NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SARAH B., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, K.J., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 20-0146

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. P1300JD202000019

The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer PC, Anthem

By Florence M. Bruemmer

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Mesa

By Thomas Jose

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 12-8-2020
SARAH B. v. DCS, K.J.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Sarah B. ("Mother") appeals the superior court's order 

terminating her parental rights to her daughter. For the following reasons, 

we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother has a history of substance abuse. In April 2017, 

Mother gave birth to K.J., who was substance exposed to benzodiazepine, 

methadone, and opiates. At that time, Mother admitted to using heroin and 

other prescription drugs. Because of Mother's drug use, the Department of 

Child Safety ("DCS") took custody of K.J., placed her in a foster home, and 

filed a dependency petition. DCS provided Mother with reunification 

services, and K.J. was returned to Mother's physical custody in March 2019.1 

Mother participated in in-home dependency services until the matter was 

closed in October 2019. 

¶3 In December 2019, Mother overdosed, and first responders 

found fentanyl in her home. In February 2020, police initiated a traffic stop 

on Mother and her friend. Police found drug paraphernalia in the car, and 

Mother appeared under the influence as she had "pin point pupils, . . . 

would not stop talking and would not sit still." K.J. was in the car at the 

time, and her car seat was not strapped in properly. Mother admitted to 

the police that she had overdosed on substances three days prior, requiring 

friends "to use Narcan to bring her back to life." DCS took custody of K.J. 

and filed a dependency petition. DCS also tested K.J.'s hair for substances, 

and the sample returned positive for methamphetamine. 

1 The termination petition alleges that during this dependency, 

Mother was provided "a full range of family reunification services to 

address her substance abuse issues." However, the evidence does not detail 

the dates or duration of the services offered, other than to confirm that 

Mother was offered some substance-abuse testing. 
SARAH B. v. DCS, K.J.

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 In March 2020, Mother attended the preliminary protective 

hearing where she received notice that failing to appear at future hearings 

could result in a waiver of her right to contest the factual allegations in the 

termination motion and a loss of her parental rights. At that hearing, the 

superior court set a case plan of severance and adoption and scheduled the 

initial termination hearing. DCS offered Mother services, including 

substance-abuse testing, a substance-abuse assessment, an intake at a 

behavioral health clinic, and parenting classes. Mother did not participate 

in any services, save for two in-person visits with K.J. Once the coronavirus 

pandemic began, DCS offered Mother video or phone visits, but she did not 

participate. 

¶5 The week after the preliminary protective hearing, DCS 

moved to terminate Mother's parental rights to K.J. under the substanceabuse and prior-removal grounds. When Mother failed to appear at the 

initial termination hearing on March 31, the superior court found that she 

lacked good cause for her absence and proceeded to take evidence on the 

termination motion. After the hearing, the court made findings consistent 

with the termination of Mother's parental rights on the grounds alleged. Six 

days later, Mother moved "for [a] good cause finding," arguing she 

mistakenly believed the court was closed due to the pandemic. K.J.'s 

guardian ad litem and DCS both responded to Mother's motion. 

¶6 On April 22, the superior court issued an order terminating 

Mother's parental rights.2 The next day, Mother appealed the termination 

order, and the superior court issued an order denying Mother's motion for 

good cause finding. On May 5, Mother appealed the court's order denying 

her motion. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-

120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 A parent's right to custody and control of her child, while 

fundamental, is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 

246, 248-49, ¶¶ 11-12 (2000). Severance of a parental relationship may be 

2 Although the order found Mother had received proper notice and 

service, it did not contain an explicit finding that Mother lacked good cause 

for her failure to appear. However, the parties did not raise the lack of 

findings as an issue on appeal. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 

Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 17 (App. 2004) ("[W]e will presume that the juvenile court 

made every finding necessary to support the severance order if reasonable 

evidence supports the order.").
SARAH B. v. DCS, K.J.

Decision of the Court

4

warranted where the state proves one statutory ground under A.R.S. 

§ 8-533 by "clear and convincing evidence." Id. "Clear and convincing"

means the grounds for termination are "highly probable or reasonably 

certain." Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284-85, ¶ 25 (2005). The court 

must also find that severance is in the child's best interest by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 284, ¶ 22.

¶8 This Court "will accept the juvenile court's findings of fact 

unless no reasonable evidence supports those findings, and we will affirm 

a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous." Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of 

Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). We do not reweigh the 

evidence but "look only to determine if there is evidence to sustain the 

court's ruling." Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 

(App. 2004). 

I. Good Cause.

¶9 On appeal, Mother asserts that the superior court erred in 

finding she lacked good cause for her failure to appear at the initial 

termination hearing.3 

¶10 Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 65(C)(6)(c)

gives the superior court discretion to sever a parent's parental rights based 

on the record and evidence presented if

the parent . . . had notice of the hearing, was properly served 

pursuant to Rule 64 and had been previously admonished 

regarding the consequences of failure to appear, including a 

warning that the hearing could go forward in the absence of 

the parent . . . and that failure to appear may constitute a 

waiver of rights and an admission to the allegations contained 

in the termination motion or petition . . . . 

To set aside the superior court's finding, Mother must show both good 

cause for her absence from the initial termination hearing and a meritorious 

defense to the petition for termination. Trisha A. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 247 

3 The superior court issued its ruling on the same day that Mother 

filed her notice of appeal from the termination order. See Aqua Mgmt., Inc. 

v. Abdeen, 224 Ariz. 91, 93, ¶ 7 n.3 (App. 2010) ("A trial court loses 

jurisdiction once the appeal is filed, unless the matter is in furtherance of 

the appeal."). Neither party raises this issue, and we therefore presume the 

superior court's ruling is in furtherance of the appeal. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 

103(F)(2).
SARAH B. v. DCS, K.J.

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5

Ariz. 84, 89, ¶ 19 (2019); Christy A. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 299, 

304, ¶ 16 (App. 2007). Good cause includes "mistake, inadvertence, surprise 

or excusable neglect," which exists if Mother's actions are those of "a 

reasonably prudent person in the same circumstances." Christy A., 217 Ariz. 

at 304, ¶ 16. "[D]iligence is the final arbiter of whether mistake or neglect is 

excusable." City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 332 (1985). A meritorious 

defense is "a good faith basis upon which to contend that the petitioner 

cannot prove a statutory basis for termination and/or that termination is 

not in the best interests of the child." Christy A., 217 Ariz. at 304, ¶ 15 n.11. 

It "must be established by facts and cannot be established through 

conclusions, assumptions or affidavits based on other than personal 

knowledge." Id. at 304-05, ¶ 16.

¶11 Regarding good cause, Mother asserted that she was 

"uncertain as to whether or not her hearing would go forward" due to the 

pandemic. She then called and checked the Yavapai County Courthouse 

website, which was closed, rather than the Juvenile Justice Center, which 

remained open. 

¶12 Although uncertainty is a reasonable response to the 

pandemic, Mother stopped short of taking reasonable actions to confirm 

whether her court hearing had indeed been canceled. She should have 

known the initial termination hearing location because she attended the 

preliminary protective hearing at the Juvenile Justice Center. There, she 

signed a "Form 3, Notice to Parent in Termination Action," which provided

the date, time, and location of the initial termination hearing and warned 

Mother that if she failed to attend "without good cause, the [juvenile court] 

may determine that [she had] waived [her] legal rights and admitted the 

grounds alleged in the motion/petition for termination." Mother was also 

personally served the termination motion and the notice of hearing 

containing the same information. 

¶13 Mother's counsel also attempted to secure Mother's presence 

at the hearing. Counsel texted Mother the day before the hearing to confirm 

that she was going to be there. Just before the hearing, counsel left Mother 

a voicemail and texted her the conference line telephone number so Mother 

could call into the hearing. A reasonable person would have confirmed the

hearing's status through the documents received in the case or through 

counsel. Mother did not do so and, therefore, has not demonstrated good 

cause for her absence. Because Mother lacked good cause for her absence, 

we affirm and do not need to address whether she established a meritorious 

defense. See Trisha A., 247 Ariz. at 89, ¶ 19.
SARAH B. v. DCS, K.J.

Decision of the Court

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II. Reasonable Efforts.

¶14 Mother argues that DCS did not provide her with the time or 

opportunity to participate in services. When seeking termination under the 

substance abuse and prior removal grounds, DCS is required to make a 

reasonable effort to provide the parent with appropriate reunification 

services. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(11)(b); Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 211 

Ariz. 450, 453, ¶ 12 (App. 2005). DCS meets this obligation by providing 

the parent with "the time and opportunity to participate in programs 

designed to help her become an effective parent." Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action 

No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). DCS is only obligated to 

provide services that have "a reasonable prospect of success." Mary Ellen C. 

v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 34 (App. 1999).

¶15 In the current dependency, DCS offered Mother substanceabuse testing and a substance-abuse assessment, which may have led to 

substance-abuse treatment. DCS also asked Mother to complete an intake 

at a behavioral-health clinic and begin parenting classes.4 At the 

preliminary hearing, Mother agreed to the services offered but did not 

partake in any of them. To be sure, Mother refused to engage in drug 

testing from the outset of the case, stating to DCS that she "completed 

enough negative [drug tests] in the previous dependency for [DCS] to know 

she is sober." Further, Mother participated in only a few visits with K.J. 

¶16 Mother argues she was not provided the time or opportunity 

to participate in reunification services in the current dependency because 

the court severed her parental rights so quickly. However, Mother's failure 

to appear at the initial hearing truncated the time she had to participate in 

services. Additionally, Mother was on notice from the preliminary 

protective hearing that the case plan was severance and adoption and that 

DCS would be filing a motion to terminate her parental rights within ten 

days of that hearing. She was notified that "[f]ailure to participate in 

reunification services may result in the termination of [her] parental rights,"

but made no effort to seek out or participate in services, especially those 

designed to address her substance abuse—the main issue preventing 

reunification. Id. (noting that DCS is not obligated to "undertake 

rehabilitative measures that are futile"); JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 353 (stating 

that DCS is not required to ensure that parents participate in services 

offered).

4 DCS agreed to offer Mother individual counseling, but it is unclear

whether DCS made that referral before Mother's rights were terminated. 
SARAH B. v. DCS, K.J.

Decision of the Court

7

III. Substance-Abuse Ground.

¶17 Mother next argues that no reasonable evidence supports the 

court's finding that she could not discharge her parental responsibilities 

due to chronic substance abuse. Mother cites a lack of positive drug tests 

or police reports in the record. 

¶18 The superior court may terminate a parent's parental rights 

when the parent cannot discharge parental responsibilities because of 

chronic abuse of dangerous drugs or controlled substances, and there are 

reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a 

prolonged indeterminate period. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). Substance abuse is 

chronic when it is long-lasting, but it need not be constant. Raymond F. v. 

Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 377, ¶ 16 (App. 2010). Accordingly, a 

parent's "temporary abstinence from drugs and alcohol does not outweigh 

[a] significant history of abuse or [a] consistent inability to abstain during 

[the] case." Id. at 379, ¶ 29. The juvenile court may consider a parent's prior 

substance abuse in evaluating whether it will continue for a prolonged 

indeterminate period. Jennifer S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287, 

¶ 20 (App. 2016). "This evidence include[s] the length and frequency of 

Mother's substance abuse, the types of substances abused, behaviors 

associated with the substance abuse, prior efforts to maintain sobriety, and 

prior relapses." Id.

¶19 When Mother failed to appear without good cause at the 

initial termination hearing, she admitted the termination motion's factual 

allegations. Those allegations, along with the remaining record, constitute 

reasonable evidence supporting the court's findings under the substanceabuse ground. 

¶20 The evidence demonstrates that Mother's substance abuse is 

chronic. She has abused substances for over three years. Indeed, K.J. was 

born substance exposed to opiates, methadone, and benzodiazepine. At 

K.J.'s birth, Mother acknowledged a lengthy history of heroin use. Due in 

part to Mother's substance abuse, K.J. was in DCS custody from April 2017 

to March 2019. During that time, Mother submitted positive drug tests. 

Although Mother achieved some sobriety during late 2019, as evidenced by 

her regaining custody of K.J., it did not last. 

¶21 Mother overdosed in December 2019, and first responders 

found fentanyl in her home. Mother claimed her overdose was due to her 

sister blowing fentanyl smoke in her face. Two months later, police 

conducted a traffic stop and noted several signs suggesting that Mother was 
SARAH B. v. DCS, K.J.

Decision of the Court

8

under the influence. Police found drug paraphernalia in the center console 

of the car.

5 During this encounter, Mother admitted to overdosing a few 

days prior, requiring friends "to use Narcan to bring her back to life." 

Despite this, Mother refused drug testing and did not complete a substanceabuse assessment, which could have assisted service providers in 

recommending treatment for her. 

¶22 Reasonable evidence also supports the court's finding that 

Mother was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities. During the

traffic stop in which Mother appeared under the influence, K.J. was in the 

car. Her car seat was not buckled in properly and was "loose enough to be 

taken out of the vehicle." Just after this incident, K.J. tested positive for 

methamphetamine. 

¶23 Mother next argues the superior court impermissibly shifted 

the burden of proof to her because, after taking evidence at the initial 

termination hearing, the court stated that "there was no confirmation that 

mother has remedied her substance abuse issue." The court's statement was 

couched in its observation that Mother had not submitted to drug testing. 

Regardless, Mother's argument is not persuasive, and the court's statement 

is not part of its final, written order. See Logan B. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 244 

Ariz. 532, 538, ¶ 18 (App. 2018) (noting that one purpose of written findings 

is to prompt judges to consider their decisions carefully); United Cal. Bank, 

140 Ariz. at 308. 

IV. Best Interests.

¶24 Mother also challenges the superior court's finding that 

severance was in K.J.'s best interests. In addition to finding a statutory 

ground for termination, the superior court must determine by a 

preponderance of the evidence whether termination is in the child's best 

interests. Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 22. Once the court finds a parent unfit 

under at least one statutory ground for termination, "the interests of the 

parent and child diverge," and the court proceeds to balance the unfit 

parent's "interest in the care and custody of his or her child . . . against the 

independent and often adverse interests of the child in a safe and stable 

5 Mother asserts that the court incorrectly stated at the hearing that 

police found drugs during the traffic stop. Mother is correct. However, the 

court's statement is not part of its final, written order, and we do not 

consider it. United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 140 Ariz. 238, 308 

(App. 1983) ("Appeals lie from findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

judgments, not from ruminations of the trial judge."). 
SARAH B. v. DCS, K.J.

Decision of the Court

9

home life." Id. at 286, ¶ 35. "[A] determination of the child's best interest 

must include a finding as to how the child would benefit from a severance 

or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship." Maricopa Cnty. Juv. 

Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990). Courts "must consider the totality 

of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination, 

including the child's adoptability and the parent's rehabilitation." Alma S. 

v. Dep't of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 148, ¶ 1 (2018). 

¶25 Mother specifically argues that the court's finding is not 

supported by a preponderance of the evidence because DCS "made only a 

negligible effort to provide services to Mother for only a few short weeks 

before seeking" termination. Although the superior court must consider a 

parent's rehabilitation efforts as part of the best-interests analysis, it must 

not "subordinate the interests of the child to those of the parent once a 

determination of unfitness has been made." Id. at 151, ¶ 15. As discussed 

in Section II, Mother made almost no effort to seek out or participate in 

services, weighing against her in a best-interest analysis. Moreover, the 

superior court found that severance would further the adoption plan by 

providing K.J. with permanency and stability because she is in an adoptive 

placement who is meeting her needs. These findings are supported by 

reasonable evidence in the record. 

CONCLUSION

¶26 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.