line: Ownership Is a Two-Way Street

To facilitate regional cooperation and its own involvement 

in the Black Sea region, NATO could establish a Black Sea Group, 

which would serve as a forum to develop PFP programs with a 

regional focus. The standard tools available to Allies and partners—the Planning and Review Process (PARP); Membership Action 

Plan (MAP); the Individual Partnership Action Plan (I–PAP); the 

PAP–T; and the PAP–DIB—could be brought under the umbrella of 

the Black Sea Group. The group could also serve as a forum where 

the Black Sea states could take the lead in developing a regional 

strategy for the Alliance.

A further sign of the Alliance’s interest in the Black Sea region 

and tangible proof of its commitment to it would be the endowment 

of a trust fund to support regional cooperation and PFP activities 

focused on the Black Sea region. This trust fund would be open to both 

partners and new members of the Alliance.

One of the key preconditions for a successful Black Sea strategy 

for the Alliance entails developing a sense of ownership of that strategy among the Black Sea states themselves. This is crucial for the success of BLACKSEAFOR, Black Sea Harmony, as well as NATO’s ability 

to integrate these regional efforts with its own Active Endeavor.

The task of developing such a sense of ownership on the part of 

the Black Sea states, however, represents a serious challenge for the 

Alliance. The chief reason for it is in the Allies’ understandable tendency to promote or express an interest in regional initiatives that 

address their security needs.

Indeed, BLACKSEAFOR, Black Sea Harmony, and Active Endeavor

are targeting problems that threaten the Allies themselves first and 

foremost: illegal migration, trafficking, proliferation of WMD, and so 

forth. These threats are universally recognized as important but are 

viewed as second-tier issues throughout much of the Black Sea region.
28 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 3

In fact, for some countries in the Black Sea region, illegal migration is not so much a part of their problem as part of their solution to 

poverty, legacy of conflict, and ethnic tensions. Separatism, ethnic conflict, and day-to-day physical survival are far more pressing issues for 

the region’s average inhabitants, as well as their leaders. To be successful 

in integrating this region into Europe whole and free, to foster ownership of Alliance-sponsored activities, NATO must make itself relevant to 

the pressing needs as they are viewed by the locals.

This challenge cannot be met without NATO’s firm and public 

commitment to make the Black Sea region’s top-tier problems its own 

problems. This does not mean that NATO must step in and solve the 

Nagorno-Karabakh problem for Armenia and Azerbaijan, for example. 

But it does mean that NATO must pledge to assist the two nations to help 

with security arrangements for maintaining peace after they agree on a 

mutually acceptable solution. By developing a conceptual peacekeeping 

plan for Nagorno-Karabakh and soliciting pledges of future contributions 

and participation from allies and partners, NATO would send a powerful signal to Baku and Yerevan that it views their security as an integral 

part of European security. Similar plans and pledges could be generated 

for the region’s other frozen conflicts. Without such actions, however, 

the Black Sea region would see NATO’s commitment to it as a one-way 

street, an abstract concept and a sign that the Alliance is more interested 

in erecting barriers than building bridges.

In the political sphere, the Alliance should include the Black Sea 

region in the top tier of its agenda. The establishment of the Black Sea 

Group would be a step toward that objective. Active participation by 

the Allies, especially the United States and other key members, would 

send a strong signal of NATO’s political commitment to the region.

Moreover, security in the Black Sea region, an area of strategic 

significance to Moscow, should be one of the key issues discussed at 

the NATO–Russia Council. Transparency and inclusion with respect 

to Russia would be of paramount importance if NATO is to be successful in pursuing its objectives, just as Russian participation in future 

peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh or in support of resolution for some other frozen conflict in the region would have to be 

a key element of planning for such contingencies from the outset.

In sum, ownership of Black Sea regional security must become a 

two-way process. NATO will have to demonstrate its stake in the region’s 

most pressing security concerns in order for the countries of the Black Sea 

region to reciprocate in regard to the threats and challenges that NATO 
TOWARD A EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION 29

considers to be at the top of its own security agenda. This in turn means 

that the Alliance will have to develop a Black Sea strategy that deals with 

what ails the region the most, not with what the Allies perceive as the 

greatest threat from that region.

Notes1 “Invocation of Article 5 Comfirmed,” NATO Update, October 3, 2001, available at <www.nato.

int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm>. 2 David J. Gerleman, Jennifer E. Stevens, and Steven A. Hildreth, “Operation Enduring Freedom: 

Foreign Pledges of Military and Intelligence Support” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 17, 2001), available at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6207.pdf>. 3 “NATO in Afghanistan,” NATO Topics, January 19, 2006, available at <www.nato.int/issues/

afghanistan/index.html>. 4 NATO, “Prague Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government of the 

North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002,” press release (2002) 127, available at <www.

nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>. 5 NATO, “Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism,” November 22, 2002, 16.1–16.5, available 

at <www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122e.htm>. 6 The Turkish Straits are among the world’s busiest waterways, with a traffic volume of 50,000 

vessels annually, including 5,500 oil tankers. These statistics do not include the more than 2,000 local 

vessels that cross the straits daily. Oil flows in 2004 represented 3.1 million barrels per day, nearly all of it 

southbound. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints: 

Bosporus,” Country Analysis Briefs, November 2005, available at <www.eia.gov/emeu/cabs/World_Oil_

Transit_Chokepoints/Bosporus_TurkishStraits.html>. 7 In the case of Russia, in 2003, the greater Black Sea region (including Bulgaria, Cyprus, Georgia, Greece, Turkey, Moldova, and Ukraine) represented 40 percent of all outbound Russian tourism, 

of which Turkey alone represented 18.3 percent. Between 1995 and 2003, outbound Russian tourism 

overall increased by 117 percent. A.L. Kevesh et al., eds., Tourism and Tourist Resources in Russia: 2004 

Statistical Handbook (Moscow: Federal Service of State Statistics, 2004), 25, 33. 8 The capacity of the Baku-Supsa pipeline is 150,000 barrels per day. The CPC pipeline expansion, 

connecting Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea area oil deposits with Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, could 

add an incremental 750,000 barrels per day of oil traffic through the Turkish Straits. U.S. Department of 

Energy, Energy Information Agency, “Caspian Sea: Oil and Natural Gas Export Issues,” Country Analysis 

Briefs, September 2005, available at <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/ExportIssues.html>. 9 Although Bosporus traffic poses a major security and environmental risk, Turkey expects a 

decrease after the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline reaches major capacity and eases the Black Sea 

oil flow. However, since the economic viability of the BTC pipeline is as of yet untested, Novorossiysk 

exports, along with those of Batumi, Supsa, and Odessa, are likely to remain at current levels for the near 

future (approximately 1.7 million barrels per day in 2003). U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, “Russia: Oil Exports,” Country Analysis Briefs, January 2006, available at <www.eia.doe.

gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Oil_exports.html>. 10 For instance, a 2002 report by the Moldovan delegation to the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe Joint Control Commission on Transnistria presented evidence that at least six 

factories in Moldova’s breakaway region produce abundant quantities of conventional arms—including 

rocket-propelled grenades, antitank grenades, portable missile launchers, and internationally banned 

antipersonnel mines—that have been used by insurgents in Chechnya, Abkhazia, and the Balkans. In 

October 2005, Moldovan prime minister Vasily Tarlev made similar allegations (denied by the Russian Ministry of Defense) about sales of weapons from Russian stockpiles in Transnistria to Chechen 

separatists. Nikolai Poroskov, “Pridnestrovsky arsenal [Transnistrian arsenal],” Vremya Novostei, no. 225 

(December 5, 2002), available at <www.vremya.ru/print/30012.html>; NewsRu.com, “Russkoe voennoe 

rukovodstvo oprovergaet zayavlenie premiera Moldovii o popadanii v ruki boevikov oruzhiya so skladov v 

Prodnesdtrovii [Russian military leadership denies allegations by Moldovan premier that weapons from 

Russian stockpiles in Transniestria fall into hands of insurgents],” available at <www.newru.com>.
30 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 3

11 Pocket World in Figures, 2005 ed. (London: The Economist Books, 2005), 227. 12 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, “Turkey,” Country Analysis Briefs, 

July 2006, available at <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/turkey.html>. 13 Russian Federation, President of Russia, “Official Visit to Republic of Turkey,” December 5–6, 

2005, available at <http://president.kremlin.ru/eng/events/articles/2004/12/80760/80759.shtml>. 14 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, “Russia: Background,” Country 

Analysis Briefs, January 2006, available at <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia.html>. 15 Liz Fuller, “North Caucasus: Dmitrii Kozak—Troubleshooter or Whipping Boy?” Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty, June 20, 2005, available at <www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/6/5A2EA0A7-

20F5-413E-8A7A-C791EF0BB7A2.html>. 16 “U.S. Backs Ukraine’s NATO Bid, Kiev Sees No Russia Block,” MosNews, October 24, 2005, 

available at <www.mosnews.com/news/2005/10/24/ukrussnato.shtml>; “EU Appealing in Ukraine, but 

Not NATO,” Ukrainian Monitor, February 24, 2005, available at <http://foreignpolicy.org.ua/eng/headlines/society/opinion/index.shtml?id=4244>. 17 Despite the legacy of Russian support for Armenia, during the final years of the Soviet Union, 

Moscow supported Azerbaijan against Armenia, which was seen as one of the most independenceminded breakaway republics of the Soviet Union. Moscow’s opposition to Armenia’s independence was 

the principal reason for siding with Azerbaijan in that conflict. 18 Poroskov, “Pridnestrovsky arsenal”; NewsRu.com, October 27, 2005. 19 For further information on the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, see <www.bsec.gov.tr>. 20 Author interview with senior Turkish military official, Sofia, Bulgaria, June 21, 2005. 21 Bulgaria still has not met its minimum military requirements for ASOC and has yet to integrate its national ASOC with the NATO defense system. Bulgaria and Romania still need identification 

friend or foe capability. 22 The members are Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Georgia, Italy, 

Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 23 John F. Markey, director, Office of Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of State, at Center for 

Strategic and International Studies conference, Romania, October 19, 2004. 24 SECI’s EU membership will expand to five when Romania and Bulgaria join Hungary, Slovenia, and Greece in January 2007. 25 Markey. 26 SEDM’s membership comprises Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, 

Turkey, and Croatia (since October 2000), with the United States, Italy, and, more recently, Ukraine and 

Moldova, as observers. Also at the November 5, 2004, SEDM ministerial in Ljubljana, Slovenia, SerbiaMontenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were guests, and Ukraine requested full SEDM membership.
About the Authors

Dr. Eugene B. Rumer is a senior research fellow in the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University. 

Before joining INSS in 2000, he served as Director for Russian, Ukrainian,

and Eurasian affairs at the National Security Council and as a member of the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State. 

Prior to Government service, he worked for the RAND Corporation

in the United States and in Moscow. Dr. Rumer holds degrees in economics, Russian studies, and political science from Boston University, 

Georgetown University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Dr. Jeffrey Simon is a senior research fellow in the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Previously, he was Chief, National Military Strategy Branch, at the Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He has taught at Georgetown 

University and has held research positions at System Planning Corporation and the RAND Corporation. Dr. Simon’s publications include 

numerous articles and 13 books, the most recent being Hungary and 

NATO: Problems in Civil-Military Relations (Rowman and Littlefield, 

2003), NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: A Comparative Study 

in Civil-Military Relations (Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), and Poland 

and NATO: A Study in Civil-Military Relations (Rowman and Littlefield, 2004). Dr. Simon holds a PhD from the University of Washington 

and an MA from the University of Chicago and has been awarded the 

Knight Cross of the Order of Merit with Star by the Republic of Poland.

31
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