“Talk the talk...Walk the walk”

e Anarea of extraordinary leadership commitment
> Rhetoric - continuous emphasis
> Policies - support transformation
> Incentives - reward transformation
© Top leadership must determine priorities and direct resources
> Establish clear goals, make clear assignments
> Plan from now to completion, follow-up, ensure stability
> Trade-off resources, time, and quality
> Involve business and Industry

Logistics transformation leadership challenge far greater than any weapon
system project!

Volume 2 — DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
5t



To restate briefly what previous DSB recommendations have said,
responsibility for managing weapons systems from “cradle to grave” should be
explicitly assigned for the life of the equipment to appropriate Program
Managers, whose reporting chain is either through a Program Executive Officer
or Systems/Materiel Command to the Service Acquisition Executives (acquisition
reporting chain includes Service Acquisition Executives, but in-service chain
often differs).

One alternative, used by the Army during the Gulf War, was to give the
PM for major systems, e.g., Abrams tank, Bradley, the life cycle support
responsibilities and spares funding control. The PM continued to report to the
PEO for execution of production and modifications but was responsible to the
Army Materiel Command for sustainment of those systems. This arrangement is
at work now for many systems whose production has ended yet modifications
continue. The service materiel command component acts as the PEO and
responds to the Service Acquisition executive for modification and to the materiel
systems command for sustainment

Controlling Total Ownership Costs

For such responsibilities to be meaningful, a standard process should be
established for defining and measuring total ownership costs (TOC), including
standard rules for allocating indirect costs, and a method for assessing the
impact on contingency lift requirements. TOC and lift goals — along with other
demand-reduction requirements and goals — should be passed along to industry
in contracts. Contracts would incentivize reductions in crew size, improvements
in equipment reliability/ maintainability, reductions in equipment weight and in the
weight and volume of the major drivers of sustainment deployments — fuel and
ammunition usage. Today's contracts tend not to provide such incentives, but
are actually structured such that revenues to the OEM and component
manufacturers rise as reliability falls. We will not achieve major TOC and
demand reductions until we have accomplished a complete “turn-around” in
these incentives.

Gaining Funding Control

Currently platform-level Program Managers often have direct control over
approximately 30 percent or less of the TOC of their systems. In this regard,
Service budgeting and financial procedures should be modified to facilitate:

1. Increased flexibility in shifting funding between sustainment and
investment accounts in new budget years. (It seems futile to attempt shifts
during the year of budget execution.)

Workforce Vision,” dated April 1, 1998, pages 9 and 10) committing to having the Services
designate ten major systems for PM management of product support. Similar recommendations
are included in the DSB 1996 Summer Study “Innovative Support . . .” and the report of the DSB
Task Force on Logistics Modernization of April 1996.

Volume 2 ~ DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel
a 115



Logistics Capabilities: Equipment/Systems

Sub NLT 2010 NLT 2025
component
Ammunition e Obsolete munitions gone e Fully unified planning for theater-level conflict
© Improved Service methodologies reduces duplication of target allocations and
foster major shift from LOE to resulting excess inventories
target-oriented “smart” weapons. | » “Wooden round” practices for new smart

e Full visibility by JTF weapons widespread

¢ _Load-out ports upgraded « Commonality among Services for ammo needs

e — Shift to more expensive and (e.g., common a/c cannon)
fragile “smart” weapons severely | © True joint planning supported by rapidly
complicates pre-positioning adaptive tools and TAV permit substantial
substantial stocks reductions in “risk” inventory.

e Excess government ammo e Rationalizing theater target sets on a cost/
production and storage capacity benefit basis reduces weapons needs
eliminated. e Increased reliability of smart weapons

e Legacy missiles costly to support facilitates pre-positioning
in theater. Long turn-around « Reduced tonnage requirements ease port
times loading

e Full JTF authority over in-theater stocks, plus
adaptive planning/allocation tools, reduce
misallocation and permit improved flexibility in
combat planning.

e Funding of surge capacity limited to those
situations where such action is the least costly
way to meet the SECDEF planning guidance.
(No more warm cannon ball lines!)

e No munitions maintenance needed in theater.
Support costs limited to storage and distribution
facilities.

Fuel e JTF full visibility e JTF full authority
e Increased design attention to fuel | * Alternative Fuel/power source
commonality © More fuel efficient engines
e improved LOTS * Light weight/composite systems to reduce fuel
Preplanned spill teams demands
Assured access to commercial e HNS agreements in place
transport * Systems fielded for

* Common, commercial fuel

e Robust LOTS for austere

e =Areas

«Minimal spills

e Real time replanning

e Advanced pipelines

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel

17



APPENd x C

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION ENABLER

INTRODUCTION. Early in the DSB Review of Logistics Transformation it was clear that information
technology (IT) i.e. the most critical enabler for logistics transformation. Information is the key to linking
worldwide assets and transportation into a seamless and integrated logistics process. Therefore,
information technology lies at the center of the strategy to achieve focused logistics and information
superiority as called for in JV 2010. Although there do not appear to be any technology limitations to
achieving IT goals, there are significarit implementation challenges — notably the need to integrate these
information systems so that information can be accessed, integrated and distributed throughout warfighter
areas and CONUS based support. As the analysis and discussions evolved it became clear that
management of this integration, and implementation, is the foundation for achieving both JV2010 and
evolving logistics transformation. This led to the recommendation to establish a Logistics Systems
Architect. The other topics included below are central to the LSA’s performance and his execution plan
to meet his responsibilities.

This report expands on that recommendation, providing background which led to the recommendation and
reviewing other key subject areas discussed by the DSB relevant to Logistics IT. Sections include the
following:

1. The current baseline of logistics information systems and capabilities

. Information requirements — Overall and selected specific mission requirements

3. Integrating Operational and Logistics Information

4. Logistics Systems Architect — Additional details

5. Use of COTS software to reduce costs, streamline operations, and speed fielding of capabilities.

6. Additional key success factors .
Capturing source data and ensuring currency, accuracy and consistency of that data
Ensuring availability of communications connectivity and capacity.
Providing effective information security and assurance in light of vulnerabilities.
Creating people partners to effect change in business processes rapidly.
Reducing the cost and time of systems development and operations.

Additional subjects were discussed by the DSB but were not selected for special attention in the report.
Where important, they will naturally be addressed and resolved during implementation of Logistics
Transformation. .



[5/18/98 ~ {Changing Logistics DLA IMr. Jeff Jones

(6/18/08 [Concepts and Technologies for the ARMY After ARMY 2010 |Dr. Joe Braddock #4
5/18/98 Logistics Vision and Requirements for [Panel One Ms. SusanLivingstone | #1-4
LL "True Transformation" .
(6/19/98 [About Bechtel _ ~~ Bechtel IMr. Futcher Tad,
5/19/98 |Joint Total Asset Visibility ° TAV IMs. Nancy Johnson 1-4
5/19/98 {Notional Deployment CONUS View [LMI Mr. Ron Frola #1-4
6/19/98 |OSD Transportation Initiatives “~{OsD IMs. Mary Lou McHugh #1-4
[5/19/98 |Qualcom Story (Qualcom (Mr. Stephen Snow #1-4
159/98 |The Caterpillar Road to Re-inventing _ (Caterpillar “TMr. Bob Mylott #1-4
| {Logistics . _ ;
(6/9/98 [Advanced Logistics Project “Paira Mr. Todd Carrico #14
[é16798 [DOD Logistics Transformation : tseatasd Mr. Louis Lambremont a
i198 IGCCS/GCSS Update —t—~S “DISA” CCM Biliary SC*)CT-

619/98 (Global Transportation Network “~TTRANSCOM Ms. Donna Lance 1-4 |

6/9/98 _|Logistics Transformation AFL ~~ iMr. Grover Dunn re

‘6/9/98 —_ ‘Long Range Plan

JUSSPACECOM __|LtCol Don Alston i 1-4

9198 (NAVAIR Affordable Readiness — Red

RADM John Chenevey | #1-4
| Total Ownership Cost (TOC) ' ;
16/9/98 ~ Transportation Coordinators’ — Automated |TC-AIMS |LtCol Walt Munyer 4
Hy Information for Movement System II (TC-
| AIMS II) :
ARMY Distribution Based -TIGASCOM "LTC Tulienne Powel #3
—_ . a - 1

DOD Logistics Transformation B-2



This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The
DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide
independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements,
opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not
necessarily represent the official position of the Department of
Defense.

This report is Unclassified.



VI. DEMAND REDUCTION — RECOMMENDATIONS

Demand Reduction - Recommendations

¢ Force structure
~ Reduce size & weight, and use fewer people
+ Examples: army after next (AAN), smart ship |

— Must overcome the cultural barriers, e.G., Crew size, use of unmanned
vehicles, artillery vs. Missile :

* Focus R&D on “agile force” with fewer platforms

— Apply R&D to reduce consumption rates, i.E., PGM; fuel efficient, super
reliable equipment

Critical to goals of DSB 96 SS on Tactics and Techniques ...;
DSB ‘98 SS Joint Operations Superiority in the 21st Century

Force Structure and Equipment

Reducing force structures, in terms of weight and manning, is essential to
teducing costs of deployment and sustainment as well as enabling DOD to
deploy forces more rapidly and with reduced risk.

New Designs

The Amy After Next (AAN) is an example of how concept development
uses technology to reduce demand. AAN is a “system-of-systems” approach to
force design to leverage U.S. technology advantages in materials, energetics,
information, and other fields. The AAN effort seeks to develop and combat and
support systems and their deployment means that can achieve high strategic and
operational mobility and tactical agility. Design parameters focus on the
reduction in the demands for logistics support through attaining high reliability,
use of precision munitions and knowledge management leading to superior
operational, tactical (and support) decisions. Similar efforts are taking place in
the Air Force examination of “Air Expeditionary Forces” and in the Navy's reviews
of its operational concepts and force and ship designs.

Also, new start acquisition programs with specific requirements to reduce
total ownership costs (TOC) and logistics demand are making progress in this
area. The Navy’s “Smart Ship” program is a useful example of payoffs available

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel
111



Volume 2 -- DOP Logistics Transformation - Requirements Panel



7/4/98 |Naval Expeditionary logistics Support ICOMNAVELSF —_|Capt Ed Horres #3
Force :

|714/98 {Naval Logistics ~ (Carrier Battle Group (Mr. Jonathan Kaskin #3

7714/98 (Optimized Equipment Asset Management |Penn State APL Mr. Bill Nickerson x)
via Condition-Based Maintenance

(714/98 |Panel 1 Logistics Vision and DSB ~~ TMss. Susan Livingstone 1-4
Requirements for “True Transformation”

7/14/98 Procurement Process At Northrop Northrop Grumman {Mr. Carrier / G. Braga #2
Grumman

74/98 |Regionalization of the Mid-Atlantic Region |Norfolk, VA IRADM Zeemier #2

714198 |Smail Unit Logistics (SUL) ACTD Proposal |1FSSG Col Willie Williams #4

74198 |Tactics and Technology for 21 Century [DSB Mr. Don Latham 1-4
{Military Superiority

(/4/98 (21st Century Global Mobility Concepts —_[Boeing [Mr. Gerald Janicki 1-4

8/4/98 [Concepts and Technologies forthe Army [ASB {Dr. Joe Braddock #1-4
Beyond 2010 |

8/4/98 Improving Business Practices and Ryder (Mr. John Torsak #1-4
Relationships Among Supply Chain i
Partners |

(a/4/98 |The Commercial ERP Environment ~IPrice Waterhouse Coopers #1-4

DOD Logistics Transformation

B-5



As an example, JOPES command and control procedures are not linked
directly to the procedures and systems used by USTRANSCOM and the Defense
Transportation System. Command and control measures increase the number of
natural "seams" in the current system. As such, they increase the need for more
command and control agencies, more checks in plan execution, and more people
wanting more information. The resultant number of layers increases the number
of required agencies to be coordinated. However, of all the organizations that
need such data, the supported CINC needs it most, since he drives the priorities,
and has less visibility over the entire system. Unfortunately, responsibilities for
reception, staging, onward movement, and integration are still indistinct after
concerted efforts to clarify roles and missions.

This is exemplified by the quantity of errors typically found in today’s
process. These errors, often as high as 40-60 percent, occur more frequently
than imagined. During a recent Joint exercise, a deployed unit requested
redeployment of more cargo than they deployed. Two vessels were programmed
for the movement. Actual cargo was less than one shipload and the service paid
for an extra vessel. On another occasion, actual unit load requirements were
estimated at 40 percent of the real requirement. Upon port closure for loading,
the 60 percent shortfall was evident and the unit closed late. In addition, allies
and coalition partners are handled on an ad hoc basis for a variety of reasons
and with the built-in “lethargy” of the current system, these additions have been
very disruptive.

In addition, sustainment shipments which are destined to either bring
theater level stocks to wartime levels or to automatically begin filling the
“pipeline,” are only notionally annotated in the deployment Time-Phased Force
Deployment Data (TPFDD). This is done primarily to help with the overall
feasibility estimation of the plan conducted by TRANSCOM. As soon as the
Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) is executed, these shipments are
stripped out and reprogrammed through the “regular” booking systems. As a
result of limited or negligible access to industrial data bases and lack of shipping
documentation standards by commercial vendors, direct shipments from these
commercial vendors are often not programmed nor planned in the TPFDL. In the
end, the lack of supported CINC visibility of the actual sustainment bound for the
theater creates huge mountains of stocks that clog facilities. This is a significant
problem area that must be addressed. This Panel agrees that the operational
and sustainment movements must be planned with real, accurate data.

Volume 2 ~ DOD Logistics Transformation —-Deployment Panel
‘71



As with all projections of the future, Panel 1 determined that certain
assumptions were necessary to enable the study to move forward. The 8
assumption above were provided to “set the stage”. Change in any one of these
assumptions can and will affect study recommendation.

While all of these assumptions have a political content, assumptions #7
and #8 require the direct support of Congress.

VII. FUTURE MILITARY ENVIRONMENTS/TRENDS

The Military Environment of the Future
(Bridging Back from the Future)

Trends
* US position as preeminent economic and military power will be challenged or even eroded
* Beyond emergence of potential major or peer competitors, ability to counter and defeat

asymmetric and asynchronous threats from both economic and military services will be a major
challenge

+ Domestic political support and understanding (national consensus) of national security needs
will be even more challenged due to generational and demographic changes and competing
budget resource demands

= Regionalization and globalization of national, corporate and financial economies will provide
both national security strengths and potential weaknesses/threats

+ Resource shortages and the potential for major environmental disasters (manmade and natural)
will increase regional instability and potential for conflict

+ Outsourcing and privatization of military support functions will have redefined the federal
sector’s relationship with the commercial sector (domestically and perhaps globally) and vice
versa

+ US information technologies and infrastructure dependence will have created major
vulnerabilities with its strengths

© Open market technologies will constantly level the playing field

+ US intelligence capability will require radical redefinition and reconfiguration

After establishing definition and parameters for this DSB study, Panel 1
assessed current DOD and CINC strategic plans, Service specific strategic plans,
the work of the QDR and NDP, and “future thinking” from private sector
associations and academia.

The purpose of this assessment was to provide the logistics implications of
an emerging vision of the not-later-than (NLT) 2025 national security environment
to ensure that the study's recommendations for “logistics transformation” were
consistent with a longer term vision of where logistics needs to be in the 21st
century.

Panel 1 summarized its assessment of the future into 9 major trends
depicted above.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation - Requirements Panel
7 7



TECHNOLOGY PANEL REPORT

Panel Chairman:

Larry Lynn
Panel Members

Keith Helferich
Ed Biggers
George Heilmeier
Mike Hopmeier
Bob Mylott
Panel Advisors

Dan McMillin
MG Billy Solomon, USA
RADM Richard Buchanan, USN
Mr Dan Winegrad
Mr. Jim Johnson
Mr Mark O’Konski

Panel Support

Mr. Richard Balzano, SAIC
Maj Wynne Waldron, USAF

Volume 2 ~- DOD Logistics Transformation — Technology Panel

aan



Recommendations covered work in many areas. Some of those with the
most potential impact are shown in the previous chart.

It is clear that reduction of the footprint affects the requirements for both
deployment lift and sustainment, in effect a double payoff.

The 1996 Summer Study was comprehensive in its coverage of this
reduction of footprint and its recommendations are still appropriate. The DOD
should increase the tempo of response to these 1996 recommendations.

Getting Effective Forces to Theater
(From DSB 96 SS, “Tactics & Technology for the 21st Century”)

Effectiveness

Time

* Effect is to reduce logistics burden to get a specified level of military force in place
* Sustaining that force with minimum in-theater logistics further decreases log demand
© We will build on the 1996 DSB SS work

4

This chart shows notionally the intent of the 1996 Summer Study.

Volume 2 — DOD Logistics Transformation — Technology Panel



and information systems. This strengthening action alone would not only improve
the deployment response, but save hundreds of millions of dollars through the
elimination of unnecessary costs.

Another illustrative recommendations concerns Foreign Military Sales
(FMS). The FMS program was created to encourage allies to buy U.S. military
equipment thereby enhancing interoperability. Over the years, the program has
centered more on political, as opposed to, military benefits. Additionally, allies
object to many of the policies and associated costs of the FMS process. We
believe that a fresh look at the FMS program would encourage our allies to buy
U.S. equipment and could result in interoperability improvements with an
associated reduction in the logistic footprint. The U.S. should not exclude allied
development and production since buying allied equipment would save millions
of R&D dollars while simultaneously reducing the footprint.

Alternative methods of logistic support have also been examined and
identified in the 1996 DSB Summer Study. We continue to endorse these
recommendations and have highlighted some additional opportunities. For
example, third-party logistic providers (PL) responsible for all aspects of
weapon system modification, maintenance, and item management, have great
cost reduction potential. The 3PL approach should be applied to both developing
and existing weapons systems. It would recognize the best of both the private
and public sectors and join in a partnership that provides best value to DOD.
While this Panel endorses the 3PL approach, it is also concerned that stovepipe
logistic systems for each weapon system are not developed. It is extremely
important that the overall battlefield logistic system be totally integrated.

Finally, while conducting research for the 1998 Summer Study, several
logistics areas requiring management attention were discovered. These areas
are presented in the following Panel Recommendation section along with
recommended corrective actions.

Il. PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. High Speed Transport Technologies

The U.S. global deployment system is the only such system in the world.
No other nation (ally, friend, past or future adversary) comes close to matching
U.S. capability. The system consists of airlift, sealift, land and sea
prepositioning, all buttressed by commercial air and sealift fleets and support
elements. Upon the completion of current airlift and sealift programs, the required
lift capacity will be achieved. However, there are other deficiencies that must be
corrected to ensure the rapid movement of forces and equipment.

Today’s mobility system can be characterized by the following:

a. Ability to move rapidly from forts, bases, and depots to the air/seaports
of embarkation (A/SPOE);

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation -Deployment Panel



acquiring equipment, supplies, facilities and services, and will thereby
have ready access to the full range of free world industrial capability,
along with the cost and innovation benefits that accrue from sustained
healthy competition. The result will be military equipment and facilities
with a much higher “commercial” content than is currently the case;
built to use the commercial support structure, including fuel, parts,
(warranty) service, and transportation. (There may be a few
specialized companies that act on DOD’s behalf, and under DOD
direction, to design, assemble and support those specialized items of
military equipment that are outside the general abilities of the
integrated commercial sector.)

Issues: To what extent should “Buy American” concepts persist vis-a-
vis international/global teaming? Given full CLS for fielded weapons
outside the immediate battle area, what does this imply for naval
ships? How should the transportation of CLS destined for provision in
rear-areas overseas be managed? [A TRANSCOM-like CONUS based
entity, or a theater based CINC logistics command?)

3. Total Asset Management. The theater CINC will be responsible for
the cost-effective employment of US military forces, including the full
integration of operations and logistics planning To this end he/she will
routinely employ a modern accounting system that provides both full
visibility into the total cost of ongoing operations and timely estimates
of the likely costs of operations being contemplated for the future. This
management responsibility will be supported by a highly accessible
data base of information on all assets - in theater and enroute - as well
as support tools that assist in near-real time decisions that help
minimize mal-distribution and reduce overall inventory requirements.
Issues. What should be the relationship between the CINC’s
operational authority over the introduction and movement of equipment
and other assets within his/her theater and the budgeting for such
assets and pre-deployment decisions on its location? [E.g. How much
prepo, and where?]

4. Full implementation of the RMA.

a. Unmanned vehicles and brilliant weapons. By 2025 about 50
percent of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance now
provided by manned aircraft, ships, and vehicles will be provided by
unmanned systems, with an attendant reduction in manpower, fuel,
and parts and other support “footprint”. Similarly, about 50 percent
of the targets now served by unguided weapons will be served by a
much smaller number and tonnage of “brilliant” weapons.

Issue: What mechanism should be established to ensure that
funding for operational stocks of fuel, munitions and other supplies
is adjusted to account for the decreased demand that will result
from this aspect of the RMA?

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel



toward commercial practices, taking a person already majoring in
logistics would provide a great opportunity to start teaching the military
side of logistics prior to entering the service.

17. Army Railcars

In the update to the Mobility Requirements Study, the Army identified the
need for railcars to support the early loadout requirements. The commercial
railroad industry either does not have these types of cars or cannot furnish them
in the time required to meet the deployment guidelines of the Army Strategic
Mobility Program (ASMP). The Army POM currently contains funding in FY99
($12.8 Mil) to acquire 151 multi-purpose 100Ton cars to deploy Army rolling
stock other, and in FYOO ($5 Mil) for 31 cars to carry containerized ammunition
(referred to as COFC cars). This acquisition should eliminate the railcar
requirement. The contribution to rapid deployment provided by these railcars
make this a very useful investment.

Recommendation:

That the JCS and DOD ensure the funding of these critical deployment
assets.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation —-Deployment Panel
Q5



Acquisition and Demand Reduction

Panel 1: Acquisition

* Complete the Acquisition Reforms

~ Adopt commercial buying practices
* Planning stability
* Price-Based instead of Cost Based
* Minimize transaction costs
* Gain broad access to commercial R&D
— Shift responsibility for major repairs and
upgrades to the private sector

PANEL 1: FINDINGS - MANAGING
REDUCTION

* Combat/Crisis Development

* Peacetime Readiness

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
31



Overall Communications Responsibilities Communications is divided into three basic domains in the
DOD. The following picture portrays those three elements. It is pivotal to understand that insufficient
capability in any of the three segments can seriously degrade communication support. At present,
indications are that the base level infrastructure and the theater capability are not likely to support the
dramatic growth in logistics data communications. This, as outlined below, is a subject that must be on
the short list of critical issues for the Logistics Systems Architect to attack.

The dramatic increase in data capture, processing and retrieval, particularly in theater, represents a major
change for the logistics community. Because bandwidth can be severely limited or dedicated to
operational data transfers dictated by the CINC, it is critical that theater communications requirements
and planning become top priority for the Logistics community and the LSA. Here are a few of the central
issues which need management attention:

1. Significant insight will be needed into the volume, response time and locations for logistics
data.

2. Communications availability, particularly during surge or conflict, must be resolved with the
CINC and operational community.

3. Careful consideration of the volume and frequency of data reporting must be considered to
ensure adequate bandwidth for the needs and mission environment.

4. Wherever possible standard DOD communications capabilities should be used — serious
interoperability problems can arise from apparent narrow economies. This could seriously
hamper the integration of logistics and operational data.

5. A “communications architecture” is a natural outgrowth of the LSA’s efforts to integrate
logistics and should be invaluable in managing connectivity of logistics and other combat
support capabilities.

Providing Effective Information Security And Assurance In Light Of Vulnerabilities.

The report on vulnerabilities of the logistics system provides the best insight into the specific threats and
vulnerabilities involved. That report is section 5 (?) of this overall report. This short discussion is
intended to reinforce the information security and assurance issues only. As warfare becomes more
computing dominant, the dependence and value of information increases. Thus the ability to plan and
implement deployment and sustainment options will be highly dependent on the available computing and
communications. This will result in it being targeted by hostile forces to deny or disrupt our responses.
Further, the integration of operations and logistics information into total situation awareness will cause
previously unclassified data to become classified. The chart on the following page provides an overview
of the elements of information assurance which the DOD must employee to meet this high intensity
information era.

C-il



What Constitutes a True Logistics Transformation

Definition: Transformation in military logistics can only be achieved through a
marked change in the nature and form of the structure and processes that equip, deploy
and sustain military operations

Attributes:

“Flexible, responsive, capability based, configurable * Anticipatoryipredictive

Reliable, precise, smart -> brilliant * Survivable (NBC & IW)

Less cost/less people intensive * Visible, integrated

Vision of a True Logistics Transformation:

1 Leadership (civilian & military) Prime Enablers

+Logistics is a fundamental part of the operational © —————® Planning, budgeting, doctrine, simulation,
ast of war (also not a CONUS/wholesale issue) training, doing

+ CINCS know, understand and trust logistics > Bult from tacticaVoperational user
(know whats needed, know will get atthe right time, requirements plus embedded in above

in right order)

2 Platforms/Systems

*Platforms and combat systems facilitate delivery and. —————» “Total ownership cost/RDTE focus (Issue:
demand reduction Jegacy systems?)

3 Demand/Delivery Improvements

Logistics functional service stovepipes are ————> Integrated, shared, correlated and

transparent to any and all “need-to-have” users ‘standardized systems

2025 CONUS Logistics Transformation Vision

* BRAC a must
¢ 2 level maintenance
¢ DoD industrial activities outsourced

* Base community support infrastructure replaced (schools,
commissaries, family housing, medical care, entertainment)
with pay increases (including retire offset)

¢ Embeds military in community

— Economic value for community
— Improved QOL
— Cost savings through overhead reduction

* Exploit commercial processes and capabilities

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel

en | - OOO


APPENDIX B — BRIEFINGS RECEIVED BY THE SUMMER STUDY

The DSB Summer Study on DOD Logistics Transformation, received briefing,
both to the entire study group, and the four individual sub-panels. The table below lists
the briefings received. They are listed alphabetically, by date, and to which group or

groups received the briefing.
Date Title" Organization | ““Briefer [Panel #
4/16/98 | A Pathway to the Future Implementing JV2010 iMG Close #1-4
, Joint Vision 2010
(4/16/98 |DOD Logistics Transformation US Adantic CAPT Jeff Wagner [ #1-4
__ ae an (Command _
4/16/98 |General Counsel Briefing JCS Mr. David Ream #1-4
|
|
4/16/98  |JC2010 Focused Logistics, Logistics 4 \CAPT Dave Shanahan | #1-4
(Directorate (J-4) the Joint Staff
[4716/98 (Joint Vision 2010 - Focused Logistics [USEuropean ~~ |COL Henderson Ha
Initiatives (Command |
4/16/98 Logistics Transformation Tus Southem {COL ‘Neil Hartenstein =| #1-4
Comma ab .
4A@I86 (Logistics Transformation - The Way Ahead! 3. Forces Korea “e0L Ronaid Rollison 4
for U.S. Logistics ir in Korea i aL i
(4/16/98 |PACOM Logistics |US Pacific ~ {COL Thomas — 1-4
Lo i _ ‘Command H ee \ _
14/16/98 Quiet Professionals |Special | Operation {COL Donald Betts #1-4
— LL. —_ _ Command - _
4/6/98 US Central Command ° US Central Col Chris Kauffmann 1-4
ee eee (Command ee L
4/17/98 iBrief to the DSB - Summer Study Task [De ~(RADM1 DaveKeller. | #1-4
‘Force j
[4A7/98 [DOD Logistics Trax — ~~ IGAPT Bill Bristow
4417198 “DOD Logistics Transformation — ; ~~
i i |
(417188 DOD Logistics Transformation JV Us Strategic Col Lynn Williadsen_
| i201 0/USSTRATCOM Uniqueness {Command |
/Requirements i
8 ILogis nd the 2 ~~ “TUS Marine Corp {col Jim Strock
i
US Army - IMG Charles Cannon, JR.
{ADCSLOG ___

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation



Leadership Issues prabler

1 OVERALL (Executive Level) 2 Strategic to operational interface
= What's Wrong = What's wrong (problems reeogaized]/sohtions being discussed)
+ Nat prong wdeots + Mutipe poss mers
[No prviig tp icv] sity + Retin
+ Notre cone + tasdegute
+ Net doy neniorag, wang. x punishing = Who ca address
Same at oven ph ied commend decision rate
= Who can Address (<50)- Power tomakecommon  -‘Thingstodo
vision aod resource priorities + Pocus and well logit
osp Services Others asnecded + Pantie ae onit
DEPSECDEF Under Secs. DLA - Implementation
Comperolle: Vice Chiefs. TRANSCOM
cg. LoyOps 3 Theater
VCICS «PARE. What's wong
‘Acq, + Nocena fae coe
= Tradeoffs = Whoemfix
Reha pint of log taeaformton vs her import + ane
ronnie) tow
» Seiremereseememmeaicee 7 T wetmmeettademnmys tee Mem
+ Gene iategation of og into opt
iid rtebi ey emit
© megrie new apoiies

+ Schedule of major issues wo decide

Panel 1 Transformation Recommendations
Leadership

Providing for Warriors
DoD Departmental Leadership

Moving to War
tional Challenge

Enabling the Wartighter
Th

The next step in Panel 1’s deliberation was to focus on “major fixes” in
each of the 3 areas.

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
7



Panel 1 Logistics Transformation Design

© Organization/Operations/OneJointnes

— Implode “owners, organization,

— Integrated, correlated,
© Organization, requirements, owners (few as possible),
© Common
© Common language, documents, definitions, information,

standard

© Common operational doctrine and
© Common threat assessments/predictive
© Common training, modeling,
© common platforms (or interoperable by different

— OPS, I, CS joint and
— System capability across the

— Lengthened operational or
— Issue: common/joint vssegmented acquisition,
doctrine, training merger?? Caterpilissue

Panel 1 Logistics Transformation Design

* Cost/Life

— Designed for easy/rapid tech
— Doctrine and systems evaluation criteria

© Tech insertion *
© Supportabili *
© Retrograd *
— New systems replace or work with old systems
with legacy

— All next generation systems/subsystems equal or
than current benchmark (AF TOC goal),

— Highly reusable

— Peacetime cost effectiveness = wartime agility

~ Fast

— Integrates industry/academia (mergers,
outsource.

Volume 2 ~ DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
5Q



Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation —-Deployment Panel
ECOOEEEEEEE———EE—E—EEEEEEEE~ya>aEE>EOEOEOE_E__E_E_____ EOE dl


of the magnitude of the leadership effort required. Use of fuel cells and the
replacement of current ground platform engines with hybrid-electric power trains
featuring direct electric drive have the potential to increase the “gas mileage” of
the ground fleet by 50 percent or more, even for a force structure that contains a
large number of legacy platforms. This is an opportunity that must not be
missed. We believe that considerable work will take place in the commercial
market in these areas, and that therefore the DOD will not have to do basic
science, only application engineering. In Desert Storm/Desert Shield, the host
nation provided almost all of the fuel used, but that support cannot be depended
on for all deployments in the future. Efforts to reduce platform weight (through
new types of armor appliqués, etc.) will also contribute to reducing fuel use, but
are important in-and-of themselves, because of their implications for lift.

Ammunition

Previous DSB and other studies have identified revolutionary decreases in
total ammunition weight that are enabled by new technologies. The substitution
of smart weapons for conventional weapons can enable order-of-magnitude
decreases in the number of rounds fired to accomplish an effect. The use of
super-precision long-range fire support rather than local conventional artillery has
been shown to offer similar weight reductions, and significant operational benefits
besides. In the time period under consideration, the use of directed energy for
some fire missions — to counter, for example, rockets and artillery, and for point
defense of key assets — is likely to be feasible. The weight and cost of directed
energy “ammunition” per kill is in another one or two orders-of-magnitude benefit
class.

Reliable, Durable, Maintainable Spares

The use of more reliable and longer-lasting spares will, in the view of the
panel, significantly reduce total demand for spares. An example that is working
in the commercial field is band tracks as replacements for conventional
segmented link tracks on ground vehicles. The commercial world has built 250-
ton vehicles that can go 60 miles per hour using band tracks, and expects that
the life-cycle cost/maintenance requirement for these tracks is on the order of
one-order-of-magnitude for this improvement alone.

Platform Based IT

Additionally, the panel believes that the use of the platform-based
information technology described earlier will enable condition-based
maintenance (that is, fix it when prognostics say that it might fail soon, rather
than based on miles, hours, or the calendar). Analysis for both the commercial
and military domains shows that condition-based maintenance will provide
significant decreases in cost and improvements in operational availability in many
areas. These include maintenance actions, improved operational availability of
the fleet, significant decreases in the number of maintainers required, decreases
in the time to determine the problem with a platform, and decreases in the total
weight and quantity of spare parts required

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel


USC Title 10

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Con’t)

+ Requirements, Programs, and Budget
= Advising on the priorities of requirements
advising on program recommendations and budget proposals
— assessing military requirements for defense acquisition program
— Develop Doctrine for Joint Employment
— Formulate Policies for Joint training
= Formulate policies for coordinating Military Education and Training
* Other Matters
— Exercise Direction of the Joint Staff
— As directed by the President, attend and participate in meetings of the NSC
— Advise and assist the NCA on establishing combatant command
— Transmit Communications between the NCA and Combatant Commands
— Review plans and programs to determine adequacy and feasibility
— Consult with and seek the advice of the Joint chis of Staff and Combatant
Commanders

— Provide U.S. representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations.

This slide summarizes the Title 10 responsibilities for Combatant
Commanders.

USC Title 10
Combatant Commands

Unless otherwise directed by the President or the
Secretary of Defense, the authority, direction, and
control of the commander of a combatant command with
respect to the commands and forces assigned to that
command include the command functions of:

+ Give Authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces over all
aspects of Military operations, joint training and Logistics

+ Prescribe the chain of command

+ Organize commands and forces necessary to carry out assigned missions

+ Employ forces as considered necessary to carry out assigned missions

+ Coordinate and approve aspects of administration and support (including
control of resources and equipment)

* exercise the authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders,
selecting combatant command staff....etc..

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
a7



translates to the application of commercial solutions to enable the DOD to meet
or exceed world class benchmarks. The 1996 DSB Study on Innovative Support
Structures for the 21° Century recognized this fact and recommended a shift to
apply commercial solution to the DOD system. Although only some of the
recommendations of the 1996 Study have been implemented, this Panel
recommends that action be taken to implement the remaining 1996
recommendations once again. However since the 1996 Summer Study was
completed, industry has leaped further ahead in developing new solutions - some
of which are shown in the following chart. Unfortunately, DOD has not kept pace.

COMMERCIAL SOLUTIONS /
TRENDS

3rt Party Logistics

Integrated Supply Chain Management
Process Improvement

Contract Management

General Management

Contracting-In

Partnering in Public / Private Competitions
Strategic Sourcing

Activity-Based Costing / Management

Figure 4

Some examples of successful industry initiatives and alternatives that
DOD could embrace include:

a. Contracting “in”
e Revised business practices,
e Public-private partnerships.
b. “Leasing” arrangements.

c. Increased use and implementation of COTS
products/systems/solutions.

d. Consolidation/elimination of selected (non-core) functions and
activities.

This Panel would like to highlight two concepts of note: Integrated Supply
Chain Management (ISCM) and 3" Party Logistics (SPL). The former is a
partnering of multi-enterprise suppliers to meet the mutual (and not always

Volume 2 — DOD Logistics Transformation -Deployment Panel
7a



—_ puccensnaneet we a aa a eee OPE PT
| 5. Vulnerability Opportunity Cost $100 M/ year loss of asse ees
herent i -- 7 military support.

The savings can be achieved and a Transformed Logistics System
can be implemented. The SECDEF should consider making Logistics
Transformation a Defense Reform Initiative

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation
a ——————rEeeS:t—‘<~S


Volume 2 -- DOD Loaistics Transformation



(6/0 0/98
‘ehio/es

[6/10/98

6/10/98

6/10/98

[Assessment of the impact of Chemical ~~

iand Biological Weapons on Joint
(Operations i in 2010

‘{Chemibio

‘Assessment of the Impact of Chemical

jand Biological Weapons on Joint

“IMs. Aime Hoeber —

6/10/98

i nn,
6/10/98

j6/i0/98

enone”

‘ents

| a
ente8

[
i 6/11/98

: \Séa Based firerat Davelopment=

:Concepts in Medical Readiness

[Operations i in 2010 - Summary Report i
"Assessment of the impact of Chemical |Chem/bio == (Ms. Aime Hoeber
‘and Biological Weapons on Joint |
{Operations in 2010 - VIGNETTES H
'C-180 Floatplane Program Review [Lockheed Martin Me ‘Andy Swick
[ a a : _
“(Contracting Out Contingency Response {AFCAP Mr. Dwight Clark
a ‘OPNAV/NSWC [Mr. Colen Kenneil’
‘CDR Steve Lehr
‘JLOTS Overview for DSB _ joint Staff, -4 “LTC Chris Barbour
i
i
joint Deployment Process Improvement {Joint Staff, J-5_ COL Tey Kennealy
i(JDPI)
(Joint Medical Logistics 2010 - 7

~ {ETC Don Wideman ~~

“\Managing Mail Surge

(Mr. Gary Thuro

“How Does Joint Vision 2010 Affect Global

Projection?
On Load / Off Load”

‘Revolutionary Capability for the 21*
Ci

ity En Route
Infrastructure Update

DOD Logistics Transformation B-3

“Lockheed Martin

|
~ “Tockheed Martin

'Ms. Joanne lorio

(Mr. Daniel Stackwick
i |
‘Mr. EdGiascow

jLockheed Martin
“TRANSCOM


The above slide identifies Panel 1 recommendations in the following
areas.

Crisis/Warfighting: Enable CINCs to rapidly plan and re-plan lift-
constrained force and sustainment packages that are tailored to their specific
needs.

Force Structure: We need to establish a truly joint process for deciding
on future weapons systems characteristics and quantities. Secondly, while
CINCs do establish theater munitions controlled supply rate (CSR) and required
supply rates (RSR), these requirements do not necessarily meet the needs of
the CINCs.

Peacetime : Shift responsibility and authority for contingency planning for
both force packaging and logistics support from the Services to the theater
CINCs. Shift funding for all in-theater exercises, including logistics exercises to
the CINCs. Significantly improve the DOD PPBS process for deciding on future
weapons systems characteristics and quantities in response to a more unified
vision of how the nation wishes to fight its future wars.

Weapons Systems Support Cost: A need exists to improve the “Cradle
to Grave” management of weapons system support costs. The following offers
several ideas for how this may be accomplish:

© Assign both acquisition and support responsibility and budgeting
authority to weapons system Program Offices.

e Establish a standardized system for estimating the likely future total
ownership costs of weapons systems.

e Establish target total ownership costs as “requirements” for each new
weapon system and then use such targets as primary management
tools.

¢ Competitively source all above-O-level weapons system maintenance
support.

e Invest in O&S cost reduction of legacy systems based on realistic ROI
and life-expectancy estimates.

Vol::me 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel

oA



Several crucial factors influence DOD expanded use of COTS software. These are:

1.

Is

The availability of COTS software packages, both general purpose and vertical, will grow
dramatically. Costs of software development and maintenance can be substantially reduced
through use of COTS. Hardware performance will continue dramatic increases and
performance loss from COTS packages will be more than offset.

Vertical COTS packages allow for customizing some business rules and processes. The major
challenge for the DOD is to determine how many present business rules must be carried over
into the future. Many of these packages provide a ready 80% solution. However, pushing
these COTS packages to provide 100% of requirements can be self-defeating. Normally the
customer must fund all of the custom code and support the maintenance of that code into the
future. Therefore rather than a COTS package, a custom coded hybrid package results and the
entire concept of “riding” commercial developments is defeated.

There are legitimate areas where COTS packages cannot meet DOD needs and it is not
practical to force fit these packages. The DOD should analyze its options carefully before
commitment to development and implementation. Opportunities for using evolving
capabilities in transformation will remain strong.

There are opportunities for the services and agencies to share common packages but to
implement different business rules that fit their needs. This is not moving toward standard
applications, but it does offer the potential for increased interoperability and integration within
common functional areas.

As an overall strategy, the DOD may find that “forcing” reduction and streamlining of
business practices through implementation of COTS packages may be the most effective way
to achieve changes toward more efficient business practices. When the requirements are
traded off against speed of development, operating costs and efficiency it may very well be
that this could be a cornerstone of transformation and modemization strategies.

It is clear that DOD logistics should make a strategic commitment to the use of COTS
software — the issues are when, how, and it what area.



This Panel Report makes recommendations to reduce today’s
dependence on the transportation infrastructure by improving both aerial and
shipping port infrastructure and processes. A top consideration must be made to
bypass these bottlenecks and deliver forces directly to the theater. (See Figure
#2) At this time, only major technology advances will make this possible.

Toda)
Transportation
Infrastructure
Future
>
—>

Dependence

Figure #2: Minimum Logistic Infrastructure

Although a major acquisition effort would provide a leap-frog approach to
transformation, this panel recognizes that fiscal constraints are imposed on
defense budgets. Nonetheless, many other opportunities exist with modest
associated costs that would lead to a firm baseline for transformation. Foremost
are changes to, and the discipline of, the planning process. Today’s planning
process is extremely complex, inflexible and leads to “push” logistics rather than
meeting the CINC’s specific requirements. This single recommendation can
result in major improvements. It is important to realize that major transformation
will occur only if technology breakthroughs are possible.

This Panel also firmly believes that strengthening the role of
USTRANSCOM in controlling both transportation and associated business
processes will greatly improve the overall response to the war-fighting CINCs. At
the present time, the transportation process is badly fragmented, resulting in
excessive costs and inefficiencies. In many cases, USTRANSCOM is outside of
the key transportation processes, such as finance, R&D, acquisition, standards,

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation —Deployment Panel
BE



d. CINCTRANS consultation of Defense Transportation System (DTS)
weapons system support;

e. Creation of a joint reporting responsibility of DFAS transportation
accountants;

f. Designation of CINCTRANS as approval authority for DTS automated
information system architecture and standards;

g. Creation of a streamlined process for tailored rates to influence
customer behavior in the year of execution;

h. Establishment of USTRANSCOM as a test project for hiring and
transfer of function flexibilities for civilian employees;

i. Designation of CINCTRANS as a Federal Government transportation
provider for readiness related programs;

Workforce sizing flexibilities.

These initiatives make good financial sense and will lead to large cost
reductions. In addition, the capability of USTRANSCOM to support the
Warfighting CINCs will be enhanced.

Recommendation

In order for the Secretary of Defense to streamline the transportation
process by eliminating fragmentation and seams, it is recommended that
USTRANSCOM be assigned total authority over the DTS.

4. Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, And Integration (JRSOI)

JRSOI is one of the major seams in the projection of power and as such
demands significant attention. If deployed personnel and equipment cannot be
merged into "fightable units", the entire reason for deployment is moot. Until
recently, doctrine was disjointed and unclear as to what agency had what
command authority, especially in the Joint arena. This is especially true when
forces are transferred from one commander to another. Unless change occurs,
these difficulties will continue to occur in operations running the full gamut from
small humanitarian aid missions to full-scale war.

The greatest difficulty arises at the end of the JRSOI process, when forces
under some definable characteristic of combat readiness are provided to the
combatant commander for employment. The acceptance, turnover, and control
of these forces between the two command authorities has been worked out on
the spot or in a very deliberate process. Working out these details "on the fly" is

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation —Deployment Panel



The Defense Science Board
1998 Summer Study Task Force

on
DoD LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION

Volume II
Panel Reports

December 1998

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR ACQUISITION & TECHNOLOGY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3140

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release { 9 9 9 0) 6 2 8 | 2 4
Distribution Unlimited



ll. CINC “PULL” VERSUS SYSTEM “PUSH” —
RECOMMENDATIONS

CINC “Pull” VS. System “Push”
-- Recommendations

* Designate theater CINC logistics component commanders

— Reports directly to theater CINC

- Manages all common supportiservices in theater (peacetime training

and war)

- Experiment with JFACC model (task a service component commander)

«Improve theater CINCs logistics information tools to tailor deploying
forces to meet contingency requirements
- Provide dynamic planning/simulation tools (DARPA ALP)

- Ability to specify deployment and sustainment packages, do
consequence analysis, change “on-the-fly”
— Provide CINCs the ability to directly locate and redirect assets

Provide CINC Logistics Command Capability

Providing the CINC or Joint Task Force Commander a robust capability to
exercise Title-10 authority to plan and direct “common” logistics support is a
major step in achieving the CINC’s control of the logistics pipeline. A theater
logistics command would manage the inflow of forces and sustainment packages
according to CINC/JTF priorities, providing the means for reception, staging,
onward movement, and integration (RSOI) for the theater and operate the
required facilities, i.e., ports, airfields, staging and storage areas.

The theater logistics command should plan for and provide all common
support and services to the forces in theater, e.g., theater distribution; movement
control; construction, medical, fuel, food, water, etc., outside the service
component areas of responsibility. Elements of DLA and TRANSCOM should be
added to the logistics command to manage the Receipt, Staging, Onward
movement and Integration (RSOl) and DLA commodities (fuel, food, medical
supplies, etc.). They will facilitate easy peace-to-war transition and avoid the ad
hoc logistics C? of previous conflicts.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel

Pry



The logistics aspects of the other two topics are discussed in subsequent
pages of this Panel Report.

Il. INTRODUCTION

Technology for
Transformation of Logistics

New Capabilities Panel Report

DSB Summer Study on
DOD Logistics Transformation

1

Technology maturity is generally not the limiting factor in improvement of
logistics. However, there are at least four areas where technology will heavily

impact our ability to create robust and integrated logistics that are responsive to
the CINC needs. These are:

e Information systems technology
e Reduction of vulnerability to CBW and IW attacks.

e Reduction of logistics demand

e Improvements in supply, particularly in strategic and tactical lift

Information systems technology is critical to transformation of the logistics
system and is dealt with separately in this report.

Likewise, the CBW and IW threat is a national problem which is being
addressed in a much broader context. However, these threats are particularly
applicable to logistics in disruption or negation of port and airfield capability. The
technology to counter these threats is quite similar to that for population
protection. While this study did not comprehensively examine the topic, it is clear
that logistics would be a prime target for these forms of attack and that the
impact of at least a CBW attack would be very disruptive or worse. Every effort

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Technology Panel

ann



“investment funds” in new or enhanced systems. These are the funds which require the most scrutiny
and which need to be consistent with the road map established by the LSA. Where necessary, funds
may be need to be reallocated to ensure corporate priorities are supported. The LSA should conduct
funding reviews, make recommendations and take actions during preparation of the President’s budget
and the summer Program Reviews for the longer term funding stream. The specific mechanisms to
implement funds control should be developed by the principals and the LSA.

¢ The LSA must maintain strong and continuing relationships with several communities. First, he must
establish strong relationships with the operational logistics community, particularly the CINCs and the
Services. Second, he must maintain strong ties to his OSD parent organization. Third he must work
closely with the acquisition community to ensure that developing systems are implemented consistent
with the road map. Fourth, he must have a very close working relationship with the OSD/C3I and
DISA to ensure that logistics systems and plans are consistent with communications and computing
directions, including the DIT Common Operating Environment.

e Because DSB has recommended a “CINC-pull” focus for logistics, the LSA must operate in very
close partnership with the warfighter community. It is very strongly recommended that the Deputy
LSA be a flag level logistician with the stature and leadership to work closely with the most senior
logistics military principals. Without such leadership commitment to this staffing, the influence of
the LSA will be diminished.

¢ During the CIM period of the early 1990’s, the DOD attempted to standardize applications software.
The Joint Logistics Systems Center was one of those manifestations. The CIM strategy failed because
it did not recognize that agreement on business processes was mandatory to fielding common
software. It is important to stress that the LSA proposal does not that focus on that goal or attempt to
centralize development. Rather, the challenge is to develop an architecture where the information
available across these individual systems can be located, accessed and integrated. In a fundamental
way, a world of “plug and play” logistics applications systems needs to be evolved or built around a
network of internet like capabilities.

e It may be most effective for the LSA to start with warfighter logistics and work back toward CONUS.
This will build on major recent initiatives and is consistent with other DSB findings. It is essential
that the LSA implement the architecture and roadmap in bite size chunks, while maintaining a broad
vision.

The LSA must provide leadership in both logistics processes and information systems. These are the
operations of logistics will be performed. Choices of which areas to attach process and system are at the
heart of the challenge. To do so requires a fundamental change from current approach to building DOD
logisitics information systems. The LSA must be the major leader in this change. The following
represent several of the guiding principles that should be followed by the LSA:
1. Understand the logistics process and systems map and use it to chart directions
2. Build and manage systems for a network computing environment, stop stovepipes
3. Establish oversight processes and budgeting approaches that support this transition to a larger
information network.
4. Focus on the warfighter requirements first and work back to CONUS
5. Build the bridges to share/integrate Logistics and C2 operational information
6. Design capabilities to leverage Internet and Web technology
7. Design and implement information systems to support rapid change and technology insertion as
well as rapid changes to information technology.
8. Invest in COTS software, where it fits, to reduce costs, streamlines business rules provide
opportunities for integration with other functional applications software.



FORWARD

This report summarizes the work of the Defense Science Board Summer
Study Task Force on DOD Logistics Transformation. The study is comprised of
two volumes.

Volume 1 contains a brief Executive Summary, the Task Force briefing
charts with facing page text, followed by several appendices. Appendix A
contains the Summer Study Terms of Reference. Appendix B lists the members
and government advisors to the study. Appendix C is a Glossary of acronyms.
Appendix D is a list of the briefings presented to the Task Force and the sub-
panels. Volume 1 is the summary of the findings and recommendations of the
task Force.

Volume 2 contains the sub-panels reports of the Task Force. The
Task Force examined four major areas in preparation of the final report:
Requirements; Deployment; Sustainment; and Technology. Each of these
reports summarizes the work of that panel. Panel findings and
recommendation in these reports, are those of the panel, and may or may
not be incorporated into the final report in Volume 1.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation



The theater logistics command also could provide the base for the
“multinational joint logistics command” envisioned for NATO operations or for
other coalition operations where U.S. leadership is necessary.

An experiment using the JFACC model, which provides for tasking one of
the service component commanders with the logistics C? mission would shed
light on how best to arrange the responsibilities for both peacetime training, and
contingency planning and execution.

Improve CINCs Ability to Tailor Deploying Forces to Meet
Contingency Requirements

The CINCs staffs need better tools to hone service-recommended time-
phased force deployment data to eliminate unnecessary force structure,
ammunition, and other sustainment supplies. New planning and simulation tools
will enable replanning and consequence analysis. These tools are essential for
the inevitable replanning necessary in crisis. DOD should continue to fund the
development of the DARPA Advanced Logistics Program (ALP). The tools being
developed under ALP are critically needed to develop “right-sized” deployment
and sustainment packages, analyze various courses of action, and change plans
“on-the-fly”.

Tools like ALP not only benefit the CINC’s staff but also Service
component commanders who must do tradeoff analyses within CINC-allocated
lift as well as the Joint and Service staffs who prepare force structure and
sustainment analyses. This capability, including the ALP techniques, should
become an important part of the Logistics System Architecture recommended in
this report.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation ~ Sustainment Panel
101



Logistics Capabilities: Operations/New Concepts/Combat Commander

Sub NLT 2010 NLT 2025
component
in-Theater e Maximum modular/prefab e JAST STOL greatly reduces in-theater AVN.
Construction Reduce density and skill of Support
operations skill mix e Modular facilities light weight and highly
e Full integration of contractors in transportable

planning and execution

¢ STOL aircraft greater part of tactical
family

e Reduced aviation support structure

e Hospital ships/strategic lift vs
extensive theater hospitals

e Environmentally conscious designs
reduced environmental impact

e Reduced skill training required

e Structure realignment combat
forces

» OMFTS and sea-based logistics for Marines

Contractor mobilization fill most requirements

for heavy construction

Significant Strategic. lift freed for reallocation

Significant Strategic. lift for PTRP reduction

Contractor logistics support

Significant reduction in construction structure

and skills

Civil contingency contracting

e Engineering schools structure and training
resources reallocated to combat training.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel



Existing System Inflexibility Retards Full Exploitation of improvements.
Functional and financial stovepipes prevent optimizing maintenance, distribution

of materiel and supply chains, within and across components, industry, and
allies/coalition partners.

The mechanisms and policies in place within DOD contain many internal
and external political and cultural barriers that hinder change. Because of that
nature, many industry improvements - especially those that have an effect on
employment - become issues under the purview of Congress.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation -Deployment Panel
81



to satisfy the warfighter’s requirements are arguably not the best in the world
relative to industry standards. The Table 1 compares several logistics metrics of
world class companies to those of DOD.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Tran: formation -Deployment Panel
re ———EOEOOOeE6VWnXao EEE Eee el


The Terms of Reference established for the study emphasized that a “true
transformation” — not marginal improvements — in the military logistics system
needed to be the focus. Panel 1 defined this “true transformation” as follows:
“Transformation in military logistics is a marked change in the nature and form of
the structure and processes that equip, deploy and sustain military operations.”

As a test of success of study recommendations, Panel 1 concluded that
while recommendations must be guided by more capability for lower cost (i.e.,
‘faster, better, cheaper’), the ultimate test must be effectiveness on the
battlespace.

I. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Problem Statement

* Today’s logistics system, though ultimately effective on
the battlefield, is

— untrustworthy (right things, right place, right time)

— too difficult to manage (stovepiped, fragmented)

— unresponsive to the rate of change (cannot dynamically
replan)

— becoming so expensive that it precludes needed
modernization ($80B+ per year)

* Bottom Lines: Today’s logistics system, it not changed,
— will not keep pace with operations
— will continue to rely on mass for effectiveness

In its deliberations, Panel 1 drafted a preliminary problem statement to
underscore the need for logistics transformation. This Panel 1 “problem
statement” reflects “macro” characteristics of today’s logistics system, but
certainly is not characteristic of all sub-elements of that system.

Nonetheless, the bottom lines remain.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel


In order to realize the tremendous benefit provided by the logistics
transformation described, DOD must devote the same level of management
attention to make it happen that is devoted to the largest weapon system
developments or major shifts in operational concepts. Logistics transformation is
a complex multi-year business project which affects $800B and 100 logistics
missions over the next 10 years. .It involves changing practices in 4 services, 9
CINCs, over 20 logistics commands, DISA, DISTA, DCMC, DLA, and finance.

Strong persistent leadership is crucial to make the degree of changes that
are necessary to accomplish the transformation in logistics. No commercial
businesses are successful in transformation of this extent without giving the
proper level of attention to the leadership issue. The leadership requires strong
agreement among the senior executives regarding a shared vision for the
enterprise, the objectives, the resources required, the expected outcome, the
priority of the effort with regard to other activities, and the management
approach. Proper leadership also insists that a comprehensive plan exists in
sufficient detail to assure that key milestones are identified, appropriate
resources are dedicated, tasks and responsibilities are defined, and
accountabilities are understood.

Progress reviews are conducted in sufficient detail to assure schedule and
budget performance and to address areas of poor performance. Since this
transformation will take 5-10 years, it is important to implement a management
approach and structure that will survive changes in personnel at executive levels.

This fundamental management approach is used by DOD whenever a
very high level program or mission is initiated. It-is ironic that the same level of
attention has not been given to the logistics transformation since it has such a
high potential to provide funds for future modernization and the success of future
operations.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel

ac
a EE aaeeeeeeeeeneereSESEs



shipment in the DOD Transportation System (DTS). This Regulation establishes
responsibilities and guidelines for DOD container system asset acquisition,
control, facilities, funding, handling, in-transit visibility, maintenance,
management, training, disposition, ISO registration, and accountability. It is the
intent of this Regulation to provide a seamless transportation system that
cooperatively interacts with commercial operations to enhance combat
effectiveness, safety, and efficiency.*

DOD Policy

It is DOD policy that components shall establish an intermodal container-
oriented distribution system of sufficient capability to meet DOD-established
required delivery dates for mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment,
and redeployment. Additionally, components shall use the DOD intermodal
container system for movement of supplies and equipment across the range of
military operations consistent with the supported commander's concept of
operations, requirements, and capabilities. Components must also make
optimum use of the vast capability of intermodal container resources and
services furnished by the commercial transportation industry when doing so is
responsive to military requirements and consistent with prudent business
practices. Finally, to ensure commonality and interoperability of intermodal
containers and infrastructure, components must include information systems to
communicate between the DOD Components and commercial industry.

At present, twenty-foot and 40-foot American National Standards Institute
(ANSI)ASO containers are the designated standards for DOD unit equipment and
sustainment. The 20-foot ANSI/ISO container is designated as the DOD standard
for containerized munitions shipments. However, despite the trend of volumetric
growth, the majority of the U.S.-owned standard dry cargo container fleet
remains as 20- and 40-foot units, with each type continuing to grow. Currently,
the U.S.-owned container fleet is essentially equally divided in number between
20- and 40-foot units. This means that approximately two-thirds of the total
standard dry cargo carrying capacity is in 40-foot units.

Recommendation:

The 20-foot ISO container is the DOD standard size for the movement of
ammunition (Class V). Both 20- and 40-foot containers will be used to move all
other classes of supply and unit equipment subject to theater reception and
onward movement capabilities. It is recommended that all Services must be
prepared to handle both 20- and 40-foot units, with each type continuing to grow.
It is further recommended that LSMRS dedicate space topside to an agile matrix
that can stack 20 or 40-foot containers.

* Additionally, Joint Publication 4-01.7, Chapter 3 (reference (a)), and the annual Container System Hardware Status
Report provide an overview of containers and associated container handling equipment available to or in use within
Department of Defense.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation —Deployment Panel


oa9 5

o

ze

Acceptable throughput in the SPOE to move rapidly to the dock;

Slow loading of airlift aircraft and sealift ships;

Airlift of adequate speed but moderate capacity and range;

Ships of moderate speed, but adequate capacity and range;

Enroute bases for refueling;

Air-refueling aircraft;

Land and sea-base prepositioning sites close to current forward bases;

Ability to rapidly unload at air/seaports of debarkation (A/SPOD) and
over-the-shore under sea-state two conditions;

Intratheater movement of forces and supplies;

A developing global transportation network providing command,
control, communications to locate all elements of the system and the
personnel, forces, and cargo being carried;

Extreme vulnerability.

The required characteristics of a “21st Century Global Mobility System’,
that is responsive to the theater CINCs for warfighting force deployment and
sustainment, as described in JV 2010 and the DSB 1998 Joint Operations
Summer Study, are:

a.

Ability to deliver a light, agile, air transportable land combat strike force
to kill enemy mechanized armor, with 24 hour global reach from
CONUS, to forward secure airfields;

Ability to deliver the follow-on force, starting in iweek, to ports, over-
the shore, or to off-shore support ships/platforms;

Upon request, provide warfighter urgent sustainment from CONUS
anywhere in the world in 1 day to meet emergency needs;

Upon request, provide warfighter less urgent sustainment to the
warfighter from CONUS in 1 week to assure confidence that
requisitioned sustainment will occur as planned, thus avoiding double
requisitioning and pile up of sustainment at bases;

Be independent of prepositioning, refueling and enroute bases.

Volume 2 -~- DOD Logistics Transformation ~-Deployment Panel

er



The charts which follow cover Panel 1’s work in each of the three
“leadership” areas. (Also see the “implementation” section of Panel 1's report for
more on departmental level actions.)

Providing for Warriors: DoD Departmental
Leadership

* Finding
— Executive leadership is slow to decide trade-offs and give direction to
organizations, resources, people, & technology.
— Significant opportunity to save money missed until services trust financial
decision-making
— Information for managing logistics well is not available
— Fragmented, individual projects (some impressive), would have much
greater impact if coordinated
* Discussion
~ Compelling need for change is at highest leadership level
— There is no multi-year plan with reasonable stability and follow-up
— There is inadequate follow-up on overall focused logistics initiatives

— Executives need much clearer understanding of why things are/are not
being done

Providing for Warriors: DoD Departmental
Leadership

¢ Recommendation
— Agreement among top executives on scope, priority, urgency, objectives
of logistics transformation
— Prepare a single plan with trade-offs among resources, organization, time,
including metrics
~ Clarify accountability for plan element achievements
— Modify existing financial and planning systems to provide data and
analysis for managing logistics
* Implementation
— USD and VICS agree Executive leadership change is necessary
~ Select minimum group, ground rules, define purpose and payoff
Clarify priority of logistics transformation vs other priorities
— Set objectives for stability of schedule, funding, and cost reduction
Agree on information required for managing logistics

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel



The rationale for logistics transformation is compelling.

Transformed Logistic System

The envisioned endstate of a transformed logistics system is depicted
above. The logistics system architect is perhaps better depicted as part of
“leadership commitment’, rather than as a separate pillar.

Implementation Architecture

3Months | 3Months | 3Months | 3Months 1 On-going, —>|
t T T u

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel



There is a major need to develop information systems that will allow for
continuous re-planning of both deployment and sustainment operations as
conditions change. The collection of platform data via the recommended source-
data automation is a prerequisite for any future dynamic re-planning / re-tasking
capability, as it will provide the current status that provides the basis for effective
re-planning and re-tasking.

This platform-based, source-data focused information system with
companion process changes should be a principal component of the
recommended Logistics System Architecture. For its successful implementation
will enable better force readiness with lower inventory, fewer people required to
maintain and manage supplies thereby reducing lift requirements to the theater
and the logistics “footprint” once deployed. Reduced costs are an important by-
product of this system that will “pull” specific items to the operational force user,
when needed by that user.

V. DEMAND REDUCTION — FINDINGS

Demand Reduction -- Findings
* Today’s forces are too heavy to permit rapid deployment
unless most equipment is prepositioned in the theater

* Big payoff for early entry and continuous combat ;

— Faster deployment of combat forces

- Smaller footprint in theater

— More agile forces

— Lower costs
* Reduces subsequent sustainment burden
* Opportunities to reduce demand include:

— Redesigned force structure and equipment

— Other demand management techniques

Critical to 21st Century Logistics Vision

_|

Demand Management Techniques — a Major Focus and a Major Success
Story of the Commercial World.

Reducing the demand for logistics support not only requires exploiting
technology to develop better forces and equipment, but it requires a set of
management changes in the way the Unified Command customers and the
Services manage demand. Demand management has become a critical
component in commercial firms’ drive for competitive advantage. The best firms

Volume 2 ~ DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel
1na



Executive leadership is slow to decide trade-offs and give direction to
organizations, resources, people, & technology. This slow decision
making process leads to: (1) significant opportunity to save money
missed until services trust financial decision-making (2) information for
managing logistics well is not available; (3) Fragmented, individual
projects (some impressive), would have much greater impact if
coordinated. Change is required at highest leadership level along with
a multi-year plan with reasonable stability and follow-up. This follow-
up needs an overall view on all focused logistics initiatives in order to
create a much clearer understanding of why things are/are not being
done.

In order to find a solution: Create agreement among top executives on
scope, priority, urgency, objectives of logistics transformation; prepare
a single plan with trade-offs among resources, ROI, capabilities,
organization, time, including metrics; clarify accountability for plan
element achievements; Modify existing financial and planning systems
to provide data and analysis for managing logistics.

Implement the changes in the following manner: USD and VCJCS
agree Executive leadership change is necessary; select minimum
group, ground rules, define purpose and payoff; clarify priority of
logistics transformation vs. other priorities; set objectives for stability of
schedule, funding, and cost reduction; agree on information required
for managing logistics

/

Transformation Implementation

¢ Logistics transformation is a complex, multi-year
business process -- 5 to 10 year effort
¢ Strong persistent leadership is essential
* Requires
— Agreement at most senior levels (objectives, resources,
priority, major trade-off decisions)
— Comprehensive master plan
— Enforcement
— Staying power

Model after DOD’s approach to managing
the largest major weapon systems

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel

45



Precision Resupply

Joint Precision Offset

Paratoil Systems
1,000

Mass Resupply
sLarge Payloads
“GPS Guided

+ Clandestine Resupply

+ Sealeable V chile

Added to Incraaso
Range

One of the more interesting and novel approaches from a logistic point of
view is the elimination or reduction of the port/airfield nodes which are both
vulnerable and inefficient. These bottlenecks might be eliminated completely if
delivery from ships off-shore, directly to troops who need supplies, could be
effective.

Several ideas have been investigated at low levels of experiment. JPODS
is one; delivery by air-launched “glide bomb” using GPS guidance. Another
which is potentially useful for greater payloads is the guided parafoil shown in
this chart. Both offer standoff delivery.

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation — Technology Panel


To achieve logistics transformation, two ingredients are key: leadership
commitment and an implementation architecture. (This is illustrated in the
previous slide). The assumption, of course, is that logistics transformation
implementation is grounded in an investment strategy, strongly supported and
guided by senior leadership to execution through the PPBS process.

National Logistics System Metrics
° Precursor Metrics + Mission Planning Measures * Mission Execution Measures
- RMA Douc/RMA Planned ~ Planning accuracy Delivery Reliability
— Financial System: (CeForecast % Seat) (Ge H1- Day) (% +/-3 Days)
(Change done/Change planed) - Cost/Ton delivered ~ Cost / Ton Delivered
(5 year change) = Cost/Hour operation
~ Reliability MTBF of systems © - Quality
= Focused (Change: 5 years) (% Daauaged/Wrong stuff)
~Join D 4 Rapid Distribution (Hardware Software) —  Hardware/Software up time
— Information Fusion = Tonnage per unit (taformation system)
~ Joint Theater Logistics Command & (Change: 5 years) (Weapons systems)
‘Control = Cost/Military person -  Re-plan cycle time (Echelon?)
= Maka Logs
1 Fareed Pein
Ae aemacn
Note: How metrics are used to NB. NB.
‘manage/make decisions is more ‘Mix variance Mission variance
important than design of *By commodity Mix
“perfect” metric. “By Function

Metrics by which to measure implementation success must also be
developed to monitor plan execution.

Panel 1 was not able to develop specific metrics given time constraints but
the above slide and the next two suggest some approaches, the second of which
suggests developing an overall measurement called “Precursor Metrics” with two
lower level measurements. This example suggests capitalizing on the measures
already being used for Focused Logistics as described in Joint Vision 2010, then
suggests development of other metrics to measure performance/progress toward
attainment of more specific goals.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
4



c. USD(A&T) should establish commercial partnerships, and provide
seed R&D funds with a commitment to procurement as soon as
possible for the selected concepts.

d. USTRANSCOM should develop a road map to introduce new systems
into the DOD/Commercial fleet with an IOC of ~2010.

e. The large, growing, commercial airlift fleet should be enhanced to
support strategic deployment by:

1) Providing CRAF enhancements to maximize suitability for carrying
a larger fraction of military cargo (larger door width and height,
increased deck height, greater cargo floor strength, and increased
deck height, and rapid ramp loading;

2) Using the enhanced CRAF characteristics as a key design criteria
for land forces equipment development.

2. Deliberate Planning Process

The Joint Operations, Planning, and Execution System (JOPES)
encapsulates the command and control system for the DOD. It consists of
hardware, software, and standard operating procedures agreed upon by the Joint
community, specifying timeframes, actions, activities, and responsibilities for
planning and executing either deliberately or in a crisis mode. It is the deliberate
process that has been root cause of many of the U.S. military's
deployment/redeployment problems. Today, as in the past, there is not a single
process owner. There are several partial "owners" of JOPES that have, over the
years, created both seams that are not easily crossed in execution and
procedures that are not easily modified to fit the real needs on an ongoing
deployment.

The current process is extremely time consuming due to three factors.
First, the process requires coordination and concurrence to extremis. Second,
much of this is done without the aid of automated assistance except in the most
basic sense. Third, one change anywhere in the plan can send the entire
planning community back to “square one.” These characteristics all lead to the
first major problem, that of plan inflexibility and adaptability. Even though
planning doctrine calls for “branches and sequels” or plan options, coming to
agreement and arrangement of such options is extremely difficult. When plan
execution begins, the inflexibility becomes evident and continued execution then
depends on human intervention at all levels.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation -Deployme'* “anel



identical) needs of all the players. This will focus on replacing inventory and
transportation with advance planning systems and communications and at the
same time, achieving cost effective operational excellence across the chain. The
success of ISCM is heavily dependent on evolving IT capabilities. The
application of this concept can be exercised with either DOD as the lead or by
being totally contracted out — a process called 3" party logistics — wherein an
independent contractor manages some or all of the parts of the supply chain as
shown in Figure 5.

Item Management Engineering

Supplies

Government |

Contract
In

- Invent
Maintenance y

Training

Figure 5

It also must be noted that this a fast growing sector of a commercial
practice is increasingly utilized in industry as an efficient, effective means of
satisfying customer demands. Some examples of the results companies
adopting 3PL is shown below. (See Table 2: Examples)

There are more numerous example of industry outpacing DOD in
innovative logistics applications and in the use of alternative logistics support
methods. These companies, of varied commodities, have benefited from leading
edge processes, technologies and policies - building upon earlier improvements -
and experiencing a faster rate of innovation as time passes. DOD has not
capitalized on many of the processes, technologies or policies available in the
private sector — conceivably widening the gap.

1996 DSB Summer Study. Although some of the tenets of the 1996 DSB
Summer Study have been embedded into DOD policy such as the DODD
5000.2R , adoption of the 1996 recommendations has been inconsistent. Where
recommendations have been adopted, DOD has not seized upon the new
technologies and capabilities emergent in the past 2 years on which to build.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation -Deployment Panel



XI. TITLE 10 OVERVIEW

Title 10: Overview

A number of recommendations surfaced that would change the role of
many of the organizations that currently exist. Many of those organizations’ roles
are based on law. If a recommendation changes the role of an organization such
that it requires changes in legislation, then the Department's implementation
approach must detail required legislative changes.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
35



Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Technology Panel
121



Diagnostics on the platform are an important part of the source-data
automation recommendation. It is important to note, however, that relatively few
current platforms (especially ground platforms) have embedded diagnostics, and
almost none of those have the ability to provide remote notification (e.g., to off-
platform and other “orderers of parts and resupply”) of the results of those
diagnostics. The panel believes that these technologies are readily achievable
within the time-frame considered, and will provide benefits that far exceed their
cost.

The recommended platform-based source-data automation, linked to
tactical and theater information systems, provides significant benefits to many
members of the combat team. Consider, for example, the organizational
mechanic — he/she would have access to current information based on platform
diagnostics (evolving to prognostics), interactive electronic technical manuals
containing diagnostics decision-trees and repair instructions, plus easy “help-
desk’ access, all of which should yield high confidence in accurate fault
diagnosis and choice of component to be replaced. Coupling this capability with
easy, rapid order entry access to the communications network and immediate
confirmation status feedback of ordered parts will improve the productivity of
mechanics and strengthen the operational units’ confidence in the logistics
system. Similarly, operators and supporters can use the platform-based data to
derive the operational status of units, to predict near-term requirements for fuel

and munitions, to continuously update orders, and to track distribution of parts
and materiel in real-time.

Prognostics

The panel also examined prognostics, and believes that — while generally
beyond the current state of the art — they represent a technology that will be
viable and valuable well within the specified time-frame. Prognostics are, in our
view, an essential component of the efficient logistics support of the future. If
status — counts / measures / embedded diagnostics — from each platform tell
you about the present and the recent past, prognostics from each platform will
tell you about the near future. Prognostics are in essence “future status”. A fuel
gauge is a simple prognostic; more interesting prognostics include oil viscosity,
bearing friction, engine inlet / outlet temperature differences, etc. In the future,
these data signals could be collected in real-time on the platform, processed on-
board the platform, compared on the platform against norms based on usage and
operating conditions (e.g., speed, external temperature, mileage / time since last
maintenance, etc.), and be used to predict likely failures in advance. Reporting
off the platform to a maintenance / analysis center (which itself could be a mobile
platform) would be on a “by exception” basis (e.g., report only off-nominal events
and predicted failures within a particular time-span), which would keep the
bandwidth requirements of the prognostics to tolerable levels.

Having logistical knowledge of the near future will add a new dimension to
status reporting, with break-through potential for logistics. For example, such
knowledge of the near-future via prognostics would enable condition-based

Volume 2 ~ DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel
105



Demand Reduction -- Recommendations

* Equipment:: make PMs responsible for total ownership
cost

A Major
— Make demand reduction significant objective of Commerciat
JROC/PPBS Focus

— Invest to reduce life cycle costs (set ROI of 3-5:1)
© Improve reliability, maintainability LPD-17 Example
© Decrease fueVammo/power consumption 20% (S4B) TOC
- Reduce weight, crew size Reduction
* Competitively source weapon systems and equipment
support above organization level; save $7 B over 10 yrs

Army IETMs
can save

$1.8B over 10yrs
on 24 W/S:

Operational Support accounts for 60% of LCC

Role of JROC/PPBS

Additionally, stronger joint requirements should reduce redundant and
single-service unique logistics requirements. Logistics demand reduction will only
occur, in either the short or long term, if it is a priority at every step in the JROC
and PPBS processes.

Make PMs Responsible for Life Cycle Support and Funding Control for New
and Legacy Systems. Focus on Total Ownership Costs (TOC).

The purpose of this second part of the set of “demand management
techniques’ is to fix responsibility for influencing logistics demands of the major
consumers — the weapons systems and equipment used by the CINCs’ forces.
Only for a few systems is that responsibility fixed in the PM; for most systems
responsibility for the systems post-fielding support is widely diffused among
organizations and commodity and maintenance managers in the Service materiel
commands and DLA.

The current policy in DOD! 5000.1 is to do just as we recommend — for
new systems. The problem of diffused life-cycle responsibility described above
has been well recognized, and the policy changed. The policy has not been
extended to legacy systems — which is where the current diffuseness of
responsibility now contributes to high O&S costs and a large logistics demand.®

® This policy was recommended by the DSB Acquisition Work Force Sub-Panel in its March 1998
report, and partially adopted by the Secretary of Defense in his report to the Congress (“Secretary
of Defense Report to Congress: Actions to Accelerate the Movement to the New Acquisition

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel

444



Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel
119



DOD Logistics Transformation

B-4

(6/30/98 [Genter for the Commercial Deployment of |TRANSCOM [LCDR John G. Meier Iii #2
Transportation Technologies (CCDoTT)
High Speed Sealift / Agile Port Program
(6/30/98 Improving the Deployment Process ITRANSCOM Mr. Phil Boyer ar)
6/30/98 ‘Joint Deployment Training Center (JDTC) [TRANSCOM IMs. Julie Frisby #2
6/30/98 Organizational Structure — An information |TRANSCOM Mr. Frank Weber #2
: Brief for The DSB
(6/30/98 " |Transportation Working Capital Fund— = |TRANSCOM ICAPT Michael T. Rader #2
ITWCF Rates TWCF Cost Drivers TWCF
jand Budget Process
6/30/98 | Transportation Modeling & Simulation for {TRANSCOM Mr. Bill Key #2
the DTS .
6/30/98 |US Transportation Command — Defense |TRANSCOM (Mr. Jerry Walker #2
Transportation The Keystone of
| American’s Defense Strategy
7/13/98 |Amy After Next Insights Army Training [Col Bourgoine #4
i7A3/98 _ |High Speed Sealift / Agile Port Program = |CCDoTT Mr. Keith Seaman #4
7/13/98 {Quiet Professionals —_ SOCOM LTC Mike Roesner #4
a ——— —. jan. _ _
7/14/98 [Autonomic Logistics Briefing TSF [Col Russ Currer & Dr. #4
_ {William Scheuren
[714/98 |Boeing Integrated logistics ~~" Boeing “~lMr Bill Delaney =—S—S*=~S:=<CSM
714/98 | F-22 Transforming Support —"TF-22 Program Office 'LtCol Mike Carpenter & Mr; #3 |
|& Lockheed. Tom May i
‘714/98 |Fast Economic Sealift Vehicle Research Handouts Only 4
Corp.
7114198 |Fast Ship Review ~~ Fastship Inc. Mr. David Giles #2 |
7/14/98 |Fixed Site Decontamination | “DECON " [Major Joe Kiple (handout) #4 |
ae oe ee meee _ cee |
'7N4/98 |High Speed Sea Litt Research Corp. Dr. Scott Rethorst ; #2
7/14/98 [Improved Logistics for the 21° Century |



THE BASELINE
LOGISTICS INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND CAPABILITIES

Over 400 Logistics information systems are in use or development by the DOD. These span traditional
wholesale, retail, distribution and transportation functions. Many of these systems are built on functional
architectures developed in the 60’s and 70’s. The total annual Logistics IT budget, including both
development and operations exceeds $1.8 billion. This figure could be higher since this is a “cross-cut”
of budget areas and many IT funds are “buried” in other budget categories. Additionally, IT systems
development and software are normally funded by O&M funds, with some procurement for equipment.
These funds do not have the same centralized control that R&D funds have in development of weapon
systems. In any case there are inaccuracies in the counting of systems and the budget estimates for
logistics information systems.

The most difficult challenge in achieving Logistics IT transformation is the existence and continuing
culture of stove-piped systems. Today’s systems:

© Are characterized by limited interoperability, too much custom code and “embedded” business
rules, laws, and policy in software. Process change is disabled.

© Are caught in a quagmire - too costly and complex to modernize, running on old, expensive
machines, with no simple path to modernization.

© — Fail to recognize that information integration is critical to both warfighter and CONUS based
support.

Although DOD has many logistics stovepipes, their existence is a direct result of prior statutes, federal
regulations, and DOD oversight directives, which require individual information systems to be budgeted,
managed and reviewed as stand-alone systems. The services (and some agencies), under their title 10
acquisition authorities, are motivated to manage their programs to cost, schedule, and “content” (or
capability). There has not been strong motivation to integrate multiple systems to share information and
achieve highly responsive interoperability, and finally, to integrate or “fuse” information into a common
operational picture for logistics. Within the last few years the DOD has recognized that it must begin to
manage these information systems as part of an integrated collection of information systems. Such an
approach does not mean build a grand design, but it does mean that one must map business and mission
processes and related information systems to ensure that these capabilities mesh and one can determine
where the most important changes should be pursued. Concurrent with this development is the rapidly
changing internet technology and the movement from stand alone stovepipes to a network computing
architecture that provides access to and integration of information from all accessible information in the

network.


Form Approved

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No, 07040188

Pubic poring burn hs clei of formatn etna avast espns, ling he ine rei tacts, searching ving dt sores, ain nd mating th ata ede ecm ad in
tho colecton af infomation. Send coments regarding ths burden estimate er anyother aspect ofthis clacton of intamatc, incufing suggestions fr reducing this burden, to Washington Headguarters Sarees, Decorate for Infomation
Uperaons and apr, 1215 dlrsn Dos Highnay, Bue 20H, Agen, VA 222024908 no tho Oc of Mangere id Bdge apewa Reditn Poet 07080188, Wshrgen, 0020503,

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

Dec 1998 Final Technical, 1999
@. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Logistics Transformation, | n/a
Vol II
6. AUTHORIS)

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Defense Science Board, Ofc of the Under Secy of Def (A&T)
3140 Defense Pentagon, RM 3D865

Washington, DC 20301-3140

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

n/a

$. SPONSORINGIMONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Defense Science Board

3140 Defense Pentagon, RM 3D865

Washington, DC 20301-3140

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

N/A

11, SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
N/A

12a. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

Approved for public release: Distribution is unlimited
A

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

14. SUBJECT TERMS

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

16. PRICE CODE

77. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 75, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF
OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT ABSTRACT
Unclassified unclassified unclassified N/A
Standard Form 298 (ev. 2-89) Ea)
Breserbed by ANS Std, 23

Designed using Perform re, WHSIDIOR, Oct 08



DARPA Defense Advance Research Projects Agency

DCMC Defense Contract management Command
DFD Direct-to-Foxhole Delivery

DISA Defense information Security Agency
DIV Division

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DMC Defense Management Council

DOD Department of Defense

DRIDs Defense Reform Initiative Documents
DSB Defense science Board

DTS Defense Transportation System

E

EDI Electronic Data Interchange

ERP Enterprise Resource Planning

EW Electronic Warfare

F

FEBA Forward Edge of the Battle Area
FMS Foreign Military Sales

FY Fiscal year

G

GATM Global Air traffic Management

GCCS Global Command and Control System
GCss Global Combat Support System

GTE General Telephone

GIN Global Transportation Network

H

HNS Host Nation Support

1

IAW In Accordance With

IS Information Systems

IT Information Technology

ITV In-Transit Visibility

Iw Information Warfare

J

J4 Director for Logistics, Joint Staff

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFACC Joint Forces Air Component Commander
JFRG Joint Force Requirements Generator
JLOTS Joint Logistics Over the Shore

JOPES Joint Operational Planning and Execution System
JRSOI Joint Reception Staging Onward Movement and Integration
JSF Joint Strike Fighter

JSOC Joint Special Operations Command
JTAV Joint Total Asset Visibility

DOD Logistics Transformation A-2



Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation - Sustainment Panel

no



Discussion #0: Key Elements of Weapon
Logistics Support Costs

¢ Engineering Sources of Support

* Production/Manufacturing + OEM

* Maintenance Strategy * Service Organic
Hybrid

© Technical Data

* Spares planning Alternatives: How to

* Training Support?

¢ Configuration + By Key element
Management + By Weapons System

* Support + By Subsystem

° Disposal + Bybrid

Panel 1 Logistics Transformation Design Principles

* Global assured situational awareness and delivery
— Awareness real time (not near real time) -- combined air, space, ground, sea
In theater receive in hours, not days (pull, not push)
— From CONUS to anywhere in the world: 2-4 days
~ From CONUS to anywhere else in CONUS: 1-2 days
— Predictive, anticipatory, precise, tailorable, scalable, modular
— Total global visibility (from individual to HQ, from supplier to acquiring source)
— Global assured, “virtual” direct order, direct delivery, virtual inventories (eliminate
redistribution)
+ Simple, small, survivable
People simple/friendly -- less people intensive
— Low to no mass (footprint: CONUS to theater and back)
~ Low to no maintenance/high reliability (diagnostics-prognostics-modular repair)
Allnext generation systems/subsystems have improved reliability equal to 1/2 delta
between current benchmark and 100% reliability (AF TOC goal)
— Capabilities (not commodities) managed (across conflict spectrum)
— Systems and components “lightened” in bulk, weight, log support
— C/BW and IW survivable -- offense capability

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel



Implementing Logistics Transformation

Implementing Logistics
Transformation

DoD Departmental Leadership

«_Findings
*Top 50 (or less) Military and Civilian leaders need to be more visibly
in agreement
Executive Leadership is slow to decide trade-offs and give direction to
organizations, resources, people, & technology.

» Recommendation

© Agreement among top executives on scope, priority, urgency,
objectives of Logistics transformation

«_Implementation
* USD and VICS agree Executive leadership change is necessary
* Select minimum group, ground rules, define purpose and payoff

© The majority of senior military and civilian leaders need to be more
visibly in agreement on the following areas:

1) Objectives for changing logistics;

2) Organization for pursuing change;

3) Plan and resources to be followed;

4) Cost reduction approach to save $15B.

Also, because they are not in agreement, many trade-off opportunities
will be missed, and the overall “project to improve logistics” will move
slowly and the management of information needed to manage logistics
will be years in coming. In sum, more cohesive leadership is needed,
even though many individuals are doing what they can do, well.

e Transforming logistics is a project that has the same needs as a
weapons system project: Clear goals, Plan from now to completion;
tradeoff of resources, time, and quality early; Clear assignments,
organizationally Stability over several years Tight coordination between
related activities Constant follow-up Positive and negative incentives
Only the most senior leaders in DOD, acting jointly can provide these
needs. So far, they have not.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
AA



e. U.S. owned or operated foreign flag vessel capacity and VSA capacity
of a Participant;

f. U.S. owned or operated foreign flag vessel capacity and VSA capacity
of a non-participant;

g. Foreign-owned or operated foreign flag vessel capacity of a non-
Participant.

Activation of VISA Contingency Contracts:

VISA may be activated at the request of USCINCTRANS, with the
approval of SECDEF, as needed to support Contingency operations. Activating
voluntary commitments of capacity to support such operations will be in

accordance with pre-negotiated Contingency contracts between DOD and
Participants.

USCINCTRANS will notify the Maritime Administrator of the activation of
Stages |, II and Ill. The administrator shall notify the Attorney General and the
Chairman —Federal Trade Commission (FTC) when DOD has determined that
activation of any Stage of VISA is necessary to meet DOD Contingency
requirements. Throughout the activation of any Stages of this Agreement, DOD
may utilize voluntary commitment of sealift capacity or systems. In the event that
Participants are unable to fully meet Contingency requirements, or do not
voluntarily offer to provide the required capacity, the shipping capacity made
available under VISA may be supplemented by ships/capacity from non-
Participants. When voluntary capacity does not meet DOD Contingency
requirements, DOD will activate the VISA stages as necessary. Stage | will be
activated in whole or in part, with the necessary approvals, when voluntary
capacity commitments are insufficient to meet DOD Contingency requirements.
Stage II will be activated, in whole or in part, when Contingency requirements
exceed the capability of Stage | and/or voluntarily committed resources. Stage III
will be activated in whole or in part, when contingency requirements exceed the
capacity of Stages | and I!, and other shipping services are not available. This
stage involves DOD use of capacity and vessels operated by the Participants
which will be furnished to DOD when required in accordance with this
Agreement. Upon allocation of sealift assets by SecTrans, through its designated
fepresentative MARAD, USTRANSCOM will negotiate and execute Contingency
contracts with Participants, using pre-approved rate methodologies as
established jointly by SecTrans and SECDEF in fulfillment of section 653 of the
Maritime Security Act of 1996. Simultaneous with activation of Stage III, the DOD
Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) will be activated for those carriers still under
obligation to that program.

Recommendation:

In order to assure that a strong partnership develops between DOD and
MARAD's VISA members, USTRANSCOM, as the principal DOD agent, must

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation -Deployment Panel
a2



Logistics Capabilities: Equipment/Systems

Subcomponent | NLT 2010 NLT 2025
Acquisition/ . Improved “joint” requirements | ¢ Unified/joint planning governs weapon system
Support for major systems “requirements”

Increased funding for limiting
growth in operating costs of
fielded systems

Newest systems designed for
2-level maint,; CLS in
CONUS

New equipment segments
increasingly sourced globally
JTAV reduces excess orders
Improved access to CRAF,
RRF, railcars

JTF uses JTAV to actively
track equipment and spares
in theater

Government depots “right-
sized” to perform
“core”/mandated work in
Support of legacy systems
New IT permits more distance
learning/"reach back” for
expertise

Distance learning/IETMs
reduce TDY costs

Most uses 2 level maintenance

“Defense” unique industrial base limited to
combat system final assembly/integration only
Broad access to “cutting edge” commercial R&D
due to AR

All new equipment embeds OJT and
maintenance aids

Marked increase in directed energy weapons
Shift from buy to lease for semi-commercial
equipment (pwrXhr)

Small floats and:better PREPO plans cut
inventory requirements

PMs have LC management authority

More use of support warranties

Widescale fielding of remote sensors and stand-
off weapons

Adaptive management tools optimize
distribution; reduce “risk” inventories

JTAV precludes duplicative shipments

Almost all new equipment fits in commercial
intermodal containers

DOD has full an prompt access to all
commercial lift assets to meet surge needs
Increased reliability and better batteries
enhance value of PREPO equipment
Management procedures established to handle
the shipment of life cycle support material now
being generated by myriad weapon system
program offices

Advanced technology permits resupply from
CONUS directly to combat units

JTF has full authority to pre-plan and manage all
in-theater transport of stocks

Sophisticated usage monitoring and modeling
permits rapid predictive reallocations

Log info system hardened

Supply system transformed into oversight of
support contractors

All depot-level maintenance supplied
commercially

Most maintenance schools closed

Most fielded equipment uses commercial fuel
“Self healing” features minimize O-level
maintenance skill needs

High reliability equipment and 2 level
maintenance minimizes in-theater heavy repair.
If some above-unit maintenance needed, it will
be provided by contractors and Reservists who
can be mobilized in place by cog CINC.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel



X. CRITICAL LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES REQUIRED FOR THE

FUTURE

Based on its assessment of future (NLT 2025) military trends and
the implications for the logistics system, Panel 1 then assessed the
logistics capabilities required to support the future.

To make this assessment, Panel 1 developed a “taxonomy” or
framework to guide the study effort.

Panel 1 Recommended Framework for Summer Study

Proposed Framework for 1998
DSB Summer Study on Logistics Transformation

Paes Eanreamet ;

ga teeta _—
—" on av ofen
areca

Secon

==

54 LBS
= eS YF
= he &*
oles

Viebaiy (Coat intenty

‘Step 4: working with recommended actions of other panels, and taking into consideration previous DSB study recommendations, Pane! 1 with
‘other panels conducts "payoff analysis” to further focus oa most important recommendations.

‘Step 5: Determine bow to get from bere to there (roadmaps & resourcing) (Panel | with other panels)
‘Step 6 Provide implementation outline and barriers/constraints (Pane! } with other panels)

The above framework represents the overall approach proposed by Panel
1 to approach logistics transformation. The purpose of this framework was to
provide a disciplined and consistent approach across the panels. The specific
terminology is intended to avoid the pitfall of addressing logistics transformation
through the potential narrowing prism of today’s classifications and to focus the
study on areas which may produce the “biggest bang for the buck’.

First, we discussed and finalized a list of CORE LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES:
e PROVIDE (includes requirements definition and acquisition)

e TRANSPORT
e SUPPORT (included sustainment, reconstitute, dispose and return).

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel

4A



SUSTAINMENT PANEL REPORT

Panel Chairman:
General William G. Tuttle, USA (Ret.)

Panel Members
Maurice Shriber
Gen “Randy” Randolph, USAF (Ret)
Neil Siegel
Larry Sur
Ron Naventi

Panel Advisors

Brig Gen Mary Saunders, USAF
Brig Gen Terry Juskowiak, USMC
COL Dave Fortna, USA
Col Larry Cannon, USAF
COL Sam Chappell, USA
Col Neil Hartenstein, USMC
Bill Leary
Deborah Pollard
Tom Sweeney
LTC George Topic, USA

Panel Support
Col George M. McVeigh Jr, USAF, (Ret), SAIC

LTC Don Burnett, USA

Volume 2 ~ DOD Logistics Transformation Sustainment Panel
97



ADDITIONAL KEY SUCCESS FACTORS

Capturing Source Data, And Ensuring Currency, Accuracy And Consistency Of That Data.

The old adage of “garbage in — garbage out” remains valid today and will be so in the future. Capturing
accurate, timely, consistent source data is the foundation for an effective logistics information technology
capability, and for achieving focused logistics. The recent use of the Automated Information Technology
in Europe has demonstrated that these technologies save time, save money and provide the essential asset
information needed to support the logistics pipeline. Without a highly accurate and responsive source
data capture capability the information systems higher in the chain will not be trusted by logisticians or
operators.

Although nothing should slow the deployment of the automated information technology (AIT)
capabilities, the DOD should anticipate major technology developments which will reduce the cost and
improve the effectiveness of these AIT devices. Major new capabilities in the commercial tranport
industry and supply chain management systems are already being deployed and the combination of smart
card, RF readers and satellite tracking will provide the DOD with improved and less costly technology.
Hand held devices will also continue their geometric grow and provide another tool for supply chain
tracking.

Accountability for the source data is essential and management policies are needed to designate the
specific commanders responsible for the different source data. Standards of reporting performance and
data quality will be needed and will likely vary between peacetime and conflict.

Ensuring Availability Of Communications Connectivity And Capacity

With the added dependence on information technology comes a parallel dependence on communications.
Users and operators must have connectivity to communications capabilities and must have the ability to
locate and access information they need across the “network”. Such technology exists in the Internet
today and many of these capabilities are being put in place in the DOD now. DISA, in implementing the
Defense Information Systems Network (DISN), is dramatically increasing the overall capacity of the
network in CONUS, Europe and the Pacific following the principles and process shown below.

POSITIVE CONTRO

© End-to-end Visibitity|
© Surge
© Reconfiguration

/

BROADBAND
® Global Grid
* Common Interfaces

*° COTS with

International
Standards
Real-Time Bandwidth
Allocation

SECURITY

Protect
Detect

ad



Information Assurance

Defense in Depth

Essential Information Assurance Services

IA Services Capability
* Availability << system availability
Identification & Pl > Signature verification of
Authentication originator
. Authorization What can they do
° Access Control With what system resources
* Confidentiality << _ Privacy of data
¢ Integrity <4——)> Assurance against data

modification

* Non-repudiation <—— Proof of participation

Creating People Partners To Effect Change In Business Processes Rapidly.

The information technology theme, focused on the establishment of a Logistics Systems Architect, must
also consider the impact of process change and IT change on the people involved. Every successful
change effort documented has devoted time and attention to the personnel effected by the changes.
Although the Logistics Systems Architect can lead these efforts, it is up to the base commanders and
others in the command chains to bring their employees into a partnership for change. There are many
examples of failed change efforts because the people involved had not accepted and supported the change.

Reducing the cost and time of systems development and operations,

The natural directions in the market place are making hardware a commodity and some aspects of
software a commodity. The technologies available today dramatically shorten the time to access WEB
based systems and to deploy new capabilities at much lower cost. The IT professionals in the military and
civilian elements of DOD must understand how to utilize these new capabilities and rethink systems
development. The concepts of the DII COE are fundamental to saving money and achieving
interoperability that is so dramatically needed. However, even deeper savings will be possible once the
DOD achieves consistent data that can be integrated reasonably and quickly. The most critical issue to
understand is that cost savings and achieving interoperability/integration are parallel, not opposing goals.

“C17



quick evacuations to CONUS public and private sector facilities for all
needed serious treatment.

XI. LEADERSHIP RECOMMENDATIONS

Leadership Recommendations

Panel 1

As the DSB study got underway, Panel 1 was asked to explore Leadership
recommendations. It was decided to look at leadership from three levels: the
National, the Strategic-Operational, and the Theater.

As seen below, Panel 1 initially conducted a quick assessment of
leadership issues at the 3 levels.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel



The only possible source of such data are the platforms themselves . . .
which are being “digitized” and linked to the tactical command-and-control
systems for other reasons. As noted in the previous section, the platforms —
linked to the logistics C? through the tactical C? systems — can be a source of
data upon which all battlefield logistics decisions can be made more accurately
and more timely than today. An example of current work in this area is the
Army's use of FBCB2 (platform digitization) to capture platform data, which is
sent to CSSCS (tactical logistics decision support) and then to the Standard
Army Management Information System (STAMIS) (logistics stock status). It is
already clear from the results of the Army’s Advanced Warfighting Experiments
that integrating these logistics status data (“logistics SA’) with battlefield
situational awareness and C? data will be highly beneficial.

Rapid Communications

The necessary companion piece to platform sensors is the communication
system to transmit the orders and status information. Wireless modem
technology coupled with multi-layer satellite or other air vehicle relay now makes
this process feasible and critical to realizing the benefits of source-data
automation. The communications architecture should integrate both collected
data from platform sensors and computer systems, and selectively those data
over-the-air in real-time to other collection and analysis functions within the
battlespace.

Process Changes

It is important to note that the successful exploitation of the proposed
investment in source data automation depends upon changes in the supply
management process. It would do little good to install these semi-automatic
order entry processes if the mechanic/technician had to obtain signatures for
expensive reparables or get two supervisors’ approval for munitions resupply.
And these processes need to be changed in peacetime, for example, making use
of government debit or credit card account numbers built into the
authentication/sign-on process for the mechanic. The supply chain management
process needs to focus on placing the needed items/supplies into the “precise

delivery” system as quickly as possible so as to reduce the need to carry
inventory.

There is a significant implementation opportunity that must not be missed
for source-data automation: this function can be “piggy-backed” on top of
planned platform digitization activities (e.g., use same computer, display,
communications network, spectrum, etc., as platform digitization equipment),
resulting in low marginal cost for source-data automation — just the cost of the
sensors and the software to connect the sensors to the platform digitization
equipment.

It is clear from the above discussions, that most of this information system
is on the tactical platforms. In our view, this implies that the source-data
automation and prognostics activities discussed earlier must be service

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel
107



More Combat, Less Support in Theater
(96 DSB SS)

Candidates for reduction of in-theater footprint
Sensors, intel functions (reachback)
CAISR infrastructure
Ammunition - precision technology and theater fires (organic, supporting)
Telemedicene, biomedicene
Logistics

— Total asset visibility and containers

— Tailored maintenance, improved reliability, replace vice repair

~ Direct precision delivery and in-theater conversion for fuel, food,

water, power
* Reduced tactical mobility footprint (fuel, power supplies, materials)
sized TE lif oo non
Combat

Today 40% 60%
Future goal 80% 20%

Broken down into classes of logistics, the broad footprints of the support
requirements are shown in the following chart for both the current and goal
systems.

The Future of Combat Service Support
(From 96 DSB SS)

CSS support for 3000 man Brigade for 30 Days

Class of Supply Current Footprint Future Footprint
Class | (MRE) 270,000 meals No change
Class | (water) 1,350,000 gals Treated indigenous water
(30% footprint reduction)
Class Il(consumables) 3,400 batteries 300 rechargeable batteries
Operations ashore —_— Prototype windmill generator
Solar battery
chargers
Class II (bulk fuel) 100,000 gals (avg) Alternate fuels, freeze dried
(50% footprint reduction)
Class V (Ammo) 350 tons Standoff precision (70%
‘ footprint reduction)
Class VI (repair parts) Approx. 30,000 Tailored maint/distribution
(75% footprint reduction)

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Technology Panel



Key Logistics Transformation
Implementation: Appoint An Architect!

+ Appoint Systems Architect
~ Gain Service Chiefs and CINC agreement to position
— Set objectives for information system from Chiefs/CINC veiwpoint
* time, cost, risk, performance relation to other processes

~ Refine commanders needs

+ — Inventory Legacy systems
~ Define architecture
— Survey COTS
~ Modify requirements, other processes to COTS
— Train government people
— Set metrics

Logistics Transformation: A “Big Deal”

* Logistics unnecessarily constrains operations (OPTEMPO
driven by LOGTEMPO)
* Also cost constrains modernization
* The logistic system
* Consists of multiple processes and owners
* Is inseparable from requirements, acquisition and
operations
* Consumes more dollars than any other DOD “system”
* Does not satisfy warfighter requirements
* Our goal: Save $15B/year after 5 years
* More savings possible through greater DOD focus on total
system costs

DOD Leadership must drive logistics transformation

In summary, the transformation of today’s military logistics system is a
“Big Deal’. And implementation will require an extraordinary leadership
commitment.

Logistics Transformation: Closing the Deal

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
Bn
eS



Build warfighter confidence through platform-based, user-friendly
Information technology, and process changes

CINC “Pull” VS. System “Push”
- Recommendations (Cont.)

* Build warfighter confidence through 1 GINC'S:~:.:
Platform-based, user-friendly IT and ee
Process changes Enables CINC

- Better diagnostics, visibility to accurately predict . “Pui

needs for fuel, munitions, parts
- Rapid, accurate communication of requirements
~ Status feedback from source to customer
- Precise delivery (“UPS brown truck” with super STOL)
- Results
* Improves force readiness
© Reduces inventory levels, lift requirements, people

Bottom Line - Better Confidence, Smaller Pipeline
and Fewer People in Battlespace

“CINC’s point-of-sale information system will enable CINC pull”.

Information will enable the CINC and his staff to tailor logistics activities to
operational needs, and will provide the insight into status and progress that will
build warfighter confidence in the new approach. In a fundamental sense, the
proposed new information systems are a key enabler of the revolution in military
logistics, just as commercial point-of-sole systems have revolutionized supply-
chain management in leading firms. They are, therefore, an inseparable part of
the strategy to transform logistics to “CINC pull”.

Better Diagnostics, Visibility To Predict Needs

As noted above, the process of confidence building begins with platform-
derived data — in essence, real-time information that tells both operators and
supporters detailed information about the supply status and operational status
(drawn from measures, diagnostics, and prognostics) of each platform (and their
crews), and aggregates that information into appropriately-focused summaries.
These platform-based IT components also serve the purpose of the “order entry”
process in this militarized “supply chain management” system. They would
provide “orders” to the sources of supply whether for a replacement component
of a system or for fuel, munitions or other consummables through an “internet”
much like personal “internet” ordering now garnering widespread use and
acceptance.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel

PY.¥.]



As identified by this Panel, the current system has the following
deficiencies:

a. Only very light forces can be air deployed in days. Military intertheater
airlift range is too short, dependent on enroute stops and refueling, and
cannot deploy an early entry force or deliver urgent sustainment in 24
hours to anywhere in the world;

b. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) cargo compartment configuration,
APOD requirements, and range are inadequate to deliver forces to the
theater in a timely manner;

c. Military sealift is too slow and cannot deploy follow-on forces or deliver
less urgent sustainment in one week to anywhere in the world. Follow-
on forces deployment and sustainment take weeks, when sailing from
CONUS;

d. Significant early land combat power delivery thus depends on the
availability of land and sea based prepositioning nearby to the combat
area, at which point airlifted military personnel can unite with their
equipment. Prepositioning is expensive, vulnerable, politically
constrained, and may not be available when needed;

e. Commercial shipping configuration and speed is inadequate to deliver
forces to the theater in a timely manner;

f. The throughput of CONUS SPOEs'’ is constrained and does not permit
timely loading and sailing of sealift ships;

g. Theater SPODs often have primitive capabilities which are inadequate
for intensive discharge operations;

h. Logistics-over-the-shore is limited to sea-state 2 conditions. Operations
can only be performed 50 percent of the time in the Persian Gulf. 2

Recommendations:

The following are recommended to meet the deployment and sustainment
objectives:

2 Data source: Carderock Division, naval Surface Warfare Center.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation -Deployment Panel



Logistics Capabilities: People

Sub NLT 2010 NLT 2025

component

Subsistence/ * Reduced burden water places on |e Individual purification 50% of needs

Water logistics system © 90% of land area, all sea, source for purification
e Technologies will reduce water © Allfood processes 50% less consumption

requirements by field systems © CB protection in clothing 50% vs water
e Water recycling ° High rate sea water to potable 10x today’s rate
e Potential for eliminating e Test 60 seconds to test purity
* altogether water in laundry, bath, |» Purify10 gallons to potable 5 minutes by each

decontamination ops
e  Miniaturized devices that draw
water from moisture content in air
e Improvements in desalination,
decontamination, and purification

soldier
Train people to 50% lower consumption per day
Air vs water cooled vehicles 50% of fleet
World-wide water mapping Geo sat of potential
purification sources

e Purification 1 quart 100,000 gallons capability in
light weight modules

Personnel
Support/
Clothes

e — Lighter, more functional, more
capable clothing

e Fabrics and components that
reduce weight of combat load by
50%

e Adaptive camouflage cloth ans
fabrics that change color/texture
to match environment

e — Self-heating and self-cooling
fabrics using encapsulation
technologies

e Single uniform that serves
multiple climatic environments

Built-in CB protection

Multi-temp, multi layer modular concepts
Throw-away/or/hyper cleaning capability
Individual replenishment via IT demand
Weight reduced by 75% for theater

Bulk reduced by 80% for theater

Quick make capability (Benetton) increased
Tailored-pack by unit for individuals
Segment needs by squad individual

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel

on



Recommendation:

That the JCS review this concept and determine its feasibility and value to
future war fighting scenarios. Appropriate development guidance should be
provided to the services based on this evaluation.

9. Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)

During Operation Desert Storm, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) played
a major role in the transportation of military personnel and cargo. Several
problems were encountered with CRAF activation that slowed the deployment
effort. While several of these problems have been resolved, the fact remains that
for military cargo, CRAF aircraft are, for the most part, insufficient. Special cargo
handling equipment is required and aircraft configuration with narrow access and
weight-limited floors restrict the cargo that can be transported. Another factor that
could limit flexibility is that the majority of CRAF members are domestic, with only
a limited number of foreign carriers participating in the program. Restriction
placed on these foreign carriers by either parent corporation (or government)
severely restricts their use. Even with these deficiencies, CRAF continues to play
a major role in deployment as shown in the following figures.

CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET
A KEY MOBILITY FORCE ELEMENT

oor FT
oon TEDEPLOVMENT
DESERT SHIELD/STORM sof
mcanco

20
a

Gf 93% OF TROOP AND 32% OF UE AIR DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY.
aff SUPPORTS DOD OPERATIONS... PEACE AND WAR

FIRST ACTIVATED IN DESERT SHIELD..RESULTED INDOD
i REVITALIZATION STRATEGY

— MANDATORY DOD USE OF CRAF PARTICIPANTS

-- MAXIMIZE LEVERAGE OF GOVERNMENT PE ACETIME BUSINESS:
- NON-TRATATIONAL INCENTIVES - COM’L USE OF MILITARY FIELDS

BOTTOM LINE: NEED CONTINUED SUPPORT TO MAINTAIN CRAF VIABILITY

Figure 6 CRAF

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation -Deployment Panel



REQUIREMENTS PANEL REPORT

Panel Chairman:

Ms. Susan Livingstone

DSB Members / Senior Advisors

VADM Bill Bowes, USN (Ret.), co-chair
Lt Gen Jim Brabham, USMC (Ret.)
Mr. Dave Heebner**

Mr. Gene Porter
Mr. John Stewart*

Mr. Frank Sullivan
GEN Jack Vessey, USA (Ret.)**

Government Advisors

COL Sam Chappell, USA
LTC Mike Roesner, USA
CAPT Dave Shanahan, USN

Panel Support

Mr. Christopher Bolkcom, SAIC
Maj Wynne Waldron, USAF
* DSB Member
** DSB Member, Study Senior Advisor

Volume 2 ~- DOD Logistics Transformation - Requirements Panel
1



a. USTRANSCOM should establish the long-term objectives of the 21st
Century Global Mobility System as follows:

1) Aglobal airlifter capable of 24-hour direct delivery from CONUS
airbases to forward theater airbases (Tentative Objectives: 12,000
NM range, 600 knots speed, 75 ST capacity, 3000 x 90 ft APOD
runway);

2) Aglobal mobility vehicle (replacement for present sealift) capable of
one week delivery from CONUS to the theater (Tentative
Objectives: 12,000 NM range, 150 knots speed, 100,000 sq. ft
capacity, integral loading/discharge at ports, over-the-shore, or at a
theater sea based support ship).

b. DOD should exploit selective commercial capabilities by modest
investment to enhance the defense value of new air and sealift
technologies. To initiate this, USD(A&T) should evaluate feasibility of
the various technology concepts attaining these objectives as well as
the potential for commercial partnerships. Examples of these
technologies, their characteristics, and current limitations in meeting
DOD objectives are:

1) Blended Wing Body Long-Range Aircraft (500 knots, 12,000 NM,
75 Tons) -Limited cargo height, excessive landing distance;

2) Hydro-ski (200 knots, range, and capacity TBD) - Tests did not
verify speed, TBD;

3) 200 knot Surfing Ship (200 knot, 20,000 Tons) - Unproven
technology;

4) Wing in Ground Effect (450 knots, 6,000 NM, 125 T) - Limited
range and excessive landing dimensions;

5) Large Airship (150 knots, global range, 500T)-Limited payload,
excessive landing distance, uncertain takeoff/landing in high winds;

6) Fastship (40 knots, 4,000nm, 10,000T)- inadequate speed and
range.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation Deployment Panel
20



the worst possible scenario. Endemic in this decision is who, how, where, when,
and under what command "authority" and although appearing simplistically easy
to an outsider, inaccurate, imprecise, or unclear transfer mechanisms cause
immediate and oft times extremely disruptive results. Doctrine has been vague
for a variety of reasons, none of which appear valid any more.

The Panel recognizes the continuing work of the JSJ4 Deployment
Process Improvement Working Group in this overall area. However, there are
two JRSOI processes that need immediate attention. First, who is responsible
for JRSOI and with what forces? Second, where does the transfer of command
take place? The appointment of an overall deployment/redeployment process
owner will go a long way in resolving these disconnects. This Panel supports the
selection of USACOM as the overall process owner, but it is important to note
that the complete resolution of these issues must be ensured.

First, the Joint doctrine must be clarified. There is currently, in draft, a
proposed Joint Publication 4-01.8, JRSO! that warrants the attention of
Department senior leadership so as to underscore the immediacy of corrective
action. Because it is an integral part of the overall power projection process, the
JRSOI activity should not be a detractor to either effectiveness or efficiency. The
proposed doctrinal changes go a long way to clarity of responsibilities at all
points in the process. With USACOM in charge of the “process”, it should be
understood that USTRANSCOM is the executor of the DTS and as such owns
most of the organizations that do the A/SPOD missions. As a result,
CINCTRANS best understands the critical function of port clearance and part of
that process is the marriage of people and equipment into functioning units.

Recommendation:

USTRANSCOM should be responsible from the port to a mutually agreed
assembly point. This will smooth the seams, especially the command and control
hand-off point and process. In this capacity, CINCTRANS will be responsible to
the Theater CINC and his logistic commander, as recommended in this report.

a. Establish the Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for
training and then insist that JRSOI be exercised whenever and
wherever practical. USACOM should put JRSOI high on its training
resource list to ensure that adequate funding is available for combatant
CINC training. CINCs must insist on adequate funding for training on
this and ensure that joint and component exercises include JRSOI.

5. Commercial Solutions

Today's military logistics system is best described as one which inherently
develops and uses organic capability and one in which demand is satisfied
through standing inventories, inflexible policies and time-inflated procedures.
Moreover, this is reflected in an infrastructure which uses large proportions of
personnel and capital. In addition, the responsiveness and agility of the system

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation —-Deployment Panel
TE



deployment / sustainment packages, do consequence analysis, and be able to
change “on-the-fly.”

DOD’s logistics System is fragmented; it has no end-to-end control,
integrated performance and accountability. DOD lacks an overall vision of
how to convert its logistics system to the needs of JV2010. A master functional
overhaul of today’s system is prerequisite to achieving “focused logistics and
beyond.”

Major corporations (including Caterpillar, Procter and Gamble, DuPont,
Cisco, Wal-Mart, FedEx and Boeing) have been able to gain competitive
leadership through world class logistics systems. They have re-engineered their
business and information systems to support business goals. Commercial
experience shows that tools and practices must be developed together.

The SECDEF should designate the DUSD(L) as the DOD Logistics
System Architect to define system-wide functional performance and cost goals,
lead in integrating logistics practices / supply chain management, develop a
functional and technical architecture and execution roadmap, ensure that
logistics fully integrates with operations, develop / manage the central.
implementation / transformation plan through decentralized implementation, and,
finally, control funding, establish and monitor performance to the plan for
Logistics System Transformation.

The USD(L), working as the Architect, and reporting directly to USD(A&T),
would work closely with Service / Agency / CINC logistics leadership and industry
logistics management leaders. The Architect should be affirmed by the
Chairman, JCS.

The USD(L), as architect, must design a system for logistics based on
best commercial practice and military needs using functional specifications,
metrics, and warfighter requirements (outcomes). The architecture is envisioned
as evolutionary model — one that adapts to operations concepts and
requirements. A supporting information tool concept and configuration model,
with supporting technical interface standards and domain-peculiar requirements,
should be directly tied to the architecture. The system should run in Common
Operating Environment (COE) and employ principles of Open Systems for
information acquisition and sharing.

Changing how we deploy and sustain is necessary. Only very light
forces are deployable in days. Significant land-based combat power depends on
PREPO or ocean shipping (weeks to close). Limited capability of over-the-shore
and primitive port techniques and equipment are a major limitation and risk.
Deployment planning systems are inflexible and slow; data are often inaccurate
and out-of-date. Responsibility for the process is fragmented, with many seams.

This study recommends that DOD:

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation

wii



materiel. The resulting present and projected operational status of systems and
tactical organizations communicated in near-real-time will greatly facilitate
course-of-action analysis.

Real Data for Logistics and Operational Decisions

The integration of source-data automation with operational situational
awareness, i.e., “real data” — not guesses, will open additional possibilities. For
example, logisticians will be able to exert unprecedented control over the
movement of supplies within the tactical area (by using the operational situational
awareness and movement planning capabilities applied to the combat trains and
other supply vehicles), and coordinate better than ever before the rendezvous of
re-supply vehicles and ships with tactical units. This system will also permit
operations planners and logisticians together to reallocate programmed materiel
(fuel, munitions, etc.) and redirect shipments as operational needs, status and
priorities change — all with confidence in the impacts on operational results.

We view the cumulative effect of these recommendations as decisive in
potential impact to the revolution in “battlespace” logistics in all the Service’s
combat organizations. Together, they will enable dramatic improvements in
speed, precision, reliability, and predictability of logistics and CSS actions within
the battlespace, and thereby provide improved support to the warfighters at
significantly lower total cost and total lift.

We also believe that they serve a separate (but related) purpose — they
will create the information needed to enable the realization of another of the key
recommendations of the panel: the creation of a logistics component Cc
capability in each operating theater discussed earlier. Placing “someone in
charge” is valuable by itself, but when combined with the power of the
information we propose to provide, this new command component will be able to
achieve the needed improvements and command focus. It is this fusion of new
information with “someone in charge” that will bring about the long-desired
integration of operations, planning, and logistics.

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel
103



e. Effective use of informational systems,
f. Positive customer relations.

The fragmentation of the transportation authority has resulted in the
development of many process seams. While the agencies responsible for these
seams recognize the cause of the deficiencies, conflicting priorities have
prevented their resolution. One example is a non-responsive accounting system.
Any successful cost reduction program begins with an overall understanding of
costs and the ability to continually track cost reductions associated with
improvements. At the present time, eight months elapse before the Defense
Accounting System can identify costs associated with the DTS. Other examples
are as follows:

a. Lack of timely, accurate financial and operational data,

b. Accounting process de-linked from responsibility and accountability,
c. Restricted ability to recapitalize equipment and infrastructure,

d. Rules and rate processes do not incentivize good customer behavior,
e. Cumbersome regulations and oversight,

f. Disconnect in contracting authority and responsibility,

g. Restrictive workforce regulations.

USCINCTRANS has already identified to the Secretary of Defense several
improvement initiatives. There are listed below:

a. Designation of USCINCTRANS as head of agency for purpose of
acquisition of common-user transportation and related services;

b. Assignment of defense transportation operational regulations and
procedures authority to CINCTRANS;

Creation of a separate Working Capitol Fund account for USTRANSCOM;

c. Implementation of Transportation Working Capitol Fund Operating
Gain Share process;

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation -Deployment Panel

79



I INTRODUCTION

The sustainment panel addressed two main areas in its deliberation:
CINC “Pull” versus “System” push, and how demand needs to be reduced.
Following are the key findings and recommendations of the Sustainment Panel.
There is more detail in the panel report then is in Volume | of the Study Report.
All thoughts are those of the panel and may be slightly different then what is
contained in the Volume |, which takes precedence over this report.

i. CINC “PULL” VERSUS SYSTEM “PUSH” — FINDINGS

The current process for introducing the materiel of war into a theater of
operations is essentially one of service-determined support levels (negotiated,
certainly, with the unified commander), on a “push” basis. The CINC or JTF
Commander, however, controls transportation by unit description. Combat forces
have little confidence in the resupply systems and tend to hoard in
compensation, creating the storied “iron mountains” of materiel. Both the CINCs
and service component commanders have less than the required visibility to plan
and manage the resultant readiness and footprint, and the J-4 and his staff are,
quite simply, overwhelmed. The situation diverts lift and pipeline space to non-
priority items, crowding out or delaying some other required resources. In the
case of overstated equipment requirements, this system also poses an
unnecessary sustainment burden on the theater logistics resources.

While planning and logistics management tools have improved since the
Gulf War, principally with GCCS and some isolated processes such as early
stages of Global Transportation Network, Service and Joint Total Asset Visibility,
the tool kit is sparse. A command and control arrangement to manage common
support, supplies and services is the product of ad hoc “executive agent”
assignments. There is nothing comparable to the Joint Forces Air Component
Commander (JFACC) process to manage logistics. With no opportunity to “train
as they will support” the logistics organizations would be sorely pressed to meet
the needs of high tempo operations.

Volume 2 ~ DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel
aq



specific “smart” conventional munitions were prohibited. Other significant
restrictions apply including statutory annual financial ceilings (one for all of NATO
and another for non-NATO nations). The exchanges are not charged against
ceilings and ceiling limitations do not apply during contingency operations. In
1982 legislation expanded authority to Japan, Australia, Korea, Israel and Egypt.
In 1987, ACSA authority was expanded to non-NATO nations who, a) have a
defense alliance with the U.S., b) permit stationing of U.S. forces, c) allow
prepositioning of U.S. assets, or d) host U.S. forces for exercises or operations.
Legislation in 1991 and 1995 removed geographic restrictions on ACSA’s and
allowed for the negotiation of agreement with the UN and other regional
organizations, allowed the exchange of airlift services, clarified ACSA use during
international exercises and allowed loans as well as sales. Presently there are
34 ACSA's worldwide with an additional 57 nations now eligible for ACSA.
Negotiations are underway with Austria, Indonesia, Singapore and other nations.

ACSA is becoming more important as the U.S. moves to support UN and
coalition operations. ACSA agreements provide the operational CINC the ability
to rapidly respond to urgent requirements ranging from natural disasters to
contingency operations.

The process is initiated by the CINC through channels to JCS, OSD,
Department of State. and ultimately back to the CINC for negotiation. The
process is not centrally controlled within the U.S., is perceived by many to be a
one-sided “take and no give” on the part of allies, and despite agreement, the
reliability of support is always in question. There is no single office that has
worldwide oversight of planning and coordination in concert with U.S. foreign
policy.

Host Nation Support follows similar concept as ACSA’s however, it
addresses specific countries responsibilities to support the U.S. military within
limits. As has been seen in the recently, many provisions of what was once
thought to be negotiated rights have been withheld by host nation governments
due to overriding political reasons (i.e. fear of terrorist activity or retaliation). This
poses a problem for U.S. strategists and begs us to develop a “go it alone’
posture that burdens the logistics system.

Recommendations
a. Establish a MOA between Department of State and DOD to define roles
and responsibilities and develop a streamlined process that will provide
worldwide visibility of needed agreements in concert with U.S. foreign

policy.

b. Use information technology to track and provide/exchange accurate
information to the CINC’s as to what is being negotiated in other theaters.

c. Provide better training at the CINC-staff level and awareness at the supply
officer/sergeant level for reporting requirements.

Volume 2 -- “OD Logistics Transformation —Deployment Panel


Implementation Challenge

Transformation Champion Needed
Overall Political Realities

Commit to long-term vision ... accept short term risk

Even with an extraordinary leadership commitment, logistics
transformation will face numerous challenges.

General Barriers and Constraints

More questions than answers -- what are barriers that prevented implementation of other DSB
recommendations?

Ability to forecast state of technology 10, 20, 30 years from now.
Projecting future on old paradigms (predictive powers poor).
Ability of people, policies, processes, and doctrine to keep pace.
Culture -- DoD.

National Culture, Will, and Values (complacency).

Organization barriers to debate; Service loyalty; trust in jointness.
Resource limitations; ability to reprioritize quickly.

Political, regulatory, and statutory limitations.

Inertia versus unrealistic expectations.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel



Guidelines For Change

* Minimum structural change

* Maximum cohesion among leaders

* Hard to reverse process

* Considerate of other pressures

° Use existing religion

* Use good past successes

* Meet minimum “threshold of change” requirements
* Reflect turnover, resistance and other disincentives

The above basic guidelines for implementation of logistics transformation
can help achieve success.

To further ensure logistics transformation success, a distinct list of
decision trade-offs required and a process for making those decisions is

important.
Transformation Implementation: Decision
Worksheet Trade-Offs
Ops Relationship Plan rT ,
*CINCS (role) vs Services +20XX milestones Architect power vs service power
*Demand reduction “Untouchables ees ny Seisions ¢ Protection
*Urgency of new technology «Prioritization gacy vs new systems/processes
* Fuel - batteries - fast lift Approve phasing, investment, ris}
Mision OXX Money Technology
2 concept Lighea *PPBS vs cost reduction *Role/objective in transformation
ee tmenrd oo *Use of savings “Portfolio approvaVadequacy
Acceptable Hak LE “Color, flexibility *Modelling/simulation dependence
< oe ‘tical Flex Resources conflicts *Risk recognition
pstructioniss Motivation *Reactive vs predictive
Obstructionists sEquity or asymmetric Vulnerability
“Punishment “Promotion affecting/not Acceptable levels
Indus “Recognition mechanisms — «Unacceptable actions
wba *Punishments . *Minimum management
“Public vs private “Neutralize resistance Organization
*Partnering/contracting, Coalition *WeapSys vs Sve vs Joint
‘Multinational Corporations Degree of dependence *Role of reserve
‘apability scenarios : a ,
“CLS Prepo Degree of jointness
*Cycle time

Volume 2 — DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel

AD
er OEE



5. TAV covers in-storage, in-process, in-transit, and in theater — it must
have redundant paths — logistics information must be a combat
multiplier. Need for multinational TAV.

Extensive GEO-prepositioning may not be politically or economically

feasible. Prepo requires rethinking.

War reserve system must be highly flexible; surge must be

funded/available.

Joint C4, logistics organizations, ops-log integration.

MOOTW capability likely to increase as percentile of budget -28

deployments in the last 8 years.

10. U.S. forces likely to be a mix of high-low forces — key is to design
integrated system that supports mixture of legacy forces from today
and 2025 forces.

11. Direct delivery of logistics to point of need.

12. Logistics system must be self-correcting (predictive in nature). Must
have dynamic replanning.

13. Must have capability to support operations from strategic distances.

14. Logistics inter-connectivity to planning and coordination of strike
operations essential.

15. Logistics will require tactical and operational mobility to exploit effects
of large-scale precision “ambushes” of NLT 2025 time-frame.

16. Must have ability to adjust logistics structures and procedures to meet
NLT 2025 requirements before, during, and following combat
operations.

17. Capability to maintain logistics support to all users throughout the
theater for the duration of the operation.

18. Comprehensive reform of financial management systems and
practices will be required to successfully complete the “Revolution in
Business Affairs” transformation.

19. Need to define, develop “Homeland Defense” logistics capability.

20. Logistics must be predictive and responsive; less reliance on “mass”
principles and “just in case”.

21. Seamless inventory — internodal movement.

22. Joint acquisition of multi-service systems. (Most/all systems should be
interoperable?)

23. Theater combat service support — agile and flexible.

24. Reduced logistics footprint - without sacrificing capability.

25. CONUS infrastructure needs to be combined and reduced.

26. Commercial industrial base must be integrated with and highly
responsive to demands of the logistics system - industry and the
military must have a shared view of the pipeline from factory to user.

27. Survivability against WMD (including NBC) and information warfare
(including EW) attacks.

28. New medical capabilities and doctrine. Higher health tolerance
required.

29. Redefine troop-to-leader ratios.

on N

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Pznel



XII. IMPLEMENTATION OF LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION

Implementation of Logistics
Transformation

Panel 1 initiated work on a logistics transformation implementation
approach.

Logistics Transformation: Key
to Full Spectrum Engagement

* Cannot have revolution in military affairs without
transformation in logistics affairs

— Tail mass is “impacting” the tooth (constrains tactics)

— Tail cost is hollowing the tooth (constrains
modernization)

* Leadership challenge an order of magnitude more complex
than a major weapon system

— $800B business over 10 years

* Information systems and survivability are critical enablers
for transformation

Failure to transform logistics is showstopper for 21st
Century warfighter vision

Need a homerun or don’t even step up to the plate

Volume 2 ~ DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
39



Guiding Logistics Transformation: Senior
Process Ownership
Finding + Discussion

— Those leaders with power to decide and = Transforming logistics is a project that
direct resourses need to be more visibly has the same needs as a weapons systm

in agreement on: project:
+ Objectives for changing logistics + Clear goals
* Organization for pursuing change + Plan from now to completion
+ Plan and resources to be followed * Tradeoff of resources, time, and
* Cost reduction approach quality early
— Because they are not, many trade-off + Clear assignments,
opportunities will be missed, and the corganizationally
overall “project to improve logistics” * Stability over several years
will move slowly + Tight coordination between related
—_...and the management of information activities
needed to manage logistics will be * Constant follow-up

years in coming

— Insum, more cohesive leadership is
needed, even though many individuals
are doing what they can do, well

+ Positive and negative incentives
— Only the most senior leaders in DoD,

acting jointly can provide these needs
— So far, they have not

Implementation also requires a clear statement of investment costs &
projected ROI.

Implementation Overview

Executive Level

A multi-year complex business project, Logistics Transformation, requires

proportionate management attention, planning and control

+ Logistics Transformation involves changing practices in 4 Services, 9
CINCs, 20+ logistics commands, DISA, DITSA, DCMC, DLA and finance
while spending $800B and conducting upwards of 100 logistics missions
over the next 10 years

* Leadership is essential

* “Leading” requires strong agreement among senior executives concerning
objectives, resources, accountability, priority and incentives.

* Planning requires a view of all individual efforts, trade-offs among
resources,timing, and technical objectives

* Control requires quarterly review of progress in considerable detail,

insistence on schedule performance, and correction of resistant units.

DoD knows how to do this in operations and weapons system acquisition.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
3 :



Recommendations:

a. DOD adopt a dynamic planning system that incorporates operations
and logistics requirements into the same process by 2002.

b. DOD fully fund and field the automation programs/applications that
enable the above dynamic planning system by 2002. These should
be: JTAV, GTN, TC-AIMS II, and JFRG.

c. DOD fully fund and field the virtual data base needed to populate the
dynamic planning system by 2001.

d. DOD formalize USACOM as the overall deployment/redeployment
process by 1999.

e. DOD immediately start disciplining these systems in terms of data
accuracy and quality. The Department should begin to use real data in
plans and planning efforts. This must include readiness and
organizational data and the Services should be directed to start
providing this data now.

3. USTRANSCOM Expanded Role

USTRANSCOM is a $7 Billion per year operation ($4.2B Transportation
Working Capitol Fund (TWCF), $1.1B Houshold Goods, and $2.1B Air Mobility
Command, Operations and Maintenance (AMC O&M).) Its peacetime operations
sustain DOD’s wartime base that is critical to any successful deployment.

While examining the transportation process for possible efficiencies, this
Panel noted that USTRANSCOM is only one of several players on the Defense
Transportation System (DTS). Because of this fragmentation of process
ownership, USTRANSCOM has not been able to apply the cost reduction tools
that corporate America has found so successful in eliminating, in many cases, up
to 30 percent of process costs. There tools include:

a. Total process review and understanding,
b. Elimination of non-value added steps,

c. Identification of cost drivers,

Metric development and monitoring,

d. Responsive strategic planning,

Volume 2 ~ DOD Logistics Transformation -Deployment Panel



MOBS: While the utility is likely to be very high, the resistance is also high
and the cost of proving the feasibility is likely in the $1-2 billion range. DOD
should seek creative ways to test the feasibility in heavy seas at lower costs.

DFD ideas should be pursued at the feasibility and performance level and
should be seriously considered in activities such as the Army After Next to
establish appropriate doctrine and tactics.

R&D for battlefield energy sources, irradiated food and potential in-theater
manufacturing should be continued and encouraged.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Technology Panel


IV. PANEL GOALS

Goals
‘96 - Enhanced Effectiveness 98 - Implications on
of Early Arriving Forces Logistic Demands
Doubie combat personne! ratio by Less burden to get the forces in

“connected”, remote support

Double the effectiveness through
improved tactics, training,

place

Less in-theater sustainment logistics
for the same level of military power

technology * Reduced support operations in
theater requires less fuel, food,
equipment

* Maximum remote support and

minimum support from within
combat zone

* Leverage situation understanding
and precision fires with remote
sensors, weapons

5

The next level of detail of goals were as shown in the above chart.

The force structure considered was a 5000-man brigade with 3-4 light
infantry battalions, organized into combat cells and with a small brigade staff.

The principal challenges that were identified in this 1996 study were:
© C? for the distributed force
e Force injection and extraction
e Force survivability
e Sustainment via smart logistics
e “Right stuff, right place, right time”

e Vastly reduced logistic footprint/personnel in the combat zone

The principal candidate areas for attention were identified as shown in the
following chart.

The ultimate goal was changing the notional “tooth-to-tail” ratio from what it is
today, approximately 0.7, to what was believed achievable at 4.0.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Technology Panel



IV. TRANSFORMATION VISION

Transformation Vision

A significantly less expensive, trusted, integrated acquisition/operations/logistics system that
delivers to plan and reacts well to changing requirements with the following attributes:

High system operational availability (reliability)
+End-to-end visibility and control of the logistics pipeline (supply chain)
*Reduced O&S costs

Industry Integrated for life-cycle support
Logistics and combat C2 integrated
*Agile theater CBT SVC SPT; smaller footprint in theater
Force medical protection, e.g. Survivability against CB, IW,
Promote battlefield effectiveness

C

pgm Logistics transformation is characterized by a management system that

a tes the structure and processes that equip, deploy and sustain military operations
and which is adaptable to 1) different force structures, 2) different operational concepts,
and 3) the full conflict spectrum to ensure sustained impact over time

Based on its definition of “true transformation” in military logistics and the
Problem Statement, Panel 1 defined a “vision” for the Transformed Logistics
System. This “vision” was ultimately refined during the work in Irvine, California,
but its elements remained constant.

As envisioned early in Panel 1’s deliberations, logistics transformation is
characterized by a management system that integrates the structure and
processes that equip, deploy and sustain military operations and which is
adaptable to 1) different force structures, 2) different operational concepts, and 3)
the full conflict spectrum to ensure sustained impact over time.

Volume 2 — DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel



V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommended Areas of Work (1)
(96 DSB SS)

* Precision resupply
- Joint precision offset delivery system (JPODS)
- Guided paratoll delivery
* Fire and lethality
- RFPIACTD
- Counter MRL ACTD
—  Loiter weapons, armed UAVs, sea-based long-range guns, dynamic force & fire
management, “arsonal aircraft”
© Information infrastructure
- BADD
— Secure personal comm
- suo
~ Tactical personal info ensemble, comm payloads for UAVs, urban comm nets
* Sensor Systems and Situational Understanding

= Combat io + Precision target ID
— Rapid Battlefield Visualization  - Counter CC&D
- SAIP - UGS

= Integrated sensor tasking - HAE, MAE, TUAV

‘Sensor galaxy management, enhanced JSTARS

This and the subsequent chart show the areas that the 1996 Summer
Study recommended for work. Many or most are related to a reduced footprint in
the combat zone.

Recommended Areas of Work (2)
(96 DSB SS)

* Insertion, extraction, sustainment, survival
= doint log ACTD
-  Survivable combat vehicle

Stealth transport aircraft, team mobility vehicle, GPS parafoil delivery, stealth clothing and
treatments, remote BW monitor, anti-sniper systems

¢ Exercises, training and operations
— Digitized battlefield
- MOUT
~ SeaDragon
- STOW at combat cell level
- Ww

* Non-Lethal systems for crowd control

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Technology Panel

ann



Implementation

© Small senior executive group to guide (not delegate) with
absolute authority (e.g., DepSec/USD(A&T)/VCICS leading)

— Top level master plan -- objective, metrics

— Interfaces in control of funds

— Guidance to “architect” regarding legacy systems
— Establish accountability for the master plan

* System architect must control the resources to enforce the
architecture implementation

© Senior working group (~ 20 persons) represent stakeholders to
advise “architect” and/or senior executive group

— Reflect customer needs

— Develop detailed implementation plans

— Establish budgets/milestones

— Define personnel issues/options/training
— Review implementation progress (metrics)

To initiate logistics transformation, a small senior executive group
representing OSD, acquisition and the services should reach agreement on the
scope of the logistics transformation. They should set the overall objectives for
the activity, establish top-level goals in terms of staff and budget reductions,
establish guidelines for assignment of top-level division of responsibility and
determine how funds are to be assigned and controlled. This group should
define the role and responsibility of the logistics system architect and establish
the proper reporting structure. They should continue to provide guidance and
support for the logistics system architect regarding legacy systems and
processes and assist in resolving significant issues. Guidelines regarding the
extent of commercial use are also needed. It is important that the logistics
system architect have contro! over the budget for implementing the logistics
information system and allocation of funds in order to converge the
transformation of the various processes and systems.

The senior executive group should establish a senior working group to
represent the various stakeholders and reflect the user's needs. The working
group develops the detailed implementation plan and monitors progress to the
plan. They should define the appropriate metrics to assure success. A major
effort will be to address the enormous personnel issues associated with such a
drastic transformation (training, reduction in force, and reassignment of
personnel.)

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
47



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents .
Executive Summary.
Requirements Panel Report
I. Introduction ..............
ll. Terms of Reference .
I. Problem Statement..
IV. Transformation Vision .
V. DSB Study Parameters
VI. Study Assumptions .....
Vil. Future Military Environments/Trends ..
VIII. Major Logistics Implications ............-:ssesecesreeeeeees
IX. Logistics Implications Looking Back from the Projecte
Environment
X. Critical Logistic Capabilities Required for the Future .
XI. Leadership Recommendations .
XI. Title 10 Overview .......e serene
XIII. Implementation of Logistics Transformation..
XIV. Backup Charts & Material ..
Deployment Panel Report
1. Panel vision..........06
ll. Panel statement and Overview
lll. Panel Recommendations...
Sustainment Panel Report.
|. Introduction
ll. CINC “Pull” versus System “Push” — Findings .
ll. CINC “Pull” versus System “Push” — Recommendations .
V. Demand Reduction — Findings..........:.:-:ssssssesseee 109
VI. Demand Reduction - Recommendations..... 111
Vil. Illustrative Actions for Demand Reduction
Technology Panel Report
|. Introduction...
UL. INtFOGUCTION .......eeeseeeeeeeteeteeeeteee
Ill. 1996 DSB Summer Study Overview ..
IV. Panel Goals.........
V. Recommendations..
VI. Technology of Note.
Appendix A — Glossary of Acronyms
Appendix B — Briefings Received by the Summer Study
Appendix C — Logistics Information Technology (IT) Supplement

DNOOHRWN=< =F

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation
iii



The actual topology shown below summarizes the communications backbone network improvements
being made. In addition to heavy use of fiber cable and satellite, provision is also made for purchase of
satellite channel capacity from commercial vendors. This provides a significant approach to meeting
surge requirements during deployment / conflict. In addition to these new communications “pipes”
additional capacity is being provided by moving to the “ATM” or Asynchronous Transfer Mode which
provides much more efficiency in the utilizing the available bandwidth. Finally, bandwidth “managers”
are being put in place that again to obtaining the maximum available bandwidth for users. The following
chart summarizes the overall changes being made in the backbone communications areas in the next
several years.

Just as added communications capacity is essential to transformed logistics operations, so is the cost of
this new communications capacity. There are clear economies of scale inherent in added capacity and the
following figure shows the relative cost of different bandwidths.

Economies Of Scale

Reduced Transmission Costs Through Aggregation Of Ri
Speed and Average Monthly Cost per

9.6 Kbps x
$66.50 2 TA ‘ 13

5 * (1.544Mbps)
56 Kbps 90

3 (620 Mbps)
(45 E $0.16
Mbps)

$13.10

Deanta
Air Force Eonilitia
Navy AR

Army Enninman ASD(C31) Long Haul Policy

DISA Agencies

a -10



and vision of these requirements. As a result, commercial requirements are
dominating the development effort.

4 Future

Today
Supplies

Delivered

Days

Figure #1: Logistics Velocity

It would be in the best interests of DOD to establish overall military lift
requirements to be further augmented by a modest R&D effort. This approach
would ensure the proper recognition of military needs during the development
phase. In the long term, this could result in substantial savings in future
development costs and time. Relying on commercial development could be
lengthy, however, the entire development process could be accelerated if DOD
would commit to production as early as possible.

Today’s deployment infrastructure is massive and inflexible to the
changing needs of the warfighter. CINCACOM has recognized this and
subsequently expressed serious concern about our ability to ingress / egress
U.S. ports ~ air, sea, and land. When further considering the limited number of
foreign capable ports and their inherent vulnerability, the problem becomes
critical. Terrorist actions against one or two shipping nodes could stop the entire
deployment process. Some effort by the Services has been directed toward the
development of “Agile Ports,” however, this effort has experienced minimum
funding and progress is very slow. It is safe to say that major U.S. transportation
nodes impose serious limitations on force deployment.

Volume 2 —- DOD Logistics Transformation —Deployment Panel



Logistics Capabilities: People

Sub NLT 2010 NLT 2025
component
in-Theater e Maximum modular/prefab e JAST STOL greatly reduces in-theater AVN.
Construction Reduce density and skill of Support
operations skill mix « Modular facilities light weight and highly
e Full integration of contractors in transportable
planning and execution e OMFTS and sea-based logistics for Marines
e  STOL aircraft greater part of © Contractor mobilization fill most requirements
tactical family for heavy construction
« Reduced aviation support © Significant Strategic. lift freed for reallocation
structure * — Significant Strategic. lift for PTRP reduction
© Hospital ships/strategic lift vs e Contractor logistics support
extensive theater hospitals © — Significant reduction in construction structure
e Environmentally conscious and skills
designs reduced environmental © — Civil contingency contracting
impact « Engineering schools structure and training
e Reduced skill training required resources reallocated to combat training.
Structure realignment combat forces
Health Services | Enhanced soldier immune system | Speed statistics by unit
for broader protection against e Accidents to zero (??)
infection * Individual monitoring/automatic telemetry daily
« Expanded range of vaccines and or weekly
means of enhancing immuno- Remote MD on demand; telemedicine for non-
competence MDs
© Recombinant DNA technology to |e Mini-formulary = 5 Ibs available to each squad
isolate disease organisms and © Clear-head pain killer for short term relief

produce vaccines in days
Dramatic improvements in trauma
treatment to reduce mortality and
morbidity

Improved prosthetics,
replacement tissues such as skin
and artificial blood

Expert systems for medical
diagnosis—contained in hand-
held computers

Non-medical personnel make
medica! diagnosis—through use
of remote medicine

Advanced video imaging and
virtual systems make battlefield
surgery easier at remote sites

Single soldier (UAV?) unique delivery of medical
supplies

Auto locator (Secure) of wounded personnel
Helicopter evacuation very quickly (similar to
now)

Reduce need for medical treatment

Screen out illness: all personnel 60 days free of
illness in theater

Habits training established in CONUS

Med history on IT; weekly update; readily
available

Services medical facilities specialize on war
related medicine

Use high-volume civilian facilities for non-war
medicine

Medic train all personnel theater- bound in
tele—medicine

Friendly fire/ID zero defects training

Airborne operating rooms/ICU for emergencies
Fast theater to CONUS transport (as now) _

Volume 2 — DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel

19



Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation —-Deployment Panel
~~


JTF Joint Task Force

JV2010 Joint Vision 2010

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Committee
L

LCC Life Cycle Cost

LMI Logistics Management Institute
LOG Logistics

LOTS Logistics Over The Shore
LPD-17 Landing Platform Docking
M

M Million

MA Marshalling Area

MBTF Mean-Time Before Failure

MHE Material Handling Equipment
MILSPEC Military Specifications

MOBS Mobile Off-Shore Basing

MSC Military sealift Command

MRC Major Regional Conflict
MTM/D Million Ton Miles/Day
MTW Major Theater War

N

NDP National Defense Panel

NLT No Later Than

NM Nautical Mile

o

OCONUS Outside Continental United states
O&M Operations and Maintenance
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
OOTW Operations Other Than War

OPS Operations

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
P

PACOM USS. Pacific Command

POD Port of Debarkation

POE Port of Embarkation

POM Program Office Memorandum
PM Program Manager

PREPO Preposition

R

R&D Research and Development

RIBS Rapid Installed Breakwater System
RORO Roll-On, Roll-Off

RMA Revolution in Military Affairs
RML Revolution in Military Logistics
PPBS Planning, Programming, Budgeting System
RSOI Reception Staging Onward Movement and Integration

DOD Loaistics Transformation A-3


Problems in Logistics Today

(Panel | brainstorming on Logistics System Problems)

Limited precision visibitity - (can't act upon what * ‘Forward (aot reach back or pull)
you see) + Mystery containers

* ‘no integrated joint combat support capabilities - + Multiple levels of maintenance
GTN: no visibility for in process or in stage - © Chokzd pons
intransit visibility every 15 minutes (notreal ime) rors of tuck

+ Functional stovepipe/rigid vertical organization/do
it yourself rather than facilitate others + Piecemeal rien CONUS

+ Stovepipe supply chain management . Twse levels of maintenance orate

‘+ Hugh inventory & lnuge footprint = MASS . te vere a ares soa coward

‘+ Lack of trust (just in case vs. justin time or sd ination re
anticipatory/predictive) ment, sustainment, redloyment

. ‘j ” sblers: logistics, .

Long, slow mobility & pipeline No “jointness” in 4 enablers: logistics, comme,

Revolution on DoD business affairs not a reality
No common language; no COE

Heavy, bulky, sluggish

Industry contracted - less) LOGCAP - civil
augmentation program) meshed

Logistics is still “tail” in planning, requirements,
acquisition, operations (not merged)

intelligence, medical

‘TPFDL doesn’t work

STAV doesn’t cover reparables

Contractor support not linked oa battlefield
PMs not linked to operations/logistics
Poor link into commercial R&D

Deliverable 1: Set DSB Study Parameters

* DSB Study Timeframes

— A: Study recommendations to achieve a logistics
baseline: implementation (fully achieved / fielded)
2000- NLT 2010.

— B: Study recommendations for logistics

transformation: implementation 2000-NLT 2025.

* Phases overlap to preclude self-fulfilling timelines for achieving both

“baseline” capabilities and “transformation” capabilities. The concept behind

these timeframes is to provide a baseline set of recommendations which will

focus on achieving NLT 2010 logistics capabilities which support attainment

of a second set of recommendations which comprise logistics transformation

as projected out to 2025.

Volume 2 — DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
5a



1. Logistics continues as critical bridge connecting the U.S. economy to
its warfighting forces. Fully integrated contractor support.

2. Relationship of NLT 2025 global economic infrastructure to military
operations undetermined.

3. Reliance on technology and global digital communications that enable
an integrated logistics system architecture increase vulnerability to
disruption due to failures or hostile actions.

4. Structure of NLT 2025 global transportation and industrial
infrastructure will impact conduct of military operations.

5. Rapid, direct power projection directly from CONUS to theater -
battlespace begins at the deployment installation in an asymmetric
warfare environment.

6. Worldwide asset availability/core competence and capability needed.

7. CRAF, RRF repositioning for globalization of commercial air and sea
lift industries; conditional coalition CRAF agreements.

8. Force protection, globally and tactically, is a big issue.

9. Tailorable logistics packages deployable rapidly worldwide.

10.Increased deployments for humanitarian missions requiring logistics
support.

11. Logistics regarded as strategic asset ... like it is in industry.

12. Strategic partnering will be the norm.

13.More leasing rather than buying.

14.Complete financial systems interface — joint and industry.

15.Global connectivity and global support teams.

16. Surge and warm industrial bases concepts need definition.

17.Rise of global partnerships — players include: commercial, academia,
international, civilian agencies, military core.

18.Peacetime military health care mirrors civilian.

TECHNOLOGY

Trend A — US information technologies and infrastructure dependence
will have created major vulnerabilities with its strengths

Trend B — Open market technologies will constantly level the playing field

Trend C — US intelligence capability will require radical redefinition and
reconfiguration.

Logistics Implications:
1. Investments in improved reliability of equipment and weapons systems
reduces the requirement for sustainment.
Capability-based logistics responsive across entire spectrum.
Force lightened through miniaturization and technology.
Agility, flexibility, modular, tailorable — to any scenario.
Ensure business operational flexibility - not held hostage to technology.
Space-based resupply.

QarRaoNn

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel

40



Moving to War
The Strategic to Operational Link

° Findings
~ Multiple process owners
— Redundancies and conflicts
— Inadequate total system performance
— Particular confusion at the strategic-operational seam
+ Discussion
— No single organization currently has responsibility and authority
over the total supporting processes
+ Elements of process not clearly defined
» Responsibility and authority not clearly linked
~ Multiple process ownership has high potential for conflict and
negative impact at theater access facilities (APO/POD/LOTS)

~- Command and control failures are exacerbated by the critical
logistics resources involved

Moving to War
The Strategic to Operational Link

+ Recommendation
— Designate a single existing organization (e.g., ACOM, TRANSCOM,
DLA) as process owner for all elements of the process

* Defense transportation - air, land, sea
» Contracting for support
* Movement rules and procedures

— Give the process owner the responsibility and authority to
* Prescribe process architecture
* Direct and enforce process compliance

— Provide for process owner inputs to infrastructure recapitalization
planning and funding forum

* Implementation
- OSD policy directions

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
20



11. Transportation capabilities that provide planning, dynamic re-planning, redirection of assets, and full
C2 of the transportation system.

Sustainment Requirements. Much of the information needed in sustainment activities parallels
deployment but covers the whole cycle of warfighting. Therefore it is essential that information capture,
processing, communication and distribution have as much commonality as possible for the both
sustainment and deployment. Sustainment requirements include:

Assets tracking from industry to theater destination, including ITV

Asset usage tracking and projected replenishment

Logistics impacts of alternative courses of action

Dynamic redirect of destinations and mix of sustaining resupply

Exchange logistics information with Allies and coalition partners

End to end information assurance

Adequate end to end communications capacity to support required responsiveness for data updates
and queries

Visibility to support in-theater, inter-service asset transfers as needed

IT instrumentation to monitor performance of critical logistics processes

NAWARYNS

© 90

INTEGRATING OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICS INFORMATION

Over the last several years, the DOD has achieved a new level of automated support for the warfighter
commanders around the world. The Global Command and Control System has achieved interoperability
and a common operational picture which provides an overview of the tactical areas, wherever they may be
in the world. This new picture provides CITF and CINC commanders a comprehensive view of the
battlespace. Linking together, and where practical, integration of logistics and other combat support
allows a similarly comprehensive picture of the combat support picture, all the way back to the CONUS.
When the C2 and combat support information are integrated, warfighting commanders will see the full
battlespace, beyond the tactical picture.

Information that must be shared across the boundaries of combat support and C2 includes the following:
1. Deployment planning — asset visibility, readiness and availability (JOPES and Crisis Action

Planning)

Deployment execution — In-Transit Visibility, Force closure

Dynamic replanning of transportation, supply assets, personnel

Consumption rates to determine resupply urgency and Sustainment needs

Evaluation of tactical options based on assured delivery of weapons, supplies and personnel as

well as the ability of the logistics pipeline to support the operations as they are executed

wPWN

Overall, integration of the Operations and Logistics as called for in this summer study is recognition of
the operational impacts of logistics on warfighting execution. Information technology is the vehicle by
which this information will be shared. Designing and building new information bridges must be a major
focus in achieving JV2010 and logistics transformation. It will generate new operational and business
concepts and provide a major force mulitiplier effect.



Fundamental Baselines for True Logistics
Transformation

The following must be fixed to achieve true logistics
transformation:
* DoD financial and accounting systems
* Total ownership cost awareness by all
+ Institutionalization of “good ideas” in midst of chur and turnover
* Logistics integration with Acquisition cycle and process (joint
requirements/acquisition)
* Logistics as a fundamental part of operational art of war
* Expenditures on legacy systems vs leaps
* Role, relationship, merger with commercial sector
— Domestic
— Global
* Integrated IS system
* Appointment of a Logistics System Architect

Panel 1 also looked at various critical enablers to implementation of
logistics transformation. The previous slide summarized some of the major

areas, while the next slide details the challenges facing DOD in effecting cost
reductions.

Cost Reduction Practices

Commercial Practice DoD Practice
+ Clear Executive Commitment *__ Unclear, words and actions conflict
* Clarity between volume reduction and | * Confusion between volume reduction
cost reduction and cost reduction

* Constraints clarified early on quality, + Constraints unclear initially
time, technical function

+ Separate project organization to + Regular organization handles cost
accelerate reduction

* Clear Plan ° Notclear

* Incentives (non monetary) made + Existing incentives (mainly procedural)
consistent are negative

* Difficult issues shared + __ Difficult issues delegated

* Executives stay involved .

Little continuing involvement
Budget is measure

* Approximate but acceptable measures |

Volume 2 — DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
49



The intent is to provide a simple logistics functional flow to guide our
thinking as we look across the needs of the 3 logistics users.

Second, we developed a list of Logistics Users which generate
requirements (People, Equipment & Systems, Operations. Then, we further
narrowed focus to three selected “high payback” subcomponent. Each Logistics
User’ was assigned a Panel 1 lead to develop critical logistics capabilities using
the overall taxonomy and to refine the proposed subcomponents:

e People (subcomponents: Health Services, Subsistence, Personnel
Support, Major Other)

« Equipment / Weapon Systems (Subcomponents: Ammo, Fuel,
Maintenance, Major Other)

© Operational Structure and Support primarily from perspective of
combat commander (subcomponents: C‘, 1, Ops planning/new
Warfighter concepts, Major Other)

From the Logistics user perspective, we further projected critical logistics
capabilities from: Theater of Operation and CONUS/Wholesale level (as
applicable).

Third, we developed a “buzzword” listing of Performance Attributes to
guide Panel 1 development of the “top level” logistics characteristics:

e Flexibility / responsiveness (ability to change quickly)

e Anticipatory (more capacity to anticipate and predict)

© Configurability (agile, tailorable, scalable, adaptive)

e Reliability / precision / “smart”

e Visibility

e Vulnerability / survivability

e Less people intensive (people intensity)

e Less total ownership cost . More cost effective (cost intensity)

Fourth, we set timeframes from which to look at capabilities as: Today
(starting point)...Baseline (NLT 2010)... Transformation (NLT 2025).

Finally, we developed a set of five basic levers or enablers which will
affect and effect the transition to the baseline and to transformation. These
“enablers” were intended to assist other panels as they transform the top level
logistics characteristics provided by Panel1 into specific recommended actions.
For instance, if a top level, baseline (NLT 2010) logistics characteristic needed is

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
45



APPENDIX A — GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

3PL

A

AAN
ACAT
ACOM
ACQ
ACTD
ADCSLOG
AF/IL
AIT

ALP

ALP
APOD
ASB
ASD/HA
B

BDE

BW

c

Ce

CAIV
CASCOM
CB

CBW
CECOM
CHE
Chem/Bio
CINC
CINCTRANSCOM
CICS
CLS

COE
CONOPS
CONUS
COTS
CRAF
CROP
css

CVX

cw

D
DAB

3" Party Logistics

Army After Next
Acquisition Category
USS. Atlantic Command
Acquisition
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics
Air Force/ Installations and Logistics
Automated Identification Technology
Advanced Logistics Program
Air Load Planning
Air Port of Debarkation
Army Science Board
Assistant Secretary of Defense/ Health Affairs

Brigade
Biological Warfare

Command and Control
Coat As an Independent Variable
Combined Arms Support Command
Chemical Biological
Chemical/Biological Warfare
Communication Electronics Command
Container Handling Equipment
Chemical/Biological
Commander-in-Chief
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Transportation Command
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Contractor Logistics Support
Common Operating Environment
Concept of Operations

Continental United States
Commercial, Off-The-Shelf
Civil Reserve Air fleet
Container Roll-In/Out Platform
Combat Service Support
Carrier Experimental
Chemical Warfare

Defense Acquisition Board

DOD Loaistics Transformation A-1



Company Initiatives Results
* — $2.7B worldwide leader in + Leader in NA quality ° — Fulfillment cycles of <=4 days
medical technologies services and promoting SC ¢ — Reduce infrastructure costs by 25%
integration + — Reduce write-offs by 50%
* — Supplier Choice * — Reduce freight costs by 10%
+ Product suppliers involved ¢ — Eliminate retums
early + Became easiest and most
cost effective
+ Leading mail order * UPS alliance * — Operates w/ virtually no inventory
PC Producer * — Co-designs and operation » Deliver to all customers in 2 days
+ — Sells directly to customers + — Dock merge program for using high cost air transportation
+ Sales $3.7B components + — Less damage
* Build to order, 5-6K PCs/day + Outsource parts order and delivery | * Real time delivery status

Plan to outsource joint quality
program

World's largest retailer
AIl50 states

~2000 Stores

~240 Super Centers
Over $90B Sales

eure ree

EDI with QR

Superior logistics and SC

Best IT & tracking systems

Use of Internet for sales
Partnerships w/ suppliers

Own & operate own fleet & DC's
Advd. materials handling & IT

Reduce prices from suppliers 2 -6%
Inventory tums overall 6 times
Suppliers managed inventory
Effective cross docking

SC supports continued growth and
competitive edge

Table 2: Examples

This DSB recommends the DOD logistics system become an efficient
arranger of services and support as well as a provider of products and services.
The “arrangement” recommended is to use best commercial business practices
to the greatest extent. The 1998 DSB Summer Study recognizes that balance
and judicious management must be exercised to ensure control of future costs
and sub-optimization. The wholesale privatization of functions obviously leads to
loss of organic capability that can’t be easily restored. There are other risks that
need to be assessed in detail to ensure that warfighter support does not
deteriorate but is enhanced.

In that sense, the Summer Study recommends that a comprehensive plan
be developed to address all the aspects of incorporating the best of commercial
practices and benchmarks into the DOD system as well as furthering those open
1996 DSB Summer Study recommendations. However it should be emphasized
that the warfighter requirements should PULL the system thereby decreasing the
footprint and increasing responsiveness.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation -Deployment Panel

on



This slide summarizes the Title 10 responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

* Secretary of Defense...is the head of the Department of Defense.
— Appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.

* Subject to the direction of the President, U.S. Code, Title 10 and the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401), The Secretary is the
principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the
Department of Defense.

* He has authority, direction, and control over the Department of
Defense.

The next two slides summarize the Title 10 responsibilities of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These responsibilities are post Goldwater-
Nichols.

USC Title 10

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

+ Planning; Advice; Policy Formulation - subject to the authority, direction and control
of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
shall be responsible for the following:

+ Strategic Direction - Assist the NCA to provide Strategic Direction of the Armed Forces
+ Strategic Planning
— Preparing Strategic Plans
— Preparing Joint Logistics and Mobility Plans
— Performing Net Assessments of the capabilities of the U.S. Armed forces, and its
Allies as compared to potential allies
+ Contingency Planning
— Preparing and reviewing Contingency Plans
— Preparing Joint Logistics and Mobility Contingency Plans
— Advising on critical deficiencies and strengths in force Capabilities(including
manpower, logistics, and mobility support)

Volume 2 ~- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
els



Commercial Companies

day 3days
(Motorola) (Boeing)

Pick & Pull 7 Days
Redist: 10 Days
(DOD average)

Distribution
(for in-stock items)

2days
(Caterpillar)

4-144 days
(DOD average)

14days
(Boeing Electronics)

14 days
(Detroit Diesel)

3days
(Compaq)

Repair 8-35 days 1day 10 days 5 days
(Anny tank/truck) (Compaq) (Boeing Electronics) | (Detroit Diese!)

70 days
(DLA)

Minutes
(Boeing, Caterpillar)

4days
(Texas Instruments)

0.5 days
(Portland General)

Table 1

Note that the selection of the companies was based on the companies’
profiles being similar to that of DOD — their equipment was fielded throughout
the world, in various climates and terrain, and in the same magnitude of yearly
requisitions.

It is self evident that the DOD logistics system has not kept pace with
industry. In addition, the industry's emphasis on customer satisfaction
(responsiveness, cost and quality) has forced a greater analysis on the core
business processes while outsourcing those functions performed more efficiently
by other suppliers. While some programs within the Department of Defense
have transitioned a portion of their logistics elements to contractor support, the
wholesale effort to outsource non-core functions have not been totally successful
due to a number of reasons, as Figure 3 depicts.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation —Deployment Panel
77



XIV. BACKUP CHARTS & MATERIAL

Backup Charts / Material

In its deliberations Panel 1 generated numerous “notional” slides. The
following are a few of these back up slides which may be of interest to readers.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel

cA



QZ=URFOM ZOmaPZBODZ
ZOersZessn cPOnZH< a
ANADBAZONM

Figure 3

The natural cultural resistance to changing the long standing and
embedded processes and policies of years of "doing it this way’ is a significant
barrier. However, other political influences significantly impact on the
Department's ability to reach private industry world class benchmarks.
Regardless of the "people" issues, some internal DOD initiatives have
progressed over time to make the military logistics system still the best in the
world today. Unfortunately, neither the progress nor the associated cost
reductions have been fast enough. As shown earlier in the report, the
procurement accounts experienced a 56 percent decrease (from $104B in 1988
to $46B in 1998) while the O&M account only decreased by 16 percent in the
same period ($114B to $96B). One can see that DOD can no longer afford the
system as we have it today. Increasing capability while at the same time
reducing costs is of primary concern.

In addition to being responsive to the CINC needs, a key tenet of this DSB
Transformed Logistics System is that it be well integrated with industry. This

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation -Deployment Panel



implementation plans, programmed in the FYDP and “extended planning
annexes.”

Force Consumption Rates

Technology is a key enabler for demand reduction through lower
consumption rates, especially for parts. Therefore, it is key that DOD R&D
efforts be focused on research that will reduce consumption requirements for
both new and legacy weapon systems/equipment. Technologies are needed to
enable weight and fuel/power reduction; precision-guided munitions; increased
reliability/durability; “self-healing” and graceful degradation; and ease of repair.

This is the second component of the proposed strategy for using
technology to reduce logistics demand — one that can result in reduced
consumption requirements for the new platforms described above, but also for
existing platforms that would follow early entry forces. That follow-on force also
needs to avoid “iron mountains” and a large support footprint. The panel was
briefed on a study done by CENTCOM which showed that a mix of PGMs could
reduce munitions demand to 25 percent of present estimates with the same
target effects. Likewise, fuel consumption reductions of 50 percent or more now
appear feasible for land, air, and sea platforms through both commercial and
DOD R&D efforts on hybrid engines, fuel cells, electric drive, and other
technologies. While battery technology improvements are slow, reduction of
power consumption requirements in electronic equipment is moving briskly.
Adoption of enhanced commercial irradiation of perishable fresh fruits,
vegetables, meat, poultry, and fish would dramatically reduce lift and storage

refrigeration requirements in the entire theater as well as guarantee disease-free
food.

And, of course, a major consumption reducer would be improvements in
the reliability of platform components and of the accuracy of diagnostics
(including technician proficiency). The Services have seen the impact of the
dramatic, often 50-fold, improvements in reliability of electronic components over
the last decade. Insertion of such technologies as fly-by-wire in place of
hydraulics can make nearly as dramatic changes in mechanical/hydraulic
components. Likewise, the commercial auto industry has doubled fuel efficiency
over the last 15-20 years when faced with motivation in the form of a
Government mandate.

Implementing the reliability changes requires resources/investments by
the Services of only $300 to $500 million per year (as recommended by the
DSB’s “Logistics Modernization” study of April 1996), but could produce high
payoffs in demand and O&S cost reduction for those systems to be retained well
into the 21st Century.

Volume 2 ~ DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel
113



2. Investments that reduce the operational support requirements of
legacy systems when such investments are indicated by a business case
analysis that includes the potential reductions in lift as well as TOC, that would

, _tesult from such investments.

Invest to Reduce Life Cycle Costs

Legacy platforms should be evaluated to determine where meaningful
investments can be made, based on business case analysis, in TOC reduction,
service-life extension, or, where costs outweigh operational utility, disposal.
Several high-leverage areas for potential investment have been identified by the
panel, including re-engining ground platforms (e.g., hybrid-electric in place of
existing gas, diesel, and gas-turbines), band tracks, fuel cells and other non-
battery power technology.

As noted earlier, similar investments in reliability, durability, and
maintainability were identified by the DSB’s 1996 study; Logistics Modernization.
Program managers and producers continually propose other investments. The
trick, also as noted earlier, is finding the $300 — $500 million a year to invest. But
there are other ways to fund these investments. Planned buys of repairables can
be competed as long-term (base year plus option years) contracts, with form-fit-
function performance specifications and incentives for reliability/durability. “Best
value” source selection would stress expected improvements over the current
component. A second similar approach utilizes the contractor-logistics support
mechanism recommended below to incentivize overall operating and support
cost reduction based on lower spares demand — an incentive the prime would
be persuaded to pass on.

The experience of the Army's Mobile Subscriber Equipment partnership
(CECOM and GTE) is that this technique (accompanied probably by the incentive
of future business) incentivizes the producers of components to propose
component modifications — or new designs that will have longer lives.

Competitively Out-Source Product Support

Finally, Weapons System Program Managers, once assigned “cradle to
grave” management responsibility, should be required to competitively out-
source all equipment support requirements above the “organizational” level. This
issue is covered extensively in the report of the DSB Acquisition Workforce Sub-
Panel of March 1998, beginning on page I-27 and including Appendices K and L.
To the extent that such sourcing can be reflected in initial competitive contracts
for the production of equipment, it can, for example, take the form of extended
warranties that strongly incentivize suppliers to provide equipment of growing
reliability with correspondingly declining support requirements. For fielded
equipment, such competitive out-sourcing, will create continued downward
pressure on support needs.

Competitively contracting for support that has historically been provided by
government personnel demands improved DOD contracting sophistication and

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel

Pr



Summary of Critical Logistics Capabilities

Summary of Critical Logistics Capabilities

Overall DoD Management Process
Integrated Industrial/Support Base
Total Asset Management
Full Implementation of the RMA
Unmanned vehicles and brilliant weapons
Fully integrated battle management (C4ISR)
Streamlined Transportation

Personnel Support/Footprint Reduction

4. Overall DOD Management Process. DOD PPBS and Acquisition
System procedures will have been changed such that there is a truly
“joint” process for managing the acquisition of military equipment,
munitions, and associated support. This will include provision for
ongoing trade-offs between desirable performance characteristics and
total ownership costs, as well as sufficient reliability to minimize the
need for in-theater maintenance by other than the normal operators.
Any in-theater heavy maintenance and construction will be planned for
contract. The resulting process will implement a fully unified vision of
the military posture that is best for the nation, in consideration of the
funding likely to be available. It will have taken on the attributes of
“continuous improvement” that characterize “world class”
organizations.

Issues: To what extent would planning, programming and budgeting
authority need to be shifted from the Services to a strengthened joint
vision entity?

Would there need to be a single acquisition system with a single DOD
Acquisition Corps?

2. Integrated Industrial/Support Base. The currently sharp distinction
between the business practices of industrial segments that work
primarily for DOD and those that don’t will have been replaced. By
2025 DOD will employ normal commercial business practices when

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
2%



LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS
— OVERALL AND SELECTED SPECIFIC MISSION REQUIREMENTS

OVERALL LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS ~ JV2010 AND LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION.

Future logistics as described by JV2010, is a much more precise, timely and focused process. To
accomplish this the logistics information environment must provide an ability:

« - to acquire timely, accurate and consistent source data for reporting
to acquire, process, and distribute this information rapidly
to integrate and “fuse” information from many sources
to apply “what if” and modeling tools to assess alternative courses of action
to provide communications access and connectivity to information sources and users
throughout the world

to tap into the “performance” of the logistics processes

eto know “what is where and when it is there” from industry source to the battlefield
and finally

© to achieve information superiority across all dimensions of JV2010.

As one reviews all of the major recommendations of the Logistics Transformation Study, it is apparent
that information technology is an integral element in all aspects of logistics transformation, beginning
with JV2010 and accelerating beyond those targeted capabilities.

MISSION REQUIREMENTS

Logistics support requirements have focused on the wholesale logistics activities--in recent years the
emphasis has turned to more direct support of the CJTF and the CINC. The following two sections
provide a select group of key requirements for both Deployment and Sustainment. It is important to note
that the information technology elements, including computing, communications and data, are common
for both processes and should be built as part of acommon logistics information technology “network”.

Deployment Requirements. Deployment surge and rapid response capability depends on information
technology. The complex activities involved in deployment planning (JOPES, Crisis Action Planning)
and deployment execution depend on-information sharing, nearly in real time, among all the supported
and supporting commands. The execution phase requires a continuous tracking of transportation assets,
monitoring the location of the all the assets and personnel and ultimately, the force closure. The range of
deployment requirements includes:

End-to-end Asset Visibility of weapons, people, supplies (static and ITV)

Management of deployment activities at the local unit level

Ability to monitor and project force closure

Linkage with C2 JOPES to permit real crisis action planning based on actuals vice notionals
Use of source data capture to provide current, accurate, protected information

Information Assurance to protect delivery and access of information.

Ability to dynamically adjust deploying activities based on changing needs and projections.
CITF ability to adjust or divert incoming logistics items (CINC PULL)

Interoperability among service functional areas and across boundaries for joint systems.

0. Electronic access to industry for procurement, support data, problem resolution, rapid transportation,
and end to end visibility

m=O RNANAWNS



(mines, subs) disruption of ports and airfields (both in theater and CONUS).
Environment threats include high seas and winds, undeveloped ports and
airfields, civil disruption (e.g., refugees), natural disasters, and inadequate civil
response (i.e., other agencies).

Considerable attention has been paid to logistics vulnerability since 1990,
but much remains to be done. Planning limits the impact of anticipated
conventional attacks. The most vulnerable points are airlift takeoff and landing
areas, PREPO sites, and civilian infrastructure. Serious vulnerabilities remain for
concerted Special Operations Force (SOF) - like attack (on PREPO afloat, DLA
Centers, supporting infrastructure and infrastructure). Sophisticated |W / CBW
attacks could be devastating to logistics.

To address these concerns, the CJCS should: direct J4 to
comprehensively review logistics / PREPO vulnerability and report results to
SECDEF within 9 months; include Red Team assaults against logistics in
wargames and simulations for both joint and service exercises; apply the same
IW standards to logistics as are in use for other C'l systems; and direct J4 action
to assure the logistics-unique aspects of CBW are accounted for in planning.

COST Implication: The cost implications of these recommendations are about a

$1 billion to the DOD budget, before logistics savings are counted. Logistics
saving implications are approximately $10 Billion.

Issue End-State Investment
*Addressed 1996 SS Cost Savings Wmpact
Greatly enhanced
4. Strengthen CINC Significant inventory Planning tools, theater log support,
reduction $1-2 B prognostics, etc .
Pull $150M per year and responsiveness;
Per yea reduced footprint
Ability to achieve
2. Designate USD(L) Potential for: Studies, focused “focused logistics”;
as the Logistics 10-15% direct labor: systems, tools, etc— true JTF
Architect 15-30% indirect ($3- $140 M; Execute supportability;
Develop an $68); 5-15% non-labor systems modernization | Platform for
integrated process (St -3B) within current systems ; continuous
and system* $1.8 B budget modernization; “Truly
oe a national asset”
+ . one 7 Greatly increased lift
3. orepitties Avoid future military lift | ¢100 Miyear and reduced need for
. military lift assets
Faster deployment of
combat capability,
R&D, retiability smaller footprint,
4 Poa at $1-2B/ Year enhancements more flexibility, less
$500 M/ year maintenance; reduced

lift burden, and
military lift investment

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation

ix



DEMAND SIDE

* 1996 DSB Summer Study was comprehensive
treatment and DOD should increase tempo of
implementation

* Some of the concepts/technologies most
important to logistics

— Remote operations and sensing

— Robotics/semi-robotics support (min. people)
— Precision/smart armament

— Precision resupply

— Exercises and training

To summarize the technology related to reduction in demand, the 1996
Summer Study was a comprehensive look at this subject and we endorse its
fecommendations and encourage the DOD to accelerate implementation. The
payoff for logistics improvement is enormous.

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation — Technology Panel



SA Staging Area

SC21

SECDEF Secretary, Department of Defense

SOCOM US. Special Operations Command

SPOD Sea Port of Debarkation

Ss3 Sea State Three

ST Short Tons

STAMIS

STOL Short take Off and Landing

T

T Tons

TAA Tactical Assembly Area

TAV Total Asset Visibility

TC-AIMS II Transportation Coordinators-Automated Information Management
System IT

TCC TRANSCOM Component Command

TOA Transfer of Authority

TOC Total Ownership Cost

TOR Terms of Reference

TPFDD Time-Phased Force Deployment Data

TPFDL Time-Phased Force Deployment List

TRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command

TY Then Year

u

USACOM USS. Atlantic Command

USCENTCOM U.S. Central Command

USD(A&T) Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)

USEUCOM U.S. European Command

USFK US. Forces Korea

USMC U.S. Marine Corp

USPACOM US. Pacific Command

USPS US. Postal Service

USSOCOM USS. Special Operations Command

USSOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command

USSTRATCOM US. Strategic Command

USTRANSCOM US. Transportation Command

w

wwi World War I

wwil World war If

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

DOD Logistics Transformation A-4



DOD Logistics Transformation B-6



This slide summarizes the Title 10 responsibilities of each Service
component.

USC Title 10
¢ Services

Subject to the authority, direction , and control of the Secretary of
Defense...the Service Secretary is responsible for, and has the authority
necessary to conduct, all affairs of the Service Department, including

the following functions:
- Recruiting - Organizing - Supplying |
- equipping - Training - Servicing
- Mobilizing . -Demobilizing - Administering

- Maintaining,

- The construction, Outfitting, and repair of Military equipment

- The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings,
structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and
interests in real property necessary to carry out the

This slide summarizes the major issues/changes to Title 10 associated
with the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986.

Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reoganization
Act of 1986

= A Bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to strenghten the position of
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide for more efficient and
effective operation of the Armed Forces.

* Identified the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the head of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the senior ranking member of the Armed Forces.

+ By law, CICS is principal military adviser to the President.

— Ashe considers appropriate, he may seek the advice of and consult with
the other JCS members and combatant commanders. When he presents his
advice, he shall present the advice or opinions of other JCS members and,
as he considers appropriate, the range of military advice and opinions he
has received.

+ Transferred to CICS the functions and responsibilities previously assigned to
the corporate body of the JCS

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
20



¢ Tailor forces to probable lift capabilities; execute Defense Reform
Initiative Decisions (DRIDs) to create unified movement system with
authority to influence transportation systems acquisition.

e Exploit commercial lift to meet future requirements by using the growth
in the civil airlift fleet to support strategic deployment. DOD should
enhance CRAF to meet military requirements (such as door width and
height, deck height and floor strength), and make CRAF use a key
design criterion for land forces equipment.

e Support altematives to delivery through fixed ports to facilitate
operations in undeveloped areas. Support should be given to the Joint
Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) initiative to create a Sea State 3+
capability. This would yield a 20 percent to 180 percent operating time
improvement.

Decreasing logistics demand is key to cutting costs and improving
effectiveness. There is a big payoff both in combat response and lower cost for
early entry and continuous combat through faster combat forces deployment,
smaller footprint in theater and more agile forces. Logistics demand reductions
will also reduce the sustainment burden, further compounding demand reduction.

Demand reduction recommendations focus on lighter force structure, low
consumption platforms development and other demand reduction techniques:

Force size and weight must reduced (along the lines of the Army After
Next (AAN), Smart Ship, and the Air Force Expedition Forces) despite cultural
barriers (against unmanned platforms, missiles versus artillery, and traditional
crew size, for instance).

Research and development should be directed at “agile force” platforms
that require less field support.

e DOD should hold program mangers responsible for Total Owners Cost
of both new and legacy platforms.

e Demand reduction should be a significant objective of the JROC /
PPBS. DOD should invest to reduce life-cycle costs, improve
reliability, maintainability, lower fuel / ammo / power consumption and
decrease weight and crew size.

e DOD should competitively source weapons systems and equipment
support above the unit level.

Logistics vulnerabilities need more attention. Logistics systems and
nodes are particularly inviting targets to adversaries, and ranks with urban
environments as a place for exploitation with minimum effort. The spectrum of
logistics node threats is very broad and includes both adversary actions and the
environment. Adversary actions of concern include IW / EW against logistics
communications and data, chem / bio attack on logistics nodes, opposed delivery

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation


Demand reduction is required in two scenarios. The first scenario is
during combat and crisis deployment. It was determined that demand is driven
primarily by the Service at the wholesale level, implementing a “push” supply
system. This system often creates bottlenecks within the theater supply pipeline
and undermines the attempt at a “pull” system initiated by the customer — the
CINC. The prime example of a push system that created “iron mountains’ is the
initial buildup during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

The second scenario is during peacetime. Current spending on logistics is
too high, exceeds acquisition, and continues to grow. Part of the problem is the
fact that the DOD management system does not have visibility of the total
ownership cost of new weapon platforms (long term support requirements).
Secondly, a need exists to reduce the operating cost of legacy systems.

PANEL 1: DISCUSSION - MANAGING
DEMAND

Crisis/Warfighting
Force Structure

Logistic Planning

Vulnerability

e

Peacetime

Weapons System Support Cost

Crisis/Warfighting: The current “push” process clogs any reasonable
estimate of available lift with material not essential to the CINC’s needs. Without
unrealistic levels of prepositioning, the timelines for crisis response expected to
be mandated by 21st Century contingencies can be met only with major redesign
of the nation’s force/equipment structure and major changes to logistics planning
processes.

Force Structure: Currently planned land forces/equipment structure is
very “heavy”, redundant, poorly fused across Service lines, and does not take
adequate advantage of the potential “RMA” reductions in demand for lift and
resupply. Large reductions in both total support costs and deployment footprint

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
a0



in reducing manpower requirements to operate and maintain legacy platforms.
Applying commercially available technology can reduce workloads and crew.
Another example is the LPD-17 Shipbuilding Program, which expects to achieve
a 20 percent total ownership cost (TOC) reduction under the cost of a similar
existing ship. The Navy is achieving this requirement largely through
workload/manning reductions. Such reductions in logistics demand are
significantly more challenging for in-service platforms because an investment is
generally required up front in order to achieve demand reduction (i.e., reliability
and maintainability improvements).

Removing Cultural Barriers

However, there are cultural barriers that must be overcome. Reductions to
platform manning (i.e., crew size, etc.) and use of unmanned air and ground
platforms will require strong leadership commitment to become a reality. Two
prime motivators for equipment (and force) design are “cost as an independent
variable” (CAIV), with its TOC goals, and the strategic lift/footprint limits
necessary to the candidacy of a system to be part of an “early entry” force. Our
panel was briefed by the PMs for LPD-17 and F-22. Clearly the demand to
reduce TOC has permeated program planning, design, and engineering
development. Air Force battle space support requirements for the F-22 look to
be significantly less than for F-15E. LPD-17 will embark a smaller crew than
current amphibious vessels of similar capability. Culture had to change in both
Services to permit these improvements. More is necessary. For example, can
remotely launched precision munitions substitute for artillery in the early entry
land combat force (beyond the close-in indirect fire capability of a mortar-like
system)? Can future Army/Marine direct fire systems be crewed with two rather
than the four needed for the M1A2, and could some of the platforms be
unmanned? Can operating concepts (and culture) be changed to permit these
“demand reductions” which technology changes would suggest are doable?

Implementing Demand Reducing Force Designs

It was clear to this panel that pursuit of early entry and continuous combat
capabilities demands an R&D focus in each of the Services on the concept of the
“agile force.” The “system-of systems’ visions of AAN, Air Expeditionary Forces,
Operational Maneuver From The Sea, and the Navy's future operating and
platform concepts (DD21, CVX) can become “blueprints” for this R&D focus.
With TOC as a driver, assisted by force simulation analyses (technology
wargames), these concepts can help focus R&D on achieving technologically
dominant early entry platforms. They may constitute only 20 percent of the
Services’ combat capabilities, but they can “get there fustest with the mostest.”
We believe that the Services should plan for the “early-later” entry mix which
includes affordably-modernized legacy platforms.

The important implementation tasks which should be put in place as soon
as possible are the road maps for each Service's vision of its “agile force”
integrated by the road maps for each of the JV 2010 (and beyond)

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel

449



30. Reduced acquisition cycle time.

31. Combined logistics doctrine and execution.
32. Logistics becomes joint and “strategic”.

33. Redefine training of logisticians.

POLITICAL/CULTURAL

Trend A — Domestic political support and understanding (national
consensus) of national security needs will be even more challenged due to
generational and demographic changes and competing budget resource
demands.

Logistics Implications:

1. Budget competition increases pressure on DOD size and cost; placing
more pressure on “transforming” the “tail”.

2. Impetus for swing toward competitive sourcing and privatization —
vendor base will be global and multi-national.

3. Greater use of FMS/HNS to stretch resources and interoperability.

Need contingency for backup if US acts unilaterally.

Smaller, joint, more mobile task forces with enhanced sustainment

capability — reduces footprint, reduces “tail”.

AC/RC more multi-tasked; multi-compo units.

Reduced levels of maintenance and support; dramatically enhanced

reliability and maintainability.

Scaleable, tailorable, modular, mobile, logistics forces.

Partnerships with industry for depth and flexibility — need to

strengthen command and control to allow partnerships to work

effectively. Redefine DOD relationship with industry.

9. Need for a common logistics lexicon and language; as well as common
logistics principles for ease of use/avoidance.

=

On On

ECONOMIC

Trend A — Regionalization and globalization of national, corporate and
financial economies will provide both national security strengths and potential
weaknesses/threats

Trend B — Resource shortages and the potential for major environmental

disasters (manmade and natural) will increase regional instability and potential
for conflict

Trend C — Outsourcing and privatization of military support functions will
have redefined the federal sector's relationship with the commercial sector
(domestically and perhaps globally) and vice versa

Logistics Implications:

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
1



V. DSB STuDY PARAMETERS

DSB Study Parameters

* Proposed DSB Study Statement of Objective:
“The 1998 DSB Summer Study on Logistics Transformation will identify and
prioritize changes in today’s core logistics activities essential to evolving a
baseline, no later than 2010, which will support a true transformation in
military logistics projected to 2025. Guided by the objectives of “faster, better,
cheaper”, the ultimate test of study recommendations will be enhanced
effectiveness on the battlefield. Transformation in military logistics results
from a marked change in the nature and form of the structure and processes
that equip, deploy, and sustain military operations.

Recommendations resulting from this DSB study should focus on ‘capability
based logistics’ (scalable, tailorable, modular, mobile and flexible) which are
adaptable to different force structures, different operational concepts and the
full conflict spectrum to ensure sustained impact over time.”

“The last step of logistics transformation recommended by the DSB is only the first step of the next generation.”

Based on the foregoing, Panel 1 developed these study parameters to
guide the Task Force in its work, focus and recommendations.

Vil. StTupy ASSUMPTIONS

Logistics Transformation Assumptions
“Truth in lending - One changes and all do”

1 US will remain fully engaged in world affairs between today and 2025.

2 US national security objectives will remain the same using cooperative agreements if possible,
and unilaterally if not, to ensure national security, protect and defend lives and property, protect
our “national interests” (what are the latter in 2025).

3. That the spectrum of conflict will remain essentially the same until at least 2025 (NDP report,

12/1/97 projected this to 2020). (NOTE: since the current conflict spectrum encompasses A-Z, we assume that the’ full
‘spectrum range of conflict continues well ito 21st century; however, the likelihood of specific threats occurring will
‘consistently fluctuate.)

4 Although change in the use and composition of the forces will continue, because of long lead
times, the types of weapons platforms will remain the same between today and 2010.

5 That not later than 2025, some significant, breakthrough changes in the types of weapon system
platforms are likely supported by technology and acquisition reform.

6 That the Services will continue to exist in 2025, but with progressively attained “jointness,”
enhanced capabilities, and potentially dramatic change in warfighting operations.

7 That modernization resources can and will be targeted at tech leaps which reduce the logistics
demand and footprint and total ownership cost .

8 That DoD will be under continued financial constraints but DoD leadership will develop
increased flexibility and systems to allocate resources responsive to dynamic changes in national

security and defense requirements. (NOTE: assumes Congress has given DoD required budget and acquisition
Nenibiity and that DoD “culture” can effectively use it)

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(Following is the Executive Summary form the Logistics Transformation Summer Study -- Volume 1)

The 1998 Defense Science Board Logistics Transformation Summer
Study was tasked to recommend actions to be taken that achieve “a true
transformation — not marginal improvements” to the U.S. military logistics system.
The DSB defines a “transformation in military logistics” as “a marked change in
the nature and form of the structure and processes that equip, deploy and
sustain military operations.”

The DOD Logistics Transformation Task Force worked in concert with the
DSB’s second 1998 summer study, Joint Operations Superiority in the ai"
Century, (co-chaired by General Larry Welch, USAF-Ret and Mr. Donald
Latham).

The DSB Summer Study on DOD Logistics Transformation emphasizes
seven points:

e Asconcluded in the Joint Operations superiority Summer Study, the
principal operational challenge facing the U.S. military in the 21%
Century is strengthening and preserving its capability for early, then
continuous, application of dominant control effects across the full
spectrum of conflict.

e The military logistics system is a critical enabler of deployment, then
sustainment, of dominant full spectrum engagement effects.

e Today's U.S. military suffers from a separation of logistics from
operations, an organizational principle of long standing, and a reliance
on mass, rather than efficiency and certainty, to be effective. As now
configured, the logistics system frequently constrains operations and
drains scarce resources needed for force modernization.

Failure to seamlessly blend military logistics with operations will be a
showstopper for DOD’s planned “Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)” —
a motivation that demands immediate action.

© DOD must recognize that logistics transformation is a “BIG DEAL... a
VERY BIG DEAL.” Continuing to regard logistics as the secondary
“tail” to warfighter doctrine, training and armament will have
unacceptable consequences in the 21° century battlespace resulting in
decreased ability to achieve national security objectives and cost.

The military logistics system can be reformed. A “Transformed
Logistics System” can be responsive to CINC (Joint Task Force
Commander) needs, support rapid closure of combat power, permit a
smaller footprint — both people and equipment, be more agile,
responsive and survivable than today’s system, fully integrate business

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation
wv



must be made to minimize these effects through robust logistics system design
and application to logistics protection of all that is developed in this field.

The logistics aspects of the other two topics are discussed in subsequent
pages of this Panel Report.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Technology Panel


\'V. _ CINC “Pull” versus System “Push” — Recommendations

CINC “Pull” VS. System “Push”
~ Recommendations (Cont.)

¢ Provide tools to integrate logistics and operations
~ Real-time monitoring of requirements/ distribution
— Real data for logistics and operational decisions

——foqets__,
Platforms Tactical C2/Log Theater C2/Log . Wholesale
ator Structure Structure PULL (conusiMoBietc.)
Supplies

Near Real-Time Information

Provide Tools to Integrate Logistics and Operations

The theaters and the tactical units are the location of the source data that
define the real logistics needs. Using the data that originates in the theater and
with the tactical units, the tactical requirements — as interpreted and defined by
the theater CINC — can and should drive the logistics process.

Real Time Monitoring of Requirements and Distribution

Source-data automation from the tactical platforms’ will provide
revolutionary operational benefits, in addition to its value for logistics and other
Combat Service Support (CSS). Source-data automation will reduce the time it
takes to communicate supply status and operational status (e.g., “How many
weapons systems/people-in my battalion/squadron/ ship are combat ready for
tomorrow?”), and dramatically improve the logistics planning process at all
echelons. Combining aggregated platform source data on supply and
operational status with status of orders for supplies, their in-transit location and
estimated time to repair systems into the recommended information/decision
support system will allow planning that is accurate enough and detailed enough
that the logisticians will be able to tell the operators when they will get their

7 Note: the Source Data Automation should include both output of diagnostics of weapons
system/equipment “health,” e.g., components failed or near-failure and consumption status of fuel
and munitions vs. capacity. A more complete discussion is found in the next section on “platform
based, user-friendly IT...”

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel

ann



DEPLOYMENT PANEL REPORT

Panel Chairman:
General Al Hansen, USAF (Ret.)

DSB Members

VADM Mike Kalleres, USN (Ret.)
Mr. Milt Minneman
Panel Advisors

Mr. Lou Chaker
Col Allen Cleghorn, USAF
Maj Gen Charles Coolidge, USAF
Col Larry Cooper, USAF
Mr. Larry Glasco
CAPT Alan Harms, USN
CDR John Joerger, USN
Mr. Bill Leary
Col Rick Lien, USAF
BG Philip Mattox, USA
LTC Robert McCalmont, USA
RADM John Scudi, USN
Mr. Tom Sweeney
COL Rod Thomas, USA
Mr. Frank Webber

Panel Support

Mr. Christopher Szara, SAIC
Maj Wynne Waldron, USAF

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation -Deployment Panel
AT



“simple, flexible AIT for quickly formed coalitions”, what levers (or enablers) need
to be effected to attain that?

e Structure (organization and culture)
° Processes - could have numerous but we recommend to focus on:
e Statutes / Policies
e PPBS (forecasting, planning, budgeting, “color of money’)
° Incentives
e Platforms (weapon systems, transportation modes, equipment)
e Acquisition
e Decision making / Leadership
e Communication
e Technology / technology insertion
e People (staffing, training, relationships)

Panel 1’s work on developing top level Logistics capabilities needed in the
future resulted in the following rough work product.

The percentages and/or metrics in the following tables were derived from
expert judgement, not quantitative analysis.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel



Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Technology Panel



I. INTRODUCTION

The DSB Summer Study Panel on “Logistics Transformation” was divided
into four sub-panels. Panel 1 was responsible for much the up-front work to lay
the environmental foundation for, and stimulate discussion among and between,
the other panels. The initial tasks of Panel 1 was to determine what constitutes a
“true transformation,” set the study’s parameters, and look at the future
environment. The later tasks of Panel 1 were to address implementation issues
and metrics.

After a review of the Terms of Reference (TOR), it was concluded that the
following was the appropriate Definition of a True Transformation:
Transformation in military logistics is a marked change in the nature and form of
the structure and processes that equip, deploy and sustain military operations.
This definition reflects recognition that logistics transformation cannot occur
without underlying changes in the way we equip, deploy and sustain the force.

Next step was to establish the Study’s parameters and objective. The
study objective was set as follows:

The 1998 DSB Summer Study on Logistics Transformation will
identify and prioritize changes in today’s core logistics
activities essential to evolving a baseline, no later than 2010,
which will support a true transformation in military logistics
projected to 2025. Guided by the objectives of “faster, better,
cheaper”, the ultimate test of study recommendations will be
effectiveness on the battlefield.

The Panel also assessed future military, political, cultural, economic, and
technological trends, as well as the resulting logistics implications.

Panel 1 concluded that there was much that had been identified in past
DSB, DOD and Service reports which will help lead to a logistics transformation;
likewise, there was also much already being done, though most of it stovepiped
within the Services or functionally fragmented. Examples include the Army's
Revolution in Military Logistics; the USAF’s Lean Logistics, USN’s Expeditionary
Logistics, the USMC’s Precision Logistics and the Focused Logistics initiatives of
JV2010. Many significant improvements are being made and, in and of
themselves, will have major impacts. But, transformation of military logistics will
only occur through a coordinated and integrated Department effort.

Panel 1 believes that the Department needs to focus on logistics reform,
approve a systemic approach, give it priority commitment, and then make it
happen. We also believe that visibility over “Total Ownership or Life Cycle
Costs”, as well as the integration of acquisition and operations with logistics, are
essential elements of a true transformation in military logistics.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel



in the far term may offer relief. The latter draws energy from the environment in
any of a variety of ways; the current practical example is solar energy but a
number of other approaches are under investigation at DARPA and other R&D
organizations.

Irradiated food has been tested and promises reduced spoilage and
potentially better taste.

In-theater manufacturing (actually on board a nearby ship) may offer
computer aided manufacturing to alleviate the time to provide spare parts of a
variety of kinds.

Principal Gains & Issues of New Technology

Advantages Issues

Heavy lift
100 Kt plus speed of transit Commercial viability and support
Potential to avoid shore Issues Rapidity of overall system, not just transit

Maximum range which is essential
MOBS
Forward basing under US control Performance of very large (airfield)
Ability to move with world situation ‘Structures in heavy seas:
DFD
Avoids all logistics of combat zone Payload and ranges achievable
“middle men” Corresponding tactics and doctrine
Support of distributed forces
Energy sources and radiated food
Reduced logistics burden from Feasibility and practicality
current batteries, food and
fuel

The recommendations with respect to the cited technologies are as
follows:

High speed, heavy lift: It is very unlikely that DOD will (or should) invest
heavily in this area. The primary issue is the ability of these various proposals to
compete economically with current forms of lift in the commercial venue. DOD
however, should stay closely coupled to the various programs and, if the
commercial world decides to invest in a fleet of any of these, DOD should
attempt to influence the detailed designs to maximize the utility for military lift and
CRAF-like arrangements should be negotiated.

Volume 2 ~ DOD Logistics Transformation — Technology Panel



Logistics Capabilities: Operations/New Concepts/Combat Commander

Sub NLT 2010 NLT 2025
component
Intelligence © UAVs generally available to tactical | « Artificial intelligence analysis capability
commanders e All source fusion of intelligence from the
e National level feeds are effective to integrated National community
at least Divisional level e Non-traditional intelligence is readily available
e Logistics intelligence data bases are | Networked national capability
complete and widely accessible e No windows/gaps in coverage
e Non-traditional threats are collected |e HUMINT is collectible with same intensity and
upon and data is readily available to speed as other sources
multiple users
c e Enhanced staff expertise through Small core staffs deployed with virtual and
reach-back reach-back capabilities
® TAV/Logistics anchor desk e Staffs can operate widely dispersed and from
« Joint theater logistics a reality any location with logistics total knowledge
* New battle staff organizational © Shipper to foxhole distribution system
concepts * Predictive” push” logistics
© C‘up front partnerships for shared  — Strategic lift requirements greatly reduced
commercial Defense capabilities « National base of expertise immediately available
e Simple , flexible AIT for quickly through reach-back
formed coalitions. * Commercia/DOD C* R&D for deployed
e  Alldefense items migrated to capability partnerships.
appropriate single manager © Reliability/survivability improvements lesson
need for redundant systems and war reserve
stocks.
e No “information black holes” ; no denied areas
of the world.
© Single source to shipper realized
° Predictive “push” logistic and force packaging
© Total integration into global communications
grid
Operations/ |e Reach-back for subject matter * Mass by combat effects
Pianning/ experts © Planning with virtual staff and M&S
Concepts e Increased quality and quantity of e Force widely dispersed
smart weapons e Small staffs and tested courses of action
¢ M&S is basis for planning ¢ Worldwide connectivity
* Reach-back to access industry , * Planning/ops done in distributed manner from
agencies , academia is feasible and any location
supportable. » Plans are fully simulated and confirmed.
* Smart vs dumb weapon inventories |» Comprehensive combat effects con be massed

are skewed toward smart through
tisk acceptance and procurement
priorities

© Satellites and surrogates provide
adequate communications

against rapidly identified and analyzed targets of
operational significance

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel

m1



Recommendation:

That the JCS support research on the technical characteristics and
refinement on the mission support roles that could be conducted on UAVs as a
means to satisfy the logistics support requirements for the future force in high
threat areas.

13. Abuse of the Transportation Priority System

In the after-action lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm, it became evident that the Transportation Priority System was broken.
Requisitions were more than duplicated, flooding the pipeline with excess cargo
because soldiers/airmen/marines/sailors in the field and resulted in commanders
losing confidence in the system. In addition, there was no method or means of
monitoring business processes to see where the item was in the pipeline. Asa
result, many items were reordered.

As a means of solving the situation, OSD and the Joint Staff appointed
USTRANSCOM, as the Executive Agent and the functional proponent, with the
mission of delivering DOD in an in-transit visibility automated information system
that would provide the visibility. The objective was to put confidence in the
system.

Recommendation:

USTRANSCOM undertake a review of the priority system to determine the
degree of discipline that exists. Subsequent appropriate actions should be taken
based on this review.

14. Strategic Air Mobility En-Route Structure

Because of the range limitations of our present airlift fleet, the Air Mobility
Command (AMC), a component of USTRANSCOM, maintains an extensive
enroute support structure. At the present time, 13 overseas locations manned by
approximately 4,000 personnel exist. During contingency operations, these
locations are augmented by Tanker Airlift Control Elements (TALCE) from AMC
CONUS locations. These enroute locations are supported by an extensive
infrastructure consisting of runways, storage tanks, pipelines, fuel hydrants,
ramps, operation/maintenance facilities, and fire-fighting equipment.

A 1997 JCS directed study confirmed severe infrastructure deficiencies
that would jeopardize war plan execution. Additionally, USTRANSCOM identified
the need for improvements to the enroute structure as a critical requirement.

At present, The Defense Logistic Agency (DLA) is making an attempt to
fund high priority POL projects within existing funds.® Until these and many other
operational infrastructure projects are completed, the successful deployment of

5 DLA POM FX00-05 funds all defined enroute POL projects with the majority after FX02.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation ~-Deployment Panel


VI. TECHNOLOGY OF NOTE

Particularly Interesting Supply Technology

¢ High speed, heavy lift capabilities

* Mobile Offshore Base Systems (MOBS)
¢ Direct to Foxhole Delivery (DFD)

* Improved energy sources

¢ {rradiated food

¢ “In-theater” manufacturing

12

Several technological developments are of particular interest in
improvement of the logistics capabilities.

High speed, heavy lift includes: high speed sealift, large aeroships
(heavier than air but with lighter than air approaches). There are a number of
proposals circulating for ships that range from 40 knots to 200 knots. At the
lower end, the technology is mature and the issue is economics. At the upper
end (above 75 knots) there are significant technology issues which tend to be
obscured in the marketing pitches. While some of these may well prove feasible,
that remains to be proven and again, the economic viability in the commercial
world is an open question.

MOBS offer attractive potential to reduce our dependence on overseas
basing. The principal technical feasibility issue is the connection of 2 units by 2
units (j.e.: 2-D architecture) in heavy seas. While the motion of these huge
platforms will be small, the forces on the coupling will be very large unless there
are innovative ways of connecting them.

DFD was covered in a prior slide (# 10).
Batteries are a continuing problem to the war fighter. Generally, there
appear to be only marginal gains from different battery chemistries since energy

density is the primary issue. However, fuel cells in the nearer term (functionally
equivalent to rechargeable batteries) and micro-turbines and “harvesting energy”

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Technology Panel


6. Foreign Military Sales

The current system for Multinational support and coalition logistics is
effected through 3 vehicles, Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Acquisition and Cross-
Servicing Agreements (ACSA) and Host Nation Support/Agreements.

FMS

Under the laws passed in 1961 and 1976 (and further emphasized by
President Clinton in 1995), FMS is used as a legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign
policy. However, over time this process has been politicized and is seen to have
lost the ability to enhance U.S. military capabilities. What was once essentially a
grant in aid program, where the U.S. could attach strings, has now evolved to
one where sales are mostly on a cash basis and customers are wanting to share
technologies with their own defense industries. FMS perceived as a slow, 2-step
process where the U.S. Government negotiates with the Foreign Government
(customer), then negotiates with industry for obtaining the supplies and services.
It is further encumbered by the extensive use of National Defense Policy
exceptions and lead-times for Congressional notification.

It is becoming increasingly popular for foreign governments to request
participation in the contracting/production process and to leverage the purchase
through a hybrid arrangement where industry provides the end-items/weapons
systems and DSAA provides the support/spares/training (or vice-versa).

In addition, the current system does not easily lend itself to allow the U.S.
Military to capitalize on the interoperability aspects or thinking of FMS as part of
their war-planning to enhance the regional capability. In many cases the foreign
policy objectives of selling weapons systems to certain countries to change the
balance of power in the region does not coincide with the CINCs war-fighting
needs and does not optimize military capability. The lack of this exploitation
increases the U.S. footprint and places an unneeded burden on our logistics
system.

Recommendations

a. We must achieve interoperability with our allies - an essential element of
coalition warfare. Accordingly we recommend amending FMS legislation
to promote use of FMS to augment U.S. Military capability.

b. Development of incentives with potential partners to foster a warm base
concept for U.S. force requirements.

ACSA/HNS

The NATO Mutual Support Act of 1979 authorized ACSA with NATO allies
and NATO Subsidiary bodies. This covers logistics supplies, support and
services and bypasses nine aspects of U.S. procurement law. Terms were for
reimbursement of replacement-in-kind (RIK). Transfers of nuclear, chemical and

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation —-Deployment Panel
83



The need for logistics reform becomes more visible when warfare
increases in sophistication, speed, and complexity. Changing how we fight
causes changes in how we support. The future of DOD logistics is tied toa
fundamental tenet — it must remain responsive to the warfighter and to changing
military strategies. To meet this challenge — and to enable the mobility,
deployability, and sustainability capabilities essential to DOD now, in the future,
and to the DOD After Next — the Department must achieve a transformation in
military logistics. This transformation must move the DOD logistics system from
a supply-based, just in case system to one based on velocity and inventory in
motion — a global, distribution-based system that takes maximum advantage of
technological breakthroughs, organizational redesign, information technologies,
and communications. Technology application and acquisition reform are critical
to logistics transformation. For example, increased reliance on industry to
complement the DOD’s emerging capabilities will require industry to be totally
integrated into logistics planning and execution. The high cost and lengthy
procurement cycle for many military items emphasize the necessity for more
streamlined acquisition processes and partnerships with industry. Innovative
application of technology, and ensuring a CINC (customer) pull vs. service push
system will be key enablers, leading to a reduction in logistics demand. These
issues and others are covered in the DSB study recommendations. Overarching
all recommendations, however, is the need for a Logistics System Architect to
make “true transformation” happen.

ll. TERMS OF REFERENCE

1998 DSB Logistics Transformation Summer Study

Goal (TOR): “...(A) true transformation -- not marginal
improvements

Study Objective: To identify and prioritize changes in today’s
core logistics activities essential to evolving a baseline, no later
than 2010, which will support a true transformation in military

logistics projected out to 2025.

Overall Test of Success: Guided by the objectives of “faster,
better, cheaper”, the ultimate test of study recommendations will
be effectiveness on the battlespace.

Definition: Transformation in military logistics is a marked change in the nature
and form of the structure and processes that equip, deploy and sustain military
operations

Volume 2 — DOD Logistics Transformation - Requirements Panel
2



11. ISO Container Incompatibility with Airlift System

The 163L system constitutes the majority of materials handling equipment
used in support of airlift operations. This system is comprised of 60,000 pound
loaders (60K), 25,000 pound loader (25K), wide-body loaders, wide-body
elevator loaders, lower-lobe loaders, 10K forklifts, and 10K all terrain lifts.

The Airlift System is capable of handling ISO Containers, however one of
the largest drawbacks of the ISO Container is its empty (or tare) weight. Due to
shortfalls on national strategic airlift capacity, the movement of large numbers of
ISO containers in the Airlift System would be done only in the most extreme
situations. When moving in the Airlift System, ISO containers are loaded in
aircraft utilizing 463L pallet as a platform to adapt the load to the 463L roller
system found in all cargo configured aircraft. Most aircraft configured for forward
and aft loading are capable of handling 20 and 40 foot containers. .

Recommendation:

It is recommended that DOD allocates new IR&D funds to develop
modular lightweight containers that can be re-configured to be ISO-, TEU-, or
FEU-sized for shipment by air or sea. :

12. Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

Traditional aerial delivery methods of providing personnel, supplies, and
equipment direct to the battle area are no longer viable. Technology has made
the air space directly over and adjacent to the battle area extremely hazardous,
especially for low and slow aircraft which must maintain a steady course to effect
an accurate airdrop.

Significant advances have been made in recent years with UAVs. The
combination of the UAVs and highly accurate Global Positioning System (GPS)
navigation make possible the aerial delivery of supplies and equipment directly to
the battlefield without risk to human life. In addition, the UAV provides a range of
design possibilities to take advantage of modularity, multi-purpose design
parameters and varying sizes to cope with a broad range of missions. The UAV
also provides great potential for a responsive intra-theatre logistics support
vehicle.

Many types of vehicles have been suggested, ranging from guided
parafoils to the "Sky Barge" 5 There are also a wide range of proposals dealing
with the size, composition, and capabilities of the future force, be it early entry,
battle force, etc. Some of these recommendations have been in the Army After
Next (AAN) series of wargames, the July 1998 Army Science Board and the DSB
Summer Study on “Joint Operations Superiority in the 21st Century.

5 armed Forces Journal Intemational, July, 1998, p. 52.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation —Deployment Panel
Ro



also be made a principal agent in VISA to ensure accountability and the cost
effectiveness of the program. This is similar to USTRANSCOMs role in CRAF.

16. Training

Joint Vision 2010 discusses six central considerations for success. They
are high quality people, innovative leadership, joint doctrine, joint education and
training, agile organizations and enhanced material. In order to accomplish this
for joint education and training, there must exist a program that teaches
personnel strategic concepts in the future environment, as well as in-depth
understanding of individual service systems and how the integration of these
systems enhance joint operation.

There are currently three new efforts underway to meet that requirement:

1. Joint training initiative to establish a joint professional military
education course by 2010.

2. Joint course in logistics at Ft. Lee Virginia, emphasizing focused
logistics and joint vision 2010.

3. USTRANSCOM is currently seeking support form the services to
create a “Center of Excellence” at Ft. Eustis Virginia to teach officers
/executive about deployment process. The class is currently funded
through 1999 but if it is to be viable will have to be funded by the
services starting in 2000.

Unfortunately, there presently exists a conflict between the Services and
the above educational efforts since many of the identified training is already
being performed in individual service schools. Not only is this duplication a
waste of resources, but it could also create gaps that would lead to
inconsistencies.

Recommendation:

a. That the JCS establish a functional working group to determine any
inconsistency between current service and proposed joint classes.
Group should consist of service, Joint Staff, CINC, and other members
as appropriate. As previously mentioned in the 1996 DSB Summer
Study consideration should be given (as a way of containing cost and
TDY requirements) to

e Increased use of distance learning,
© Commercial computer aided teaching technologies,
e Just in time training.

b. Establish “Logistics” as a core area of study in college ROTC
programs. There are currently numerous universities that have
established Logistics Degree Programs. As we continue to move

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation —Deployment Panel



are learning to anticipate changing consumption patterns and learning how to
tespond quickly to anticipated changes. Fashion-sensitive firms link their
ordering, manufacturing and distribution processes directly to retail point-of-sale
systems so that the development of “hot-sellers” does not leave empty shelves.
Rather, the whole supply chain is quickly stimulated to increase the production of
“hot-seller’ products, and reduce the production of slow-moving products. This
supply chain management approach is precisely what the DOD logistics system
needs, and what we recommend in this section of the report.

CINC “Pull”

We described the first part of the demand management approach earlier
— from the CINC’s “point-of-sale” system residing on weapons system platforms
and with mechanics and combat supply distributors in the combat forces. Their
changing needs stimulate the military supply chain to respond with parts, fuel,
etc., So as to leave no “empty shelves” — but no burdensome “iron mountains”
either. The decision to adopt “CINC pull”, implemented with the process changes
and information systems recommended in the “CINC pull” section constitutes a
major step forward in managing the flow of supplies and services into the battle
space.

Reducing demand for logistics services, people, and material has a big
payoff — enabling early entry of more combat power than now is possible, and
also enabling continuous combat. Since the demand for logistics support creates
a major demand for deployment lift and inter-theater transport and support units,
reducing demand would translate into a reduction in the weight and volume of the
materiel and people to be moved, especially critical in the early portions of an
expeditionary activity. Reducing demand will facilitate faster deployment of
combat forces, a smaller support footprint in the battle space (and, therefore, a
smaller force protection requirement), more agile forces, and lower operating and
support costs. The challenge is to assure the high level of operational availability
of weapons systems and the health of personnel in the battle space that is
necessary to sustain continuous combat. There is a major element of risk
management in pursuing demand reduction. In this section we will attempt to
show how the benefits can be achieved within acceptable risks.

Two principal approaches can be used to significantly reduce in-theater
logistics demand. The first is the deliberate designing of combat and support
organizations and their equipment to reduce their size, weight, and consumption
rates, e.g., fuel, munitions. The second approach is to adopt a suite of
management techniques to reduce demands for maintenance of
systems/equipment and for consumable supplies. Both reduce the requirement
in the battle space for support personnel and inventories of supplies. The results
would be a sharp reduction in the “iron mountain” and a much more agile
structure.

Volume 2 ~ DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel
440


A Schematic to Achieve Logistics Transformation

“The Transformation Fix”
Leadership
1 3.
2 4.
Y —————_,
Delivery System Improvements
(Provide - Transport - Si ) Vulnerabilities

1 3. 1 3. 1. 3.
2 4 2 4. 2. 4.

NY _/

Analyze against: Payoff, Metrics, Enablers of Change (Structure, Process, People, Technology)

Finalize Study Recommendations

Do Roadmap (timeline), Resourcing, Implementation, Constraint

Logistics Transformation: Recommendation in Priority Order?

Log Bus
System Architect
(Integrated Management)

Build CINC
Pull System
(User responsiveness)

Info Systems the Critical Enabler....Survivability Essential

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
a7



Deployment Panel Report
1998 Defense Science Board Summer Study on

DOD Logistics Transformation

L PANEL VISION

To achieve the most efficient combination of logistic velocity management,
agility and commercial practices that result in Best Value to the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the warfighting CINC.

Il. PANEL STATEMENT AND OVERVIEW

The deployment process (intra/inter-theater lift') is critical to the success
of any contingency operation. Based on the lessons and deficiencies learned
during Operation Desert Storm, a major effort has been made over recent years
to enhance both sealift and airlift. However, much still needs to be accomplished.
With the reduction of U.S. Forces overseas, the capability to quickly deploy
forces to the battle area has reached a critical state. In most cases, decisive
early action can reduce the follow-on force requirement significantly. At the
present time, the U.S. falls short of meeting the operational timelines for early
entry and follow-on sustainment to take advantage of a rapid strike force.
Transportation nodes in the U.S. and overseas are extremely vulnerable and
even under the best conditions can congest very easily. While advances in
transportation modes have been made, the basic infrastructure of our ports, rail,
and loading/unloading systems have remained virtually unchanged for the past
50 years. Since only small amounts of R&D funds have been allocated to
improve the infrastructure, progress has been extremely slow. Most
improvements have been incremental and no “break-through” technology exists
today.

The planning process remains fragmented and lacks discipline, even
though much attention has been directed toward it. The Joint Chief's of Staff
have identified USACOM as the single owner of the Deliberate Planning Process.
While this is a major step forward, this report identifies several existing
deficiencies that must be resolved to ensure a responsive planning process.

To achieve the warfighting CINCs’ stated operational requirements as well
as the objectives of Joint Vision 2010, DOD must try to influence evolving
transportation technology. It should be noted that today’s lift technology and
capacity does not meet the future desired closure times (see Figure #1). To date,
DOD has yet to identify any future military lift requirements to industry. Absent
these military requirements, industry is moving ahead with their own expectations

" |ntratheater lift has been addressed jointly in the Joint Deployment Summer Study

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation -Deployment Panel
xi



Panel 1’s overall “future assessment” was too lengthy to include in this
study. However, a rough, partial summary follows.

Vill. MAJOR LOGISTICS IMPLICATIONS

Major Logistics Implications

+ Logistics becomes joint and “strategic”.

= Rely on technology and global digital communications to enable an integrated logistics system architecture.

‘Avoid information warfare becoming a “Maginot Line”; will have increased vulnerability to disruption due to
failures or hostile actions.

+ Seamless voice and electronic access for commanders and staff to all logistics data from tactical through strategic
levels.

* Need for a capability-, distribution-based logistics system responsive across entire spectrum “from factory to
foxhole”.

+ Direct delivery of logistics to point of need.

* USS. forces likely to be a mix of high-low forces ~ key is to design integrated system that supports mixture of legacy
forces from today and 2025 forces. Logistics must be agile.

+ Smaller, joint, more mobile task forces with enhanced sustainment capability ~ reduces footprint, reduces “tail”.

+ Joint C2, logistics organizations, ops-log integration.

Will require comprehensive reform of financial management systems and practices to successfully complete the
“Revolution in Business Affairs” transformation. Commercial industrial base must be integrated with and highly
responsive to demands of the defense logistics systems.

‘+ Exploit industry's depth and flexibility.

© Battlefield logistics reduced — leaner, more effective or, for some systems, eliminated (¢.g. ultra-reliability, self-
‘healing, etc.).

‘+ Need investments in improved reliability of equipment and weapons systems to reduce the requirement for
sustainment.

* Decision support tools will enhance logistics planning, execution, visualization.

Increased use of diagnostics and prognostic — enhances the ability to provide anticipatory logistics.

* Need for real-time, precision logistics applications and processing.

From these nine major national security trends, Panel 1 further assessed
the implications of these trends for the military logistics system.

Sixteen major areas of implication were identified. These “implications”
are stated in rough form but provide a summary of the more lengthy version of
Panel 1’s assessment.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel



USE OF COTS SOFTWARE AS A MAJOR COMPONENT OF TRANSFORMATION

Software modernization, including development, enhancement, and maintenance factors is central to
logistics transformation. Rather than unique software development for all of DOD logistics needs the
DSB believes that Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software packages should be aggressively used for
Logistics and Supply Chain functions wherever appropriate. However, there are important issues in
determining when and how they should be applied.

COTS software can be broadly grouped into two categories: First are general purpose packages that can
be applied to a wide variety of applications systems and processes. These include data base management
systems such as Oracle, Sybase and Informix, as well as email, mapping, telecommunications, electronic
commerce, and graphics packages. The proper use of these COTS packages not only reduces costs
dramatically, but also increases interoperability and information integration. Further, finding a select set
of packages meeting broad user needs provides tremendous savings through enterprise licensing which
offers discounts well in excess of 50% of normal fees or prices. A select set of general purpose packages
are components of the COE and are being applied in both C2 and combat support arenas.

The second type of COTS software is directly relevant to Logistics. These are vertical market packages
specializing in functional areas of business practice such as payroll, inventory management, human
resource management. Within this second group are really two different capabilities — first is the family
of vertical packages such as those developed by SAP/3 or People-soft. These packages provide a
portfolio of capabilities from personnel, payroll, general ledger, supply chain management and these
capabilities work together to provide an enterprise solution. These are called enterprise resource planning
capabilities.

The second group are individual vertical software packages. The following commercially available
capabilities are applicable to DoD logistics as shown:
1. Transaction processing - ok - applicable now
2. Inventory - ok - applicable now
e Identification and tracking
e Storage hierarchy management/planning
3. Planning — ok — but mostly static capability, not yet dynamic
e Capacity planning
Demand planning
Delivery commitments
Operations planning
Transportation needs
e Load planning
4. Scheduling — ok — mostly static, net yet dynamic
© Static scheduling
e Dynamic scheduling
> Transport
> Equipment utilization

a-?



forces remains a high risk. A far term solution would be the procurement of long-
range airlifters that can bypass the enroute structure.

Recommendation:

That the JCS and DOD review the enroute basing infrastructure status

and ensure that funding is applied to critical projects to reduce the deployment
risk

15. VISA (VOLUNTARY INTERMODAL SEALIFT AGREEMENT)
Purpose and Concept:

The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) is a program,
administered by the United States Department of Transportation, Maritime
Administration (MARAD), designed to provide DOD the commercial sealift and
intermodal shipping services/systems necessary to meet national defense
Contingency requirements.

USTRANSCOM procures commercial shipping capacity to meet
requirements for ships and intermodal shipping services/systems through
arrangements with common carriers, with contract carriers and by charter. DOD,
through USTRANSCOM) and Department of Transportation (DOT) (Through
MARAD) maintain and operate the Ready Reserve Fleet (RAF), a fleet of ships
owned or chartered by the Federal Government to meet the logistic needs of the
military services which cannot be met by existing commercial service. These
government controlled ships and ships of the RRF area selectively activated for
peacetime military tests and exercises and satisfy military operational
requirements that cannot be met by commercial shipping in time of war, national
emergency or military Contingency. Foreign flag shipping is used in accordance
with applicable laws, regulations and policies.

The objective of VISA is to provide DOD a coordinated, seamless
transition from peacetime to wartime for the acquisition of commercial sealift and
intermodal capability to augment DOD's organic sealift capabilities. This
Agreement establishes the terms, conditions and general procedures by which
persons or parties may become VISA Participants. Through advance joint
planning between USTRANSCOM, MARAD and the Participants may provide
predetermined capacity in designated stages to support DOD Contingency
requirements.

VISA is designed to create close working relationships between among
MARAD, USTRANSCOM and Participants through which Contingency needs
and the needs of the civilian economy can be met by cooperative action. During
Contingencies, Participants are afforded maximum flexibility to adjust commercial

operations by Carrier Coordination Agreements (CCA) in accordance with
applicable law.

Participants will be afforded the first opportunity to meet peacetime and
contingency sealift requirements within applicable laws and regulations, to the

Volume 2 — DOD Logistics Transformation Deployment Panel
at



7. TAV and ITV must include 3rd party visibility.

8. Inter-operable AIT — quick fix for rapidly-developed coalitions.

9. Improved strength to weight benefits due to lightweight materials and
composites.

10. Fire and forget — use of alternative munitions.

11. Enhanced anti-fratricide capabilities to match technological
advancements.

12.Reduction in fuel and batteries through new power generation and fuel
sources.

13. Smaller, lighter engines producing greater output to weight.

14.Military forces maintain physical readiness without reliance on
traditional foods because of condensed rations.

15. Advanced packaging techniques make shipping cases serve more
than one purpose.

16. Advanced munitions generate reduced munitions infrastructure.

17. Increased use of diagnostics and prognostics — enhances the ability
to provide anticipatory logistics.

18. Streamlined acquisition — faster fielding.

19.In and of itself, smaller is not necessarily better — better is better.

20.Industrial mobilization programs geared to short technological
lifecycles by 2025.

21.Need for integrated, correlated Ops, Intel, Combat Support information.

22. Seamless voice and electronic access for commanders and staff to alll
logistics data from tactical through strategic levels.

23.Major advances in decision support tools enhancing logistics planning,
execution, visualization.

24. Need for real-time, precision logistics applications, processing, and
execution.

25. Logistics will require speed, agility, enhanced security operations, and
even greater dispersion.

26. In-transit visibility of friendly forces and supplies essential.

27. Fully integrated national defense logistics information network will
enhance support across joint and commercial boundaries — also, plug
in capability by coalition forces possible.

28.New predictive/performance models needed due to technology
application on the battlefield.

29. Avoid information warfare becoming a “Maginot Line.”

30. Identify technological breakthroughs which could become surprise
“Pearl Harbors”.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel

13



Calibrating a Transformation

(Economic Level Screening)

Objective: Provide a means to compare dissimilar recommendations, particularly the resources
required, the effect on Time, Cost, Quality, and Technical Performance.

Degree of Change
Degree Cost Time Quality Tech Degree of
Performance Difficulty
Minor <15% <15% Probably better Somewhat better Hard
Existing parameters
Medium/Mod 15-40% 15-40% Demonstrably Noticeably better Moderate
better
Major/ > 40% >40% — Impressively New capability that | | Easy
Substantial better changes system

(Cos The ee cat implement one, ad sepamiey the on ving cat ingore

“Tame The abd lp a eneonte ss of evies.  he ock Kime te xn a ety

(aly: Th eit and comssecy wih which he mame evi afore my es

Th opening he cag fre i
efor iden has bra ipa. This sti cmbined wth Quy

METRICS and MEASURMENTS

Precursor Metrics
Challenges

- Information

. Fusion

% RMA Done 2010

-Force Medical

% RMA Planned 2010 Protection

- Joint Deployment
Rapid distribution

- Joint Theater
Logistics Management

- Multinational
Logistics

~ Agile Infrastructure

Focused Logistics

Measures Metric

= = _ TimtoRE-TPFYD
Amy ——‘100hrs
Div 10 hrs

—% Healy and
available

—% Doctrine done
9 Assets im place

—% Doctrine done
available
— Time-in-transit

—% Coalition doctrine done
—% Functional commonality

= fventory in-limits
= Equipment up-time
- Response time & cosvfunction

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel



Air Mobiity Forces

The Kev ta Marly force Entry

MCRAF Il
SCRAF Il
BCRAFI
=C-141
=eKC+0
=C-17
=C4SB.
BC5A

20.4 MITND-

50

40

Peace (Active Active & 100% War
& 25% ARC) ARC ad

Figure 7 Air Mobility Forces
Recommendation:

USTRANSCOM leverage its business potential to encourage commercial
aircraft developers and manufacturers to incorporate military requirements into
their designs (door width and height, deck height, and floor strength). The use of
new light weight materials should offset the weight increase of these military
requirements and associated increase in fuel consumption. Where possible,
military equipment designs should take into account CRAF military specifications
during their design phase. Additionally, host nation agreements should be
developed that provide the unrestricted use of foreign carriers assets during
wartime operations.

10. DOD Container Policy®

DOD Regulation 4500.9-R-1 prescribes uniform policies, responsibilities,
and procedures governing management and control of the DOD intermodal
container system. The system includes intermodal containers and container
services, either DOD-owned, -leased or commercially provided, and other ISO-
configured equipment held by DOD activities before, during, or after intermodal

3 The terms "DOD intermodal container system" and "DOD container system," as used herein, are synonymous, and
refer to all DOD-owned, -leased, and -controlled 20- or 40- foot intermodal ISO containers and flatracks, supporting
equipment such as generator sets and chassis, container handling equipment, information systems, and other

infrastructure that supports DOD transportation and logistics operations, including commercially provided transportation
services.

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation —Deployment Panel
87



b. Fully integrated battle management (C‘ISR).
ISR. By 2025 all-source intelligence fusion will be in place and
supplemented by automated tools that assist commanders in
exploiting the information content. A process will be in place that
permits commanders to not only “reach back’ for available
information without the necessity of a large in-theater PEDs
footprint, but to also retarget collection assets as needed to support
the operational situation.
C“/Advanced Combat Management. By 2025 sufficient
connectivity and navigational systems will be in place to permit
continuous real-time knowledge of all unit locations, engagement
status, and logistics posture. Additionally, commanders will have
available a broad range of modeling and simulation decision
support tools that can utilize available threat and friendly unit
information to rapidly plan, re-plan, and rehearse optimum courses
of action to accomplish the objective with a smaller force than
would otherwise be needed.

5. Streamlined Transportation. Logistics transportation in 2025 will take
full advantage of available commercial transportation capacity, building
on the highly successful CRAF concept. Essentially alll equipment and
supplies will be designed for transport in commercial intermodal -
containers using commercial MHE. Pre-negotiated HNS/prepo plus the
increased ability to use commercial fuels will have sharply reduced the
need to transport fuel early. Improved lift efficiency, coupled with the
reduced weight of required supplies, permits the delivery direct to
combat units of roughly % of the resupply that originates in CONUS.
Asset visibility is such that the JTF commander is able to rapidly
redirect the incoming flow of supplies to the optimum location. In- ,
theater distribution/redistribution will be facilitated by the availability of
both accurate information and new modes of transport, including
manned and unmanned VTOL aircraft (including airships) and ground
vehicles. Interface between the CONUS transportation management
entity and the JTF logistics commander.

6. Personnel Support/Footprint reduction. By 2025 advanced clothing
materials will significantly reduce the need for auxiliary CB and ballistic
protection, cleaning, and reptacement. The bulk and weight of combat
rations will have been reduced by about 50 percent and rations will
tailored to the needs of each individual. Water requirements will be
largely met by advanced local purification techniques, and demand will
be reduced through improved food preparation and general cleaning
techniques. The health Services footprint will be reduced through
extensive telemetry of all individuals; auto-location of injured, tele-
medical diagnosis and treatment orders; advanced medicines, and

Volume 2 - DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
oF



iil. 1996 DSB SUMMER STUDY OVERVIEW

DSB 96 Summer Study:

Tactics & Technology for 21st Century Military Superiority

* Focused on reduced in-theater footprint but increased

effectiveness
— Radically increase combat-zone tooth-to-tall
Support Combat
Today 60% 40%

Future 20% 80%
— Remote support where possible (weapons, sensors, logistics)
— Maximize “brains over brawn” approach

* Double effectiveness of combat forces through
improved tactics, training and technology

* Addressed challenges of
— C2 for distributed force, force injection/extraction, force survivability

— Sustainment via smart logistics (“right stuff, right place, right time”
and vastly reduced logistic footprint/personne! in combat zone) 2

The goal of the 1996 DSB Summer Study on “Tactics and Technology for
21st Century Military Superiority” was to modify the early arriving forces to
achieve a greatly reduced footprint in theater while achieving a greater level of
effectiveness. The proposals spanned tactics, doctrine and equipment.

DSB 96 Summer Study:
Tactics & Technology for 21st Century Military Superiority

* Recommended work in
— Precision resupply - Insertion, extraction, sustainment, survival

— Fire and lethality - Exercises, training and operations
— Information infrastructure - Non-lethal systems for crowd control
~ Sensor systems and situational understanding

* Many of these are now active DARPA or Service programs but
much more could be done

The reduction of in-theater footprint and the shift to remote
support would have a major impact in improving the logistics
and lift situation

The 96 DSB Summer Study provides a comprehensive
approach to reducing the “demand” and we encourage
DOD to more actively pursue those recommendations

3

Volume 2 — DOD Logistics Transformation — Technology Panel



IX. LOGISTICS IMPLICATIONS LOOKING BACK FROM THE
PROJECTED NLT 2025 ENVIRONMENT

2025 Military Environment

* Based on the trends projected for the NLT 2025
military environment and the major implications
for logistics, Panel 1 made a more detailed listing
of future logistics implications.

* The pages which follow summarize the major
national security “TRENDS” and the Panel’s
rough assessment of the “LOGISTICS
IMPLICATIONS” which emanate from them.

Military/Threat

Trend A — US position as preeminent economic and military power will be
challenged or even eroded

Trend B — Beyond emergence of potential major or peer competitors,
ability to counter and defeat asymmetric and asynchronous threats from both
economic and military services will be a major challenge

Logistics Implications: All will be characterized by Commonality,
Redundancy/Flexibility, Deployability, Mobility/Agility, Responsiveness, and
Interconnectivity.

1. Battlefield logistics reduced — leaner, more effective or, for some
systems, eliminated (e.g. ultra-reliability, self-healing, etc.).

2. High system availability (lowest possible O&S costs); emphasis on
survivability (equipment, protective gear, etc.).

3. Better protected or self-protected — armored logistics?

4. Global strategic management of limited, valuable, highly specialized
stocks/components — may imply non-traditional sources of logistics
support. Vendor base will be global/multi-national.

Volume 2 ~ DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
Q



There are many reasons as to why previous needed actions have not
been implemented. Logistics transformation implementation must address each
up front. These are a few.

Signal and data processing technology has had an order of magnitude
every five years — so in 25 years, information technology will have 5x
current capabilities.

e Noone predicted rate of engagement of today’s forces or the Asian
financial instability.

e Already exhausting services with good intentions, high OPTEMPO,
mismatch between ends and means

e DOD's ability to rapidly accommodate, learn, adapt and institutionalize
change — still have a bi-polar mentality.

e -Good ideas are overwhelming resources, including R&D.

e There exists a Depot Caucus, but not an equivalent Industrial Caucus
— internal/external policies affect ability to change

Logistics Transformation: Make it Happen!

ACTION LIST

. DEPSEC/USD(A&TIVCICS ‘USD(A&T) ‘Log Info/Business
Authority —> Syren arcietonce
passive

IMMEDIATE. | hesittantn Usb Antony re

THoLy TPP feet Sa
treet

<p sae WE sda Logis
NEAR-TERM Sree

MID-TERM

Require high level

trades to do...keep

0 Horizon

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
53



I. INTRODUCTION

Technology for
Transformation of Logistics

New Capabilities Panel Report

DSB Summer Study on
DOD Logistics Transformation

Technology maturity is generally not the limiting factor in improvement of
logistics. However, there are at least four areas where technology will heavily
impact our ability to create robust and integrated logistics that are responsive to
the CINC needs. These are:

e Information systems technology

e Reduction of vulnerability to CBW and IW attacks.

e Reduction of logistics demand

e Improvements in supply, particularly in strategic and tactical lift

Information systems technology is critical to transformation of the logistics
system and is dealt with separately in this report.

Likewise, the CBW and IW threat is a national problem which is being
addressed in a much broader context. However, these threats are particularly
applicable to logistics in disruption or negation of port and airfield capability. The
technology to counter these threats is quite similar to that for population
protection. While this study did not comprehensively examine the topic, it is clear
that logistics would be a prime target for these forms of attack and that the
impact of at least a CBW attack would be very disruptive or worse. Every effort
must be made to minimize these effects through robust logistics system design
and application to logistics protection of all that is developed in this field.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Technology Panel



maintenance (perform maintenance when needed, rather than by mileage or by
the calendar). It would also enable “predictive parts flows” and maintenance
interventions — i.e., send a part to meet a platform when a prognostic signal
received over-the-air at a maintenance / monitoring facility from that platform
indicated the likelihood of a forthcoming failure. We believe that condition-based
maintenance and predictive parts flows and maintenance interventions are key
elements of the revolution in battlespace logistics.

The areas of prognostics, in the view of the panel, still need technical-
base work. Despite fanciful claims from the commercial sector, our analysis is
that prognostics are not yet “here” as a technology ready for widespread
incorporation onto platforms, especially less expensive platforms (like ground
platforms). We therefore recommended the corresponding focus in service S&T
& R&D programs, with the goal of the incorporation of prognostics into selected
legacy platforms, and all new / major modified platforms on an expedited basis,
well within the time-frame considered by this study.

The incorporation of prognostics into the platform-based source-data
automation scheme in the future will enable significant additional logistics
improvements, both cost savings and improved support to the fighting force.
They will open the door to lower maintenance costs, while providing higher
operational availability.

An incremental approach is viable; start with fuel and ammunition on
selected platforms, and grow from there. For source-data automation, the
technology is here today. This ought to be, in the view of the panel, a priority for
service funding, as the payoffs (cost reductions, improved equipment readiness)
are enormous. Platform-based information provides the information the theater
CINC and his team need to lead the U.S. to a new level of logistics
responsiveness.

We note that there is a derived need for a non-platform infrastructure to
read / use all of these data. We believe that the tactical C?/ tactical decision-
support systems can perform this function. Again, the Army’s FBCB2 is an
example of the beginnings of the required technology. Similar technology is
incorporated in the Navy's “Smart Ship” design.

It is the opinion of the panel that such source-data automation will have
great value, and is now within the state-of-the-art. Embedding source-data
automation onto key platforms will provide real-time data to the logistics process
upon which to make logistics decisions — positioning the military to take
advantage of technologies that have proven to be of great value in the
commercial world.

A very important benefit of source-data automation, in addition to its
benefits to the logistics process, is that it provides the data needed to create real-
time “logistics situational awareness’ — a near-real-time summary of the
status of the battleforce. These data are important to operators and provide the
currently-missing link between planning, operations, and logistics.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel



responsibilities. But they must also be integrated into the theater GCCS / Gcss.
This can be achieved through the use of the logistics architect recommended in
other portions of this report.

Precise Delivery

Source-data automation, in combination with over-the-air linkage from
platform to the tactical C? systems, creates an opportunity for “precise
battlespace delivery” of re-supply. Supply requirements can be aggregated and
grouped for optimal delivery. Steer-to guidance (see figure A) with way-points
can be provided to the "delivery trucks" and to the intended recipients, permitting
synchronization of re-supply movements. Supply vehicles can be re-tasked in
real-time to meet emerging needs. The location of every supply platform can be
known to the tactical staff, who can then ensure protection and avoid friendly-fire
incidents. This is a “closed-loop” system! The results — already validated by
Advanced Warfighting Experiments — will be to improve force readiness and
OPTEMPO, and to reduce total materiel, lift, and support personnel
requirements.

Structure

Figure Ill-A
Results

The battlespace logistics information process should aggregate platform
and force requirements generation, and distribution status monitoring through an
“internet” at designated logistics and operational nodes, so as to portray a
common picture of the health of warfighting assets and organizations. This
picture can then be integrated into the overall operational picture for continuous
course of action analysis.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel



processes and information systems, be well integrated with industry,
and be significantly less expensive.

Transformation of the military logistics system is not held up by knowledge
of what to do, not primarily a structural issue, nor is it limited by lack of people,
technology or resources. Instead, the most significant barrier to logistics change
to meet 21° century needs is the lack of an overall business and information
systems architecture focal point — a “champion (in the Arthurian sense).

The study’s findings and recommendations are spelled out in five areas:

e Unified and specified CINCs are unable to perform their Title 10
responsibilities to plan and manage theater logistics. CINCs must be
able to “pull” required support from the logistics system.

¢ DOD's logistics system is fragmented with no end-to-end control,
integration, performance measures and accountability. Transformation
of logistics business and information systems must be led by a
Logistics Systems Architect with power to define and enforce an
integrated system.

« Deployment and sustainment methods and equipment must change.
Ability to deploy in undeveloped areas and under unfavorable
conditions must improve; better use of commercial capability is
needed.

e Decreasing logistics demand is a major element of cutting cost and
improving flexibility. Force structure and weapons systems and
equipment must be upgraded to reduce consumption.

e Logistics vulnerabilities need more attention. Exercises and plans
must anticipate and deal with physical and information attacks on the
logistics system.

Unified or Specified CINCs are unable to perform their Title 10
responsibilities to plan and mange theater logistics. CINC needs must drive
the logistics process. He should have an in-theater logistics component
commander to manage all common support / services in theater (peacetime
training and war). The logistics component commander must report directly to
the theater CINC. DOD should experiment with the JFACC model (task a service
component commander).

Today, Services push initial deployment supplies to a theater with little
CINC / theater planning and control. Unnecessary materiel clogs the lift and
supply pipeline. This, in turn, creates an unnecessary sustainment burden.
Combat forces lack confidence in the logistics system to supply their needs and
insist on creating vast stockpiles of materiel before commencing operations.

DOD must improve the theater CINC’s logistics information tools. These
tools must provide dynamic planning / simulation capability, ability to specify

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation



7. Reduced Theater Footprint

During the Cold War, the United States’ deployed logistic footprint grew
larger and larger as weapon systems doubled and even tripled in size or
tonnage. As a result, air and sealift assets and theater support areas grew to
accommodate these new weapons. Today, however, the Army After Next (AAN)
is moving towards smaller vehicles with increased lethality. This presents the
opportunity to make corresponding reductions in support requirements that will
make possible a significant theater footprint reduction.

For example, a family of light weight vehicles that are maneuverable and
rugged has already been developed. These vehicles could replace the Humvee
in all its present configurations and could further be expanded into the 2 % ST
truck replacement. An added mobility feature is that these vehicles can be
stacked for transportation. This concept would reduce transportation
requirements and provide faster response to the Theater CINC.

Another example concerns alternative fueled vehicles, which could reduce
fuel requirements that are presently major deployment resupply commodities.
Electric vehicles offer significant advantages over internal combustion engines
vehicles, such as reduced fuel consumption in the operating environment and
stealth (battery only) capability. Additionally the hybrid has the potential of
providing ancillary benefits including the capability to provide AC and DC power
to the aircraft and provide external lighting with minimal modification to the
baseline vehicle configuration. Providing these ancillary benefits will enhance
the military utility of the vehicle. In addition, demonstrating the availability of
these benefits will accelerate the commercialization of hybrid electric
technologies.

Recommendation:

That a joint service development office be formed to evaluate the use of
hybrid vehicles.

8. Mobile Off-shore Basing (MOB)

Development of MOBs, while lacking a well-defined operational concept,
suggests a tremendous capability, but also presents a very large investment
requirement. At first glance, the MOB will provide a wide range of capabilities and
deployment flexibility, but it may also be very slow to deploy and difficult to
assemble at an operating site. Consequently the entire concept needs to be
better defined, the engineering feasibility and technical risks need to be

investigated, and its utility needs to be evaluated through simulation and insertion
into various exercise scenarios.

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation -Deployment Panel
a5



Enabling the Warfighter
Theater Level Logistics

° Finding
— Multiple, redundant and costly competing organizations and
requirements for sustainment
— Effective command and control cannot be accomplished
under current organizational concepts
— Logistics and operations not adequately integrated
* Discussion
— CINC J-4

* Cannot direct logistic information operations among the
service components/coalition forces

* Cannot effectively integrate activities of theater service
components, contractor logistics support, host nation
support NGOs...

— It’s too late to start when we go to war
¢ Relationships, policies, procedures, systems
* Logistics may in fact be the key to success e.g. OOTW

Enabling the Warfighter
Theater Level Logistics

* Recommendation
~ Establish a logistics functional component commander

* Utilize Joint Forces Air Component Commander
(JFACC) model

* Single point of responsibility for theater level logistics

* Reports to CINC co-equal to other functional
commanders (JFACC, LCC, MCC)

* Specific responsibilities, authorities and forces designated
by CINC
¢ Implementation

— Develop supporting doctrine, policies, procedures and tools
to enable execution

— Reinforce in deliberate planning and appropriate CINC/joint
exercises

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel

an



LOGISTICS SYSTEMS ARCHITECT —- ADDITIONAL DETAILS

LUG TE) eee

The Summer Study summary report and briefing describes the basic need, concept and functions of the
Logistics System Architect. This section amplifies details of this recommendation.

The Logistics System Architect is a carefully crafted position that:

Ensures a common vision for the business processes and information systems supporting logistics.
Although Focused logistics represents major strides, the concept does not have sufficient detail to
guide the development of an integrated logistics system for the DOD. The DOD uses the Joint
Technical Architecture to develop and document the visions and templates to implement these
processes and systems, The LSA should utilize the appropriate JTA tools to ensure interoperability.
The following figure portrays the essential architectural elements of the JTA.

JOINT TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE

Technical
Architecture

There are significant risks in centralizing development of these processes and systems. To avoid the
“grand design” syndrome, the LSA must develop a flexible architecture that will accommodate the
unique requirements of the services and agencies, focus on joint capabilities and ensure information
exchange. The Services and Agencies should accomplish actual development wherever possible. One
view of the LSA is that he or she is one who guides processes and systems from “stovepipes” to an
integrated logistics system. The advent of network oriented computing systems provides a major
advantage locating and accessing information across many sources. The LSA can make tremendous,
and rapid progress by utilizing WEB and internet technologies to integrate and field capabilities.
The Architect is not a manager of studies — his job is to lead change and that means implementation is
his focus. In order to accomplish that he must avoid long drawn out process reengineering before
deciding to proceed with change. He must also champion implementations that can be accomplished
quickly and flexibly. He must provide the strategic road map and use a building block approach.
The LSA should be involved in requirements, primarily joint requirements, in a substantial way.
Utilizing requirements of warfighters and others, he should review opportunities to share common
solutions and make recommendations to phase in capabilities or go for the 80% solution to reduce
risks and fielding time. He must also use the requirements of existing programs to understand where
information sharing is essential and fits in the “architecture”.

Funding control is essential to achieving the common vision and accelerating the integration of
logistics systems. For most logistics systems, funding is broken into three categories — procurement,
development and modernization and operations and maintenance (O&M). Normally the largest
portion of the $1.8 billion IT budget is for operations and maintenance of existing systems. The LSA
would typically recommend or transfer these funds directly to the Services and Agencies at
apportionment time. The procurement and development/modernization funds represent the

-s



skills if the potential benefits of this element of the transformation are to be
obtained. Dedicated training, development and publishing of “lessons learned,”
developing model contracts, extensive dialogue with industry — all can help to
achieve the objective of fostering a healthy integrated partnership with industry to

focus both on high performance of systems and minimization of TOC — and
logistics demands.

VI. ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIONS FOR DEMAND REDUCTION

Demand Reduction -- Recommendation
Illustrative Actions

Notional Logistics Su Demand = Fuel:
+ Increase fuel efficiency
«Move to fuel cells

» R&D focus on power sources

Present Force Ammo:
Substitute smart for dumb weapons:

Long range fire support
More missile, less artillery

Weight

Water:
« New purification technology
«Host country arrangement
+ Spares:
* More reliable/durable
Fuel Ammo Water Spares oft * Design for ease of repair
er

+ Platform-based IT for condition-
based maintenance

le Fi

The panel has identified the key demands on lift and sustainment, and
believes that significant reductions in demand for each can be realized over the
time-span considered by this study. We believe that this series of seemingly

“evolutionary” changes can have a total impact to force projection that is
revolutionary.

We have identified illustrative actions — some of which already have been
mentioned — for each of the “classes of demand” listed. The panel reviewed

“real” technologies with potential for useful improvements in all of these areas,
and others besides.

Fuel

Fuel is an area where significant progress can and should be made. The
significant increase in fuel efficiency of the US automobile fleet over the last 25
years is indicative of the scope of improvement we believe possible . . . and also

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation — Sustainment Panel
117



extent that operational requirements are met. Participants’ capacity which may
be committed pursuant to this Agreement may include all intermodal shipping
services/systems and all ship types, including container/bulk, container/roll-
on/roll-off, roll-on/roll-off, (of all varieties), breakbulk ships, tug and barge
combinations, and barge carrier (LASH, SeaBee) In the event VISA Participants
are unable to fully meet Contingency requirements, the shipping capacity made
available under VISA may be supplemented by ships/capacity from non-
Participants in accordance with applicable laws and by ships requisitioned under
Section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936. In addition, containers and
chassis made available under VISA may be supplemented by services and
equipment acquired by USTRANSCOM or accessed by the Administrator
through provisions of 46 CFR Part 340.

VISA provides for the staged, time-phased availability of Participants’
shipping services/systems to meet NCA-directed DOD Contingency requirements
in the most demanding defense oriented sealift emergencies and for less
demanding defense oriented situations through pre-negotiated Contingency
Contracts between the government and Participants. Such arrangements will be
jointly planned with MARAD, USTRANSCOM and Participants in peacetime to
allow effective, and efficient and best valued use of commercial sealift capacity,
provide DOD assured Contingency access, and minimize commercial disruption,
whenever possible.

Stages | and II provide for pre-negotiated contracts between DOD and
Participants to provide sealift capacity against all projected DOD Contingency
requirements. These agreements will be executed in accordance with approved
DOD contracting methodologies.

Stage III will provide for additional capacity to the DOD when Stages | and
tl commitments or volunteered capacity are insufficient to meet Contingency
requirements, and adequate shipping services from non-Participants are not
available through established DOD contracting practices or U.S. Government
treaty agreements.

The following is a prioritized order for the utilization of commercial sealift
capacity to meet DOD peacetime and Contingency requirements:

a. U.S. Flag vessel capacity operated by a participant and U.S. Flag
Vessel Sharing Agreement (VSA) capacity of a Participant;

b. U.S. Flag vessel capacity operated by a non-Participant;

c. Combination U.S./foreign flag vessel capacity operated by a
Participant and combination U.S./foreign flag VSA capacity ofa
Participant;

d. Combination U.S. /foreign flag vessel capacity operated by a non-
Participant;

Volume 2 -- DOD Logistics Transformation Deployment Panel



can be achieved by taking advantage of improved accuracy, lethality and
targeting; unmanned systems, and improved fuel efficiency.

Logistics Planning: Traditional “just in case” push procedures are
excessively costly and seriously delay achieving needed levels of combat
capability. CINC’s do not have the capability to dynamically plan and tailor the
composition and timing of either initial force units or sustainment material.

Vulnerability: Large distribution centers with large amounts of material
and single transportation nodes are highly vulnerable to WMD.

Peacetime: Peacetime logistics system costs are high and growing while
military equipment will age excessively unless modernization rates are increased.

Weapons System Support Costs: The necessary weapons system
logistic support requirements are largely determined during early design and
development, but development PMs do not often have stated requirements for
specific ownership costs and are equipped with few management tools. Life cycle
support costs are not visible, and management responsibility is split between
acquisition and logistics stovepipes. The result is a weapons systems inventory
with excessive operating and support costs. Due to long remaining lives, legacy
weapons operating costs must be included in computing the support cost of
systems.

PANEL 1: RECOMMENDATIONS - MANAGING *
DEMAND

Crisis/Warfighting
Force Structure
¢ Peacetime

Weapons Systems Support Cost

Volume 2 ~ DOD Logistics Transformation — Requirements Panel
33