2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-24-2015

Joseph Stevens v. Santander Holdings USA Inc Sel

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No. 14-1481

______________

JOSEPH STEVENS

v.

SANTANDER HOLDINGS USA INC SELF INSURED 

SHORT TERM DISABILITY PLAN; LIBERTY LIFE 

ASSURANCE CO OF BOSTON, DBA LIBERTY MUTUAL; 

SANTANDER HOLDINGS USA INC.; SANTANDER 

HOLDINGS USA INC LONG TERM DISABILITY PLAN,

Appellants

______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civ. No. 3-11-cv-07473)

Honorable Peter G. Sheridan, District Judge

______________

Argued May 20, 2015

BEFORE: GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE, and 

GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
2

(Filed: August 24, 2015)

______________

Mary C. Gordon 

Amy L. Bashore

Patricia A. Smith (argued)

Ballard Spahr

210 Lake Drive East

Suite 200

Cherry Hill, NJ 08002

 Attorneys for Appellants

Mark D. DeBofsky (argued)

DeBofsky & Associates

200 West Madison Street

Suite 2670

Chicago, IL 60606

Bonny G. Rafel

Suite 410

17 Hanover Road

P.O. Box 97

Florham Park, NJ 07932

 

Attorneys for Appellee

______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

______________

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
3

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from 

an order entered in an action that plaintiff-appellee Joseph 

Stevens, a former employee of a subsidiary of defendantappellant Santander Holdings USA Inc. (“Santander”), brought 

against Santander seeking to recover benefits from two disability 

benefit plans that Santander provided for its eligible employees. 

As an employee of a Santander subsidiary, Sovereign Bank, 

Stevens participated in these plans, a short-term disability plan 

(“STD”) and a long-term disability plan (“LTD”). In October 

2010, Stevens sought STD benefits through the administrator of 

Santander’s plans, defendant-appellant Liberty Life Assurance 

Company of Boston, doing business as Liberty Mutual (“Liberty 

Mutual”). After it initially awarded STD benefits to Stevens, 

Liberty Mutual determined that Stevens no longer suffered from a 

qualifying disability, a determination that led it to terminate his 

STD benefits. Stevens responded by bringing this action pursuant 

to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 

U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., seeking reinstatement of the payment of 

benefits. The District Court found that Liberty Mutual’s decision 

to terminate Stevens’s STD benefits was arbitrary and capricious 

and remanded the case to the plan administrator with instructions 

to reinstate Stevens’s STD benefit payments retroactively and to 

determine his eligibility for LTD benefit payments.

Santander and Liberty Mutual appealed to this Court, but 

Stevens moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, 

arguing that the District Court’s remand order to the plan 

administrator was not a “final decision” appealable pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 at that time. Before reaching the merits of this 
4

appeal, we must determine whether the District Court’s remand 

order is presently final and appealable under § 1291 or is 

otherwise appealable. Upon review, we hold that the District 

Court has retained jurisdiction over the case and that the order 

from which appellants have appealed is not yet appealable. We 

therefore will dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background and Administrative 

 Proceedings

Sovereign Bank employed Stevens as a Retail Investment 

Financial Consultant II from October 2, 2006, through October 5, 

2010. During his employment, Stevens received treatment for 

ankylosing spondylitis, a chronic inflammatory disease. As we 

have indicated, Santander sponsored and funded an STD benefits 

plan for its employees and engaged Liberty Mutual as the plan’s 

administrator. But even though Liberty Mutual was the plan 

administrator, Santander retained final decision-making authority 

in the review of STD claims and Santander paid any benefits 

awarded. Under the STD plan, a covered employee, such as 

Stevens, is considered “disabled” if objective medical evidence 

demonstrates that he is unable to perform the “material and

substantial” duties of his own occupation, in Stevens’s case as a 

Retail Investment Financial Consultant II. “Material and 

substantial” duties are those normally required to be performed 

that cannot be eliminated or modified. 

Santander also purchased an LTD benefit plan from 

Liberty Mutual. The administration and funding of the LTD plan 
5

differed from that of the STD plan because Liberty Mutual both 

administered and had final decision-making authority under the 

LTD plan and paid benefits awarded under the plan. To qualify 

for LTD benefits, an employee needs to show that he is “unable 

to perform the Material and Substantial duties of his Own 

Occupation” for an “elimination period” of 180 days, and 

thereafter cannot perform these duties for the next 24 months. 

During the “elimination period,” an employee does not receive 

benefits under the LTD plan, but he can receive LTD benefits 

during the 24-month “Own Occupation” period that follows. 

However, during the elimination period the employee may be 

eligible for STD benefits, and thus the two plans complement 

each other as LTD benefits can start when STD benefits stop.1 

After the expiration of the 24-month “Own Occupation” period, 

an employee will be eligible for LTD benefits only if he 

demonstrates that he is “unable to perform, with reasonable 

continuity, the Material and Substantial Duties of Any 

Occupation.” (J.A. 67.) 

On or about October 5, 2010, Stevens began a leave of 

absence from Sovereign Bank due to worsening symptoms related 

to his medical condition. Consequently, Stevens filed a claim 

with Liberty Mutual for STD payments as he asserted that he was 

subject to qualifying physical restrictions and cognitive 

impairments. Liberty Mutual reviewed records of Stevens’s 

treating rheumatologist and approved his request for STD 

 

1

In his brief Stevens indicates that “[t]he short-term disability 

(‘STD’) coverage provide[s] for up to 25 weeks of benefits (177 

[sic] days of disability) following a 5 day elimination period.” 

(Appellee’s br. 5.)
6

benefits through December 21, 2010.2 In December, Liberty 

Mutual reviewed updated medical information and approved 

payment of STD benefits through February 5, 2011. 

Liberty Mutual again reviewed Stevens’s updated records 

in February 2011, this time determining that his medical reports 

did not substantiate Stevens’s subjective complaints of pain. 

Accordingly, it forwarded the case for review to an independent 

physician, Dr. Sara Kramer, a board certified physician in internal 

medicine and rheumatology. After Dr. Kramer reviewed 

Stevens’s records and spoke with Stevens’s treating 

rheumatologist, she concluded that Stevens could return to work 

provided that he was allowed certain accommodations, including 

being permitted to stretch and change positions as needed 

throughout the course of an eight-hour day.3 Liberty Mutual 

subsequently informed Stevens that his condition no longer met 

the definition of disability and therefore it would not award him 

additional STD benefits. The termination of Stevens’s eligibility 

for STD benefits effectively rendered Stevens ineligible for LTD 

benefits as he could not demonstrate that he was unable to 

perform his own occupation’s duties throughout the 180-day 

elimination period. 

 

2 Stevens indicates that he also applied for and received 

temporary disability benefits from the State of New Jersey at the 

same time predicated on the same information that he supplied to 

Liberty Mutual to support his STD claim. (Appellee’s br. 7-8.)

3 Stevens asserts that Dr. Kramer spent a total of one hour and 15 

minutes reviewing his case and that Liberty Mutual did not ask

Stevens to submit to a physical 

examination. (Appellee’s br. 11-12.) 
7

After Liberty Mutual notified Stevens that he was not 

eligible for further STD benefits, Stevens filed a series of 

administrative appeals with Liberty Mutual that he supported 

with medical records and additional documentation. In response 

to each of Stevens’s requests for review of additional 

information, Liberty Mutual enlisted medical professionals to 

evaluate the information in his record and the new information 

that he provided. On November 10, 2011, Liberty Mutual made 

a final determination that Stevens was no longer eligible for STD 

benefits, and it provided its final recommendation and analysis to 

that end to Santander, which, in turn, approved the decision a 

short time thereafter. Liberty Mutual then notified Stevens of the 

final decision to deny him further STD benefits. 

B. District Court Proceedings

On December 22, 2011, a little over a month after Liberty 

Mutual notified him of the final decision that he no longer 

qualified for STD benefits, Stevens filed this action in the District 

Court pursuant to ERISA, seeking both retroactive reinstatement 

of his STD benefits starting on February 5, 2011, and continuing 

through April 4, 2011, and LTD benefits starting on April 5, 

2011, the end of the elimination period. The parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment, and on January 29, 2014, the 

District Court granted Stevens’s motion and denied Santander’s 

motion in an oral decision. The Court pointed to “a number of 

procedural anomalies that can lead to a finding of an arbitrary and 

capricious termination” of Stevens’s STD benefits and explained 

that it was “most important” that “despite retaining final approval 

authority over the STD plan . . . Santander failed to conduct any 

meaningful independent review of [Stevens’s] file,” a procedure 

that the Court viewed as “‘rubber stamping’ Liberty’s benefit 
8

determinations.” (J.A. 19-20.) The Court determined that the 

decision to terminate Stevens’s STD benefits and thus, in effect, 

to deny him LTD benefits “was not a product of reasoned 

decision making” and determined that the appropriate remedy 

was to (1) reinstate STD benefits because they had been 

terminated after being awarded and (2) remand Stevens’s claim to 

the plan administrator for full consideration of his eligibility for 

LTD benefits. (Id. 4-5, 20-21.) The Court entered a separate 

judgment on January 29, 2014, evidencing its determination and 

directing the clerk of court “to close this case.” (Id. 5.) 

Santander and Liberty Mutual timely appealed to this 

Court, but Stevens moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. In contending that we do not have jurisdiction, 

Stevens argues that the District Court’s January 29, 2014 

decision and judgment were not final because they did not resolve 

the amount of “Own Occupation” benefits to which he was 

entitled under the STD plan or his eligibility for benefits under the 

LTD plan.4 Santander and Liberty Mutual contend that the 

District Court’s decision was final because (1) the calculation of 

the amount of STD benefits owed to Stevens was a “ministerial” 

task not subject to genuine dispute, and (2) an analysis of 

Stevens’s eligibility for LTD benefits could be made separately 

from the other issues in this case. They also cite as indicia of 

finality the District Court’s direction to its clerk to close the case 

and its entry of a separate judgment evidencing its determination. 

III. DISCUSSION

As we have explained, prior to reaching the merits of an 

 

4 As a matter of convenience, we usually will refer to the District 

Court’s decision and judgment as though they are a single order.
9

appeal, we determine if we have jurisdiction. See Poole v. Family

Court of New Castle Cnty., 368 F.3d 263, 264 (3d Cir. 2004). 

Courts of appeals most commonly have jurisdiction over appeals 

taken from “final decisions of the district courts of the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C § 1291. Consequently, our first inquiry is to 

decide whether the District Court’s order remanding Stevens’s 

claim to the plan administrator was a final appealable order under 

§ 1291. We analyze our jurisdiction under § 1291 primarily by 

applying the three-prong test we recognized in Papotto v. 

Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co., 731 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 

2013). For the reasons that we will explain, our consideration of 

the Papotto test and the other cases that we discuss leads us to 

conclude that we do not have jurisdiction over the District 

Court’s order under § 1291, and inasmuch as we do not have 

jurisdiction on any other basis, we will dismiss the appeal. 

A. Case Law Applicable to Our

 Jurisdictional Analysis

1. Papotto’s Three-Prong Test

In Papotto, an ERISA case involving a claim for accidental 

death benefits under an accidental death and dismemberment 

(“AD&D”) policy, the plan administrator denied benefits because 

the plaintiff’s decedent was intoxicated at the time of his 

accidental death. 731 F.3d at 267-68. After both parties filed 

summary judgment motions, the district court found that a 

provision in the AD&D policy precluding recovery for accidental 

death or injury if the decedent was intoxicated at the time of his 

death or injury was applicable only if there was a causal 

connection between the intoxication and the death or injury. Id. at 

268. As a result, the court denied both parties’ summary 

judgment motions and remanded the case to the plan 
10

administrator for consideration of whether the decedent’s 

intoxication caused or contributed to his death. Id. The insurer 

appealed, and the plaintiff cross-appealed. Id. at 268-69. 

We raised the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte and 

considered whether the district court’s order remanding the case 

was final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 731 F.3d at 269-70. We noted

that the remand order directed the plan administrator to take two 

actions: “(1) to consider additional evidence, and (2) to read a 

causation requirement into the intoxication exclusion provision 

and determine whether [the decedent’s] intoxication caused or 

contributed to his death.” Id. at 272. We considered the case to 

be analogous to cases dealing with appeals from orders 

remanding cases to administrative agencies. This conclusion led 

us to “distill” a three-prong test for determining the finality of the 

order in that case. Id. at 270. Under that test, we may exercise 

jurisdiction over remand orders in ERISA benefit cases when “(1) 

the remand ‘finally resolves’ an issue, (2) the legal issue is 

‘important,’ and (3) denial of immediate review will ‘foreclose 

appellate review’ in the future.” Id. at 270.5 In fashioning this 

test, we noted that we “consistently [have] accorded significant 

weight to the third factor—i.e., potential for evasion of future 

review.” Id. Applying that test in Papotto, we “easily 

determine[d]” that we lacked appellate jurisdiction over the first 

portion of the order remanding for consideration of additional 

evidence. Id. at 272. Not only had we held previously that 

“orders directing remands to [administrative agencies] to consider 

additional evidence [are] nonfinal,” but we also reasoned that the 

 

5 We understand the Papotto third prong to mean that it is 

necessary to allow an immediate appeal because there will not be 

an opportunity for an appeal in the future.
11

order failed the first prong of the test that we had distilled 

because it did not “finally resolve” anything. Id. (alterations in 

original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The second portion of the order for remand in Papotto

directing the plan administrator to read a causation requirement 

into the intoxication exclusion provision when evaluating 

Papotto’s case required a separate analysis. Beginning with the 

first prong of our test—whether the order “finally resolve[d]” the 

underlying issue of the case—we followed the lead of other 

courts of appeals by asking: “Does the remand order make an 

ultimate determination as to eligibility, thus leaving the plan 

administrator with nothing left to do but issue an order?” Id. at 

273. We held the order did not “finally resolve[]” the issue of the 

plaintiff’s eligibility and therefore required further action by the 

plan administrator. Id. at 274. 

After noting that the second Papotto prong—importance—

was met, id. at 274 n.7, we addressed the third prong, stating that 

“no provision in the ERISA statute permit[s] an insurance 

company to challenge the decision of its own plan administrator in 

district court.” Id. at 274-75 & n.8. We nevertheless held that 

the insurer was not left without recourse because the district court 

retained jurisdiction over the case, inasmuch as “administrative 

closings do not end the proceeding. Rather, they are a practical 

tool used by courts to ‘prune . . . overgrown dockets’ and are 

‘particularly useful in circumstances in which a case, though not 

dead, [is] likely to remain moribund for an appreciable period of 

time.’” Id. at 275 (first alteration in original) (quoting Freeman v. 

Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 247 (3d Cir. 

2013)). We also pointed out that a court may reopen an 

administratively closed case—“either on its own or at the request 
12

of a party—at any time.” Id.6 We concluded that the district 

court’s order in Papotto administratively closed the case but did 

not dismiss it. Overall, we were satisfied that the third Papotto

test prong for allowing immediate appeal was not met. 

We further held that the order was not appealable under 

the collateral order doctrine because it did not conclusively 

determine the disputed question, was not effectively unreviewable 

on appeal from a final judgment, and was not separate from the 

merits of the action as it “directly implicate[d] the heart of [the] 

case—whether Mr. Papotto’s death [was] an eligible event for 

distribution of benefits.” Id. We therefore dismissed the appeal 

for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 277.

2. Mead and Finality Considerations

A recent ERISA case from the Court of Appeals for the 

Second Circuit, Mead v. Reliastar Life Insurance Co., 768 F.3d 

102 (2d Cir. 2014), is useful in our consideration of the finality 

of the remand order now on appeal. Mead concerned an 

employee disability benefits claim in circumstances factually 

similar to those that we address now. There, the employer, 

Reliastar, provided a group insurance policy to its employees that 

included two kinds of benefits comparable to the STD and LTD 

benefits that Santander provided: own-occupation benefits for up 

to 24 months and any-occupation benefits thereafter. Id. at 104. 

Mead filed suit under ERISA after Reliastar denied her claim for 

 

6 See also Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S.Ct. 1686, 1691 

(2015) (describing a final decision as “a ruling ‘by which a district

court disassociates itself from a case’” (quoting Swint v. 

Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 1208 

(1995))).
13

disability benefits under its group policy. Id. at 104-05. 

The district court entertained Mead’s suit twice and both 

times remanded it for reconsideration, first because Reliastar’s 

reason for denial of own-occupation benefits did not identify the 

evidence that Reliastar credited and the evidence that it rejected 

in arriving at its decision, and second because the court believed 

that Reliastar “ignored” several physical requirements of Mead’s

former position, refused to recognize the “ample” objective 

evidence supporting her subjective complaints of pain, and 

provided what the district court believed were “obviously false or 

misleading reasons” for discrediting the conclusions of its own 

neurologist. Id. at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted). After 

issuing its second remand order instructing Reliastar to “calculate 

and award” the own-occupation benefits and to determine 

whether Mead was entitled to any-occupation benefits, the district 

court directed its clerk to “close the case,” though it indicated 

that it would entertain a separate motion from Mead for 

prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs. Id. at 106 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Reliastar appealed from this 

second remand order to the Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit. 

The court of appeals in its analysis of its jurisdiction 

observed that “remands to ERISA plan administrators generally 

are not ‘final’ because, in the ordinary case, they contemplate 

further proceedings by the plan administrator.” Id. at 108. The 

court explained that it nonetheless would “examine the content of 

the particular ERISA remand in order to determine its 

appealability,” citing Papotto with approval. Id. Further, “to 

preserve an ERISA plan administrator’s ability to obtain appellate 

review of a nonfinal remand order,” the court decided that it 
14

generally would “interpret a district court’s remand order as 

[retaining] jurisdiction over the case such that, after a 

determination by the plan administrator on remand, either party 

may seek to reopen the district court proceeding and obtain a final 

judgment.” Id. at 108-09. 

The court of appeals concluded that the district court’s 

remand order was not final and appealable under either a 

conventional application of § 1291 or pursuant to the collateral 

order doctrine. Id. at 113.7 In determining that the remand order 

was not final and appealable, the court reasoned that by 

remanding the issue of Mead’s eligibility for any-occupation 

benefits without addressing the merits of that issue, the district 

court’s order did not “conclusively determine” Reliastar’s liability 

to Mead under her ERISA claim.8 Id. at 209. Importantly, the 

 

7 As we noted in Papotto, when considering the collateral order 

doctrine, the Supreme Court in Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 

349, 126 S.Ct. 952, 957 (2006), applied a practical construction 

of rather than an exception to § 1291 to bring a collateral order 

appeal within that section. Papotto, 731 F.3d at 271 n.4.

8 Appellants posit that Mead rejected the approach that Papotto

adopted when Papotto formulated the test for deciding whether 

remands to ERISA plan administrators are appealable. This view 

is an overstatement; Mead ultimately declined to decide whether 

to apply its own precedent governing the finality of orders 

remanding cases to administrative agencies, but its analysis 

mirrored our own in Papotto. See Mead, 768 F.3d at 108-09, 

111-12, 114 (analyzing whether the remand order contemplated 

further proceedings by the plan administrator and whether the 

district court retained jurisdiction over the case, permitting later 
15

court rejected Reliastar’s argument that the any-occupation and 

own-occupation portions of the order were separable, reasoning 

that “[w]hile it may be true that Mead’s eligibility for ‘any 

occupation’ benefits has no practical effect on whether she is 

entitled to receive ‘own occupation’ benefits, this has no impact 

on [the court’s] jurisdiction because a district court’s decision that 

does not dispose of all of the plaintiff’s claims for relief is not 

‘final.’” Id. at 110 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 

U.S. 737, 744, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 1206 (1976)). Moreover, the court 

determined that even the own-occupation portion of the order was 

not final, as the amount of benefits due had not yet been 

determined, and calculation of that amount was more than a 

“ministerial task.” Id. at 110-11 & n.5.

3. Carr and Finality of the District Court 

 Order

Appellants’ argument that we have jurisdiction because the 

District Court’s order consists of “a final order and a remand 

order” that are “inextricably linked” is predicated in part on our 

opinion in Carr v. American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671 (3d Cir. 

1994). In Carr, we analyzed the appealability of an order that 

dismissed the American Red Cross as a party and remanded the 

case to a state court because the district court believed that it did 

not have subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of the Red 

Cross as a party and declined to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 674. 

We explained that the district court’s dismissal order 

needed to satisfy two separate jurisdictional requirements to be 

appealable: First, to avoid the bar to appellate review in 28 

 

appellate review).
16

U.S.C. § 1447(d),9the dismissal order had to be “logically 

precedent to, and separable from” the decision to remand the case 

to state court, a requirement that we held had been satisfied. Id.

at 675. The second requirement was that the dismissal order be 

final. Id. We held that the order was final under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 because dismissal of the appeal would “have the practical 

effect of denying later appellate review of [the] district court’s 

underlying order,” as the case was remanded to state court 

without the Red Cross as a party, and, as a result, the state court 

could not review the order dismissing the Red Cross from the 

case. Carr, 17 F.3d at 678. We also held that the order was 

appealable under the collateral order doctrine because it 

“conclusively determine[d] [a] disputed question, resolve[d] an 

important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, 

and [was] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 

judgment.” Id. at 675-76 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. 

Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2458 (1978)) 

(internal quotation mark omitted). Therefore, we concluded that 

the dismissal order was reviewable on appeal, and we also held 

that the remand order was appealable as well.

But the procedural posture of Carr differs from that in our 

case because the District Court’s order here is not final under 

either a conventional application of § 1291 or the collateral order 

doctrine. For the reasons we explain below, the District Court 

retained jurisdiction over Stevens’s claims after the remand, and 

 

9

“An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was 

removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an 

order remanding a case to the State court from which it was 

removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be 

reviewable by appeal or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
17

any party will be able to move to reopen the case at some future 

date following which the parties will be able to appeal from the 

District Court’s orders in the case including the earlier January 

29, 2014 remand order. Cf. Carr, 17 F.3d at 677 (distinguishing 

as unappealable those orders that, “though unreviewable in 

federal court, would be reviewable by [a] state appellate court on 

appeal”). 

B. Analysis of Our Jurisdiction

We principally analyze whether we have jurisdiction over 

this appeal under the three-prong test outlined in Papotto: (1) 

whether the remand finally resolves an issue, (2) whether the 

legal issue is important, and (3) whether unless there is immediate 

review, there can never be appellate review of the remand order. 

731 F.3d at 270. 

We will consider first whether the remand order made a 

final resolution of Stevens’s LTD disability eligibility. It is surely 

clear that the second part of the District Court’s order, which 

instructs the plan administrator to consider fully Stevens’s LTD 

benefits claim, does not “end[] the litigation on the merits and 

leave[] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” 

Coopers, 437 U.S. at 467, 98 S.Ct. at 2457 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The opposite is true because the remand order’s 

plain terms require the plan administrator to make a new 

adjudication; the first prong of the three-part Papotto test to allow 

immediate appeal therefore has not been satisfied, as the order 

determines neither whether Stevens is eligible for LTD benefits 

nor the amount of those benefits. Papotto, 731 F.3d at 273; see

Liberty Mut., 424 U.S. at 742-44, 96 S.Ct. at 1206-07. 

While we recognize that if Stevens qualifies for full STD 
18

benefits, as he does under the District Court’s decision, he will 

have satisfied the LTD requirement that he be unable to perform 

his own occupation duties during the LTD 180-day elimination 

period, he must do more than obtain a favorable determination on 

that issue to be eligible for LTD benefits. To qualify for LTD 

benefits after the expiration of the 180-day period, Stevens also 

must demonstrate that he cannot perform the duties of his own 

occupation for the next 24 months and thereafter cannot perform 

the duties of any occupation. These requirements are distinct 

from the requirements for eligibility for STD benefits and, in the 

second situation, are more demanding because to qualify for STD 

benefits, an employee merely needs to demonstrate that he cannot 

perform the duties of his own occupation during the initial 180-

day period. 

A determination of whether the District Court’s order 

insofar as it reinstated Steven’s STD benefits satisfies Papotto’s 

first prong requires a more complex analysis. We acknowledge 

that the Court’s direction to the plan administrator with respect to 

benefits under the STD plan was to undertake what arguably is a 

“ministerial task.” After all, inasmuch as Stevens was awarded 

STD benefits before the remand, it appears that Liberty Mutual 

only needs to multiply the amount Stevens previously was 

awarded per month by the remaining number of months of 

benefits to which he is entitled pursuant to the District Court’s 

decision under the STD policy and add appropriate interest. But 

we need not decide whether the order “finally resolves” the issue 

of STD benefits because, as we will explain, the order is not 

appealable under Papotto’s third and most important prong.

In considering Papotto’s third prong, we determine that 

our dismissal of this appeal for lack of jurisdiction will not mean 
19

that there can never be an appellate review of the order awarding 

Stevens STD benefits, though Liberty Mutual and Santander 

suggest otherwise. Our dismissal of an appeal from a remand 

order in an ERISA action generally would not preclude a party 

from filing an appeal of the remand order at a later time. Our 

examination of the case law satisfies us that any of the parties—

including Santander and Liberty Mutual—can preserve its right to 

appeal to this Court to challenge the District Court’s decision by 

filing a motion to reopen the case in the District Court after the 

remand to the plan administrator. If Liberty Mutual denies 

Stevens LTD benefits, he can seek to reopen the case and appeal 

the decision denying the benefits to the District Court, and, after 

the District Court’s decision, one or both parties may appeal to 

this Court. If Liberty Mutual grants LTD benefits on remand, 

Santander can move to reopen the case and obtain entry of a final 

judgment, from which it may appeal the District Court’s January 

29, 2014 order. In the meantime, Santander can seek a stay of the

District Court’s order to award STD benefits pending further 

proceedings. See Mead, 768 F.3d at 112.10 

 

10 At oral argument, appellants pointed out that they sought such a 

stay from the District Court, but the Court has not ruled on their 

motion. In considering the motion for a stay of the order to 

award STD benefits, the Court should be mindful of our inquiry 

under Papotto, which focuses on whether dismissing the appeal 

will prevent future review as a practical matter, 731 F.3d at 270, 

and thus should consider the feasibility of Santander recouping its 

payment of STD benefits, in the absence of a stay, if such benefits 

are ultimately determined to have been awarded wrongfully. We 

note that the district court in Mead granted a stay under similar 

circumstances. See 768 F.3d at 106. 
20

It is also significant that the District Court did not intend to 

enter a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 

as it did not make the findings required by that rule to enter a final 

judgment on either the STD or LTD claim. See Elliott v. 

Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 229 (3d Cir. 2012); Powers 

v. Southland Corp., 4 F.3d 223, 237 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The 

dismissal of a party or a particular cause of action does not 

necessarily make a decision final.”). While partial review might 

be efficient in this case, our jurisdictional concerns are paramount: 

we must “resist[] the temptation to abandon the deeply held 

distaste for piecemeal litigation simply because we are presented 

with a case whose immediate resolution would clarify the law and 

terminate a drawn-out controversy.” Papotto, 731 F.3d at 276 

(alteration in original) (quoting Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. v. 

Consol. Rail Corp., 864 F.2d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 1988)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

We make clear here that regardless of delay or resource 

costs, this Court generally will consider remands to ERISA plan 

administrators nonfinal because, in the ordinary case, they 

contemplate that the plan administrator will engage in further 

proceedings. We also make clear that we will interpret a district 

court’s remand order to a plan administrator in an ERISA case as 

including a reservation of the court’s jurisdiction over the case so 

that, after a determination by the administrator on remand, either 

party may seek to reopen the district court proceedings and obtain 

a final judgment. See, e.g., Young v. Prudential Ins. Co., 671 

F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012). The finality of an order 

ultimately will turn on the substance of the district court’s order, 

such that even a district court’s assertion of finality cannot 

 
21

establish appellate jurisdiction to review a decision that is not 

otherwise “final” for purposes of § 1291. 

Though appellants ask that we sever the STD portion of 

the District Court’s order and review it now, we decline to do so. 

In making this request, appellants rely principally on City of 

Waco v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 293 U.S. 140, 55 

S.Ct. 6 (1934). However, we consistently have interpreted City 

of Waco as permitting severance and appellate review only where 

refusing to do so would render a portion of a remand order 

unreviewable. Compare Powers, 4 F.3d at 237 (holding that an 

order allowing a relation back amendment and remanding to state 

court was unreviewable because “no doctrine . . . would bar the 

state court from reviewing the federal district court’s 

interlocutory decision to allow the relation back amendment,” and 

thus, there was no “right at stake the value of which effectively 

will be lost if the order is not immediately appealable”), with

Beneficial Consumer Disc. Co. v. Poltonowicz, 47 F.3d 91, 93 

(3d Cir. 1995) (exercising jurisdiction over an appeal from an 

order dismissing a cross-claim against the IRS on grounds of 

sovereign immunity but not over an order remanding remaining 

claims to state court). Here, the District Court has retained 

jurisdiction and there is no need for us to entertain a piecemeal 

appeal.

C. Constitutionality of Remand to the Plan

 Administrator

Stevens argues that orders remanding cases to plan 

administrators are not permissible under ERISA and “may even be

unconstitutional.” (Appellee’s br. 34.) Stevens accordingly 

contends that we should order Liberty Mutual to pay both the 

STD and LTD benefits instead of remanding the matter for a 
22

determination of Stevens’s eligibility for LTD benefits even 

though there has not been an administrative or judicial 

determination that he is entitled to benefits during the 24-month 

“Own Occupation” period following the elimination period, nor 

has there been any determination that he is entitled to benefits 

during the “Any Occupation” period that follows. 

We, however, will not address this request on the merits as 

it is not properly before us because Stevens did not file a crossappeal from the District Court’s order remanding the case. 

“Absent a cross-appeal, an appellee may ‘urge in support of a 

decree any matter appearing in the record, although his argument 

may involve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court,’ but 

may not ‘attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own

rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary.’” El 

Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 479, 119 S.Ct. 

1430, 1434-35 (1999) (quoting United States v. Am. Rwy. 

Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S.Ct. 560, 564 (1924)). 

Stevens is seeking impermissibly to enlarge his rights under the 

District Court’s order as he is attempting to obtain an award of 

LTD benefits. Therefore, he is doing more than attacking the 

reasoning underlying the District Court’s order; he is seeking an 

award of previously unawarded relief, and he cannot obtain that 

relief in the absence of a cross-appeal. See El Paso Natural Gas, 

526 U.S. at 479, 119 S.Ct. at 1434-35; cf. Blum v. Bacon, 457 

U.S. 132, 137 n.5, 102 S.Ct. 2355, 2359 n.5 (1982) (holding that 

failure to file a cross-appeal did not bar an argument where 

accepting the argument would not “alter the relief ordered in the 

judgment”). 

IV. CONCLUSION
23

For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss this appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction and will remand the case to the District Court 

for further proceedings.