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KYRGYZSTAN’S REVOLUTION:

CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 7, 2005

Printed for the use of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

[CSCE 109–1–9]

(

Available via http://www.csce.gov 
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

HOUSE SENATE

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,

Co-Chairman 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New 

York 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 

MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas,

Chairman 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

VACANT 

VACANT 

VACANT

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

VACANT, Department of State 

VACANT, Department of Defense 

WILLIAM HENRY LASH III, Department of Commerce 

(II) 
C O N T E N T S 

APRIL 7, 2005

COMMISSIONER 

Page 

Hon. Sam Brownback, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation 

in Europe .............................................................................................................. 1

WITNESSES 

Zamira Sadykova, Editor, Res Publica .................................................................. 3

Dr. Martha Olcott, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace ..................................................................................................................... 7

Daniel Kimmage, Central Asia Analyst, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty ....... 10

Yulia Savchenko, Talk Show Host, Pyramid TV, Kyrgyzstan ............................. 12

APPENDICES 

Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman, Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe ............................................................. 25

Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member,

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ........................................ 27

Prepared statement of Dr. Martha Olcott ............................................................. 28

Prepared statement of Daniel Kimmage ............................................................... 38

(III) 

(1)

KYRGYZSTAN’S REVOLUTION: CAUSES AND 

CONSEQUENCES 

APRIL 7, 2005

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC

The hearing was held at 1:15 p.m. in room 428–A Russell Senate 

Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Sam Brownback, Chairman, 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding. 

Commissioner present: Hon. Sam Brownback, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Witnesses present: Zamira Sadykova, Editor, Res Publica; Dr. 

Martha Olcott, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Daniel Kimmage, Central Asia Analyst, Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty; and Yulia Savchenko, Talk Show Host, Pyramid TV, Kyrgyzstan. 

HON. SAM BROWNBACK, CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Good afternoon. I want to welcome all of you 

here to this hearing on Kyrgyzstan. 

After Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003 and Ukraine’s Orange 

Revolution in 2004, Kyrgyzstan has now followed suit in 2005. 

There appears to be some confusion whether these historic 

events should be categorized as yellow, pink, or tulip revolutions, 

so I will refrain from assigning them any particular color. 

Although the collapse of the regime of President Akaev was stunningly fast, it was not entirely unexpected. Of all the central Asian 

countries, analysts have singled out Kyrgyzstan as the state most 

likely to experience the latest surge of people power in the CIS 

states. 

The success of opposition-led efforts to galvanize a popular uprising after the flawed parliamentary elections of February-March has 

demonstrated that Central Asia, though mired in repression and 

accustomed to autocratic rule, is no less susceptible to the contagion of democracy than countries in other places around the 

world, in the Caucasus or Eastern Europe. 

We should not be surprised that the people of Kyrgyzstan have 

finally said ‘‘enough’’ to official corruption, rigged elections and 

chronically poor governance. 

All over the world, including regions long thought to be unsuited 

for democracy, popular movements have arisen in recent months. 

Palestinians and Iraqi elections have shown the clear desire of 

Arab peoples for clean, accountable, representative government. 
2

I have no doubt that other peoples in the Arab world share that 

same dream. As soon as the opportunity emerges they will express 

their longing for the same chance at a better life. 

It is regrettable that the revolution in Kyrgyzstan was accompanied by looting and disorder, unlike the Rose and Orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. Certainly those who stormed businesses and swiped goods did not varnish Kyrgyzstan’s reputation. 

Still, I do not agree with those who describe events in 

Kyrgyzstan as a riot, not a revolution. 

For the first time in years, people in a Central Asian country 

have refused to accept passively another rigged election. 

From now on, whoever comes to power in Kyrgyzstan will have 

to be more accountable to the people, which is an essential prerequisite of democratic governance. 

I’m saddened by the fate of President Akaev whom I have met 

several times. In the context of Central Asia, he struck me as a relatively enlightened man. Ultimately, however, he failed to meet the 

expectations of his people, who were extremely frustrated by years 

of official corruption and the prospect of more of the same. 

I understand he has publicly voiced regret that he did not use 

force to keep his job. That view does not speak well of him, and 

I hope he will rethink his position as time passes. 

I also hope that the leaders of other former Soviet republics draw 

the appropriate lessons from the Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, 

and probably soon-to-follow other names of nations syndrome. 

The precedent of mass protest movements is important in itself. 

Even if conditions differ significantly in all these states—there 

will be parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan this November and 

Kazakhstan is scheduled to hold Presidential elections next year—

the leaders of these countries should see the writing on the wall 

and commit to holding free and fair elections by international 

standards. 

They should do so in practice and not just in rhetoric. Otherwise, 

we’ll be holding hearings in the future on various colored revolutions in those countries as well. 

Kyrgyzstan’s revolution raises many questions which U.S. policymakers will have to address. Does this revolution auger well for 

the building of a more democratic, lawful society? 

Will Kyrgyzstan’s example inspire similar events in neighboring 

countries? 

Could the turmoil in Kyrgyzstan undermine Bishkek’s cooperation with the United States in the war on terrorism? 

Will Moscow work with Washington in helping Kyrgyzstan’s new 

authorities develop a more democratic, less corrupt state, or see the 

ouster of its close allies as a threat to its strategic interests? 

And what can Washington do beyond what it is already doing to 

consolidate democracy and respect for human rights, the dignity of 

the individual, in Kyrgyzstan? 

Today’s witnesses will examine these and other questions. I’m 

delighted with the panel that’s joining us here today on this very 

important and certainly timely topic. 

Today’s witnesses are Zamira Sadykova—I’m apologetic for that, 

I’m much better with Smith and Johnson and Lee, I apologize—Dr. 

Martha Olcott, Daniel Kimmage, and Yulia Savchenko. 
3

Unfortunately, the Department of State was unable to provide a 

witness for this hearing, but we hope to get the official perspective 

at some point in time in the near future. 

I want to thank you all very much for joining us, and the audience as well. And we will begin with the testimony of the first witness. 

Ms. Sadykova, thank you for joining us here today. 

ZAMIRA SADYKOVA, EDITOR, RES PUBLICA 

Ms. SADYKOVA. Thank you very much to inviting me here to this 

hearing, because it’s very important for us, for our country, and for 

our civil society. 

First of all, I would like to express gratitude on behalf of all of 

civil society in Kyrgyzstan for the attention and sympathy which 

we have experienced from your country and from the U.S. Congress, in particular from the very outset of gaining our independence and developing democracy. 

I will not enumerate all the help which you have rendered to the 

creation of our civil society institutions and independent mass 

media. I just want to say that this has greatly contributed to setting up a solid foundation for society based on principles of human 

rights and freedoms declared by the Helsinki Act of 1975 year. 

Initially, this was supported by the first President of Kyrgyzstan, 

too, but he has forsaken his nation and fled from the country after 

the 24th of March election, which shocked the international community. 

The March events cannot be called unexpected. At least they 

were not for me, as a journalist who has been for years in the thick 

of political events, covering the whole spectrum of opinions. 

We were strongly impressed by the statement made by President 

Bush right after his inauguration, that your country will not allow 

the tyranny of dictators who have emerged especially in the developing countries. 

This was a strong message, which gave us confidence that our 

expectations and rights are being perceived in the right way. 

But now, one could not call the intense persecution and prosecutions of civil activists, human rights defenders and independent 

journalists, anything else but a display of dictatorships on the part 

of the regime of Akaev. 

The President, Akaev, lost his constitutional right to remain at 

his post as far back as in 2000. However, the octopus of corruption, 

which his whole family has been caught by, forced him in violation 

of the constitution to prolong his powers. 

All the administrative resources they used in the preparations of 

the elections. But what roused the indignation of people of our 

country even more was the fact that we were now perceived as 

slaves whose votes could be bought. 

Money for the election campaign of candidates from the proAkaev party, Alga-Kyrgyzstan, was not declared in reports on electoral funds. 

Nobody knew that what happened on March 24 would happen so 

quickly. Although based on the behavior of President Akaev, the 

fact that he fled so fast, it is possible to suppose that he was probably the only person who understood the situation. 
4

The opposition only intended to start protest actions, so that the 

authorities would annul the results of the elections. But they did 

not plan the storming of the government house. 

Unlike the opposition, judging by the events of that day, Akaev 

had at first planned provocations and clashes among the participants of demonstrations, and then deserted his office and abandoned his nation in the hope that after him a civil war would break 

out. 

Attacks against the demonstrators could have grown into armed 

conflict. Judging by the actions of the law enforcement bodies and 

soldiers of the armed forces, the firing of weapons and the assembled equipment, anything could have been expected. 

But the participants in the protest meetings were forced to 

plunge inside the building of the government house in order to escape there from possible bullets. 

The peaceful nature of this action, which has been called by 

some, ‘‘a the seizure of the government’s building,’’ is proven by the 

fact that all government materials were kept safe and transferred 

to the appropriate bodies of people’s brigades, which were formed 

right there. 

I would like to assure you one more time, as a witness to the 

events, that nobody has seized power in Kyrgyzstan. It was abandoned and fled from. 

Kyrgyzstan, her true revolution, even it some call it the tulip or 

yellow revolution, was truly a revolution of the people. 

We were proud of the people of Georgia and Ukraine, who managed to assert their rights and freedom of choice. 

In response, we heard threats about the export of revolutions 

which were implanted by the authorities in all their recent public 

speeches. But we saw that these were the peaceful acts of civil participation in the preservation of democratic values declared by 

these countries. 

We wanted the same in spite of the fact that we are a Muslim 

country. Adherence of the people of Kyrgyzstan to democratic values, which we have managed to prove indeed by having asserted 

them in March 2005, once again says that democracy can be developed regardless of the religious views of the major part of the population in a country. 

In 1998, we were the first to experience the threat emanating 

from Islamic terrorists and accepted with joy participation in the 

anti-terrorist coalition by opening the military base of the coalition 

in Manas. 

We felt ourselves protected, but the leaders of the political opposition started being accused of political extremism only for having 

been organized into a single block on the eve of the parliamentary 

elections. 

All this time, you understand that the Coordination Council of 

People’s Unity controlled the situation in the country and continued its work right after it became known that President Akaev fled 

out of the country. 

A temporary government was formed. It was impossible to delay 

because disorders could have started in Bishkek. These were proven by the actions of looters who started to attack shops and trade 

centers. 
5

But these incidents cannot be called mass phenomena. Psychologists affirm that this could have been caused by the stress, panic 

and chain reaction, but also could possibly have been provoked by 

somebody knowingly. 

I personally feel that this phenomenon was the result of deep 

poverty into which the corrupted power of Akaev has plunged the 

major part of the population. 

During these days, attention of all leading world channels was 

riveted to our small country. I was hurt to see how Kyrgyzstan was 

gaining its fame. But believe me, what happened in Bishkek by no 

means spread throughout the whole country. Leaders of the Coordination Council of People’s Unity managed to redistribute forces in 

order to restore the management of the country. 

On the same day, the old parliament urgently assembled and 

named the leader of the opposition, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, as the 

Prime Minister and vested power in him. 

The Constitutional Court recognized as legitimate this transfer of 

power. 

A few days ago, you know, our runaway president, hiding in Moscow, finally signed his resignation. New Presidential elections are 

scheduled on 26th of June this year. 

The crisis has been overcome. National government is being restored. But the revolution would not have been a revolution if it 

would not raise the necessity of constitutional reforms. After all, 

what happened in Kyrgyzstan was caused by the usurpation of 

power by Mr. Akaev and his full control over the judiciary. 

Now the most important thing is to preserve the trust of people 

toward the power which came into being on 24th of March. There 

are major objectives before it: to preserve stability and calm in society, not to allow economic indicators to fall, to create conditions for 

holding Presidential elections on 26th of June. 

For all of this, your strong support is needed. 

It has been recently said that the West supported the Kyrgyzstan 

opposition and that America financed the revolution in Kyrgyzstan. 

You perfectly know that it is not the case. 

It is now that we request your assistance—financial, humanitarian. It is needed by our country, by our government and our society. 

It is definite that Kyrgyzstan will now support civil society, freedom of mass media, transparency of state government. 

In the light of the forthcoming Presidential elections and discussions of the constitutional reforms, I would like to see a strong role 

by the OSCE to enabled us to carry out independent and an impartial analysis of what we have and what we still need to be assisted 

with in the development of democracy. 

Up to now, the OSCE mission in Bishkek has been poorly 

equipped, the work has been carried out without spirit, and the 

OSCE simply could not realize its mission to the fullest extent in 

the establishment of dialogue between the authorities and the opposition. 

We would like to see expansion of the existing OSCE center in 

Bishkek into a significantly larger-scale OSCE mission in 

Kyrgyzstan in order to assist in ensuring a peaceful and orderly 

transition process and to promote the long-term development of 
6

democratic institutions, good governance and respect for human 

rights. 

The OSCE is uniquely positioned to respond to continuing confusion and turmoil in the wake of the recent popular uprising in 

Kyrgyzstan. 

The OSCE brings the support of 55 countries, including the 

United States, Russia, European Union, and other Central Asian 

states, as well as relevant expertise in elections, rule of law, democracy-building and good governance. 

Kyrgyzstan has been a leader in Central Asia, in cooperation 

with the OSCE. 

And there are precedents for such a mission, including the establishment of the OSCE presence in Albania in response to unrest in 

1997. 

The OSCE presence in Albania had some 45 international staff 

and field offices throughout the country. This would likely be an 

appropriate size for an enhanced OSCE mission in Kyrgyzstan. 

We understand that there may be some reluctance to move forward with such a proposal, considering the impasse in the OSCE 

over the budget, as well as Russian discontent with OSCE election 

assistance programs. 

However, we are willing to work with Russia and with our neighbors to get a permanent council decision enlarging the staffing, resources and mandate of the current center in Bishkek. 

We would like a significantly enhanced mission that would: assist with dialogue among all political parties and factions; support 

the technical preparations for and observation of new elections to 

ensure that there is public confidence in their electoral process; develop programs to fight corruption and promote good governance; 

assist with legislative and judicial reform; conduct parliamentary 

capacity-building programs, including through training programs; 

train law enforcement officials to ensure professional policing and 

ensure respect for human rights; monitor human rights and issues 

related to extremism or ethnic tensions, particularly in the 

Ferghana Valley region; support the further development of civil 

society and political parties; assist with the development of independent mass media. 

Recent events in Kyrgyzstan are only the beginning of the integration of our country into the family of democratic and developed 

world. The U.S. Congress and administration can do a lot to help 

us in that journey. 

Thank you again for your attention and attention for our country. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Ms. Sadykova. 

I wanted to point out—and I didn’t at the outset—anybody who 

has followed Kyrgyz’s politics is very well familiar with you and 

with your work: government opposition and work on independent 

journalism in Central Asia for the past 15 years. 

She’s the founder and longtime editor of ‘‘Res Publica,’’ an opposition-oriented newspaper, which has been under constant pressure 

from the Kyrgyz authorities prior to the revolution that took place 

there. 

In 1995, she was banned from journalism for a year, and in 1997, 

was sentenced to prison for 21⁄2 months. In 2000, she received an 
7

award from the International Fund for Women for courage in journalism, and she has now been named Kyrgyzstan’s Ambassador to 

the United States. 

After this hearing she will go to the State Department to begin 

the formal process of accreditation. She actually appears here today 

as a private citizen, but one with an incredible story and background. 

And I’m delighted to have you here. And I’ll look forward to having some exchange in the question and answer in the dialogue that 

we have. 

I’d like to ask the other witnesses, if we could, we will take your 

full statement into the record. Now, if you could mostly summarize—if we could run this clock at 7 minutes, we’ll give you some 

timeframe to be able to—it’s not a hard and fast rule—but I would 

like to get that so that we can get into some dialogue. 

The next person to testify will be Dr. Martha Olcott. 

She’s very familiar to this Commission, having testified many 

times on Central Asia. 

She is a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Before that she was for many years a professor of 

political science at Colgate University and a special consultant to 

one of my favorite foreign policy experts, former Secretary of State 

Lawrence Eagleburger. 

She’s a leading expert on Central Asia, having authored many 

books on the topic, including ‘‘Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promises.’’

I look forward to your testimony. 

Dr. Olcott? 

DR. MARTHA OLCOTT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE 

ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Ms. OLCOTT. Thank you so much. It’s a pleasure to be here today. 

And it’s a pleasure to be sitting next to Zamira under these circumstances after many years of talking about what could or could 

not or should happen in Kyrgyzstan. 

I’ve put a much longer statement into the—I’ve submitted a 

much longer written statement. Now, let me just briefly summarize 

it. 

The mass protest in Kyrgyzstan against Kyrgyzstan’s flawed parliamentary elections that led to the ouster of President Akaev were 

as momentous in their own way as the Rose or Orange revolutions. 

They demonstrated that the Central Asian masses have the same 

aspirations to choose their leaders, as those living in the European 

parts of the former Soviet empire do, and that Central Asians also 

expect that the exercise of their right to vote will not be compromised, neither in the nomination process, nor at the ballot box. 

It also very importantly demonstrated that long-term U.S. and 

OSCE investments in projects designed to build citizen participation at the grassroots level are worthwhile, that the presence of 

deeply rooted nongovernmental organizations, once they reach a 

critical number, can play a decisive role in political struggles by 

serving as the instrument to challenging public protests in peaceful 

ways. 

But the conduct of the Tulip Revolution tells us very little about 

whether the Kyrgyz elite is capable of organizing and sustaining 
8

democratic reforms in their country. As we know, they were unified 

around a single goal: the ouster of former President Akaev. 

The next stage is much more critical. The situation in 

Kyrgyzstan could still degenerate or disintegrate into something 

that’s little more than a division of spoils between long-competing 

political groups, some of whom are democratic, some of whom are 

much more concerned to have access to power rather than how its 

access to power is obtained. 

The Kyrgyz elite has to demonstrate that they have in fact made 

a revolution. The test of this will not be in the area of international 

relations. Kyrgyzstan’s old friends will remain their new friends. 

And this is as it should be. 

It won’t be through the announcement of ambitious new economic reforms. Kyrgyzstan has already gone through a fundamental economic reform program. 

A key challenge in the economy will be to attack corruption, corruption in the economy, corruption which often originated with the 

very officeholders themselves. It will be incumbent with the new 

group of officeholders to be and example of probity, rather than the 

example of corruption that their predecessors all to frequently 

were. 

The task before the new elite, I would argue, is strictly political. 

Their first burden is to demonstrate that they can hold transparent, free and fair Presidential elections, and then move on to 

necessary constitutional reform, reforms which will hopefully lead 

at their conclusion, not only to enhance power for a parliament and 

a balance of power at the national level—a balance of power between center and periphery—and judicial reform, were points that 

Zamira made, but will also lead to new parliamentary elections, because the current group that was seated out of the necessity of the 

exigencies of the moment was not elected freely and fairly and will 

never enjoy legitimacy. 

Obviously, U.S.—the OSCE nations—can help the Kyrgyz leaders 

in this process by providing a great deal of technical assistance. 

But these are reforms—the reforms that advisers can help them 

derive—that must be accepted and put into life and be invigorated 

by the actions of the Kyrgyz themselves, by the Kyrgyz elites themselves. 

It is not our assistance that will make them a success or a failure. Whether they succeed or fail, the Kyrgyz, what happens in 

Kyrgyzstan will have a profound impact on Central Asia. 

Certainly, the Kazakh opposition will feel inspired to try harder 

to oust their president at the next elections. And hopefully this 

same president will anticipate this and press harder and make 

himself an example by holding elections that are free and fair, and 

opening up political space in the advance of the elections. 

I’m not even going to talk about Azerbaijan, but I do want to talk 

some about the influence on Uzbekistan. 

The influence on Uzbekistan, tragically, is likely to be just the 

opposite. The regime could close down further, seeking what they 

have always termed has to be their own path to change, making 

it more difficult for what they term foreign forces—or what we 

term Western-funded NGOs—to act in their country. 
9

This really will create a considerable challenge for the United 

States, as we have never been able to convince the Uzbek Government what I firmly believe is true, that it is in the interest, not 

just of the United States, but most importantly, in the interest of 

the Uzbek Government to allow nongovernmental political groups 

space in their country. 

And I feel that it’s incumbent on the Helsinki Commission and 

on the U.S. policymakers to maintain a stance of keeping pressure 

on Uzbekistan and other states in the region to allow U.S.-funded 

NGOs to act in their countries. 

At the same time, though, we should be realistic. What 

Kyrgyzstan shows to us is that it is precisely the long-term effort 

that has impact. 

The critical factor in Kyrgyzstan was that NGO groups were so 

deeply rooted that there was no prospect of keeping them out of the 

election campaign, even though their life was made miserable oftentimes. 

This same capacity to mobilize, this same being part of the life 

in the country, does not exist in Uzbekistan. And even if we get the 

door open to continued funding for these groups, social upheaval in 

Uzbekistan could well occur before civil society or institutions are 

sufficiently deeply enough rooted to institutionalize that process in 

peaceful ways, to lead to peaceful transitions. 

I also, as I move to my conclusion, don’t rule out the prospect 

that violence, upheaval could still occur in Kyrgyzstan. 

Civil society institutions, even when deeply rooted, cannot ultimately deal with the frustration of demonstrators who believe that 

their elites have been unresponsive. 

In conclusion, the spotlight today is not on the Kyrgyz masses—

they’ve done their job, they’ve demonstrated that they support 

democratic goals—it is on the Kyrgyz elite. 

While the United States can provide them with humanitarian assistance, technical assistance, it’s the Kyrgyz elite that has to make 

the tough choices; they must demonstrate that they are responsible 

and democratic partners of the United States. And they can do this 

by creating the preconditions for democratic Presidential elections, 

and then moving on to timely constitutional reform. 

If they do this, not only will they have the confidence of the 

United States, but they will actually achieve the goals that President Askar Akaev set for the Kyrgyz nation in his very first years 

of independence, when he argued that Kyrgyzstan could become a 

beacon of democracy in Central Asia. 

It’s tragic that he failed to see through his own early vision, but 

the people in place now have the responsibility, the burden, and if 

they succeed, everybody’s absolute joy at their success of making 

these dreams a reality. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. That is true. 

I look forward to some of the discussion on this. 

I’ve been involved in that country for some time, and it did seem 

to me that they were on the right track, everybody thought the 

wind was behind their sails on making reforms, and then it just 

got off track and didn’t complete on through. I want to look at more 

why. 
10

Daniel Kimmage is a Central Asian analyst for Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty. He has been at that organization since 

2002 when he began writing about Russian affairs. 

Since December 2003, Mr. Kimmage has been concentrated on 

Central Asia, editing the Central Asia Report. He also writes about 

terrorism and the evolving ideology of jihad in Central Asia and 

the Middle East. 

He’s widely published; fluent in Arabic, Farsi, French, German, 

and Uzbek—English, I’m sure, as well. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Kimmage, thank you for joining us. 

DANIEL KIMMAGE, CENTRAL ASIA ANALYST, RADIO FREE 

EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY 

Mr. KIMMAGE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for inviting me to appear before this committee. 

I have also submitted a longer statement, and I will summarize 

my testimony here. 

After Dr. Olcott’s excellent summary of the political situation, 

I’m going to take a step back and look at some of the broader implications of events in Georgia, Ukraine, and now Kyrgyzstan. 

In May 1993, Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev visited the United 

States and met with President Clinton, who singled him out for his 

model leadership and praised him for his government’s bold pursuit 

of economic stabilization and democratic reform. 

A little less than 12 years later, President Akaev fled his country 

as Kyrgyzstan’s opposition celebrated the end of what it condemned 

as a corrupt and undemocratic regime. 

The president’s optimism in 1993 was not misplaced. It rested on 

encouraging signs and genuine hopes. But I would argue that the 

eventual failure of those hopes to come to fruition should warn us 

today against any irrational exuberance in the face of the latest 

chances. 

We certainly hope that democracy is on the march in Georgia, 

Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. But for now, we should take a hard look 

at the one very clear and indisputable lesson from these events, 

which is that the post-Soviet political systems in each of these 

countries faced and failed a very crucial test, and that test was a 

test of fair and free elections. 

Now, for those who want more detail, the OSCE provided excellent assessments of elections in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. 

I will read one brief quote which is from their report on Georgia, 

it says: ‘‘The elections process was characterized by a clear lack of 

political will by government authorities to organize a genuine and 

democratic elections process.’’

You can find similar verdicts in their assessments of Ukrainian 

and Kyrgyz elections. 

The root of this problem is a phenomenon called, ‘‘managed democracy.’’ And managed democracy is what happens when a ruling 

elite feels obligated to hold elections to buttress its legitimacy, but 

does everything in its power to control their outcomes. 

The practice of managed democracy is essentially a grab-bag of 

dirty tricks. The state-controlled media serves up puff pieces to promote certain candidates and smear campaigns to denigrate other 
11

candidates. Elections commissions ignore gross violations and punish minor ones. The list is very long. 

But the purpose is short and sweet, which is to reduce the necessary evil of elections to a predictable exercise. It allows elites to 

devote their time to more pressing pursuits, such as the exploitation of public office for private gain. 

This system is fatally flawed. And the flaw is that it removes accountability and thus the incentive for the political elite to communicate with constituents and base governance on the electorate’s 

real concerns. 

Second, as issues that should be treated in the public, political 

realm are left to fester or are resolved through back-room deals, 

this inevitably sparks popular dissatisfaction, which then creates 

an inventive for the elite to intensify its management of the political process. And you get a vicious cycle. 

Sooner or later, something has to give, as we saw happen in 

Georgia, Ukraine, and now Kyrgyzstan. Elections are a flash point 

because they put the spotlight on the machinery of managed democracy even as they raise the very issues the dysfunctional political system has neglected. 

The particular course of events in Georgia, Ukraine, and 

Kyrgyzstan was influenced by local considerations, but this was the 

common element. 

Now the causes of Kyrgyzstan’s revolution are not difficult to 

spot. They include a perception that the Akaev government was 

massively corrupt, that economic benefits were distributed with 

gross inequality, that Akaev and the ruling elite were actively manipulating democracy and that the state-controlled media was distorting the real situation in the country. 

The outcome of this revolution at this early stage is much less 

clear. 

The interim government has been off to a bit of a slow start. It 

has been hampered by a less than transparent approach to appointments, infighting, and an ability thus far to articulate policy 

changes that would mark a clean break with the Akaev era. But 

the situation is very fluid and it is much too early for any verdict 

on the post-revolutionary government. 

Now, the implications for the rest of the region are also difficult 

to discern, but we should bear in mind we can’t simply extrapolate 

the Kyrgyz situation to other countries. 

Kazakhstan held parliamentary elections in September 2004 that 

were substantially flawed and evaluated as such by international 

organizations. Tajikistan recently held parliamentary elections. No 

upheaval really resulted in either country. And there are specific 

reasons for this that we could go into. 

But I would note that both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan fall under 

the general rubric of managed democracies and have the same significant state-sponsored stage-managing of the political process and 

thus, are susceptible to the same outcomes we have seen elsewhere. 

A failure of managed democracy is much less likely in 

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, because there is much less democracy to fail. That does not mean that we could not see upheaval in 

Uzbekistan for the reasons that Dr. Olcott noted in her testimony. 
12

In closing, I would like to stress that beyond Central Asia, the 

proven failure of managed democracy in Georgia, Ukraine, and 

Kyrgyzstan points to an uneasy future for the largest and most important managed democracy of all, which is Russia. 

In Russia, we find many of the features of this flawed system: 

state control over national television, an increasingly virtual political environment that lacks the viable channels for communication 

between government and governed, and a squabbling elite that 

uses the mechanisms of the state for its own ends, often rendering 

them useless for legitimate purposes. 

The point is not that Russia or any other country is next in a 

parade of democratic revolutions. Rather, the cautionary moral of 

this story is that the ongoing breakdown of managed democracy 

bodes ill for the stability for all countries, including Russia, where 

this dubious experiment continues in willful ignorance of the lessons of Georgia, Ukraine, and now Kyrgyzstan. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Very thoughtful. 

Well, finally, the final presentation will be Yulia Savchenko. 

She’s a fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington. She’s a television anchor and journalist in Kyrgyzstan—has 

achieved public recognition for hosting the talk show, ‘‘No Edits.’’ 

That’s on Pyramid TV. 

And Ms. Savchenko began working for Pyramid during her undergraduate years at the Kyrgyz-Russia Slavic University, first as 

news reporter and then as an investigative journalist, an editor of 

the news department and now hosts her own show. 

Her own show features various perspectives and debates on 

issues of political and social interest. 

Last fall, it was called the best public affairs TV program in 

Kyrgyzstan, and is a breakthrough in the area of participatory public policymaking in they country. 

In March 2004, a crackdown by the Kyrgyz authorities temporarily shut down her show. 

I’m delighted that you’re here to join us today. 

There will be no edits here. 

YULIA SAVCHENKO, TALK SHOW HOST,

PYRAMID TV, KYRGYZSTAN 

Ms. SAVCHENKO. Thank you so much for having me here. And I’ll 

try to be as brief as possible in assessing the post-revolutionary 

hardship in Kyrgyzstan. 

I would say that the instant analysis by many political observers 

is to classify Kyrgyzstan as part of the global domino effect of democracy. But the forces at work in Kyrgyzstan are markedly different than those that produced change in both Georgia and 

Ukraine. 

In sharp contrast, change in Kyrgyzstan has been led by a far 

less disciplined force with no widely recognized leader and no clearly defined program. 

It should, thus, not be viewed as another in a string of velvet 

revolutions. Events in Bishkek are shaping up to be revolutionary 

in a more classic sense. 
13

Allegations of vote-rigging served as the catalyst for the Kyrgyz 

revolution, but it was pent-up frustration among the population 

over persistent poverty and pervasive government corruption that 

packed the revolution with its explosive power. 

Many supporters of the revolution aren’t necessarily interested in 

democracy; they are just preoccupied simply with providing for 

themselves and their families. 

Since this start of the end game for the Akaev administration—

when protesters seized government buildings in Jalalabad and Osh 

in the wake of the second round of parliamentary voting on March 

13th—the president’s political opponents never demonstrated that 

they had firm control over the crowds of demonstrators. 

Political leaders, including the new interim president, 

Kurmanbek Bakiyev, have admitted that when anti-government 

protesters gathered on March 24th in Bishkek, they had no idea 

that the day would end with the collapse of Akaev’s administration. 

Now, suddenly finding themselves thrust into power, these same 

political leaders started pulling in different directions. 

On the one hand, they need to cooperate in order to foster a 

sense of order. At the same time, they will doubtless experience 

competitive pressure in the coming days and months as many of 

them jockey to position themselves for the presidency. 

The most prominent figures of the current revolution and further 

power contests are Kurmanbek Bakiyev, former Prime Minister of 

the country, and Felix Kulov, also the Prime Minister and the 

mayor of Bishkek. 

Bakiyev has managed to position himself as the leading figure of 

the opposition movement. The 56-year-old former Prime Minister 

has been appointed interim Prime Minister and acting president. 

The leader of the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan, Bakiyev also 

took charge of the Coordinating Council of People’s Unity, the body 

set up to make the disparate regional protests flow up into one. 

Bakiyev is a serious contender for the post of president, with an 

election announced for June. He enjoys widespread support in his 

home region of Jalalabad in the south of Kyrgyzstan. And the fact 

that he’s married to a Russian will appeal to minorities who feel 

excluded from Kyrgyz politics. 

Yet, there is a downside to his popular image. Until 3 years ago, 

Bakiyev was an active supporter of Akaev. 

In March 2002, while he was Prime Minister, police fired into a 

crowd of demonstrators in the southern village of Aksy. The resulting deaths caused a furor and sparked mass protests not dissimilar 

to those seen in recent weeks. 

Bakiyev resigned after Aksy, but critics still question his role in 

the decision to use violence against civilians, a point which may be 

used against him in the future. 

Kulov is a long-standing personal opponent of Akaev’s, and his 

release from prison brings him back to the center of political 

events. 

Now 53, the former general was once Akaev’s vice president. He 

served as interior minister and then mayor of Bishkek and then 

was imprisoned in the year 2000 on embezzlement charges that are 

widely perceived in Kyrgyzstan as politically motivated. There was 
14

a sense that as mayor of the capital, Kulov was simply getting too 

popular and Akaev began to see him as a dangerous rival. 

Sprung from prison on the day Akaev fled, Kulov was assigned 

general responsibility for law enforcement, national security and 

defense, without being given a particular ministerial post. 

Several days after order was restored on the streets of Bishkek, 

he resigned, unhappy with new official appointments made by Mr. 

Bakiyev. 

Yesterday, Kyrgyzstan’s supreme court annulled one of two 

criminal charges that sent Kulov to jail. After that, he immediately 

announced about his intentions to run for the presidency. 

With this announcement, the Presidential race has come into 

sharper focus. Kulov’s candidacy sets up a regional battle surrounding the looming Presidential race, as he is generally viewed 

as representing Northern political and economic interests, while 

Bakiyev is recognized as the candidate of the South. 

Today, we have come to the point when it’s safe to say that the 

legislative and power crisis Kyrgyzstan experienced during these 

latest days has somehow approached its logical conclusion. 

Finally, we have one more or less legitimate parliament and 

Askar Akaev finally agreed to resign after all attempts to denounce 

the revolution and proclaim it anti-constitutional. 

This seemingly put an end to the legislative crisis. Many observers, however, believe that Akaev’s resignation may only be a prelude to new problems. 

Now that Akaev has resigned, many experts believe that rivalries among political parties and individual politicians are likely to 

intensify. 

The latent problem is a deepening confrontation between Felix 

Kulov and interim President Kurmanbek Bakiev; besides, there is 

a confrontation within the new Kyrgyzstan leadership, as several 

politicians have declared their intentions to run for the presidency. 

Western analysts tend to perceive any revolution in the former 

Soviet Union as something that will create democracy. But in our 

case, no one among these new leaders is talking about democracy. 

We have a very colorful opposition, but they are not proclaiming 

democratic principles as a core of their activity. 

What also makes the situation really awkward is the fact that 

the current parliament, elected with huge violations of all possible 

norms that finally sparked the revolution, was considered the legitimate one. 

So the revolution got half of its wish: Akaev is gone, but the disputed parliament remains. So some observers are asking, ‘‘What 

was the purpose of the so-called revolution in Kyrgyzstan if the 

parliamentary elections that sparked the unrest are now considered legitimate?’’

I would also like to stress that the currently legitimate parliament was elected just as we were changing the structure of our 

ruling system, moving from a strong Presidential system to a 

strong parliamentary one. 

The current Constitution of the country, amended by the initiative of Askar Akaev 2 years ago, gives more rise to the new unicameral parliament. 
15

According to amendments, the president transferred part of his 

authority to the legislature. It means whoever is elected as a new 

president of Kyrgyzstan, he’s likely to become a nominal figure that 

is subordinate to a parliament with a pro-Akaev majority. 

So right now this situation is really absurd. After the revolution, 

we discovered ourselves in the pre-revolution situation, only without Akaev. What happened is imply the redistribution of authority 

among different influential groups within the elite. 

And of course, the lack of unity among leaders of the country endangers the future of legislative changes, because it was supposed 

to have a constitutional reform in Kyrgyzstan and to hold Presidential and parliamentary elections. 

Pulling all in different directions, former allies united in front of 

one enemy, President Akaev, during the latest days, had been revealing their skyrocketing ambitions—they only desire to beat up 

their ex-friends and today’s rivals. 

The date of the upcoming Presidential elections has been several 

times questioned by those candidates running for presidency. 

The formal excuse is not to conduct elections in a rush. The real 

reason is to gain some time to prepare for the election race personally. 

No one in this situation tends to perceive the reality of the country facing the crisis of legitimacy and seeking for one legitimate 

president who can start working out the complex economic and political situation instead of maneuvering in the corridor of political 

slogans and competitors eager to tailor the Presidential chair for 

themselves. 

Constitutional reform, I’d like to stress, could be essential for 

Kyrgyzstan right now. Today we have a unique chance to lay the 

foundation of a social state system which will be monolithic, stable 

and independent from leaders’ ambitions, and will prevent the return of a personal, authoritarian regime. 

But obviously not so many people are willing to shift for the 

changes. 

Thank you so much for your attention. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you. And thank you for the thought that 

you put forward. Thank you for the entire panel. 

I want to have kind of a free-flowing dialogue and discussion, if 

we could. 

I have some familiarity with the country and I’ve been to 

Kyrgyzstan twice. I’ve worked with the leadership, I’ve put forward 

a bill, the so-called Silk Road Strategy Act, that was passed by 

Congress, trying to get some integration and work within the region and working back and forth with us. 

Kyrgyzstan, this one really troubles me, is the fact that it 

shouldn’t have ended this way from where it started. I think that, 

Mr. Kimmage, you were the one that talked about President Clinton’s ’93 statement to President Akaev and laudatory statements. 

When I first got involved in the region, you know, this was clearly the case of the one that was moving forward the fastest, the 

rhetoric was right, the setting seemed to be right, was sizing up 

as you said, ‘‘You know, this really should be the model country 

moving toward democratic, open, stable society development.’’ And 

then it careened off wrong, badly. 
16

When were the decisions made that started taking it the wrong 

way, first, and what were they? 

Mr. Kimmage, do you have a——

Mr. KIMMAGE. I would just contribute the comment that I think 

the decisions that began to take the country in the wrong direction 

were likely not public decisions, because I think at the root of this 

problem lies corruption. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. I’m going to just have a dialogue back and 

forth—in that sense, it is much like Georgia where Shevardnadze 

was seen as a good president and all, but there was always this 

underlying corruption issue that was there, and just finally it boils 

to a certain point that we’ve had it? 

Mr. KIMMAGE. I don’t know if there was always the underlying 

corruption. I think that it certainly ended up in a very similar position where, if you look at statements in the lead-up to the revolutionary events, there’s this perception of absolutely total corruption 

and a perception that had simply gone too far. 

So I think you ended up in a similar position, you know. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Dr. Olcott? 

Ms. OLCOTT. I think that the mid-’90s were really critical. 

I agree with some of what Daniel said, that I think that both the 

behind-the-scenes always played a more important role than what 

was going on in front of the scenes. And I think that when somebody finally digs up President Akaev’s papers, if they ever do, and 

bank statements, that it will be clear that there was corruption at 

the beginning, probably around the gold transactions that was the 

big part of Kyrgyz economic reform. 

But I don’t think that President Akaev became terrified by that. 

I think by the mid-1990s, it was clear that none of the surrounding 

states were going to become democratic and that there were going 

to be very high costs to him personally from dissatisfaction within 

the Kyrgyz elite if——

Mr. BROWNBACK. So he just kind of assumes his surroundings 

then? 

Ms. OLCOTT. I think he did assume his surroundings. 

I mean, there’s a lot of talk that he was influenced by his wife 

and stuff—and I talk about this in the testimony—I always see him 

as a much stronger figure than many others do. I think he made 

a lot of conscious choices. 

But I think it’s just as he became aware that economic reform 

was going to become more difficult than he expected—and I think 

the economy was a big driver, that when people came in ’92 and 

’93 and he accepted the macroeconomic reforms and he severed 

Kyrgyzstan’s currency from Russia, I think he believed the reformers, both inside Kyrgyzstan and outside, that this is going to work 

and it was going to work quickly. 

And then the regional economy really collapsed. Kyrgyzstan’s reforms turned out to be much more complicated than they were presented to him, and even than the advisers themselves, the international advisers, perceived. 

And corruption, local-level corruption, just grew worse and worse. 

And at the same time——

Mr. BROWNBACK. As the economy wasn’t growing like it needed 

to, that the people just kind of—I’m going to get what I can? 
17

Ms. OLCOTT. Exactly. I think that was an important trigger. People just felt it was easier to be dishonest than to be honest, because 

at least by being dishonest you take care of mine, you take care 

of me and myself. And by being honest you weren’t going to get the 

outcome you wanted. 

I even think that at some point this happened in his own head, 

that he felt, by the mid-’90s, that it was just easier to be thug-like 

like many of his neighbors—soft thug-like, you know. I mean he 

sent Zamira to jail. But you didn’t have the same deaths that you 

had in other places. 

And the countervailing pressure just wasn’t so great. Friendship 

with the United States wasn’t producing heaven on earth for 

Kyrgyzstan. The neighbors were beating on him in private for having gone this way. And the economy was going sour slowly. And it 

went even more sour after 1998. 

But that doesn’t make the man not responsible for his own actions. It just makes them comprehensible. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. I understand. 

Ms. SADYKOVA [through interpreter]. I agree with everything 

that has been said so far by others here. However, as a journalist 

who has studied what was happening in Kyrgyzstan for many 

years, I would like to add a personal note. 

He was a man who depended very much on other members of his 

family. 

His family and his clan played a very great role in his decisions. 

And he himself has deepened the clan competition in the country. 

And this is what my colleague, Ms. Savchenko, mentioned, that 

many of the problems that remain unsolved in Kyrgyzstan are regional—south, north and between clans. 

And the new parliament, the one that has just been elected, is 

a clan parliament. 

And therefore, when and if constitutional reforms are instituted, 

one of our demands or desires is that this clan influence be brought 

under control by proportional representation of regions and clans 

and parties—proportional regional and party representation. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. I want to move now to the issue of the lessons 

that other countries in the region will learn from this. 

And, Dr. Olcott, I found your analysis of this quite interesting. 

And as I heard it, OK, that sound pretty logical to me, for the people that I know in the region, of the Kazakhs, the Uzbeks. The 

Tajiks I know less about, and the Turkemen, I don’t know who 

knows anything about what’s going on there. 

But it seemed to me on this one, on Kyrgyzstan, with what had 

just happened in Georgia, what had just happened in Ukraine, 

what was literally happening in Lebanon, that this should be very 

clear—if you’re going to be a country that’s aspiring somewhat on 

the democracy model, or let’s say even you don’t, it’s pretty clear 

you’ve got the civil society that’s developing somewhat in your 

country and you know that this is taking place. 

And if you’re going to run an election that’s not free and fair and 

open by domestic standards at least, and certainly not by international standards, you’re going to have some trouble here—or the 

potential for trouble would seem to me to be quite high. 
18

I’m just putting myself in the leadership position in Kyrgyzstan. 

I’ve seen these things taking place in other countries. I know I 

have a civil society, at least the early stages of development in 

Kyrgyzstan. The potential of a revolution taking place would seem 

to be quite a bit in the cards if I don’t hold a free and fair election. 

So why isn’t that held? Why doesn’t that happen? 

Mr. Kimmage, or whoever would feel—Dr. Olcott? 

Ms. OLCOTT. Yes. I’m going to ask the question I asked myself 

late into the night this whole last 3 weeks. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. This is a bright man. Dr. Akaev is a physicist. 

He’s a bright man. 

Ms. OLCOTT. I think I would say three things. I think one thing 

that we mentioned in our testimonies that didn’t come out so much 

in discussion is that the political crisis of 2002, from the time of 

the Aksy disturbances, was never resolved. 

And this is what drove Bakiyev into opposition. 

But Akaev really cheated the elite at that time. There was a 

whole debate over constitutional reform. He practically was ousted 

in 2002. And he held onto his job by the skin of his teeth. 

And he understood that. He understood that he had pulled a fast 

one in the process of drafting constitutional reform, substituting a 

text virtually at the last minute that included changes he wanted, 

and that nobody in the elite trusted him. 

And so what he failed to do, I think, was to convince people, prior 

to that election, that he really was going to step down in October, 

2005. I don’t think there was a single, serious political figure in the 

country that thought that Akaev wasn’t going to use that election 

to somehow remain in power. 

And in his mind, he no longer—and I think part of this is that 

he became much closer to Russia after 2002. And Daniel Kimmage 

talks this when he talks about managed democracy—that he was 

sold a bill of goods by advisers from outside the country who didn’t 

understand Kyrgyzstan, that this could work. 

I know some of the people that came to advise him—they knew 

nothing about Kyrgyzstan. 

So to the degree to which a leader wants to believe they can get 

away with what they want, he just was willing to put aside his better intellectual sense and take the only path that he saw that could 

give him the outcome he wanted, which was being able to either 

stay in power or dictate the terms of his departure. 

And since that was his overwhelming goal, he just blinded himself to the things around him. 

But I think most people were shocked that he behaved as stupidly as he did, that he could have done things along the way that 

would have made that election free enough and fair enough to have 

gotten through this crisis and found some way to exit with some 

grace. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Ms. Savchenko? 

Ms. SAVCHENKO. I think that at some point we need to remember 

about this inner circle of our President Akaev. 

And, as Zamira already mentioned, after the year 1995, his family acquired this overwhelming authority over our president. And 

then they just acquired these incredible economic assets in the 
19

country and literally half of the economy or even more were just 

sold to the Akaev family. 

And then it was very dangerous for all of them to lose power at 

this point. 

And that’s why Mr. Akaev was reassured by his son-in-law, by 

his wife—I think by his daughter—to stay in power by any means. 

That’s why elections were badly rigged even though some real 

problems with rigging these elections were so easily predicted. 

So it wasn’t about his personal will, as well. And he can be smart 

and bright—and he’s a scientist. But it was all about this inner circle after the year 1995. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. That’s sounds like the Eve doctrine to me. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. SAVCHENKO. Yes. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. It was all Eve. 

Mr. Kimmage? 

Mr. KIMMAGE. I want to return to your question which is, as I 

understood it, why are these lessons not learned time after time, 

which I’ve also asked myself. 

And one of the things I would stress is the extremely Soviet understanding of politics that we find among these Soviet elites, 

which is to say that——

Mr. BROWNBACK. You’re using the term ‘‘Soviet?’’

Mr. KIMMAGE. Soviet understanding of politics. And what I mean 

by this that they look at all politics, be it through elections or others, as an art of manipulation, not an expression of political will. 

Where we see this come out is if you look at the way events in 

Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan are analyzed by critics in postSoviet countries. 

And you can find many articles in the Russian press—you can 

find it on Russian state television. This is seen as part of a plot. 

It’s seen as a manipulation through these nefarious Western-funded organizations. 

So in other words, when leaders or political elites outside of 

these countries look at what happened in Georgia or in Ukraine or 

in Kyrgyzstan, they say, ‘‘Oh, look, somebody paid. Somebody 

pulled this off. It’s a manipulation. This has nothing to do with political will.’’

And so the conclusion they draw is: ‘‘I simply need to manipulate 

better.’’

In other words, I don’t actually need to carry out a free election. 

What I need to do is actually pull off a better sort of art of manipulation. 

And I think this is one of the key reasons why this lesson is not 

learned. 

And I’ll just close with a little vignette. There was a discussion 

recently, I believe in a Russian radio station, and a group of experts were discussing—So how do you avoid an Orange revolution 

in Russia or elsewhere? 

And they discussed all of these very complicated schemes of 

countering the influence of these various, nefarious Western-funded 

groups. And then one analyst said, ‘‘Well, you know, it’s actually 

very simple. Don’t falsify elections. Don’t lie through state media. 

And that’s how you prevent it.’’
20

And, of course, everyone looked at him as a naive fool. 

But we should bear in mind that this mentality is very pervasive. 

And I think that’s one of the reasons why these lessons are not 

learned. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. To me, that just seems to be so fundamental, 

particularly when you’re in a Kyrgyzstan-type of setting. It’s a relatively small country and a revolutionary change could get started 

pretty rapidly and conclude pretty rapidly. 

That just still doesn’t much sense to me. 

But maybe it’s generational then, too. When you describe a Soviet leadership—that it just takes some time to take that mental 

cap off before you engage and say, you know, ‘‘Democracy is a good 

way and it isn’t something you manage. It happens. And you put 

yourself up for it and you win or lose. And that’s just the way it 

goes.’’

Let me take you to the next question of lessons for others in the 

region, if I could. And I do want to get some pointedness on this, 

because my message to the leaders in that region—and I hope and 

I know through all of OSCE—is: Conduct free and fair elections. 

This is not rocket science. This is not a complicated thing. If they 

want help in conducting free and fair elections, we will gladly provide that. 

If they want monitors to be able to tell their people that they’re 

conducting free and fair elections, we will provide monitors. 

If they want monitors from other parts of the world than the 

United States, we will provide monitors from other parts of the 

world than the United States. 

Now we’re not going to go to other managed democracies—of 

your term, Mr. Kimmage. I think you’re doing disservice to the 

term ‘‘democracy’’ by calling it managed. 

Maybe you call it managed government. But I wouldn’t call it 

managed democracy. 

But we will help. We will do whatever you want. 

But if you’re not going to conduct free and fair elections, you will 

see the international community call it for what it is. It’s not a free 

and fair election—period. 

And if people are going to start a revolution then because they 

didn’t have a free and fair election, you’re the one that made that 

decision. 

We will help to make sure that it’s conducted as a free and fair 

election, as we helped, as others did in Iraq, in Afghanistan—there 

will be problems with elections. There always are somewhat. 

But the international community will help so that if the Kazakhs 

are concerned about their people not perceiving a free and fair election, we will do so to help, if that’s the case. And Azerbaijan, the 

same way. 

What could we do better or more to drive that message to these 

other countries that will soon be cuing up for elections and this 

issue come before their country? 

Any thoughts from any of you? 

Ms. SADYKOVA [through interpreter]. For all these years, we actually had been asking for greater involvement by the OSCE in our 

electoral process. The problem is that the mission—the OSCE mis-
21

sion—works more with the governments than with the political 

parties. 

And the main goal should have been to arrange or enhance or 

contribute to a dialogue between the government and society and 

the other parties. 

This pre-election task, it seems to me, was let go and not accomplished. 

The work that needs to be done is to bring to one table a very 

diverse group of all opinions, all political opinions. 

And if you speak of Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, there is no dialogue whatsoever; nobody even speaks about dialogue. 

It is impossible to imagine that opposition members or leaders 

would sit at the same table with Karimov or Nazabaev. 

And right now in Kyrgyzstan, as we prepare for elections again, 

it is very important, again, to bring all the different factions together for a dialogue so that they can work out some basic common 

rules of the game that then would preclude that the new elections 

would again lead to some kind of disturbances. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Is that being done and helped by the OSCE? 

Ms. SADYKOVA [through interpreter]. Well, this is one of the 

things that I mentioned, that the OSCE mission in Bishkek is very 

small and they have not been able to work in that area. 

So this is why one of my requests that I have mentioned is to 

follow the example of what OSCE did in Albania before the elections there, and maybe temporarily, before our election, have an increase in staff that could work on this problem. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. I think that’s an excellent thought. 

And we just passed yesterday in the state authorization bill an 

expanded election mission for Kyrgyzstan from here, from the 

United States’ governance or funding approach. 

Now, that’s report language for now, so we’ll have to put more 

funding behind it. But I think that’s a very good suggestion. 

Dr. Olcott? 

Ms. OLCOTT. I think it’s very important in terms of how the 

United States can maximize its affect on these states to really distinguish one state from another, to look at Kyrgyzstan separate 

from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 

And in Kyrgyzstan, as Zamira was just saying, the real challenge 

will be whether the international community—whether the OSCE 

and United States and other Western countries—can deliver 

enough technical assistance through our own foreign policy allocation machines to get us there fast enough for this election. It’s very 

soon and it’s really critical. 

This is a receptive audience, and I think we really could get a 

lot of technical assistance in there if we could agree on what—if all 

the different foreign actors—and the OSCE certainly is the appropriate umbrella—what kind of assistance should be prioritized and 

get the donating up fast. 

Even in the last election, the Kyrgyz were complaining they 

didn’t get things that were promised to them in time. I mean, it 

was very slow getting technical assistance then. That wouldn’t 

have changed the outcome, but this is going to be a real burden on 

the Western nations to do this properly, because we do have a door. 
22

There’s a different door, I think, in Kazakhstan. I was really surprised that just recently, again, the OSCE leadership mentioned 

again the possibility that Kazakhstan was still in the running for 

the chairmanship in—I think it’s 2009 they asked for it and the decision is to be made in 2006. 

This really gives the OSCE, in particular, a real bargaining position with the Kazakhs. 

I was shocked that this door didn’t close after the parliamentary 

elections, but it doesn’t seem to have. Well, these Presidential elections are really his last time to run clean, free and fair elections. 

And, again, the technical assistance is one part of the problem. 

It’s really the will that this has been thwarted in Kazakhstan as 

much by the will as by—near the top and probably at the top—

than by their incapacity. 

But there at least there is possibility of dialogue between OSCE 

nations and the Kazakh Government. They can, at least, pretend 

that they share some of our goals. Many of the organizations we 

work through are still legal in Kazakhstan. 

So that is one strategy and it may not work. I think it’s will rather than technical assistance, but technical assistance and the whole 

move to dialogue, use of the media—his new reform program, his 

February speech, opens the door for renewed efforts by the United 

States and by other OSCE actors. He claims that he wants all 

these reforms and wants them quickly. 

And, you know, it gives us a document that we can go in to 

Nazabaev with and say, ‘‘We’re happy to help you. Others are 

happy to help you.’’

These two cases are easy. We both know how hard they are. 

You open Uzbekistan, that is really an impossible case for this 

kind of vocabulary, partly, I would argue, because you have this 

basic tension. 

We go in—the OSCE goes in and says that we’re interested in 

giving you technical assistance. We want these elections to be freer 

and fairer. 

You have other democracy activists, some of whom are U.S.-funded, who are now illegal in these countries. And they’re illegal in 

part because some of the people associated with them say it’s impossible to work with this regime, that the only hope is to overthrow the regime. 

So, in a sense, Congress and the State Department have to work 

through which message they want to send. Are they sending the 

message that we want to work with repressive regimes to have 

them modify their regimes with a template of things, including 

working with pro-government parties—increasing their skill level—

or do we only say we will not deal with anything having to do with 

these repressive states, but then they’re not going to take seriously 

that they have to have democracy-builders in there? 

The one tragedy, and the thing that makes me most frightened 

about Uzbekistan, is that it’s not enough to simply work with parties; you have to have a secular elite competent to take over. 

And that’s the other area of training, because we haven’t been 

working with pro-government groups in a place like Uzbekistan. 

That secular elite, those people who are against Karimov in their 

hearts but still aren’t willing to be against them in their mouths, 
23

that serve the regime they would like to see changed, they’re kind 

of falling out of the loop of democracy-building efforts. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Ms. Savchenko? 

Ms. SAVCHENKO. I just wanted to add briefly on the OSCE presence in Kyrgyzstan. 

The problem is that before these elections, OSCE was very cautious, in fact, about its position. And what is necessary right now 

is to claim this position more definitely, because after Mr. Akaev 

started to crack down on all international organizations and independent media—and he actually accused an American ambassador 

of supporting directly the opposition in the country—OSCE was 

very, very cautious. And there weren’t any statements, any clear 

statements. 

And they actually preferred to work with our government, and 

a lot of opposition people who were NGOs representatives accused 

OSCE of this position and of being extremely loyal to the Kyrgyz 

government. 

And the latest action of the OSCE was actually to arm our military forces with some kind of guns, and it was a governmentally 

supported program and it was—actually, it was the mission of the 

OSCE and that’s how the image of the organization is created, and 

the image was actually spoiled. 

And right now they need to think it over and probably they need 

to redefine their positions in terms of a more direct approach of 

their statements and missions. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. That’s a very helpful comment, particularly for 

us in looking at the other countries in the region and what’s taking 

place there as well and in Russia, what’s happening in that country. 

I do know as I’ve watched this all evolve and with amazement 

seen the Soviet Union fall when it did—because I just didn’t think 

that was possible for another 30 years. I thought it was a ways off, 

a long ways off. And then to see it fall, I’m just astounded. 

And it seems like we’re in the second wave of revolution through 

the Soviet Union, that after the Soviet Union fell, a lot of guys fled 

to disparate parts of the country and set up shop. And these were 

people that were part of the Politburo at the time, Soviet Union, 

and they went to places like Kyrgyzstan and Georgia and 

Kazakhstan. And it started economic reforms and slow democratic 

reforms and opened the society up. 

Relative to what it was during the Soviet Union time period, it 

was a profound change. But it hasn’t moved fast enough. 

And so now you move forward to 2000, 2004, 2005, and the people are impatient, saying, ‘‘Look, we started here. We’ve gone a certain distance, but we’re not near where we need to get.’’

And I would hope, really, that the leaders in that region and the 

leaders in our country and around the world would press them saying, it was great, the fall of the Soviet Union. Things were extraordinarily peaceful overall, given the fall and collapse of an empire 

that, what, 19 countries come out of. 

There’s been some fairly good change that’s taken place during 

that time period. It’s not near where we need and have to be to satisfy the needs and the will of the people in this region. And it’s 

really got to step up much more aggressively at this point in time. 
24

I’d hope that would be the lesson to all of us, and that hopefully 

we can see these free, fair elections and transitions to another generation of leaders that are open to, not a managed democracy, but 

a pure democracy, that here the people rule, not the elite. 

Thank you all very much for joining us. 

Ms. Ambassador-Designate, I welcome you. I look forward to receiving you in my office as the new Ambassador from Kyrgyzstan. 

And this has been an excellent hearing. 

Do you have a final thought? 

Ms. SADYKOVA. We would like to invite you, Mr. Brownback, in 

Kyrgyzstan near the future. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you for that invitation. 

Hearing’s adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
25

A P P E N D I C E S 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH,

CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling these hearings. As you 

know, the Helsinki Commission last held a hearing on Kyrgyzstan 

in 2001. At that time, former Kyrgyz Vice-President-turned opposition politician Felix Kulov was in jail on political grounds. His wife 

came down from New York, where she lived, to make a personal 

plea on his behalf. I am delighted that as we hold today’s hearing, 

the circumstances in Kyrgyzstan are very different, and Felix 

Kulov is a free man. Indeed, he has announced his candidacy for 

the post of president. 

Over the last year and a half, I have followed with fascination 

the progress of revolutionary situations in the former Soviet Union, 

which I see as an outgrowth of a great, historic wave of freedom 

that began in the 1980s and continues to this day. After Ukraine’s 

Orange Revolution, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili met 

with Viktor Yushchenko in January. They jointly issued a Declaration hailing the revolutions and democratic processes in both their 

countries. That document has not gotten the attention it deserves, 

except probably from very nervous analysts in Moscow. In their 

declaration, the two leaders forcefully assert that ‘‘. . . freedom 

and democracy, the will of the people and fair elections are much 

stronger than the state machine, regardless of how powerful and 

aggressive it is.’’ Just as important, they categorically deny the 

view—often heard in Moscow and from Central Asian leaders—

’’that a peaceful, democratic revolution can be brought about artificially through certain techniques or as a result of outside interference.’’

Presidents Yushchenko and Saakashvili also expressed their 

gratitude to democratic states and organizations for supporting the 

non-violent struggle by the people of Ukraine and Georgia for freedom and democracy. They expressed the hope that such support 

would continue in the future. In conclusion, they declared that the 

Ukrainian and Georgian revolutions represent ‘‘the new wave of 

liberation of Europe, which will lead to the final victory of freedom 

and democracy on the continent of Europe.’’

I agree with Presidents Yushchenko and Saakashvili on these 

two critical points. First, the slow, patient work done by NGOs and 

civil society activists in the former Soviet bloc, with the steady assistance of Western NGOs, has had a powerful impact in liberating 

the minds of the people in those countries. We should continue 

those efforts and emphasize democracy-promotion in our assistance 

programs. And, we should expect to see more ‘‘revolutions’’ in the 

future. 

It is noteworthy that all three revolutions of the last year and 

a half were sparked by elections. In Georgia, Ukraine and 

Kyrgyzstan, people refused to accept the latest official attempt to 

lie about who had earned the right to represent them. I find it inspiring that the trigger for all of these revolutions was the most 

fundamental expression of democracy. Many analysts and opposition activists all over the former Soviet Union—after fifteen years 
26

of consistent vote fraud—had sadly concluded that many people 

had lost interest in voting. Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan demonstrate that faith in the ballot persists despite years of disillusionment and apathy. 

Precisely for this reason, it is essential that Kyrgyzstan’s preterm presidential election now scheduled for June 26 be exemplary 

and meet all international standards. The country’s future head of 

state must enjoy unquestioned legitimacy inside and outside the 

country. In fact, although the interim authorities have come to 

terms with the newly elected lawmakers, perhaps new parliamentary elections should be discussed. After all, it was popular resistance to the official results—which gave the pro-Akaev forces about 

90 percent of the legislature—that sparked the events we are investigating today. 

I’m sure our witnesses will address this question and other important matters. I look forward to hearing their testimony.
27

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,

RANKING MEMBER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. Chairman, I applaud you for organizing these hearings, especially so soon after the events we will be discussing today in detail. 

As is clear from the series of revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and 

now Kyrgyzstan, the post-Soviet political order is shaking and may 

be on the brink of total collapse. Most likely, many governments 

will be calling for stability above all. But the main lesson I draw 

from these events is that stability is possible only through democracy. 

It is striking how quickly the regime of President Askar Akaev 

collapsed. From one day to the next—when many still doubted that 

the protests would extend from Kyrgyzstan’s southern cities to the 

north—the country’s authorities in the capital Bishkek just melted 

away. A relatively small group of demonstrators quickly managed 

to bring down the government, leading Askar Akaev and his family 

to flee. Almost no one could be found to defend his regime. His officials deserted him and the law enforcement apparatus opted not to 

take on the demonstrators. We can only conclude that he had lost 

all support in Kyrgyzstan. Throughout my years of involvement 

with the Helsinki Process and the work of this Commission, I have 

paid special attention to the problem of corruption. For that reason, 

I would like to take note of widely-reported resentment in 

Kyrgyzstan over the rapacity of the Akaev family. His children and 

relatives, notably his son-in-law, were notorious in the country for 

seizing all economically profitable sectors of the economy. Businessmen complained bitterly about their inability to grow beyond a certain level without attracting the acquisitive eye of a member of 

‘‘The Family,’’ who would appropriate the concern or make the 

owner an offer he couldn’t refuse. It is not surprising that looters 

reportedly targeted stores they believed were owned by the Akaev 

family, although this in no way justifies their excesses. 

The stunning speed of the government’s collapse in Kyrgyzstan 

raises serious questions about the stability of neighboring regimes, 

all of which are authoritarian and corrupt. Is it reasonable to assume that they are as fragile as Kyrgyzstan and would topple as 

quickly if given a push? If so, what are the implications for U.S. 

policy in the region? 

In the meantime, Kyrgyzstan must develop its democratic and 

economic potential. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses 

what obstacles must be overcome and how the United States can 

help.
28

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MARTHA OLCOTT,

SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR

INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Thank you so much for the opportunity to testify before you 

today. 

For the third time in 18 months seriously flawed elections have 

brought down the government in a CIS state, and for the first time 

this has occurred east of the Urals, demonstrating that popular expectations in the Asian states of the former Soviet Union are not 

appreciably different from those in the European ones. 

Like Georgia’s Rose Revolution, the catalyst for Kyrgyzstan’s 

Tulip Revolution was flawed parliamentary elections. This time too, 

like in Georgia, the elections were more democratic than the previous parliamentary election, but fell short of being ‘‘free and fair’’ 

and more importantly did not meet local expectations. Poverty, corruption, and the fear that the president would sabotage the succession struggle during the last months of his presidential term, made 

the opposition and masses take to the street in now familiar fashion. 

If it succeeds, the ‘‘tulip revolution’’ could prove to be the most 

remarkable of all, causing positive reverberations throughout a region that many had written off as lost from the point of view of 

building democratic societies. It will put all of the other leaders in 

the region on notice that they too must take seriously the need for 

popular political enfranchisement or risk that they will be driven 

from power. 

And if it fails, it will not be because the masses in Central Asia 

failed to meet the test, but because the ruling elite in Kyrgyzstan 

managed to sabotage the process of political change. For that reason, even the failure of the Kyrgyz revolution will not leave Central 

Asia’s other leaders feeling more secure. 

PRESIDENT AKAYEV WAS THE MASTER OF HIS FATE

While Askar Akayev was frequently described as the cause of his 

the captive of a domineering wife, and rapacious relatives, the 

former Kyrgyz president was always in control. Although he may 

not have orchestrated the electoral abuses that occurred, he obviously never tried to stop them. 

The preconditions of President Akayev’s political demise developed as a result of his poor management of a public protest in 

spring 2002. The protest was a result of 

Azimbek Beknazarov, now interim Prosecutor-General and then 

chairman of the Jogorku Kenesh (parliament) committee on Judicial and Legal Affairs, called for Akayev’s impeachment, after the 

government decided to cede 125,000 hectares of territory to Chinese 

control during border negotiations between the two states. 

Beknazarov claimed that these lands contained valuable water resources, as well as the graves of people who died fleeing to China 

to avoid arrest by Russian troops in the 1916 uprising. 

Shortly afterwards, on January 5, 2002 Beknazarov was arrested, charged with exceeding his official powers as an investigator in the Toktogul regional prosecutor’s office, seven years earlier. Beknazarov was put on trial in January 2002 and his sup-
29

porters began to picket and some even began a hunger strike. 

When one of the fasting demonstrators died of a stroke, tempers 

flared even more, and demonstrations in his hometown of Ak-Sui 

in the province of Jalalabad grew in size, so that by March hundreds, if not more, were participating. Intimidated by the size of 

the demonstration, on March 17–18, 2002, the local police used 

force to break them up, leaving seven unarmed people dead. Their 

deaths quickly became the cause of nation-wide protests leading to 

calls for President Akayev’s resignation. 

The deaths in Ak-Sui, and the government’s response to them, 

unified Akayev’s political opposition for the first time. The scale of 

public protests grew, and people from provincial cities started 

marching to the capital. Advisors close to the president feared that 

if a way out of the crisis was not found, Akayev would be forced 

to resign. In May 2002, in an unsuccessful effort to satisfy the opposition Akayev fired his Prime Minister, Kurmanbek Bakiev (now 

serving as Prime Minister), and named Nikolai Tanayev, a Russian 

who had long worked in the republic, to replace him. 

In the weeks that followed, Akayev demonstrated his political 

mastery. He simultaneously promised to with the legislature and 

threatened to disband the parliament, which would strip the current members of all privilege. It was in this period that Akayev 

first reached out to Russia’s Ministry of Interior for tactical assistance. Meeting halls became impossible to rent and marchers were 

turned away from Bishkek. 

Akayev also sought to open new channels for political dialogue, 

inviting the whole country to debate what changes to the country’s 

constitution should be made in order to open up the political process. At the president’s behest, a committee of jurists, politicians, 

and political activists was organized, and they recommended restricting the power of the presidency, enhancing the independence 

of the prime minister and the cabinet, and converting Kyrgyzstan’s 

two house legislature back into a one-chamber body. 

But the version of the constitution put to the voters, on February 

2, 2003, was not that offered by the committee, but a rewrite done 

in the office of the president, which left the presidency stronger 

than the committee of specialists had envisioned and made it almost impossible for the president to be impeached. The referendum, which also included a call for President Akayev to serve 

out his term of office, passed overwhelmingly. Just to make sure 

that Akayev would do this without undue public pressure, in the 

run-up to the referendum the Kyrgyz authorities added a number 

of constitutional amendments that made it permanently more difficult for opposition groups to get permits for large public meetings. 

This experience convinced Kyrgyzstan’s opposition—and many 

people who had previously been politically rather apathetic—that 

the Kyrygz president was not to be trusted, and that he would always find a way to cheat or outmaneuver his opponents. It explains 

why they were so fearful that Akayev would use the newly elected 

parliament to change the constitution. 

At the very time that his hold on power was being challenged, 

Akayev found it easier to behave more like the leaders of neighboring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and to accept ‘‘technical assistance’’ from Russia designed to help shape Kyrgyzstan into a ‘‘guid-
30

ed’’ democracy, rather than a society that is recognizably democratic according to western norms. Instructors from special troops 

of the MVD came to help teach the Kyrgyz to better manage crowd 

control, while political analysts close to the Kremlin advised President Akayev’s staff on how to manipulate parliamentary and presidential elections. 

But as we saw in late March, even with help from both these 

groups President Akayev was unable to maintain control. Akayev 

received bad political advice, and even with extra training, 

Kyrgyzstan’s security forces proved unreliable in crowd control. 

At the center of the election turmoil was the opposition’s 

unshakeable belief that Askar Akayev was determined to elect a 

pocket parliament in order to change the constitution, which barred 

him from running for president again in the planned October 2005 

presidential elections. And the energy that Akayev and his surrogates extended to affect the parliamentary elections of February 27 

and March 13 fed these rumors as well as squandering most of 

Akayev’s remaining political good-will. 

While the actual process of voting was judged more transparent 

than in the previous parliamentary election, the violations of democratic norms were rarely random. Dozens of people who got on the 

ballot were pressured into withdrawing their candidacy, generally 

to allow an Akayev supporter an easy election victory. Several 

prominent critics were denied places on the ballot due to legal loopholes, including a number of popular former ambassadors, who 

failed to meet the residence requirements for parliamentarians because of their diplomatic service. 

Former (and now acting) foreign minister Roza Otunbayeva was 

one of those barred from running, She returned to the country in 

2004, from a U.N. diplomatic post in Sukhumi (Georgia) to try and 

unify the opposition form the Ata kurt movement and, establishing 

the United Opposition group. Not only was Otunbayeva denied a 

place on the ballot, but Akayev’s daughter Bermet won the seat in 

the district the former hoped to contend in. 

Political independents and opposition figures were targeted for 

defeat, and most of the reports of vote buying came from their districts. A half dozen opposition figures, though, received a majority 

of votes during the first round of balloting; and in all only a third 

of the 75 seats were filled at this time. But the Akayev machine 

refused to rest easy. Even more effort was put into defeating opposition candidates than previously. The country’s independent media 

center found its electricity was cut, without explanation, and until 

they received help in finding generators the country’s small opposition press and opposition candidates were without the means to 

reach readers. 

Two key opposition figures—Adakhan Madamarov and 

Kurmanbek Bakiev, who were expected to be easily reelected, went 

down to defeat in the second round, each charging fraud. The defeat of Bakiev in particular seems to have been a turning point. 

This former Prime Minister and declared presidential candidate 

had strong support from masses and elite alike in the country’s 

densely populated and impoverished south, his home region. After 

his defeat Bakiev through his support behind the United Opposition, who then sought to wrest control of the southern half of the 
31

country from Akayev, a goal they achieved in only a few days. The 

speed with which they stabilized their new ‘‘popular’’ or interim executives and legislative councils, undoubtedly gave confidence in 

the ability of the opposition to make a smooth transfer of power, 

as thousands of unhappy residents of the capital took to the streets 

on March 24. The march organizers did not expect that part of the 

march—mostly young people—would break off and storm the President’s office (and seat of government). But when Akayev fled they 

were only too happy to pick up the pieces, and assume authority. 

Askar Akayev, like his colleagues throughout the region, introduced political institutions that were intended to create an illusion 

of political participation. They were designed to assuage foreign 

and domestic critics and not to facilitate the sharing of power by 

the president and his entourage with other groups in society. When 

demands for real power emerged Akayev’s first instinct was to try 

and stifle protest and when that failed he sought to push the offending groups from political life. But over time the Kyrgyz population and the opposition elite learned to anticipate his behavior, 

and in March 2005, they simply outsmarted him. 

Akayev brought little honor to himself in the way he retreated. 

He swore in the newly elected parliament, after he had already lost 

control of the southern half of the country, and then took back his 

hastily offered resignation as president once he reached safety outside the country. Both actions further exacerbated the country’s 

constitutional crisis and led Kurmanbek Bakiev, who was chosen 

as Prime Minister and acting president by the old legislature, to 

recognize the legitimacy of the newly elected parliament (save in 

20 disputed districts), which in turn affirmed him as Prime Minister (but not acting president). 

To his credit though, Askar Akayev did learn one thing from the 

events in Aksy, that firing on an unarmed crowd could lead to civil 

war, and for all his unwillingness to resign, he choose to draw the 

line at that. However, there is no reason to assume that all of 

Akayev’s Central Asian colleagues would make the same choice. 

THE KYRGYZ ELITE MUST STEP UP TO THE CHALLENGE

The political elite in Kyrgyztan is a fractious group, which has 

yet to demonstrate whether it is democratic or as potentially corrupt as the outgoing office-holders. If the latter proves to be true, 

the population may decide that they have been shortchanged and 

once again take to the streets in protest. 

The ‘‘Tulip Revolution’’ has been suffering a lot of bad press lately, fed in part by the frustration of Kyrgyzstan’s young political activists—from student groups and other non-governmental organizations,—who had very idealized versions of what a transfer of power 

was likely to bring. They looked to Georgia and Ukraine and 

viewed and—with the distance and some idealization—saw them as 

much more fundamental and revolutionary then what when on in 

their own country, when a group of politicians quite familiar to 

them began dividing power in what many saw as all too familiar 

ways. But it is not too late for these young people to have at least 

some of their idealism restored. 

Like Ukraine and Georgia, one faction of a split political elite 

took over from another. But unlike Georgia power was not trans-
32

ferred from one generation to another, Kurmanbek Bakiev, the acting president is only a few years younger than Askar Akayev, as 

is his principal rival former vice-president Feliks Kulov. And unlike 

Ukraine, the worldview of the newcomers doesn’t vary differently 

from the incumbents, the foreign policies that they pursue will be 

identical. 

But it still remains to be seen whether the domestic politics that 

they pursue will closely resemble that of the Akayev regime. The 

key now is for the interim authorities to develop public confidence, 

and to maintain it through the presidential elections. This means 

concentrating on good government, rather than a division of the 

spoils. Looked at coldly it is sometimes hard to believe that the 

running interim government are primarily preoccupied with finding 

the most qualified person for each job, or keeping talented senior 

officials and experts in place. It seems instead, that parallel with 

trying to keep things afloat, there is a desire to reward every major 

opposition figure with a prominent position to compensate them for 

their years of sacrifice. One wonders, too, how much of the division 

of jobs is being made with an eye to building alliances in the upcoming presidential election. 

Many observers have always used the clan structure of the 

Kyrgyz people as the explanation for all that was bad in Kyrgyz 

political life. But the perpetuation of patrilineal based kin-groups, 

simply helps give shape to the patronage networks which have become more pervasive since independence. In small countries like 

Kyrgyzstan, elites sometimes believe that stability can be maintained if all the major interests—or patronage groups—are given a 

continuing stake in the political system. 

In his final few years in power former president Askar Akayev 

sought to restrict the power of key patronage groups, and as a result drove more and more of the country’s leading political figures 

into opposition. But as this was occurring the country was growing 

more complex as well. Economic reforms had led to a small group 

of independent businessmen, who while willing to pay some ‘‘tribute’’ also wanted market conditions to regulate economic opportunities. While they may be happy to benefit from preferential treatment, and trade support (and funding of campaigns) for it, when 

choices begin to be made among them, those who fall from favor 

will once again be pressing for a level playing field in the economy. 

Similarly, the Kyrgyz population has also changed a lot in recent 

years, or they wouldn’t have believed that it was their right to 

press for the ouster of a president who was abusing their electoral 

rights. 

For this reason it is really incumbent upon the new Kyrgyz leadership to concentrate on rebuilding public confidence through insuring that the upcoming presidential election meet international 

norms of competitiveness and the conduct of the balloting be both 

free and fair. Having never had an election that fully complied with 

democratic norms this will really be an ambitious task for the 

Kyrgyz government to organize in under three months. Yet there 

is very little wiggle room available to them to get it wrong. 

Moreover, following the presidential election, the newly elected 

president should further legitimate his or her authority by sponsoring a national dialogue on to solicit opinions on what key groups 
33

in society see as necessary constitutional changes. The way that 

the last constitutional modifications were handled left many dissatisfied, and the current balance of power between president and parliament needs to be redressed in a way that provides more constitutional checks on the former’s authority. The debate should culminate in a referendum followed by pre-term elections. The current 

parliament, elected in controversy and sworn into office when the 

central government had already lost control of half of the country 

will never enjoy legitimacy, and should be replaced by a democratically elected body. The adjudication of 20 disputed seats is not a 

sufficient remedy. 

The ‘‘tulip revolution’’ has been messier than its Georgian and 

Ukrainian predecessors. The result is that the interim government 

in Kyrgyzstan will have an uphill battle to demonstrate their 

democratic credentials. But while the major tests are yet to come, 

the Kyrgyz deserve credit for not standing still for an election filled 

with irregularities, from the time that opposition figures were 

barred from running on technicalities, to potentially independent 

candidates intimidated into stepping down, to irregularities at the 

ballot boxes. The new government in Kyrgyzstan will enjoy a short 

honeymoon period, and they had better use it wisely. 

For the last fifteen years the leaders of all of these Asian states 

have been warning the west that their populations were not ready 

for democracy, and that without the guidance of strong authority 

figures, the situation would degenerate to one of mob rule. 

But the mob in Kyrgyzstan was easily quelled, with promises 

that new office-holders would take their public trust more seriously 

than their predecessors. But if the Kyrgyz elite degenerate into 

‘‘business as usual Central Asian style’’ the hope for democratic reform in the region more generally will be dashed. And if the 

Kyrgyz masses take to the streets once more—in a year or two, or 

even sooner—it is unlikely that their protests will be broken up 

without the use of force, and without considerable bloodshed. 

THE IMPACT OF THE TULIP REVOLUTION IN CENTRAL ASIA

The messy exit of President Akayev may not mean that his colleagues in the region will also be pushed from office, but it certainly does increase the likelihood that secular and religious opposition groups will try and oust them. The current presidents may 

still be strong enough to retain power or stage-manage its passage, 

but not to create risk-free environments for their successors to try 

and secure their authority. But throughout the region disgruntled 

members of the elite, some long-time opponents and others who 

previously were silent, are likely to try and take advantage of what 

most view as the growing weakness of each of the region’s presidents the inherent weakness of a new president. 

Those who seek political power are going to use all the potential 

tools at their disposal to advance their cause. Many will see these 

contests as their final chance of a lifetime to take power, which 

could make substate identities and ethnic loyalties more generally 

of greater importance than they have been in the past few years. 

The existence of these loyalties introduces an element of greater 

volatility into the situation. With the exception of Tajikistan 

though, the elite in Central Asia have been quite sensitive to the 
34

incendiary capacity of attempting to mobilize populations along 

ethnic or sub-ethnic lines and there is no evidence to suggest that 

either today’s political elders or the next generation coming up will 

seek to advance their claims in a dangerous fashion. 

This is only one source of potential danger. Throughout Central 

Asia, there are various ‘‘have-not’’ groups that have been waiting 

to make their presence felt. These include those from the presidential entourages who will feel slighted and damaged by the 

choice of a successor, as well as out-groups from among the old-Soviet elites and their children, many of whom have accumulated economic ‘‘markers’’ or levers to use in advancing their cause. Added 

to this are the remnants of the alternative elite, who had counted 

on independence providing them with new economic and political 

opportunities, but who were thwarted in their plans. The alternative elite include both those with secular and religious orientation. The mix of forces, though, varies quite substantially from 

country to country, as do the tools that are available for them to 

use in their struggle for power. But most had added to their traditional arsenal of tools—manipulation of political position or of position in ethnic and sub-ethnic communities—new economic and cultural tools of ‘‘global outreach.’’

Throughout Central Asia, members of the elite from disfavored 

clans and families have been sitting by, waiting for the opportunity 

to grasp more economic and political power. As institutions to ensure a peaceful transfer of power do not exist, there is no foundation on which for them to rest their hopes. The Rose, Orange and 

Tulip revolutions have changed their perspective, and have given 

them new incentive to try and plot the downfall of the current regime. 

This is particularly true in Kazakhstan. The political system in 

Kazakhstan most resembles that of Kyrgyzstan, in that in both 

countries there is already a strong penetration of civil society institutions, the political and economic elite is partially fragmented, 

and the president has been associated with a pattern of corruption. 

But there are important differences. 

Kazakhstan is a much wealthier society than Kyrgyzstan, with 

a much larger economy. Both countries have pursued relatively 

similar policies of economic reform, but in the Kazakhstan attracted vastly greater sums of foreign investment, due to its large 

oil and gas reserves, which also have allowed the Kazakhs to benefit from high global oil prices. As a result poverty is much less of 

a problem than in Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan’s poor are relatively dispersed across the country’s enormous territorial expanse, 

making them much more difficult to organize. 

Kazakhstan is likely to be the next state targeted by its opposition for a democratic revolution. Some might argue that civil society institutions are not as well dispersed in Kazakhstan, but the 

biggest difference is that the majority of the political elite is still 

unwilling to break with the country’s president. 

Things may change between now and the planned presidential 

elections in 2006, when Nursultan Nazarbayev plans to run for a 

final, and constitutionally permitted, term in office. Most political 

opposition groups in the country—who have organized as a bloc For 

a Just Kazakhstan, have decided to support a single candidate—
35

former parliamentary speaker Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, in a conference held in Almaty on March 20, 2005. 

The opposition—which took a real beating during the 2004 parliamentary elections—hopes to turn the next presidential elections 

into a Ukrainian style route. It is true that they do engage some 

degree of popular support, particularly from the population in the 

country’s ‘‘second’’ and former capital of Almaty. They have managed to hold large—upwards of 2000 people—demonstrations, but 

the police have also easily broken them up, and they have been unable to trigger a series of interrelated public events. 

President Nazarbayev has a lot of discretionary power, and a lot 

of real options. He maintains that he is committed to real, albeit 

gradual political reform, to be accompanied with concrete steps to 

improve the social and economic conditions of the Kazakh people. 

Uzbekistan is trickiest, because President Islam Karimov squandered the honeymoon offered to him by increased western assistance after September 11 Many observers believe that Uzbekistan 

is becoming ‘‘ripe’’ for political change, but few feel confident that 

the country’s elite or population is able to sustain a democratic 

transformation. 

Political discourse in Uzbekistan is slowly growing more relaxed. 

In private and semi-private settings, ordinary Uzbeks have begun 

to venture to discuss political themes, to speculate on the health 

of the president and to ponder what may come in the future. They 

also have begun grumbling publicly, in stores, in markets, and 

when they are delayed because all traffic is stopped to allow for a 

passing official. Less common, are formal public protests, but they 

too are occurring with increasing frequency. 

The hand of fate need not endorse the timetable of dictators, and 

by mid-2002 rumors began spreading about the president’s illhealth, and with them came signs of jockeying for position among 

the putative ‘‘godfathers’’ of Uzbekistan’s leading political families. 

These men had little understanding of how a democratic system operated, and no confidence in it. You cannot manipulate what you 

do not understand. 

The government made some largely symbolic steps to introduce 

a few of the promised political changes. Karimov supported the 

gradual transformation of the parliament from a body that provides 

a rubber-stamp on all decrees and draft laws emanating from the 

president and his cabinet. However, the absence of formal political 

institutions to moderate elite competition mean that the period of 

political transition will be a time of potential instability in 

Uzbekistan. Excluded political groups seeking to expand their influence are likely to appeal to regional and sub-national groups as 

they seek ways to expand their potential power bases. For much 

the same reason, the role of religious opposition groups may well 

expand as well, particularly, the least radical of them. 

Given the hard road Uzbekistan faces, most secular opposition 

groups, both democratic activists and the largely mute critics of 

Karimov who consider to serve in his regime, hope that order continues to hold in Kyrgyzstan. But at the same time few have much 

insight in how to get the Uzbek president to create more public 

space for civic society institutions. 
36

Tajikistan is also likely to be influenced by events in Kyrgyzstan, 

but it is hard to decide whether it will serve to increase the 

chances for democratization in the country, or whether it will exacerbate the countervailing processes of political and social decay. 

Tajikistan had parliamentary elections on the same day that the 

first round of elections were held in Kyrgyzstan , and these were 

found by the OSCE to fall far short of international norms. The ruling People’s democratic Party got 80 percent of the vote, while the 

Islamic Renaissance and Communist Parties got only 10 percent of 

the vote collectively, and they will hold only 6 of 63 parliamentary 

seats. The four opposition parties (the Democratic, Communist, Islamic and Social Democratic parties have strongly protested the 

election results, and pressed for a new election. But they have not 

been able to translate these protests into large popular demonstrations against the government of President Imamali Rakhmonov, 

largely because the population of Tajikistan is still partially traumatized from their own lengthy (1992–1997) civil war. 

Rakhmonov, who felt confident enough that he pressed for a constitutional referendum in 2003, that changed the term of office of 

the president to seven years and made Rakhmonov, also comes up 

for reelection in 2006. The Tajik leader is eligible to serve two additional terms in office. According to current law Rahmonov would 

then be forced to retire in 2020, at age 68. The clumsy way the referendum was conducted showed Rakhmonov’s relative lack of concern for international opinion. Voters could cast their ballot ‘‘yes’’ 

or ‘‘no’’ for a group of 56 amendments, and many Russian voters 

complained that they were handed Tajik language ballots with no 

translation provided. 

The opposition believes that they have a better chance of defeating Rakhmonov in 2006 than in getting the recent parliamentary 

results overturned. But they may well be discounting continuing 

Tajik apathy caused by their relief that the long civil war is over. 

Whatever their discontent many Tajiks will not want to risk starting a new Civil War. 

If people hold out some prospect for the slow opening of Uzbek 

society, virtually no one believes that the same will occur in 

Turkmenistan. While Niyazov talks of holding presidential elections in 2008–2009, no one believes that there will be competitive 

elections held in Turkmenistan during Niyazov’s lifetime. As long 

as Niyazov is in power there will be no possibility of building or 

even ‘‘planting the seeds’’ of any democratic society. But one day 

someone trusted by Niyazov may move against him, not by taking 

to the street—Boris Shikhmuradov showed the futility of that approach—but by the more classic and less subtle approach of simply 

physically eliminating him. 

WHAT LESSONS CAN THE U.S. LEARN FROM THE ‘‘TULIP

REVOLUTION’’

U.S. policy makers should be very pleased by the developments 

in Kyrgyzstan, as they do provide strong evidence that sustained 

support for grass-roots political organizations can prove effective. 

Some recently organized student groups may have played a pivotal 

role in mobilizing the final demonstrations in Bishkek that brought 

down Akayev. But the more than decade old presence of non-gov-
37

ernmental independent political groups—human rights groups, 

independent press and journalists, and political monitors, provided 

the backbone necessary for their creation. The older groups proved 

the niche in Kyrgyz public life that made the formation of newer 

groups possible, as they established the right of Kyrgyz to organize 

independently of the government. 

This sense of ‘‘history’’ or ‘‘naturalness’’ of non-governmental political groups is absent in both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and 

increased U.S. assistance will not succeed in creating it overnight. 

In neither country can NGO’s be expected to either organize or 

channel public opposition in peaceful ways. In Uzbekistan in particular, where the risk of anomic violence is already palpable, there 

is reason to fear that secular groups will have only minimal impact 

on creating what the U.S. would see as desirable political outcomes. And what is going on underneath the surface in 

Turkmenistan is largely terra incognito, so impenetrable this society has been to outside influences and observers. 

As already noted, Tajikistan is more difficult to predict. Civil society groups have penetrated more deeply in that society than in 

either Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan, but the population has already 

paid a huge price in the civil war that developed as part of the 

aftermath of the political mobilization of the early 1990s, and may 

choose to remain apathetic in the face of both secular and religious 

groups seeking to make them more active. 

Kazakhstan, is much more of a conundrum. Civil society institutions have penetrated quite deeply in the society, and a vocal opposition (both inside and outside the ruling elite) exists to challenge 

the power of President Nazarbayev. But it is less clear how much 

of a priority the U.S. should place on influencing outcomes. Obviously, the U.S. should strongly support the conduct of transparent 

and competitive elections in Kazakhstan, and offer both government and opposition technical assistance to help make this a reality. But, in sharp contrast to Kyrgyzstan, the Kazakh opposition 

is much more capable of funding their own activities, and there is 

no need to potentially discredit them as ‘‘the tools of foreign actors’’ 

by the U.S. offering much more than seed money and technical assistance. 

Moreover, much like the situation in Kyrgyzstan, the introduction of a more democratic government in Kazakhstan is unlikely to 

produce a regime that is more amenable to U.S. geopolitical interests. Just like in Kyrgyzstan, any successor government is likely to 

see to sustain close ties with both Russia and China, as well as 

maintain the support of the U. S. government. 

This does give the U.S. a renewed opportunity for influencing developments in Kyrgyzstan. But if the new government in Bishkek 

is going to try and obtain increased U.S. economic and security assistance, in order to try and get it through an inevitably difficult 

transition period, it has to demonstrate its worthiness by conducting elections that are demonstrably more democratic than 

those organized by the regime that they ousted.
38

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL KIMMAGE, CENTRAL ASIA 

ANALYST, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY 

I would like to thank you for inviting me to appear before this 

Committee. My academic background is primarily in history, but 

for the past several years I have focused on economic, political, and 

social developments in Russia and Central Asia. I began to write 

about Russian affairs for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in 2002. 

Since December 2003, I have been RFE/RL’s Central Asia analyst. 

Today, I will address recent events in Kyrgyzstan, both in light of 

events in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004, and with an eye 

to the implications of these developments for other post-Soviet nations. The conclusions here are my own, but I base them to a large 

extent on material by RFE/RL reporters in the field, and particularly RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service (Radio Azattyk). 

KYRGYZSTAN: THE FAILURE OF MANAGED DEMOCRACY 

I. IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE

In May, 1993 Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev visited the United 

States. He met with President Clinton, who promised U.S. assistance to Kyrgyzstan in the nation’s transition to a democratic system. A White House spokesperson said at the time that President 

Clinton and Vice President Albert Gore ‘‘singled out Kyrgyzstan as 

a model for the other new independent states, praising President 

Akaev for his government’s bold pursuit of macroeconomic stabilization and democratic reform.’’

A little less than 12 years later, on 24 March 2005, President 

Akaev fled his country amid protests that began over alleged improprieties in parliamentary elections but quickly focused on a single demand—the ouster of President Akaev. As Kyrgyzstan’s opposition celebrated the end of what it condemned as a corrupt and 

un-democratic regime, observers looked to similar events that felled 

long-ruling regimes in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004, and 

asked: Is a wave of democratic change sweeping through the former 

Soviet Union? 

The White House’s optimism about Askar Akaev and Kyrgyzstan 

in 1993 was not unfounded; it rested on encouraging signs and genuine hopes. But the eventual failure of those hopes to come to fruition—a failure sealed by Akaev’s ignominious fall and flight on 24 

March—serves to warn us against undue exuberance in the face of 

the latest changes. Once again, we encounter encouraging signs. 

But for now we should be wary of concluding that democracy is finally on the march, much as we might hope for that outcome. Instead, we should take a hard look at the one indisputable lesson 

to be drawn from events in Georgia, Ukraine, and now 

Kyrgyzstan—the post-Soviet political systems in each of those 

countries faced and failed a crucial test. What was the test, why 

did they fail, and what lessons does their failure hold for other 

countries in the former Soviet Union? 

II. FAILED TESTS

In Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, the test that the existing 

political system faced and failed was the test of free and fair elec-
39

tions. In all three countries, allegations of election fraud sparked 

protests that eventually led to political changes so significant that 

they call to mind the word ‘‘revolutionary.’’

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s 

(OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights monitored all of the elections in question and produced detailed reports. 

The OSCE’s preliminary report on 2 November 2003 parliamentary 

elections in Georgia concluded that they ‘‘fell short of a number of 

OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections.’’ A subsequent post-election interim report went 

further, stating that ‘‘the election process was characterized by a 

clear lack of political will by the governmental authorities to organize a genuine and democratic election process . . .’’ The OSCE’s 

assessment of second-round Ukrainian presidential elections was 

similarly harsh . 

The OSCE’s evaluation of 27 February first-round parliamentary 

elections in Kyrgyzstan struck similar notes: ‘‘The 27 February 

2005 parliamentary elections in the Kyrgyz Republic, while more 

competitive than previous elections, fell short of OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections in 

a number of important areas. The election displayed some limited 

improvement, including the fact that voters were offered a real 

choice among contesting candidates in many constituencies. However, the competitive dynamic was undermined throughout the 

country by widespread vote buying, de-registration of candidates, 

interference with independent media, and a low level of confidence 

in electoral and judicial institutions on the part of candidates and 

voters.’’

III. MANAGED DEMOCRACY

Managed ‘‘democracy’’ is what happens when a ruling elite feels 

obligated to hold elections but does everything in its power to control their outcome. In the post-Soviet world, managed democracy is 

the brainchild of a political elite that grudgingly accepts elections 

as a precondition for legitimacy, yet retains a Soviet understanding 

of politics as a dark art of manipulation. The practice of managed 

democracy amounts to a grab-bag of dirty tricks and a playing field 

that is anything but level—state-controlled media serve up puff 

pieces to promote favored candidates and smear campaigns to denigrate undesirable ones, election commissions ignore gross violations 

and punish minor ones, duplicate candidates confuse voters . . . 

The list is long and sordid. But its purpose is short and sweet—

to reduce the necessary evil of elections to a predictable exercise 

that allows elites to devote the bulk of their time to more pressing 

pursuits, mainly the exploitation of public office for private gain. 

Though it has its roots in a Soviet idea—that politics is at once 

material and ethereal, administered with payoffs and adjusted with 

propaganda—the managed democracy we find in post-Soviet states 

should not be confused with the system that came before it. 

Through all its permutations, the Soviet system had a strong totalizing streak that led it to try to control all things in society. Its successors are, in at least one sense, genuinely more democratic, for 

they focus on the majority. They jealously guard state-run television, with its nationwide reach and demographically average 
40

viewers, but are not overly concerned if the numerically insignificant chattering classes air their discontents in newspapers with 

limited readership. (Managed democracy comes in a variety of 

forms, however, and some regimes—in Central Asia, for example—

‘‘manage’’ the political process so closely that they reduce the role 

of ‘‘democracy’’ to window-dressing, producing systems more accurately described as ‘‘authoritarian’’ or even ‘‘dictatorial,’’ although 

they contain elements of managed democracy.) 

But while this system offers undeniable advantages to elites 

more concerned with the perquisites of power than the perils of accountability, it is fatally flawed. The flaw is twofold—first, the lack 

of accountability reduces the incentive for the elite to communicate 

with constituents and base governance on the electorate’s real concerns; and second, as issues properly treated in the public political 

realm are left to fester or are resolved through back-room deals, 

the inevitable popular dissatisfaction creates an incentive for the 

elite to intensify its management of the political process. The result 

is a vicious cycle in which the political process becomes dysfunctional. In other words, managed democracy is not democracy at all. 

Sooner or later, something has to give. Elections are a flashpoint 

because they put the spotlight on the machinery of managed democracy even as they raise the very issues the dysfunctional political system has neglected. The particular course of events in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan was in each case a product of local 

circumstances, but the unifying thread was that a virtual political 

system that maintains the appearance of democracy but disdains 

its essence collided with the real political concerns of millions of 

citizens. The collision revealed that the emperor had no clothes, 

and he was soon forced to exit the scene. 

IV. KYRGYZSTAN

While the breakdown of managed democracy is the common 

thread in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, the way it broke down 

in Kyrgyzstan was a product of local factors. The first election-related protests erupted in Kyrgyzstan a few days before the first 

round of parliamentary elections on 27 February, when demonstrators blocked roads in a number of districts to protest the removal 

of candidates from the ballot. Two aspects of these protests were 

significant. First, they were not limited to the southern part of the 

country. Mountains divide Kyrgyzstan into north and south, and 

the south, which is poorer than the north, has traditionally been 

home to significant anti-government sentiment. President Akaev is 

a notherner, and the perception that the south languished under 

his rule contributed to dissatisfaction. Second, the late-February 

protests did not fit neatly into a divide between ‘‘pro-government’’ 

and ‘‘opposition’’ candidates. Protestors took to the streets because 

they felt that ‘‘their’’ candidates, usually prominent local figures, 

had been removed from the ballot by regional election commissions 

as a result of manipulation, sometimes by rival local figures with 

better connections to central authorities. 

Kyrgyzstan held first-round parliamentary elections on 27 February and second-round elections on 13 March. Preliminary official 

results from the two rounds showed a commanding victory for progovernment candidates, with the opposition garnering at best 10 
41

percent of the legislature’s 75 seats. As events progressed and protests intensified during and after the election period, they began to 

conform more to the familiar outline of Kyrgyz politics sketched 

above, with the largest demonstrations taking place in the south 

and well-known opposition figures playing an increasingly prominent role. More importantly, local demands such as the reinstatement of a particular candidate or a recount of election results in 

a particular district gave way to broader political demands, primary among them the resignation of President Askar Akaev. Numerous sources indicate that protestors were driven by a sense that 

Akaev and his family had ‘‘gone too far,’’ plunging the country into 

a morass of corruption, mismanagement, nepotism, and cronyism. 

The perception was widespread that Akaev and his family not only 

controlled substantial business interests, but also maintained a 

stranglehold on virtually all sources of revenue in the impoverished 

country. Contributing to this sense that ‘‘enough is enough’’ was 

the decision by Akaev’s son and daughter, as well as the children 

of other high-ranking officials, to run for parliament. 

Akaev and his allies mobilized the resources of the state-controlled media apparatus to depict protests either as insignificant or 

as the work of dangerous extremists with ties to the outlawed 

Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir. But these efforts backfired. 

They angered protestors who felt that their concerns were being deliberately ignored or misrepresented. Further exacerbating the situation, the Kyrgyz authorities had recently taken steps to tighten 

their control over the media. Although it already controlled nationwide television channels, the government threatened independent 

newspapers with lawsuits in the lead-up to elections. A printing 

press funded by Freedom House suffered a mysterious power outage on 22 February, only days before elections. And Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) lost much of its local broadcasting capacity on 24 February when the state-run radio authority announced that it was holding a new tender for the frequencies used 

by RFE/RL. 

By 20 March, anti-government protestors occupied administrative offices in a number of locations, including the key southern 

city of Osh. On the early morning of 20 March, riot police stormed 

provincial administrative offices in Osh and Jalal-Abad, another 

southern city. Large crowds of protestors soon gathered, and by 21 

March opposition forces had retaken the government buildings and 

controlled the two cities. The opposition by now had united behind 

a demand for President Akaev’s resignation. Yet even as the opposition readied itself for a demonstration in the capital of Bishkek, 

President Akaev continued to claim that his opponents were too 

fragmented for negotiations. The president also sent contradictory 

signals, telling the Central Election Commission on 21 March to review certain election results, then calling the new, disputed parliament into session the next day. Akaev’s position hardened further on 23 March, when he appointed a new interior minister who 

promptly announced that police could use ‘‘any legal means’’ to reestablish ‘‘constitutional order.’’

On 24 March, things fell apart. A large opposition demonstration 

in Bishkek turned violent after pro-government provocateurs incited fights only a few hours after the new interior minister had 
42

vowed that he would not use force against demonstrators. The scuffles produced numerous injuries, but no confirmed fatalities. After 

brief resistance from riot police, protestors stormed and took the 

presidential administration. President Akaev fled. The opposition 

had come to power. 

V. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

The causes of Kyrgyzstan’s revolution are not difficult to divine. 

They include a widespread perception that the Akaev government 

was massively corrupt, that the distribution of whatever economic 

benefits had accrued to Kyrgyzstan in the post-Soviet period was 

grossly inequitable, that the Akaev-led ruling elite was actively 

manipulating the mechanisms of democracy in order to prolong its 

rule, and that state-controlled media were distorting the real situation in the country. The specific grievances that gave rise to protests were election-related. But the government’s refusal to respond 

to demonstrators’ concerns, and the decision to bring into play progovernment provocateurs, exacerbated an already critical situation 

and opened the floodgates for an outpouring of popular dissatisfaction that brought down the regime. 

The outcome of Kyrgyzstan’s revolution is much less clear. While 

opposition leaders managed to restore order after looting gripped 

Bishkek on the night of 24 March, they have had more difficulty 

consolidating and legitimizing their new-found power. After some 

confusion, the newly elected parliament was sworn in as the legitimate legislature, although alleged violations in elections to that 

very body had sparked the protests that eventually felled President 

Akaev. For his part, President Akaev, currently residing in Russia, 

has signed a resignation petition, but the Kyrgyz parliament has 

not yet managed to hold a session to approve it. New presidential 

elections are tentatively set for 26 June 2006, and five candidates 

have already thrown their hats in the ring. Meanwhile, the interim 

government of acting President Kurmanbek Bakiev, a former prime 

minister and prominent opposition leader, has been somewhat slow 

off the mark, hampered by a less-than-transparent approach to appointments, apparent infighting, and an inability thus far to articulate policy changes that would mark a clean break with the Akaev 

era. The situation is still fluid, however, and any verdict on the 

post-revolutionary government would be premature. 

It should be noted that events in Kyrgyzstan differ from events 

in Georgia and Ukraine in several crucial respects. Protestors in 

Kyrgyzstan united against the figure of President Akaev, but they 

did not rally behind a single opposition leader, as Georgians rallied 

behind Mikheil Saakashvili and Ukrainians behind Viktor 

Yushchenko. Also, Kyrgyzstan’s geopolitical orientation was never 

at issue. President Akaev made efforts to maintain solid relations 

with both Russia and the United States, and Kyrgyzstan hosts both 

a Russian and a U.S. military base. One of the Kyrgyz opposition’s 

first statements upon assuming power was that this policy will continue. During events in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin 

publicly supported presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych, who 

made a ‘‘pro-Russian orientation’’ one of the planks of his platform. 

The Russian position on events in Kyrgyzstan was much more restrained, and key opposition figures such as Kurmanbek Bakiev 
43

and Roza Otunbaeva traveled to Moscow in the lead-up to parliamentary elections for talks with Russian officials. 

VI. REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

With events in Kyrgyzstan still very much in flux, the eventual 

consequences for the rest of Central Asia will likely take some time 

to emerge. For now, the fall of Askar Akaev has emboldened domestic opposition movements, especially in Kazakhstan, and unsettled current rulers. Nevertheless, events in Kyrgyzstan cannot simply be extrapolated to the rest of the region. Tajikistan, for example, held parliamentary elections at the same time as Kyrgyzstan, 

and international observers found those elections to be similarly 

flawed, yet no protests resulted. Kazakhstan’s September 2004 parliamentary elections produced a solidly pro-government majority 

amid opposition allegations of fraud and guardedly negative assessments by international observers, yet no upheaval resulted. Other 

factors play a role as well—Tajikistan’s bloody civil war in the 

1990s continues to exert a sobering influence on domestic politics, 

and Kazakhstan’s far-flung geography and comparative economic 

prosperity militate against an exact repetition of the Kyrgyz scenario. 

Still, both Kazakhstan and, to a lesser extent, Tajikistan fall 

under the general rubric of managed democracies, with significant 

state-sponsored stage-managing of the political process and a resulting failure to provide viable venues for the discussion and resolution of pressing problems. The evidence from Georgia, Ukraine, 

and Kyrgyzstan indicates that when managed democracy fails, its 

failure can quickly become catastrophic for the existing rulers. The 

implications could prove especially relevant to Kazakhstan’s upcoming presidential elections, for which the opposition has already 

selected a single candidate to oppose long-ruling President 

Nursultan Nazarbaev. 

A failure of managed democracy is much less likely in 

Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, if only because there is much less democracy to fail. Turkmenistan is an isolationist, neo-Stalinist dictatorship that obeys laws peculiar to that political genre, rendering 

any discussion of life after ‘‘president-for-life’’ Saparmurat Niyazov 

highly speculative. Uzbek President Islam Karimov maintains a 

tight hold on power, and reformist initiatives have been few and 

far between in Uzbekistan. But recent reports from Uzbekistan 

point to a dangerous combination of rising social tensions as a result of economic hardship and an authoritarian government intent 

on maintaining the status quo . This comes against a backdrop of 

rancorous debates over the extent of the Islamist threat in 

Uzbekistan, with the government and its supporters claiming that 

a real threat necessitates harsh measures and critics charging that 

repression is fueling extremism and creating dangers where none 

need exist. The Uzbek pot has simmered stubbornly for years in 

the face of predictions that it will soon boil over. But its contents 

are indeed explosive, and turmoil in Central Asia’s most populous 

country could have grave consequences for the region. 
44

VII. BEYOND CENTRAL ASIA

Beyond Central Asia, the proven failure of managed democracy 

in three post-Soviet nations could betoken an uneasy future for the 

largest and most important managed democracy of all—Russia. In 

Russia we find many of the features of this flawed system in its 

classic form: state control over national television, a virtual political environment increasingly bereft of viable channels for communication between government and governed, and a squabble-prone 

elite that bends the mechanisms of the state to its own ends, often 

rendering them useless for legitimate purposes. The point is not 

that Russia, or any other country, is ‘‘next’’ in a parade of democratic revolutions. Rather, the cautionary moral of this story is that 

the ongoing breakdown of managed democracy bodes ill for the stability of all countries, including Russia, where this dubious experiment continues in willful ignorance of the lessons of Georgia, 

Ukraine, and now Kyrgyzstan.

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