GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Ranking Minority Member,

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug

Policy, and Human Resources,

Committee on Government Reform,

House of Representatives

September 2000 H-1B FOREIGN

WORKERS

Better Controls

Needed to Help

Employers and

Protect Workers

GAO/HEHS-00-157

Page 1 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 40

Appendix II: Labor’s Technical Skill Grants and Examples of

NSF Grants Awarded 42

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Labor 45

Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of State 52

Appendix V: Comments From the Immigration and

Naturalization Service 54

Appendix VI: Comments From the National Science Foundation 58

Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 60

Tables Table 1: H-1B Investigations, Violations, and Back Wages Due 22

Table 2: Labor’s Technical Skill Grants Awarded, February 2000 42

Figures Figure 1: New H-1B Nonimmigrants Approved, Fiscal Year

1992-Fiscal Year 1999 8

Figure 2: Summary of H-1B Visa Approval Process 9

Figure 3: Occupations for New H-1B Visas, Fiscal Year 1999 15

Figure 4: Age Distribution of Workers Approved for H-1B Visas,

Fiscal Year 1999 16

Figure 5: Countries of Birth for New H-1B Visa Approvals, Fiscal

Year 1999 17

Abbreviations

ACWIA American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act

ETA Employment and Training Administration

FLSA Fair Labor Standards Act

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service

IT information technology

LCA Labor Condition Application

NSF National Science Foundation

WHD Wage and Hour Division
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Page 3 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Health, Education, and

Human Services

B-283330 Letr

September 7, 2000

The Honorable Patsy T. Mink

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

Dear Ms. Mink:

A strong national economy depends, in part, on employers’ ability to hire

workers with the necessary skills to perform needed tasks. Without these

workers, American businesses may be unable to sustain the economic

performance that has improved the quality of life for many Americans. The

information technology (IT) industry, in particular, is a driving force behind

current and future U.S. economic growth, and the Bureau of Labor

Statistics projects that the demand for workers with certain IT skills will

double over the next 10 years. Employers in the IT industry have expressed

concerns about not being able to fill their many vacancies. To help U.S.

employers in IT and other industries fill their needs for highly skilled

workers, the H-1B visa program allows employers to temporarily (for up to

6 years) fill needs in specialty occupations with foreign workers. Under the

law, H-1B workers must be employed in specialty occupations and have

suitable credentials for the job, and their employers must meet certain

labor conditions, including paying comparable wages.1 These requirements

are intended to ensure that American workers are not adversely affected.

The number of foreign workers legally authorized to enter the United

States annually through the H-1B program has increased substantially—

from 65,000 in 1992 to 115,000 in 1999 and 2000. Some believe the limit

should be raised even further to address workforce needs, such as for IT

workers. However, others question whether enough is being done to

increase the skills of American workers so they can fill these vacancies.

1

Under the H-1B program, specialty occupations are those requiring theoretical and

practical application of a body of specialized knowledge and the attainment of a bachelor’s

or higher degree (or its equivalent) in the specific specialty. These can be in a range of fields

from architecture, engineering, and mathematics to medicine, education, theology, and the

arts. Comparable wages are those being received by U.S. workers in similar positions in the

same area.
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Also, some employers are dissatisfied with how the Department of Labor

and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) administer the H-1B

program.2 Finally, reports of program misuse—such as employers paying

workers less than comparable wages or employees using false

credentials—have led to questions about whether the program adequately

serves employers or protects workers.

Because of these concerns, you asked us to provide information on the

H-1B program’s implementation and implications for the American

workforce—specifically (1) the jobs that H-1B workers are filling in the

United States and the characteristics of those workers, (2) the adequacy of

the H-1B visa program’s implementation and enforcement, and (3) efforts

underway to improve IT skills in the American workforce. To answer these

questions, we obtained and independently analyzed newly collected INS

data on approved H-1B workers’ characteristics; observed and evaluated

application processing at several INS and Labor offices around the country;

obtained and evaluated available processing data; and discussed the

program’s history, current operations, and limitations with INS, Labor,

State, and National Science Foundation (NSF) officials, employer and

employee associations representing numerous IT employees and

employers, the IT industry and users of the H-1B program, and 13 individual

employers, primarily in the IT industry. We conducted our work in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards

between August 1999 and July 2000. (See app. I for a full discussion of our

scope and methodology.)

Results in Brief Employers have used the H-1B visa program to fill hundreds of thousands

of positions in which certain skills, including computer programming,

engineering, education, and medicine, were needed quickly. According to

INS data, about 60 percent of the positions that new workers were

approved to fill in fiscal year 1999 were related to IT. Workers approved for

H-1B visas were scheduled to fill positions that offered initial median

annual salaries of $45,000. The workers had a median age of about 28 years

at the time of approval, and almost half were born in India. About 40

percent of them were already in the United States on another type of visa.

Those workers approved for H-1B visas in IT-related occupations differed

somewhat from other H-1B workers in that they were less likely to have an

2

The Department of State also has a role in issuing the visas, as discussed later.
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advanced degree, were younger, more likely to be from India, and less

likely to be in the United States on another type of visa when approved for

the H-1B program.

Despite the H-1B program’s success at helping employers bring in highly

skilled foreign workers, Labor’s limited legal authority to enforce the

program’s requirements and weaknesses in INS’ program administration

leave the program vulnerable to abuse. Delays and administrative problems

have also led to inefficient service for employers using the program. Under

the law, in certifying employers’ initial requests for H-1B workers, Labor is

limited to ensuring that the employer’s application form has no obvious

errors or omissions. It does not have the authority to verify whether

information provided by employers on labor conditions, such as wages to

be paid, is correct. Moreover, some of this same information is reviewed

again by INS during its assessment of employer requests for workers.

Further, Labor has limited authority to ensure that employers are actually

complying with the law’s requirements after the H-1B workers are

employed in the United States. Unlike under other labor laws it enforces,

Labor generally cannot initiate enforcement actions (such as conducting

investigations and subpoenaing employer records), even if it believes

employers are violating the law. We have included two matters for

congressional consideration to address Labor’s limited authority under the

law. Labor disagreed with our matter concerning the transfer of LCA review

to INS, arguing that consideration should be given to making Labor’s

review more substantive. Unless the Congress decided to authorize a more

substantive review, transfer to INS would be more efficient. Labor agreed

with our second matter to broaden Labor’s enforcement authority for the

H-1B program.

INS is responsible for ensuring that H-1B positions are in fact specialty

occupations and that workers granted entry are qualified for those

positions. Until recently, INS had no national systematic approach for

adjudicators to follow to ensure the consistent review of employer

petitions. Further, INS staff conducting these reviews continue to lack easy

access to specific, case-related information that would help them assess

the merit of employers’ requests, which can also lead to inconsistent or

incorrect approvals of requests. Because existing supervisory review and

performance appraisal systems for INS staff reviewing petitions are based

largely on the number of requests processed, rather than the quality of the

review, staff can be rewarded for timely handling of petitions rather than

for careful scrutiny of petitions’ merits. As a result, there is not sufficient

assurance that INS reviews are adequate for detecting program
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noncompliance or abuse. In addition, INS decisions about the priority of H1B application processing related to other types of petitions handled by INS

have resulted in delays of several months to process employers’ requests

for H-1B workers. Other system weaknesses at INS have contributed to

errors in counting the number of visas approved under the H-1B visa

program. We make three recommendations designed to enhance the

consistency and correctness of INS’ H-1B decisions. INS generally did not

agree with our recommendations, believing that current program

procedures are sufficient to detect noncompliance and abuse. We continue

to believe that actions beyond those taken by INS are warranted.

To enhance U.S. workers’ ability to fill IT positions, Labor and NSF are

working to improve the IT skills of the U.S. workforce. The IT employers

we contacted told us that they are also trying to improve U.S. workers’ IT

skills and identified a variety of short-term methods, such as retraining new

or existing employees, to provide U.S. workers with the needed skills. On a

longer-term basis, IT employers reported using a variety of programs to

encourage U.S. students to pursue IT careers, such as providing computer

training and mentoring for students in elementary and secondary schools.

Efforts by Labor and NSF, funded through fees paid by employers wishing

to use the H-1B program, include training grants and scholarships. These

efforts should help increase the number of U.S. workers with IT skills.

However, their ultimate effect is unknown because the programs are new,

their focus is longer-term, and in some cases, there is a lack of data about

what IT skills are needed.

Background The H-1 nonimmigrant category was created under the Immigration and

Nationality Act of 1952 (P.L. 82-414) to assist U.S. employers needing

workers temporarily. The Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649) amended

the law by, among other things, creating the H-1B category for

nonimmigrants who are sought to work in specialty occupations, and

fashion models “of distinguished merit and ability.”3 Unlike most temporary

worker visa categories, H-1B workers can intend both to work temporarily

and to immigrate permanently at some future time.

No limit existed on the number of specialty occupation visas that could be

granted until 1990. Through the Immigration Act of 1990, the Congress set a

3

The rest of the report focuses on only the specialty workers.
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yearly limit of 65,000 for H-1B visas alone, which took effect in fiscal year

1992. In an effort to help employers access skilled foreign workers and

compete internationally, in 1998 the Congress enacted the American

Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act (P.L. 105-277, Title IV)

(ACWIA), which increased the limit to 115,000 for fiscal years 1999 and

2000, and 107,500 for fiscal year 2001. The limit is scheduled to revert to

65,000 in fiscal year 2002. The number of visas approved did not reach the

annual limit until fiscal year 1997 (see fig. 1), and exceeded the limit in

fiscal year 1999 by more than 20,000.4 In March 2000, INS stopped accepting

new petitions for fiscal year 2000, believing it had received enough to reach

the limit. Legislation has been introduced in the Congress to further

increase the number of H-1B workers authorized to enter the United States

or to eliminate the limitation entirely.5

4

A consulting firm hired by INS estimated that INS approved between 21,888 and 23,385

more visas than were authorized for 1999, due to problems with the computerized tracking

system. Because the same system and approach were used to count approvals in previous

years, it is unknown whether INS exceeded the authorized amount in previous years.

5

The following H-1B bills are pending before the Congress: S. 2045, H.R. 3983, and H.R 4227.
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Figure 1: New H-1B Nonimmigrants Approved, Fiscal Year 1992-Fiscal Year 1999

Source: INS.

0

25,000

50,000

75,000

100,000

125,000

150,000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Nonimmigrants Approved

Annual Limit

Fiscal Year

New Nonimmigrants Approved
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An employer who wishes to hire an H-1B worker must follow several steps,

beginning with the submission of a labor condition application (LCA) to

Labor (see fig. 2).6

Figure 2: Summary of H-1B Visa Approval Process

Note: At each step of the process, the application/petition could be denied; employers have the ability

to resubmit their forms or appeal such decisions.

On the LCA, the employer must identify the number of workers requested

and the occupation and location(s) in which they will work, and show the

wages that they will receive. The employer must attest that

• the employment of H-1B workers will not adversely affect the working

conditions of other workers similarly employed in the area;

• the H-1B workers will be paid wages that are no less than the higher of

the actual wage level paid by the employer to all others with similar

experience and qualifications for the specific employment or the

prevailing wage level for the occupational classification in the area of

intended employment;

• no strike, lockout, or work stoppage in the applicable occupational

classification was underway at the time the application was prepared;

• a copy of the application will be given to the H-1B worker; and

6

These procedures are followed whether an employer is requesting a visa for a new worker

or a renewal of a worker’s existing H-1B visa. The H-1B visa permits the worker to work only

for the employer who originally filed the request; if the worker changes employers, the new

employer must obtain new approval for the worker. Although there are limits on the number

of visas that can be approved each year, there are no limits on the number of LCAs that can

be submitted. According to Labor, it received over 300,000 LCAs in fiscal year 1999.
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• a copy of the application will be given to the employees’ bargaining

agent or, if there is no bargaining agent, will be posted for a 10-day

period to inform potentially affected workers of the application for an

H-1B worker. This helps to inform workers of their right to file

complaints if they do not believe the employer is complying with the

law.

The employer must maintain public files to support and document the

information attested to on the application.

In an effort to protect U.S. workers, ACWIA requires employers who are H1B dependent (generally those with a workforce consisting of at least 15

percent H-1B workers) to provide additional information and comply with

additional requirements regarding recruitment and layoff procedures.

These additional requirements, which will not apply to most applications

after September 30, 2001, have not gone into effect because, according to a

Labor official, implementing regulations are still awaiting organizational

approval.

After Labor approves the LCA, the employer then files a petition (referred

to as the I-129), along with the approved LCA with INS.7 The petition is

required to contain the necessary information to show that a bona fide job

exists and that the prospective H-1B worker has the requisite education

and work experience for the position. The employer must file a petition for

each H-1B worker. Information provided includes the type of business, the

employer’s income, the number of employees, and the prospective worker’s

educational background or work experience. INS staff review the petition

and LCA, ensuring that the petition information indicates that the labor

conditions on the LCA will be met, that a bona fide job exists for the

worker, and that the worker meets the qualifications for the designated

specialty occupation. With each petition, the employer submits a filing fee

of $110; ACWIA authorized an additional $500 fee to be used for skill

grants, scholarships, and other purposes (as discussed later), although

some types of employers are exempt from this.

7

The employer may send the petition to the INS service center with geographic jurisdiction

for the work location, or may request, with supporting justification, that one service center

have sole jurisdiction for processing all of its petitions, regardless of where the work site is

located. There are four INS service centers: Laguna Niguel, California; Lincoln, Nebraska;

Dallas, Texas; and St. Albans, Vermont.
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If the petition is approved, INS notifies the Department of State to issue a

visa for the worker. State’s consular officers abroad review these petitions

to assess the potential worker’s visa eligibility. The consular offices

generally interview the potential worker to decide whether to issue a visa,

and, if appropriate, do so. If the worker is already in the United States in

another visa status (such as a student), the worker applies to INS to change

the visa status. Petitions are approved for up to a 3-year period; employers

can apply for extensions, but H-1B workers are limited to a 6-year

maximum stay.

After the H-1B worker is employed, Labor and INS also have responsibility

for ensuring that the employer is complying with program requirements

and that both H-1B workers and their American counterparts are receiving

the protections guaranteed under the law. Labor’s Wage and Hour Division

(WHD) is the Labor entity responsible for enforcing a number of labor laws

governing wages and working conditions, including the Fair Labor

Standards Act (FLSA), which governs minimum wage, child labor, and

overtime pay. To assess compliance with FLSA as well as other laws, WHD

conducts on-site investigations based on a variety of criteria, obtains

records from employers (and may subpoena such records), and may cite

and fine an employer for noncompliance. It also surveys particular

industries and employers within them to obtain a baseline understanding of

compliance, then targets either employers or specific industries for further

investigations to address the most serious abuses. For the H-1B program,

WHD is responsible for ensuring that H-1B workers are actually working in

the occupation listed on the LCA and receiving the promised wages. INS is

responsible for detecting visa fraud across all visa categories and

conducting investigations based on a number of criteria. INS reviews

whether worker qualifications are appropriately represented, the employer

has provided a job for the worker, the employer is using the worker in the

specialty occupation, and whether the wage promised in the petition is

being paid. Enforcement authority includes citing and fining employers,

revoking the petition approval, seeking prosecution if criminal statutes are

violated, and possibly seeking the removal of aliens if violations are found.

Although employers are not required to prove a shortage of U.S. workers

exists in order to recruit H-1B workers, there has been a longstanding

debate about whether, in fact, sufficient numbers of U.S. workers with the

requisite skills to fill current IT vacancies are available. These debates have

led to numerous studies, but definitional and methodological problems in

these studies do not permit a conclusion as to the extent of any IT skill

shortage. Studies have estimated IT vacancies in the United States from
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190,000 to more than 700,000, but some studies define IT workers very

broadly whereas others focus on specific IT occupational clusters.

Moreover, the studies provide little information about these vacancies,

such as how long positions were vacant, whether sufficient wages to

attract workers were offered, or whether companies considered jobs filled

by contractors as vacancies. We, the Department of Commerce, and the

Computer Research Association (under an NSF grant) have reported that

more information is needed to characterize the IT labor market and

determine the extent of any shortage.8 In October 2000, NSF plans to report

its assessment of labor market needs for IT workers; however, according to

an NSF official, the report will provide anecdotal information rather than

empirical evidence.

This lack of data has caused some to be concerned about employers’

increasing use of the H-1B program. Associations representing U.S.

workers believe that IT employers have exaggerated the need for foreign

workers, which could lead to a surplus of workers in certain occupations

and depress wages for all workers in the long term. Officials representing

these associations cite instances in which IT employers have hired

younger, temporary foreign workers with narrowly focused skills rather

than older U.S. workers who could be retrained. They also note that if,

indeed, employers cannot find skilled U.S. workers, they could hire foreign

workers through permanent employment-based immigration programs.

However, this process requires documentation indicating a particular need

for each worker, and can take several years. Moreover, there are limits on

the number of such visas that can be granted each year.

The debate has also led to questions about whether enough has been done

to identify and train U.S. workers to fill IT vacancies. As a result, various

federal efforts have been implemented to improve the IT skill set of

workers.9 As noted above, the most recent legislation required most

employers wishing to use the H-1B program to pay a $500 fee that would

largely be used to fund two efforts to increase the skill set of American

8

See Information Technology: Assessment of the Department of Commerce’s Report on

Workforce Demand and Supply (GAO/HEHS-98-106R, Mar. 20, 1998); U.S. Department of

Commerce, Office of Technology Policy/Technology Administration, The Digital Work

Force: Building Infotech Skills at the Speed of Innovation (Washington, D.C.: June 1999);

and Peter Freeman and William Aspray, The Supply of Information Technology Workers in

the United States (Washington, D.C.: Computing Research Association, 1999).

9

Labor noted that the H-1B fees build upon over $70 million in ongoing efforts since 1998 to

train workers in high-tech skills.
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workers. The first effort, administered by Labor, provides training through

skill grants. The second effort, administered by NSF, funds scholarships

through universities to encourage low-income students to enter fields of

computer science, engineering, and math. Of the total fees collected from

employers wishing to use the H-1B program, Labor will receive 56.3 percent

for the technical skill training grants and NSF will receive 28.2 percent for

scholarships. The legislation provides other uses for the remaining

amounts.10

Jobs Filled by and

Characteristics of H-1B

Workers

In the past, few accurate data have been made available about the jobs

filled by and characteristics of workers approved for H-1B visas. However,

in 1999, for the first time, INS compiled information on key characteristics

such as occupations, wages, degrees earned, and countries of birth from a

statistical sample of new H-1B visa approvals.11 INS has now begun to

regularly collect and analyze specific information on new H-1B workers, as

well as renewals, as required under ACWIA. It still lacks important

information on these workers, however, such as an accurate, unduplicated

count of approved H-1B workers who actually enter the United States on an

H-1B visa.

Demographics of Workers

Approved for H-1B Visas

In 1999, workers approved for H-1B visas were to fill a wide array of

specialty occupations. As shown in fig. 3, 59 percent of the visas were for

workers slated to work in IT-related occupations, including the large

10NSF will receive 4 percent for grants for math, engineering, or science enrichment courses,

and 4 percent for systemic reform efforts. Projected funding for these two efforts is

relatively small—$3 to $4 million annually for 3 years. Because there is no time limit for

expending the funds, NSF may use the funds at a later date when there is a larger amount of

funding available for each effort, but has already expended some funds for several small

projects. Another 1.5 percent is available for INS to carry out duties related to decreasing

the processing time for petitions and to carry out duties under ACWIA. Six percent is

available to Labor for decreasing the processing time for LCAs and investigating complaints.

11INS randomly sampled visa petitions and supporting documents for workers approved for

H-1B status that count against the 1999 limit. Details about the sampling and its results are

included in app. 1.
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category of systems analysis and programming.12 Another 5 percent were in

electrical or electronics engineering occupations, fields that may also be

related to computer development.13 The remaining visas were for

occupations in fields as diverse as college and university education,

accounting and auditing, biological sciences, economics, mechanical

engineering, medicine, and commercial art. INS has few historical data for

comparison, but in fiscal year 1992, about 6,000 H-1B visas were approved

for IT-related occupations—many fewer than the approximately 79,000

estimated to have been approved for IT-related occupations in fiscal year

1999.

12Because our estimates are based on samples, they are subject to sampling error. Our

estimates have a 2 percentage point (or less) confidence interval around each estimate.

There is a 95 percent chance that the actual value (whether dollars, ages, or percentage

estimates) falls within that interval.

13For example, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers’ most recent salary

survey data indicated that one-quarter of its members reported their area of technical

competency as computer-related, with specialties such as hardware development, software

development, and network administration.
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Figure 3: Occupations for New H-1B Visas, Fiscal Year 1999

Note: Totals do not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

Source: INS.

The majority—57 percent—of workers approved for new H-1B visas in

fiscal year 1999 had earned a bachelor’s degree as their highest degree,

while 41 percent had attained an advanced degree. The positions they were

scheduled to fill offered a median initial annual salary of $45,000. About 35

percent of those workers approved for IT-related occupations had

advanced degrees, as compared with 50 percent for those approved for the

remaining occupations.

Workers approved for new H-1B visas in 1999 had a median age of 28.3

years (see fig. 4); over 80 percent were younger than 35 years old. Those

workers approved for IT-related occupations were younger than their nonIT counterparts—a median age of 27.4 years, compared with 30.2 years.

54%

Systems Analysis and Programming

36%

Remaining Occupations

5%

Other IT-Related Occupations

5%

Electrical/Electronics Engineering
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Figure 4: Age Distribution of Workers Approved for H-1B Visas, Fiscal Year 1999

Source: INS.

Almost half of the workers approved for new H-1B visas in fiscal year 1999

were born in India, with the second highest number of workers born in

China (see fig. 5). In total, at least 119 countries were represented. Almost

three-quarters of the workers approved for IT-related occupations were

born in India, compared to 14 percent for those workers approved for nonIT-related occupations.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Under 20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-40 Over 40

Age

Percentage
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Page 17 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Figure 5: Countries of Birth for New H-1B Visa Approvals, Fiscal Year 1999

Source: INS.

About 42 percent of those workers approved for H-1B visas in 1999 were

already in the United States when their visas were approved. The majority

of those here were on student visas, while others were spouses or children

of foreign students, visitors, or other types of nonimmigrants. About onequarter of the workers scheduled to fill IT-related occupations were already

in the United States, which indicates that H-1B workers for IT-related

occupations are more likely than those in non-IT related occupations to be

recruited from outside the country.

48%

India

34%

Remaining 

9%

China

3%

United Kingdom

3%

Canada

3%

Philippines
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Additional Data Collection

Is Under Way, But Some

Data Are Still Unavailable

As required under ACWIA, INS has been collecting specific data on H-1B

visa petition approvals for fiscal year 2000. Although INS had previously

obtained some of these data on the petition or supporting documentation

(such as workers’ country of origin, educational levels, and wages to be

paid), it did not routinely analyze all of this information. It is now collecting

and analyzing this information in addition to other information, such as the

worker’s major or primary field of study and the employer’s industry code,

in an effort to shed light on characteristics of H-1B visa-holders and the

jobs they fill in the United States.

Preliminary data from new visa approvals as of February 29, 2000, mirror

the 1999 data. For example, nearly 50 percent of the petitions counting

against the annual limit—those for new workers—were for IT-related

occupations (as compared with 59 percent from 1999). INS also is finding

that about 60 percent of approvals not counting against the limit were for

IT-related occupations, indicating that workers in computer-related

occupations are more likely to extend their stay in the United States, move

between companies, or work concurrently for another employer than other

H-1B workers.

However, INS is still unable to determine the number of H-1B workers

approved in any given year who actually come to the United States. This

inability to accurately identify the number of workers who actually enter

the country on a particular visa or who stay in the country after their initial

term has ended, obtain a visa extension, or obtain permanent residency

extends beyond the H-1B program. For example, in 1998, about 13,000 H-1B

nonimmigrants became legal permanent residents, but there are no data on

how many returned to their home country, or stayed here illegally after

their H-1B visas expired.14 This is because INS has two systems that do not

interact with each other—one that tracks the number of visa petitions it

approves, and another that tracks nonimmigrants entering the country on

visas. Nonimmigrants may enter and leave the country several times during

the period of their visa but these entrances are not matched with the year

of approval, nor does INS attempt to eliminate repeat entrances in its

nonimmigrant system statistics. The Congress recognized the need for

better information on nonimmigrants entering and leaving the country and

14One estimate of the current H-1B population in the United States is 360,000. See B. Lindsay

Lowell, Ph.D., H-1B Temporary Workers: Estimating the Population (Washington, D.C.:

Georgetown University Institute for the Study of International Migration, Apr. 17, 2000),

http:/www.ieeeusa.org/grassroots/immreform/h1breport.pdf (cited Apr. 24, 2000).
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in 1996, through the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act, required INS to develop an automated entry/exit control

system that would provide better records on every individual arriving in or

departing the United States under a visa. It was anticipated that, by having

such records, INS would be able to link individual nonimmigrants with

their particular visa category. In June 2000, the Congress extended the full

implementation date for this system to December 31, 2005.

Implementation

Weaknesses Leave the

Program Vulnerable to

Abuse and Lead to

Inefficient Customer

Service

Labor has limited legal authority for questioning an LCA and initiating

enforcement actions, such as investigations, to address potential

noncompliance. Moreover, INS lacks the necessary program controls to

ensure that each petition is correctly reviewed in a timely manner. As a

result, the program is vulnerable to abuse—both by employers who do not

have bona fide jobs to fill or do not meet required labor conditions, and by

potential workers who present false credentials. In addition, employers

who meet H-1B requirements may not be able to obtain the H-1B workers

they need in a timely manner. Finally, systems weaknesses at INS also lead

to INS’ difficulty in accurately tracking the number of visas counted against

the annual limit.

Labor Has Limited Authority

to Question Information on

the LCA

Under the law, Labor’s Employment and Training Administration (ETA) has

7 days to decide whether to certify the conditions that an employer attests

to on the LCA.15 Because the law permits Labor to review the LCA “only for

completeness and obvious inaccuracies,” ETA cannot evaluate other types

of information, regardless of how questionable it may appear. As a result,

ETA approves most LCAs—93 percent in fiscal year 1999 (and, according to

a Labor official, many of the LCAs initially rejected were likely resubmitted

with changes and then approved). While this part of the H-1B application

process was established to require the employer to attest to the existence

of various labor conditions, the Congress wanted it to be as quick and

efficient as possible by limiting the depth and time frame of Labor’s review.

15Difficulties meeting the 7-day timeframe led to the development, in 1999, of a facsimile

process to speed up LCA processing. Machine malfunctions, and heavy workloads for

offices that still processed manually, continued to lead to processing times in excess of 7

days; in February 2000 we found that, in two offices, LCAs were processed in 12 and 13 days.

According to Labor, as of May 2000, the facsimile process had matured, and except during

malfunctions or maintenance, regional offices are processing the LCAs within the 7-day time

period.
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However, this statutory limitation means that Labor’s certification can do

little to ensure that employers are meeting required labor conditions. For

example, an employer must certify that no strike, lockout, or work

stoppage was under way at the time the LCA was prepared; however,

according to ETA officials, even if they find out through other means that a

strike is under way, they must approve the LCA. As another example, even

though employers may be required to pay H-1B workers a prevailing wage,

ETA officials said employers can use almost any source to determine a

prevailing wage and ETA does not have the authority to verify the

authenticity of the information unless officials can demonstrate that the

source is obviously inaccurate on its face. According to ETA officials, even

if they know a prevailing wage is incorrect, they must approve the LCA.

Once Labor has certified the LCA, the employer must provide it, along with

the petition, to INS. The petition includes some of the same information as

the LCA, and, as a part of its review, INS reviews information on both

documents (such as the wages to be paid). In that respect, the filing of the

LCA with Labor represents an additional step for employers that adds

additional effort and at least a week to H-1B processing time.

Labor Has Limited Authority

to Initiate Enforcement

Actions

Labor’s WHD has limited ability to ensure that H-1B employers comply with

their legal obligations and H-1B workers and their U.S. counterparts are

protected under the law. When authorized to investigate, WHD is

responsible, under the H-1B law, for ensuring that workers are receiving

the wages promised on the LCA and are working at the occupation and

location specified; it can only initiate H-1B-related investigations as a result

of one of three factors:

• A complaint is received from an aggrieved person or organization, such

as the H-1B worker, an American worker, or the employee bargaining

representative. Information that surfaces from ETA’s or INS’ review of

an employer’s information on an LCA or INS petition is prohibited under

the law from being used as a basis for compliance investigations. WHD

receives few complaints—135 in fiscal year 1999—yet about 137,000 H1B workers were approved that year. A Labor official told us that these

workers are reluctant to complain about their working conditions, as

they are dependent on employers to enable them to stay in the United

States or sponsor their permanent residency.

• WHD obtains information about a particular employer who, within the

last 5 years, has been found to have committed a willful failure to meet a

condition specified in the LCA or willfully misrepresented a material
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fact in the LCA. According to WHD officials, these criteria are very

difficult to meet in order to sustain legal challenges by employers and, to

date, WHD has only established one employer as a “willful” violator.

• WHD receives specific credible information from a reliable source

(other than a complainant) that the employer has failed to meet certain

specified LCA conditions, has engaged in a pattern or practice of failures

to meet such conditions, or has committed a substantial failure to meet

such conditions that affects multiple employees.16 The Secretary of

Labor must personally certify that these conditions exist. WHD has yet

to receive any specific credible information that could justify an

investigation under the Secretary’s special authority.

These limitations contrast with WHD’s enforcement authority under other

worker protection laws, in particular, FLSA. As mentioned earlier, under

FLSA, WHD can initiate inspections on a variety of criteria to determine

potential noncompliance. It can survey industries to obtain a baseline

measure of the extent of compliance. It can then use that information to

target either employers or specific industries for further investigations,

thereby directing its investigation resources to eliminate the greatest

program abuses. Further, WHD during investigations can subpoena the

necessary records from employers, such as payroll documents, to

determine whether employers are paying the appropriate wages. Under the

H-1B program, however, WHD has no authority to perform these activities.

In many ways H-1B workers are different from workers covered under

FLSA, which affects WHD’s ability to use other laws to ensure H-1B

workers receive their legal protections. First, FLSA’s protections are

focused on workers who are lower paid, which H-1B workers generally are

not. Second, WHD investigators are more likely to investigate companies

that have many lower-paid workers, which are not the typical companies

that use H-1B visa workers. Finally, during investigations, WHD

investigators would not likely know which employers are H-1B workers

because that kind of documentation is not typically available during

investigations. However, in a very important way, H-1B workers are very

much like workers covered under FLSA; according to a Labor official, H-1B

workers may be vulnerable to abuse since their dependency upon their

employers may lead to reluctance to complain, not unlike those workers

protected under FLSA. As a result, according to WHD officials, the original

16The source may not be an officer or employee of Labor unless the information was lawfully

obtained while conducting another investigation under this or another act.
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assumption that enforcement for H-1B workers could be complaint-driven

has not held true.

Although its authority to investigate is limited, there is evidence to believe

that program noncompliance under the H-1B program exists. For example,

even though there has not been a large number of complaints, WHD is

significantly more likely to find violations in H-1B complaint cases than in

complaint cases under other laws, according to WHD officials. As shown in

table 1, over the last 4 1/2 years, 83 percent of the closed H-1B

investigations found violations−compared to about 40 to 60 percent under

other labor laws, according to Labor officials, and the amount of back

wages owed to H-1B workers has been substantial—over $2 million, or

about $3,800 per employee found to have back wages due.

Table 1: H-1B Investigations, Violations, and Back Wages Due

Source: WHD, Department of Labor.

a

Through April 30, 2000.

Finally, according to WHD officials, there are increasing instances of

program abuse in which workers are brought into the United States to

work, but are not employed and receive no pay until jobs are available

(often called “benching”). Other violations have included employers

withholding wages from employees who have voluntarily left for

employment elsewhere. WHD’s investigative findings are corroborated by a

1996 Labor Inspector General report that found 75 percent of the aliens

were working for employers who did not adequately document the proper

wage on the LCA and, when the actual wage could be determined, 19

Fiscal year Investigations completed Back wages due

Total

Violations

(number)

Violations

(percentage) Investigations

Amount due

(dollars)

Number of

employees involved

1996 24 22 92 20 $335,454 36

1997 16 14 88 14 149,458 33

1998 24 20 83 17 365,840 90

1999 32 24 75 19 361,534 206

2000a 35 29 83 29 1,168,154 255

Total 131 109 83 99 $2,380,440 620
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percent of the H-1B workers were paid less than the wage specified on the

LCA.17

Procedures at INS Could

Lead to Potential Abuse

INS staff, called adjudicators, review employers’ petitions and decide

whether to approve the nonimmigrants’ H-1B visa classifications. They

review the petitions and supporting documentation to determine whether

bona fide jobs exist for the H-1B workers—that is, jobs that meet the

requirements of a specialty occupation. They also are supposed to

determine whether the petition indicates that the qualifications of the

prospective H-1B workers meet the statutory requirements—for example,

that they have a bachelor’s or higher degree (or its equivalent) in the

specific specialty. They also compare the information on the petition with

that provided on the Labor-certified LCA. During our review, we found that

adjudicators did not have a systematic approach for reviewing petitions.

INS recently implemented national standard operating procedures with

criteria for adjudicators to follow. Adjudicators continue to lack easy

access to case-related information that could help them make decisions

about the merit of the petitions. We found that the supervisory review and

performance appraisal processes give adjudicators incentives to approve

petitions. These procedures leave the program susceptible to abuse. We

also found that decisions on work priority at the various service centers

have led to delays of several months in reviewing employers’ H-1B visa

petitions.

Until Recently, INS Lacked a

National Systematic Approach

for Petition Review

Before August 2000, INS had no national systematic approach for how

adjudicators at all four INS service centers were to determine whether an

employer’s request for workers should be approved. Service center officials

and adjudicators said that although they initially received national-based

training, and there were center-based standard operating procedures, this

training or center-based guidance did not provide them the kind of practical

information they needed to assess petitions. In interviews with

adjudicators and observations of them performing reviews, we found major

differences among and within the different centers in how adjudicators

decide which petitions to approve.

17U.S. Department of Labor Inspector General, The Department of Labor’s Foreign Labor

Certification Programs: The System Is Broken and Needs to Be Fixed, Report No. 06-96-002-

03-321 (Washington, D.C.: May 22, 1996).
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For example, at one service center, employers were required to provide a

report from an independent agency that specializes in evaluating the

educational or work credentials of foreign workers; other service centers

we visited did not have such a requirement. Moreover, even within the

service center that required these reports, one adjudicator said that she

would not accept reports from a particular agency, while another

adjudicator said that he would accept this agency’s reports. Also, an

adjudicator at one center said that, because of her experience in the hightechnology field, she questions whether certain IT occupations should be

considered specialty occupations under the H-1B program, and she would

apply this belief to her review of petitions. Adjudicators at other centers

accepted these occupations more readily.

We also found a wide range of views among the service centers as to

whether and how adjudicators may request additional information from an

employer to assess the merit of the petition.18 Adjudicators at each service

center said they were not sure whether the law allowed them to request

additional information, especially concerning whether a bona fide job

exists and, as a result, were reluctant to do so. However, an adjudicator at

one service center said that an adjudicator can request any information he

or she believes is necessary to assess whether such jobs exist and has

instructed adjudicators on how to obtain this information from employers.

INS headquarters officials said these differences may result from

adjudicators’ discretion, or from differences in petitions that may not be

initially apparent. However, it acknowledged that gains could be made in

the efficiency and consistency of reviews and, in August 2000, implemented

a 75-page set of national standard operating procedures that established a

systematic approach for adjudicators to use when reviewing H-1B

petitions. INS officials said that, in conjunction with these new procedures,

it conducted national training at all centers on the H-1B program. The

standard operating procedures lay out the basic steps that adjudicators

should follow when reviewing petitions, and explain the types of

documentation that should accompany the petition. The procedures

require adjudicators to document why they denied a petition or why they

believed additional information was necessary. The implementation of

these procedures should help all adjudicators understand what steps they

18INS headquarters officials said that adjudicators request additional information on about

15 percent of nonimmigrant worker petitions they review, based on unofficial local service

center management reports. (These data are not collected in any of INS’ national systems.)
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should follow to assess the merit of petitions. However, the procedures do

not clearly detail how adjudicators will address several of the issues we

identified, such as how an adjudicator will decide on the sufficiency or

accuracy of the documentation provided, or the criteria for, or situations

under which, an adjudicator should request additional documentation from

an employer or deny a petition. Moreover, the procedures do not require

any documentation of the process used by adjudicators to approve a

petition, which account for the vast majority of petitions reviewed. Without

some explanation of those cases that are approved, it is difficult for

supervisory reviewers to determine whether adjudicators actually took the

appropriate steps when approving petitions. According to INS, the

procedures will continue to evolve to address adjudicators’ needs.

INS has also begun to compile relevant decisions in H-1B court cases that

will help adjudicators make decisions consistent with past, binding cases.

While these cases are helpful, service center officials noted that they would

like better training on how to use judicial precedents and how to word

requests for additional information that would improve adjudicators’

effectiveness.

Case-Specific Information That

Could Help Adjudicators Is Not

Easily Accessible

Adjudicators commented that they do not have easy access to case-specific

information developed by other INS officials that would help them better

determine whether a petition should be approved. As INS’ information

systems now operate, information that supports petition denials, such as

evidence of a fraudulent employer or falsified worker credentials, is either

not available to adjudicators, or not available in a manner that is easily

accessible for adjudicators, given the timeframes in which they must

review petitions. Information that a petition has been denied is initially

only available to adjudicators within the same service center. After a

month, it is uploaded to a central system and is available to adjudicators in

all centers, but can be accessed only through a complicated, timeconsuming process. Even if an adjudicator accesses the information, the

reason for the denial is not recorded in the automated file, so the

adjudicator cannot readily use the information to assess a petition from the

same employer or for the same potential employee. As a result, a petition

previously submitted and denied can be approved by another adjudicator,

even if the denying adjudicator determined that the employer does not

meet H-1B requirements. According to an INS official, in addition to

information developed by adjudicators, results of INS investigations of

employers already approved for H-1B workers are not readily available to

adjudicators on the information system. Adjudicators noted that they are

under pressure to adjudicate cases quickly and, unless the information is
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accessible on an automated basis, they do not have time to review it. Such

information is sometimes available from service center staff who focus on

fraud investigations, but adjudicators and fraud staff at the centers

explained that because of the fraud staff’s many responsibilities and

adjudicators’ time pressures, adjudicators would not routinely use

investigations staff to look into potentially fraudulent petitions.

Officials at INS headquarters acknowledged that adjudicators need timely,

accurate, and accessible information in order to properly assess the merit

of petitions. These officials said that INS is in the process of stabilizing and

upgrading the petition-tracking computer system to correct some other

problems and believes that the upgrade could enable them to make better

information available on-line for adjudicators.

Supervisory Review and

Performance Appraisal

Processes Encourage Approvals

The process for assessing adjudicators’ performance can give adjudicators

an incentive to approve petitions rather than scrutinize them carefully for

their merit. Currently, supervisors are required to routinely review only

denials and any requests that adjudicators might make for additional

information. They generally do not review approvals, which represent

about 91 percent of petitions reviewed for all nonimmigrant employment

visas. As a result, in order to reduce the amount of supervisory review, an

adjudicator may approve petitions rather than deny them. Further,

according to service center officials, INS’ current performance appraisal

system for adjudicators is based on the number of petitions reviewed, not

the quality of the review. They said that staff who process the greatest

number of petitions are generally rewarded over those who tend to assess

petitions more critically and, therefore, review fewer petitions in a given

time period. They added that while adjudicators understand that their

responsibility is to carefully review petitions, the performance appraisal

system provides disincentives to deny a petition or request additional

information because of the additional time it will take to reach a decision.

INS headquarters officials explained that the absence of a quality measure

in performance appraisals reflects the difficulty of implementing a

reasonable measure, not an encouragement of production over quality. INS

officials said that, at various times, INS has experimented with including a

quality measure in the adjudicator performance work plan but the various

approaches have had significant drawbacks.

Implications of Inadequate INS

Adjudication

The combination of the lack of guidance in particular areas, difficulties in

accessing case-related information, and the performance assessment

procedures have left the program vulnerable to program noncompliance

and abuse by potentially allowing H-1B petitions that do not meet
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requirements to be approved. There is evidence that some employers and

workers have tried to abuse the program. INS investigators following up

after petitions have been approved have found a number of instances of

program fraud in the program. For example, INS has found workers

brought to the United States under the program who worked in

occupations that did not qualify as H-1B occupations; it has also identified

employers who have created shell corporations and created false

credentials and documents for aliens who were not eligible for H-1B

employment. In 1998 and 1999, INS referred petitions to the State consular

post in Chennai, India, if they had certain fraud indicators, such as a degree

from a university often used in forged degrees. State found that of the 3,247

petitions referred through March 31, 1999, close to 45 percent of claims

made on these petitions were of questionable validity and 21 percent of the

work experience claims made to INS were fraudulent.19

In addition to eliminating potential program noncompliance or fraud, INS’

review of petitions needs to be effective for several other reasons. First,

INS typically does not verify whether the workers it approves actually work

in the jobs for which it approved the petitions and, according to INS

officials, detection of visa fraud after petitions have been approved is not

an investigative priority because limited special agent resources are, of

necessity, primarily devoted to criminal activities. Second, the State

Department’s consular offices are generally required to interview each

applicant, but can waive this requirement when the consular office is

satisfied (based on a review of the application) that the applicant qualifies

for a visa. It relies on INS to ensure that petition information related to U.S.

employers is correct. One State Department foreign officer said he assumes

that Labor and INS, respectively, have satisfied themselves on these issues

before approving the LCAs and petitions. Third, we believe that because

the number of visas that may be issued for H-1B workers each year is

limited, there should be procedures in place to ensure that these visas are

granted judiciously and correctly so that those eligible for the program

have access to the limited visas.

The procedures can also lead to inconsistent reviews across and within

service centers that frustrate employers and prospective workers alike.

One adjudicator told us that she had denied a petition, and when the

19This effort involved INS service center staff screening petitions for H-1B visas slated for

issuance from the Chennai post, the most heavily used consular post. State staff at the post

then attempted to validate the prospective workers’ work experience or credentials.
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employer resubmitted it without modifications, another adjudicator at the

same center approved it.

INS’ Prioritization Decisions

Lead to Delays for H-1B

Processing

Before February 2000, INS had an established time frame of 30 days within

which adjudicators should start their review of H-1B petitions.20 At that

time INS increased the time frame to initiate H-1B petition review to 60

days. According to INS officials, the revision in processing times was an

effort to balance priorities and workloads at the service centers. At that

time, processing times on other types of petitions, which make up the

majority of petitions INS reviews, had grown to a year or more.21

As a result of this decision, at one service center we found petitions waiting

in a file room for 2 months or more before being distributed to adjudicators

for review. Moreover, we found in April 2000 that the four centers were

exceeding the 60-day time frame, taking anywhere from 45 to 70 days to

start reviewing petitions. According to INS headquarters officials, however,

as of August 2000, the service centers were generally taking 60 days or less

to process petitions.

Although INS’ decision was made to address greater priorities, it

nonetheless has led to delays for employers using the H-1B program, and,

according to employers, has affected their ability to staff projects when

workers are needed. Employers said that, although the time it takes to hire

an H-1B worker varies, the LCA and INS petition process can exceed 4

months.

Systems Problems at INS

Led to Inaccurate H-1B Visa

Count

In 1999, INS discovered that it had approved more than the allowable

number of H-1B visas for fiscal year 1999. Recognizing the need to

determine the extent of the overage, INS engaged KPMG Consulting, LLC,

to estimate the number of H-1B petitions approved by INS that applied to

the 1999 limit, document the current H-1B petition-processing

environment, and identify potential improvements to the process. KPMG

found that INS approved between 136,888 and 138,385 petitions—well over

20This time frame represents the time between when the petition arrives at the service

center and when an adjudicator actually begins reviewing it. Some petitions are decided on

immediately; others take longer because they are investigated further or the adjudicator

requests more information.

21According to INS, of the 2.5 million petitions and applications it processes each year, about

500,000 are for nonimmigrant workers.
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the limit of 115,000. KPMG also found that the computer system that tracks

the H-1B petitions was not designed to count petitions against the annual

limit. It found that the computer system needs the capability to accumulate

accurate and current H-1B information, identify individuals who submit

multiple petitions with slight variations in biographical data and count

them only once against the cap, and, in general, support the generation of

an accurate and timely H-1B count. KPMG made a series of

recommendations to INS to improve the accuracy of the count, and INS is

in the process of analyzing and incorporating these suggestions.

Efforts Are Under Way

To Improve IT Skills of

U.S. Workforce

Labor and NSF have taken several steps to improve the IT skills of the U.S.

workforce, as have IT employers. Labor and NSF’s efforts have recently

provided millions of dollars in grants to institutions to train workers or

provide scholarships, respectively, to increase the number of American

workers with IT skills. While these efforts may over time help increase the

number of American workers with IT skills, their ultimate effect is

unknown given their recent start, their long-term focus and, in some cases,

the lack of data on specific IT skills needed. In the short term, some

employers say they train existing workers or new employees, while in the

long term, they reported that they are encouraging students to pursue IT

careers.

Labor Has Provided $41.5

Million in Skill Grants

In February 2000, Labor provided $12.4 million to nine grantees to train

employed and unemployed workers for high-skill occupations that are in

demand. In July 2000, Labor announced the second of three rounds of

demonstration grants and awarded $29.1 million to 12 grantees for training

American workers for high-skill jobs in areas where companies are facing

labor shortages.22 ACWIA, which mandated the skill grants, did not specify

what occupations the skill grants should target. As a result, Labor used as a

proxy those occupations for which employers requested H-1B workers.

Given that accurate data on H-1B approvals did not exist at that time, in its

August 16, 1999, Federal Register notice, Labor provided a list of the

occupations requested on LCAs from October 1, 1998, to May 31, 1999. The

LCA data showed health care and IT as the two industries most frequently

using the H-1B program. Labor officials noted that the actual number of

22More funds are available; ACWIA permits these funds to remain available until expended.

Labor estimated nearly $80 million in fees received through the H-1B visa program would be

available to invest in high-skill training in 2000.
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occupations shown by LCA data was flawed because, for example, some

openings certified on the LCAs for anticipated employment do not actually

get filled.23 Moreover, Labor’s criteria for assessing the merits of each

proposal were based largely on characteristics of typical job training

program quality factors, such as service delivery strategy, target

population, and outcomes. Of the possible total points, 20 percent were

assigned for local needs for the first round and 15 percent were assigned

for the second round.

Despite these limitations, Labor’s first round of 2-year grants was focused,

with one exception, on training in IT-related occupations (see app. II for a

listing of the grants). As a result, the grants are likely to contribute U.S.

workers with IT skills to the workforce. For those grants awarded under

the first round, grant recipients plan to train about 3,000 people in ITrelated skills. Under the second round of grants, most were also focused on

IT training; recipients plan to train about 2,500 in IT-related skills. However,

given remaining questions about the number and type of workers needed,

whether individuals will have the skills that employers need is unknown.

NSF’s Scholarships Are in

Initial Stages

In its first round of scholarship grant awards, NSF provided about $22.5

million to 114 academic institutions so that each institution could provide

approximately 40 scholarships per year over a 2-year period of up to $2,500

to low-income, academically talented students to help them pursue

associate, baccalaureate, or graduate-level degrees in fields such as

computer science, engineering, or mathematics (see app. II for examples of

these grants).24 NSF also plans to award $25 million in the second round of

awards25 and $24 million in another round of awards in 2001.26

23Labor included the same LCA data in the March 29, 2000, grant solicitation for the second

round of grants, even though INS by that time had developed data on occupations for

approved H-1B visa petitions. A Labor official said they were aware of the new data but had

not adequately investigated it in time to include it in the grant solicitation.

24Institutions were allowed to retain 9 percent of the grant for administrative and academic

support.

25Proposals for the fiscal year 2000 funds were due to NSF by August 3, 2000.

26NSF, and several other agencies, receive additional funds to develop math and science

curriculums for elementary and secondary students, intended to improve students’ skills

needed in the future workforce. For information on these other efforts, see Math and

Science Education: Comprehensive Information About Federally Funded Materials Not

Available (GAO/HEHS-00-110, July 12, 2000).
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According to NSF officials, NSF sought to fund those projects that best tied

the school’s academic standards to the workplace by helping students

make the transition from school to work. Applicants were judged for

• an infrastructure designed to help scholarship recipients graduate

(including, for example, academic support and mentoring);

• a management and administration plan that is effective and clearly

articulated, which includes verification of scholarship candidates’

eligibility and evaluation of program outcomes; and

• an education program of high quality, having external accreditation and

academic courses of study that are well defined, current, and

intellectually rigorous.

NSF officials believe the scholarships will lead to long-term outcomes such

as

• improving education for students in the stated disciplines,

• increasing retention of students to degree achievement,

• improving professional development and employment and/or further

higher education placement of participating students, and

• strengthening partnerships between institutions of higher education and

related employment sectors.

Given the long-term nature of the scholarships, it is difficult to know

precisely how many workers they will add to the U.S. IT workforce. First,

the actual amount of the individual scholarships is relatively small so that

these funds alone may not be sufficient to pay education costs. According

to NSF officials, the scholarships provide strong incentives to institutions

to retain and prepare students for IT-related occupations. It will be

important for the academic institutions to combine financial resources

from a number of sources to ensure that these scholarships make a

difference. Second, it is difficult to predict whether scholarship recipients

will actually enter IT-related occupations, because recipients’ choice of

majors does not always correspond with their actual employment several

years later. NSF officials acknowledge that these individuals may not enter

the IT field, and also that students from other academic backgrounds may

enter IT occupations.
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Employers Use a Variety of

Methods to Improve IT

Skills in the Short Term

IT employers we contacted said they have several choices to fill their many

IT vacancies in the short term—they can retrain existing workers, train

new workers, or recruit workers from the outside with the necessary skills.

For example, one employer retrained its workers whose jobs were being

eliminated, such as retraining a hardware engineer to be a software

engineer. According to the employer, the program costs about $3,500 per

worker for 3 months of training. Other employers established tuition

reimbursement programs to encourage their employees to obtain or

improve skills, and offered annual stipends, part-time employment, and full

tuition and fees while workers pursued a master’s or doctoral degree in an

IT-related field. Other employers maintained skill inventory databases and

required employees to develop individual development plans in order to

update or obtain IT-related skills.27

Several employers said they train newly hired employees—even recent

college graduates—in order to give them the necessary IT skills, at a cost

two employers estimated to be about $10,000 for each new employee.

Because of high turnover, training for new workers is a potentially costly

option, and employers may be reluctant to provide training at significant

cost for fear that, once employees have received this training, they will

leave. Consequently, when employers do provide training, they may ask

employees to agree to stay for a period of time in exchange for the training

provided—in one case, it was for 1 year.

According to employers, the ideal short-term solution for filling IT

occupations is to obtain IT workers who already have the necessary skills.

To do this, employers use a variety of traditional recruiting strategies, such

as on-campus college recruiting and participation in job fairs. Employers

also use less-traditional recruiting strategies. For example, they said a great

deal of hiring occurs now over the Internet; employers either post job

vacancies and applicants respond, or employers recruit from web sites

where job seekers post resumes. Another method is “cold calling;” a

recruiter at a relatively small business noted that he sometimes calls a

company that he knows has the type of talent he needs and attempts to

recruit workers who answer the phone. Finally, employers also take

advantage of contract workers; a large employer that had over 300 contract

personnel from over 100 contract labor agencies reported that the company

27Approaches to attracting and retaining skilled information management professionals are

discussed in Executive Guide: Maximizing the Success of Chief Information Officers—

Learning from Leading Organizations (GAO/AIMD-00-83, March 2000).
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ensures that all such contracts provide the option of eventually hiring the

workers directly.

However, IT employers we interviewed said that they cannot always find

U.S. workers with the necessary skills to fill all IT vacancies; as a result,

they may actively seek workers through the H-1B program. Employers may

find H-1B workers through their usual recruiting efforts, because workers

who may be already employed in the United States or on a student visa best

meet the employers’ needs. The H-1B program offers a number of benefits,

including that workers will start their jobs with the requisite skills, and also

that if the H-1B worker is good, employers can sponsor the worker for

permanent U. S. residency. All of the employers we interviewed sponsored

at least some of their H-1B workers for permanent residency.28 These IT

employers, however, also said that there were disadvantages to using the H1B program, as it can cost over $2,000, including attorney and filing fees, to

obtain a worker with an H-1B visa, and it may take as long as 4 or 5 months

before a visa is approved.

Employers Are Undertaking

Long-Term Efforts to

Encourage IT Careers

Employers are also making some effort to improve the IT skills of

American workers over the long term. These efforts are predominately

focused on encouraging students to pursue careers that may be IT-related.

For example, several of the employers we contacted said they worked with

universities to improve the skills needed in the IT industry. One employer

reviewed university curriculums and served on panels and partnerships

intended to improve IT skills. Other employers provided mentors to

students, computer assistance, or computer equipment to elementary and

secondary schools. To assist in improving math and science curriculums,

one employer funded a program whereby local universities would work

with four school districts to help children stay in school and go to college.

For the participating universities, the employer provided scholarships and

internships for minority students majoring in engineering and computer

science. This particular program will cost $2.5 million over a 4-year period.

28Although an employer may sponsor an H-1B worker for permanent residency, this does not

guarantee permanent residency. With increasing numbers of H-1B workers, the annual

numerical limitations on employment-based immigration and per-country ceilings mean that

growing queues and waiting periods face H-1B workers seeking permanent residency in the

United States.
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Conclusions The H-1B visa program has helped employers fill specialty occupations on a

temporary basis; in fiscal year 1999 alone, over 130,000 individuals were

approved to work in the United States on an H-1B visa. The significant

growth in the number of such workers authorized to enter the country

indicates that the program is an important tool for hiring workers in

specialty occupations, especially IT-related occupations. However, as the

program currently operates, the goals of preventing abuse of the program

and providing efficient services to employers and workers are not being

achieved. Limited by the law, Labor’s review of the LCA is perfunctory and

adds little assurance that labor conditions employers attest to actually

exist. Furthermore, the requirement that employers first file the LCA with

Labor before filing the same information with INS represents an extra,

time-consuming step that adds to H-1B processing time. Expanding Labor’s

authority to question information on the LCA would provide additional

assurance that labor conditions are being met; however, this would likely

increase processing time substantially and the Congress has demonstrated

its desire that this process be handled quickly by establishing a short time

frame and limiting Labor’s review. If the Congress wants to retain the

minimal review, it could consider eliminating altogether the separate filing

of the LCA with Labor and assigning the LCA review solely to INS. Because

Labor cannot now independently verify whether labor conditions will be

met, no current protections would be lost if INS were to subsume this

process. Moreover, because INS reviews much of the information on the

LCA as a part of its petition review, there would not be any additional

resource needs for INS adjudicators to perform this function. Finally,

eliminating one review step may also shorten the total approval time for

H-1B workers, thereby increasing employers’ ability to get the workers they

need in a timely manner.29

Limitations governing Labor’s ability to enforce H-1B requirements for

employers who have H-1B workers restrict Labor’s ability to adequately

detect program noncompliance or abuse. Currently, unlike other labor laws

it is responsible for enforcing, Labor is able to initiate investigations to

29There is a precedent for such streamlining. In 1997, we found similar problems on another

visa program—that for agricultural guest workers. We found that INS was merely “rubberstamping” visa applications, which burdened the employer with additional paperwork and

added time to the visa application process. We recommended for that program that INS’ role

be subsumed by Labor, which was performing the more substantive review; this change was

proposed in the Federal Register in 1999. See H-2A Agricultural Guestworker Program:

Changes Could Improve Services to Employers and Better Protect Workers (GAO/HEHS-98-

20, Dec. 31, 1997).
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address potential only if narrowly restricted circumstances are met. It has

no authority to subpoena records during an investigation to identify

whether employers are complying with the law, and it cannot conduct a

baseline survey to obtain a true understanding of employer compliance

with the H-1B program. Yet, Labor Inspector General reviews and other

available evidence suggests that program noncompliance or abuse by

employers, after the H-1B workers have been placed, exists and may be

more prevalent than under other laws where Labor has broader

enforcement authority.

Finally, existing INS procedures do not give adequate assurance that

program noncompliance is being detected. INS’ recent efforts to implement

procedures to standardize adjudicators’ review steps are a positive step.

However, INS must continue to implement and revise the procedures and

conduct training to address the concerns raised by adjudicators, such as

when and how they can request additional documentation from employers.

Additionally, there is no requirement that adjudicators document their

adherence to procedures or how they exercised their discretion in

assessing the sufficiency of documentation when petitions are approved.

The lack of easy access by adjudicators to case-related information, as well

as supervisory and performance appraisal procedures that could

discourage adjudicators from denying petitions, can lead to incorrect

approvals of employer petitions.

INS’ efforts to upgrade its data systems and analyze and incorporate

KPMG’s suggestions should prove beneficial to the entire H-1B visa

process, but the ultimate effectiveness of such computer upgrades and

revisions will be limited if INS does not include easy access by adjudicators

to the case-specific information they need to accurately assess the merit of

petitions. Finally, even with these improvements, unless INS has a

supervisory review and performance appraisal system based, at least in

part, on quality rather than quantity of review, it is not clear whether

adjudicators will have any incentive to carefully scrutinize the merit of

petitions.

The federal government and employers are making efforts to improve the

IT skill set of U.S. workers. While these efforts may help increase the

number of workers with IT skills, it is too early for two reasons to evaluate

whether the skill grants or the scholarships being funded by H-1B fees will

reduce the demand for H-1B workers. First, there continues to be a wide

range of views on the extent of need for IT workers and the kinds of skills

that are most important. Second, education and training programs, by their
B-283330

Page 36 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

nature, can be long-term remedies to labor needs. To be successful, these

programs will have to continually adjust their focus to the changing skill

needs of the rapidly growing IT industry. Better information now available

on the kinds of positions that H-1B workers are filling should help to target

their efforts.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

Given the limited nature of Labor’s review of LCAs, the Congress should

consider streamlining the H-1B approval process by eliminating the

separate requirement that employers first submit an LCA to Labor for

certification. Instead, the Congress could require employers to submit an

LCA and the I-129 petition simultaneously to INS, which will continue to

review and evaluate the information contained on both the LCA and the

petition.

If the Congress wished to broaden Labor’s enforcement authority and

improve its ability to enforce relevant provisions in the H-1B law, it could

consider, at a minimum, giving Labor’s WHD subpoena power to obtain

employers’ records during investigations under the H-1B program. It could

also consider allowing Labor to perform baseline evaluations to determine

the extent of employers’ compliance with H-1B requirements and conduct

subsequent targeted efforts to address suspected noncompliance or abuse.

Recommendations To improve INS’ ability to prevent H-1B visa abuse and better serve

customers, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the

Commissioner of INS to take the following steps:

• expand upon INS’ current efforts to standardize H-1B adjudication

procedures by (1) providing practical guidance to help adjudicators

assess the adequacy or sufficiency of documentation and determine

when and how to request additional documentation from employers,

and (2) having adjudicators document adherence to standard

procedures when reviewing petitions;

• provide easy access to case-specific information for adjudicators when

reviewing petitions as a part of the current upgrade of its computer

system; and

• enhance existing supervisory review and performance appraisal

systems so that adjudicators are held accountable for the correct

assessment of petitions as well as for the quantity of reviews they

complete.
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Agency Comments The Departments of Labor and State, INS, and NSF commented on a draft

of this report (see apps. III-VI, respectively). Only Labor and INS provided

comments concerning our matters for congressional consideration or

recommendations.

Labor did not agree with our matter for congressional consideration

concerning the transfer of the LCA review; instead, it stated that

consideration should be given to how to improve the substantive nature of

the LCA review in a way that has minimal impact on timely processing. If

the Congress expands the LCA review, we agree that Labor is the most

appropriate agency to perform a more substantive review. However, unless

the Congress chooses to require a more substantive review, we believe it

would be more efficient to have the review done only once, by INS.

Labor agreed with our second matter for consideration to provide it

broader authority to enforce the H-1B program’s requirements. Labor said

that it has long urged the Congress to reconsider and expand the narrow

limits on its enforcement authority.

INS said it was taking a number of actions to ensure consistent adjudicator

reviews, make information more accessible to adjudicators, and

experiment with measuring quality. However, it did not agree with our

overall conclusions or our recommendations to improve the consistency

and correctness of its H-1B decisions. Regarding our first recommendation

concerning guidance to help adjudicators assess the adequacy of

information and request additional documentation, INS agreed in principle

with standardizing the procedures used by adjudicators to review petitions.

However, it said its recently implemented procedures are sufficient to

address our recommendation. We agree that these procedures should help

adjudicators understand the steps they should follow to assess the merit of

petitions. However, it is too early to tell whether the procedures as they

currently exist will be sufficient to address the areas we identified where

adjudicators were uncertain about how to exercise their discretion. INS

also said that our recommendation to have adjudicators document their

adherence to standard procedures would detrimentally affect timely

processing if extended to approval cases. We acknowledge that an onerous

requirement could affect processing time, but believe that there are simpler

ways for adjudicators to demonstrate their adherence to standard

procedures. For example, a checklist with space for adjudicators to note

areas of concern and briefly indicate how they address those concerns

would provide a decision trail for a reviewer. Without some documentation
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Page 38 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

about how cases are decided it is more difficult for supervisors to assess

whether approval decisions were correct. Such decisions constitute the

vast majority of decisions and we believe it is important that INS

supervisors assess both approvals and denials to assure that the

adjudication process is operating effectively.

INS also disagreed with our recommendation to provide adjudicators with

easy access to case-specific information. INS said that adjudicators already

have access to information they need, such as laws, legal precedents, or

information obtained by investigators. However, in general, laws or

precedents are not specific to the case an adjudicator is reviewing because

they do not involve the same employers, workers, schools, or occupations.

Also, we found that communications between adjudicators and

investigative staff at the service centers may not be as routine or efficient

as INS headquarters envisioned. Furthermore, petition denial information

is available only to adjudicators in the same service center for 30 days, after

which the information is available nationally, but is not easily accessible,

and does not provide adjudicators the basis for the denial. Both

adjudicators and investigative staff said that unless the information is

automated and potential problems are flagged, adjudicators will not take

advantage of such information. INS did state, however, that the upgrades to

its computer systems will enhance access to some of this information.

INS said it values both the quality and timeliness of decisions by

adjudicators, but disagreed with our recommendation to enhance existing

supervisory review and performance appraisal systems so that adjudicators

are held accountable for the correct assessment of petitions as well as for

the quantity of reviews they complete. INS said that adding a quality review

process to its appraisal system would place an impossible burden on

supervisors because they would need to take statistically valid samples for

each adjudicator. Moreover, according to INS, the employee-to-supervisor

ratio has changed from six employees per supervisor to as many as 15

employees per supervisor, while petition decisions have significantly

increased. We disagree with INS’ view that adding a quality review would

necessarily be unduly burdensome. As discussed, we believe that INS’

current supervisory review and appraisal process emphasizes the quantity

of reviews over the quality, and that more balance is needed between the

two objectives. Headquarters officials said that service centers are, in fact,

already using a variety of techniques to check the quality of adjudication.

Although we did not observe these efforts at the service centers we visited,

INS said that efforts range from teams randomly selecting cases and

determining the permissible range of decisions before providing the cases
B-283330

Page 39 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

to an adjudicator, to supervisors reviewing a random sample of 10 cases for

each adjudicator. Moreover, supervisors already review denials and

requests for additional information. All of these efforts indicate that service

centers have found a need for some type of quality review and are

implementing some mechanisms. We believe efforts such as these need to

be established agency-wide so that quality of adjudication receives the

proper degree of attention.

All four agencies provided technical comments, which we incorporated as

appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Alexis M. Herman,

Secretary of Labor; the Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney General; the

Honorable Doris Meissner, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization

Service; the Honorable Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State; the

Honorable Dr. Rita R. Colwell, Director, National Science Foundation; and

other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon

request.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me on

(202) 512-7215. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed

in app. VII.

Marnie S. Shaul

Associate Director

Education, Workforce, and

Income Security Issues
Page 40 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

Characteristics of H-1B

Workers

To obtain information on the jobs H-1B workers are filling in the United

States and the workers’ characteristics, we relied primarily on data

collected and supplied by the Immigration and Naturalization Service

(INS)—most of it from a sample of petitions filed for fiscal year 1999. INS

randomly sampled 1,100 petitions processed at each of the four service

centers from a universe of petitions approved during the period from May

11, 1998, through July 31, 1999, and projected the results to the universe of

134,411 H-1B petitions approved during that time, weighting them to reflect

the variations in numbers of petitions processed among the four centers.

The universe included only applications for new employment (not renewals

or changes of employers)—those that potentially would have been

recorded against the fiscal year 1999 limit. INS employees reviewed the

petitions in the sample and accompanying documents at the INS records

center in Harrisonburg, Virginia, and recorded data from those files. We

analyzed these data further to, for example, make comparisons between

information technology (IT) and non-IT workers. INS also provided results

from an analysis of all petitions approved for work beginning during the

first 5 months of fiscal year 2000. We did not independently verify the data

collected by INS in either the 1999 sample or the 2000 data. However, we

did compare the results of our analysis of the INS data with information

published by INS.

H-1B Visa Program

Implementation and

Enforcement

To assess the adequacy of the H-1B visa program’s implementation and

enforcement, we interviewed officials at the headquarters offices of Labor,

INS, and State to understand the policies and procedures of the program.

To understand how employers and nonimmigrants must proceed through

H-1B visa approval, we visited three of INS’ four service centers (in Laguna

Niguel, California; Dallas, Texas; and St. Albans, Vermont) and three Labor

regional offices (in San Francisco, California; Boston, Massachusetts; and

Dallas, Texas), contacted officials at the fourth INS service center (in

Lincoln, Nebraska), and obtained information electronically from eight

State consular offices with high H-1B visa workloads. We discussed how

prevailing wage rates are calculated with an official at one state

employment service agency. In addition, we obtained views on H-1B

procedures from IT employers who use the program, and met with

associations representing American employer and employee groups,

including representatives from higher education.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 41 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Efforts to Improve IT Skills

in the American Workforce

To identify and obtain information about efforts under way to improve IT

skills in the American workforce, we met with officials at the National

Science Foundation and Labor to obtain information on the training and

scholarship programs funded with H-1B visa fees. We also contacted 13

employers nationwide, representing companies that significantly invest in

software development or provide IT services, and one university. These

employers were selected judgmentally based on several factors and

included employers who employed H-1B workers, geographic

representation, and different company sizes. We also contacted

associations such as the Information Technology Association of America,

the National Association of Manufacturers, and the American Immigration

Lawyers Association. In addition, we contacted groups representing

employees such as the AFL-CIO and other unions, and the Institute of

Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
Page 42 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Appendix II

Labor’s Technical Skill Grants and Examples

of NSF Grants Awarded ApendxiI

The technical skill grants that Labor awarded as of February 2000 are listed

in table 2 below.

Table 2: Labor’s Technical Skill Grants Awarded, February 2000

Awardees Award amount Project emphasis and target group

Regional Employment Board

of Hampden County, Inc.,

Springfield, Mass.

$1.5 million Create a sustainable network of training

providers to train and upgrade the

technical skills of 130 employed and 80

unemployed individuals for highly skilled

jobs in the information and

telecommunications technology industry.

NOVA Private Industry

Council, Sunnyvale, Calif.

$1.3 million Bring together a consortium of partners

to provide high-level technical skills

training over 2 years to 200 individuals

from the poorest neighborhoods in the

Silicon Valley with predominantly

Hispanic, African-American, and Pacific

Islander populations. The grant will also

target low-income, multiethnic adults and

older youth (18-24), dislocated workers,

and incumbent workers.

Pima County Community

Services Department,

Tucson, Ariz.

$1.5 million Build on a project to provide training to a

wide range of participants in five “H-1B

technical skill areas” that are in short

supply in Pima County: health, IT (up to

180 participants), education, electrical

and electronics, and accounting and

management. The grantee is committed

to training single parents and women,

with a focus on nontraditional fields for

women.

The City of Chicago, Ill. $1.5 million Develop an information technology

worker training model that meets the

needs of business and includes both

entry into the IT industry and paths to

career advancement. About 425

employees of participating companies

will be selected, based upon prerequisite

training and job performance, to train for

H-1B designated positions, with 200

openings created through promotion and

training.
Appendix II

Labor’s Technical Skill Grants and Examples

of NSF Grants Awarded

Page 43 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Seattle-King County Private

Industry Council, Seattle,

Wash.

$1.5 million Develop new building blocks for IT

training, geared to several target

populations at various stages on the

career ladder, and provide training for up

to 500 people. Target groups for training

are unemployed workers who require

additional skills to gain employment in IT

professions and currently employed

workers who wish to advance in their

professions or change career paths.

The Workplace, Inc.,

Bridgeport, Conn.

$1.5 million As a partner with two employers, provide

IT-related skills training to about 540

workers. Target population includes both

unemployed and employed workers.

Philadelphia Workforce

Development Corp., Inc.,

Philadelphia, Pa.

$0.6 million Address needs of area employers for

nurses at all levels and especially for the

highest-skilled nurses—registered

nurses (50) and licensed practical nurses

(30). In addition, 200 will be trained as

nurses’ aides. Training will target

incumbent workers, low-wage workers,

younger workers, and the unemployed.

New Hampshire Job Training

Council, Concord, N.H.

$1.5 million Implement job training and career

development program to increase

companies’ ability to find and retain

skilled workers in the state. One

important innovation is the use of a newly

developed bachelor’s degree program in

information sciences. The grant will

target up to 320 unemployed and

incumbent workers around the state.

Prince George’s Workforce

Services Corp., Landover,

Md.

$1.5 million Recruit, assess, train, and place 588

participants into jobs in the

telecommunications and IT fields.

Employed and incumbent workers in the

East Bay area of Northern California and

the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area

will be targeted, with emphasis on a

nontraditional information technology

workforce which includes minorities,

women, and handicapped workers.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Awardees Award amount Project emphasis and target group
Appendix II

Labor’s Technical Skill Grants and Examples

of NSF Grants Awarded

Page 44 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Examples of Grants

Provided by NSF to

Academic Institutions

Rensselaer Polytechnical Institute plans to provide scholarship

opportunities to 40 participants, and has the goal of providing sufficient

support services to graduate 95 percent of these participants and

implement a series of workshops to engage participants in research and

community service activities relevant to their degree program.

Houston Community College in Texas plans to provide scholarships,

curriculum enrichment, student support services, and summer internships.

It will recruit 40 students into an Associate of Science and Associate of

Applied Science scholarship program and has a goal of retaining at least 75

percent of the participants until they complete a degree and transfer to a

higher degree program.

The University of Texas at El Paso plans to offer scholarships to 22 upperdivision undergraduate students in computer science, engineering, and

mathematics; 11 master’s level students in those programs; and 11 doctoral

students in computer engineering, environmental science and engineering,

and materials science and engineering who are at the dissertation-writing

stage of their graduate careers. These students will also receive mentoring

from faculty who combine outstanding teaching with research programs

funded through federal, state, and corporate sources.
Page 45 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Appendix III

Comments From the Department of Labor ApendxiI

Now on p. 9

Now on p. 9
Appendix III

Comments From the Department of Labor

Page 46 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Now on p. 11

Now on p. 12

Now on p. 20

Now on p. 19
Appendix III

Comments From the Department of Labor

Page 47 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Now on p. 21

Now on pp. 29-30
Appendix III

Comments From the Department of Labor

Page 48 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Now on p. 33
Appendix III

Comments From the Department of Labor

Page 49 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Now on p. 34

Now on p. 36

Now on p. 36
Appendix III

Comments From the Department of Labor

Page 50 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas
Appendix III

Comments From the Department of Labor

Page 51 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Now on p. 36
Page 52 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of State ApendxiIV

Now on p. 10

Now on p. 27
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of State

Page 53 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas
Page 54 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Appendix V

Comments From the Immigration and

Naturalization Service ApendxiV
Appendix V

Comments From the Immigration and

Naturalization Service

Page 55 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas
Appendix V

Comments From the Immigration and

Naturalization Service

Page 56 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas
Appendix V

Comments From the Immigration and

Naturalization Service

Page 57 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas
Page 58 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Appendix VI

Comments From the National Science

Foundation ApendxiVI

Now on p. 30
Appendix VI

Comments From the National Science

Foundation

Page 59 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas
Page 60 GAO/HEHS-00-157 H-1B Visas

Appendix VII

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiVI

GAO Contacts Lori Rectanus, (202) 512-9847

Carol L. Patey, (617) 565-7575

Staff Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, Betty S. Clark, J. William Hansbury, Jr.,

Lawrence J. Horinko, John G. Smale, Jr., and Joan K. Vogel made important

contributions to this report.

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