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27–024 PDF 2007

S. Hrg. 109–804

HURRICANE KATRINA: THE ROLE OF THE

GOVERNORS IN MANAGING THE CATASTROPHE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 2, 2006

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

DAVID T. FLANAGAN, General Counsel 

ARTHUR W. ADELBERG, Senior Counsel 

JOHN H. COBB, Senior Counsel 

JAMES R. MCKAY, Counsel 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

ROBERT F. MUSE, Minority General Counsel 

ERIC P. ANDERSEN, Minority Professional Staff Member 

F. JAMES MCGEE, Minority Professional Staff Member 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 3

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 16

Senator Warner ................................................................................................ 31

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2006

Hon. Haley Barbour, Governor, State of Mississippi ............................................ 4

Hon. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor, State of Louisiana ........................ 6

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Barbour, Hon. Haley: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41

Blanco, Hon. Kathleen Babineaux: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 52

APPENDIX 

Affidavit of Col. (Ret.) Perry Jeff Smith ................................................................ 56

Committee Exhibit 1 and State Exhibit 1 ............................................................. 72

Committee Exhibit 2 ............................................................................................... 76

State Exhibit 2 ......................................................................................................... 79

State Exhibit 3 ......................................................................................................... 80

Committee Exhibit 13 and State Exhibit 4 ........................................................... 82

State Exhibit 5 ......................................................................................................... 83

State Exhibit 6 ......................................................................................................... 84

Committee Exhibit 3 ............................................................................................... 93

Committee Exhibit 5 ............................................................................................... 132

Committee Exhibit 29 ............................................................................................. 136

(1)

HURRICANE KATRINA: THE ROLE OF THE 

GOVERNORS IN MANAGING THE 

CATASTROPHE 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2006

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Susan M. Collins, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Warner, Lieberman, and Akaka. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. 

Good morning. In the partnership among State, local, and Federal Governments that forms the backbone of the American system 

of disaster preparation and response, our Nation’s governors play 

the central role. They are the essential bridge between local knowledge, and needs, Federal expertise and resources. They are the 

chief executive officers of their States and the commanders-in-chief 

of their National Guard forces. 

They are the indispensable decisionmakers in times of crisis. 

They decide when to ask for a presidential declaration of disaster, 

when to declare a state of emergency, whether to call up the 

Guard, under what circumstances to stand up their emergency operations centers and ask their sister States for help, when to trigger an evacuation order, how much emergency financial obligation 

to incur, how best to put the State’s own resources to work, and 

how and what to communicate to a population suddenly thrust into 

misery, uncertainty, and fear. 

The governor’s influence cannot be overestimated in times of catastrophe. By word and deed, by where the governor spends time, 

by the priorities the governor sets, by the issues and problems the 

governor becomes personally involved in, the whole tone and tempo 

of the response to a disaster are established. And the ultimate results, the successes and failures, to a very large degree, measure 

the governor. 

Today’s hearing will examine in depth the challenges faced by 

two governors in overcoming the awful consequences of Hurricane 

Katrina. Their experience and insight will help this Committee as 

we seek to understand what worked and what failed across all levVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:47 Mar 13, 2007 Jkt 027024 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27024.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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els of government so that we can prepare more effectively for disasters yet to come. 

I am pleased this morning to welcome Governor Kathleen Blanco 

of Louisiana and Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi to this 

Committee. In this, our 15th hearing as part of our in-depth investigation of Hurricane Katrina, we will explore further the issues 

that have surfaced in earlier testimony about the responsibilities of 

these States’ chief executives both before and after the hurricane 

hit. 

How did they carry out the critical function of assigning responsibility for the emergency support functions under the National Response Plan and seeing to it that those duties were actually carried 

out? As an example of that, earlier testimony before the Committee 

revealed that the responsible cabinet officer in Louisiana completely abdicated his responsibility to plan for the evacuation of the 

elderly, the sick, and the poor who lacked their own means of 

transportation. 

How do the governors see their fundamental role of maintaining 

law and order and security of their citizens in cases where local 

law enforcement crumbles under the weight of its own deficiencies 

in planning and communications, as well as the severity of the conditions? 

How did the governors act to resolve disputes, conflicts, and jurisdictional rivalries among local, State, and Federal agencies that 

each wanted to do it their own way? How successful were they in 

expediting government resources to providers of critical services, 

even if they were in the private sector, such as hospitals and nursing homes? 

And then there is the uniquely American issue that must be addressed by the governors—resolving State and Federal differences 

regarding the status and use of National Guard and active duty 

forces in a very serious crisis. Under what circumstances, if any, 

should the National Guard be federalized? 

What of the relationship between the States? The pre-storm 

evacuation by Gulf Coast residents with their own vehicles was relatively efficient, due in large part to the exemplary cooperation between the two governors here today. In addition, the assistance 

from other States through the Emergency Management Assistance 

Compacts was invaluable. How can such cooperation be enhanced 

and used to even greater effect in the future? 

Finally, how do the governors see their own role within their own 

States? Who has the authority to order mandatory evacuations, 

and how can such orders be enforced? How can the governors help 

to resolve the communication problems that hampered preparation 

and plagued response across all levels of government? What can 

they do to remedy the serious problems that Katrina exposed that 

are clearly matters of State jurisdiction, such as the lack of effective evacuation plans for some hospitals and nursing homes? 

Governors are chief executives and commanders-in-chief of the 

National Guard. But above all, they are public servants with enormous responsibilities. They are the leaders to which their States’ 

residents look to in times of crisis. 

This hearing will help us better understand both their obligations and limitations so that the partnership among governments 

3

that forms the core of our national emergency response system will 

be stronger and more effective the next time disaster strikes. 

Senator Lieberman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman. As a 

matter of fact, I associate myself with just about everything you 

said. And I will make my opening remarks brief. 

I want to welcome Governor Blanco, Governor Barbour, and a 

special welcome to your wife, Ms. Marsha Barbour, who was kind 

enough to escort us when we were in Mississippi a few weeks ago. 

I suppose in full disclosure, Governor, I should repeat to you what 

I said to the first lady that day, which is that she was a much more 

intelligent, charming, and attractive woman than I thought you deserved as a spouse. [Laughter.] 

Governor BARBOUR. As usual, we agree, Senator. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And I am sure the same would be said of 

me and my wife and that relationship. 

I want to thank both Governor Blanco and Governor Barbour for 

the cooperation that they and their staffs have given us and our 

investigators and staff in our inquiry here. And I can’t resist saying 

that I wish we had this same full level of cooperation from the 

White House, which we are working on, but we have not, in my 

opinion, yet received. 

This is your opportunity, Governors, to tell us, to the best of your 

recollection, what happened, to answer some of the questions about 

the performance of State government, your State governments in 

this unprecedented natural disaster, and also to share with us your 

frank assessment of the performance of the Federal Government, 

particularly in the preparation for and response to Hurricane 

Katrina. 

What comes out of our hearings, and the story is well known, 

which is that not just was there, particularly in New Orleans, the 

long-time fear of the so-called ‘‘big one,’’ the big hurricane that 

would overrun the levees and flood the city, but that there were 

specific warnings along the way in the Hurricane Pam exercise, etc. 

And I think, as we look back, I presume that both of you would 

agree that no level of government did as much as it should have 

done to prepare for that eventuality. 

And so, this is an opportunity to share your reactions to all of 

that. This investigation is not about getting anybody. It is about 

getting to the truth of what happened so together we can work to 

make sure that we are much better prepared for the disasters that 

will inevitably come. 

I want to say, finally, briefly that, as you both know, we were 

there a short while ago, the second trip Senator Collins and I have 

taken there. And I think we were both stunned by the continuing 

devastation that exists, and not just to the property, which is extraordinary, and the dislocation of the people, but the threat that 

the storm continues to leave on the communities involved, large 

and small. 

And if I may say so, on the unique cultures that are parts of 

those communities that are a very important part of the fabric of 

American culture. The Chairman and I were not satisfied with 

4

1The prepared statement of Governor Barbour appears in the appendix on page 41. 

what we heard that day of the Federal work on reconstruction, and 

we are going to take action soon to make some recommendations 

that we hope will improve it. 

But most of all, this morning, I thank you for being here, and 

I look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

I want to echo Senator Lieberman’s thanks publicly to Marsha 

Barbour for being our escort when we were in Mississippi and you, 

Governor, for joining us in our tour of New Orleans. 

Like Senator Lieberman, I was absolutely stunned at the appar- ent lack of progress. When we think of the $85 billion that we have 

voted for to invest in the recovery and reconstruction of the region, 

it is very difficult to figure out where the money has gone. And we 

look forward to working closely with both of you to try to expedite 

the Federal assistance and to make it more effective. 

I am very pleased to welcome our distinguished panel today. 

Both Governor Haley Barbour and Governor Kathleen Blanco took 

office in January 2004. Because this is an ongoing investigation 

and we are swearing in all of the witnesses, I am going to ask you 

to stand so that I can administer the oath. 

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give will be 

the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, 

God? 

WITNESSES. I do. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

We will begin with Governor Barbour. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. HALEY BARBOUR,1 GOVERNOR, STATE 

OF MISSISSIPPI 

Governor BARBOUR. OK. I thought we were going to have ladies 

first. My fault. 

Chairman COLLINS. That is southern. [Laughter.] 

Governor BARBOUR. Madam Chairman, I thought you were from 

Southern Maine. 

Madam Chairman, distinguished Ranking Member, thanks for 

the opportunity to join you today to discuss the worst natural disaster in our Nation’s history, Hurricane Katrina. I have given you 

my written testimony. So I am not going to read it all because I 

look forward to the chance to answer the questions about the 

things that you are interested in. 

I will simply tell you, for us, this wasn’t a calamity for the coast. 

We had hurricane-force winds 200 miles inland. We had a county 

100 miles inland where there were 12 fatalities from the hurricane. 

You have seen the obliteration of the Gulf Coast, but there was tremendous damage in our State inland and a number of fatalities inland as well. 

In its wake, Katrina left tens of thousands of homes uninhabited, 

often obliterated; thousands of small businesses in shambles; 

schools, public buildings ruined, unusable; and highways, ports, 

railroads, water, sewer systems, all destroyed. 

You mentioned the EMAC system, the Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact. Our sister States were tremendous to us, 

5

starting with Florida whose elite search and rescue teams were on 

the ground in Mississippi the night of the storm. And we had 600 

Florida State law enforcement officers in Mississippi for more than 

2 months. 

But it wasn’t just Florida. North Carolina sent their Med-One 

portable hospital, Georgia’s investigators, and Ohio’s search and 

rescue teams. We had 12,000 National Guard from units from more 

than 20 States, boots on the ground. Alabama sent two MP units 

while Mobile was still flooded. 

So, as Governor, I am terrifically grateful to all of the States. 

The generosity of the American people has just been unbelievable—

Corporate America, philanthropists, everyday citizens. 

The President came to Mississippi about the second or third 

time, we went to a feeding station, where I bumped into a man who 

told me he was from Vermont and said that he and 16 other truck 

drivers had driven 17 tractor-trailer loads of food from Vermont to 

Mississippi. And I was marveling, thanking him, and he told me 

it was his third trip. The generosity and outpouring of the goodness 

of the American people has been spectacular. 

And I will tell you, I appreciate the efforts of the Federal Government. People complain about the failures, and there are plenty of 

problems. But let me tell you about some Federal efforts that didn’t 

go wrong. 

The night Katrina struck, Coast Guard helicopter crews from 

Mobile conducted search and rescue missions on the Mississippi 

Gulf Coast. These fearless young men, who hung from helicopters 

on ropes—dangling through the air in the pitch-black darkness of 

the first night because there was no electricity—pulled people off 

of roofs and out of trees. And by the first Friday, these Coast 

Guard daredevils had lifted 1,700 Mississippians to safety by hoisting them up into helicopters. 

Later that week, the U.S. Department of Transportation began 

providing fuel for all our emergency responders and all our critical 

operations, which was essential to our recovery efforts. 

During the relief and recovery stage, the Federal Government 

has pumped resources in to help us. These efforts have been enormous, but those efforts have been far from perfect. From the outset, there were problems and shortages. Some were the inevitable 

result of our State’s bearing the brunt of the largest and worst natural disaster in American history, which obliterated all systems. 

Electricity, water, sewer, roads, bridges, communications were all 

devastated. FEMA’s logistical operations simply didn’t provide 

what was needed. 

We found ourselves having to scramble, adjust, innovate, make 

do. Our efforts weren’t perfect either, not by any means. But the 

spirit of our people pulled us through. Our people are strong, resilient, and self-reliant. They are not whiners. They are not into 

victimhood. 

From day one, they hitched up their britches and did what had 

to be done, helping themselves and helping their neighbors. Their 

spirit has been an inspiration to me, and it was and is the key to 

relief, recovery, rebuilding, and renewal. 

I am going to stop in a second. I do want to thank Congress. Just 

before Christmas, Congress passed a major Katrina supplemental 

6

1The prepared statement of Governor Blanco appears in the appendix on page 52. 

disaster assistance package, totaling $29 billion. Added to the assistance that will result from the Stafford Act, the Federal Government is providing and will provide some $25 billion to $27 billion 

of support for Mississippians and rebuilding our infrastructure. We 

are very grateful. And I pledge to you and to your constituents that 

we will be good stewards of the money that you are giving us. 

I especially want to thank Senator Thad Cochran, who led the 

passage of the package of supplemental appropriations, and Senator Trent Lott, who led the passage of the Gulf Opportunity Zone 

bill, and our entire congressional delegation. 

With that, Senator, I think what I will do is stop and let Governor Blanco make her remarks and then answer questions, as I 

would particularly like to speak to some of the questions that you 

raised, particularly about progress, debris removal, temporary 

housing. And so, I look forward to that. 

But if it suits the Committee, I would stop my formal statement 

at that point. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Governor Blanco. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. KATHLEEN BABINEAUX BLANCO,1

GOVERNOR, STATE OF LOUISIANA 

Governor BLANCO. Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, I want 

to tell you that it is a great honor to be here today. I deeply appreciate your bipartisan review and your efforts to identify the lessons 

learned from Hurricane Katrina. 

I take full responsibility for improving Louisiana’s emergency response, just as Congress is responsible for improving the Federal 

response. We stand united in our determination to do better. 

I thank the American people for uplifting us with prayers and 

generosity. And I must thank the governors and officials from 

every State and territory for sending tens of thousands of National 

Guard troops and first responders. Men and women from across the 

country from every State stood shoulder to shoulder with Louisiana’s first responders and the Coast Guard to save lives. 

I count Louisiana’s neighbors among our blessings. Governor 

Barbour, thank you. Thank you so much for being a good neighbor 

and helping me when I called you. You helped me to move 1.3 million people to safety before the storm. Many traveled through your 

State, and it was because of your willingness to enact a contraflow 

plan in your State, as well as the contraflow plan in our State, that 

actually worked. 

And thank you for extending welcome mats to so many of our 

displaced families. We have some of your families, too, ironically. 

But my heart goes out to your families. We know that our people 

lost everything. Our people experienced not just a Louisiana tragedy, not just a Mississippi tragedy, but an American tragedy of biblical proportions. 

In Louisiana, the catastrophic failure of our Federal levee system 

eclipsed Katrina, sending flood waters across New Orleans and the 

surrounding parishes. Still reeling from round one, Louisiana 

braced for round two. Rita leveled Southwest Louisiana the way 

Katrina leveled Mississippi. 

7

Katrina took 1,100 lives in Louisiana, and we mourn every one 

of them. Katrina and Rita wreaked a path of destruction through 

our State that displaced more than 780,000 people, ruined 217,000 

homes, closed 18,000 businesses, and left 240,000 people unemployed. 

All 64 parishes in our State were affected, and I hope you will 

join me in recognizing presidents and leaders of many of the hardest-hit parishes in Louisiana who are with us today. I would like 

to ask them to stand. 

Benny Rousselle, Plaquemines Parish president. Kevin Davis, St. 

Tammany Parish president. Toye Taylor, Washington Parish president. Junior Rodriguez, St. Bernard Parish president. I have Mayor 

Randy Roach of Lake Charles in Southwest Louisiana. Jefferson 

Council president John Young. Craig Taffaro, who is a councilman 

in St. Bernard. And Roland Dartez, who is director of the Police 

Jury Association. 

These are the people who are in the trenches today, helping us 

to rebuild Louisiana and working through recovery. 

[Applause.] 

Governor BLANCO. Senators, most of you on this Committee 

toured, and certainly, Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman, we 

appreciate the fact that you toured our devastated areas. I believe 

you definitely understand the gravity of what has happened. 

We appreciate your call for additional Federal funding, and it 

has to be sustained. Help us as we ask the rest of Congress to understand. One way you can do that is by urging your colleagues to 

visit our State, please. 

In a hurricane region, we learn from every storm. Our evacuation 

for Hurricane Ivan that did not hit our State resembled Houston’s 

gridlock during Hurricane Rita. So, at that point in time, I revised 

our plan. The phased evacuation used during Katrina used 

contraflow, using both sides of the interstate for outbound traffic. 

We efficiently moved 1.3 million people to safety within 36 hours. 

In other words, we evacuated a population comparable to the entire 

State of Alaska or the entire State of Delaware or Hawaii, Rhode 

Island, or even Maine. In spite of successfully evacuating over 92 

percent of the population, it is tragically clear that too many were 

left behind. 

Some people played hurricane roulette, remaining by choice, and 

had to be rescued. Others simply could not leave. We did the best 

we could under the circumstances, but we have to do better. We 

must do more to make sure that local governments succeed. When 

they succeed, we all succeed. 

Hurricane season begins again on June 1, and we are enacting 

lessons we learned. Here are some of the steps we are taking. 

We are rethinking our evacuation plans to account for the new 

reality of weakened levees and of people now living in trailers. We 

are requiring additional oversight of evacuation plans for nursing 

homes and hospitals. We are revamping primary and secondary 

emergency support functions under the State emergency operations 

plan. We are streamlining credentialing for out-of-state first responders, and the list goes on. 

We saw in Katrina what the Nation learned with the collapse of 

the communications systems after September 11. If you can’t comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:47 Mar 13, 2007 Jkt 027024 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27024.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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municate, you can’t coordinate. In Louisiana, we are working to acquire mobile command units and develop a state-wide interoperable 

solution that incorporates the entire emergency community. I ask 

Congress to design uniform interoperable standards with dedicated 

funding. 

Please reform the Stafford Act to account for catastrophic events 

and to allow the flexibility to adopt common-sense cost-saving 

measures that meet our needs. For example, the Stafford Act forces 

FEMA to purchase costly temporary housing when the wiser investment just might be in some permanent housing. 

It is not uncommon to hear about evacuation planning, but it is 

unusual to hear about the inability to repopulate an area after an 

evacuation. This is the dilemma we currently face. For our people 

to return home, we must guarantee their security, their housing, 

their jobs, access to health care, a restored infrastructure, and improved schools. We are rebuilding an entire urban center from 

scratch. 

Today, I ask Washington to focus on security and housing. Our 

people deserve a stronger levee system, coupled with a long-term 

plan for hurricane protection and coastal restoration. Louisiana 

could finance its own long-term solution if Congress would simply 

give us what we believe is our fair share of oil and gas revenues 

from the outer continental shelf. 

We would not be here today if the levees had not failed. People 

could have walked or driven home from the Superdome if the levees had not failed. Our people entrusted their lives and properties 

to levees designed more than 40 years ago. It was like we expected 

a worn-out 1965 Chevy to pass 2006 safety and inspection standards. It is long past time to upgrade. 

We must replace false security with reliable 21st Century hurricane protection systems based on the most innovative, scientific, 

and technological advances. In the last special session of the legislature, I pushed creation of the Coastal Protection and Restoration 

Authority. The CPRA is charged with overseeing levee boards 

statewide and developing a master plan for coastal and flood protection. 

Next week, I am convening the legislature one more time to consolidate levee boards, to reorganize New Orleans government in 

order to eliminate waste and duplication, and to elevate the director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness to directly report to 

the Governor in order to improve internal communications. 

These new actions are only the latest in a series of tough posthurricane reforms that Louisiana has enacted to help rebuild ourselves stronger and better than before. For the first time ever, our 

State has adopted a state-wide building code to better protect 

against future storms. Our new reality forced my decision to cut 

$650 million from our budget. We had a $1 billion shortfall. 

We are cracking down on corruption and have adopted new 

standards of accountability, mandating full disclosure of disasterrelated contracts by public officials and/or their relatives. 

In order for our people to return home, we must address at the 

root many of the inequities that dominated New Orleans and the 

surrounding communities. Parents need to know that we are committed to building a brighter future for their children. This is why 

9

the State is taking over failing New Orleans schools and insisting 

on standards of excellence. We will preserve our unique culture, 

while building an improved future for all our citizens. 

Our people need housing. I want to thank you for the housing relief Congress so graciously sent us through the Community Development Block Grants. But I must tell you that this funding will 

only take us to the first junction along a road of urgent needs. Louisiana suffered more than 70 percent of the housing loss from 

Katrina and Rita. Fifty-four percent of the housing funding does 

not come close to an equitable solution. 

We do have a plan, a plan that will help homeowners whose 

homes were destroyed help clear their mortgages without losing 

their pre-storm equity through the Baker bill. Congressman Richard Baker is proposing a bill that would complete our package and 

make it work for Louisiana citizens. 

Last week, however, the White House attempted to kill this bill. 

Our delegation is urging Congress to consider our proposal favorably. 

An investment in the Gulf Coast region is a wise investment in 

the economy and the economic security of our country. Our port 

system is one of the Nation’s largest epicenters of trade and commerce. We produce 25 percent of the domestic oil needs that drive 

our economy and are so important to the move toward energy independence. Our cultural contributions are studied and celebrated 

the world over. 

Congress has been generous, but we have a long road ahead of 

us. We are insisting on accountability and adopting bold reforms at 

the State level that I hope will echo through the halls of Congress. 

We are writing the book on lessons learned from this catastrophe. 

Please, be our lasting partner. That is what we need from you. 

Stand by us as we rebuild. Our people, hard-working and patriotic 

American citizens, deserve no less. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Governor Barbour, the Committee has heard repeatedly from officials at all levels of government that Mississippi’s biggest problem 

immediately following Katrina was a severe shortage of commodities like food, water, and ice. 

In fact, your director of the emergency management agency has 

estimated that during the first 9 days after Katrina hit, FEMA delivered only 10 to 15 percent of the food, water, and ice that was 

requested by your State. And that point was actually echoed by 

FEMA’s own representative in Mississippi, who has since retired. 

I want to ask you what you believe was the major cause of that 

shortfall in commodities. I understand that whole systems were 

down and communications were bad. But did it reflect, in your 

judgment, fundamental failures in FEMA’s logistics? 

Governor BARBOUR. I don’t think you can come to any other conclusion. It is correct, I know at least through the first week, that 

we were getting about 10 to 15 percent of what we were supposed 

to have received. 

As I said earlier, we just took matters into our own hands. We 

scrambled and started making things work. And the other Federal 

agencies, I have to say, really helped us. 

10

On the fuel side, the Coast Guard gave us 2 days worth of fuel 

when we were about to run out. And then before that was all consumed, U.S. DOT came in and provided fuel for us for several 

weeks. All of our emergency operations, including generators at 

hospitals and at public jails, not just motor fuel for our police cars. 

But that is what we had to do because FEMA couldn’t provide 

it. Ultimately, the U.S. military provided us 1.5 million MREs that 

I remember them flying in, in C–17s if I remember right, there at 

Gulfport/Biloxi and started unloading tens of thousands of cases of 

MREs. 

Again, I don’t know whether to attribute that to FEMA being 

agile or the military just filling in for them. But for us, it was a 

godsend. 

But this is the nature of the beast. And that is why when you 

ask ‘‘what is the role of the governor,’’ somebody has got to be in 

charge. And there can’t be but one person in charge, and the Federal Government can’t be in charge in Mississippi. And they never 

were. 

And you mentioned Bill Carwile, who was the Federal coordinating officer. One of the good things about the unified command 

structure was he knew he reported to me because it is like it says 

in the Good Book, ‘‘Man can’t serve two masters.’’

And he and they tried hard, but their logistical system just 

couldn’t provide it. So we made other arrangements in various and 

different ways, and this wasn’t the only thing where we had to 

make other arrangements. And sometimes it was a Federal agency 

that came in to help us fill the gap. Sometimes it was the private 

sector. Sometimes people just figured out how to make do. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Governor Blanco, during the 15 hearings that we have held, we 

have heard a lot of very troubling testimony. And during this past 

week, in particular, we have heard testimony that is very troubling 

to me and that seems to contradict the statement that you made 

this morning in which you said ‘‘we did the best we could.’’

And I want to give you an example of that. Your Secretary of 

Transportation, Secretary Bradberry, has conceded to the Committee in his testimony that his department did absolutely nothing 

prior to Katrina to meet its emergency support obligation to plan 

for the transportation needs of those hurricane victims who could 

not evacuate themselves, the so-called special needs populations, 

nursing home residents, those who may have medical needs but are 

at home. 

His exact words I want to read to you. ‘‘We have done nothing 

to fulfill this responsibility.’’ How can you say this morning that 

‘‘we did the best we could’’ when one of your cabinet members has 

testified that he did absolutely nothing to plan for the transportation needs of the most vulnerable people in your State? 

Governor BLANCO. Senator Collins, I have a very honest cabinet 

secretary who explained to you, I believe, that plan was in transition. We certainly agree with you that the Department of Transportation should have planned for the evacuation of the most needy 

citizens. Let me say that will never happen again. We all have 

learned powerful lessons. 

11

But in the pre-evacuation stages, the parish presidents here 

would tell you that the first-line responsibility lies at the local 

level. They know what is going on. And as we walk through the 

process of evacuation, they express their needs up the chain. Just 

as we do with the Federal Government, they do at the local level. 

The nursing homes, in particular, all had evacuation plans that 

they were expected to follow. And if they didn’t follow them, they 

were expected to ask for assistance, first, from their local governments and then to the State. And then if, indeed, that could not 

be handled, we would handle it just like we did in Hurricane Rita. 

We actually had military assets at our disposal for Hurricane Rita, 

and we pre-evacuated the nursing homes and the hospitals. 

This is a very delicate population, and it has to be handled carefully because, as all medical personnel will tell you, an evacuation 

under the best circumstances can cause a delicate population to 

cause us to lose lives in the evacuation process. We even, with having the most assets at our disposal, when we did Hurricane Rita, 

because everybody was in Louisiana at that time, we even found 

glitches in the system then. 

My own Lieutenant Governor, Mitch Landrieu, was paying a 

last-minute coordinating call to the Lake Charles area just before 

the hurricane struck and ended up staying overnight with them in 

order to expedite the evacuation. Some of the military assets and 

the FEMA assets were being redirected to Houston, when they had 

been ordered by our DOD commander, General Honore ́, to come to 

Lake Charles. 

So even under the best of circumstances, a lot of things get confused. We have learned, though, a lot of lessons, and we are demanding that the nursing homes submit their plans to the State 

for very close scrutiny and review, and we will make sure that they 

all get evacuated. 

Chairman COLLINS. Well, let us talk about the nursing homes. 

You made the point that lives could be lost during the evacuation 

process. And I certainly agree with you that it is difficult, and it 

requires planning to move frail patients. But in this case, what 

happened is the majority of nursing homes did not evacuate, and 

people died because of it. 

You talked about that the nursing homes have an obligation to 

come up with their own plans, and that is certainly true. But certainly, when pleas for help were coming in to your emergency operations center, they should have been responded to. 

The most troubling testimony that we have received in this past 

week was from Joseph Donchess, who is the executive director of 

the Louisiana Nursing Home Association. He testified that although he is a named participant to sit at the EOC in Baton Rouge 

and was there throughout Hurricane Katrina, that when he communicated, passed on the messages from nursing homes pleading 

for buses to help evacuate them, pleading for fuel to keep their generators going, he was told, in effect, that because he represented 

a private organization that he could not order or send out missions 

for help. 

As a result, the evacuation of nursing homes was much delayed. 

He told us of a specific case where the delay contributed to the 

deaths of six patients. 

12

Were you aware that requests were coming in from nursing 

homes—I know you were present at the EOC—and that they were 

not being given priority, as Mr. Donchess has testified? 

Governor BLANCO. I know that Mr. Donchess was extremely agitated in the aftermath of the hurricane when I saw him and spoke 

to him in the EOC. At that point in time, evacuations were far 

more difficult, and nursing homes and hospitals were competing for 

the limited amount of assets available to us. 

I would not characterize it, as he has, that nursing homes did 

not have a priority. Indeed, there were tremendous cries for help 

from many sectors—hospitals that needed evacuation, nursing 

homes needed evacuation. I cannot say that it was a pretty sight. 

But I will tell you, Senator, you are absolutely right in your concerns, and we will do a better job coordinating. I would like to point 

something out, though. It does take some time to evacuate this 

delicate population. And on the day, on the Friday before the 

storm, if every State that was threatened by this hurricane began 

evacuations on the Friday before the storm, Florida’s nursing 

homes and hospitals would have all been evacuated in the panhandle. 

Alabama’s coastal nursing homes and hospitals would have all 

been evacuated. Mississippi’s would have all been evacuated, and 

Louisiana’s. And that means they would have all moved north, perhaps into other States, into other facilities, or into the northerly 

reaches of our respective States. This would call for an enormous 

amount of equipment to accomplish this. 

Chairman COLLINS. I have just got to say that I can certainly understand his being extremely agitated if he is getting reports in 

that the most vulnerable elderly, ill, infirm patients in nursing 

homes are dying and can’t get evacuated. I would be agitated, too, 

if I was getting those reports. 

Governor BLANCO. We also have investigations going on, and arrests have been made. There is a personal responsibility from the 

owners of nursing homes. 

And I do want to correct the record. I don’t think that anyone 

stopped to ask about public or private facilities. Indeed, we had privately owned hospitals that were evacuated by whatever assets we 

could command. I would take issue with that particular characterization because, in the end, we evacuated 60,000 people. We had 

limited assets with unlimited needs. 

Remember that we are going to do this better the next time, and 

I think Mr. Donchess is very willing to work with us now to make 

sure that each nursing home follows its evacuation plan early and 

properly as well. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Governor Blanco, I want to go back to Secretary Bradberry for 

a moment because I had two reactions to his testimony yesterday. 

The first was to be quite impressed and appreciative of the work 

that he did on behalf of your administration with people from New 

Orleans city government in the mass evacuation, which was really 

quite remarkable and obviously is a major reason, perhaps the 

most significant reason, why more people were not killed by 

13

Katrina, in addition to the heroic efforts by a lot of search and rescue people. 

And that is the people who pretty much could get out on their 

own. But to facilitate that was a very important and impressive exercise in governmental partnerships. 

But on this question of the responsibility that his department 

was given under the State emergency response plan, I must say 

that his answer that it was transitional didn’t fly with me. And 

just to briefly say that, as I understood it, the State, under your 

leadership, did something very responsive and constructive, which 

was that you—and maybe in response to the Hurricane Pam exercise—also created a new State response plan in some sense mirrored after the Federal response plan. 

In that regard, you gave the State Transportation Department 

the specific responsibility to get ready for transportation facilities 

for those who could not get out on their own prior to a natural disaster. 

And what was really stunning to me, first, in the reading of the 

staff interview with Secretary Bradberry was that he essentially 

said he didn’t think that was an appropriate—I am paraphrasing, 

but I think I am catching the essence of it. He didn’t think that 

was an appropriate responsibility for the State Department of 

Transportation. So he just plain didn’t do it. And the consequences 

of that were terrible. 

Incidentally, we had the man from the Federal Department of 

Transportation here yesterday, and they didn’t get going until after 

the storm either in terms of the enormous transportation assets 

they could have brought. 

But I want to ask you, were you aware that Secretary Bradberry 

had made this personal judgment that he essentially was not going 

to carry forward his responsibility for pre-storm evacuation transportation? 

Governor BLANCO. I was not aware. But then, again, let me say 

that we didn’t have any specific requests in the pre-storm exercise. 

We had much need after the storm. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I am sorry, and excuse me. Do you mean 

that the city did not make a request for pre-storm transportation 

for evacuation? 

Governor BLANCO. That is correct. The city did not. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Even though, am I right, the State Department of Transportation was given that responsibility under the 

State response plan? 

Governor BLANCO. That is correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. But for some reason, the city did not ask, 

and the State did not, on its own, initiate any action to do that. 

I want to go back. So I don’t want to dwell too long on this. But 

you did not know that Secretary Bradberry had decided not to 

carry out that part of his responsibility? 

Governor BLANCO. No, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Just for future reference, was there anybody 

in your administration who had responsibility for essentially making sure that the various State officials who had been given individual responsibility were carrying it out in preparation for a disaster? 

14

1 Committee Exhibit 3 appears in the Appendix on page 93. 

Governor BLANCO. Yes. The officer in charge of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency——

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. And hopefully, going forward, that person under your direction will make sure that everybody in the 

State government is doing what they are supposed to be doing to 

get ready for a disaster. 

Governor, yesterday, the Comptroller General, David Walker, 

issued a preliminary report on the conduct of the Department of 

Homeland Security and FEMA in regard to Katrina, and it was 

quite critical. The press secretary at the Department of Homeland 

Security put out a statement in response, which was quite critical 

of the comptroller general’s report. 

In it, there is this sentence, and we will want to ask Secretary 

Chertoff and Mr. Brown about this. But since you are here today, 

I want to ask you about it. This is, again, the response of DHS to 

the criticism yesterday. 

‘‘The preliminary report falsely implies inaction by DHS and 

FEMA before landfall. In fact, the clear record shows that State officials expressed satisfaction with the Federal Government’s asset 

pre-positioning and other pre-hurricane assistance during a video 

conference the Sunday prior to landfall.’’

There is a transcript of that conference that we have pulled up, 

which is Exhibit 3 in the exhibit book.1 But I am going to quote 

from it. If you want to look at it later, you can. President Bush was 

on that video call on Sunday, August 28. Other officials from 

around the country. 

The record shows that during the call, Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy Director of Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, provides a briefing for all on the call. And at 

the end, Mike Brown, Director of FEMA, says, ‘‘Colonel’’—and I 

presume this is the basis for the DHS response—‘‘Colonel, do you 

have any unmet needs, anything that we are not getting that you 

need?’’

And Colonel Smith says, ‘‘Mike, no.’’ Then there is a word that 

is inaudible to the transcriber—‘‘resources that are en route, and 

it looks like these resources that are en route are going to be a 

good first shot.’’

‘‘Naturally, once we get into this thing, neck deep here, unfortunately, or deeper, I am sure that things are going to come up that 

maybe some of even our best planners hadn’t even thought about. 

So I think flexibility is going to be the key and just as quickly as 

we can cut through any potential red tape when these things do 

arise.’’

I want to ask you what your understanding of what Colonel 

Smith was saying there. Because, obviously, the DHS is saying and 

going to say that they have got the word that they felt that everything was fine as far as the Federal pre-positioning for the hurricane coming on. 

Governor BLANCO. Senator Lieberman——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Excuse me a second. Am I right that you 

were not on the call? 

Governor BLANCO. That is correct. 

15

Senator LIEBERMAN. So what I am asking you to do is to really 

try to, as a chief executive, help us interpret what Colonel Smith 

was saying. 

Governor BLANCO. I think what Colonel Smith would be referring 

to, and I was not on the call, was the fact that for what we might 

call a ‘‘normal hurricane,’’ and if the levees had not failed, we 

would have had what we call a ‘‘normal hurricane.’’ And that would 

have been a lot of wind damage, a lot of rain damage. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Governor BLANCO. I think that what FEMA seemed to be lining 

up and what they were lining up would have been considered adequate, and it would probably have worked fairly well for us. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Had there not been flooding? 

Governor BLANCO. Had there not been the awesome flooding that 

we had to deal with. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Governor BLANCO. And so, I am sure that in the early stages, the 

best you can do is know what is being lined up and know that you 

can count on that coming in. As it turned out, the level of preparation at the Federal level was inadequate. 

The State was overwhelmed. The Federal resources were overwhelmed. The local resources were overwhelmed. We were all overwhelmed by the magnitude of the fury of the storm, which then destroyed the Federal levees and then inundated our entire region 

with waters that were very destructive. And in that case, it became 

inadequate. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So do you think there is basis for what I 

take it to be the DHS statement that Colonel Smith’s words led 

them to believe that at that point, on Sunday afternoon, the State 

was satisfied with what FEMA had done? 

Governor BLANCO. Well, I think if they tell you that they have 

got a multitude of resources lined up, I can tell you, not being on 

that conference, that was the way I felt from the personal interactions that I had with Mike Brown and other FEMA representatives. 

They were working hard, we thought, to pre-position a lot of various assets, and indeed, they did that. And in the end, it simply 

was not enough. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Even though, by testimony we have heard 

and the extraordinary narrative that you provided the Committee, 

that Dr. Mayfield of the National Hurricane Service spoke to you 

on Saturday night, apparently got so anxious about what his scientific ability told him was coming that he was calling anybody he 

could call. 

Did he call you, Governor Barbour? 

Governor BARBOUR. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. To say, ‘‘This is the big one. This is 

going to probably cause enormous flooding.’’

So, on Sunday, wasn’t the State on notice—and the Federal Government, I gather—from Dr. Mayfield’s warnings, on notice that 

flooding was probably going to occur? 

Governor BLANCO. We expected flooding. We get flooding after 

every hurricane. It is the amount of flooding that became untenable. There are certain low-lying regions that flood every time. And 

16

that is why we had wildlife and fisheries boats pre-positioned, some 

400. 

But I do want to say that we had first responders from all over 

Louisiana rushing in to the scene immediately following, as soon 

as it became evident of the level of devastation. We had volunteers 

who drove in with their boats and began rescue missions late Monday afternoon. 

Rescues, when life is in danger, a rescue situation is never really 

pretty. It is filled with tension and danger. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. My time is up. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Akaka. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

I am sorry I was detained and missed all of your testimony. Just 

to let you know, I was at the National Prayer Breakfast this morning and also had a hearing as ranking member on the Veterans 

Committee. So I thank you so much. But I have got to tell you the 

timing has been perfect. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman, Governor Blanco, and Governor 

Barbour. I would like to add my welcome to you, too. 

In October, I toured parts of the Gulf Coast with my colleagues 

on the Energy Committee, and I was deeply moved by the heroic 

and humanitarian actions taken by the people of the Gulf region. 

It was great to hear and see them. 

Throughout our investigation, I keep thinking about those Gulf 

Coast residents who couldn’t take care of themselves, especially the 

sick and the elderly. Like most Americans, I was stunned by the 

news footage of those left behind in nursing homes and hospitals. 

We saw firsthand nurses and doctors moving stranded patients to 

higher ground and higher floors as the hospital flooded, knowing 

that their own families needed help, too. 

I know Senator Collins has questioned you extensively on this 

subject, but I would like to follow up with a few additional questions. 

I would like to follow up with you on an issue I raised earlier 

this week with Dr. Guidry, the medical director of the Louisiana 

Department of Health and Hospitals. As you know, Emergency 

Support Function, ESF–8, of the Louisiana emergency operations 

plan gives the Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center 

primary responsibility for providing and coordinating hospital care 

and shelter for nursing homes and home health patients with acute 

care requirements, as well as casualties of emergencies and disasters. 

However, our Committee interviews have revealed that health 

care officials, specifically those in the Department of Health and at 

LSU, knew that LSU did not have the capability to perform this 

emergency function when the plan was agreed upon. 

As Senator Collins mentioned, a representative from the Louisiana Nursing Home Association testified that LNHA was barred 

from submitting requests for assistance for stranded nursing home 

residents through the E–Team process at the State emergency operations center. It looks to me as though there was no one organiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:47 Mar 13, 2007 Jkt 027024 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27024.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
17

zation willing and able to take responsibility for the Louisiana 

nursing homes during Hurricane Katrina. 

My question to you is did you know that the emergency operations plan contained a health care section that was not operational when you approved it? 

Governor BLANCO. Senator Akaka, there are many parts of the 

early emergency plans that are very difficult to achieve, and we understand that. I do want to—for your own information because I 

have responded to Senator Collins’ inquiry, the nursing home question, I believe, came into play in the aftermath of the storm, when 

we had unlimited needs, but limited resources. 

The nursing homes were competing with the hospitals at that 

point in time for removal of the neediest patients, fragile patients. 

We understand that we need to pre-evacuate nursing homes and 

have the nursing home owners follow the plans that they submit 

to the local governments. And the State has already put processes 

in place now to assure ourselves that every nursing home owner is 

following a prescribed plan and is safely evacuating their nursing 

home patients before an event occurs and not to be found in these 

difficult situations when everybody is crying and clamoring for resources. 

And I respectfully disagree with Mr. Donchess’s assertion that 

because it was private sector they didn’t have standing. We were 

evacuating private sector hospitals at the same time that we were 

evacuating public hospitals. In fact, some of the private hospitals 

got pre-evacuated, got evacuated before the public hospital. 

Senator AKAKA. What person or agency do you hold accountable 

for responding to nursing home needs in the event of a disaster? 

Governor BLANCO. We will now have the Department of Health 

and Hospitals responsible for that, and that will be Secretary Fred 

Cerise. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Governor Barbour, your testimony raises concerns over the labor 

shortage in Mississippi that is hindering your State’s reconstruction. I share your concern over labor issues. However, in order to 

attract workers, their rights must be protected. 

I understand that Latino and immigrant workers are playing a 

critical role in rebuilding Mississippi communities. Yet numerous 

reports indicate that they are being exploited by contractors. The 

Mississippi Immigrant Rights Alliance, one of the key organizations assisting foreign workers on the ground, has filed approximately 200 complaints of nonpayment with the U.S. Department of 

Labor. Complaints have also included injuries resulting from unsafe working conditions. 

What is being done to enhance enforcement of State labor laws 

and to penalize unscrupulous contractors who refuse to pay or 

refuse to protect their workers? 

Governor BARBOUR. Senator, as you noted, those complaints were 

filed with the U.S. Department of Labor. They haven’t been filed 

with the State, to my knowledge. 

Now the attorney general is not my appointee. He is an independently elected government official like I am, and perhaps his office has received those complaints. He is the person who would receive complaints about consumer fraud or business practices, that 

18

1 Committee Exhibit 29 appears in the Appendix on page 136. 

sort of stuff. But perhaps this organization has chosen to file those 

exclusively with the U.S. Department of Labor, which would be, of 

course, up to them, not up to me. 

We have, as I noted in my testimony, a lot of nonlocal people who 

are there working. Some of them are Latinos, Hispanics. Others 

are from other parts of the United States. We have got plenty of 

work for them. 

They need to be treated just like anybody else, and that is the 

policy of our State. I think if the attorney general were here, he 

would tell you that is the policy of his office. And if those complaints were made to him, I am sure he would act on them. 

Senator AKAKA. Governor Blanco, would you respond to that 

also? 

Governor BLANCO. I am not aware of anything, any complaints 

filed, not to say that couldn’t be going on in Louisiana as well, sir. 

Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Governor Barbour, for those of your residents who were self-employed before the hurricane and who have been unable to find work 

since then, the Federal Government now provides financial assistance to meet their needs through the disaster unemployment assistance. 

That program now provides about $90 a week in benefits. Do you 

think it is realistic to expect these displaced and unemployed residents of your State to support themselves and rebuild their lives 

on $90 a week? 

Governor BARBOUR. Senator, as you noted earlier, we have a labor shortage on the coast. Anybody who is earning $90 a week 

through disaster unemployment or any other kind of unemployment, it is because they choose to. Because there is plenty of work, 

and there are jobs that are going a’begging in my State, good-paying jobs. In fact, we see today restaurants that can’t open their normal hours because they can’t get enough labor. So anybody that is getting $90 a week of disaster unemployment 

assistance in Mississippi is doing it by choice. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

According to the diary you submitted to the Committee, Governor 

Blanco, Exhibit 29,1 on Saturday evening, Mayor Nagin informed 

you over the phone that he intended to order a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans on Sunday morning. Given the fact that you 

knew it was important for as many people as possible to evacuate, 

did you encourage Mayor Nagin to issue the mandatory evacuation 

order that night in order to give the people of New Orleans extra 

time to evacuate? 

Governor BLANCO. Senator, the mayor and the parish presidents, 

many of whom are present with us today, all worked with us, and 

all of us were asking our people to evacuate beginning Friday 

morning. We learned late Friday night that Louisiana would be affected by the storm. 

So first thing Saturday morning, we had a 7:30 a.m. conference 

on Saturday morning. We also had one at 5 p.m. on Friday night, 

the night before, but Louisiana was not definitively a target at that 

19

point in time. We had just moved into the cone of influence. But 

by Friday night, we knew the hurricane was coming. 

So we began immediately early Saturday morning, all of us, urging evacuation, getting people to not panic, but to plan their exit. 

We evacuated an urban center of 1.4 million people. Now that is 

bigger than many States that are present and represented on this 

panel. It had to be staged in order to work properly. The low-lying 

areas had the mandatory orders out on Saturday. 

In Hurricane Ivan, those low-lying areas have one road down and 

the same road out. They are peninsula-like regions. And people 

from the low-lying areas actually got trapped and could not get out 

because the urban center had clogged the arterials. 

We have very limited access. I–10 is the main arterial that goes 

from California to Florida. And I–10 east and west is basically the 

main highway that people would mostly take. 

So when that happened, we all got together and worked very 

closely, and all signed agreements on how to stage an evacuation 

plan. It went extremely well. As the lower lying areas ordered their 

mandatory evacuations first, we were also urging all people to 

evacuate. 

We weren’t saying, ‘‘Stop, New Orleans people, do not evacuate.’’ 

We were saying, ‘‘Get your evacuation plans going. Pack up. Prepare to be on your own for 3 days. Bring food. Bring chairs. Bring 

cots if you have it. Bring your pillows, your blankets. Bring toys 

for the kids. Pack like you are going on a camping trip.’’ Those 

were the things that I said to the people on the media. 

But we began that process on Saturday morning and urged evacuation all through the day Saturday. These parish presidents were 

urging mandatory evacuation so that their people would not get 

trapped. 

On Saturday night, Max Mayfield called me. Now we had been 

in our evacuation process. We had called for contraflow at 4 p.m. 

in the afternoon. I had called Governor Barbour on Friday night, 

per our plan, our coordinated plan, and asked him if he would also 

order contraflow in his State so that some of our people could exit 

from the east and go north. And he did. 

I let him know on Friday night that was our plan, and again on 

Saturday morning, I confirmed it with him. We had a terrific partnership. We are going to do the same thing with Texas. In Rita, 

Texans came into Southwest Louisiana, the very place that we 

needed to evacuate ourselves. And our highways, our interstate 

was totally gridlocked for many miles. 

So Governor Perry and I have conferred, and our people are now 

working on a sensible exit plan to respond to these huge numbers 

of people who live in Texas that may need to use Louisiana highways. We think it is appropriate. We just need it to be coordinated, 

and we could establish contraflow if we pre-plan that. 

See, I had to tell the Louisiana people in Southwest to use the 

back roads as much as they could to be able to get through the 

gridlock on the interstate. But we got everybody out safely for Rita. 

We did many things similarly in Katrina. Our contraflow plan 

worked magnificently. I was up in the air checking it. I watched 

it at major intersections, when you are blocking traffic from enterVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:47 Mar 13, 2007 Jkt 027024 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27024.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
20

ing the city, when you have all of your lanes going outbound, and 

that is basically what we were attempting, what we actually did. 

So the evacuation process was complex. In fact, Secretary 

Bradberry of the Department of Transportation was the person 

who masterminded this, along with Colonel Whitehorn of the Louisiana State Police. And as I said, this was a very deliberate and 

well-planned and agreed-upon effort. All of the parish leaders had 

to sign on and agree to have the courage to stay with their plan. 

Now when Max Mayfield called on Saturday night, I will tell you 

that the mayor was probably going to call mandatory evacuation on 

Sunday for New Orleans because that was in the plan. But 

Mayfield actually enhanced his sense of urgency. 

Mayfield called me first, and I said, ‘‘Sir, there is a mayor you 

must speak to tonight.’’ He said, ‘‘I have been trying to reach him.’’ 

I said, ‘‘I have his number. Give me yours. I will find the mayor 

and connect you two.’’

So when the mayor got that information Saturday night, he immediately went to his television stations and urged the people even 

more. Now do you know that all through the night Saturday night, 

our interstates were flowing outbound, and we still had contraflow 

in place all through Saturday night until we were supposed to close 

it down on Sunday at 4 a.m. 

Now you can’t keep these things up. You have cones in the highway. You have barricades that prevent incoming traffic. You have 

got to remove all of that before a hurricane because the wind will 

then take those, and those will be flying missiles, and that can be 

very dangerous. 

So Governor Barbour’s people had to do the same thing in Mississippi for us all to be able to make this thing work. His people 

were also using that contraflow part of the interstate that our people were using, and I had to urge patience because people, in tense 

situations, they might drive recklessly. They might get injured. 

An automobile accident, I told them explicitly. ‘‘Drive carefully. 

We don’t want you to get killed in an automobile accident. The idea 

is to get you to safety.’’ And that was essentially what went on. 

When the mayor did call for mandatory evacuation on Sunday, 

I had traveled into New Orleans and had two press conferences on 

Saturday, but I went back on Sunday morning for the 9 o’clock announcement to back him up, to make sure that the citizens understood the seriousness and the severity of what we were dealing 

with. 

And Senator, there were news reports at that time saying that 

no governor had ever gone into the city during the course of a hurricane. And so, they understood the seriousness of it, and the 

media was urging their citizens as well to get out. They were 

supplementing our messages, and they were saying Governor Blanco is here 2 days in a row. We know this is a serious hurricane. 

We are urging all of you to get out. No governor has ever done that 

before. 

So our evacuation efforts were comprehensive. There are always 

people, though, who want to play hurricane roulette. It is nearly 

impossible to get 100 percent of the people out. Our people are 

jaded, to some extent, or feel very brave at other times. We had 

evacuated for Hurricane Ivan. It didn’t come to Louisiana. 

21

We had a bluebird day, and everybody was frustrated up on the 

highways. The kids are screaming, and you just want to get home, 

and they had to turn around and come back. And they said, ‘‘We 

did that for nothing.’’ And I was so worried that this time, they 

would take that same attitude because Huricane Ivan was just the 

year before. 

But, fortunately, most people did not. But some people believe 

that they can tough out a hurricane. We have got some pretty 

rough, tough citizens who feel like they can be challenged by anything, and they choose to stay. 

And indeed, they would have been right, but for the flooding. 

They could have toughed out the storm, the winds and the rain of 

the storm. They would have made it. 

Chairman COLLINS. The Senator’s time has long expired. 

Governor BLANCO. I apologize. I am sorry. 

Senator AKAKA. I thank you very much, Governors, for your responses, and I thank you for the time, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. You are welcome, and we will do another 

round. So you will certainly get more opportunity. 

Governor Blanco, before we go on, I do want to clarify an issue 

involving Mr. Donchess’s testimony because I think you are under 

a misimpression. He did not say that the issue was whether the 

nursing home or hospital was privately or publicly owned, as you 

have asserted twice this morning. 

Governor BLANCO. Well, that was my understanding. I am sorry. 

Chairman COLLINS. Right. And that is why I want to correct it 

for the record and just for your personal information. 

His point is that although he was a designated participant at the 

EOC, because he was representing a private organization, not a 

governmental agency, his requests were not handled in the same 

way that they would have been if they had come from a governmental entity, despite the role that specified for his organization in 

the plan. 

So it had nothing at all to do with the ownership of nursing 

homes and hospitals, and I just wanted to clarify that. 

Governor BLANCO. We will fully investigate that, Senator Collins. 

There is no excuse for that. I appreciate the clarification. 

Chairman COLLINS. Governor Barbour, obviously, the evacuation 

of nursing homes and hospitals and others with medical needs presents some real challenges. Can you tell us what the experience 

was in Mississippi? How did you go about dealing with your nursing homes and other vulnerable populations? 

Governor BARBOUR. Well, first of all, the health department, the 

Division of Medicaid, the Department of Mental Health all have a 

piece of the action here. When Hurricane Ivan came, Governor 

Blanco mentioned Ivan, and I identify with her talk about hurricane fatigue. With Ivan, everybody boarded up, evacuated, nothing 

happened. Then for us, Hurricane Dennis, everybody boarded up, 

evacuated, and nothing happened. 

And candidly, Friday and Saturday, we were very worried about 

people evacuating. Even though a mandatory evacuation had been 

called for in the flood zones on the coast, there was just a lot of 

hurricane fatigue. 

22

But we have a situation where we have got a couple of nursing 

homes that are very vulnerable, and we just make them evacuate. 

And candidly, that is risky. As Governor Blanco said, some of those 

frail elderly, moving them is physically dangerous for them. It is 

emotionally dangerous for them. But Miramar, which is one of 

those nursing homes, is a slab today. So it was obviously the right 

risk to take in the case of Katrina. 

Same thing with the hospitals. The health department works 

with the hospitals, and we see what the danger looks like. And we 

evacuate anybody that can be taken. We had a number of hospitals 

that were knocked out, flooded. Hancock County, particularly. But 

most of the damage was down low. As you know, they are pretty 

well built, but we got a 38-foot storm surge in Hancock County, 

and that flooded them out. 

But I remember, not this hurricane because it was so obviously 

going to be bad, but for Ivan, we had to make one of the nursing 

homes evacuate. And that is where Medicaid comes in because that 

is who pays them. And if they get sort of uncertain of whether they 

need to evacuate, I get the director of Medicaid to call them, and 

they get a better attitude. 

But I sympathize. This is a dangerous thing, and we only do it 

when we know or we just think there is a really big risk. And that 

is really all I can tell you about it. 

Chairman COLLINS. I have noticed that the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency recently hired a logistics expert. Does 

that reflect your assessment that you can’t rely on FEMA to be 

there for logistics? Or does it indicate that you found a gap in your 

own preparedness, or is it both? 

Governor BARBOUR. Madam Chairman, I don’t try to micro manage FEMA—MEMA. Sorry. Either one of them, for that matter. 

But I don’t try to micro manage MEMA. We are staffing up a little 

bit there. We have a tremendous amount of paperwork now that 

is involved with getting the reimbursements and getting all of that 

done, seeing how much the State’s share is. 

The other thing is we are preparing for the next hurricane season. We have 34,000 travel trailers sitting on the Gulf Coast. 

Chairman COLLINS. Very vulnerable. 

Governor BARBOUR. Yes, ma’am. And they are vulnerable in several ways. They are not only vulnerable, if houses were blown away 

for 10 blocks deep, as you have seen, think of what it will do to 

these travel trailers. 

The other way they are vulnerable is the fear that some people 

will put a trailer hitch on the back of the pickup truck and drive 

off with the travel trailer, which is now hooked up to sewer. Most 

of them are hooked up to electricity. A handful still are running 

gas and that sort of stuff. So that is dangerous. 

But part of his logistical issue that the head of MEMA faces now 

is how are we going to deal with the people on the coast who are 

in temporary housing, very vulnerable temporary housing? And 

that may be why, but I don’t know his specific thinking. 

And as I say, I think of my job, I don’t try to micro manage all 

the State departments and agencies. If they think they know what 

to do, I tell them to do it. If they don’t, I tell them, well, come on, 

let us sit down and talk about it, and we will figure it out. 

23

But both of those two situations may figure into that. Preparing 

for the future and also making sure we are getting all our Federal 

reimbursement stuff right. 

Chairman COLLINS. Governor Blanco, yesterday Mayor Nagin expressed his frustration over what he described as ‘‘an incredible 

dance between the Federal and State government over who would 

be in charge.’’ He said that the failure to promptly resolve that 

issue impeded the response to Katrina. 

And he went on to describe a meeting that he attended with you 

and with the President in which the President presented you with 

two options. Either the Federal Government could have a unified 

command structure over both the active duty and National Guard 

troops, thus essentially federalizing the Guard, or you, as Governor, could retain your authority over the Guard, and the Federal 

commanders would simply coordinate their efforts with you. 

The mayor said to us that he pushed very hard. In fact, he described himself as ‘‘I was a bit pushy. The meeting left me disappointed. No decisions were made.’’

He said he pushed for this fundamental issue to be rapidly resolved, but he told us that instead of a decision being made at this 

critical meeting, where all the participants were, that you instead 

asked for 24 hours to make a decision, thus delaying the resolution 

of what the mayor identified as a key impediment. 

It seems to me that the options were pretty clear, the two options. You had the mayor expressing his repeated concern that the 

failure to resolve the command structure one way or the other, and 

he made very clear that he didn’t care which way the decision was 

made, was hurting the response efforts. Why didn’t you just make 

a decision at that point? 

Governor BLANCO. Senator Collins, the mayor was not in our 

meeting that I had with the President, per se. The discussion had 

nothing to do with the underlying assumptions that no decision 

was made. Indeed, I told the President that the proper way to do 

business would be for me, as Governor, to retain control of the National Guard and for him to simply send troops in. 

I was pushing for Federal DOD troops to come in. At that point 

in time, we had very few. We had General Honore ́, a magnificent 

general of the Army, there without a force. And I was asking for 

a force to come in. And I was very clear with the President that 

I, as Governor, needed to retain control of the National Guard. 

There was no question in my mind ever. 

The President was asking another question, and I said out of respect to him that I would give him 24-hour notice. It had nothing 

to do with my adamant decision to retain control of the National 

Guard. 

There is not a governor in this country, four territories, or the 

mayor of Washington, DC, who would give up control of the National Guard. You absolutely have to have the law enforcement capacity of the Guard in these circumstances. 

I have for many years, as a citizen of the State of Louisiana and 

as a public official for the various offices that I have held, worked 

with and coordinated and observed as a citizen the National Guard 

coming in as a support system for local law enforcement authority. 

They have the legal right and the proper training to do that. 

24

Indeed, many of the Guard members who work in security, per 

se, are members of the civilian law enforcement effort that exists 

in our State and in our Nation. So they know the protocols, the 

local protocols. They know how to fold in with local law enforcement very well. 

I will tell you that at that point in time, Mayor Nagin had not 

been in good communication with us. You know the communication 

system had fallen down. The National Guard on Friday—this conversation occurred on the Friday after the storm. 

We actually were in the process of evacuating the Superdome. 

We had begun that process on Thursday and had also begun the 

process of evacuating the Convention Center on Friday. And I 

knew from our logistics and because I was deeply involved in every 

decision on this triage mission that I inherited from above that we 

were nearly completely finished with the evacuation process. 

Now that was the trauma of the week, trying to get assets to 

move about 60,000 people, 70,000 people out of the Superdome and 

out of the Convention Center. And that was when I was pleading 

for additional assets and for additional help from the Federal Government and waiting, well, gathering our own school buses up and 

sending them in, beginning on Tuesday, picking people up off the 

highways that were exposed to the elements. I also knew that we 

were just very nearly finished with that evacuation mission. 

Now I had asked General Honore ́ to be in charge of the evacuation when he came in on Wednesday, and he coordinated all of his 

activities with me. We were in constant communication. But General Honore ́ did not have a force to use. So he had to use the National Guard. 

We had to do a very focused, coordinated effort, and the National 

Guard actually carried out the vast amount of the responsibilities. 

We did ask the small number of DOD forces there—and really, it 

was a handful initially and very few people after that—to do the 

actual coordination. 

Chairman COLLINS. Governor, I will come back to this issue, but 

my time is expired. So I am going to yield to Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. I am actually 

going to pick up on that. 

Because this is an important question, not just to help us understand what happened in the case of Katrina, but because one of the 

questions we are considering is the role of the Department of Defense in responding to disasters here at home, whether they be natural or, God forbid, terrorist. 

Incidentally, you provided early in December, both to this Committee and the House investigating committee, I think it is a 33-

page narrative on what you were involved in, which has been very 

helpful to us. And I will refer to this as I go through my questions. 

Let us go to Monday, August 29. Hurricane Katrina hits landfall. 

Am I correct at that point or even before, had you begun making 

requests—and here I am speaking particularly for military assistance—from both your own National Guard, other National Guards 

under the so-called EMAC program, and the Federal Government 

for active Army support? 

Just tell us a little bit about who you spoke to after landfall at 

each of those levels. 

25

Governor BLANCO. Well, before landfall, the Louisiana National 

Guard was being activated. We had, out of a force of about 11,000, 

approximately 5,000 available to us. The rest of them were in Iraq 

or Afghanistan. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Governor BLANCO. So we immediately activated all 5,000. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I want to make that clear. Your intention 

was to activate every available National Guards person? 

Governor BLANCO. Every available member of the Guard in Louisiana. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Governor BLANCO. General Landreneau, who is the Adjutant 

General——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Adjutant General, right. 

Governor BLANCO [continuing]. Of the Louisiana Guard also 

began to make calls to some of our nearby States, and they had already begun, before landfall, to deploy force in some numbers into 

Louisiana. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Governor BLANCO. In the aftermath of the storm, General 

Landreneau and I worked very closely. We were trying to determine exactly what our needs would be, and he began immediately 

to call the adjutant generals of other States, and governors from 

many States across the country——

Senator LIEBERMAN. And how did they respond? 

Governor BLANCO [continuing]. Were calling me and offering assistance, as well as I was calling others to ask for specific assistance. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. By what time——

Governor BLANCO. I got it in every single case. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good. 

Governor BLANCO. They responded quickly and with force. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me try to focus on that a little bit. By 

what point did you have the 5,000 members of the Louisiana National Guard activated? 

Governor BLANCO. I think that was probably by Monday——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Later in the day, after landfall, or during 

the day? 

Governor BLANCO. Well, I would have to go back and actually 

look at the record. But I know that they were activated before and 

converging on the scene. They were stationed away from the destruction because you don’t want too many of them to get caught. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Governor BLANCO. Now we had some also in the area. We had 

some embedded in the Superdome. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. So when did the National Guard 

start to arrive from other States? 

Governor BLANCO. Oh, on Monday, and I think prior to the 

storm, probably on Sunday a few. But in large numbers, Tuesday, 

Wednesday, and Thursday. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So is it fair to say by——

Governor BLANCO. By Thursday, we had a significant number. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Can you take a guess at what it was? 

26

Governor BLANCO. I know that we had probably more than 2,000 

because part of what I needed right then on Thursday was this effort to settle the issues of the lack of law enforcement in the city 

down. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Governor BLANCO. The media had certainly amplified the lawlessness going on. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Hold off on that a minute because I do want 

to come back to that. Let me now ask you at what point you began 

to specifically request what I would call ‘‘regular Army’’ involvement? I know you have said, correct me if I am wrong, that General Honore ́ came onto the scene, and you met with him on 

Wednesday, I believe you said in your narrative. Does that sound 

right? 

Governor BLANCO. Right. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. But at that point, he had few or no active 

Army troops? 

Governor BLANCO. Well, I had requested it when we had begun 

talking on Tuesday. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Who did you talk to? 

Governor BLANCO. I called General Landreneau——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Governor BLANCO [continuing]. And asked him to go through the 

channels. I mean, he is military. DOD forces in Iraq and National 

Guard work side by side. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Governor BLANCO. So I asked him to see what he could do to 

bulk up and get DOD forces. He called General Honore ́. Now these 

two men have a great deal of respect for each other, and General 

Honore ́ is from Louisiana. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I could tell that General Honore ́ was from 

Louisiana when I heard him speak, yes. [Laughter.] 

Governor BLANCO. You could tell. He has a wonderful Louisiana 

accent. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. He does. 

Governor BLANCO. Well, his son is in the Louisiana National 

Guard as well. So he called General Honore ́, who promptly showed 

up on Wednesday. Now I was under the impression that—also on 

Wednesday, I spoke to the President directly. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Governor BLANCO. And told him, I was trying to explain the 

magnitude of our situation. That was very different, as Governor 

Barbour has said, from his situation. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. Right. 

Governor BLANCO. We had water for a month, that we had to dry 

the place out. But nonetheless, I was excited when General Honore ́

actually showed up on Wednesday. I thought we had gotten the response that I had requested. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Can I go back a ways? Did you ask the 

President that was in a phone call on Wednesday? 

Governor BLANCO. It was in a phone call on Wednesday. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. For specific additional regular Army? 

Governor BLANCO. Military assistance. 

27

1 Committee Exhibit 29 appears in the Appendix on page 136. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, and let me ask you this question. Were 

you looking for additional numbers? In other words, you had a 

growing number——

Governor BLANCO. Yes. Boots on the ground. 

Senator LIEBERMAN [continuing]. Of National Guards people, or 

was it special capabilities that you thought the regular Army would 

have? 

Governor BLANCO. Well, it was both. We needed troops. We needed people on the ground. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Governor BLANCO. There was a huge amount of work to be done. 

And indeed, when they did come in, beginning on Saturday, they 

worked for weeks. It was hard work, going house to house and trying to find any people left. But I asked in a phone call on Wednesday. And then later in the day Wednesday, I thought that my request had been honored and——

Senator LIEBERMAN. When General Honore ́ showed up——

Governor BLANCO. On Wednesday. 

Senator LIEBERMAN [continuing]. You assumed that was the response to your request to the President? 

Governor BLANCO. I did. And I was very pleased and honored, 

and I thought that was pretty rapidly deployed. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Did General Honore ́ then tell you that he 

was going to be bringing in regular Army troops? 

Governor BLANCO. Well, he never actually committed to that because I think I have to assume that he couldn’t make that call by 

himself. But he came, as he explained to me, in an advisory capacity. I then asked him to please take over the coordination of the 

evacuation process. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Governor BLANCO. And we worked very closely together. I mean, 

we were in constant communication. But as I said, the National 

Guard then had to actually do the evacuation. But they all worked 

together. It was very well done. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. Let me ask you a question. Now we are 

going to Thursday of that week, and I am basing this on your narrative. It happens to be page 12 of Exhibit 29.1 You met, you tell 

us, with General Blum, who is the head of the National Guard for 

the country, to discuss what was happening. 

And in that narrative—and you correct me if I am wrong—you 

state that General Blum advised you that you, as Governor of the 

State, that your National Guard forces should not be federalized. 

Is that correct? 

Governor BLANCO. That is correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. What were the circumstances under which 

that came up? Were you worried that there would be a request to 

federalize the forces, or did General Blum initiate——

Governor BLANCO. This is what was going on. We understood the 

magnitude of our need. So General Landreneau at one point came 

to me, and he said, ‘‘Governor,’’ he said, ‘‘I have been calling in to 

these States, but I need General Steve Blum to make a national 

28

call.’’ Because I kept saying, ‘‘How many troops do we have coming 

in now?’’ And we were just looking at the whole picture. 

And then you must remember this was not just New Orleans. 

This was St. Tammany——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Sure. Right. 

Governor BLANCO [continuing]. Washington Parish, St. Bernard, 

Plaquemines. There were many needs. Jefferson is a huge parish, 

huge geographic parish. And we needed people deployed in all of 

these regions, and a lot of people live in those areas. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Excuse me for interrupting, just because the 

time is going. 

Governor BLANCO. I am sorry. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. No, that is not your fault at all. I appreciate 

it. 

In the conversation with General Blum, were you concerned or 

was he concerned that there might be a request to federalize the 

troops? Or did he just say that as part of the normal operating procedure of the National Guard? 

Governor BLANCO. No. I told him that I had asked the President 

for DOD forces. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Governor BLANCO. And then on Thursday, and I guess maybe before that, the word ‘‘federalization’’ had been floating around. And 

as I appreciated, I asked General Blum to explain what exactly 

that would mean. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Governor BLANCO. And he said it would mean that the National 

Guard forces would become a part of DOD, and then we talked 

about the law enforcement capabilities that I needed. And in federalization, it changes, all of that changes. You lose the law enforcement capacity. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Correct. Because of posse comitatus, and all 

of that. 

Governor BLANCO. So I asked him because, really, I didn’t want 

to be negligent, and I said does it prevent DOD coming in with 

force, if we don’t do this thing, this federalization move? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, because——

Governor BLANCO. And he said absolutely not. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. It doesn’t prevent them? 

Governor BLANCO. It does not prevent them. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. Let us go to Friday, the meeting that 

we have heard about, whether it was a dance or not I guess is up 

to the participants’ vision of it. But the President was there. Mayor 

Nagin was there. 

Was it at that larger meeting or at what we have heard described as a separate meeting right afterward that you and the 

President had that the idea of federalizing the Louisiana National 

Guard was first raised? 

Governor BLANCO. It was in our separate meeting. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. And who was there besides the President? 

Governor BLANCO. Well, in our private meeting, I think it was 

just the President, myself, and I think his Deputy Chief of Staff, 

Joe Hagin. 

29

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. Was there an explanation given 

about why you were being asked to federalize the National Guard 

of Louisiana? 

Governor BLANCO. The President was just asking me what my 

thoughts were on it. It was just really an honest discussion about 

the pros and the cons of coordinating, how would you best coordinate two forces. I would describe that as a very honest and open 

and direct conversation, and I shared with him mainly the things 

that I have told you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So you tell me if I am drawing a wrong impression from what you just said. Though the question was being 

raised by the President, I take you to be saying you didn’t feel like 

this was a demand or a coercion? 

Governor BLANCO. I did not feel at that time in that meeting that 

there was any demand or coercion. I thought that he was seeking 

an honest answer. And indeed, on Saturday, he announced the organization just as I had suggested it, and the organization worked. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So, again, why the question was even coming up, to the best of your knowledge, it was just being described 

as a matter of administrative what, effectiveness or——

Governor BLANCO. Well, I guess what I would say that at some 

junctures you could sort of boil it down to just trying to figure out 

how to make it work for everybody. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. 

Governor BLANCO. I was trying to get more people in, and another concern of mine was if they gave my National Guard to the 

DOD general, they might then consider that all the force that I was 

going to get. And I needed more people. I needed a lot of people. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let us go to Friday night, and again, I am 

depending on your narrative. Close to midnight on Friday, you received a phone call from the Chief of Staff at the White House, Andrew Card. Is that correct? 

Governor BLANCO. No. I received a call from General Blum——

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. 

Governor BLANCO [continuing]. Who was at the White House. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Was Mr. Card on the phone? 

Governor BLANCO. Not the first two calls, but on the third call. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And they all happened that night? 

Governor BLANCO. All happened that night. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Am I right that, at that point, you were 

being requested to allow the federalization of the Louisiana National Guard, and they faxed you this memorandum of understanding that we have since——

Governor BLANCO. Essentially, I would say yes. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. What was the reason given for that request? 

Governor BLANCO. For a midnight call? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. Three, apparently. 

Governor BLANCO. Right. Well, the reason was that the President 

was going to make a statement the next morning. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And was going to announce that the Louisiana Guard was going to be federalized? 

Governor BLANCO. If I would agree to it. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. And did General Blum, who had advised you earlier in the week not to allow the Guard to be federalVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:47 Mar 13, 2007 Jkt 027024 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27024.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
30

ized, continue to take that position? Did he say nothing, or did he 

urge you to allow the federalization? 

Governor BLANCO. He explained to me that he was at the White 

House, being asked to make this call to me, and he had a schematic that he asked me to agree to. He actually didn’t explain anything. He asked me to sign a letter that he was sending and wanted me to return it in 5 minutes. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That was the memorandum of understanding? 

Governor BLANCO. That is correct. And I told him I could not do 

any such thing without legal review and that I certainly didn’t 

want to make midnight decisions, even though I happened to be 

very wide awake. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Card then was on the second call? 

Governor BLANCO. On the third phone call, I think. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Who was on the second? 

Governor BLANCO. Blum. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Calling back and asking——

Governor BLANCO. It was Blum, and then Card came on on the 

third call. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Card on the third call with the same request? 

Governor BLANCO. Right. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And again, any reason given for the request? 

Governor BLANCO. They just thought it was—at that point in 

time, Andrew Card determined that he thought it was the best way 

to go. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. Did you feel under pressure at that 

point, as compared to the conversation with the President earlier 

in the day? 

Governor BLANCO. Well, it was a very different kind of pressure, 

but I still told him no. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. And that is the way it ended? 

Governor BLANCO. That is correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. 

Governor BLANCO. I was very definitive, sir. There was never a 

question in my mind as to the lines of authority. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Governor. I apologize, Madam 

Chairman. I just want to ask Governor Barbour a quick question. 

Were you at any time asked to allow the Federal Government to 

federalize the Mississippi National Guard? 

Governor BARBOUR. I was never directly asked. I made it very 

plain from day one that we didn’t need Federal troops. We didn’t 

need the Federal Government to run our National Guard, and they 

never attempted to. 

And when General Honore ́ came onboard, it was made plain to 

me, and I made it plain to the Federal Government that we loved 

having General Honore ́, but he wasn’t in charge of anything in 

Mississippi. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. So, in a sense, you preemptively, if I 

may use that word, made it clear that you were not going to allow 

the federalization? 

31

Governor BARBOUR. Nobody ever asked me. But when the talk 

started——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Governor BARBOUR [continuing]. I was very emphatic. It was the 

wrong thing to do. It is the wrong thing to do, but nobody ever 

asked me to do it. As far as I know, nobody ever tried to impose 

that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Governor BARBOUR. Yes, sir. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Warner. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I welcome you, Governor Barbour. Nice to see you again. And 

Governor Blanco, I welcome you as well. Both of you had a very 

arduous task and a challenging one, and history will have to unfold 

and make its judgments, but I have been impressed with your testimony this morning. 

I have been on an issue for some months up here in the context 

of these tragedies, and that is the doctrine of posse comitatus, 

which controls the authority of the Federal troops, that is the regular Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, when they are involved in 

situations like this. 

It is a time-honored doctrine that prohibits them from involving 

themselves in what we call the ‘‘normal police activities’’ by a municipality or State or otherwise. And I support that basic doctrine. 

But then given the magnitude of these tragedies, I think we 

should go back and address the doctrine once again, determining 

if there may be cases for making some exceptions to that. And I 

have so wrote that to the Secretary of Defense, and that study is 

under way. But I think your views on it would be helpful. 

Recognizing that when the Guard and regular forces are integrated in the confusing, often tumultuous situations that evolve in 

these catastrophes, the average citizen can’t distinguish from one 

uniform or the other. They are about the same. 

And if a law enforcement situation arose where the local law enforcement needed the assistance or wasn’t available, and citizens 

had to turn to such troops that were present, the Federal troops 

would have to step back and relinquish the entire responsibility to 

National Guard, which does have the legal authority to integrate 

and work on law enforcement problems. 

Now given that history and doctrine, was that a factor in some 

of your considerations with regard to Federal troops, I ask you, 

Governor Blanco? 

Governor BLANCO. I am not sure I understand the question. It 

was what? 

Senator WARNER. When you decided about the utilization of the 

Federal troops, you wanted boots on the ground? 

Governor BLANCO. I wanted boots on the ground to help with 

our——

Senator WARNER. And you wanted those boots to have full authority to assist law enforcement? 

Governor BLANCO. No, sir. 

Senator WARNER. You didn’t? 

32

Governor BLANCO. No. I have the National Guard for that. And 

that is why I did not want the Guard federalized. It is very important for a governor to be able to retain control of the National 

Guard precisely for its law enforcement capabilities. 

Many of the members of the Guard who work as security forces 

are actually civil law enforcement officers in their daily work. So 

they know the rules. They know the parameters. They know the 

language of local law enforcement, which is very different from 

military protocols. 

And so, I think it is very important to respect the time-honored 

issues of posse comitatus. I would urge you not to do anything to 

alter that. 

I think that the recommendation that I would make is if and 

when a governor requests additional Federal troops, in our case, we 

needed people. We needed people who could go in and carry out 

very difficult missions, which, indeed, they did afterward. And that 

was going from home to home, doing the searches. Doing even some 

more rescue efforts at certain times. 

But I would say if a governor calls, please send the troops, and 

they can work out their coordination details upon arrival. But as 

we support the local law enforcement efforts at the State level with 

the National Guard, I think that having the Federal troops support 

the National Guard is the correct procedure. 

Senator WARNER. Governor Barbour, do you have some views on 

that subject? 

Governor BARBOUR. We never asked for any Federal troops, partially because we didn’t need them. But we never lost continuity of 

government. Our local police and fire, Waveland, Mississippi, population 7,000, 26 policemen. There is not a habitable structure in 

Waveland, Mississippi. 

At 9 p.m. the night of the storm, all 26 policemen were on duty. 

And so, we never got to the situation where we even thought about 

Federal troops. We do have Federal troops. We have military facilities, and particularly the Seabee base, they were fabulous. But 

never in any law enforcement role. Never wanted them in any, 

never needed them in any, never asked for them in any. 

And I would not be for making any change in posse comitatus, 

and I would not be for using Federal troops. The truth of it is, Senator, the National Guard, most of them are not trained for law enforcement. More of that is they can help with important things. 

The uniform makes people behave. 

But I would hate for my National Guardsmen to have to go out 

and start arresting people because they are not trained to do that. 

They could hurt somebody. So we tried, as much as possible, except 

for the MPs and other specially trained people, to not let our 

Guardsmen get in a true law enforcement situation. There was 

plenty of other stuff for them to do, don’t get me wrong. 

But I think that not only is the doctrine of posse comitatus important, I think it is important that these folks are not trained in 

law enforcement. And lots of them are warriors, and the training 

they got is not exactly what you want from law enforcement. 

Senator WARNER. Well, the Department of Defense now is looking at the future of the Guard, and I am among, I think, most of 

33

us here who want to support the Guard and strengthen it in every 

way. 

Should we add, as a requirement, that Guardsmen receive some 

basic training in law enforcement in the event that they may be 

called in to situations? 

Governor BARBOUR. I am not sure it is necessary, Senator. I 

would not advocate that if it took away from training for their true 

mission for the country because their mission is critical. I just had 

3,500 come home from Iraq, and they did a fabulous job because 

they are trained. And I wouldn’t want us to train them on something superfluous. 

But, yes, if there is extra time. If it doesn’t interfere with the 

real mission. Lots of them are going to do some kind of duty that 

is close to law enforcement during their period in the Guard, but 

I sure wouldn’t let it interfere with the real mission. 

Senator WARNER. No, I don’t think that. 

Governor BARBOUR. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. But as you know, those of us who went 

through basic training in the military, you are given a diversified 

spectrum of training initially, and they don’t have to have that as 

their primary mission. But it might be helpful in the event of these 

contingencies. 

This was an extraordinary event in the history of our Nation, 

and great people stood up and provided assistance for which they 

had no training at all. And they acted magnificently in a wide 

range of areas. 

Governor BARBOUR. Yes, sir. And the Guard was indispensable 

to us. We had about 12,000. Every National Guard of every State 

in the country did something. But we had about 12,000 actually, 

as they say, boots on the ground. And they were indispensable, but 

we tried not to let them have any true law enforcement assignment 

unless they were trained for it. 

Senator WARNER. Good. Thank you. 

I hope to press these questions with General Honore ́—because he 

distinguished himself in this area—Madam Chairman, when he appears next week. I thank each of you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Governor Blanco, you were very clear this morning that Mayor 

Nagin did not participate in the private discussion that you had 

with the President in which you did definitively turn down the option of changing the status of the Louisiana National Guard. And 

that contrary to what the mayor told us yesterday, you did reach 

a decision during that meeting. Is that correct? 

Governor BLANCO. I was very clear, yes. I was very clear with 

the President on the way that I believed the structure should function. I was much less concerned with turf than with tactics. I needed people, and I did not need to do a paper reorganization at that 

moment. 

Chairman COLLINS. I am trying to figure why, if you rejected 

that offer at that meeting, you got three phone calls after midnight 

that night and a memorandum of agreement concerning the authorization consent and use of dual status commander for Joint 

Task Force Katrina was faxed to you. 

34

1 Committee Exhibit 5 appears in the Appendix on page 132. 

If you told the President that you didn’t want to change the status of the Guard and the decision was, in fact, made at that meeting, then——

Governor BLANCO. I am not saying that about the decision. I said 

we had an honest discussion, and I left very clear on what I wanted 

to do. I told the President—he is the President of the United 

States—that with all due respect, if I changed my mind, I would 

let him know within 24 hours. 

How that conversation was reinterpreted by Mayor Nagin is another conversation I was not privy to. At midnight, a hybrid offer, 

I suppose, was called in for my consideration. But essentially, it 

had the same effect, in my estimation. 

Chairman COLLINS. Well, that is what I want to clarify. I want 

to clarify two points. Then, essentially, Mayor Nagin is correct that 

a final decision was not made until later, but you are saying you 

made a tentative decision? 

Governor BLANCO. I did not. I gave the President my idea of how 

this structure could work. And on Saturday morning, he ended up 

agreeing with me when he went to his press conference to announce that he would be sending additional troops. 

I was there to ask for additional troops. I wasn’t there to talk 

about structure. The structure was their conversation or their concern, not mine. 

Chairman COLLINS. I want to clarify a second point related to the 

structure, and it is in Exhibit 5 in your book,1 if you want to look 

at what I am reading. 

This is the memorandum of agreement that the White House 

proposed, and I think it is important that we look at it because 

when we use the word ‘‘federalizing’’ of the National Guard, most 

people would believe that meant that you would lose control over 

the National Guard. But in fact, that is not at all what the White 

House proposed to you. 

Governor BLANCO. It was a hybrid arrangement at midnight on 

Friday night. 

Chairman COLLINS. It is. It is dual-hatting, and it says specifically under State Command and Control, ‘‘The Louisiana governor 

will provide command and control over the supporting National 

Guard forces. As a member of the Louisiana National Guard in a 

State status, the dual status commander is subject to the orders of 

the governor of the State of Louisiana.’’

What really was being proposed is that General Honore ́, the active duty general, would report both to you and to the Secretary 

of Defense. Is that not correct? 

Governor BLANCO. Well, that is probably essentially correct. As 

I said, it was a hybrid. Apparently, they spent all day trying to figure out how to federalize without actually federalizing, I guess. I 

am not quite sure what that exercise was all about. 

In essence, the drama moments were settled by the Louisiana 

National Guard and the Guard members from 50 States, 4 territories, and Washington, DC. And I couldn’t get one Federal Government to move its troops in to assist. So, at that point in time, 

35

this hybrid arrangement coming to me at midnight just seemed a 

little like posturing instead of a real solution. 

Chairman COLLINS. Well, let me make clear that I think it would 

have been helpful to you to have active duty troops in your State 

earlier than——

Governor BLANCO. I agree, Senator. 

Chairman COLLINS [continuing]. When the bulk of them arrived, 

which was not until Saturday. You did have General Graham and 

his staff in the State on Wednesday. But significant numbers of 

troops did not arrive until Saturday. 

We did ask General Landreneau whether the fact that those significant numbers of active duty troops that did not arrive until Saturday harmed his ability to execute any missions. And his response 

was that while the National Guard forces had to perform the missions with smaller forces than was ideal, he told us, ‘‘I cannot identify a mission that was compromised.’’

Do you agree with that assessment? 

Governor BLANCO. Well, our people worked very hard, and that 

is what Louisiana’s trademark is. We have hard-working people 

who will do whatever it takes, no matter what the circumstances 

are. And that is, I think, what he was defining that while we would 

have probably felt better about having more boots on the ground, 

we did with what we had. 

And that was the story all week, that story of that week of misery that our people had to suffer. We did all that we could with 

what we had, and we worked very hard and saved a lot of lives. 

We saved 1.3 million before the storm, and we pulled out over 

70,000 in the aftermath of the storm. 

And so there are a lot of Louisiana heroes. They are in the National Guard. They are sheriff’s deputies. They are city police officers. They are firefighters. They are volunteers. 

We had a State senator, Walter Boasso, and another in the affected region, who lost his home and business, leading rescue missions. My lieutenant governor was leading rescue missions. Another State senator outside of the area organized volunteers and 

brought volunteers with their boats in to lead rescue missions. 

We did with what we had. It was miraculous. We did a fabulous 

job, Senator. And I can only tell you that the Louisiana heroes are 

long in number, strong in courage, and they did a magnificent job. 

Could we have used more help? That was what I was trying to 

say. And I believe the help could have come on Tuesday or Wednesday. The Federal forces could have been leaning forward under the 

annex part of the disaster planning that FEMA has. They could 

have leaned forward and come. 

Even without me asking, they could have come. But I was asking, and I just want to make that clear for the record. 

Chairman COLLINS. I am just going to ask a couple final questions to each of you, and I am going to start with Governor 

Barbour—and ask you the same question. 

Looking back, what do you believe is the single greatest deficiency at the State level that you had to confront, and what reform 

are you going to implement at the State level to improve your response? 

36

Governor BARBOUR. The lack of a survivable interoperable communications system is the single biggest problem. If you can’t communicate, you can’t lead. 

My head of the National Guard might as well have been a Civil 

War general for the first 2 or 3 days because he only could find out 

what was going on by sending somebody. He did have helicopters 

instead of horses, so it was a little faster. But same sort of thing. 

But that is clearly the biggest problem, and I would suggest for 

the Federal Government, the Federal Government has a dog in 

that fight, too, and that it should be involved in it. But that is the 

thing. If it is one thing, that is the one thing. 

Chairman COLLINS. You have anticipated what my second question was going to be for you, and that is what is the single most 

important reform that needs to be done at the Federal level? 

Governor BARBOUR. Well, in my testimony, you will see I make 

some suggestions about how to improve debris removal, temporary 

housing. And I will try not to run on. 

Chairman COLLINS. Take your time. 

Governor BARBOUR. But we think the biggest single thing is to 

get your people home. If your people come home to rebuild their 

community and have hope and optimism, then they will stay, and 

they will rebuild the Gulf Coast bigger and better than ever, which 

is what is going to happen. 

They have got to have temporary housing. Got to get the kids 

back in school. Got to have work. One hundred fifty-one of our 152 

school districts in Mississippi were open October 10. The last one 

opened November 6, and it would have been opened 2 weeks earlier 

except the portable classrooms got delayed. 

So our kids are back in school. Over 99 percent of Mississippi 

school children are back in school in the community where they 

were before the hurricane. Now some of them are not in the same 

school building because it doesn’t exist anymore. Some of them 

maybe have gone to another part of the county. 

Second, we have 34,000 people living in travel trailers right now. 

I am going to come back to that. We have already talked with Senator Akaka. There is work. The biggest problem for getting people 

home, once you get the electricity on—and don’t underestimate how 

critical that is. Everything runs on electricity, it turns out. 

And our electric utilities, Mississippi Power and Entergy Mississippi, were fabulous. After Camille, a much smaller storm, it 

took 8 weeks to get the electricity back on. Twelve days after the 

storm, Mississippi Power gave electricity to everybody who could 

receive it. Unfortunately, there were about 70,000 houses that 

couldn’t receive it because they had been destroyed. 

But the temporary housing thing has been the toughest mountain, and I say in my testimony, please, come up with alternative 

temporary and transitional housing solutions. The single solution 

of travel trailers and mobile homes is just not enough. These guys 

have put in more travel trailers than anybody, maybe two or three 

times the pace. It is just not good enough. 

We have got to have other solutions for temporary housing because you cannot rebuild your community if people can’t have a 

place to stay at home. They start going to Texas and going to Georgia, getting a new job. 

37

And our whole goal was to get people home as fast as possible, 

to give them a stake in rebuilding the communities, and give them 

optimism and hope that they are going to be part of building back 

the coast bigger and better than it ever was before. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Governor Blanco, the same questions for you. What is the number-one reform that you are going to be pressing for at the State 

level, and what is the most important reform that we need to do 

at the Federal level? 

Governor BLANCO. I think, as I remarked in my comments, my 

opening statement, that communication network is probably the 

single most important thing that hampered our ability to understand what was going on in the field and respond to the needs of 

the local leadership. So interoperability and a communications network is extremely critical to Louisiana’s response efforts. 

We are working to acquire mobile communication networks, command units that can be deployed into a disaster area of any magnitude right now. We also know that the monies that we received 

for that are dedicated 80 percent to the local governments and 20 

percent to the State. We have begun the process of developing an 

interoperable network that will transcend into the local level so 

that everybody is on the same page and that we can all communicate on the same network, and I think that is extremely important. 

As to the Federal side, again, Governor Barbour and I have the 

exact same problems. We experienced a lot of the same frustrations. Ours was a magnitude and a dimension that was far greater, 

and I guess that is our essential difference. The storm hit an intensely urban area. 

But I will tell you that the big frustrations come through FEMA 

contracts. These local leaders will tell you that they could have effected a clean-up for far less money, and the money that you have 

expended on the clean-up could be going to restoration and to rebuilding housing instead of debris removal. The contracts could be 

done earlier at the local level if given some flexibility. 

And the Stafford Act definitely needs to be revised to handle a 

catastrophe of the magnitude that we are dealing with. Specifically, 

the costs of sending in temporary housing sometimes equate per 

unit to the cost of buying new housing for our citizens, permanent 

housing. 

And I think that the Stafford Act needs to be reviewed, and I believe that a lot of FEMA people who have to work with it will be 

in agreement with us. It is faster to fix apartment units that have 

gone down—but that is permanent housing, they are not allowed 

to do that—than to run out and try to find a bunch of trailers that 

don’t exist on the scene. 

I think they had to order some 150,000 trailers, and this Nation, 

in the early stages of this operation, could produce 3,000 per 

month. So you see the longevity efforts. 

Now the trailers are in place, but they are spending a lot of 

money putting up the infrastructure for the trailer communities. 

And again, this is all temporary housing, and it is estimated that 

sometimes it costs as much as $75,000 to $100,000 per unit to establish. You could buy a house for that amount of money. 

38

But there is a prohibition against permanent housing. And I hate 

to see good money thrown after temporary situations when we 

could, in effect, be putting in permanent housing. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks. 

Governor Blanco, one of the questions we are focusing on here is 

why all levels of government—but we are particularly focusing on 

the Federal Government, of course—didn’t heed the warnings that 

in the big one, a big hurricane hitting—I am speaking specifically 

about New Orleans now because of the water all around and the 

topography, the bowl effect—that the local and State governments 

would be overwhelmed and that the Federal Government would 

have to come in. And one of the questions we keep asking is why 

they didn’t do it earlier. 

Last fall, before a House committee, the former director of FEMA 

Michael Brown testified, when he was asked the question about his 

biggest mistake, just as you all were just now, he said, ‘‘My biggest 

mistake was not recognizing by Saturday that Louisiana was dysfunctional.’’

I presume that you are familiar with this comment? 

Governor BLANCO. Yes, sir. I am. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I don’t know if you ever had the chance to 

talk to him about it. It was last fall after he had left FEMA. 

Governor BLANCO. No. I chose not to speak to him. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. So how do you react to that? And what 

do you think the basis for that statement was? 

Governor BLANCO. Well, let me just capsulize it by saying that 

Mr. Brown was removed by the President, and I thank him for it. 

Mr. Brown has now set the record straight, and I thank him for 

it. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That was very gracefully done. [Laughter.] 

Let me ask you a factual question now, which is, and I am asking everybody this. In your opening statement, you remarked that 

we would not be here if the levees had not failed. Absolutely right. 

But fail they did. 

I am interested in knowing when and how you first learned that 

the levees around New Orleans had broken or been topped? 

Governor BLANCO. Starting at about noon on Monday, probably 

at a pretty strong period, high pitch of the storm event for the New 

Orleans area, the region, we began to learn of many levees breaking. You cannot do anything during the course of the storm. Everybody has to stay put. There is not very much you can do. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. How did you learn? 

Governor BLANCO. Well, we were hearing it, I guess, to some extent, from our own internal reports. We had people out in the field, 

and the reports came in. And I remember that I went to the press 

briefings and reported it out to the media as well, through the 

media. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. What went through your mind when you 

heard that the levees had broken? 

Governor BLANCO. My heart sunk. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

39

Governor BLANCO. Yes. We expected some overtopping, and we, 

indeed, got that in some of the low-lying regions. We were depending on those levees to hold. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. What steps did you take after you learned 

that? 

Governor BLANCO. Well, when I spoke to Mayor Nagin later in 

the afternoon, I immediately called General Landreneau and asked 

him if he could begin to organize an effort by the National Guard 

to go sandbag the breach. He started that process immediately. 

Now you can’t bring helicopters up as long as the winds are 

blowing, and not all helicopters can be flown at night either. So 

they organized a sandbagging operation. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. From the ground? On the ground? 

Governor BLANCO. Well, no. They had to do it—they couldn’t do 

anything from the ground. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So, in other words, they waited until the 

hurricane had subsided? 

Governor BLANCO. They had to. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Governor BLANCO. You have no choice in that. There was still 

gale force winds and tropical force winds late Monday afternoon. 

So, in the next day or so, they began to organize a sandbag operation, and the general called me, I needed to report on what was 

going on. And so, he called, and he said, ‘‘Governor,’’ he says, ‘‘I 

hate to tell you this. We are dropping 3,000-pound sandbags into 

that breach, and they are disappearing as though we are doing 

nothing.’’

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Governor BLANCO. So with the Department of Transportation, 

Secretary Johnny Bradberry, and his public works people, together 

with the National Guard in those early, those first days, they tried 

to figure out how they could stop the breach. 

They had to build a road to the area, and also the West Jefferson 

Levee Board was helping the Orleans Parish Levee Board. And 

they brought all their equipment in, and they had to build a road. 

There was a bridge that prohibited getting in by boat. 

Any kind of complication that you can think of was there, but 

they began the process. Then they designed 10,000 pound sandbags, and for several days, they brought that in. But on Friday, the 

level of the lake and the level in the canal became the same. Before 

that time, the lake was very high and pushing water into the canal 

and into the city. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. Thank you. 

I have no further questions. I just want to come back to a line 

of questioning and leave you with something to think about, if I 

might, and I ask your thoughts, which is the whole question illustrated, in some sense dramatized, by the conversations you had, 

Governor Blanco, with the Federal Government—the President, 

etc.—about troops coming in. 

There is no question that one of the reactions, certainly here in 

Washington, to Hurricane Katrina was to ask, looking back, why 

didn’t we move Federal regular Army troops in, in the specific case 

of New Orleans, quicker? 

40

But now to look at an increasing role through the Northern Command of the regular Army, so-called Title 10 forces, in homeland 

defense and disaster response. Again, thinking both of natural disasters and the possibility of a terrorist attack. And I think it is 

very important for the governors and your State adjutant generals 

to think this through and give us your counsel on it, both in terms 

of whether the Federal role would be critical just for more personnel or whether they, and you said both, Governor Blanco, would 

bring some extra capability? 

Presumably, the regular Army could have set up at least right 

after the storm, maybe right before, a communications system that 

would have literally weathered the storm. And under what circumstances you, as governors, would like to see that happen? 

And then I guess you both made pretty clear what administrative 

arrangement you would like to see, which is that you, as governors, 

remain in charge of your National Guard State, but that the Federal presence be separately under the command of a Title 10 commander. In this case, it was General Honore ́. Anyway, these are real important questions. I know the people 

at the Pentagon are thinking about them. I know that Admiral 

Keating of Northern Command is thinking about them. We are 

going to have them testifying before us in the next week or maybe 

afterward. I believe next week. 

And you are at the middle of this because you are going to be 

the people who are going to be on the front lines, literally, and we 

need your counsel as to how best to create both the assistance and 

appropriate command and cooperation. 

I thank you both, and I thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. I want to thank both of you for 

your participation in this hearing today. Your testimony was very 

helpful to us in getting a better understanding. 

I can’t imagine two governors in the United States who have 

been tested through such an ordeal more so than you have, and I 

do want you to know that, as we go forward, we are also very 

mindful of the recovery and reconstruction challenges that you 

face. And both of you, in your written statements, give us advice 

and recommendations and requests, and I want to assure you that 

those have not gone unheard. 

Your full statements will be included in the record. I do anticipate that there may be some additional questions for the record. 

So the record will remain open for 15 days. 

Again, thank you for your participation. 

Governor BLANCO. Thank you, Senators. 

Governor BARBOUR. Thank you, ma’am. 

Senator COLLINS. The hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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