J-S65017-17 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.S.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.D., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1216 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree March 16, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-0000084-2017, 

CP-51-DP-0002374-2011

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.P.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.D., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1217 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree March 16, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000085-2017, 

CP-51-DP-0002589-2014

BEFORE: OLSON, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 06, 2017

T.D. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees entered March 16, 2017, in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which involuntarily 

terminated her parental rights to her minor daughters, N.S.D., born in 

November 2011, and R.P.D., born in October 2012 (collectively, “the 
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Children”).1 After careful review, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand 

for further proceedings.

The record reveals that the Philadelphia Department of Human Services 

(“DHS”) filed dependency petitions with respect to the Children on November 

3, 2014. In its petitions, DHS averred that it had a lengthy prior history of 

involvement with Mother, dating back to 2009. Dependency Petition (N.S.D.), 

11/3/2014, at 8 (unnumbered pages). DHS averred that Mother had a history 

of substance abuse and mental health issues, lacked stable housing, and that 

the Children’s two older siblings had already been removed from her care. Id. 

DHS requested that the Children be adjudicated dependent, but remain with 

Mother. Id. at 8-9. The trial court entered continuance orders deferring the 

adjudication on November 19, 2014, and January 14, 2015.

On January 29, 2015, the trial court entered additional continuance 

orders, directing DHS to obtain orders of protective custody. DHS filed 

applications for orders of protective custody that same day, in which it averred 

that Mother was noncompliant with her drug and alcohol and mental health 

treatment program, and that she also was noncompliant with the rules of the 

shelter where she resided with the Children. Application for Order of 

Protective Custody (N.S.D.), 1/29/2015. The court granted the applications, 

____________________________________________

1 The trial court entered separate decrees that same day, terminating the 

parental rights of N.S.D.’s putative father, M.C., the parental rights of any 

unknown father of N.S.D., and the parental rights of any unknown father of 

R.P.D. Neither M.C., nor any unknown father, appealed the termination of his 

parental rights.
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and placed the Children in foster care. The Children remained in foster care 

pursuant to shelter care orders entered January 30, 2015. DHS filed updated 

dependency petitions on February 4, 2015, and the court adjudicated the 

Children dependent by orders entered March 10, 2015. 

On January 24, 2017, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to the Children. The trial court conducted a 

termination hearing on March 16, 2017, at which Mother failed to appear. 

Following the hearing, the court entered decrees terminating Mother’s 

parental rights. Mother timely filed notices of appeal on April 10, 2017, along 

with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal.

Mother now raises the following questions for our review.

1. Whether the Trial Court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of Appellant, [Mother], under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §[]2511(a)(1)?

2. Whether the Trial Court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of Appellant, [Mother], under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §[]2511(a)(2)?

3. Whether the Trial Court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of Appellant, [Mother], under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §[]2511(a)(5)?

4. Whether the Trial Court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of Appellant, [Mother], under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §[]2511(a)(8)?

5. Whether the Trial Court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of Appellant, [Mother], under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §[]2511(b)?

Mother’s brief at 5 (suggested answers and trial court answers omitted).2

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2

In her notices of appeal, and in the orders in question section of her brief, 

Mother indicates that she also is appealing the permanency review orders 

entered March 16, 2017, changing the Children’s permanency goals to 
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We address these issues mindful of our well-settled standard of review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

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adoption. However, Mother did not include any claim regarding the goal 

change orders in her concise statements. In addition, Mother did not include 

any such claim in her statement of questions involved, or in the argument 

section of her brief. Accordingly, we conclude that Mother waived any 

challenge to the goal change orders, and we focus solely on the decrees 

terminating her parental rights. See Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pa., 

893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“We will not ordinarily consider any 

issue if it has not been set forth in or suggested by an appellate brief’s 

statement of questions involved, and any issue not raised in a statement of 

matters complained of on appeal is deemed waived.”) (citations omitted); In 

re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 

(Pa. 2011) (quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa. Super. 2010)) 

(“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with 

citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other 

meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”).
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that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with the 

court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), 

in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we analyze the court’s 

decision to terminate under Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provides as 

follows.

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 
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of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). 

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations 

omitted). 

Instantly, the trial court found that Mother is incapable of parenting the 

Children, and that Mother cannot, or will not, remedy her parental incapacity. 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/15/2017, at 8-9. The court reasoned that Mother failed 

to complete her Single Case Plan (“SCP”) objectives, in that she did not obtain 

mental health treatment, failed to comply with drug treatment and drug 
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screens, lacks appropriate housing, and lacks employment. Id. The court 

further reasoned that, while Mother completed an anger management 

program, she continues to engage in threatening behavior. Id. at 9. Finally, 

the court reasoned that Mother has only attended visits with the Children 

consistently since September 2016. Id.

Mother argues that the trial court erred by terminating her parental 

rights, because DHS failed to present clear and convincing evidence in support 

of its petition. Mother’s brief at 15. Mother argues that she completed 

housing, anger management, and parenting programs, as well as a parenting 

capacity evaluation. Id. at 15-16. 

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s findings. During the 

termination hearing, DHS presented the testimony of Community Umbrella 

Agency case manager, Tamara Whittaker. Ms. Whittaker testified that 

Mother’s outstanding SCP objectives included obtaining stable housing and 

employment, stabilizing her mental health, and participating in visitation. 

N.T., 3/16/2017, at 18. Ms. Whittaker testified that Mother completed a 

housing program, but that she remains without stable housing or employment. 

Id. at 20-21, 23. Further, Mother is not currently enrolled in mental health 

treatment. Id. at 18. Mother’s mental health remains a concern, because 

“[s]he does present, at times, [as] very unstable. She’s aggressive at times, 

and we just don’t know where she stands with her mental health.” Id. at 27. 

Finally, Ms. Whittaker testified that Mother visits with the Children once per 

week for an hour. Id. at 22. Mother has attended her visits consistently since 
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September 2016, although her attendance prior to then was inconsistent. Id. 

at 23. 

During her testimony, Ms. Whittaker placed particular emphasis on 

Mother’s aggressive behavior. Ms. Whittaker testified that Mother completed 

an anger management program, but that she did not believe that Mother was 

utilizing the skills that she learned in the program. Id. at 22. She explained, 

“[w]e recently had some concerns in February of 2017. Mom engaged in 

inappropriate conversations with the caregiver. She’s called the home, sent 

text messages, left voicemail messages threatening to fight them.” Id. Ms. 

Whittaker requested a stay-away order on the foster parent’s behalf, due to 

these threats.3 Id. at 25.

Thus, the record presents clear and convincing evidence that Mother is 

incapable of parenting the Children, and that Mother cannot, or will not, 

remedy her parental incapacity. At the time of the termination hearing, the 

Children had already been in foster care for over two years, and Mother had 

made little, if any, progress toward reunification. Mother remained without 

stable housing or employment, and her mental health issues remained 

unresolved. Moreover, Mother engaged in aggressive behavior, including 

threatening the Children’s foster parent. As this Court has stated, “a child’s 

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3 Ms. Whittaker testified that the Children’s foster parent “turned in [her] 30-

day notice” as a result of these threats, but later withdrew it. N.T., 3/16/2017, 

at 28-29. In its opinion, the trial court indicates that this testimony refers to 

the “thirty-day notice for removal of the Children from her home[.]” Trial

Court Opinion, 7/15/2017, at 5.
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life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity 

necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not 

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a 

parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.”

4

 In re Adoption of 

R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).

We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). We have 

discussed our analysis under Section 2511(b) as follows.

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, 

Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and 

the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, 

however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, 

between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of 

our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, 

it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

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4 The certified record does not support the trial court’s finding that Mother 

failed to comply with drug treatment. The record contains a Clinical Evaluation 

Unit (“CEU”) progress report, dated June 9, 2015, indicating that Mother 

completed a CEU evaluation, and that “CEU would tentatively recommend 

[Mother] would not benefit from any substance abuse treatment[.]” CEU 

Progress Report, 6/9/2015. On February 3, 2016, the court entered 

permanency review orders indicating that “D&A treatment is no longer needed 

as to Mother.” Permanency Review Order (N.S.D.), 2/3/2016, at 3. While 

DHS presented several CEU reports of noncompliance during the termination 

hearing, which the court admitted into evidence, all of those reports predated 

the court’s February 3, 2016 permanency review order. The most recent 

report, Exhibit 16, is dated January 14, 2014. Nonetheless, we find that the 

court’s remaining findings with respect to Section 2511(a)(2) are supported 

by the record, and are more than sufficient to affirm the court’s decision. 
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[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated 

that the trial court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing 

parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

Here, the trial court found that terminating Mother’s parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the Children. Trial Court Opinion, 

7/15/2017, at 13. The court reasoned that there is no parental bond between 

the Children and Mother, and that terminating Mother’s parental rights would 

not cause the Children to suffer irreparable harm. Id. The court further 

reasoned that the Children are doing well in their foster home, and that the 

Children’s foster parent meets all of their needs. Id.

Mother argues that DHS failed to present clear and convincing evidence 

that terminating her parental rights would best serve the Children’s needs and 

welfare. Mother’s brief at 18. Mother emphasizes that she has been compliant 

with visitation since September 2016. Id.

After a careful review of the record in this matter, we agree with Mother, 

and conclude that DHS failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to 

Section 2511(b). As detailed above, the Children were born in November 

2011, and October 2012, respectively. At the time the Children were removed 
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from Mother’s care, in January 2015, they were three and two years old.5 In 

addition, by the time of the termination hearing, Mother had been attending 

her visits with the Children consistently for approximately six months, starting 

in September 2016. While Ms. Whittaker testified that Mother attended visits 

with the Children inconsistently prior to September 2016, she did not specify 

how inconsistent Mother’s visits were. Thus, both of the Children have spent 

a significant amount of time in Mother’s care, and the record suggests that 

they may continue to share a bond with her. 

However, during the termination hearing, DHS presented only minimal 

evidence addressing the relationship between the Children and Mother, and 

the effect that terminating that relationship would have on the Children. In 

fact, the only evidence presented during the entire hearing to address these 

issues was the following testimony by Ms. Whittaker.

[Counsel for DHS]: With regards to [N.S.D.] and [R.P.D.], do you 

believe there would be any irreparable harm to either children

[sic] if [M]other’s parental rights were terminated?

Ms. Whittaker: No.

***

____________________________________________

5 The record reveals that N.S.D. was removed from Mother’s care once before, 

shortly after her birth in November 2011, and adjudicated dependent in 

December 2011. See Exhibit 11 (Order of Protective Custody); Exhibit 12 

(Order of Adjudication and Disposition – Child Dependent). N.S.D. was 

returned to Mother’s care only a few months later, in March 2012. N.T., 

3/16/2017, at 15. The dependency docket indicates that N.S.D. remained 

dependent while in Mother’s care for another year, until court supervision was 

terminated in March 2013. 
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[Counsel for DHS]: Do you believe there is a positive, healthy 

maternal relationship between [M]other and [N.S.D.] or [M]other 

and [R.P.D.]?

Ms. Whittaker: No.

***

[Counsel for DHS]: Okay. With regards to these children, where 

are they presently residing?

Ms. Whittaker: They currently reside at a general foster home 

through Children’s Choice. 

[Counsel for DHS]: And how are they doing there?

Ms. Whittaker: They’re doing well in the home.

N.T., 3/16/2017, at 26-27.

This testimony is simply too weak to support the trial court’s findings 

with respect to Section 2511(b). While Ms. Whittaker opined that the Children 

do not share “a positive, healthy maternal relationship” with Mother, and 

would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated, 

she did not explain her opinions and offered only conclusory one-word 

answers. Indeed, Ms. Whittaker’s testimony provides no real insight at all into 

the relationship between the Children and Mother, particularly since the 

Children were in Mother’s care before they were removed at ages three and 

two, respectively, and she attended visits. Given the sparsity of testimony 

concerning the best interests of the Children, we find that DHS has failed to 

prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s rights is 

in their best interest. See In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 229-30 

(Pa. Super. 2002) (reversing a termination order where the record lacked 
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sufficient evidence addressing the appellant’s bond with her child, and where 

the trial court addressed the child’s needs and welfare in a conclusory fashion).

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the portion of the trial court’s decrees 

terminating Mother’s parental rights with respect to Section 2511(a), and we 

vacate the portion terminating Mother’s parental rights with respect to Section 

2511(b). Further, we remand this matter and direct the court to conduct an 

additional termination hearing as soon as possible, so that it may hear 

testimony regarding the relationship between the Children and Mother. The 

court must then conduct a new Section 2511(b) analysis, and determine if 

there is clear and convincing evidence to grant the termination petition.

Decrees affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/6/2017