NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 09-2539 

___________ 

FRANCIS X. MINA; LAURA MINA, 

Appellants 

v. 

HOTEL ON THE CAY TIMESHARING ASSOCIATION, INC. 

____________ 

On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands, Appellate Division. 

(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-00072) 

District Court Judges: Curtis V. Gomez, Chief Judge. Raymond L. Finch, District Judge. 

Michael C. Dunston, Superior Court Judge. 

___________ 

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

on December 14, 2010 

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

(Opinion Filed: December 21, 2010) 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 

1 
 This matter arises from Appellants Frank and Laura Mina’s (the “Minas’”) 

purchase of interests in nine partial timeshare units located in the Hotel on the Cay resort 

in St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands. Due to the Minas’ failure to pay annual charges and 

assessments, Appellee Hotel on the Cay Timesharing Association, Inc. (the 

“Association”) brought suit against the Minas in Superior Court, seeking $33,543 in 

outstanding charges and assessments, a judgment terminating the Minas’ contractual 

rights to the timeshares, as well as attorney’s fees and costs. The Superior Court granted 

summary judgment in favor of the Association and the Appellate Division affirmed. We 

conclude that summary judgment was appropriate and will affirm.1

I.

 Because we write for the parties, we discuss the facts only to the extent necessary 

for resolution of the issues raised on appeal. On February 10, 1980, the Minas contracted 

to purchase partial leasehold interests in nine timeshare units located in the Hotel on the 

Cay resort. Under these contracts, the Minas were responsible for annual common 

charges and assessments to be paid to the Association, which under the contracts had 

authority to seek termination of the Minas’ interest in the timeshares in the event of 

nonpayment. 

 On October 23, 2003, the Association filed a Verified Complaint against the 

Minas in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, alleging that the Minas were overdue 

in their payments and had materially breached their time share contracts. The 

 

1 The Appellate Division of the District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 

48 U.S.C. §1613a(a), and we exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c). 

2 
Association sought $33,543, a judgment entitling it to terminate the contracts, and 

attorney’s fees and costs. On November 18, 2003, the Minas answered the Complaint, 

arguing that they were joint owners of the nine timeshare units, and asserting that their 

interests in the timeshares did not constitute a lease between themselves and the 

Association. They also argued, without explanation, that they did not believe that their 

ownership interest was “subject to this type of complaint” and requested that the Court 

dismiss the action. 

In January 2004, the Association served requests for admission on the Minas, 

including a request that the Minas admit that they were lessees rather than owners of the 

timeshare units. After receiving no response from the Minas, the Association moved for 

summary judgment. When the Minas failed to oppose, the Superior Court granted the 

motion and entered judgment. The Minas timely appealed to the Appellate Division and 

for the first time argued that their asserted non-lease ownership interest in the units 

afforded them protection from termination under Title 28 of the Virgin Island Code. The 

Appellate Division found that under Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the 

Minas had admitted that they were lessees of their timeshare units and therefore had no 

ownership interest. Accordingly, the Appellate Division affirmed the Superior Court’s 

grant of summary judgment. 

II.

The Minas argue that the Superior Court erred in granting summary judgment 

because it failed to consider that the Minas’ answers asserted an ownership rather than 

leasehold interest in the timeshares, which they argue entitles them to a defense under 

3 
4 

Title 28 of the Virgin Island Code. However, once a moving party has shown the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party may no longer rely 

solely on the allegations and denials in its pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (“When a 

motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party may 

not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading . . . “); GFL Advantage 

Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 2001). Further, even had the Minas 

provided specific facts beyond the statements in their pleadings, under Rule 36, the 

Minas’ failure to respond to the Association’s requests for admission prevents them from 

contesting their now established leasehold interests in the timeshares. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

36(b) (“A matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court, on 

motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended.”) Accordingly, summary 

judgment was properly entered. 

The Minas further contend that the Superior Court awarded the Association relief 

in excess of that available because the Association had rented and resold the timeshare 

units, thereby mitigating its damages. This argument fails, however, because the Minas 

do not point to any evidence in the record to support it. 

III.

 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.