UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4736

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff – Appellee, 

v. 

LEWIS CARNELL JACKSON, 

Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan, 

Chief District Judge. (5:07-cr-00110-FL-1) 

Submitted: March 24, 2011 Decided: April 12, 2011

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Deborrah L. Newton, NEWTON LAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
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PER CURIAM: 

After a two-day trial, a jury found Lewis Carnell

Jackson guilty of one count of conspiracy to distribute and 

possess with the intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), one count of aiding and abetting the 

possession with the intent to distribute marijuana, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) and 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West 2006 & 

Supp. 2010), one count of using, carrying, and possessing a 

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006), and one count of possession 

of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2006). The district court 

sentenced Jackson to 360 months’ imprisonment. 

Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no 

meritorious issues for appeal, but asking this court to review 

whether: the district court erred in denying Jackson’s motion to 

suppress post-arrest statements to law enforcement officials; 

the court erred in arraigning Jackson on the superseding 

indictment; trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 

failing to call certain persons to testify on behalf of the 

defense; Jackson was prejudiced when several jurors observed him 

in jail attire and shackles; and the 360-month prison sentence 

violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
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Jackson has filed a pro se supplemental brief raising several 

issues. We affirm. 

We review the factual findings underlying the denial 

of a motion to suppress for clear error, United States v. 

Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 

S. Ct. 427 (2010), which exists where we are “left with the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” 

United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 337 (4th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). When a defendant’s 

suppression motion has been denied, we construe the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the government. United States v. 

Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 217 (4th Cir. 2008). We also defer to 

the district court’s credibility determinations. See United 

States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008). With 

these standards in mind, and having reviewed the transcript of 

the suppression hearing, we conclude that the district court did 

not err in denying Jackson’s motion to suppress. 

Counsel also questions whether the district court 

erred in arraigning Jackson on the superseding indictment. 

Because Jackson raised no challenge to his arraignment in the 

district court, our review is for plain error. See Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002). 

Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 10(a), an arraignment must be conducted 

in open court and must consist of: ensuring the defendant has a 
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copy of the indictment or information; reading the indictment or 

information to the defendant; and asking the defendant to enter 

a plea to the indictment or information. After review of the

transcript of the arraignment, we conclude that the district 

court substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 10(a) 

in arraigning Jackson and that the court’s omission did not 

violate Jackson’s substantial rights. Accordingly, we discern 

no plain error in the district court’s arraignment procedures. 

Next, counsel questions whether trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to call two of Jackson’s 

co-conspirators to testify on his behalf at trial. Claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel generally are not cognizable 

on direct appeal. United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 

(4th Cir. 1997). Rather, to allow for adequate development of 

the record, a defendant must bring his claims in a 28 U.S.C.A. 

§ 2255 (West Supp. 2010) motion. Id. An exception exists, 

however, where the record conclusively establishes ineffective 

assistance. United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 

(4th Cir. 2006). After review of the record, we find no 

conclusive evidence that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance, and we accordingly decline to consider this claim on 

direct appeal. 

Counsel questions whether Jackson was prejudiced when 

three or four members of the jury observed him in his jail 
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jumpsuit and shackles when he was being transported to the 

courthouse on the second day of trial. We conclude that the 

jurors’ brief and inadvertent observation of Jackson in this

condition does not amount to prejudice requiring reversal of his 

convictions. See United States v. Lattner, 385 F.3d 947, 959-60 

(6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Halliburton, 870 F.2d 557, 

560-61 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Counsel also questions whether Jackson’s 360-month 

prison sentence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment because his prior convictions were used in the 

calculation of his offense level and criminal history category 

under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2006). This claim 

is meritless. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 155 

(1997) (per curiam); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 

(1995). 

Finally, we have reviewed the remainder of the record 

in accordance with Anders and the claims raised in Jackson’s pro 

se supplemental brief and conclude that no meritorious issues 

remain for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s 

judgment and deny Jackson’s motions to relieve counsel. 

This court requires that counsel inform Jackson, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Jackson requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 
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would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Jackson. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED