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NUCLEAR INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAMS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION 

OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL 

ATTACK

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 27, 2005

Serial No. 109–50

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL 

ATTACK

JOHN LINDER, Georgia, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Georgia and Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 

Biological Attack: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Prevention 

of Nuclear and Biological Attack ........................................................................ 3

The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania .................................................................................................... 15

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 12

WITNESSES

PANEL I 

Mr. Joseph Krol, Associate Administrator, National Nuclear Security 

Administration, U.S. Department of Energy: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5

Mr. John Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

U.S. Department of Justice: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8

(1)

NUCLEAR INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAMS 

Thursday, October 27, 2005

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR

AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:29 p.m., in Room 

B–300, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Linder [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Linder, Dent, Langevin, Thompson, and 

Dicks. 

Mr. LINDER. [Presiding.] The hearing of the Homeland Security, 

Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack will 

begin. 

I would like to welcome and thank our witnesses for appearing 

before this subcommittee today. 

Estimates show that a small nuclear device detonated in a large 

metropolitan area will produce hundreds of thousands of casualties, 

destroy critical infrastructure, force millions to evacuate, contaminate thousands of square miles, and extract untold billions of dollars from the U.S. economy. These are, however, mere estimates. 

No one knows the true cost of such an attack, only that the price 

is far too high to pay. The United States has for a long time lived 

under the threat of a nuclear attack. Although overshadowed during the Cold War by the threat of mutually assured destruction, 

concern over a clandestine nuclear attack on one of our cities existed throughout these dark years. 

In April 1974, in Boston, Massachusetts, police received a letter 

stating that atomic bomb with a yield equivalent to 500 kilotons of 

TNT had been planted somewhere in the city and would be detonated unless the author receive $200,000 in small bills. Officials 

from the national laboratories, equipped with nuclear detectors, 

swarmed the city to try to find the device. 

The event turned out to be a hoax, but established a need for 

dedicated teams to be ready to search for a nuclear device. This 

event marked the beginning of a number of nuclear-search programs, which are now collectively referred to as Nuclear Incident 

Response Teams, NIRT. 

The NIRT program was codified by the 2002 Homeland Security 

Act and led to the Department of Homeland Security having a nuclear radiological response capability. These teams consist of specialized personnel drawn from the Departments of Energy and Defense and the FBI, depending on the particulars of the mission. 
2

We are pleased to have representatives from two of these organizations with us here today. 

While these teams have existed in one form or another for many 

years, their work has never been more vital than it is now. The 

possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack is at an all-time high. 

We must ensure that the Department of Homeland Security expands its nuclear-detection capabilities at the border and elsewhere, and is fully engaged with the long-standing programs, such 

as those as NIRT. We must do all we can to detect fissile material 

smuggling and, should that material be in a form of an explosive 

device, be prepared to render it inoperable immediately. 

Interagency coordination and action must be swift and decisive. 

It is a rare opportunity to save perhaps tens of thousands of lives 

through a simple act of intervention. We must ensure that all of 

the many pieces of our national response work seamlessly toward 

that outcome. 

That is precisely what this subcommittee will focus on today, and 

I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses. 

And I now recognize my friend from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, 

for the purpose of an opening statement.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN LINDER

I would like to welcome and thank our witnesses for appearing before this Subcommittee today. 

Estimates show that a small nuclear device detonated in a large metropolitan 

area would produce hundreds of thousands of casualties, destroy critical infrastructure, force millions to evacuate, contaminate thousands of square miles, and extract 

untold billions of dollars from the U.S. economy. 

These are, however, mere estimates. No one knows the true costs of such an attack—only that the price is far too high to pay. 

The United States has, for a long time, lived under the threat of nuclear attack. 

Although overshadowed during the Cold War by the threat of mutually assured destruction, concern over a clandestine nuclear attack on one of our cities existed 

throughout those dark years. 

In April 1974, Boston, Massachusetts, police received a letter stating that an 

atomic bomb with a yield equivalent to 500 kilotons of TNT had been planted somewhere in the city and would be detonated unless the author received $200,000 in 

small bills. Officials from the national laboratories equipped with nuclear detectors 

swarmed the city to try to find the device. The event turned out to be a hoax, but 

it established the need for dedicated teams to be ready to search for a nuclear device. 

This event marked the beginning of a number of nuclear search programs which 

are now collectively referred to as Nuclear Incident Response Teams (NIRT). The 

NIRT program was codified by the 2002 Homeland Security Act to provide the Department of Homeland Security with a nuclear-radiological response capability. 

These teams consist of specialized personnel drawn from the Departments of Energy and Defense, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, depending on the particulars of the mission. We are pleased to have representatives from two of these 

organizations with us here today. 

While these teams have existed in one form or another for many years, their work 

has never been more vital than it is now. The possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack is at an all time high. We must ensure that as the Department of Homeland 

Security expands its nuclear detection capabilities at the borders and elsewhere it 

is fully engaged with long standing programs such as those of NIRT. We must do 

all we can to detect fissile material smuggling, and, should that material be in the 

form of an explosive device, be prepared to render it inoperable immediately. 

Interagency coordination and action must be swift and decisive. It is a rare opportunity to save perhaps tens of thousands of lives through a single act of intervention. We must ensure that all of the many pieces of our national response work 

seamlessly toward that outcome. That is precisely what this Subcommittee will 

focus on today, and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 
3

I now recognize the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Langevin of 

Rhodes Island, for the purpose of making an opening statement. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to welcome our witnesses here today, and I certainly 

look forward to your testimony. 

Today’s hearing will examine our government’s ability to prevent 

a nuclear attack in the event a nuclear weapon is in the United 

States. Searching for a nuclear weapon inside of the United States 

is extremely difficult, given the size of our country and the many 

locations that a terrorist could strike. 

The difficulty of this search was highlighted in a recent movie 

produced by the Nuclear Threat Initiative called ‘‘The Last Best 

Chance.’’ In this movie, the President learns that al-Qa’ida had 

been pursuing and acquiring nuclear devices from several different 

fronts and as well as building a nuclear device. 

And, in fact, in this movie, al-Qa’ida had purchased a nuclear device on the black market and planned to conduct an attack within 

the United States. The movie ends with the weapon crossing the 

northern border in an SUV on its way to an American city. 

The scene is chilling, because it causes one to question whether 

our government has the ability to locate such a weapon once it is 

the country. One thing that the movie highlights, and our work on 

the subcommittee has underscored, is that intelligence is key, if our 

government has any chance to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack. 

There has been numerous articles on a nuclear emergency support teams which state that, after 9/11, these teams are deployed 

based on intelligence that was not corroborated to determine 

whether a threat was valid. In addition, incidents like the one that 

occurred last week in Baltimore make me wonder whether our intelligence community has improved enough to be able to give our 

federal officials the tactical intelligence required to thwart an attack. 

I would like to hear from our witnesses what steps are being 

taken to develop our intelligence capability to meet the nuclear terrorist threat. 

Second, our government must be organized in a way that forces 

coordination and eliminates confusion. Section 504 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 gives the Department of Homeland Security authority over Nuclear Incident Response Teams. DHS, however, does not have the management or budgetary authority over 

these teams. 

Adding to the bureaucratic challenge, the FBI is the lead federal 

agency for intelligence-driven events involving weapons of mass destruction, while the Department of Defense plays a large role, as 

well. I would like to hear our witnesses’ thoughts on the current 

model, specifically whether this committee should revisit the 

Homeland Security Act to eliminate any potential confusion that 

may occur in the event a team must respond to a nuclear terrorist 

threat. 

I look forward to hearing from Admiral Krol and Special Agent 

Lewis. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing 

on this all-important issue. Thank you very much, and I yield back. 
4

Mr. LINDER. Did the gentleman from Mississippi have an opening 

statement? 

Other members are reminded that the committee—to submit a 

written report for the record. 

Our witnesses today are Admiral Joseph Krol, the associate administrator for emergency operations at the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, and Mr. John 

Lewis, deputy assistant director of the Counterterrorism Division 

at the FBI. 

Admiral Krol. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH KROL 

Mr. KROL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. 

My name is Joseph Krol, and I am the associate administrator 

for emergency operations at the National Nuclear Security Administration. Our task, in this very important effort that you have both 

outlined in your statements, is to provide a detailed technical support organization that can operate in support of many organizations across the interagency to locate and render safe any type of 

nuclear device. 

I want to give you two major messages in my opening statement. 

The first is our integration across the interagency and our ability 

to work with a large group of government agencies. And, second, 

I want to give you a quick overview of our current capabilities. 

On the first item, we have a very strong interagency support organization that allows us to respond to a large variety of requests 

from anyone in the United States, including local authority and, of 

course, the government authorities that we work with. 

We primarily support the Department of Homeland Security, the 

Justice Department, the FBI, under Justice, and the Defense Department. But we have supported in the past Coast Guard, Customs, a whole variety of government agencies. 

Our primary support is the FBI, because, in most of these situations that arise, the FBI, by virtue of their investigatory powers in 

counterterrorism, ends up being the lead federal agency. 

Typically, the way these things come to us, over 90 percent of our 

deployments are requested by the FBI. Upon a request, we immediately inform the Department of Homeland Security that we are 

about to deploy. And, of course, the FBI does the same thing. 

We respond to intelligence-driven radiological incidents or potential incidents. There is a system in place, a program called National Significant Security Events, where known events that have 

high visibility, like national conventions, a lead federal agency 

would be appointed, and part of that support will be the radiological support that we provide. 

For example, over the last week, we have supported both venues 

for the World Series in Chicago and Houston. We do Super Bowls. 

We do G–8 conferences. Whatever the federal system identifies as 

a National Significant Security Event, we are at the table providing hardcore radiological search and monitoring. 

We also get involved in unexplained radiological events. They can 

be something as simple as a hot dog vendor—this has happened—

on the street in New York that recently had a medical treatment. 
5

A policeman’s pager went off, and we were called in to verify what 

the real radiological issue is. 

We do this with technical expertise from across the weapons 

complex. I have about 1,000 people that provide exacting technical 

expertise to do exacting nuclear search, radiological search, and, if 

we find a device, to Render Safe, using technical procedures, in 

support of the FBI or the Department of Defense. It is a joint team 

effort. 

We are not an organization that only has its capability on paper. 

We deploy on average about once a week to do various radiological 

things around the country in support of all manner of organizations, as I have told you. We also hold full dress rehearsal exercises 

that cause us to do our deployments. Our general rule for all our 

assets is 4 hours response time. 

We fly around the country using DOE aircraft, generally. And we 

have demonstrated our ability to do that in real training situations 

on numerous occasions. So this is a real capability that is constantly exercised and constantly deployed in support of various 

issues that may come up. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to be here. And I welcome your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Krol follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH J. KROL

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, my name is Joseph Krol and I am 

the Associate Administrator for Emergency Operations at the National Nuclear Security Administration. I am pleased to have this opportunity to present an overview 

of our nuclear incident response capabilities, emphasizing how we conduct our mission working with and supporting other United States Government agencies with 

a nuclear/ radiological counter-terrorism mission. 

As I begin, I want to emphasize that it is our strong inter-relationship and close 

coordination with law enforcement entities and the intelligence community that enables our joint success in executing the United States counter-terrorism mission. 

Through pre-event planning and response coordination, the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Defense and Energy have demonstrated on-going success in 

event execution as exemplified by National Security Special Events, such as the National political conventions, where National Nuclear Security Administration assets 

supported both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and United States Secret Service; Special Events, such as the Olympics and National Football League Super 

Bowls, where National Nuclear Security Administration assets supported the Federal Bureau of Investigation and numerous other federal agencies; and a variety of 

other scheduled and unscheduled events, to include Federal Bureau of Investigation 

/Joint Terrorism Task Force requests for technical support within a city. 

It is important to note that the equity the National Nuclear Security Administration brings to bear on the nuclear/radiological counter-terrorism problem is technical 

expertise. Our core competencies include; (1) knowledge of U.S. nuclear weapons, radiological dispersal devices, and improvised nuclear devices with specific specialties 

in spectroscopy, device modeling, radiography and device assessment technology; (2) 

knowledge of technical operations such as explosive ordinance disposal procedures 

and techniques for device access, disablement, render safe, weapon recovery, and 

final disposition; and (3) knowledge of technical support requirements such as attribution, weapons effects, health and treatment capabilities and the technical evaluation of consequence management radiological data. 

Specific to the nuclear/radiological counter-terrorism mission, we offer mature 

technical capabilities to support Federal law enforcement to search for, locate, and 

render safe improvised nuclear devices. In order to support the increased number 

of requests since 9–11 for timely nuclear/radiological search, we have grown our 

search capability from 2 search teams in one centralized location to 29 teams in numerous locations spread across the United States. If an incident requires a surge, 

we also have the capability to train and equip 60 searchers per day. 

Once a device is located, the ‘‘render safe’’ mission begins. This mission is conducted using well-documented and well-rehearsed policies and procedures among all 
6

levels of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the FBI, and the Department of Defense. It is because of National Nuclear Security Administration’s equities in the U.S. nuclear weapons program that we provide the technical support for 

both the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s and the Department of Defense’s response teams. This support spans from nuclear design and materials training to the 

design and fabrication of specialized tools for accomplishing the render safe mission. 

Key to this effort is our technology integration and research and development programs where we develop and integrate new tools and techniques for device access 

and disablement. 

In closing, I would like to say a few words about our emerging mission and role. 

With the launching of the new Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) by a 

Presidential Directive signed on April 15, 2005, DOE/ National Nuclear Security Administration and DHS/DNDO have been afforded new opportunities as well as challenges to enhance our Nation’s nuclear detection and response programs. Through 

the same kind of interagency cooperation and coordination about which I have already spoken, we at the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration Emergency 

Operations Office are working with DHS/DNDO in the joint development of: (1) better overall technical integration among the operative agencies in the event of a domestic incident, (2) closer coordination and cooperation in technology development 

and research and development activities for enhancing our detection capabilities, 

and (3) better detection reporting and communication among the key stakeholders 

such as, for example, through the Joint Center for Global Connectivity. 

Mr. Chairman, in concluding my statement, I would like to emphasize that since 

9/11 we have made positive changes to improve our abilities to respond. What has 

not changed, however, is DOE/ National Nuclear Security Administration’s continued close interagency working relationships and commitment to provide quality 

technical support for the nuclear/ radiological counter-terrorism mission. 

Mr. Chairman, I welcome your questions.

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Mr. Krol. 

Mr. Lewis? 

STATEMENT OF JOHN LEWIS 

Mr. LEWIS. Good afternoon, Chairman Linder and members of 

the committee. I am pleased to be here to discuss the coordination 

between the FBI and other federal agencies in detecting and neutralizing potential terrorist threats involving nuclear weapons. 

You are all aware of the catastrophic consequences that would 

result if a nuclear device were detonated. Because of the severity 

of that threat, it is imperative that the FBI and our partner agencies have procedures and coordination mechanisms in place before 

the fact, in the event that we must respond to a potential nuclear 

threat or incident. 

We must combine our expertise in order to meet and defeat these 

threats. We must work together, and we are working together. 

Let me give you a brief overview of some of these joint efforts. 

The FBI has extensive liaison relationships with DHS, Department 

of Energy, and the Department of Defense. All of us play a vital 

role in resolving the nuclear crisis. 

As you know, special components within each agency provide 

critical support in the detection, analysis, mitigation and secure 

transport of a nuclear device. And when we respond to threats 

today, each and every response is fully coordinated with our colleagues. 

As one example, the FBI and DOE keep DHS apprised of the 

operational status and geographic disposition of DOE’s nuclear 

search response assets. During potential incidents or periods of 

heightened alert, DHS will be fully aware of operational response 

activities. This ensures national-level integration, coordination and 

strategic focus. 
7

The FBI and DHS also have developed an operational agreement 

for coordinating nuclear and radiological detection and search operations. For a general threat response, where no specific geographic 

target has been identified, DHS will lead interagency coordination 

in developing courses of action and recommendations for the Secretary of Homeland Security and other officials. 

The FBI will assume tactical control or temporary authority of 

any nuclear search assets that are deployed. There are some specific exceptions to that, which I can explain later, if you desire. 

For a specific threat response of a time-sensitive nature, where 

credible information suggests a particular city or location may be 

a target, the FBI will immediately notify and coordinate missiontasking with DHS and DOE. This facilitates the fastest possible 

federal government response. And DOE, on our behalf, will immediately deploy a tailored search tactics appropriate for the situation. 

As a side note, the DHS-managed Nuclear Assessment Program 

has also proven to be a very valuable asset in helping to determine 

the credibility of nuclear radiological threats. The FBI combines 

our own analysis with nuclear specialists and behavior analysts 

that we have on our staff to determine whether or not a threat is 

credible and how we may tailor our response. 

Whether the threat is general or specific, DHS may designate 

and send a liaison to the FBI’s Strategic Information Operations 

Center, as well as the local field office command post. This DHS 

official will have full access to information and will participate in 

joint planning. The FBI will also keep the Homeland Security Operations Center fully informed. 

The FBI also participates in a number of interagency efforts to 

help prevent terrorists from accessing, using or smuggling nuclear 

weapons or materials. For instance, the FBI coordinates extensively with DHS in response to incidents involving possible detection of nuclear and radiological material at U.S. ports of entry. 

The FBI and DHS both maintain extensive reach-back capability 

to obtain rapid technical analysis of possible nuclear or radiological 

material from national laboratory experts who can immediately 

analyze this data. 

The FBI also participates in various joint training initiatives, exercises that bring federal, state, and local law enforcement and 

emergency management personnel together for training so that we 

are all prepared to coordinate our response to a nuclear incident, 

if so called upon. 

On the international level, the FBI trains foreign law enforcement officials to more effectively search, detect and interdict nuclear materials being illicitly transported. We are not the only ones 

that do this. DOE, I know, does this as well. 

And on a national level, the FBI’s Nuclear Site Security Program 

requires each of our 56 field offices to establish close liaison with 

security personnel at critical nuclear facilities and to develop and 

exercise site-specific Internet response plans with them. 

The FBI has also assumed a leadership positions in the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office. The DNDO is an interagency effort with 

the goal of strengthening our collective capability to detect, report 

and respond to attempts that may involve the importation, assem-
8

bly or transportation of a nuclear explosive device, fissile material, 

radiological material, any of which might be intended for illicit use. 

An FBI detailee currently serves as a director of the office of operations support at the DNDO. And in the near term, I will be 

dedicating additional FBI detailees there in several areas, including strategic planning, red-cell planning, information analysis, 

reach-back development, as well as training and protocol development. These are just a few of the FBI’s interagency efforts. 

Chairman Linder and members of the committee, the FBI continues to work aggressively, both internally and with its partners 

at every level, to investigate, disrupt and respond to potential or 

actual nuclear threats. We, of course, are committed to deterring 

crime and terrorism and protecting our fellow citizens from the 

threat of nuclear weapons. 

We will do everything in our power to anticipate these threats 

and prevent them from becoming a reality. 

I wish to thank you again for having me here today. And I am 

pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[The statement of Mr. Lewis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN E. LEWIS

INTRODUCTION 

Good afternoon Chairman Linder and Members of the Committee. I am pleased 

to be here today to discuss the coordination between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other federal agencies in detecting and neutralizing potential terrorist 

threats involving nuclear weapons. 

We are all well aware of the catastrophic consequences that would result if a nuclear device were detonated. Because of the severity of the threat, it is imperative 

that the FBI and our partner agencies have procedures and coordination mechanisms in place before the fact, in the event that we must respond to a potential nuclear threat or incident. 

The FBI is the lead law enforcement and investigative agency charged with responding to terrorist threats or incidents involving nuclear weapons or materials. 

However, no one agency can protect America from every threat—especially a threat 

as complex as a nuclear incident. We must combine our expertise with that of other 

federal agencies, in order to meet and defeat these threats. And we are working together. Let me give you a brief overview of some of our joint efforts.

COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

The FBI has extensive liaison relationships with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Defense 

(DOD), all of which play a vital role in resolving a nuclear crisis. Specialized components within these agencies provide critical support in the detection, analysis, mitigation, and secure transport of a nuclear device. For example, DOE supports both 

the FBI and DHS by deploying mobile detection assets to search for nuclear/radiological materials and/or devices, and also provides high-end technical expertise. The 

FBI also has specialized response components from the Critical Incident Response 

Group and the FBI Laboratory. Officers assigned to these components regularly 

train together in order to ensure that we are all prepared ahead of time. 

The FBI also maintains a close working relationship with DHS, particularly with 

regard to coordinating the U.S. Government’s response to nuclear threats and incidents. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires that specialized DOE emergency 

response assets fall under the operational control of DHS when they are deployed 

in response to a potential nuclear incident. When we respond to threats today, each 

and every response is fully coordinated with our colleagues at DHS. 

For example, the FBI and DOE keep DHS apprised of the operational status and 

geographic disposition of the DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration’s nuclear search response assets, in accordance with the reporting processes outlined in 

the National Response Plan. During potential incidents or periods of heightened 
9

alert, DHS will be fully aware of operational response activities, including nuclear 

search operations, and provide this information to senior government officials, as required. This process ensures national-level integration, coordination and strategic 

focus. 

FBI AND DHS COORDINATION ON GENERAL AND SPECIFIC THREATS 

The FBI and DHS have also developed an operational agreement which provides 

additional guidance for coordination in nuclear/radiological detection and search operations—whether the threat response scenarios are very general or highly specific. 

As background, ‘‘general threat response’’ may be defined as an increase in the alert 

posture or actions taken to address increased threat traffic on nuclear/radiological 

materials and/or devices where no specific geographic target has been identified.

‘‘Specific threat response’’ may be defined as actions taken to address a time-sensitive, credible threat that an unresolved detection event has occurred, or to address 

specific information suggesting that a particular city or location may be the target 

of nuclear/radiological material or device. (It should also be noted that a general 

threat may evolve into a specific threat as investigators gather intelligence.) 

For a general threat response, DHS will lead interagency coordination in developing courses of action and recommendations for the Secretary of Homeland Security and other officials regarding the overall distribution of search response assets. 

The Secretary will direct deployment of search assets. Once employed operationally, 

the FBI will assume tactical control of nuclear search assets, unless those assets are 

deployed in direct support of DHS component entities, such as Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP) or the United 

States Coast Guard (USCG). Under this scenario, ‘‘tactical control’’ refers to temporary directive authority and control over those nuclear search response assets in 

support of planning, mission objectives and operational taskings developed by the 

FBI or other federal law enforcement entities. 

For a specific threat response of a time-sensitive nature within the jurisdictional 

authorities of the FBI, the FBI will immediately notify and coordinate mission 

tasking with DHS and DOE. To facilitate the fastest possible federal government 

response, DOE will immediately deploy a tailored search package appropriate for 

the situation. In the event that DHS does not agree with the deployment or proposed employment of this search package for any reason, redirection of DOE assets 

may be effected by the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the Attorney General. 

During a general or specific threat response, DHS will deploy a liaison official to 

the FBI Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) as well as the local 

FBI command post. This DHS official will have full access to all required operational search information, participate in joint planning, and maintain connectivity 

with the local Principal Federal Official cell, if one is activated, in accordance with 

the National Response Plan. The FBI, through the SIOC, will provide the primary 

pipeline of communication to headquarters elements in Washington. The FBI will 

also keep the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) fully informed of all 

appropriate information. The FBI will be responsible for providing information concerning the nature, timing, location and results of search activities to appropriate 

entities, including the White House, back through its chain of command. 

The DHS-managed Nuclear Assessment Program (NAP) has also proven to be a 

valuable asset in helping to determine the credibility of nuclear/radiological threats. 

This program, which is coordinated through the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, CA, provides assessments of incidents not only involving communicated threats to use nuclear/radiological materials but also alleged possession of such materials. The FBI utilizes this analysis, in conjunction with its own 

nuclear specialists and behavioral analysts, to determine the credibility of a particular threat and to determine the level of response that may be required. 

FBI AND INTERAGENCY EFFORTS TO PREVENT TERRORISTS FROM 

ACCESSING, USING, AND SMUGGLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

The FBI participates in a number of interagency efforts to help prevent terrorists 

from accessing, using, or smuggling nuclear weapons—or the materials needed (such 

as enriched uranium or plutonium) to construct a nuclear weapon. For instance, the 

FBI coordinates extensively with DHS/CBP in response to incidents involving possible detection of nuclear/radiological material at U.S. Ports of Entry. The FBI and 

DHS both maintain extensive ‘‘reachback capability’’ to obtain rapid technical analysis of possible nuclear/radiological material to obtain a more definitive analysis of 

the origin and nature of the suspect material from DOE personnel and/or other sub-
10

ject matter experts. FBI field personnel can send technical spectra back to national 

laboratory experts who can immediately analyze the data. 

Other interagency forums include nuclear smuggling focus groups, as well as various joint training initiatives. For example, since 1999, the FBI and DOE have jointly coordinated the SILENT THUNDER Tabletop Exercise (TTX) Program. These exercises bring together FBI personnel, state and local law enforcement officers and 

emergency management personnel, and DOE facility management and security personnel. The exercises are no-fault tabletop exercises designed to familiarize key decision makers and managers with the U.S. government’s interagency emergency response to a nuclear or WMD domestic terrorism incident. Approximately four exercises are conducted per year throughout the nation. 

The FBI also participates in training with foreign law enforcement personnel, 

which is designed to increase their capability to search, detect and interdict nuclear 

materials being illicitly transported. In addition, the FBI provides foreign law enforcement assistance and coordination through its Legal Attache ́ Program, currently 

in 53 countries worldwide. Our hope is that aggressive investigation and prosecution 

of illicit nuclear material trafficking incidents—on the international level—will discourage and hinder thefts of such material. 

On the national level, the FBI’s Nuclear Site Security Program requires each 

Field Office to establish close liaison with security personnel at critical nuclear facilities (including DOD and DOE sites, as well as commercial nuclear power facilities under the cognizance of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission). This program 

also requires FBI Field Offices to develop site-specific incident response plans and 

to exercise those plans with facility security personnel. 

The FBI has also assumed a leadership position within the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). The DNDO is an interagency effort to oversee the deployment of detection architecture with the goal of strengthening our capability to detect, report, and respond to attempts to import, assemble, or transport a nuclear explosive device, fissile material, or radiological material intended for illicit use. An 

FBI detailee currently serves as the Director of the Office of Operations Support, 

one of 5 offices which comprise the DNDO. In the near term, I will be dedicating 

additional FBI detailees to the areas of strategic planning, red cell planning, information analysis, reachback development, and training and protocol development. 

OTHER LIAISON EFFORTS 

While close liaison has always been standard at U.S. nuclear sites, it should be 

noted that the events of 9/11 have dramatically increased the level of awareness regarding any suspicious activity at these sites. Our partners at these sites are now 

even more proactive in their efforts to report even potentially suspicious incidents 

to local law enforcement and/or the FBI. 

The establishment of a National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) at FBI 

Headquarters and the expansion of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) in the 

field have also increased information sharing and improved response coordination. 

There are now over 100 JTTFs nationwide, consisting of various representatives of 

federal, state and local agencies. 

The FBI is also a regular participant in the interagency review and update of the 

threat or potential threat to U.S. nuclear facilities and activities. The results of this 

annual review help to structure the postulated threat that DOD and DOE utilize 

to structure their protective forces. 

Chairman Linder and Members of the Committee, the FBI continues to work aggressively, both internally and with its partners at every level, to investigate, disrupt, and respond to potential or actual nuclear threats. We are committed to deterring crime and terrorism, and protecting our fellow citizens from the threat of nuclear weapons. We will do everything in our power to anticipate these threats and 

prevent them from becoming a reality. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today. I would be happy to answer 

your questions.

Mr. LINDER. I have a couple. What are the roles, the various 

roles and responsibilities, of DHS, FBI and DOE, in the coordinating a nuclear terrorist—response to a threat? 

Mr. Krol? 

Mr. KROL. The Department of Homeland Security has the lead 

for providing expert recommendation and advice to the President. 

In the execution of that lead, in the event of an unfolding situation, 

a national significant security event would be declared and the Sec-
11

retary of Homeland Security would most probably appoint a Principal Federal Official who would proceed to the scene of the activity. 

Mr. LINDER. They have not mirrored the nuclear capabilities that 

your department has? 

Mr. KROL. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. LINDER. How do they make these judgments? 

Mr. KROL. Through total immersion in the process that is ongoing. In this particular scenario, you would expect the FBI to be the 

Lead Federal Agency and that DOE would be the primary support 

for, say, radiological search. And you would expect those two organizations to keep the Principal Federal Official apprised on what 

the situation is and what the planning efforts are to proceed to the 

next step. 

We have exercised that on a couple of occasions, in exercise scenarios. And I think we have demonstrated that DHS is getting the 

information they need, and we have the ability to educate them on 

the spot with what is going on. 

Mr. LINDER. You do your testing and game-planning with various 

local agencies, as well as? 

Mr. KROL. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LINDER. How do you deal with the interoperability problem 

that we have run into daily here? 

Mr. KROL. That is a challenge. There is no doubt about it. 

Mr. LINDER. Well, who is working to solve that challenge? 

Mr. KROL. Department of Homeland Security. The DNDO office 

that was made reference to by Director Lewis is going to be a tremendous aid in coordinating across the various entities that exist 

in the United States to standardize and provide a concept of operations for execution of radiological counterterrorism activity. 

I am very optimistic that they will be able to have great impact 

in that area. 

Mr. LINDER. When? 

Mr. KROL. I think it is a tremendous challenge, and I think it 

is going to take them some time. I mean, it is not going to come 

immediately. 

Mr. LINDER. I thought you said the FBI is engaged in analysis 

of credibility of these threats? What do you do independent of the 

others? 

Mr. LEWIS. I would not say we do it independent, sir, as much 

as we would do it to complement what Lawrence Livermore does 

today. You may know that they have been in the business for some 

time. And, of course, their product is one that we highly value and 

will seek every time. 

We have our own nuclear scientists down at Quantico. We also 

have behavioral scientists that, for instance, could listen to a tape 

recording or could evaluate the text of a letter. We will draw upon 

those individuals for whatever value they might add to that process. 

And please bear in mind that, whatever Lawrence Livermore 

tells us, whatever our own folks tell us, this is just a pointer, if you 

will. It is never going to solve anything or resolve anything. It is 

just some additional information for us to consider on top of everything else that we might collect during the course of investigation. 
12

Mr. LINDER. And say you have considered and collected all this 

information, and DHS, and FBI, and DOE disagree. Who decides? 

Mr. LEWIS. I am not sure I understand your question. 

Mr. LINDER. Let me try it again. Let me try it in English. You 

have all got your independent analysis sources and you all examined your own sources, as well as the sources of the information 

from others. And you have a disagreement on the threat. Who decides? 

Mr. KROL. It is a group effort. We have been through this many 

times, and there have been disagreements. When one of these 

issues kicks off, what we expect is we go into a secure video-teleconference mode, where we have video-teleconferences twice a day, 

with all the agencies online coordinated by the White House. 

Mr. LINDER. Who in the White House? 

Mr. KROL. Homeland Security Council and, in some cases, National Security Council. And what we expect in these VTCs is a 

constant give and take. People will disagree. Organizations will 

have look-ups. And we will come back again 4 or 5 hours later and 

proceed down the line. 

I have been through those about maybe eight or ten times now. 

And, at the end of the day, we are able to achieve consensus on 

a way ahead. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today. I wanted to 

just ask you a couple of questions. 

And I guess the best place to start is, in the testimony, Mr. 

Lewis, you stated that DHS appoints a lead federal agency or officer, in event of a nuclear incident or the threat of one, and it would 

likely be that they would designate the FBI. 

Why wouldn’t we just put the FBI in charge in the beginning? 

Do we need this level of bureaucracy? 

Mr. LEWIS. Sir, let me clarify what we just said. DHS does not 

appoint the FBI to anything. The FBI’s role, with respect to investigating terrorism, is laid in a statute. That statute was backed up 

most recently by HSPD–5. And the statute says that the attorney 

general has primary responsibility for addressing acts of terrorism 

here in this country. 

As a practical matter, when we are looking at a terrorism matter 

that begins to involve or involves a threat of a nuclear device, as 

has been noted here, we will engage several other members of the 

community in looking at that threat, often times well before any 

decision is made to roll search assets, if, in fact, we can get there. 

You can rest assured that, in today’s times, before any decision 

to roll assets are made, several agencies around town, through the 

secure video-conferencing that Admiral Krol has just mentioned, 

have discussed the matter back and forth, most likely on multiple 

occasions. 

I have been involved in four or five of those. 

Mr. DICKS. Would you tell us the name of some of those agencies 

you just talked about? 

Mr. LEWIS. That are in the morning conference? 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. 
13

Mr. LEWIS. It is chaired by Homeland Security. DOE is there. 

Central Intelligence is there. National Security is there. NCTC is 

there. 

Mr. KROL. Defense Department. 

Mr. LEWIS. DOD, of course. 

Mr. KROL. Justice. 

Mr. LEWIS. Treasury. 

Mr. KROL. Treasury. 

Mr. LEWIS. This happens every morning, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. It is good to hear who they are. 

Mr. LEWIS. Essentially, the hot topics of the day, if you will, are 

discussed each and every morning. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. But let me ask you, given FBI’s lead role in 

counterterrorism and DOE’s nuclear expertise, why not just put the 

FBI in charge? Are we creating another level of bureaucracy by 

having suddenly DHS call the shots? 

Should the committee revisit the Homeland Security Act to give 

DHS a role, but not the lead role? 

Mr. LEWIS. Well, from my seat, sir, I do not. I do not see that 

they have the lead role. I think that they own the assets, so to 

speak, until such a point that an FBI investigation determines the 

threat to be of a specific nature. 

And at that point, my experience has been over the last yearand-a-half—and I have been involved now with three or four of 

these—it is very easy for us to draw down on what has been a very 

good and long relationship with DOE and get assets rolling. 

In today’s times, given the creation of DHS, that call is immediately followed by a call to DHS where all three of us are coordinating very closely. The MOU that has been struck between us and 

DHS does allow the Secretary to step in and challenge the FBI’s 

deployment of resources. 

And should it get to a point where the Secretary and the Attorney General actually have to talk because there is a difference of 

opinion, if they cannot solve it there, there is a process for them, 

where they take that before Homeland Security and/or National Security. 

I do not believe—and, Admiral, correct me if I am wrong—if we 

had ever seen one at all like that. 

Mr. KROL. No, I think in execution it is working exactly as you 

outlined. A threat is identified. The FBI asks us for support. We 

provide support. And as we are going out the door, we inform 

Homeland Security. That is the execution model that we are using, 

the execution model that was en vogue before DHS stood up. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I just want to quote here from the Homeland Security Act. And this is—it is a nuclear incident response. It is in 

general. ‘‘At the direction of the Secretary, in connection with an 

actual or threatened terrorist attack, major disaster, or other emergency in the United States, the Nuclear Incident Response Team 

shall operate as an organizational unit of the Department. And 

while so operating, the Nuclear Incident Response Team shall be 

subject to the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary.’’
14

And my question is, would it be more practical to have the FBI 

in charge with a role for DHS, but not necessarily in charge? 

Mr. LEWIS. Sir, after the date that what you are reading was 

written, the FBI and DHS, recognizing that that language was not 

entirely consistent with what is written in statute regarding our responsibilities, came together and drafted an MOU, which, at least 

as far I am concerned, straightens out the agreement or the operational agreement between DHS and FBI. 

I do not have today any problems at all with deployment of nuclear search assets. The emergence of DHS and having them as 

part of the federal team now has not hindered me in any way, 

shape or form. We came together quickly. We drafted an MOU. We 

both agreed with what is in here. And I think it is fine. 

I understand why you might raise that question, having read 

what you just did, because it does kind of conflict with what is in 

statute. But, again, that is precisely the reason why we came together and drew up an MOU, to clarify that. 

Mr. LINDER. This is statute. 

Mr. LEWIS. Sir? 

Mr. LINDER. It does not conflict with the statute; this is statute. 

Mr. KROL. He is making reference to the MOU, I believe. 

Mr. DICKS. Is the MOU consistent with the statute? 

Mr. LEWIS. Right. The MOU goes beyond the actual words of the 

statute. I can tell you that our attorneys within the FBI, as well 

as the attorneys over at DHS, poured over both of these. 

And I am not an attorney, sir, but I know that, after both shops 

looked at it, you know, the offices of general counsel, they are fine 

with it. 

Essentially what it does is protect deployment. It favors rapid deployment to get the job done. And it allows for—

Mr. DICKS. That is what we want. 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes. 

Mr. LINDER. The memorandum still leaves the Secretary of 

Homeland Security in control. ‘‘While so operating, NIRT shall be 

subject to the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of 

Homeland Security.’’

What person would take control of nuclear search assets and so 

should activities will be delegated to the Secretary of Homeland Security and appropriate law enforcement entity or organization. In 

other words, this response team—and responsibilities—

Mr. LEWIS. Are you reading from MOU between DHS and Department of Energy, sir? If I may? Or is it ours? 

Mr. LINDER. Evidently. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. If I could inquire, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. LINDER. Sure. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The MOU that you are describing, that is something that the FBI has in your possession. It is that something we 

would forward to the committee? 

Mr. LEWIS. Absolutely, if they do not have it already, yes. 

Mr. DICKS. Could I ask on this point? 

Mr. LEWIS. Please 

Mr. DICKS. Was this done—did the Secretary of DHS delegate 

this responsibility to the FBI? I mean, that sounds like, in that lan-
15

guage, the head of the DHS could say, ‘‘I want the FBI to take the 

lead on this.’’

Mr. LEWIS. The MOU executed between two agencies allows the 

FBI to have tactical control of nuclear assets when they are on the 

ground. They do not belong to me, but when they are deployed for 

case reasons, because we have something that we need to look for, 

at that point in time, the FBI has control of those. And we use 

them to execute our searches. 

Mr. DICKS. Is this their equipment? Is this the Department of 

Energy equipment? 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. That is what we are talking about? 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Afternoon, sir. 

How often are your capabilities exercised over the years? I know 

you have been around for decades. 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, but not in the same position. I have been in my 

current seat since May of 2004. And I want to say that, on three 

or four occasions, this has been exercised. 

And from my seat, not to make this sound too simplistic, what 

we have today works well. I can count on very rapid, cooperative 

contact with DOE to get assets rolling quickly when I need them. 

And I have had no problems, with respect to interference with a 

deployment from DHS or anybody else. 

And I will say, throughout this entire process—and, normally, we 

can see these things coming. So, in the time leading up to this, the 

FBI, and DOE, and DHS are not acting in a vacuum. There are 

many other agencies involved. 

Mr. DENT. These capabilities are exercised three or four times. 

Is that since you have been there, you said, or since the inception? 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DENT. What was the most recent one? 

Mr. LEWIS. Approximately 9 or 10 months ago, New York City. 

Mr. DENT. Okay. And I guess my question would be, are there 

plans in place—NIRT teams plans in place that will train local and 

state law enforcement officials, train in the search of a nuclear device or radiological dispersion device? 

Mr. LEWIS. That is one of the reasons why the new DNDO was 

set up. One of the things that is going to happen inside of DNDO, 

as they build a bigger nuclear detection architecture for the U.S., 

is state and local law enforcement entities are going to be right in 

the middle of this mix. 

DNDO is going to help states acquire, help states use, in a standardized format throughout the U.S., nuclear search assets. 

Mr. DENT. And finally—

Mr. LEWIS. I am sorry, detection, not search. Detection. There is 

a difference. 

Mr. DENT. And then finally, what type of research are you engaged in right now in nuclear detection? And are you making—and 

what is the sense of investment in that area? And is it effective? 

Mr. KROL. From our perspective, we have a detection research 

capability that we work on. We are constantly working on coming 

up with more sensitive meters, more portable meters. 
16

A lot of our work is in support of federal agencies. We have to 

blend in to the general populace we are working in so we do not 

create a question or a panic. So we apply budgetary money to upgrade ourselves constantly. The figure that we are applying is 

around $10 million a year. 

Mr. DENT. In terms of the sensitivity of those detection devices, 

I know sometimes they are a little too sensitive. For example, certain things that get picked up. Bananas, I guess, for example, emit 

a certain radiation. 

How good is the technology at discriminating against those benign objects? 

Mr. KROL. Well, it is not. You have to have highly sensitive detection devices, especially when you are dealing with rolling stock, 

moving stuff, trucks and so on. And so you have to have a reasonable sensitivity. 

And we do get hits on naturally occurring sources of radiation. 

And you just have to run those down. There is no way out of it. 

In some ways, we are a slave to physics. I mean, physics is what 

physics is. And we are dealing in a continuum that the rules have 

not been changed in a long time. 

So, again, DNDO, we are optimistic that in their effort to bring 

together architectures and do hardcore research into new possibilities for radiological detection that they have an opportunity to 

make a difference. 

Mr. LINDER. Would the gentleman yield? 

How close are we to detection instruments that identify isotopes? 

Mr. KROL. Oh, we can do that now. We can get a hit and identify 

an isotope. We can tell you if it is strontium–90, or cesium–137, or 

cobalt–60. 

Mr. LINDER. Shouldn’t that prevent you from having false hits? 

Mr. KROL. It can. It can. And it does in many instances. The 

great equalizer for radiological search, from our perspective, is 

TRIAGE. That is the home team capability, where our teams can 

feed back into the weapons labs and get the absolute best expert 

analysis of what we have provided to them for identification. 

Mr. DENT. And just finally here, are these detecting devices—do 

you believe that a lot of our local law enforcement, at least in our 

major metropolitan areas, are adequately equipped with devices 

like that? 

Mr. KROL. That is a hard question. They are equipped. And I 

would say they are adequately equipped. 

I think the issue that is a problem is that they are not adequately trained, in many cases. And I do not blame them necessarily, because they have a wide variety of issues they deal with, 

the fire department—and the radiological—you know, they do not 

spend a lot of time on radiological training. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Dicks? 

Mr. DICKS. Where do we get most of the—where do we get most 

of the information about an incident? Where does that come from? 

Does that come from intelligence sources or—which we probably 

cannot talk about here—but where do you get your information? 

Mr. KROL. Usually, there are two major sources that cause us to 

go out the door. That would be an intelligence stream that leads 
17

the FBI or another federal agent in the direction that there is 

something going on radiologically somewhere in the country. Or 

somebody, a fire department or some, has passed a meter in front 

of somebody or something and the meter has moved. And then we 

are asked to come in and be the arbitrator of what they have. 

Mr. DICKS. Now, where is all this equipment kept? And how 

many locations do you have? 

Mr. KROL. We have eight major centers of excellence tied to the 

weapons labs around the United States. We have 29 deployable 

teams. Our rule is 4 hours deployed. 

Mr. DICKS. Do you have your own airplanes? 

Mr. KROL. We do not have our own airplanes, but we are—some 

of our teams are in places where we can get access to aircraft. Most 

of our deployments are by ground. Most of the—

Mr. DICKS. Do you have pre-arranged arrangements to get aircraft? 

Mr. KROL. No. And we do not need them in most places. For example, the team we have at Brookhaven is equipped with vans. 

And we can get downtown to New York City in an hour. 

Mr. DICKS. What about Washington, D.C.? 

Mr. KROL. Washington, D.C., we have team at Andrews. And so 

Brookhaven, Andrews, Oak Ridge National Labs, Savannah River, 

Albuquerque, Idaho National Lab, Hanford, in your area—

Mr. DICKS. Right. 

Mr. KROL. —and in Livermore and Las Vegas. So when you lay 

that out on a map, there are only a few areas that are difficult to 

get to from a time perspective. 

The Argonne National Lab in Chicago, if they have to go to 

North Dakota, you know, we have an agreement in Chicago with 

Coast Guard to provide us transportation, air transportation. We 

are trying to provide air transportation to ourselves using the National Guard, but that is a work in progress. 

But in most—

Mr. DICKS. Well, we are getting rid of a lot of the National Guard 

aircraft, too. 

Mr. KROL. Yes, sir. But we do not need—the National Guard has 

a small aircraft, a Twin Otter, that was just perfect for us, because 

our teams are five-to seven-man teams with about 250 pounds of 

equipment. 

But most of the places that we need to deploy that involve metropolitan areas, we are 3 hours driving max from where we need to 

get. So that is our situation. 

Mr. DICKS. And how many times a year do you exercise this? 

Mr. KROL. We actually go on deployments on the average of, I 

would say, three times a month. I mean, real deployments that are 

driven by one thing—

Mr. DICKS. Like incidents, I mean, these are—

Mr. KROL. Incidents—

Mr. DICKS. You really test this system. You know what it will do. 

Mr. KROL. We test this system. That is why I made a point in 

my opening statement that this is not a system that looks good on 

paper. I mean, we—and if we miss our deployment time, we go 

back and do lessons learned. But very seldom to we miss our deployment time. 
18

We have people watch billed. We know who to reach out and 

touch and make move on short notice. 

Mr. DICKS. Now, when you are having all these meetings, are the 

HHS people involved or the DHS people, who are going to deal 

with the victims of an attack? 

Mr. LEWIS. DHS is a regular member, sir. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. And, you know, Mr. Chairman, I hesitated to bring 

this up, but I cannot help myself. 

I am still concerned that we are not, you know, on our BioShield 

effort, that we are still not—we still do not have the attention of 

the administration. I hope these gentleman will take this back to 

one of your meetings and maybe you can have a discussion on it. 

Maybe you can do better on this than we have done, in terms of 

oversight. 

But we are worried that we are not getting enough of these 

drugs that could deal with ARS, acute radiation system, a stockpile. And the companies out there are extremely frustrated. They 

want to—some of these people have gone out, put up their own 

money to try to develop these kinds of drugs that would help with 

the people who were exposed to radiation. 

And I just worry that all the work we are doing here—prevention 

is obviously, in this case, uno, numero one. I understand that. 

But, God forbid, if something does happen and we are not prepared to have the drugs in place so that these people can be treated within 3 or 4 hours, whatever it takes, we are going to lose a 

lot of people that we did not have to lose. And we are going to look 

back on this like we looked back on 9/11 and say, ‘‘Why didn’t we 

do something?’’

So you two the very responsible officials in this administration. 

I hope you will start asking some questions. We are trying to ask 

the questions. We are not getting the answers that we think the 

American people would expect us to get. 

And this is part of this whole scenario. I hope you will try to help 

us on this. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LINDER. Let me ask you one more question. I assume that, 

if we have a biological event, the FBI will be involved in the intelligence—

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LINDER. Who would you look to without the DOE? 

Mr. LEWIS. Who would I look to if—

Mr. LINDER. If you do not have the DOE? 

Mr. LEWIS. I am sorry. I still did not get the last part. 

Mr. LINDER. Who would you look to—like, currently, you look to 

DOE for flushing out the analysis of the information. Who would 

you look to with a biological event? 

Mr. LEWIS. We have reached back both at Quantico, for our own 

scientists, and beyond, in terms of evaluating precisely what kind 

of event we are dealing with. I did not come prepared today to talk 

to you about bioterrorism, but if you want me to take that back, 

or if you want to send the question over, I—

Mr. LINDER. I hope we do not just reinvent the wheel. I hope we 

do not just send one of these for every different bug we have got, 

every kind of nuclear event that we have. 
19

Mr. LEWIS. We have a separate set of experts that we have relied 

upon for years that give us quick, reach-back expertise so that we 

can evaluate quickly and conclusively what it is we are dealing 

with in that particular area. I would be delighted to share that 

with you, if you wanted to send a question my way. 

Mr. LINDER. We probably will. 

Mr. Langevin? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I would just like to revisit the discussion we were 

having a minute ago. I just want to be clear you are willing to forward that MOU to the committee between the—

Mr. LEWIS. Yes. I will get my hands on the signed copy. I do not 

have a signed copy in front of me, but I do know it was signed by 

Admiral Loy when he was with us and the FBI. And I will make 

sure you get it. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. In your opinion, would it be wise for this committee to revisit the Homeland Security Act to make the authority 

more clear, to codify that, so that the statute would change to reflect the MOU? 

You know, I just have concerns when I read things that I have—

a veteran—member was quoted in a June 2005 National Journal 

article saying that adding DHS to the chain of command compounded the confusion of multiple agencies trying to report straight 

to the President. 

The last thing we want in a nuclear event or a threat of a nuclear event is to have confusion out there as to who is reporting 

to whom. And, you know, we are on your side. 

Mr. LEWIS. I understand. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. We want to work with you. If there is something 

you need, this is the time to ask. 

Mr. LEWIS. It is not broke, as far as I am concerned. I come from 

the operational side of the house. If I have got a situation to deal 

with this afternoon, I have a very high degree of confidence that, 

working with my DOE and DHS partners, I can put search assets 

on the ground very quickly. I do not have any problem with that. 

I do not spend a lot of time evaluating exactly what the statute 

says, the two different statutes, the one that gives the attorney 

general responsibility for investigating terrorism and the one that 

you have read from today. 

There is language in there that, when you look at it, it appears 

to some, I suppose, that maybe it could be strengthened or clarified. It does not hamper me. 

I would invite Mr. Krol to chime in here. I have what I need 

today to respond very quickly to take care of business. 

Mr. KROL. I agree with Director Lewis completely. And I think, 

if you go back to 2002, to 2003, there was a lot of muscling with 

about who was in charge. I think all the effort that we have made 

among our three organizations, including the MOU, has in great 

degree mollified those concerns. 

And I think we are all operating with a great understanding on 

how we are really going to execute our mission. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Dicks? 

Mr. DICKS. No more questions. 

Mr. LINDER. If there are not more questions, without objection, 

this hearing is adjourned. 
20

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one thing, just one thing? 

Tell us the difference between the NEST teams and the RAP 

teams? 

Mr. KROL. The RAP teams is a subordinate organization to 

NEST. The Radiological Assistance Program is the program I made 

reference to where we had 29 teams spread across the country. 

They are the primary search engine, if you will, if they are needed. 

They are first out the door. 

From that level on, we can go to a high-level search with the 

Search Response Teams that we have in two locations, Nevada and 

inside the NCR at Andrews Air Force Base. In fact, NEST is the 

overall umbrella that covers all our capabilities, including Render 

Safe. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. In both of your experiences, have you ever had 

a time when you could not get an airplane? When you could not 

get in—

Mr. KROL. No. 

Mr. LEWIS. No. 

Mr. DICKS. Never had a problem? This never has come up? 

Mr. KROL. Well, you are—Congressman, you have probably—

when you say you have never had a problem, I mean, we—

Mr. DICKS. Well, I mean, if you had a problem, you called. They 

said, ‘‘Well, we do not have any planes for you.’’ They tell us that 

all the time. 

Mr. KROL. No, it is—

[Laughter.] 

No. That may be the first answer, but persistence usually prevails when we—

Mr. DICKS. So you have had a problem? 

Mr. KROL. Well, initially, right out of the barrel. But, like I said, 

persistence prevails. And when you declare you have a national 

mission, everybody lines up. 

And I operate from a different perspective, in that I do have 

DOE aircraft available to me, you know, in Albuquerque. So I can 

get on my own airplane in many cases, because our center of excellence for a lot of these assets, including particularly Render Safe, 

is in Albuquerque. 

So it is a manageable problem, is the way I would answer the 

question. 

Mr. DICKS. Now, we make clear we can make some plans available, if there was a need for some dedicated aircraft. I mean, I can 

see all the training you do. I mean, a few airplanes—these are 

small airplanes, too. These are not, you know, budget-busters. You 

know, think about it. 

Mr. KROL. I think we are okay. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, both. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 2:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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