J-A28004-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.S., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 911 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered July 2, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Juvenile Division at No(s): 

CP-67-JM-0000062-2020

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 02, 2022

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) appeals from the 

interlocutory order,1 entered in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The Commonwealth has certified that this appeal is permissible as a collateral 

order. See Pa.R.A.P. 313(b) (“A collateral order is an order separable from 

and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too 

important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if 

review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be 

irreparably lost.”). “With regard to the first prong of the collateral order 

doctrine, an order is separable from the main cause of action if it is entirely 

distinct from the underlying issue in the case and if it can be resolved without 

an analysis of the merits of the underlying dispute.” K.C. v. L.A., 128 A.3d 

774, 779 (Pa. 2015) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Regarding the second prong, “a right is important if the interests that would 

go unprotected without immediate appeal are significant relative to the 

efficiency interests served by the final order rule.” Id. at 779. “[I]t is not 

sufficient that the issue under review is important to a particular party; it 

‘must involve rights deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular 

litigation at hand.’” Stahl v. Redcay, 897 A.2d 478, 485 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

Concerning the third prong, whether a party’s claims will be “irreparably lost” 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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limiting forensic interviews of L.S. (born Feb. 2015) (Child) to those conducted 

only by L.S.’s guardian ad litem (GAL) for fear of parent coaching and resulting 

taint.

2

 The order further requires that any other party, including the 

Commonwealth, wishing to interview Child as part of a separate, ongoing child 

abuse investigation, first obtain “the knowledge and consent of the GAL,” as 

well as secure the GAL’s presence, unless the GAL agrees otherwise. After 

careful review, we dismiss this appeal as moot. 

Child is the subject of ongoing custody and dependency matters, 

involving contentious parents. After a final custody order was entered 

granting Mother primary and Father partial physical custody of Child, the York 

County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (CYF) sought to suspend 

Father’s custodial rights pending an investigation based on allegations of 

sexual abuse of Child by Father. As part of its child abuse investigation, the 

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if review is postponed turns on the particular facts and circumstances of each 

case. G.B. v M.M.B., 670 A.2d 714, 721 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en banc). Here, 

we conclude, as did the panel in Z.P. v. K.P., A.3d , 2022 PA Super 6, *19 

(Pa. Super. filed Jan. 6, 2022), that: (1) the trial court’s order placing 

limitations on the Commonwealth from interviewing Child is separable from 

the underlying custody dispute; (2) the Commonwealth’s ability to conduct a 

child abuse investigation without interference from a custody court is a right 

too important to be denied review; and (3) the Commonwealth’s right would 

be irreparably lost if we denied review where the Commonwealth would then 

have to follow the restrictive dictates of the trial court to conduct its child 

abuse investigation. See id. at *19. Notably, at the time the Commonwealth 

filed its interlocutory appeal the right would have been irreparably lost had we 

denied review, thus vesting this court with jurisdiction to consider the appeal. 

However, during the pendency of the appeal, as we determine infra, the issue 

was finally decided, and, thus, has become moot.

2 See G.S. v. V.O., 2014-000295-03 (involving custody and protection from 

abuse matters).
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York County District Attorney’s Office attempted to conduct an in-person 

forensic interview of Child at the Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC).

On August 11, 2021, a forensic interview of Child was conducted at the 

CAC in compliance with the restrictions set forth in the trial court’s July 2, 

2021 interlocutory order. Appellee’s Brief, at 7. On September 2, 2021, the 

district attorney’s office notified the CYF caseworker in the underlying custody 

matter that the criminal child abuse investigation had been closed and that 

the referral had been deemed “unfounded.” Id. at 7-8. Additionally, during 

the pendency of this appeal, our Court decided Z.P., supra, a case addressing 

the same issue presented in this matter.

3

 

In Z.P., our Court concluded that under the relevant provisions of the 

Child Protective Services Law (CPSL):4

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3 The Commonwealth claims in its reply brief that “the issue in [Z.P.] is not 

identical to the issue in this case. . . . That matter, unlike the instant matter, 

did not include the issue of whether or not a custody court judge can impose 

requirements that the GAL be present for any forensic interviews of suspected 

child abuse victims.” Appellant’s Reply Brief, at 4-5. We disagree. In Z.P., 

the trial court’s order specifically stated that “no interview of the children shall 

be conducted by any attorney or law enforcement without the permission 

of the GAL and attorney in this case, Lori Yost. Attorney Yost need 

not be present for the interview if she feels that it is not necessary to 

protect the interest of her client. However, a decision by her to be 

present for any interview, including an interview at the CAC, is solely 

at the discretion of the GAL looking at protecting the interest of her 

clients.” Z.P., supra, at *14-*15.

4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-6475. In In re C.B., A.3d , 2021 PA Super 

189 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 23, 2021) (en banc), our full Court recently 

reiterated:

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[T]he trial court has no authority to establish the investigatory 

protocol, or place limits on how the District Attorney and CYS 

follow that protocol. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6334.1, 6346(c), 

6365(c). Put simply, nothing in [s]ection 8334.1 or 6365(c) of 

the [(]CPSL[)] contemplates a custody court’s role in the 

investigatory process.

Id. at *35. Rather, “any problems with the timing, frequency, and other 

procedures employed[5] during child abuse investigations are matters best 

left to the legislature to address.” Id. at *36 (emphasis added). Accordingly, 

our Court reversed the trial court’s order, holding that “the trial court lacked 

the authority to dictate the manner in which the Commonwealth and CYF 

conducted [their] child abuse investigation in th[e] case” and remanded the 

matter “with instructions that the Commonwealth be permitted to interview 

Children pursuant to procedures established in York County.” Id. at *37-*38.

Here, we conclude that this appeal is now moot. 

As a general rule, an actual case or controversy must exist at all 

stages of the judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot. 

An issue can become moot during the pendency of an appeal due 

to an intervening change in the facts of the case or due to an 

intervening change in the applicable law. In that case, an opinion 

of an appellate court is rendered advisory in nature. An issue 

before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot 

enter an order that has any legal force or effect. 

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The [] CPSL . . . controls determinations regarding findings of child 

abuse, which the juvenile courts must find by clear and convincing 

evidence. The CPSL does not provide for legal determinations of 

abuse; it is mainly a vehicle for reporting abuse and bringing 

quickly into play those services (including court hearings) 

available through county protective service facilities for the care 

of the child.

Id. at *14.

5 See supra at n.3.
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In re J.A., 107 A.3d 799, 811 (Pa. Super. 2015), quoting In re D.A., 801 

A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc).

Presently, the appeal is moot because: (1) after a CAC forensic 

interview took place under the constraints of the now-appealed trial court

order, the child abuse investigation was deemed “unfounded” and the matter 

has been closed; (2) our Court has finally decided the issue raised on appeal 

in Z.P., a published decision, which the trial court will be bound to follow 

prospectively; and (3) Z.P. effectively grants the Commonwealth’s requested

relief. See In re J.A., supra at 811 (“An issue can become moot during the 

pendency of an appeal due to . . . an intervening change in the applicable 

law.”).

Appeal dismissed as moot.6 Case remanded for proceedings consistent 

with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/02/2022

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6 Although we have determined that this appeal is now moot, we emphasize 

our disapproval of the trial judge’s actions in the underlying matter. As 

espoused in Z.P., the trial court simply did not have the “authority to dictate 

the manner in which the Commonwealth and CYF conducted its child abuse

investigation[.]” 2022 PA Super 6, at *37.