www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 263 1 

The Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) concept calls for a 

U.S. capability to deliver conventional strikes anywhere in the world 

in approximately an hour. The logic of the CPGS concept is straightforward. The United States has global security commitments to deter and respond to a diverse spectrum of threats, ranging from terrorist organizations to 

near-peer competitors. The United States might need to strike a time-sensitive 

target protected by formidable air defenses or located deep inside enemy territory. Small, high-value targets might pop up without warning in remote or 

sensitive areas, potentially precluding the United States from responding to the 

situation by employing other conventional weapons systems, deploying Special 

Operations Forces (SOF), or relying on the host country. 

A long-range nuclear-armed ballistic missile has the speed and global 

reach to overcome these obstacles. But a President would probably prefer a 

conventional strike option as an alternative to nuclear weapons in most contingencies. In fact, many advocates of the CPGS concept argue that it would 

provide a new capability for scenarios in which existing conventional systems 

would be insufficient but the use of nuclear weapons would be inappropriate. 

Additionally, in many potential crises, a nuclear threat might lack credibility 

in the eyes of U.S. allies and adversaries regardless of a U.S. President’s willingness to employ nuclear force. At the same time, U.S. allies and potential 

adversaries might question whether existing U.S. conventional weapons would 

be effective against some emerging threats. A long-range conventional strike 

capability might enhance deterrence and assurance by providing an effective 

and usable (and thus more credible) strike option. For these reasons, a conventional weapon that is faster, travels farther, and is more effective against 

Conventional Prompt 

Global Strike: Strategic 

Asset or Unusable Liability?

by M. Elaine Bunn and Vincent A. Manzo

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

Center for Strategi

c

ReSEARCH

About the Author

M. Elaine Bunn is a Distinguished 

Research Fellow in the Center for 

Strategic Research (CSR), Institute 

for National Strategic Studies, at 

the National Defense University. 

Vincent A. Manzo is a Research 

Analyst in CSR.

Key Points

◆ A Conventional Prompt Global 

Strike (CPGS) capability would 

be a valuable strategic asset 

for some fleeting, denied, and 

difficult-to-reach targets. It would 

fill a gap in U.S. conventional 

strike capability in some plausible 

high-risk scenarios, contribute to 

a more versatile and credible U.S. 

strategic posture, and potentially 

enhance deterrence across a diverse spectrum of threats. 

◆ A small number of CPGS systems 

would not significantly affect the 

size of the U.S. deployed nuclear 

arsenal or substitute for the ability of nuclear weapons to hold 

large sets of hard, deeply buried, 

or mobile targets at risk.

◆ A key concern is the risk that 

either Russia or China might 

launch its nuclear forces due to 

uncertainty about the target of an 

ambiguous U.S. CPGS strike. Assuming functioning early warning 

systems, the Conventional Trident 

Modification (CTM) mitigates this 

risk better than the conventional 

strike missile because Russian and 

Chinese officials would be better 

able to assess quickly whether a 

CTM would land on their territory. 

February 2011
2 SF No. 263 www.ndu.edu/inss

antiaccess capabilities than existing conventional forces 

would be a valuable strategic asset. 

The most commonly discussed CPGS systems 

envision mating a conventional warhead with either 

a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) or a 

modified intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). If 

successful, this would provide a conventional weapon 

with the same rapid speed, global reach, and ability to 

penetrate air defenses as U.S. nuclear-armed SLBMs 

and ICBMs. 

Because the United States has thus far only deployed nuclear-armed ICBMs and SLBMs, some argue that U.S. conventional SLBMs or ICBMs would 

be destabilizing weapons. For instance, Congress 

withheld the funding necessary for the George W. 

Bush administration to develop and deploy conventional Trident D–5 missiles on Ohio-class submarines 

due to concerns that Russian officials might misinterpret a U.S. CPGS launch as a nuclear attack. Additionally, since long-range ballistic missiles possess 

unparalleled speed and reach, some analysts worry 

that U.S. leaders will be tempted to launch CPGS 

missiles quickly without fully assessing the potential risks of using military force. Finally, Russian and 

Chinese officials have suggested that they perceive 

the CPGS concept as part of a U.S. effort to achieve 

a first strike capability. 

Skeptics also argue that CPGS weapons would 

likely be unusable because the United States would lack 

the necessary intelligence to employ them against fleeting targets. If the United States does possess actionable 

there is no clear consensus within 

Congress and the U.S. national 

security policy community about 

whether the United States 

should develop and deploy 

CPGS capabilities

intelligence, they reason, other conventional assets will 

be within range of the target. 

As a result, there is no clear consensus within Congress and the U.S. national security policy community 

about whether the United States should develop and 

deploy CPGS capabilities. This Strategic Forum examines the conceptual and policy issues surrounding CPGS 

missiles. It concludes that, on balance, a CPGS capability 

would be a valuable strategic asset for some fleeting and 

difficult-to-reach targets. It would fill a gap in the U.S. 

conventional strike capability in some circumstances, 

contribute to a more versatile and credible U.S. strategic 

posture, and potentially enhance deterrence across a diverse spectrum of threats.

Continuity amid Change

Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy and enhancing nonnuclear capabilities have been U.S. objectives since the 1994 Nuclear 

Posture Review.1 This section examines the previous 

and current administrations’ interest in developing nonnuclear capabilities, especially CPGS. This discussion is 

intended neither as a comprehensive analysis comparing the Barack Obama administration’s nuclear policies 

to those of the Bush administration nor as a complete 

assessment of U.S. strategic forces policy since the end 

of the Cold War. However, this brief review highlights 

continued U.S. interest in the CPGS concept as an important continuity between the Bush and Obama administrations. 

Nonnuclear Capabilities and Tailored Deterrence. President Obama set two objectives for the 2010 

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). He instructed his administration to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. 

national security strategy while simultaneously strengthening deterrence of potential adversaries and assurance 

of U.S. allies and friends.2

 These objectives also guided 

the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the 

2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). 

A core conclusion of these three strategy and policy 

reviews is that strengthening U.S. reliance on nonnuclear 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 263 3 

strategic capabilities to deter adversaries and reassure allies 

will advance the President’s dual objectives. In particular, 

the 2010 NPR states that improved conventional 

capabilities have reduced the role of nuclear weapons in 

deterring and responding to nonnuclear—conventional, 

biological, and chemical—attacks. Enhancing deterrence 

of nonnuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 

conventional attacks via further improvements in U.S. 

conventional capabilities is an important policy goal of the 

2010 NPR.3 The NPR states that “reinforcing” regional 

security architectures with nonnuclear capabilities will 

contribute to the assurance of allies about U.S. security 

commitments. It further notes that “U.S. nuclear weapons 

will play a role in the deterrence of regional states so long as 

those states have nuclear weapons, but the decisions taken 

in the NPR, BMDR, and QDR reflect the U.S. desire to 

increase reliance on non-nuclear means to accomplish our 

objectives of deterring such states and reassuring our allies 

and partners.”4 

Administration statements suggest that regional 

ballistic missile defense architectures and an enhanced 

mix of nonnuclear strike forces are critical components 

of its plan to accomplish these objectives. In February 

2010, Vice President Joseph Biden said, “Capabilities 

like an adaptive missile defense shield, conventional 

warheads with worldwide reach, and others that we 

are developing enable us to reduce the role of nuclear 

weapons.”5 Similarly, the NPR Report states that the 

administration’s near-term goal is to “increase reliance on non-nuclear deterrence capabilities (e.g., missile defense and conventional long-range missiles).” It 

also notes that the United States protected these systems in New START because of their potential value 

for regional deterrence: “Contributions by non-nuclear 

systems to U.S. regional deterrence and assurance goals 

will be preserved by avoiding limitations on missile defense in New START and ensuring that New START 

will not preclude options for using heavy bombers or 

long-range missile systems in conventional roles.”6

 The 

BMDR report states that “the role of nuclear weapons in these regional deterrence architectures can be 

reduced by increasing the role of missile defense and 

other capabilities.”7

Developing nonnuclear strategic capabilities to reduce the role of nuclear weapons is an important continuity between the Obama and Bush administrations. 

The Bush administration’s 2001 NPR conceptualized 

strategic capabilities as a New Triad of nuclear and 

nonnuclear offensive strike forces, defenses (including 

missile defenses), and a robust industrial base.8 “The 

goal of the new triad is to reduce our emphasis on nuclear weapons for deterrence and provide the president 

more non-nuclear deterrence options and responses 

to potential crises,” said Secretary of Defense Robert 

Gates in 2006.9 Similarly, Keith Payne, the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy during the 2001 NPR, explained that the policy guidance 

flowing from the review “seeks to reduce reliance on 

nuclear weapons, and place greater weight on non-nuclear threat options.”10 Brian Green, the former Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities, said that “the New Triad is intended to reduce our 

dependence on nuclear weapons.”11

This continuity between the Bush and Obama administrations stems from a shared assessment of the 

contemporary strategic environment. The Bush administration’s 2001 NPR and 2006 QDR concluded that the 

world was more complicated and unpredictable than it 

had been during the Cold War and that the United States 

had to deter a more diverse range of actors and threats. 

The policy implication was that the United States needed versatile strategic force structure options from which 

it could tailor deterrence to specific actors and circumstances. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Peter C.W. Flory’s explanation 

of this reasoning is worth quoting at length: 

In this new and uncertain environment, a “one 

size fits all” approach to deterrence is no longer 

appropriate; we must re-think our approach to 

21st Century threats and tailor deterrence to assure 

our allies and friends, and achieve specific effects 
4 SF No. 263 www.ndu.edu/inss

against a wide array of potential adversaries 

and circumstances, such as advanced military 

competitors, regional WMD states, and non-state 

terrorist networks. To do this we must have a broad 

range of credible strategic capabilities—including 

nuclear and non-nuclear Global Strike capabilities, 

defenses, and a revitalized . . . infrastructure.12

The Obama administration’s 2010 QDR Report

echoes this theme. It states that the United States faces 

a complex and rapidly evolving security landscape: “The 

rise of new powers, the growing influence of non-state 

actors, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and 

other destructive enabling technologies . . . pose profound challenges to the international order.”13 The report 

concludes that the United States needs to create “tailored 

regional deterrence architectures” with its allies to manage this environment. Accomplishing this will require 

an in-depth knowledge of the capabilities, intent, values, 

and decisionmaking of potential adversaries and a diverse 

strategic posture that spans “forward presence, relevant 

conventional capabilities (including missile defenses), 

and continued commitment to extend our nuclear deterrent.”14 Vice Admiral P. Stephen Stanley emphasized 

that effective tailored regional deterrence architectures 

must combine all of these capabilities.15

An important takeaway from these quotes is that 

both administrations emphasized that a mix of nuclear 

and nonnuclear and offensive and defensive capabilities 

is necessary for effective deterrence across the contemporary spectrum of threats and actors. 

Implementing tailored deterrence requires much 

more than military capabilities and knowledge of potential adversaries. Influencing the perceptions—and 

ultimately the actions—of potential adversaries also requires tailoring U.S. statements and actions. The clarity 

and credibility of American messages in the mind of the 

deterree are critical to tailoring deterrence threats. Nevertheless, capabilities and knowledge of potential adversaries are also essential ingredients of tailored deterrence, 

and much work remains in both areas.16

The Capability Gap and CPGS. Building the proper strategic force posture for tailored deterrence is tricky. 

Nearly any weapons system could be justified on the 

grounds that it enhances the versatility of U.S. strategic 

forces. The challenge is to distinguish between what is 

necessary for versatility and what is extraneous or even 

counterproductive and dangerous. 

This question is the key dynamic in the CPGS debate. Both the Bush and Obama administrations have 

noted that the United States cannot currently deliver 

rapid conventional military strikes on a global scale. In 

2006, then-U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) 

commander General James Cartwright explained that the 

U.S. conventional global strike portfolio includes sea- and 

air-launched cruise missiles, joint direct attack munitions, 

and converted cruise missile submarines that carry both 

cruise missiles and SOF. These assets provide a robust and 

effective conventional global strike capability. 

However, General Cartwright cautioned that a small 

class of targets exists against which these assets would be 

ineffective but nuclear weapons would be inappropriate.17

For example, existing conventional weapons might be too 

slow to reach time-sensitive targets that spring up without 

warning in remote locations. This was a key finding of the 

2006 QDR: “Existing conventional forces, such as fighter 

and bomber aircraft and surface ships, could take hours to 

days to deploy and strike a target . . . only nuclear weapons 

are available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to engage 

distant, fleeting targets promptly.”18

Bombers, aircraft, and surface ships carrying cruise 

missiles might be unable to get within striking distance 

of a target due to an adversary’s antiaccess capabilities. 

The 2010 QDR Report concludes that the threat from 

influencing the perceptions of 

potential adversaries requires 

tailoring U.S. statements and actions
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 263 5 

antiaccess capabilities is growing: “States with the means 

to do so are acquiring a wide range of sophisticated 

weapons and supporting capabilities that, in combination, can support antiaccess strategies aimed at impeding 

the deployment of U.S. forces to the theater and blunting 

the operations of those forces that do deploy forward.”19

In particular, it notes that the United States must prepare 

to engage adversaries armed with ballistic missiles, antiship cruise missiles, and ASAT (antisatellite) weapons; it 

also observes that the air defenses of all potential adversaries will be “of far greater sophistication and lethality 

than those fielded by adversaries in the 1990s.”20

Advocates argue that CPGS could fill this alleged 

“capability gap” in the U.S. strategic posture by providing a conventional weapon that possesses the same 

speed, range, and ability to penetrate air defenses as a 

nuclear-armed ICBM or SLBM. CPGS would “provide the United States with a capability that we currently lack: the ability to hit a target anywhere on the 

earth in less than one hour using a non-nuclear warhead,” explained James Miller, the Principal Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.21

Advocates cite four scenarios in which the United 

States might need a CPGS capability: when terrorist leaders are located, WMD transfers are suspected, 

missile launches are imminent, and “high-value” targets 

(for example, a national leader or command and control 

nodes) are identified in larger military campaigns. 

Senior officials in the Bush administration often 

evoked these scenarios. For instance, in Senate testimony, Green stated that CPGS capabilities might be 

necessary to prevent WMD transfers to terrorists, disrupt missile launches by rogue states, and hit targets 

that are protected by antiaccess capabilities.22 In 2006, 

General Cartwright noted that a CPGS weapon might 

have enabled the United States to hit several high-value 

individuals at the beginning of the wars in Afghanistan 

and Iraq.23 In 2007, General Cartwright said that the 

United States would need CPGS weapons to respond 

to an attack on U.S. satellites in low Earth orbit, though 

he did not argue that the United States could suppress 

a sophisticated ASAT attack exclusively by employing 

CPGS weapons.24

The Obama administration’s statements about CPGS 

employment are less specific (although this may change as 

it attempts to persuade Congress to fund specific CPGS 

systems). But its strategy and policy reports allude to the 

same threats that the Bush administration cited. The 2010 

NPR Report states that CPGS capabilities may be “particularly valuable for the defeat of time-urgent regional 

threats.”25 The 2010 QDR discusses CPGS systems and 

long-range strike more broadly as one response to adversaries employing antiaccess strategies.26

Another similarity is that the Obama administration 

describes the CPGS concept as one element of a broader 

portfolio of nonnuclear long-range strike assets that it is 

studying for the fiscal year (FY) 2012 budget. Other systems include penetrating and standoff bombers, air- and 

sea-launched cruise missiles, electronic warfare capabilities, and the enabling intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.27 Recall that in 2006 General 

Cartwright said that CPGS weapons would be for the 

rare circumstances in which other conventional global 

strike systems were insufficient. The Obama administration’s decision to study a mix of nonnuclear long-range 

strike assets suggests that it also sees CPGS as a capability that would compensate for the limitations of other 

nonnuclear strike assets in rare situations. 

Officials in both administrations have argued that a 

CPGS capability would enhance U.S. deterrence. Flory 

argued that it would enable the United States to hold at 

risk a regional adversary’s high-value strategic assets (for 

example, WMD-armed missiles, command and control nodes, and leadership bunkers) with conventional 

weapons, which would strengthen the credibility of U.S. 

deterrence threats in a crisis.28 Bradley Roberts, Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile 

Defense Policy, recently provided a similar explanation 

for the value of a CPGS capability: 

If we’re in a circumstance where we see a 

heightened risk of war, and . . . North Korea 
6 SF No. 263 www.ndu.edu/inss

transporting a missile to a launch site, standing 

it up on its launch pad and beginning to mount 

a nuclear warhead to it. We would like to have to 

not rely on nuclear weapons to attack that site or 

threaten to attack that site. . . . A nuclear weapon 

would be perfectly thorough in dealing with the 

military threat. We’d like to have other means; we 

think that would be more credible as a threat in 

the eye of the North Korean leader that we might 

actually employ other means.29

Lastly, the Bush administration did not see CPGS 

weapons as substitutes for nuclear weapons. Neither does 

the Obama administration. Some might disagree with 

this observation. In the absence of a definitive explanation of the CPGS mission, the Obama administration’s 

statements about nonnuclear capabilities and reducing 

the role of nuclear weapons are open to interpretation. 

Thus far, there is no evidence that the Obama administration sees CPGS deployments as enabling nuclear 

force reductions or that the administration plans to rely 

exclusively or primarily on CPGS weapons to deter 

threats from nuclear weapons states. The NPR states that 

nuclear forces “will continue to play an essential role in 

deterring potential adversaries, reassuring allies and partners around the world and promoting stability globally 

and in key regions.”30 General Kevin Chilton, General 

Cartwright’s successor as USSTRATCOM commander, 

has said that a CPGS capability would not provide even 

a 10-for-1 substitute for nuclear weapons for fulfilling 

U.S. deterrence objectives.31

The Obama administration’s policy decisions reflect 

this interpretation. It explicitly rejected a sole-use policy 

and reserves the right to use nuclear weapons to deter 

and respond to the full range of threats, nuclear and nonnuclear, from nuclear weapons states and those not in 

compliance with their nonproliferation obligations; it 

also pledged to maintain the triad of nuclear ICBMs, 

SLBMs, and nuclear-capable bombers and refurbish the 

nuclear infrastructure.32 Indeed, Linton Brooks, the former director of the National Nuclear Security Administration, said that he would have “killed” for the budget 

and high-level attention that the Obama administration 

is devoting to nuclear weapons issues.33

Analyzing the Value of CPGS

Given the growing consensus about the value of 

nonnuclear strategic capabilities and CPGS within 

the community of former and current U.S. defense officials, it is worth revisiting the analytical arguments 

underlying enthusiasm for CPGS in both the Bush 

and Obama administrations. 

The 2008 National Research Council Report and 

the Capability Gap. In 2006, Congress requested that 

the National Research Council (NRC) of the National 

Academy of Sciences study the CPGS concept. The NRC 

report on CPGS is the most comprehensive open source 

analysis of the subject. Completed during the summer of 

2008, it affirmed the Bush administration’s rationale for 

a CPGS capability: “The basic policy conclusion of the 

Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability . . . is that there would be important political and 

strategic advantages to the United States in being able to 

strike high-value targets having time-sensitive urgency 

that could not be effectively engaged by currently available conventional strike systems.”34 

The NRC CPGS committee reached this conclusion through a scenario-based analysis of existing conventional strike systems, such as tactical aircraft, bombers, and cruise missiles, and potential CPGS systems. The 

study described the attributes it perceived as necessary for 

an effective CPGS capability. It concluded that a 1-hour 

execution time—the time between an attack order and 

there is no evidence that the 

Obama administration plans to rely 

exclusively or primarily on CPGS 

weapons to deter threats from 

nuclear weapons states
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 263 7 

when the weapon affects the target—is a justifiable goal 

for CPGS systems, although some systems that “do not 

quite” satisfy this requirement are worth consideration. A 

CPGS capability must be long range, but it need not be 

capable of reaching everywhere in the world in an hour 

at all times.35

This conclusion is based on the study’s independent judgment that there are three plausible categories 

of scenarios where an execution time of an hour would 

be critical. The categories of scenarios are consistent 

with those the Bush administration frequently cited. The 

first two involve actionable intelligence about the location of terrorist leaders and WMD shipments. The study 

cited U.S. strikes against al Qaeda during the 1990s as 

an example. It did not provide a historical example of a 

WMD transfer, but it noted that “experience” suggests 

that the United States might know the destination or 

route of a WMD shipment. The third category involves 

larger military operations. The United States might need 

to prevent or respond to enemy missile launches. Or it 

might attempt to degrade an adversary’s command and 

control network during the opening salvo in a war. As 

an example, the report cited U.S. air attacks on Iraqi air 

defenses at the start of the 1991 Gulf War.36

The study derived six test cases from these categories. It scored the performance of the systems in test 

cases involving combinations of soft, hard, near-surface, 

deeply buried, and mobile targets and varying adversary 

air defense capabilities. To guide its analysis, it also identified and ranked the systems according to 15 capability 

metrics, such as a 1-hour execution time, defense penetration, lethality, and the need for overflight and basing 

rights. The study only analyzed a modestly sized CPGS 

force for each test case (that is, approximately 24–28 

CPGS weapons).37

Existing systems scored poorly in the test cases. 

They were vulnerable to air defenses and frequently were 

unable to satisfy the 1-hour execution time even if they 

were forward deployed. Coordinating tanker support 

for tactical aircraft, securing overflight permission, and 

determining how to bypass enemy air defenses took as 

much as 10 to 20 hours in some instances. The study 

demonstrated, however, that existing systems are highly 

capable in a wide variety of contingencies. They might 

suffice if an execution time of several hours is acceptable, and they could accomplish a 1-hour strike in some 

circumstances. For example, the study concluded that a 

tactical aircraft that is already in flight when it receives 

an attack order could conceivably reach a target no more 

than 500 miles away in an hour.38

The study concluded that CPGS missiles could consistently complete strikes within 1 hour of the order to 

execute and penetrate air defenses, and were less dependent on forward basing than existing systems. Most of 

the CPGS systems were superior to existing systems for 

responding quickly to threats, quickly attacking terrorist/

WMD targets, and striking an adversary’s command and 

control nodes. The study also noted that the Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) was ineffective for 

attacking known weak points of hard targets, such as vulnerable entrances and exits. A variant of the CTM that 

would carry larger payloads and the conventional strike 

missile (CSM) systems performed better in this category. 

All of the CPGS missiles that the study examined were 

only effective against “large, complex, hard and buried 

complexes” that possess a known vulnerability that the 

United States could exploit. The CTM and CSM systems both struggled to hit moving targets. As with other 

conventional systems, the CPGS missiles would be unable to destroy many hard and buried targets.39

The study documented a gap in existing U.S. conventional strike capabilities. Its test cases suggest that 

CPGS weapons would be an imperfect but valuable 

solution. CPGS weapons would be faster and more 

unless the CPGS system is capable of 

in-flight targeting, intelligence about 

the location of the target would 

need to be exact prior to launch
8 SF No. 263 www.ndu.edu/inss

effective against air defenses than other conventional 

strike assets. In some contingencies, they might provide 

the United States with an effective conventional strike 

option that it does not currently possess. At the same 

time, CPGS would not be a silver bullet. To be effective, CPGS weapons would need to be more accurate 

than nuclear weapons, and unless the CPGS system 

is capable of in-flight targeting, intelligence about the 

location of the target would need to be exact prior to 

launch.40 A modest number of CPGS weapons would 

not be capable of threatening large sets of hard, deeply 

buried, or mobile targets. In fact, the NRC study concluded that the United States would need thousands of 

CPGS missiles to hold Russian nuclear forces at risk.41

A core policy implication is that a small-scale CPGS 

capability would not by itself pose a conventional threat 

to Russian and Chinese nuclear forces. 

An independent study by Bruce Sugden reached 

similar conclusions. Sugden argued that conventional 

ballistic missiles (CBMs) would be more prompt, possess a greater range, and penetrate air defenses more effectively than manned and unmanned aircraft. He also 

noted that CBMs would be inferior to existing conventional systems for strikes against hard, deeply buried, and 

mobile targets because they would carry smaller payloads 

and have a limited ability to collect and receive targeting 

data while in flight. On this basis, Sugden concluded that 

in the near- to mid-term future, CBMs would be preferable for targets that are soft, fixed, time-sensitive, and 

protected by air defenses.42 

CPGS Weapons: Unnecessary, Unusable, and 

Unwise? Some analysts are skeptical of the NRC study’s 

conclusions. They argue that CPGS missiles would be 

an ineffective capability: a CPGS strike would be either 

unnecessary or infeasible and almost always dangerous. 

To further analyze the CPGS concept in light of these 

counterarguments, it is worth taking a closer look at the 

categories of scenarios cited in the NRC Report and 

other forums. 

Terrorist and WMD transfers. Some analysts doubt 

that the United States will encounter a crisis in which 

a CPGS strike is both necessary and feasible. They argue that collecting, analyzing, and vetting intelligence 

take time. The insights derived during this process often require additional information and further analysis, 

which usually entails redeploying intelligence assets and 

consulting with local authorities. By the time the United 

States is able to verify the location of a target, U.S. forward-deployed or foreign forces could be within striking 

distance. In other words, the time required to gather the 

information necessary to execute a CPGS strike would 

create alternative options for fulfilling U.S. objectives. 

Some targets might be so fleeting that the United 

States would not have time to reposition forward-deployed strike assets to hit time-sensitive targets. Critics 

argue that in these cases, a CPGS strike would also be 

infeasible. Without on-site reconnaissance assets, U.S. 

leaders would lack the requisite information to confirm 

the target’s location with sufficient precision to launch a 

CGPS strike and estimate collateral damage.43 Senator 

Jack Reed articulated this reasoning in 2006: “I presume, 

in terms of developing our intelligence sources, we first 

have suspicion, then we have information, we go out and 

verify it, and in that process . . . our national security officials would begin to move assets into the area which 

would conduct a strike with precision weapons.”44

This argument has merit because it reflects experience from routine U.S. counterterrorism operations in 

Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The United States would 

not need CPGS weapons for most counterterrorism and 

counterproliferation strikes. But CPGS weapons would 

be for exceptional rather than routine scenarios. The operative question is whether plausible scenarios exist in 

which the United States could possess actionable intelligence but be unable to strike targets with other conventional strike assets.

The answer is yes. The forward-deployed forces 

that collect and confirm intelligence about a target 

might be incapable of disabling or destroying it. For 

instance, an unmanned aircraft system might be unarmed or adversary forces might destroy it. Special 

Operations Forces might locate a target but lack the 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 263 9 

capability to attack it. Any number of obstacles could 

prevent on-site assets from successfully engaging a 

target. Since the scenarios under consideration involve 

fleeting targets, other forward-deployed forces might 

be unable to respond in time.45

The United States might also acquire actionable 

intelligence about an urgent target that is out of range 

of existing U.S. nonnuclear forces. As an example, intelligence sources might provide information about a rail 

car that contains radiological material and is traveling 

in a country thousands of miles from U.S. conventional 

forces based in Europe and Asia. U.S. leaders could possess intelligence indicating that once the train arrives in a 

city, terrorist operatives plan to split up the material and 

disperse.46 Local authorities might not have the capability to reliably intercept the train, seize the material, and 

maintain custody of it until U.S. reinforcements arrive. 

A President might consider employing CPGS 

weapons in this scenario. According to the NRC study’s 

analysis, the United States is unlikely to be able to execute a direct CPGS strike against a moving train. But it 

might be possible to delay or derail the train by employing CPGS weapons against the tracks, thus creating a 

larger window for other U.S. forces to arrive and seize 

the material. Of course, a President might conclude that 

a CPGS strike would be too dangerous because it might 

disperse hazardous materials into a population center. 

This scenario involves a low-probability, high-consequence event. It is also hypothetical and subject to 

manipulation; one could alter a few variables so that a 

CPGS strike would be unnecessary, too risky, or feasible. 

In reality, final decisions about CPGS employment in a 

specific situation would rest with the President. The issue is whether a President should have a CPGS option 

in future crises. Because this and similar situations are 

plausible today, it would be prudent for the United States 

to acquire a small-scale CPGS capability as a precaution. 

Utilizing CPGS weapons against time-urgent, popup targets. To be sure, vetting intelligence and weighing the risks and benefits of a CPGS strike against a 

time-urgent, pop-up target would be a major operational 

challenge. In theory, the speed of CPGS missiles should 

increase the deliberation time available to the President 

because the time between a strike order and target impact will be shorter.47 Despite this, deciding to execute 

a CPGS strike under severe time constraints would still 

be difficult. A President might make a strategic decision 

to strike a target, such as Osama bin Laden, in advance. 

However, he or she would still need to evaluate operational decisions on actionable intelligence on a case-bycase basis because there are too many context-specific 

variables. For instance, a President would need to weigh 

the probability that the target would be in the location 

against the number of civilians who might die in the 

strike. Informing a President of the potential opportunity for a strike while the Intelligence Community is still 

vetting sources and analyzing the target might expand 

the launch-decision timeline. Regardless of the process, 

however, there will likely be situations in which the due 

diligence required to justify a strike offsets the speed of 

CPGS missiles. 

Studying the intelligence and decisionmaking timeline for Predator strike operations in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan might yield insights that help the United States 

effectively utilize CPGS weapons against pop-up targets. 

Unfortunately, the risk of a CPGS strike based on faulty 

intelligence or insufficient deliberation will always exist, 

though this risk applies to every weapons system.

Communicating targeting information is another 

challenge of employing CPGS weapons against popup targets. As an example, a U.S. Ohio-class submarine 

equipped with CPGS would probably not have the 

the speed of CPGS missiles should 

increase the deliberation time 

available to the President because 

the time between a strike order and 

target impact will be shorter
10 SF No. 263 www.ndu.edu/inss

coordinates of a pop-up target in advance of the crisis. 

The United States would need to develop procedures to 

quickly transmit target data to the submarine. U.S. military planners and policymakers would need to anticipate 

and resolve this and many other operational challenges 

for an effective CPGS capability against pop-up targets. 

Regional powers and near-peer competitors. The NRC 

report’s third category of scenarios involves CPGS strikes 

embedded in larger military operations. Examples include 

U.S. CPGS strikes on an adversary’s missile launchers or 

command and control capabilities. Others have suggested 

that CPGS missiles would be useful for blunting ASAT 

attacks from near-peer competitors.48 

Some argue that CPGS missiles are unnecessary for 

wars with regional powers and near-peer competitors 

because such conflicts would not be a strategic surprise. 

Rather, relations would sour and tensions would build 

over time, allowing the United States to position existing conventional systems within striking distance of the 

adversary during the run-up to war. If U.S. satellites detected a potential adversary preparing for an attack, these 

assets would provide an array of conventional strike options capable of hitting the same targets that the United 

States would strike with CPGS missiles.49

A period of heightened tension probably would precede a war between the United States and another state. 

This does not necessarily invalidate the rationale for a 

small-scale CPGS capability. Crises can escalate precipitously and unexpectedly, and the United States might 

need to launch rapid strikes to prevent and respond to 

attacks. Based on the 2010 QDR’s analysis, many potential adversaries will possess formidable antiaccess 

capabilities designed to prevent the United States from 

forward-deploying and successfully employing existing 

conventional strike assets. CPGS missiles alone will not 

enable the United States to overcome antiaccess strategies, but they would contribute to larger military operations against adversaries with antiaccess capabilities.50

That contribution could be significant. 

In a conflict with a regional power, the United States 

might destroy vulnerable components of the adversary’s 

air defense network with CPGS missiles prior to highvolume bomber and aircraft strikes against hard targets.51

Operations against air defense systems might still succeed without CPGS weapons, but they would likely take 

longer and place a larger number of vulnerable bombers 

and aircraft at risk. If U.S. leaders believe that a missile 

launch from an unhardened launcher in a known location is imminent, they might employ CPGS missiles immediately rather than waiting until U.S. forces degrade 

enemy air defenses. 

Although CPGS systems would not be capable of 

holding large sets of hard and deeply buried targets at 

risk, some systems might have utility against a small 

number of such targets depending on the system and the 

target. For instance, a CPGS missile strike against the 

entrances of an underground facility might delay the dispersal of an adversary’s missiles and buy time for followon bomber and cruise missile strikes.52 Even if CPGS 

missiles hit the entrances less than an hour before other 

conventional strike assets, U.S. chances of thwarting a 

WMD attack might increase significantly. If the United 

States has intelligence about a high-impact target, such 

as vulnerable but critical command and control nodes 

or leadership locations, a CPGS missile might be the 

quickest and most effective strike option. 

The prospect of employing CPGS missiles against 

a nuclear-armed, near-peer competitor in response to an 

ASAT attack has generated much controversy. To be clear, 

the CPGS concept is not intended as a one-stop solution 

to U.S. vulnerability in space. Deterring and responding 

to ASAT attacks would likely require a multipronged 

because of the nuclear shadow, 

the decision to go to war with a 

near peer would be one of the 

most difficult that any President 

would face
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 263 11 

approach. It would probably entail a mix of offensive capabilities—the ability to reposition satellites, offload services to other satellites and terrestrial assets, operate with 

a degraded satellite capability, and many other measures. 

Obama administration statements suggest that it does 

not equate deterrence in space to offensive retaliation, let 

alone retaliation with CPGS missiles.53

Independent analyst Joshua Pollack asks an excellent question: “If the protection of a particular asset, say, a 

satellite constellation, requires gambling with millions of 

lives, is that asset worth protecting?”54 One would hope 

that a President would consider this in a crisis with a 

near peer. Of course, there would be an inherent risk of 

escalation in any conventional war between two nuclear 

powers. Employing CPGS weapons might exacerbate 

this risk in some circumstances, but possession of a modest number of CPGS weapons is unlikely to make a U.S. 

conventional war with a near peer more likely. Because 

of the nuclear shadow, the strategic decision to go to war 

with a near peer would always be one of the most difficult that any President would face. This will not change 

after the United States deploys CPGS weapons. (For a 

discussion of CPGS ambiguity and misinterpretation 

risks with Russia and China, see the next section.) 

Whether the United States should acquire or forgo a CPGS capability and whether the United States 

should go to war with a near-peer competitor in a specific situation are two distinct issues. Calculations about 

the benefits and risks of striking a near-peer competitor with CPGS missiles, or other conventional systems, 

would depend on the situation, though a war with such a 

competitor would be extremely risky under any circumstances. Few would question this, but it is not the core 

issue in the debate about CPGS acquisition. 

CPGS weapons might enhance U.S. conventional 

military operations in a war with a near peer; for instance, in very rare circumstances, the United States 

might utilize the speed and access of CPGS weapons 

in a larger strike that employs other nonnuclear assets 

as well. However, simply because CPGS weapons might 

be useful in a war with a near peer does not mean that 

the United States would develop a CPGS capability primarily for this purpose. The CPGS concept is attractive 

because it would better equip the United States to deter 

and respond to a variety of threats and crises. But in the 

absence of the threat from terrorists and unpredictable 

regional powers, the rationale for a niche CPGS capability would be much less compelling because the odds of a 

war with a near-peer competitor are so remote. 

Preparing for CPGS Employment in War. Employing CPGS weapons to achieve the desired effects in 

a war would require preparation. Civilian and military 

planners must incorporate CPGS weapons into existing 

plans, and senior officials and commanders would need 

to think through how best to utilize the mix of CPGS 

weapons, other conventional and nonkinetic assets, and 

missile defenses in a variety of contingencies. Decisions 

about CPGS employment would vary according to the 

situation, but senior officials and military commanders 

would probably make better choices during a crisis if 

they have thought through the conceptual benefits, risks, 

and tradeoffs beforehand. 

As an example, evaluating the escalation risks of 

CPGS employment against specific adversaries merits 

further study. Detailed assessments of potential adversaries are a fundamental ingredient of tailored deterrence. Defense planners must explore whether some 

potential adversaries would react more severely to a 

CPGS strike than to an attack against the same target with other nonnuclear means. The U.S. Intelligence 

Community must account for the unique capabilities, 

command authority and decisionmaking structures, 

if the United States deploys a CPGS 

system, potential reactions to such 

employment are another variable 

that the Intelligence Community 

would need to research and analyze
12 SF No. 263 www.ndu.edu/inss

leadership traits, strategic cultures, and doctrines of 

specific actors. These analyses probably exist already and 

are routinely reassessed. If the United States deploys a 

CPGS system, potential reactions to such employment 

are another variable that the Intelligence Community 

would need to research and analyze. 

Military planners would also need to evaluate which 

specific targets the United States can affect with CPGS 

weapons. This process will involve detailed technical and 

intelligence analyses about the locations and vulnerabilities of specific targets. Understanding the probable effect 

of CPGS weapons against specific targets will enable 

the United States to best allocate limited CPGS assets 

against larger target sets. 

How Do CPGS Weapons Reduce the Role of 

Nuclear Weapons? The Obama administration might 

provide a more detailed explanation of how CPGS weapons reduce the role of nuclear weapons after it submits its 

FY12 budget request. For now, however, the relationship 

between CPGS weapons and nuclear weapons is inchoate. 

The NRC study concluded that CPGS weapons 

would provide the United States with a new military option in circumstances in which a President is unlikely to 

resort to nuclear force but cannot accomplish national 

objectives with current U.S. conventional capabilities:

CPGS would be a valuable new instrument of 

national policy because in extremely serious cases 

it would avoid the dilemma of having to choose 

between using a nuclear weapon or making no 

response at all. The committee believes that in the 

face of such a dilemma, the disadvantages of using 

nuclear weapons are such that there are very few 

cases in which the President would actually choose 

to use a nuclear weapon.55

Thus, a CPGS capability might prevent the United 

States from having no appropriate military options to respond to a serious threat. Alternatively, it might prevent 

a President from using a nuclear weapon as a substitute 

for a conventional strike option that would not exist 

without a CPGS capability. 

A plausible variant is that a President might have 

to choose between a nuclear response and a less effective conventional response. For instance, an adversary 

might be preparing to launch short- and medium-range 

conventional missiles at U.S. forces and allies. Existing 

U.S. conventional forces might be unable to penetrate or 

avoid the adversary’s air defenses quickly enough to prevent the missile launch or to rapidly degrade the missile 

forces, but the incentives against nuclear force employment would still be very strong. In this instance, CPGS 

weapons might enable the United States to respond more 

quickly and effectively, and probably save more lives. 

Operationally, a small-scale CPGS capability would 

likely incrementally expand the range of targets that the 

United States could destroy with conventional weapons. 

In other words, deploying CPGS weapons might allow 

the United States to create conventional strike options 

for a small number of the targets that it currently can 

attack only with nuclear weapons. 

This is not without precedent. In 2007, General 

Cartwright explained that the United States previously needed nuclear-armed cruise missiles to destroy 

integrated air defenses, but could now credibly threaten 

these targets with conventional cruise missiles: “And so 

we’ve been able to offload some of those targets, and that 

has allowed us to stay on track in the reduction of operationally deployed nuclear weapons.”56 The 2010 NPR 

Report reflects this: “But fundamental changes in the 

international security environment in recent years—including the growth of unrivaled U.S. conventional milideploying CPGS weapons might 

allow the United States to create 

conventional strike options for a 

small number of the targets that 

it currently can attack only with 

nuclear weapons
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 263 13 

tary capabilities . . . enable us to fulfill those objectives 

[deterrence, assurance, and promoting global stability] at 

significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced 

reliance on nuclear weapons.”57 In this sense, CPGS 

weapons would reduce the role of nuclear weapons by 

providing conventional alternatives to nuclear weapons 

against some targets. 

However, a modestly sized CPGS force would not 

be able to satisfy the requirements that U.S. leadership 

perceives as necessary to deter nuclear weapons states and 

states not in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations. For instance, U.S. policy on deterring Russia requires 

holding at risk those targets that the United States believes 

a potentially hostile Russia would value. Historically, implementing this policy has meant meeting a high standard of 

destruction in four categories: nuclear forces, other military 

forces, economic and industrial targets, and leadership command, control, communications, and intelligence assets. As 

the NRC study demonstrated, the United States would 

need thousands of CPGS missiles to do this.58

The Obama administration does not plan to undertake large-scale CPGS deployments. Administration officials have described CPGS long-range ballistic missiles 

as a “niche” capability.59 A core policy implication is that 

CPGS weapons would not play a significant role in reducing the number of nuclear weapons that the United 

States deploys unless policymakers dramatically alter 

U.S. strategic deterrence requirements.

In theory, a President might employ CPGS weapons against a target that would have required a nuclear 

response prior to the existence of CPGS missiles. For 

instance, without a CPGS capability, nuclear missiles 

might offer the fastest strike option against a regional 

power’s difficult-to-reach WMD-armed missiles. If 

U.S. leaders thought that an adversary attack was imminent, they might conclude that nuclear weapons offered the only strike option that could reliably prevent 

the adversary from launching all or some of its missiles. If CPGS missiles offer an effective conventional 

strike option that existing conventional systems cannot 

provide, they might substitute for nuclear weapons—

thereby reducing the role of nuclear weapons—in that 

specific situation. 

Some might perceive this hypothetical scenario as 

contrived. The bar for the U.S. use of nuclear weapons is 

very high. One could argue that in a situation in which 

a President would seriously consider employing even a 

single nuclear weapon, the stakes would be of such magnitude that he or she would probably not risk relying on 

conventional weapons.60 On the other hand, if a President 

was reasonably confident that the United States could accomplish its objectives with CPGS missiles (and perhaps 

missile defenses and follow-on strikes with other nonnuclear forces), he or she would have strong incentives to 

respond to the situation without using nuclear weapons. 

As one element of a larger set of nonnuclear capabilities that increase the versatility of the U.S. strategic 

posture, CPGS weapons could make an incremental but 

important contribution to deterrence of potential adversaries and assurance of U.S. allies. 

In the short term, the threat from nonstate actors may 

become more severe, rogue states may develop more advanced air defense and missile capabilities, and near-peer 

competitors will likely acquire improved antiaccess capabilities. Against this backdrop, U.S. leaders, allies, and potential adversaries may perceive current U.S. conventional 

weapons systems as inadequate for fulfilling extended deterrence objectives in some circumstances. The utility of 

U.S. nonnuclear strategic capabilities—CPGS weapons, 

other nonnuclear strike assets, and missile defenses—is 

that allies and potential adversaries may perceive them 

as an effective and more usable (and thus credible) set of 

military options for some emerging threats. This would 

enhance deterrence against an increasingly diverse and sophisticated spectrum of threats against which other conventional weapons may be of questionable effectiveness 

but where the threat of nuclear retaliation would not be 

credible in the eyes of U.S. allies and adversaries. 

Is CPGS Too Expensive for a Niche Capability? 

Developing and deploying a small number of CPGS 

weapons will be costly.61 As the United States approaches a period of constrained budgets, some might fairly 
14 SF No. 263 www.ndu.edu/inss

question whether expending substantial resources for a 

niche capability is a worthwhile investment. The United 

States deploys high-end strategic capabilities for dire 

scenarios that most U.S. officials hope will never occur. 

In such circumstances, however, a President would probably want a versatile strategic toolkit. A small number 

of conventional long-range missiles might be worth the 

cost if they add strategic flexibility by filling the gap between existing conventional systems and nuclear forces. 

CPGS Ambiguity and 

Misinterpretation

The most pervasive objection to CPGS is the risk of 

ambiguity and misinterpretation. Critics argue that other 

countries will be unable to distinguish U.S. conventional 

long-range ballistic missiles from U.S. nuclear-armed 

ICBMs and SLBMs. They fear that Russian officials will 

detect the launch of a CPGS missile, conclude that the 

United States has launched a nuclear attack, and launch 

nuclear weapons in retaliation. 

Concerns about CPGS ambiguity focus primarily on 

Russia because it possesses a massive nuclear arsenal and 

is capable of detecting and tracking long-range missile 

launches. In the near- to mid-term future, however, China 

may develop launch detection and early warning capabilities. This is significant because a nation cannot misinterpret 

a CPGS strike as a nuclear attack if it does not have the 

capability to detect long-range missiles prior to impact.

Congress and CPGS Ambiguity. Congressional 

concerns about CPGS ambiguity arose as the Bush administration attempted to gain funding for the CTM 

system, which would mate a conventional warhead with 

the existing Trident D–5 missile. The Bush administration initially sought funding to deploy two CTM missiles alongside the nuclear-armed Trident D–5 missiles 

on the 12 deployed Ohio-class submarines by 2008. Administration officials argued that the CTM is the quickest and most affordable path to a CPGS capability because it would rely primarily on existing technology.62

The Bush administration was unable to persuade 

Congress to provide the funding necessary to develop 

and deploy CTM missiles by 2008.63 The risk of CPGS 

ambiguity triggering a Russian nuclear strike was central to congressional opposition. For instance, Senator 

Carl Levin (D–MI) said: “Now, those D–5 missiles today carry nuclear warheads, and there’s a real question as 

to whether we are creating a very dangerous ambiguity if 

we proceed to have on a boat either D–5 conventional or 

D–5 nuclear. And I’m just wondering . . . if other countries 

are not clear as to whether or not a launch is a nuclear or 

conventional launch. It creates huge dangers.”64 Similarly, 

Senators Daniel Inouye (D–HI) and Ted Stevens (R–AK) 

listed the ambiguity issue as a core concern in a letter to 

the National Academy of Sciences explaining Congress’s 

decision to request an independent NRC study of CPGS: 

“The fact that one would not be able to differentiate between a conventional missile launch and a nuclear missile 

launch from a Trident submarine was viewed with particular concern by those of us who opposed the program.”65

Congress did not completely reject the CPGS 

concept. For FY08, it created a single CPGS program 

element for the development of alternative non-CTM 

CPGS systems.66 One alternative is the land-based 

CSM. The Air Force’s CSM envisions mating a modified ICBM, know as the Minotaur IV, with a boostglide reentry vehicle (commonly referred to as the Hypersonic Glide Vehicle) that would deliver the warhead 

to its target. If the technology develops as planned, the 

boost-glide vehicle would maneuver and deviate from a 

ballistic trajectory after it separates from the missile.67

Obama administration officials have recently stated that 

the CSM (and boost-glide CPGS concepts more generally) would mitigate the ambiguity risk because they 

concerns about CPGS ambiguity 

focus primarily on Russia because it 

possesses a massive nuclear arsenal 

and is capable of detecting and 

tracking long-range missile launches
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 263 15 

would follow a ballistic trajectory for less than half of 

their flight (whereas ICBMs and SLBMs are ballistic 

for the entire flight) and would be able to “steer around” 

countries such as Russia.68 Sugden reaches a similar conclusion: “CBMs [conventional ballistic missiles] based in 

the continental United States and at forward locations 

that carry boost-glide vehicles, ideal for shaped trajectories, would mitigate the risks of ambiguous warning.”69

The Obama administration requested $136.6 million to further develop the boost-glide component of 

the CSM for FY11. The Budget Item Justification stated 

that the CSM is the lead design to demonstrate a CPGS 

capability. It also requested $69 million to test and evaluate the Army’s Hypersonic Glide Body concept, which 

is an alternative risk reduction path for the CSM.70 The 

Obama administration is still conducting its nonnuclear 

long-range strike study, and has not ruled out further efforts to develop the CTM concept (see section on New 

START for more on this). 

NRC Assessment of CPGS Ambiguity. Congress 

tasked the NRC study to examine the ambiguity risks 

associated with the CTM and CPGS concepts. As the 

Obama administration has already requested further 

CPGS funding and is evaluating different systems, it is 

worth reviewing the analysis in the NRC report. 

The NRC study concluded that the ambiguity risks 

would be manageable and should not preclude the development of a CPGS capability. The study argued that, 

after years of observing U.S. CPGS policy debates, acquisition decisions, and weapons tests and deployments, 

and participating in dialogues on CPGS issues with U.S. 

officials, other nations would be unlikely to misinterpret 

a CPGS launch as a nuclear attack. Rather, they would 

probably anticipate U.S. CPGS strikes in wars and crises. As examples, the study noted that the B–52, B–1, 

B–2, fighter bombers, and air- and sea-launched cruise 

missiles are all used for conventional strikes even though 

they initially carried only nuclear warheads.71

Additionally, it noted that ambiguity risks with Russia will flow from the context in which the United States 

employs CPGS missiles. For instance, if Russia detects 

the launch of a few U.S. CPGS missiles but is unsure 

of their location and payload (conventional or nuclear), 

Russian leaders would “be unlikely to conclude that the 

United States was starting a nuclear war with Russia in 

a ‘bolt-from-the-blue’ attack with so few missiles.”72 At 

the very least, Russian leaders would have strong incentives to wait until they had more information about the 

targets of such a small strike before employing their nuclear forces against the United States. 

The study acknowledged that there would be inherent ambiguity risks in U.S. CPGS launches. But it concluded that the United States could reduce this through 

confidence-building measures. For example, the United 

States could invite Russia, China, and other nations to 

participate in some or all of the following confidencebuilding measures: “These could include cooperative 

measures to increase information about the system and 

its operations (notification, transparency arrangements, 

a joint warning center, data exchanges, participation in 

and observation of exercises, inspection regimes) as well 

as extensive and candid discussions of the nature of the 

system and the U.S. doctrine for its use.”73

The NRC report’s analysis is persuasive. The international security policy community has been analyzing and 

debating the CPGS and CTM concepts since 2006. If the 

United States moves forward with a CPGS system, Russia, China, and others will possess a voluminous body of 

knowledge about the size and characteristics of U.S. CPGS 

forces and the situations in which the United States might 

use them. If employed against a third party (that is, not 

Russia or China), the confluence of these overlapping 

sources of information, launch notification arrangements, 

and the context (for example, periods of heightened tension preceding a U.S. war with a third party or an absence 

of U.S.-Russian or Chinese tensions preceding a CPGS 

strike against a nonstate actor) would provide Russian and 

Chinese officials with a set of metrics to distinguish a U.S. 

CPGS strike from a nuclear attack. 

Moreover, Russia has long had a survivable second 

strike capability. China is clearly investing to improve 

its confidence in the survivability of its strategic forces 
16 SF No. 263 www.ndu.edu/inss

through modernization, hardening, mobility, and concealment.74 Neither is vulnerable to a disarming U.S. first 

strike. An underlying motivation of achieving a survivable second strike is that national leaders can confidently 

“ride out” ambiguous missile launches because they are 

not at risk of losing the ability to retaliate. Neither Russian nor Chinese officials would have strong incentives to 

employ nuclear force in response to a small, ambiguous 

U.S. missile launch. 

This reasoning supports the development of a CPGS 

capability, but it does not suggest that the risk of ambiguity and misinterpretation would be acceptable in all 

circumstances. Prior to CPGS deployments, U.S. officials 

should identify aggravating factors that would raise the 

probability of Russia or China misinterpreting a CPGS 

strike against a third party as a nuclear attack against it. 

For example, a CPGS strike against a terrorist might be 

too risky if the United States and China are embroiled 

in a crisis over Taiwan. A CPGS strike while Russia or 

China is on the cusp of a conflict with another nucleararmed power might be too dangerous as well. Identifying 

red flags in advance will help senior decisionmakers assess ambiguity risks in a crisis. 

Controversy over the NRC Report. Several of the 

NRC report’s assertions about CPGS strikes against a 

near peer overshadowed much of this analysis. The report stated that the “probability of a nuclear response 

to such a conventional attack is surely lower than the 

probability of a nuclear response to a nuclear attack.” 

It also argued that the ambiguity risks of a U.S. CPGS 

strike against either Russia or China are higher than 

those in other cases, but not high enough to rule out the 

option in all circumstances.75

Sugden questions this logic, and Pollack describes it 

as exhibiting a sanguine attitude about nuclear escalation 

that “could justify almost any act imaginable.”76 To be fair, 

the NRC report also stated that it is difficult to “conceive 

of situations in which the benefits of using CPGS against 

targets in Russia or China would outweigh the risks.”77

As we argued earlier, this debate is not pertinent 

to the core issues surrounding CPGS acquisition. In a 

specific situation, a niche CPGS capability is unlikely 

to have a decisive impact on whether the United States 

would go to war with a near-peer competitor. The NRC 

study’s central conclusion that CPGS ambiguity risks are 

serious but not prohibitive is persuasive.

Acquisition Decisions That Affect Ambiguity. Russia and China would likely be able to assess U.S. CPGS 

launches with their own technical means.78 What they are 

able to determine about U.S. CPGS launches will affect 

the ambiguity risks. This is relevant to the FY12 budgetary decisions about CPGS because many currently assume 

that the CSM is less ambiguous than the CTM. 

The NRC study’s analysis, however, suggested that 

the ambiguity tradeoffs between the CSM and the CTM 

are not clear cut. An effective launch detection and tracking system can quickly identify a ballistic missile’s flight 

path and determine its destination. This would apply to 

the CTM. Alternatively, if a CPGS weapons system, such 

as the CSM, employs a maneuverable boost-glide vehicle, 

an observing nation’s technical means will not be able to 

determine its target until very late in flight, if at all.79 

We compare the CTM and the CSM according to 

warhead and destination ambiguity to further flesh out 

the implications of this distinction. Warhead ambiguity is 

when the target of a U.S. CPGS strike correctly or incorrectly concludes that the attack is directed against it, 

but misinterprets the attack as a nuclear strike. Destination ambiguity is when a state observes a U.S. CPGS strike 

against a third party and incorrectly concludes that it is 

under nuclear or conventional attack. A variant is if a state 

correctly or incorrectly concludes that the United States 

neither Russian nor Chinese 

officials would have strong 

incentives to employ nuclear force 

in response to a small, ambiguous 

U.S. missile launch
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 263 17 

is attacking it with a CPGS weapon but does not know 

whether the strike is directed against its nuclear forces, 

conventional forces, or command and control centers. 

Warhead and destination ambiguity would play out 

differently for the CTM and the CSM (see table).

The CTM and CSM are both ambiguous but in 

different ways. Assuming that Russia and China possess 

adequate launch detection and early warning systems, 

each country’s leaders would likely be able to determine 

if a CTM strike is aimed at them. But they would not 

be able to verify whether it is carrying a conventional 

or nuclear warhead. Alternatively, Russian and Chinese 

officials might quickly identify an incoming U.S. CSM 

strike as fitting the profile of a conventional missile. Their 

inability to predetermine the target of the strike, however, 

could exacerbate their fears of losing critical strategic assets, such as some of their nuclear missiles and command 

and control capabilities. And they could not be certain 

that the CSM is carrying a conventional warhead. 

Russian and Chinese leaders might not believe U.S. 

assurances about the conventional warhead on CPGS 

missiles or U.S. notifications of the targets of CPGS 

launches. The CTM concept better mitigates the risk 

that either Russia or China might launch its nuclear 

forces due to uncertainty about the target of an ambiguous U.S. CPGS strike than does the CSM; assuming 

functioning early warning systems, Russian and Chinese 

officials would at least be better able to assess whether 

they are the target of a CPGS strike, and if they are, what 

assets the United States is attempting to destroy. 

Upcoming CPGS Policy Issues

Implications of New START for CPGS. Conventionally armed ICBM and SLBM systems that travel 

along a ballistic trajectory for over half of their flight paths 

(which would include the CTM) would count toward 

New START limits. The Obama administration has argued that New START would not constrain U.S. ability 

to deploy a sufficient number of CPGS weapons.80 The 

NPR Report states that the force structure analysis that 

informed the U.S. New START negotiating positions on 

acceptable warhead, delivery vehicle, and launcher limitations assumed that the United States would deploy a small 

number of treaty-accountable nonnuclear systems.81

This is an important point. Critics of New START 

note that it would require the United States to trade 

deployed nuclear weapons for deployed conventional 

long-range ballistic missiles on a one-for-one basis.82

Though technically true, the 2010 NPR Report and 

subsequent administration testimony make clear that 

the United States negotiated limitations that would 

allow it to deploy a sufficient number of CTM missiles in addition to the nuclear force levels the senior 

leadership deemed necessary to fulfill U.S. strategic 

objectives. Therefore, deploying, as an example, 24 to 

28 CTM missiles (for example, 2 CTMs on 12 to 14 

submarines)83 would not require the United States to 

drop below the 2010 NPR’s minimum nuclear force requirements by 24 to 28 nuclear weapons.

The Obama administration’s article-by-article 

analysis states that the United States would not consider “strategic range non-nuclear systems that do not 

otherwise meet the definitions of the Treaty” to count 

against the treaty’s limits.84 Administration officials 

emphasize that the treaty would not capture future 

CPGS systems that use boost-glide vehicles, such as 

the CSM.85 Presumably, these systems would not meet 

New START’s definition of a ballistic missile because 

they would travel along a ballistic trajectory for less 

than half of their flight paths.86

Despite the U.S. position, Russia would have the 

right to bring the issue before the Bilateral Consultative Commission if it chooses to contend that these 

“nonballistic” CPGS systems count against the treaty’s 

limits. This would not legally prohibit the United States 

from deploying such systems. Nor is it certain how 

Russia would react if the United States refuses to treat 

nonballistic CPGS systems as treaty-accountable. After all, Russia did not withdraw from START after the 

United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile 

Treaty. But Russian officials might attempt to use New 

START to constrain deployments of CPGS systems 
18 SF No. 263 www.ndu.edu/inss

Comparison of CTM and CSM Ambiguity

Warhead Ambiguity Destination Ambiguity

Conventional 

Trident Modification (CTM)

The CTM carries a risk of warhead ambiguity because it would launch from the 

same platform and have the same trajectory as U.S. nuclear-armed Trident D–5 

missiles. Even if a nation’s technical means 

determine where the missile will land by 

examining its trajectory, national leaders 

would be unable to independently verify 

whether the CTM is carrying a conventional or nuclear warhead until it reaches the 

target. Knowledge of the target of a U.S. 

strike, however, might provide observing 

countries with clues about the warheads; 

foreign leaders might conclude that an 

incoming strike is conventional if they 

believe that a U.S. nuclear strike against a 

nonnuclear target is highly unlikely.

The CTM would carry less risk of 

destination ambiguity because 

it would follow a totally ballistic trajectory. If a nation has 

the technological capacity for 

early warning, it could determine a CTM missile’s destination 

before target impact. One Bush 

administration official said that 

Russia’s early warning system 

has the capability to determine 

a missile’s aimpoint within tens 

of miles.1

Conventional 

Strike Missile 

(CSM)

The CSM system would possess two 

unique attributes that might distinguish 

it from nuclear-armed intercontinental 

ballistic missiles (ICBMs). First, the United 

States would deploy and launch CSMs 

from different geographic locations 

within the United States than its nuclear 

ICBMs.2 Second, because of its boostglide reentry vehicle, it will travel along 

a different trajectory than a nuclear 

ICBM.3 In principle, an observing nation’s 

launch detection and early warning 

system should be able to observe these 

differences, thereby allowing national 

leaders to confirm that the missile fits 

the profile of a CSM. Foreign officials, 

however, may not believe that U.S. CSMs 

only carry conventional warheads, creating a residual risk of ambiguity.

If successfully developed, the 

boost-glide reentry vehicle 

would enable the United States 

to avoid flying over certain 

countries, such as Russia. The 

ability to maneuver, however, 

prevents an observing country 

from using its technical means 

to determine the destination of 

a CSM before it hits its target.4

This will increase the risk of 

destination ambiguity because 

observing countries would be 

unable to determine promptly if 

the strike is aimed at them. If it 

is, they would be unable to determine if the strike is aimed at 

their nuclear forces and nuclear 

command and control assets or 

at other nonnuclear targets.

1 Brian R. Green, testimony for the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee Hearing Regarding 

Global Strike Issues, March 28, 2007, 8. 

2 Amy F. Woolf, “Conventional Warheads for Long-range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, RL33067, January 26, 2009, 11.

3 James Miller, testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on the New START Treaty: Views from the 

Pentagon, June 16, 2010, 4–5. 

4 National Research Council, Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global 

Strike: Issues for 2008 and Beyond (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2008), 72.
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 263 19 

that the United States considers outside the confines 

of New START.

Boost-glide vehicle CPGS systems might ultimately 

turn out to be prohibitively expensive or technologically 

infeasible. Even then, the United States would likely be 

able to deploy a sufficient number of treaty-accountable 

CPGS systems for a niche capability without chafing 

under the treaty’s limits. 

However, some analysts argue that the Obama administration should have excluded conventional longrange ballistic missiles from the treaty. For instance, 

Eric Edelman said, “We do not yet know what the requirements for PGS will be, and thus run a substantial 

risk of putting the arms control cart ahead of the capability requirements horse.”87 In other words, the United 

States might need to deploy more CPGS weapons than 

the Obama administration anticipated. For example, 

the antiaccess capabilities of potential adversaries might 

become more capable than the 2010 QDR analysis projected.88 According to this logic, if the CTM is the only 

feasible CPGS system and the strategic environment 

unexpectedly worsens, the United States might face a 

one-for-one tradeoff between its baseline nuclear force 

requirements and additional CPGS weapons beyond 

the margin protected in the New START negotiations. 

New START does not risk this worst-case scenario. The treaty will remain in force for 10 years, with 

an option for extending it for a maximum of 5 more 

years.89 The United States could allow the treaty to expire at the end of the 10-year timeframe if U.S. officials 

perceive a need for a much larger CPGS force. What 

is more, it would take years for U.S. officials to identify 

the need for a larger CTM force, generate the political 

support necessary to fund such a decision, and build 

and deploy the additional CPGS missiles. Even if the 

United States dramatically altered its CPGS requirements early in the treaty’s life, therefore, New START 

probably would not constrain U.S. CPGS deployments 

while the treaty is in force.

Lastly, treaty limitations did not derail the Bush 

administration’s plan to deploy the CTM; the problem 

was a lack of political support. CPGS proponents should 

keep this in mind. A Senate rejection of New START 

because it counts some CPGS systems would not have 

guaranteed congressional funding for CPGS. Emphasizing the continued interest in CPGS and the CTM 

system across two administrations is a more effective 

strategy for achieving sustainable congressional support. 

Strategic Stability Dialogues with Russia and China. The 2010 NPR Report states that the United States will 

pursue high-level dialogues with Russia and China to facilitate “more stable, resilient, and transparent strategic relationships.”90 Administration officials have acknowledged 

that Russia and China are concerned about the CPGS 

concept, especially the prospect of conventional long-range 

ballistic missiles. For instance, the report emphasizes that 

future deployments of conventional long-range ballistic 

missiles would be “designed to address newly emerging regional threats, and not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia.”91 General Chilton said that the United 

States would size its CPGS force to avoid “perturbing our 

strategic relationship with Russia and China.”92

Russian and Chinese officials, however, have stated that the CPGS concept would undermine strategic 

stability. For instance, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 

Lavrov said: “World leaders will hardly accept a situation in which nuclear weapons disappear, but weapons 

that are no less destabilizing emerge.”93 Chinese officials 

have voiced similar concerns. In a discussion of the Bush 

administration’s New Triad, Wang Zhongchun, professor and senior colonel in the People’s Liberation Army, 

argued that “once the system is completed, the United 

States will obtain a strategic deterrent force with both 

offensive and defensive capabilities, which could pose 

serious challenges to the limited nuclear deterrent capabilities of medium-sized nuclear countries.”94

A modest number of CPGS weapons would not enable the United States to rapidly degrade Russia’s or China’s strategic forces with conventional weapons. Russian 

and Chinese foreign officials may exaggerate the negative 

consequences of U.S. CPGS systems in their public statements. These quotes, however, illustrate apparent Russian 
20 SF No. 263 www.ndu.edu/inss

and Chinese concerns about new U.S. strategic capabilities, especially CPGS weapons and missile defenses. 

Strategic stability dialogues are a good venue to address 

Russian and Chinese concerns about U.S. CPGS deployments. Explaining the purpose and role of CPGS weapons 

to Russian and Chinese officials would help them to better understand when, and against what targets, the United 

States might employ these capabilities. At the very least, this 

should reinforce U.S. CPGS launch notification and confidence-building measures. For instance, the United States 

could explain to Russian and Chinese officials that a sophisticated launch detection and early warning system would 

allow them to independently assess U.S. CPGS launches. 

Regardless of the CPGS system that the United States 

would deploy, a functioning early warning system would 

provide both countries with more situational awareness 

about CPGS launches than they would otherwise possess. 

A logical starting point would be to engage Russia 

on implementing a Joint Data Exchange Center ( JDEC) 

for early warning information. This might be an effective venue to provide Russia with information about the 

trajectory of CPGS launches. Unfortunately, the U.S.-

Russian agreement to form a JDEC has expired. That 

Russia held up the implementation of the JDEC over 

bureaucratic issues for more than a decade suggests that 

Russian officials are not seriously concerned about miscalculation over faulty or ambiguous early warning information. The United States should propose the renewal 

and standing-up of the JDEC. At the very least, this will 

help U.S. officials gauge whether Russia is interested in 

addressing the CPGS issue constructively. 

China may be unwilling to discuss its early warning system plans and capabilities with the United States. 

CPGS launch notification could be a useful starting point 

for a U.S.-Chinese discussion of CPGS. Though the United 

States and China have a formal military-to-military hotline, 

they do not have much experience using it. Nor can senior 

U.S. officials assume that they would be able to promptly 

reach their Chinese counterparts in a crisis. The United 

States should attempt to develop a mutually recognized set 

of procedures for CPGS notification with China. Perhaps 

the two countries could participate in exercises or simulations in which U.S. officials notify their Chinese counterparts of a CPGS strike against a terrorist target. This would 

likely contribute to the broader U.S. effort to develop a more 

transparent and resilient strategic relationship with China.

This is not to say that strategic stability dialogues will 

alleviate Russian and Chinese anxiety about U.S. CPGS 

deployments. Russian officials might perceive a CPGS capability as threatening Russia’s nuclear deterrent even if 

the United States deploys fewer than 50 CPGS weapons. 

Similarly, Chinese leaders might perceive CPGS weapons 

as part of a U.S. effort to offset China’s antiaccess capabilities, and therefore as threatening and destabilizing, despite 

strategic discussions with U.S. defense officials. 

Moreover, Russian and Chinese concerns about the 

impact of CPGS reflect a larger trend: the military balance between the United States and near peers encompasses a broader set of capabilities than offensive nuclear 

weapons. It also includes conventional weapons systems, 

nonnuclear long-range strike capabilities (for example, 

CPGS and ASAT weapons), missile defenses, the space 

and cyber assets that underlie command, control, and 

ISR capabilities, and offensive cyber operations. 

One goal of strategic dialogues, therefore, should 

be to further explain to Russian and Chinese officials 

the objectives, scope, and drivers of the evolving U.S. 

strategic posture. As an example, U.S. officials could 

continue to explain that the United States is developing a more diverse strategic portfolio to address threats 

from regional powers such as Iran and North Korea as 

well as nonstate actors. Even though the United States 

will not foreswear the potential use of these capabilities 

against Russia and China, it is not pursuing a first strike 

advantage over either country. Eliminating Russian and 

Chinese concerns is unrealistic, but perhaps the United 

States can attenuate them.

A related goal is for U.S. officials to understand 

better how Russian and Chinese strategists perceive 

U.S. capabilities, and how they aim to offset U.S. military advantages with their strategic forces. The United 

States will never possess perfect information about 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 263 21 

Russian and Chinese perceptions, but reducing ignorance on these issues as much as possible is desirable. 

Building a common conceptual framework should help 

all three countries avoid misperceptions and miscalculations about the objectives, concerns, and capabilities 

of the others. In this context, discussing U.S. CPGS deployments with Russia and China would be one component of a dialogue about a larger and more complex 

mix of strategic capabilities. 

Conclusion

As the world changes and threats evolve, so too must 

U.S. priorities, policies, and capabilities. For instance, preventing a large-scale nuclear attack against the United 

States and its allies remains a top priority, but a failure to 

reorient U.S. policies to combat the less-devastating but 

more probable threat of nuclear terrorism would be reckless. 

Few serious analysts would question this. Yet there 

is no consensus on whether and how the United States 

should modify its strategic offensive capabilities. A longrange missile is a highly effective way to deliver a payload to distant and denied targets. Recognizing this, is 

it logical to deploy only long-range missiles armed with 

nuclear warheads? Should the United States preserve its 

strategic arsenal in precisely the same configuration as it 

was at the end of the Cold War, albeit in smaller numbers? Or should the United States alter a small portion of 

its most potent strategic delivery vehicles in response to 

a spectrum of threats and actors that is more diverse and 

complex than it was during the Cold War? 

The answer to the final question is yes: a CPGS capability would be a valuable strategic asset. A long-range 

missile armed with a conventional warhead would not 

be the optimal strike option in all circumstances, but it 

might provide the best available means for achieving U.S. 

objectives in some plausible high-risk scenarios. 

Developing and deploying a CPGS capability that enhances U.S. deterrence and assurance without undermining 

strategic stability with Russia and China would require a 

good deal of persuasion. Internationally, the United States 

should make efforts to persuade Russia and China that a 

niche CPGS capability would not threaten the credibility 

of their nuclear deterrent forces. Within the United States, 

advocates of CPGS need to persuade skeptics in Congress 

and the analytical community that a CPGS capability 

would be worth the cost and that the ambiguity and misinterpretation risks are manageable. As a first step toward 

building bipartisan support, former Bush administration 

officials should credit the Obama administration for pursuing the CPGS concept, and Obama administration officials 

should note the continuity with the Bush administration on 

the need for CPGS. Policy differences on other strategic issues should not obscure mutual support for a Conventional 

Prompt Global Strike capability. 

Notes

1 William S. Cohen, Department of Defense Annual Report to the 

President and Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 

1998), chapter 5; see also Nuclear Posture Review slides from press 

conference with Secretary of Defense William Perry, General John 

Shalikashvili, John Deutch, and Kenneth Bacon, September 22, 1994.

2 See “Fact Sheet on Nuclear Posture Review Background,” 

August 6, 2009, available at <www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/193/NPR_Background.pdf>; Bradley H. Roberts, testimony for 

the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee Hearing to Receive Testimony on Strategic Force Programs in 

Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2011 

and the Future Years Defense Program, March 17, 2010, 8, available at <http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2010/03%20

March/10-21%20-%203-17-10.pdf>. 

3 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review [NPR] Report

(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2010), 15–17.

4 Ibid., 7, 28. 

5 Joseph Biden, “The Path to Nuclear Security: Implementing 

the President’s Prague Agenda,” remarks at the National Defense 

University, Washington, DC, February 18, 2010. 

6 NPR Report, 46, 25. 

7 Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2010), 23. 

8 Donald Rumsfeld, Department of Defense Annual Report to the 

President and Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 

2002), chap. 7, 2–4. 

9 Robert Gates, “Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in the 

21st Century,” remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, October 28, 2008, 4, available 

at <www.carnegieendowment.org/files/1028_transcrip_gates_

checked.pdf>.

10 Keith B. Payne, “The Nuclear Posture Review and Deterrence 

for a New Age,” Comparative Strategy 23, no. 4 (2004), 416. 

11 Brian R. Green, testimony for the Senate Armed Services 

Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee Hearing Regarding 

Global Strike Issues, March 28, 2007, 2. 

12 Peter C.W. Flory, testimony for the Senate Armed Services 

Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee Hearing Regarding 

Global Strike Issues, March 29, 2006, 4. 
22 SF No. 263 www.ndu.edu/inss

13 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] 

Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2010), 5. 

14 Ibid., 11. 

15 Department of Defense news briefing with Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy Michéle Flournoy and Vice Admiral P. Stephen 

Stanley, February 1, 2010. 

16 For a detailed discussion of tailored deterrence, see M. Elaine 

Bunn, Can Deterrence Be Tailored? Institute for National Strategic 

Studies Strategic Forum 225 (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, January 2007). 

17 General James Cartwright, testimony for the Senate Armed 

Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee Hearing on 

Global Strike Plans and Programs in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for FY07, March 29, 2006. 

18 Green, 6. 

19 2010 QDR Report, 31.

20 Ibid., 32. 

21 James Miller, testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee Hearing on the New START Treaty: Views from the 

Pentagon, June 16, 2010, 3–4, available at <http://foreign.senate.gov/

imo/media/doc/Miller,%20Dr.%20James%20N.pdf>.

22 Green, 7; see also Payne, 3. 

23 Cartwright, March 29, 2006.

24 General James Cartwright, Commander of U.S. Strategic 

Command, testimony for the Senate Armed Services Committee 

Strategic Forces Subcommittee Hearing on Strategic Forces Programs 

in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for FY08 and the 

Future Years Defense Program, March 28, 2007. 

25 NPR Report, 34.

26 2010 QDR Report, 33.

27 For Obama administration description of CPGS as part of a 

larger family of long-range, nonnuclear strike assets, see Roberts, 4; 

see also James Miller, testimony for the House Armed Services Committee Hearing on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Force Structure, 

April 14, 2010.

28 Flory, 8. 

29 Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable with Bradley 

H. Roberts, Admiral John E. Roberti, Deputy Director for Strategy 

and Policy, J5, the Joint Staff; The Nuclear Posture Review, April 6, 

2010, 12, available at <www.defense.gov/Blog_files/Blog:...assets/20100406_NPR_transcript.pdf>. 

30 NPR Report, 6. 

31 General Kevin Chilton, testimony for the Senate Armed 

Services Committee Hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review, April 

22, 2010, 24–25, available at <http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2010/04%20April/10-37%20-%204-22-10.pdf>.

32 NPR Report, 15–17, 21–24, 37–43. 

33 Arms Control Association, “Understanding New START 

and the Nuclear Posture Review,” April 9, 2010, available at <www.

armscontrol.org/events/STARTandNPRBriefing>.

34 National Research Council, Committee on Conventional 

Prompt Global Strike Capability, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global 

Strike: Issues for 2008 and Beyond (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2008), 61. 

35 Ibid., 27–51, for a full explanation of the study’s scenariobased analysis. 

36 Ibid., 27–33.

37 Ibid., 43, note 10: “The committee recognized that the CTM 

proposal involves only two conventionally armed missiles per submarine, and did not analyze or discuss in detail the issues that would 

arise from the deployment or use of larger deployments.” 

38 Ibid., 47; see also 30, 41–42. 

39 Ibid., 50; see 41–47 for a discussion of CPGS systems and the 

15 capability metrics and 48–49 for a table summarizing the performance of the systems in the test cases. 

40 Ibid., 51–55.

41 Ibid., 86.

42 Bruce M. Sugden, “Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of 

Conventional Ballistic Missiles,” International Security 34, no. 1 (Summer 2009), 124–141. 

43 For examples of this argument, see Bruce Sugden, Dinshaw 

Mistry, and Austin Long, “Going Nowhere Fast: Assessing Concerns 

about Long-Range Conventional Ballistic Missiles,” International 

Security 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010), 166–172; and Joshua Pollack, “Evaluating Conventional Prompt Global Strike,” Bulletin of the Atomic 

Scientists ( January–February 2009), 15–18. 

44 Jack Reed, Floor Statement Opposing Sessions Amendment 

on the Trident Submarine, August 3, 2006, available at <http://reed.

senate.gov/newsroom/details.cfm?id=261473>.

45 Sugden, Mistry, and Long, 179–180. 

46 This hypothetical scenario is drawn from a more detailed one 

provided in Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science 

Board Task Force on Time Critical Conventional Strike from Strategic 

Standoff (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2009), 

69–72, available at <www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA498403.pdf?>. 

47 U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike, 67. 

48 For examples of near-peer ASAT attacks, see scenario 1 in 

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Time Critical Conventional Strike from Strategic Standoff, 65–68. The scenario involves a 

near-peer competitor attack on a U.S. satellite as the United States is 

preparing to intervene in a conflict between the near peer and a U.S. 

ally; see also General Cartwright testimony, March 28, 2007. General 

Cartwright said that the United States needs a CPGS capability 

to respond to ASAT attacks; the comment was in the context of a 

discussion about China’s ASAT capabilities. 

49 For an example of this argument as it applies to states such as 

Iran and North Korea, see Sugden, Mistry, and Long, 170–171.

50 See 2010 QDR Report, 31–34, for a discussion of how the 

United States plans to respond to the threat of aggression in antiaccess environments. It lists expanded long-range strike capabilities 

and CPGS as one of eight force enhancements that will enable the 

United States to overcome antiaccess strategies. 

51 Sugden, Mistry, and Long, 177. 

52 This example is drawn from scenario 5 in Report of the Defense 

Science Board Task Force on Time Critical Conventional Strike from 

Strategic Standoff, 81–84. Also see Flory; he stated that Conventional 

Trident (CTM) D–5 missiles would probably possess the energy and 

accuracy to close the entrances and exits of a hard target. As noted 

earlier, the NRC study concluded that the initial CTM would be 

ineffective against hard targets with known vulnerabilities. Also see 

Sugden, 133. He suggests that CPGS attacks might “functionally disable” some hard and deeply buried targets. 

53 See Miller testimony, March 16, 2010, for a brief description 

of administration thinking on deterrence in space. 

54 Pollack, 19. 

55 U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike, 70.

56 Cartwright, March 28, 2007.

57 NPR Report, 6.

58 U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike, 86.
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 263 23 

59 Miller, June 16, 2010, 3–4. 

60 We would like to thank Richard Davison of the National War 

College for his insight on this perspective. 

61 Elaine M. Grossman, “Senior U.S. Official Doubt Conventional Global Strike Value,” Global Security Newswire, November 

26, 2008, available at <http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/

nw_20081126_9258.php>.

62 See Flory, 12; Green, 7; and Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense, February 6, 2006), 50. 

63 See Amy F. Woolf, “Conventional Warheads for Long-Range 

Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, RL33067, January 26, 2009, 14–19, for an 

overview of funding for CTM during the Bush administration. 

64 Senator Levin during the Senate Armed Services Committee 

Hearing on the Quadrennial Defense Review, March 8, 2006.

65 Letter to Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone, President of the National 

Academy of Sciences, from Senator Daniel K. Inouye and Ted Stevens, February 16, 2007. The letter is reprinted in National Research 

Council, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Appendix B. 

66 Woolf, 18.

67 For a more detailed description of the CSM concept, see 

Woolf, 11–14, and U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike, 113–115 

and 144–145. 

68 Miller, June 16, 2010, 3–4. 

69 Sugden, 144.

70 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimate: 

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluations, Defense Wide Volume 3B, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense, February 2010), 257–271. 

71 U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike, 72.

72 Ibid., 74–75.

73 Ibid., 76; also see Woolf, 23–24. 

74 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, 

Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic 

of China 2010 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 

2010), 34–35. 

75 U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike, 69, 76.

76 Sugden, 121; Pollack, 19. 

77 U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike, 76.

78 China does not currently possess a missile launch detection 

and early warning system. To avoid a “best case scenario analysis,” we 

assume that China will develop one in the near term.

79 U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike, 72.

80 See Robert M. Gates, testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on the New START Treaty, May 18, 2010, 

3, available at <http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/GatesTestimony100518a.pdf>.

81 NPR Report, 20–21; also see Department of State, Bureau 

of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, “Conventional 

Prompt Global Strike Fact Sheet,” April 8, 2010, available at <www.

state.gov/t/avc/rls/139913.htm>.

82 Keith B. Payne, testimony for the Senate Armed Services 

Committee Hearing on Independent Analysis of the New START 

Treaty, July 27, 2010, 2, available at <http://armed-services.senate.gov/

statemnt/2010/07%20July/Payne%2007-27-10.pdf>.

83 This is the example that Miller provided while arguing that 

the United States protected a sufficient number of treaty-accountable 

CPGS systems; see Miller, June 16, 2010, 3–4. 

84 Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and 

Implementation, “Article-by-Article Analysis of the New START 

Treaty Documents,” May 5, 2010, 14, available at <www.state.gov/t/

avc/trty/141829.htm>.

85 Miller, June 16, 2010, 5.

86 For New START’s formal definition of ballistic missiles, see 

the Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and 

the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and 

Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Part One, Paragraph 6. 

87 Eric S. Edelman, testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee Hearing on the New START Treaty: Benefits and Risks, 

June 24, 2010, 6, available at <http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/

doc/Edelman,%20Hon.%20Eric%20S.pdf>. 

88 Sugden, 119. 

89 Article XIV, paragraph 2 of the New START Treaty. 

90 Nuclear Posture Review Report, 28. 

91 Ibid., 28. 

92 General Kevin Chilton, testimony for the House Armed Service Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee Hearing on Strategic 

Forces, March 16, 2010, 13, available at <http://armedservices.house.

gov/pdfs/StratForces031610/Chilton_Testimony.pdf>. 

93 Craig Whitlock, “U.S. Looks to Non-Nuclear Weapons to 

Use as a Deterrent,” The Washington Post, April 8, 2010.

94 Wang Zhongchun, “Nuclear Challenges and China’s Choices,” 

China Security (Winter 2007), 61, available at <www.wsichina.org/

cs5_4.pdf>. 

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional studies and engages in independent and leading-edge 

research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndupress.edu.

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24 SF No. 263 www.ndu.edu/inss

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