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34–148 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 110–20

US–VISIT: CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES FOR

SECURING THE U.S. BORDER

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 31, 2007

Serial No. J–110–6

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

MICHAEL O’NEILL, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JON KYL, Arizona 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JENNIFER DUCK, Chief Counsel 

STEPHEN HIGGINS, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page

Cornyn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas ............................... 3

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 107

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, a U.S. Senator from the State of California ................. 1

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 109

Kennedy, Hon. Edward M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Massachusetts, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 111

WITNESSES 

Barth, Richard C., Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy Development, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. ................................................. 5

Bond, Phillip J., President and Chief Executive Officer, Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), Arlington, Virginia .............................. 18

Mocny, Robert A., Acting Director, US–VISIT, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. ......................................................................................... 7

Stana, Richard M., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C. .................................................. 16

Verdery, C. Stewart, Jr., Partner and Founder, Monument Policy Group, 

LLC, and Adjunct Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

Washington, D.C. ................................................................................................. 19

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Richard C. Barth and Robert A. Mocny to questions submitted 

by Senators Cornyn, Kennedy, Sessions and Feinstein .................................... 29

Response of Phillip J. Bond to a question submitted by Senator Kennedy ........ 77

Responses of Richard M. Stana to questions submitted by Senator Kennedy ... 78

Responses of C. Steward Verdery, Jr. to questions submitted by Senator 

Kennedy ................................................................................................................ 81

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Barth, Richard C., Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy Development, and 

Robert A. Mocny, Acting Director, US–VISIT, Department of Homeland 

Security, Washington, D.C., statement .............................................................. 86

Bond, Phillip J., President and Chief Executive Officer, Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), Arlington, Virginia, statement ........... 96

Clawson, Greg, Regional Manager, Motorola Enterprise Mobility Government 

Business Solutions, statement ............................................................................ 102

Koslowski, Rey, Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, 

Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy, University at Albany, State 

University of New York (SUNY), Albany, New York, statement ..................... 114

Stana, Richard M., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C., prepared statement ............... 133

Verdery, C. Stewart, Jr., Partner and Founder, Monument Policy Group, 

LLC, and Adjunct Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

Washington, D.C., statement .............................................................................. 164

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US–VISIT: CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES 

FOR SECURING THE U.S. BORDER 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2007

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND

HOMELAND SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Dianne Feinstein, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Feinstein, Kennedy, Cardin, and Cornyn. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. This meeting of the Subcommittee will 

come to order. 

Senator Kyl, who is the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, 

is not able to be present due to the press of other duties. I believe 

he is on the floor. So the ranking position will be occupied fully and 

completely by Senator Cornyn of Texas. We are delighted to have 

you here. 

The Subcommittee today will be dealing with a program that is 

not without its controversy, namely, the US–VISIT Program. I 

have long been very concerned about the interplay between immigration and national security. I believe that we will not be able to 

protect our Nation effectively until we can protect our borders. I do 

believe we need to know who is coming in and out of our country. 

The congressional mandate to create a system for tracking who 

enters and leaves this country was first codified in 1996 with a 

deadline of establishing a workable program by September 30, 

1998. To the best of my knowledge, that is 8 years ago. Since that 

time, Congress has extended the deadline over and over. Time and 

time again, we have sacrificed our border security because of inaction or slow action by the Federal Government. 

According to the 9/11 National Commission Staff Report on Terrorist Travel, prior to 9/11, no agency of the U.S. Government 

thought of border security as a tool in the counterterrorism arsenal. 9/11 and its subsequent actions have made this goal a priority 

and have exposed our country’s vulnerability. Yet over 5 years 

later, the Federal Government has failed to devote sufficient time, 

technology, personnel, and resources to making border security a 

cornerstone of our national security policy. 

2

In 2003, 5 years after its first deadline in 1998, the Department 

of Homeland Security created the US–VISIT Program to implement 

an automated system for documenting entry and exit by capturing 

biometric information. US–VISIT is an important program that has 

done a decent job of monitoring the entry of the millions of visitors 

into the United States. But there is so much more work to be done. 

Today, over 10 years after the initial congressional mandate, we 

do not have a reliable means of measuring who leaves our country. 

We are here today to examine the challenges of implementing a 

workable system. 

DHS—Homeland Security—has essentially declared that the exit 

program is dead as far as land borders are concerned. This is a serious problem. There are over 425 million border crossings at U.S. 

borders every year. Because we do not know who is leaving the 

country, we do not know who of these 425 million is overstaying 

a visa versus who is playing by the rules. We do know that in 2004 

there were 335.3 million crossing at land ports of entry. About 4.6 

million people who crossed by land were eligible for US–VISIT 

screening. And we have no way of knowing whether any of those 

4.6 million ever left the country. Think about that. We do not know 

whether 4.6 million people here on a visa, whatever that visa is, 

ever really followed the visa regulations and left the country. 

I understand that the 4.6 million people subject to US–VISIT 

screening at land ports is only a fraction of the total number crossing each year. I also understand the argument that more US–

VISIT-eligible persons come into our country via airports than by 

land. This argument, though, does not convince me that we should 

shelve the exit program at the land border. I think we have got to 

take seriously that we have left a gaping hole in our country’s border. Anyone coming in by air or sea could leave undetected by way 

of one of our 170 land ports of entry on more than 7,500 miles of 

border with Canada and Mexico. By failing to address exits at all 

ports, we are providing a blueprint to those who wish to harm the 

United States. Without implementing a comprehensive exit and 

entry system at all of our ports, we are leaving ourselves vulnerable to another attack. 

The biggest problem here is that we still have not heard a sufficient explanation from the Department of Homeland Security as to 

the challenges—or I should say the failure—to implement an exit 

program at all ports. The New York Times reported that Homeland 

Security claims that an exit program would cost tens of billions of 

dollars to implement, but we have yet to see a breakdown of these 

costs or a good-faith explanation of what is at stake here. 

Homeland Security has failed to meet their June 2005 statutory 

requirement to submit a report to Congress describing, one, the 

status of biometric exit data systems already in use at ports of 

entry; and, two, the matter in which US–VISIT is to meet the goal 

of a comprehensive screening system with both entry and exit biometric capability. 

I must say I am very disappointed that the Department of Homeland Security, this huge Department, has failed to submit this report, and I call upon them to expedite this report to the Congress. 

So today, I hope we can have a very candid, honest discussion of 

how we can implement a workable entry-exit system. 

3

I would also like to just indicate that the National Sheriffs Association is represented here by their general counsel, Richard 

Weintraub, and I want them to know that we are delighted to have 

you join us in the audience. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Feinstein appears as a submission for the record.] 

And now, if I may, I would turn it over to the Ranking Member, 

Senator Cornyn. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, and I appreciate very much your convening this hearing, and also Senator 

Leahy for scheduling this hearing. This is an important program. 

As we move forward with our debate about immigration reform 

and how to solve our Nation’s immigration crisis, we all recognize 

the importance of an immigration enforcement system that enhances the security of our citizens and visitors to the United 

States. No enforcement system, however, should be adopted without assessing the impact it will have on legitimate travel and trade 

to the United States. Our Nation’s security is paramount, to be 

sure, but trade, especially with our partners on the Northern and 

Southern borders, is critical to the health of our economy. 

The US–VISIT Program is one component of an overall border 

and interior enforcement strategy. Since its inception in 2004, the 

Department of Homeland Security has made significant progress in 

phasing in implementation of the program at air, sea, and land 

borders. And I want to specifically congratulate the Department. I 

know they receive few kudos and more than a few arrows, but this 

is one program that I think was very well implemented in consultation with local stakeholders. And it was an important part of the 

rollout process to do that, and I think we should give credit where 

credit is due. 

But DHS must continue working hard to ensure that it continually receives the input of the public and interested stakeholders 

on any expansion efforts, such as officials along the Texas border. 

I remain concerned about the effect of the US–VISIT program on 

Southern border communities. According to DHS, the US–VISIT 

entry technology has been installed at most air and sea ports and 

in secondary inspection areas at 154 land borders. The Texas border region already has felt the effects of increased security screening. Southern border businesses and officials are concerned with 

the increased delays at border crossing checkpoints and the impact 

of delays on the local economy. As we continue working toward additional security measures, we need to develop a quick and efficient 

process to identify those who may be a threat to our national security, while allowing legitimate, law- abiding travelers to enter and 

exit the United States in a timely manner. 

One significant initiative to facilitate trade and travel on the 

Southern border is the border crossing card. I have introduced yesterday a new bill, S. 422, which will actually permit Mexican nationals who hold laser visas and who have already undergone rigorous background screening by the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security to remain in the United States for 

4

an initial period of up to 6 months. The bill allows for expedited 

entry into the U.S. while at the same time maintains the strong 

border enforcement process. It also ensures that commerce on the 

Southern border remains strong and viable, notwithstanding any 

new enforcement measures that DHS will put into place. 

Now, just a footnote to say that this legislation would merely establish parity with visitors from Canada, and I think it is an appropriate goal for this Nation ultimately, by the use of technology, 

to treat all of our guests and lawful visitors exactly the same, without any discrimination. 

DHS has indicated that the US–VISIT entry process has been 

beneficial, especially in terms of identifying criminals, people who 

commit identity theft, and immigration violators. DHS, however, 

also acknowledges that it needs additional resources and personnel 

to improve the existing entry process. If we are going to be a welcoming Nation to lawful trade and traffic, we ought to make that 

as easy as possible, consistent with security efforts, while we spend 

whatever it takes to secure our borders against those who attempt 

to enter our country in violation of our laws. 

So we will need to continue to work with DHS to make sure that 

it gets the help that it needs in order to make the system successful. 

As Senator Feinstein has noted, DHS has recently announced it 

would delay implementation of the exit procedures at land borders, 

in part due to the potentially significant delays in the flow of crossborder traffic and the significant resources it will take to expand 

existing infrastructure and systems communications that are needed for the US–VISIT process to work effectively. 

Of course, I share Senator Feinstein’s concerns, but I do note 

that at this point we have not thought far enough ahead to determine what it is we would actually do with that information if we 

were to capture it and whether there would be sufficient ICE 

agents necessary to actually enforce overstays. It is a significant 

problem, but I think it needs to be addressed in the context of overall border security and immigration reform, and perhaps not as a 

stand- alone issue. 

DHS should continue to explore various strategies for improving 

the ability to capture traveler biometrics and entry and exit information. With the movement to create a single, secure biometric and 

machine-readable travel card, like the e-Passport, DHS should 

work with industry leaders and stakeholders to determine how the 

latest technologies, such as radio frequency identification technology, can best be incorporated into travel and entry-exit documents. DHS also needs to complete its law enforcement systems integration, which is a cornerstone of any successful law enforcement 

strategy. 

With these improvements and with the support of the Congress, 

we will eventually be able to have an integrated entry-exit process 

that protects our Nation’s security and facilitates legitimate travel 

to and from the United States. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Cornyn appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

5

I would like to introduce the witnesses of panel one. 

The first will be the Honorable Richard Barth, Assistant Secretary for the Office of Policy Development, Department of Homeland Security. He has been the Assistant Secretary for this office 

since August 26th of 2006. He is the principal action officer for coordinating policy among DHS entities, as well as with State and 

Federal agencies and foreign governments. Prior to this, Assistant 

Secretary Barth was Corporate Vice President and Director, Homeland Security Strategy, for Motorola’s Government Relations Office 

in Washington. 

The other witness is Robert Mocny, the Acting Director of US–

VISIT, who is on the hot seat today. Mr. Mocny is Acting Director 

of US–VISIT. He is responsible for the day-to-day operations of 

US–VISIT, including managing the development and deployment of 

the program. Over the course of his career, he has served in several 

senior Federal Government positions related to U.S. immigration 

policy and operations, including director of the Entry-Exit Project 

and Acting Assistant Commissioner and Assistant Chief Inspector 

with the former INS, Immigration and Naturalization Service. 

Welcome, gentlemen. What we usually do at these hearings is 

you will have a time limit of 5 minutes, and that way Senator 

Cornyn, and I hope other members, will have a chance to ask you 

additional questions. So please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD C. BARTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 

OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. BARTH. Chairman Feinstein and Ranking Member Cornyn, 

thank you for taking the time and inviting us here to discuss the 

efforts of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to record the 

exit of non-citizens as they leave the United States. 

It is one of DHS’ missions to modernize and improve our immigration and border management systems, and biometric exit control is a key component of fully securing our Nation’s borders. Our 

first priority, though, given that we do not have unlimited resources, is to fully implement ten-fingerprint collection of non-citizen travelers as visa-issuing ports around the world and upon 

entry to the U.S. Secretary Chertoff has made it clear many times 

that keeping terrorists out of the country is the priority as we 

make decisions for the prudent, risk-based investment of the border 

control dollars we have. Yet the challenge for border security is to 

implement a well-planned exit solution to assist us in closing the 

door on those individuals who pose an overwhelming risk of entering or remaining in the United States undetected. 

As you can imagine, the deployment of a comprehensive exit solution poses significant challenges. First, we must address three 

very different border environments: air, sea, and land. Second, the 

United States has almost always had some form of entry inspection, and over time, infrastructure developed to support that entry 

process. U.S. international airports have customs inspection booths 

near the baggage claim areas for arriving international passengers. 

Seaports serving international cruise lines provide terminal-based 

customs inspection. The number of lanes processing vehicular trafVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:06 Apr 20, 2007 Jkt 034148 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\34148.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
6

fic and pedestrian entry inbound is constantly expanding. But not 

one of these ports was designed to accommodate exit control. 

Unlike the entry process, there are only limited facilities to process international travelers as they leave the United States. In fact, 

the aerial photograph that we have displayed over here, Chairman 

Feinstein and Ranking Member Cornyn, I think vividly shows the 

striking difference between entry and exit infrastructure at the 

largest land border port of entry—San Ysidro, California, which I 

will discuss in more detail in a moment. And, finally, an exit solution presents not only an infrastructure challenge but, equally important, a fundamental change in the business process of travelers 

who are departing the United States. 

Accordingly, DHS proposes a phased deployment of exit in the 

three environments of air, land, and sea, with an initial focus on 

air. We are beginning at airports primarily to focus on travelers 

from countries of interest, 91 percent of whom arrive in the United 

States via air. It is absolutely essential for us to know what travelers from these countries have complied with the terms of their 

admission. We will, of course, work closely with our Government 

and private sector partners to deploy the most viable option for air 

exit. We are already in dialog with the airline industry on the options to deploy biometric exit at airports. 

After deploying exit procedures at airports, we will begin deploying a solution to seaports based on the air solution. And this brings 

us to our most significant challenge: deploying an exit solution at 

the land border. Biometric confirmation of the departure of travelers via land ports is significantly more complicated and costly 

than the air and sea environments. Using the aerial photograph of 

San Ysidro, I would walk you through the two different variations 

of the entry and exit. On the left is the entry, and on the right is 

the exit from the U.S. 

San Ysidro is the largest entry-exit land border port for travelers 

entering or leaving the United States, with 25 lanes for vehicular 

entry traffic and only about 4 for exit traffic. Simply duplicating biometric, biographic collection of data upon departure will not work. 

It would require costly infrastructure improvements, land acquisition costs, and staffing for additional lanes of traffic over multiple 

shifts. 

I could go into the cost of wait times for the public to cross the 

border, but in the interest of time, I will rely on the written testimony we have provided to give you those details. 

As I said, while the challenges are significant, they are not insurmountable. There are ways to approach a land border exit solution, 

and we intend to pursue them. We are closely monitoring technology solutions that could help resolve the land border challenges 

without the extraordinary infrastructure investment that otherwise 

would be required. 

An interim solution for exit data collection at the land border 

could also involve the cooperation of Canada and Mexico. Such cooperation could include agreements between our countries to share 

data on an as-needed transactional basis between our systems. We 

will explore that option to more quickly obtain good data on departing aliens. 

7

The Department takes seriously the issue of protecting the privacy of non-citizens travelers also. Our written testimony, again, 

goes into some detail on attention to privacy as well as accessibility 

issues. 

In conclusion, a comprehensive exit solution for the United 

States requires the administration and Congress to collaborate 

closely on finding the best, cost-effective solutions for each environment. We will meet this challenge with a set of policies and processes that provide our decisionmakers with flexible solutions. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify, and we look forward to 

answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Barth appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Dr. Barth. 

Mr. Mocny? 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. MOCNY, ACTING DIRECTOR, US–

VISIT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. MOCNY. Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member Cornyn, 

thank you for inviting me to discuss the operations of the US–

VISIT Program, which has just marked its third anniversary. In 

those 3 years, US–VISIT has significantly strengthened our Nation’s immigration and border security capabilities to a level that 

simply did not exist before. I am proud of our dedicated team of 

professionals who are working hard to solve some difficult challenges that face our Nation. And I am proud that many are supportive of the program’s progress. For example, some governments 

expressed apprehension when we first launched the program. Now 

many of those same governments are seeking our expertise as they 

work to establish their own biometrics-based border management 

programs. US–VISIT has clearly become the standard for the rest 

of the world. 

The background of US–VISIT is our innovative use of biometrics, 

which enhances our capacity to know definitively who is coming 

into our country and to crack down on fraudulent document use. 

With biometric identification technologies at its base, US–VISIT 

has revolutionized our ability to verify that travelers are who they 

say they are and do not pose a risk to the United States. 

US–VISIT also provides immigration and law enforcement decisionmakers with critical information when they need it and where 

they need it. But perhaps the best way to evaluate the success of 

US–VISIT is to look at what we have achieved against our four 

goals, and those are: to enhance the security of our citizens and our 

visitors, to facilitate legitimate travel and trade, to ensure the integrity of our immigration system, and to protect the privacy of our 

visitors. 

In terms of enhancing security, since January of 2004 we have 

processed more than 76 million visitors and in that time have 

intercepted approximately 1,800 immigration violators and people 

with criminal histories based on the biometric alone. US–VISIT 

also provides the infrastructure for the State Department’s BioVisa 

Program, which consular officials use when they process a person 

applying for a visa to the United States. Biometrics are also deprivVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:06 Apr 20, 2007 Jkt 034148 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\34148.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
8

ing potential terrorists of one of their most powerful tools—the 

ability to use fraudulent or stolen identification documents to enter 

the country. This means that biometrics also protect travelers by 

making it virtually impossible for anyone else to claim their identifies should their travel documents be lost or stolen. 

US–VISIT also tracks and records changes in immigration status 

and matches entry and exit records to determine overstays. ICE officials, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, have made more 

than 290 arrests based on US–VISIT overstay information. US–

VISIT uses and maintains the Arrival and Departure Information 

System, or ADIS, which has grown to be the definitive immigration 

status system that provides overstay information for subsequent 

action. 

Regarding our second goal, facilitating legitimate travel and 

trade, US–VISIT’s biometric-based capabilities, while enhancing security, have not increased wait times at our ports of entry. US–

VISIT has also strengthened the integrity of our immigration system, our third goal. We continue to work with the FBI to achieve 

interoperability between their fingerprint data base and DHS’. We 

are piloting a program that will provide Federal, State, and local 

law enforcement officers biometric-based access to criminal and immigration information. 

We are also moving from a collection of a two-fingerprint to a 

ten-fingerprint standard. This will help us collect more accurate 

and actual information on those attempting to enter our country. 

But we also recognize that keeping bad people out is not enough. 

We must ensure that those few people who remain in the country 

as a threat to our Nation’s security do not go undetected. 

This brings me to perhaps our greatest challenge: the development of biometric exit procedures that address our goals of security 

and facilitating legitimate travel and trade at those three very different environments—air, sea, and land. Over the past 2 years, we 

have been evaluating new and evolving technologies that allow us 

to definitively know when a traveler has left the country. Through 

pilot programs at 14 air and sea ports, we have learned that a 

technology to record a traveler’s departure does, in fact, work. But 

to be most effective, it has to be integrated into the existing travel 

process. We have already reached out to the travel industry to 

identify the best way to integrate exit procedures into the traveler’s 

current airport experience. 

The land border poses its own challenges. Assistant Secretary 

Barth adequately explained those challenges, but you should know 

that we have been pursuing possible solutions there as well. US–

VISIT recently completed a test of radio frequency identification, or 

RFID, technology at five land border ports of entry, proving that 

vicinity-read RFID technology is a viable solution to meet the multiple challenges of the land border environment. But as cited in the 

recent GAO report and our own findings, more work needs to be 

done. 

Finally, we are achieving our mission without compromising our 

fourth goal of protecting the personal privacy of our visitors. Privacy is a part of everything that we do, and it is essential to our 

mission. But US–VISIT’s job is not done. Challenges remain, especially regarding the solution to exit procedures. We have proven 

9

the skeptics wrong in the past, and we believe we can do it again 

going forward. 

Thank you again for your support and for the opportunity to testify here today. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, both of you. 

We appreciate it. 

It is my understanding that at least a third of visa holders do 

not leave the United States. So the looser the system we have, the 

more visa holders we are going to have who do not leave, the more 

you add to the numbers of undocumented, and the more you make 

any reform of immigration more difficult. I think the economic arguments that are made really have to deal with that factor. 

The numbers are only going to grow, so the importance of developing an exit program I think is really there. And I travel. I get 

visas. The other governments know when we leave the country. 

But the bigger you get, the harder it is going to be. And I think 

you ought to develop some system. I have gone in and out of San 

Ysidro. This is my backyard. There is no problem going out. And 

you look at that photo, and that shows it right there. The lane 

leaving the United States is vacant. Coming into the United States 

is where there are a lot of cars. So, in a way, that to me countermands what you are saying. It seems to me we could have an exit 

land program that would work. 

Is it true that you have suspended work on an exit system, Mr. 

Mocny? 

Mr. MOCNY. No, Chairman Feinstein, we have not abandoned 

exit in any way. In fact, we are pursuing both the air and sea exit 

this very year and beginning to look at the challenges that we continue to face at the land borders. But we have not—and I want to 

correct the record that has been out there for some time. We have 

not abandoned our move toward exit control. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. OK. GAO notes that Homeland Security 

has discontinued testing of its radio frequency identification system 

at the land borders. Is this true? 

Mr. MOCNY. We concluded a proof of concept, and so we were 

very clear to call it not a pilot or something that we were going to 

put out there—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. No, let me—my question is very carefully 

phrased. Have you discontinued testing of the radio frequency identification system? 

Mr. MOCNY. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Now you can go ahead and answer the rest 

of it. 

Mr. MOCNY. Thank you. We had a proof of concept. It was always 

designed to be put up and then brought down. The idea was to look 

at what technologies might afford us to have a viable exit program 

at the land borders. So we had a very clearly defined—and one 

thing with US–VISIT is that we practice what I believe to be good 

project management, which is we have a beginning and an end to 

anything that we put out there to be able to evaluate that. So we 

had a proof of concept with a beginning and an end portion to that, 

with the idea to evaluate that and take it to its next level to see 

where would we go with that. And what we identified was where 

there were certain challenges with that proof of concept. 

10

Chairman FEINSTEIN. OK. Are you currently testing any alternative means of tracking who leaves the country? 

Mr. MOCNY. We currently have the 14 air and sea pilots that we 

have, but we do not have any testing at the land ports of entry. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. All right. So there is no testing going on. 

So as I interpret all of that, effectively the exit program has been 

stopped. Nothing is moving ahead, so I conclude it stopped. Am I 

wrong? 

Mr. BARTH. Chairman Feinstein, you are correct in concluding 

that any physical activity by people to test systems, to implement, 

to do something at the land borders is going on. There is nothing 

there. You are correct. However, the planning to do something that 

is efficacious, cost-effective, and real to plug the holes that we are 

all in agreement need to be plugged for controlling our exit at the 

borders is very actively underway. 

When we hopefully in the very near future send to you our strategies for the 2007 spend plan and budgets, et cetera, you will be 

able to see in a better level of detail the kinds of things we will 

be doing to actively pursue air exit, air bio-exit technologies, and 

implement them, actively pursue them at sea, and actively find the 

technological solution that we truly believe is out there to solve the 

problem that we see here. 

We cannot do—in our Department’s completely agreement 

throughout, we cannot do a mirror image of that and block up traffic going out of the country like it is blocked up there coming in 

without costs that are astronomical. That border control station 

you see there that is causing all that blockage is a very old—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The blockage is coming into the country, 

sir. 

Mr. BARTH. It is all coming in. And if we tried to put biometric 

exit data capture going out, we would have to have a similar number of lanes, we would have to have similar staffing, and we would 

see back-ups like you see coming in. And just to the point of the 

costs of those buildings there that the U.S. Government owns, the 

Congress has already approved and has half-funded a $500 million 

upgrade and replacement of those facilities. So the cost of doing 

that on the outbound lanes, we have a good data point. Maybe it 

is only one, but it is a very good one. At your backyard to do what 

we are doing incoming with biometric exit outgoing would cost 

$500 million, not including the land acquisition costs and not including the staffing costs. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. You know, I guess I have been around here 

for almost 15 years now. I mean, this to me is the typical bureaucratic argument: ‘‘We cannot do it because it costs too much, therefore...’’ I mean, we cannot even get a report that was due in 2005. 

I guess what I want to say, that is in my State. I care about it. 

I care about this issue. I think this is a soft underbelly of this country not to know that people ever leave. Virtually everybody that 

came into this country to do us harm so far came in on a visa. We 

have no way to know that people leave this country by way of a 

land border. And that ought to—I mean, how many employees does 

Homeland Security have, 250,000? How many—what? 

Mr. BARTH. Not quite. 

11

Chairman FEINSTEIN. An awful lot. It would seem to me that if 

this is a priority—and my view is to make it a priority—you would 

adjust priorities within this huge megalopolis of yours and be able 

to deal with it. 

So I have just got to tell you, I do not accept reasons, well, the 

building is going to cost X and this is going to cost Y. You came 

up here with something that shows that this could be done at San 

Ysidro with some ease because there are no cars on the road leaving. And I will just leave it at that. I think this is a real national 

security issue, and hopefully somehow that will get through. So 

thank you very much. 

Senator, your turn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

Gentlemen, I want to pick up on the matter of overstays. The latest statistic I have seen indicates that 45 percent of the illegal immigration in this country results not from people who have entered 

illegally but from people who have entered legally and overstayed. 

In other words, 55 percent have come across the border without a 

visa; 45 percent have come in with a visa, but have simply overstayed. 

And I guess that gets to my question, Mr. Mocny, to you. You indicate, if I heard you correctly in your statement, that ICE—Immigration and Customs Enforcement—has arrested 290 people for 

visa overstays. And so I guess the next question is obvious. That 

is just a fraction of the number of people who come in legally but 

overstay their visa. 

Can you speak to what we need to do as a Nation to make sure 

that we can actually deal with everyone who overstays their visa, 

ultimately? 

Mr. MOCNY. Well, I think having a viable exit program will begin 

to address that. The information that we provide to the ICE agents 

is culled from many different systems. It is corroborated by the biometric systems that we have at the 12 airports, and so we can 

produce on a daily basis reports to ICE that have people who have 

definitively been overstays and actually checked out with the biometric. That is called a ‘‘confirmed overstay.’’ That record is then 

flagged for any time they may want to get another visa or try to 

come back under the Visa Waiver Program. They would be prevented from doing so. 

But we also have many unconfirmed overstays, and those are 

people where this ADIS system, as I described earlier, sends an 

automatic trigger to our unit, the Data Integrity Group, that culls 

through that information and says this person is a possible or 

unconfirmed overstay. We then have to go through many other 

multiple systems to make a determination whether or not that person did, in fact, leave. And, of course, they go through I–94 information, the boarding card that they get upon arrival. That is a separate system that we have to go into. And then they would have 

to also consider the land border departure as well. 

And so, clearly, this speaks to, in fact, why we have not abandoned exit. We believe that exit has to occur in order to close this 

gap, but we do not have that. This is the first time in many years 

that we have been able to actually make arrests on overstays based 

on an automatic trigger of that person’s immigration record. In the 

12

past it has been because of some work site enforcement and it was 

later determined that they were an overstay. But this sends an 

automatic signal to ICE. 

I will grant you it is far from being as many as we would like 

it to be, but it is much further than we have been before. 

Senator CORNYN. Well, I will grant you both that birds have 

come home to roost due to many, many, many, many years of neglect that no doubt preceded even the creation of the Department 

of Homeland Security or your being hired by the Federal Government in your current position. But it strikes me that we have come 

up with a comprehensive way to deal with the information. Let’s 

say we do get information that somebody has not left the country 

at the expiration of the visa, so what? Collecting the information 

does not keep unless we are going to actually have the people to 

followup on the information and are going to have the ability to 

communicate technology through the various data bases to give a 

law enforcement person the information they need in order to apprehend that individual. 

So I think what this points out is that there is a huge void we 

have in other areas. Even if you had the exit system up and running 100 percent, the question is what you are going to do with 

that information. 

I want to ask Dr. Barth—and I think, Mr. Mocny, you also mentioned the desire of the Department to go after a ten-fingerprint on 

US–VISIT. As I understand right now, it is an index finger on each 

hand. 

Mr. MOCNY. Correct. 

Senator CORNYN. But as I understand from Secretary Chertoff, 

the desire to go to ten fingerprints is to be able to try to get 

matches with various partial prints that had been obtained in 

places like safe houses in Afghanistan or Iraq or elsewhere around 

the country to take advantage of all the fingerprint records that 

may be available and then match those with people coming across 

our border through the US–VISIT Program. Do I have that about 

right? 

Mr. BARTH. Yes. 

Mr. MOCNY. Yes, you have it very clear. 

Senator CORNYN. And what are your estimates in terms of how 

much of an improvement this will be in terms of our ability to 

catch criminals and threats to our country by the use of ten fingerprints as opposed to just two? 

Mr. BARTH. Let me just add one factor. Then I will have Bob answer your details here. 

An additional feature of the ten-fingerprint system is that the 

DHS data bases then will be able to be more easily aligned with 

the significantly large FBI data bases which are based on ten fingerprints. So there is an added advantage there that you are not 

just searching half of the universe, if you will, of available prints. 

And the interoperability of those two systems is something that our 

two Departments—the Justice Department and DHS—are very actively pursuing so that when we do have DHS’ ten-print systems 

fully set up, we will have a very good exchange of prints with the 

FBI. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much. 

13

Madam Chairman, I think, you know, one of the things that we 

have talked about in terms of comprehensive immigration reform 

is the importance of work site verification and eliminating some of 

the identity theft and document fraud at the work site, which, of 

course, is most often the magnet that draws people to this country. 

And I would just say I will leave this portion of the hearing even 

more convinced that we are going to have to fill in a lot of different 

gaps here and not just the exit program in order to make this system work. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Cornyn. 

I would like to ask one quick question. Doesn’t Customs and Border Protection require that land passengers submit their I–94 

forms to a Mexican or Canadian immigration inspector when they 

leave the country? 

Mr. MOCNY. I don’t know if it is a requirement that they actually 

have that as a requirement, but that is often what happens. So the 

I–94, the arrival card and the departure card the person gets when 

they enter the U.S., is either surrendered at the airport to the airline check-in agent and at the land border often times is given to 

a Canadian officer. The challenge we have with the Mexican border 

is that for every port of entry we have on the Southern border, 

there is not always a corresponding port of entry in Mexico. So 

there is that additional challenge for us as well. But that does happen on a regular basis and very often on the Canadian border that 

data—those cards are handed over. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, I have one here. It says you must 

surrender this permit when you leave the United States across the 

Canadian border to a Canadian official, across the Mexican border 

to a United States official. Why can’t that be a starting point? Why 

can’t we require that when people leave? If they are leaving and 

they have to give the U.S. official or the Canadian official the information——

Mr. BARTH. I am not sure of the legal or regulatory basis for the 

language on the card itself. However, it again comes back to an infrastructure problem that we have and have to fix. I think—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, why don’t we try to fix it? 

Mr. BARTH. Because I think in the first instance we have neither 

the staff nor the facility to slow down the traffic and collect those 

things as people leave the U.S. 

Mr. MOCNY. That also does not get to the biometric capture at 

this point. As you have the biographic information—and that is 

helpful in some cases. We have the name of the individual. But we 

cannot capture the biometric that way, and I think we are trying 

to pursue technologies that would allow us to capture a biometric 

as part of the exit. But that very well may mean work with Canada 

in doing so. As Assistant Secretary Barth says, they have the infrastructure just 100 yards north of us, and we may be able to use 

some of that. But that is a negotiation with Canada that we would 

enter into and have discussions with them. 

But as I said—and I think it is fair to note—at our 37-some ports 

of entry on the Southern border, there is not always a corresponding port of entry into Mexico. So it just represents another 

challenge for the program. 

14

Chairman FEINSTEIN. But at least where there is a will, something might be worked out. I appreciate that. 

We are joined by Senator Kennedy. Senator, I understand you 

would like to make a statement. 

Senator KENNEDY. No, thank you. I will put it in the record, 

Madam Chairman. I have just a couple of questions at an appropriate time. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Yes, please go ahead. 

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much. I apologize for being 

late. I was going to ask about these exit systems of other countries. 

How do they do it? And have you looked at other countries? Which 

countries are doing it well? What are their systems? Are there lessons we ought to learn from those? I know Singapore, for example, 

does it well. That is probably a unique situation given the size of 

the country and the population. But, I mean, in Europe, they might 

have had a system years ago, but because of the EU, it may be 

somewhat different. But have you looked at other countries to see 

what we might be able to learn from them? 

Mr. MOCNY. We have, and that is certainly something that we 

note to ourselves, that these countries have had departure control 

for many, many years, and it is just something that we never had 

here. So as they begin to modify some of their systems—you have 

departure control, passport control in France and Japan and Australia. They have always had that infrastructure in place, and the 

challenge that we are faced today with is in a very, you know, 

rapid fashion to stand up any kind of exit control absent that infrastructure. So they do it well, and it is useful information. 

I will say that some countries are, in fact, beginning to look at 

biometric exit, are doing away with the basic infrastructure, the 

kind of hard brick and mortar, as it were, with personnel in place 

because that does become very expensive. So we do look at many 

countries across the world to try to learn from them as well. 

Senator KENNEDY. Maybe you have gone over this, and if you 

have, don’t bother. But biometric, I mean, I think all of us are familiar with what happens with automobiles and going through the 

tolls and all the rest. So you have got that capability, but how do 

you know who is in the car? And that is obviously the problem. 

Did you discuss in terms of the biometric some suggestions in 

these areas? Mr. Barth. We did not go into that particular detail, 

Senator, but it is safe to say that that poses the additional layer 

of problem. If you have the driver and they merely have to come 

up and put their finger on the biometric detector at the land point 

of exit, that is one problem. Having everyone get out of the car and 

have to approach the stand and put the finger on it just would create an impossible back-up at the border that we believe the technology will help us solve, just as—whatever it was-10 or 15 years 

ago, EZPass just burst on the scene and you had to slow down to 

5 miles an hour to get through it, but compared to the Route 95 

toll booths, that was definitely an improvement. We will get to that 

point sometime, and we believe at some time in the future we will 

get to where the New Jersey Parkway is, which is you can speed 

through at 55 miles an hour and capture the data you need. 

15

Senator KENNEDY. Just finally, in the next panel we are going 

to hear some testimony about the use of 

electronics, and I don’t know whether you want to make any 

comment or if you have got a reaction to it. I think people ought 

to be able to make their presentation before people make maybe a 

comment. But we are all friends here, and we are all trying to 

learn. So if you have got some ideas or suggestions or comments, 

it would be useful. 

Mr. MOCNY. Thank you, Senator. We did provide in our written 

testimony the concept of a bio-token, and that is the combination 

of radio frequency identification with biometrics. So it is a very 

nascent technology at this point. We have to look at the 

ergonomics. If people are going to be leaving the country at 55 

mph, we have to be careful about what device we give them to actually biometrically verify their departure. 

So what we know is that technology is beginning to emerge, but 

we have to factor in so many things such as the ergonomics, the 

safety of it as well. So this is something that we are trying to pay 

attention to. We are looking at it earnestly, and we believe, as the 

Assistant Secretary says, it is not here now, but in the office in a 

couple years’ time, it may very well present ourselves with a potential solution. 

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. Madam Chairman, if I could, I 

will submit some additional questions, if I could. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Absolutely. 

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very, very much. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

I thank you gentlemen. We look forward to great things happening. Thank you very much. 

The next panel consists of—and I will begin while you all come 

to the table, please—Richard Stana, the Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues for the U.S. Government Accountability 

Office. He is a 30-year veteran of GAO who has directed reviews 

on a wide variety of complex military and domestic issues. Most recently, he directed GAO’s work relating to immigration and border 

security issues, and he is the author of the recent report on the 

challenges of implementing an exit program at the land borders. 

Phillip Bond is the president and CEO of Information Technology 

Association of America. Mr. Bond directs the day-to-day operations 

of the largest and oldest information technology trade association, 

representing 325 leading software services, Internet, telecommunications, electronic commerce, and systems integration companies. 

Stewart Verdery is the president of the Monument Policy Group. 

He is the founder and president. This is a consulting firm in Washington that advises clients on issues relating to homeland security, 

immigration, and technology. So, gentlemen, we are very interested 

to hear from you, and if you could particularly -you have heard the 

problem. If you could particularly concentrate your remarks as to 

possible solutions, that would be appreciated. Mr. Stana, please. 

16

STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. STANA. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, Senator Cornyn, 

Senator Kennedy. I am pleased to be here today to discuss DHS’ 

implementation of the US–VISIT entry-exit program. As you know, 

the US–VISIT Program is designed to collect, maintain, and share 

data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the country 

at air, sea, and land ports of entry. Data is captured to learn and 

verify visitors’ identities, screen information against watchlists, 

and record arrival and departure. My prepared statement is based 

on a report we did last month on the US–VISIT implementation on 

land ports of entry, and I would just like to make a few points 

about that effort. 

First, we found that DHS cannot currently implement a biometric US–VISIT exit capability, as mandated by statute, without incurring a major physical and economic impact on land border ports. 

Implementing a biometrically based exit recording system that mirrors entry would require more than $3 billion in new infrastructure 

and could produce major traffic congestion because travelers would 

have to stop their vehicles upon exit for processing. Technology 

compatible to the land port environment is not currently available 

to address this processing issue. The RFID technology tested at 

land ports—and you can see them on the picture board hanging on 

gantries and on poles here at ports of entry, at Alexandria Bay, 

New York, and Nogales, Arizona—was subject to numerous performance and reliability problems. In fact, it had a success rate of 

only 14 percent in one test and provided no assurance that the person recorded as leaving the country is the same one who entered. 

It is important to note that DHS has not yet provided to Congress 

a statutorily mandated report which was due by June 2005 on its 

plans to fully implement an exit-entry program. 

Second, we found that DHS had not yet articulated how US–

VISIT will strategically fit or incorporate other land border security 

initiatives and mandates. It is important to know, for example, how 

the new Secure Border Initiative, or SBI, will tie in with US–

VISIT, especially given the interior enforcement goals of SBI and 

the inability of the US–VISIT system to generate comprehensive, 

reliable, and accurate overstay data. It is also important to know 

how the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative will work with US–

VISIT. 

Last, DHS deserves credit for installing the entry portion of US–

VISIT at nearly all of the land ports, and this was done with minimal new construction or changes to existing facilities. But officials 

at 12 of the 21 land ports we visited told us about US–VISIT-related computer slowdowns and freezes that adversely affected processing times and could have compromised security. These problems 

were not routinely reported to headquarters, in part because of the 

lack of coordination between US–VISIT and CBP. 

A real challenge lies ahead because the introduction of technology to permit a ten-fingerprint scan and read e-passports could 

increase inspection times and crowding, and thus affect port operations at aging and space-constrained facilities like those pictures 

on the picture board. The left-hand side is San Ysidro—it is a port 

17

right in your backyard, Senator Feinstein and on the right is the 

Detroit-Windsor Tunnel. There is really no place to expand in the 

tunnel. 

In the limited time I have remaining, I would like to raise a few 

other issues that members of the Committee may wish to consider 

as you conduct oversight of the US–VISIT Program. 

First, technology is a tool, but not a cure for every border security problem. It is only one leg of a three-legged stool that includes 

people, process, and technology. As good as technology might be, it 

must fit in the port operational environment and facilitate, not 

hamper, the inspection process. CBP inspectors told us that technology is unreliable at times or can overwhelm them with information. And when this happens, the inspection process can slow down. 

Time pressures have resulted in information being ignored and security being compromised by hasty inspections. And keep in mind 

that Ahmed Ressam, the Millennium Bomber, was stopped not by 

technology but by an alert customs inspector who observed the subject and had a gut instinct that something was not quite right. We 

do not want technology to force our inspectors to keep their eyes 

off the traveler. 

Second, the US–VISIT Program cannot operate effectively in a 

vacuum but, rather, needs to be integrated with other border security systems. Even an effective entry-exit system would be compromised if travelers could walk, drive, or sail in and out of the 

country without detection between the ports. Controlling 7,500 

miles of land border and 95,000 of coastline is no easy or inexpensive task. Fragmenting responsibility for border security programs 

among several organizational components at DHS frankly is not 

helpful. 

Third, although various laws and mandates call for an entry-exit 

system, there may be opportunities to help achieve the system’s 

goals in combination with other DHS programs. An effective entry 

system is extremely important to prevent identified terrorists and 

other criminals from entering the United States, but enhanced intelligence might also be needed to improve our watchlists. And an 

effective exit control system would be helpful to identify those who 

have overstayed their visas, but the feasibility of locating and removing millions of overstays who may not wish to be found is questionable, without increasing the modest number of ICE agents and 

resources currently devoted to this task and implementing an effective work site enforcement or temporary worker program. 

In closing, there is no question that securing our Nation’s borders is a vital task and deserves high priority. The challenges we 

have found provide an opportunity for Congress to consider how 

this task can best be accomplished. 

This concludes my oral statement, and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stana appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Stana. 

Mr. Bond? 

18

STATEMENT OF PHILLIP J. BOND, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (ITAA), ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 

Mr. BOND. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, Senator Cornyn, 

Senator Kennedy. On behalf of the membership of ITAA, it is a 

privilege to be here. Let me get right to the point. 

For this hearing, I was asked to discuss whether technology currently exists that can verify the identity of a foreign visitor leaving 

this country, as mandated by Congress. The short answer is yes, 

both proximity-and vicinity-read RFID technologies can help accomplish this task, but as with almost any technology, I have to 

quickly add that it depends. 

Let me talk briefly about the two and preface that by saying just 

very generally the Co-Chair of the bipartisan RFID Caucus understands this well, but RFID simply means you have some information and a small antenna which transmits differing amounts of information to a receiver, which then reads that information via 

radio wave. Two different basic approaches. 

Proximity-read RFID systems have a very secure chip, a lot of information. These are the smart cards you read about for access to 

buildings and so forth. They are commonly used and have advanced 

computing powers. Very good at authenticating the user and ensuring that the person using the card is who they claim to be. 

For the purpose of the exit program, DHS could issue all US–

VISIT applicants a smart card upon entering. They would then authenticate their identity upon exiting by going through a reader 

station. Officials located at the stations could verify that the person 

is who they say they are by a visual matchor by a biometric match 

which fingerprints. This may, as has been noted, slow traffic. It 

may require significant investment, additional agents at point of 

entry, or expansion of those. On the other hand, stopping the traffic to inspect the documents may be the answer if the national priority is 100 percent authentication. That technology would do that. 

DHS would need, I think, to perform a cost/benefit analysis. 

Alternatively, there is ultra-high frequency or vicinity-read 

RFID. This could be attached to the I–94 form when visitors enter. 

These have a longer read range—they are like the speed pass that 

you are familiar with on some of the roads—and would provide 

some flexibility in facilitating the flow of traffic while hopefully securing our borders. 

Vicinity-read RFID technology transmits a unique number, kind 

of like your license plate number on a car, and then you separately 

dive into a secure data base to determine the connection between 

the two. 

With the UHF border solution, DHS could quickly read a high 

volume of credentials while vehicles passed through. And as with 

any type of exit program, presumably some visual inspections 

would need to occur. Unlike the smart card or proximity-read option, it would keep the traffic moving and perhaps align with existing trusted traveled programs that we have today that use similar 

technology. 

However, the current generation of vicinity-read solutions, like 

existing smart card products, do not independently tie a person to 

an ID card through biometrics without some intervention, without 

19

checking visually or with some other biometric. The limitation in 

this case is that it really only proves that the I–94 left the country, 

not the person that is supposed to be attached to that I–94, which 

is, of course, not the same thing. 

I am aware of the pilot program that was mentioned and the results there are not satisfactory looking at the ultra-high frequency 

vicinity-read. However, I also know that this kind of technology 

works. It is in use on both our borders today with the NEXUS and 

SENTRI programs. The DOD has used it. And as has been mentioned, there is technology on the horizon that would combine the 

longer read, faster flow with the biometric capability. It is not here 

yet, but it is on the horizon. 

Proponents of the vicinity-read technology would say that implementing this through a phased approach would give significant 

benefits in the near term, increasing dividends on security, and 

commerce in the future while minimizing delays. That is the chief 

advantage there. However, it is not up to me or my association to 

pick winners in this space, and I think Government should be very 

careful about picking winners and losers as well. As Senator 

Cornyn I think alluded to earlier, Government should define the 

mission, objectives, and requirements, and then go to the technology sector of the country and find what is best to fit the mission 

and the objectives and the priorities that Congress in its oversight 

helps to set. 

If I can, with 12 seconds, I want to briefly just point out that 

some folks very legitimately concerned about privacy have depicted 

vicinity-read RFID as a privacy risk. I would submit that it is not 

at all inherently secure and that those charges do not really hold 

up to scrutiny because, again, it only transmits a number, like your 

license plate, and unless you know which secure data base to go 

to and how those numbers correspond to the personally identifiable 

information, the risk is very, very small. In fact, in the 10 years 

that these kind of technologies have been in use, I am not aware 

of any identity theft problems that come from that operation. 

I am over my time limit. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bond appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Bond. 

Mr. Verdery? 

STATEMENT OF C. STEWART VERDERY, JR., PARTNER AND 

FOUNDER, MONUMENT POLICY GROUP, LLC, AND ADJUNCT 

FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL 

STUDIES, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. VERDERY. Chairman Feinstein and Ranking Member Cornyn 

and Senator Kennedy, it is nice to return to your Committee again 

and talk about some of the issues that the country faces in securing 

our borders and mixing policy, technology, and personnel to do so. 

Not only must these programs protect us against terrorism, crime, 

and illegal immigration, but also must welcome those and facilitate 

the travel of those who contribute to our economic livelihood and 

contribute to our public diplomacy efforts. 

My written testimony goes into great depth about six priorities 

for US–VISIT in 2007 and moving forward. I am only going to 

20

touchon some of them. But, in order, they are airport exit, the 

International Registered Traveler Program, land entry and exit, 

transition from two- to ten-fingerprint capture, cooperation internationally, and how this would fit in with our employment 

verification efforts. I have a great faith in the US–VISIT Program 

Office and the Office of Screening Coordination at the Department 

to make the best use of the dollars that Congress gives them under 

the authorities that they are operating under. 

As you may know, I served as Assistant Secretary for Border and 

Transportation Security Policy at DHS 2003 to 2005 working for 

Tom Ridge and Asa Hutchinson. I was proud to help build the US–

VISIT Program into what it is today. We spent many years, as you 

mentioned in your opening statement, Madam Chairman, with no 

deployment because people could not figure out how to build a system all at once. So Secretary Ridge made the tough decision to 

build this in increments, and that is the way it has gone since, and 

it has worked well with what has been built. The problem has been 

the lack of progress in the last couple years on building additional 

steps. 

One reason for that fact is, of course, the budget for the program has relatively been flat, between $330 million and $362 million a 

year for the last 5 years, just enough to pay for ongoing operations 

and the important interoperability work with the FBI systems. In 

addition, the post-Ridge leadership has gone the extra mile to try 

to coordinate US–VISIT with other credentialing and screening 

programs resulting in delays. 

I was interested to see the GAO report that Mr. Stana released 

last month. I thought it was a fascinating report. Some news stories picked this up as a huge bombshell. It was a development out 

of left field no one had heard of. We had taken a shocking turn 

away from monitoring departures of all foreigners leaving the country—except it is not so shocking and it is not a new development. 

There has never been money in the budget that has been requested, and there has never been money in the budget that has 

been enacted to do a land exit solution for the reasons that have 

been discussed here related to infrastructure and personnel. 

On air exit, I do believe that DHS and US–VISIT have to end 

2 years of deliberation and choose a system to deploy. They have 

had a difficult time deciding whether to place this at the airport 

check-in counter, at the TSA checkpoint, at the boarding gate, or 

at some combination of the above. In my view, it ought to be at the 

checkpoint where TSA screeners operate because they are used to 

interacting with the public. You have a law enforcement presence 

there. You have information technology connectivity there, and also 

it is a natural funneling device to move people through a limited 

number of locations as opposed to putting it at the counter or at 

the gate. This, of course, would have to require coordination with 

the airlines’ departure records to make sure that the person who 

was ‘‘exited’’ biometrically at the checkpoint actually left the country. 

Hopefully, once we have a robust exit system, this would change 

some of our visa policies that have been deterring travel to the 

United States. The overwhelming majority of people who want 

visas, don’t get them because we are not sure they are going to 

21

leave. Hopefully, with a robust exit system, we could expand the 

Visa Waiver Program if countries meet the security criteria that 

DHS has put forward, the new proposal that has been proposed, as 

well as requiring those nationals to compile a sterling record—and 

whatever percentage you want, 98 percent, 99 percent—of on-time 

dedicated departures. I think this is a way to both do the risk management of travel that we need to do and also make our country 

more welcoming than it has been in several years. 

The Discover America Partnership announced a report today endorsing the Visa Waiver Program enhancements that the President 

has put forward, but also the exit requirement as a way to make 

sure that people have actually left the country. 

Another aspect of this would be the International Registered 

Traveler Program. Frequent business travelers, whether they are 

U.S. citizens returning to the country or foreigners coming to the 

country, should not have to through robotic screening time after 

time after time. The U.K. has deployed a system, their Project 

IRIS. They are going to have a million people enrolled by the end 

of the decade who have been enrolled, gone through a thorough 

background check, and are able to skip immigration processing 

with a random audit function, of course. It is a way to maximize 

the attention on less known travelers. 

On the land side—and it looks like I am running out of time—

I do believe that the RFID solution that Secretary Bond mentioned 

can work. The piloting that was done in the last couple years, the 

results were not good, but I think it really will require a port-byport deployment with the kind of resources you need to put the 

gantries in the right place. Programs are coming online with RFID 

and travel documents, such as the Western Hemisphere Passport 

Card, which will be unveiled later this year or perhaps next with 

RFID. The Border Crossing Card that Mexicans travel with will 

need to be retrofitted to include RFID. And this can work, and we 

should not wait for a biometric, bio-token system which could be 

several years down the road, which is the ultimate solution. We 

should be able to do both at the same time. 

As I mentioned, my written testimony also talks about the use 

of biometrics from employment verification as part of the guest 

worker program. Perhaps we can address that in written questions. 

I thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Verdery appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, gentlemen, very, very much. 

Mr. Verdery, since you mentioned the Visa Waiver Program, as 

you know, two terrorists entered the country on the Visa Waiver 

Program: Mr. Moussaoui and the Shoe Bomber, Mr. Reid. As you 

also know, there are 27 countries, there were 15 million people who 

came in a year ago on Visa Waiver, and no one knows whether 

they left or not. 

You also know that there is great pressure to expand the program. The rejection rate of Visa Waiver is 3 percent. In other 

words, if you are a country that rejects more than 3 percent of 

the—has 3 percent or more of the visas to come here rejected, you 

are not eligible. Well, these countries have like 20 percent rejecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:06 Apr 20, 2007 Jkt 034148 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\34148.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
22

tion, 25 percent rejection. I don’t know whether you know or not, 

but there are tens of thousands of Visa Waiver country passports 

that are stolen, international travel documents, Geneva Convention 

travel documents that are stolen, international driver’s licenses 

that are stolen. What do you think happens to those? People buy 

them. They are in the country that is part of the Visa Waiver Program, and they come into this country, and we do not know who 

they really are. Now, some of us have had a bill to tighten up passport fraud. Use a forged passport illegally, you know, it is a go-tojail card, which it should be in my view. 

Having said that, I think, you know, we are with this dilemma. 

The bigger these programs get, the more people come here and 

stay, the more you swell the undocumented population, which creates this backlash in America which prevents us from doing a number of things to reform immigration. 

Mr. Bond, you mentioned that there are systems that could provide the kind of exit program, and you mentioned coordinating 

them with the I–94 document. I am not asking you to declare a 

winner and a loser in the competitive race for this, but what kind 

of a system would be most practical, would be doable, and satisfy 

verification simply that a visa holder has left the country? 

Mr. BOND. Well, I think in the near term there is no perfect solution right now. You could attach RFID to the I–94 and know that 

the I–94—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. You could attach—go ahead. 

Mr. BOND. RFID technology on the form. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Right. 

Mr. BOND. It could actually go on the form, and so you know 

when the I–94 has left. Now, if that were combined with random 

testing of some leaving, the visitor who is getting ready to leave 

thinks, well, there is some chance I may be pulled out and checked, 

and so you have some additional security. Ultimately what they are 

looking at is—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Is that costly to do that, to attach it to the 

I–94 form? 

Mr. BOND. No. I think compared to some of the alternatives, that 

would be considered a very low-cost factor. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And so that would be a chip. Is that correct? 

Mr. BOND. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. That essentially would have biometric 

identifiers? 

Mr. BOND. No. In this case, it would have—currently, it would 

just simply transmit a unique number, which then, when read on 

the other end, that separately connects to a secure data base that 

tells you what that number corresponds to. This is where I used 

the example of your license plate. It does not really tell you anything, but when combined with the DMV data base, then you know 

who that person is. That could be done today, but, again, if it is 

attached to the form, it only tells you the form has left. If you combine it with some random testing, you get some more discipline in 

the system perhaps. 

They are looking at ways to use a biometric on the form—and 

this is where you heard concern about safety and ergonomics—so 

23

that it perhaps might have a biometric on the form so when my 

thumb is read, that releases the identifier. So then I know that not 

only is it the I–94 but it is my I–94 because it read my finger. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Fascinating. 

Mr. BOND. But that is not here today, I want to be clear about 

that. 

Mr. VERDERY. Senator, could I just jump in? Because, again, the 

air side is a key. You do not need all this for the air side. You have 

people there. You have connectivity. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. You do not need all this what? 

Mr. VERDERY. You do not need these forms and this kind of 

RFID. You have the person right there who can be fingerprinted. 

So the air side, it is just a question of where you put it—at the 

checkpoint, at the counter, at the gate. You have the person right 

in front of you, can put their fingerprints down, two, four, ten, or 

whatever. 

And then in terms of the visa waiver question, if people who 

come in, fly in from France or Japan or a new country, South 

Korea, and want to leave for a day trip to Mexico, that is fine. They 

come back in. But they still would have to leave the U.S. by air, 

‘‘exited,’’ checked out. You would know they left within 90 days. 

And if their country does not compile a sterling record, it is out. 

It would solve the problem that you eloquently described. 

Mr. STANA. Senator, can I add a note of caution to the RFID discussion? 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Please. 

Mr. STANA. One of the things that concerns me about the discussion of using a card or a key fob and pressing your thumb to it as 

you leave at X number of miles an hour is that I have witnessed 

Border Patrol agents at Border Patrol stations and I have witnessed inspectors at the ports trying to take fingerprints. Taking 

fingerprints is nothing that is easy, that you can just put your finger on a form while you are talking on the cell phone going through 

a port at 35 miles an hour. Maybe technology will catch up, but 

currently it is very difficult to get readable prints that would satisfy the biometric identity requirement of the law. Prints, you 

know, are pressed too hard, or too soft; it could be raining outside, 

or be foggy. As a result the technology does not pick up the print. 

The car’s glass could be tinted. You might hold the I–84 too close 

to your body. There is any number of reasons why it won’t work 

as planned. There might be a solution down the road, but right 

now I think it is a bit optimistic. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So come up with a better one. 

Mr. STANA. Well, right now—what can we do right now, I guess 

is your question. Right now there is no good solution, and unless 

you want to embark on a $3 to $5 billion building program—and 

I do not think any of us want to do that. There might be something 

downstream a little ways that we can rely on. Right now we might 

be able to build somewhat on current trusted traveled programs, 

but, again, you are basically keeping honest people honest. People 

who enroll in those programs are not a threat. They are likely to 

leave. But it is a start. 

The other thing I would do is I would look to non-US–VISIT, 

non-trusted traveler programs to see if we can get there through 

24

different means. Senator Cornyn mentioned more effective work 

site enforcement, beefing up ICE agents to search out visa 

overstays. If you do the math, Senator, there are about 5 million 

visa overstays in the United States—12 million illegal alien times 

roughly 40 percent estimated to be overstays, you get about 5 million overstays. ICE has between 200 and 300 agents out looking for 

them right now. And if you consider the numbers, you would see 

they are not going to get very far, and it explains the 200 apprehensions figure that Mr. Mocny mentioned a few minutes ago. So 

that is one way we can do it. 

We can beef up intelligence services to try to get our line of defense up so we do not let dangerous people in to begin with. We 

only know to stop those on the watchlist, and there are ways we 

can improve those lists. And then, of course, there’s the work site. 

If people are coming here to find work, fine. We can acknowledge 

that and create a temporary worker program. Or we can enforce 

the work site rules and reduce the size of that haystack, so to 

speak. 

But until a technology solution presents itself, I think we need 

to take interim steps. But I would caution against taking a step 

that would lead us to a large investment that would not ultimately 

be the solution we are looking for. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. My time is up. Mr. Bond had wanted to respond. Do you mind, Senator? 

Senator CORNYN. No. 

Mr. BOND. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein. Just one additional 

point. While I agree that the technology is not there today, you had 

mentioned, Chairman Feinstein, your desire for at least a starting 

point. And I guess if I could, I would say a common denominator 

you may be hearing here is some combination of faster flowing vicinity read along with bringing some percentage of the folks out for 

a real fingerprint biometric test so there is some discipline or decent chance of discipline in the system. But that might be a starting point for you and the Department to discuss. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Just one quick comment. I think Mr. Stana 

is right about the fingerprint. I think they are very difficult. You 

have to have very trained people. They do take time, and I am not 

sure that that is the right biometric indicator to use for this. 

What piqued my interest was the I–94 form that is simple, that 

is a piece of paper, but that Canadian officials and Mexican officials at least at places collect. Maybe there is a way of temporarily 

building on that. 

Mr. BOND. That would let you know, as I said, that the form had 

left. You do not have real correlation between—certain correlation. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. We understand that. We understand it is 

imperfect. 

Mr. BOND. But it would be the starting point, right. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I mean, China, you know, you go into 

China, and you get a piece of paper, and you fill it out. It is in triplicate. And you give it out at various places, and when you leave, 

you provide one piece of paper, too. They know you have left. 

Mr. BOND. I think all I was trying to suggest is just as we do 

at airports pull some people out for a little bit closer examination, 

25

you may do that with some percentage of the folks going across the 

land borders. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Sorry, Senator. Go right ahead. 

Senator CORNYN. No problem. We have a former State elected official in Texas who likes to, when she is traveling around the State 

on the stump, talk about the Yellow Pages test and her conviction 

that Government should not do anything that you can find provided by a private party in the Yellow Pages. And I think there is 

a lot of merit to that. 

But I am struck by the fact that I can carry a card like this 

around with me, provided by the financial services industry, and I 

can transfer funds at a store, at a money machine, virtually anywhere in the world. And in the United States, in talking about the 

various incremental changes we have made to try to adapt to a 

post-9/11 environment, we have, for example, Mr. Stana, you mentioned the Secure Border Initiative, which is a huge project that 

has been announced by the Department of Homeland Security. I 

think, Mr. Verdery, you talked about the Western Hemisphere 

Travel Initiative, which will require American citizens to have a 

passport or passport equivalent just to go back and forth to Mexico 

or back and forth to Canada, out of the country. We have the laser 

visas that we issue to Mexican nationals. We have the port security 

bill we passed late last year that requires workers at ports to carry 

cards that will demonstrate they have gone through the appropriate background and security check. And we have this proliferation of programs and cards. 

And what I worry about a little bit is that Government is just 

so slow and we do things in such an incremental way that the wisdom perhaps of a program that seemed like exactly the thing we 

needed to do 5 years ago after 9/11 has sort of been overcome by 

subsequent events. I would be interested to know, and perhaps get 

a comment from each of you, about whether there is anything that 

you would recommend we do to reduce or minimize that problem 

in order to address the concerns that we are talking about here 

today. 

Mr. Stana, do you have any thoughts? 

Mr. STANA. Well, yes, I have a few thoughts. 

First, you mentioned a number of programs—SBI, WHTI, US–

VISIT, and so on. There is an alphabet soup of border security programs—NEXUS, SENTRI. If they are not well coordinated and 

funded on a level where they complement each other, I think we 

might be at a point where we are creating chains with a lot of 

weak links. A great US–VISIT Program is not going to be any good 

if you can walk 2 miles down the border and cross without detection. So that is one point. 

The second point is let’s define what the goals are. What are we 

trying to achieve here? If we are trying to achieve a criminal-and 

terror-free country, then I would want to beef up entry, because I 

think experience has shown that sometimes terrorists they do not 

exit alive. 

If I am looking for immigration control, I would—

Senator CORNYN. If I could just interject there, the problem is 

when they get in, not them leaving. 

26

Mr. STANA. Exactly. 

Mr. BOND. Because they are going to do their damage, and we—

Mr. STANA. They are going to do their damage and they do not 

care if they leave. If you are looking for immigration control, there 

are any number of programs and methods of getting at overstays 

without a US–VISIT system. The trick is identifying them. 

I would point out we ran into this identification and location 

issue with the old Alien Registration Program. I don’t know if you 

remember, but every January, aliens used to have to go to the post 

office and fill out a card about their whereabouts. And many filled 

it out, and many did not because they did not want to be found. 

And that is the problem that ICE has now. Even when US–VISIT 

sends them the names of overstays, trying to find people who do 

not want to be found is extremely difficult. 

We all leave electronic fingerprints everywhere. You pointed at 

your credit card, and somewhere, if you used it today, there is 

going to be a record of you using it. If you do not want to be found, 

you do not us the you do not use the card and those records will 

not exist. So if we are trying to find overstays and if overstays is 

the problem we are trying to address, you probably do not need a 

US–VISIT system or have to rely solely on a US–VISIT system to 

get there. You might find another way to at least start doing that. 

But I would agree with the proposition that we ought to know 

who is in the country and we ought to have some way to assure 

our border security and our internal security, but maybe we do not 

need to wait until the US–VISIT technology is mature enough to 

give us that assurance. 

Senator CORNYN. Mr. Stana, your comments remind of—I think 

I have seen or read about cell phones that are being marketed to 

parents because they have the capacity to be tracked by global positioning systems so they can determine where their children are. 

Mr. STANA. That is true. The same with the video surveillance 

technology with cameras everywhere. I have been told that there 

probably are not too many hours of the day—and those hours are 

probably at home in your bedroom while you are asleep—where 

you are not recorded on some camera, either passing by an ATM 

machine or being in a CVS pharmacy. 

Senator CORNYN. I am not suggesting we issue cell phones to all 

of our visitors when they come to the United States, but, clearly, 

the technology exists if we can figure a way to direct it in a way 

that is most constructive. 

I know my time is up, but I would appreciate it, Madam Chairman, if Mr. Bond and Mr. Verdery could respond. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Please, go ahead. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you. 

Mr. BOND. Thank you. I will be very brief. I think that that, as 

was alluded to here, Government should define the mission, the objectives, and the prioritized requirements so that you can get started, and then sit down with those folks in the Yellow Pages who are 

the technology leaders, many of them in Texas and California, and 

figure out what is possible, what is possible in the near term, what 

really are longer-term considerations so you can begin to match the 

technology with the prioritized requirements. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you. 

27

Mr. VERDERY. Senator, just a few points. One, I completely agree 

with the need to synergize and look at these programs holistically. 

There is a new office at the Department that started last year, the 

Office of Screening Coordination. That is their exact job, to look at 

these credentialing programs and find out where the gaps are, 

where the benefits are in coordination. And they are trying to do 

that. 

I think in terms of the land systems, if you could get a system 

where the Western Hemisphere Passport Card or a State-issued 

passport card was online with RFID, you retrofitted the Border 

Crossing Cards or laser visas with RFID, you have people with the 

new e-Passports—it is a different kind of RFID, but it would still 

probably work—you essentially have gotten to the point where 

most people are coming in with an RFID capability that could be 

tracked inbound and outbound; you have gotten far down the road 

for the land borders. 

The other question would be, as Mr. Stana mentioned, on the 

entry side, the ten-print conversion that you have heard a lot about 

is unfortunately moving rather slowly. This was announced in the 

summer of 2005. Those machines are out there. They are being 

tested, but we are not talking about full implementation now until 

the end of 2008 at our consular posts and ports of entry. And they 

are not the big giant, bulky ones you saw before. They are very 

smooth and work well. So I think that is an entry security enhancement that is ready to go from a technology basis. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Just by way of having a bit of discussion 

here until we have the vote and can excuse the panel, I want to 

go back to the national security implications. There is a lot of pressure on us economically, ease everything, let people come in—largely, a lot of businesses. I have had California companies, I have had 

others come in to me. They run big operations. They want more 

and more and more people. 

On the other hand, you have to look at it as to whether we are 

going to be a country that respects a border at all, and we have 

always been a sieve. People have come, they have gone, and we 

now find ourselves wanting to have some security, some knowledge, 

with huge immigration problems that grow every year. 

Senator Cornyn and I got interested in the last Congress in 

something that is called the OTM, the Other than Mexican, who 

comes across the Mexican border. And we see those numbers burgeoning, and we see more people appearing from Middle Eastern 

countries who come into the country illegally through Mexico—all 

of which sends a signal, you know, there could be a problem. 

And I do not know how we sit here and just shrug our shoulders 

and say, well, it does not appear to be doable, without trying different things. And I do not think the perfect should be the enemy 

of the good. I think we probably do not worry about the fingerprint 

on it, but just at least if you give in a piece of paper when you 

leave, that is a record that that individual has left. 

And so I am really interested in following this through and trying to get a continuum of technology where, for a modest investment up front, you can begin to get this correct accounting and 

then build on it as the technology improves. So if anybody has any 

28

ideas, at least I—and I hope Senator Cornyn, too—would be interested in receiving them. 

Would you like to make any further comment? 

Senator CORNYN. Just one last comment, Senator Feinstein. 

Thank you very much again for convening this hearing. This is important to me and my constituents in Texas and I submit, to the 

Nation, for the reasons that you have mentioned and we have discussed here today. But I think there is also a risk that we need 

to acknowledge, and that is, a false sense of security. 

I am reminded of the recent raids by ICE on the Swift Meat 

Packing Plant companies across the country. This is a company 

that participated in a voluntary program, as you know, called Basic 

Pilot to be able to verify that, in fact, their employees could legitimately work in the United States. So they were sort of the good 

guys participating in it. But what they did not realize is that a 

large percentage of their employees were using forged documents, 

which Basic Pilot does not reveal. And so while it is true that they 

were—that because they participated in the Basic Pilot program, 

they were immunized from certain penalties that might otherwise 

attach to those who hire people who cannot legally work in the 

country, they suffered millions of dollars of business disruption because, in fact, they were under the false impression that if they 

just complied like a good citizen with the Basic Pilot program that 

they would be protected. And they were not. 

So this is another way to look at this problem that we have got 

to solve as we address all these other issues. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I really agree with that, and this is really 

about bringing order out of disorder. And I think it is worth it to 

do it, and I think it makes it easier for us to do some of those 

things like a guest worker program that you referred to, Mr. Stana, 

because there is so much hyperbole. People’s emotions swell so 

greatly around this issue. And we cannot go out and represent to 

anyone that our borders are enforced. We just cannot do it. And 

that is a very terrible situation. 

So my very strong view is that we have to walk before we run, 

that we should work on, even if it is a paper system, whatever it 

is, to try to bring about a continuum of order and have it cost-effective. 

So, once again, any suggestions would be more than welcome, 

and I really want to thank the witnesses for being here. I hope to 

continue this conversation. I know Senator Cornyn, Senator Kyl, 

and Senator Kennedy would like to as well. 

Thank you very much. The vote has started, and the meeting is 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.]

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