United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on National Security and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform, 

House of Representatives 

 

CHEMICAL AND 

BIOLOGICAL 

DEFENSE 

Management Actions 

Are Needed to Close 

the Gap between Army 

Chemical Unit 

Preparedness and 

Stated National 

Priorities 

January 2007 

GAO-07-143 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

January 2007

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Management Actions Are Needed to 

Close the Gap between Army Chemical 

Unit Preparedness and Stated National 

Priorities 

Highlights of GAO-07-143, a report to the 

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee 

on National Security and International 

Relations, Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

 The 2006 Quadrennial Defense 

Review Report states that the 

Department of Defense (DOD) must be

prepared to respond to and mitigate the 

effects of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) attacks at home or overseas. 

Moreover, the Secretary of Defense 

directed the U.S. military to define the 

nature and potential requests for 

military capabilities needed to respond 

to 15 National Planning Scenarios 

issued by the Homeland Security 

Council. The Army’s chemical units are

key players in this mission. 

GAO was asked to evaluate the 

preparedness of the Army’s chemical 

and biological units, including the 

extent to which (1) units tasked with 

providing chemical and biological 

defense support to combat units and 

commands are adequately staffed, 

equipped, and trained and (2) units also

tasked with a homeland defense 

mission—especially National Guard 

and Reserve units—are adequately 

prepared for this mission. During this

review, we analyzed readiness data and 

other preparedness indicators for 78 

Army chemical units. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends actions to address 

long-standing chemical unit personnel 

and equipment shortages; and better 

enable Army chemical units to perform

wartime and homeland defense 

missions. DOD generally agreed with 

two recommendations and disagreed 

with those to address unit personnel 

and equipment shortages. GAO 

continues to believe its 

recommendations have merit. 

Most Army units tasked with providing chemical and biological defense support 

are not adequately staffed, equipped, or trained to perform their missions. 

Although the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and current operational plans

highlight the need to mitigate WMD attacks at home and abroad and DOD has 

doubled its investment in chemical and biological defenses since 2001 and plans

to increase funding for this program during fiscal years 2006 through 2011, there

is a misalignment between the high priority DOD states that it places on 

chemical and biological defense and the current low level of chemical unit 

readiness. Most of the Army’s chemical and biological units, particularly in the 

National Guard and Reserve, are reporting the lowest readiness ratings—

meaning that they are not considered sufficiently qualified for deployment. This 

situation reflects critical personnel shortages, particularly in their key 

occupational specialty—chemical operations—and shortages of mission-critical

equipment, such as decontamination equipment. Lacking key personnel and

equipment, some units have not been able to train for their wartime chemical 

and biological defense missions. Army chemical unit readiness problems have 

historically been attributed to personnel and equipment shortages, and recently 

these have been greatly exacerbated by personnel and equipment transfers to 

other types of units in support of current operations. Moreover, the Army does 

not have a specific plan in place to resolve long-standing shortages in personnel 

and equipment. Until the Army develops a specific plan to address personnel and 

decontamination equipment shortfalls and the transfer of chemical operations 

specialists to deploying units, adequate chemical defense forces may not be

available in the event of a WMD attack at home or abroad. 

Even though 12 of the 15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the Homeland 

Security Council involve chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield

explosive (CBRNE) response, the ability of Army chemical and biological units, 

especially National Guard and Reserve units, to concurrently perform both their 

original warfighting chemical and biological defense mission and their homeland 

defense mission is doubtful. While the Joint Task Force-Civil Support 

deployment data list contains a limited number of chemical and biological units 

that must be ready to perform homeland defense missions, the forces on this list,

according to United States Northern Command planning documents, are

intended only to be an initial response force. The Army is prohibiting the 

transfer of personnel and equipment from units on this deployment list to 

deploying units overseas. However, it is unclear whether this is an adequate

number of units to support the homeland defense mission because no criteria 

have been established to determine how many and which chemical units are 

needed. In the event of multiple near-simultaneous WMD attacks in the United

States, additional chemical units would be required—but most chemical and 

biological units are already at a low state of readiness and DOD has not updated

doctrine for addressing the new homeland defense missions. 

 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-143. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Davi D'Agostino 

at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. 
Chemical and Biological Defense

Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5 

Background 7

Most Army Chemical Companies Are Inadequately Staffed, 

Equipped, and Trained to Perform Their Missions 16 

Army Chemical Units' Ability to Perform Both Homeland Defense 

and Warfighting Chemical and Biological Defense Missions Is 

Doubtful 31

Conclusions 35

Recommendations for Executive Action 36 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 41 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 44 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 48 

Figures 

Figure 1: Composition of Army Chemical Companies, by 

Component 8

Figure 2: Biological Integrated Detection System 9 

Figure 3: M12 Heavy Decontamination System 10 

Figure 4: M17 Light Decontamination System 11 

Figure 5: FOX M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

Reconnaissance System 12 

Figure 6: M56 Coyote Smoke Generating System 13 

Figure 7: Army Chemical Companies by Type 14 

Figure 8: Fill Rates for Selected Army Chemical Company Military 

Occupational Specialties, as of February 2006 20 

Figure 9: Chemical Operations Specialist Fill Rates, by Army 

Component, 2000 through 2006 22 

Figure 10: Falcon Fixed Site Decontamination System 25 

Figure 11: Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination System 26 

Figure 12: M17 Light Decontamination Systems Authorized and 

Assigned to Army Units, as of July 2006 27 

Page i GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

Abbreviations 

BIDS Biological Integrated Detection System

DOD Department of Defense 

CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield 

 Explosive 

CERFP CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages 

COTS commercial off-the-shelf 

CST Civil Support Teams 

HMMWV high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle 

NBC nuclear, biological, chemical 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

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other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-07-143
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

January 19, 2007 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Shays: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that the United States is likely 

to be faced with adversaries abroad who possess a wide range of 

asymmetric capabilities, including chemical and biological weapons, 

which challenge our military forces’ ability to fight and win conflicts 

overseas. Additionally, the United States continues to believe that nuclear, 

biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the 

possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest 

security challenges facing our country.

1

 The 2006 Quadrennial Defense 

Review report states that DOD must be prepared to respond to and 

mitigate the effects of WMD attacks at home or overseas. All of the 

military services— the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps—plan 

and execute chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense 

programs, ranging from basic research to procurement and sustainment. 

Chemical and Biological Defense

 1

 For the purposes of this report, the term weapons of mass destruction means any weapon

or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a

significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of (1) toxic or 

poisonous chemicals or their precursors, (2) a disease organism, or (3) radiation or

radioactivity. 50 U.S.C. § 2302 (1). 

Page 1 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

The Army, however, is the only service2 that includes dedicated chemical 

and biological units3

 as a standard part of its force structure. The Army’s 

chemical units provide the following capabilities: chemical and biological 

detection, decontamination, reconnaissance, and smoke screening.4

Additionally, certain Reserve component chemical units have been given 

the mission of providing hazardous materials reconnaissance and mass 

casualty decontamination in the event of a WMD attack on the homeland.

These designated units are rotated annually on the Joint Task Force-Civil 

Support’s5

 force deployment list. These units’ personnel and equipment 

remain with the unit; they are not reassigned to deploying units in support 

of ongoing operations overseas. 

The National Guard is creating a new regionally based force that would 

support the WMD-Civil Support Teams (CST) in the event of a WMD attack 

on the homeland. WMD-CSTs are federally funded, state-controlled 

National Guard units whose mission is to assist civil authorities in the 

United States in responding to incidents involving WMD, including 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive 

(CBRNE) weapons and agents. Specifically, the WMD-CSTs are to identify 

CBRNE agents and substances, assess current or projected consequences, 

and advise civil authorities on response measures. They do not perform 

any decontamination functions. Unlike traditional National Guard units, 

 2

 One exception is that the Marine Corps has a Chemical Biological Incident Response 

Force that, when directed, is to deploy and/or respond to a credible threat of a chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident in order to assist

local, state, or federal agencies and unified combatant commanders in the conduct of

consequence management operations. This force accomplishes its mission by providing 

capabilities for agent detection and identification; casualty search, rescue, and personnel 

decontamination; and emergency medical care and stabilization of contaminated 

personnel. However, chemical and biological defense in the Marine Corps is generally 

considered an additional duty performed by regular marines rather than by specialized 

chemical or biological units. We recently reported that this force had some operational 

challenges. See GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Marine Corps Response Force 

Has Developed Many Capabilities, but Critical Operational Challenges Remain, 

GAO-05-2C (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 3, 2004). 

3

 Hereinafter referred to as “chemical units.” 

4

 Smoke screening is the act of providing large-area obscurant screening intended to

enhance a commander’s ability to conceal and therefore deploy and maneuver forces. 

5

 The Joint Task Force-Civil Support, part of U.S. Northern Command, will provide 

dedicated domestic CBRNE command and control in support of the responsible lead 

federal agency for domestic CBRNE consequence management operations.

Page 2 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

each team is composed of 22 members who are on full-time duty.6 The new 

National Guard regional forces, called CBRNE Enhanced Response Force 

Packages (CERFP), are composed of Army and Air National Guard units 

who will support local, state, and federal agencies in managing the 

consequences of a CBRNE event by providing capabilities to conduct 

personnel decontamination, emergency medical services, and casualty 

search and rescue.7

 Existing Army National Guard chemical companies 

will perform the personnel decontamination function. 

All of the services’ chemical and biological defense training, except for 

medical courses, is located at the U.S. Army Chemical School at Fort 

Leonard Wood, Missouri. The U.S. Army Chemical School Doctrine 

Division is responsible for joint, multiservice, and Army doctrine 

development for operations related to nuclear/biological/chemical 

contamination avoidance, protection, decontamination, and smoke 

screening. 

The 1997, 2001, and 2006 Quadrennial Defense Reviews, as well as other 

DOD publications, have emphasized the need to address the increasing 

threat posed by WMD, including chemical and biological weapons. Toward 

this end, DOD has doubled its investment in chemical and biological 

defenses since 2001, and it is increasing funding for its Chemical and

Biological Defense Program by $2.1 billion (approximately 20 percent) for 

the next 5 years beginning in fiscal year 2006. The department plans to use 

these funds primarily for improving its research, development, and testing 

infrastructure as well as expanding efforts to improve defenses against 

emerging chemical and biological threats. However, experiences during 

preparations for Operation Iraqi Freedom exposed continuing weaknesses 

in the preparedness of U.S. forces to defend against a chemical or 

biological attack that were identified during the Persian Gulf War. We and

DOD’s Inspector General have published multiple reports addressing 

continued problems in aspects of DOD’s chemical and biological defense 

preparedness. While potential opponents have been assessed to be 

 6

 We recently issued a report on these teams’ mission and management: GAO, Homeland

Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support Teams’ Mission and 

Address Management Challenges, GAO-06-498 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006). 

7

 The National Guard has already placed 12 certified force packages on the ground. The 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 increased the Army National 

Guard end strength and, in the conference report, the conferees recommended that this

end strength include 5 additional certified force packages. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-360, at

687 (2005). 

Page 3 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

technologically capable of sustaining certain levels of chemical and

biological warfare, there is still disagreement on the specific extent to 

which this capability has actually been developed.

At your request, we evaluated the preparedness of Army chemical units. 

Specifically, we determined the extent to which (1) units tasked with 

providing chemical and biological defense support to combat units and 

commands are adequately staffed, equipped, and trained and (2) units also 

tasked with the homeland defense mission—especially Army National 

Guard and Army Reserve chemical units—are adequately prepared for this 

mission. 

To determine the extent to which units tasked with providing chemical 

and biological defense support to combat units and commands are 

adequately staffed, equipped, and trained, we met with officials from the 

office of the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 

U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Reserve Command, the National 

Guard Bureau, and officials from a nonprobability sample of Army 

chemical companies. We selected companies from each Army component

and from each type of chemical company. Results from nonprobability 

samples cannot be used to make inferences about a population because 

some elements of the population have no chance of being selected. We

obtained readiness data from the Army Readiness Management System 

and reviewed readiness reports for all 78 chemical companies from fiscal 

years 2000 through 2006. To assess whether Army chemical companies are 

adequately staffed to perform their missions, we obtained personnel data 

from the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and compared 

personnel authorized with personnel on-hand for all of the chemical 

companies and Army-wide. We determined that the readiness and 

personnel data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

To assess the extent to which active, National Guard, and Reserve Army 

chemical companies have the equipment needed to perform their missions, 

we obtained chemical equipment requirements from the U.S. Army 

EQUIPFOR Database, and compared those requirements to what the data

indicated that the chemical units had on-hand. We also obtained and 

analyzed data on other types of mission-essential items and compared 

authorizations to what the data indicated were on hand in chemical units

and Army-wide. The data from the U.S. Army EQUIPFOR Database were 

of undetermined reliability because we received them close to our 

reporting deadline and, therefore, were not able to conduct a full reliability 

assessment. However, we corroborated the system data we used with 

officials from the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs, 

Page 4 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

U.S. Army Reserve Command, the National Guard Bureau, and selected 

Army chemical units. 

To assess the extent to which units also tasked with the homeland defense 

mission—especially Army National Guard and Reserve chemical units—

are adequately prepared for this mission, we used the data obtained in the 

first objective, contacted officials from the U.S. Northern Command, and 

obtained planning documents that describe the use of Army chemical units 

to perform chemical and biological homeland defense missions. We also 

discussed this mission with some National Guard and Reserve chemical 

units who had been given this mission. We reviewed and analyzed current

and planned chemical and biological defense doctrine and discussed the 

applicability of this doctrine to the newly emerging homeland defense 

missions with officials from the U.S. Army Chemical School and U.S. Army 

Reserve Command. We conducted our review from July 2005 through June 

2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Our assessments of data reliability, other than that for the U.S. 

Army EQUIPFOR Database, showed that the data we used were 

sufficiently reliable for this report. A more detailed discussion of our 

scope and methodology is contained in appendix I.

This report is an unclassified version of a classified report dated 

September 29, 2006.8

 That report provides additional details on the 

readiness of the Army’s chemical units. 

Most Army units tasked with providing chemical and biological defense 

support are not adequately staffed, equipped, or trained to perform their 

missions. Although the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and current 

operational plans highlight the need to mitigate WMD attacks at home and

abroad and DOD has doubled its investment in chemical and biological 

defenses since 2001, there is a misalignment between the high priority 

DOD places on chemical and biological defense and the current low level 

of preparedness characterizing Army chemical companies, particularly in

the National Guard and Reserve. Problems occurring primarily as the 

result of personnel shortages related to current operations are now 

causing most of the Army chemical units expected to perform these

Results in Brief 

 8

 GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to Close the 

Gap between Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated National Priorities, GAO-06-867C 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006). 

Page 5 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

missions to report low readiness ratings—in other words, they are not 

considered sufficiently qualified for deployment. The low readiness ratings 

reflect critical personnel shortages, particularly in the key occupational 

specialty—chemical operations. Army chemical unit readiness is also 

being compromised by shortages of mission-critical equipment, such as 

decontamination equipment. For example, Army chemical units, 

particularly in the National Guard and Reserve, currently lack a substantial 

portion of their authorized light decontamination equipment. Because they

lack key personnel and equipment, some units have not been able to train

for their wartime chemical and biological defense missions. Army National 

Guard and Reserve chemical unit readiness problems have historically 

been attributed to personnel and equipment shortages, and recently these 

have been greatly exacerbated by personnel and equipment transfers to 

other types of units in support of current operations. Moreover, the Army 

does not have a specific plan in place to resolve long-standing shortages in

chemical defense personnel and equipment. Until the Army develops a 

specific plan to address personnel and decontamination equipment 

shortfalls and the transfer of chemical operations specialists to deploying 

units, adequate chemical defense forces may not be available in the event 

of a WMD attack at home or abroad.

Even though 12 of the 15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the 

Homeland Security Council involve CBRNE response, the ability of Army 

chemical units, especially National Guard and Reserve units, to be 

concurrently prepared to perform either their original warfighting 

chemical and biological defense mission or their homeland defense 

mission is doubtful. According to Army Reserve Command officials, no 

criteria have thus far been established for determining how many and

which units are needed to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE 

attacks on the United States. While the Joint Task Force-Civil Support 

deployment data list contains a limited number of chemical units that must 

be ready to perform homeland defense missions, this list, according to U.S. 

Northern Command planning documents, is intended to provide only an 

initial response force. The Army is prohibiting the transfer of personnel 

and equipment from units on this deployment list to deploying units 

overseas. However, it is unclear whether this is an adequate number of 

units to support the homeland defense mission, because no criteria have 

been established to determine how many and which chemical units are 

needed. Since most chemical units are already at a low state of readiness, 

their ability to respond in the event of a mass casualty WMD attack on the 

United States is doubtful. Given DOD’s emphasis on planning for WMD 

events at home and abroad, we believe that leaving chemical units in such 

a low state of readiness and dual tasking them will result in an increasing 

Page 6 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

operational risk to both the homeland defense and warfighting missions. 

Further, although some Army National Guard and Reserve chemical units 

are currently being trained and equipped to meet both new homeland 

defense and ongoing wartime chemical and biological defense missions, 

the Army has not updated doctrine for addressing these new missions, and 

Army Chemical School officials told us that this doctrine would not be 

completed until at least June 2007. However, it is unclear whether officials

will meet this date, given the low priority updating the doctrine has 

received in the past. 

We are recommending several actions to align DOD’s stated emphasis on 

responding to and mitigating effects from WMD incidents at home and 

abroad with the actual readiness of the Army’s chemical units. However, in 

written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with two 

recommendations but disagreed with our recommendations to address 

long-standing chemical unit personnel and equipment shortages. 

Specifically, DOD disagreed with our recommendation to develop a 

specific plan to address chemical unit personnel shortfalls. In general, the 

department stated that we did not fully consider the Army’s current 

accession and recruitment plan as a solution to chemical unit personnel 

shortfalls and questioned our method for measuring unit readiness for 

homeland defense missions. As discussed in this report, we did consider 

the recruitment plan and found it has had a limited effect on personnel 

shortfalls, and we used the only available DOD metric because there is no

other metric available to measure readiness of chemical units. The 

department also disagreed with our recommendation to develop a plan to

address decontamination equipment shortages until new joint systems are 

fielded because the department believes these issues are addressed in its 

Fiscal Years 2008–2013 Program Objective Memorandum. In our view, that

approach does not address many of the issues we highlight in our 

recommendation, such as training and logistics support. We continue to 

believe our recommendations have merit. DOD’s comments and our 

evaluation of them are discussed in the agency comments section of this 

report. 

The Army Chemical Corps is comprised of brigades, battalions, 

companies, and detachments that perform a variety of chemical and

biological defense missions. However, the chemical company is the 

primary operative unit that performs the majority of these missions. Of the 

Army’s 78 chemical companies, about three-fourths (74 percent) are 

located in the Army National Guard or Army Reserve. Two of these 

companies are actually multicomponent—composed of both active and 

Reserve platoons—but are counted as Reserve companies because their 

Background 

Page 7 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

headquarters platoons are part of the Army Reserve. Figure 1 illustrates 

the division of the Army’s chemical companies between the active, 

Reserve, and National Guard components. 

Figure 1: Composition of Army Chemical Companies, by Component

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.

Active (20 companies)

41%

33%

Reserve (32 companies)

National Guard (26 companies)

26%

Page 8 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

The Army’s chemical companies provide the following capabilities: 

1. Biological detection–Biological detection units provide monitoring, 

sampling, detection, and identification of biological agents through the 

use of a detector suite in a Lightweight Multipurpose Shelter mounted 

on a dedicated, high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle 

(HMMWV). The detector suite is called the Biological Integrated 

Detection System (BIDS), and hence these units are commonly 

referred to as BIDS units (see fig. 2). 

Figure 2: Biological Integrated Detection System

Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense.

Page 9 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

2. Decontamination–Decontamination units perform decontamination 

operations in direct support of either fighting forces or operations at 

fixed sites, such as strategic ports of embarkation and debarkation. 

The decontamination mission is performed using primarily either 

heavy or light decontamination equipment. The M12 Heavy 

Decontamination System consists of a pump, tank, and water heater 

mounted on a 5-ton truck, and it performs both equipment and terrain 

decontamination (see fig. 3). 

Figure 3: M12 Heavy Decontamination System 

Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense.

Page 10 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

The M17 Light Decontamination System is a portable, lightweight, 

compact, engine-driven pump and water heating system used to perform 

mostly personnel and equipment decontamination (see fig. 4). 

Figure 4: M17 Light Decontamination System 

Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense.

Page 11 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

3. Reconnaissance–Chemical reconnaissance companies perform 

reconnaissance—that is, they conduct surveillance, monitoring, and 

sampling in hostile territory—often using the lightly armored, wheeled 

FOX M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance System 

(see fig. 5) or a similar system mounted on other vehicles such as a 

HMMWV. 

Figure 5: FOX M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance System 

Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense.

Page 12 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

4. Smoke screening–Smoke companies use smoke-generating equipment 

(see fig. 6) to provide large-area obscurant screening intended to 

enhance the commander’s ability to conceal and thus deploy and 

maneuver forces. 

Figure 6: M56 Coyote Smoke Generating System

Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense.

Page 13 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

Most of the Army’s chemical companies are multifunctional—that is, the

company may perform a combination of capabilities, such as 

reconnaissance and decontamination; smoke and decontamination; and

smoke, decontamination, and reconnaissance. Most of the Army’s 

chemical companies are smoke/decontamination companies, as shown in 

figure 7. 

Figure 7: Army Chemical Companies by Type

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.

43%

Smoke/Decontamination

Biological detection

12%

10%

9%

6%

5%

15%

Smoke

Smoke/Reconnaissance/

Decontamination

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance/

Decontamination

Decontamination

Page 14 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

In addition to their wartime chemical and biological defense missions, 

certain Army National Guard and Army Reserve chemical units have also

been given homeland defense missions. The Defense Against Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Act of 1996 mandated the enhancement of domestic 

preparedness and response capability for terrorist attacks involving 

nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons.9

 In response to 

this mandate, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested an assessment 

for integrating the National Guard and the Army Reserve into ongoing 

WMD domestic preparedness programs. This assessment, led by the Under 

Secretary of the Army, was completed in January 1998. The assessment 

recommended the training of Reserve component chemical companies for 

domestic nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance and

decontamination and specified additional equipment lists to enable the 

needed capabilities. It also required the creation of Military Support 

Detachments, now known as WMD-CSTs. The Deputy Secretary of 

Defense approved this plan in January 1998 and directed its 

implementation. 

According to an Army official, the fiscal year 1999 Army budget included

funds for addressing the increased support requirements associated with 

terrorist use of WMD in the United States. Specifically, the support 

requirement included the establishment of 10 WMD-CSTs (later increased

to 55 authorized) to perform identification of CBRNE agents and 

substances, assess current or projected consequences, and advise civil 

authorities on response measures; the establishment of WMD patient 

decontamination teams within existing standard National Guard and 

Reserve chemical companies; and the training and equipping of standard 

National Guard and Reserve units to conduct WMD reconnaissance. A 

March 1999 U.S. Army Forces Command message required the training and

equipping of standard National Guard and Reserve chemical units to 

perform NBC reconnaissance and mass casualty decontamination. 

Additionally, in October 2001, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Operations and Plans directed that U.S. Army Forces Command, with 

support from Army Training and Doctrine Command and the Director of 

Military Support, refine the domestic reconnaissance and casualty 

decontamination mission for standard Army chemical units and develop 

operational requirements documents and training support packages. 

However, by 2005, the Army was still in the process of designing and 

implementing its response to these tasks, and the needed doctrine and 

 9

 Public Law 104-201, § 1411 (1996). 

Page 15 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

training support packages had not been completed. This and other 

problems raised questions regarding the readiness of the Army’s chemical 

units to perform their assigned missions and led to a 2005 congressional 

request that we perform this review. 

In response to an initiative from the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 

the National Guard is in the process of creating additional regional forces 

to support WMD-CSTs in the event of a WMD attack. According to the 

Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the mission of the 17 currently 

authorized CERFPs is to support local, state, and federal agencies 

managing the consequences of a CBRNE event by providing capabilities to 

conduct personnel decontamination, emergency medical services, and 

casualty search and rescue. Army National Guard chemical companies will 

perform the decontamination function of the CERFPs. 

Both Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies perform their 

homeland defense missions in support of civil authorities under the 

direction of the U.S. Northern Command. One of the U.S. Northern 

Command’s missions is, when requested by civil authorities and directed 

by the President or the Secretary of Defense, to provide support to civil 

authorities for response and recovery from incidents such as CBRNE 

events. 

The vast majority of the Army’s chemical companies, particularly in the 

National Guard and Reserve, are currently reporting readiness levels so 

low that their ability to perform their mission is in doubt. Our analysis of 

Army active duty, National Guard, and Reserve chemical unit readiness 

and personnel data determined that most of these units’ readiness is 

currently being affected by severe personnel shortages, especially in key 

chemical occupational specialties. They are also experiencing key 

equipment shortages, and both these factors are adversely affecting 

chemical unit training. Under these conditions it is questionable whether 

most of these units would be able to respond effectively to significant 

wartime or terrorist CBRNE events, and the Army appears to lack a 

specific plan for remedying this condition. 

Most Army Chemical 

Companies Are 

Inadequately Staffed, 

Equipped, and 

Trained to Perform 

Their Missions 

Page 16 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

As of March 2006, most of the Army’s chemical companies, particularly in 

the National Guard and Reserve, were reporting the two lowest states of 

readiness measured by the Army’s Unit Status Reporting System.10 In fact, 

the overall readiness of the Army’s chemical companies began to decline 

precipitously from already low levels in early 2004. According to Army 

officials, this decline in readiness was primarily attributable to the transfer 

of resources from chemical units to other types of units deploying to 

support Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Army chemical

companies reporting the lowest level of readiness doubled from March 

2000 to March 2006. Specific details on the readiness ratings and 

readiness trends of the Army’s chemical companies are included in the

classified version of this report.11

Severe personnel shortages created primarily by the transfer of chemical 

unit personnel to other types of units deploying in support of Operations 

Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom are the primary reason why Army 

chemical companies, particularly in the National Guard and Reserve, are

reporting low readiness levels. Long-standing shortages in key

occupational specialties are now becoming worse and further 

exacerbating chemical company personnel shortages. 

The impact of these shortages on chemical companies is demonstrated by 

comparing the staffing levels authorized with the staffing levels actually 

filled. Army units are designed to perform certain defined missions and are 

authorized a specific number of personnel in order to be able to conduct 

their missions. Active Army chemical units are relatively well-staffed in 

relation to their authorized levels. However, about 74 percent of the

Army Chemical Company 

Readiness Is Low 

Personnel Shortages Are 

Driving Chemical 

Companies’ Low 

Readiness Rates 

Chemical companies are not 

staffed to authorized levels 

 10 The Unit Status Report is the Army’s primary mechanism for measuring and reporting a

unit’s readiness, i.e., the unit’s ability to perform its wartime mission. The Unit Status 

Report provides a snapshot of the status of the unit’s overall readiness (C rating). Unit 

Status reports are submitted monthly by active Army units, and quarterly by Army National 

Guard and Reserve units. The Army measures four areas of readiness: personnel, 

equipment-on-hand, equipment readiness, and training. There are five levels for rating

readiness. The highest level, C1, indicates that the unit is prepared to undertake its full 

wartime mission. At C2 the unit is able to undertake most of its wartime mission and at C3

the unit is able to undertake many, but not all, portions of its wartime mission. C4 is the

lowest level and, at this level, the unit is not prepared and requires additional resources or

training to conduct its wartime mission. In addition, the C5 level indicates that the unit is 

undergoing an Army-directed resource action and is not prepared, at the time of the report,

to perform its wartime mission. 

11 GAO-06-867C. 

Page 17 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

Army’s chemical companies are located in the National Guard and 

Reserve, and these companies are presently staffed far below their 

authorized levels. 

Current operational plans for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring 

Freedom have little or no requirement for chemical companies. As a result, 

soldiers from chemical companies are being reassigned to address 

personnel shortages in deploying units. For example, in one state we 

contacted, three Army National Guard chemical companies are currently 

staffed at 22–45 percent of their authorized levels due to the transfer of 

141 soldiers to other deploying Army National Guard units, such as 

military police units, from that state. These units were already suffering 

low fill rates before the transfer of soldiers to deploying units. The three 

companies together were authorized 401 soldiers, but only 275 soldiers 

had been assigned—a fill rate of 69 percent. Currently, the only soldiers in 

these three chemical companies who are not deployed are those ineligible 

for deployment because they either (1) have not received the training 

required for deployment or (2) do not meet deployment standards due to 

medical reasons. 

Active Army chemical companies have significantly better personnel fill 

rates than Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies. Overall, 

active Army chemical companies do not need to be supplemented with 

soldiers transferred from other units in order to deploy. However, our data 

show that Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies will 

require extensive personnel increases in order to deploy. According to 

Army National Guard and Reserve officials, the overall fill rates for these 

companies will not improve until Army personnel requirements for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom are significantly reduced. As long as the Army 

National Guard and Reserve are tasked to provide a significant portion of 

the units deployed to Iraq, chemical companies as well as other low 

demand units will be used as a source of soldiers to fill deploying units. In

addition, these officials stated that concrete plans to bring their chemical 

company fill rates back to pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom levels are not 

currently in place, or being developed, due to the Army’s focus on 

supporting current operations. 

Chemical company personnel fill problems are being exacerbated by 

Army-wide shortages in occupational specialties that are key to chemical 

units. The Army classifies the jobs its soldiers perform as military 

occupational specialties. Army units are comprised of many occupational 

specialties, such as mechanics, supply personnel, and truck drivers. The 

primary specialty in chemical companies is the chemical operations 

Army chemical companies have 

shortages in their key 

specialties 

Page 18 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

specialist. We determined, based on interviews with Army chemical 

officials, that three occupational specialty groups are critical to chemical

companies in the performance of their missions: chemical operations 

specialists, chemical officers, and mechanics (that is, chemical equipment 

repairer, wheeled vehicle mechanic, tracked vehicle mechanic, and fuel 

and electrical repairer). These specialties are also found in other types of

Army units. For example, most combat units have an assigned chemical 

officer or noncommissioned officer to advise their commander on 

chemical and biological defense matters. 

Chemical companies are staffed significantly below their authorized levels

for chemical operations specialists, chemical officers, and mechanics, and

these shortages exist Army-wide. However, as shown in figure 8, these 

shortages are greater for the chemical companies than for the Army as a 

whole. 

Page 19 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

Figure 8: Fill Rates for Selected Army Chemical Company Military Occupational 

Specialties, as of February 2006 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Chemical

Operations

Specialist

Chemical

Officer

Mechanic

Percentage of personnel fill

Military occupational specialty

Source: GAO analysis of the Total Army Authorizations Document System and the Total Army Personnel Database.

Army-wide

Chemical companies

77

58

74

43

91

60

Army officials told us that the primary reason for the greater shortage in 

chemical companies is that very few chemical companies are deployed; 

therefore, as the need for deployable personnel has arisen, many of these 

soldiers have been transferred to deploying units. 

The Army has historically had difficulty recruiting and retaining the 

primary chemical company occupational specialty, the chemical 

operations specialist, but shortages of this occupational specialty are 

currently worsening despite Army efforts to reverse this trend. Army 

officials told us that staff for the chemical occupational specialty has 

always been difficult to recruit and retain because of the high aptitude 

scores required. In addition, they said that chemical unit training with real

and simulated agents is limited, chemical unit personnel are often assigned 

nonchemical additional duties, and chemical unit equipment often is also 

used for more mundane tasks. For example, decontamination equipment

such as the M17 and M12 can also be used for washing vehicles and 

Chemical operations specialist 

shortages have worsened 

Page 20 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

operating showers for troops in the field. Officials also told us that there 

are limited promotion opportunities in the chemical operations career 

field, making it difficult to retain personnel in this specialty. 

The military services have offered enlistment or reenlistment bonuses to 

critical specialties in order to attract and retain personnel in these 

specialties. Although bonuses offered to chemical operations specialists 

led to some improvement in fill rates in the past, this has perpetually been 

one of the Army’s underfilled military occupational specialties.12 Fill rates 

for chemical operations specialists were on the increase between 2000 and 

2003. According to Army officials, this increase was due to (1) enlistment 

and reenlistment bonuses for personnel who selected the chemical 

operations specialty as their primary military occupational specialty and 

(2) the efforts of Army recruiters. However, as shown in figure 9, the fill

rates for this specialty began a steady decline in 2004, especially in the 

Army National Guard and Reserve.

 12 See GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted Personnel 

and Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005). 

Page 21 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

Figure 9: Chemical Operations Specialist Fill Rates, by Army Component, 2000 

through 2006 

0

60

70

80

90

100

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Fill rate percentage

Source: GAO analysis of the Total Army Authorizations Document System and the Total Army Personnel Database.

Year

Active

Total Army

National Guard

Reserve

50

According to Army National Guard and Reserve officials, the subsequent 

decline in chemical operations specialist fill rates is directly attributable to 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. First, as operations continued in Iraq, certain

critical, nonchemical specialties were required due to the declining 

security situation. As a result, chemical operations specialists were often 

retrained, reclassified, and assigned to other units, such as military police 

units. Second, the fill rate for chemical operations specialists declined 

because, according to Army officials, this specialty is considered by 

recruits to be less attractive than other military occupational specialties. 

Recruits have historically been drawn to combat military occupational 

specialties, such as infantrymen, and to specialties, such as military police 

and mechanics, which more directly correspond to civilian jobs. 

Furthermore, many recruits want the opportunity to serve in Iraq, and they 

have a much better chance of doing so if they enlist as infantrymen or 

military police. 

Page 22 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

In addition, the shortage of chemical operations specialists has worsened 

in part because once transferred, retrained, or reclassified, these 

specialists often opt not to return to chemical units or specialties. For 

example, as discussed earlier, three Army National Guard chemical 

companies in one state lost a significant number of personnel to deploying 

units from that state. Of the 275 soldiers assigned to these three 

companies, 141 soldiers (51 percent) of those assigned were transferred to 

other deploying units. Of the 141 transferred, 129 went to military police 

companies, and most of these soldiers were retrained and reclassified as 

military police. The remaining 12 soldiers were transferred to a support 

battalion that deployed to Kuwait. National Guard officials from this state 

are not expecting many of these soldiers to return to their former chemical 

companies when their military police companies return because, 

according to these officials, these soldiers will have developed new 

camaraderies within their current units and as a result will not transfer 

back to their former chemical companies. Consequently, unless DOD 

requires soldiers in chemical occupational specialties to return to units 

requiring those specialties, National Guard officials will need to recruit 

additional soldiers into chemical operations specialties in order to address 

personnel shortfalls. 

In one case, an entire Army National Guard chemical company from a 

different state was retrained and reclassified as military police and 

deployed to Germany as a military police company in order to assume the 

mission of an active duty military police company deploying to support the 

global war on terrorism. According to National Guard officials from that 

state, when this unit returns, it will remain a military police company. 

Other chemical companies from this state have lost personnel due to their 

transfer to other deploying units, including military police units. Army 

National Guard officials from this state also told us that increased 

recruitment of chemical operations specialists would be needed to refill 

these units with the required number of personnel. 

Some Chemical 

Companies Lack 

Equipment Needed to 

Perform Their Missions 

After personnel shortages, the second major reason for Army chemical 

companies’ reporting low readiness rates is the shortage of key equipment, 

thus hampering their ability to perform their missions. Army chemical 

doctrine states that chemical units will perform both heavy and light 

decontamination functions. But the heavy and light decontamination 

equipment in use today by Army chemical companies is old and difficult or 

costly to maintain, previous attempts to replace it have failed, and the

fielding of new replacement equipment is not scheduled to begin until at 

least fiscal year 2009. 

Page 23 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

The M12 Heavy Decontamination System and the M17 Light 

Decontamination System are the two primary types of decontamination 

equipment currently found in Army chemical units. The M12 is 35 years old 

and is scheduled to be replaced by a joint system beginning in fiscal year 

2012. Army chemical company personnel told us that while recently 

refurbished and adequate to perform most functions, the M12 is 

inadequate to support all of the Army’s heavy decontamination 

requirements. This has recently resulted in emergency purchases of 

alternate heavy decontamination equipment from commercial sources to 

meet standard operational requirements. For example, during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, heavy chemical companies equipped with the M12 were 

tasked with performing fixed-site (such as seaport and airfield) 

decontamination, including spraying decontaminant on buildings or large 

pieces of equipment, if needed. However, according to a Corps chemical 

officer, the M12 cannot effectively reach higher than a one-story building 

or the upper surfaces of large aircraft. As a result, U.S. Central Command 

submitted an Operational Needs Statement requesting a different mobile 

decontamination system to provide the heavy decontamination support 

needed for terrain, large area, and fixed-site decontamination operations. 

Additionally, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the same new 

systems for U.S. Army forces in Korea in order to enhance the nuclear, 

biological, and chemical defense preparedness in this theater. These 

requests were approved, and DOD subsequently purchased new 

commercial heavy decontamination equipment—116 Falcon Fixed Site 

Decontamination Systems costing $14.2 million—to meet these 

requirements (see fig. 10). 

Page 24 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

Figure 10: Falcon Fixed Site Decontamination System 

Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense.

Light decontamination companies are assigned the M17 Light 

Decontamination System to perform tactical personnel and equipment

decontamination. This system is also typically fielded to Army combat 

units to enable them to decontaminate their own personnel and equipment 

(see fig. 4). 

The M17 is also an old system (20 years old) that has reached the end of its 

service life. This system has been seriously affected by long-standing 

maintenance problems, and it has been difficult for the Army to obtain the 

needed repair parts. The Army consequently implemented a modernization 

program to replace the M17’s engine and upgrade the system’s hose/wand 

assembly. However, this effort was terminated because its costs were 

greater than those to purchase a new commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 

replacement system, called the Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination 

System (see fig. 11). 

Page 25 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

Figure 11: Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination System 

Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense.

With the termination of the M17 overhaul program, the decontamination 

system program manager determined that any future lightweight 

decontamination system requirements would be filled by the Karcher 

Multipurpose Decontamination System until the replacement system is 

fielded, currently scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2009. As with the M12, 

prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, one Army Corps submitted an 

Operational Needs Statement requesting a new, improved light 

decontamination system, due to the mission capability problems of the 

M17. Subsequently, another Army corps, an Army organization in Korea, 

and the Marine Corps all submitted Operational Needs Statements 

requesting the procurement of an alternative to the M17. Consequently, 

DOD purchased 410 Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination Systems, 

costing approximately $8.2 million, to provide the required light 

decontamination capability. 

Furthermore, the Army—particularly the National Guard and Reserve—

does not have sufficient M17s to meet the numbers currently authorized. 

Page 26 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

As shown in figure 12, the fill rate of M17s for the Army as a whole is less 

than 52 percent; the fill rates for the National Guard and Reserve are about 

13 percent and 56 percent, respectively. For the chemical companies we 

reviewed, the fill rate for M17s is about 65 percent, since it is a missioncritical piece of equipment, but that is still well below required levels. Five 

Army National Guard chemical companies we visited had never received

their authorized M17s or Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination System 

substitute equipment, even though these units had been activated in 2002 

and this piece of equipment is a mission-critical item. 

Figure 12: M17 Light Decontamination Systems Authorized and Assigned to Army 

Units, as of July 2006 

0

800

1,600

2,400

3,200

4,000

Total chemical

companies

Total

Reserve

Total

National Guard

Total

active

Total

Army

Number of M17s

Source: U.S. Army EQUIPFOR database.

Authorized

On-hand

3,612

624

961

586

1,041

105

785

1,185

1,786 1,876

Note: These data are of undetermined reliability.

DOD has long recognized the need to replace its aging decontamination 

systems. However, the Modular Decontamination System, an attempted 

replacement program for both the M12 and M17 begun in 1993, was 

unsuccessful and was officially terminated in 2003. According to an Army 

Chemical School memorandum, this system did not keep up with the 

emerging requirements of the Army’s transformation, and the planned 

replacement system continued to be plagued with reliability deficiencies.

Page 27 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

According to officials from the Joint Program Executive Office for 

Chemical and Biological Defense, the M17 and M12 will not be replaced by 

new, joint systems until at least fiscal years 2009 and 2012, respectively. In

the meantime, the Army will resort to equipping units with commercial 

systems, in limited quantities, as an interim solution. However, the 

suitability of these commercial off-the-shelf systems for serving as interim 

replacements for the M12 and M17 has not been fully determined. For 

example, as commercial-off-the-shelf systems, they have not been 

ruggedized or tested for suitability in a tactical field environment. Since 

they have not been type-classified as standard military equipment, they are 

not recognized as standard issue items or included on chemical unit 

equipment lists. Furthermore, questions remain regarding logistical 

support issues, such as spare parts, maintenance, and training support. It 

is presently unclear how many commercial decontamination systems will 

be required in the interim, how these will be integrated with the new 

systems planned for delivery after fiscal year 2009, or how effectively the 

Army will be able to address its near-term decontamination mission 

requirements. At the time of our review, the Joint Program Executive

Office for Chemical and Biological Defense had identified several options

for addressing the replacement of M12s and M17s with interim commercial 

equipment, but no decision had yet been reached. After we completed our 

work on this assignment, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical 

and Biological Defense told us that they are now evaluating steps that 

would ensure that the commercial decontamination equipment and 

existing M12s and M17s will be integrated with the new, joint systems 

currently under development. A recommendation in this report on this 

subject remains, however, since these actions have not yet been 

completed. 

A further contributing factor to the chemical companies’ readiness 

problem is the Army-wide shortage of other key equipment. The Army 

chemical companies we visited, especially in the National Guard and 

Reserve, reported shortages of other key pieces of equipment that hamper 

their ability to perform their mission. Military units cannot deploy without 

other mission-critical equipment, including chemical monitors, weapon 

night-vision sights, and radio sets. Since these items are in short supply 

across the Army, nondeploying units have transferred them to deploying 

units to support current operations. We previously reported on the extent

of this problem in the National Guard and concluded that growing 

equipment shortages resulting from the need to fully equip deploying units

Chemical companies are low 

on other pieces of key 

equipment 

Page 28 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

(1) make it unclear whether units will be able to maintain acceptable 

levels of equipment readiness for missions overseas or at home and 

(2) hamper the ability of nondeployed forces to train for future missions.13

Personnel and equipment shortages, as well as other priority requirements, 

have had an adverse impact on some chemical companies’ ability to train 

collectively for their wartime chemical defense mission. Chemical 

companies are required to train for the tasks on their Mission Essential 

Task Lists14 as well as complete other priority training as designated by

their headquarters. For example, due to the high pace of current 

operations, all Army soldiers are required to train on “warrior skills,” the 

individual skills in which all soldiers need to be proficient if deployed. 

Chemical Company 

Mission Training Is 

Suffering 

Transferring soldiers from nondeploying units to deploying units to 

support current operations has had a negative impact on chemical 

companies’ ability to train for their chemical mission-essential tasks. For 

example, two Army National Guard chemical companies that we visited 

have been unable to conduct unit-level training because of the requirement 

to transfer soldiers to other deploying National Guard units from that 

state. Further, another National Guard chemical company we visited told 

us they were unable to train for their mission-essential tasks due to the 

transfer of 44 soldiers to a deploying unit. 

We visited four active-duty chemical companies at one Army installation 

that had not been able to train together as a unit for their chemical and 

biological defense mission because they were being used as trainers for 

other Army units that were deploying from that installation for Operation 

Iraqi Freedom. This training consisted of tasks such as convoy operations, 

individual readiness training, and live-fire training. One unit also operated

the equipment movement site, where deploying units’ equipment was 

located prior to being shipped to the port of debarkation. Performing these 

missions was a full-time responsibility, and as a result, these companies 

told us they had not trained for their mission-essential tasks since June 

 13 GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment 

Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives, 

GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2005). 

14 The Mission Essential Task List is a statement of the tasks a unit is required to 

accomplish in order to perform its wartime missions. For example, tasks on a biological 

detection company’s task list include conducting mobilization and deployment operations, 

biological surveillance operations, and force protection/antiterrorism operations. 

Page 29 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

2005. However, as of April 2006, three of the four units had recently 

resumed unit-level training for their chemical and biological missions. The 

fourth unit still had not been able to train due to personnel shortages. This

unit had only about 50 percent of its authorized personnel, and as a result 

the unit was unable to train for its mission-essential tasks. This unit’s 

headquarters battalion transferred the company’s soldiers to other activeduty chemical companies so that those units, which were also short of 

personnel due to the transfer of personnel to deploying units, were able to

conduct their unit-level mission training. 

Equipment shortages have similarly adversely affected chemical 

companies’ ability to train for their mission-essential tasks. For example, 

three Army National Guard chemical companies we contacted from one 

state have a chemical decontamination mission, but only two of them had

received any decontamination equipment; in this case, they received only 4 

of the 54 decontamination systems authorized. As a result, these three 

companies, activated in September 2003, have never had the opportunity 

to conduct unit-level decontamination training. Additionally, five Army 

National Guard chemical companies we visited from another state have

similar equipment shortages that impede their ability to train for their 

mission. All these chemical companies have a chemical decontamination 

mission, but none have been issued M17 light decontamination systems. 

To improvise, one company conducted annual training using M12 heavy 

decontamination systems and commercial sprayers. But since these 

substitute decontamination systems are markedly different from the 

authorized light decontamination system in performance and application,

company personnel told us that the training experience was not nearly as 

effective as it would have been if conducted with the authorized 

decontamination systems. 

Page 30 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

Army National Guard and Reserve chemical units’ ability to perform not 

only their original warfighting chemical and biological defense mission but 

also their homeland defense mission is doubtful. DOD is currently tasked 

with planning how the U.S. military will support the response to the 

Homeland Security Council’s National Planning Scenarios, 12 of which 

involve a CBRNE response. Selected National Guard and Reserve 

chemical units are being trained and equipped for homeland defense 

missions, and a limited number of active duty and Reserve units have been

placed on the Joint Task Force-Civil Support’s deployment list to be 

prepared to respond to a range of CBRNE incidents, including multiple, 

near-simultaneous mass casualty attacks on the United States. The Army is 

prohibiting the transfer of personnel and equipment from units on this 

deployment list to units that are deploying overseas. However, it is unclear

whether this is an adequate number of units to support the homeland 

defense mission because no criteria have been established to determine 

how many and which chemical units are needed. Further, the poor 

readiness of these units, as described above, and inadequate doctrine to 

guide these units in the procedures needed for operating in the homeland 

defense environment, may compromise their ability to perform these 

missions. 

DOD’s strategy for homeland defense and civil support calls for its 

warfighting forces to be trained and equipped for domestic CBRNE 

consequence management to support its interagency partners in 

responding to a range of CBRNE incidents, including multiple, 

simultaneous mass casualty attacks within the United States, in addition to

their warfighting chemical and biological defense missions.15 The standing

consequence management execute order from the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff specifically directs the U.S. Northern Command to be 

prepared to execute multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE consequence 

management operations for up to three incidents within the U.S. Northern 

Command area of responsibility. Moreover, in the spring of 2006, the 

Secretary of Defense directed the U.S. military to define the nature and 

potential requests for DOD capabilities needed to support its response to 

15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the Homeland Security Council.

16

Army Chemical Units’ 

Ability to Perform 

Both Homeland 

Defense and 

Warfighting Chemical 

and Biological 

Defense Missions Is 

Doubtful 

Lack of Criteria and Poor 

Overall Readiness Will 

Likely Compromise Unit 

Preparedness for 

Homeland Defense 

Missions 

 15 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington,

D.C.: June 2005). 

16 Department of Defense, Strategic Planning Guidance Fiscal Years 2008-2013

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2006).

Page 31 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

Twelve of these scenarios involve a CBRNE response, and 6 involve a 

specifically chemical or biological response. Army National Guard and 

Reserve chemical companies have been given the hazardous materials 

reconnaissance and mass casualty decontamination portions of the 

homeland defense mission. However, according to Army Reserve 

Command officials, no criteria have thus far been established for 

determining how many and which units are needed to perform this 

mission. Without such criteria, it is uncertain whether adequate chemical

units will be available to respond to near-simultaneous mass casualty 

attacks on the United States. 

In fiscal year 2000, the U.S. Army Reserve Command began training and 

equipping selected standard chemical units for domestic reconnaissance 

and mass casualty decontamination missions. As of April 2006, 12 platoons 

in 4 companies had been trained and equipped for hazardous materials 

reconnaissance. Additionally, 178 additional Army Reserve chemical 

soldiers have been trained for hazardous materials reconnaissance, for a 

total of 430 trained and certified hazardous materials technicians. Further, 

75 platoons in 25 companies have been trained and equipped for mass 

casualty decontamination, and about 3,500 Army Reserve chemical and 

medical soldiers have been trained to perform mass casualty 

decontamination operations. The National Guard has designated certain 

standard chemical companies to provide the personnel decontamination 

function for the CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP). 

These companies are also expected to continue to maintain the skills 

necessary to perform their wartime mission. Consequently, the Army must 

ensure that the chemical units tasked with performing homeland defense 

missions are ready to perform them, along with their warfighting missions. 

However, the Unit Status Report is designed only to address unit 

readiness for major combat operations. DOD currently does not have 

readiness measures designed to assess unit readiness to conduct domestic 

missions. We previously reported, though, that traditional readiness 

measures are likely adequate for some types of units to determine their 

preparedness to successfully conduct their domestic missions.17 As of July 

2006, five National Guard decontamination companies, about 375 

personnel, had been trained and equipped to provide personnel 

decontamination as part of their homeland defense mission. The National 

 17 GAO, Homeland Defense: Progress Made in Organizing to Achieve Northern 

Command’s Mission, but Challenges Remain, GAO-04-622C (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8,

2004). 

Page 32 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

Guard Bureau plans to train and equip an additional five decontamination 

companies during the remainder of fiscal year 2006. 

The Joint Task Force-Civil Support deployment data list contains certain 

chemical units that must be ready to perform CBRNE consequence 

management operations in support of civil authorities. Specifically, one 

Reserve chemical company, two active duty platoons, and two Reserve 

platoons are currently on this deployment list. As such, the Army is not 

allowing the reassignment of personnel or equipment from these units to 

units deploying in support of current operations. To provide additional 

surge capacity, Army Reserve Command officials have unofficially 

designated two additional companies as exempt from the reassignment of 

personnel and equipment to support ongoing operations. The force 

structure identified is strictly an initial response capability; additional 

forces will be required and will have to be requested using established 

request-for-forces processes. However, other Reserve chemical companies 

with a homeland defense mission that are not currently on the deployment

list have lost personnel due to transfers to deploying units. Unless DOD 

prohibits the transfers of personnel from all chemical units with homeland 

defense missions into units supporting other operations, there may not be

sufficient Reserve chemical units available to provide surge capacity if 

needed. 

Since many chemical units are already stressed due to their support of 

ongoing operations and are reporting low readiness levels, it is unclear 

whether they would be ready to support consequence management 

operations in the event of a catastrophic WMD attack in the United States. 

We have previously reported that although DOD has met the Northern 

Command requirements for forces to be made available should a CBRNE 

event occur, DOD acknowledges that it has become increasingly difficult

to meet all expected requirements because of the high pace of operations, 

which may include the forces that would be requested or directed to 

support civil authorities for CBRNE events.18 Additionally, we reported 

that Northern Command officials are particularly concerned about a 

domestic CBRNE attack and have asked for forces to be dedicated to this 

mission. We also reported that DOD still plans to continue with its present 

practice of trying to balance the competing demands of the various 

combatant commanders and the use of dual-purpose units to accomplish 

CBRNE missions both at home and abroad. Further, the Quadrennial 

 18 GAO-04-622C. 

Page 33 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

Defense Review states that military forces are also to be prepared for 

conducting a “long war” in the future. Given DOD’s emphasis on planning

for WMD events at home and abroad, we continue to believe there is 

operational risk to both the homeland defense and the warfighting 

missions in not only leaving chemical units in such a low state of readiness 

but also dual tasking them. 

Current Chemical and 

Biological Defense 

Doctrine Does Not 

Adequately Reflect 

Homeland Defense 

Missions 

The Army published doctrine in December 200119 on nuclear, biological, 

and chemical consequence management that mentions the reconnaissance 

and mass casualty decontamination capabilities of the National Guard and 

Army Reserve. According to an Army Reserve Command senior official,

however, this doctrine was published in the early stages of developing the 

Army Reserve’s CBRNE domestic response capabilities, and consequently 

this doctrine is now out of date. In the past 3 years, the Army Reserve has 

made progress in this area, having completely revised and improved the 

tactics, techniques, and procedures for these missions. For example, in 

2001, it took approximately 1-1⁄2 hours for a single mass casualty 

decontamination line to be set up and become operational. By the summer 

of 2005, Army Reserve soldiers were able to perform the same operation 

with the latest procedures and equipment in an average of 20 minutes. 

However, the Army Chemical School has not updated the doctrine needed

for addressing these homeland defense missions. A 2001 memorandum 

from the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans specifically 

states that Army chemical units have a mission to provide nuclear, 

biological, and chemical reconnaissance and mass casualty 

decontamination in support of domestic emergencies involving WMD. The 

memorandum goes on to list several other defense directives and 

publications that identify this mission. Further, it specifically directs Army 

Forces Command, along with Training and Doctrine Command and the 

Director of Military Support, to refine the homeland defense mission and 

develop operational requirements documents and training support 

packages. However, according to an official from the Army Chemical 

School’s homeland security office and documents provided by the school,

DOD has not been told what military capabilities are required to support 

civil authorities in the event of a terrorist attack involving WMD, making it 

 19 U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-11.21: Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Consequence Management (Ft. Leonard

Wood, Mo: Dec. 2001). 

Page 34 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

more difficult to write doctrine. In addition, the Army did not provide 

funding for the school to update its doctrine or provide training for the 

Reserve component homeland defense missions until fiscal year 2006.

Since the Army did not consider these missions to be warfighting missions, 

it gave them a low priority for funding, even though DOD considers 

defending against a chemical and biological attack to be a national 

priority. Once the funding was received, the Army Chemical School began 

exploring options to revise current doctrine to include comprehensive 

tactics, techniques, and procedures on the hazardous materials 

reconnaissance and mass casualty decontamination homeland defense 

missions. The school finalized its plan to update its doctrine in March 

2006. 

Army Chemical School officials told us that it typically takes 24-36 months 

to update doctrine to incorporate a new mission, but they are accelerating 

this process and plan to complete revised doctrine, to include the 

homeland defense missions, by June 2007. The chemical companies we 

visited with homeland defense missions told us that they need updated 

doctrine to provide guidance on how to operate effectively in the unique

homeland defense environment because of differences between homeland 

defense and tactical wartime missions. Further, the new equipment that 

has been fielded to these units is nonstandard equipment and, therefore, 

the chemical companies lack guidance on how to properly integrate it with

their standard wartime military equipment. As a result, without doctrine to

guide their efforts, Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies 

cannot ensure that they are meeting DOD needs, prioritizing their training 

requirements appropriately, and properly integrating new equipment with 

existing items. 

The readiness of Army chemical units—particularly in the National Guard 

and Reserve—is so low that it is doubtful whether most of these units can 

now perform their missions. The absence of a plan to address the 

personnel and equipment shortfalls that are primarily responsible for these 

readiness problems makes it unclear whether and when these problems 

will be corrected. Consequently, we believe there is a misalignment 

between DOD’s stated national priorities, especially the Secretary of 

Defense’s requirement for military forces to be able to respond to the 

Homeland Security Council’s 12 National Planning Scenarios requiring a

CBRNE response, and the current readiness of Army chemical units. 

Moreover, it is unclear whether Army chemical units affected by low 

readiness, but tasked with both wartime and homeland defense chemical 

and biological missions, can perform both effectively, especially given the 

Conclusions 

Page 35 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

lack of criteria to determine how many and which units are needed to

support civil authorities in the event of multiple, near-simultaneous 

attacks on the United States. Even though DOD considers responding to 

and mitigating the effects of WMD attacks on the United States to be a 

national priority, the Army did not consider funding the completion of 

doctrine for the Reserve component homeland defense mission to be a 

priority. Consequently, the U.S. Army Chemical School has not yet 

updated the doctrine needed for performing homeland defense missions, 

leaving chemical units assigned these missions with only limited guidance 

on how to accomplish them. Unless DOD takes the steps needed to 

address long-standing gaps in chemical unit readiness and doctrine, we 

question whether these units will be able to perform either their 

warfighting or homeland defense missions effectively. 

To align DOD’s stated emphasis on responding to and mitigating the 

effects from WMD incidents at home and abroad with the readiness of 

Army chemical units, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 

the Secretary of the Army to take the following actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Develop a specific plan to address the long-standing chemical unit 

personnel shortages that have been exacerbated by ongoing operations, 

particularly for chemical operations specialists. 

• This plan should specifically address and discuss options such as 

• the need for temporarily prohibiting the transfer of personnel from 

chemical units with homeland defense missions into units 

supporting other operations; 

• requiring soldiers in chemical occupational specialties to return to 

assignments requiring that specialty after deployments, as long as 

shortages continue in that specialty; 

• other steps designed to mitigate the loss of these personnel; and 

• the risks associated with not taking such steps. 

• Determine how many and which active, National Guard, and Army 

Reserve chemical units will be needed to perform homeland defense 

missions, including responding to multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE 

attacks on the United States, and set forth a plan to ensure that for these 

units, the homeland defense mission is given priority over other missions. 

Page 36 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

• Develop and approve a plan for addressing DOD’s decontamination 

equipment shortages until new joint systems are fielded beginning in fiscal 

year 2009. This plan should determine 

• the total number of systems needed during the interim period, by type

of system (M12, M17, Karcher, or Falcon) to maintain the needed 

decontamination capability; 

• how the interim systems will be integrated with retained M12 and M17 

systems; 

• how training and logistical support for the interim systems will be 

addressed; and 

• whether the interim systems should be type-classified and standardized 

as official military equipment with a national stock number, and added 

to units’ official equipment lists. 

• Set a definitive deadline for completing chemical and biological defense 

doctrine to reflect new homeland defense missions. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with our 

recommendation to direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a specific

plan to address the long-standing chemical unit personnel shortages that 

have been exacerbated by ongoing operations, particularly for chemical

operations specialists, and cited several reasons as a basis for their 

position. First, DOD stated that we are discounting the Army’s accession 

and recruitment plan, which strives for 100 percent fill of all units. We 

acknowledge that the Army does have an agencywide accession and 

recruitment plan, and the goal is 100 percent fill of all units. However, as 

we discuss in this report, that plan by itself has not been fully successful 

and has had little positive long-term impact on chemical unit personnel 

shortages. Specifically, while the recruitment and retention bonuses—

which are a part of the Army’s plan—were helping to alleviate chemical 

operations specialist shortages to some extent, the transfer of chemical 

unit personnel to other deploying units for Operation Iraqi Freedom 

negated those gains. Second, DOD disagreed with our use of the Unit 

Status Report to gauge the readiness of the chemical forces to support a 

homeland defense mission. In their comments, the department points out 

that the Unit Status Report is designed to evaluate an organization’s ability 

to support wartime missions, not a homeland defense mission, and that

the Army is developing improved readiness metrics in support of evolving 

DOD and Joint Staff reporting requirements, which will include the 

readiness for contingency operations such as homeland defense missions. 

We agree that the Unit Status Report is designed to address readiness for 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 37 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

major combat operations. However, DOD also acknowledges there is no 

other metric currently available to measure readiness for homeland 

defense missions. DOD also stated that some unit personnel who are not 

available for a major combat operations deployment are available for a 

homeland defense mission. Our analysis shows that chemical unit 

personnel shortages are severe and primarily a result of personnel 

transfers to deploying units; therefore, DOD’s statement that unit 

personnel could be available for a homeland defense mission is in our 

opinion, invalid. Because of the severe personnel shortages in most 

chemical units, we continue to believe our recommendation has merit and 

is an important step that should be taken by the Army. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of 

the Army to determine how many and which active, National Guard, and 

Army Reserve chemical units will be needed to perform homeland defense 

missions, including responding to multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE 

attacks on the United States, and set forth a plan to ensure that for these 

units, the homeland defense mission is given priority over other missions. 

DOD agreed that the capability requirements for homeland defense, 

including the number and type of chemical units, must be identified in the 

context of an interagency, DOD, and Army assessment process. DOD 

further states that the Chief of Staff of the Army has identified 

improvement of homeland defense as a focus area with the intent of 

identifying Army contributions to homeland defense as well as gaps and 

shortfalls where Army capabilities could be improved to support the joint 

force. However, DOD then stated that, with some exceptions, the Army 

generally does not develop force structure to identify specific units for 

specific missions beyond those supporting the Joint Task Force-Civil 

Support because such designation limits the pool of units that can be 

deployed for overseas requirements, greatly increasing the burden on the 

deployable units. While we believe the above DOD actions are good first 

steps, we do not believe DOD’s comments address the overall intent of our 

recommendation, which was to ensure DOD identified all forces needed to

respond to homeland defense missions and develop a plan to ensure that 

these forces are available and ready for those missions. Specifically, as we 

highlight in this report, the units designated to support the Joint Task 

Force-Civil Support are only intended to be an initial response capability, 

and additional forces would be required to support multiple, nearsimultaneous attacks on the homeland. The low readiness levels of units 

not associated with the Joint Task Force, combined with the potential 

deployment of personnel from other units in support of overseas 

operations, could inhibit DOD’s ability to provide the planned surge 

capacity needed for supporting DOD’s execute order on multiple, nearPage 38 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

simultaneous homeland defense missions. DOD’s response does not 

indicate how, or to what extent, this homeland defense requirement will 

be prioritized compared with other missions, and our recommendation to 

do this is both valid and important to accomplish. Without a clear set of 

priorities for chemical unit response capabilities, DOD increases the risk 

that it may not be able to provide the forces required to respond to its own 

stated homeland defense requirements. 

DOD disagreed with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of the 

Army to develop and approve a plan for addressing DOD’s 

decontamination equipment shortages until new joint systems are fielded. 

DOD stated that while the equipment information contained in the report 

is generally correct as of the time the information was collected, our 

recommendation does not accurately depict the current situation. Since a 

draft of this report was provided to DOD for comment, the Joint Program 

Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense developed a plan 

that addresses replacement and future fielding of decontamination 

equipment and this plan was funded in the Fiscal Years 2008-2013 Program

Objective Memorandum. Although we have not analyzed this plan indepth, it appears to be a good first step in meeting the Army’s 

decontamination needs as long as the procurement and fielding of 

replacement systems stays on track. However, in its comments, DOD did 

not discuss whether its plan will address the specifics of our 

recommendation, including how training and logistics support for the 

interim systems will be addressed and whether the interim systems should 

be type-classified and standardized as official military equipment with a 

national stock number and added to units’ official equipment lists. We 

maintain that these steps are necessary so that appropriate training and 

logistical support will be available and accountability over these interim 

systems can be maintained. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation to set a definitive deadline for 

completing chemical and biological defense doctrine to reflect new 

homeland defense missions. Although DOD agreed that updated chemical 

and biological defense doctrine to reflect homeland defense missions is a 

high priority, they did not set a deadline because they believe any deadline

must account for the impact on other high-priority doctrine development 

projects, particularly those supporting ongoing combat operations. We 

continue to believe that without a deadline, development of this doctrine 

will be uncertain, leaving chemical units without much-needed doctrine to

address the unique requirements associated with their homeland defense

missions. 

Page 39 GAO-07-143
Chemical and Biological Defense

DOD’s comments are included in appendix II. DOD also provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate. 

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its 

issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of Defense 

and the Army. If you have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix III. 

Sincerely yours, 

Davi M. D’Agostino, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 40 GAO-07-143
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the extent to which units tasked with providing chemical 

and biological defense support to combat units and commands are 

adequately staffed, equipped, and trained, we met with officials from the 

office of the U.S Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. 

Army Forces Command, National Guard Bureau, and U.S. Army Reserve 

Command to define the population of Army chemical units. Using the 

information provided, we determined that in fiscal year 2006, the Army 

had 78 chemical companies tasked with providing chemical and biological

defense support to combat units and commands. We did not include 

command and control units (brigades and battalions) and units smaller 

than companies, such as detachments, in our population since the actual 

chemical and biological defense mission is largely performed at the 

company level. 

To determine the overall readiness levels of Army chemical companies in 

our population and reasons why units were reporting low readiness rates, 

we obtained and analyzed data from the Army Readiness Management 

System for fiscal years 2000 through 2006. We determined that these data 

were sufficiently reliable for our purposes by comparing the system data 

with the readiness data reports submitted by the companies we visited 

(see below). We also reviewed reliability assessments conducted by other 

GAO teams. To further assess the preparedness of Army chemical 

companies to perform their missions, we visited five active duty Army 

chemical companies located at Fort Hood, Texas; five Army National 

Guard chemical companies in Alabama and Texas; and five Army Reserve 

chemical companies in Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas. We selected units

to visit from each Army component—active, National Guard, and 

Reserve—and from each type of chemical unit—biological detection, 

decontamination, reconnaissance, and smoke screening. We discussed 

personnel fill rates, the adequacy of decontamination equipment, fill rates 

for mission-essential equipment items, and training issues with officials 

from each of these companies. We also discussed chemical company 

mission preparedness with officials from the Kentucky Army National 

Guard, and the Army Reserve’s 81st and 90th Regional Readiness 

Commands. 

To assess whether Army chemical companies are adequately staffed to 

perform their missions, we obtained and analyzed data provided by 

officials from the U.S Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. This office 

provided us with personnel data for the entire Army, which includes our 

universe of 78 chemical companies. It included authorized and assigned 

soldiers segregated by grade and military occupational specialty as of 

February 2006. To assess the reliability of the personnel data, we reviewed 

 

Page 41 GAO-07-143 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

data reliability assessments prepared on the same data system by another 

GAO team and performed electronic testing of the data. We also 

corroborated system data with officials at selected sites and interviewed 

officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the personnel 

data we used were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes. 

To determine the extent to which the Army chemical companies have the 

equipment needed to perform their mission, we obtained and analyzed 

data as of July 2006 from the U.S. Army EQUIPFOR Database. We 

determined the equipment fill rates by comparing the equipment 

authorized to the equipment on-hand of selected chemical and other 

mission-essential equipment for the 78 chemical companies and compared 

this with overall Army equipment fill rates. Because we received the Army 

EQUIPFOR Database data close to our reporting deadline, we were not 

able to conduct a full reliability assessment. Consequently, these data are 

of undetermined reliability. However, as noted above, we used the Army 

EQUIPFOR Database as only one source of information for findings about 

equipment readiness. In addition, we corroborated system data with 

officials at the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs, U.S. 

Army Reserve Command, National Guard Bureau, and selected Army 

chemical units. We also discussed decontamination equipment issues with 

officials at the chemical units we visited and with officials from the office 

of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs; the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology; and the 

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense. 

To determine the extent to which units with the additional homeland 

defense mission—especially National Guard and Reserve chemical units—

are adequately prepared for this mission, we used the data collected in the 

first objective, contacted officials from U.S. Northern Command, and 

obtained planning documents that describe the use of Army chemical units 

to perform chemical and biological decontamination and reconnaissance 

functions for homeland defense. We discussed these missions with 

officials from the Army Reserve Command and National Guard Bureau. 

We also reviewed and analyzed current chemical and biological defense 

doctrine and discussed the applicability of this doctrine to the newly 

emerging homeland defense missions with officials from the Army 

Chemical School and Army Reserve Command. We also discussed the 

chemical and biological homeland defense doctrine that is being 

developed with Army Chemical School officials and discussed homeland 

defense doctrine needs with officials from the chemical companies we 

visited that had been assigned homeland defense missions. 

 

Page 42 GAO-07-143 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

We performed our work from July 2005 through June 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 

Page 43 GAO-07-143 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 44 GAO-07-143 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 45 GAO-07-143 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 46 GAO-07-143 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 47 GAO-07-143 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact Davi M. D’Agostino, (202) 512-5431 

In addition to the contact named above, William W. Cawood, Assistant 

Director; Hamid Ali; Jane Ervin; Robert Malpass; Enemencio Sanchez; 

Kimberly Seay; and Cheryl Weissman made key contributions to this 

report. 

 

Page 48 GAO-07-143 Chemical and Biological Defense

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

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