Filed 8/24/23 Yoder v. Okhovat CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying 

on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by 

rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

JANINE M. YODER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

MAHYAR OKHOVAT et al.

Defendants and Respondents,

 B320945

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 20STCV00442)

APPEALS from the judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Bernie C. LaForteza, Judge. Affirmed. 

Janine M. Yoder, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Cole Pedroza, Kenneth R. Pedroza, Nicole F. DeVanon; 

Schaeffer Cota Rosen, James C. Schaeffer and Dana A. Garber 

for Defendants and Respondents.

________________________________
2

Plaintiff Janine M. Yoder sued defendants Mahyar 

Okhovat, M.D., and Dr. Mahyar Okhovat, M.D., Inc. (collectively, 

defendants) for medical malpractice. The defendants successfully 

moved for summary judgment, and the court thereafter entered 

judgment in their favor. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm the 

judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On January 7, 2020, plaintiff, acting in propria persona,

filed a complaint in the superior court against defendants

alleging a cause of action for negligence and medical malpractice. 

She alleged that on January 8, 2019, Dr. Okhovat “negligently, 

carelessly, [and] recklessly” conducted an electromyography 

test (EMG) on plaintiff that “damag[ed] her left ankle and foot.”

According to plaintiff, Dr. Okhovat forcefully twisted her 

left foot and ankle with both hands inwardly while performing 

the EMG of her left leg, at which point she heard a pop and felt

excruciating pain in her left foot and ankle. She asserts that, as 

a result of the incident, she continues to experience severe pain 

in her left foot and ankle and has developed acute tendinitis and

complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS).

A. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

On February 22, 2021, defendants filed a motion for 

summary judgment. The motion was based on the alternative 

grounds that there is no triable issue of material facts as to 

whether (1) Dr. Okhovat breached the applicable standard of care 

and (2) if Dr. Okhovat breached a duty of care, his conduct did 

not cause plaintiff’s injuries, and that defendants are entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.
3

Defendants supported the motion with the declaration 

of Peter-Brian Andersson, M.D., a neurologist with experience 

in performing EMGs and diagnosing and treating patients with 

CRPS. Dr. Andersson reviewed plaintiff’s deposition testimony

and medical records.

Dr. Andersson opined “to a reasonable degree of medical 

probability, that no conduct on the part of Dr. Okhovat caused

or contributed to any injury to [plaintiff] or aggravated any

pre-existing problem or injury.” Dr. Andersson further opined 

that, if Dr. Okhovat did “manipulate [plaintiff’s] left ankle 

and foot during the EMG study, this would not have caused 

or contributed to the plaintiff’s claimed injuries, including her 

allegation that she has developed CRPS involving her left leg, 

ankle and foot.”

Dr. Andersson explained that an EMG study measures 

muscle response or electrical activity in response to nerve 

stimulation of the muscle. The study is conducted with needle 

electrodes, which are inserted through the skin into the patient’s 

muscles. An EMG measures muscle activity while at rest and

while contracting by measuring the electrical activity picked up 

by the electrodes on an oscilloscope. According to Dr. Andersson, 

the data from Dr. Okhovat’s EMG of plaintiff showed “normal 

test results,” which “rule out that [plaintiff] suffered any type 

of acute injury to her left leg, including her foot and ankle, 

immediately before and at the time that this EMG was 

performed.” Dr. Andersson further stated that “if Dr. Okhovat 

had caused trauma to [plaintiff’s] left foot, ankle or leg at the 

time of her EMG, this study could not have been completed. 

Trauma would have caused injury to the muscles which would 

have prevented their contraction. This would have prevented 
4

the completion of this EMG [and] . . . precluded normal test 

findings on the EMG.”

Dr. Andersson also relied on records concerning plaintiff’s 

visit to the emergency room at West Hills Medical Center 

immediately after the EMG. According to these records, 

plaintiff complained of a possible deep vein thrombosis or blood 

clot, which she believed may have developed as a result of an

airplane flight she took two days prior, and of pain as a result 

of “a nerve test performed” earlier that day. She complained of 

pain and swelling in both lower extremities. A physician noted 

“[m]ild swelling to [plaintiff’s] right lower extremity” and 

“[t]enderness to palpation to the left region of the hamstring.” 

The hospital’s records, however, do not indicate any problem 

with her left ankle or foot. An X-ray of her left ankle was 

“normal,” and the physician’s impression of radiological lab 

results concerning plaintiff’s left ankle state only: “Negative 

examination.” According to Dr. Andersson, these records do not 

indicate “that she sustained any injury to her left ankle or foot[,] 

such as swelling, redness, bruising or warmth.”

The day after the incident with Dr. Okhovat, plaintiff was 

examined at Mission City Community Network medical clinic.

According to the records of that visit, plaintiff was seen “for 

[v]ertigo-like symptomatology.” The records of that visit include 

no reference to any problem with her left leg, foot, or ankle. 

According to Dr. Andersson, the absence of any complaint by 

plaintiff concerning her “left leg, foot or ankle pain or problems”

the day after the incident with Dr. Okhovat is “inconsistent 

of someone who suffered a traumatic injury to the left foot and 

ankle the day before.”
5

On January 10, 2019, plaintiff presented at Forward 

medical clinic. Plaintiff complained of the pain she experienced 

during the EMG in Dr. Okhovat’s office two days before. The 

records from Forward indicate that the treating physician found

“[n]o redness, warmth, swelling or rash,” and “[n]o evident 

deformity.” The “[o]nly area of some tenderness is plantar 

surface of foot arch, but no redness or swelling there either.”

On January 22, 2019, two weeks after the EMG, plaintiff 

underwent MRIs of her left foot, left ankle, and “left tibia/fibula.” 

These MRIs showed plaintiff suffered from “mild Achilles 

tendinitis, a mild sprain of the superficial and deep fibers of the 

deltoid ligament complex and mild chronic sprain of the anterior 

talofibular ligament.” According to Dr. Andersson, “none of 

these conditions could have been caused by the incident alleged 

by the plaintiff. The Achilles tendon connects the calf muscle 

in the back of the leg to the heel bone. Achilles tendonitis is a

chronic condition caused by overuse. It is common in athletes 

such as runners. It is highly unlikely that it could have been 

caused by a single, inward twisting motion as alleged by 

[plaintiff]. The deltoid or medial ligament is a band that connects 

the lower leg bone (tibia) to the inner side of the ankle. It is 

a strong structure. Traumatic injuries to this ligament almost 

always occur when the ankle is twisted forcefully in an outward

direction, not in an inward direction as alleged in this instance. 

The anterior[ ]fibular ligament is located at the lateral aspect of 

the ankle and connects the fibula to the talus of the ankle. The

mild chronic sprain of this ligament as described in the MRI of 

January 22, 2019 means that this condition was the result of a 

recurring giving way of the lateral side of the ankle and repeated 
6

ankle sprains. Such a condition develops over an extended period 

of time, and is not the result of a single incident.”

Dr. Andersson reviewed additional records of consultations 

and examinations with various medical professionals occurring 

after plaintiff’s January 2019 MRIs. Although some of these 

records refer to plaintiff’s complaints of left leg, foot, and ankle 

pain or swelling, none indicate a diagnosis of CRPS or attribute 

her pain or swelling to Dr. Okhovat’s conduct. 

On April 10, 2019, further MRIs were conducted of 

plaintiff’s left foot and ankle. The MRI of the left foot was 

described as “unremarkable, showing no stress fractures, no 

Freiberg infractions, no soft tissue masses and everything intact.” 

The MRI of her left ankle, like the previous MRI on January 22, 

2019, indicated “mild Achilles tendinitis, mild sprain of the 

superficial and deep fibers of the deltoid ligament complex 

and minimal to mild chronic sprain of the anterior talofibular 

ligament.” Another MRI of plaintiff’s left foot, conducted on 

May 17, 2019, “was normal without any pathology noted.”

Dr. Andersson further noted that the injuries allegedly 

“caused by Dr. Okhovat are subjective in nature, not confirmed 

by objective findings, are contradicted by [plaintiff’s] physical 

examinations, [and] are inconsistent and fluctuate.” Moreover, 

“there is also no evidence of wasting or lost reflexes to 

[plaintiff’s] lower extremities, which is inconsistent with all of 

her complaints.” Her complaints, he explained, “demonstrably 

have a psychogenic component.”

As to plaintiff’s claim that she has developed CRPS 

as a result of Dr. Okhovat’s conduct, Dr. Andersson concluded 

that, “the medical records demonstrate to a reasonable degree 

of medical probability plaintiff does not suffer from CRPS to her 
7

left leg, ankle and foot.” According to Dr. Andersson, “CRPS is 

a diagnosis of exclusion, meaning no other alternative diagnosis 

can explain the patient’s symptoms. CRPS is diagnosed using 

the very stringent Budapest Criteria. Under this criterion, the 

patient must have at least [two] signs and [three] symptoms 

from [four] categories. The [four] categories are sensory . . . ,

vasomotor . . . , sudomotor . . . , and motor/trophic . . . .” 

Dr. Andersson explained that plaintiff’s medical records do not 

indicate that any medical provider had applied these criteria, 

and plaintiff “has only ever complained of symptoms from 

one category (motor) and these symptoms of weakness and 

restricted range of motion were entirely subjective (without 

objective evidence to corroborate[,] such as wasting or reflex 

abnormalities).”

Dr. Andersson concluded that “to a reasonable degree of

medical probability, nothing Dr. Okhovat did or did not do caused 

or contributed to the plaintiff’s alleged injuries, including but not 

limited to, her alleged problem with CRPS of the left foot, ankle 

and leg.”

B. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Summary Judgment

Plaintiff, still acting in propria persona, filed opposition to 

the motion for summary judgment supported by her declaration 

and the declarations of Steve Frlekin, Janet Johnson, Curtis 

Johnson, and Andrew Portenstein. Plaintiff did not file any 

objections to Dr. Andersson’s declaration.1

1 As the trial court observed, plaintiff stated objections 

in her separate statement of disputed material facts. The court 

ruled that it would not rule on the objections because objections 

made in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must 
8

In her declaration, plaintiff stated that she “can pro[ve] 

that Dr[.] Okhovat did force her left foot and ankle inward 

and he did say ‘opps [sic] I didn’t mean to do that.’ ” Plaintiff 

states that Dr. Andersson’s declaration and the medical records 

defendants rely on do not refer to her left foot and ankle, and 

that she will obtain declarations from doctors who will discuss 

the injury to her left foot and ankle.

Frlekin’s declaration states that on January 8, 2019, he 

drove plaintiff to Dr. Okhovat’s office and was in the room with 

plaintiff and Dr. Okhovat during the EMG test. Okhovat tested 

plaintiff’s right leg and began to test the left leg. As he “reached 

the lower part of [plaintiff’s] leg, at the ankle area, he asked 

[plaintiff] to move her left foot toward the right. [Plaintiff] moved 

her foot. Dr. Okhovat asked, ‘Is that as far as you can move it?’ 

[Plaintiff] said, ‘Yes.’ Dr. Okhovat, without saying anything, 

then took hold of [plaintiff’s] foot and abruptly and forcefully 

pushed her foot inward to the right. Instantly, [Frlekin] heard 

a large ‘POP’ and [plaintiff] SCREAM[ED] with tears flowing. 

Dr. Okhovat said, ‘Oh! I didn’t mean to do that!’ ” (Boldface 

omitted.)

Frlekin further states that Dr. Okhovat asked plaintiff if 

he should continue with the test, and plaintiff responded, “ ‘Yes, 

I just want it over with?’ ” Dr. Okhovat then “left the room and 

be filed separately, not made in the separate statement. (See 

Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 

Cal.App.4th 1, 9.) The objections were also improper, the court 

stated, because they were objections to defendants’ material 

facts, not to particular evidence. On appeal, plaintiff does not 

assert that the court should have ruled on and sustained her 

objections. 
9

never came back.” After the test, plaintiff “was unable to stand” 

or put pressure on her left foot. Frlekin then took plaintiff to 

a hospital emergency room.

Janet Johnson and Curtis Johnson are plaintiff’s mother

and stepfather. According to their declarations, plaintiff has had 

surgery on her right leg on four occasions and two surgeries on 

her back. During a visit in December 2018, plaintiff’s mother 

observed plaintiff walking and recalled that plaintiff’s left side 

was not injured at that time. Plaintiff’s mother and stepfather 

saw plaintiff again in 2020, and observed that “she was not 

doing well” and “could not walk on her left foot.” The injury to 

plaintiff’s left foot, they conclude, happened in 2019, between 

the two visits.

Andrew Portenstein states that he took plaintiff to the 

hospital and doctor appointments “[a]s of March 21, 2016, and 

other dates in question.” On one occasion, plaintiff tripped 

and fell in a parking lot on the way to a doctor’s appointment.

On June 29, 2021—the date set for the hearing on the 

defendants’ motion—the court granted plaintiff’s request for 

a continuance to allow her to submit further declarations in 

support of her opposition.

On October 6, 2021, plaintiff filed a further opposition. She

submitted her supplemental declaration, attaching as exhibits:

a letter from Leonora Fihman, DPM; certain documents that 

appear to have been prepared by or for Vikram Singh, M.D., and 

Eric Wee, DPM; and an unverified statement by Jonathan Frank, 

M.D.

Dr. Fihman, in a letter not signed under penalty of perjury, 

described plaintiff as having symptoms “consistent with complex 

regional pain syndrome.” Dr. Fihman does not opine on whether 
10

Dr. Okhovat breached a standard of care or whether his conduct 

caused any injury to plaintiff or the pain plaintiff suffers.

The documents from Dr. Singh’s office recite that plaintiff 

had automobile accidents in 2016 and 2018 and that she 

underwent an EMG/nerve conduction study on January 18, 2019. 

Plaintiff reported to Dr. Singh that, “during the study, . . . her 

left ankle was injured and she has had increasing pain in her left 

ankle since then. That is the second reason why she is unable 

to ambulate because of the pain in her left ankle and requiring 

her to use [a] scooter.” Under the heading, “medical causation” 

(boldface and capitalization omitted), Dr. Singh states that “the 

patient’s signs and symptoms and the diagnostic findings were 

caused by the accident suffered by the patient.” The report, 

which is not signed under penalty of perjury, does not include 

any opinion that Dr. Okhovat’s conduct is a cause of plaintiff’s 

condition.

Plaintiff also included a progress note, dated April 1, 

2019, on letterhead of Jonathan Frank, M.D. The unsigned 

report refers to the automobile accident that occurred in

February 2018, and does not mention the incident with 

Dr. Okhovat. The documents purported to be from Dr. Wee

do not include any indication of what might have caused any 

problems with plaintiff’s left leg or ankle. The Dr. Frank and 

Dr. Wee documents are not signed under penalty of perjury.

C. Court’s Ruling on the Motion

On October 14, 2021, defendants filed an objection to 

Dr. Fihman’s statement on the grounds, among others, that it 

lacks foundation and was not signed under penalty of perjury.

On October 20, 2021, the court heard the motion for 

summary judgment. The court sustained the defendants’ 
11

objection to Dr. Fihman’s statement and granted the motion for 

summary judgment. The court determined that the defendants 

had met their burden of demonstrating that Dr. Okhovat did not 

breach the applicable standard of care, and did not cause or 

contribute to plaintiff’s injuries, and plaintiff had failed to meet 

her burden of showing the existence of a triable issue as to either 

element.

On November 3, 2021, plaintiff filed a motion for 

reconsideration, which the court denied on March 10, 2022.

On March 23, 2022, the court entered judgment in favor of

defendants. Counsel for defendants served notice of entry of the 

judgment on March 29, 2022. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on 

May 23, 2022.

2

DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standards

A trial court properly grants summary judgment when the 

papers submitted establish that no triable issue of material fact 

exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) We review the trial 

court’s decision de novo, liberally construing a plaintiff’s evidence 

while strictly scrutinizing the moving defendant’s showing. 

2 The notice of appeal states that the appeal is taken from 

a judgment or order entered on March 10, 2022—the date of the 

order denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. An order 

denying a motion for reconsideration, however, is not appealable. 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (g); Mack v. All Counties Trustee 

Services, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 935, 937, fn. 1.) We construe 

the notice of appeal as taken from the judgment entered on 

March 23, 2022. (See Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan 

Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 18.)
12

(Kolodge v. Boyd (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 349, 355–356.) We 

consider all evidence offered by the parties in connection with 

the motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and

the inferences the evidence reasonably supports. (Aguilar v. 

Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar); 

Artiglio v. Corning Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 604, 612.)

Defendants meet their burden of showing that a cause 

of action has no merit if they show that “one or more elements 

of the cause of action, . . . cannot be established, or that there 

is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.) Once 

a defendant has carried that burden, the burden shifts to the 

plaintiff “to show that a triable issue of one or more material 

facts exists as to that cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, 

subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.) “There is a 

triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would 

allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in 

favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the 

applicable standard of proof” at trial. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th

at p. 850; accord, Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol (2001) 

26 Cal.4th 703, 722.) The plaintiff may not rely upon the 

allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts. 

(§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.) 

B. Analysis

Plaintiff’s claim of medical malpractice required her 

to establish four elements: (1) the defendants’ duty to use 

the skill, prudence, and diligence that other members of the 

profession commonly possess and exercise, (2) a breach of the 

duty, (3) a proximate causal connection between the alleged 

negligent conduct and the injury, and (4) resulting loss or 
13

damage. (Lattimore v. Dickey (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 959, 968; 

Johnson v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 297, 305.) 

Here, defendants asserted that there is no triable issue of 

material fact as to the second and third elements: breach of

duty and causation. Because, as discussed below, we conclude

that summary judgment is proper based on the issue of 

causation, we do not reach the breach of duty issue.

When, as here, the determination of causation in a 

medical malpractice case involves matters beyond a layperson’s 

knowledge, causation “must be proven within a reasonable 

medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.” 

(Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 

402.) When a medical malpractice defendant supports a motion 

for summary judgment with an expert declaration, the defendant 

“ ‘ “is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes 

forward with conflicting expert evidence.” ’ ” (Powell v. Kleinman

(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 112, 123.)

Defendants supported their motion for summary judgment 

as to causation with Dr. Andersson’s declaration, to which 

plaintiff asserted no objection. Dr. Andersson’s opinion that 

Dr. Okhovat’s conduct did not cause or contribute to the injuries 

of which plaintiff complains rests on facts set forth in plaintiff’s 

medical records or, based on Dr. Andersson’s unchallenged 

expertise, inferred from the records. According to Dr. Andersson, 

the EMG study itself showed “normal test results,” which 

could not have been obtained if plaintiff suffered the trauma 

she alleges. An X-ray of plaintiff’s ankle obtained the same 

day of the EMG study was “normal” and the emergency room 

records provide no indication of an injury to plaintiff’s left ankle 

or foot. Dr. Andersson also noted that plaintiff’s apparent failure 
14

to make any complaint about her left leg or ankle the following

day at a medical clinic is “inconsistent of someone who suffered

a traumatic injury to the left foot and ankle the day before.” 

Subsequent MRIs revealed, at most, only conditions that

would be caused by events other than Dr. Okhovat’s conduct. 

Dr. Andersson explained that mild Achilles tendonitis, for 

example, is a chronic condition, common to athletes and runners, 

caused by overuse, not a single, inward twisting motion as 

alleged by plaintiff. Nor is there any evidence in plaintiff’s 

extensive medical records “of wasting or lost reflexes to 

[plaintiff’s] lower extremities,” which Dr. Andersson explained

“is inconsistent with all of her complaints.” Lastly, Dr. Andersson 

pointed to the absence of any diagnosis in any medical record 

that plaintiff suffers from CRPS in her left leg, foot, or ankle.

Dr. Andersson’s declaration provides “a reasoned 

explanation of why the underlying facts lead to [his] ultimate 

conclusion” that Dr. Okhovat’s conduct during the EMG 

study did not cause the injury plaintiff alleges. (Bushling v. 

Fremont Medical Center (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 493, 510.) 

The declaration is thus sufficient to support the defendants’ 

initial summary judgment burden of showing that plaintiff 

cannot establish the element of causation. Plaintiff was

therefore required to establish by expert declarations that a 

triable issue of material fact exists as to the issue of causation.

Plaintiff has failed to do so. The court sustained the 

defendants’ objections to the statement plaintiff submitted from 

Dr. Fihman based on lack of foundation and Dr. Fihman’s failure 

to verify the statements under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff 

does not challenge this ruling on appeal. As the trial court noted, 

even if Dr. Fihman’s statement was admissible, the statement 
15

provides no evidence to support plaintiff’s “case that defendants

caused plaintiff’s injuries.” Plaintiff offered no other evidence 

sufficient to create a triable issue as to causation. 

In her opening brief on appeal, plaintiff argues that she 

“had a ‘witness in the room’ during the [EMG] test[,] so there is 

proof of wrongdoing by [Dr.] Okhovat.” (Capitalization omitted.) 

She is referring to Frlekin, who was present during the EMG 

study and stated that Dr. Okhovat “abruptly and forcefully 

pushed [plaintiff’s] foot inward to the right.” Frlekin “heard 

a large ‘POP,’ ” plaintiff screamed and cried, and Dr. Okhovat 

said, “ ‘Oh! I didn’t mean to do that!’ ” (Boldface omitted.) 

Even if Frlekin’s declaration was sufficient to show that 

Dr. Okhovat breached a duty of care, it does not create a triable 

issue as to whether Dr. Okhovat’s actions caused the ongoing 

pain, tendonitis, and CRPS for which plaintiff seeks relief. 

Under a heading in plaintiff’s opening brief that 

reads, “defendant/respondent Okhovat caused” (boldface 

& capitalization omitted), plaintiff points to evidence of 

the injuries she claims Dr. Okhovat caused. These include: 

“Achilles tendinitis ligament,” “mild sprain of the superficial 

deep fibers of the deltoid ligament complex ligament,” “mild 

chronic sprain of the anterior talofibular ligaments,” and 

“a slightly hypertrophied peroneal tubercle of the calcaneus.” 

(Capitalization omitted.) Even if plaintiff suffers from these 

ailments, however, she has failed to produce admissible evidence 

that Dr. Okhovat caused any of them. 

For all the foregoing reasons, defendants have shown 

that there is no triable issue of material fact as to the element 

of causation and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. 
16

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their 

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

BENDIX, J.