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30–668 PDF 2007

OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL AVIATION

ADMINISTRATION SAFETY PROGRAMS

(109–98)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

AVIATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

TRANSPORTATION AND

INFRASTRUCTURE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 20, 2006

Printed for the use of the

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

(
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice-Chair

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

SUE W. KELLY, New York

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana

ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

JERRY MORAN, Kansas

GARY G. MILLER, California

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

SAM GRAVES, Missouri

MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

TED POE, Texas

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington

CONNIE MACK, Florida

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York

LUIS G. FORTUN ̃ O, Puerto Rico

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JERROLD NADLER, New York

CORRINE BROWN, Florida

BOB FILNER, California

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD,

California

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JULIA CARSON, Indiana

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado

JOHN BARROW, Georgia

(II)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

SUE W. KELLY, New York

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana

ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

JERRY MORAN, Kansas

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

SAM GRAVES, Missouri

MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

TED POE, Texas

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York,

Vice-Chair

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

DON YOUNG, Alaska

(Ex Officio)

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

CORRINE BROWN, Florida

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD,

California

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia

BOB FILNER, California

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

(Ex Officio)

(III)

(V)

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY

Page

Dillingham, Gerald, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 18

Haueter, Thomas, Deputy Director, Office of Aviation Safety, National Transportation Safety Board ........................................................................................ 17

Sabatini, Nicholas, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration .............................................................................................. 15

Zinser, Todd, Acting Inspector General, Office of Inspector General, U.S.

Department of Transportation ............................................................................ 19

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri ......................................................................... 64

Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois .......................................................................... 65

Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 115

Reynolds, Hon. Tom, of New York ......................................................................... 119

Ros-Lehtinen, Hon. Ileana, of Florida .................................................................... 121

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

Dillingham, Gerald .................................................................................................. 68

Haueter, Thomas ..................................................................................................... 99

Sabatini, Nicholas .................................................................................................... 125

Zinser, Todd ............................................................................................................. 165

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Kelly, Hon. Sue W., a Representative in Congress from New York, article,

′′Air Traffic Controllers Chafe at Plan to Cut Staff′′, Matthew L. Wald,

New York Times, September 20, 2006 ............................................................... 34

Costello, Hon. Jerry F., a Representative in Congress from Illinois, letter

to Hon. James L. Oberstar, a Representative in Congress from Minnesota,

from Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Civil Aviation Issues, U.S General

Accounting Office, September 23, 2003 .............................................................. 60

Sabatini, Nicholas, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety Federal Aviation Administration:

Responses to questions from Rep. Mica ............................................................. 136

Blakey, Hon. Marion C., Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration,

U.S. Department of Transportation, letter to Hon. Mark V. Rosenker,

Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, May 31, 2006 ... 143

Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO), memo, April 28, 2006 ............................... 146

Responses to questions from Rep Chandler ....................................................... 148

Responses to questions from Rep. Schwartz ...................................................... 150

Additional responses to questions from Members ............................................. 152

ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD

Aeronautical Repair Station Association (ARSA), Christian A. Klein, Legislative Counsel, and Virginia K. Scattergood, Associate Counsel, letter and

charts, October 4, 2006 ........................................................................................ 186

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc., Aircraft Product Support Division,

Ralph Sorrells, Deputy General Manager, Product Support Division, statement ...................................................................................................................... 194

(1)

OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL AVIATION

ADMINISTRATION SAFETY PROGRAMS

Wednesday, September 20, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m., in room

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica [Chairman of the subcommittee] Presiding.

Mr. MICA. I would like to call this hearing of the Aviation Subcommittee to order. Welcome, everyone, today.

The subject of today’s hearing is oversight of Federal Aviation

Administration safety programs, and the order of business is going

to be as follows:

We will have opening statements from members, and we have

one panel of witnesses, I see, today. I also have had requests from

a number of members, some who sit on the Transportation and Infrastructure full committee, but not on our Aviation Subcommittee;

and then we have requests for members who are not on the T&I

Committee, who also have asked to participate.

So I am going to entertain a unanimous consent request from

Mr. Costello that these Members be allowed to participate after

members of our committee are heard. Without objection, so ordered.

So we do welcome other Members to participate and, again, give

preference to those on our subcommittee who will participate first.

So with that under way, I will open the proceedings today with my

opening statement. I yield to Mr. Costello, and then other members

who wish to be recognized, and then we will proceed to our panel

of witnesses.

As I said, today’s hearing will focus on oversight of our Federal

Aviation Administration’s safety programs. We are conducting this

hearing at a time when America’s aviation system has been safer

than at any time in our history. In fact, the remarkable safety

record achieved in the last several years, I believe, is the result of

sound safety policy and continuous oversight.

Safety is the number one priority of our subcommittee. It is also

the number one priority of the FAA and the users of the aviation

system. That is why I believe also that the U.S. aviation system

is the safest in the world.

In fact, we have got a slide up there; if you want to look at that,

it does show how good our performance is vis-a-vis other areas of

the world. That safety record is clearly reflected by the table that

we have displayed, and with the data from the Aviation Safety Net-
2

work of the Flight Safety Foundation, which is an independent,

nonprofit, international organization engaged in research, auditing

and education—also advocacy and publishing—to improve aviation

safety.

The table sets forth the percentage of world departures versus

the percentage of accidents by international region. Even though 42

percent of all the world’s departures are in the North American region, North America accounts for only 8.6 of the world’s accidents.

Aviation is also, by far, the safest form of transportation in the

United States. You are about 40 times safer in an airliner than on

the safest stretch of any highway in our country today. And today

and every day of the year, unfortunately, more than a hundred people will die in automobile accidents, just to give you some comparison.

Since 2001, the FAA has handled 50 million successful flights

with 2.7 billion passengers flying on commercial aircraft in the

United States and arriving at their final destination safely. This

safety record is all the more amazing when you consider how incredibly complicated our U.S. aviation system is. On a typical

weekday in the United States, there is an average—and this is an

average—of 33,000 commercial and 55,000 instrument flight rules

departures.

I think we have got a slide up there that we will now address.

This slide shows—and was produced by the Aircraft Owners and

Pilots Association; it is on their Web site, and it shows the latest

statistical data available from the National Transportation Safety

Board, and is current through August 25, 2006. The data includes

both fatal and nonfatal accidents.

This graph also shows the year-to-date change of accident counts

compared to the previous year. With the exception of business and

corporate and executive operations, all other types of operations,

including commercial and general aviation, have seen a reduction

in the number of accidents compared to the same period just last

year in 2005. And we may have some questions for our panelists

about the exception category.

Let me just say a few other areas where safety has improved.

The fatal accident rate for commercial carriers is, in fact, down.

Ten years ago the rate was 0.51 fatal accidents per 100,000 departures. Today, the rate is less than half that—well, even—far less

than that. What is that, about—do the math on it here. But it is

.02 percent, so it is down absolutely dramatically.

General aviation fatal accidents have also dropped. The number

of fatal accidents through May 2006 is 36 less than in the same period of 2005.

Emergency medical aircraft accidents have been cut in half in 1

year from 2005 and 2006.

We are all aware that the risks associated with flight cannot be

eliminated completely. In fact, we have been very boldly reminded

of that with the Comair accident in Lexington, Kentucky, last

month, and that was a sobering reminder that again we still can

have accidents in our aviation industry. So while flying is by far

the safest mode of transportation, we must continue to strive for

an even safer aviation system.
3

The witnesses for today’s hearing will provide detailed testimony

on the aviation industry’s safety record as well as issues that they

believe should be addressed, including—some of the issues we will

hear about are runway safety, operational errors, training, the inspection processes, aging aircraft, center fuel tanks, air tours and

emergency medical service flights.

They will also highlight emerging issues that they believe will require our attention as the system continues to expand, areas such

as the new, very light jets, unmanned aircraft systems and commercial space transportation. These are all very important issues

for the Aviation Subcommittee, and particularly as we assess the

continued safe operation of our National Airspace System.

Another emerging issue that has been the subject of much review

is ensuring that we have adequate air traffic control and safety inspector training and staffing levels to deal with expected retirements and the growing use of our airspace system. This discussion

should include not only FAA’s workforce plan and staffing models,

but also ways to create efficiencies such as consolidating FAA facilities and expanding FAA—our FAA contract tower program.

In particular, I believe we should closely examine the benefits

both in terms of safety and funding and the consolidating, I should

say, of FAA terminal radar approach control facilities, also known

as TRACONs. Due to the improvements in technology, the FAA is

able to consolidate TRACONs that are located in close proximity to

one another and whose separation—separate operation is highly inefficient at the current time. The benefits of TRACON consolidation

include reducing controller workload, decreasing facility overhead

staffing requirements, enhancing safety and efficiency within the

system, and still providing, I think, even better redundancy and

backup in the system.

Another hugely beneficial program in terms of meeting future

staffing needs is our FAA contract tower program. We have this in

a number of airports. We have an outstanding record, and I am

going to ask that we submit that rather than review it for the

record. Both the contract tower program and the TRACONs consolidation proposal, I believe, deserve due consideration as we

evaluate the best way to ensure adequate staffing in the future.

In terms of ensuring aviation’s safety, no one would argue that

air traffic controllers don’t have a very important role and certainly, at times, have a stressful job. They do have a stressful job

and an important role, and that is why our air traffic controllers

are now one of the highest paid government groups in our entire

Federal Government.

This subcommittee has been closely monitoring the FAA staffing

and hiring plans, and we have held hearings on that topic. Since

2001 the FAA has hired some 2,500 controllers. To date, the FAA

has hired 920 controllers and expects to hire a total of 1,100 during

fiscal year 2006 alone. The FAA’s fiscal year 2006 onboard staffing

target, I am told, is some 14,670 controllers. This reflects a

ramping up of hiring in order to replace controllers who, FAA anticipates, will retire in the next few years.

As of September 3, there were 14,537 controllers on board. The

FAA expects to meet its staffing goals by the end of September.

Unfortunately it appears that some have chosen the unfortunate
4

tragedy of Lexington, the Lexington Comair crash in August, to forward their own agenda.

It is important to note that the accident investigation on that

particular crash is still being investigated by the NTSB. They

haven’t reached any final conclusion on the cause of the accident,

and we will pay close attention to their findings.

It is important to note that we have over 100 commercial air

service airports across the country with no tower and no air traffic

controllers, and they all function very well. I believe that efforts to

make that accident and the tragic loss of life that occurred on that

day a sounding board for one’s own agenda is not in very good

taste.

I am confident the NTSB—and I have talked with officials there

that are involved in the investigation—will consider all factors,

eliminating some and drawing appropriate and fact-based conclusions. Second-guessing and sharing piecemeal bits of information is

not only inappropriate; I think it is uncalled for.

Today’s witnesses will highlight areas where they believe we can

improve safety of our already very safe aviation system. There is

always room for improvement. This is a very healthy exercise. Actually, this hearing was requested by the ranking member long before the terrible accident in Lexington. So it is not a reaction to

that particular serious accident.

As we engage in discussing the important safety issues today, I

want members not to lose sight of the fact that the United States

does, in fact, have the safest aviation system in the world. We have

got some great people working at FAA. They have set standards

that are adopted by the world, and we look forward to hearing from

our witnesses on ways that we can make our system even safer.

With that, those long opening statements—actually I had some

longer ones which we will put in the record. By unanimous consent,

so ordered.

I will be yielding to Mr. Costello in just one second. Don’t usually

take a point of personal privilege, but I have a number of personal

constituents from my district, and I think most of you on the panel

have done this before, and I have had to put up with it.

I am pleased to have from the Seventh Congressional District of

Florida, and I think many of you know, Members, that we have

had both cancer survivors and those who are here speaking on behalf of increasing Congress’ efforts towards research and cure. So

I am very pleased to welcome you to my subcommittee. Sorry you

had to endure my long opening statement, but if you all weren’t

here, I would have made them listen to even more. So thank you,

and you are welcome.

Thank you, Mr. Costello. You are recognized.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I thank you for

calling the hearing today. As you mentioned, we requested this

hearing several months ago in order to examine the issue of safety.

Let me also say that I want to make it clear for the record—Mr.

Chairman, I want you to hear this if you will—I know of no one

on this side of the aisle that is attempting to use the Comair tragedy to further a personal agenda; and I want to make that clear.

And if there is anyone on our side of the aisle that is doing that,
5

I certainly would want you or anyone else to identify who that

might be.

I do appreciate your responding to our request for this safety

hearing today. I believe that safety is the number one issue that

this subcommittee has the responsibility of dealing with. As the

chairman pointed out, the United States does have the safest air

transportation system in the world, with the fatal accident rate of

about one in every 16 million flights. However, we must not become

complacent about our past success.

The recent crash of Comair Flight 5191 has once again placed

aviation safety in the spotlight. It is the responsibility of this subcommittee to make certain that the FAA is fulfilling its duties to

provide effective safety oversight in every aspect of the aviation

system from aircraft maintenance to air traffic control to runway

safety.

Both the GAO and the Department of Transportation’s inspector

general have highlighted numerous safety issues of concern including the use of noncertificated repair stations and maintenance

outsourcing in general, runway incursions, inspector staffing and

general concern about the FAA’s ability to meet the changing needs

of the airline industry. And it is because of these GAO reports and

the inspector general’s issues that they have raised that we asked

for this hearing today.

I am particularly concerned about the increased use of aircraft

maintenance, both foreign and domestic repair stations. Airlines

continue to look for ways to trim costs by outsourcing maintenance

of their airplanes.

In January of 2005, The Wall Street Journal did a comparison

of wages paid by U.S. carriers, both wages and benefits, and compared them to outsourced maintenance stations in North America,

Europe, Asia and Latin America. It is very clear to me, and I think

it is clear to anyone, that the U.S. airlines are relying more heavily

on outside contractors to perform everything from routine maintenance to major overhauls in order to cut their cost.

According to the DOT inspector general, U.S. air carriers now

outsource 62 percent of their maintenance expense, compared to

just 37 percent in 1996. The IG noted in a June 2005 report that

the FAA safety oversight has not kept pace with changes in the

aviation industry, including increased maintenance outsourcing.

This was evident in the 2003 crash of Air Midwest Flight 5481 in

Charlotte, North Carolina, which killed 21 people. The NTSB found

that deficient maintenance by a third-party repair facility and lack

of oversight by both the FAA and the air carrier of the work being

performed by the repair facility contributed to this crash. Safety

must not be compromised in an effort to save money or for a lack

of resources and oversight.

Another area of concern to me is personnel. The FAA is well

below the safety staff necessary to fulfill its critical safety mission,

including the oversight of our air carriers, as well as foreign and

domestic repair stations. The FAA, according to the statistics and

numbers that I have, have a total of 68 inspectors to oversee 688

foreign repair stations; and in fact, in a recent conversation I had

with an employee of the FAA, I was informed that only six inspec-
6

tors were responsible for inspecting 99 foreign repair stations in

the FAA’s facility out of Singapore.

The commercial aviation industry is constantly changing, and the

FAA’s ability to change and adapt with that is very questionable.

As this subcommittee moves toward the FAA reauthorization, we

must make certain that the FAA is able to meet its mission of safety first and foremost.

One final point: I have real concerns about the speed and the

completion at FAA with rulemaking. For example, the Department

of Transportation compiles a list of significant rulemaking, giving

the status of each rule and where it is in the process. For the FAA,

21 significant rulemakings are listed; only three of them are on

schedule, and 17 are either behind schedule or have no schedule

at all. Many of these deal with important safety issues.

In December of 1996, not even 6 months after the TWA 800

flight tragedy, the NTSB strongly recommended the installation of

a nitrogen safety system to reduce fuel tank flammability across

the fleet for U.S. commercial air carriers. Yet today—it was December of 1996, yet today we still do not have a final rule, almost 10

years later.

Aviation safety is the number one issue that this subcommittee

should be concerned with. We must continue to ask tough questions, issue the even tougher and sometimes costly rules, and push

forward in order to ensure the highest level of safety for the travelling public.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will, as you did, submit the rest of

my statement for the record, and yield back the balance of my

time.

Mr. HAYES. [presiding.] I thank the gentleman for yielding, and

I will take my time, since I have changed seats, to thank you and

Chairman Mica for giving very well informed, comprehensive, crucial and relevant opening statements.

This is a safety hearing. Until the accident rate reaches zero,

until the fatality rate reaches zero, until we are zero across the

board, we will continue to appropriately have these hearings.

As I look at the system today I am impressed, constantly, having

flown as recently as today in the system, at the professionalism,

the competence, the tremendous contribution that our controllers

make to our air traffic system. By the same token, the FAA is absolutely conscientious—not perfect—in the prosecution of their mission.

What is left? The pilots. We also have a huge part to play in the

outcomes of aviation safety today. And I won’t quote the additional

figures because both the ranking member and the chairman have

given you a very clear idea. We are moving in the right direction,

and we have the safest system in the world, but zero is still the

target that we all desire.

Now, I have talked to my friend, Mr. Costello, about the situation that occurred in Lexington. That is not the focus of today’s

hearing, but it is something that I am sure we will discuss. Unfortunately, it was misreported. It was not the controller’s fault, it

was not the FAA’s fault; those are simply the facts.

We have, that I know of, three pilots here—myself, Mr. Salazar

and Mr. Graves, maybe others; and we have a certain knowledge
7

of what goes on and why. And unfortunately, again for whatever

reason, the press has created an incorrect perception of what happened there. It wasn’t the controller’s fault. It wasn’t the FAA’s

fault.

Same thing happened when we had an incursion—and unfortunately, Mr. Chandler, Kentucky was involved again. When we had

the incursion in the airspace in Washington several years ago, I

went through every step and visited every facility to track down exactly what happened to improve safety and to see how we prevent

that in the future.

We got there. By the time we arrived, having carefully looked,

the press had gone away. They weren’t interested at that point.

But, again, back to the purpose in being here today, it is to continually, at every step of the way, make sure that we are doing everything that we reasonably, responsibly and in any way can do to

make this the perfect aircraft safety transportation system, realizing full well that human beings are flying mechanical devices

called airplanes.

Again, I thank each and every one of you for being here.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, can I ask for 20 seconds to make

a point for the record?

I would agree with your assessments in our conversation. Everyone knows, as the chairman stated, the NTSB, regarding the

Comair fatality and tragedy, has not concluded their investigation;

and as you have said, no one has indicated that it was the air traffic controller’s fault.

But I do want to make clear for the record that the FAA has said

that a directive that they had issued—two controllers should have

been on duty at that tower at that time when, in fact, one was on

duty—that their own directive was not followed. And I just want

to make that clear for the record.

That is not to say that the tragedy would not have happened, but

the directive was not being followed by the person in charge of the

air traffic controllers in that region.

Mr. HAYES. Very relevant comment, and not necessarily in response, but the other side of that is, the comment made by the

FAA was relevant to another situation in a different place at a different time.

And again, what—I don’t want people to come away, and I am

sure you don’t either—you have to have controllers in a tower for

aviation to be safe. You don’t have to have one, you don’t have to

have two, you don’t have to have three. All kinds of things that you

might do, but at what point do reason and common sense take

over?

But the controller who was there did exactly what he was to do.

Again, we are not arguing for the fact, for the record, for the public

responsibility of the controller is to separate traffic, get them to the

point of departure. You are cleared to runway—I don’t have the

diagram in front of me—26. They stopped at 22. So you know, that

is—the FAA misspoke, NTSB misspoke.

But that is not why we are here today. We want to make sure

that the lessons we learn are correct and that we apply them appropriately going forward so that everybody can be as safe as they

possibly can be. Again, thank the gentleman.
8

Mr. Chandler, you are recognized.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And for the record, I

want to make it clear that I was not involved personally in the incursion into the Capital airspace except to the extent that I had to

run for my life, like so many other people did. It was our governor.

I appreciate the chairman and Ranking Member Costello holding

this hearing today, and I am sorry that it is timely in respect to

my district. And while we do have the best safety record in the

world in our country, and we are very proud of that, I believe it

is appropriate to ask questions when a tragedy occurs. And the August 27 Comair Flight 5191 crash occurred in my district at the

Blue Grass Airport in Lexington, Kentucky. It resulted in the

deaths of 49 people, and has not left one person in central Kentucky unaffected.

One of the many issues that has been raised after the crash is

that of FAA tower staffing, and let me read a number of the headlines that were published by the two local newspapers, the Lexington Herald Leader and the Louisville Courier Journal: ′′tower

Should Have Had Two Controllers; FAA Acknowledges It Broke Its

Own Rules; FAA Controllers Clash on Staffing; Controller Had Two

Hours of Sleep; New Shift Began Nine Hours After Last Shift

Ended; Controllers Say They Will Have to Work When Tired.′′ Now, this has caused a great deal of confusion about what the

FAA is doing, particularly regarding air traffic controller staffing.

Earlier this month, the entire Kentucky delegation joined me in

passing House Resolution 980, which expressed the House’s condolences to the families, the friends and the loved ones of the victims

of Comair Flight 5191. I am grateful for the House’s support, but

we must also answer the many questions that remain in the wake

of this terrible accident.

It is premature, I believe, to speculate on the causes of the

Comair crash, but it is not premature to ask what Congress and

the pertinent Federal agencies must do to improve our Nation’s

safety policies as we move forward. It seems critical to me that the

FAA promote policies that lead to happy and well-qualified air traffic controllers operating in a well-staffed environment. These are

serious questions—there are serious questions as to whether this

goal was being properly pursued.

On September 6, the FAA briefed Mr. Oberstar, Mr. Costello and

me on the Comair accident. On page 14 of the briefing packet that

they gave us, the FAA stated, ′′We have now ensured that all FAA

tower managers understand that during the midnight shift, regardless of low traffic levels, they should normally schedule one controller for the tower control function and one controller for the radar

control function.′′

However, on September 12, the Lexington Herald Leader published this story with the headline ′′Another Brush With Short

Staff, Indianapolis Almost Took Radar Duties for Lexington.′′ why

did the Lexington air traffic control tower nearly relinquish critical

radar duties not even a week after FAA officials personally assured

us that they had addressed the staffing problems at that tower?

It is not comforting that Lexington’s air traffic control tower ultimately may do with half of its normal number of controllers. And

that same night, between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m., in Louisville, Ken-
9

tucky, the airport did relinquish its radar duties to Indianapolis

due to a lack of controllers.

We must make a better effort to address these sorts of staffing

shortfalls before they require last-minute decisions like the ones I

just mentioned.

The Louisville incident is reminiscent of the staffing shortages

faced by the Lexington control tower on the morning of the Comair

accident. And so we should be concerned because the FAA has yet,

in my view, to address its staffing problems.

That is a safety issue, but the Comair incident raises other questions that I would like to address today. First, I want to know why

the FAA is issuing major safety policies via verbal guidance rather

than through written correspondence with its towers.

Second, I want to hear more about who is responsible to ensure

that pilots have an up-to-date understanding of runway layouts.

Finally, I want to ensure that the NTSB has all the resources

they need to conduct a comprehensive investigation of this tragedy.

Our Nation has the most aviation traffic in the world, as we have

seen, and we maintain the highest safety standards in the world.

That is something for us all to be proud of, but we must not, and

I am sure that we will not, rest on our laurels. Therefore, I hope

as we go forward that we work together to ensure that we are

doing everything possible to prevent tragedies like Comair 5191

from occurring again in the future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAYES. I thank the gentleman for most appropriate comments and remind him that the governor was in the back. He

didn’t even know what was going on.

Mr. Graves is recognized.

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

And I appreciate the opportunity to speak today and have this

hearing.

Aviation is obviously near and dear to many of us, and you know,

it is very important. As a pilot, I am concerned about our safety,

as I know you are. I am taking a little bit different focus. I am interested in general aviation and what is going on there and the

safety there.

I know this is one of the safest periods we have ever had in aviation. I think we can always do a little bit better, but I enjoy hearing—or I am looking forward to hearing today what the FAA’s

ideas are, and what their advancements in safety and what their

plans are to make the skies even safer; but I am particularly interested in regards to general aviation. The accident rate for general

aviation pilots has gone down, but I do believe too many accidents

are occurring.

There are a number of great programs out there that the FAA

has put out, a number of materials, guide books, a lot of information. I know a lot of the private organizations have put together

some great programs, mentoring programs, out there for new pilots; and the plethora of technology, which just continues to get

better, is making the skies safer all the time. But I want to make

sure that as we move forward and we modernize the system that

general aviation isn’t left behind and is very much considered, that
10

we don’t strangle them with so much regulation that it pushes

some aspects of general aviation out.

I am also additionally concerned about the implementation of the

new contract between the FAA and air traffic controllers. I am

afraid there could be some confusion among controllers. Our air

traffic controllers are obviously folks that guide a lot of aircraft

through a lot of different types of weather and through some of the

busiest airports in the world; and we want to make sure that—you

know, that they are considered as this contract moves forward.

But having said all that, I do want to thank and commend the

FAA and everybody from the Department of Transportation and

the NTSB for a fantastic job in terms of safety. This has been an

incredibly safe period of time. And I am proud of that aspect and

proud to be a part of it, but again looking forward to this hearing.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAYES. Thank the gentleman for his comments.

And Mr. Pascrell is recognized for any statement he might have.

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Far be it from me to

defend the press; I have a different slant.

Before I get into that, I want to commend Chairman Mica for

today, exposing what the committee has talked about in terms of

the detection of explosives in passenger luggage. It is a disgrace,

and it would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that the FAA and the

TSA better get their act together—yesterday.

Whether this Congress has the will to do what is necessary—and

I think the chairman laid out specifics and this committee discussed them. So we are not here to exchange pleasantries today;

I want you to know that.

I want to thank the Chair and the ranking member for putting

this together. It is unconscionable that to end a contractual agreement in the midst of a labor dispute is absolutely not only unacceptable, but has put people in jeopardy. And I want to address

that today and not soft-coat it.

The FAA’s self-described mission is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world. They are tasked with regulating the National Airspace System, to promote safety and reduce

and eliminate aviation accidents; that is their charge.

In 1997, in response to the TWA 800 crash, the White House

Commission on Aviation Safety and Security recommended that the

FAA set a target to reduce the airline fatal accident rate fivefold

in 10 years. Over the last 4 years, the fatal accident rate has

reached an all-time low. However, having a target rate for accidents that is anything more than zero is frankly a bit macabre.

One accident we would agree on either side of the table is one too

many.

The skies over New Jersey and New York are the busiest in the

world and are expected to grow even more crowded over the coming

years. By 2015, domestic passenger traffic will nearly double to 1

billion passengers annually. This creates not only an air traffic

nightmare, but a real safety concern.

The National Airspace Modernization effort launched by the

Reagan administration in 1981 was supposed to be completed by

1996 at a cost of $2.5 billion; $43.5 billion later, it is not. This committee has responsibilities of oversight and accountability. This ef-
11

fort has been fraught with significant cost overruns, delays, has

had numerous high-profile program failures. A full 10 years after

the original completion date, we are still awaiting modernization of

our airspace system. The GAO, certainly an objective agency in

government, in a review of the FAA’s work on this project, reported

this:

′′the FAA did not recognize the technical complexity of the effort,

realistically estimate the resources that would be required, and

adequately oversee its contractors’ activities or effectively control

system requirements,′′ unquote—quote-unquote.

In addition to poor planning, the FAA has failed to gain appropriate cooperation and involvement by the private sector, nor have

major stakeholders been sufficiently involved in the process. Aside

from the major system development, it is my understanding that

some of our nation’s major air traffic control centers do not yet

even have some of the most basic upgrades.

Last April, the Air Traffic Organization released a preliminary

cost estimate that found that the latest project would cost a total

of $18 billion. This is in addition to the $50 billion needed just to

sustain the existing air traffic control system between 2008–2025.

This subcommittee has shown consistent support for the goal of

modernization. We have been supportive of that; no one can point

to anything different. Yet our task is made more difficult by the

fact that a lot of time and funding has gone into this project, and

the results are sorely lacking.

Technological advancements have contributed to the remarkable

decline in fatal commercial air carrier accidents, but technology

cannot do it alone, and I would contend people are still the most

vital factor in air safety and in controlling the airways. You can

have all the technology in the world, and if the people don’t know

what they are doing or there are not enough of them or they don’t

get proper rest or we don’t give attention to it except when there

is an accident, there is something wrong. And there is something

wrong here, dramatically.

I think that this seems to have been a factor in the fatal crash

in Kentucky. According to those reports, there was only one air

traffic controller working at Lexington that morning; correct me if

I am wrong. The FAA acknowledged violating its own policies when

it assigned only one controller to the airport tower that morning.

Now, what would possess the FAA to do that? And at how many

more airports is that the case? And God forbid, if there is one, if

that individual male or female has a catastrophic illness all of a

sudden, who do we turn to? Who do we turn to?

It appears that one result of that violation—and we know what

the disaster was. So I believe that the FAA has come to grips with

some very serious air traffic controller staffing issues. And, really,

when I read that in the future we are going to change procedures

and technology and we are going to reduce the number of controllers—and I would like to know how we are going to do that, I am

trying to figure this out very carefully.

So I am sure that you will place me on the right path because

I think we all want the same thing; and if we do, then we can’t

play games about this and wait for tragedies. We are long past the
12

time when the redesign of the system should have been done, and

I am not satisfied that we are even close.

So, Mr. Chairman, I ask that you read The New York Times article, September 20, about reducing staffing levels. And nobody else

wants to talk about it.

I want to talk about it.

Mr. MICA. [presiding.] I thank the gentleman, and we will, I am

sure, be asking questions in that regard.

The gentleman from Texas has requested to be recognized. Mr.

Poe.

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for

holding this important hearing.

Down there in Texas, Bush Intercontinental Airport is in my district, the headquarters of Continental Airlines. So when it comes

to talking about aviation safety, of course, as all members here do,

I take these matters very seriously, because we are talking about

risking the lives of many people who are my constituents.

Recently some air traffic controllers from Bush Intercontinental

Airport have met with me—several times, in fact—regarding their

staffing levels. Bush Intercontinental Airport is the fourth fastest

growing airport in the world. It recently opened its fifth runway,

and traffic continues to increase to about 1,700 operations every

day.

On one hand, I am glad the airport is growing and serving more

customers. However, I am still concerned when I talk to air traffic

controllers, how their numbers are smaller than they should be.

Bush Intercontinental Airport is authorized to have 42 controllers;

they have 29. They need at least 28 to fully staff throughout every

day. This means they have one extra staffer to cover if someone

gets sick or goes on vacation.

This lack of staffing leads to unnecessary overtime being paid. It

also creates extra wear and tiredness on the air traffic controllers

as they pull additional hours to cover for each other.

And next year, 10 of those 29 will be eligible for retirement. That

is over one-third of the current workforce. However, they are only

expecting six, maybe eight new controllers to be added to the

tower. This situation isn’t helping retain our current aging controller workforce nor has it taken the staffing level up to the authorized 42 staffing level where it should be.

And this is not a unique problem at Bush. It occurs all over the

country with our aging air traffic controllers. So I am concerned

and curious to see what the FAA says about the air traffic controller staffing crisis and the aging air traffic controllers crisis that are

before our Nation.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.

Mr. MICA. Mr. DeFazio, you are recognized.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would

like to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman who

preceded me. Excellent questions, well poised; and I hope they can

be addressed.

I think we have a system under extraordinary stress when you

think about deregulation and bankruptcies that have resulted—the

economic pressures in the industry itself, the pressures that are
13

being exerted, both ideological and budgetary, by the current administration. Anywhere you look, the system is stressED.

Mechanics or mechanical work is being outsourced to foreign

countries because it is cheaper, not because it is safer, better, more

desirable or meets security needs. Noncertified repair facilities are

being used by desperate airlines. The FAA hasn’t taken adequate

steps to address that. I hope to hear about that.

Our air crews are under stress. I spent about half of a recent

flight talking to a flight attendant who was telling me how her

pension was going to be about $200 a month, and she had lost all

her stock and 401(k), let alone what has happened to the pilots and

others.

ATC is now under stress because of the arbitrary imposition of

work rules and an agreement by this administration. You know,

there are numerous reports there.

And Mr. Poe just talked about another aspect of that. The equipment is not adequate. We are way behind schedule in terms of updating the equipment for our ATC system. And now we have new

stresses, you know, the proliferation of private jets, the very light

jets, again which is a symptom of all the other problems because

anybody who can afford to is fleeing the commercial system, and

going to private jets to avoid it.

I think we have a system in crisis. I think it is only a matter

of time, you know, when and where it is going to break again. And

I am hoping that this hearing is the beginning of a plan to rebuild

the integrity at each and every level that I just described.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Additional members seeking time?

Mr. Matheson.

Mr. MATHESON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I associate myself with the previous remarks about stress on the system in addition to the staffing levels within the control towers.

I also want to raise the issue of staffing for maintenance, and I

want to refer to an article dated August 5, 2006, in the Salt Lake

Tribune about an incident that occurred at the Salt Lake Airport,

and I am just going to read a few passages from that during my

opening statement. It describes the following:

′′A sudden loss of both radio and radar communications Thursday

at the Salt Lake City International Airport occurred while six passenger jets were in the air sent air traffic controllers scrambling for

alternative communications to keep the skies safe.

′′Federal Aviation Administration technicians conducting routine

maintenance of a backup generator were to blame, but the controllers didn’t know that. All they knew was the weather was getting

worse.

′′’we were panicked,’ Brady Allred, a controller at the airport’s

Terminal Radar Approach Control tower said Friday, ’We had a

half dozen planes in the sky, a couple thousand people.’′′

Fortunately, no one was hurt in this incident.

′′Allred said the scene was barely controlled desperation as controllers broke out cell phones, whose use FAA prohibits in the towers, to seek help from other control centers and Hill Air Force

Base,′′ which is nearby the Salt Lake City airport.
14

′′’we had no ability to see the airplanes or to talk to them,’ said

Allred, a spokesman for the controllers’ union. ’we have battery

backup, we have a huge generator, we have all kinds of

redundancies but for some reason they didn’t work.’

′′’that’s because they were all turned off,’ said Allen Kenitzer, an

FAA spokesperson based in Seattle.

′′’to put it bluntly, this was human error,’ he said.

′′the outage was planned. Technicians who were testing a backup

generator ended up turning off all power to the radar and the radio

system.

′′told Friday the reason for the outage, Allred,′′ from the controllers union, ′′fumed, ’Why pick a day when thunderstorms are blowing through to test a backup generator?’

He pointed out the only bright side was ′′relatively few flights

were coming in and out of the airport at the time. ’had the outage

occurred 45 minutes earlier or 45 minutes later, it would have been

chaos,’ he said.

Now, Kenitzer, the spokesman for the FAA, ′′said it was a management decision′′—and this is the key to all my comments here—

′′it was a management decision to test the backup system during

the day instead of at night, when it would have been more expensive.′′

Now, he said, ′′While pilots couldn’t have landed on visual flight

rules because they couldn’t have seen the runway through the

clouds, said Kenitzer, safety was never compromised. There was

never a total break in communications,′′ according to the spokesman from the FAA.

′′Mr. Allred,′′ from the controllers union, ′′said he is still gathering information on the power outage. During the past 5 years,

there were other situations in which controllers lost a critical component, but losing both radio and radar ’was the worst,’ he said,

and he denied the FAA’s claim ’that there was no danger.’ he said,

’That’s what the FAA always says, but the reality was, it was

scary.’ he said, ’Safety was compromised.’′′

I just bring this to light because I think this is an incident that

reflects a broader issue here about scheduled maintenance and an

effort to try to cut costs; and I think we are compromising safety,

and we have a classic example right here.

I look forward to hearing the witnesses’ testimony. And I wanted

to make sure they were aware of what happened in Salt Lake City

in August of this year.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Do any other members seek recognition at this time?

If not, what we will do is turn to our first panel of witnesses, and

we have on panel Mr. Nick Sabatini, who is the Associate Administrator For Aviation Safety with the FAA; Mr. Thomas Haueter,

Deputy Director of the Office of Aviation Safety at the National

Transportation Safety Board; Mr. Gerald Dillingham, Director of

Physical Infrastructure Issues with the United States Government

Accountability Office; and we have Mr. Todd Zinser, Acting Inspector General at the Office of Inspector General, the U.S. Department

of Transportation.
15

Welcome. I think most of you have been before us before. If you

have anything lengthy or a report you want to be to made part of

the record, just seek recognition through the Chair, and we will accommodate you. We won’t hold you to the j5 minutes, but as you

can see, there will be some questions from members who are in attendance today.

So, with that, let’s turn to our number one expert on aviation

safety, Mr. Sabatini with the FAA.

Welcome back, and you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS SABATINI, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Mr. SABATINI. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Costello,

members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you

today to discuss the current state of Federal Aviation Administration aviation safety oversight.

My primary message to you today is that despite the tragic accident that took place in Lexington, Kentucky, last month, the safety

record of aviation in the United States is extraordinary. And while

the Kentucky accident serves as an important reminder that our

work as safety professionals is never done, we remain in the midst

of the safest period in aviation history.

In the past 3 years, U.S. scheduled air carriers have transported

approximately 2.2 billion passengers, or 7 times the population of

our United States. Over that time period, we have had a total of

78 passenger fatalities. All of us who work for or with aviation professionals can take pride in the results of our collective efforts, especially given the economic turbulence that has been experienced

by U.S. carriers in recent years.

I am here to admit to you that while I take great pride in the

current state of aviation safety, the FAA has no intention of becoming complacent. Aviation is extremely dynamic, and the FAA must

be prepared to not only keep pace with, but stay ahead of changes

in the industry.

In the early 1990’s, the Boeing Company projected that if the

aviation industry did not take strong preventive measures in safety

initiatives in commercial aviation, the projected growth in the operations over the next 20 years would increase the number of hullloss accidents worldwide to approximately one every week. This

was a wake-up call to all who work in and care about aviation.

I would like to direct your attention to the chart currently on the

screen. It shows an accident rate that not only has not risen, as

Boeing feared, but has declined appreciably. Because of work done

collectively by government, industry and operators today, a fatal

accident occurs about every 15 to 16 million commercial flights, an

accomplishment about which we can all be proud.

By no means do I want to downplay the Kentucky accident, but

it must be put into context so the flying public understands that

our system is extremely safe. In fact, pilots are actually safer on

the job than when they are not at work.

At about the same time, both the White House Commission on

Aviation Safety and Security and the National Civil Aviation Review Commission recommended the adoption of a goal of an 80 per-
16

cent reduction in the fatal accident rate by 2007. FAA and industry

embraced this recommendation and have made significant inroads

in meeting the goal. In virtually all segments of the aviation industry, the accident trend lines are going in the right direction.

The FAA sets annual goals for itself, and we are meeting them.

We know the system is safe, but it is difficult to measure the nonevents, the accidents that did not happen, the headlines that were

not written, the lives that were not lost. Only over time can we

begin to quantify how our safety initiatives are working. We can

plot data points to represent when certain safety initiatives were

implemented and then we can document the absence of failure, the

lack of accidents.

This brings me to my second chart, which does just that. I would

like to bring your attention to the blue shaded area. It represents

the accidents that did not happen. As you can see, it tells quite a

dramatic story. We are no longer dealing with ′′common cause′′ accidents.

As the name suggests, common cause accidents are a series of accidents that were caused by a similar problem, such as engine failure, controlled flight into terrain and loss of control, to say—to just

list a few examples.

Now that we have tackled the obvious safety problems that cause

multiple accidents, we are dealing with accidents that are each

caused by a unique set of circumstances. We are just as committed

to preventing these accidents, but due to the distinctive nature of

each accident, it poses a greater challenge.

I have stated repeatedly that FAA must not and will not become

complacent when it comes to finding ways to improve an already

safe system. The one certainty we must face is that humans make

mistakes. It is the human condition. Therefore, our focus must be

on making the total system more error tolerant. We have done a

lot to create a series of intertwined defenses to trap the human

error.

This continues to be the challenge before us today. Working with

my colleagues at this table, Congress, and our partners in the aviation industry, I am confident that safety can continue to be improved. We are moving into an exciting period of aviation with the

advent of new aircraft types and systems. FAA’s bottom line has

always been and will continue to be that safety will never be compromised.

Mr. Chairman, I know of your commitment and this Committee’s

commitment to finding solutions to the safety challenges we face.

This afternoon I want you to understand the strength of my commitment and the commitment that exists within FAA at all levels

of the agency to do what needs to be done to make a safe system

safer.

This concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer

your questions at any time.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. And we will hold the questions until we

have heard from everyone.

And we have Thomas Haueter, Deputy Director of the Office of

Safety with the NTSB.

Welcome, sir, and you are recognized.
17

STATEMENT OF THOMAS HAUETER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AVIATION SAFETY, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY BOARD

Mr. HAUETER. Good afternoon, Chairman Mica, Member Costello

and other members of the committee.

Mr. MICA. Pull that mike up as close as you can. I want to hear

every word.

Mr. HAUETER. Thank you.

Since becoming an independent agency, the Safety Board has

issued over 3,500 aviation safety recommendations. Eighty-two percent of these recommendations have been adopted by the FAA or

the aviation industry.

We believe that through the Safety Board’s accident investigations and recommendations, the United States enjoys the safest

commercial air transportation system in the world. However, as the

recent accident in Lexington, Kentucky, shows, we must maintain

our vigilance and continue to find ways to make this very safe system even safer.

The investigation of the accident at Lexington is ongoing and no

recommendations or conclusions have been issued.

Runway incursions continue to be an area of concern. On July

2006, a United 737 passenger jet and an Atlas Air 747 cargo plane

nearly collided at O’Hare International Airport. Only the evasive

action by the pilot of the 737 prevented the accident.

The runway incursion rate has not appreciably changed in the

United States in the last 4 years, about 5.2 runway incursions per

billion tower operations. Simulations of actual incursions show that

the alerts may occur 8 to 11 seconds before potential collision. In

recent incidents, controllers were not alerted in time to be effective.

The investigation of the TWA 800 accident found that fuel tank

design and certification that relies solely on the elimination of

every ignition source, while accepting the existance of fuel tank

flammability, is fundamentally flawed. In May 2006, a fuel vapor

explosion occurred in the left wing of a Transmile Airline 727 in

India resulting in substantial damage to the wing. The Safety

Board believes that operating transport category airplanes with

flammable fuel air vapors in fuel tanks represents an avoidable

risk.

The comment period on FAA’s proposed rulemaking for flammability reduction is now closed. We hope that the lessons learned

from TWA will be carried forward to prevent a similar accident.

Aircraft icing is two different types of icing events, inflight icing

and icing that occurs on the ground, more commonly called upper

wing icing. In January of 2006, an American Eagle Saab 340 encountered icing conditions in departed controlled flight. Fortunately

there were no injuries.

An example of ground icing is the December 2004 accident involving Canada Air 600 that crashed shortly after takeoff from

Montrose, Colorado. The flight crew failed to ensure that the airplane’s wings were free of ice and snow contamination that accumulated while the airplane was on the ground.

Industry continues to address these types of events on a case-bycase basis rather than incorporating standards as recommended by

the Safety Board.
18

The above cases are but a small sample of the Safety Board’s efforts; there are additional areas of concern, such as landing distance calculations, emergency medical service aircraft, fatigue, turbine engine disk failure, helicopter servo actuators, air cargo, unmanned aerial vehicles or systems, flight recorders, and air tour

operations.

As I previously mentioned, the United States enjoys a very safe

transportation system, and the Safety Board and staff are dedicated to continue to find ways to make aviation travel even safer.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

And now we will hear from Gerald Dillingham with the U.S.

GAO office.

Welcome and you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF GERALD DILLINGHAM, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL

INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Thank you, Chairman Mica, Mr. Costello, Mr.

Oberstar.

My testimony today focuses on three areas. The first is FAA’s

safety management system. The second area is training of the staff

that are responsible for implementing that safety management system. And third is some of the key safety-related challenges that are

on the horizon for FAA.

With regard to the safety management system, the safety management system includes a complex array of people, programs and

processes. It also represents a major cultural shift for FAA from

the old ′′go out and kick every tire′′ approach to one that has focused on risk identification and mitigation through systems safety.

I think that the long-term trends we see in the decline of commercial and cargo accidents, as well as a decline in serious runway incursions, are attributable to that system’s approach, as well as the

efforts of the wider aviation community.

Mr. Chairman, I am, however, concerned that some of the recent

developments may be the early warnings of a system under strain.

The system is again experiencing widespread delays. There have

been four fatal commercial aviation accidents this fiscal year, and

FAA will not meet its commercial air carrier safety performance

target for fiscal year 2006.

General aviation continues to be involved in a significant number

of fatal accidents every year. And although the cargo accident rate

has been on a downward trend over the last few years, according

to FAA, it is still as much as six times that of commercial aviation.

There has also been a spike in the number of air ambulance accidents. Over the last 3 years, there were 55 air ambulance accidents

with 54 fatalities, the highest number of accidents since the 1980’s.

FAA has also missed its performance target for the last 3 years for

reducing the number of operational errors.

Regarding my second issue, the training for safety-related staff,

GAO’s work for this committee has shown that FAA has made

training an integral part of its safety oversight system and generally follows effective management practices for its training pro-
19

grams. Where we have made recommendations for improvement,

FAA has generally agreed with those recommendations.

With regard to my final issue, safety challenges on the horizon,

the broadest and perhaps most difficult challenge will be to continue and complete the cultural transformation that is under way

at the Agency, that is, transforming the safety oversight program

from a direct oversight approach to the safety management system

approach. We believe that this cultural change will take several

years; and for FAA to know whether the cultural change is effective, it will have to increase both the quantity and quality of the

data available to evaluate the initiative.

A more immediate challenge is the replacement of over 10,000,

or 70 percent, of the controller workforce over the next 10 years.

This staffing situation may even be more acute than was first realized since new data shows that the controllers are retiring sooner

than estimated.

A similar situation exists for safety inspectors. FAA anticipates

losing over 1,100 safety inspectors over the next 5 years. This will

represent an average loss of about 200 inspectors per year.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Costello, and members of the subcommittee, the early indications from some of the studies that we

currently have under way for this subcommittee suggest that the

changing aviation landscape would pose additional challenges for

FAA. For example, it is expected that within the next few years

several hundred very light jets, along with unmanned aerial vehicles and vehicles participating in the emerging space tourism industry, will be operating in the National Airspace System. All of

these developments will add to FAA’s workload, require additional

FAA staff and expertise and possibly put further strains on the system.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

And now we will hear from Mr. Todd Zinser, Acting Inspector

General at the Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of

Transportation.

Welcome, and you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF TODD ZINSER, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL,

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION

Mr. ZINSER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Costello, Mr. Oberstar, members of the subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity

to testify today and offer our observations on how to make a safe

system even safer.

Today, I would like to highlight three areas that characterize the

current aviation safety landscape and current challenges, and request that my full statement be submitted for the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. ZINSER. First, FAA is making progress in using risk-based

systems to carry out its safety oversight mission, but a lot of work

remains. Facing a rapidly changing industry, FAA needs effective

systems to help target inspector resources to areas of greatest risk

and proactively spot problems before they can contribute to accidents.
20

To its credit, FAA has developed risk-based systems for its oversight of air carriers, repair stations, and manufacturers, but these

systems are at different levels of maturity and by no means at an

end state. FAA’s old inspection system focused more on compliance

regardless of risk. For example, FAA inspectors would schedule and

conduct hundreds of inspections even where no significant problems were found.

FAA’s risk-based systems rely on data analysis to identify where

the greatest risks are in an air carrier’s operations, for example,

and inspectors can then use that analysis to target their inspections to those areas. In our view, FAA is moving in the right direction with risk-based systems, but substantial challenges remain.

This approach requires a significant cultural change because inspectors may not be accustomed to working with data analysts and

using data analysis to find safety problems. FAA’s risk-based systems need to be flexible enough to adapt to significant changes in

the industry, such as the greater use of outside repair stations by

air carriers to perform maintenance and the greater use by aircraft

manufacturers of outside suppliers, many in foreign countries, for

the parts and components for their products.

My second point is that there are several key trends and issues

that need FAA’s attention. My written statement addresses five

issues. I would like to highlight two in particular. The first is noncertificated repair facilities.

Last December, we identified a trend in air carriers’ use of external maintenance facilities that FAA was unaware of: the use of repair facilities that have not been certificated by FAA to perform

critical and scheduled aircraft maintenance. These facilities are not

covered under FAA’s routine oversight program because FAA believes this responsibility rests with the air carriers.

Even though the maintenance performed at these facilities is approved by a licensed mechanic, the fact is that noncertificated facilities do not have the same regulatory requirements as FAA-certificated repair stations and yet perform the same type of work.

Air carriers have used these facilities for years, but it was widely

believed they only did minor work, for example, checking oil levels

or changing tires. However, some of these facilities perform critical

maintenance, including engine replacements.

FAA agrees it needs to gather more information on the type of

work these facilities actually perform. We think FAA needs to move

more quickly to determine the range of actions that will be needed

to improve oversight.

Second is inspector staffing. Much attention has been focused on

controller staffing, but FAA safety inspectors also face a surge in

retirements. By 2010, half the current inspector workforce will be

eligible to retire. Right now, FAA does not have a staffing model

that would provide an effective means of determining inspector

staffing needs or where they are needed. For example, FAA has one

inspector assigned to Des Moines, Iowa, where his assigned carrier

averages six flights per day, but does not have an inspector assigned to Chicago, Illinois, where the same air carrier averages 298

flights per day.

It will be important for FAA to have a systematic way for allocating inspector resources in response to changes in the industry.
21

My third point this afternoon is that FAA must continue to emphasize and address the risks of runway incursions and operational

errors. To its credit, FAA has taken significant steps to reduce runway incursions. The total number of runway incursions has decreased from a high of 407 in 2001 to 327 in 2005. However, since

2003, the number of runway incursions has flattened out and very

serious runway incursions continue to occur. We are currently looking at three airports that have recently experienced higher numbers of runway incursions and will be reporting our findings later

this year.

While FAA has reduced the number of runway incursions, it has

not had the same success with operational errors. This past year,

there were 1,489 operational errors, which is the highest number

of these errors reported in the last 6 years. Seventy-three of those

errors were serious incidents, compared to only 40 reported in fiscal year 2004.

Operational errors, especially the serious ones, are important

safety metrics, but we urge caution in making year-to-year comparisons because, at the vast majority of facilities, FAA relies primarily on self-reporting. As a result, we have reported that the

prior-year numbers were subject to underreporting and, in some

cases, systematically and deliberately ignored.

FAA is taking actions to improve the reporting of operational errors. For instance, as a result of our recommendations, FAA now

requires towers and TRACONs to conduct random audits of radar

data to identify operational errors, and FAA is also developing an

automated reporting system for TRACONs. The imperatives are to

make sure that operational errors are accurately reported at all facilities, to establish a good baseline to measure progress, and to examine root causes.

That concludes my summary, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased

to answer any questions you or other members of the committee

may have.

Mr. MICA. OK. We will start with some questions. First, to Mr.

Sabatini.

OK, let’s get right to a couple of the key questions here. I keep

hearing different numbers. I heard Mr. Poe talking about 42 versus

29. We have different air traffic control people running around, giving different figures.

What, before the committee, is your current onboard number of

controllers; do you know? I mean, within—I see your target is

14,670 in fiscal year 2006. How many do we have onboard? It says

as of September 3, there were 14,537?

Mr. SABATINI. As of this time, Mr. Chairman, we have 14,500;

and we had in the pipeline——

Mr. MICA. 14,500?

Mr. SABATINI. Yes.

Mr. MICA. And you are authorized and you are targeted for

14,670; that is your target. So that is 100 different. You have

those——

Mr. SABATINI. 14,500 onboard now, and we are in the process——

Mr. MICA. Well, the numbers I am hearing again—is this because folks are using old numbers or——
22

Mr. SABATINI. Well, let me say, sir, that even with our organization, aviation safety, the numbers are fluid in the sense that while

you are hiring people, you are also losing people.

Mr. MICA. But we are within a 100 or 200?

Mr. SABATINI. Absolutely. Absolutely sir.

And I would tell you that the hiring is moving along at a very

brisk pace. In fact, we recognized what has been highlighted by

some folks in terms of the retirement. In fact, instead of hiring the

930 people that we had originally planned to hire, we are going to

hire 1,100 people to accommodate for that change.

Mr. MICA. OK. So that other question was, with the anticipated

numbers of retirements, are you preparing—you are prepared for

that?

Mr. SABATINI. Oh, absolutely.

Mr. MICA. And you have got those numbers covered?

Mr. SABATINI. Yes.

Mr. MICA. All right.

Just for the record—I don’t want to dwell on the Lexington situation, but for the record, I was told we have over 100 airports with

commercial flights, that have commercial flights landing in them,

without a tower or without an air traffic controller. Is that correct?

Mr. SABATINI. That is correct. The rules——

Mr. MICA. Just for the record, could you just tell me—again, do

you know those numbers? Is it over a hundred?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, I don’t know the number precisely, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. MICA. But it is over 100, there is no air traffic controller, no

tower, and we have planes taking off and landing safely?

Mr. SABATINI. We have air carriers operating into and out of airports where there may not be an air traffic controller, and I have—

the actual figure is 145.

Mr. MICA. One hundred forty-five. And I have repeated this to

the press and to the public, I have not seen it published one time.

Another question, I have heard a lot about the 9-hours-off requirement. That is for air traffic controllers between shifts?

Mr. SABATINI. They are required to have 8 hours between their

shifts.

Mr. MICA. Eight hours?

Mr. SABATINI. Eight hours.

Mr. MICA. Eight hours. How does that compare with pilots?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, it is essentially the same. By regulation, the

difference is, we have a regulation which is part of the CFR system

for pilots, and they are required to have a prescribed set of hours

for rest. The difference is internally; it is an internal order that dictates the amount of time that——

Mr. MICA. So if they made it 16 hours for pilots and air traffic

controllers, I mean, could somebody just go out and pull an allnight drunk? I mean, is there a requirement they come to work

ready to work?

Mr. SABATINI. There is a requirement that they come fit for duty.

However, as you well know, Mr. Chairman, there is no way that

we can regulate what people do on their own personal time.

Mr. MICA. Do you recommend a change in that policy for pilots

and air traffic controllers?
23

Mr. SABATINI. A change in what, sir?

Mr. MICA. The hours.

Mr. SABATINI. Well, I believe that the system has provided us

with the safest air transportation system in the world. In fact, we

are the envy of the world. So I would be very cautious about changing the formula that is already producing a very safe system.

Mr. MICA. OK. We have had some areas where we have had

some problems. Business and corporate jets are one, and—do you

want to comment on that? Air ambulances, I think, was cited as

another.

Mr. SABATINI. Well, there is—as you know, Mr. Chairman, and

as has been mentioned by the Inspector General and Mr.

Dillingham from GAO, we have moved to a data-driven risk management approach in systems safety. And we target those areas

that present as we go through our surveillance, using those systems that present areas of risk.

We have identified an area of risk with emergency medical services, particularly in the helicopter community, and have addressed

that in a very effective way. We engaged with the industry, starting back in 2004; and if you look at the data, you will see that having worked with the industry, having identified the number of actions that they voluntarily put in place, which is an expeditious

way to deal with requirements that should be regulatory, but—we

are going to follow up with the regulations, but the fact is, the industry and FAA work together, and today we have essentially cut

in half the number of accidents that that particular category and

group of users was experiencing.

Mr. MICA. Well, final question: Mr. Dillingham, we went to a

risk-based system, which was something that I supported. People

said the sky was going to fall, planes were going to fall out of the

air in changing that out.

I think that the evidence that has been shown here today is dramatic, a dramatic safety record. And also using our resources to go

after seen risk, should we have any change in that? And I know

you have spoken to making certain that we have inspectors, et

cetera, but any change in the risk-based approach, Mr. Dillingham?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Chairman Mica, I don’t think at this point we

can talk about having change, but we can certainly talk about making sure that it is fully implemented; and part of that implementation should include the ability to have information that will allow

FAA to evaluate these systems and determine if they are actually

effective.

Mr. MICA. OK.

Mr. ZINSER. Yes, I would agree with Dr. Dillingham that the key

is to take the systems that the FAA has developed and make sure

that they are implemented.

I think there is more work to be done on suppliers, and there is

more work to be done on developing the system for repair stations.

The system for air carriers is pretty mature at this point. By the

end of next year, FAA should have most air carriers under the system.

Mr. MICA. Mm-hmm. I have serious questions about the incursion, runway incursion issue; also questions about this outsourcing
24

and the level and how we approach that. I don’t have time to get

into all that, but I want to get back to that.

And finally, Mr. Haueter, when do you think you will be done,

any idea, on that Lexington report?

Mr. HAUETER. We are hoping to have it done within a year of the

accident, and we are seeing if we can make it shorter than that.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Costello, you are on until we vote. Incidentally,

there are—how many votes are pending, three or four votes?

Three votes. So what we will do is try to let Mr. Costello consume some time. Then we will recess until 4:00—I think it is going

to take until then—and then come back and grill, then grill what

is left over.

Mr. COSTELLO. So it is clear for members, we are coming back?

Mr. MICA. Yeah, we are, 4:00, and then we will take them, bam,

bam, bam.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

[Resuming]

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I hope to get some answers as well. In my opening statement, I made it very clear that

several concerns that I have that both the inspector general and

the GAO addressed and brought up as their concerns about the

outsourcing of maintenance and Mr. Sabatini, first question, you,

as I indicated in my opening remarks, there is no question that the

U.S. air carriers are outsourcing more of their maintenance work

than they have in the past. I think the statistic was from 1996

about 37 percent of their expenses for maintenance was outsourced.

It is 62 percent and climbing as we speak, and I think we all know

why. It is because of the labor costs.

The statistics and numbers I have, and I am not going to quibble

over a few, but I understand that your inspectors were foreign repair stations that my understanding is that you have 68 inspectors

that have the responsibility of inspecting 688 facilities. I told you

of a conversation I had with one of your people out of the Singapore

office where they have six inspectors to do 99 facilities.

First question, and we have limited time, although we are coming back. My first question is this: In your opinion, do you have

enough inspectors to adequately provide oversight to facilities, both

here in the United States, domestic facilities and in foreign countries?

Mr. SABATINI. Mr. Costello, let me first say that the former Inspector General Ken Mead, as well as the acting Inspector General

today, has stated emphatically that it is not the quality of maintenance that is of a concern, but rather the ability to provide adequate oversight. That is a significant statement because if you recall, there was a period of time where there was concern about the

quality of maintenance, simply because it was being outsourced.

Now that we can put that aside, we can address the hard facts of

the oversight and how best to do that.

I would also say that we will never compromise safety ever. So

what we are doing with the resources that we have is identify priorities. And our number one priority is the continuing oversight of

those certificated entities that are already issued authority to perform work.

Mr. COSTELLO. I understand that.
25

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. But answer my question, if you will. Do you have

enough inspectors to adequately inspect domestic maintenance facilities, repair stations and foreign stations as well?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, I have, in the foreign arena, several combinations of oversight.

Mr. COSTELLO. Your people tell me that you don’t, so I want to

know if you believe that you do.

Mr. SABATINI. Well, when you have to draw comparison, Mr.

Costello, in with the foreign repair facilities, those inspectors only

have responsibility for the oversight of repair stations, period. That

is all they do. And on average, they have about 10 certificates that

they need to have that they have responsibility to conduct oversight. Here domestically, our inspectors have more than just 10 certificates. They on average have about 14 to 20 certificates.

So the attention is divided here. But I will tell you that the number is adequate to assure the level of safety where there is a consequence when you prioritize the way we do. There is a consequence in new applicants, and for the past several years, we have

informed the industry that we could not process new applications

because once a new applicant is issued a certificate, it becomes an

ongoing responsibility for oversight.

Mr. COSTELLO. Can you state emphatically that with the foreign

repair stations, that every foreign repair station has physically one

of our FAA inspectors visit their facilities at least one time during

the year.

Mr. SABATINI. There are locations where because we have maintenance implementation agreements with——

Mr. COSTELLO. So there are facilities where we go a whole year

without physically sending an inspector to that facility. That is

what I have been told by your people.

Mr. SABATINI. That is true, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that acceptable?

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, it is because we have, through the bilateral

aviation’s safety agreement with these countries, with whom we

have determined are competent authorities, and we have examined

those countries up close and personal, so to speak, and have determined that they have the wherewithal to execute, on our behalf,

the oversight that we have ordinarily had to exercise.

Mr. COSTELLO. Regarding the report issued in this past December by the IG, air carriers use of non-certificated repair facilities,

they were criticized, the FAA, for oversight and they said that the

work performed at non-certificated repair facilities, they criticize

the agency and said that you are not providing adequate oversight

for the non-certificated facilities. I want to know your response to

that, and number two, what have you done about that?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, I will tell you that I always welcome the constructive criticism we receive from my colleagues.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you disagree or agree?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, we can certainly improve on the number of

surveillance activities. But I want to caution you that this is not

a numbers game. It is identifying risk and using system safety

principles that will take us to those places where we will have to

devote our resources. And having said that, there is no data to sug-
26

gest that there is an untoward occurrence about to take place because of uncertificated entities.

Mr. COSTELLO. The last before, I think, we have to run vote, the

IG has said that 28 percent of the current inspector workforce is

eligible to retire this year, and by 2010, half of the inspector work

force is eligible for retirement. And when and how is the agency

going about hiring inspectors?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, I will tell you this year consider, sir, considering the new growth and the back filling, our organization has

hired 4,040 inspectors. But I would caution you when people banty

about the term eligible for retirement, our organization is an organization that hires very experienced people and they come generally speaking from an industry where they have already completed one career and starting a new career with us. So you might

say that from the day they start with us, they are eligible for retirement that certainly was the case for me. When I joined the

FAA, I was eligible for retirement.

Mr. COSTELLO. So let me ask the question. When the IG says 28

percent of eligible for retirement, now you are saying that they are

eligible for retirement under a different standard that you are looking at versus the IG. Explain that.

Mr. SABATINI. Well, they may be eligible for retirement but you

will find that they have short tenure with the FAA and are planning to stay. These people that we have hired, and I personally

talked to these folks. They are here, they have some—many have

military and previous government service and they come and they

have the age and the period of time necessary for retirement and

then can, if they choose to with FERS, which allows you to retire

with as little as 5 years, but I can tell you practically speaking Mr.

Costello they do not retire. They stay for a long period of time.

Mr. COSTELLO. We will follow up. But I do want to point out for

the record, and you can correct me if I am wrong when we come

back, that the FAA has seen more retirements in the area of air

traffic controllers than they anticipated.

Mr. SABATINI. Well, I was addressing the safety organization.

Mr. COSTELLO. What I was saying if your agency was wrong in

anticipating how many traffic controllers would retire, how would

we—would be reasonable to assume that when we say 28 percent

are eligible for retirement, but you don’t anticipate that—that the

agency may be wrong again.

Mr. SABATINI. I don’t think the agency is wrong. We—I would

agree that those are the numbers that represent the number of

people eligible for retirement, but they may not necessarily retire,

and that is the only point I wish to make.

Mr. MICA. We will stand in recess until 4 o’clock and then we

will continue. Thank you.

[recess.]

Mr. MICA. The subcommittee will come back to order. The witnesses will please take their places and see if Mr. Costello had any

concluding questions. He got cut a little short. We don’t want to deprive him any opportunity to question the witnesses.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. Dr. Dillingham, let me ask you the

same question. The same questions, number one about staffing

issues, both the GAO and the IG have either criticized or com-
27

mented or questioned, number one, do we have enough inspectors

for the adequate oversight both domestically and at foreign repair

stations. So I would ask you, one, do you believe that the FAA at

their current staffing level if they have adequate staff to perform

adequate oversight?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Mr. Costello, I think that we haven’t done any

work on the foreign repair stations, but with regard to inspectors

staffing, we can’t tell you whether they have enough, and I don’t

think FAA can tell you whether they have enough either, because

there is no staffing standard for that position. I think the National

Academy of Sciences has been asked to do some work to sort of

help FAA along in developing a staffing standard.

Mr. COSTELLO. I would ask the same question of Mr. Zinser.

Mr. ZINSER. I would say two things. I would agree that a model

is needed and the work that the National Academy of Sciences was

commissioned to do should help FAA get to such a model and establish some staffing standards, but I would also say that the staffing levels underscore the importance of a risk-based approach here

because you are never going to have enough inspectors to be at the

repair stations 100 percent of the time and to see everything that

is going on.

You really have to target risk areas. And so I think between the

staffing model that they are working on and this risk-based approach, FAA will have adequate staffing levels for inspectors.

Mr. COSTELLO. Before we go on to other members, let me give

both Dr. Dillingham and you, Mr. Zinser, the opportunity to comment on any of the other either GAO or IG observations concerning

staffing foreign repair stations or anything in general that you

would like to address at this hearing.

Dr. Dillingham.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I would just like to reiterate that we, too, agree

that we have the safest aviation system in the world. However,

again, I want to also agree with Mr. DeFazio when he said that

some of the things that we are currently seeing, we need to take

them as early warnings of a system in distress in that we need to

address those before they become critical issues in our system.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Zinser.

Mr. ZINSER. I would comment on a couple of things, Mr. Costello.

One is on the use of repair stations by air carriers, the increasing

use of outsourced maintenance. And Mr. Sabatini is correct. We are

not saying thatthat, in and of itself, outsourcing poses a safety

issue. What we are saying is that you have to provide oversight

where the maintenance is performed, and the maintenance is moving to outside repair stations.

And our recommendations on repair stations to FAA included

things as simple as finding out where air carriers are sending their

planes for repairs and what repairs are being done. Let us get the

data and then see what the implications of that are.

So that is a key point for us.

My second issue would be non-certificated repair facilities. If

there are 5,000 certificated repair stations and FAA knows where

they are and who they are, they cannot say the same thing about

non-certificated repair facilities. I think it took everybody by sur-
28

prise when we went out and found the types of maintenance being

performed at these non-certificated facilities.

The common wisdom or the common thinking was that these

non-certificated facilities were being used to do emergency repairs

or small repairs and, lo and behold, we find that the airlines are

using these non-certificated facilities for some major repairs. And

our only point there is to find out who they are and what repairs

or maintenance they are actually performing because when we

went out and looked at 19 carriers, and their maintenance vendor

lists, we found the use of non-certificated repair stations ranges

from 1 percent of the maintenance vendors these carriers were

using up to—to up to 39 percent. We think that this is an area that

FAA has to get on top of: who they are using and what they are

using them for.

Mr. COSTELLO. Final question, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Haueter, I

want to ask you about the May 16th, 2006 letter to the FAA regarding the runway incursion at Chicago O’Hare Airport, and the

NTSB referenced the issue of air traffic controller fatigue. In your

view, is this controller fatigue an issue that needs to be examined

more closely?

Mr. HAUETER. In the event in Chicago, the particular air controller had a sleep disorder and he was fatigued. It was a kind of a

different situation than what we normally see. Clearly, in our investigations, if we find fatigue, we will highlight it, make recommendations and so we look into those areas.

Mr. COSTELLO. Very good. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, and I guess we will hear now from Mr.

Hayes. Are you ready?

Mr. HAYES. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Zinser, you posed an interesting issue. Mr. Sabatini, could

you comment on his observation for the sake of the audience and

the press, distinguish between certificated and non-certificated repair stations?

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, sir. Actually for precision and accuracy, there

is no such thing as an uncertificated repair station. There are facilities that are authorized to be used by an entity such as an air

carrier, which is certificated and a repair station can outsource.

So both of those entities can outsource to those facilities that

have a capability that those entities, certificated entities do not

have. So for example, if an air carrier wishes to have something

down, for which they themselves do not wish to take on or wish to

farm out, they can go to an organization and let us use, for example, an engine change at a location where they do not have their

own facility there.

They can’t contract with an organization that has repair men or

A&P certificated mechanics and they can arrange under certain

conditions under the air carriers quality control program, which

means that the air carrier continues to be responsible for its total

system. It has already been said. We will never have enough inspectors to be everywhere. But quality management systems, safety

management systems, deal with system level design and attributes

that assure that no matter where the work is being done, whether

it is being done on the property by the air carriers, or it is being

done by someone that the air carrier contracted with.
29

It is then the air carriers’ responsibility to ensure that that entity has the wherewithal, the facilities and the knowledge and the

appropriate tools to do what it is going to do on behalf of that carrier within that very narrow piece that that carrier is asking it to

do.

So we may not be present at every one of those entities that do

work for air carriers, but we certainly can improve on that, but it

is going to be driven by risk, data that identifies, hazard analysis.

Identify the risks and to date, the data does not suggest a significant change in what we are doing today.

But we are always about continuous improvements. System safety is about continuous improvement, and I welcome the constructive criticism that we receive from our colleagues here. But you

have got to keep it in perspective.

Mr. HAYES. To follow-up on the question. The public is present

here, as is the press. Is it a correct statement to say that when aircraft, airline or any other type maintenance is done, and it is done

correctly, then it will be done by certificated mechanics, an A&P,

which stands for Air Frame and Power Plant, or A&I, aircraft inspection? Not by boat mechanic or truck mechanic. Is that correct?

Mr. SABATINI. There are circumstances under which certain work

must be done under the supervision of a person who is certified by

the FAA. So there are circumstances when work that is not critical

can be done by someone who is not necessarily certificated by the

FAA, but is under the supervision of the carrier’s system, but they

would not have the responsibility to return, for example, an aircraft to service. That can only be done by a certificated person. So

it is low-level work that doesn’t—that does not require the knowledge and the skills and the abilities that we expect from a certificated mechanic.

Mr. HAYES. And when that is done, let us say it is a person who

is learning, it still has to be inspected and signed off by the station

inspectors. Again, I think it is important that people know that

various and sundry things in place, again, to address the safety

issues. Point for clarification, not to take sides in this very, very

important discussion.

Mr. Haueter, has the NTSB ever investigated an aviation accident where the air traffic controller staffing level or air traffic controller fatigue was determined to be a contributing cause of the accident? I think I just heard Mr. Costello’s question answered or

somebody said there was a sleep disorder issue that there was.

Mr. HAUETER. There was a runway incursion event in Chicago

where the controller did have sleep disorder and fatigue was probably part of that event. That wasn’t an incident. It was an incursion. Looking at our database, we don’t have any accident with a

probable cause mentioning controller fatigue.

Mr. HAYES. Now, again for clarification, talk about what an incursion could be. It could be your nose wheel crossing the whole

shore line or it could be as serious as entering an active runway

when you are not supposed to be there. So distinguish that a little

bit.

Mr. HAUETER. That is correct. An incursion can be two aircraft

on the same runway at the same time coming in close proximity

to each other. It can be an aircraft has gone into the runway of an
30

aircraft is ready to take off and maybe its only the nose that has

gone over the runway. That can count as an incursion. There are

different levels of these, obviously.

Mr. HAYES. One more issue on safety again. I think it was Mr.

Porter. I am not sure who talked about the situation at Salt Lake

City where there was a power interruption. Obviously, bad judgment mistake was made. But again, if one of you all would point

out, not me, that in the event of a loss of communication in the

eyes of our system, both the controllers, and that is a tough situation for them, but there are provisions in place where every one of

those pilots has a clearance.

It may be the landing, but his instructions are to proceed to his

last point of clearance and then commence the published approach.

So again, I don’t want folks to come away thinking the power goes

off, it is not the situation you want. You do everything to prevent

it, but chaos is not the automatic result because the controllers and

their professionalism has set their aircrafts and those pilots up to

follow published procedures and the properly trained pilot knows

what to do. So if you could clarify that just a little bit.

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, sir, Mr. Hayes. I would say that to be, again,

where there is no recorded accident or incident because of communication failure. And the analogy I would share with you is one of

a football game. There is a playbook. We all have the same playbook. I am an active pilot. I know my responsibilities in the event

of loss of communications, even on—especially under instrument

conditions. The world class, hard working professionals, the air

traffic controllers have the same playbook.

In the event of a loss of communication, I know what they are

going to expect me to do, and they know what I am expected to do.

And we can continue to a safe landing under IFR conditions, so it

is absolutely not chaos whatsoever.

Mr. HAYES. I think it is a good point and just, again, to endorse

the system and I will say, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Pascrell has a little

different accent than I. I have trouble understanding him sometimes. And the controllers in the northeast, they talk a lot like him.

I am not sure what language it is. But they do a good job. I was

flying up to the northeast and the weather was bad, and they had

lots of traffic and a lot of things going on, but those guys handled

the situation extremely well professionally, they used my knowledge of where I was and what I needed to do and what they had

to do and they get it done.

So again, our hats off not to a perfect system, but to a group of

professional controllers and professional FAA personnel who are

working together.

And the last thing, we put a lot of blame in the air by a lot of

things. But it is us, Congress, who funds. If you want to double the

number of this, that or the other, then we can do that. But we have

a certain responsibility there. So that hadn’t been mentioned, or at

least I didn’t hear it.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. DeFazio has been waiting patiently.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Sabatini, to continue on the questioning about

non-certificated repair. I was a bit, you know, I just harken back

to Value Jet. Now remind me whether that was non-certificated or
31

certificated incompetence of mechanics or unlicensed incompetent

mechanics who stowed the loaded air, the oxygen containers that

caused a lot of people to die. Now that is out, you know, like subcontracting. I mean, tell me how—what was that setup? Was that

non-certificated under the supervision of the airline? A lot of people

died.

Mr. SABATINI. I don’t recall the particulars, but I can certainly

provide you with the fix on that.

Mr. DEFAZIO. But that is the problem we have today. We have

airlines that are under tremendous stress trying to make a buck

coming out of bankruptcy, in bankruptcy, whatever, and you know

they are chasing the cheapest labor around the world around the

country. I am just not quite so sanguine about the fact that gee,

no one at the airline is going to sign off on this that was done three

levels away from the airline and they don’t know how incompetent

that person really was and they assume the person two levels away

from the airline actually checked on what the person did, and the

person one level from the airline assumes that the person two levels away did, and the person at the airline assumes the person one

level, two levels and three levels away all knew what they were

doing, and they did it the way they said they did it, and the piece

of paper that the first person signed ends up getting adopted by the

airline, and then you have a tragedy.

So I am just not quite so sanguine about all of this outsourcing

that is going on here, and the level of supervision or oversight that

we are getting. I just—I am not, and I am not sure that the computers provide us with that level of oversight that we lack.

And I would go to another, the designee program. I mean, as I

recall testimony here from your folks, they say maybe once every

9 or 10 years they can get around to designees, because their scope

is you talked about a scope of 1 in 10 and foreign 1 in 4 to 20 national. What is the scope for people who supervise designees? I

think it was—I remember it was one to several hundred was what

we heard testimony, it was a huge number.

Mr. SABATINI. Well, I can get you the specific number in terms

of ratio inspectors to designees. But I will certainly provide you

with that information.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Again, I am not totally saying what the number of

people that you have and the level of oversight we are providing

in these areas should be. And if any one else has a comment on

either designees or level of oversight, I would be happy to hear it.

Dr. Dillingham.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Congressman DeFazio, we did a report that

looked at the oversight of designees and the designee program and

we concluded that much the same thing that you just discussed.

But in fairness to FAA, in response to some of the recommendations that we made, that oversight needed to be tighten up. It

needed to be more systematic and it needed to be closer. They are,

in fact, developing systems that will increase their ability to oversee what designees do.

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. Well, I will look forward to a bit of follow-up

on that.

Mr. Sabatini, I would congratulate the FAA on standing firm on

the A–380 and the actual physical evacuation. I have always been
32

dubious about the drills as conducted by computer simulation as

opposed to the physical approach. The NTSB is against that. Are

we going to stick with a new type, or a reconfiguration, stick with

the actual evacuation tests?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, the regulation allows a combination of options for the 380. It was new and novel, and certainly, we don’t

have any airplanes that have two full decks and for those reasons

and that kind of logic, we decided the best course of action in the

interest of safety was to have an actual full evacuation.

The rules do permit under certain circumstances airplanes that

have a history of preceding models where we have demonstrated

initially with a full evacuation. We could use computer modeling in

a variant of that particular model or similarly situated aircraft.

Mr. DEFAZIO. All right. My final questions go to the issue of, and

again, you are the only person from the FAA, so you get all the

questions.

The air traffic controllers. I am just, you know, getting

bombarded with, and I assume other members of the committee

are, too, a number of concerns from air traffic controllers, real folks

who work in my district and elsewhere around the country. And

what they are saying is that some of the new work rules are very

arbitrary, and potentially jeopardize safety, particularly those that

relate to you know people who are not feeling up to snuff to work

or are ill, and what would be required to be relieved, and whether

there are adequate people to relieve them. Other sorts of petty harassment. People who are retiring early. We have a crisis in terms

of replacing our qualified controllers.

And I guess I would just ask what the FAA intends to do to try

and rebuild a relationship and some morale with the vital link in

our air traffic control system.

Mr. SABATINI. Well, sir, I would tell you, Mr. DeFazio, that I

don’t think that the retirement situation is at crisis situation to

date. The numbers that have been projected are not materializing.

There have been 463 retirements in 2005. 541 through September

3rd of 2006, and we fully expect to go beyond the numbers that we

had originally thought which was 930, and we will have 1,100 people, 1,100 controllers on staff by the end of September.

So we will certainly have addressed the concern and the concern

that was basically said has basically not materialized.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Since the arbitrary imposition of a unilateral

agreement, you haven’t seen any acceleration in retirements?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, let me say that there was approximately 15

to 18 months of negotiations between——

Mr. DEFAZIO. I am familiar with the history. We disagree with

the result or history in terms of how long there were material negotiations ongoing. But the point is have you seen any increase in retirement since the arbitrary imposition of this and the new work

rules?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, I would say these are the numbers and I can

get you——

Mr. DEFAZIO. I know, but they are not since the unilateral imposition of the agreement. So I guess I would like to see numbers

since that date, if you could, and how they compared to other

months.
33

Mr. SABATINI. Well, let me say that we can certainly provide you

with that information. The numbers that I can tell you that are accurate as of this moment, and that is the 463 in 2005 and you take

it from there to 541. That is more than last year. So if you want

to consider that an acceleration.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Again, to me, the question is, you know, I can’t be

getting this many e-mails and contacts to my staff and other members from people who are talking about working conditions, arbitrary things being done by management. I have one photo here provided to me with a guide essentially pulling down his jeans or pulling up his shirt to show the supervisor that those really aren’t

jeans that he is wearing.

Now I don’t care what an air traffic controller wears. They can

be sitting there in shorts and Tevas, if they are comfortable and

it is hot. That is fine with me. I don’t know what bureaucrat has

decided to go to this level of harassment. Other things are being

imposed and I don’t know why that is being done, but it is. I am

just concerned about morale, and I believe that there is probably

going to be, or has been an acceleration in retirements, which further jeopardize the system. And I look forward to seeing month-bymonth statistics.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Ms. Kelly.

Mrs. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am concerned about the new work rules that have been imposed on our Nation’s controllers since September 3rd, 3 months

after having this new contract forced on them. There is an article

in today’s New York Times, with permission and consents, Mr.

Chairman, I would like to enter into the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection.

[The information follows:]
34
35
36
37
38
39

Mrs. KELLY. If the picture in that looks familiar, it is because it

is from the control tower in Stewart Airport in my district, which

you visited last month. The article contains details on the fast

plans to cut its work force by 10 percent. As many of our control

facilities are already understaffed, this goal concerns me and my

constituents a great deal. I recently heard a very troubling story

regarding a controller at the New York TRACON. The controller

was on medical leave and was doing other duties that were assigned. He was told by his supervisor to stay home, but to call

every morning to see if the facility needed him. The controller

called every morning at 6:00 a.m.

On a day when his supervisor asked him to come in, he arrived

at 7:00 a.m., one hour after his call-in time. However, because and

you heard that the—he was called at 6:00 a.m., but because he

wasn’t there at 6:00 a.m., his normal start time, no flight progress

strips were being distributed to radar position, and when the radar

positions were combined, an aircraft was overlooked and subsequently entered New York air space without a prior coordination.

This story is unfortunately indicative of not only the effect on

safety that the new staffing rules have, could potentially have further. But it also shows how lowering staff levels may not necessarily be in the interest of best safety. New imposed work rules,

the FAA—at the FAA, mean all of the memorandums of understanding that the controllers had with the FAA before this appeared, to have gone right out the door.

There is no one for the controllers to even talk to to express their

concerns.

What I really want to do is talk to you, Mr. Dillingham. If this

story is indicative of how many—how managers are using their

new authority, and if lowering staff levels is going to mean less

safety for our flying public, how do I answer that to my constituents and how do you answer that to me?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. That is a very tough question. I think that, you

know, as was mentioned earlier in the hearing, that the negotiations were long and stiff, and there were lots of bad feelings on

both sides between labor and management.

Mrs. KELLY. This isn’t about bad feelings. It is about an instance

where there was a problem.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Right. I understand that, and what I am getting to is I think that it is going to take some time for labor and

management to be able to work through these issues that were the

result of the contract. It is early on, and there is still lots of unanswered questions, lots—my understanding is that FAA and the controllers have not fully vetted all of how the work rules are going

to be put in place. And usually, when there is a situation that is

so widespread as all of the facilities that FAA has, they will be implemented differently at different places, until there is some understanding about exactly how the rules should be implemented.

Mrs. KELLY. Sir, I am flying in and out of—using New York

TRACON twice a week. A lot of my constituents are flying in and

out more than twice a week out of the New York air space. If you

need someone to be there as a controller, you don’t call them at

7:00 o’clock in the morning because they are supposed to be there

at 6:00 o’clock in the morning. I am very concerned that there is
40

oversight over this kind of thing. We need our air traffic controllers

and we need them there for our safety. This has been acknowledged by the whole panel. But what I am concerned about is that

there is some kind of an effective oversight going into place that

is going to happen soon, not while we are working on it, because

that is not satisfactory if there is a problem.

And so I am challenging you to come back to me with some kind

of a plan that is going to focus on what kind of oversight we have

to make this thing work. Since the contract was imposed, I think

it is up to the FAA to work—to work with the air traffic controllers

to make sure we all feel comfortable when we are flying in and out

of New York TRACON space.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I agree with you, and maybe Mr. Sabatini can

probably add to whatever processes they have in place to make this

contract work and the work rules work better.

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Sabatini, do you want to address that?

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, ma’am. I will. First, I would like to say that

we don’t believe this was an arbitrarily imposed contract. There

were a fair period of time for the contract to be negotiated, and I

will say that over the course of about 5 years, it will save the taxpayers $1.9 billion.

Mrs. KELLY. Excuse me, sir. That is not my question. My question is—goes right to what I am looking for, I have 42 seconds for

you to answer my question. So I would really appreciate it if you

would talk to me about oversight and what you are going to do to

try to make this thing work.

Mr. SABATINI. St. Louis is a perfect example where there was a

negotiated agreement that said there had to be an authorized number of controllers at that facility. It had nothing to do with capacity

or anything else. American Airlines pulled out of St. Louis and it

would be foolhardy to have what would be considered, which are

not in place any more, authorized positions. So what we now have

in place is the flexibility for the FAA to do its job and put controllers where they are most needed to address safety in the most effective and efficient way.

Mrs. KELLY. Well, would you say that because this man was

called at 7 o’clock because he wasn’t there at 6:00 a.m. Which

would be his normal start time and no flight progress strips were

being distributed to the radar positions, would you say that that

was an effective use?

Mr. SABATINI. I would—I will tell you that the absence of a flight

progress strip is not an unsafe condition. There is information that

is available on the aircraft from the transponder and the data

block. That information is available. The controllers have the information they need to do the work they need to do.

Mrs. KELLY. My husband was an air traffic controller in the

Navy. Never worked as a civilian, and I have been in the TRACON

and I have talked to my husband. I watched him control airplanes

from his—from his destroyer. And so I have been at this a long

time. My husband and I have been married a long time. We talked

about air safety. What I am concerned about here is that there was

an aircraft that was overlooked and it got into New York air space

without a prior coordination. That is worrisome, sir. That is a very

congested air space. I need to know, and everyone in the flying
41

public needs to know that this kind of thing isn’t going to happen.

And we need oversight.

Do you have any kind of thing to talk to me about or can you

come back at me and talk to me about what kind of oversights you

are going to put into place so this kind of thing doesn’t happen?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, let me clarify what you mean by oversight.

You mean oversight by the IG or the GAO or oversight by the

FAA?

Mrs. KELLY. You are running this show. The FAA is running this

show. You shouldn’t have to have us look at this oversight. If there

is something like this that could result in an aircraft being overlooked that enters into a busy air space, I mean, some place like

the Chicago air space. There ought to be some mechanism in place

that the FAA—so that this kind of thing doesn’t happen.

Mr. SABATINI. Well, there is a mechanism in place and——

Mrs. KELLY. It didn’t work here.

Mr. SABATINI. Well, let me say that as I mentioned earlier in the

day, humans make mistakes and what we are doing is building

systems to catch errors like that. And that is what we are doing.

So I have the responsibility now for the oversight of the air traffic organization. I can tell you we are aggressively staffing up that

organization and it will be fully staffed by the end of 2008, and we

have programs in place to address those situations. But I will tell

you, I am an active pilot. I fly this system. I can tell you that the

system is world class and the effectiveness of our system is demonstrated every single day and when you look at the statistics that

exist today, it is the envy of the world in terms of the incredible

safe system that we have so there are mechanisms that are in

place that address this.

Mrs. KELLY. Well, Mr. Sabatini, in my lifetime, which has been

reasonably long, I have never found anything perfect yet. So I

would hope that you would come back at us with—and you can just

contact my office when you have something in place that will assure me that I can assure my constituents in the greater New York

area that we are not going to have this kind of incursion happen.

Mr. SABATINI. I agree with you, and I certainly didn’t say that

the system is perfect. In fact, I will tell you that we have imposed

upon ourselves a rigorous methodology which is a world class third

party oversight of our organization, aviation safety and that is the

ISO 9001, and it is founded on the basis of continuous improvement. That alone should say and tell everyone that we recognize

that we too will hold ourselves to the highest standards and are

subject to the rigor and discipline of such a system and such a

methodology that will demand continuous improvement. And I will

be happy to share more information with you about what we are

doing for the oversight of the ATO as well as what we have imposed upon ourselves.

Mrs. KELLY. Thank you, sir. I am not impugning the FAA, because I do think you do a pretty good job. But there are glitches,

there are problems and those definitely need to be addressed and

this is an example of one.

I thank you for indulging me with a little extra time.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chandler.
42

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Sabatini, I am

afraid, not surprisingly, I am going to bring you back to the Lexington tragedy. And I would like to ask you, I am a little bit concerned about this whole notion that the tower was not staffed appropriately. There was one controller there when there should have

been two, as I understand it. And you all issued a verbal directive

that there should have been two rather than one. One thing I

would like to know is does the FAA generally issue verbal directives of this sort? Is that your policy?

Mr. SABATINI. The FAA manages its business through orders and

other written guidance. Where there is information that needs to

be identified to be further explained, it can be done in the moment

verbally, and I believe that was what was done in that instance.

But I would also go on to say that even if there had been two

persons in that tower, two persons would not have been in the cab.

One would have been down in a room without windows looking at

radar, radar which does not look at what is on the ground. It was

for airborne purposes.

Mr. CHANDLER. I understand that, Mr. Sabatini, and I am not

suggesting that this problem caused that accident. We are going to

wait for the NTSB to—I want to ask Mr. Haueter some questions,

but I know what the answer is: The report isn’t done, so we are

going to have to wait and we will wait until that gets done, and

maybe we will have a shot at you. But I am sure you are going to

have do a good job.

But Mr. Sabatini, this directive was put in place for a reason. I

assume that you put the directive in place because you thought

that it was good policy to have two controllers on that site for safety purposes. And the directive clearly wasn’t followed, and what

also concerns me is that you didn’t know that the directive wasn’t

being followed until after the crash. So here we get into this same

issue about oversight. Do you know whether your directives are

being followed and shouldn’t directives like this, aren’t they important enough to be put in writing?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, it is in writing. In fact, the order 7110——

Mr. CHANDLER. Was it at that time? I mean, it is in writing now,

I guess.

Mr. SABATINI. Well, the order has been a standing order and provides guidance on the staffing of those facilities.

Mr. CHANDLER. Then why wasn’t that facility staffed?

Mr. SABATINI. Because it provides latitudes to the management

to make determinations based on the needs at the time.

Mr. CHANDLER. So it wasn’t really a directive. It was up to whoever is in charge there. I mean, it is either a directive or not a directive.

Mr. SABATINI. I want to make clear, sir, there is an order that

describes generally how you manage an air traffic control tower.

That order—that order is what stands in terms of the guidance for

managers to use. There was a follow-up conversation based on an

event in Raleigh-Durham and as a result of what that event was

in Raleigh-Durham, there was a verbal conversation.

Mr. CHANDLER. With somebody—somebody in Lexington?

Mr. SABATINI. Explaining what was expected in terms of——

Mr. CHANDLER. Telling them to have the two people?
43

Mr. SABATINI. That the explanation was that there would be a

person on radar and a person on—of course, obviously in the tower.

Mr. CHANDLER. And they still didn’t do it.

Mr. SABATINI. But it still left room for interpretation.

Mr. CHANDLER. I mean, if you have a written directive and then

you find out that that wasn’t being followed, you know, that the

Raleigh-Durham matter took place. And then you followed that up

by saying that you need to follow this directive and they still don’t

follow it, at what point do you need to interpret that? I mean, that

seems pretty clear to me. Were they directed to do it or not?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, I can get back to you with more specifics. As

I want to say that I am responsible for this oversight of this safety,

the persons who can address that more specifically can certainly

be—we can arrange to have them meet with you from the air traffic organization.

Mr. CHANDLER. Do you know who was in charge of making that

decision as to whether there were one or two people there in Lexington?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, ultimately, it is the chief operating officer,

Russ Chew, is responsible for the air traffic organization.

Mr. CHANDLER. Has there been any discussion with who was responsible that maybe they should have made a different decision

and followed the directive? Has anybody been reprimanded for it?

Mr. SABATINI. I don’t have that information, sir.

Mr. CHANDLER. Well, could you get back to me with that information, please?

Mr. SABATINI. I certainly will do that.

Mr. CHANDLER. OK.

One other question, if I may, Mr. Chairman. Do you consider

Lexington to be adequately staffed at this time?

Mr. SABATINI. We believe that given the requirements there for

the traffic that is operating in and out of Lexington, that it is adequately staffed.

Mr. CHANDLER. Well, I understand that we are short three air

traffic controllers in Lexington; is that not correct?

Mr. SABATINI. As I said, I can get you the specifics for that tower,

sir.

Mr. CHANDLER. Well, I wish you had, given the importance of the

Lexington tragedy, I wish that you had come with some of this information, some of this detailed information.

One other question and I will stop. You said that there are

14,500 air traffic controllers. Is that what you said?

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHANDLER. How many of those are fully trained and serviceable? All of them?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, I can tell you of course that represents people who have recently been hired but if you need a further breakdown with the precision and accuracy that I think you are asking

for, we can certainly provide——

Mr. CHANDLER. I understand that it is a moving target but in

general, is that number, does that number represent your average

staffing level or have you just beefed it up recently with a flurry

of new hires?
44

Mr. SABATINI. Well, it does of course include the 930 and will reflect the difference as we get up to the 1,100. But a percentage of

those would be new hires and the larger percentage would be full

performance——

Mr. CHANDLER. What percentage will be?

Mr. SABATINI. I can get you that.

Mr. CHANDLER. Can you get me a ballpark?

Mr. SABATINI. I can’t, sir. I don’t have that information.

Mr. CHANDLER. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Pascrell.

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Sabatini, thank you for your patience with all of us. And you

understand and appreciate our concerns because our concerns are

really your concerns. I know that. No one is questioning that whatsoever.

I am looking at your logic though in your testimony, and your

logic is puzzling to me because you are almost saying that with less

humans and we have humans who make mistakes, we have less

humans who will make mistakes, that filters down through a lot

of your testimony.

Now, the workforce plan that the FAA has put forth states that

new procedures use that term, new procedures. And technology will

reduce the number of controllers needed in the future. What are

these new procedures and what is this new technology?

Mr. SABATINI. Sir, I will draw an analogy for you that has proven

to be very, very successful in our system. If you go back to about

the 1960’s, we were operating aircraft with as many as five crew

members in the cockpit and you had a captain, you had a first officer, you had a flight engineer, you had a radio navigator, and you

had a radio operator and the navigator. Five people. Today the

most sophisticated, the most sophisticated aircraft that man has

been able to design and with greater capability is operated by two

people: A captain and a first officer.

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Sabatini—I will let you finish but I want to

go so I don’t lose it. I am a slow learner, so I want to take a little

bit at a time. If what you just presented to us is very true, less

people in the cockpit and there are more people looking at radar

screens. So the state of the art is followed up in the air and also

on the ground. There are reasons and you are absolutely correct.

So continue, please.

Mr. SABATINI. So continuing with the analogy, we now operate

the most sophisticated airplanes with two crew members. The point

being that we have used technology to enhance human performance.

Let me give you an example of the technology in Atlanta.

There is a new technology, that we refer to in our performancebased national air space that is called required navigation performance. It provides us with tremendous precision and accuracy for

navigation such that with that kind of precision operating out of

Atlanta, and we have been doing this now for almost a year. Delta,

the major operator out of there, claims because of that precision,

$38 million a year savings just in fuel alone. As far as the air traffic controllers are concerned, that technology has enabled the reduction of the voice communications between pilots and controllers
45

by as much as, and I will be very conservative, 40 percent. That

has allowed controllers to do what they prefer to do and that is observe and manage traffic flow and that is the kind of technology

that we need to take and bring into place with our next generation

air transportation.

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you. And you do know and you know it

better than I do, about the basics of working in the control tower

and that is—there is reading and then there is operation. In every

place that I have seen in FAA literature, that must be designated

and defined so that they are not confused, so that there are carefully deliberated responsibilities. It is an absolute horrific absurdity

as Woody Allen would say, that anybody could even hesitate about

their only being one person in the control tower in Kentucky.

Now Mr. Dillingham, you responded in your testimony, which

you didn’t read, you couldn’t read the whole thing obviously. You

did say that on page 13 that in addition, although general aviation

accidents, on a whole, decreased in recent years, general aviation

safety is also a concern because the large number of fatal accidents

every year, an average of 334 fatal accidents since the year 2000.

So we have reduced the number of accidents and that has still

remained the average number of fatal—of fatal accidents. Furthermore, you brought other industry sectors such as cargo operations

and on demand air balances have poor safety records as mentioned

earlier. So I notice you are double reverse before in reaction to—

in response to the gentlelady from New York, and I understand. I—

I am a decent human being, and you shouldn’t have been asked the

question. In fact, isn’t that your job, Mr. Zinser, in your position

as inspector general, and you know, there is 50 inspector—over 50

inspectors general. Half of them get appointed by the President,

and the other half get appointed by whoever the Secretary happens—happens to be within the Department. You have a very specific obligation and responsibility which you already know about.

But in case anybody who doesn’t understand it of overseeing

what happens in the very department that you are assigned to.

And I have got a question to ask you. You state in your testimony

that the FAA needs to address the issue of air traffic controller attrition and staffing at each facility. That is what you stated in your

testimony, correct——

Mr. ZINSER. Yes, sir.

Mr. PASCRELL. Now it is my understanding that FAA recently released an update of its 2000 air traffic controller workforce plan.

In the IGs view, does FAA’s current work force plan provide a comprehensive roadmap to ensure that we have a sufficient number of

controllers at each facility? If you want me to repeat the question,

I will. If you understand the question, I would like a very precise

answer.

Mr. ZINSER. Yes, sir. I think I understand the question. You are

referring to the workforce plan that FAA just submitted in August.

Mr. PASCRELL. That is correct.

Mr. ZINSER. In our view, it is missing two critical pieces. I think

FAA has some explanation for why those pieces are not in the report, but, in our view, it is missing the cost of hiring the number

of air traffic controllers necessary to make up for the attrition, and

it is also missing facility-by-facility numbers of how many air traf-
46

fic controllers are necessary. We have been reporting on that for a

couple of years now, and I think the numbers are still needed.

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Zinser, thank you so much.

There are two things I would like to leave with the committee,

if I may, with the Chair; and it is this.

We are not only talking about attrition. Attrition is numbers. I

am talking about the experience that leaves the box.

You have a similar situation, Mr. Chairman, right here on Capitol Hill when we force police officers and our bodyguards—whatever you want to call them—when they become 57 years of age to

get the heck out of the system. We are losing a tremendous amount

of expertise, which is being lost in the control towers when you see

the kind of training that perhaps we should be giving but we are

not giving.

There is another problem. The amount of overtime of the police

officers here on Capitol Hill is astronomical. The problem is no one

is being held accountable as we push people out of the system. And

there is a reason for it. We push out the higher-paying folks. We

bring in those at the basic salary.

I hope that we are going to look very carefully about these socalled, Mr. Sabatini, these so-called new procedures and new technologies. We all appreciate—we are pretty familiar not with all the

technology, but we are pretty familiar as to the changes that have

occurred in the airline business, in the airplane business and the

operations business in the past 5 or 6 years. We have a pretty

good, general idea of that. Not as good as you, but, you know, some

latitude and longitude.

But, Mr. Sabatini, it has got to be very, very clear that you are

going to have to have a reckoning, I am going to have to have a

reckoning when we look back at this every year. We have oversight. Mr. Zinser has oversight. GAO will continue to write——

Because there is a lot of other things you said in here, Mr.

Dillingham, I don’t have time to spend on now. You chose not to

read that, and you are going to have to make this situation much

better, and we are going to make sure that you do that.

It is unacceptable as far as I am concerned. I can’t speak for Mr.

Chairman. It is unacceptable, the answers you gave him, about

what happened in Kentucky. Either it is a directive or it is not a

directive. Who made the decision that there is only one controller?

You must answer that question. We have a right to ask that question.

And your response was, I will get back to you? Who are you talking to here? You are talking to those people who have been duly

elected—and I know when you said—and you weren’t here before

when I mentioned the fact—with the great work that you have

done, Mr. Chairman, in terms of the explosive detection, I mean,

that is on the front page of many of the papers today. And the fact

is, if we don’t do it, nobody is going to do it, and it is as simple

as that.

What he asked is a very basic question, and we got gobbledygook,

and you know it just as well as I do.

Mr. MICA. Well, I thank the gentleman.

And did you want to respond? Or Mr. Bishop is waiting patiently.
47

Mr. SABATINI. I would just add one piece, that we have approved

many waivers that allowed folks to stay on beyond age 56—that is,

air traffic controllers—and we just use a very reasonable amount

of overtime to accommodate the needs as the need arises.

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Chairman, we are proud Italian-Americans.

We talk straight. You are not talking straight right now. I know

you are a straight person. And you didn’t answer his question. And

you know that in your heart that you did not answer his question.

That is unacceptable.

God forbid that today there is another situation in another part

of America and there is only one controller there, OK, and there

is no waiver, OK, and he has a fatality. If he dies, he can’t come

up for air. A thousand things can happen when you are a human

being. What are we going to do about it? Are we going to say, I

will have to look at the circumstances and get back to you, OK?

Mr. MICA. Mr. Bishop, waiting patiently, you are recognized.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you and the ranking member for allowing me to

take part in this hearing, even though I am not a member of the

subcommittee.

I have several concerns about the relationship between the FAA

and the air traffic controllers, but several of my colleagues have addressed those. So I am here to talk about—or ask questions about

other issues.

Mr. Sabatini, I would like to ask you about center wing fuel

tanks inerting systems. It was off of East Moriches, Long Island,

which is in my district, that Flight 800 crashed into the Atlantic

in July of 1996, more than 10 years ago.

The NTSB rather quickly determined or at least surmised that

the cause of the crash was an explosion in the center wing fuel

tank. They made their first recommendation that there be some

type of flammability mitigation system installed in December of

1996. They then added that recommendation to their so-called most

wanted list in 2002, and then I offered legislation in October of

2005 that has actually attracted a fair number of cosponsors that

would require the installation of some flammability mitigation system in fuel tanks.

The FAA offered a proposed rule in November of 2005. So about

nine and a half years after the crash and after the initial recommendation from the NTSB. It is now September of 2006.

So I guess my first question to you is, why does it take nine and

a half years for the FAA to address a safety issue that has been

brought to them both by human tragedy and by an NTSB investigation and recommendation?

Mr. SABATINI. I agree with you, sir. That was a tragic event and

a terrible loss of life.

But when you go back in time and look at the actions that the

FAA has taken, we immediately introduced a special Federal aviation regulation, S–488, to look at what we thought could be the

identification of possible failures in wing tanks in terms of the ignition sources. But we all know that just the identification of ignition

sources is not sufficient, and we agree with you that fuel inerting

is an important direction to take and a solution that is significant

in terms of preventing future types of accidents.
48

But, at the time, the only technology that existed in terms of

inerting was what the military had; and it was very heavy, very

expensive and not very reliable for application and commercial

aviation. The FAA took it upon itself with some industry help in

doing—in research and development at the tech center in Atlantic

City and devised a very reliable, very effective and very cost-effective lightweight fuel inerting system; and that is what has taken

time.

R&D was very challenging. It was not an easy thing to get to,

but the good news is we are there today. We have proposed a rule,

as you have acknowledged, and we are dispositioning the comments

as we speak, and we expect that to continue forward in the rulemaking process.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much for that.

Let me just—the rule-making period or the comment period—

pardon me—is now closed.

Mr. SABATINI. Yes.

Mr. BISHOP. I have two questions. One, when do you think you

will be issuing a final rule? And, secondly, can you outline for us

briefly, because we are going to run out of time, what are the principle arguments against installing these systems that have been—

that have come forward in the comment period?

Mr. SABATINI. There are very sophisticated and very knowledgeable organizations that have challenged the FAA on the logic to

even go forward. So we are working to address that. And that is

not just a simple yes or no kind of an answer. It is a very sciencebased kind of response which is very challenging. But we are confident that we are going to be successful; and, as I said, the kind

of challenges that we are getting are on cost and challenging the

science behind what we are saying is an effective system.

Mr. BISHOP. When you say you are confident that you are going

to be successful, are you suggesting that you will ultimately issue

a rule that will require the installation of these systems both in existing aircraft and in new aircraft?

Mr. SABATINI. I am confident that we will put out a rule that will

require a flammability reduction means, and what that really says

is that we are not going to specifically mandate that it be fuel tank

inerting but the only solution to get you to where we want you to

be to meet what we call into rule of these performance standards

is only to be achieved by fuel tank inerting. So you can come up

and say we have an equivalent means of achieving that same level

of protection, and we would accept that. So that is what the rule

is going to require.

Mr. BISHOP. OK. And just one last question. Thank you very

much for that. About when do you think you will issue that rule?

Mr. SABATINI. September of 2007 we expect to have the final

rule.

Mr. BISHOP. OK, so a year from now.

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BISHOP. So that would mean a 2-year period from the time

when you began the proposed rule-making process.

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BISHOP. Is that normal or is that a rather extensive period

for a proposed rule to alternately become a rule?
49

Mr. SABATINI. It depends on the complexity of the rule. This is

not an easy one, sir.

Mr. BISHOP. OK. Thank you very much, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Now waiting patiently, not a member of our panel, but we welcome Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am

not a member of the subcommittee nor the full committee, so I

greatly appreciate this opportunity.

My local hometown paper, The Miami Herald, recently published

a series that they entitled ′′Deadly Express;′′ and it exposed some

very troubling facts and figures regarding the aviation cargo industry, focusing on smaller air cargo planes.

The series exposed many of the problems that are related to this

industry, and they reported a staggering 60 crashes and 80 deaths

over a 5-year period. It also revealed that cargo pilots are frequently flying very long hours with inadequate flight training

themselves. So with less training than commercial air pilots and

with tight deadlines imposed upon them by their business entities,

they frequently fly in weather that would normally ground commercial aviation. Inspections and maintenance of these smaller air

cargo planes are not regulated by the same standards that apply

to larger carriers, and this frequently leads to ill-maintained and

faulty equipment.

So all of these factors—older planes, tight deadlines, lax inspections, less pilot training, bad equipment, insufficient safety features—all of this combines to create a very dangerous work environment that fails to protect pilots of smaller air cargo carriers.

I would encourage our panelists to closely examine the regulations impacting our small air cargo industry in order to make our

skies safe for pilots as well as citizens. As the Department of

Transportation Inspector General review points out, there is a

large loophole in the inspection of small air cargo planes. Small air

cargo planes are not mandated to undergo the same rigorous inspection regimes as other older planes, due to probably monetary

concerns.

Air cargo planes that are more likely to crash are 26 years old,

three times older than commercial passenger airline planes and

had fewer safety features. As the FAA mandate states, there

should be one level of safety.

So, with that, I would like to pose three questions to the panelists.

Why don’t the same safety standards apply to all air cargo operators? Is it a financial difficulty tied to an inspection? Why is this

standard less for small air cargo operators?

Secondly, has the FAA or the National Transportation Safety

Board conducted any studies or investigations to determine what

can be done to reduce the incidence of accidents among small air

cargo operators?

And, thirdly, if air cargo has the highest frequency of crashes

among commercial aviation, what is the FAA or the NTSB doing

to correct this trend?

I thank the Chairman for the opportunity.
50

Mr. MICA. Well, did you want to divide—you had questions.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Whoever would like to.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Sabatini, maybe you could take the first.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Mr. HAUETER. Certainly we determine probable cause on every

accident involving cargo flights. It is a difficult area. One issue is

that records aren’t kept in terms of number of flight hours, so it

is hard to say whether the rate has really increased for this group.

Certainly the numbers have gone up. We don’t know if the rate has

really changed.

We are aware of the standards; and if we see a trend, definitely

we would issue recommendations regarding those type of aircraft.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So what you are saying is that you don’t see

a trend yet or you haven’t done any studies to see if there is a

trend? A trend being there are more crashes. The planes are getting older. There are no records that are truly being kept. What is

the trend? That it is not there or you haven’t done the studies to

see it?

Mr. HAUETER. We have not done a specific study on demand part

135 cargo operations. We have looked at a number of accidents,

and the number has increased. However, we don’t know whether

the number of flights have increased.

Taking another look, we have seen that most of the accidents, so

far, are not systemic in nature, but operational errors. If these aircraft are driving piston-driven engines and the pilots have lower

flight times.

Mr. SABATINI. I would also add that we are working very closely

with that community. They are represented, as you well know, by

associations—RAACO being one of them, Regional Airline Association for Cargo Operations—and we have devised a number of interventions that can help address that. But I would tell you that what

is not sought out is the accuracy with which newspapers report

these accidents. It is not all about poor equipment, which I would

take issue with, or poor maintenance or lack of oversight.

I would tell you that we can certainly improve. We look at risk

areas. This seems to be a risk area. We are going to continue to

focus on addressing cargo operators.

But you also need to know that there are instances, and I will

use just one, where pilots decide for their own reasons to take an

aircraft that is not certificated to fly—not certificated by the FAA

to fly into known icing conditions but intentionally conduct an operation with that aircraft in known icing conditions, and that led

to a disaster. So you need to sort out those kinds of accidents that

are human error, those kinds of things, and you begin to see a

slightly different picture.

But I want to assure you that we take any accident very seriously. Any loss of life is a tragic event, and I can assure you that

we will follow up with the cargo operators and have been and have

put in place a number of interventions.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And you are working with the agencies and

the organizations that these cargo operators belong to in order to

have them suggest these more stringent regulations? Or is it something that we are looking at as mandated?
51

Mr. SABATINI. Well, the regulations already exist. So we have direct responsibility for the oversight of the air carriers, whether

they be from the FedEx and UPS level down to the smallest air

cargo operator. So we have direct responsibility.

But we also know that we can get very effective introduction of

the immediate corrective actions collectively across the board by

working with their associations, and they can voluntarily agree,

and you can in the moment get the sorts of actions or interventions, you might say, that can be put in place right away, versus

going through the rule-making process which in our form of government and our country it is checks and balances and it does take

time. So we work quickly and actively with the associations and

the operators.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Did you want to comment?

Mr. ZINSER. Yes, Congresswoman.

The Chalk’s Airways crash I think brought a lot of attention to

the issue of aging aircraft. In fact, the report that we issued was

issued after we received a request from Mr. Oberstar to look at

what has transpired on aging aircraft. We did find that there are

several categories of aircraft that are exempt from any aging aircraft review or program. There are even categories of aircraft that

are required to undergo some inspections but not what is being

called supplemental inspections to get a more detailed analysis of

fatigue on aircraft.

One thing FAA has done is put out a rulemaking on widespread

fatigue on aircraft, and my understanding of what that rule is designed to do is establish life limits for aircraft. You have parts on

aircraft that are life limited. You can only use them so long. But

there really are not any aircraft that are life-limited. We can keep

flying them, you know, for a long time.

So I think part of the design of this rule is to try to get to what

is the life-limitation on an aircraft and sort of address the issue.

The Chalk’s Airways aircraft was 58 years old. How long are we

going to fly some of these aircraft? The manufacturer was long

gone. The airline was making its own parts to keep the plane

going. So I think the FAA is trying to address some of those issues.

In terms of the exemptions on the current requirements, I think

that FAA should do some more research on exactly what aircraft

and what operations are exempt. The preliminary recommendation

coming out of the NTSB on the Chalk’s Airways crash is for FAA

to expand their rule to cover some of these aircraft, and I think

that deserves a pretty close examination.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Well, thank you.

I have some questions I want to go back to. Some of the issues

that have been raised here have also raised some questions with

me.

Mr. Sabatini, we have been working under an old FAA air traffic

controller contract. In the new contract—and some of that has just

been released; I really don’t know all the details of what has come

into play—but does anything come to mind, specifics come to mind

in the new contract that would give better flexibility and placement
52

of personnel, utilization of personnel, in staffing or any of the

issues that have been raised here today?

Mr. SABATINI. I think one of the greatest benefits, not only the

reduction of costs but—is the flexibility to bring controllers where

they need to be. The example I used earlier, St. Louis, where

American Airlines pulled out of there to stay with what was a negotiated agreement of authorized—that had no relationship to what

is actually in terms of activity at that airport, authorizations no

longer in place, but rather staffing standards that address the need

for that particular activity at that airport. So it is a very powerful

tool.

Mr. MICA. So you think that you will have more flexibility to get

people—can you get them there quicker, too, under this new contract?

Mr. SABATINI. You can easily move them about the countryside.

You can be responsive to the changes.

Mr. MICA. So that is a change.

You know, Lexington raised a bunch of issues. I don’t want to get

into the specifics of the crash, but FAA did raise this specter publicly, or issue publicly, of putting another air traffic controller at

that location. And I heard several things. One was that the position

had been approved in January or a year earlier. Do you have

that—you said you didn’t have all the time frame. Do you know?

Mr. SABATINI. I don’t have the details from——

Mr. MICA. But it had been that a position had been approved

earlier.

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, it was.

Mr. MICA. And I was told at one point that a trainee had appeared on the scene because—and that was sometime in April or

May or—what I am trying to get here is we were cooperating under

an old contract, tough to move people around. I am wondering, is

it an inordinate amount of time—you heard the question occur over

here that, you know, you did not have that position filled or you

gave the discretion to a manager and it wasn’t filled or was somebody coming or on their way there to fill the position. I had heard

that.

Mr. SABATINI. I need to preface that by saying I need to be accurate in what I say, and I will follow up to you with precision with

that information, but I believe a new person was——

Mr. MICA. Obviously, it had been approved, the position, earlier.

It wasn’t totally filled at the time of this incident, or was it?

Mr. SABATINI. I will turn to someone who may have that information, if you will just bear with me for a moment.

Mr. MICA. OK. A developmental was on site and had arrived in

the summer. That was an individual—see, now that is what I had

heard. An individual had arrived, was on site in the summer but

wasn’t fully—full-fledged air traffic——

Mr. SABATINI. Full performance.

Mr. MICA. What?

Mr. SABATINI. Full performance.

Mr. MICA. Full performance, OK. Again, I go back to the contract, the provisions of the contract. You are saying that was the

old contract we are operating. The new contract went into effect

what a few weeks ago or what?
53

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, sir.

Mr. MICA. So things could change in that regard as far as us

being us able to place people on an expedited list.

Lexington also got me to think about—and maybe we should—

I might ask GAO, I might ask the Inspector General or other people to look at this. But when we put someone at an air traffic control tower like Lexington, and the reports I got was the average

traffic on a weekend night was six to eight flights, is that the best

utilization of staff?

Now I know FAA had looked at closing down some towers from—

or not having them manned from midnight to, say, 5:00 a.m. or

something like that. Then at Lexington, like on a Sunday night—

but Monday morning traffic picks up at 5:30, 6:00—or I guess 6:00

is when they had a couple start taking off.

Would it be better to go back and look at the staffing on the

model of not having somebody there—and I know you tried that

and some of that was rejected. Is that the case?

Tell me again where we went with that program. You looked at—

I know Russell did, and we got a lot of pushback. So we put people

in some places where we may not have needed people because of

pressure.

Mr. SABATINI. As you know, Mr. Mica, I am responsible for the

aviation safety organization, and I am not the person to get into

that kind of detail. We can certainly arrange to get you a briefing.

Mr. MICA. But, again, from a safety standpoint, would it be better to utilize your person out where you have the volume and the

traffic or should we—is this something we should be looking at

from a safety standpoint?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, from a safety perspective, sir, I would say

that the flexibility we have in this contract will enable us to be responsive to changes in the system and put the appropriate number

of people where they need to be.

Mr. MICA. This raised another question of safety and utilization

of personnel. If I put one person at Lexington downstairs, as was

described here, he is not really a reliever for the guy upstairs, is

he? Is that part of his responsibility? Do you know?

Mr. SABATINI. That would not be part of his responsibility.

Mr. MICA. Now if I am putting somebody downstairs and that

guy’s responsibility is to look at a radar screen and he is not looking at it, this made me think we need to be looking more at consolidations where I can put that—if that person doesn’t have to be in

that location but could be in a location where we could have a consolidation, it seems like you would have redundancy and backup in

human personnel to be on that screen. This guy has to go potty or

he has to excuse himself for something, and I got one guy—that is

not—I don’t have a lot of redundancy in the system. Wouldn’t it be

safer for some consolidations where you can have that redundancy?

Mr. SABATINI. I believe it would be, sir, and that you would have

the leverage of using resources in the way that they combined and

you get a synergy out of that.

Mr. MICA. I think we are going to have to find a way—and people have come to me about a base closure type or BRAC kind of

thing to do some of this. Because every time we want to move one

air traffic controller, it is like we are changing the world as we
54

know it. You get the political pressure to call on Members of Congress. It doesn’t seem like a very efficient way to run the railroad

or the air traffic control system.

OK, now, in April of 2000, before I became chairman, we had a

GAO study done—was it GAO? I am sorry—IG study done. It said

contract towers continue to provide services that are comparable to

the quality and safety of FAA-operated towers. Users remain supportive of the program. The program has been successful in providing air traffic control services at low activity airports at lower cost

than the agency could otherwise provide.

Now that showed that—and low activity—I guess with Lexington

or that kind of airport—be a low activity or—a contract tower—and

I haven’t heard a lot of problems with staffing. It seems like the

private sector is able to staff people in a little bit more expedited

fashion. But I will give you the discretion you have under the new

contract to do some of that to see how that works.

But that was 2000, and when I cited this I got hammered by

folks that this was, oh, they didn’t ask the right questions. So when

I was chairman in September of 2003, we had GAO ask more questions that were wanted to—folks said needed to be asked. And they

said this is, quote, in terms of safety of operations as measured by

operational errors slash deviations, both the contract towers and

the FAA staff VFR towers fell well below FAA’s 2002 overall average of 6.7 operational errors for every 1 million operations handled.

We found that the contract controllers met qualification requirements, received regular training, and users were satisfied with the

services they received at contract locations.

Mr. Zinser, so they said they were safer, at least from an operational standpoint to operational errors and deviation. And, actually, I think we also found they cost a lot less. Is that correct?

Mr. ZINSER. Yes, sir. Each time we looked at that program, the

results would be the same.

Mr. MICA. So you would recommend, too, from that study some

60 towers be converted to that where we could save money, probably hire more air traffic controllers someplace else, probably have

more management, flexibility in meeting the needs of a small airport. So it seems like we are playing a little bit of a game where

we have facts and statistics that we could better utilize our personnel from a safety standpoint. And this hasn’t been measured once.

It has been measured several times. Mr. Zinser, am I reading—taking something from this I shouldn’t?

Mr. ZINSER. No, sir. I think you are reading it correctly.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Sabatini?

Mr. SABATINI. I would agree with that as well.

Mr. MICA. So I think we really need to look at what we are

doing. I mean, this has raised—you know, it is horrible. Forty-nine

people lost their life in Lexington, but Lexington may send a message that we need to look at the safety and application of our personnel and utilization of personnel with systems and programs that

make us safer; and the ironic thing is the thing even costs less for

the taxpayers when instituted and we get that management flexibility. Then the consolidation of some of these locations we need to

look at for redundancies in the system.
55

We also had—I heard the outage issue, and that does concern

me. We did have a briefing before, and I don’t—that was an accidental power outage that was raised by one of the members. That

was a safety concern.

Now redundancy was mentioned by both Mr. Sabatini and Mr.

Hayes and also training and protocols that the pilots should know.

That, however, still could pose a risk, having some of these facilities down, maybe in our larger locations. Is anybody on the panel

aware of where we may stand in power redundancy? I mean, nice

to have air traffic controllers sitting in front of screens and directing traffic and all this electronic equipment, but the failure to have

power redundancy, what have you got on that, Mr. Sabatini?

Mr. SABATINI. I would tell you that there are backup systems

throughout the ATO in their structure. What happened there was

human error again. It was a mistake. It was accidental.

Mr. MICA. But there was no backup for that human error.

Mr. SABATINI. No, because they actually switched over to the

backup.

Mr. MICA. OK. OK. Mr. Zinser, did you have something?

Mr. ZINSER. Sir, I do not think we have a lot of data on how

many outages occur in situations similar to what was reported here

this afternoon. I think there have been some locations in the recent

past where there have been outages but I do not think there are

data where it is a widespread issue.

Mr. MICA. OK. Well, that concerns me from some of the incidents

I have heard, and I think that is something we need to keep an

eye on to make certain we have that capability.

Anybody recommend—OK, based on what you see, what you

have heard, you are all experts on safety, is there any change that

we need to make in statute for any reason that you are aware of

at this point in time and space that would improve safety? Is there

something, a legislative change, something you can’t do by rule or

your action that you already have with your current authority?

Mr. Sabatini, anything you think we need to address legislatively?

Mr. SABATINI. Sir, as you know, we are going through reauthorization; and we certainly have been thinking——

Mr. MICA. Anything you can think of in safety you are lacking?

You have all the jurisdiction, the tools you need to proceed.

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, we do. There are some minor

things.

Mr. MICA. Dollars that are missing, but you don’t get into that

business.

Anything you can think of Mr. Haueter?

Mr. HAUETER. Well, we don’t have regulatory authority, obviously, but we continue to have your support of our recommendations to help push them.

Mr. MICA. We changed where we used to put so many recommendations on the shelf that they are no longer just left on the

shelf. They are brought back up.

Mr. HAUETER. We appreciate that, sir.

Mr. MICA. Is there anything—now you are—and we apologize. I

have tried to move your reauthorization. I am hoping we can get
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it next week. That would be real fun. I would have an NTSB—but

anything there in the wrong direction, right direction, missing?

Mr. HAUETER. From the NTSB point of view?

Mr. MICA. Yeah.

Mr. HAUETER. Well, certainly we could use more staff, sir.

Mr. MICA. Oh, OK. I am just teasing. Anything else legislatively?

Mr. HAUETER. No, sir.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Dillingham?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir.

I agree with Mr. Sabatini. I think we have adequate tools. Those

tools need to be played out at this point in time before additional

legislation should be considered, we believe.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Zinser?

Mr. ZINSER. Mr. Chairman, we prepared a lot for this hearing,

but we did not prepare for that question. To be honest with you,

I really cannot think of a specific issue where legislation is needed.

I think there are a lot of rulemakings under way that if they do

not move, you may want to consider legislating them, but, at this

point, I would have to say I do not have a specific item.

Mr. MICA. Now, one question that was raised by several members was this new—this new trend towards outsourcing repairs,

maintenance. It appears, of course, that is going to continue; and

everybody believes we have the current authority to handle that if

we want to, OK? Nothing has to be legislated as far as the standards or requirements for aircraft that fly in U.S. airspace and carry

domestic U.S. passengers? No?

OK, I think I have covered all the remaining—not all. I have additional questions that we will be submitting for the record. So Mr.

Costello moves that we keep the record open for a period of what?

Mr. COSTELLO. I do indeed.

Mr. MICA. I will give you all the time I want.

Mr. COSTELLO. I so move for a period of 2 weeks.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, so ordered.

One other question. I should know the answer to this as Chairman, but, actually, we don’t do the—the FTEs, are there FTEs for

air traffic controllers set by Congress, by the appropriators? Does

anybody know?

Mr. SABATINI. I will ask.

Mr. MICA. FTEs.

Mr. SABATINI. We don’t believe so, sir. I will get you that information.

Mr. MICA. See, because I want to know—now, you told me—and

the other question we have—we have got to look at here is the determination of how many air traffic controllers are sufficient, how

many inspect—I think the inspection function is very critical to

this whole process. And there are a number of other positions, professional positions, that must be staffed. And you know that some

of the downsizing we have done, how I have expressed my concern

that we can’t even get near the margins on these things.

This brings up the question of how do we decide what is enough

as far as coverage for air traffic controllers, inspectors, other key

positions? Tell me how we do that now within this regime, and

then if FTEs are mandated by Congress, then—and I guess they

are for the rest of FAA, I would imagine.
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Mr. SABATINI. They certainly are for the safety organization, Mr.

Chairman.

I would tell you that, as I mentioned earlier, our first priority is

continued operational safety. We will never compromise safety. But

as we assure that we deploy our personnel to address the number

one priority, it shows up in terms of not being as responsive to the

applicants who wish to receive the services of the FAA for the certification of an engine, a component or to be certificated as an air

carrier. So that is where it shows up, and what you see is a delay

in getting to those folks.

Mr. Costello brought up the foreign repair stations. I can tell you

that we have a pending list of applicants, as many—I believe the

last figure was about 94 pending applicants for certification, which

we will not certificate because we know we cannot add 94. So what

shows up is the inability to be responsive to those who wish to be

certificated.

Mr. MICA. Again, how—are you, Russell and Marian sitting in a

dark room somewhere and saying—you have a formula in all of

that to say, 14,670 controllers, that is your—that was your target.

How did you reach that? Maybe you could just elaborate a minute

on that process. How much is adequate? Who is making that decision?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, we respond to what we can anticipate. There

isn’t a barometer for us to say, well, this year we can expect X

more people applying for what we would provide as a service for

certification. In fact, during bad economic times you will find that

that decreases; during good economic times, as we see today, we

have an increase in the number of applicants.

But specifically for our organization, Mr. Chairman, as you know,

we are working with the National Academies of Science who are

working with us to develop a staffing standard for the ABS organization. I do know that there is a staffing standard that has been

developed on behalf of the ATO, and while I don’t have that document here, and I am certainly not the person with the kind of detail to address the ATO in that kind of detail, we certainly can——

Mr. MICA. —responsibility in charge of safety? Again, I am trying

to get a handle on how we say that 14,670 is the adequate number

to service all of our towers and responsibilities.

Mr. SABATINI. Well, sir, I would say that the evidence is quite

clear. We will acknowledge today that this is the safest system in

the world, and that is the objective evidence of good work being

done. So we are in the throes of, as I said, addressing the staffing

standard.

And I would also say that the air carriers today are providing us

with one of the safest systems in the world, and we don’t regulate

them in terms of how many people they need to have to conduct

safe operations, except in those areas where it is obvious. Well, if

it is a crew of two in an airplane, you have to have two flight crew

members or where flight attendants are required for a certain

number of seating capacity. But as far as how to operate the air

carrier, we do not specify how many people they need to have to

safely conduct the operation. The output is the objective evidence,

and that is what we look at.
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And it is the same with us. Right now, we don’t have a formula.

It is a complicated formula. It is no different than what you have

heard about the air traffic organization.

Mr. MICA. Drafting—again, you have got a whole new set—new

contract. Are you telling me this is in transition and you are feeling

your way, so to speak? But I mean—or is there some formula I can

address? Is it requests from the managers of towers across the

country?

Mr. SABATINI. Well, I think the transit organization—that formula already exists. As I said, I can provide that to you, but I don’t

have it myself personally today.

Mr. MICA. Anybody else want to comment on the adequacy of the

current——

Mr. ZINSER. Sir, your question is a central question that FAA has

to deal with. What we have been recommending is that FAA come

up with a standard, facility by facility. There are facilities out there

right now, for example, where the allocation from FAA headquarters is a hundred controllers more than what they have on

staff right now, and they are operating fine. And the overtime is

not exaggerated or inordinate either.

So what we are recommending is that they narrow that gap—

even if it is just a range at each facility of how many controllers

they need. What I was just told today is that FAA managers have

done a facility-by-facility bottom up estimation of how many controllers they need at each facility. Those are not published, but

they have them. They have asked the MITRE Corporation to come

in and validate those numbers and help them come up with a

facility——

Mr. MICA. Do we know where we are on MITRE’s validation?

And, again, all this would be new, because we are in a new contract, sort of a new year.

Mr. ZINSER. My understanding is that they have begun with the

enroute centers, but I don’t think that is completed.

Mr. MICA. The other thing, too—and I think Mrs. Kelly is gone—

but as I recall when I visited there—now she said there is a reduction in air traffic controllers, but there is also reduction in air traffic. Which means you have sort of a floating requirement.

I mean, if you have somebody like Independence pull out of Dulles—I don’t know how many they had at Dulles, but you take out—

what did they have? 350 flights a day or something? It was just

a phenomenal amount. They chopped that in half.

Under this contract, you have the ability now to move those people to someplace else or——

Mr. SABATINI. That is absolutely correct.

Mr. MICA. —they just sit there and collect the salary.

Mr. SABATINI. They are. You are absolutely correct. With this

contract, we have the flexibility to move people where they are

needed.

Mr. MICA. I want to see the MITRE——

Mr. ZINSER. I am told that it is expected in draft in the enroute

centers by the end of the year.

Mr. MICA. I hope to be here as a member.

Mr. Costello.
59

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope you are here,

too, sitting where I am.

I don’t have any further questions, but let me just make a point

that in September of 2003 the GAO made some observations concerning the issue of contract towers and looked at the issue of safety, and I would ask unanimous consent Mr. Chairman that we

enter that GAO report into the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection.

[The information follows:]
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Mr. COSTELLO. With that, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your calling this hearing. I think that in the coming months that we need

to come back and examine some other issues concerning safety.

Mr. MICA. And I want to compliment you because, you know, we

have been so focused on security, security, ATO—or ATC modernization, we got back into it, but we have not paid enough attention. I appreciate Mr. Costello’s request for this hearing, and I

think we will do a follow-up. We may need to bring in some other

players, because we have a great record and those probably—out

of sight, out of mind. Maybe Lexington is a little bit of a wake-up

call or a reminder, but we do need to see whatever we can do.

I will also submit a question asking your recommendation on

R&D for technology. Of course, we are getting into—and I have

seen the price tag on the end gas, the next generation air traffic

control system, but also things we can do in the short term, either

R&D or deployment of existing technology on a cost-effective basis

to enhance safety, and we can spend the rest of the night talking

about some of that. So I look forward to your recommendations on

that.

Finally, we did have at least one member from another panel and

from the full committee ask a question. I have a question from

Congressman Tom Reynolds. He is not on the committee, but we

also granted him the courtesy of submitting a question. That will

be submitted for Mr. Sabatini, I believe; and we will ask for a response. It is on a specific incident.

There being no further business, I ought to just break for a few

minutes and then call you back for a few more hours. No, I’m just

kidding.

There being no business to come before the subcommittee, I want

to thank our panel of witnesses and those who participated here

today. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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