[ DO NOT PUBLISH ]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 19

- 14097

________________________ D.C. Docket No s
. 1:09

- md

- 02036

- JLK ; 1:08

- cv - 22463

- JLK

In re: Checking Account Overdraft Litigation
1:09

- md

- 02036

- JLK THOMAS LARSEN, et al., Plaintiffs, MELANIE L. GARCIA, CELIA SPEARS

- HAYMOND, DELORES GUTIERREZ, MARC MARTINEZ, ALEX ZANKICH, Plaintiffs

- Appellants,

versus CITIBANK FSB, et al., Defendants, WELLS FARGO BANK N.A., WACHOVIA BANK, N.A., WACHOVIA CORPORATION,

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 1 of 20Defendant

- Appel lee.

__________________________________________________________________ 1:08

- CV

- 22463

- JLK MELANIE L. GARCIA, Plaintiff

- Appellant,
Versus WACHOVIA BANK, N.A.., Defendant

- Appellee.

__________________________________________________________________ 1:09

- cv - 21680

- JLK
CELIA SPEARS

- HAMMOND, as an individual, and on behalf of all others similarly s ituated, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v ersus WACHOVIA CORPORATION, WACHOVIA BANK N.A., Defendants

- Appellees.

________________________ Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

________________________ ( April 7, 2021 ) USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 2 of 203 Before WILSON , GRANT, and TJOFLAT , Circuit Judges. WILSON, Circuit Judge : This case presents the question whether, in light of arbitration agreements contained in two contracts, the district court properly dismissed the claims of unnamed members of five class actions in favor of individual arbitration. The parties

— on one side, a bank, and, on the other side, five classes made up of former and current customers of the bank

— dispute the enforceabilit y of arbitration clauses contained in their account agreements. After careful review, we find that arbitration is appropriate, and affirm the district court. I. Background Plaintiffs are members of five class actions filed against Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A ., for itself and its predecessor, Wachovia Bank, N.A. 1 Each complaint challenges alleged practices of Wells Fargo relating to overdraft fees. Plaintiffs alleg e that such practices breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under their respect ive account agreements

— either the Wells Fargo Consumer Account Agreement (Wells Fargo Agreement) or the Wachovia Deposit Agreement (Wachovia Agreement). 2 This issue has yet to be addressed, and we

1 Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia in January 2009. Wachovia has since ceased to exist as a separate bank. For that reason, we refer to both banks jointly as Wells Fargo

. 2 Wells Fargo is not alone in having been accused of unlawful overdraft

- fee practices. T he Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these five class actions with dozens of similar cases filed against approximately thirty banks

. In re Checking Acc t. Overdraft Litig

. , 626

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 3 of 204 will not address it here because t his case is about arbit ration

— specifically, about the enforceability of the arbitration clauses contained in the Wells Fargo and Wachovia Agreements. In relevant part, the Wells Fargo Agreement reads: Dispute Resolution Program: Arbitration A greement This section constitutes the Arbitration Agreement between you and the B ank.
Non
- Judicial Resolution of Disputes If you have a dispute with the Bank, and you are not able to resolve the dispute informally, you and the Bank agree that any dispute between o r among you and the Bank, regardless of when it arose, shall be resolved by the following arbitration process

. You understand and agree that you and the Bank are each waiving the right to a jury trial or a trial before a judge in a public court. Disputes

. . . A dispute

. . . includes any disagreement about the meaning of this Arbitration Agreement, and whether a disagreement is a “dispute” subject to binding arbitration as provided for in this Arbitration Agreement.

. . . Binding Arbitration

. . . . Eac h arbitration, including the selection of the arbitrator shall be administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA), according to the Commercial Arbitration Rules and the Supplemental Procedures for Consumer Related Disputes

. . . . To the extent that there is any variance between the AAA Rules and this

F. Supp. 2d 1333 (U.S. Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 2009). The case before us is just the latest installment in a series of appeals concerning this multidistrict litigation (MDL)

.

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 4 of 205 Arbitration Agreement, this Arbitration Agreement shall control.

. . . In relevant part , the Wachovia Agreement reads:
25. Arbitration of Disputes/Waiver of Jury Trial and Participation in Class Actions. If either you or we request, an y dispute or claim concerning your account or your relationship to us will be decided by binding arbitration under the expedited procedures of the Commercial Financial Disputes Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), and Title 9 of the US Code.

. . . Each party will pay its own costs and attorney’s fees.

. . .

. . . The arbitration or trial will be brought individually a nd not as part of a class action. If it is brought as a class action, it must proceed on an individual (non

- class, non

representative) basis. YOU UNDERSTAND AND KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE THAT YOU AND WE ARE WAIVING THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY AND THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE OR BE REPRESENTED IN ANY CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT.

. . . . 31. Changing this Agreement. We have the right to change the terms of this Agreement

. . . . We will notify you in writing at least thirty calendar days before the change will take effect if the change is not in your favor. Notably, the arbitration clauses require individual, nonclass arbitration of any disputes concerning the customer’s account. In the agreements, the clauses are set off by a heading in bolded type and listed in the t able s of c ontents. The Wells Fargo Agreement contains a delegation clause, delegating to the arbitrator “any

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 5 of 206 disagreement about the meaning of this Arbitration Agreement, and whether a disagreement is a ‘dispute’ subject to binding arbitrat ion as provided for in this Arbitration Agreement.” Both agreements incorporate the American Arbitration Association’s (AAA) Commercial Financial Disputes Arbitration Rules, and in the case of the Wells Fargo Agreement, the Supplemental Procedures for Consumer Related Disputes (AAA Rules). Wells Fargo invoked the arbitration clause from each agreement and filed a motion to dismiss the claims of the unnamed class members

— i.e., all members of the certified class other than the named Plaintiffs

— and compel arbitration. 3 Plaintiffs opposed the motion and argued that the arbitration cla uses in the Wells Fargo and Wachovia Agreements are illusory and unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable. The district court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments and dismissed the claims of the unnamed class members without prejudice to the right of any

unn amed class member to bring his or her claim in an individual arbitration according to the terms of the applicable contract. With respect to the Wells Fargo Agreement, the district court did not reach the question of whether the arbitration clause was illu sory and/or unconscionable

.

3 This is the third time Wells Fargo renewed its motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, making this appeal the fourth of the parties’ arbitration

- related appeals we have heard. Garcia v. Wachovia Corp

. , 699 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2012); In re Checking Acc t. Overdraft Litig

. , 780 F.3d 1031 (11th Cir. 2015); Gutierrez v. Wells Farg o Bank, NA , 889 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2018).

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 6 of 207 The court found that the delegation clause delegates to the arbitrator all questions of arbitrability, including Plaintiffs’ challenge to the enforceability of the arbitration clause. In other words, the district court determin ed that it was up to the arbitrator

— not the court

— to determine whether the parties must arbitrate. Because the Wachovia Agreement does not contain a delegation clause, the district
court did decide whether the arbitration clause in the Wachovia Agreement is illusory and/or unconscionable. Applying Eleventh Circuit precedent, the court found that it is neither. On appeal, Plaintiffs contest both determinations. 4 First, they argue that the district court erred because the delegation clause in the Wells Fargo Agreement only assigns two arbitrability issues to the arbitrator

— and Plaintiffs’ challenge to the enforceability of the agreement is not one of them. Second, they argue that the district court improperly took a “one

- size

- fits

- all” approach when it analyzed the enforceability of the Wachovia Agreement pursuant to Eleventh Circuit caselaw. Plaintiffs contend that the district court should have conducted a state

- by

- state analysis when considering if the arbitration clause is illusory or unconscionabl e. To this end, Plaintiffs claim that the district court should have focused on the laws

4 Plaintiffs a dvance a third argument that Wells Fargo waived its arbitration rights. We already held in Gutierrez , that Wells Fargo appropriately preserved its arbitration rights as to the unnamed class members

. See generally 889 F.3d 1230. While we decided that case on different grounds, Plaintiffs concede that they presented the exact same argument in Gutierrez that they make here. We see no reason to revisit the issue and maintain that Wells Fargo has not waived its right to invoke arbitration.

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 7 of 208 of the District Columbia and other relevant states where Wells Fargo conducted business in considering these issues. We address each argument in turn. II. Standard of Review We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion to compel arbitration. In re Checking Acc t. Overdraft Litig. , 754 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2014). We also review de novo a district court’s interpretation of an arbitration provisi on. Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd. , 657 F.3d 1204, 1213 (11th Cir. 2011). III. The Wells Fargo Agreement We start with the Wells Fargo Agreement. Plaintiffs argued before the district court that the contract’s arbitration clause is unconscionable , and thus the court could not enforce it. The district court did not reach this issue because the delegation clause delegates all questions of arbitrability

— or gateway issues

— to the arbitrator. Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that their claim

— that the arbit ration clause is unenforceable

— is not governed by the delegation clause. Therefore, Plaintiffs contend, the delegation clause does not require them to arbitrate this specific gateway issue. “Arbitration is a matter of contract and of consent.” JPay, I nc. v. Kobel , 904 F.3d 923, 928 (11th Cir. 2018). Arbitrators can resolve disputes in arbitration only because the parties have agreed to do so in advance. Id. Where parties have

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 8 of 209 agreed to arbitrate certain questions, it is the duty of the court to enfo rce that agreement. Id. at 929. But the court may not require arbitration beyond the parties’ agreement. Id. So it must use caution when requiring parties to arbitrate gateway issues. “A party often might not focus

. . . upon the significance of havin g arbitrators decide the scope of their own powers.” First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan , 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995). Therefore, we presume that it is up to the court to decide arbitrability, unless the parties “clearly and unmistakably” provide that the arbitrator should decide arbitrability. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am. , 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986). We have repeatedly ruled that the reference or incorporation of AAA R ules with language providing that “the arbitrator shall have the power t o rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement” demonstrates a clear and unmistakable intent that the arbitrator should decide all questions of arbitrability. S ee JPay , 904 F.3d at 938

– 39 (alteration adopted) (“[W]e read an arbitration agreement incorporating AAA rules containing this language as clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties contracted around the default rule and intended to delegate questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator.”); Sp i rit Ai rlines, Inc. v. Maizes , 899 F.3d 1230, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018) (“The parties’ agreement plainly chose AAA rules [containing this language].

. . . [T]his is clear and unmistakable evidence that

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 9 of 2010 the parties chose to have an arbitrator decide whether their agre ement provided for class arbitration.”); U.S. Nu t raceuticals, LLC v. Cyanotech Corp. , 769 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2014) (“When the parties incorporated into the 2007 contract the [AAA Rules containing this language], they clearly and unmistakably contra cted to submit questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator.”); Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. , 432 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he parties have agreed that the arbitrator will answer this [gateway] question by providing

. . . that ‘arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the [AAA Rules].”). Our caselaw is dispositive here. Plaintiffs and Wells Fargo clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate all gateway issues. The Wells Fargo Agreement explicitly incorporates commercial AAA Ru les: “Each arbitration, including the selection of the arbitrator shall be administered by the [AAA], according to the Commercial Arbitration Rules and the Supplemental Procedures for Consumer Related Disputes.” Further, those commercial AAA Rules specifi cally provide that the arbitrator will decide questions of arbitrability : “The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement o r to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.” 5 This alone is sufficient for us to find the requisite clear and unmistakable intent to arbitrate arbitrability.

5 Am

. Arb

. Ass ’ n, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures R

- 7 (a)

.

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 10 of 2011 Plaintiffs raise four arguments in support of their theory that the delegation claus e does not apply to all gateway issues, and importantly, does not apply to the gateway issue at hand. However, we do not find them persuasive. First, Plaintiffs
argue that the incorporation is ineffective because the agreement incorporates commercial AAA Rules rather than consumer AAA Rules. But we have been willing to accept the incorporation of any AAA Rules so long as they contain the proper language as clear and unmistakable evidence of an agreement to arbitrate gateway issues. See , e.g. , JPay , 904 F.3d at 937 (noting that we do not “interrogate which specific AAA rules were incorporated through t he contract’s general incorporation language” ) . As such, our precedent compels that we construe the delegation clause in the Wells Fargo Agreement as a clear and unmistakable intent to delegate to the arbitrator questions of arbitrability. Second, r elyin g on an out

- of

- circuit, unpublished district court decision, Plaintiffs contend that incorporation of AAA Rules is “insufficient to establish delegation in consumer contracts involving at least on e unsophisticated party.” Ingalls v. Spotify USA, Inc. , 201 6 WL 6679561 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2016). However, we have never distinguished between agreements involving sophisticated and unsophisticated parties, and those involving only sophisticated parties; in fact, our precedent includes cases about agreements inv olving unsophisticated parties. See generally, e.g. , JPay , 904 F.3d 923 (incorporation of

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 11 of 2012 the AAA Rules signaled clear and unmistakable intent to arbitrate arbitrability issues arising between a money

- transfer vendor and its customers); Spirit Airlines , 8 99 F.3d 1230 (incorporation of AAA Rules signaled clear and unmistakable intent to arbitrate arbitrability issues arising between a major airline company and its customers). Third, Plaintiffs argue that the incorporation of the AAA Rules cannot

overcome the plain language of the delegation clause, which limits the arbitrability of gateway issues to only two specific instances: “[A]ny disagreement about [1] the meaning of this Arbitration Agreement, and [2] whether a disagreement is a ‘dispute’ subject to binding arbitration as provided for in this Arbitration Agreement.” This, Plaintiffs contend, expressly contradicts and creates tension with AAA Rules. However, we see no direct conflict between the two. Nothing in the Wells Fargo Agreement explicitly excludes or contradicts anything included in the AAA Rules. Read together, we view the incorporation and delegation clause as “mutually reinforcing methods of delegation.” JPay , 904 F.3d at 941. We have already said that the incorporation of the AAA Rul es was enough to indicate the parties’ clear and unmistakable intent to arbitrate gateway issues. Now, that incorporation, coupled with the delegation clause, proves to be more than enough. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the delegation clause is unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. Because the Wells Fargo Agreement delegates issues of

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 12 of 2013 interpretation, scope, and enforceability to the arbitrator, we only retain jurisdiction over challen ges directed specifically at that delegation. Rent

- A

- Center W., Inc. v. Jackson , 561 U.S. 63, 70

– 71 (2010). Where a plaintiff’s only challenge applies to the arbitration agreement more broadly, we leave those challenges to the arbitrator. See Parnell v. CashCall, Inc. , 804 F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th Cir. 2015). As the district court properly noted, “Plaintiffs do not identify any specific defect in the delegation clause and instead argue only that it is unconscionable ‘for the same reasons’ as the contract m ore generally.” W ithout Plaintiffs pointing to any specific deficiencies in the delegation clause, we find no reason to deem it unconscionable. Plaintiffs may take up their challenges to the contract as a whole with the arbitrator.
I V. The Wachovia Ag reement
We now turn to the Wachovia Agreement. Because the Wachovia Agreement contains no delegation provision like th e one in the Wells Fargo Agreement, the district court considered whether the arbitration clause was illusory and/ or unconscionable, ultimately determining it was neither. A. Illusoriness Plaintiffs argue that the Wachovia Agreement is illusory because it unilaterally empowers Wells Fargo to modify or delete the arbitrati on clause. However, the Wachovia Agreement only authorizes Wells Fargo to change the

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 13 of 2014 terms of the agreement so long as it “notif[ies] [Plaintiffs] in writing at least thirty calendar days before the change will take effect if the change is not in [their] favor.” In other words, Wells Fargo can make no changes to the agreement that would disadvantage Plaintiffs without first providing 30

- days’ notice of such change. During that time, Plaintiffs could opt out of the contract by closing their bank account. In another decision from this MDL, we held that similar notice protections defeated arguments that an arbitration clause was illusory. See Larsen v. CitiBank,
FSB , 871 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2017). In Larsen , we considered an account agreement where t he bank “reserve[d] the right to change or add to the terms and conditions of [the] Agreement or change the terms of [plaintiffs’] Account[s] at any time.” Id. at 1317. Per the agreement, the bank would provide “notice of the change as [it] determine[s] appropriate.” Id. The Larsen court interpreted the modification language as “specifically obligat[ing] [the bank] to provide consumers with notice prior to making any amendment.” Id. at 1321. Even though the bank had discretion to determine what notice period was “appropriate,” its “commitment to provide notice [was] accompanied by an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.” Id. And so we found that the bank’s “power to amend the Provision [was] therefore not unfettered, unlimited, or absolute.” Id.

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 14 of 2015 Here, the modification provision’s notice requirement demands more from the bank than the notice requirement in Larsen . Rather than “appropriate” notice, Wells Fargo must provide 30

- days’ notice of any changes to the terms of the agreement. Having already found that “appropriate” notice was enough, we can confidently say that the 30

- days’ notice protection is more than enough to overcome the argument that the Wachovia Agreement is illusory. This is true even though the Wachovia Agreement affords th e bank discretion as to when it must provide notice. Like the agreement in Larsen , and any contract for that matter, the Wachovia Agreement is subject to an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. And so Wells Fargo’s power to change the terms is no t “unfettered, unlimited, or absolute.” Id. However, Plaintiffs argue that Larsen is inapplicable

. They allege the Wachovia Agreement is illusory under the laws of California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Nevada, Tennessee, and Texas

— and the district court failed to conduct a thorough state

- by

- state analysis before determining the Wachovia Agreement was not illusory . We have held that “choice of law questions can be avoided if the laws of the different jurisdictions lead to identical results .” Shapiro v. Associated Int’l Ins. Co. , 899 F.2d 1116, 1118 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990). So applying Lars en is only problematic if the relevant jurisdictions’ laws would turn up different results. But Plaintiffs do not demonstrate how state

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 15 of 2016 specific analyses would result in different outcomes. Accordingly, we do not find that it was improper for the distric t court to rely on Larsen to conclude that the modification provisions in the Wachovia Agreement do not render the contract illusory. To the contrary, we agree with the court’s well

- reasoned, albeit brief, analysis of precedent from the relevant states, w hich actually confirms this conclusion. B. Unconscionability Plaintiffs argue that the Wachovia Agreement is also unenforceable because it is unconscionable. As a preliminary matter, while these issues of unconscionability are state

- law matters, Plai ntiffs have not shown that the state laws that would apply here differ in any material respect from those addressed in prior Eleventh Circuit decisions. See id. As such, we measure conscionability against those cases. 1. Procedural Unconscionability To start, Plaintiffs allege several theories of procedural unconscionability

. B ut binding caselaw and decisions from this MDL have already rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments. First, Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration clause is procedurally unconscionable b ecause it is the product of a gross disparity in bargaining power. However, “[a]s the Supreme Court has recognized, ‘[m]ere inequality in bargaining power

. . . is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 16 of 2017 are never enforceable.’” In re Checking Acc t. Overdraft Litig. MDL No. 2036 ( Hough ), 672 F.3d 1224, 1229 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. , 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991)). And we further noted in Hough that the disparity i n bargaining power must result in a contract that is “so one

- sided that no sane man not acting under a delusion would make and that no honest man would participate in the transaction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The arbitration clause in the Wachovia Agreement

— nearly identical to the one in Hough

— “falls well short of this standard.” Id. Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration clause is procedurally unconscionable because it was “buried” in a lengthy agreement “consisting of small print legalese.” But also in Hough , we rejected the notion that the arbitration clause was “not c onspicuous because it was buried on the twenty

- first page of a forty

- three page, single

- spaced document and in a maze of fine print.” Id. That was because there were “other aspects of the document that made apparent the agreement to arbitrate.” Id. The same is true here: the Wachovia Agreement specifically identifies the arbitration by including it in the table of contents and using a prominent heading. Last, Plaintiffs argue that the clause is procedurally unconscionable because it is a take

- it

- or - l eave - it proposition offering no opportunity to opt out of arbitration. We have previously stated that a contract is not procedurally

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 17 of 2018 unconscionable simply because it is a contract of adhesion. See, e.g. , id. (“take

- it

or - leave

- it” contract was not per se procedurally unconscionable); Larsen , 871 F.3d at 1310 (same). Additionally, we have already rejected the argument that “a consumer may not be bound by a term contained within a standardized adhesion contract merely because he has not been offered an opp ortunity to opt out of that provision.” Larsen , 871 F.3d at 1311

– 12. For these reasons, we find that the Wachovia Agreement is not procedurally unconscionable under our precedent. 2. Substantive Unconscionability Next, Plaintiffs argue substantive un conscionability. Plaintiffs first argue that the Wachovia Agreement is substantively unconscionable because it requires customers to pay Wells Fargo’s attorney’s fees and allows Wells Fargo to deduct those fees from customers’ accounts without notice. Bu t the only place where the Wachovia Agreement calls for customers to pay attorney’s fees is a clause governing conflicts and disputes involving the account

— not the arbitration clause. The arbitration clause explicitly states that “[e]ach party will pay it s own costs and attorney’s fees.” There is no fee shifting when it comes to arbitration

— so there is no fee

- shifting argument to be made. 6

6 Even if the fee

- shifting provision in the conflicts

- and

- dispute clause was unconscionable, it i s severable. Thus the arbitration provision would be enforceable regardless. See In re Checking Acc t. Overdraft Litig

. MDL No. 2036 ( Barras ), 685 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding that an unconscionable cost

- and

- fee

- shifting provision did not app ly to the arbitration provision and was therefore severable).

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 18 of 2019 Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Wachovia Agreement is substantively unconscionable because it leaves consumers f acing “insurmountable filing fees” as a condition of initiating arbitration. The AAA, however, charges no filing fee for consumers to arbitrate monetary claims against a company, and it caps the arbitrator fee at $125. 7 Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not shown that the unnamed class members would be unable to pay other arbitration

- related fees. See Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale , 325 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.

- Ala. v. Randolph , 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)) (“Under Gr een Tree , [the plaintiff] has an obligation to offer evidence of the amount of fees he is likely to incur, as well as of his inability to pay those fees.”). Without directing us to evidence of that inability to pay, Plaintiffs have not shown that the alle ged “insurmountable filing fees” would render the Wachovia Agreement substantively unconscionable. V. Conclusion To conclude, we find no error on the part of the district court for two reasons. First, the delegation clause in the Wells Fargo Agreement delegates all gateway issues, including the one here, to the arbitrator. As such, it wa s not for the district court to determine wh ether the agreement is illusory and unconscionable.

7 The $125 fee is hardly insurmountable, as we previously held in Larsen that a $150 filing fee is not unconscionable. 871 F.3d at 1315

– 16.

USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 19 of 2020 Second, the Wachovia Agreement is neither illusory nor unconscionable . There is no need to remand for state

- specific analyses because Plaintiffs have not shown how state

- by

- state analyses would deliver a different result . Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED. USCA11 Case: 19-14097 Date Filed: 04/07/2021 Page: 20 of 20