Elements of 

Defense Transformation
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i Elements of Defense Transformation

When Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld established the Office of Force Transformation on October

29th 2001, the events of September 11th had focused considerable attention on the urgent requirement 

for defense transformation. During those extraordinarily difficult days, it was easy to think of the future of

transformation in the Department as a narrow consequence of 9/11. Over the past several years, however,

it has become increasingly clear that defense transformation is not simply a response to global terrorism.

While the events of September 11th triggered a “system perturbation”— a systemic shock to the stability

of the international system—profound change was already occurring in that system. Thus, the establishment of the Office of Force Transformation signified not just a reaction to terrorism, but rather Secretary

Rumsfeld’s overall commitment to the process of transformation within the Department.

The need to transform the U.S. Armed Forces, as well as the organizations and processes that control,

support, and sustain them, is compelling. This need is a by-product of the effects of globalization on the

international security order and the transition from the industrial age to the information age. And while 

we might point to a beginning of transformation, we cannot foresee the end. President George W. Bush’s

mandate for defense transformation was “to challenge the status quo and envision a new architecture of

American defense for decades to come.” Both he and Secretary Rumsfeld view transformation as a 

continuing process, one that not only anticipates the future, but also seeks to create it.

This document is intended to provide an understanding of the key elements of defense transformation. To

that end, this brochure seeks to answer some fundamental questions about defense transformation. What

is defense transformation and what is its scope? Why is transformation so urgent? In general, how 

will defense transformation be accomplished? What is the Department’s force transformation vision for 

the future and what is needed to support this vision? What are the primary senior leadership roles and

responsibilities for implementing the force transformation strategy? What are some of the key force 

transformation issues requiring additional investment in the years ahead? How can we measure the 

effectiveness of our force transformation process? 

Transformation is a key component of the U.S. defense strategy and will affect everyone in the Department

as we seek creative, innovative solutions to the challenges we face at home and abroad.

Foreword
Elements of Defense Transformation 1

Contents

I. Defense Transformation

What is Defense Transformation? ............................................................................................................................................2

Scope of Defense Transformation ............................................................................................................................................3

Defense Transformation – Why? ..............................................................................................................................................4

Defense Transformation – How?..............................................................................................................................................6

II. Force Transformation Vision

Primary Characteristics of the Emerging Way of War ............................................................................................................8

What Is Needed to Support this Vision? ..................................................................................................................................9

Examples of Force Transformation ........................................................................................................................................10

III. Force Transformation Implementation

Force Transformation Roles and Responsibilities ..................................................................................................................11

Force Transformation Issues ..................................................................................................................................................12

Measuring the Force Transformation Process ......................................................................................................................13

IV. Conclusion

Innovation = Creativity x Implementation .............................................................................................................................14

Preventative Versus Punitive Defense ...................................................................................................................................15

Search for Sustained Competitive Advantage.......................................................................................................................16
2 Elements of Defense Transformation

What Is Defense Transformation?

In the April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG), Secretary of Defense

Rumsfeld identifies transformation as:

A process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and

cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people,

and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against

our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps

underpin peace and stability in the world.

Transformation is more than just acquiring new equipment and embracing new 

technology. It is rather the all encompassing process of thinking creatively in order to

work better together with other parts of the Department and other agencies 

within the U.S. Government. It also means working better with our numerous 

coalition allies, leveraging new technologies and operational concepts in order to

create U.S. and coalition advantage against current and potential future adversaries.

Transformation should be thought of as a process, not an end state. Hence there is

no foreseeable point in the future when the Secretary of Defense will be able to

declare that the transformation of the Department has been completed. Instead,

the transformation process will continue indefinitely. Those responsible for defense

transformation must anticipate the future and wherever possible help create it.

They must seek to develop new capabilities to meet tomorrow’s threats as well as

those of today.

Defense transformation is a vital component of U.S. defense strategy and more

broadly, the nation’s overall security strategy, as set forth in The National Security

Strategy of the United States of America (NSS). Like the NSS and the U.S. defense

strategy, of which it is an integral part, defense transformation takes

into account the increasingly porous boundaries between political,

economic, and military domains as a result of rapid technological

advances and the impact of globalization in the early 21st Century. The

U.S. has competitive advantages in space technology, information

technology, intelligence, and logistics, as well as in global economic

reach, and we must ensure that we retain and capitalize upon these

advantages as we transform our military forces.

Defense Transformation 

“We need to change not only the

capabilities at our disposal, but also

how we think about war. All the

high-tech weapons in the world will

not transform the U.S. armed forces

unless we also transform the way

we think, the way we train, the way

we exercise, and the way we fight.”

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

at the National Defense University,

January 31, 2002
3

Scope of Defense Transformation

Overall, the scope of defense transformation encompasses three major areas: how

we do business inside the Department, how we work with our interagency and

multinational partners, and how we fight.

• Transforming How We Do Business: The Department is 

currently seeking to identify and adopt transformational business and planning

practices more suited to the compressed time cycles of the 21st century. These

include adaptive planning; a more entrepreneurial, future-oriented, capabilitiesbased resource allocation planning process; accelerated acquisition cycles 

built on spiral development; output-based management; and a reformed 

analytical support agenda.

• Transforming How We Work with Others: In the wake of

the attacks of September 11th, there is an increased premium on defining

new and more efficient ways of interacting with other agencies of the U.S.

Government and with our multinational partners. Enhanced interagency

coordination within the U.S. Government, as well as improved coordination

across all levels of government (federal, state, and local), will promote

increased cooperation, more rapid response, and the ability to conduct

seamless operations. As the U.S. military transforms, we must ensure that

rapidly transforming U.S. military capabilities can be applied effectively in

concert with multinational and interagency capabilities.

• Transforming How We Fight: The strategy for transformation

presented in the TPG includes a detailed approach to force transformation, or

the transformation of how we fight. Force transformation depends on the

innovative development of future joint

warfighting concepts and the experimentation

necessary to evaluate these new concepts

under rigorous combat simulation conditions

at our various national training facilities,

incorporating lessons learned from recent

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and other

aspects of the ongoing global war on terrorism.

Elements of Defense Transformation

“First and foremost, the President

and the Secretary elevated transformation to the level of strategy, and

that is probably the most important

lens through which we should look

at transformation.”

Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski,

Director Office of Force Transformation,

Prepared Statement for the House

Appropriations Committee,

March 13, 2002
4 Elements of Defense Transformation

Defense Transformation – Why? 

Some have questioned the urgent need to transform what are widely acknowledged as the world’s best military forces. However, history indicates that merely

attempting to hold on to existing advantages is a shortsighted approach that has

frequently proven disastrous. The continuing threat posed by terrorist networks and

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), compels us to accelerate our efforts. At least

four imperatives, (as shown in Figure 1), lend urgency to the need to transform

now: strategy, threat, technology, and risk mitigation.

• Strategic Imperative: In the post-Cold War period, when the U.S.

appeared to have no peer competitors, and even more so in the post-9/11

world, where the battlefield appears to have no boundaries, senior defense

planners have had to assume that surprise is the norm rather than the

exception and build a capabilities-based, rather than threat-based force.

Our new defense strategy requires agile, network-centric forces that can

take action from forward positions, rapidly reinforce from other areas and

defeat adversaries swiftly and decisively.

• Threat Imperative: At the same time, we are operating in a less predictable threat environment than we faced before 1990, with many more axes

of approach to defend against, both at home and abroad. Regional powers are

developing capabilities to threaten stability in areas critical to U.S. interests.

Both state and non-state adversaries are attempting to compensate for U.S.

military superiority by developing asymmetric capabilities. And the proliferation

of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities raises the

specter of such weapons falling into terrorists’ hands. Non-state actors using

the international sea lanes and airways of global commerce have also greatly

diminished the protection that the U.S. was afforded by geographical distance

in the past.

“Putting transformation on the back

burner and focusing solely on the

fight at hand is simply not an option.

We are fighting a war unlike any we

have fought before – it demands

new ways of thinking about military

force, new processes to improve

strategic agility, and new technologies to take the fight to the enemy.”

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

General Richard Myers,

February 4, 2004
5

• Technological Imperative: Access to highly capable, low cost

technologies has lowered the barriers to competition in areas where the U.S.

previously enjoyed uncontested advantage. These technological advances

create the potential for new forms of competition in space and cyber-space;

they also increase the potential for miscalculation and surprise, particularly

involving WMD and their delivery systems. Our defenses against such attacks

need to be continuously updated, refined and exercised.

• Risk Mitigation Imperative: The Department’s risk management

framework envisions four categories of risk: force management risk (the

continuing challenge to recruit, train, and retain the right caliber of personnel

to prevail in combat), operational risk (the ability to support near-term

contingencies and operations), future challenges risk (the challenge of

investing in new capabilities for the future) and institutional risk (the

challenge of ensuring that we manage our resources effectively). As we

attempt to create the force for tomorrow, we must carefully balance the

needs of today. Today’s forces need to be more agile and lethal so that they

are not being put at risk as the Department rebalances its investment

towards designing and building the forces of the future.

Elements of Defense Transformation

Capabilities

Technology

Imperative

Strategic

Imperative

Threat

Imperative

Compelling Need

Risk

Mitigation

Imperative

Joint Concepts

Technology Process Organization People

Transformation

Strategy

Threat

Drivers

Figure 1: Compelling Need for Transformation
6 Elements of Defense Transformation

Defense Transformation – How? 

• Transformed Culture and Processes: The strategy for achieving

transformation in the Department of Defense must begin with an effort to transform

the overall culture into one where innovation and informed risk taking are encouraged

and rewarded – a culture that is characterized by the information age. This must be

done through leadership development and education, an increased emphasis on

concept development and experimentation, and changes in the personnel system

and incentive structure. Senior leadership must set the example by fostering

innovation and adopting information age technologies and concepts.

In addition to transforming the culture, the Department’s overall strategy for

implementing transformation includes the transformation of key management

processes including: a joint capabilities-identification process to better identify

and assess specific options for mitigating future risks; a transformed strategic

analytic capability to support the recently established capabilities-based

planning process, and a more adaptive and flexible acquisition process to

replace the Cold War era acquisition system that functioned well when the

principal adversary was well known and predictable.

• Four Pillars of Force Transformation: There are four pillars, shown

in Figure 2, around which the Department has built its force transformation implementation strategy: (1) strengthening joint operations through the development of

joint operations concepts and architectures; (2) exploiting existing U.S. intelligence

advantages through enhanced exploitation and broader dissemination of global

surveillance and reconnaissance information; (3) innovative concept development

and experimentation through wargaming, simulations and field

exercises; and (4) developing new transformational capabilities,

building on the successful pursuit of the first three pillars.

Successful implementation of the Department’s force transformation strategy will accelerate the ongoing shift from an industrial

age to an information age military. This is a matter of developing

competency for the new age. Future military operations will be

conducted using more network-centric forces. The tactical and

operational effectiveness of widely dispersed forces will be

enhanced by increasing information sharing via a secure network

that provides actionable information at all levels of command. This

in turn will create conditions for increased speed of command and

opportunities for self-synchronization across the battlespace. The

first step towards the development of a network-centric joint force

is to invest more now in the four military transformation pillars.

“...We must transform not only our

armed forces, but also the

Department that serves them by

encouraging a culture of creativity

and intelligent risk taking. We must

promote a more entrepreneurial

approach to developing military

capabilities, one that encourages

people, all people, to be proactive

and not reactive, to behave somewhat less like bureaucrats and more

like venture capitalists; one that

does not wait for threats to emerge

and be ‘validated,’ but rather anticipates them before they emerge and

develops new capabilities that can

dissuade and deter those nascent

threats.”

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

at the National Defense University,

January 31, 2002

Transformation

Strengthening

Joint

Operations

Exploiting U.S.

Intelligence

Advantages

Concept

Development &

Experimentation

Developing

Transformational

Capabilities

J0035-06

Figure 2: The Four Pillars of Force Transformation
7

• Security = All Else + Defense: As part of the overall transformation of the Department, there needs to be a clear recognition that the national

security of the United States cannot be guaranteed by military prowess alone,

although that is a necessary precondition for success.

U.S. military forces are now likely to find their opponents retreating into more

complex terrain, thereby forcing us to engage in the “close fight.” We have no

peer competitors at this time that can seriously challenge us in “the commons”

– on the high seas, in the air, in space or even in cyberspace. However, we are

still susceptible to being challenged in the “close fight” by low cost/ low tech

devices such as improvised explosive devices (IED’s) alongside our lines of

communications, by mines in coastal waters, or by shoulder-fired surface-toair missiles launched at low-flying helicopters, transport aircraft or commercial

airliners. (See Figure 3)

More significantly, in our nation-building endeavors in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Haiti,

our troops need to be able to shift roles, on a block-by-block basis, serving as

diplomats one moment, peacekeepers the next, and warfighters when under

ambush, in order to win the peace and not just the battle. For this kind of

mission, intelligence becomes key, and social and cultural intelligence even

more valuable than conventional military intelligence, as we strive to prevail

in the domain of political victory as well as the domain of military victory.

Elements of Defense Transformation

“Thus we see a change in our intelligence capabilities – the value of

military intelligence is exceeded by

that of social and cultural intelligence. We need the ability to look,

understand, and operate deeply into

the fault lines of societies where,

increasingly, we find the frontiers of

national security.”

Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski,

Director Office of Force Transformation,

Statement for the House Armed Services

Committee, February 26, 2004

Figure 3: Security = All Else + Defense

Domain of

Political

Victory

Domain of

Military

Victory

Domain of

Strategic

Primacy

The Close Fight:

Decisive Operations

Littorals

Low Altitude

Land

The Commons:

The Strategic Imperative

High Seas/Airspace

Space

Cyberspace

Winning/Maintaining the Peace:

Social Intelligence, Political, Diplomatic,

Economic, and Military Power

Winning the Battle/Combat:

Military Intelligence

Combat Power

Maximum

Complexity

Denial Strategies

Winning the War

Local Stability

Hegemonic Strategies

Global Stability

Domain of

Cooperative

Engagement

Total Force Requirement

...Security=All Else+Defense
8 Elements of Defense Transformation

Primary Characteristics of the 

Emerging Way of War 

Although the concept of what the future force will look like and how it will conduct

military operations is still evolving, two salient characteristics seem to stand out: (1)

It will be a joint, network-centric force; and (2) It will be capable of executing

effects-based operations (EBO), enabled by NCW.

Already, the combination of modern technology and new operational concepts has

enabled networked units and individual platforms to operate together in ways not

considered possible just a few years ago. Network-centric warfare (NCW) is characterized by the ability of geographically dispersed forces to attain a high level of

shared battlespace awareness that is exploited to achieve strategic, operational,

and tactical objectives in accordance with the commander’s intent. This linking of

people, platforms, weapons, sensors, and decision aids into a single network

creates a whole that is clearly greater than the sum of its parts. The result is

networked forces that operate with increased speed and synchronization and are

capable of achieving massed effects, in many situations without the physical

massing of forces required in the past.

The emerging way of war, constructed around the fundamental tenets of NCW and

emphasizing high-quality shared awareness, dispersed forces, speed of command,

and flexibility, will allow U.S. forces to exploit the potential of EBO in achieving

strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. In the process of transforming the way

that we fight, we should emerge with a force that is more expeditionary, agile, and

lethal than the present force and more capable of employing operational

maneuver and precision effects capabilities to achieve victory. The battlespace

is expected to be a more dispersed one, within which our forces will conduct noncontiguous, mutually supporting operations. These operations will

seamlessly tie in other government agencies, as well as multinational partners, in order to permit a smooth transition from

Major Combat Operations (MCO) to Stability Operations.

Force Transformation Vision

“...our overall goal is to encourage

a series of transformations that in

combination can produce a revolutionary increase in our military

capability and redefine how war is

fought. The capabilities demonstrated in Afghanistan show how far we

have come in the ten years since the

Persian Gulf War. But they are just a

glimpse of how far we can still go.”

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul

Wolfowitz, Testimony before the Senate

Armed Services Committee, April 9, 2002
9

What Is Needed to Support This Vision? 

The realization of the Department’s vision for a joint, network-centric force capable

of conducting military operations in accordance with the principles of the emerging

way of war will depend on a significant improvement in the volume and quality of

the intelligence available to commanders, staffs, units, and individuals at all levels

and a more flexible, responsive concept of combat logistics.

More persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities will

be needed to ensure sufficient battlefield awareness to support dispersed but collaborative operations. Vastly improved, deep penetration intelligence is needed to

support tactical and operational maneuver, precision strikes, and other EBO’s. NCW

alone will not be effective if the common operational picture (COP) is not supported

by timely and accurate intelligence. Although the technological capability exists to

put ordnance very precisely on target, such capabilities cannot be fully leveraged for

EBO unless we know exactly what enemy forces are present in near-real-time and

have a clear sense of exactly what the proposed target’s value is to the other side.

At the same time, vastly more adaptive logistics are also needed to support global

operations despite a move towards 80% homebasing of the force. “Sense and

Respond” logistics (Figure 4) is a promising new concept offering great potential

to provide a more responsive logistics capability for our forces. In this concept, still

undergoing development, experimentation, and testing, the logistics support

organization is equipped to monitor supply usage forward and expedite replacement supplies to where they are needed without creating cumbersome rear 

echelon stockpiles.

One of the natural developments

to be expected, as we strive to

improve the quality and quantity

of intelligence and make logistics

support more dynamic and

adaptive, is a lessening of the

traditional boundary lines

between intelligence, logistics

and operations. Rather than

being viewed as separate

functions they need to be

seamlessly planned and executed as interdependent parts

of the overall campaign plan in

the emerging way of war. Figure 4: Transforming Logistics

• More is Better

• Mountains of Stuff Measured

in Days of Supply

• Uses Mass Inventory to Hedge

Against Uncertainty in Demand

and Supply

Prime Metric: Days of Supply

• On-time is Better

• Inventory is Reduced to a Minimum 

and Kept Moving

• Requires Precise Demand Prediction 

to Purge Uncertainty

Prime Metric: Flow Time

• Adaptive is Better

• Inventory is Dynamically

Positioned Throughout

• Uses Transportation Flexibility 

and Robust IT to Handle

Uncertainty

• Supports Adaptive Ops

Prime Metric: Speed/Quality

Defense Transformation Basics
Examples of Force Transformation

There is a natural tendency to equate “military transformation” with “military

modernization.” While the latter is very important (the natural process of

improving equipment and training, etc. as time progresses), what is meant by

“transformation” is decision-making according to new rules, a more innovative

and revolutionary change that creates a whole new warfare environment.

Historically, such sea changes were demonstrated by the Napoleonic ability to mobilize and inspire whole nations for war at the beginning of the 19th century or the

blitzkrieg tactics developed by the Germans in the mid 20th century. Napoleon’s levee

en masse forced the entire world to rethink how it waged war, while the Wehrmacht’s

innovative employment of armor and tactical air in combination overwhelmed the

Allies until they adapted by following the German model.

In more recent history, we have achieved some notable transformational changes.

The Global Positioning System (GPS), one of the best known examples of transformation, gave the U.S. forces a tremendous advantage over Iraqi forces in 1991

during Operation Desert Storm. Its advent changed the military, the Department,

and civil society. Another example of transformation has been the U.S. Army’s 

successful efforts to “own the night,” combining new night vision technology with

innovative operational concepts.

In recent operations both in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has demonstrated an impressive ability to adapt and transform. In Afghanistan, U.S. special

operations forces (SOF) were able to call in precision air strikes by B-1s, B-52s,

and other U.S. aircraft to support the Northern Alliance offensive at Mazar-i-Sharif.

This innovative use of existing technology proved highly effective, dramatically

affecting operations and hastening the defeat of the Taliban.

On a broader field of battle in Iraq, while heavy armor and mechanized units pushed

rapidly towards Baghdad in the main effort, lightly armed SOF, airborne, and air

mobile forces in unprecedented numbers were used to prosecute supporting but

dispersed operations in the south, north,

and west of the country. The U.S. and

allied forces shared a COP to a degree not

previously achieved in battle and the

speed of their movements precluded the

demoralized (although numerically superior)

Iraqi army from being able to mount a 

credible defense or counter-attack.

10 Elements of Defense Transformation

“But really, this is precisely what

transformation is all about. Here we

are in the year 2002, fighting the

first war of the 21st century, and the

horse cavalry was back and being

used, but being used in previously

unimaginable ways. It showed that

a revolution in military affairs is

about more than building new high

tech weapons, though that is certainly part of it. It’s also about new

ways of thinking, and new ways of

fighting.”

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

at the National Defense University

January 31, 2002
Elements of Defense Transformation 11

Force Transformation Roles and

Responsibilities

Because of the ambitious, all encompassing nature of the Defense Department’s

transformation strategy, it affects all branches of the Department and requires

innovative senior leadership throughout the organization. The April 2003

Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) approved by the Secretary of Defense

identifies the primary senior leadership roles and responsibilities for executing and

implementing the transformation strategy:

• Secretary of Defense: sets the Department’s transformation policies

and objectives, defines the roles and responsibilities of the Department’s 

senior leadership in executing the transformation strategy, and is the final

approval authority on all major elements of the transformation strategy.

• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS): advises the

Secretary on the best approach to balancing the four risk areas described in the

2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, especially operational and

future risk, and is responsible for overseeing development of joint concepts and

validating joint warfighting requirements.

• The Director, Office of Force Transformation: acts as the

advocate, focal point and catalyst for transformation within the Department. He

monitors and evaluates the implementation of the Department’s transformation

strategy, advises the Secretary, manages the transformation roadmap process,

and helps to ensure that joint concepts are open to challenge by a wide range of

innovative alternative concepts and ideas.

• The Commander Joint Forces Command and other

Combatant Commands: are responsible for developing joint warfighting requirements, conducting joint concept development and experimentation, and

developing specific joint concepts assigned by CJCS. Commander, JFCOM is also

responsible for coordinating the concept development and experimentation efforts

of the Combatant Commands and for producing a Joint Transformation Roadmap

to achieve joint capabilities required by joint concepts.

• Secretaries of Military Departments and Service

Chiefs of Staff: are responsible for developing specific concepts for

supporting operations and core competencies, for overseeing Service

experimentation, and building the transformation roadmaps to achieve

transformational capabilities to enable those concepts.

Force Transformation Implementation
12 Elements of Defense Transformation

Force Transformation Issues

As part of the Department’s ongoing effort to implement the force transformation

strategy and identify promising areas for increased emphasis and investment, the

Director, Office of Force Transformation (OFT), has recommended a number of important force transformation issues as “candidates for action now.” The Strategic

Planning Guidance (SPG) provides additional emphasis and specific guidance on

many. However, if these issues are not adequately addressed in the near future, they

may become lost opportunities or “issues of regret” in the more distant future.

Key force transformation issues identified by the Director, OFT, are grouped under

six major battlespace functional areas or warfare elements: (1) fire, (2) maneuver,

(3) protection, (4) command & control and communications (C2&C), (5) intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and (6) logistics.

• Fire: Although considerable attention and investment has been devoted to

increased lethality and precision fire, much less has been devoted to non-lethals

or directed energy and redirected energy weapons that can be used both for

lethal and non-lethal purposes (including lasers, communications and sensing).

• Maneuver: This is another area that needs more emphasis to include not

only the procurement of air and sea assets to support operational maneuver

and vertical battlefield operations, but also the development of innovative

ways to sea base joint task forces to simplify the problems associated with

getting access to global theaters of operations.

• Protection: In the area of force protection, there is clearly a need for

improved active and passive biomedical countermeasures to deal with the

increasing likelihood of having to face Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear

and Enhanced high explosives (CBRNE) weapons effects on the battlefield.

Likewise there is an urgent need to study, train, and practice techniques and 

procedures for operating in urban terrains, where the goal is not to take over or

destroy, but rather to stabilize, rebuild and keep functioning vital economic and

social infrastructures as we are having to do today in Iraq and Afghanistan.

• C2&C: In the field of command and control and communications, the

movement towards a robust networked force with which all DoD communications will interoperate, is promising. The overall goal is not only

increased interoperability, but also increased interdependency as this 

system of systems is put into place.
13

• ISR: In the fields of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance there is an

urgent need for more tactically responsive space assets – low cost tactical

satellites that can be launched quickly with tailored packages in direct support

of joint task forces (Figure 5). Likewise, there is a need for more horizontal 

integration of the various sources of intelligence and a demand-centered 

intelligence system.

• Logistics: Finally, in the field of logistics, there is a clear need for a more

dynamic, demand-centered logistics construct to support the more widely 

dispersed battlefield and permit a truly adaptive, agile and joint logistics system.

Measuring the Force Transformation

Process

When specific suggestions for force transformation are evaluated by the Director,

OFT and others, a “measuring stick” or methodology is needed to assess potential

transformational effectiveness. To this end, two important questions should 

be asked:

“Will the proposed change profoundly affect the competition more than 

the legacy forces?” and

“Does it allow us to do something that we cannot currently do?”

These seven additional questions may be used to further measure the transformational value of systems or concepts under consideration:

• Does it increase our capability to dominate in the sensor war?

• Does it reduce or eliminate the enemy’s ability to create “No Man’s Lands?”

• Does it compress and seamlessly integrate the cycle for planning, organizing,

deploying, employing, and sustaining U.S. forces?

• Does it establish new command structures that leverage networked 

capabilities?

• Does it turn an information advantage into a competitive advantage?

• Does it radically reduce the logistical demands of deployed forces?

• Does it create concepts and capabilities to operationalize Information

Superiority?

Elements of Defense Transformation

Figure 5: Responsive Tactical 

Micro-Satellite Concept

TACSAT 1969

TACSAT 2004

2 stories high

9 ft in Diameter

20” high

41” in Diameter
14 Elements of Defense Transformation

Conclusion

Innovation = Creativity x Implementation

Transformation is a continuing process designed to help define the competitive

space where current U.S. comparative advantages will be maintained out into

the future. Innovation, so vital to the transformation process, is dependent upon

creativity—the development of new organizational and operational concepts,

processes, and technologies. For meaningful innovation to occur, however,

creativity alone will not be sufficient; implementation is equally important.

Without interested customers to conduct experiments, demonstrations, tests,

and evaluations, and ultimately, adopt new concepts,

processes, and technologies for the conduct of real-world

operations, innovation will not occur.

Together, creativity and implementation will have a multiplying

effect in providing our forces with innovative new capabilities

(see Figure 6). We must encourage innovation and the sharing

of knowledge and operational experimentation among the

Services and with our multinational partners. This will enable us

to discourage and ultimately defeat the development of new

capabilities and effective asymmetrical strategies by our current

adversaries and future competitors.

An overall goal of transformation is to broaden the capabilities

base of the U.S. and our allies and multinational partners. It is in

the close fight that transformation arguably is most important

and where we are most likely to see the results of falling 

barriers to competition. For naval forces, diesel submarines,

mines and small boats can make littoral warfare the most difficult to dominate. For

land forces, urban terrain, such as we encountered in Lebanon and Somalia and

now face in Iraq, poses an extremely difficult challenge. In cities or built-up areas,

particularly when we are fighting terrorists or small units, employing guerilla tactics,

our high technology advantages are least effective. For the air forces, employing

both fixed and rotary wing aircraft, it is in airspace under 15,000 feet, in particular,

where simple-to-use, shoulder-fired weapons often present a dangerous threat. As

cyber-space becomes more globally integrated, we need to guard against its 

hostile use by talented hackers determined to attack our critical economic and 

military databases.

Emerging Needs

Joint/Service Experimentation

Force Transformation

Emerging Means and Methods

Innovation = Creativity x Implementation

Demonstration

Exercise Test and Evaluation

Innovation

Consensual

Change

Non-Consensual

Change

Unarticulated

Needs

Articulated

Needs

Figure 6: Concept of Innovation
Elements of Defense Transformation 15

Preventative Versus Punitive Defense

Through defense transformation—transforming how we do business inside the

Department; transforming how we work with others, especially with other agencies

of our own government and with our multinational partners; and transforming how

we fight by continually seeking to develop significant, innovative new capabilities 

in our forces—the Department will be able to achieve the six operational goals of

transformation set forth in the QDR (Figure 7) and deal effectively with unforeseen

operational requirements likely to arise in the future.

Further, transformation will enable our forces to achieve strategic and operational

objectives, in concert with allies and multinational partners, by conducting preventative actions during the early stages of a crisis rather than having to take punitive

actions after a crisis has developed. Such a strategy will, of course, depend on our

ability to obtain early and unambiguous warning of threats in advance so that we can

signal our resolve clearly to potential aggressors and thus decrease the likelihood of

conflict breaking out in the first place. Our goal, simply stated, is to deter forward.

We will accomplish this goal by decisively altering the conditions of the crisis at the

earliest possible stage.

To have a preventative capability will require a 

sufficiently robust intelligence indications and

warning (I&W) capability to provide early warning.

At the same time, we must possess a sufficiently

robust operational deployment capability to

respond quickly to situations as they arise around

the world. In situations where host countries are

reluctant to grant basing and transit rights, U.S.

forces must be able quickly to alter their

deployment plans and redirect their forces

using operational maneuver from the sea or

strategic distances.

Protect Critical Bases

MissionOriented

Goals

DETER

FORWARD

Project and Sustain Forces

Deny Enemy Sanctuary

Leverage Information TechnologyAssure Information SystemsEnhance Space Capabilities

Enabling Goals

Figure 7: Six Operational Goals of Transformation
Search for Sustained Competitive

Advantage

The overall goal of force transformation in the Department is to ensure that the

present superiority of the United States is sustained in the future despite the

attempts of potential adversaries to emulate our new approach to warfare or to

develop asymmetrical strategies that target those areas where we may appear to

be vulnerable.

Currently, we enjoy a powerful strategic advantage over our adversaries, particularly in three key areas of competition – aerospace, sea, and cyber-space. However,

our position can be challenged in the future by potential adversaries in all three

areas and others, due in part to falling barriers to competition. The transformation

process aims to ensure that we maintain our lead in all of these areas.

As shown in Figure 8, in the fight to gain and maintain information superiority, we

must constantly readjust the balance between our forces and those of our adversaries, making it increasingly complicated for them to satisfy their information needs

while simultaneously decreasing and simplifying our own.

In the current and projected future strategic

environment, we must retain our competitive

advantages in the crucial areas of information

superiority and decision superiority. As described

in the Joint Operations Concepts document, the

ability to gain and maintain decision superiority

is a key requirement for U.S. forces today and is

likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.

The objective of decision superiority is to turn an

information advantage into a competitive advantage. To facilitate decision superiority, our forces

must gain and maintain information superiority, an

imbalance in the information domain with respect

to the adversary. The power of superiority in the

information domain mandates that the U.S. fight

for it as a first priority, even before hostilities begin.

16 Elements of Defense Transformation

Increase

Deny

Add Complexity

Centralized -

then Fragment

Theirs Ours

Decrease

Satisfy

Simplify

Decentralize

and Converge

NEEDS

ABILITY TO SATISFY

NEEDS

ABILITY TO SATISFY

ACCURACY

TIMELINESS

RELEVANCE

“We need a force that is designed and capable of fighting

for information superiority first”

INFORMATION

SUPERIORITY

Figure 8: Competitive Advantage - Information Superiority
Elements of Defense Transformation

• Make force transformation an integral element of national defense

strategy and DoD corporate strategy effectively supporting the four

strategic pillars of national military strategy.

• Change the force and its culture from the bottom up through the use

of experimentation, transformational articles (operational prototyping),

and the creation and sharing of new knowledge and experiences.

• Implement Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as an emerging theory of

war for the information age and the organizing principle for national 

military planning and joint concepts, capabilities and systems.

• Get the decision rules and metrics right and cause them to be applied

enterprise-wide.

• Discover, create, or cause to be created new military capabilities to

broaden the capabilities base and to mitigate risk.

Top Five Goals of the Office 

of Force Transformation

OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY

Director, Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense

1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1000

www.oft.osd.mil

Date of Publication: October 2004

Cleared for public release by Department of Defense Office of 

Freedom of Information and Security Review, 04-S-3000