## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Pendergast v. Meade

Electric Co. , 2013 IL App (1st) 121317

Appellate Court Caption T HO M AS PENDERGAST, as Ex ecutor of the Estate of L I SA RI CHTER, Dec ease d, Plaintiff-Appellee
, v. MEADE E L ECTRI C CO M PA NY, I NC., an I llinois Corporation; THORNE EL ECTRI C, I N C.
, an I l linois Corporation; ECONOL I TE GROUP, I NC., a California Corporation, d/b/a Econolite Group Company
, Econoli t e Control Products, Inc., and Econolite; ALEX P. DYCHE, Individually ; and OL SSON ROOFI

NG COMPAN Y, I

NC., an I llinois Corporation, Def endants-A

ppellants (Metro Transpor tation Group, Inc., an I llinois Corporation, and Traf

fic Control Corporation, an I llinois Corporation, Def endants).–ROB ERT R. L EATHERS, Plaintiff-Appellee
, v. AL EX P. DYCHE, Individually ; OL SSON ROOFI NG COMPANY, I

NC
., an I llinois Corporation; MEADE EL ECTRI C COMPANY, I NC., an I llinois Corporation; THORN E EL ECTRI C, I NC., an I llinois Corporation; and ECONOL I TE GROUP, I

NC., a California Corpora tion, d/b/a Ec onolite Group Company
, Econoli te Control Products, Inc., and Econolite, Def endants-Appellants (Tra ffic Control Corporation, an I llinois Corporation; Metro Transpor tation Group, Inc., an I llinois Corporation; and Thomas Penderg ast, Ex ecutor of the Estate of L isa Richter, Dec ease d, Def

endants).

District & N o. First District, Second D ivision Docke t No. 1-12-1317

Filed August 27, 2013Held

(Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no pa r t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by t he Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) In two actions filed i n C o ok County arising from a traff ic acc ident that

occur red in Kenda ll County
, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to transf

er both c ases to Ke ndall County based on the doctrine of

forum non conve niens, since only two of the rele vant fac tors favor ed a transfe r, but due to the passag e of more than 30 day s from the trial court’s or der tra

nsfer ringthird-par

ty claims to K endall County
, the appellate court lac ked jurisdiction to consider that issue.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of C ook County
, Nos. 10-L -4072, 1 0 -L

4075; the Hon. J ames N. O ’Ha ra, Judge , presiding

.

J udg ment Affir med.

Counsel on Appea l Steven E. Dane kas and Catherine Ba sque Weiler, both o f Swanson, Martin & Be ll, L LP, Fr ancis J

. Mara sa, of Mara sa & L ewis, J ere miah P. Connolly
, of Bollinger

Connolly Kra use L L C, and J oseph B. Carini I I I
, of Johns on & B ell, Ltd., all of Chicag o, for a ppellants.

Scott R. Clewis, of L aw Offic es of Thomas J

. Popovich, PC, and Martin Hea ly
, J r., David Huber
, and Dennis M. Ly nch, all of H ea l y L aw Firm, both of Chicag o, for a

ppellees.

Panel J USTI CE CONNORS delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices Quinn and Simon concur red in the judgment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Following a traff ic acc ident, plaintiff Robert L eathe rs initially filed a neg lige nce a ction in the circ uit court of Kenda ll County

. L isa Richter was killed in that a ccide nt a nd plaintiff Thomas Penderg ast, as executor of her estate, filed a wrong ful death and survival action in the circ uit court of Cook County

. L eathe rs then voluntarily dism i s sed the Kenda ll County action and ref

iled his action in Cook County
, adding new defe ndants. Severa l d ef en d ants moved to transfe r both actions to Kenda ll County under the d octrine of forum non

conve niens

. The circuit court of Cook Coun t y d enied the motion. Def endants now appea l,

-2-arguing that the court’s decision was an abuse of discretion. They also contend that the court

abused its discretion in severing third-par ty claims ag ainst the County of Kenda l l and transfe rring them back to the circ uit court of Kenda ll County

. For the following rea sons, we aff irm.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 L i s a R i chter, a resident of Osweg o, Kenda ll County
, was driving eastbound on L ewi s Street in Osweg o, Kenda ll Count y , when he r ca r collided with a truc k driven by defe ndant Alex Dyche of Montgome ry , Kenda ll County
, alleg edly while h e was in the course of his employ ment w it h d e f e n d a nt O lsson Roofing Company
, of neighboring Kane County

. Richter

was killed instantly and her passeng er, plaintiff Robert L eathe rs, who also lived in Kenda ll County at the time, was injured. Shortly there afte r, L eathe rs filed a neg lige nce action in Kenda ll Count y

ag ainst Dyche a

nd Olsson. ¶ 4 Richter’s mother initially was appointed as the admi n i s t ra t o r of her estate, which wa s probate d in Kenda ll County

. About a year afte r th e ac cident, the probate court grante d an

emer g ency motion to substitut e Richter’s uncle, plaintif f Thomas Penderg ast, as the administrator of her estate. The same day
, Penderg ast, of Tinley Park, Cook County
, filed the instant lawsuit on Richter’s behalf in Cook County

. Penderg ast asser ted wrong ful death and survival claims which pleade d neg lige nce ag ainst defe ndants Meade Electric Com p any , Thorne Electric
, Metro Transpor tation Group, and Traf

fic Cont ro l C o rporation for their alleg edly neg lige nt design of the traff ic signa l sy stem at the intersec tion wher e the acc ident

occur red. He also asser

ted neg lige nce claims ag ains t Dy che and Olsson. Additionally
, Penderg ast asser

ted products liability claims in neg lige nce an d s trict liability ag ainst defe ndant Econolite for its alleg edly faulty design and manufa cture of the traff ic signa l equipment used at the intersec tion. ¶ 5 At about the same time, L eathe rs voluntarily dismiss ed his complaint in Kenda ll Count y and ref iled in Cook County

. In his new lawsuit, L eathe rs rea sser t ed h i s neg lige nce claims
ag ainst Dyche a

nd Olsson a

nd added c laims ag ainst Meade , Thorne, Me tro Tra nsportation Group, and Traf

fic Control C orporation. He asser ted the same products liability claims
ag ainst Econolite and Atlantic Scientific, which made component parts for the traff ic signa ls. Additionally , L eathe rs included a neg lige nce c laim ag ainst Richter. ¶ 6 Dyche and Olsson then filed motions to transfe r both actions to Kenda ll County pursuant to the doctrine of

forum non conve niens

. They arg ued that this litigation has no meaning ful

connec tion to C o o k County and that Kenda ll County is a more appropriate venue. Specifica lly , they argued that Ke ndall County was more convenie nt for most of the par ties and that witnesses and evidenc e wer e located in or near Kenda ll County

. T h e ac ci dent

occur red in Kenda ll County betwee n three Kenda ll County residents

. T h e two known witnesses t o the accident were re s i d ents of Kendall County and L a S alle C ounty , which is adjac en t t o Kenda ll County

. The Osweg o fire depar tment responde d to the acc ident and transporte d L eathe rs t o a Kane C ounty hospital. The Kendall County corone r i n v es t i g ated Richter’s death. The Osweg o police depar tment investigated the acc ident and conducte d an

acc ident rec onstruction.

-3-¶ 7 Dyche and Olsson argued that althoug h a plaintiff’s choice of venue ordinarily is e ntitled

to g reat weight, less defe renc e is g iven to that decision when the plaintiff’s choice is not the site of the acc ident or the county in which he resides. Thus, they argued that the acc ident did
not occur in Cook County ; that L eathe rs’ choice of venue is not entitled to defe renc e beca use he does not live in Cook County ; and that Penderg ast is a nominal plaintiff whose residenc e is immaterial for deter

mining the appropriate venue. Additionally
, they ar gu ed t h at Cook County was not L eathe rs’ fir st choice of venue a nd is entitled to less defer ence

. ¶ 8 Dyche and Olsson asser ted that of the defe ndants, Meade has office s in northern I llinois
, southern Wis co n s i n , and northwest Indiana; Thorne is located in Carol Stream, Du Pag e County ; Traf

fic Control Corporation has office s acr oss the Midwest, including its corpor ate headqua r ter s in Woodridge
, Du Pag e County ; and Econolite is a California corpor ation. They contend that only Metro Transpor tation ha s office s in Chica g o and Hoffma n Estates, Cook County
, but the fac t that it “mer ely conduct[s] business” in Cook County “does not aff ect the forum non conve niens issue.” ¶ 9 Moreove r, they argued that the public int er es t co n s i d er at i o n s we i gh ed in favor of litigating the case in Kenda ll County

. They contend that Kenda ll County has a strong interest in deciding this dispute, which involves injuries sustained by its reside n t s i n an acc ident

occur ring within its boundarie s, and it would be unfair to burden Cook County and its potential jurors with resolving a case in which it has no intere st. Thorne joined Dyche a nd Olsson’s motion. ¶ 10 Meade also filed a motion to transfe r. I t admitted that its principle place of busin es s is in Cook County and it repr esente d that Traf fic Control Corporation “has a place of business in” C ook County

. Neve rtheless, it argued that the allege d liability in this ca s e arose out of work it perf

ormed in Kenda ll Coun t y , making the latter the more appropriate venue. Econolite joined Meade ’s motion. Neither Metro Transpor tation Group nor Traf

fic Control Corporation conte sted venue

. ¶ 11 L eathe rs and Penderg ast filed briefs in response , challeng ing transfe r to Kenda ll Count y

. They eac h attache d copies of t h e d efendants’ forum non conve niens interrog atories and admissions to support t heir a rguments. ¶ 12 Dyche and Olsson filed a reply brief to which th ey at t ac h ed p laintiffs’ answe rs to the defe ndants’ reque sts for admissions and aff idavits of seven potential witnesses attesting that it would be inconvenient and burdensome for them to trave l to Cook County to testify at trial. M ea d e als o filed a reply brief in which it argued that it had no rela tionship to the accident and that it wa s named as a defe ndant “for the sole purpose of circ umventing the forum non

co n veniens motion.” It attache d the deposition of an employee of the Kenda ll Cou n t y Hig hway Depa rtment to support its argument. ¶ 13 At about the same time that Dyche a nd Olsson filed their motions to transfer
, they also f il e d thir d-par

ty contribution claims ag ainst the County of Kenda ll (County) in L eathe r s ’ c a s e and in Penderg ast’s case

. The County then moved to transfe r the third-par ty claims to the circ uit court of Kenda ll County pursuant to section 2-103(a ) of the Code of Civil Procedur e (Code) (735 I L CS 5/2-103(a) (West 2010)). It argued that section 2-103(a ) require d that any action brought ag ainst a g overnme ntal corpor ation must be brought in the county in which

-4-its principal office is located.

¶ 14 Dyche and Ols son stated t hat t hey had “no grounds t o object to [the C ounty ’s ] m o t i o n to transfe r.” Howeve r, in the interest of judicial economy , they reque sted that the court either
g rant their pending motions to transfe r the entire action to the circ uit court of Kenda ll County

or defe r ruling on the Cou n t y ’s motion until their other motions to transfe r have been d ec ided. In its reply brief, the County arg ued that the plaintiffs’ case s should be hear d in Cook County
, but that the third-par ty claims ag ainst it should be sever ed and transfe rre d to the circ uit court of Ke ndall County

. ¶ 15 On September 8, 2011, the circ uit court grante d the County ’s motion, sever ed the thirdparty cl ai m s , and transfe rre d them to the circ uit court of Kenda ll County

. No petition for leave to appea l was filed f ollowing e ntry

of that orde r. ¶ 16 On April 5, 2012, the circ uit c ourt enter ed a case manag ement order setting a date for a status hearing on the rema ining claims and also stating, “De fenda nts’ motions to transfe r for forum non conve niens are all denied. 14 day s to p ro p o u nd discovery on Metro Transpor tation’s motion for summary judgme nt. Status on pleading s and discovery .” Dyche and Olsson, Thorne, Meade
, and Econolite (collec tively
, defe ndants) filed a timely petition for leave to appea l that order pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a) (2) (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010), which this cour

t gr anted.

¶ 17 ANALYSI S ¶ 18 In I llinois
, an action must be commence d in: (1) the county of residenc e of any defe ndant who is joined in g ood faith; or (2) the county in which the ca

use of a ction arose

. Dawdy v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.
, 207 I ll. 2d 167, 172 (2003); 735 I L CS 5/2-101 (West 2010). I f more than one appropriate forum exis ts, a defe ndant may invoke the doctrine of forum non

conve niens to deter

mine which forum is most appropriate. Dawdy
, 207 I ll. 2d at 172. The doctrine permits the court in which the action was filed to decline jurisdiction and direc t the lawsuit to an alternative forum that the court deter mines can better serve the convenie nce of the par ties and the e nds of justice. Dawdy , 207 I ll. 2d at 172. ¶ 19 In making its deter mination as to the appropriate forum in which the case should be tried, the court must balanc e cer tain private and public interest fac tors. Dawdy
, 207 I ll. 2d at 172. Private interest fac tors include: the convenie nce of the parties; the rela tive ease of acc ess to

source s of evidenc e; the availability of compulsory proce ss to secur e attendanc e of unwilling witnesses; the cost to obta in attendance of willing witnesses; the possibili ty of viewing the premises, if appropri at e; an d all other prac tical considerations that make a trial easy , expeditious
, and inexpensive. Dawdy
, 207 I ll. 2d at 172. Public interest fac tors include: the administrative difficulties cause d by litigating case s in cong ested forums; the unfairne ss of imposing jury duty on residents of a county wi t h n o connec tion to the litigation; and the interest in havinglocal contr oversies de cided loca lly

. Dawdy , 207 I ll. 2d at 173. ¶ 20 Significa

ntly , the cour

t must also consider theplaintiff’s choic e of f orum. A plaintiff’s right to selec t the forum is substantial and is entitled to defe renc e. Dawdy
, 207 I ll. 2d at 173. The plaintiff’s choice of forum should not be disturbed unless the fac tors weigh strong ly in favor of transf er. Dawdy , 207 I ll. 2d at 173.

-5-¶ 21 Howeve r, the plaintiff’s choice of forum is not en t i t l ed t o such defe renc e in all case s.

Dawdy
, 207 I ll. 2d at 173. When a plaintiff chooses to litigate his cause of action in his home forum or in the forum in which his acc ident or injury occur red, it is rea sonable to assume that the forum was chosen for rea sons of convenie nce. Dawdy
, 207 I ll. 2d at 173. Howeve r, when the plaintiff is fore ign to his chosen forum or the events that g ave rise to the litigation did not

occur in t h at fo ru m , that assumption is less rea sonable and his choice is aff orded less defe renc e. Dawdy
, 207 I ll. 2d at 173-74. In fac t, our supreme court has said that under those circ umstances, it is instead rea sonable to conclude that the plaintiff en g ag ed in forum shopping to suit his indivi dual intere sts, which is disfavored. Dawdy , 207 I ll. 2d at 174. ¶ 22 Thus, in ruling on a motion to transfe r, the circ uit court must take all of these fac tors into

acc ount and giv e each factor proper defe renc e or weight under the circ umstances. Dawdy
, 207 I ll. 2d at 176 (quoting Griffith v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc.
, 136 I ll. 2d 101, 107-08 (1990))

. The circu i t co u rt m ust evaluate the total circ umstances of the case to deter mine whether th e b a la

n c e o f f a ctors strong ly favor s dismiss al. Fenne ll v. Illinois Central R.R. Co.
, 2012 I L 113812, ¶ 17. Acc ording ly
, the deter mination of a forum non conve niens motion li es within the sound discretion of the circ uit court. Dawdy , 207 I ll. 2d at 176. The court’s decision will only be reve rsed if it can b e s h o wn t hat it “abuse d its discretion in balanc ing th e re levant fac tors,” meaning that no rea sonable person would take the view adopted by

the cour t. Fenne ll , 2012 I L113812, ¶ 21; Dawdy , 207 I ll. 2d at 177. ¶ 23 The parties did not expli citly indicate whether the circ uit cour t h el d a h ea ring on the motions to transfe r. In their brief, defe ndants repr esente d that “the circ uit court orally denied all of the motions to transfe r. T h e ci rc uit court did not issue a written ruling .” Plaintiffs
repr esente d that the circuit court denied the m otions “a fter a full course of briefing .” Both parties cit e to the April 5, 2012, case manag ement order
, which simply states that “[d] efe ndants’ motions to transfer for forum non conve niens areall denied.” ¶ 24 We order ed the parties to submit supplemental briefs addre ssing whether this court c ould revie w the circ uit court’s balanc ing of the public and private interest fac tors without a written order or hearing transcript setting forth the manner in which the court balanc ed those fac tors. Our conce rn is that on the one hand, our supreme court rec ently reiter ated its admonition to circuit courts to “include all of the rele vant private and public interest fac tors i n t h ei r analy ses.” (Emphasis in orig inal.) Fenne ll
, 2012 I L 1 1 3 8 1 2, ¶ 24 (citing First American Bank

v. Guerine
, 198 I ll. 2d 511, 520-21 (2002) (urg ing trial courts to “leave a bett er re cord of their analy ses” when ruling on forum non conve niens motions to “allow our appellate court to make informed d ec i s i o ns on Rule 306(a) (2) petitions”)). In Fenne ll
, the circ uit court issued a written ruling containing its analy sis of some, but not all, of the public and private interest factors. Fenne ll
, 2012 I L113812, ¶ 24. Howe ver, a s defe ndants note, t he supreme

co u rt did not hold that omitti ng fac tors from the analy sis nece ssarily results in reve rsal

. R at h er , i n that case , afte r admonishing the circ uit court, it revie wed the circ uit court’s analy sis of the fac tors that wer e addre ssed in the order and reve rsed the court on the merits. Fenne ll , 2012 I L113812, ¶ 24. ¶ 25 On t h e o th er hand, this court long ag o held that an appellant’ s failure t o i n cl u d e a transcript of the hearing on the motion to transfe r did not prec lude appellate revie w. W alker

v. Iowa Marine Repair Corp.
, 132 I ll. App. 3d 621, 626 (1985); see also DeVries v. Banke rs

-6-Life Co. , 128 I ll. App. 3d 647, 650 (1984). The W alker court c oncluded: “The fac t that the trial court may have esp o u s ed cer tain rea sons for its order not appea ring on the fac e of the [complaint, answe r, aff irmative defe nse, motion to transfe r, and supporting aff

idavits] does not support the nece ssity of a transcript on appea l wher e, as here, the r ecor d contains every thing that was presented to the j udg e in support of or in oppositi on to the motion.” W alker , 132 I ll. App. 3d at 626.
Howeve r, t his rea soning sugg ests that the appellate court may disreg ard the circ uit court’s rationale in ruling on motions to transfe r and conduct an independe nt revie w of the motions
prese nted below, as we would do if applying de novo revie w. That runs counter to the wellestablished leg al proposition that when revie wing a decision on a m o t i o n t o transfe r for forum non conve niens
, we must evaluate whether t he circuit court “ab u sed [ its] discretion in weighing the rele vant considera tions.” (Emphasis added.) Mey ers v. Bridgeport Machine s Division of Textron, Inc.
, 113 I ll. 2d 112, 118 (1986) (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Rey no , 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981)) ; see also Fenne ll
, 2012 I L 113812, ¶ 21 ; Da wdy
, 207 I ll. 2d at 177. ¶ 26 Although it would be benef icial to rema

nd the matter to the circ uit court with instructions
to provide its analy sis of the public and private interest fac tors, we lack a clea r direc tive from
t h e supreme court to do so. See Fenne ll
, 2012 I L 113812, ¶ 75 (Kilbride, C.J
., dis s en t i n g upon denial of rehe aring ) (noting that “[t] he trial court’s exercise of its discretion cannot be revie wed a dequate ly

when se vera l of the forum non conve niens fac tors are not included in the analy sis” and sug g esting that rema nd is appropriate under these circ umstances)

. Acc ording ly
, we will un d er t ak e our revie w of the court’s decision to deny the motion to transfe r as we have done in the past. Amme rman v. The Raymond Co r p

. , 3 7 9 I ll. App. 3d 878, 887-88 (2008). That is, we will endea vor to an aly

ze the fac tors based on the “undisputed” fac ts, as defe ndants char acte rize them. Where any doubts arise due to the incompleteness of the rec ord, we will resolve them ag ainst defe ndants, who bear the burden of prese nting us with a s u ff i ci en t l y complete rec ord to support their claim of err or. Amme rman , 379 I ll. App. 3d at 888. ¶ 27 We beg in with the presumption that a plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to de fer ence and must not be disturbed unless the other fac tors strong ly favor transfe r. Dawdy
, 207 I ll. 2d
at 173. As noted above, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to somewhat less defe renc e if it is neither his place of residenc e nor the place wher e the injury occur red. Langenhorst v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co.
, 219 I ll. 2d 430, 442-43 (2006). Her e, Penderg ast is a resident of Cook County and filed his orig inal cause of acti o n in Cook County

. Although defe ndants contend that Penderg ast’s status as the administrator of Richter’s estate makes him a “nominal plaintiff” whose residence is inconseque ntial for purposes of honoringchoice of forum, that arg

ument has been reje cted by this court. Glass v. DOT Transportation, Inc.
, 393 I ll. App. 3d 829, 834 (2009). ¶ 28 L eathe rs was a resident of Kane County when he filed his lawsuit. Additionally
, his first choice of forum was Kenda ll County
, wher e the acc ident occur red, which dimin i s h es the degree of defere n ce acc orded to him in this analy sis. Fenne ll
, 2012 I L 113812, ¶ 25. Howeve r, that does not mean his choice deser ves no defe renc e. Amme rman , 379 I ll. App. 3d
at 885 (quoting Guerine
, 198 I ll. 2d at 518). Indeed, L eathe rs only di s m i s s ed his orig inal

-7-lawsuit and ref iled in Cook County afte r Penderg ast filed his action in Cook County
, which could be interpre ted as forum shopping, as defe ndants sug g est, or mere ly an appre ciation for judicial economy

. The rec ord does not indicate the degree to which the circ uit court defe rre d
to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum. Consequently
, we must co n s t ru e this fac tor ag ainst defe ndants and presume that on the whole, plaintiffs ’ ch o i ce of forum is entitled to defe renc e. Amme rman , 379 I ll. App. 3d at 888. ¶ 29 In light of that, defe ndants must demonstrate that the other fac tors strong ly favor transfe r. Dawdy
, 207 I ll. 2d at 173. This high burden comports with the supreme court’s direc tive that

a case should be transfe rre d only under “ exc eptional circumstance s when it has been shown that the interests ofjustice require a trial in a more convenie nt forum.” (Emphasis in orig inal and interna l quotations marks omitt ed.) Guerine , 198 I ll. 2d at 520. ¶ 30 The first private interest fac tor considers the convenie nce of the parties. Her e, defe ndants
must show that the plaintiffs’ chosen forum is inconvenient to them and that another forum is more convenie nt to all parties. Amme rman , 379 I ll. App. 3d at 888. Howeve r, they cannot

asser t that plaint i ff’s chosen forum is inconvenient for pl aintiff. Amme rman , 379 I ll. App. 3d at 889 (c iting Langenhorst , 219 I ll. 2d at 448). ¶ 31 Of t h e d ef

en d ants , Meade indicated in its answe rs to interrog atories that it resides i n McCook, I llinois
, which is in Cook County

. Metro Transpor tation has headqua

rters in Cook County
, an d i n the court below, several of the defendants concede d that Traf fic Cont rol is considere d a Cook County resident. Thorne i s located in Du Pag e County

. Econolite is l o ca t ed in California. Dyche resides in Kenda ll County and Olsson is located i n Ka n e County

. Dyche and Olsson’s president and chief executive office r, Wil liam Ly nch, wer e the only defe ndants who submitt ed a f f id a v it s stating that Cook County would be an inconvenient forum for them and Kenda ll County would be more convenie nt. Howeve r, three defe ndants

are residents of Cook County and two defe ndants (Metro Transpor tation and Traf

fic Control) did not object to proce eding in Cook County

. The re m aini ng two defe ndants reside in counti es other than Kenda ll. Thus, on the whole, defe ndants have not demonstrated that Kenda ll Count y

is more conve nient to all parties. ¶ 32 Next, we consider t h e re l at i v e ea s e of acc ess to testimonial, documentar y , and other evidenc e. In their answe rs to interrog atories, plai n t iffs identified potential witnesses who would testify at trial. Cheryl Alexan der, of Kenda ll County ; Gar y Ba lzarini, of L a Salle County ; Br ayden Dyche, of Kenda ll County ; L eathe rs; and Dyche wer e i d en t i fi ed as eyewitnesses to the acc ident. Plaint i ffs also identified six Osweg o police office rs, five
para medics with the Osweg o fire depar tment, the Kenda ll County co r o n e r , and two eng ineer s from Kenda ll County as potenti a l w it n e s s es. Additionally
, L eathe rs indicated that he has seen two doctors in Aurora
, I llinois
, and three other doctors whose locations wer e not identified, for injuries he suffe red in the acc ident. Six of these potential witnesses submitt ed aff idavits stating that it would be inconvenient and burdensome to trave l to Cook County to testify in
t h i s case

. Neve rtheless, they are amena ble to compulsory proce ss and can appea r in C o o k County , notwithstanding the relatively minor expense involved in a ppearing to testify

on a particula r day

. On t he other hand, defenda nts listed their co rp o ra t e officer s as people with knowledg e of this case , who res i d e i n s everal differ ent counties and California, as noted above. Neve rthel ess, the preponde ranc e of witnesses reside in or near Kenda ll County

.

-8-Additionally
, defe ndants note that the equipment at issue is stored in Kenda ll County
,

making it easie r to transport to a Kenda ll County courtroom. On balanc e, this fac tor weighs in favor of

transfe r. See Dawdy , 207 I ll. 2d at 178. ¶ 33 In considering the other fac tors that make a trial easy , expeditious and inexpensive, we acknow ledg e that the acc ident took place in Kenda ll County and that, in the event that a court later deter mined that it was nece ssary to view the acc ident site, it would be more convenie nt for a Kenda ll County jury to do so. Neve rtheless, the importance of these fac tors diminis hes wher e, as here, t h e case conce rns products liability claims beca use “any local interest is larg ely supplanted by a more g ener al i ntere s t i n re s olving a claim concerning an allege dly defe ctive produ ct [ m aking] jury views of the acc ident site *** g ener ally unnece ssary .” Amme rman , 379 I l l. App. 3d at 886; Guerine
, 198 I ll. 2d at 525. Penderg ast and L eathe rs

asser ted products liability claims ag ainst Econolite claiming that it neg lige ntly designed and manufa cture d the traff

ic signa l equipment used at the acc ident location and that it should be strictly liable for plaintiffs’ injuries. Moreove r, while also entitled to less weight, it is worth considering that all of plaintiffs’ and defe ndants’ attorney s are located in Cook County and would be require d to trave l to Kenda ll County ever y day to attend trial. Amme rman , 379 I ll. App. 3d at 891. Thus, we cannot sa y that this factor strong ly

favor s transfe r. ¶ 34 Turning to the public interest fac tors, we fi rs t co n s i d er t h e interest in havinglocal
controve rsies decide d locally

. As stated above, beca use this case involves products liability claims, the lo ca tion of the acc ident is less signific ant beca use defe ctive products in the
stream of commerc e can aff ect the residents of many counties. Amme rman , 379 I ll. App. 3d
at 892. For the same rea son, it is not unfair to impose jury duty on t h e re s i d en t s o f Cook County beca use they areas likely

to be af fec ted by the alleg edly

faulty products at issue in this ca s e as Kenda ll County residents. Amme rman , 379 I ll. App. 3d at 892. Additionally
, three of the defe ndants are residents of Cook County and, thus, Cook County has an interest in deciding controve rsies involving its residents. Amme rman , 379 I ll. App. 3d at 892. Thus, these fa ctors do not strong ly favor transfe r. ¶ 35 The final public interest fac tor considers the relative cong estion of the two court sy stems. Howeve r, this fac tor, “ ‘by itself, is relatively insignifica nt.’ ” Amme rman , 379 I ll. App. 3d
at 892 (quoting Dawdy
, 207 I ll. 2d at 181 ). Ne v ertheless, defe ndants submitt ed case load statistics showing t h at Cook County is a more cong ested venue than Kenda ll County

. In 2009, Kenda ll County had less t han 10,000 case s pending wher eas Cook County had over 925,000, which fa

vors transf

er to Ke ndall County

. ¶ 36 We reiter ate that we lack any information about how the circ uit court balanc ed the private and public interest fac tors on the whole. Howeve r, in light of the fac t that only two of the six fac tors could possibly be said to fa v o r transf er to Kenda ll County
, any rea sonable person would conclude that defe ndants have failed to satisfy their burden of showing that the fac tors strong ly favor transfe r. See Dawdy
, 207 I ll. 2d at 1 7 3

. Nor would any rea sonable person conclude that these circ umstances are so exceptional t h at t h e interests of justice require transfe r to Kenda ll County

. See Guerine
, 198 I ll. 2d at 520. Acc ording ly
, we cannot say that the circ uit court abused its discretion in denying the motion. Fenne ll
, 2012 I L 113812, ¶ 21; Dawdy , 207 I ll. 2d at 177.

-9-¶ 37 Def endants also argue o n ap p ea l t h at the circ uit court abused its discretion when it

sever ed the third-par

ty claims ag ainst the County and transfe rre d them to the circ uit court of Kenda ll Coun

ty, wh il e r e tain in g ju

ris d ic tion over the rema ining claims. This arg ument comes notwithstanding defe ndants’ repr esentation in the circ uit court that they had “no grounds to object to [t he County ’s] motion to transfe r.” Neve rtheless, we lack jurisdiction to revi ew defe ndants ’ argument. Appea ls taken from order s g ranting or denying motions to transfe r

mus t b e fi l ed wi t hin 30 day s of entry of that order

. I ll. S. Ct. R. 306(c) (1) (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010). The time limit for fil i n g a petition for leave to appea l is jurisdictional. Kemner v. Monsanto Co.
, 112 I ll. 2d 223, 236 (1986). The circ uit court gra nted t he C o u n ty ’s motion
to transfe r for

forum non conve niens and enter ed its order on September 8, 2011. No petition for leave to appea l was filed within 30 day s of that order

. The petition for leave to appea l in this case was filed on Marc h 7, 2012, well beyond the 30-day period allowed to file a petition addre ssing the court’s September 8, 2011, ruling . Acc ording ly
, we are without jurisdiction to consider that issue. ¶ 38 Fo r t h e foreg oing rea sons, we aff irm the order of the circ uit court denying tr an s fe r pursuant to the doctr ine of forum non conve niens

.

¶ 39 Affir

med.

-10-