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27–759 PDF 2007

S. Hrg. 109–877

THE FUTURE OF PORT SECURITY: THE

GREENLANE MARITIME CARGO SECURITY ACT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 5, 2006

Available via http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

KATHLEEN L. KRANINGER, Professional Staff Member 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

JASON M. YANUSSI, Minority Professional Staff Member 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 3

Senator Warner ................................................................................................ 5

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 6

Senator Coleman .............................................................................................. 7

Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................................... 31

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 2006

Hon. Patty Murray, a U.S. Senator from the State of Washington .................... 9

Hon. Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

California .............................................................................................................. 12

Hon. Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress from the State of California ..................................................................................................................... 16

Hon. Michael P. Jackson, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 18

Captain Jeffrey W. Monroe, MM, Director, Ports and Transportation Facilities, City of Portland, Maine ............................................................................... 36

M.R. ‘‘Mic’’ Dinsmore, Chief Executive Officer, Port of Seattle, Washington ..... 39

Andrew Howell, Vice President for Homeland Security Policy, U.S. Chamber 

of Commerce ......................................................................................................... 41

James P. Hoffa, General President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters ... 43

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Dinsmore, M.R. ‘‘Mic’’: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 39

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 79

Harman, Hon. Jane: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 16

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 65

Hoffa, James P.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 43

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 94

Howell, Andrew: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 41

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 85

Jackson, Hon. Michael P.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 18

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 69

Lungren, Hon. Daniel E.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 60

Monroe, Captain Jeffrey W., MM: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 36

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 75

Murray, Hon. Patty: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9

Prepared statement with attached photos ..................................................... 51

APPENDIX 

Letter from John J. Castellani, President, dated April 5, 2006, with a statement on behalf of Business Roundtable ............................................................. 103

Page

IV

Questions and responses for the Record from: 

Mr. Dinsmore .................................................................................................... 106

Mr. Howell ........................................................................................................ 108

Mr. Hoffa ........................................................................................................... 113

Mr. Monroe ........................................................................................................ 115

(1)

THE FUTURE OF PORT SECURITY: 

THE GREENLANE MARITIME CARGO 

SECURITY ACT 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 2006

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan Collins, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Coleman, Warner, Lieberman, Carper, 

and Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. Today the 

Committee considers the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act, 

which Senator Patty Murray and I introduced last November with 

our colleagues Senator Lieberman and Senator Coleman. I am very 

pleased that we will shortly be joined by two of our House colleagues who have joined with us in this bipartisan, bicameral effort. Representative Dan Lungren and Congresswoman Jane Harman, who has arrived right on cue, are both outstanding leaders 

on this important issue. This hearing builds on the extensive efforts begun by this Committee 3 years ago to enhance the security 

of our Nation’s maritime transportation system and the international supply chain. 

Seaports are more than just waterfront facilities. They are crucial links in a supply chain that includes all modes of transportation and that reaches across the country and around the world. 

They are also profoundly and unacceptably at risk. The urgency 

cannot be overstated. Approximately 95 percent of our Nation’s 

overseas trade, worth nearly $1 trillion, enters or leaves through 

our seaports. Our ports receive some 8,500 foreign vessels, which 

make more than 55,000 calls per year. These ships carry the bulk 

of approximately 800 million tons of goods that come into our country, including more than 175 billion gallons of oil and other fuels. 

In fiscal year 2005, these vessels also brought more than 11 million containers. I remember 3 years ago when we held the first 

hearing on this issue the number of containers was approaching 9 

million, and now it is more than 11 million. The number of containers entering this country by sea continues to grow by more 

2

than 10 percent per year. While this figure represents robust trade, 

it also signals a considerable risk in our national security. 

Al Qaeda has the stated goal of causing maximum harm to the 

American people and maximum damage to the American economy. 

Clearly, our cargo ports provide a tempting target. One has only to 

visit a major port like Seattle, which I did in February at the invitation of Senator Murray, with its large urban population, two stadiums nearby, and ferries bringing thousands of passengers every 

day, to realize the enormous loss of life that could occur if a dirty 

bomb were detonated. I have also had the honor of visiting the 

Long Beach and Los Angeles ports at the invitation of our colleague Representative Harman, and, again, the magnitude of the 

potential damage is evident when one tours those enormous ports. 

We have already had a glimpse of the staggering economic damage that a terrorist attack on a cargo port could produce, damage 

that would extend far beyond the waterfront. The West Coast dock 

strike in the fall of 2002 cost our economy an estimated $1 billion 

a day for each of the 10 days that it lasted. It not only brought 

those ports to a halt, but harmed businesses throughout the country and along the entire length of the supply chain. That astonishing amount of harm was the result of an event that was both 

peaceful and anticipated. A terrorist attack, obviously, would be 

neither. 

We cannot eliminate the risk of a terrorist attack, but better supply chain security can build a stronger shield against terrorism 

without hampering trade. Indeed, greater security can promote 

trade and strengthen the global economy by building confidence 

and trust. 

That is why Senator Murray and I joined together last year to 

introduce comprehensive legislation. Our bill was developed in 

close consultation with key stakeholders, including port authorities, 

major retailers and importers, carriers, labor organizations, supply 

chain managers, security and transportation experts, and Federal 

and State agencies. Let me highlight just some of the important 

features of this bill. 

First, it directs the Department of Homeland Security to develop 

a strategic plan to strengthen security for all modes of transportation by which containers arrive in, depart from, or move through 

seaports. Despite the myriad of programs aimed at enhancing supply chain security, the Administration has not yet brought those 

programs together in a coherent and seamless strategy. The plan 

we require in the bill would clarify the roles, responsibilities, and 

authorities of government agencies at all levels and of the private 

sector stakeholders. It would establish mandatory baseline security 

standards and provide incentives for additional voluntary measures. 

Most important, the Secretary would be required to develop protocols for the resumption of trade in the wake of an attack. Just 

as the attacks of September 11 grounded all commercial flights, an 

attack on one port would likely result in the closure of all ports for 

a time. More than 4 years later, the Federal Government has yet 

to establish protocols for resuming port operations and for deciding 

which cargo would be released first after an attack. 

3

The impact on factories and retailers using just-in-time inventory, as many businesses do, would be devastating. Much of our agricultural sector would also be harmed as farmers would be unable 

to export their crops. These protocols are essential to enhancing 

our economic security. 

Second, the legislation would require the Department to make 

faster progress in strengthening port security and outlines priorities for action. I am deeply concerned by the slow pace of many 

of the security initiatives. For example, the Department has been 

working on a regulation setting a minimum standard for mechanical seals on containers for more than 2 years. In addition, though 

the Department has recently announced a timeline toward implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential, 

the TWIC card has also languished despite the obvious importance 

of a secure ID to facilitate access to our ports. Such delays are simply unacceptable in this era. This legislation would set and require 

clear timelines for action. 

The bill also provides guidance and deadlines for essential improvements in several well-conceived security programs, including 

the Automated Targeting System, the Radiation Portal Monitor 

Program, the Container Security Initiative, and the Customs-Trade 

Partnership Against Terrorism (C–TPAT). All of these programs 

are well conceived, but their implementation has been spotty and 

flawed in some cases. 

Third, this legislation would provide for the creation of the 

GreenLane, a third tier of C–TPAT, which would offer additional 

benefits to participants that voluntarily meet the highest level of 

security standards. This part of our bill, which was conceived by 

Senator Murray, is going to be part of her testimony, so I will not 

go into detail. Finally, this comprehension legislation would authorize a competitive Port Security Grant Program, with $400 million 

of stable, consistent funding each year. 

America’s cargo ports, large and small, are on the front lines of 

the war against terrorism. Strong accountability provisions are included in this bill to prevent wasteful spending, but we need to 

give the ports consistent, multiyear funding. These port security 

dollars would originate from duties collected by Customs and Border Protection. This is a major commitment of resources. Overall, 

the bill would authorize $835 million a year, but it is fully proportional to what is at stake. 

The controversy over the Dubai Ports issue has focused muchneeded attention on the overall issue of port security. It is my hope 

that we can pass significant port security legislation this year. I am 

very proud to have worked with our colleagues on this issue, and 

I look forward to hearing their views. Senator Lieberman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Thanks for holding this hearing on a gap in our homeland security 

that just should not be as wide as it is, 41⁄2 years after September 

11, 2001. 

As you have said, on a daily basis, 800 million tons of goods cross 

our borders whether by ship, train, or truck. Ninety-five percent of 

it arrives in the 21,000 containers that enter U.S. ports each day. 

4

This is a number that probably startles most people because most 

people live away from all of the activity at our ports in this country 

and do not see how much is coming in. But these ports really are 

our lifeline to the global economy. 

The Administration has told us in testimony before this Committee recently that somewhere between 5 and 6 percent of those 

21,000 containers that come in every day are physically inspected. 

That’s up from 2 or 3 percent a few years ago, and of course I am 

grateful for that progress, but it obviously is not enough. The fact 

is that, at any given moment, our government still has too little 

knowledge of the contents of thousands of multi-ton containers that 

are loaded from the ports onto trucks, trains, and other barges for 

shipment into and across the heart of this Nation every day. The 

nightmare scenario that we all have within us and together want 

to stop, of course, is the smuggling of a nuclear bomb or a dirty 

bomb within a shipping container. We know that criminals have for 

a long time used cargo containers to smuggle drugs, firearms, and 

even people into this country. We know containers have been a 

means for transporting terrorists and their weapons, as well. And 

we know that a terrorist attack at any one of our major ports could 

cause billions of dollars of damage to the economy just in the shortterm. Given the irreparable damage that would result from the 

smuggling of a weapon of mass destruction across our borders in 

a shipping container, we have to act urgently to protect ourselves 

before it is too late, and that means directing people, technology, 

and resources toward the goal of greater port and cargo security. 

That is exactly what the legislation before the Committee today 

does. I am privileged to have joined you, Senator Collins, Senator 

Murray, and Senator Coleman, on this. We are of like mind and 

singular purpose. We understand that we need a comprehensive, 

coordinated, and multilayered strategy to protect not just cargo and 

containers, but ships, piers, ports, and maritime workers, as well. 

We need to do this to protect our national and economic security 

before terrorists strike. That is the purpose of the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act, which we introduced, again, last month. 

The Chairman has outlined the bill and many important things 

it does. I just want to focus on one part that I believe is very important, and that is the Port Security Grant Program. Unfortunately, the Administration has tried to eliminate a dedicated Port 

Security Grant Program from the budget for the last 3 years in a 

row, despite evidence that it is crucial to our ability to improve the 

physical security of our ports. 

Congress has, fortunately, and across party lines, rejected the 

Administration’s proposal as many times as it has been proposed. 

The legislation before us today, our legislation, would ensure 

that every port is eligible to apply for a port security grant. We require them to persuade the Department that they are at risk, but 

once they do, they are eligible for the grant. 

The bill also would reauthorize Operation Safe Commerce to test 

innovative technologies in real-world cargo environments, another 

program, which unfortunately, the Administration has seemed determined to eliminate. 

Madam Chairman, the legislation that we have introduced together and that has been introduced on the House side by ConVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:01 May 08, 2007 Jkt 027759 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27759.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
5

gresswoman Harman and Congressman Lungren and others would 

greatly increase the security of American ports and, therefore, 

greatly raise our defenses against terrorists who would use our 

ports to attack us. 

Here again, we have a choice. The warnings are clear. We can 

await disaster, or we can act proactively to prevent it. Ultimately, 

there is no choice. Our legislation acts wisely to establish the structure proactively and preventively and to provide the resources necessary to protect the American people. 

I join you, Madam Chairman, in welcoming Senator Murray, 

Congresswoman Harman, Congressman Lungren, and I look forward to their testimony and that of the other witnesses that we 

have. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Warner. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER 

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. In 

deference to our distinguished colleagues about to testify, I will ask 

to put my statement in the record with one or two observations 

quickly. 

Quite interesting, the Nation’s 361 ports form the heart of the 

U.S. maritime transportation system and function as the Nation’s 

lifeline. I did not realize it. They handle 95 percent of all overseasU.S. trade, extraordinary. And they serve as the conduit for 90 percent of the war material destined for major theater operations. So 

you can realize the full importance of what we are about to do, as 

this Committee moves ahead with potential legislation. I would like 

to say that I am privileged to represent a State that has the second 

largest port on the East Coast, and our port was recently recognized by the London-based Containerisation International as the 

top port authority in the world for 2004 and 2005. 

I yield the floor. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER 

Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding today’s hearing. It is a topic with 

which I share your interest both from a security and economic perspective. 

I am privileged to represent a State that has the second largest container port 

on the east coast and is the fastest growing in the country. In fact, with the expansion of our existing port and opening of the Nation’s first privately owned and operated terminal next year, the combined ports in the Hampton Roads area of Virginia 

will double in size. We are proud of the fact that Virginia Port Authority was recently chosen by Containerisation International, a London-based publication, as the 

top port authority in the world for 2004 and 2005. 

As I stated before, the issue of enhanced port security is something I have focused 

on for the past several years:

• The 2002 Defense Appropriations Bill (P.L. 107–117) created four new Coast 

Guard marine safety and security team teams—two teams ‘‘to exclusively 

serve those port areas presenting the greatest security challenges, especially 

those ports with a substantial concentration of critical Department of Defense 

facilities. . . .’’ and two with area-wide responsibilities (one for the Atlantic 

Ocean, one for the Pacific).

• I have also worked with my colleague from New York, Senator Schumer, introducing our own bill in the 107th Congress. The ‘‘Port Terrorism Prevention 

Act’’ required strict cargo reporting standards, provided funds for mobile Xray machines, and authorized grants for research and development. The passage of the Port Security Bill in November 2002 included several of our provisions, including $15 million per year in research and development grants.

6

Since that time the maritime industry, our Port Authorities, and the Department 

of Homeland Security have all worked together to improve security at our Nation’s 

seaports. I am proud of the progress made to date and look forward to the opportunity to continue on that path. 

The Nation’s 361 major ports form the heart of the U.S. Maritime Transportation 

System (MIS), and function as the Nation’s lifeline. They handle 95 percent of all 

U.S. overseas trade, and they serve as the conduit for 90 percent of war material 

destined for major theater operations. While only 2-5 percent of the 6 million cargo 

containers that pass through these ports each year are physically inspected, it is important to note the progress made in establishing a strong worldwide network under 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C–TPAT) programs that coordinate prescreening in ports and businesses around the world. 

Once again, thank you Madam Chairman for holding this hearing. I look forward 

to the testimony of our witnesses and to working with the Committee and the rest 

of the Senate to advance the security of our Nation.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. I appreciate your reminding us 

of the military implications of our ports too. That is an important 

point. 

Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is always good 

to see our colleague Senator Murray, and I have not seen Dan Lungren for a while. Your career has taken an interesting set of turns, 

so welcome, Daniel, nice to see you. And Congresswoman Harman, 

great to be with you last week and again to be with you today, and 

thank you for your leadership in the House of Representatives on 

some real important issues. A brief statement I want to make, and 

then to have a chance to hear your testimonies. 

In the wake of September 11, we all recall Congress passing legislation to transform aviation security and to allocate the billions 

of dollars to make our airports safer, and I am reminded, as I travel around the country and around the world, I think we have made 

some real progress. We all know that we have some way to go. 

Around the same time, we recall that we passed the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act. It is a bill that requires Federal agencies, ports, and vessel owners to take a number of steps to upgrade 

security, and 4 years later, I am sorry to say, we have not really 

followed through. 

While it is not physically possible to open up every piece of cargo 

brought onshore on our ports, we are still inspecting, as we know, 

only a very small portion of that. In addition, initiatives to inspect 

high-risk cargo overseas before it comes to us in the United States 

and reward shippers that secure their supply chains have proven 

ineffective to date, largely due to inadequate staffing and an inability to conduct necessary inspections. 

In my State we do not have a port like you do in Washington. 

I was out visiting part of your port operation not long ago, however. We are small potatoes in comparison. We are a big banana 

port but small potatoes compared to what you have in Washington. 

In Delaware, the Port of Wilmington has been the site of a test conducted by the Department of Homeland Security of an identification system for screening port workers and blocking individuals 

with criminal or terrorist backgrounds from accessing sensitive 

areas around our port. The test under way at the port and at three 

other locations has been, we believe, quite successful. However, 

7

Homeland Security, for reasons that are not all together clear to 

me, is ending this test, even though a national screening and identification system is still more than a year away. 

I just do not think this makes a lot of sense, Madam Chairman, 

and I look forward to hearing from Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson, who is out here somewhere in this audience, about what the 

Department of Homeland Security plans to do to get this program 

adopted and implemented nationally and whether it makes sense 

to discontinue a program that is working at our port and a number 

of other ports. We are already using it successfully in the interim. 

Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Again, to our witnesses, welcome, it is great to see you all. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Coleman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. We may be a 

big potato port since we grow them in Western Minnesota, and we 

have a small banana port over on Lake——

Senator CARPER. Keep away from our bananas. 

Senator COLEMAN. First, Madam Chairman and the Ranking 

Member, thanks for your leadership on this critical issue. And I applaud Senator Murray for her leadership, and I see my friends 

from the House who have done an outstanding job. 

This is important. I will reflect on Senator Warner’s words and 

request that my full statement is entered into the record. I have 

just a couple observations. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Coleman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

Thank you, Chairman Collins and Ranking Member Lieberman for holding this 

important hearing and championing the legislative solution to the challenge of port 

security. I also applaud and thank Senator Murray for her leadership on this important issue. As you know, I held two hearings last week in my Subcommittee examining these issues. Our oversight investigation culminated with an extensive staff 

report that makes several recommendations that I believe are reflected in the 

GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act. And I am happy to be an original co-sponsor of this important legislation. 

Many experts in the industry believe it is just a matter of time before terrorists 

compromise the security of supply chain, most likely with a dirty bomb. This legislation will help prevent that from happening by adding standards to supply chain security as well as insisting that the Department of Homeland Security expedite the 

deployment of Radiation Portal Monitors to our Nation’s seaports. It is 41⁄2 years 

after September 11, and we have a massive blindspot at our seaports. More than 

half of the containers that enter through this Nation’s seaports are not screened for 

radiation. 

When enacted, this legislation will significantly enhance our supply chain security 

and codify many existing programs. I also intend to amend this legislation and order 

the Secretary of DHS to report back to us within 90 days with a plan on how to 

improve our screening processes. As I have previously mentioned, the Hong Kong 

system is a promising concept that demonstrates the potential to enhance our supply chain security by screening more containers with both an X-ray and a radiation 

scan. We—as elected officials—have a difficult time explaining to our constituents 

that the Department of Homeland Security believes screening 5.4 percent of containers is adequate when technology may exist to screen close to 100 percent. 

Improving supply chain security demands a public-private partnership. Not only 

is the task too great for government, but we do not possess the in-depth knowledge 

of the global supply chain. 

However, we do know that the supply chain is riddled with vulnerabilities. That 

is what we in the government must fix. Industry and government need to work colVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:01 May 08, 2007 Jkt 027759 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\27759.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
8

laboratively and move forward on programs and technologies to secure trade. Instead of security being a cost of doing business, it must become a way of doing business. 

The bottom line is this: We are safer now than we were yesterday, but we are 

not safe enough. Enacting the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act will make 

us safer and solve many of the challenges that confront our supply chain security 

programs.

Senator COLEMAN. It has been 41⁄2 years since September 11, and 

we still have massive blind spots in our container security. We simply have to do better. There is no question about that. 

I am proud to be an original co-sponsor of this legislation. It is 

important, and it will improve our supply-chain security. 

One of the things that we discussed at our hearing was we 

looked at a system in Hong Kong. I am not here to say that this 

system works, but rather demonstrates the potential to screen 100 

percent of the containers as they come through the port. One of the 

difficulties that I have is explaining to my constituents how we are 

safe when we screen about 5.4 percent of the containers coming in. 

I believe it is important to screen more, and I intend to push the 

Department very hard to come back within 90 days and tell us how 

we are going to screen at least 100 percent of the high-risk containers, those in which we have some reason to believe, based on 

a process that we use, there is some risk. And I think it is also important that we have that screening done before it reaches our 

shores, that we have kind of a multi-layered system here. But the 

best place to do that screening first is before it ever gets on a cargo 

ship coming here. Then, when it gets here, we have to put in place 

many of the mechanisms that are already in place and are 

strengthened by this legislation. 

Two other quick observations. One, I was pleased to hear, and 

we will hear from Secretary Jackson, that the TWIC program, the 

worker ID, is finally moving forward. It was indicated to us that 

by last Friday there would be notice published about this process. 

So I do hope the efforts of this Committee and others to accelerate 

the process by which we improve the level of securities is having 

a difference, and I look forward to seeing those results. 

Then the last observation is this, and that is that this is something that government cannot do alone. We really do need to work 

with the private sector. I heard that. I saw that. They have an interest. Security, instead of being a cost of business, it needs to be 

a way of doing business. We have to work in partnership and, perhaps, work in partnership with some foreign companies since they 

control about 80 percent of the terminals. 

So the bottom line is this: We are safer today than we were yesterday, but we are not safe enough. Enacting the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act will make us safer and solve many of the 

challenges that confront our supply chain security programs today. 

So thank you again for your leadership, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. I want to commend the Senator from Minnesota for his leadership on this. You have held many hearings in 

the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations to look at the effectiveness of our port security programs, and that has been extremely helpful in educating this Committee as we go forward. 

9

1The prepared statement of Senator Murray with attached photos appears on page 51. 

2The photos mentioned by Senator Murray appear in the Appendix on page 56. 

I am very pleased now to welcome our first panel of distinguished witnesses, each of whom has been a true leader on port security. We will start with Senator Murray. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. PATTY MURRAY,1 A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

Senator MURRAY. Thank you very much, Chairman Collins and 

Ranking Member Lieberman, for calling this hearing and for your 

leadership on cargo security. 

I am here today because our country is vulnerable to a terrorist 

attack, and time is not on our side. By using cargo containers, terrorists can deliver a deadly one-two punch to our country. The first 

punch would create an untold number of American casualties. The 

second punch would bring our economy to a halt. 

Cargo containers carry the building blocks of our economy, but 

they can also carry the deadly tools of a terrorist attack. Today we 

are not doing enough to keep America safe. Sitting here in this 

Senate room, it can feel like the dangers at our ports are a million 

miles away. In recent years, some in our government have said 

they could never have imagined the devastation caused by recent 

disasters. 

So let me make this crystal clear. On March 21, just 2 weeks 

ago, a container ship called the Hyundai Fortune was traveling off 

the coast of Yemen when an explosion occurred in the rear of the 

ship. Here is a photo of what happened next.2 About 90 containers 

were blown off the side of the ship, creating a debris field of five 

miles long. There were few fatalities, and the crew was rescued. 

They are still investigating the cause, but it does not at this time 

appear to be terrorist related. Here is another picture. Now I want 

you to imagine this same burning ship just a few feet from our 

shores in New York Harbor, or Puget Sound, or off the coast of Los 

Angeles, or Charleston, Miami, Portland, Hampton Roads, Delaware Bay, or the Gulf of Mexico. 

Now imagine that we are not just dealing with a conventional explosion, we are dealing with a dirty bomb that has exploded on 

American shores. Let me walk you through what would happen 

next. First, of course, there would be an immediate loss of life. 

Many of our ports are located near major cities. If this was a nuclear device that exploded at a major port, up to 1 million people 

could be killed. If this was a chemical weapon exploding in Seattle, 

the chemical plume would contaminate our rail system, Interstate 

5, and SeaTac Airport, not to mention the entire downtown business and residential district. At the port, there would be tremendous confusion. People would try to contain the fire, but it is unclear who, if anyone, would be in charge. Then, when word spread 

that it is a dirty bomb, panic would likely set in. There would be 

chaos as first responders tried to react and residents tried to flee. 

Next, our government would shut down every port in America to 

make sure there were not other bombs in other containers in other 

cities. That shutdown would be the equivalent of driving our economy into a brick wall. It could even spark a global recession. Day 

10

by day, we would feel the painful economic impact of such an attack. American factories would not be able to get the supplies they 

needed. They would shut their doors, lay off workers. Stores 

around the country would not be able to get the products they 

needed to stock their shelves. 

Now, in 2002, as the Chairman said, we saw what a closure of 

a few ports on the West Coast would do. It cost our economy $1 

billion a day. Imagine if we shut down all our ports. One study concluded that if U.S. ports were shut down for just 12 days, it would 

cost our economy $58 billion. Next, we would realize we have no 

plan today for resuming trade after an attack. No protocol for what 

would be searched, what would be allowed in, and even who would 

be in charge. There would be a mad scramble to create a new system in a crisis atmosphere. Eventually, we would begin the slow 

process of manually inspecting all the cargo that is waiting to enter 

the United States. One report found that it could take as long as 

4 months to get them all inspected and moving again. Finally, we 

would have to set up a new regime for port security, and you can 

bet that any new rushed plan would not balance strong security 

with efficient trade. 

The scenario that I just outlined could happen tomorrow, and 

frankly, we are not prepared. Nearly 5 years after September 11, 

we still have not closed a major loophole that threatens our lives 

and our economy. Time is not on our side. We must act. 

Madam Chairman, I approach this as someone who understands 

the importance of both improving security and maintaining the 

flow of commerce. My home State of Washington is the most tradedependent State in the Nation. We know what is at stake if there 

were any incident at any of our ports. That is why I wrote and 

funded Operation Safe Commerce to help us find where we are vulnerable and to evaluate the best security practices. It is why I have 

worked to boost funding for the Coast Guard and have fought to 

keep the Port Security Grant Program from being eliminated year 

after year. Right after September 11, I started talking with security and trade experts to find out what we need to be doing to both 

improve security and keep commerce flowing. 

Ten months ago, I sought out Chairman Collins, and she has 

been a partner in this effort. I approached her because I knew she 

cared about the issue, I knew she had done a lot of work on it already, and I knew she was someone who could get things done. 

Since that day, we have worked hand-in-hand to develop this bill 

and move it forward, and I am very grateful as well to Senators 

Lieberman and Coleman for their tremendous work as well. 

The GreenLane Act recognizes two facts: we must protect our 

country, and we must keep trade flowing. We know we are vulnerable. Terrorists have many opportunities to introduce deadly cargo 

into a container. It could be tampered with any time from when it 

leaves a foreign factory overseas to when it arrives at a consolidation warehouse and moves to a foreign port. It could be tampered 

with while it is en route to the United States. And there are several dangers. I outlined what would happen if terrorists exploded 

a container, but they could just as easily use cargo containers to 

transport weapons or personnel into the United States to launch an 

attack anywhere on American soil. 

11

Madam Chairman, while I have been sitting here I have just received notice that there were 21 Chinese nationals just found this 

morning in a cargo container in the Port of Seattle, and I want to 

commend our Customs agents for being very efficient in finding 

them, but it shows us once again how vulnerable we are. 

The programs that we have in place today are totally inadequate. 

Last May, thanks to the insistence of Senators Collins and Coleman, the Government Accountability Office found that C–TPAT 

was not checking to see if companies were doing what they promised in their security plans, and even when U.S. Customs inspectors do find something suspicious at a foreign port, they cannot 

force a container to be inspected. So we have a clear and deadly 

threat, and we know that current programs are inadequate. So 

what are we going to do about it? We could manually inspect every 

container, but, frankly, that would cripple our economy. 

The real challenge here is to make trade more secure without 

slowing it to a crawl, and that is why Senators Collins, Coleman, 

Lieberman, and I have been working with all of our stakeholders 

and experts to strike the right balance, and the result is the 

GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act. It provides a comprehensive blueprint for how we can improve security while keeping our 

trade efficient. At its heart, this challenge is about keeping the 

good things about trade, speed and efficiency, without being vulnerable to the bad things about trade, the potential for terrorists to 

use our engines of commerce. 

Our bill does five things. First, it creates tough new standards 

for all cargo. Today we do not even have any standards for cargo 

security. 

Second, it creates the GreenLane option, which provides an even 

higher level of security. Companies have the option to follow the 

higher standards of the GreenLane, and their cargo will be tracked 

and monitored from the moment it leaves a factory floor overseas 

until it reaches the United States. We will know everywhere that 

cargo has been. We will know every person who has touched it, and 

we will know if it has been tampered with. The GreenLane will 

push out our borders by conducting inspections overseas before 

cargo is ever loaded on a ship bound for the United States, and we 

will provide incentives for the companies to use the highest standards of the GreenLane. 

Third, our bill sets up a plan to resume trade quickly and safely 

to minimize the impact on our economy. 

Fourth, our bill will secure our ports here at home by funding 

port security grants at $400 million. 

Finally, our bill will hold DHS accountable for improving cargo 

security. DHS is long overdue in establishing cargo security standards and transportation worker credentials. We need to hold DHS 

accountable, and our bill provides the infrastructure to ensure accountability and coordination. 

I want to thank all of our cosponsors and partners, especially 

Chairman Collins for her tremendous leadership, and I want to 

thank Senator Coleman for his leadership and work as Chairman 

of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Senator Coleman has helped expose our vulnerabilities and has worked to help 

develop solutions. I also want to thank the Ranking Member, SenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:01 May 08, 2007 Jkt 027759 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\27759.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
12

1The prepared statement of Mr. Lungren appears on page 60. 

ator Lieberman, for his leadership and his support, and I want to 

commend our cosponsors, Senators Feinstein, Snowe, DeWine, and 

Warner. We are also seeing tremendous progress on the House side 

with SAFE Port Act, and I want to thank Representatives Dan 

Lungren and Jane Harman for their leadership. 

You are going to hear today also from Mic Dinsmore. He is the 

CEO of the Port of Seattle. He has been a real leader on cargo and 

port security issues, and I have been proud to work with him. 

Madam Chairman, today we have a choice in how we deal with 

cargo security challenges facing us, but if we wait for a disaster, 

our choices are going to be much starker. Let’s make the changes 

now, on our terms, before there is a deadly incident. Let’s not wait 

until a terror incident strikes again to protect our people and our 

economy. 

Two months ago, the American people woke up and spoke out 

when they heard that a foreign-government-owned company could 

be running our ports. That sparked a critical debate. Now we need 

to set up a security regime that will actually make us safer. Until 

we do so, none of us should sleep well at night. A terrible image 

like this one, a burning container ship, with a dirty bomb, in one 

of America’s harbors could be on our TV screens tomorrow, so this 

Committee and this Congress must act today. 

Thank you, Chairman Collins. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you so much for your very eloquent 

testimony and your hard work on this issue. 

Representative Lungren, welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. DANIEL E. LUNGREN,1 A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Chairman Collins and Ranking Member Lieberman, for inviting me to testify 

today. Although I now represent a district that is centered in Sacramento County and goes up into the mountains of the Sierras, in 

my previous term of service I represented a district 400 miles away 

on the coast in Long Beach. I had both Long Beach and Los Angeles Harbors in my district. When I was in college, I actually worked 

in the Port of Los Angeles at one of the shipbuilding facilities, so 

I have seen many changes. 

After 16 years away from Congress, it is refreshing to return to 

an environment in which important issues such as port security 

can be approached in a bipartisan and bicameral fashion. The cooperative manner in which the House and the Senate are moving 

companion legislation on this issue is a testament not only to your 

leadership here in the Senate, and that of Chairman King in the 

House, but also evidence of the urgent need, the urgent nature of 

our task. 

On October 18, 2001, Italian port authorities noticed unusual 

movement coming from a container waiting for the next leg of its 

transshipment to Canada. Inside the container, a man was attempting to widen ventilation holes for what had become his temporary residence. The container boasted superior amenities to those 

found in many homes around the globe. It had a bed, a heater, toiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:01 May 08, 2007 Jkt 027759 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\27759.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
13

let facilities, water, laptop computer, and a satellite phone; all accompanied the man for his trip. Also inside the container were airport security passes, an airline mechanic’s certificate valid for New 

York’s JFK Airport, Newark Airport, LA International Airport, and 

O’Hare Airport in Chicago. After the man was temporarily apprehended, he disappeared. His intent and his whereabouts are unknown to this day. 

This event, occurring only one month after the tragic events of 

September 11, is in part the product of an increasingly liberal global trade system. Those of us who remember the great film ‘‘On the 

Waterfront’’ know that only 50 years ago things were quite different. Before the advent of cargo containers, cargo had to be individually loaded, offloaded, transported to a warehouse, inspected by 

Customs officers, and then reloaded on to their respective vessels. 

Although this system ensured transparency, it was, obviously, a 

barrier to trade. Cargo containers are able to accommodate the 

transport of huge volumes of goods without manual intervention by 

dock workers, making global trade more efficient and more profitable, and that is the world that we live in today. 

Today we must ensure that the efficiency of our intermodal 

transportation system does not, however, compromise American security. The various aspects that make it so unique, the various aspects that make it possible for a different world to exist today, compared to 50 years ago, where we do not have things warehoused, 

where our warehouses are really moving on ships and trucks 

around this world, and we depend on that. We depend on these 

things to come to us just in time. That is, as I say, the world we 

live in. At the same time it creates the vulnerability. The very efficiency, the very timeliness of this kind of trade provides opportunities for those who would do us harm. 

I believe that the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act, which 

we are here today to discuss, does help create an environment in 

which we can maintain that efficiency without compromising American security, and it does it primarily by enhancing supply-chain 

visibility and accountability. By involving everyone in the supply 

chain, including importers, freight forwarders, shippers, terminal 

operators, longshoremen, truck drivers, and port employees, this 

Act ensures accountability from the factory floor overseas to seaports here in the United States. 

Let us pause here and take a moment to recognize the nature of 

this endeavor by Senators Collins and Murray. I think it is important to note that neither this effort in the Senate nor the companion effort in the House with the SAFE Ports Act is an afterthought to the recent Dubai Ports World controversy. Senators Collins, Murray, Lieberman, Coleman, and others began work on this 

bill months before the now-defunct acquisition of U.S. port operations by the United Arab Emirates-owned company made headlines around the country. That is important because this is not a 

reaction to headlines. It is not a reaction to the emotion of the moment. It is, in fact, a well-considered response to a continuing problem that affects all of us. The facts that were illustrated in the remarks by the senior Senator from Virginia are extremely important. We take for granted this trade. We take for granted that it 

is going to be there. We do not realize, as was pointed out by SenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:01 May 08, 2007 Jkt 027759 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\27759.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
14

ator Murray, the tremendous impact an attack on a single major 

port would have on all of us. It would not just close down that one 

port. When we had September 11, we did not just close down the 

airport from which the airplanes originated—we closed down our 

entire system. Does anyone think we would not do the same thing 

with respect to ports, at least for a short period of time? 

When I recently was at the Los Angeles Port and met with some 

of the port operators there, they talked about the 11-day slowdown 

we had because of a little labor dispute in LA-Long Beach Harbors. 

They told us it took 100 days for them to recover from that 11 

days. One hundred days, and this is one of the most efficient operators in the entire world. They did not want to have delay. They 

worked as hard as they could to get back to everyday operations, 

but an 11-day slowdown caused a 100-day shortfall in terms of getting back to day-to-day operations. 

Nonetheless, the hullabaloo around the Dubai Ports World deal 

injected a sense of urgency to the need for important port security 

reform, and for that at least we can be thankful. 

The GreenLane Act authorizes important programs such as the 

Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Customs-Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism (C–TPAT) program, creates a third tier of C–

TPAT known as GreenLane, directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to create baseline container security standards and procedures, and importantly, creates a dedicated port security grant program. 

The C–TPAT program, which is authorized for the first time in 

this Act, incentivizes the private sector to share responsibility in 

the protection of our homeland from terrorist attack with government. Entities participating in the international supply chain, from 

importers to land carriers, are encouraged to enter into a partnership with the Department of Homeland Security. By allowing companies to volunteer to submit additional information regarding 

their business operating procedures, manifest data, and container 

contents, they will become eligible for expedited processing once 

their shipment reaches the United States. 

This program, I believe, lies at the heart of future homeland security business approaches. It serves a dual purpose of protecting 

Americans from those that would do us harm, while also creating 

more efficient and profitable business operations for companies 

that choose to participate. 

One company, for instance, toy manufacturer Hasbro, has seen 

a five-to-one return rate since becoming a C–TPAT member in 

2002. What do I mean by that? The company spent approximately 

$200,000 in up-front costs becoming compliant with C–TPAT and 

about $112,500 each year thereafter maintaining compliance. After 

becoming a member, its inspection rates dropped significantly. 

Given that it imported 8,000 containers into the United States in 

2003 and that port authorities charge $1,000 per inspection, they 

are saving about a half a million dollars a year in inspection costs 

alone. There is a carrot and a stick involved in this program that 

is in this bill. 

The GreenLane Act allows the Department of Homeland Security 

to focus a greater percentage of its resources on those threats that 

pose the greatest risk. It makes little sense to spend 99 percent of 

15

our resources hardening 99 percent of what will never become a 

target. Risk-based analysis is appropriate. 

That is why I am here today to commend your efforts. Your legislation is reflective of a common-sense approach to port security. As 

you know, Congresswoman Jane Harman, ranking member of the 

House Intelligence Committee, and I have developed House companion legislation. Our bill, called the SAFE Port Act, Security and 

Accountability for Every Port Act, is somewhat different from the 

Senate legislation before us, but is based upon the common principle of pushing our shores out as far as possible through layered 

defenses. The SAFE Port Act is a comprehensive proposal to 

strengthen the maritime transportation system through the multilayered security strategy that everyone agrees with, which builds 

on existing initiatives to secure the supply chain from the point of 

origin to delivery in the United States. 

It focuses on improved security, both at home and abroad, by expanding capabilities, maximizing available resources, and pushing 

our borders forward. I would just mention three key areas. 

First, enhancing security at our U.S. ports by establishing a riskbased port security grant program with dedicated funding from 

Customs duties. I think a dedicated revenue stream is extremely 

important. It also requires implementation of the TWIC program. 

We are happy to hear, as others are, that it looks like we are finally going to get a TWIC program. Nonetheless, we should keep 

it in our legislation to make sure that we do get it. 

Second, preventing threats from reaching the United States by 

authorizing and improving two Customs and Border Protection cornerstone security programs, CSI, the Container Security Initiative, 

and C–TPAT, similar to the Senate bill. 

And third, tracking and protecting containers en route to the 

United States by improving our ability to detect high-risk containers through strengthening the existing Automated Targeting 

System by requiring entry data, establishing container security 

standards, supporting additional cargo security research and development, and reviving Operation Safe Commerce. 

We held legislative hearings on our bill on March 16, followed by 

a markup in subcommittee on March 30. We added two key provisions to the base bill. First, we established the Directorate for Policy, Planning, and International Affairs in the Department. Within 

this directorate, we created a position of Director of Cargo Security. 

I worked with Congressman John Linder of the Subcommittee on 

Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack to establish the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, which will work to establish relationships across departments and levels of government in order to 

develop a global nuclear detection architecture. 

The full House committee met yesterday to hold a legislative 

hearing on this piece of legislation, and a full committee markup 

is scheduled before the end of April. We have a commitment from 

our leadership to have this on the floor in May. We are working 

expeditiously because we want to make sure that we keep up with 

you, and hopefully, we will meet you in conference. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much, and let me commend 

you for the rapid action in the House of Representatives. You really 

16

1The prepared statement of Ms. Harman appears on page 65. 

have leap-frogged us by getting it out of subcommittee already. I 

do hope that we will schedule a markup within the next few weeks 

on this bill, and I look forward to meeting you in conference. Thank 

you for your good work. 

Representative Harman, it is a great pleasure to welcome you to 

the Committee today. We have worked together on so many different homeland security bills, and it is great to have you here. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JANE HARMAN,1 A REPRESENTATIVE IN 

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much. I am last, but I hope I am 

not least. I am very excited about the progress we are making on 

this legislation. 

Chairman Collins, my Senate Security Sister, has been to the 

Los Angeles-Long Beach port complex twice in the last year at my 

invitation to assess best practices and observe how various agencies and levels of government cooperate and coordinate. She even 

buckled up in a Coast Guard helicopter in Maine-like weather to 

see the huge complex from the air. Now, if I could only get her to 

go for a run on the beach, as Secretary Chertoff has. 

It was during our work on the Intelligence Reform Bill in 2004 

that Senator Collins, Senator Lieberman, and I really bonded. Our 

collaboration yielded great results then, and I am confident that it 

will again. 

If there is a silver lining to the recent Dubai Ports World debacle, it is that it roused Congress from a deep security slumber, at 

least as far as port security was concerned. Congress and the 

American people are now focused on the huge vulnerability of our 

seaports. 

I applaud your leadership and initiative on this issue. You and 

your partners, Senator Murray and Senator Coleman, have a terrific bill in the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act. My California colleague, Dan Lungren, and I used many of the same ideas 

in crafting our SAFE Port Act. It differs in some respects, of 

course. In those ways it is better. [Laughter.] 

But it is similar, and in that regard, I want to also commend contributions from a number of House members, including Bennie 

Thompson, the ranking member of the full House committee, Loretta Sanchez, ranking member on Representative Lungren’s subcommittee, and former Representative Doug Ose, whose idea it was 

to use dedicated Customs revenues to fund long-term multi-year 

port security improvements. 

I will not share my worst nightmare with you. It is just as bad 

as Senator Murray’s. I am not going to embellish it with some of 

her information. But I also will not share with you how many times 

focused dock operators have found human beings in containers at 

the Port of Los Angeles. That is truly scary. Let’s understand that 

instead of Chinese stowaways, we really could have terrorists in 

those containers, and they could be fully armed. A lot of the things 

they might be armed with would escape our detection techniques, 

and they could attack us, both in those ports, or if they continued 

to be in those containers, in the interior of the United States. 

17

Let’s remember that 50 percent of our cargo, our container cargo, 

goes through the LA-Long Beach complex, and some of it directly 

goes on rail into the center of our country, and it may even end 

up in Maine or Connecticut. So this is a very bad nightmare. 

Why did these incidents happen despite steps taken by the 

Homeland Security Department to improve supply chain security? 

Well, first, as others have said, we still do not really know what 

is in the box, evidence, human beings might be in a box labeled 

‘‘clothing.’’

Second, the system used to determine whether or not a container 

poses a threat remains flawed. There have been good efforts at 

DHS. I applaud them, and I am sure you are going to hear about 

them from Secretary Jackson in a moment, but nonetheless, the 

system is not even close to what it needs to be. 

Third, many ports, as we know, do not have the technology in 

place to screen containers for contraband or weapons of mass destruction. 

Fourth, CBP and the Coast Guard do not have adequate personnel to examine containers and conduct inspections throughout 

the worldwide supply chain or at U.S. ports. 

The legislation we are discussing in both chambers is strategic, 

comprehensive, and badly needed. I am very proud to be part of 

this bipartisan, bicameral effort. Port security, as you have heard, 

must be layered and strategically structured to enhance safety 

without disrupting the flow of trade. These are two competing 

goods, and we will either have both or we will have neither, unless 

we get it right. 

The terrorists, as we know, attack us asymmetrically, and they 

will look for holes in our security network and look to strike where 

we are weakest. It is impossible to hand search every container entering the country. As Congressman Lungren has just said, that 

was the old port security. The new port security has to have better 

strategies and the use of technology. 

Our bill would do that. It would push out our borders and help 

prevent bad actors and hazardous materials from reaching American soil at all. I think we failed if those materials get in. Let’s understand that the residents around the Port of Los Angeles, who 

live in my congressional district, are at risk if we find a container 

there that includes some sort of radiological bomb. 

Central to success on port security and the war on terrorism in 

general is better intelligence and better technology. These two coordinates apply as much to immigration and border points-of-entry 

as they do to port security. Let me make that point again because 

I do worry that when we pass this excellent legislation—and we 

will—we may push the terrorists to find other ways to get bad people and bad material into America. So it is important that we think 

strategically about the whole issue of entry into America. 

We have to make our ports safe, but we also have to make our 

other borders safe, and in that connection, I would just observe 

that building bigger walls is not an adequate answer. Finding ways 

to get better intelligence on who is trying to come here,or what 

they are trying to bring here and stopping those people and those 

things is a much better strategy for true border security. 

18

1The prepared statement of Mr. Jackson appears on page 69. 

Good maritime security measures have been introduced in the 

past, I know, many of them in the House, and they have languished. But now, finally, Congress seems appropriately focused, 

and as you heard from Congressman Lungren, in the House we 

have already had subcommittee markup, and we are poised for full 

committee markup in a few weeks. To my Senate friends, you 

should know that this is nothing short of a legislative miracle. 

Time is of the essence. I am glad you are going to try to catch 

up with us. [Laughter.] 

Good luck. The terrorists are not waiting on the legislative schedule, and nor should we. 

Thank you very much for inviting me to testify. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you so much for your testimony and 

your extraordinary leadership. 

I want to thank this entire panel for being here today. This is 

evidence that when confronted with a serious threat to our homeland security, we can work together across the aisle, and even more 

remarkably, across the Hill—with the House and the Senate working together. I am very pleased that we have such a strong team 

leading the way, and I am convinced that we will see success this 

year. Thank you very much for being here. 

I am now going to ask our second panel to come forward. Our 

second panel is really just one witness. It is Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson. He was confirmed by this Committee last year to 

serve at the Department of Homeland Security, and we look forward to hearing his comments today. 

Senator Murray, I understand that you are going to stay for part 

of the hearing. If you would like to join us up here, we would be 

happy to have you do so. We would even let you sit on the Republican side if you wanted to. [Laughter.] 

I guess that would be too traumatic. [Laughter.] 

Secretary Jackson, welcome, and you may proceed with your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL P. JACKSON,1 DEPUTY SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Chairman Collins, and thank you, 

Ranking Member Lieberman. I am grateful to be included in this 

testimony, and I am very grateful for the work that you are doing 

in this Committee. 

You have talked about the intersection of interest and of will and 

of commitment to make a bill that the House and the Senate share. 

I just want to tell you today, and to reiterate throughout my appearance here, that the Administration shares your commitment to 

improved maritime security, to make a difference with this legislation. We have been working closely with your staff for months on 

it, and we are committed to continue to help you craft as strong 

a bill as possible for passage and to improve our transportation security in the maritime world. 

I will not reiterate the importance of making increased security 

here. I would like to say that we are very grateful in particular for 

19

this legislation, as well as the legislation in the House, because it 

has helped us focus the interest and the commitment of our Department and of the Congress on a common set of goals and objectives, and for that, I think we have made good progress. 

We have made, however, and I want to say for the record, transformational improvements since September 11. I agree with Senator Coleman, we have done a lot, we have not done enough, there 

is more to do. I will just say it simply and stop. There is more to 

do. We are prepared to roll up our sleeves with you and get this 

done. 

I would like to talk particularly today then about the path ahead 

and to start with a discussion of some of the principles, which the 

Administration and the Congress, I believe, share in common as we 

approach this, so that we can find a template, an approach, a basic 

set of principles in agreement, and then flesh out those principles 

to make programs that are stronger and to accomplish the objectives that you have laid out for us today. 

First, I want to talk about risk. The first principle—and it is one 

that has been stated here in this Committee today—is that we 

have to talk about risk and some sense of starting where the highest risks are. As an Administration, our programs have been designed to start with the question of the nuclear and weapons of 

mass destruction risk. That is the starting point. 

Second, a layered system of security, a strong layered set of 

interlocking tools. I think this is the most important part in a way 

for us to understand, to get our brains around, how to pull these 

pieces together in the legislation and in our programs. No one single thing will be sufficient in and of itself to give us the security 

that we need in this maritime domain. We have a system of interlocking tools, and single-point failure is reduced if we have multiple 

layers of security working in concert with each other. The security 

is seldom adequately delivered via a single silver bullet. 

Next. It begs the obvious, but this is a global supply chain. It 

serves multiple different economies and governments, and it is a 

series of interdependent private sector driven businesses, so a second doctrinal component of our cargo strategy has been, where possible, to push security out, to push the borders out. So I think that 

is something that is very much embedded in this legislation. We 

are fundamentally in alignment with you there. 

Close partnerships with the private sector are a third component, 

indispensable to make this work. 

A fourth component, we have to strengthen government-to-government partnerships. When we talk about the Container Security 

Initiative, as an example of our government-to-government partnerships, we have to understand that we cannot control everything 

they do. We have to work cooperatively with them, and it is the 

same thing with the private sector when we work on a program 

like C–TPAT, which is voluntary. We have made tremendous 

strides with the private sector. I believe they have a strong commitment to improve security, so we have to leverage both the public, foreign, and the private relationships as well. 

Let me try to just divide where the working product has to hit. 

There are four basic areas that we have to work on in this enterprise: First, vessel security; second, personnel security; third, we 

20

have port facility security; and fourth, we have cargo security. So 

these four areas, cargo, people, facilities, and the vessels themselves, we have to work on those four sets of issues domestically 

and abroad, so you basically have a grid with 8 cells in it, and we 

have to fill in programs, processes, and tools to help us at home 

and abroad to strengthen this. 

I would say again, this legislation, I believe, generally tries to 

look across that range and find appropriate tools to create this system of systems. 

So let me just say a couple of words about where the Administration thinks we can get the highest return in the short term and 

where we would like to focus. Again, I think these are things that 

the Committee has found also to be high-priority items. 

The first of these is in an area that we have aggregated under 

the rubric ‘‘secure freight.’’ It has two essential parts, first, better 

targeting, and second, enhanced inspection tools. 

On better targeting, we believe, as an important tool, that the 

Department’s Automated Targeting Systems run at the Customs 

and Border Protection is an indispensable tool. We have made tremendous and strong growth in using this tool to screen all inbound 

cargo. We use this tool to screen and then do a profiling of risk for 

100 percent of all inbound containers into this country. We assign 

scores for containers of high risk, and we then inspect 100 percent 

of all the high-risk containers. The next generation tool that we 

would use here would give us, and the ATS system, a more rich 

and deeper profile of the prehistory of a container move. Where has 

the cargo been? Who has touched it? What information do we have 

about it from order to order fulfillment, to the intermodal supply 

chains that touches that container as it moves across the globe. 

Today there are resident, and multiple different and non-connected 

businesses, information about this prehistory. 

I believe it is possible, working in the right way, to aggregate 

that data, fuse it, share it globally, not only for containers that are 

bound for the United States, but to create a true global switch so 

that we can try to begin to get our arms around a close-loop system 

in which governments who have containers inbound have the opportunity to evaluate a richer and deeper prehistory of this to score 

that risk as they deem fit and to take measures as appropriate to 

inspect it. This is a natural extension of what we have done. It is 

a big idea here, but it is not an idea that cannot be delivered in, 

I think, a reasonable timeframe. 

I would say, particularly to Senator Murray, that it builds very 

much on the initiative that you helped launch after September 11 

to begin to probe supply chain weaknesses and to work with that 

data to help us build the next generation of tools, so for that I am 

very grateful. 

I will tell you that before I took this job at the Department, I was 

invited by the Department to come talk about cargo security, and 

this was the area in a speech, which I was grateful to be asked to 

give to the people who are now my DHS colleagues, that I identified as the primary point and the focal point for us for next-generation tools. 

Next, as part of secure freight, we need enhanced inspection 

tools. At home, again, inspection tools at home, inspection tools 

21

abroad. At home, our target is to have 100 percent inspection of all 

containers that are transported by truck or rail from a U.S. port 

into the interior of our country. Abroad, our goal is to increase materially the number of containers inspected by radiation detection 

tools and by non-intrusive detection tools such as large X-ray devices. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, which we have created at the Department and which this bill authorizes formally, 

has a vital role in making that process work. 

I would tell you that Secretary Chertoff was in Asia last week 

on a trip and was able to look at the Integrated Container Inspection System pilot in Hong Kong. He comes back with enthusiasm 

about the opportunities for this. I would just say after extensive 

discussion with the industry about the so-called ICIS pilot, we believe that its underlying technology and business concerns are very 

valuable and possible as a way to take, again, a next-generation 

and substantial leap so that we can use those tools, multiplexing 

the images into the United States and look at that inspection data, 

along with our targeting data, and have a much richer and deeper 

profile of what’s headed our way. 

And, Senator Coleman, your Subcommittee has done very good 

work. I was grateful for the chance to talk about this particular 

topic with you last week. 

Finally, on the high-priority list, in addition to secure freight, is 

TWIC. Let me just say we have last week published a request for 

qualifications. There are three moving parts to go from where we 

are today, which is, we have completed a pilot phase of this work. 

We are now moving straight into deployment nationwide with the 

TWIC program. It has three moving parts. One, it requires regulations from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Two, 

it requires cognate rules by the Coast Guard. And three, it will require some procurement work so that we can bring in the tools for 

card production and distribution, for intake management, and for 

the back-room processing tools that we are going to need to make 

this a nationwide program. 

I think we have a good architecture. We have a path ahead. It’s 

going to be a balance, but it is a very aggressive commitment. Secretary Chertoff has made it very clear to his team, do it, get it 

done, get it in the street, get it going. And I promise you, that is 

where we are headed. We are moving all three of those components 

at warp speed through the process, through the regulatory process 

and through the procurement process, and I am going to be very 

pleased to come back to this Committee and show you the results 

of that in the weeks ahead. 

Finally, I’ll just say a quick word about the GreenLane Maritime 

Cargo Security Act. We believe that this proposed legislation reflects a great deal of solid agreement, as I’ve already tried to indicate, and we are committed to trying to work with you to close any 

gaps we have, to refine any places where we find disagreement, 

and to work with you as you move this through your Committee 

and to the floor. 

We have already talked about a core component part of your legislation, which is next-generation Automated Targeting Systems. 

We believe that the vision that I have just briefly outlined is in 

alignment with you and will help do just that. 

22

On the movement of radiological material, which is a key part of 

this legislation, we are in alignment in the core with you. We believe that the deployment strategy, both at home for getting to 98 

percent inspection with some random inspection of the remainder 

on a short path by the end of next year, will get us where we need 

to be. We can accelerate this a bit. We are trying very much to 

push that as much as we possibly can to get that penetration there 

and at our land borders. 

We think the GreenLane concept in principle is very important. 

I would just say a few words about it. I think that it is important 

to retain some flexibility for a voluntary program to define the 

terms and conditions of this GreenLane third-tier type approach. 

We believe that giving carrots and sticks, as has been spoken about 

already today, is important. The industry has to find sufficient motive to participate with us, and having the benefits of voluntarily 

submitting to a more rigorous security profile. We will need the 

chance to be nimble, and we will need the chance to be responsive 

to particular attacks or incidents in a post-response manner. If it 

is an explosion offshore, the response would be different than if it 

is an attack at the fences, at the gates of a terminal facility. 

So we need to have the flexibility, as you think through the 

GreenLane privileges, to be able to work at that in an effective 

way. 

We are grateful for your formalization of the Under Secretary for 

Policy. We are also very much in agreement on the need to create 

in the Department in our policy shop a cargo security position, a 

Director of Cargo Security. I will tell you that shortly after I came 

on board, I started trying to recruit a couple of stars from the industry. We are committed to doing this, and we are grateful for the 

legislation that makes it formal. 

On the port security grants, we have a difference of opinion on 

the structure of port security grants. We are, as an Administration, 

committed to a $600 million transportation infrastructure program, 

and the targeted infrastructure program that we have proposed. 

Let me just explain briefly why we think that flexible program 

is a better alternative to simply earmarking in the modes of transportation for transit grants, port security grants. 

Last summer, after the attack in London, we were together worrying over how best to focus our funds and our resources, our limited resources, in the best possible way, and after the Dubai Ports 

World discussions that we have had here in public, we are now 

showing a lot of attention on the maritime world, rightfully so, appropriately so, absolutely necessarily so. But what we think is the 

principle of being able to allow State and local leaders and terminal 

owners in multiple different types of facilities to have some flexibility to be able to align those resources with the highest risk is 

a valuable tool. We have talked about the importance of having 

risk-based investment. This gives our colleagues at the State and 

local level the flexibility to say, ‘‘I’m concerned more about ports 

this year. We’re going to put some more focus on that.’’ They can 

also use UASI, State grants, and local grant money in this area. 

They have not historically used as much as we think they might 

and could and should, perhaps, in some cases. 

23

But we are looking overall for a principle of targeting on highest 

risk and giving flexibility to be nimble as the threat evolves over 

time. When we lock these massive programs years in advance and 

then drive to an agenda, it sometimes reduces the flexibility that 

we have to be nimble and responsive to the threats that we face 

in the world ahead. 

So I would stop there simply and say thank you very much for 

the opportunity to continue our work with this Committee, and I 

am happy to answer questions that the Committee might have on 

our programs and your program. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much for your testimony. I 

am going to interpret your testimony as an endorsement of the 

GreenLane bill with a few qualifications, and I think my colleagues 

here would all agree with that interpretation. If you would like to 

disabuse me of that, I will give you an opportunity to do so. 

Mr. JACKSON. Madam Chairman, I want to be as close to this 

Committee and our work together as we possibly can, and what I 

would tell you is we are very close around very many particulars 

and very much of the philosophic approach that this bill brings to 

the table. We have some changes, some edits, some suggestions, 

some differences. I will try to be clear about that here today and 

also to have our staff line-by-line, word-by-word, go over your latest 

draft to make sure that you have the benefit of our counsel as best 

as we can give it to you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. JACKSON. But substantial alignment, and I think that is a 

very good thing. 

Chairman COLLINS. I think it is as well. I want to pick up on an 

area of disagreement, and that has to do with having a line item 

for port security grants. The Administration has long recognized 

the importance of enhancing our port security, and yet, the Administration’s budget continues to lump port security grants into an 

overall infrastructure grant program. That is an approach that 

Congress has rejected in years past, and I am quite confident will 

do so again this year. 

It seems inconsistent to me for the Administration to say: Yes, 

port security is a priority. It is a major vulnerability. We need to 

do more. We have developed all these programs such as CSI, C–

TPAT, but, no, there should not be targeted funding for port security grants. 

We have made the $400 million that we proposed a competitive 

program to address some issues that the Administration has. We 

know that the American Association of Port Authorities says that 

is needed each year to just meet the goals of the Maritime Transportation Security Act. If you lump port security in with other 

infrastructure needs, you risk not allocating any funding to port 

security grants or insufficient funding. I do not understand why the 

Administration is so resistant to a targeted program, given the 

overwhelming evidence and advice that we receive from terrorism 

experts. We do need to put more resources into this area. 

Mr. JACKSON. Let me try to summarize it this way. We share the 

conviction that infrastructure investment in ports is a vital priority 

for the country, and in fact, what we have done—and where I think 

the difference is—is how best to make those investments. The prinVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:01 May 08, 2007 Jkt 027759 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\27759.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
24

ciple that we are trying to press very hard is the principle of flexibility and nimbleness. We authorized these programs in a siloed 

fashion years in advance and spend a year trying to get the money 

out the door, the applications reviewed in a systematic way. And 

what we are saying is we think that by giving States and locals 

more flexibility about how they take core infrastructure programs 

and their grant money associated with it that we can be more responsive to the threat itself, that we will have a more threat nimble system of grants. 

In fact, the Administration has proposed more money, almost 

double the amount of money for the individual programs this year. 

We did the same thing last year. We proposed, aggregate them, 

give us some flexibility, and we are supporting more money. That 

will allow for the particular needs to be served, we think, and it 

will give us a stronger tool that is responsive to the terrorist 

threat. The terrorist threat is driven by our intelligence assessments, as Representative Harman spoke. We have to have tools in 

our tool kit that do not take 2 years to change course when we see 

that threat change, and that is the core reason for our program. 

I will tell you, if the Congress should decide—we did propose it 

last year, the Congress decided not to support it. If the Congress 

decides not to support it, we will make a targeted marine port security program that is as strong and as good as we can make it, 

and we will do so with the funds we have available. 

Chairman COLLINS. As you mentioned, Congress did reject that approach last year and instead provided $175 million for port security grants for this fiscal year. We are deep into this fiscal year, 

and yet the Administration still has not provided guidance, and as 

a result, not a dime of that grant money has been awarded. Why 

has that been held up? Does that reflect opposition to the concept? 

What is the problem? 

Mr. JACKSON. No. It does not reflect opposition to the concept, 

and I believe that the release of the grant guidance is imminent. 

I get my first briefing on the details of it this week, and the next 

step out the door is a very short step out the door when the Secretary and I have had a chance to review it. We are trying to make 

sure that it is philosophically aligned with the risk-based concerns 

that you have articulated and that are animating the core programs of the Department. It will be very soon. 

Chairman COLLINS. I am pleased to hear that, and I hope you 

will keep us informed——

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman COLLINS [continuing]. Because I do think that is an inordinate delay. 

When I was in Seattle, I saw the radiation portal monitors that 

were used to detect radiation, and they worked pretty well. There 

were some false positives, but they did not delay the trucks that 

were rolling through them, and I thought it was an effective system. Our legislation would require that there be screening for radiation of all containers entering our seaports within a year of enactment. But I have to tell you, as I was looking at the system, I was 

struck by the fact that it is really too late by the time radiation 

is detected in Seattle. If in fact one of those containers includes a 

nuclear weapon or the makings of a dirty bomb, by the time it is 

25

detected in Seattle, the risk, the explosion may already have occurred. What are we doing to push out our borders to install these 

radiation portal monitors overseas so that before the containers 

come to our shores, they have already been screened for radiation? 

Mr. JACKSON. That is an excellent question. Let me try to do a 

couple of layers of that. First, the first important layer of defense 

is the screening process, the container profiling that we do in our 

Virginia targeting center at CBP. That is a two-part process. It involves all of the electronic data we have about the given container. 

It involves a massive history file that allows us to detect patterns, 

look at trends, find areas to probe to understand rules that will 

allow us to use algorithms. There are many of these rules that 

drive a score for us to profile the container. That is Level 1. If you 

have not had an opportunity to see this, I volunteered to Chairman 

King yesterday to take him out and show him because it is an impressive set of tools, but we can also show you what the next generation looks like. That is Level 1. 

Level 2, the ICIS program that I mentioned is an example of the 

industry, I think, that has very responsibly volunteered to tax 

themselves, to assess a fee on themselves to put the radiation portal monitors in the inbound part of this equation overseas. We are 

talking with that industry. As I said, my boss just got back last 

week from an actual look-see at it and discussion, and we have 

some significant hope that we can work with the industry in a way 

that might see this work across the globe in many ports. 

Will it be 100 percent overnight? No, it can never be turned on 

like a switch, but we see this as a very promising tool. I do not 

think the tool that is currently working in Hong Kong is the panacea. The technology is not as complete as it can be. That is what 

DNDO’s research is producing for us, a next generation spectroscopic tool that allows us to target which particular type of radiation is there so that we can, with a more fine comb, understand 

whether we have a problem or not. But we have current generation, next generation, with afterburners blowing to move into the 

ports and to our land ports. We have the concept of multiplexing 

those images, in other words, taking those images and sending 

them to the United States so we can align our targeting work with 

the ATS, with the visual image, the inspection that is overseas, 

and together making a much stronger connection there. So that is 

a business concept that secure freight proposes for this next generation of pushing the border out. 

It is, I think, a powerful idea, especially if we can take the enthusiasm of terminal operators and port owners and ocean carriers 

around the globe, shippers, to help us assess the fees that they 

would make to do this. We, obviously, would have to have an investment and make a system that would work in a more global 

way. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. I mean I know 

there is general rumoring around here that you and I spend too 

much time together, having worked together, as was shown in your 

first two questions, and I thank you for them. 

They are the first two I was going to ask. I am not going to repeat them, but I agree totally with the Chairman on the port secuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:01 May 08, 2007 Jkt 027759 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\27759.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
26

rity grant program. This is a real priority. You understand that 

and have stated it very clearly today, this bipartisan feeling of Congress. 

You know, people ask me at home, ‘‘What’s the thing you think 

we haven’t done enough of yet to protect our security?’’ And I always start with port security. If we just lump the money together, 

there is a danger that we all worry about, that there is not going 

to be the money there for meeting this priority. So I was glad to 

hear you say at the end that if this is our will in Congress, you 

will do your best to carry it out. 

The second line of questioning, we both shared the same reaction. I was waiting to hear you say the Administration endorses the 

GreenLane proposal. I did not quite hear that. I heard about substantial alignment, which is good because we do not have to go to 

one of the auto places to get aligned. 

But now, let me ask you this: Where are we out of alignment, 

just either generally or specifically? What are the areas where the 

Administration is not happy with the bill, where we have to work 

together? 

Mr. JACKSON. Well, I will take on the GreenLane itself, that particular part of it. I think that we need a little flexibility to discern 

what the incentives should be and how they align with the C–

TPAT program. That is something, I believe, that is a bridge that 

we can cross with some good and short-term work here to design 

a way to give us the flexibility to figure out in a post-incident fashion what would constitute the privileges that we would want to 

award to a carrier to bring containers in on a more expedited basis. 

That is an example of something that I think deserves a little bit 

of further work. 

On the funding issue about the dedicated funding, I have some 

work to do with my OMB brethren to opine about that in a formal 

and final fashion, and I tell you that I will make the commitment 

to work with my colleagues in the Administration on that issue. 

But I think the principle of spending money on reducing port risk 

and port vulnerability is one that you would see DHS in agreement 

with you on. 

So there are examples of that. There is another example about 

some of the legislation in the House and the Senate, I think, points 

to performance indicators. I am a vigorous advocate that we measure and report to you what our goals and objectives are and how 

we run our programs and we do so routinely and make it quite 

transparent, our performance. When we fail, we fail. When we succeed, we succeed. 

But, for example, putting a deadline of one year on getting radiation portal monitors installed is unrealistic based upon the production capabilities and also trying to balance the idea that we are 

moving to a new generation. I really urge you, if you have not had 

the opportunity, to be briefed in more detail about this next-generation leap that DNDO is doing. And with the support of Congress, with a half a billion investment in this office, to move to a 

much more strong tool. 

And so this is the constant tradeoff about risk and speed of technology and innovation. We are trying to balance the current generation of tools and the next-generation deployment and to bring 

27

these two into harmony in a way that gets us a stronger set of tools 

out there for the work we have to do. It is a refinement. We can 

get to, for example, 98 percent coverage on exit from our ports in 

the United States into the country of trucks carrying these containers out by December of next year. That is the plan. And we 

would say to get that last 2 percent is a massive investment which 

should not probably be spent. We can tackle that 2 percent with 

portable radiation detecting programs that come into a small port 

that has very low volumes on a given day and, with a random 

basis, make such a presence in that port that we would have a deterrent effect. 

So there are details like this, Senator, that I think we should 

work through with you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate the answer. Those are differences, but they are bridgeable. Those are not chasms that cannot be bridged, and I think the sooner we do that, the better everybody will be. 

I want to pick up on, in the time I have remaining, your last 

point. Under the DHS Secure Freight Initiative, you have stated 

the Department goal, which is to inspect 100 percent of all containers coming into a U.S. port for radiation and overseas to materially increase the number of containers inspected by radiation detection tools and non-intrusive inspections, including large-scale Xray devices. And today, you again stated the goal of 98 percent inspection. 

But as we have been educated on the Committee and as the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) last week heard 

from Steve Flynn again, a very strong argument was made that 

unless we have both the portal monitors and the non-intrusive Xray equipment, we are not really inspecting. Am I right that the 

98 percent goal you talked about is for portal monitor inspecting? 

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So as I understand it—you correct me if I 

am wrong—the portal monitors inspect a container, and they can 

detect radiation. But they cannot detect the nightmare package of 

a dirty bomb or a nuclear weapon that is shielded because the 

shielding is there to stop the radiation from coming out. And that 

is why the non-intrusive X-ray equipment is necessary because it 

can see the shielding, and once it does, presumably, the container 

gets pulled off and gets physically inspected in some way. 

So my concern is that the budget that DHS has given us for the coming fiscal year includes $178 million for additional radiation 

portal monitors, which does move along at a good pace, and I appreciate that, but just $33 million for additional non-intrusive inspection equipment. So I wanted to ask you, do you agree that we 

need both types of technologies to ensure that neither nuclear or 

dirty bombs are able to be smuggled into the country, and if so, 

why are we not appropriating up to that level to achieve that level 

of protection as soon as possible? 

Mr. JACKSON. Both tools are valuable tools. They are not the only 

tools that help us address the risk that you are presenting. 

The first point, again, is the layered security idea. Better targeting and a better profiling of the container is the starting point 

for making this assessment. 

28

Senator LIEBERMAN. And that is the kind of computer work——

Mr. JACKSON. That is the ATS—exactly, yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And that is great. 

Mr. JACKSON. So that is part one. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. The beginning. 

Mr. JACKSON. Part two is then we would inspect all of those containers with both tools for the high-risk ones that we have identified as high risk. We would randomly inspect other containers both 

for radiation and using the large-scale X-ray machines so that we 

have some check and randomness about the process of looking with 

both tools. And then the idea of the radiation portal monitors on 

exit is, again, aiming to the goal of 100 percent of those containers 

leaving having this additional check. In other words, it was not—

we cannot inspect literally through these two tools everything coming off of a ship without fundamentally changing the business design of port operations, as I think Senator Murray mentioned. But 

as we get these tools and test them in configurations where we can 

make them intersect in ways that balance security and mobility, 

we are eager to deploy them in that fashion. That is why the idea 

of the ICIS program overseas inbound of trying to find a way to 

align in the inbound lane the two things would be another layer 

of security. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me interrupt, with thanks, because my 

time is up. But as I understand the Administration request, it will 

bring us to a point where, by the end of 2007, every port in the 

United States will have a portal monitor. 

Mr. JACKSON. It will be by that point 98 percent of all the containers leaving a port would be done. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. Pretty good. 

Mr. JACKSON. And then, sir, in those ports that do not have the 

lane equipment, there will be handheld devices; there will be random inspections using portable tools. So there will be a concept of 

operations that we can move through in those ports as well. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. But the $33 million requested for non-intrusive inspection equipment, which can detect the shielding on a potential radiation-containing container, will only cover five prototype 

systems. So that is leaving—in other words, on this schedule, when 

do we get to a point where we have enough equipment to see the 

shielding that may be covering a dirty bomb or a nuclear weapon? 

Mr. JACKSON. Well, again, we are doing that for every one of the 

high-threat containers that we identify. I would like to be able to 

get you a schedule, if permitted. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I would appreciate that. 

Mr. JACKSON. That will give you a deployment schedule for future years, commitment of large gamma ray, X-ray type machines. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Bottom line, I think we are not spending 

enough fast enough in this area, although you are making progress, 

and I thank you for it. Thanks. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Secretary Jackson, the core foundation for our inspection program really starts with container profiling. We put a lot of stake 

in the targeting system, the computer program. 

29

Just a couple questions. On the panel at my hearing last week, 

we had somebody from the World Shipping Council. They raised a 

concern about data, about entry data, and apparently before you 

can pick up a cargo container, once it is in the country, there are 

certain entry data that you need. They are concerned—and apparently they indicated that they have raised this with DHS—that 

this is the kind of data that needs to be looked at before the container comes into this country. And there was still concern that it 

was not. So, yes, you get it, but the comment by the Chairman was 

basically saying that it is already in, the container is already here. 

Obviously, we are safe when we push it back. 

So my first question really has to do with the data that we have 

and your sense of confidence that it is sufficient to make the critical and profound judgment about whether there is any risk in this 

container. 

Mr. JACKSON. I am going to say exactly what you said in your 

opening remarks. We have made tremendous progress here. There 

is a lot more to do so. So there are two parts of the data filing 

equation. One is the 24-hour notice, 24 hours before lading, before 

we put a container on a ship, they have to give us a core number 

of variables—I believe it is 22, but I may be wrong by a small 

amount—variables that come in that help us score risk. That again 

is pinged against a large database and a big history that helps us 

understand where these variables tease out risk. So the combination of those two things help us profile. 

In addition, before arrival into the port but after the ship has left 

overseas, we get further data relating to the customs transaction. 

That data is gone back again and fused with the Coast Guard data, 

which was receiving information before arrival, both about the ship 

and the mariners on the ship. 

So we take the ship, the mariners, and the cargo, and we profile, 

screen, and assess when it is farther out, before it has left, and also 

shortly before arrival. 

Your core question goes to, I think, the importance of Secure 

Freight. We need more data elements to get a richer stew of data 

about the pre-history of that container. There is such data in the 

supply chain out there. We are just not getting it, and we are not 

fusing it as part of this risk analysis. By getting additional data, 

we can move from this level to this level, and we should do exactly 

that. 

Senator COLEMAN. And my concern is that the whole system 

really, which is a targeted system, essentially rests on that. So the 

concern that I have raised before is the validation of ATS. Do we 

know that it is working? We look at high-risk cargo, but a lot of 

cargo that goes by is not high-risk. Are we confident that we are 

getting the high-risk stuff, that we are not missing something? 

And so I continue to have this concern about the amount of data, 

the type of data, when we get the data, since so much rests on the 

fundamental early determination: Are we looking at something 

with risk? 

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, I think we are doing a very good job. I do not 

think we are doing a perfect job. I will tell you, we will never do 

a perfect job. There is no risk assessment engine tool or model 

known to man that is perfect. We are all about reducing risk, and 

30

you understand that very well. I think we can do more here, and 

I think we have to take a fundamental business model leap. Scraping the waybill electronically and assessing what is there is not 

where we need to be. So what we are going to have to do is something that is more complex, more time-consuming, but I think more 

effective, which is to take the various different supply chain partners, the people who order goods to be imported, the people who 

fulfill those orders, the subcontractors that are associated with the 

fulfillment, the drayage firms that move it out of a point of manufacture and into a port; if it is an intermodal move, the rail touch, 

the customs brokers, the 3PL people who manage all this. All of 

these entities have data. We have to find a way, without causing 

the economy to grind to a halt, to be able to fuse that data in some 

intermediary organization between the supply chain actors and the 

governments. And if we can fuse it appropriately and then spread 

it to the government, we will tap into our A system. We will get 

a more rich analytical tool to evaluate that data. We will also, if 

we create this right as an intermediary between us and the private 

sector with some investment from the government sector to help 

make it work, prove its concept, audit and monitor its activity, we 

can then create an international tool. 

Right now we have been, in the first generation after September 

11, talking almost exclusively about what the United States can do 

to protect ourselves. We need to take this to a more global basis 

so we can help our colleagues around the globe understand they 

need to be doing risk profiling and that they will contribute to the 

store of data that is being used to manage this. 

So I think there is a new business model. I am very excited that 

it has an opportunity to be transformationally helpful in improving 

our capability. 

Senator COLEMAN. My time is running short. I am not going to 

get to the follow-up, but just——

Mr. JACKSON. I know your question. I would be happy to answer 

it. 

Senator COLEMAN. First, I hope it is our goal that we are inspecting, that we are having some kind of review of all high-risk cargo 

before it gets to our ports. That needs to be the goal. And, second, 

we need the cooperation of foreign governments, and we have to 

push them to do this or else tell them we are not bringing the stuff 

into our country. There are still too many high-risk containers out 

there that we have identified as high-risk and that we have asked 

to be inspected. We do not have that cooperation today, and I think 

we have to demand it. And if we are not getting it, just say it is 

not going to come here until that takes place. 

Mr. JACKSON. Madam Chairman, can I give just a little bit of a 

gloss on Senator Coleman’s concern? I was not adequately capable 

of answering your question when I spoke to you last week. I will 

try another shot at it, and then I would be happy to go further at 

another time. 

The data that Senator Coleman has pointed to shows a question 

about what amount of cargo that we flag for a foreign country is 

actually being inspected in a CSI port. And here there is a distinction which my CBP colleagues have helped to educate me about. 

31

There is a referral and a request. When we work in the targeting 

center, we first begin to aggregate data, and we begin to look at 

a container that may be in a CSI port and has not yet been loaded 

and sent. And we frequently have a referral, as it is called in CBP, 

in which we probe our colleagues in the Customs Service of another 

country and say, for example, there was an inadequate amount of 

data about the shipper itself. We have not seen him shipping 

things into the United States. We do not have that component of 

the risk—which is just one component of the risk work—fleshed out 

in any meaningful way. So it may turn out that the customs people 

in another country say, ‘‘We have a lot of data about that, and here 

is that data.’’ Our CSI colleagues find it, and that lowers our concern about that particular container. 

When we complete that assessment, we identify containers and 

have what is called a request to look at that container. The requests are averaging in the area of about 89 percent fulfillment 

prior to a container coming our way. So when we perfect an investigation from referral to request—and I believe that this data that 

you had showed referral data rather than request data—we are 

getting a much higher compliance level. Is it 100 percent? No. 

Should we look for 100 percent? I believe we should aim as a goal 

for that. But you see here we are doing very much more, and when 

it gets to the United States, 100 percent of all these containers that 

have not been reconciled abroad are immediately put into the system for reconciliation. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I apologize 

for coming in so late. We had another committee hearing, and it 

took more time than we expected, so I missed an opportunity to 

hear the Secretary’s statement and some of the questions. I hope 

none of this is redundant. 

I am going to use part of my time to make this statement. The 

proposed Dubai Ports World deal stirred up a lot of controversy, 

particularly because the Administration handled it so poorly. It 

should have been investigated more closely before it was rubberstamped. The Dubai Ports World fiasco woke up the American people to the fact that a good job has not been done protecting our 

ports since September 11. 

I was Commissioner of the Port Authority of New York and New 

Jersey, and I have been sounding an alarm on port security for 

many years. Now, I understand our colleague and friend, Senator 

Murray, knows how vulnerable our ports are, and I commend her 

for addressing the issue. Unfortunately, I do believe there are some 

major problems with the bill before us today. 

Instead of meeting the 9/11 Commission demand that security 

grants be based on risk, it would return us to the days of the less 

responsive distribution of funds. Now, I worked hard to change the 

system for port security so grants would go to threatened areas 

where the impact would be the greatest. And I cannot support any 

measure that takes a step backward in this regard. 

The measure also would continue to outsource many important 

links in the security of our ports by relying on voluntary actions 

by private companies. Additionally, I am disappointed that the bill 

32

once again extends the deadline for DHS to develop critical standards for container security. 

So when something is this important, you have got to meet a 

deadline, and the job should already have been completed. By failing to meet its deadlines, DHS gives the impression that port security is not quite the high priority that many of us see it, and I certainly hope that is not the case. 

Mr. Jackson, what is the Department’s view about port security 

grant programs being entirely risk-based in their distribution? 

Mr. JACKSON. Senator, we believe that risk-based is the core of 

what we should be thinking about when we make these port security grants. As in the entire world of security, we can never address 

fully every single thing that might be a good idea. We have to 

triage in some significant way how to invest those monies. 

We have had an exchange about the idea of how to structure 

grants to try to drive it to a more risk-based model by giving States 

some flexibility, and that is the Administration’s position. We will, 

however, in whatever form of grant program we have, as we did 

last year, put risk at the core of the equation. 

We had a program last year of port security grants, which I 

think did just that and made a very strong focus and improvement 

on analytical, measurable results that were derived from the people 

in our ports. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I am not sure where you are going, Mr. 

Jackson. Does the Department view risk as the critical factor in 

distributing port security grants? Now, I heard the Secretary, Mr. 

Chertoff, say that he believed that is the way it ought to be done. 

He said it publicly several times. 

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir, and that is how we did it last year. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. OK. And with the pending bill, do you see 

that same requirement to be in there? 

Mr. JACKSON. I think the bill reflects an intent—which I cannot 

validate, and I would defer to the authors of the bill—that would 

spread more money across a larger spectrum of ports and that is 

not in full alignment with where the Administration was, for example, in last year’s port security grant program. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. In the bill it says the Secretary, acting 

through the Office for Domestic Preparedness, shall establish a 

grant program to ‘‘fairly and equitably’’ allocate Federal financial 

assistance. So that ducks the question, very frankly. It certainly 

does not emphasize it. And that is something—I lost in this Committee 15 to 1, so you can see where——

Chairman COLLINS. If the Senator would yield on this point, and 

I will yield him additional time, the bill that Senator Murray and 

I have drafted establishes a competitive grant program. It is not an 

automatic entitlement for each port, so it is consistent with the 9/

11 Commission and with what you said, so I think you have misread the bill. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. With all due respect, Madam Chairman, 

when I read this language—and I do not know what the criteria 

is for competitive opportunity. Does that mean competition will include the risk factors exclusively, or will it allow for other things 

as well? 

33

Chairman COLLINS. All entities that are subject to area maritime 

security plans under the Coast Guard are eligible to apply. But it 

is the Department’s decision on who gets funded, and that is a riskbased decision. It is a competitive process that looks at the quality 

of the grant applications. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, I regret to continue this discussion 

because I do not see it firmly coming down on risk-based. And 

when I have 2 miles within my State declared to be the riskiest 

2-mile target for terrorists in this country, abutting the port, less 

than 2 miles from the airport, Newark Airport, a giant airport, and 

we devote any of these funds to anything other than risk I think 

is less than a good perspective on how to protect ourselves. So we 

have this difference. 

I understand, Mr. Secretary, that you have been more and more 

involved in the Hong Kong pilot project, and hopefully, the target 

is to be able to scan all the containers that come in. Why haven’t 

we at this point worked to develop more of a likelihood that we will 

have 100 percent screening as a result? Have these tests proved to 

be effective? Now, I know that you were discussing it, and I am 

sorry if it is redundant. 

Mr. JACKSON. No, sir, Senator. I am happy to address this. I believe that the pilot in Hong Kong is a very promising business 

model and technology. It is not perfect right now. For example, the 

data in the pilot phase is simply retained and stored. We would 

need the data to be able to be networked and used on a real-time 

basis. There is not a technology impediment to that. We can make 

that happen, I think. And we need to strengthen the technology 

tools themselves and the business of how those are operated. We 

need a business operations plan that tells us how to inspect containers in a more aggressive fashion if they have been flagged for 

radiation. Again, I believe that can be worked through operationally to do it. 

So the sum is I consider this a very promising tool. The most important part that I omitted from that list was that the industry has 

in Hong Kong decided to assess a fee upon themselves to pay for 

this, and we again find that a very public-spirited and valuable 

way of helping us to accelerate this type of scrutiny overseas. And 

so we are in close conversations with the industry about that. 

My boss just got back last night from his trip overseas to look 

at this. We have talked about it this morning already and will be 

working it hard. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Has DHS spent some significant funding 

on maritime container security, would you say? 

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir, I think we are spending quite a lot of 

money. This year it is roughly $2.5 billion in the Department for 

maritime security all up. If you take the period of time from fiscal 

year 2004 to fiscal year 2007, if the President’s fiscal year 2007 bill 

were to be implemented, we would all up have spent $9.6 billion 

in that period fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2007. That is the 

whole layer of security using all the tools that we are applying at 

DHS. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Murray. 

34

Senator MURRAY. Madam Chairman, thank you so much for allowing me to join your Committee and for holding this hearing and 

for the excellent questions so far. 

I did want to just join with the Chairman’s and Ranking Member’s comments regarding the port security grants because, as an 

appropriator, I think we are very frustrated that when we do not 

delineate where this money is going to go, it gets lost, and we have 

seen that with the lack of funding for fire grants, for law enforcement training grants, for emergency management performance 

grants that all get lost if we do not specifically say that. In fact, 

Operation Safe Commerce, which we are using much of what we 

learned from that experience to write the legislation that is before 

us, when we funded that I actually had to hold up a nominee from 

the Department in order to get that funded, even though we had 

said the funds were going there. 

So I think many of us feel very frustrated that ports and cargo 

security has been sort of the forgotten stepchild of an agency that 

does have a tremendous amount on its plate, but which many of 

us see the port and cargo security as an item that we cannot any 

longer continue to ignore. And that is why I think we feel strongly 

that funding those and delineating that is extremely important as 

part of this bill. 

And, in fact, Operation Safe Commerce, I believe the report has 

been sitting on your desk for some time, and I would like to know 

when we are going to see that because that is essential for us to 

be able to have the knowledge to move forward. 

Mr. JACKSON. I am not aware of the timing of the release of the 

report. I was told that we are close to a conclusion of the sum-up 

of the status of what we have learned so far in Operation Safe 

Commerce. I would be happy to let you know directly what the 

timetable of that is. 

Senator MURRAY. If you could give us that quickly, I think that 

is really essential for us to have that knowledge and move forward. 

Mr. JACKSON. There has been, as you know, as a sponsor of this 

program, a fair bit publicly released. The last phase of it, I believe, 

is what has not yet been formally presented publicly. 

Senator MURRAY. We are waiting for that. 

Mr. JACKSON. Good. 

Senator MURRAY. In your response to one of the questions from 

Senator Lieberman on what you may disagree with, you talked 

about the incentives for GreenLane post-incident. I would just ask 

you: If an incident occurred today in the Port of Seattle, for example, as I talked about earlier, how would you resume—I assume everything would be shut down. What would you do? How would you 

resume any kind of activity today? 

Mr. JACKSON. Well, I am not going to dodge your question, but 

I will caveat it at one point by saying that a recovery plan discussed in full complexity ought to be something that we do in a 

classified environment so that we can preserve some of the core assumptions about what happens and not unduly expose our operational plan to those who might choose to do harm to the country. 

I would say in the structure of this is part of the maritime domain awareness work that we have done. We have drafted a plan 

on response and recovery. We did this in close coordination with a 

35

wide array of external parties that actually operate these businesses—our port security people, captains of the port, port operators, terminal operators, and others in the ocean carrier business 

and the shipping industry. 

So there is a concept of operations which has been drafted for 

this, and I would say that one of the keys is to decide what the 

particular incident was and what is a measured response to that 

type of incident. So let’s say we have a Cole-type of attack, which 

I believe is, in the hierarchy of maritime threats, not an inconsequential concern. We would have a different type of response to 

that, which would not, in my view, shut down commerce automatically in order to be able to respond to that type of incident. 

If we had another type of attack, a nuclear explosion in a container, that would be a higher level—and that is the scenario that 

you discussed this morning already earlier. That would be a higher 

level of response. Again, I am not certain that we would automatically shut down the entire global system. That is a step that I 

think we should take with some substantial consideration before 

we leapt to that conclusion that an attack is an automatic response 

there. But that would certainly be at the high end or the far end 

of the equation of risk and would require our most aggressive set 

of tools, lockdown and other tools to be evaluated for that response. 

Senator MURRAY. I think one of the holes that I know Senator 

Collins and I have talked about is the resumption of trade. 

Mr. JACKSON. Yes. 

Senator MURRAY. Senator Coleman has mentioned it as well, and 

I think it is very clear that we need a very strong regime in place 

that we are all confident, whether it is an incident small or large, 

that we know who is in charge, who is going to be called on, and 

how that is going to be resumed. So that is why it is part of it. 

Mr. JACKSON. In our substantial alignment comment, let me just 

say I think we are aligned on your concerns in the bill on that 

score, producing a plan and having the right type of opportunity to 

share both the public and a classified version with our authorizers 

and appropriators and other important committees on the Hill. 

Senator MURRAY. All right. In my few seconds left, you also responded about delineating timelines because technology might 

change as well, and I think all of us totally understand that there 

is a lot of great technology out there. But as someone who grew up 

without a color television because my Dad was always waiting for 

the better one to come along, I just think it is really important that 

at some point we make a decision and we move forward. And if 

new technology comes along, great, but do not let that be the 

enemy of the good. So I think that is important. 

I thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for your comments. 

I, too, grew up without color television, but it is because my father was colorblind and it did not matter to him. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for being here today. We do 

look forward to working very closely with you and turning substantial alignment into wholehearted support. So that is our goal, and 

I do hope that you will devote significant time to working with us 

because we do want to move this bill rapidly. 

36

1The prepared statement of Captain Monroe appears on page 75. 

Mr. JACKSON. Good. You have my personal commitment to work 

closely with you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much. 

I am now pleased to call forward our final panel of witnesses. 

These witnesses bring great expertise in maritime security and the 

security of the international supply chain. 

Captain Jeffrey Monroe is the Director of the Department of 

Ports and Transportation for the City of Portland, Maine. He is a 

valuable advisor to me on all issues involving our ports, and we 

consulted closely with him in drafting this legislation. In addition 

to his responsibilities at home in Maine, Captain Monroe also 

serves as the Chairman of the National Maritime Security Advisory 

Committee. 

M.R. ‘‘Mic’’ Dinsmore is the Chief Executive Officer of the Port 

of Seattle. I had the opportunity of meeting Mr. Dinsmore when I 

toured the port. He oversees the fastest-growing container port in 

the United States—that was an important fact that I learned during my trip—and he deserves much credit for its growth. I know 

that Senator Murray and her staff have worked very closely with 

him. 

Andrew Howell is the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Vice President 

responsible for the Homeland Security Policy Division. Mr. Howell 

has been the Chamber’s principal spokesman and strategist on 

issues including transportation security, critical infrastructure protection, and cyber security, and we are pleased to welcome you here 

today. 

And, finally, last, but certainly not least, James Hoffa is the General President of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. He 

has led this organization since 1998, and he represents a very important perspective on the issue of port security from the perspective of truck drivers and others in the transportation industry. And 

we look forward to hearing his testimony, particularly on the long 

delayed TWIC program. 

I thank you all for being here today, and I am going to exercise 

the home State prerogative and start with Captain Monroe. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN JEFFREY W. MONROE,1 DIRECTOR, 

PORTS AND TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES, CITY OF PORTLAND, MAINE 

Captain MONROE. Good morning, Chairman Collins and Members of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security. It is a real 

honor to be here, and my personal thank you to Senator Collins for 

all the good work that you have done in supporting us in the public 

sector in regard to homeland security. 

Since my graduation from Maine Maritime Academy 30 years 

ago, I have been involved in the supply chain, in the international 

supply chain and domestic supply chain of this Nation. Today, I am 

the Director of Ports and Transportation for the City of Portland. 

We operate the Portland International Jetport, also coordinate all 

the surface transportation system around Portland, and obviously 

look after the Port of Portland, Maine, and their municipal marine 

facilities. 

37

The Port of Portland is the largest foreign inbound tonnage transit port in the United States and ranks 25th among the top 100 

ports in this country. I currently serve as Chairman of the U.S. 

Coast Guard Navigation Safety Advisory Committee, a member of 

the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee, and I am 

President of the North Atlantic Ports Association. 

I appreciate the opportunity to come and talk about the 

GreenLane Security Act. This bill is coming at a very critical moment in port security and transportation logistics planning. It is 

time to take a really serious look at international cargo. 

The GreenLane Maritime Security Act and its companion legislation, the SAFE Port Act, we believe will greatly improve international trade and certainly will enhance homeland security. We do 

support the concept of joint operation centers that are contained in 

the bill; however, as often as possible, we think it is very critical 

that we do not need to duplicate facilities. We know that there are 

many facilities already in place. We have one in Portland, Maine, 

already that works very well. And rather than creating a large set 

of duplications where you have miscommunications and different 

organizations working in different areas, we think they should all 

be combined, and if they exist, to be enhanced. One size can fit all 

no matter who it belongs to. Also, sharing allows us to do something that is very definitive in emergency management, and that 

is using resources for critical back-up locations. 

We support the expansion of the Port Security Grant Program and commend Senators Collins and Murray on the $400 million 

level that is proposed in here. We would like to see funding for 

some regular operations and training included, as well as an expansion of authorized uses for those who need it. Not every port 

is as wealthy as many of the major port authorities, and many 

times municipal ports like ours or state-owned ports have minimal 

resources, and it is a real struggle. 

In a regional center, such as Portland, we would be unable to 

comply with the Maritime Transportation Security Act without 

grant support. We have been very fortunate that we have received 

about $3.5 million, which otherwise would have had to have been 

borne by the taxpayers of the city of Portland, Maine, and that in 

competition with our schools and social services. 

I absolutely agree that these funds need to be designated. There 

is no question that putting them all in the same pot will create a 

real problem, and we have seen that time and time again, and certainly in the realm of transportation where commingled monies 

never get to where they are supposed to be. 

Our port security grants have provided us with surveillance and 

screening equipment, interoperable communications, back-up 

power, and systems integration capabilities that allow us to share 

resources and provide for layered facilities right at our own docks 

and within our city. It involves all the stakeholders, all the Federal, State, and local agencies. None of this could have been funded 

locally. 

We also believe that an Office of Cargo Security Policy will be of 

great value. It lays the groundwork for the merging of the many 

separate cargo security responsibilities that have evolved since 

September 11. 

38

We also believe that the best chance of finding problem cargo is 

when it is loaded and not when it is on the dock. We support the 

third tier of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 

that offers additional benefits to validated participants. And we 

also support the Container Security Initiative. 

But we believe that we are not concentrating all of our efforts in 

the right place. Weapons of mass destruction do not necessarily 

come in containers. Sometimes they come in other locations. For 

example, we very rarely look at the millions of automobiles that 

are imported into the United States. We believe that these units 

can be brought into the United States in component form, and a 

lot of new research is necessary, and I am glad that the bill focuses 

on that. 

We also believe that the almost 4-year delay in implementing the 

TWIC is absolutely unnecessary and puts this Nation’s security at 

risk. To continue to operate without this TWIC standard is an area 

of America’s greatest vulnerability and can no longer be tolerated. 

I cannot personally understand why we could do this in aviation 

in a short amount of time and haven’t been able to do it in other 

areas of transportation. 

We also believe that dynamic leadership by the Coast Guard is 

required in each Area Maritime Security Committee that brings 

stakeholders together in frequent and robust discussion and exercises. That leadership in most cases is there. But we noticed that 

a lot of the Federal agencies get a chance to interact with each 

other but do not often get a chance to interact with State, county, 

or city municipal officials, and those folks have to be included in 

all of these mixes. 

We continue to see the development of advisory committees on 

any number of transportation and security issues, and these are essential. The reality here, though, is that most of the committees 

meet too seldom to be effective and are often ignored by the agencies they advise. 

Homeland Security is not about collecting all agencies under one 

roof. It is about creating a system. And I often tell people about my 

own experience being in aviation, being a merchant mariner, having to go through four separate security checks under Department 

of Homeland Security. I was very happy that every time they found 

me clean, but the reality is it should have never been necessary. 

Ports are just one link in our transportation network. No part of 

the system can be neglected or overemphasized, particularly in restoring that system, if we do have an incident. We talk about ports. 

We need to think in the concept of total systematic restoration. 

Moving cargo or people by air, water, rail, or road must be looked 

at collectively. Every part of our total border system, including all 

of our land, air, and sea ports of entry, must be monitored and 

managed completely cohesively through a comprehensive partnership. That partnership has to involve everyone who is in any way 

involved in transportation security or law enforcement. The standard for that partnership has to begin here in Washington, DC. 

Agencies in Washington, DC, must work together, and that is very 

important because that sets the standard and the tone for how they 

will work locally. 

39

1The prepared statement of Mr. Dinsmore appears on page 79. 

I am often asked if we are better off than we were on September 

11. Yes, we are much better off and much better prepared than we 

were. And, no, because most of what we have created to address 

our security needs has become overly bureaucratic and sometimes 

non-responsive. 

If we really want to make homeland security effective, it is time 

to trim our agencies to their fighting weights and set them up with 

clear, very definitive goals and absolute deadlines that help them 

to meet their responsibilities quickly. For guys like me who are on 

the dock, or on the bus or the train platform, or at the airport, we 

need a level of efficiency that I had hoped would come a lot further 

than it has today. Nearly all of the legislation you have proposed 

here today and that has been mentioned in the past is good legislation. But that legislation without dynamic implementation is ineffective. If the lessons of the last 5 years have taught us anything 

at all, it is that we can be far more effective and efficient in the 

protection of our Nation than we already are. And I hope that all 

of this gets us to the point where we can finally solve these problems and get to where we need to be. 

Thank you for your time today. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Dinsmore. 

TESTIMONY OF M.R. ‘‘MIC’’ DINSMORE,1 CHIEF EXECUTIVE 

OFFICER, PORT OF SEATTLE, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 

Mr. DINSMORE. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and let me start 

by saying to you and Senator Murray, Wow, tremendous leadership 

in bringing this GreenLane legislation forward today. I have sat 

here for 2 hours listening to many presentations, many questions, 

and let me start by saying I am in awe. I have been here many 

times for almost 40 years, long before my hair got this color, and 

I cannot remember a time being more encouraged, more proud of 

what you are doing in the U.S. Senate. 

Now, I have had the good fortune—a little bit of background—

of leading the Port of Seattle for almost 15 years, and that is my 

daytime job. I also have other roles. I am in my fifth year as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of the Pacific Northwest. I am 

in my second year as Chairman of this Nation’s Center for Asian 

Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and I share that with you 

only to say I get it. I have more than a neophyte understanding 

of the economic alignment of what you are talking about today, and 

it has been said so many ways and so many times, our economic 

vitality of this Nation is at risk unless we move forward with the 

creative leadership that I have witnessed here today with you and 

your Committee and many others. 

So, almost 5 years ago, I think about what we did within 2 

weeks, we, the Port of Seattle, with the open, active endorsement 

of the five elected officials I work for, we were back visiting with 

Senator Murray and said the following—we have an airport and a 

seaport, a very unique institution. We are public, yes, but at the 

end of the day we look more like a Boeing and Weyerhaeuser than 

City Hall. We want to make a difference. We have worked so closely with Senator Murray and her leadership for almost 5 years. Are 

40

we better today than we were 5 years ago, Jeffrey? Absolutely yes. 

Senator Coleman, we are a long way from where we need to be, 

and thanks for your comment. 

We have been an active participant, hopefully an energetic, supportive one of Senator Murray and this Nation, trying to make our 

movement of people and commerce more safe and secure, our Nation more safe and secure. We have been actively involved in endorsing the tremendous amount of programs. Secretary Jackson 

talked about CSI, C–TPAT, Operation Safe Commerce, so we know 

it well. But here we are, the fact remains, almost 5 years later and 

finally, Madam Chairman, doing the right thing. 

Now, I don’t mean to pretend for a minute that this piece of legislation is going to solve this tremendous challenge, but it absolutely is the right thing to do. It is a means to an end, helping this 

Nation be more safe and secure. 

When I listened to the presenters before me, almost every issue 

has been covered, but a couple I want to recall again. Please continue your leadership, bring this issue to the U.S. Senate for a positive vote so we can move forward because we have to move forward. When I think about what we have not done yet, we do not 

yet have an integrated system that ties together with technology 

what needs to be done. And, yes, fortunately, we are looking at, at 

the national level, local level, in excess of 4.5 or 5 percent of containers. That is not the only solution. We cannot slow down the 

movement of commerce, nor should we. And I encourage you to 

move forward with your piece of legislation that enhances the 

movement of cargo. But we need the technology, and technology is 

clearly part of the solution. 

Four and a half years ago, Senator Murray, we talked about 

what do we need to do. Then and now there are three absolute 

underpinnings of this legislation that I am so pleased with your actions. One, it is about making this Nation more safe and secure in 

the movement of commerce. Two, it is about expediting, moving 

more effectively and efficiently the movement of commerce. And, 

lastly, it is about doing something that is indeed a public-private 

partnership, and it is affordable. Everything I have heard you say 

today, Madam Chairman, is directly supportive of those three comments. So I applaud what you are doing again. 

But I ask you to consider a couple more things as you move this 

forward, both of which have been talked about. 

Five years later, we still do not have protocols to get this Nation 

up and running when and if there is an incident. And I am both 

surprised, pleased, and delighted we have not had an incident, but 

I think the clock is clearly ticking. 

So I listened to Secretary Jackson, and I am a fan of what he 

is doing in Homeland Security. But when and if there is an incident, we are not going to be shut down for a day. We do not have 

protocols, and it is not going to be just, well, let’s start again as 

we did our Nation’s airports in 4 days. We are going to be down 

a while. And if, in fact, we do not have protocols, we are not going 

to get up and running in a manner that we would all support. So 

we are talking weeks, perhaps longer. So please push that forward. 

Let the industry be part of the solution as you have in the past. 

41

1The prepared statement of Mr. Howell appears on page 85. 

When I hear us talk about funding—and I applaud your efforts. 

Is it $400 million, $500 million, $600 million? Please make sure 

that whatever the number is it is adequate to implement in a way 

in which we can all be proud of this piece of legislation. And I must 

tell you, I am somewhat taken with here we are today with tremendous support of the Federal Government and leaders in front 

of me. We are spending order of magnitude at the Federal level $8, 

$9, $10 billion a year in our Nation’s airports. So when I hear us 

talk about $400 or $500 or $600 million, I suggest where we are 

vulnerable today is not at our Nation’s airports. It is clearly at our 

Nation’s seaports. 

So let me end where I began. Your leadership has been extraordinary. I applaud you, and please keep doing the heavy lifting that 

we so desperately need. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Howell. 

TESTIMONY OF ANDREW HOWELL,1 VICE PRESIDENT FOR 

HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 

Mr. HOWELL. I would like to thank Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman for the opportunity to testify here today. Before I 

continue, I would ask that my full statement be submitted for the 

record. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

Mr. HOWELL. By way of background, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is the world’s largest business federation, representing more 

than 3 million companies around the world. Our membership encompasses direct corporate members of all types and sizes, trade 

and professional associations, State and local Chambers of Commerce, and 104 American Chambers of Commerce abroad in 91 

countries. 

The Chamber appreciates the Committee’s continued efforts to 

bring attention to the important issue of supply chain security. 

Clearly, the Chamber believes that ensuring the security of our 

citizens should be America’s first priority. And in the maritime security arena, while we have certainly made progress, there is obviously more work to be done. 

We commend Chairman Collins and Senator Murray for introducing the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act. Although we 

have some very real concerns with aspects of the bill, the legislation by and large represents a reasoned approach to the issue. We 

especially appreciate the attempt to provide incentives for businesses to adopt even more robust security practices. 

This approach is consistent with the multi-layered, risk-based 

approach that the Department of Homeland Security uses to address supply chain and maritime security. The legislation builds on 

the strength of successful programs established by Customs and 

Border Protection, including the Customs-Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism, commonly referred to as C–TPAT. 

Moreover, the United States has worked cooperatively with other 

countries through the Container Security Initiative and the World 

Customs Organization’s Security Framework. 

42

Through such partnerships and on their own, U.S. companies 

have spent a great deal of time, effort, and money on improving 

supply chain security. Congress should recognize that companies 

have taken and continue to take voluntary measures to address 

key security concerns at their own expense. 

Although the programs mentioned above do have room for improvement, we believe that they have individually helped improve 

supply chain security. And when taken in aggregate, they form effective layers of improved supply chain security. 

One of the reasons our members tell us these programs have 

been so successful is that they are not one-size-fits-all solutions. 

Unlike regulatory regimes, these voluntary programs recognize differences among and between industries and modes of transportation and affirm that what works in one sector or company may 

not work in others. Flexibility is key to their success. 

This bill would eliminate this flexibility, which leads me to our 

chief concern: The proposal to regulate the now voluntary C–TPAT 

program. We strongly oppose the idea of regulating a program that 

has been successful precisely because of its voluntary nature. Provisions that would require the Secretary to promulgate regulations 

that describe minimum requirements, program tiers, and program 

benefits of C–TPAT and GreenLane, respectively, run counter to 

how our member companies have built their security programs. 

This would actually damage the cooperative nature of the program 

and limit the ability of both government and those who move goods 

globally to evolve in an ever-changing security, economic, and technology environment. 

Our second concern with the legislation relates to the confidentiality of information collected from businesses. While provisions in 

this bill would authorize the government to collect information 

about business operations and security procedures, there are insufficient safeguards against the unwarranted distribution of the information or data. 

Third, we believe this legislation would impose significantly new 

compliance burdens on small and medium-sized firms. As written, 

the legislation does not adequately address the regulatory compliance costs that would be imposed upon such firms. 

Finally, we question the wisdom of permitting new third-party 

validations of supply chain security practices of C–TPAT participants. The use of third-party validators raises issues of cost, confidentiality, and practicality. Instead, we believe Congress should 

give CBP the necessary resources to conduct the needed validations. 

In addition to needing additional validations, realizing the benefits of the GreenLane concept requires new technology. As some of 

you may recall, last year former Customs and Border Protection 

Commissioner Robert Bonner laid out his vision of some basic requirements for C–TPAT in order to achieve true GreenLane status. 

In his words, ‘‘No inspection upon arrival—immediate release.’’ 

Most critical among these requirements was the use of some form 

of smart box technology to detect and record whether tampering 

has occurred with a container seal after being affixed at the point 

of origin. 

43

1The prepared statement of Mr. Hoffa appears on page 94. 

This technology, referenced in Section 10 of the legislation as 

‘‘Container Security Devices,’’ is a critical element in making the 

GreenLane concept a reality. 

Over the past year, DHS has conducted tests on technologies designed to track, monitor, and secure containers against compromise. The Department has been very clear that before incorporating these devices into any government-sponsored programs, 

they must meet a strict 1-percent or lower false positive threshold. 

We agree wholeheartedly with this requirement. 

At the same time, we hope that policymakers avoid mandating 

any one technology solution, allowing the private sector to choose 

particular solutions that best fit the needs of their business operations. Technology neutrality is central to fostering competition, innovation, and effective solutions. 

Also, DHS must conduct a cost/benefit analysis to ensure that 

buyers will see an acceptable return on investment. 

Finally, policy and operational requirements for container security devices must be established in order to gain the confidence of 

the trade community. To the extent that this legislation focuses 

DHS to finally make decisions in this critical area, we applaud the 

Committee’s efforts. 

In conclusion, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and our member 

companies fully support the goal of continually improving the security of maritime supply chains. In fact, American companies spend 

billions of dollars toward this end every year. To the extent that 

this legislation reinvigorates the policy debate and helps DHS 

make long overdue decisions, we thank and congratulate you. However, we remain concerned with a number of provisions in this legislation, especially the regulation of C–TPAT. We hope that any bill 

that emerges from this Committee would address the points that 

we have raised here today. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share our views. We stand 

ready to assist you as you move forward, and we would be pleased 

to answer any questions you might have. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Hoffa. 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES P. HOFFA,1 GENERAL PRESIDENT, 

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS 

Mr. HOFFA. Thank you. Madam Chairwoman, Members of the 

Committee, thank you for having me here today. My name is 

James P. Hoffa. I represent 1.4 million members who are very concerned about the issues of cargo and port security. I commend you 

and Senator Murray for your efforts to introduce the GreenLane 

Maritime Cargo Security Act and for holding these hearings because I think they are very important at this time. 

My written statement includes specific comments about sections 

of the bill. It is extremely important that these issues receive the 

public airing that they really deserve. 

Let me start by saying what the Teamsters believe. We believe 

that American ports should be run by Americans. We believe that 

port security should be managed by Americans. We believe, as it 

stands now, that American ports are extremely vulnerable. And we 

44

believe that something should and can be done. The GreenLane 

Maritime Cargo Security Act will address many of the current 

vulnerabilities. 

These additional security protocols will improve cargo and port 

security in the future, but steps must be taken now to improve port 

security. Our union has been sounding the alarm on these issues 

for decades. Because of the Dubai debacle, our Nation is now focused on port security. And I am here to say let’s not lose that 

focus. 

I would like to talk about something I know something about: 

The labor force that works in our ports. 

When a container comes off a ship, a longshoreman moves the 

container within the port to the container yard. From there, a port 

driver, a truck driver, picks up the container and leaves the port 

for final delivery. Longshoremen are regular employees that report 

every day to a hiring hall. They are the same people every day. But 

it is not clear who manages the port truck drivers. There are over 

100,000 port truck drivers that outnumber all the other people that 

work at the ports, but there is no employer, no chain of control, 

and no accountability. And the faces of these drivers change daily. 

That would be unacceptable at any airport. We are really playing 

Russian roulette with our Nation’s security. 

There has been an intense congressional and media focus on 

funding infrastructure and improvements to protect our maritime 

ports, and that is as it should be. But no matter how high we build 

fences or how many Coast Guard cutters patrol the harbors, our 

ports remain vulnerable when the gates are left wide open. And 

that is the situation at most of our U.S. ports today. 

Former Coast Guard officer Stephen Flynn, in his recent report 

to the Council on Foreign Relations, said that our Nation’s ports 

are the weak link of port security. They are our Achilles heel. 

A recent unpublished report by the Department of Homeland Security found that over half of the 9,000 truck drivers at the Port 

of New York and New Jersey have criminal records, including 

smuggling, and over 500 were driving without valid commercial licenses. And it gets worse. 

In an effort to ratchet down the rates that truck drivers are paid, 

the industry uses container-hauling companies who contract with 

drivers who are exploited by making only $5 to $7 an hour; driving 

unsafe, polluting vehicles; hauling dangerously overweight containers; operating without driver’s licenses; many of them have no 

insurance, no hazmat certificates, and who are regularly forced to 

violate wage and hour laws. 

This is the dirty little secret of the maritime import/export business. You may not have known this, and the public and press may 

not have known this. But the port authorities and the terminal operators all know it. 

They know that the annual turnover rates for these truck drivers 

is close to 140 percent, compared to 2 or 3 percent with unionized 

truck drivers. The steamship lines have posted incredible profits, 

increasing 100 to 200 to 400 percent, while most of the drivers 

struggle just to survive. 

And the industry also knew that something was critically wrong 

in Los Angeles and Long Beach when dozens of trucks were abanVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:01 May 08, 2007 Jkt 027759 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\27759.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
45

doned, effectively shutting down the terminals, when the INS 

showed up at the gates. 

The industry also knew that something was terribly wrong at the 

Port of Miami when drivers boycotted the ports in the year 2000 

and 2004 to protest trucking companies engaged in insurance 

fraud. 

And the industry knows that the reason one-third of the drivers 

in the Port of Savannah get daily passes is the fact that they cannot pass the background checks that you need to get a permanent 

pass. 

There can really be no port security when the industry promotes 

a system where motor carriers operate with pirate companies, 

when they employ drivers who cannot find work in the regular 

trucking industry, all in the name of providing low-cost trucking 

services. 

The industry uses the excuse that these drivers are not their employees. They claim the drivers are contractors or independent contractors for container-hauling companies and subcontractors with 

foreign-owned steamship lines. Like our airports, every one of these 

ports is controlled by a public authority. They must take responsibility. They must operate as stewards for the public good and place 

national security first. 

Reasonable people can debate the issue of independent contractors, but we also know one other thing: That we really have to have 

security at our ports. The current system is a security nightmare. 

It allows port drivers to be treated like sharecroppers on wheels. 

Most importantly, the independent contractor system means that 

no one in the industry takes responsibility for these drivers and the 

cargo that they deliver. 

Contrast this with the movement of cargo within the port itself. 

The U.S. Customs ruled a long time ago. In 1993, they said we are 

not going to use independent contractors because it is too dangerous to have them move cargo within the U.S. Customs facilities. 

Customs rejected the use of independent contractors because of the 

lack of control, and it meant that no one was responsible in the 

supply chain. And that is exactly my point. Someone must be responsible for these drivers. 

So why are these issues of concern for national security? Because 

these drivers are ruled by fear. Drivers operating illegally in our 

ports or operating at or near bankruptcy are vulnerable to blackmail and bribery. They are susceptible, knowingly or not, to people 

who would harm our country. They are in a position to smuggle 

contraband or, God forbid, weapons of mass destruction. As many 

port drivers operate under the radar, they are in no position to report to the police a violation if they did see one. This is the nightmare scenario that none of us really want to see. 

You know, there is a movie out that I have seen, and I hope you 

all see it. It is called ‘‘The Sum of All Fears,’’ where a nuclear device is smuggled into the port of Baltimore. And I think it is instructive today with the environment we live in. What is fiction 

today could be fact tomorrow. Could anyone have imagined September 11, four airplanes hijacked simultaneously? You would have 

said it couldn’t happen, but it did. 

46

Most experts agree that a terrorist attack at a major U.S. port 

would cripple the entire Western economy, and, unfortunately, 

many experts also say that it is not a matter of if, it is a matter 

of when the next terrorist attack happens. 

So since September 11, the shipping industry has avoided dealing with these security issues. They think that close scrutiny of the 

ports will increase the shortage of drivers. I am here to say that 

there is something more important than the companies’ bottom 

line. You get what you pay for. Our Nation’s security should not 

be dependent on the highest bidder or the lowest payer, especially 

if the highest bidder is the one who wants to cut corners when it 

comes to safety and security. 

Congress must authorize the ports to set guidelines that will 

eliminate the pirate motor carriers who operate in an underground 

economy. As General President of the Teamsters, I know our country can do better than allow critical infrastructure to be at the 

mercy of companies who supply unqualified and uninsured drivers, 

companies who pay no FICA, no unemployment taxes, no workmen’s compensation. These companies are undercutting the possibility of legitimate carriers competing for this important business. 

As soon as legitimate carriers enter the process, thousands of drivers who can pass security tests will line up for good jobs and deliver good services in a secure environment. Legitimate transportation companies have these obligations to their workers. 

The system we have now is bad for our ports and bad for America. If Congress forces the industry to clean up its act, you will 

have a workforce that can pass security checks, a workforce that 

will be trained, efficient, and productive, a workforce that will be 

the eyes and ears of our ports and report any violations to the authorities. 

The solution to improving port security is to stabilize the workforce, the 100,000 port drivers. Give them employee status. Give 

them decent pay. Make them legitimate. Give them a stake in the 

American dream. 

On behalf of the Teamsters, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. I think it is very important what you are doing, and sitting here today listening to all the comments has been very instructive, and I think we all share the common goals of a safe 

America. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I am going to call on Senator Coleman for his questions. I am 

going to have to leave shortly to go to the floor to offer an amendment to the immigration bill. But I will be submitting questions for 

the record to each of you, and I want to thank each of you for your 

helpful testimony. 

Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

First, Mr. Hoffa, in your written testimony you talked about—

you didn’t talk about it in the oral testimony, but I want to thank 

you for raising the issue of checking empties. It is something we 

do not talk about, and I am sure the folks operating ports understand this. So much of our focus has been what is coming in, but 

then containers come back, and I would be interested in the percentage, somewhere along the way there is a very significant numVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:01 May 08, 2007 Jkt 027759 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\27759.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
47

ber of percentages going back as empties. Does anybody have any 

information on what that number is? 

Mr. DINSMORE. Out of the Northwest, I would say order of magnitude 30 to 40 percent. And let me assure you, Senator, we are 

checking every one. 

Captain MONROE. The same thing on the Northeast. It is about 

40 percent, and you can be sure that every one of those empties 

are checked. 

Senator COLEMAN. One of the concerns that we had in the Subcommittee is the ability to smuggle materials to create a dirty 

bomb into this country, and the concern is if you want to shut 

down a port, it may be easier on the way back. So I just think it 

is something that we have to take a closer look at. I have not 

looked at that as extensively, but, clearly, when you have 30 or 40 

percent going back as empties, we have to be focused on every step 

along the way. 

Mr. Howell, just one comment about C–TPAT. I do not read this 

bill as regulating C–TPAT, as simply ensuring that there is some 

legislative specificity to say we are going to do C–TPAT. It is still 

a voluntary program. Where I may disagree—and I am not sure we 

are disagreeing. Perhaps that is my question. C–TPAT, in effect, 

gives you a free ride, pretty close to a free ride. You are part of 

C–TPAT, the chance of your cargo being inspected significantly 

drops. And so we have an interest in there being specific standards. 

It is voluntary, but if you participate, you are going to get certain 

benefits. Is there any question that we need to ensure that those 

who are involved, voluntarily work in C–TPAT, live up to the highest level of security? And today the problem is we just are not 

checking that. We have not been verifying it. Do you disagree with 

the need to verify the process, procedures that folks are using for 

C–TPAT? 

Mr. HOWELL. Senator, I would argue those are two separate 

issues, the first issue being baseline criteria for C–TPAT and for 

the different tiers of C–TPAT. CBP has, in fact, published that and 

made it available on their website, and those baseline criteria are 

the criteria that C–TPAT participants must hit. 

On the validations piece, separate issue, but we do believe emphatically that CBP should be conducting validations of C–TPAT 

participants, and maybe an appropriate next step is to more 

robustly fund CBP to perform more of those validations. And if the 

risk management model supports doing more of that, we are all for 

it because we believe this voluntary program is, again, one layer 

in a multi-layered security strategy, but an important one to make 

sure that it is, in fact, validated going forward against those baseline criteria as set by CBP. 

We do not view there being a compelling need to go through the 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking process to lay out those criteria. 

Senator COLEMAN. So I am still trying to understand what would 

you find as overly burdensome or regulatory in what is in this bill? 

I am just not seeing that this bill is doing that kind of regulating. 

It is simply saying, we want to make sure that C–TPAT is there 

regardless of whether there are changes in Administration or 

changes with the head of DHS. We want to make sure this program is part of that layered security system that we have. 

48

Mr. HOWELL. We see it being, again, a voluntary program where 

the criteria are published on the CBP website now, and going 

through the Administrative Procedures Act in order to regulate 

those benefits in our view eliminates flexibility and does not allow 

us to, on a dime, shift and change security strategies as may be 

appropriate as threats and technology evolve. We view the flexibility of the criteria as set on the website and as continually evolving over time as being the appropriate step to take. 

Senator COLEMAN. I would submit the legislation does not create 

the problems that you are reflecting. I think we agree with where 

we want to go on this. We just want to make sure that there is 

a C–TPAT that is there, regardless of who is in charge, and that, 

in fact, there are the highest levels, that we are going to push the 

Department to make sure that this is validated, that it works. 

Let me just switch gears and perhaps across the board. One of 

the benefits in the Hong Kong ICIS program is that you have a 

system that demonstrates the potential to screen 100 percent of the 

containers that come through. They are all checked with radiation 

portal monitors as well. There are questions about how that is used 

and not used. But one of the key factors here is that the private 

sector—this was done without Homeland Security grants. The private sector did that. 

Do you think that there is the appetite in this country for the 

private sector to be a full paying partner in the creation of programs like ICIS in any of our ports? 

Mr. DINSMORE. Senator, I would suggest to you that what you 

saw and I have seen many times in Hong Kong is a partial solution, including perhaps ICIS. But to your question, is there an interest in the generic maritime industry to know there has to be a 

financial partnership? Yes. To what degree and how do we make 

sure that it is really about value-added? Quite candidly—and we 

have said it. We have listened to it many times. Putting the emphasis back on the offshore port both with the X-ray and with the 

radiation portal because, quite candidly, the incident you know 

about last night in Seattle, where 21 people came into our harbor, 

a tragedy and an irony, Customs Border Patrol had flagged that 

container, which is the good news. The bad news, they are here. 

So it could have very easily been a very different set of circumstances. 

Captain MONROE. I have to agree with Mr. Dinsmore. I think the 

reality here is that there is a blatant economic self-interest on the 

part of the carriers to make sure that their cargo gets from Point 

A to Point B with no issues. And, while the industry is always looking for ways to cut its costs, I think they recognize that this is a 

critical part of their business and that they need to look at this. 

And I think they would be willing to participate in it. 

Mr. HOWELL. And if I could just add, companies have every incentive in the world to protect their people, their property, and 

their assets. And finding the best ways to do that is what we really 

need to engage in a public-private partnership to make sure we do 

going forward. 

Mr. HOFFA. I disagree. I think that what we have is a record 

here of people trying to cut costs, and when it comes to the most 

important part, these 100,000 truck drivers that are on the docks, 

49

what have we seen? We have seen people shirk their responsibility, 

want to pay them the lowest wages, get people that are unqualified, and basically to save money to make—to fatten their bottom 

line. So I do not think that this is working. That is why we have 

to have legislation or help that basically says we have to make 

these concessions where they have to hire people who are responsible. Take this TWIC program, move that out where more and 

more people have to have their backgrounds checked, that is going 

to get you a higher quality of people. And I do not think the voluntary system is working because we have a record of years and 

years and years of cost-cutting and these sharecroppers on wheels. 

It is not working for the truck drivers. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much, and thank you for all 

the work you have done on this really important issue. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses today. I think this has been 

an extremely valuable hearing that establishes a very good record 

for us to proceed forward in marking up the legislation, and I appreciate your sharing your expertise with us. 

The hearing record will remain open for 15 days for the submission of additional statements, materials, and questions. Again, my 

thanks to all of you. 

This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:44 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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