GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

U.S. Senate

August 2000 SPACE SHUTTLE

Human Capital and 

Safety Upgrade 

Challenges Require 

Continued Attention

GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186 Space Shuttle Human Capital Challenges

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Space Shuttle Program Skill Shortfall Areas 18

Appendix II: Space Shuttle Upgrades 19

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 20

Tables Table 1: Potential Space Shuttle Upgrades 19

Figures Figure 1: Figure 1: High-Priority Safety Upgrades 13

Abbreviations

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Page 3 GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186 Space Human Capital Challenges

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-285463 Letr

August 15, 2000

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science,

 and Transportation

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) space shuttle 

program is at a critical juncture as three key factors converge: its 

workforce has declined significantly since 1995, its flight rate will have to 

double over that of recent years to support assembly of the International 

Space Station, and costly safety upgrades are being planned to enhance the 

space shuttle’s safe operation until at least 2012. 

As agreed with your office, we examined workforce and safety issues 

facing NASA and its shuttle program. Specifically, we assessed the impact 

of workforce reductions on the shuttle program, the challenges NASA faces 

in addressing workforce issues, and the status of planned shuttle safety and 

supportability upgrades.

Results in Brief Several internal NASA studies have shown that the shuttle program’s 

workforce has been affected negatively by the downsizing, much of which 

occurred after 1995. Since 1995, the shuttle workforce has decreased by 

more than one-third to about 1,800 full-time equivalent employees.1

 The 

shuttle program has identified many key areas that are not sufficiently 

staffed by qualified workers, and the remaining workforce shows signs of 

overwork and fatigue. For example, indicators on forfeited leave, absences 

from training courses, and stress-related employee assistance visits are all 

on the rise. Moreover, the program’s demographic shape has changed. For 

example, throughout the Office of Space Flight, which includes the shuttle 

program, there are more than twice as many workers over 60 years old than 

under 30 years old. This jeopardizes the program’s ability to hand off 

1

Full-time equivalent is a measure of staff hours equal to those of an employee who works 

40 hours per week in 1 year.
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leadership roles to the next generation and achieve a higher flight rate to 

support assembly of the International Space Station. In addition, according 

to NASA, it poses significant shuttle program flight safety risks. 

NASA has recognized the need to revitalize its workforce. For example, in 

December 1999, it terminated shuttle program downsizing plans and 

initiated efforts to begin hiring new staff. In addition, NASA and the Office 

of Management and Budget have begun an overall workforce review to 

examine personnel needs, barriers to achieving proper staffing levels and 

skill mixes, and potential reforms to help address the agency’s long-term 

requirements. NASA human resource officials told us that they are now 

using a draft checklist we recently published as a guide2

 in ongoing 

workforce planning and in discussions with the Office of Management and 

Budget. The checklist includes a five-part framework: strategic planning, 

organizational alignment, leadership, talent, and performance culture. The 

guide should help NASA to more clearly establish a linkage between human 

capital programs and the agency’s mission, goals, and strategies. 

In addition, the Government Performance and Results Act requires a 

performance plan that describes how an agency’s goals and objectives are 

to be achieved.3

 These plans are to include a description of the 

(1) operational processes, skills, and technology and (2) human, capital, 

information, and other resources required to meet goals and objectives. In 

reviewing NASA’s fiscal year 2000 annual performance plan, we found that 

the plan does not adequately describe how the agency’s strategies and 

human capital resources will help it achieve performance goals.4

 NASA’s 

fiscal year 2001 plan, however, addresses at least some human capital 

issues in that it includes an objective to improve workforce health 

monitoring. In addition, in June 2000, the President directed the heads of all 

executive branch federal agencies to integrate human resource 

management into planning, budgeting, and mission evaluation processes. 

The directive requires each agency to include specific human resource 

management goals and objectives in its strategic and annual performance 

plans beginning October 1, 2000. 

2

Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders (GAO/GGD-99-179,

Sept. 1999).

3

Section 4(b) of Public Law 103-62, Aug. 3, 1993, 31 U.S.C. 1115.

4

Observations on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Fiscal Year 2000 

Performance Plan (GAO/NSIAD-99-186R, July 20, 1999).
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Concerning safety issues, over the next 5 years, NASA plans to develop and 

begin equipping the shuttle fleet with a variety of safety and supportability 

upgrades, at an estimated cost of about $2.2 billion. The potential safety 

upgrades are estimated to cost $1.6 billion and are expected to enhance 

shuttle system safety significantly.5

 Improvements could include an electric 

auxiliary power unit, improved orbiter avionics, and main engine 

modifications. However, to implement the program successfully, NASA will 

have to overcome a number of programmatic and technical challenges, 

such as a demanding schedule and undefined design and workforce 

requirements. During the summer of 2000, NASA plans to independently 

review the shuttle program’s safety upgrade strategy to assess how funding 

can be used most effectively to improve space shuttle safety. NASA also has 

an ongoing supportability upgrade program that is intended to address the 

effects of aging components on the system. NASA estimates that it will 

spend about $630 million through fiscal year 2005 to develop and 

incorporate the supportability upgrades, which include the electronic 

assembly in the solid rocket booster and insulation of the external tank. 

While the President’s June 2000 directive provides further emphasis on the 

need to integrate human capital requirements with the strategic planning 

process, continued management emphasis will be critical to the success of 

NASA’s human capital planning. In addition, NASA will need to take steps 

to ensure it has the right people to manage the shuttle program. 

Because the President has now directed NASA and all other executive 

branch agencies to include human capital goals and objectives in their 

strategic and annual performance plans, we are not making 

recommendations in this report. We will monitor NASA’s progress in 

establishing and achieving its human capital goals as part of our annual 

performance plan assessments. NASA reviewed a draft of this report but 

provided no comments.

Background The space shuttle is the world’s first reusable space transportation system. 

It consists of a reusable orbiter with three main engines, two partially 

reusable solid rocket boosters, and an expendable external fuel tank. Since 

it is the nation’s only launch system capable of carrying people to and from 

space, the shuttle’s viability is important to other space programs, such as 

5

NASA has not yet fully approved the set of upgrades it will include in the program.
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the International Space Station. NASA operates four orbiters in the shuttle 

fleet. 

NASA budget data shows that from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 

1999, the space shuttle’s workforce shrank from about 3,000 to about 1,800 

full-time equivalent employees. A major element of this workforce 

reduction was the transfer of shuttle launch preparation and maintenance 

responsibilities from the government and multiple contractors to a single 

private contractor. NASA believed that consolidating shuttle operations 

under a single contract would allow it to reduce the number of engineers, 

technicians, and inspectors directly involved in the day-to-day oversight of 

shuttle processing, and it restructured its organization accordingly. 

However, the agency now recognizes that it has shortages of required 

personnel to perform in-house activities and maintain adequate oversight 

of the contractor. In December 1999, NASA terminated its shuttle program 

downsizing efforts and initiated efforts to begin hiring new staff. 

Space systems are inherently risky because of the technology involved and 

the complexity of their activities. For example, thousands of people 

perform about 1.2 million separate procedures to prepare a shuttle for 

flight. NASA’s top priority for the shuttle program is safety. Since the 

shuttle’s first flight in 1981, the program has developed and incorporated 

many modifications to improve performance and safety. These include a 

super lightweight external tank, cockpit display enhancements, and main 

engine safety and reliability improvements. In 1994, NASA stopped 

approving additional upgrades pending the potential replacement of the 

shuttle with another reusable launch vehicle. NASA now believes that it 

will have to maintain the current shuttle fleet until at least 2012 and has 

established a development office to identify and prioritize upgrades to 

maintain and improve shuttle operational safety.
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Human Capital Needs 

for the Space Shuttle 

Program Require 

Continued Attention

According to recently completed internal NASA studies, workforce 

reductions are jeopardizing NASA’s ability to safely support the shuttle’s 

planned flight rate. Various assessments, one completed as recently as 

March 2000, provide evidence that the current shuttle civil service 

workforce is stretched thin and overworked. In addition, studies of launch 

vehicle failures6

 cited workforce concerns similar to those experienced by 

the shuttle program. Recognizing that in-house workforce reductions had 

gone too far, NASA discontinued its downsizing and has begun addressing 

critical staffing needs. However, it faces several human capital challenges, 

including that of successfully attracting and retaining employees with 

critical skills. NASA officials have begun using our draft human capital selfassessment checklist, which provides a structured approach to identifying 

and addressing human capital issues. 

Recent Studies and NASA’s 

Actions Highlight Shuttle 

Workforce Problems

Over the past several years, NASA and its Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 

have studied the shuttle program civil service workforce.7

 The studies 

concluded that the workforce suffered significantly from the downsizing, 

much of which occurred since 1995. The studies found that stress levels 

have reached the point of creating an “unhealthy” workforce. According to 

NASA’s Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight, the agency 

faces significant safety and mission success risks as a result of the 

downsizing. The safety panel concluded that workforce problems could 

potentially impact flight safety as the shuttle launch rate increases to meet 

its demands.

In addition, NASA has concluded that the shuttle program’s workforce is 

showing signs of overwork and fatigue as a result of the downsizing.8

 For 

example, indicators on forfeited leave, absences from training courses, and 

6

Between August 1998 and May 1999, there were five government/commercial expendable 

launch vehicle failures. NASA, the Department of Defense, and private industry use 

expendable launch vehicles to place satellites in orbit when human presence is not required. 

7

Several workforce studies have been completed since 1996. The most recent include

Independent Assessment of the Shuttle Processing Directorate Engineering and 

Management Processes, NASA Human Exploration and Development of Space Independent 

Assessment Office (Nov. 4, 1999); Annual Report for 1999, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 

(Feb. 2000); and Report to Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight, Space Shuttle 

Independent Assessment Team (Mar. 7, 2000). 

8

Space Shuttle: Human Capital Challenges Require Management Attention

(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-133, Mar. 22, 2000). 
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stress-related employee assistance visits are all on the rise. Moreover, the 

program’s demographic shape and skill mix jeopardizes the program’s 

ability to hand off leadership roles to the next generation. For example, 

throughout the Office of Space Flight, which includes the shuttle program, 

there are more than twice as many workers over 60 years old than under 

30 years old. 

NASA has also identified areas in which it believes the shuttle program is 

experiencing critical skill shortages (see app. I). In December 1999, NASA 

completed an internal workforce assessment focusing on its Office of 

Space Flight. That assessment identified work in which NASA is 

experiencing skill shortfalls. These areas include avionics, mechanical 

engineering, computer systems, and software assurance engineering. More 

recently, the Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team Report, 

completed in March 2000 and chaired by NASA’s Ames Research Center 

Director, concluded that the shuttle program should determine the size of 

the workforce, skill levels, and experience needed to maintain and operate 

the shuttle at the anticipated higher flight rates. The shuttle program flew 

four flights each in fiscal year 1998 and 1999. However, the number of 

flights is projected to increase substantially over the next 5 years. 

In response to the studies, NASA has begun taking actions to address its 

shuttle workforce problems. It has terminated downsizing plans and 

expects to add 95 full-time equivalent employees to the shuttle program in 

fiscal year 2000 to address many critical skill shortages. In its fiscal year 

2001 budget request, NASA is seeking authority to add another 278 full-time 

equivalent employees to the shuttle’s workforce. NASA believes the 

stress-related indicators highlighted by the studies constitute critical 

evidence supporting the need to increase its workforce. 

In October 1999, NASA’s Administrator directed the agency’s highest-level 

managers to consider ways to reduce workplace stress. NASA 

subsequently included improved health monitoring as an objective in its 

fiscal year 2001 performance plan. The Government Performance and 

Results Act of 1993 requires agencies to prepare annual performance plans. 

The purpose is to improve the efficiency of all federal agencies, with the 

goals of improving management, effectiveness, and public accountability; 

improving congressional decision-making on where to commit the nation’s 

fiscal and human resources; and improving citizens’ confidence in the 

government’s performance. 
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According to its fiscal year 2001 performance plan, NASA intends to 

develop and implement supervisor-specific and individual training to 

identify, manage, and cope with stress in the workplace. Also, in May 2000, 

the Administrator announced the creation of a new office to increase the 

agency’s emphasis on health and safety.

In addition, NASA has undertaken a joint review with the Office of 

Management and Budget to identify its overall future workforce needs. 

According to the NASA Administrator, this review will assess potential 

tools for and approaches to overall agency personnel management. NASA 

expects this effort to examine the process used to determine resource 

needs, the barriers to achieving proper staffing levels, and potential 

reforms that may help the agency address long-term human capital 

requirements. NASA and the Office of Management and Budget plan to 

complete the study in time for consideration during the fiscal year 2002 

budget process. 

Expendable Launch Vehicle 

Studies Offer Ways to 

Address Workforce Issues

NASA, the Department of Defense, and the private sector have carried out a 

number of studies on the causes of expendable launch vehicle failures. The 

studies can provide additional insights into how NASA’s shuttle program 

can address workforce issues.9

 These studies, completed in late 1999, 

include assessments by the Lockheed Martin and Boeing companies and a 

review by the Department of Defense that encompass previous and 

ongoing studies and included NASA’s participation. In general, the studies 

address a range of issues, including the effects of hardware problems and 

the need to improve launch processes, establish accountability for mission 

success, and enhance government and industry cooperation. The studies 

also emphasize the importance of human resources by discussing the 

effects of employee burnout, the need for a proper skill mix, the alignment 

of staff with program goals, the potential effects of critical skill losses, and 

the need for long-term human capital planning.

Shuttle officials believe that they can apply the lessons learned from the 

expendable launch vehicle studies, particularly in the areas of establishing 

accountability when transferring work to a private contractor and 

mitigating the effects of downsizing. Over the next several years, NASA 

expects to seek improvements in these areas by (1) responding to the study 

9

The studies prompted a number of investigations by the Department of Defense, NASA, and 

the private sector to identify the root causes and potential corrective actions.
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completed in March 2000 by NASA’s shuttle independent assessment team, 

(2) developing cost and accountability criteria for completing the next 

phase of the transfer of responsibilities to the shuttle processing 

contractor, and (3) establishing resource levels during the current budget 

preparation cycle. 

Structured Approach Can 

Help NASA Face Its Human 

Capital Challenges

In dealing with its workforce issues, NASA shuttle program officials will 

have to deal with a number of complicating challenges. These include 

(1) meeting increased training needs deriving from higher workforce levels, 

(2) ensuring adequate staffing levels for its safety upgrade program, 

(3) attracting and retaining employees with critical skills, and (4) achieving 

a higher projected flight rate compared with rates of recent years. A 

structured approach can help NASA resolve its human capital challenges.

NASA’s shuttle independent assessment team report notes that although 

hiring and training new personnel are logical steps in making up for the loss 

of critical skills, these are slow processes and initially add to the workload 

of existing personnel. For example, according to another NASA study, 

training new engineers can take 2 or more years, but the shuttle’s current 

workload leaves little time for training.10

Also, the shuttle program is undertaking a 5-year safety upgrade initiative 

involving modifications to increase the safety of all major vehicle 

components. Although the workforce requirement for the upgrade program 

is still undefined, Johnson Space Center officials believe the program could 

require more than 200 engineers. Moreover, NASA Headquarters officials 

told us that people with some critically needed skills, such as software 

engineering, will be hard to attract and retain.

NASA’s downsizing coincided with a decreased number of shuttle flights: 

eight flights in fiscal year 1997, but only four each in fiscal years 1998 and 

1999. However, the number of flights is projected to increase substantially 

as the International Space Station assembly schedule accelerates. For 

example, NASA plans nine flights in fiscal year 2001. 

10Independent Assessment of the Shuttle Processing Directorate Engineering and 

Management Processes, NASA’s Human Exploration and Development of Space 

Independent Assessment Office (Nov. 4, 1999).
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Our Comptroller General has made improved human capital management 

throughout the federal government one of his top priorities. In testimony 

on March 9, 2000, he stated that

“human capital management recognizes that employees are a critical asset for success, and 

that an organization’s human capital policies and practices must be designed, implemented, 

and assessed by the standard of how well they support the organization’s mission and 

goals.” 11

In September 1999, we published a draft human capital self-assessment 

checklist that provides a systematic approach to identifying and addressing 

human capital issues. This checklist allows agency managers to quickly 

determine whether their approach to human capital supports their vision of 

who they are and what they want to accomplish and to identify those 

policies that are in particular need of attention. The checklist follows a fivepart framework that includes strategic planning, organizational alignment, 

leadership, talent, and performance culture. The guide helps to establish a 

linkage between human capital programs and an agency’s mission, goals, 

and strategies.

Our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government also address 

human capital management issues and state that 

“only when the right personnel for the job are on board and are provided the right training, 

tools, structure, incentives, and responsibilities is operational success possible.”12

In addition, the Government Performance and Results Act requires a 

performance plan that describes how an agency’s goals and objectives are 

to be achieved. These plans are to include a description of the (1) 

operational processes, skills, and technology and (2) human, capital and 

information resources required to meet those goals and objectives. In 

reviewing NASA’s fiscal year 2000 annual performance plan, we found that 

11Testimony was given before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 

Restructuring, and the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; 

Human Capital: Managing Human Capital in the 21st Century (GAO/T-GGD-00-77). Also on 

March 9, 2000, we testified on similar human capital concerns related to the Department of 

Defense. This testimony was given at a joint hearing involving the Subcommittee on Military 

Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Civil Service, 

House Committee on Government Reform; Human Capital: Strategic Approach Should 

Guide DOD Civilian Workforce Management (GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-00-120). 

12Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, 

Nov. 1999).
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the plan does not adequately describe how the agency’s strategies and 

human capital resources will help it achieve performance goals.13

The President recently underscored the importance of linking human 

capital requirements with an agency’s strategic planning processes. On 

June 9, 2000, he directed the heads of all executive branch federal agencies 

to “fully integrate human resources management into (each) agency’s 

planning, budgeting and mission evaluation processes, and clearly state 

specific human resources management goals and objectives in (the) 

organization’s strategic and annual performance plans.” 

NASA human resource officials told us that the agency is using our 

checklist as a guide in ongoing workforce planning and discussions with 

the Office of Management and Budget. For example, they provided a draft 

of a Human Resources and Education Functional Leadership Plan that 

addresses NASA’s approach to (1) recognizing employees as the agency’s 

most important resource by creating a safe, challenging, and satisfying 

work environment; (2) attracting and retaining a skilled and diverse 

workforce; (3) establishing a continuous learning environment; and

(4) ensuring that the agency’s human resources professionals have the 

knowledge, skills, abilities, and tools to carry out their responsibilities.14

NASA plans to develop feedback surveys to measure its success in 

achieving these goals.

Safety and 

Supportability Upgrade 

Programs

Over the next 5 years, NASA plans to develop and begin equipping the 

shuttle fleet with a variety of shuttle safety and supportability upgrades, at 

an estimated cost of about $2.2 billion. While safety upgrades have been 

identified, NASA plans to independently review the shuttle program’s 

safety upgrade strategy to assess how funding can most effectively be used 

to improve space shuttle safety. To implement the safety program 

successfully, a number of programmatic and technical challenges will have 

to be overcome. NASA also plans to incorporate system supportability 

upgrades to mitigate the effects of aging components and outdated 

technologies. 

13Observations on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Fiscal Year 2000 

Performance Plan (GAO/NSIAD-99-186R, July 20, 1999).

14The Functional Leadership Plan establishes the human resource strategies necessary to 

achieve the agency’s missions and goals.
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Safety Upgrades Identified 

but Currently Under 

Evaluation

Between fiscal year 2000 and 2005, NASA plans to develop and begin 

equipping the shuttle fleet with safety upgrades affecting every major 

aspect of the system, at an estimated cost of $1.6 billion. For example, the 

plan includes potential improvements to the orbiter, the external tank, the 

main engine, and the solid rocket booster (see fig. 1). NASA’s time frame for 

completing these improvements is based on its current plans to operate the 

shuttle fleet until at least 2012. A general description of each potential 

upgrade is provided in appendix II.

Figure 1: Figure 1: High-Priority Safety Upgrades

Source: Space Shuttle Program Office.

Orbiter avionics

• Cockpit

• Data processing

Power and propulsion

• Orbiter electric auxiliary

power unit

Main engine

• Advanced health

monitoring

• Extra large throat main

combustion chamber

• Channel wall nozzle

External tank

• Friction stir welding

Implementation and studies

• Crew escape system (study)

• Main landing gear tire

improvements

Solid rocket booster /

redesigned solid rocket motor

• Improved auxiliary power unit

• Propellant grain geometry

• Attach and hold down system
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NASA has undertaken two independent reviews of the safety upgrade 

program. One review, begun in April 2000, will deal with specific cost and 

technical issues related to each project; the other, begun in June 2000, will 

concentrate on the overall program strategy. As individual projects are 

approved for implementation, NASA’s Independent Program Assessment 

Office will evaluate the upgrades to determine whether (1) requirements 

are well defined, (2) design and implementation risks are acceptable, and 

(3) cost-effectiveness has been appropriately considered.

In addition, in February 2000 the Associate Administrator for Space Flight 

asked NASA’s Space Flight Advisory Committee to assess the agency’s 

strategy and priorities for the planned safety upgrades. The Committee is 

expected to determine whether NASA has defined the right upgrade 

program and has adopted a sound approach. It also expects to incorporate 

the results of the review by the Independent Program Assessment Office 

into its work, currently scheduled to be completed by late summer 2000.

NASA Faces Challenges in 

Successfully Completing 

Safety Upgrade Program

NASA and the shuttle program will have to overcome many programmatic 

and technical challenges to implement the safety upgrade program 

successfully. Specifically, the agency has not yet fully approved the set of 

upgrades it will include in the program or the associated workforce 

requirements. Assuming the shuttle will be replaced by 2012, the upgrade 

program must be implemented on schedule to achieve maximum benefit. 

Addressing potential development problems while meeting a demanding 

flight schedule will make cost containment a major challenge. 

Programmatic and technical challenges include the following:

• Several major safety upgrade projects are not fully approved, creating 

program uncertainty. For example, the avionics upgrade is to increase 

hardware reliability and improve cockpit information for the crew. The 

breadth of information to be provided and the means to do so have not 

yet been fully determined. In addition, replacing the auxiliary power unit 

in the solid rocket booster will require additional studies to determine 

the best alternative. Also, NASA is still assessing potential safety 

upgrades such as crew escape and thermal protection systems.

• While NASA has begun to establish a dedicated shuttle safety upgrade 

workforce, it has not fully determined its needs in this area. Johnson 

Space Center officials estimate that the program could require more 

than 200 engineers dedicated specifically to the safety upgrades. NASA 

Headquarters officials believe the planned workforce increase in fiscal 
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year 2000 and 2001 will be sufficient to cover upgrade workforce needs. 

However, neither organization was able to provide a firm estimate. Also, 

it is important to note that the planned workforce increase as currently 

portrayed is supposed to address all shuttle program workforce needs, 

not just those of the upgrade program.

• NASA currently plans to operate the shuttle until at least 2012. Thus, it is 

important that the safety upgrades be developed by 2005 to ensure that 

the program provides maximum benefit. The upgrade schedule 

coincides with the peak assembly period of the International Space 

Station. During this period, the shuttle will have to double its flight rate 

over those of recent years. NASA officials acknowledge that it will be a 

challenge to accommodate both schedules.

• Historically, major hardware and software development efforts have 

encountered unforeseen technical problems. The planned safety 

upgrade program could require developing and integrating at least nine 

major improvements in 5 years. As such, it may be the most aggressive 

modification effort ever undertaken by the shuttle program. Because the 

technical requirements for the program are not yet fully defined and the 

schedule for implementation is very success oriented, it is likely that 

cost pressures will develop.

Supportability Upgrades to 

Mitigate Effects of Aging 

Components

In addition to the safety improvements, NASA plans to incorporate a 

number of supportability upgrades over the next 5 years at an estimated 

cost of $630 million. This effort is designed to combat the obsolescence of 

vehicle and ground systems. Through this program, NASA hopes to 

mitigate the effects of aging components and outdated technologies.

The most expensive supportability upgrade is the Checkout and Launch 

Control System. This system is to replace the launch processing system 

that has been used since the 1970s at the Kennedy Space Center. In 1997, 

the new system was estimated to cost about $200 million, with a 

completion date in fiscal year 2001. The estimate was later increased to 

about $230 million, with completion in fiscal year 2003. According to a 

program official, additional substantial cost and schedule increases are 

under review but will not be fully determined until fiscal year 2001. Other 

supportability upgrades involve improvements to the vehicle itself, 

including the solid rocket booster and external tank. 
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Conclusions Over the last several years, NASA’s strategic human capital planning was 

inadequate. While the agency was emphasizing workforce reductions, 

various NASA studies were showing that the shuttle workforce was being 

negatively impacted by the reductions. In the wake of analyses of 

workforce shortages agencywide over the past couple of years, NASA 

recognized that it had serious problems. The shuttle program was entering 

a critical phase in which it had to prepare for a doubling of its current flight 

rate to assemble the International Space Station while at the same time 

developing and incorporating numerous safety upgrades. NASA is now 

taking a number of important steps to address the effects of workforce 

reductions and to ensure that a proper skill mix and staffing level for the 

shuttle program is achieved and maintained. While the President’s June 

2000 directive provides further emphasis on the need for integrating human 

capital requirements with the strategic planning process, continued NASA 

management emphasis on human capital planning will be critical to 

continued safe shuttle operations in an environment of increasing flight 

rates. 

Agency Comments NASA reviewed a draft of this report but provided no comments. 

Scope and 

Methodology

To assess the impact of workforce reductions on the shuttle program and 

the challenges NASA faces in addressing workforce issues, we reviewed 

the agency’s workforce reduction goals, recent shuttle workforce studies, 

budget documentation, internal indicators of workplace stress, recruitment 

and hiring strategies, and workforce trends related to skill mix and age. In 

addition, we reviewed internal briefings and recent launch vehicle studies 

and interviewed program officials, study participants, members of NASA’s 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, and officials in the Expendable Launch 

Vehicle Office to gain further insights. 

To assess the program’s plans to incorporate safety upgrades, we reviewed 

development plans, budget documentation, internal briefings, and risk 

assessments. In addition, we compared cost estimates to budgetary 

projections. We interviewed officials in the shuttle program development 

office, NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, and the Aerospace 

Safety Advisory Panel. 
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We conducted our review from September 1999 through June 2000 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further 

distribution of this report until 14 days from its issue date. At that time, we 

will send copies to the Honorable Ernest Hollings, Ranking Minority 

Member, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; 

the Honorable Daniel Goldin, NASA Administrator; the Honorable Jacob 

Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested 

parties. We will also make copies available to others on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions 

about this report. Key contacts for and contributors to this report are listed 

in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Allen Li

Associate Director

Defense Acquisitions Issues
Page 18 GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186 Space Shuttle Human Capital Challenges

Appendix I

Space Shuttle Program Skill Shortfall Areas ApApenednxidexiIs

In December 1999, NASA completed an internal workforce assessment 

focusing on its Office of Space Flight, which includes the shuttle program. 

That assessment identified work areas in which NASA was experiencing 

skill shortfalls. At our request, NASA provided a listing of shuttle program 

skill shortages. The areas the agency identified follow: 

• Program/project management/project engineering

• Aerospace vehicle design and mission analysis

• Avionics 

• Guidance, navigation, and control systems

• Materials analysis

• Mechanical engineering

• Thermal control 

• Structural dynamics

• Vehicle dynamics

• Aircraft ground systems

• Human factors

• Environmental controls

• Robotic systems

• Computer systems

• Fluids (liquid propulsion systems)

• Information technology security

• Aerospace systems test engineering

• Software (applications and systems)

• Sensors and transducers

• Electrical engineering

• Software assurance engineering

• Flight assurance

• Quality engineering

• Reliability engineering

• Safety engineering

• Flight controls
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186 Space Shuttle Human Capital Challenges

Appendix II

Space Shuttle Upgrades ApendxiI

NASA has identified a set of potential shuttle upgrades to be incorporated 

by fiscal year 2005. The program includes potential improvements to every 

major area of the shuttle system. A breakout of the planned modifications 

is shown in table 1. 

Table 1: Potential Space Shuttle Upgrades

Dollars in millions

Upgrade area Purpose of upgrade Estimated cost

Electric auxiliary power Unit Eliminates use of hazardous fuel and high-speed equipment to 

generate power for the orbiter's hydraulic system

$224.0

Space shuttle main engine advance health 

monitoring

Provides real-time information to the crew on engine performance 108.1

Orbiter avionics Reduces flight crew workload and improves situational awareness 380.0

Space shuttle main engine Improves engine operating environment, thereby increasing reliability 400.0

Solid rocket booster auxiliary power unit Eliminates the use of hazardous fuel in the solid rocket booster thrust 

vector control auxiliary power unit

208.0

Solid rocket booster attach/hold-down 

hardware

Reduces the potential for human error and improves reliability 5.0

Redesigned solid rocket motor propellant Improves the solid propellant and safety of ground personnel 10.0

External tank friction stir welding Improves reliability, supportability, and manufacturing process control 20.0

Implementation and additional studies Vehicle installation, system integration, studies, and maintainability 232.9

Subtotal $1,588.0

Supportability upgrades Checkout and Launch Control System and mandatory supportability 

shuttle upgrades

$630.0

Total $2,218.0
Page 20 GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186 Space Shuttle Human Capital Challenges

Appendix III

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contact Allen Li (202) 512-4841

Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Jerry Herley, Stephen Altman,

John Gilchrist, James Beard, Fred Felder, and Shirley Johnson made key 

contributions to this report. 

(707444) Letr
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