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S. HRG. 109–880

NEW INITIATIVES IN COOPERATIVE THREAT

REDUCTION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

February 9, 2006

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, Jr., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 4

Knight Ridder newspaper article dated February 7, 2006, submitted for

the record ....................................................................................................... 32

Joseph, Hon. Robert G., Under Secretary for Arms Control and International

Security, Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Biden .................................... 34

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Obama .................................. 44

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 1

Obama, Hon. Barack, U.S. Senator from Illinois, opening statement ................ 5

(III)

(1)

NEW INITIATIVES IN COOPERATIVE THREAT

REDUCTION

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2006

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room

SD–419 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Lugar

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Martinez, Biden, Bill Nelson, and

Obama.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S.

SENATOR FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. The Foreign Relations Committee is called to

order. The committee meets today to examine the U.S. policies and

programs in two critical threat reduction areas: Conventional

weapons dismantlement and counterproliferation assistance.

Senator Obama and I observed firsthand the United States efforts in both of these areas during visits to Ukraine and Azerbaijan

last August. These visits and our subsequent joint research convinced us that the United States can, and should, do more in both

of these areas. On November 1, 2005, we introduced Senate bill

1949, the ‘‘Cooperative Proliferation Detection and Interdiction Assistance and Conventional Threat Reduction Act.’’ Modeled after

the Nunn-Lugar program, our new legislation seeks to build cooperative relationships with willing countries to secure vulnerable

stockpiles of conventional weapons and to strengthen the ability of

other nations to detect and interdict illicit shipments of weapons or

materials of mass destruction.

The Nunn-Lugar program must, and will, remain our flagship

nonproliferation program. The elimination of threats at their

source is the most effective means of preventing the spread of

weapons of mass destruction. But the United States has the ability

to perform multiple missions in response to proliferation threats.

Focusing more attention on the threats posed by conventional

weapons and improving the capabilities of other nations to interdict

weapons of mass destruction can be achieved without negative consequences for the Nunn-Lugar program. The lessons learned from

the Nunn-Lugar experience should be applied to other fronts in the

fight against terrorism and weapons proliferation. To do less would

be irresponsible and would forfeit critical national security opportunities.

2

The first part of our legislation would energize the U.S. program

against unsecured lightweight antiaircraft missiles and other conventional weapons. There may be as many as 750,000 man-portable

air defense systems in arsenals worldwide. The State Department

estimates that more than 40 civilian aircraft have been hit by such

weapons since the 1970s. In addition, loose stocks of small arms

and other weapons help fuel civil wars in Africa and elsewhere and

provide the means for attacks on peacekeepers and aid workers

seeking to stabilize war-torn societies. In Iraq, we have seen how

unsecured stockpiles of artillery shells and ammunition have been

reconfigured into improvised explosive devices that have become

the insurgents’ most effective weapon. Senator Obama and I are attempting to ensure that everything possible is being done to secure

such stockpiles worldwide.

American efforts to safeguard conventional stockpiles are underfunded, fragmented, and in need of high-level support. The U.S.

Government’s current response is spread between several programs

at the Department of State. The planning, coordination, and implementation of this function should be consolidated into one office at

the State Department with a budget that is commensurate with

the threat posed by these weapons.

The second part of the Lugar-Obama legislation would strengthen the ability of America’s friends and allies to detect and intercept

illegal shipments of weapons and materials of mass destruction.

American forces cannot be everywhere at once. Our security depends not just on the willingness of other nations to help; it depends on whether they have the capabilities to be effective. The

State Department engages in several related antiterrorism and export control assistance programs. But these programs are focused

on other stages of the threat, not on detection and interdiction.

Thus, we believe there is a gap in our defenses that needs to be

filled.

The Proliferation Security Initiative has been successful in enlisting the help of other nations for detection and interdiction operations. But some PSI countries lack the capabilities to be active

and effective partners. Lugar-Obama seeks to improve the capabilities of foreign partners by providing equipment, training, and other

support. Examples of such assistance may include maritime surveillance and boarding equipment, aerial detection and interdiction

capabilities, enhanced port security, and the provisions of handheld detection equipment and passive WMD sensors.

The legislation would create a new office at the State Department to support and coordinate U.S. assistance in this area. Existing foreign assistance law contains discretionary authority for the

Secretary of State to establish a list of countries that should be

given priority in U.S. counterproliferation funding. It is our view

that these efforts have been insufficient. As a result, we believe

that such a program should be mandatory.

The Lugar-Obama bill sets aside $110 million to start up the program and proposes an innovative use of current foreign military financing assistance. Under the bill, the President would ensure that

countries receiving foreign military financing would use 25 percent

of these funds on weapons of mass destruction interdiction and detection capabilities, unless the President determines that U.S. naVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:49 May 07, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 800926.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
3

tional security interests are not served by doing so. This offers a

potent but flexible tool to build a robust international network to

stop proliferation.

Senator Obama and I have sought to work closely with the administration on our legislation. We have raised the issue in several

venues and have been given general statements of support. Today,

we are eager to finally receive an official reaction from the administration and to discuss ways in which our legislation can be perfected.

I believe that the Bush administration recognizes the problems

that we are trying to address. Last month, Senator Obama and I

wrote to Secretary Rice urging full funding for programs aimed at

counterproliferation and safeguarding conventional weapons stockpiles. I am pleased that funding for the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs account received a $43

million increase in the administration’s budget request over the

amount enacted last year.

Historically, however, new threat reduction techniques and proposals have not always been warmly received by the executive

branch. I remember well the initial executive branch reaction to

the introduction of the Nunn-Lugar program in 1991.

Senator Sam Nunn and I were told by the administration that

the United States was already doing everything necessary to address the problems posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction and the collapse of the Soviet Union. We were astounded by this response, because other sources, including Russian

military leaders themselves, who had come to visit with us, were

describing rampant difficulties with the security around weapons of

mass destruction. They voiced their fears of an emerging black

market in WMD fueled by economic desperation and collapsing governmental authority. Only months later, after Defense Department

officials were on the ground in Russia witnessing the problem, did

the administration begin to recognize the urgency of the situation.

The proliferation threats that Senator Obama and I have witnessed may be less comprehensive than those that confronted the

United States at the genesis of the Nunn-Lugar program. But the

problems are obvious, nonetheless. Moreover, these security gaps

exist in an era when we know that terrorist groups are actively

seeking both weapons of mass destruction and lethal conventional

arms.

We have seen these vulnerable stockpiles in person, and we are

resolved to do something about them. We understand that the

United States cannot meet every conceivable security need everywhere in the world. But filling the security gaps that we have described should be near the top of our list of current priorities. We

are asserting that these problems have not received adequate attention.

Senator Obama and I are hopeful for a constructive response

that recognizes the nuances of the threats involved and the necessity of preventing bureaucratic obstacles to action. We are hopeful

for a partnership with the administration that assigns these tasks

a high priority. We look forward to working closely with the administration to get this done.

4

To assist the committee in our evaluation today, I am pleased to

recognize our friend, Under Secretary of State Bob Joseph. Under

Secretary Joseph has been a good friend of this entire committee

and a tireless advocate for U.S. national security through his work

on the Proliferation Security Initiative, Libya’s renunciation of

weapons of mass destruction, and many other important projects.

We especially appreciate his willingness to appear today, given the

intense schedule he has undertaken with regards to the Iranian

nuclear issue.

We thank you in advance for being with us to share the administration’s views of the legislation and to help us through important

nonproliferation and threat reduction issues.

Before calling on Secretary Joseph, I’d like to call upon the distinguished ranking member of the committee, Senator Biden, for

his opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S.

SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Thanks for making the time to be here. And thank you, Mr.

Chairman, for holding this hearing. The spread of weapons of mass

destruction and conventional weapons like shoulder-fired missiles,

quite frankly, may be the gravest threat to our country today, especially if those weapons end up in the hands of terrorists. We need

to keep close watch on these issues in all their complexity, and the

administration, it seems to me, has to give more than a voice to

our fears here. It needs to address this issue in a practical way,

and I think you and our colleague, Senator Obama, have suggested

a way that may be a route to that. I especially commend you for

introducing legislation to bring more order and funding to the State

Department’s effort to control the proliferation of small arms/light

weapons, surface-to-air missiles, and tactical missiles.

These weapons are, as I said, not weapons of mass destruction,

but they cause more deaths and destruction year in and year out

and around the globe than all the world’s strategic weapons. From

Colombia and the Andes to Central Africa and South Asia, the

automatic weapon in the hand of a criminal, the explosives and

missiles in the hands of a terrorist, pose a tremendous threat to

U.S. personnel and interests as well as to friendly governments

and societies. And although our gravest concern is dealing with

what Nunn-Lugar has put us on the path to deal with—and that

has not been embraced as fully, in my view, as it should be, although it’s better now—we can’t take our eyes off the ball on this

matter. We ought to be able to walk and chew gum at the same

time. I have a few notions about S. 1949. It may need some amendment before we report it out; but I fully expect to be a supporter

of the bill at the time it’s reported out, and I hope the administration will also support S. 1949, the Lugar-Obama bill.

It seems to me the effort should be a collaborative one here, and

I hope the Secretary’s here to offer support and constructive criticism, if any, to make this bill better if that’s possible. Proliferation

is an issue that demands cooperation among all of us who recognize

the need to do more. Mr. Chairman, Under Secretary Joseph is, of

course, a senior policymaker regarding WMD as well, and I would

5

admit at the outset that I may take advantage of your presence,

Mr. Secretary, to ask you a few questions about nuclear programs

of Iran and North Korea if that’s permissible. We need to know

where you’re going, and I think your, quite frankly, editorial comment moved in the right direction on Iran. I’m not sure about

Korea, but at some point, maybe we can talk about that as well.

Notwithstanding, the central focus is this legislation. So, I thank

both my colleagues for their initiative, and I thank the Secretary

for being here.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden, for

your opening statement. I’d like to call upon our colleague, Senator

Obama, for his opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S.

SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

Senator OBAMA. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I don’t

think I can do a better job than you have along with our ranking

member, Senator Biden, in laying out the issue as you just did. So,

I’m going to try to keep my opening remarks relatively short. Mr.

Secretary, thank you for taking the time to be here. You know, first

of all, I want to thank our chairman, Senator Lugar, for your tireless leadership on this issue, for holding this hearing and for letting me work with you to introduce what I believe is a very good

bill. And I want to thank Senator Biden for his insights and his

long track record of good work on nonproliferation issues. And I

think that Senator Biden’s absolutely right. We’ve introduced this

legislation. We want to fine tune it. We want to be in a cooperative

relationship with the State Department to make sure that it works,

but we think that this is something that needs to be done.

The Lugar-Obama legislation, S. 1949, does two basic things.

First, it enhances our ability, working with friends and allies to detect and intercept illegal shipments of weapons and materials of

mass destruction. Second, the bill bolsters ongoing efforts to destroy conventional weapons such as lightweight antiaircraft missiles. As the chairman pointed out in his opening statement, many

of these efforts are underfunded, they’re fragmented and in need of

high-level support. I take note of the chairman’s comments that

new threat reduction proposals, even the Nunn-Lugar program, are

not always received warmly by the executive branch. I agree with

your testimony, Secretary Joseph, that the Department does need

flexibility to deal effectively with global threats and international

diplomacy, but that isn’t, as I see it, the issue before us today.

Every member of this committee wants to give the State Department the flexibility it needs. The issue here today is whether the

State Department can use additional resources and coordination to

more effectively deal with two critically important threats, interdiction of WMDs and the destruction of conventional weapons, and I

believe that it can.

I’m also concerned that the issue just simply does not get the attention it deserves within the State Department. I know that both

the President and Secretary Rice have expressed their commitment

to nonproliferation, proliferation issues, but four key State Department interdiction and nonproliferation programs are either flat

lined or slated for only modest increases in the President’s budget.

6

Meanwhile, a $1.2 billion increase is proposed for the Millennium

Challenge Account, which will provide funding to such nations as

Cape Verde, Madagascar, and Vanuatu.

I’m supporting the MCA, and I’m not saying these countries

aren’t worthy of assistance, but, you know, a budget is about

prioritizing strategic objectives, and in my view, the priorities don’t

appear appropriately and aligned with the strategic threats we confront today. Secretary, despite my concerns, I’m hopeful we can

work together to make an adjustment in our budget priorities with

the regard to Lugar-Obama. I’m also confident that we can work

in a collaborative spirit to make a good bill even better. I would

just make—add one personal note. You know, I recently returned

from Iraq. Both of you have made these trips. Joe, you’ve been

there repeatedly. This was my first trip, and, you know, we toured

in a Black Hawk helicopter with the vest and the helmet on. The

same day that I was flying to Fallujah and Kirkuk was the same

day that another Black Hawk further north got shot down, and—

or something happened where 12 of our brave marines were killed.

And we don’t know exactly what happened, but I guess I would

simply make the point that if it was a shoulder-to-air missile,

which is possible, then those lives could potentially have been

saved if we did not have the kind of proliferation that we do and

the ease with which MANPADS may be available on the black

market. Heaven forbid if these got into the hands of terrorists and

there was a commercial flight that was targeted. So, you know, I

just think that when we’re thinking about our defense systems and

our security, that this has to be at the top of the priority list.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Obama. I’ll

just add one more anecdotal note before I ask you for your testimony. A year ago, in the summer of 2004, I went with Cooperative

Threat Reduction personnel to Albania. That was on a mission that

had been initiated by the Albanians, who were requesting help in

trying to secure nerve gas, as it turned out, 16 metric tons. It was

an interesting trip because it was the first extension of the NunnLugar Program outside of the United States. We had sent memos

back to Secretary Powell, eventually the President of the United

States, for a signature to obtain the $20 million dollars that are

now being utilized to neutralize that nerve gas. In the spirit of the

day, the Albanians took us to sheds in which there were 79

MANPAD missiles, beyond our recognition or knowledge other than

the fact that in the spirit of the occasion, they agreed to destroy

them with our assistance. They are not covered by Nunn-Lugar.

They’re not covered by anything, but it led to, at least, some

thoughts as to how they got there, the origins and the international

relations that are complex.

As we’ve mentioned, they are not the only 79 in the world. The

thousands that are out there are important. But it is an issue that

you’ve been dealing with, sir, and so we want to appreciate both

the need for flexibility, and the resources, as these opportunities

become available. Would you please proceed with your testimony?

7

STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. JOSEPH, UNDER SECRETARY OF

STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. JOSEPH. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, Senator Obama,

thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today. It’s always an honor to appear before this very distinguished committee.

Today, I’ve been asked to talk about the role of the State Department in implementing several key aspects of the President’s strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction and to reduce the

threat of dangerous conventional arms. I have provided a written

statement to the committee which I would like to summarize.

The CHAIRMAN. We made it a part of the record in full.

Mr. JOSEPH. Thank you, Senator. Let me say from the outset, as

I said during my confirmation hearing this past spring, we very

much want to work closely together with you and your staffs, as

we are doing, to achieve what I know are shared goals. Your letter

of invitation to me to testify today lays out the broad objectives

that S. 1949, the Lugar-Obama bill.

Specifically, you stated that the United States must do more to

assist others in detecting and interdicting weapons of mass destruction and in eliminating conventional weapons stockpiles that

pose a security threat. As you know, I fully share those objectives

as well as the need that you point out in the legislation to give

greater focus to the threat and to improve the coordination of both

policies and programs within the State Department, within the

Interagency, and at a multinational level. We are working to

achieve these same objectives, from stopping the proliferation trade

to ending the humanitarian and security threats posed by surplus

and abandoned conventional weapon stockpiles, including, of

course, the key threat that we face from MANPADS, in the wrong

hands.

There are a number of elements of S. 1949 that I believe are very

helpful. At the most general level, through your sponsorship, you

bring new and needed attention to these priority objectives, shining

the spotlight where it is needed as you did in your speech at the

United Nations on Monday. At the operational level, the legislation

offers an important, broader definition of conventional arms, which

is in keeping with the comprehensive nature of the threat, again,

even as it puts needed emphasis and priority on the danger of

MANPADS.

We also, of course, welcome the provision to provide permanent

authority for the use of NDF funds outside the former Soviet

States. But just as there are positive elements, we do have some

problems. The President and his administration have devoted higher priority and more funding to nonproliferation and counterproliferation and weapons reduction assistance than any of our

predecessors.

However, the United States, even when we are joined with very

active partners, cannot do everything at once. Therefore, as I’ve

discussed with your staff, and as I know you agree, we must establish priorities, especially in a constrained funding environment. But

I would point out that even in this environment, the President’s request for nonproliferation and conventional weapons destruction

elements of the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and ReVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:49 May 07, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 800926.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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lated programs, or NADR account, would rise by a significant percentage compared to the estimate for FY06.

Mr. Chairman, conventional weapons destruction is a significant

challenge, and it does require resources that are matched to the

scope of the problem. Yet, it’s one of a number of challenges that

we face, and resources cannot come from other priorities of equal

of greater value. We carefully considered our funding proposal in

light of the current budget environment and other needs. Any additional requirements that are imposed outside of the normal budgetary process would limit our ability to implement the Secretary’s

other priorities.

In that regard, the Department is concerned at the requirement

in S. 1949 to devote specific percentage amounts from the NADR

and the Foreign Military Financing programs for WMD detection,

interdiction, and conventional arms reductions. While those objectives are clearly important, and we share them, the designation of

funds required by the legislation could lead us to devote resources

to efforts which other agencies may be better suited to fund and

could also prevent us from implementing what may be higher priority programs in which the State Department funds might best be

used.

Further, we do not support the organizational changes called for

in S. 1949, but not because we disagree with their purpose. On the

contrary, we believe that the recent restructuring in the State Department configures as well to pursue the objectives of the legislation in both counterproliferation and conventional weapons reduction. As you know, and as you supported, Senator, we have created

a new Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, a

new post of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterproliferation and new offices responsible for counterproliferation

initiatives, WMD terrorism, and strategic planning. The Office of

Counterproliferation Initiatives is bringing new focus to the Department’s counterproliferation efforts including the Proliferation

Security Initiative and other defensive measures against proliferation. The Office of WMD Terrorism directly confronts the nexus

between terrorism and WMD and is working to help build the capabilities of our friends and allies to prevent, protect against, and

respond to the use or threat of use of WMD by terrorists.

The Office of Strategic Planning and Outreach undertakes planning, program analysis, and evaluation to encourage new and innovative thinking to meet today’s and tomorrow’s threats. We’ve also

retained the relatively new Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the Bureau of Political Military Affairs to provide a strategic focus on the growing conventional weapons proliferation

threat.

This office, which we formed in 2003, unites formerly separate

units responsible for humanitarian demining, mine action, and

small arms and light weapons initiatives allowing our organizational structure better to pursue the comprehensive approach to

this problem that is required and that I believe is envisaged in S.

1949.

The Department of State is taking an active leadership role in

pursuing both counterproliferation and conventional weapons destruction goals reflecting the strong personal commitment of the

9

Secretary and my own. These areas are important priorities both

within the State Department and more broadly within the administration.

The Department vigorously leads U.S. efforts to deepen the international foundation for action against proliferation. Examples include the progress we have made in elevating proliferation to a

core concern of G–8 leaders, the passage of the landmark U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 and the creation and expansion of

the Proliferation Security Initiative.

This past fall, I traveled to Central Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East to expand international efforts to broaden active participation in PSI by states in those regions. I emphasized to the governments in Central Asia the need to cooperate more with us in

improving WMD detection and interdiction, and they have responded positively. Outside of PSI specifically, the same is true

with South Korea and others. Next week, we will have our first

meeting of a new counterproliferation task force with the United

Arab Emirates, which as you know is a critical transshipment

point. While much of the specific operational work for detection and

interdiction is carried out by other agencies, for example, the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security,

the State Department’s Export Control and Border Security Program does help to build partner’s capacity to participate effectively

in PSI, and the department overall takes the diplomatic lead in establishing priorities for fostering and implementing these vital efforts. We admittedly, as a department and as an administration,

need to do even more in these areas, especially in effective

prioritization of and follow through on detection.

But as you know, increasing our capacity for WMD interdiction

is about much more than money and assistance. We have requested

an increase in NADR funds for 2007 related to WMD interdiction

for projects that would help partners improve their overall interdiction capability. At its core however, increasing WMD interdiction

is even more about increasing active cooperation through PSI and

other means. Many of these collaborative efforts with our friends

and allies are with partners who do not need our assistance, but

who do contribute greatly through information sharing and through

coordination of capabilities, both with regard to military and law

enforcement action.

In contrast, the role of the Department in conventional weapons

elimination is both diplomatic and programmatic. Working with

other agencies and other governments, we provide site surveys, assistance for physical security and stockpile management and for

demining and destruction of excess weapons and munitions. In

some cases, like Cambodia and Bosnia, our dealing with landmine

problems has given us access to small arms and light weapons, particularly MANPADS. We have fully integrated programs to address

land mines, ordnance and small arms/light weapons in Iraq,

Afghanistan, and Sudan, and we are working to do the same in

several other countries.

For a relatively small amount of money, the Department of State

with the assistance, of course, of the Department of Defense and

others, has destroyed or disabled over 17,000 at-risk MANPADS,

and we have commitments for the destruction of over 7,000 more.

10

The Department looks forward to working with this committee to

address how best to enhance our ability to meet the full spectrum

of WMD missile and conventional threats that we face as a nation.

As I mentioned, more flexible funding authority could help us

take on higher priority tasks, some unforeseen for which other

agencies or other governments are not as well equipped. We also

would welcome an extension of the period covered by our Conventional Arms Destruction funds. At the moment, most of those appropriations are good for only 1 year. It often takes that much

time, if not more, to agree with a government on a program, let

alone to start it or to complete it.

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Department, I would like to

thank you and other members of your committee for your leadership and support as we have worked to confront the threat of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and dangerous conventional

arms. As I’ve described, we’ve been working hard to develop innovative and more effective tools. We have had considerable success,

but there is still much to be done.

Again, I look forward to working with you and the committee to

insure that the Department implements fully the transformational

diplomacy that is required to protect the American people, our

friends, and our allies from the threats of the 21st century.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Joseph follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT G. JOSEPH, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, I am pleased to have the

opportunity to discuss with you, today, the role of the State Department in implementing the President’s strategy against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as

well as in reducing the threat of dangerous conventional arms.

From his first days in office, President Bush has given the highest priority to combating WMD and missile proliferation, and has developed many new measures to

counter this challenge. The administration began by fashioning the first truly national, comprehensive strategy for preventing and protecting against the proliferation threat. The National Strategy to Combat WMD, issued publicly in December

2002, readily acknowledged that the starting point, and initial line of defense, is to

prevent proliferation. However, we also knew that prevention would not always succeed. Therefore, the strategy placed new emphasis on protection from, and response

to, the use of these weapons against the United States, our friends, and our allies.

For this reason, we are building the counterproliferation capabilities to deter, defend

against, and defeat weapons of mass destruction in the hands of our enemies, and

we are acquiring the ability to contain and reduce the potentially horrific effects if

these weapons are used against us.

The three pillars of our strategy—counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management—do not stand alone, but rather come together as elements

of a unified approach. Underlining that point, the National Strategy identifies four

crosscutting functions that are essential to combating WMD: Improved intelligence

collection and analysis, research and development, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and tailored strategies against hostile states and terrorists. We must

bring all elements of our strategy to bear in our targeted effort against WMD and

missile proliferation. To that end, the Department of State works closely with the

National and Homeland Security Council Staffs, the Departments of Treasury, Defense, Justice, Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services,

and Agriculture, and the Intelligence Community.

While the threat from WMD and their delivery systems must be our highest priority, we are also working actively to reduce the massive stocks of surplus conventional arms worldwide. Landmines, unexploded ordnance, aging and poorly secured

weapons stockpiles, and abandoned munitions all create humanitarian as well as security dangers. In too many parts of the globe, they harm innocent civilians, threatVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:49 May 07, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800926.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
11

en our Armed Forces and those of our allies, weaken the stability of friends, and

contribute to the creation of large ‘‘ungovernable’’ areas effectively outside of state

control and open to terrorism.

TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY/STATE DEPARTMENT REORGANIZATION

When Secretary Rice began her tenure, she challenged the State Department to

transform the way we think about diplomacy and consider how we might best use

our diplomatic tools to meet the threats of today, not of yesterday. Contemporary

diplomatic efforts to counter WMD and missile proliferation and the accumulation

of dangerous conventional weapons stocks bear little resemblance to those of the

past. No longer do we engage in ponderous and lengthy negotiations that focused

primarily on the offensive forces of two antagonistic superpowers.

We have worked to improve our ability to use effective diplomacy to meet today’s

and tomorrow’s threats by restructuring the State Department arms control and

nonproliferation organization to deal with contemporary realities, such as black

markets, front companies, and global terrorist networks. To that end, we have created a new Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, a new post of

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterproliferation, and new offices responsible for Counterproliferation Initiatives, WMD Terrorism, and Strategic Planning. We have also expanded the portfolio of, and renamed accordingly, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Office.

The Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives takes the lead for the Department

in developing, implementing, and improving counterproliferation measures. It has

brought new focus to the Department’s counterproliferation efforts, including the

Proliferation Security Initiative and other defensive measures against proliferation,

and implementation of financial efforts such as Executive Order 13382 relating to

proliferation financing. By working with the other agencies of the U.S. Government,

the new Counterproliferation Initiatives Office can leverage our ability to work with

other governments to plan and carry out interdiction of WMD shipments, build political will and national capacity to impede WMD-related shipments, and coordinate

multinational activities including implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. The Office of WMD Terrorism directly confronts the nexus between terrorism and WMD. It is developing policies and plans, directing, initiating, and

coordinating activities to help build the capabilities of our friends and allies to prevent, protect, and respond to the threat or use of WMD by terrorists. The Office of

Strategic Planning and Outreach undertakes strategic and long-range planning, program analysis, and evaluation to encourage new and innovative thinking to meet

today’s and tomorrow’s threats.

In another important element of the State Department’s restructuring, we have

expanded the responsibilities of the former Bureau of Verification and Compliance,

now named the Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation (VCI). In

doing so, we have enhanced our ability to pursue the achievement of critical treaty

requirements: Implementation, effective verification, and full compliance. VCI now

oversees the implementation of many existing treaty commitments, some of long

standing. It also is responsible for ensuring full, verified compliance with all arms

control and nonproliferation commitments, including more modern ones, which may

not involve detailed written agreements. A key example of the latter is implementation of Libya’s historic December 2003 decision to eliminate its WMD and longer

range missile programs. Under the direction of the Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee, VCI is also now leading interagency efforts to develop our

concepts for the verified denuclearization of North Korea, consistent with the September 19, 2005, Six-Party Talks Joint Statement.

Finally, in 2003, we created the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement within the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs to provide a strategic focus on the growing

conventional weapons proliferation challenge. Uniting formerly separate units responsible for Humanitarian Demining, Mine Action, and Small Arms/Light Weapons

initiatives, the established mission of this Office clearly describes its comprehensive

approach: ‘‘to develop policy options, implement destruction and mitigation programs, and engage civil society in order to reduce the harmful worldwide effects

generated by indiscriminately used illicit and abandoned conventional weapons of

war.’’

S. 1949—LUGAR-OBAMA LEGISLATION

Mr. Chairman, the Department of State fully shares the core objectives of the proposed ‘‘Cooperative Proliferation Detection, Interdiction Assistance, and Conventional Threat Reduction Act of 2005.’’ We have transformed our internal organization to provide the focus on proliferation detection, interdiction, and conventional

12

weapons destruction that the legislation envisages. The administration as a whole

has developed an effective interagency structure for interdiction to coordinate efforts

quickly and effectively. We are now working to augment our capacity for detection

and interdiction, to expand our programs worldwide, and to ensure that they fully

meet their intended purpose—to prevent dangerous WMD-related shipments from

reaching their intended destination. We are also expanding our efforts, and cooperating closely with other agencies and governments, to destroy or disable man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), persistent landmines, small arms/light weapons, and other conventional arms of greatest concern.

The Department looks forward to working with the committee to address how best

to enhance our ability—and to assist our partners to enhance their ability—to meet

the full spectrum of WMD, missile, and conventional threats. In particular, flexible

funding authority can help us to take on high priority tasks, some unforeseen, for

which other agencies—or other governments—are not as well equipped. A good example of the importance of such flexibility was our ability to use the Department

of State’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) to help implement, rapidly, the elimination of Libya’s WMD and longer range missile programs. Without

that flexibility, we could not have removed, quickly, Libya’s UF6, centrifuge equipment, uranium metal casting gear, or SCUD–C ballistic missiles. We fully support

section 106 of S. 1949, which would permanently authorize NDF activities to be conducted outside the former Soviet States.

The President and his administration have devoted higher priority, and more

funding, to nonproliferation and weapons reduction assistance than any of their

predecessors. The President also has spearheaded efforts like the G–8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to increase dramatically the contribution of our international partners in this area. However, the United States, even when joined by active partners, cannot do everything

at once. Therefore, we must establish priorities.

In that regard, the Department is concerned at the requirement in S. 1949 to devote specific amounts from our Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR), and our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program to help

other states with WMD detection, WMD interdiction, and conventional arms reduction. While these objectives are certainly important, the designation of funds as required by the legislation could lead us to devote funds to efforts for which other

agencies—for example, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security on

interdiction or the Departments of Energy and Homeland Security on detection—

may be better suited to develop and manage. Potentially, even more significant,

such designation of funds could also prevent us from implementing what may be

higher priority programs—support to capacity-building against WMD terrorism

might be a good example—in which State Department funds might best be used.

Let me emphasize that our concerns about this aspect of the proposed legislation

do not in any way imply that we do not place great importance on the tasks it outlines, or that we do not agree that far more remains to be done in these vital security areas. I look forward to consulting with this committee to ensure we have the

tools to carry out these missions in the most efficient, cost-effective manner possible.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES

I would like now to outline, briefly, some of our key accomplishments—and challenges that remain—in combating WMD proliferation and reducing the threat from

conventional weapons.

We are taking a broad range of defensive measures—using numerous instruments, policies, and programs—to protect ourselves from WMD proliferation and

WMD-armed adversaries. At one end of the spectrum are those measures that prevent proliferators from gaining access to sensitive technologies and materials that

could represent a shortcut to nuclear weapons. The Nunn-Lugar programs, and

their spinoffs in the State Department and Department of Energy, are key to reinforcing other important measures such as working to ensure effective export controls

by all states. It is noteworthy how these programs have evolved to meet today’s

threats; from an early focus on denuclearizing Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan

and reducing the former Soviet strategic arsenal, to an increasing concentration on

measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related

materials.

Detection is a critical part of that effort, with major contributions from my Department’s Export Control and Border Security Program, the Department of Defense

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the Department of Homeland Security’s

Container Security Initiative Program, and the Department of Energy’s Second Line

of Defense and Megaports Programs. For example, the Second Line of Defense Core

13

Program has equipped 78 sites in Russia, with another 8 planned for this fiscal

year. Recent agreements will allow installations to proceed in Slovenia, Ukraine,

Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The Second Line of Defense Core Program has also assumed responsibility for maintaining detection equipment installed under several

U.S. Government programs in 23 former Soviet and Central European countries between 1992 and 2002. Megaports work is underway in 14 countries, with portal

monitors having been installed so far in Greece, the Netherlands, and Sri Lanka.

The Department of Homeland Security Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is developing a global nuclear detection architecture that will serve as a backdrop for these

individual detection-related programs.

Other defensive measures address the financial underpinnings of proliferation.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540—adopted in April 2004 at the

President’s urging—requires states to adopt and enforce effective controls on funds

and services related to export and transshipment that would contribute to state or

nonstate WMD efforts. Consistent with Resolution 1540, G–8 leaders have called for

enhanced efforts to combat proliferation through cooperation to identify, track, and

freeze transactions and assets associated with proliferation activities.

President Bush augmented U.S. efforts last June when he issued Executive Order

13382, which authorizes the U.S. Government to freeze assets and block transactions of designated entities and persons, or their supporters, engaged in proliferation activities and to prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with them.

Currently 18 entities—6 from Iran, as well as 11 from North Korea and one from

Syria—have been designated under the order, and we are actively considering designating additional ones.

One of the most important defensive measures by the Bush administration, of

course, is PSI, involving close interaction among—and the creative use of—diplomatic, military, economic, law enforcement, and intelligence tools to combat proliferation. PSI countries are applying laws already on the books in innovative ways

and cooperating as never before to interdict shipments, to disrupt proliferation networks, and to hold accountable the front companies that support them. PSI has expanded to include support from more than 70 countries and continues to grow. And

it is working. PSI cooperation has prevented WMD- and missile-related shipments

to Iran and from North Korea. And, of course, it was PSI cooperation among the

United States, United Kingdom, and other European partners that began the demise of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, and contributed importantly to Libya’s

decision to abandon its WMD and longer range missile programs.

Regarding surplus conventional weapons, the threat requires a comprehensive solution not bound by limitations based on weapon type or size. The problem takes

myriad forms, depending among other things on the region and on the host government’s attitude toward the problem. The Department of State has developed a variety of tools to respond to each situation in an effective manner. We provide site surveys to assess areas affected by landmines or unexploded ordnance, or weapons and

munitions storage facilities. We provide assistance for physical security and stockpile management and for demining and destruction of excess weapons or munitions.

In some cases, like Cambodia and Bosnia, our demonstrated success dealing with

landmine problems has been leveraged to gain access to small arms/light weapons,

particularly MANPADS. We have created fully integrated programs capable of addressing landmines, ordnance, and small arms/light weapons in Iraq, Afghanistan,

and Sudan, and are working to do the same in several other countries.

Since 1993, the United States has allocated over $1 billion to address in 40 countries the humanitarian effects caused by the indiscriminate use of persistent landmines. Since 2001 we have destroyed over 800,000 small arms/light weapons and

80 million pieces of ammunition. S. 1949 rightly emphasizes the unique threat that

MANPADS pose to civilian aviation. For a relatively small amount of money, the

Department of State, with assistance from the Department of Defense and others,

has had substantial success in destroying MANPADS at risk of falling into the

hands of terrorists. We have destroyed or disabled over 17,000 at-risk MANPADS

and have commitments for the destruction of over 7,000 more. Also, we are working

in a number of international fora, including the United Nations, NATO, Wassenaar,

the G–8, OSCE, OAS, and APEC, to create global political support for actions to reduce MANPADS and ensure they stay out of the hands of terrorists.

In another important effort, 11 nations and the European Union have matched

our funding for the NATO-Partnership for Peace project to destroy munitions, small

arms, light weapons, and MANPADS in Ukraine. Our partners’ contributions have

doubled the funds available for the project. The United States is supporting similar

programs in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, and an assessment mission to Georgia took

place in December 2005.

I would now like to turn to four proliferation challenges.

14

The first is to end the North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons programs.

President Bush has made clear that we will protect ourselves and our allies from

these threats, and that all options remain on the table. He has made equally clear

that our preference is to resolve them through diplomacy.

In the joint statement agreed on September 19, 2005, at the Six-Party Talks,

North Korea committed to abandoning all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear

programs. This was a notable development, but we still must agree on, and implement, the detailed requirements of North Korean denuclearization and its

verification. That task will certainly be difficult. Indeed, North Korea’s behavior

since the joint statement has underscored the difficulties ahead. First, it demanded

a light water reactor immediately after the issuance of the joint statement—in contrast to what was in the joint statement itself. More recently, Pyongyang indicated

that it would boycott further negotiations until the United States rescinds what

North Korea calls ‘‘economic sanctions’’ against it. We have made clear that we are

committed to pursuing successful Six-Party negotiations, and are ready to resume

the talks at any time. However, we have also made clear that we intend to continue,

and will expand as necessary and appropriate, our defensive measures to ensure

that we can protect ourselves from the proliferation threats from North Korea, as

well as from its illicit activities, including money laundering and counterfeiting.

In some ways, the challenge Iran poses to the nuclear nonproliferation regime is

even more daunting and complex than the North Korean threat. Although the evidence—including Iran’s 20 years of hiding sensitive nuclear fuel cycle efforts—clearly indicates a weapons program, Iran continues to maintain that its work is peaceful. Last week, in a significant victory for our efforts to deny Iran a nuclear weapons

capability, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors reported Iran to the United Nations Security Council. The vote, which secured the

support of all the Permanent Members of the Security Council as well as key states

such as India, Egypt, and Brazil, sent a clear signal to the Iranian Government that

it will not be able to divide the international community and continue its pursuit

of nuclear weapons.

We are entering a new phase of diplomacy where the Iranian regime is increasingly isolated and the international community increasingly united in calling on

Iran’s leaders to reverse course. The issue is now before the Security Council. We

expect the Council to take up action on Iranian noncompliance after Director General ElBaradei’s report to the March 6 meeting of the IAEA Board.

The Security Council will not supplant the IAEA effort, but reinforce it—for example, by calling on Iran to cooperate with the Agency and to take steps the IAEA

Board has identified to restore confidence, and by giving the IAEA new, needed authority to investigate all aspects of the Iranian nuclear effort. The Council should

make clear to the Iranian regime that there will be consequences if it does not step

away from its nuclear weapons ambitions. We will continue to consult closely with

the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (the so-called EU3) and the European

Union, with Russia, China, and many other members of the international community as this new diplomatic phase proceeds.

We have no illusion that reporting the Iran issue to the Security Council will

produce a quick resolution of the threat that Iran presents. When faced with a challenge like that which we face from the Iranian regime—a government that is able

to bring to bear many of its own tools—diplomacy will never be easy, nor will its

results be immediate. But diplomacy remains essential and, despite the frustrations,

is working. The Security Council offers the best next step for diplomacy to succeed.

The second challenge is to end the proliferation trade by rogue states, individuals,

and groups. We have made considerable progress over the last few years. We have

moved from the creation of international export control standards to their active enforcement—through enhanced national legislation, improved detection, interdictions,

international law enforcement, and financial cooperation. We have shut down the

world’s most dangerous proliferation network and steadily reduced the opportunities

available to proliferators. However, proliferators are quick to adapt to changing environments and move their business to less intrusive environments. We must continue to expand and deepen our efforts—using all available national and international authorities and, where necessary, creating new ones until the proliferation

trade has been effectively ended.

The third challenge that I would emphasize is the need to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of WMD, especially biological and nuclear weapons. If terrorists acquire these weapons, they are likely to employ them, with potentially catastrophic

effects. A well-organized terrorist group with appropriate technical expertise could

probably create a crude nuclear device once it gained access to fissile material. Although terrorist use of a radioactive dispersal device is far more likely, the consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack would be so catastrophic that the danger

15

requires particular attention. On the biological weapons side, with today’s dual-use

capabilities and access to particular, dangerous pathogens—many of which exist in

nature or could be relatively easily obtained and cultured—the bioterror challenge

presents a low-cost means of a potentially high-impact attack.

Many of the tools we have in place to combat proliferation by rogue states are

important in the fight against WMD terrorism. A few examples are: Reducing the

global stocks of fissile material; improved nuclear and biological detection capability;

and the interdiction of trafficking in nuclear and biological materials and weapons

components. However, preventing WMD terrorism requires different approaches

from those we have followed against state WMD programs or against non-WMD-related terrorism. For example, intelligence collection and action against the proliferation of WMD have traditionally focused on state-based programs, while antiterrorist

intelligence has focused on individuals and groups. Intelligence regarding the nexus

of terrorism and WMD must cover the full range of state and nonstate threats and

their interrelationships. We are working hard to close any remaining gaps and to

ensure that the intelligence process supports our strategic approach to combating

WMD terrorism. The National Counterterrorism Center’s ongoing efforts and the recent establishment of the National Counterproliferation Center are critical steps to

ensuring better integration and responsiveness across the U.S. Government against

the WMD terrorism threat. The Department of State will continue to work closely

with both centers and with all agencies to produce targeted strategies, to synchronize resources to disrupt terrorist groups seeking to acquire or use WMD, and

to deter and defeat those who may provide terrorists with safe haven or support.

Any effective strategic approach will entail working with partner nations to build

a global layered defense to prevent, detect, and respond to the threat or use of WMD

by terrorists. To prevent, we will undertake national, multilateral, and global efforts

to deny terrorists access to the most dangerous materials. To protect, we will develop new tools and capabilities with partner nations to detect the movement of

WMD and to disrupt linkages between WMD terrorists and their facilitators. Because we can never be certain of our ability to prevent or protect against all potential WMD terrorist attacks, we will cooperate with partners to manage and mitigate

the consequences of such attacks, and to improve our capabilities to attribute their

source. Thus, we will work to harness, in an effective multinational way, all relevant collective resources to establish more coordinated and effective capabilities to

prevent, protect against, and respond to the global threat of WMD terrorism.

Finally, we must address the challenge of the huge remaining stockpiles of dangerous conventional weapons. The United Nations estimates that over 600 million

small arms/light weapons are in circulation worldwide. Of these, an estimated 1 to

3 million are in Nigeria, where there are 100 active militias in the Rivers State

alone. Huge cold-war-era stocks in Central and Eastern Europe present a dangerous

legacy. According to the Russian Government, over 15,000 small arms and light

weapons were stolen from Defense and Interior Ministry stockpiles and units between 1994 and 2001. One and a half million tons of munitions in Ukraine have

been declared surplus, and 340,000 tons require urgent disposal. Albania, Bosnia

and Herzegovina, and Bulgana each have tens of thousands of tons of surplus ammunition. We estimate that since the 1970s, over 40 civilian aircraft have been hit

by MANPADS, causing 25 plane crashes, primarily in war zones, and over 600

deaths. More than 100 countries are affected, and approximately 20 are heavily affected, by landmines and/or unexploded ordnance.

The challenge posed by these conventional weapons is massive, but well-targeted

assistance has achieved—and will continue to achieve—positive, cost-effective results. The Department of State has made great strides over the last few years in

addressing this threat, but we have yet to realize our full potential. Working closely

with other agencies and with other governments, we look to greater progress in the

future. We also know we must work closely with Congress in meeting this essential

national security goal. We greatly value and appreciate the support of this committee and the Senate more broadly.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Department of State and the administration, I

would like to thank you for your vision, leadership, and support as we confront the

threat of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and dangerous conventional arms.

As I have described, we have been working hard to develop innovative and more

effective tools. We have had considerable success, but there is much that still needs

to be done. I look forward to working with you and the committee to ensure that

the Department implements fully the transformational diplomacy required to protect the American people, our friends and allies from the threats of the 21st century.

16

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Joseph.

Let me correct the record. I misspoke in my last comments before

you began when I talked about the Albanian experiences, the first

outside the United States. I meant to say outside of Russia. That

has been the purview of the cooperative threat reduction situation.

I have several questions, and I want to suggest that we will have

a time limit of 10 minutes a round so that we can proceed, and

then we’ll come back and raise questions that we were not able to

raise in the first 10 minutes.

Let me start, Secretary Joseph, by saying that Congress has specifically authorized the President to provide countries with proliferation interdiction assistance under chapter 9 of part II of the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The relevant provisions state that

the President should insure that not less than 25 percent of the assistance provided in that chapter is expended on transit interdiction.

More specifically, it calls on the President to enhance the capabilities of friendly countries to detect and interdict proliferation related shipments of cargo that originate from or are destined for

other countries. It goes on to suggest that priority should be given

to any friendly country that has been determined by the Secretary

of State to be a country frequently transited by proliferationrelated shipments of cargo.

My question is to you, Secretary Joseph. Do you believe that

chapter 9 of the Foreign Assistance Act currently provides all the

authority the Department needs to coordinate and implement proliferation detection and interdiction assistance?

Mr. JOSEPH. Senator, I believe that it does, and I believe that

based on the fact that no one has raised the issue that we require

more authorities for that purpose. And I devote an enormous

amount of my time to this issue, and if there had been a, you

know, a suggestion of a problem, I probably would have been informed of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me follow up on that same general area. Is

it your view the Department is currently following all the provisions of chapter 9 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act, in particular, with regard to: One, establishing a list of countries that

should be given priority in U.S. transit interdiction funding; and

two, insuring that not less than 25 percent of chapter 9 funds are

used for transit interdiction?

Mr. JOSEPH. Senator, if I may get back to you on that, I will give

you the specifics.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good, if you would do so for the record, we

would appreciate it.

Mr. JOSEPH. I will do so.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—At the time this hearing went to press the State

Department had failed to provide the requested information.]

The CHAIRMAN. Now, third, in conjunction with this question,

what programs are used to meet requirements of chapter 9, and

what percentage of the funds expended by these programs go to detection and interdiction assistance, as opposed to export controls

and other efforts?

17

Mr. JOSEPH. Senator, as I mentioned in my opening statement,

we do have a significant effort that is reflected in the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance. This is a program that

involves efforts with 50 countries or more. It is a program that contributes to detection and interdiction in a number of ways, really,

across the spectrum from trying to work with others, and we have

done so successfully in many cases to build the legal authorities in

those countries, to have effective export controls and to have effective customs capabilities to training and providing equipment. It is

a program that has had a great impact, I would say, on the overall

objective of WMD detection and interdiction.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, with regard to this third question, will you

review that, too, for the record, because I have asked what percentage of funds expended by the programs go to interdiction and detection as opposed to export controls and other efforts.

Mr. JOSEPH. I will do that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This may be difficult to respond to, but——

Mr. JOSEPH. I’ll get you this——

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, that would be helpful.

Mr. JOSEPH [continuing]. Precise percentage; yes, sir.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—At the time this hearing went to press the State

Department had failed to provide the requested information.]

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in another area, listening close to your testimony, if I understand it, you believe the provisions of our bill, S.

1949, requiring increased coordination, are not needed given the

recent reorganization of the arms control and nonproliferation

bureaus into a single international security, a nonproliferation bureau. Is that right? Is my understanding correct?

Mr. JOSEPH. Sir, I think the key contribution of the reorganization is to put better focus on the problem, the problem particularly

related to detection and interdiction and dealing with the threat of

proliferation more broadly. In terms of coordination, I think that

we do require greater coordination, better coordination, and that

we can do better in that area, both within the State Department,

but also within the interagency and with other countries. I think

that is the key to success.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when Senator Obama and I were in

Donestk, Ukraine, we were struck by what we would call numerous

moving parts within the administration on these issues. And with

regard to that, I have four related questions. First of all, would you

please describe how many and which offices were involved in conventional weapons dismantlement both before and after the reorganization of your bureaus? Now, let me ask all four of these questions because some may require followup. What mechanisms have

you put in place to insure that coordination is improved? What coordination mechanisms are in place to insure there are no overlaps

or gaps in the assistance. More specifically, How do you ensure the

United States is not paying for the same item through the Export

Control and Border Security Program, our voluntary contributions

to the IAEA fund that assists countries in similar areas or other

U.S. programs at the Department of Defense or Customs? And finally, as you have reorganized the coordination of these efforts,

have you found any evidence of mismanagement or problems inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:49 May 07, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 800926.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
18

volving wasteful overlaps? I’d be pleased by your response to any

of this generally, but, also, please provide specific responses for the

record.

Mr. JOSEPH. I will provide specific responses for the record, Senator, but let me say that I am not aware, going to your last question first, of any reports of mismanagement or wasteful overlap.

But again, I will get you a, you know, a complete response for the

record. In terms of how many offices are involved in conventional

weapons elimination or dismantlement, well, the key office, of

course, is the office that I described in my testimony, the office

within the Political Military Bureau dealing with weapons removal

and abatement. This was our attempt to bring together, into one

office, the disparate functions that were separated prior to the creation of that office in 2003 relating to conventional weapons removal and demining, everything from demining to the small arms/

light weapons initiatives and the MANPAD initiatives that we

have undertaken. There are other offices that are involved. At

times, the office dealing with the nonproliferation and disarmament fund has been involved because they have provided resources for specific projects. And naturally, there’s a large coordination effort within the State Department involving many different

offices, but the principle focus of the work is done within the PM,

the PM Bureau. Your second question dealt with how has coordination improved. I think it has been improved through the reorganization and particularly, the creation of this particular office dealing specifically with conventional weapons initiatives. And as to

EXBS and the voluntary IAEA contributions and the question as

to whether we’re paying twice for the same horse, I’ll get back to

you. Again, I am not aware of any cases in that regard.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—At the time this hearing went to press the State

Department had failed to provide the requested information.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you. Now, Secretary Joseph, you’ve expressed concern that specific funding allocations or earmarks for

these programs would reduce your flexibility to address the full

range of threat initiatives for which you’re responsible. Let me just

ask, How much has the Department requested for conventional

weapons dismantlement in fiscal year 2007? How is that number

determined? To what extent is the request for the fiscal year 2007

based on a threat risk assessment of known conventional weapons

and stockpiles? In your testimony, you indicate some stockpiles of

conventional weapons require urgent disposal. Under current

plans, how long will it take to eliminate those threats? And then,

if there was additional funding, would you be able to accomplish

your goals faster?

Mr. JOSEPH. Senator, let me say that I, of course, support the

President’s budget as has been submitted. The request for small

arms/light weapons destruction in the NADAR account for fiscal

year 2007 is approximately $8.6 million. That is not the only account from which we could support the conventional elimination

initiatives including the elimination of at-risk MANPADS. To the

question of whether or not we could spend additional money, sure,

we could spent additional money, but it would be important that

19

that money not be taken out of other accounts that reflect other

priorities.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate your loyal response. Let me

just say, anecdotally, that as we met yesterday with the King of

Jordan, he expressed a number of security issues which are vital

in the war against terrorism. You are aware of many of these. It

was apparent that the administration budget did not contemplate

quite all of what he had in mind. He took this up directly with the

President. The President indicated what the budget is of the administration, but also indicated to the King that if, in fact, he had

a more favorable congressional response, conceivably, the Congress

might work as well. I raise these questions with that thought in

mind, but I want your assessment, quite honestly, as to the risk

that we have. In other words, my own view with regard to the

weapons of mass destruction as well as these extremely important

so-called conventional weapons is that if there is an urgent threat,

we must meet it, and this is not simply a bookkeeping tabulation.

You share that view, I know, but I need, in addition to your loyal

response to the administration’s budgets, your assessment as a professional of what we need to do, really, in this year that we’re looking at. I’d like to call now upon my distinguished colleague, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary, what other

priorities are equal to or greater than this one? You said there are

other priorities that are greater. Can you list some for me?

Mr. JOSEPH. Senator, I personally put the highest priority on

combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I have

been working on that problem, as you know, for a good number of

years.

Senator BIDEN. We don’t disagree there. Any other priority that’s

higher than this that you could list?

Mr. JOSEPH. I don’t think there’s another national security priority higher than stopping proliferation, and specifically, meeting

the challenge of nuclear terrorism.

Senator BIDEN. No; I agree with that. I think we all agree the

highest priority is the challenge of weapons of mass destruction.

Now, you said there are other priorities that are equal to or greater

than the priority set out in this legislation, and my dad used to say

show me a budget, and I’ll tell you what you believe. You know,

you can say—I remember we used to have these discussions—we

value the women on our staffs. I said, well, show me the budget.

How much do you value them? Do you have them at the top of the

list, as many women as men making the same amount of money,

if you really value them? If someone tells me he values taking care

of the sick and the elderly, well, show me what the budget says.

Now, we talk about proliferation, and we all have our anecdotal examples. Senator Lugar and I were in Iraq a couple times together

right after the war. I remember walking out in the street, and we

were—remember Dick, they had this deal wherever they were paying for MANPADS, the surface-to-air missiles that could be held by

an individual, and we’re paying $500 bucks, I guess, for the retrieval because there were 800,000 tons of weapons left unguarded

at weapons dumps that we literally did not guard, that were looted

extensively. And I was told a story by a captain; I didn’t actually

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see it. I think it was a captain who said, there’s a guy that crossed

the street on the corner near him—and we were able to walk

around town in those days; we were outside the Green Zone; can’t

do that now—and there was one of these shoulder-launched missiles leaning up against a chain-linked fence that a guy just could

not come up with $500 bucks to pay this young Iraqi who came

with him. He said, ‘‘Do you have any more?’’ I didn’t see this now,

I’m told this. ‘‘Do you have any more?’’ And the Iraqi said, ‘‘I

thought I could only bring in one.’’ He said, ‘‘No, you can bring as

many as you have.’’ And the Iraqi came back with a beat-up pickup

truck, literally, I’m told, completely filled with these missiles. He

could not fit any more in the pickup truck. So, there are thousands

of these things out there, hundreds and hundreds at least. I suspect thousands. And so, I am just wondering what is a higher priority. Eight million bucks in this budget to deal with conventional

weapons like this. Eight million dollars doesn’t even get a blip on

the screen. You all have underfunded Nunn-Lugar for 4 or 5 years

on balance. We’re doing a little better now. So, I’m wondering what

are the other things in the budget. It was referenced by Senator

Obama that we’re putting another billion bucks into it. And we all

agree we should be doing more in foreign aid, but—you know, I’ve

already put you in too much of a spot—but, I do not get it how

there could be anything with a higher priority. I promise you, if a

conventional airliner comes down in this United States due to one

of these weapons, whoa, you’re going to find this is the highest priority in the minds of every American citizen.

So I just think the priorities are a little misplaced. In recent

years, I have been pressing you, with the help of the chairman, for

a requirement that before we sell or give arms or light weapons to

a country, we ask what the State Department Office that deals

with these weapons, your Office, thinks about the probable sale.

And the reason for that is to give your Office notice, a chance to

offer assistance to the recipient country, either on how they’re

going to secure these weapons or what they’re going to do with the

old weapons they are retiring. Is this something you guys could

support? We’ll send you a question—I do not want to catch you off

guard. We had it in our legislation, and we have not gotten much

of a response.

But the bottom line is, the Defense Department decides to sell

some of these weapons of the kind we’re talking about. Sometimes

it replaces older versions of similar weapons. What does the recipient country do with those older weapons, and what do they have

in place to secure the weapons we’re selling them? It seems to me

we should know that, and you guys are the ones who, I think,

should be looking at that. Do you have any objection to that legislation, that requirement?

Mr. JOSEPH. Senator, let me say that I will actively look at what

you have proposed——

Senator BIDEN. Good.

Mr. JOSEPH [continuing]. And provide you with a response. I

would like to have an opportunity to respond to the question of the

budget, though——

Senator BIDEN. Sure.

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Mr. JOSEPH [continuing]. Because I think that is a very important point.

Senator BIDEN. I’d be happy to have you do that. I only got 10

minutes, and I got two questions, but go ahead.

Mr. JOSEPH. Senator, I——

Senator BIDEN. Tell you what, let me ask you the two other questions so I get them in, and then you can respond to all of this, because, you know, there’s this rumor that I talk more than others,

and so I want to be fastidious about the 10-minute rule here. So,

I’m going to get in my questions, then you all can talk as long as

you want. I have two other questions if you will mark that one

down and respond to it, the budget. Another one that I’m going to

submit for the record is an article you’ve already seen, from February 7, ‘‘State Department Sees Exodus of Weapons Experts,’’ by

Warren Strobel, a first-rate well-known reporter here, with KnightRidder. I have questions off of that which I’ll submit for the record

and I’d like you to be able to respond to, but I want to move quickly before my time is up, also, to Iran. And as I said, I give you guys

credit. I think the administration is on the right course, keeping

the international community together. You’ve made progress.

You’ve stuck with the Europeans. You put them in a position where

they’re going to have to—you know, I love my European friends;

they always want to do things by consensus, but sometimes, when

the rules are broken, they’re not so willing to enforce. So, you’ve

kind of been backing them into a position where I think they will

have more—I shouldn’t say it this way, but more, how can I say

it, I was going to say spine, but I wouldn’t, won’t say that—more

conviction about following up.

But here’s the deal. We hear all the time that, obviously, sanctions against Iraq by China, which is thirsting for energy, Russia,

that has been reluctant to take on Iran, and Europe which desperately needs energy, at the end of the day, when you go to the

United Nations and seek sanctions, assuming we get them, they’ll

probably not be real sanctions. But I want to know, and you don’t

have to give me the answer now because it may be classified: Have

you guys analyzed the impact that oil sanctions would have on

Iran, not the impact it would have on the consuming world, but on

Iran? Because it’s my understanding that they are net importers of

refined fuels, gasoline for example, and that Iran is incredibly dependent on the moneys coming from crude oil, thanks to the high

market prices right now. And I, for one, think this is the place we

should have the nerve to pull the trigger on Iran, if it gets there.

But my question is, has there been a hard analysis done—and

if it was classified, fine, I’d like to ask for the committee to have

access to it in an appropriate time and place—but have you done

a hard analysis on the impact sanctions would have on Iran, if, in

fact, we found the nerve, Europe and China not vetoing, but in supporting sanctions for Iran’s failure to cease and desist from their

nuclear ambitions? My time’s up, and all those questions are yours.

Mr. JOSEPH. Senator, thank you. I’ll try to be very brief. In terms

of the budget, I think the budget that this administration has proposed does reflect our priorities, particularly in the area of stopping

or combating weapons of mass destruction. We have a record that

goes back a good number of years now as an administration. To

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meet the requirements of the comprehensive strategy that we have

put forth for dealing with this preeminent threat to our Nation, one

element of that strategy is prevention, and this administration has

a very proud record in terms of its budget requests for nonproliferation assistance programs, not just CTR, but, of course, the

DOE programs and the State programs that contribute to that effort. We also, in that very same context, have worked with others

because we believe that this is an international responsibility. This

is not a responsibility solely of the American taxpayer. And in

2002, the President achieved, what I think, is a major success in

terms of the establishment of the G–8 Global Partnership to stop

the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, which

has resulted in billions of dollars. I believe it’s about $7 billion of

commitments for this effort. I mean, that’s real money.

Senator BIDEN. How much has been expended?

Mr. JOSEPH. I would have to give you the specific figures on

what’s been expended, but I think the fact that we have commitments in this regard of $7 billion is very significant.

We’ve also, of course, in terms of the second element of the strategy, the protective element, spent a great deal of money, not just

in efforts that we’ve talked about today like PSI in terms of detection and interdiction, but building our counterproliferation capabilities. Prevention may not always work. We need to be in a position

to protect ourselves, and we are expending tremendous resources

in that regard, everything from improving the ability of our troops

in the field to operate in a chemical or biological environment to

missile defense.

And third, in terms of the final element of the response of the

strategy, we are developing our response capabilities. And Congress has appropriated billions of dollars just in the biological area

alone. We are moving forward with a very comprehensive strategy

to deal with this very dangerous and complex threat, and we are

spending enormous amounts of money in a constrained environment on dealing with the threat, but we’re doing it comprehensively. Now, my sense, Senator, is that MANPADS represent a tremendous threat. And you are exactly right in your characterization

of this, but if I had to compare the priority of MANPADS, we’ve

got to deal with it. There’s no question about it. But the consequences of, you know, a coordinated attack using MANPADS

would be very significant. Some could say that it would be catastrophic, but I think the use of even a single nuclear weapon

against an American city would be greater, and I think we’ve got

to place our priorities in that framework.

Senator BIDEN. That’s what you call a straw man. No one’s suggesting that you in any way do that. As a matter of fact, I don’t

think you spend enough there. Your whole budget’s about $450 million, and you’re going to spend on missile defense this year, which

I think is a cockamamie priority, a whole lot more, but that’s above

your paygrade and mine. But how about the issue of Iran?

Mr. JOSEPH. Senator, as we move forward, and thank you for

your words, as we move forward, we are analyzing all aspects of

next steps that we might be able to take. I would not want to, in

this context, get into the specifics of what we’re looking at with regard to options for sanctions, but what you’ve said is, you know,

23

it is something that we know in terms of certain vulnerabilities

that are out there.

Senator BIDEN. Is there any place in the administration we can

go in a classified way and get a sense of whether or not there’s

been a hard analysis done of what an oil embargo would do in

terms of impact upon Iran? That’s my question.

Mr. JOSEPH. Why don’t I talk to you right after this?

Senator BIDEN. OK, great, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden. I

would just underline Senator Biden’s query. I understand the confidentiality, but it is important for us to know not simply that

there’s been thinking by the administration on that specific response, but perhaps on a whole gamut of responses so that in the

event that at some point, heaven forbid, we are called upon to take

action, in this committee or in this body, we will have been well

informed and will have been thoughtful throughout the process. I’d

like to call now on Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Joseph,

thank you very much for your testimony so far. I just want to start

by making sure we’re all on the same page here.

My understanding in your interchange with Ranking Member

Biden is that you seem to be implying, at least, that we had an

either/or choice between dealing with weapons of mass destruction

and dealing with threats like MANPADS. And I just want to make

absolutely clear for the record here that the question I understood

Ranking Member Biden to be making was setting aside the priority, the appropriate priority, of weapons of mass destruction and

the nonproliferation in that area in which all of us would like to

see probably more resources than the administration is currently

devoting. You still have a pretty sizable budget remaining, and the

question then becomes what are the other priorities aside from

weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation, that you think might

be higher than assuring that shoulder-to-air missiles don’t get into

the hands of terrorists that can shoot down commercial flights, either here in the United States or abroad.

Is there a priority higher than that from your perspective? And

if it is, I think we want to know what that is because I’m not sure,

in my mind, that there is another priority other than preventing

nuclear weapons or biological and chemical weapons. So, I never

felt like I got a clear answer on that question, and I’m wondering

if you could address that right now.

Mr. JOSEPH. Senator, I’ll give you a very clear answer. Other

than stopping weapons of mass destruction, I personally do not

think that there is, in the area that I work, a higher priority——

Senator OBAMA. Right, OK.

Mr. JOSEPH [continuing]. Than keeping MANPADS out of the

hands of the wrong people.

Senator OBAMA. Good, so I actually think we’re in agreement

there. So, then the question becomes, I guess, Is there room for improvement, and are there additional resources that the department

could use in order to make this program more effective? It does not

detract from the effectiveness of what you’ve already been doing.

And I think we compliment the efforts that have been made. But

as Chairman Lugar indicated, our observations, at least, have been

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that the problem of proliferation in this area is considerable, partly

because there are a lot more MANPADS out there than there are,

you know, weapons grade nuclear material, and so the challenges

are different than the ones that you face. There may be numerous

MANPADS floating around somewhere. We may not have tracked

them sufficiently. And so the question, then, I guess is, Where are

the areas of improvement that can be made, either organizationally

or budgetary that would be significant? And I’ll—what I’ll do is, I’ll

just read one quote that I have from an internal State Department

document that was on this issue that came out last year. It says,

and I’m quoting in part, ‘‘Globally, there is a requirement to destroy large excess stockpiles of conventional munitions. However,

the tools and resources available to the Department are insufficient

to address this requirement.’’

Now, you know, this is a State Department response, to a precursor to the legislation that we’ve introduced. This prior legislation, introduced back in 2004, was called Conventional Arms

Threat Reduction Act of 2004, and I am quoting from the talking

points from the Department concerning this legislation. So, it just

seems to me that we can do better. You’ve just acknowledged this

is the second highest priority after making sure that weapons of

mass destruction are secure. The legislation here attempts to provide you additional authority and resources in order to improve

how we’re dealing with this critical issues. If these are not the

right tools please tell us what is the way to make this system work

better—unless, of course, you think that it’s working as good as it

can.

Mr. JOSEPH. Senator, thank you. Let me just say that we can always do better, and we are striving to do better. And I do believe,

as I said, that MANPADS is a threat that we need to treat with

the highest priority. And in the last few years, the State Department has focused much of its budget in the Small Arms/Light

Weapons Account on MANPADS as well as taking the lead in

working with other countries to address this threat, such as in

Ukraine. We’ve worked in 17 countries, literally, around the world

on this, and no country that has sought MANPADS assistance has

been refused. We are trying to meet this priority threat, and we are

making a determined effort.

Senator OBAMA. Oh, I have no doubt that, given the limited resources you have and the fact that you’ve got a lot on your plate

right now, that you’re doing the best that you feel that you can.

Mr. Secretary, I think you’ve got a big job, which is why we’re interested in giving you potentially more authority and resources to

do your job. And as Senator——

Senator BIDEN. We want to throw you in the briar patch.

Senator OBAMA. As Chairman Lugar indicated, you know, we appreciate your loyalty to the President’s budget. You know, we are

not required to, toe the line in the same way that you are, so we

in Congress are going to push on this.

Let me focus on a couple points before my time is out. You know,

right now, the budget for small arms and light weapons, including

MANPADS is $8.6 million—million dollars. I mean, that’s decimal

dust in our budget, given how important this issue is to our security. Now, this is taxpayer money, and you start in Washington,

25

you start talking in terms of millions, and people lose perspective.

Millions is real money, but $8.6 million in our budget is not commensurate with the threat posed by these weapons. You mention

that anybody who asks us for help, you’re happy to provide it, but

there are a whole bunch of countries out there who may not be asking us for help. That’s part of the problem.

When Senator Lugar is wandering up in the hillside somewhere

and just because he happens to be there, they say, Oh, by the way,

here are 47 MANPADS in a crate, you know, we don’t want to

leave securing these issues to, you know, these random encounters

or some sort of conscience on the part of some other foreign power

somewhere. I mean, we want to make sure that we’re doing everything we can.

And so, can you just tell me how could we be more proactive as

opposed to, what it sounds to me, maybe somewhat passive or, at

least, not as systematic as we could be on this program?

Mr. JOSEPH. Senator, again, if we were to devote more resources

to the destruction of MANPADS, I think we could achieve more,

but I would very much recommend not taking those resources from

other accounts. If you look——

Senator OBAMA. Other accounts, I just want to be clear, other accounts of yours in the area of nuclear war——

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, I can’t speak——

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. Weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Am I correct? I mean, that’s your point. You don’t want

to shift, I just want to make sure I’m getting your point clear here,

you don’t want to shift money out of the vital work that’s being

done in the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction into

this area. Is that correct?

Mr. JOSEPH. That’s correct, Senator.

Senator OBAMA. OK.

Mr. JOSEPH. Obviously, I can’t speak for others, but in terms of

the budget accounts that are appropriate in terms of, you know,

the tasks that I am responsible for, for example, in humanitarian

demining, we have a relatively, you know, large effort in that context.

Senator OBAMA. That’s important stuff. I don’t want——

Mr. JOSEPH. It’s very important, Senator.

Senator OBAMA. I don’t want a bunch of kids maimed as a consequence of——

Mr. JOSEPH. But, Senator, these are the types of choices that,

you know, that are reflected in our budget.

Senator OBAMA. I understand, and I don’t mean to interrupt you.

I guess my point is simply that I don’t necessarily want to—I don’t

feel constrained in a way that you necessarily are in your institutional role by thinking just within your budget. I’m not interested

in robbing Peter to pay Paul necessarily within your budget. We’ve

got some more flexibility. I suspect there’s a whole bunch of money

being spent on less important priorities outside of the issues for

which you are responsible. You don’t have to comment on that.

That’s my comment that, you know, we could quadruple the budget

devoted to MANPADS, and I assure you there are some programs

in this federal budget could be cut to fund this increase. So, again,

26

you don’t need to comment on that. I’m out of time on this round.

I’ll see if I can come back on some points.

Mr. JOSEPH. Could I just make one suggestion?

Senator OBAMA. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOSEPH. It may be very useful to have a classified briefing

given to the committee on MANPADS because there are a number

of things that I think the committee could learn from if we were

able to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that’s a good idea, and perhaps, to the extent that it’s possible, the discussion may be made more candidly

of the priorities and the problems that we have so that we could

understand the criteria of the budget making at this point and

maybe be better informed as we verge into this and try to rearrange some of the cards in the deck.

Senator Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This must be

kind of bittersweet for you. Bitter in that it goes against the grain

of the administration’s budget, but sweet as Senator Biden said,

Oh, please don’t throw me in that briar patch. But you see where

we’re coming from.

I’d like for you to address the question of how the United States

should express our disgust at Iran’s position toward Israel, but do

so in a way that does not preclude a diplomatic resolution to the

crisis?

Mr. JOSEPH. Senator, I have spoken publicly on the issue of Iran

and the threat that is posed by a potential nuclear-armed Iran, and

one of the key threats, of course, in that context is that Iran, a nuclear-armed Iran, with this leadership, does represent an existential threat to the State of Israel. When the President of Iran says

that he would like to wipe Israel off the face of the map and—oh,

by the way, he said the same for the United States, but wipe Israel

off the face of the map and denies the historical reality of the Holocaust and makes other truly abhorrent statements, I think we

ought to make very clear not only that we find that repugnant, but

that has policy significance. That that hardens our view that we

and the entire international community must band together and

prevent this regime from acquiring nuclear weapons. And quite

frankly, I think that the President’s comments, the President of

Iran’s comments, about Israel have hardened the opposition, have

resulted in other countries moving from the abstain column, if you

will, at the IAEA Board of Governors to voting with us because I

think a number of countries believe that Ahmadinejad does believe

what he says in this context.

Senator BILL NELSON. So, you think we can still move toward a

diplomatic solution given the extremist positions that have been

taken?

Mr. JOSEPH. Senator, I think we need to do everything we can

to give the highest prospect for diplomacy working, and that’s what

we have been trying to do. We’ve been trying to do that in the

IAEA context. We will now try to do that in the Security Council

context, but this is very hard. As you know, Iran has tremendous

resources. It has a whole number of tools that it also can play, but

a nuclear-armed Iran is something that is unacceptable to us.

27

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, I’m getting around to the question

of all options on the table, but tell me how long you think this situation can go on.

Mr. JOSEPH. I can’t give you a good sense, Senator, of the time.

You know, as well as I, the estimate of the Intelligence Community

in terms of 5 to 10 years, but I don’t know what level of confidence

is associated with that assessment or how many wildcards, for example, foreign assistance, that may be involved in that assessment.

We know that Iran drew on the assistance of the A.Q. Khan network in the past, and it may find shortcuts in the future. We do

know that it is determined. It appears to be absolutely determined

to move from conversion, to enrichment, to weaponization. I don’t

know—I don’t have a good sense of the time. But my sense is that

we can’t wait 10 years and 17 resolutions, you know, before we address the full aspect of the threat.

Senator BILL NELSON. And what do we do about our friends, the

Russians, who now have said they’re willing to take and enrich

Iran’s uranium? That plays right into Iran’s hands.

Mr. JOSEPH. Senator, the Russians put forth their ideas, their

proposal, in the context of the EU3 negotiations, and the EU3 negotiations are based upon the Paris Accord from November 2004

and would not allow Iran to conduct enrichment-related activities.

The Russian proposal would not permit Iran to have access to

the technologies that are associated with enrichment and would not

permit Iran to enrich uranium in Iran.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, they bought some time in going

through that exercise. Has the U.S. Government made clear that

all options are on the table?

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes, sir, the President has said that. We are working diplomacy as hard as we can. Everybody wants diplomacy to

provide the solution to this threat. We are also working to deny

Iran access to sensitive materials and technologies through the

Proliferation Security Initiative, through all of the other counterproliferation and nonproliferation programs and capabilities that

we have built.

Senator BILL NELSON. OK, and is it the position of the administration that they’re OK with Iran possessing nuclear power technology?

Mr. JOSEPH. We, Senator, supported the EU3 proposal. Part of

the proposal that was made last August would have allowed peaceful nuclear power reactors in Iran. It would not allow conversion

or enrichment, and it was particularly straightforward on not permitting enrichment which, of course, is key to developing the fissile

material for the weapon.

Senator BILL NELSON. So the administration’s position would

allow the Iranians to possess that nuclear power technology?

Mr. JOSEPH. It would allow, you know, the current Bushier reactor that is being built by the Russians. But under the conditions

that have been made, you know, the arrangement that the Russians have made for providing all the fuel and taking back all of

the fuel, that’s a very important nonproliferation measure. We supported that. We encouraged that. And, of course, we have drawn

the line with regard to Iran moving beyond that.

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Senator BILL NELSON. And that’s the position of the administration even though Iran has cheated at every opportunity?

Mr. JOSEPH. That is the position that we have taken with regard

to the EU3 negotiations. Things have moved. I mean, the Iranians

now have moved to conversion in August when the Europeans

made this very generous proposal in August, and the Iranians responded by moving to full-scale conversion.

We, then, had a resolution of noncompliance, which I think was

a significant diplomatic success for the President and the Secretary

in September. For the first time, we found Iran in formal noncompliance, which requires the report going to the Security Council. We, then, had Iran responding to that by its activities, I believe

it was the 9th or 10th of January, in which they removed seals and

said they were moving forward with what they called innocent research and development on enrichment. Innocent research and development which one Iranian was reported to have said takes place

at most major universities, which it wasn’t the case from my universities or any one that I know. I mean, clearly this is the next

step to enrichment. This is what we’re trying to stop. And I think

we had, you know, some success at the IAEA, but this is going to

be a very difficult diplomatic effort stretching over many months.

Senator BILL NELSON. There’s an awful lot that hangs in the balance. And at every step we’ve seen, it appears Iran is absolutely

intent on moving toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. You

can approach this with carrots. You can approach it with sticks.

Why was it the position of the U.S. Government under your predecessor not to use both?

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, I couldn’t speak for my predecessor, but we

have, you know, supported diplomatic efforts that would provide

real benefits to the Iranian people. I mentioned civil nuclear energy, but also much broader than that. But this is not about nuclear energy, this is about a state, a government, that is determined to acquire a nuclear weapon’s capability. That’s how I see

it.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, on that, we certainly agree, and

there’s a lot at stake. We have to be successful.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. I apologize. I am going to have to leave, and I

wanted to leave two—present some additional questions to the Secretary that you can respond to in writing and just if you don’t

mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to do so right at this time, and

then I’ll ask my questions after you’ve concluded?

Senator OBAMA. Well, rather than take additional time and delay

you, I’ll just present them in writing. I’d like a response. My hope

is, just as a closing statement, you know, I think we have a very

high regard for the work that your Office is doing, and we appreciate the priorities that you have set with respect to weapons of

mass destruction.

I just want to reiterate that this has to be the second priority,

is dealing with MANPADS and other conventional weapons. I

mean, we didn’t talk about when Senator Lugar and I were in

29

Ukraine just seeing mountains and mountains and mountains of

conventional weapons, asking the manager there how long did he

expect, at the rate they were going, to dismantle these, you know,

mortars, and he said, what, 60 years. These are, you know, as

Chairman Lugar stated, being used to make IEDs in Iraq and now

Afghanistan, and who knows where next. And so, we’ve got to deal

with this, and I think that we can do better.

My hope is that maybe outside the context of this hearing we can

have a more constructive conversation about how we can fine tune

this piece of legislation to give you the additional tools that you

need, so thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I would just add, we hope

and pray for the success of your work. But these questions need to

be answered, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for providing this

forum.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for attending the hearing.

Secretary Joseph, just to complete the record, with my questioning.

In the past, the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and others,

have described the nonproliferation and disarmament fund, which

I’ll refer to after as the NDF, as designed to respond to urgent unanticipated nonproliferation events of immediate concern to the

United States. And for these reasons, I, and others, have been

strong supporters of that program. However, it appears that a disturbing trend may be developing. Instead of responding to emergencies or opportunities, such as Libya, in which you have been

heavily involved, NDF funds would appear to be identified up front

to fill funding shortfalls in other areas. Is this an indication of a

larger funding problem in the disarmament nonproliferation accounts? What steps can be taken to ensuring that NDF is not crippled by taking up the slack for funding shortfalls in other program

areas?

Mr. JOSEPH. Senator, thank you. NDF has been used for a wide

number of purposes, including to support conventional weapons destruction and detection and interdiction on the WMD side. We have

recently moved the money that was coming from the NDF for

EXBS, out of that, out of that account. We are trying to retain this

fund for the purpose that it was established. Because we do find

that it provides great flexibility. I believe it’s no year money, and

it’s not withstanding, it gives us exactly the type of flexibility that

we need. And we just need to be very careful in ensuring that it’s

used for the proper purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that’s for certain. I raise the question because once again we have a fund here and we’ve all agreed on the

importance of it. Obviously, it’s used from time to time for other

purposes, and, therefore, priorities may have been established ad

hoc that would determine that.

Your testimony outlines concerns about funding choices, and facing these funding choices between projects, addressing equally important threats and your need for greater flexibility.

As my colleagues and I have suggested, isn’t this an indication

that the funding levels are insufficient? In our opinion, all of these

30

dismantlement, nonproliferation, and counterproliferation efforts

are critical to the U.S. security. And if you’re concerned about important projects being sidelined because of earmarks, isn’t the answer an increase in funding for the nonproliferation accounts?

I would hope that the answer is, ‘‘Yes’’; although, as you pointed

out, the administration has come to a conclusion as to what the

current request would be. It could be that, perhaps, Senator Obama

and I, in addition to offering this legislation, should craft an

amendment to the appropriations bill to ensure that all these programs are fully funded, and that harmful choices are avoided.

My hope would be that we can work with the administration on

this, as opposed to having a competition as to who finds more

threats and more difficulties. But I mention that because at least

one of our options as Members of Congress is to offer amendments

to appropriation bills.

The President ultimately does not have to accept those. But we

think that there is genuine bipartisan support for what we’re talking about here today. And I mention that just historically, because

one of the good things about longevity in the Congress, is that you

outlast administrations. Three, four, five, six, as the case may be.

Secretaries come and go. Some are more sympathetic to programs

such as the ones we’re talking about.

My hope is that your administration would be very sympathetic

now, in this particular period. In this administration. Not in the

next. But providence willing, the voters of Indiana willing, I’ll be

around for the next one. And I’m trying to indicate tactfully my

persistence as you proceed with the Nunn-Lugar efforts over the

last 15 years.

So this area won’t go away. This is why we really appreciate your

taking time to testify today, so that we could have direct conversation, publically, about these issues which are important. Not only

to Senator Obama and myself, but I think to others who have spoken. And let me just offer two more thoughts in light of the testimony you’ve given.

You mentioned the European contributions and the idea of the

G–8 contributing, matching what amounts to about a billion dollars

of cooperative reduction funds. Plus the Energy Department, and

State, and so forth. It was a wonderful idea. Senator Biden may

not have pressed the issue, but he inquired, What have the European contributions been? We’ve had hearings on this issue before.

Clearly there are problems. Some of the problems are posed by

Russia, by the Duma, or by their administrations which have not

given umbrella coverage in terms of liability to many European

contractors in the same measure that we have requested and obtained that with our own initial Nunn-Lugar funds and to some extent with subsequent efforts.

Although there were good faith pledges to move as a practical

matter, lacking coverage, many of our colleagues in the G–8 have

not been able to move very rapidly or successfully. Others have

never quite determined their priorities. Sometimes they have established priorities that were important to them in terms of their

national interest and which do contribute to the whole situation.

For example, there has been some greater interest in nuclear subVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:49 May 07, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 800926.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
31

marines, or in the tactical missile problem, which has not really

been tackled in terms of international negotiation.

I mention this because clearly one of the things that Senator

Obama and I found when we were in this Donetsk area, and visiting people in Ukraine, was that there had been, in a small way,

European interest in this conventional arms destruction process

and some appropriation of moneys by a few countries, including

modest amounts by ourselves.

That, I think, is worth following through on, because very clearly

the European nations were interested in this issue. All of those

stocks are much closer to them, geographically, than they are to us.

In terms of proliferation and the actual carting off of material, it

is in a practical matter much more likely to occur in the European

continental context, and, therefore, an unusual concern. I’m not

certain to what extent this has ever entered the agenda, not only

of the G–8, or NATO, or various other international organizations,

but I would hope that it would. I take the occasion of this hearing

this morning simply to outline that specifically.

And finally, certainly each administration has to set priorities on

this issue, but one of the discussions of cooperative threat reduction

has always been the value of destruction or containment or securing weapons, conventional or nuclear, at the source.

To the extent that there can be confinement there, and programs

of destruction, then the problems of response are not eliminated. To

the extent that prevention has taken care of the problem, or secured it, that is a much less expensive method, by and large. This

is sort of a second situation, as you know. You’ve given these lectures more often than I have. If you can’t confine the problem at

the source, at least try to confine it within the boundaries of a

country. We must ensure that there be international controls so

that things do not cross boundaries.

Wth the PSI program, you have another stopper. Material went

outside the boundaries, went to sea, but nevertheless you stopped

it before it got to somebody else’s boundary.

Ultimately, with the missile defense or various other programs,

with our local officials, we try to think through the reaction to

chemical or biological attack. That is vital. The problems of that

kind of response, horrendous as they are to contemplate, are important.

Our legislation here, and the furtherance of cooperative threat

reduction, seems to me to be the least expensive method at the

source. Right there on that pile in Donetsk, whatever it is, is destroyed. Perhaps that is the best solution, given a willing partner

in Ukraine. Those officials took us to that part of the country to

display this.

I conclude by saying, as others have already, that we saw a

mountain of detritus from old wars. Plural. All covering this acreage, much with weeds and trees growing around it and through it.

I don’t know what is to happen in the world, how we really deal

with these problems. We’ve been trying to—with weapons of mass

destruction—discover why the Soviet Union ever built 40,000 metric tons, more or less, of chemical weapons. Speaking of overkill,

this is awesome. And the problem of getting rid of 40,000 metric

tons is formidable, even if by treaty you’ve pledged to do it, under

32

the Chemical Weapons Convention, which they have. It’s been awesome for them, and for us.

So it’s not an easy set of issues to discuss, in terms of priorities.

Our taxpayer funds are not unlimited even given the safety concerns. But this is why we would like to work with you, if we can,

to refine and maybe even further the targeting of conventional

weapons, in terms of priority. We seek to locate where they are,

and what’s the least expensive way of excising them. This is important for our security and for the security of our allies. We must,

likewise, enlist the allies who see the problem but who, perhaps,

are waiting for more enthusiasm on our part and increased organization of the effort.

I thank you again for coming today. We appreciate very much

the cooperation you have given to our staffs and to Senators on this

committee. It has been a generous devotion of time, and so saying,

the hearing is adjourned.

Mr. JOSEPH. Thank you, Senator.

[Whereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED

FOR THE RECORD

NEWSPAPER ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BIDEN

[From Knight Ridder Newspapers, Feb. 7, 2006]

STATE DEPARTMENT SEES EXODUS OF WEAPONS EXPERTS

(By Warren P. Strobel)

WASHINGTON.—State Department officials appointed by President Bush have sidelined key career weapons experts and replaced them with less experienced political

operatives who share the White House and Pentagon’s distrust of international negotiations and treaties.

The reorganization of the department’s arms control and international security

bureaus was intended to help it better deal with 21st-century threats. Instead, it’s

thrown the agency into turmoil and produced an exodus of experts with decades of

experience in nuclear arms, chemical weapons and related matters, according to 11

current and former officials and documents obtained by Knight Ridder.

The reorganization was conducted largely in secret by a panel of four political appointees. A career expert was allowed to join the group only after most decisions

had been made. Its work was overseen by Frederick Fleitz, a CIA officer who was

detailed to the State Department as senior adviser to former Under Secretary of

State John Bolton, a critic of arms agreements and international organizations.

Bolton’s nomination to be the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations was nearly

derailed last year by allegations that he’d harassed and bullied his staff. Some State

Department weapons experts from offices that had clashed with Bolton were denied

senior positions in the reorganization, even though they had superior qualifications,

the officials and documents alleged.

Fleitz, who works for Robert Joseph, Bolton’s successor, later telephoned State

Department employees who signed a letter protesting the moves and registered his

displeasure, one official said.

The political appointees who crafted the shakeup sought and received assurances

from the State Department’s legal and human resources offices that what they were

doing was legal.

But other officials charge that it violated longstanding management and personnel practices.

‘‘The process has been gravely flawed from the outset, and smacks plainly of a

political vendetta against career Foreign Service and Civil Service (personnel) by political appointees,’’ a group of employees told Under Secretary of State for Management, Henrietta Fore, on December 9, according to notes prepared for the meeting.

33

A dozen State Department employees delivered a rare written dissent to Fore and

W. Robert Pearson, the director general of the Foreign Service, on October 11. Some

also sought, but failed to get, a stay from the Justice Department to stop the plan.

Joseph, the Under Secretary of State for arms control and international security,

said in a telephone interview Tuesday that the changes might have been painful to

some but were necessary.

‘‘Reorganizations are never easy. They inevitably mean change,’’ he said. ‘‘The reorganization . . . was essential to better position us to further the President’s strategy against WMD (weapons of mass destruction) proliferation and (Secretary of

State Condoleezza Rice’s) emphasis on transformational diplomacy.’’

‘‘Yet the reorganization also offers important new professional opportunities for

the employees of the State Department,’’ he said.

Much more than personnel disputes are at stake, said the officials who are critical

of the changes.

They said they were concerned that Rice, who announced the changes last July

but apparently hasn’t been deeply involved in their execution, will be deprived of

expertise on weapons matters. Among those who have left is the State Department’s

top authority on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the international regime to curb the spread of nuclear arms.

‘‘We had a great group of people. They are highly knowledgeable experts,’’ said

former Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf, who frequently clashed with Bolton.

‘‘To the extent they now are leaving State Department employ, or U.S. Government

employ, it’s a real loss to State Department. It’s a real loss to the government.’’

A half-dozen current department officials expressed the same view, but spoke on

condition of anonymity because, they said, they feared retaliation.

Jonathan Granoff, the director of the Global Security Institute, an arms control

advocacy group, said the loss of State Department arms-control expertise was especially worrisome because the only mechanism for verifying U.S. and Russian nuclear

arms cuts—the 1991 START I treaty—is due to expire in less than 3 years.

That also will eliminate the most effective way of verifying that the former rivals

are abiding by their Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments to eliminate their nuclear arsenals eventually, he said. ‘‘Rather than nurture our experts, the administration seems to have brought in neophytes without a passion for progress in this

field and, worse, undermined the international institutions that are most effective

in stopping proliferation,’’ he said.

More broadly, the clash is the culmination of a generation-old battle over arms

control.

In one corner are specialists who argue that negotiated arms agreements help

U.S. security; in the other are those who argue that the United States should rely

mostly on the threat of force, sanctions and other unilateral steps to curb the spread

of dangerous weapons and maintain a credible deterrent against an attack.

When she announced the reorganization, Rice declared that more than deterrence

and arms control treaties are necessary to safeguard America. ‘‘We must also go on

the offensive against outlaw scientists, black-market arms dealers and rogue state

proliferators,’’ she said.

Bush has demanded maximum Presidential flexibility on national security matters, avoiding major new arms treaties and pushing the limits of executive power

on issues from domestic eavesdropping to the treatment of terrorism suspects.

Many career government experts didn’t dispute the need to reorganize U.S. policy

offices that deal with weapons of mass destruction. But they said they worried that

future administrations with a view different from Bush and Rice’s would have to

build the expertise they’d need from scratch.

An inquiry by Knight Ridder has found evidence that the reorganization was

highly politicized and devastated morale.

Thomas Lehrman, a political appointee who heads the new office of Weapons of

Mass Destruction Terrorism, advertised outside the State Department to fill jobs in

his office. In an e-mail to universities and research centers, a copy of which was

obtained by Knight Ridder, he listed loyalty to Bush and Rice’s priorities as a qualification.

Lehrman reportedly recalled the e-mail after it was pointed out that such loyalty

tests are improper.

Specialists in the Department’s old Nonproliferation Bureau, which frequently

battled Bolton on policy toward Iraq, Iran and North Korea, largely were frozen out

of important jobs when offices in that bureau merged with those in another.

‘‘Bolton had blood in his eyes for the Nonproliferation Bureau,’’ said another official who’s still working at the State Department.

One of the government’s top experts on the U.N. International Atomic Energy

Agency, which helps stem the spread of nuclear weapons but disputed the Bush adVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:49 May 07, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800926.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
34

ministration’s claims about Iraq’s weapons programs, returned from two and a half

years at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, and was blocked from assuming an

office directorship that had been offered to him, the officials and a complaint document said.

The post, which oversees U.S. diplomacy regarding international efforts to contain

suspected nuclear-weapons programs such as those in Iran and North Korea, went

to a more junior officer who numerous officials said shared Bolton’s views.

Five higher-ranking officers were passed over, the document says, adding that

none had negative work histories ‘‘aside from intimations that they were not as

‘trusted’ politically by the political management level.’’

In August 2005, the officer chosen for the job sent an e-mail sarcastically titled:

‘‘A Nobel for the IAEA? Please.’’ The agency and its director general, Mohamed

ElBaradei, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October.

None of the most senior posts in the new organization was filled by a woman, although several highly qualified female candidates were available.

The effort was at odds with the recommendations of four December 2004 reports

by the Department’s inspector general, also obtained by Knight Ridder.

The reports praised the nonproliferation unit as ‘‘having remained center stage

following the events of September 11, 2001.’’ The unit it merged with, the Arms

Control Bureau, was described as ‘‘largely in search of work.’’

A third unit overseen by Bolton—and now Joseph—which deals with overseeing

compliance with arms treaties, was recommended for downsizing. Instead, it’s been

expanded.

Mark Fitzpatrick, a veteran nonproliferation expert who recently left the State

Department, said he was worried about what he called an ‘‘exodus’’ of qualified specialists from the Department.

‘‘It seems about a dozen or so have left since the merger came about, many out

of frustration,’’ said Fitzpatrick, who’s now at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. ‘‘I’m concerned that the ability of the merged bureaus to

provide to Condoleezza Rice the same kind of high-quality advice they provided

Colin Powell on the very dire proliferation issues facing the world will be diminished

by the exodus.’’

The American Foreign Service Association, which represents foreign service officers, wrote to Rice on November 28, citing allegations that political considerations

drove the reorganization.

Dissidents had a second meeting last month with Fore, the Under Secretary of

State for management.

RESPONSES OF UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. The United States and the EU3 put together a remarkably broad coalition in the IAEA Board of Governors, leading to the Board’s resolutions of September 24, 2005, and February 4, 2006.

• What are you going to do to maintain that coalition in the coming weeks and

months?

• Do recent statements by U.S. officials that Iran is close to being able to build

a nuclear weapon help to maintain that coalition, or do they threaten to undermine it by sounding too similar to our prewar statements on Iraq?

Answer. The United States is committed to a peaceful, diplomatic solution to the

Iran nuclear issue that spares the international community from the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. We have worked actively with the EU3 and EU, Russia, China,

India, and many others to build a large and widening consensus on the steps Iran

must take to resolve this issue. Those steps are clearly spelled out in recent resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors: Iran must reestablish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities; reconsider

construction of a heavy-water reactor; ratify and implement an Additional Protocol;

and provide the IAEA with the full cooperation and transparency that the IAEA has

repeatedly requested. Iran’s continuing refusal to take those steps, and indeed Iran’s

decision to take contrary and confrontational actions, is actually helping to solidify

the international consensus that any diplomatic resolution must be preceded by Iran

fulfilling those conditions as requested by the IAEA Board.

As the IAEA’s efforts continue, and as both the IAEA Board and the U.N. Security

Council work in coordinated fashion to urge Iran to take those steps, we will continue to work closely with our international partners to maintain firm pressure on

Iran to comply with the international community’s wishes.

35

As U.S. intelligence officials have stated in open testimony before Congress, the

risk of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, especially as it pursues in parallel a ballistic missile program, makes stopping those programs an immediate concern to the international community. Our best assessment of Iran’s nuclear program

is that absent significant additional foreign assistance, and assuming there is not

a clandestine centrifuge program that is more advanced than the overt program,

Iran will not be able to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon before

early to mid next decade. Given the significant gaps in our understanding of the

scope and history of Iran’s nuclear program, however, we cannot be certain that

there is not a clandestine centrifuge program ongoing right now.

As the latest report from the IAEA makes clear, the IAEA continues to see indicators that Iran has not come clean about the full extent of its activities, including

in regard to centrifuge uranium enrichment and possession of information related

to nuclear weapons. Thus, apart from any national intelligence perspective on Iran’s

nuclear program, the international community has been placed on alert by the IAEA

that there are serious questions and inconsistencies arising from Iran’s declarations.

Moreover, we believe that once Iran crosses a more near-term threshold of mastering the operation of a centrifuge cascade—a goal that Iran is aggressively proceeding toward now—it will be much more difficult for diplomatic pressure to persuade Iran to change course and abandon that program before it crosses the nuclear

weapons threshold.

Question. Iran is now fairly isolated in the world, on the issue of its sensitive nuclear activities. How will we convert that isolation into tangible pressure on Iran

to comply with resolutions of the IAEA Board?

• Will other countries, with stronger ties to Iran, pay visits to Tehran and tell

Iran’s leaders that they have to change their policies? • Will leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement make clear that Iran is not acting

in their best interests?

Answer. We are working to widen the international consensus on the steps Iran

must take to resolve this issue diplomatically. Most countries throughout the world

share our objective of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.

In addition to the ongoing efforts by the IAEA and at the IAEA Board, and our expectation that the U.N. Security Council will take up the Iran issue shortly after

the IAEA Board meeting’s early March discussion of the issue, we are encouraging

countries that maintain relations with Iran to use what leverage they have—diplomatic, political, even economic and commercial—to persuade Iran to change course.

If countries wish to visit Iran to deliver such messages directly to Iran’s leaders,

they have our support to do so.

We encourage the Non-Aligned Movement to use its influence with Iran to persuade Iran’s Government to change course, comply with IAEA Board requests, cooperate fully with the IAEA’s ongoing investigations, and return to negotiations in

good faith on the future of its nuclear program. Many individual NAM members or

observers voted to support the IAEA Board’s February 4 resolution, including Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, Ghana, India, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Yemen.

Given that five NAM members—Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya, and South Africa—abstained on the resolution, and three NAM members—Cuba, Syria, and Venezuela—voted against it, it is clear that there is no NAM consensus on how to address the Iran nuclear issue. One important message we are trying to send to the

NAM and its member states is that the United States supports the right of states

to enjoy access to peaceful nuclear energy. Our concern is that Iran’s pursuit of the

nuclear fuel cycle is not for peaceful or nuclear energy-based purposes, a concern

shared by at least some NAM members.

Question. Many people think that the United States wants the U.N. Security

Council to sanction Iran immediately, but U.S. officials have emphasized that this

would not be the first step. If Iran fails to comply with IAEA Board resolutions by

next month, what action will you encourage the U.N. Security Council to take?

• Should it simply call upon Iran to resume its suspension of sensitive nuclear

activities and to work with the IAEA?

• Does the Security Council have the authority to give the IAEA special inspection rights in Iran? Is that under consideration?

Answer. When the U.N. Security Council takes up the Iran issue following the

IAEA Board’s March meeting, we will encourage the Council, as an initial step, to

issue a Presidential Statement (PRST) that calls on Iran to comply fully with the

IAEA Board’s repeated requests. Those requests include resumption of a full suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, full cooperation with the

IAEA, and ratification of an Additional Protocol. I believe such a statement from

36

the Security Council, which lends the Council’s weight to the IAEA’s efforts in Iran

and IAEA Board’s calls on Iran, would add significant pressure on the Iranian regime to comply. However, if Iran defies such a UNSC request as it has defied the

past nine IAEA Board resolutions, we would expect the Council to consider taking

additional measures to increase pressure on Iran to comply.

Both IAEA Director General ElBaradei and the IAEA Board have called on Iran

‘‘to implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, which

extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional

Protocol, and include access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement,

dual-use equipment, certain military-owned workshops, and research and development locations.’’ Iran has refused.

If Iran defies a request from the UNSC to provide such transparency and cooperation to the IAEA, we would want the Council to explore additional measures. The

Security Council has the authority under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to decide

that states must take particular actions in order to maintain international peace

and security. Accordingly, it would be within the Security Council’s authority, under

chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, to require Iran to provide such transparency and

cooperation to the IAEA, and to take any other measures that the Security Council

deems necessary, to address the threat to international peace and security posed by

Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability.

Question. Iran’s public case is built around the contention that it cannot remain

dependent on others for nuclear reactor fuel. What is the United States doing, what

are other countries doing, and what more can be done to assure Iran (and other

countries) that if they were to give up the objective of nuclear independence, there

would be a truly assured access to nuclear reactor fuel and to spent fuel management, at a reasonable price?

Answer. Iran claims that it is seeking an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle—including

the capability to make fissile material—for nuclear energy purposes only. Iran

claims that its pursuit of the full nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium conversion

and enrichment, and fuel fabrication, is both economically cost effective, and enhances Iran’s energy security and independence. These claims are false. It is important to recall that Iran immediately, and unilaterally, rejected an August 2005 offer

from the EU3 that offered a tangible and significant package of future cooperation

and incentives to Iran, and held out the best prospect for improved relations between Iran and the international community since Iran’s 1979 revolution.

The EU3 proposal included future European assistance to support an expanded,

safe, safeguarded nuclear power program in Iran, with assurances of guaranteed

fuel supply. In return, Iran was asked to suspend its enrichment program for a period of at least 10 years, during which international confidence in Iran’s nuclear intentions was to be rebuilt.

Contrary to Iran’s claims that ‘‘the West’’ seeks to deny Iran access to peaceful

nuclear energy or related technologies, Iran rejected the EU3’s offer of tangible assistance precisely on nuclear power and other fronts. Iran has chosen instead to pursue aggressively an indigenous uranium enrichment capability it does not need for

peaceful purposes, and is not in position to utilize for peaceful purposes in any case,

due to Iran’s continuing lack of the necessary fuel fabrication know-how.

It is instructive to look at Iran’s declared uranium reserves. Iran’s uranium reserves, as provided by Iran in 2003 to the OECD, are not commensurate with its

declared program of reactor development—seven 1,000 MW reactors by 2020—and

would not provide sufficient reactor fuel for such a program. Under the most likely

set of scenarios, Iran’s uranium reserves would be exhausted before the seven-reactor construction program was even completed. Indeed, Iran’s known uranium reserves—1,427 tons—provide less than 1 year’s worth of operations for seven nuclear

power reactors. Iran’s known and speculative reserves in total—15,277 tons—provide less than 10 years worth of such operation. Iran’s uranium reserves simply do

not give Iran nuclear energy independence, regardless of whether Iran possesses a

nuclear fuel cycle. However, those reserves would provide enough uranium for Iran

to support a significant nuclear weapons program.

In addition to our support for the EU3 and Russian diplomatic initiatives, which

would provide Iran with specific fuel supply assurances, the United States is now

working with major supplier states, with the IAEA, and with industry to develop

a mechanism for alternative supply arrangements in the event of problems with the

commercial market. Our aim is to provide assurances that will convince states with

power reactors—both current and future—that their best interest is not to invest

in fuel-cycle capabilities. If we can succeed, this will be a major gain for proliferation security.

37

Question. If Iran refuses to cease its sensitive nuclear activities, there may well

be a need to impose sanctions. What is the executive branch doing to plan for that

eventuality?

• What analysis has been done of the likely impact of various possible sanctions

in terms of costs to Iran, likelihood of effective enforcement, costs to the countries imposing the sanctions (especially if Iran took actions of its own), and

whether the right Iranians would bear the brunt of the sanctions? Please summarize the results of those analyses.

• Have other countries done such analysis, and have we and our allies shared our

results?

• We all know that there would be a great reluctance in the world to invoke sanctions on Iran’s oil and gas industries. But some people say that those sanctions

would work because Iran is dependent on imported refined products and cannot

afford to pull its crude oil off the world market. What is the administration’s

view? What is the likelihood that the Security Council could be convinced to invoke those sanctions and that they would be obeyed? What actions could Iran

take in response, and how would those play out?

• What is the administration doing to prepare the American people and world

markets for the possible need to accept the economic costs of sanctions?

• Are there other sorts of sanctions that could be effective?

• Sometimes actions speak louder than words, while rhetoric or threats can backfire. What are you doing with other countries to develop actions that could be

taken quietly, perhaps before the Security Council orders mandatory sanctions,

to get Iran’s attention.

Answer. We have made clear that in raising pressure on the Iranian regime to

abandon its nuclear weapons intentions and activities, we do not seek to harm the

Iranian people. We hope the Iranian regime can be persuaded to make the strategic

decision to end its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability before the UNSC is

forced to take more serious measures. But if Iran defies the UNSC—as it has defied

the IAEA Board, the EU3, and others—we would support the UNSC using the full

range of its authority to compel Iran to change course. We believe many members

of the U.N. Security Council agree with this approach.

It would be premature, however, to answer questions about any internal deliberations within the executive branch regarding the application of UNSC sanctions on

Iran. It would be equally premature to answer questions about ongoing diplomatic

discussions we are having with friends and allies on that same question.

Separate from UNSC sanctions, however, there are other measures we are taking

to persuade Iran to stop its nuclear weapons related activities, and to slow down

those programs until Iran can be persuaded to stop. We are building the

counterproliferation capabilities to deter, defend against, and defeat weapons of

mass destruction.

To be successful, we must work with others who share our goals and are willing

to contribute to the outcome we seek. Protecting the United States from WMD proliferation and WMD-armed adversaries requires a broad array of instruments, policies, and programs. At one end of the spectrum are those measures that prevent

Iran and other proliferators from gaining access to sensitive technologies and materials that could represent a short cut to nuclear weapons. Nunn-Lugar and other

nonproliferation programs are key in this effort, reinforcing other important measures such as effective export controls by all states. As an administration, we have

succeeded in expanding and accelerating these programs through not only U.S.

funding, but also through the President’s Global Partnership initiative which has

added billions of dollars from others.

At the other end of the spectrum, one key element of the solution set is missile

defense, as well as improved counterforce and passive defense capabilities, together

with capabilities to eliminate adversary WMD and to manage the consequences of

WMD attacks. In a number of these critical areas, we are working closely with our

allies, such as with Japan and Israel, on missile defenses to protect both our forces

and our populations. This capability adds not only another layer of defense to our

strategic posture against the preeminent threat we face, but also another powerful

reason to persuade states like Iran not to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place.

Other measures address the financial underpinnings of proliferation. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540—adopted in April 2004 at the President’s

urging—requires states to adopt and enforce effective controls on providing funds

and services related to export and transshipment of nuclear, chemical, or biological

weapons and their means of delivery. Consistent with Resolution 1540, in July 2005

G–8 leaders called for enhanced efforts to combat proliferation networks by develVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:49 May 07, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800926.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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oping, on an appropriate legal basis, cooperative procedures to identify, track, and

freeze relevant financial transactions.

President Bush augmented U.S. efforts in this field when he issued last June a

new executive order, which authorizes the U.S. Government to freeze U.S. assets

and block U.S. transactions of designated entities and persons, or their supporters,

engaged in proliferation activities, and to prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in

transactions with them. Currently 18 entities—6 from Iran, as well as 11 from

North Korea and 1 from Syria—have been designated under the order, and we are

actively considering designating additional ones.

Finally one of the most important initiatives undertaken by the Bush administration to combat weapons of mass destruction, is the Proliferation Security Initiative

(PSI), which shows the close interaction among—and the creative use of—diplomatic, military, economic, law enforcement, and intelligence tools to combat proliferation. PSI countries have put all of these assets to work in a multinational, yet

flexible, fashion. The participating countries are applying existing laws in innovative ways while at the same time looking to strengthen relevant authorities where

necessary and are cooperating as never before to interdict WMD-related shipments,

to disrupt proliferation networks, and to hold accountable the front companies that

support them. PSI has now expanded to include support from more than 70 countries, and continues to grow. It is not a treaty-based approach, involving long, ponderous negotiations that yield results only slowly, if at all. Instead, it is an active—

and proactive—partnership, to deter, disrupt, and prevent proliferation of WMD,

their delivery systems, and related materials.

And PSI is working—including against Iran. PSI cooperation has stopped the

transshipment of material and equipment bound for ballistic missile programs in

countries of concern, including Iran. PSI partners, working at times with others,

have prevented Iran from obtaining goods to support its missile and WMD programs, including its nuclear program. And, of course, it was PSI cooperation among

the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy that led to the demise of

the A.Q. Khan network, an action that also impacted heavily on the decision of the

Libyan Government to abandon its nuclear weapons and longer range missile programs.

Question. What will the United States do if Iran goes ahead and produces fissile

material, or at least builds the facilities to make such material? How will you minimize the damage that will cause to regional security and to the global nonproliferation regime?

• Would military action be the only option?

• Or are there containment options that could limit Iran’s freedom of action and

negate any benefits it might try to achieve by virtue of having nuclear weapons?

• What is the administration doing to lay the groundwork for those options?

Answer. The President and many of the world’s leaders have repeatedly made

clear that a nuclear-armed Iran is intolerable. If Iran were to cross that nuclear

weapons threshold, it would have profoundly negative consequences, especially

given the regime’s unstinting support for terrorism; its blatant denial of human

rights for its citizens; its reckless pursuit of regional dominance. Add to all that the

critical importance to the international community, of compliance with the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty, of preventing any nuclear weapons proliferation, and of

keeping nuclear weapons and materials out of the hands of rogue states and terrorists. As the President has said, we are committed to seeing a peaceful, diplomatic

solution to this problem, in which Iran agrees to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear

weapons capability. Given the dangers posed by a nuclear-armed Iran, however, no

option is off the table to stop that program.

I have already mentioned bilateral measures that the United States is taking, and

encouraging other countries to take, to deter and defend against Iran’s nuclear

weapons ambitions. Beyond what I have already said, it would not be useful or prudent to address the administration’s contingency planning should diplomacy not succeed. The entire international community recognizes the stakes involved, and is

thus committed to seeking a diplomatic solution.

Question. Ambassador Chris Hill got a good agreement in the last session of the

Six-Party Talks, but North Korea seems to have buyer’s remorse. And U.S. actions

and statements on North Korea’s criminal enterprises have played into the hands

of those who never much liked negotiations in the first place. Where does that leave

us? Are we keeping the pressure on North Korea? Or is North Korea keeping the

pressure on us, as it continues to produce more plutonium and perhaps moves closer

to a uranium enrichment capability as well?

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Answer. The United States is prepared to uphold its commitments in the joint

statement adopted at the conclusion of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in

Beijing on September 19, 2005. We expect North Korea to do the same. The joint

statement included significant benefits the other parties will provide to the DPRK

in the context of North Korea’s full implementation of its commitment to eliminate

all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs verifiably and irreversibly.

The United States has taken, and will continue to take, concrete actions against

North Korean entities involved in illicit activities and proliferation. They are not related to the Six-Party Talks. Some of those actions long predate the Six-Party Talks.

These defensive measures are necessary to defend against dangerous North Korean

activities and will continue as long as North Korea engages in these types of activities. Some of these measures include designations under E.O. 13382, the USA PATRIOT Act section 311 designation against Banco Delta Asia, and our efforts

against North Korean counterfeiting of U.S. currency and goods.

Question. What priority do you give, and what priority does the President give,

to actually reaching an agreement with North Korea?

Answer. The complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of North Korea’s

nuclear weapons and nuclear programs is one of the highest national security priorities of President Bush. North Korea’s nuclear programs pose the most serious security challenge in Northeast Asia. The issue is appropriately being addressed in the

Six-Party Talks. It is a regional issue with global implications not a United StatesNorth Korea bilateral issue.

Question. Do you really think that the Proliferation Security Initiative can prevent North Korea from exporting fissile material or even a nuclear weapon if it is

determined to do so?

Answer. We believe the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) supplements and

complements our efforts in the Six-Party Talks to achieve the complete, verifiable,

and irreversible elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and nuclear programs. PSI provides a basis for governments to work together to share intelligence

and make maximum use of their national and international legal authorities to

interdict cargoes of proliferation concern. It is one of a number of counterproliferation tools we have at our disposal. It does not target any one country; however,

participants have identified North Korea as a country of proliferation concern. Other

counterproliferation measures target North Korea’s illicit activities—drug smuggling, currency and cigarette counterfeiting, etc.—that yield hard currency that we

believe helps enable North Korea’s WMD and WMD delivery programs.

Question. Do you see any realistic military option? Do we even know where North

Korea’s plutonium is?

Answer. As President Bush said, we seek a peaceful, diplomatic settlement of the

North Korean nuclear issue. In the joint statement adopted at the conclusion of the

fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing in September 19, 2005, the United

States affirmed that we have no intention to attack or invade North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons.

I would refer you to the Intelligence Community for information on the whereabouts of North Korea’s plutonium.

Question. Do you see any great likelihood of a favorable regime change in North

Korea over the next few years?

Answer. We believe that the six-party process offers the best opportunity to

achieve a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. We remain ready

to resume talks without preconditions and to work with all participating countries

on a strategy for implementing the joint statement.

Question. In December, the Senate again passed the Global Pathogen Surveillance

Act, which would authorize the State Department to do more to train and equip

other countries to spot infectious disease outbreaks and to recognize diseases that

might be the result of bioterrorist attacks or experiments. The Secretary of State

spoke out strongly in favor of this bill, and Senator Frist and I appreciate that support. Will the Department also weigh in on the House side now, with the International Relations Committee and the House leadership?

Answer. The Secretary of State was strongly supportive of the Global Pathogen

Surveillance Act (S. 2170) at the time of its consideration by the Senate and remains equally supportive of the act now. The Department looks forward to working

closely with the International Relations Committee and the House leadership to promote enactment of this bill.

40

Question. Last year, the fiscal year 2006 budget failed to fully fund the U.S. contribution to building the International Monitoring System to detect any covert nuclear test by an Iran or a North Korea. We amended the Foreign Operations appropriations bill to make up for that, but we lost in conference. I am pleased to see

that the fiscal year 2007 budget submitted by the President includes full funding

for this program next year. But we still need to meet our obligations for this year.

Do you expect to reprogram fiscal year 2006 funds to make up the shortfall?

Answer. Reprogramming funds to IMS is among the options under consideration,

but budgets are extremely tight and priorities have to be set, even among programs

supported by the administration. We will, of course, look for opportunities to reprogram funds during the fiscal year, but there are many competing priorities, and in

any potential reprogramming we would have to take into account the allocations detailed by the conferees, which fully allocated all the NADR funds appropriated.

Question. How many career professionals, with a rank of GS–13 or higher, have

left what is now the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation since

you came on board? How many more will leave in the next 6 months? How many

of those were from the old Bureau of Nonproliferation?

Answer. Rates of attrition in the T family of bureaus have remained relatively

constant from year to year. In 2004, the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Bureaus

experienced five retirements, five resignations, zero reassignments, one appointment

expiration, and five terminations in appointment. In 2005, these two bureaus experienced nine retirements, six resignations, two reassignments and six terminations in

appointment. (Terminations in appointment refer to employees that were one time

limited appointments and changed Federal employment status.) Thus far, in 2006,

the ISN Bureau has recorded one termination in appointment and anticipates four

resignations and two retirements through March.

Personnel turnover is an unfortunate fact of life in any organization, not only in

the government and not only during periods of restructuring. Employees retire after

years of service while others choose to pursue new opportunities. While we are disappointed to see employees leave the T family, we are heartened by the number of

employees who are presented with other job opportunities based upon their excellent

track record of work in the T family at the Department.

Question. Were any women picked as Deputy Assistant Secretaries during the T

reorganization?

Were any women picked as office directors? How many women were serving as

office directors, either permanently or in an acting capacity, before the reorganization?

How many women will be deputy office directors? How many women were serving

in that capacity, either permanently or in an acting capacity, before the reorganization?

How many minorities will be deputy office directors or above?

Answer. There were no changes in Deputy Assistant Secretaries during the T reorganization, and the Bureau management team remains in an acting capacity. In

order to provide continuity and minimize disruption to the work of offices, no incumbent office directors were replaced by new personnel. This limited the number of office director openings to three new offices and one existing office that was headed

by a female acting director who for personal reasons no longer wished to serve as

a manager. In addition, another office headed by an acting female office director was

merged with an office headed by a Foreign Service officer, who is a minority. The

latter was selected to head the merged office. For those offices now headed by an

acting director, the positions will be fully competed, in accordance with normal personnel procedures.

The T bureau’s record on diversity is excellent. The T bureaus have several female

leaders and managers, including Assistant Secretary Paula DeSutter and Deputy

Assistant Secretary Karin Look. Our ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Jackie Sanders, is also female. Although the small number of new office

director openings did not result in the addition of women office directors, we anticipate T managerial positions becoming available in the near future and anticipate

having several outstanding female candidates. Moreover, ISN has four office director

positions assigned to the Foreign Service, which may well be filled from time to time

by women or minorities through the normal Foreign Service rotation.

Question. Last fall, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) complained

to Secretary Rice about how your reorganization was proceeding.

• What were their concerns?

• How did you respond to those concerns?

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Answer. AFSA raised a number of questions about the T reorganization. The Department carefully studied these questions and answered them in a letter from

Under Secretary Fore. Copies of AFSA’s letter and Under Secretary Fore’s response

are attached.

AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION,

Washington, DC, November 30, 2005.

Hon. CONDOLEEZZA RICE,

Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State,

Washington, DC.

DEAR MADAM SECRETARY: I am writing to express AFSA’s continuing concerns

about the reorganization process and the reorganization itself of the Bureaus in the

‘‘T family’’—concerns that are being reaffirmed by numerous Foreign Service members who remain in communication with AFSA on this matter—and to reiterate

AFSA’s request to review, comment on, and if necessary negotiate the reorganization plans in writing before they are implemented.

A number of developments have occurred since AFSA State VP Steve Kashkett

and I met with Under Secretary Fore on October 28 to discuss these issues. The

Senior Management Panel, which Under Secretary Joseph created to plan this reorganization, had a brief meeting with AFSA and invited us to participate in the two

T ‘‘all-hands’’ meetings that it organized for employees of those bureaus. While we

appreciated these limited attempts at outreach, we note that AFSA has never received anything in writing regarding the Panel’s specific proposals for the reorganization, and the Panel finalized its decisions and proceeded to implement them

without concurrence from AFSA.

AFSA and its members throughout those bureaus remain deeply concerned over:

• Lack of clarity and transparency in the naming of acting office directors and

deputy office directors for the newly reorganized bureaus;

• Continuing concerns over the possible downgrading or elimination of FS-designated positions in those bureaus, or their subordination to non-career supervisors at the office director level;

• Persistent allegations from Foreign Service members that political considerations—i.e., perception of loyalty to a particular ideological point of view—are

determining how individual employees fare in the reorganization;

• The implementation of changes without advance review much less formal concurrence by AFSA.

While we recognize Under Secretary Joseph’s right to reorganize the bureaus that

fall under his direction, AFSA also has the right under the Foreign Service Act and

our collective bargaining agreement to be consulted on specific proposed actions—

and where appropriate to engage in negotiations—prior to the Department’s implementation of changes that affect our bargaining unit members. In fact, it would be

an unfair labor practice for the Department to change the conditions of employment

of our members without negotiating/consulting with AFSA.

This reorganization is already affecting the conditions of work for Foreign Service

members serving in those bureaus, as well as the willingness of other FS employees

to seek assignments in the T bureaus. Numerous members have noted the extremely low morale among T bureaus’ employees as a result of the manner in which

the Senior Management Panel conducted this reorganization. Foreign Service members have also expressed to us their deep concern that these and other actions related to the reorganization will harm the Department’s ability to respond to the

great security threat of WMD proliferation, not only in the short term, but for many

years to come.

We therefore request, in accordance with our collective bargaining rights, the

following:

1. A complete written description of the reorganization plan, including details

of all changes proposed by the Senior Management Panel that affect Foreign

Service employees and positions, including the selection of acting office directors/deputy directors;

2. Suspension of all personnel decisions, including those announced late on

November 22, until AFSA has had the opportunity to consult and/or negotiate

as appropriate on these proposed changes;

3. A comprehensive list of all vacant FS positions in the T bureaus and their

inclusion on the open assignments bid list for summer 2006, in accordance with

our agreement relating to the Open Assignments system;

4. A written summary of how the Panel’s plans mesh with the Inspector General’s report and recommendations.

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5. Finally, we strongly suggest that you appoint an independent panel to review all proposed reorganization decisions with regard to EEO concerns and

prohibited personnel practices, both of which have been alleged by our members

and which some may pursue should the Department itself not act to correct

those actions.

Thank you again for your assistance and for your attention to this important

matter.

Respectfully yours,

J. ANTHONY HOLMES,

President.

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT,

Washington, DC, December 13, 2005.

Hon. J. ANTHONY HOLMES,

President, American Foreign Services Association,

Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. HOLMES: The Secretary has asked that I reply to your letter of November 30 regarding the T reorganization in the Department. As always, we appreciate

learning of your concerns, and those of your members.

In its 2004 reports on the Bureaus of Arms Control (AC) and Nonproliferation

(NP), the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) asked the leadership of the Department to explore the restructuring of these former ACDA entities because, in its

view, the existing bureaucratic structure did not meet current needs. We have done

so and, as recommended, Secretary Rice has decided to merge the two bureaus.

The inspectors also recommended that the Department ‘‘redesign’’ the Bureau of

Verification and Compliance. After considerable discussion, including with the Congress, we have done so, albeit not as a ‘‘specialized entity.’’

I understand that despite several townhalls and meetings, plus the sharing of the

‘‘cross-walk’’ on November 22, AFSA continues to hear from employees in the T family about the reorganization. Although the reorganization has not been easy, I can

assure you and your members that the Office of the Legal Adviser and Deputy Assistant Secretary Linda Taglialatela of the Bureau of Human Resources have actively monitored the reorganization to ensure that all steps were taken in accordance with the law.

Nevertheless, in the spirit of cooperation and in response to your request, I am

forwarding to you the following papers:

(1) The ‘‘cross-walk’’ distributed November 22;

(2) September 2005 staffing patterns for the Bureaus of Nonproliferation;

Arms Control; Verification and Compliance; and Political-Military Affairs;

(3) Draft December 2005 staffing patterns for the Bureaus of International Security and Nonproliferation; Verification, Compliance; and Implementation; and

Political-Military Affairs; and

(4) A list of all expected 2006 vacant FS positions in the T bureau and their

status in the 2006 Open Assignments cycle.

I hope that this information will reassure you and your members.

Cordially,

HENRIETTA H. FORE. Enclosures: As stated.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The enclosures stated above were too voluminous to include in

this hearing. They will be retained in the permanent record of the committee.]

Question. Is it true that your reorganization was handled in a manner that made

it difficult for Foreign Service officers to know, in a timely manner, what positions

were open and what their duties would be?

Answer. No. All efforts were made to ensure the timely placement of accurate

FSO position descriptions for the newly created and merged offices.

Question. How many ISN positions will be filled by Foreign Service officers, and

how will that compare to the number of FSOs in the old Arms Control and Nonproliferation bureaus? How will the new FSO positions compare to the ones in the

old bureaus?

Answer. All FSO positions have transferred from the previous AC and NP bureaus in the new ISN Bureau. Moreover, as part of the reorganization, two of the

new office director positions were converted to Senior Foreign Service positions, and

thereby made available for members of the Senior Foreign Service or those serving

in a ‘‘stretch’’ assignment. Unfortunately, we face an uphill battle in filling all our

43

positions because more FSO positions exist Department-wide than the number of

available FSOs to fill those positions. We are examining ways to enhance our recruitment efforts and to attract FSOs to the T family.

Question. A Knight-Ridder story cited one especially disturbing case:

A political appointee who heads the new office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism advertised outside the State Department to fill jobs in

his office. In an e-mail to universities and research centers . . . he listed

loyalty to Bush and Rice’s priorities as a qualification. [He] reportedly recalled the e-mail after it was pointed out that such loyalty tests are improper.

Is that report accurate? If so, please provide a copy of the e-mail and answer the

questions that follow:

1. What action did you take regarding that political appointee?

2. Is he still in that Office Director position?

3. Is he still applying a political litmus test, even if he isn’t advertising it in public?

Answer. The Acting Office Director of the Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Terrorism, who is not a political appointee, forwarded some information to two of

his former professors, who in turn sent an e-mail to certain students and contacts,

regarding potential openings in this new office. The Department regrets any suggestion in the e-mail that there would be a political litmus test applied to prospective

employees. Department officials spoke to the acting office director, who issued a

clarification of his e-mail. The Department is committed to complying with all applicable personnel rules in hiring its employees.

Question. Is it true that you had to find another position for an officer returning

from the International Atomic Energy Agency, after you were warned that you were

violating his employment rights by denying him an Office Director position?

Answer. No. The senior employee who returned from the International Atomic Energy Agency will be reemployed in an appropriate SES position in the T family.

That employee does not have a right to a particular SES position in the Department.

Question. In December, I raised with the Secretary the lack of an office with responsibility for any future arms control negotiations. Her response to my letter said,

‘‘We have not eliminated any of our arms control negotiating capability, and I am

committed to maintaining it.’’ She went on to say that, ‘‘Officers in the ISN Bureau,

as well as elsewhere in the Department . . . can be drawn on as necessary to support any negotiations that may take place.’’

Is it your view that arms control (other than verification and implementation of

existing agreements) is best treated as an ad hoc function? If so, why?

Answer. The Department maintains considerable multilateral arms control expertise that is regularly involved in working on important arms control treaties to

which the United States is a party. For example, Ambassador Donald Mahley, the

U.S. Special Negotiator for Chemical and Biological Weapons is actively engaged in

preparations for the 2006 BWC Review Conference. Ambassador Eric Javits, our

representative to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, is similarly engaged in The Hague. The Department is active in other areas to promote

the NPT, IAEA Safeguards agreements, the MTCR, and the Australia Group.

Question. What preparations are you making for possible negotiations on an extension of the START Treaty? Have you commissioned any analysis of how our national security would be affected if the START Treaty were allowed to lapse in

2009? Have you asked the Intelligence Community how its monitoring of Russian

strategic arms would be affected if there were no more START Treaty arms inspections?

What changes in the treaty might be desirable and obtainable, in the context of

an extension of it?

Under article XVII of the START Treaty, bilateral consideration of any extension

of the treaty would have to begin in 2008. When do you expect to put a team together and make this a mission of one of your ISN offices?

Answer. The United States has proposed to Russia that discussions on transparency, the START Treaty, and our future strategic relationship take place in the

Strategic Group on international security issues, which I cochair with my counterpart in the Russian Foreign Ministry. We are already discussing aspects of that relationship and expect the START Treaty will soon be a subject of our discussions.

44

At my request last fall, we began preparing for these discussions, with the coordination of the NSC staff. The Departments of State and Defense and the Intelligence

Community are considering what approach the United States should take to the

scheduled expiration of the multilateral START Treaty in December 2009. We are

considering the overall impact on our national security, including our relationship

with Russia and the other START Parties, how our defense programs would be affected, the adequacy of our capabilities to monitor future developments in Russian

strategic arms, and what measures might be desirable and obtainable after December 2009. Prior to detailed discussions with the Russians, we will work to develop

a comprehensive U.S. position.

As indicated above, discussions will occur initially in my channel with the Russian

MFA. I intend to draw upon the expertise in the Department as well as other appropriate agencies.

RESPONSES OF UNDER SECRETARY ROBERT JOSEPH TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR

THE RECORD BY SENATOR BARACK OBAMA

Question. Would the development of additional international standards and controls, with a robust enforcement mechanism on the export of conventional weapons,

assist the State Department in controlling the proliferation of small arms,

MANPADS, and other advanced conventional weapons? In what areas are further

global export controls needed?

Answer. The U.S. Government believes that the illicit and irresponsible proliferation of conventional weapons has had serious consequences for regional stability and

social and economic development. We spend millions of dollars per year on the destruction of excess small arms and light weapons to further this goal.

The U.S. Government is working in several international fora to strengthen national controls on arms brokering. Many countries have recognized the destabilizing

impact of conventional arms sales can have in regions or countries of/in conflict,

and, therefore, have policies to prohibit such transfers. Arms brokering is one element that needs higher attention in these policies. The Wassenaar Arrangement

and the OSCE have already taken steps on strengthening brokering controls. Under

the U.N. Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, a GGE on brokering

will convene in the fall 2006.

We are nevertheless skeptical that a new legally binding international agreement,

would significantly contribute to the objective of controlling the proliferation of

small arms, MANPADS, and advanced conventional weapons. To be effective, any

new measures would have to include all major military exporters, not undermine

ongoing programs in the United Nations and elsewhere, and be consistent with existing national laws.

Question. Secretary Joseph, could the Department use more personnel to implement future destruction plans? Does the current budget request allow for expanding

staff resources?

Answer. As I stated during my testimony, I support the President’s budget. Within the parameters of our fiscal year 2007 request, I will work to balance available

positions to achieve the common interdiction and destruction goals we discussed. I

am working to allocate human resources on a basis of identified work load to ensure

that our highest priority needs are met. As an example, as part of the ongoing reorganization within the ‘‘T’’ family of bureaus, staff resources are being reallocated to

support the destruction of both WMD and conventional weapons.

Question. Secretary Joseph, of the 191 U.N. members states, how many (1) have

a conventional weapons stockpile that pose a proliferation threat, and (2) lack the

financial or institutional capacity to address that threat?

Answer. Comprehensive information of this kind is not available from either government or nongovernmental sources. However, while it might be useful to know the

totality of the problem, we do not require this information to develop an effective

response. We know those states that are sources of weapons, those that are involved

in illicit trade in weapons, and those that suffer from the effects of proliferated

weapons. Impact assessments that include security, humanitarian and environmental factors allow us to prioritize our work and to develop a targeted and effective

response to the overall problem. Based on these assessments, smaller stockpiles

often pose the greatest threats.

We have found in our work that for those states facing a proliferation threat, it

is neither finances nor institutional capacity that is the greatest impediment to action, but political will. Extensive diplomatic engagement is required to gain cooperaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:49 May 07, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800926.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
45

tion from states to secure and destroy stockpiles. Most states consider issues such

as weapons stockpile size and weapons security to be sensitive items of national security. As a result, they often are reluctant to share such information and are extremely unlikely to cooperate with any sort of global assessment activity.

Question. Secretary Joseph, in your view, where is there room for improvement

within the State Department on the issues covered by the Lugar-Obama legislation

(conventional weapons and WMD interdiction)?

Answer. Lugar-Obama is a comprehensive piece of legislation that seeks to reduce

both WMD and conventional weapons proliferation. My team is currently studying

the proposed legislation and will be briefing me on their suggestions in the near future.

Question. Secretary Joseph, in his opening statement, Senator Lugar stated, ‘‘U.S.

efforts in this area (curtailing the spread of WMD and conventional weapons) are

currently underfunded, fragmented, and in need of high-level support.’’ What parts

of this statement do you agree with—which parts with which do you disagree?

Answer. We carefully considered our funding proposal in light of current fiscal

constraints, present funding environment, and the Secretary of State’s priorities.

While curtailing the spread of WMD and conventional weapons are both significant

challenges, as you know, they are but two of the many challenges that we face, and

needs will always exceed resources, no matter what the challenge.

We believe that the recent restructuring in the State Department configures us

well to pursue the objectives of the legislation in both counterproliferation and conventional weapons reduction. The new Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation brings focus to the Department’s efforts in the WMD area, while the

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ relatively new Office of Weapons Removal and

Abatement consolidates the humanitarian mine action and small arms and light

weapons initiatives into one unit, allowing us to better pursue the integrated and

comprehensive approach that is so essential to address these complex problems.

Finally, this issue is supported at the highest levels within the Department and

the executive branch. The President and his administration have devoted higher priority and more funding to nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and weapons reduction than any previous administration.

Question. Secretary Joseph, one of the key aspects of the Lugar-Obama legislation

is its focus on detection and interdiction of weapons of mass destruction. In his

opening statement, the chairman made a comment in that current State Department programs are ‘‘focused on other stages of the threat, not on detection and

interdiction.’’ And, that the Proliferation Security Initiative, while successful, is

flawed—many of our partners do not have the resources to be capable and effective

partners. Do you believe that there are gaps in current State Department efforts

to address this critical issue?

Answer. State Department efforts are indeed focused on developing international

cooperation to detect and interdict WMD-related shipments through the Proliferation Security Initiative. A variety of U.S. technical assistance programs currently

help international partners develop relevant capabilities ranging from export controls enforcement and border security to establishment of appropriate national legislation, as called for in UNSCR 1540.

The State Department has made clear to our PSI partners that we will respond

on a case-by-case basis to requests for technical or other program assistance. State

also reviews country reports that come to the UNSCR 1540 Committee regarding

country resource needs in this area and alerts existing U.S. technical assistance programs regarding detection and interdiction-related needs that are reported. In the

rare case that existing U.S. programs can not address such a need, the State Department will explore the use of ISN’s NDF program and/or investigate other

means, up to and including the establishment of new assistance programs to address such needs.

Question. In May 2005, Secretary Rice stated that ‘‘In the last 9 months alone,

the United States and 10 of our PSI partners have quietly cooperated on 11 successful efforts. PSI cooperation stopped the transshipment of material and equipment

bound for ballistic missile programs in countries of concern, including Iran.’’

What is your definition of a ‘‘PSI’’ interdiction and what is not?

How many such interdictions have occurred since then?

On a classified basis, if necessary, could you please provide me with a list of specific PSI-sponsored interdictions?

Answer. A PSI interdiction entails cooperation among two or more PSI participants. The number of interdictions, whether PSI related or not, that has occurred

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since May 2005, is a classified matter involving sensitive intelligence information.

The Secretary’s remarks were elaborated in a classified briefing I presented to Members of the Senate in August 2005. Foreign Relations Committee staff retained copies of this briefing for committee files.

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