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S. HRG. 110–36 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

Department of Homeland Security 

Nondepartmental witnesses 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

TOM HARKIN, Iowa 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

PATTY MURRAY, Washington 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BEN NELSON, Nebraska 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

LARRY CRAIG, Idaho 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

TERRENCE E. SAUVAIN, Staff Director 

BRUCE EVANS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

PATTY MURRAY, Washington 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BEN NELSON, Nebraska 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

LARRY CRAIG, Idaho 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

Professional Staff 

CHARLES KIEFFER

CHIP WALGREN

DRENAN E. DUDLEY

TAD GALLION

CHRISTA THOMPSON

REBECCA DAVIES (Minority) 

CAROL CRIBBS (Minority) 

MARK VAN DE WATER (Minority) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2007 

Page 

Department of Homeland Security ......................................................................... 1 

Nondepartmental Witnesses ................................................................................... 185 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met at 2:35 p.m., in room SD–192, Dirksen 

Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert C. Byrd (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Byrd, Leahy, Murray, Landrieu, Lautenberg, 

Nelson, Cochran, Stevens, Shelby, Craig, and Alexander. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

Senator BYRD. Welcome, Secretary Chertoff. You’ve been here 

long enough to know what the problems are, and you should be 

able to answer the tough questions. 

This is the first hearing of the Homeland Security Subcommittee 

during the 110th Congress. The Department of Homeland Security 

has had the benefit of oversight from two excellent Subcommittee 

chairmen during the Department’s 4-year history. Senator Thad 

Cochran, and Senator Judd Gregg. It would be difficult, Mr. Chairman, to live up to the standard that you and Senator Gregg have 

set. But, I look forward to the challenge. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for appearing here today. 

You manage a department that employs over 192,000 dedicated 

men and women. These workers serve on the front lines. The front 

lines, securing our ports and waterways, securing our borders, enforcing our immigration laws, protecting the 600 million flyers who 

use our airports each year, and responding to disasters. I commend 

them for their dedication, and their service to preserving our freedoms and securing our homeland. 

Two years ago, Senator Craig and I, with support from Chairman 

Gregg offered an amendment to begin the process of hiring and 

training a significant number of border patrol agents, and immigration investigators. 

Despite opposition from the White House, the funds for enhanced 

border security were enacted into law. Since 2004, on a bipartisan 

basis, we have increased the number of border patrol agents by 

4,000, the number of immigration enforcement personnel by 1,373, 

and the number of detention beds by 9,150. 
2 

So, Mr. Secretary, I’m pleased that the President’s budget for fiscal year 2008 includes significant additional resources for improving security at our borders. 

Regrettably, the President’s budget did not commit significant resources to other known vulnerabilities in this country. The administration continues to attempt to secure the Nation on the cheap. 

In every State of the Union address since the attacks on 9/11, the 

President has raised the specter of another attack. 

In January he said, ‘‘Every success against a terrorist is a reminder of the shoreless ambitions of this enemy. In the 6 years 

since our Nation was attacked, I wish I could report to you that 

the dangers have ended. They have not.’’ Yet, when you dig 

through the details and decipher the book-cooking in the President’s budget, and truly understand the consequences of the budget, the increase that is proposed for Homeland Security is only 1 

percent, 1 percent. 

The administration has a huge credibility gap when it comes to 

Homeland Security. In August, after the arrests in Britain of potential terrorists who plotted to blow up commercial airliners over 

the Atlantic Ocean, you elevated the threat-risk level in the aviation sector to ‘‘orange,’’ or high, orange. And it remains there today, 

orange. 

Yet, the President’s budget that is before the subcommittee, proposes to cut funding for purchasing and installing explosives-detection equipment at airports by 17 percent. 

According to your own Department’s nationwide plan review, 61 

percent of the States, and 69 percent of the urban areas, do not 

have adequate plans to respond to a catastrophic event. Hurricanes 

Katrina, Rita and Wilma, certainly proved that we are not prepared to respond to such an event, or a mass evacuation. 

Yet, the President’s budget proposes to cut first responder grants by $1.2 billion—B-I-L-L-I-O-N—$1.2 billion, and to freeze funding 

for emergency management performance grants. 

In recent years there have been deadly attacks on trains in London, Madrid, Moscow, Tokyo, and Mumbai, India. Hundreds of innocent people have lost their lives. The Department has responded 

with unenforceable policy directives, two small pilot projects, the 

results of which have not been applied nationally, and a budget 

that proposes to fund the mass transit and rail security program 

at the inadequate 2007 level of $175 million. 

I also figure that the Department is far too reliant on what I 

would call paper security. The Department is reliant on standards 

that are not enforced, and on reports prepared by contractors that 

are never executed. Five years since 9/11, the majority of cargo containers that are loaded onto passenger aircraft are not N-O-T not 

inspected. We rely on a paper process for determining the threat 

potential of 3,800 freight forwarders, who have access to air cargo 

in 10,000 facilities. Congress has added funding for 300 air cargo 

inspectors, none of whom are being used to actually inspect cargo. 

Now, with regard to inspecting the 11 million cargo containers 

that are shipped into this country, we physically inspect only 5 to 

7 percent. How, how, how can you ride herd on an aggressive and 

regular basis over more than 6,100 trading partners in nearly 60 

countries who ship cargo into this country with only 157 supply- 
3 

chain security specialists? And yet, the President does not seek additional security specialists for fiscal year 2008. 

Mr. Secretary, you have taken on the task of managing a Department within an organization that was flawed at its inception. I said 

so then. Flawed at its inception. In its short 4-year history, the Department has been reorganized nine times. 

I know you’re committed to securing the homeland. But I do not 

understand why this administration insists on hamstringing the 

Department with a status quo budget. Can you explain that? Can 

anyone? I doubt it. 

Mr. Secretary, you have a tough job. Following any opening remarks that Senator Cochran might have, we look forward to your 

testimony. 

Senator Cochran. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, I’m pleased to join you in welcoming the distinguished Secretary of Homeland Security to our 

Committee. We appreciate his leadership of the Department, and 

his assistance in describing the Department’s priorities as we begin 

the year’s appropriations process. 

The discretionary appropriations request included in the budget 

submitted for the Department is $32.4 billion, which is an increase 

of just over 1 percent from the current year’s level. 

Mr. Secretary, I compliment you for not including the presumption that aviation security fees will be approved by the Congress. 

I also want to compliment you for the Department’s response to the 

U.K. airline bombing plot last August. The Transportation Security 

Administration deserves commendation for creating a flexible program to meet threats to aviation. 

In the past 2 years, you have managed a substantial increase in 

funding for border security, and you have overseen the ending of 

the practice of catch-and-release on the Southwest border. I’m also 

pleased to see that you are on-track to meet the aggressive hiring 

targets that were funded during the past 2 years for Customs and 

Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

The people of my State appreciate very much the Department’s 

efforts to respond to the Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The devastation caused by those hurricanes continues to be a reminder of the 

importance of this Department’s mission. Our State’s Governor, 

Haley Barbour, has worked closely with your agencies to recover 

and rebuild. He has said, on several occasions, and I agree, that 

the Federal Government has been a strong partner with the States. 

We need to ensure that this partnership will continue. 

Welcome to the hearing. 

Senator BYRD. The subcommittee has received a statement from 

Senator Shelby which will be placed in the hearing. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing today. 
4 

Secretary Chertoff, I appreciate you appearing before the committee. I believe it 

is essential to hear directly from you about the Department’s needs, challenges, and 

goals. 

Last week, I visited Alabama after a tornado ripped through the State. In Enterprise, the tornado destroyed a high school, killing 9 people. The same storm system 

killed another Alabamian half way across the State in Miller’s Ferry. This was a 

horrific natural disaster causing nearly $400 million in damage in Alabama alone. 

Lives were shattered and communities are struggling to cope with the aftermath of 

the storm. 

It was this visit in the aftermath of the storm that reminded me of the great need 

for preparedness. We won’t always be able to predict when disaster will strike, but 

having a capable, tested system in place will allow us to react effectively. And it 

is your Department, Secretary Chertoff, the Department of Homeland Security that 

we turn to after events like the one we faced in Alabama last week. 

While the Department has made some major mistakes in the past when responding to other natural disasters, I am confident that you are making progress. The 

recent response in Alabama was quick and decisive. The affected communities came 

together to react to the damage and with the assistance of the Department of Homeland Security, Alabama is moving towards a swift recovery. 

The storms last week once again reinforced the importance that we, as a Nation, 

must become better prepared to respond to all disasters whether they are acts of 

God or acts of man. While the risk of another terrorist attack is as real today as 

it was 6 years ago, we must ensure that our Nation is prepared to respond effectively to all disasters we may face. We cannot stop training our first responders for 

the next terrorist attack. We must remain vigilant and continue funding essential 

programs to keep our Nation ready to deter and respond to the next disaster—in 

whatever form it may take. 

A plan without proper execution is merely words on paper. And proper execution 

can only occur with well-trained, properly equipped first-responders. Whether it is 

a FEMA recovery team, a State emergency management group, or a volunteer 

search and rescue squad, we must do everything in our power to ensure that those 

responsible for executing the plan are able to act swiftly and appropriately in order 

to save lives and property from further destruction. In particular, Mr. Secretary, I 

am interested in hearing the Department’s efforts to effectively train the men and 

women that are willing to put themselves in harm’s way when duty calls and disaster strikes. I am particularly interested because Alabama has our Nation’s only 

live-agent training facility for civilian first responders, The Center for Domestic Preparedness or CDP. 

In addition, Mr. Secretary, I remain concerned about the problem of illegal immigration. Our immigration laws must be enforced. If they are not enforced, what is 

their purpose? 

Enforcing our current immigration laws would send a message to those seeking 

to enter this country illegally, that breaking our laws is not a lucrative endeavor 

when you are immediately deported. Our law enforcement must be agile and efficient but more importantly, able to enforce the law. Those in search of a better way 

of life through immigration are welcome, but only if they do so legally. 

Ours is a Nation of laws Mr. Secretary, and to continuously reward those that 

ignore the law or to turn a blind eye sends the wrong message to those who come 

here legally and those that follow our laws each and every day. 

Mr. Secretary, as I travel through Alabama and hear from my constituents, illegal 

immigration is the number one topic of discussion. Alabamians are searching for answers. They want to know why they are raising their children to obey the law when 

our own government is encouraging others to break the law. What’s more, they are 

not punished, in fact many are proposing to reward them. Yet hundreds of thousands of people are sitting behind bars today for breaking the law—the difference 

is that they didn’t enter the country illegally, they were already here. Mr. Secretary, 

how do you differentiate between the laws that are acceptable to break and those 

that are unacceptable to break? 

I look forward to hearing from you about what your Department is doing to address this pressing, and increasingly threatening, issue. 

The Senate has a responsibility to make sure the Department of Homeland Security is adequately funded so that it may carry out its mission, but it would be imprudent for us to go about this blindly. We want to make sure that you are better 

organized and that you have learned from the mistakes of the past. 

Again this is a critical hearing and I applaud the Chairman for holding it today. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 
5 

DEPARTMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE CENTER FOR DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS

Answer. The Department provides Federal leadership and resources to strengthen 

State and local governments’ preparedness capabilities—with the goal of reducing 

the Nation’s risk as a whole while increasing the collective ability to address catastrophic events. To fulfill this critical mission, first responders must have the necessary training and knowledge to mitigate a range of threats. The Department fulfills this requirement in a number of ways. 

The Training Division within the Department’s Office of Grants and Training assists first responders by serving as a central resource for the creation, management, 

and dissemination of high-quality preparedness training and related products. Over 

100 Grants & Training-supported courses are available to emergency responders 

across the Nation through 45 training providers. In fiscal year 2006, over 700,000 

first responders were trained through these providers. Courses are offered in Agroterrorism, Cyber Security, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Hazardous Materials, Intelligence Capacity, Transit Security, and Vigilant Communities. The Training Division also maintains course catalogs of State and other Federal training courses for 

over 150 courses. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) operates the Emergency 

Management Institute (EMI), a national training center for emergency planning, exercise design, and incident command operations for Federal, State, local, tribal and 

private sector individuals. EMI curricula are structured to meet the needs of this 

diverse audience with an emphasis on how the various elements work together in 

emergencies to save lives and protect property. Instruction focuses on the four 

phases of emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. 

EMI develops courses and administers resident and non-resident training programs 

in areas such as natural hazards (earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, dam safety), technological hazards (hazardous materials, terrorism, radiological incidents, chemical 

stockpile emergency preparedness), professional development, leadership, instructional methodology, exercise design and evaluation, information technology, public 

information, integrated emergency management, and train-the-trainers. Additionally, the U.S. Fire Administration/National Fire Academy (NFA) promotes the professional development of the fire and the emergency response community and its allied professionals. The NFA delivers educational and training courses having a National focus to supplement and support State and local fire service training programs. 

Within the Department’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), the 

Counterterrorism Division (CTD) provides several courses of instruction to First Responders, both at the basic and advanced levels. Advanced First Responder-related 

training is also provided to State, local, tribal and campus law enforcement colleagues. First Responder training delivered to basic students includes Introduction 

to Man-Portable Air Defense Systems, Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices, 

Bombs & Explosives, Elements of Suicide Bombers, National Incident Management 

System, Incident Command System, and Critical Incident Response, and Response 

to Weapons of Mass Destruction /Hazardous Material situations. These courses are 

delivered throughout the FLETC Basic Training Programs to students from more 

than 80 Federal agencies. 

Plans for the ‘‘New FEMA’’ call for the Center for Domestic Preparedness in Alabama to be a key component of FEMA’s new National Preparedness Directorate’s 

National Integration Center (NIC). The NIC will include a specialized office for integration and coordination of emergency management and emergency preparedness 

training and exercises to ensure the most effective use of the Nation’s training and 

exercise assets. The NIC will also include among its components the Noble Training 

Center and EMI; will have strong ties to the NFA; and, will coordinate its efforts 

with other training partners, including the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, TRADE, and other colleges, universities and training facilities. This approach 

will support a more coordinated and effective emergency preparedness and management training program that will help ensure that the Nation’s first responders are 

properly trained for their responsibilities. 

While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made measurable 

progress in achieving effective control of the border and improving the enforcement 

of our immigration laws in the interior, in order to continue on this path of success, 

we need your help by giving us effective tools to do our job. We appreciate the ongoing consideration for comprehensive immigration reform within the Congress. DHS 

is committed to the President’s vision of immigration reform based on five main pillars: (1) gaining effective control of the border; (2) building a robust interior enforcement program; (3) establishing a Temporary Worker Program (TWP); (4) bringing 
6 

illegal aliens who are now in the United States out of the shadows; and (5) promoting assimilation of new immigrants into our society. 

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CHERTOFF

Secretary CHERTOFF. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to 

testify on the President’s budget. I appreciate the opportunity to 

appear before you and Ranking Member Cochran and the other 

members of the committee to talk about what our priorities are for 

the coming fiscal year. I have a somewhat more extensive statement than I propose to deliver orally, and I ask that it be made 

part of the record. 

Senator BYRD. It will be made part of the record. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CHERTOFF

Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, and Members of the Subcommittee, as this is my 

first opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee in the 110th Congress, let me 

start by saying that I look forward to working with you in not only securing the 

appropriate resources, but making sure that we use them in the most effective and 

efficient manner to protect the homeland and the American people. While we have 

had many successes, there are numerous challenges that still remain. I am here 

today to ask for your partnership and support as we face these challenges. We may 

not see eye to eye on all issues, but we certainly agree that our interests are best 

served when we work together to achieve our common goal of securing this great 

Nation. 

I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee today to highlight some of our 

key accomplishments of the last year and present President Bush’s fiscal year 2008 

budget for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Five years after September 

11, 2001, DHS is more dedicated than ever to our vision and accomplishing our mission. September 11, 2001, will forever be etched in our souls as we remember the 

lives lost, the terror felt, the sacrifices made, and the courage shown. As a result 

of the deliberate and malicious acts of our enemies that occurred on that day, the 

Department was formed and charged with the significant responsibility of securing 

America. As we approach our fourth anniversary on March 1, 2007, we recognize 

that the Department has endured challenges, yet bravely stood in the face of our 

Nation’s enemies, diligently building systems to secure our homeland with urgency, 

flexibility and resolve. 

We must focus on the greatest risks and be flexible to changing threats, disciplined in our use of resources, and fully committed to building a Department that 

will meet future challenges, preserve freedom and privacy, and protect the American 

people. To achieve this, we will place considerable attention over the next 2-year period on the following five goals: 

We have already made great progress in each of these areas, and with the fiscal 

year 2008 Budget, we will continue that momentum. Let me highlight some of our 

key accomplishments along with initiatives and ongoing programs in our fiscal year 

2008 budget request. 

Overall, the fiscal year 2008 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security represents an 8 percent increase over fiscal year 2007, with a total request 

of $46.4 billion in funding. The Department’s fiscal year 2008 gross discretionary 

budget is $37.7 billion, an increase of 8 percent. Gross discretionary funding does 
7 

not include funding such as Coast Guard’s retirement pay accounts and fees paid 

for immigration benefits. The Department’s fiscal year 2008 net discretionary budget is $34.3 billion, which does not include fee collections such as funding for the Federal Protective Service (ICE), aviation security passenger and carrier fees (TSA), 

credentialing fees (such as TWIC–TSA), and premium collections (National Flood Insurance Fund, FEMA). It should also be noted that the fiscal year 2008 President’s 

Budget request reflects the Notice of Implementation of the Post-Katrina Emergency 

Reform Act of 2006 (Public Law 109–295) and of Additional Changes Pursuant to 

Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, provided to Congress on January 

18, 2007. 

GOAL 1: PROTECT OUR NATION FROM DANGEROUS PEOPLE

We have accomplished a lot in terms of continuing to protect our Nation from dangerous people. Key accomplishments supporting this goal are as follows: 

6,000 National Guard Deployed to Border.—In support of the President’s initiative 

to secure the border, 6,000 National Guard personnel were deployed to the Southwest border as part of Operation Jumpstart. In addition to the National Guard deployment, Border Patrol agent staffing increased by 8 percent, from over 11,200 to 

12,349, as shown in the chart below. 
8 

‘‘Catch and Return’’ Replaced ‘‘Catch and Release’’ Along the Borders.—As part of 

the Secure Border Initiative, the Department ended the practice of ‘‘catch and release’’ along the Southern and Northern borders. In the past, we apprehended illegal 

aliens from countries other than Mexico and then released them on their own recognizance. Often these illegal aliens failed to return for their immigration hearings. 

In July of 2005, we were releasing up to 80 percent of non-Mexican illegal aliens 

because we did not have the bed space to hold them. As of August 2006, we are 

holding 100 percent. When people know they will be held in detention and then returned to their home country, it creates a strong disincentive to cross illegally in 

the first place. Ending this practice and replacing it with ‘‘catch and return’’ is a 

breakthrough in deterring illegal immigration on the Southern border. This accomplishment is one that many considered impossible in 2005 when only approximately 

34 percent of apprehended non-Mexican aliens were detained. 

Apprehension Rates Declined.—Fiscal year 2006 showed a marked decrease in the 

apprehension rate due, in principle, to the end of ‘‘catch and release,’’ the implementation of Operation Jumpstart, and the expanded use of expedited removal procedures. The graph below provides historical data by fiscal year for total apprehen-
9 

sions of both Mexican and non-Mexican aliens between U.S. ports of entry. CBP’s 

Office of Border Patrol (OBP) made nearly 100,000 fewer apprehensions in fiscal 

year 2006 than in fiscal year 2005 due to these factors. This decline is represented 

below by quarter. 

Border Security At and Between the Nation’s Ports of Entry Increased.—By deterring illegal immigration, security has been strengthened. DHS can more effectively 

target resources to control our borders with fewer alien crossings. As shown in the 

chart above, CBP Border Patrol agents reduced the number of apprehensions at the 

borders by more than 8 percent in fiscal year 2006. As a result of targeted coordinated enforcement efforts, CBP Border Patrol reduced non-Mexican illegal alien apprehensions by 35 percent. 

CBP Increased Capability to Secure the Northern Border.—CBP Air and Marine 

opened its third of five Air Branches planned for the Northern border of the United 

States. The Great Falls Air Branch in Montana joins the Bellingham, Washington, 

and Plattsburgh, New York, Air Branches in supporting Homeland Security efforts 

along the Northern tier. 

Ports of Entry Inspections Formed First Line of Defense at Land Borders.—CBP 

officers inspected 422 million travelers and more than 132 million cars, trucks, 

buses, trains, vessels, and aircraft. CBP officers inspected 1.19 million private vehicles, 11.48 million trucks, and more than 1 million aircraft. 

ICE Set New Records for Worksite Enforcement and Compliance Enforcement.— 

As depicted in the graph below, in fiscal year 2006 more than 4,300 arrests and apprehensions were made in ICE worksite enforcement cases, more than seven times 

the arrests and apprehensions in fiscal year 2002, the last full year of operations 

for the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). ICE completed 5,956 

compliance enforcement investigations resulting in the administrative arrest of 

1,710 overstay and status violators, a 75 percent increase over the number of administrative arrests in fiscal year 2005. 
10 

ICE Set New Record for Alien Removals.—ICE removed 189,670 illegal aliens 

from the country in fiscal year 2006, a 12 percent increase over the number of removals during the prior fiscal year. As shown in the following chart, ICE also increased its detention bed space by 6,700 and is now funded for a total of 27,500 beds 

for fiscal year 2007. 

US VISIT’s Biometric Program Kept Terrorists and Other Criminals Out of Our 

Country.—US VISIT’s biometric program increased watch list hits by 185 percent 

at consular offices. Keeping terrorists and other criminals out of our country protects the American people, while facilitating visits from legitimate travelers. In fiscal year 2006 there were 2,558 watch list hits at consular offices, up from 897 hits 

in fiscal year 2005. The use of biometrics has allowed DHS to deny entry to more 

than 1,100 known criminals and visa violators. 

TSA Responded to Liquid Explosive Threat.—Although over 600 million people fly 

each year, the Transportation Security Administration was able to perform necessary passenger screening operations preventing and protecting against adverse ac-
11 

tions while attaining a new high in customer satisfaction. Customer satisfaction 

reached 81 percent, a new high for screening operations at the Nation’s security 

checkpoints. In addition, in response to the foiled terror plot in England, TSA 

trained its 43,000 security officers to address the threat of liquid explosives. After 

two days, security wait times returned to normal levels. Six weeks later, after conducting extensive explosive testing with our Federal partners, TSA again proved its 

flexibility by modifying its ban on liquids by allowing limited quantities onboard aircraft. Again, efficiency was not seriously affected and in fact wait times during the 

Thanksgiving holiday in 2006 were slightly lower than in 2005. 

U.S. Coast Guard Migrant Interdiction Efforts Contributed to Border Security. The 

Coast Guard evaluates its migrant interdiction effectiveness by counting the number 

of undocumented migrants from four primary source countries (Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and the Peoples Republic of China) against the combined estimated yearly migration threat from these countries. There were 5,552 successful migrant arrivals out of an estimated threat of 51,134 migrants in fiscal year 2006, 

yielding a deterrence and interdiction rate of 89 percent. 

Intelligence Campaign Plan for Border Security (ICP).—The ICP, managed by the 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis, is a departmental planning effort to provide comprehensive and coordinated intelligence support for the full spectrum of the Department’s border security operations. The ICP is linking DHS intelligence resources, 

and those of State and local partners, with the Intelligence Community in order to 

deliver actionable intelligence to front-line operators and to fuse national intelligence with law enforcement information. As part of the ICP, we began developing 

and implementing, in partnership with the Director of National Intelligence, a robust strategy for collection and analysis of border security intelligence to support 

our operational missions. In addition, DHS intelligence analysts draw on their extensive experience in the Intelligence Community to help ensure that the Department gets full benefit from national collection assets. 

The fiscal year 2008 budget request includes funding to continue the progress 

made in protecting our Nation from dangerous people. Examples are as follows: —Total funding of $1 billion is requested for the SBInet program to support the 

deployment of an integrated infrastructure and technology solutions for effective 

control of the border to include fencing and virtual barriers to prevent illegal 

entry into the United States. —Total funding of $778 million will provide for 3,000 additional Border Patrol 

agents as well as the facilities to house the agents, the support personnel, and 

equipment necessary to gain operational control of our borders. This will bring 

the total number of Border Patrol agents to 17,819 at the end of fiscal year 

2008. This will keep us on track to achieve the President’s goal of doubling the 

Border Patrol by the time he leaves office. —Increased funding of $252 million is requested for implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) at land ports of entry. The requested 

resources will advance the WHTI goal of ensuring that all people arriving at 

U.S. ports of entry have a valid and appropriate means of identification and can 

be processed in an efficient manner. 

—An increase of $146.2 million for the transition to 10-Print and IDENT/IAFIS 

Interoperability. The funding will provide the capability to biometrically screen 

foreign visitors requesting entry to the United States through the collection of 

10-print (slap) capture at enrollment. US VISIT, along with the Departments 

of State and Justice, will be able to capture ten fingerprints rather than the 

current two, as well as increased interoperability between DHS’ Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) and Justice’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). 

—An increase of $224.2 million in funding will support the Transportation Security Administration’s screening operations. This includes funding for the Transportation Security Officers (TSO), Document Checkers, Career Progression Program, and procurement and installation of checkpoint support and explosives 

detection systems. TSA has evolved its TSO workforce to be highly responsive 

and effective in addressing the variety of potential threats, such as those presented in August 2006 by liquids, aerosols and gels. In fiscal year 2008, TSA 

will add an important layer of defense for aviation security by assuming responsibility of document checking. 

—An increase of $38 million in funding will support development of the Secure 

Flight system. This includes funding for hardware procurement, operations 

ramp-up and training, and network interface engineering between the Secure 

Flight and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Advance Passenger 

Information System (APIS) network. Secure Flight will strengthen watch list 

screening and vet all domestic air travelers. 
12 

—An increase of $28.7 million for the ICE Criminal Alien Program (CAP) will ensure the safety of the American public through the addition of 22 CAP teams. 

These teams will identify and remove incarcerated criminal aliens so they are 

not released back into the general population. 

—An increase of estimated fee revenue of $16.5 million in funding will support 

the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) which will establish an integrated, credential-based, identity verification program through the 

use of biometric technology. In order to gain unescorted access to the secure 

areas within the Nation’s transportation system, transportation workers who 

need access to these areas will go through identity verification, a satisfactory 

background check and be issued a biometrically verifiable identity card to be 

used with local access systems. The TWIC final rule has very recently been 

issued, and initial enrollment for this program is scheduled to begin in March 

2007. 

—A total of $788.1 million is requested for the Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater System. This funding will: complete the acquisition of four National Security Cutters; fund engineering and design costs for the Replacement Patrol 

Boat; and purchase four additional Maritime Patrol Aircraft. These long-awaited upgrades to its fleet will strengthen the Coast Guard’s ability to safeguard 

our seaports from terrorists seeking to enter the country or transport dangerous 

weapons or materials. 

—A funding request of $30 million for U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ 

Employment Eligibility Verification (EEV) Program. Through this voluntary 

web-based program U.S. employers are able to quickly verify the employment 

eligibility of their employees, helping them avoid the hiring of unauthorized 

workers. 

—Total funding of $263 million requested for the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) will provide the most current basic and advanced training 

for our Nation’s law enforcement officers. FLETC will provide training for over 

53,000 students in fiscal year 2008 including an estimated 4,350 Border Patrol 

Agents, 60 ICE Investigators and 530 ICE Detention Personnel in support of 

the Secure Border Initiative. 

GOAL 2: PROTECT OUR NATION FROM DANGEROUS GOODS

We have also made a lot of progress in protecting our Nation from dangerous 

goods. Key accomplishments include: 

Increased the Number of Containers Inspected Prior to Entering the United 

States.—Almost seven million cargo containers arrive and are offloaded at U.S. seaports each year. CBP increased the percent of shipping containers processed through 

its Container Security Initiative prior to entering U.S. ports from 48 percent in fiscal year 2004 to 82 percent in fiscal year 2006. This significantly decreases the risk 

of terrorist materials entering our country while providing processes to facilitate the 

flow of safe and legitimate trade and travel from more foreign ports. 

DHS Deployed Over 880 Radiation Portal Monitors at Land and Sea Ports.—DHS 

deployed 283 new radiation portal monitors throughout the Nation’s ports of entry, 

bringing the number of radiation portal monitors to 884 at the Nation’s land and 

sea ports of entry. These additional RPMs allow us to inspect 90 percent of incoming 

cargo containers, an increase of approximately 30 percent from this time last year. 

DNDO Awarded over $1 Billion for Next Generation Nuclear Detection Devices.— 

DNDO announced the award of Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program contracts totaling $1.15 billion to enhance the detection of radiological and nuclear materials at the Nation’s ports of entry. ASP models were deployed to the Nevada Test 

Site, where they will be tested using nuclear threat material. Portals have also been 

delivered to the New York Container Terminal for data collection. 

Secure Freight Initiative Launched to Begin Screening at Foreign Ports.—DHS and 

the Department of Energy announced the first phase of the Secure Freight Initiative, an unprecedented effort to build upon existing port security measures by enhancing the Federal Government’s ability to scan containers for nuclear and radiological materials overseas and to better assess the risk of inbound containers. The 

initial phase involves the deployment of a combination of existing technology and 

proven nuclear detection devices. 

Protected Air Cargo.—Recently published air cargo security rules help prevent the 

use of air cargo as a means of attacking aircraft. The rules mark the first substantial changes to air cargo regulations since 1999, and represent a joint governmentindustry vision of an enhanced security baseline. These new measures will be enforced by an expanded force of air cargo inspectors, who will be stationed at the 102 

airports where 95 percent of domestic air cargo originates. 
13 

U.S. Coast Guard Set Records for Drug Seizures and Arrests.—This year, counterdrug boardings from United States and Royal Navy vessels resulted in all-time 

records for seizures and arrests. The 93,209 pounds of drugs that were seized was 

more than the combined amount seized in the last 2 years. 

The fiscal year 2008 budget request includes funding to build on the accomplishments made in protecting our Nation from dangerous goods. Some examples include: 

—Total funding of $178 million is requested for the procurement and deployment 

of radiation portal monitors, including next-generation Advanced Spectroscopic 

Portal (ASP) systems. Our goal is to screen almost 100 percent of arriving cargo 

at seaports by the end of this year, and nearly 100 percent at all of our ports 

of entry by the end of fiscal year 2008. 

—An increase of $15 million is requested for the Secure Freight Initiative that 

is designed to maximize radiological and nuclear screening of U.S. bound containers from foreign ports. Secure Freight includes a next generation risk assessment screening program and an overseas detection network, while merging 

existing and new information regarding containers transiting through the supply chain to assist customs and screening officials in making security and trade 

decisions. 

—An increase of $47.4 million is requested for DNDO’s ‘‘The Acceleration of NextGeneration Research and Development’’ program which will increase funding 

across multiple DNDO Research, Development, and Operations program areas. 

The largest increases will be for the Systems Development (including multiple 

variants of Advanced Spectroscopic Portal systems) and Transformational Research and Development program areas. 

GOAL 3: PROTECT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Working closely with State and local officials, other Federal agencies, and the private sector, DHS helps to ensure that proper steps are taken to protect critical infrastructure, property and the economy of our Nation from acts of terrorism, natural 

disasters or other emergencies. America’s critical infrastructure includes food and 

water systems, agriculture, health systems and emergency services, information and 

telecommunications, banking and finance, energy (electrical, nuclear, gas and oil, 

dams), transportation (air, road, rail, ports, waterways), the chemical and defense 

industries, postal and shipping entities, and national monuments and icons. 

Summarized below are some of the key accomplishments associated with the goal 

of protecting critical infrastructure: 

Buffer Zone Protection Plans Helped Protect Communities from Potential Terrorist 

Attacks Against Chemical Facilities.—In 2006, 58 percent of identified critical infrastructure has implemented Buffer Zone Protection (BZP) Plans, up significantly 

from our fiscal year 2005 percentage of 18 percent. The Department worked in collaboration with State, local, and tribal entities by providing training workshops, 

seminars, technical assistance and a common template to standardize the BZP plan 

development process. 

DHS Completed the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).—The NIPP 

is a comprehensive risk management framework that clearly defines critical infrastructure protection roles and responsibilities for all levels of government, private 

industry, nongovernmental agencies and tribal partners. 

TSA Conducted Rail Security Explosives Detection Pilot Programs.—Rail Security 

Explosives Detection Pilot Programs were conducted in Baltimore, MD and Jersey 

City, NJ to test and evaluate security equipment and operating procedures as part 

of DHS’ broader efforts to protect citizens and critical infrastructure from possible 

terrorist attacks. 

U.S. Coast Guard Implemented the National Capital Region Air Defense Mission.—The U.S. Coast Guard officially assumed responsibility for air intercept operations in the Nation’s capital from CBP. The Coast Guard will support the North 

American Aerospace Defense Command’s mission with its rotary wing air intercept 

capability. Coast Guard HH–65C helicopters and crews will be responsible for intercepting unauthorized aircraft which fly into an air defense identification zone that 

surrounds Washington, D.C. Since assuming the mission on September 25, 2006, the 

Coast Guard has successfully responded to 23 of the 23 incursions into the National 

Capital Region Air Space. 

The Secret Service Continued its 100 Percent Protection Rate of Our Nation’s Leaders.—To safeguard our Nation’s leaders, the Department operates the Domestic 

Protectees program 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to protect the President and 

Vice President and their families, former Presidents and their spouses, and other 

individuals designated by statute or Presidential directive. All protectees arrived 
14 

and departed safely 100 percent of the time at more than 6,275 travel stops during 

fiscal year 2006. 

We will protect critical infrastructure by continuing to foster mutually beneficial 

partnerships with industry owners and operators. Our fiscal year 2008 budget request builds on the 17 sector-specific plans as identified in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), which will be complete this year. We will continue to 

enhance protection through our chemical plant security program and regulations to 

protect high risk rail shipments in urban areas. The fiscal year 2008 budget request 

will support this goal by providing: 

—An increase of $30 million is requested for DNDO’s ‘‘Securing the Cities’’ initiative. Building off analytical work done in fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007 

in support of the New York region, DHS will begin the implementation of strategies developed through the course of this analysis. Activities included in the 

development of regional strategies include analyses of critical road networks, 

mass transit, maritime, and rail vulnerabilities. DNDO will engage State and 

local partners in additional urban areas beginning in fiscal year 2008 to tailor 

strategies and lessons learned from the New York region to meet requirements 

specific to these regions. 

—An increase of $21.9 million is proposed for the newly formed Science and Technology Office of Innovation to provide increases to programs developing gamechanging and leap-ahead technologies to address some of the highest priority 

needs of the Department. The technologies being developed will be used to create a resilient electric grid to protect critical infrastructure sites, detect tunnels 

along the border, defeat improvised explosive devices, and utilize high-altitude 

platforms and/or ground-based systems for detection and engagement of 

MANPADS in order to offer alternative solutions to installing systems on aircraft. 

—An increase of $15 million is requested to improve Chemical Site Security and 

regulate security of chemical plants. The funding will be used to establish the 

Chemical Security Compliance Division which will include a national program 

office to manage training of inspector staff, help desk personnel and other administrative staff. The division will also include an Inspector/field staff of subject matter experts in chemical engineering, process safety, as well as an adjudication office. Funds will also be spent on assisting chemical facilities with vulnerability assessments. 

—TSA requests an increase of $3.5 million to expand its National Explosive Detection Canine Team program by approximately 45 teams to support the Nation’s largest passenger transportation systems in both mass transit and ferry 

systems. 

—An increase of $11.5 million is requested for the Coast Guard’s National Capital 

Region Air Defense program. This funding is needed to make seven HH–65 helicopters fully mission ready, enabling the Coast Guard to continue protecting the 

National Capital Region against potential airborne attacks. 

—An increase of $35.6 million for the Presidential Campaign will enable the Secret Service to provide the appropriate level of resources to adequately protect 

the candidates and nominees during the 2008 Presidential Campaign while sustaining other protective programs. 

GOAL 4: BUILD A NIMBLE, EFFECTIVE EMERGENCY RESPONSE SYSTEM AND A CULTURE

OF PREPAREDNESS

We have taken many steps toward building a nimble, effective emergency response system and culture of preparedness. Before I highlight some of those steps, 

let me reflect on what has been accomplished in the Gulf Coast Region since Hurricane Katrina made landfall. 

DHS through the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) disaster relief and recovery programs specifically, have provided an unprecedented amount of 

assistance to the Gulf Region following the devastation caused by Hurricanes 

Katrina, Rita and Wilma. Over 1.5 million people were affected with over 800,000 

displaced from their homes and communities. DHS is committed to continuing its 

efforts in working with its Federal partners and State and local governments to rebuild the Gulf Region. 

—FEMA has provided more than $9 billion in Public Assistance grant funding to 

support State and local authorities and non-profit organizations repair, rebuild 

and restore public facilities and infrastructure. 

—The Coast Guard has played a vital role in ensuring the aids-to-navigation and 

waterway management requirements have been restored and maintained to 

keep the Port of New Orleans open. The Coast Guard also assisted in the recov-
15 

ery of the off-shore oil industry in the Gulf by locating and marking damaged 

or destroyed oil platforms to ensure safe navigation that allowed operations to 

resume. —FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program has paid over $16 billion in flood 

damage claims to help over 200,000 people rebuild and recovery from their 

losses. Over $12.8 billion of that amount was for Louisiana alone. To-date, approximately 98 percent of all claims have been closed. 

—FEMA has funded the removal of approximately 108 million cubic yards of debris in the Gulf Region. Virtually all of the debris in Texas, Alabama and Mississippi has been removed, with approximately 83.4 percent of the debris in 

Louisiana removed. 

—In the immediate aftermath of the storms, FEMA provided over 85 million liters 

of water, 176 million pounds of ice, and 46.5 million meals. —FEMA is providing over $1.47 billion in mitigation grant funding to Louisiana and an additional $432 million to Mississippi to fund post-disaster mitigation 

projects that will enhance the safety and protection of lives and property in future event. 

As we continue our efforts to assist those affected in the aftermath of Hurricanes 

Katrina, Rita and Wilma, we continue to learn valuable lessons. Many of our major 

accomplishments supporting this goal stem from those lessons, including: 

Federal, State, Local and Tribal Governments are Better Able to Protect Against 

Acts of Terrorism, Natural Disasters, or Other Emergencies.—The percent of Federal, 

State, local and tribal governments that self-reported their compliance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), for fiscal year 2006 was 100 percent, 

up from 82 percent. NIMS establishes standardized processes, protocols, and procedures that all responders—Federal, State, tribal, and local—will use to coordinate 

and conduct response actions. With responders using the same standardized procedures, they will all share a common focus in national preparedness and readiness 

in responding to and recovering from an incident should one occur. 

FEMA’s Average Response Time to Arrive at a Disaster Scene Has Improved.— With a goal of 48 hours for Federal response teams to arrive on scene at a disaster 

site, during fiscal year 2006 our average response time was 25 hours. Improving the 

timeliness of specialized Federal response teams has saved lives, reduced property 

loss, enabled greater continuity of services, and enhanced logistical capability in the 

wake of disasters. 

Customer Satisfaction with FEMA’s Recovery Assistance Has Improved.—To ensure that individuals and families that have been affected by disasters have access 

to the full range of response and recovery programs in a timely manner, the Department seeks to increase the annual customer satisfaction level among recipients, 

while reducing the program delivery cost and increasing the timeliness of service 

delivery. With a goal of 90 percent satisfaction with Individual Recovery Assistance 

programs, during fiscal year 2006 we achieved a customer satisfaction rating of 91 

percent in response to the question ‘‘Overall, how would you rate the information 

and support you received from FEMA since the disaster occurred?’’ 

FEMA Expands Capability to Assist Disaster Victims.—FEMA increased registration capability to 200,000 victims a day through its toll-free registration number, online registration process, registering individuals in shelters and using mobile units; 

increased home inspection capacity to 20,000 a day; activated a contract to assist 

in identity verification in future disasters; and tightened processes to speed up delivery of needed aid while simultaneously reducing waste, fraud and abuse. 

FEMA Strengthened Logistics Management Capabilities.—FEMA implemented the 

Total Asset Visibility (TAV) program in two Regions to provide enhanced visibility, 

awareness, and accountability over disaster relief supplies and resources. It assists 

in both resource flow and supply chain management. 

FEMA Improved Communications and Situational Awareness.—To improve upon 

existing communications systems, DHS has initiated technological advances and elevated the standard by using satellite imagery, upgrading radios, and employing frequency management. The new National Response Coordination Center at FEMA 

and Mobile Registration Intake Centers are now operational. 

DHS Awarded $2.6 Billion for Preparedness.—Included in this total, approximately $1.9 billion in Homeland Security Grant funds has been awarded to State 

and local governments for equipment, training, exercises and various other measures designed to increase the level of security in communities across the Nation. 

$400 million in grants was awarded to strengthen the Nation’s ability to prevent, 

protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters and 

other emergencies that could impact this country’s critical infrastructure. Almost 

$300 million was also distributed in fire grants to fire departments and EMS organizations to enhance their response capabilities and to more effectively protect the 
16 

health and safety of the public and emergency response personnel with respect to 

fire and all other hazards. Of the funds awarded to State and local governments, 

almost $400 million was used to support State and Local Fusion Centers—valuable 

partnerships in place across the Nation in which interagency efforts are focused to 

better share intelligence with State and local governments. The graph below shows 

the funding available to States and localities since fiscal year 2002. 

DHS Reviewed 131 State and Local Emergency Plans.—By reviewing State and 

local disaster plans, collocating decision-makers, and pre-designating Federal leadership, DHS is improving coordination across all levels of government. Through the 

Nationwide Plan Review, DHS completed visits to 131 sites (50 states, 6 territories, 

and 75 major urban areas) and reviewed the disaster and evacuation plans for each. 

These reviews will allow DHS, states and urban areas to identify deficiencies and 

improve catastrophic planning. 

DHS Issued Tactical Interoperable Communication Scorecards for 75 Urban/Metropolitan Areas.—These scorecards measured the ability of Urban/Metropolitan 

Areas to provide tactical (within one hour) communications capabilities to first responders. This process included the creation of Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan (TICP), peer evaluation, full-scale exercise, and after action reports. 

U.S. Coast Guard Search and Rescue Efforts.—No one can predict when the next 

disaster will occur or whether it will be natural or man-made. Nevertheless, it will 

come, and the public expects the Coast Guard to be mission ready to answer the 

call and respond. The Coast Guard rescued 85 percent of mariners in imminent danger during 2006. 

The fiscal year 2008 budget request includes funding to build on these accomplishments and reflects the Administration and DHS’ commitment to the recovery of the 

Gulf Coast Region. Examples include such things as: —An increase of $100 million is requested for FEMA’s Vision Initiatives that will 

ensure FEMA has the resources in place to continue the progress made in preparation for the 2006 hurricane season and be positioned to deliver these critical 

commodities to a disaster area as quickly, efficiently, and effectively as possible. 

A combination of staffing increases, new technologies, and targeted investment 

in equipment and supplies, will increase FEMA’s mission capacity in the areas 

of Incident Management, Operational Planning, Continuity Programs, Public 

Disaster Communications, Hazard Mitigation, Disaster Logistics, and Service to 

Disaster Victims. 

—The fiscal year 2007 supplemental request includes a $3.4 billion for FEMA’s 

Disaster Relief Fund to continue the Department’s recovery efforts in the Gulf. 

These funds will allow FEMA to continue to provide financial assistance to the 

Gulf Region in support of the President’s commitment to rebuilding the Region 

and restoring the City of New Orleans to its rightful place as one of the Nations 

preeminent cities. 
17 

—A total of $3.2 billion will be available for State and local preparedness expenditures as well as assistance to firefighters in fiscal year 2008, as shown in the 

following table. In addition to the $2.2 billion requested by DHS to fund its 

grant, training and exercise programs, DHS will also be co-administering the 

$1.0 billion Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC) grant program, 

in partnership with the Department of Commerce. 

—A realignment of $132.7 million in base resources is requested to establish a 

Deployable Operations Group and strengthen the Coast Guard’s overall response capability. The alignment of Coast Guard’s deployable, specialized forces 

under a single command will improve and strengthen Coast Guard’s ability to 

perform day-to-day operations and respond to maritime disasters and threats to 

the Nation. 

—A total of $48 million is requested to further professionalize FEMA’s disaster 

workforce by converting Cadre of On-Call Response Employee (CORE) positions 

with 4-year terms into permanent full-time employees. This transition will stabilize the disaster workforce, allowing for the development and retention of employees with needed program expertise and increased staffing flexibility to en-
18 

sure critical functions are maintained during disaster response surge operations. 

—An increase of $12 million for the Nationwide Automatic Identification System 

will continue funding for this vital project that significantly enhances the Coast 

Guard’s ability to identify, track and exchange information with vessels in the 

maritime domain, especially those vessels that may threaten our Nation. 

GOAL 5: STRENGTHEN AND UNIFY DHS OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT

It has been a challenge to take 22 separate agencies, each with their own set culture and way of operating and merge them together into a unified Department with 

a common mission of securing the homeland from terrorist and other threats. We 

have made many strides in strengthening the Department’s operations and management. Major accomplishments include the following: 

Chief Human Capital Office Moved Forward with Performance Management 

Goals.—DHS deployed its performance management program and its automated 

system to approximately 10,000 employees in multiple components and trained 350 

senior executives and more than 11,000 managers and supervisors in performance 

leadership. 

The Office of Security Completed HSPD–12 Goals.—The Office of Security met all 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 requirements by deploying an 

HSPD–12 compliant credentialing system and associated policy and procedures. 

This new credential meets all Federal requirements for interoperability and security. 

The Chief Procurement Office Exceeded Small Business Goals. DHS awarded approximately 34 percent of DHS prime contracts to small businesses, exceeding the 

goal by 4 percent. 

Chief Information Office Stood up New Data Center.—Data Center Services completed the Stennis Space Center Data Center Construction Phase I, 24,000 square 

feet, on time and the first application has been transferred to this data center. 

The fiscal year 2008 budget request includes funding to build on the accomplishments made in this area. 

We will strengthen and unify DHS operations and management by joining DHS 

headquarters’ facilities at a single campus, beginning in 2010. We will unify IT infrastructures by reducing 17 data centers to two, seven networks to one, and 

through a common email operation. We will meet HSPD–12 goals by providing all 

newly-hired DHS employees with a single, secure, tamper-proof smartcard that allows interoperable access to DHS facilities and systems. We will integrate our hiring, retention, training and development, and performance programs by the end of 

2008. Other specific examples of items included in the fiscal year 2008 budget include: 

—An increase of $139 million in premium processing fees will transform and improve USCIS Business processes and out-dated information technology systems. 

This investment will improve customer service and processing times of immigration applications, increase security and fraud detection, and support automation 

of USCIS operations by eliminating the current paper-based processes and antiquated technology. 

—An increase of $120 million is requested for the DHS Consolidated Headquarters Project for the relocation of the USCG Headquarters and the consolidation of other DHS components on the St. Elizabeths West Campus and throughout the National Capital Region. 

—A total of $99.1 million will continue to support the Inspector General activities 

to serve as an independent and objective inspection, audit, and investigative 

body to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in DHS programs and operations. 

—A total of $17 million in new funding within ICE and CBP will help improve 

the internal oversight of personnel. This is especially critical as the workforces 

of these organizations are continuing to expand. Timely attention to allegations 

of misconduct is critical to DHS success. 

—An increase of $9.6 million for the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer is 

requested to improve acquisition operations. The Department is committed to 

establishing the staffing necessary to properly award and administer Department-wide acquisition programs to ensure effective delivery of services and 

proper procurement and contracting procedures in compliance with all Federal 

Laws and Regulations Governing Procurements. 

—An increase of $5 million is requested for the Policy Office to strengthen the 

Department’s Committee on Foreign Owned Investments in the United States, 
19 

work with states on the REAL ID Act, and expand the duties of the International Affairs Office. 

—An increase of funding is requested for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

to strengthen the Department’s intelligence and information sharing capability 

and to continue integrating the intelligence offices and programs of the Department. 

CONCLUSION

I am sure you will recognize that with the support of Congress, the Department 

has had many successes. I have outlined many of them in my testimony today and 

how they relate to the Department’s five goals. We have also learned from our experiences certain things that we could have approached differently to get better results. As we move forward to face the many challenges ahead, those lessons learned 

will be at the core of our planning and implementation efforts. I am looking forward 

to working in partnership with the 110th Congress to build on our many accomplishments and focus on getting the desired results. 

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I look forward to answering 

your questions and to working with you on the fiscal year 2008 budget and other 

issues. 

THE DEPARTMENT’S MAJOR PRIORITIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

Secretary CHERTOFF. I thought I would very briefly review for a 

few minutes what our major priorities are, and where we hope to 

go with the help of Congress in fiscal year 2008. 

Obviously, we continue to face complex challenges to our security, and it’s important that we proceed in partnership with Congress in addressing the threats to the homeland, and to our people. At $46.4 billion in homeland security funding that’s being requested, our budget represents an 8 percent increase over the fiscal 

year 2007, and an increase of nearly 50 percent over the 2003 fiscal 

year. It’s a strong budget, and it reflects the President’s unwavering commitment to give us the tools and resources that we need to 

protect the homeland. Obviously, we have to deploy those tools and 

resources in a cost-effective and disciplined manner, but this is a 

budget that will enhance our security, safeguard our freedom, and 

extend our prosperity. 

From border protection to intelligence gathering and sharing, 

from airline security to maritime protection, this budget funds a 

wide range of endeavors. But it reflects, overall, a consistent strategy of focusing on our greatest risks, and confronting them in a deliberate, but decisive manner. 

FIVE OVERARCHING STRATEGIC MISSIONS

Essentially, the budget looks at five different over-arching strategic missions that the Department has: protecting our Nation from 

dangerous people; protecting our Nation from dangerous cargo; protecting our critical infrastructure; building a more nimble and effective emergency response system, and a culture of preparedness; 

and finally, strengthening and unifying our own operations and 

management at the Department. 

Let me very briefly talk about our progress in each of these areas 

over the past year, and the funding priorities for the coming fiscal 

year. 

PROTECTING THE NATION FROM DANGEROUS PEOPLE

As you observe, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Cochran, we’ve 

added significant new Border Patrol and infrastructure along the 
20 

border, deployed the National Guard under Operation Jump Start, 

awarded the SBInet contract, which will give us 21st century tools 

on the border, and replaced catch-and-release at the border, with 

catch, detain, and return. 

As a consequence, apprehension rates have fallen significantly. 

We are seeing some very clear indicators that fewer illegal immigrants are attempting to cross our border. To further this important progress, we’re requesting $1 billion for 

the SBInet high-tech program to continue the deployment of integrated infrastructure and technology across our land borders. We’re 

also requesting money for 3,000 additional Border Patrol, which 

will put us on track to meet the President’s commitment of over 

18,300 Border Patrol by the end of 2008. That is a doubling of the 

number of Border Patrol, as compared to the number that existed 

when the President took office. 

Now, we measure the results each quarter in terms of the number of apprehensions we have, as compared to the same time period 

the prior year. That’s a good way to show some of the results that 

we’ve had. Since the President announced Operation Jump Start in 

the third quarter of last year, we have seen in each quarter, a successive, significant decline in apprehensions; 13 percent in the 

third quarter of 2006, 38 percent in the fourth quarter, and a 25 

percent decrease in the first quarter of 2007. 

The conclusion that this reflects positive momentum in stemming 

the flow of illegal migration, is supported by other metrics which 

the Border Patrol uses that leads them to conclude that we are beginning to win this war against illegal migration. Although, I hasten to add that we have not won the war, and we have to continue 

to put the resources and effort into the border if we are to be successful. 

I also want to observe that we’ve dramatically turned around our 

efforts at the interior, in terms of worksite enforcement cases. Last 

year, we had 716 criminal arrests, and more than 3,600 administrative apprehensions for violations of the worksite rules by those 

who employ illegal migrants. This is a seven-fold increase over INS 

in its final year of operation in fiscal year 2002. 

PROTECTING THE NATION FROM DANGEROUS CARGO

Now, let me talk about keeping dangerous things out of the country. We currently screen 90 percent of incoming cargo into the 

United States for radiation. That is a major leap forward, considering that in fiscal year 2003, we screened zero percent. In fiscal 

year 2008, we’re requesting $178 million for radiation porto-monitors, including the next-generation advanced spectroscopic portosystem. This will get us to the point that will allow us to screen 

almost 100 percent of cargo at our major sea ports by the end of 

this year, and almost 100 percent at our land and sea ports by the 

end of next year. That is from a base of zero, just several years ago. 

PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Across the interior of this country, we are acting to protect infrastructure through new chemical site regulation authority, and new 

regulations we’ve proposed to protect high-risk rail shipments in 

transit. We’ve conducted site visits and vulnerability assessments 
21 

at hundreds of critical facilities. We’ve released a National Infrastructure Protection Plan that gives real guidance to all of the sectors of the economy, in terms of steps they need to take to protect 

their investments, their assets, and most importantly, their people. 

As was noted, we also protected our aviation system from a terrorist attack, originating in London during last summer, while responding with remarkable flexibility to the rapidly changing circumstances posed by that plot. 

EFFECTIVE EMERGENCY RESPONSE SYSTEM AND A CULTURE OF

PREPAREDNESS

Of course, a big part of our mission involves improving our Nation’s response to catastrophes, including natural disasters like the 

gulf coast hurricanes of 2005, as well as man-made catastrophes. 

At the Federal level, that means rebuilding our Nation’s emergency 

management agency. Last year, we boosted FEMA’s capabilities, 

leadership and customer service, worked with State and local partners to assess emergency plans, and communications interoperability, promoted individual preparedness, and awarded $2.6 billion 

in Homeland Security grants. By the end of fiscal year 2007, we 

will have committed nearly $20 billion in grants to our State and 

local partners. 

It also bears mentioning that the Federal Government has committed more than $100 billion in support of gulf coast recovery in 

the aftermath of the hurricanes. This includes more than $9 billion 

in FEMA public assistance grant funding to help State and local 

authorities and non-profits repair and restore public facilities and 

infrastructure. 

FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program has paid over $16 billion, in flood damage claims, to help over 200,000 people rebuild 

and recover from their losses, and over $12.8 billion of that amount 

was for Louisiana alone. To date, approximately 98 percent of all 

of those claims have been closed. 

FEMA is providing over $1.47 billion in mitigation grant funding 

to Louisiana, and an additional $432 million to Mississippi to fund 

post-disaster mitigation projects. We’re committed to continuing 

gulf coast recovery, and the fiscal year 2008 budget request includes a $3.4 billion supplemental request for FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund. These funds will allow for me to continue providing financial assistance to the gulf region, along with our other partners 

in the Federal Government, all in support of the President’s commitment to rebuild the region, and restore the cities of that region 

to the preeminence that they previously had. 

Now, to boost preparedness across the country, we intend to 

make available $3.2 billion in grants over this next year, to support 

State and local preparedness expenditures, as well as assistance to 

firefighters. Of this amount, $2.2 billion is requested to fund grant 

training and exercise programs under FEMA. But we will also be 

co-administering the $1 billion public safety interoperable communications grant program, in partnership with the Department of 

Commerce. 
22 

STRENGTHENING AND UNIFYING DHS MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS

Finally, we need to tend to our own house. We plan to strengthen 

and unify our own operations in management at DHS, by among 

other things, requesting $120 million in additional funds, to help 

join our headquarters facilities at a single campus, starting in 

2010. In order to make sure we continue to improve our procurement and auditing skills, we’re proposing a $9.6 million increase 

for the Office of the Chief of Procurement, to make sure that we 

are capable of managing our acquisition operations; and this includes staffing increases. 

We’re looking forward to working with this committee, as we continue to build on the successes that we’ve had. I have to observe 

that this country has been blessed since September 2001, in that 

we’ve not had another successful attack on the domestic homeland. 

But, I have to say that is not for lack of trying by the enemy. 

Therefore, we look forward to continuing to work with you to 

make sure that we can preserve safety and security in the homeland, and do so in a way that does not compromise our liberty, or 

our prosperity. 

Thank you. 

EXPLOSIVE DETECTION TECHNOLOGY

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

The intelligence community says terrorists still view the aviation 

sector as the biggest target for an attack. The threat risk has 

stayed at orange, or high, since August. There is a $1.1 billion 

backlog for baggage systems to screen for explosives at our 25 largest airports across the country. Five and one-half years have 

passed since 9/11, and air passengers still walk through archaic security devices that cannot detect plastic or liquid explosives. Yet, 

the President proposes to reduce spending for explosives detection 

and installation by 17 percent. 

What is the rationale for such a cut? Shouldn’t we also be investing more in emerging technologies that can better detect explosives 

on passengers and their baggage? Shall I repeat the question? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. No, I have the question, and I think that 

you’re quite right. The current technology, and the technology that 

we’re currently in the process of purchasing, is useful, but it has 

some limitations. Among the limitations, is that it’s not an adequate system for detecting liquid explosives, or other kinds of explosives like certain types of plastic explosives. Therefore, even as 

we continue to acquire existing technology, we have to make sure 

we don’t over-invest in a technology that has, within itself, the 

seeds of its own obsolescence. That’s why we have a couple of strategies with respect to aviation. 

First, through our Science and Technology Directorate, we are 

continuing to work aggressively to find new technologies that actually work in the real world, and provide a higher measure of security. We’re trying one of those out now in Arizona; the backscatter 

device, which does allow us to detect all kinds of explosives, if concealed on an individual. We’re looking at other kinds of devices 

which would be able to detect and distinguish among various kinds 

of liquids. 
23 

But the fact remains that there do not currently exist, technologies that satisfy all of these needs. We don’t necessarily want 

to over-invest in a technology that is imperfect, as opposed to continuing to push forward on new technology. 

TRAINING AND DEPLOYING SCREENING OFFICIALS

I also have to say, an important dimension of what we do in airline security is focusing on individuals who might be a threat. For 

that reason, we have in the President’s budget, over $60 million for 

training and deploying screening officials that will be operating at 

the very entry point of the screening process; they are trained in 

behavioral analysis, and replacing the traditional mechanical document-checkers, who used to simply look at your identification and 

your face, and let you go through. A combination of better-trained 

and behaviorally trained screeners, plus research in additional 

technologies, gives us a more comprehensive strategy than simply 

putting all of the money into an existing, but not totally effective 

explosives screening set of equipment. 

AIR CARGO SECURITY

Senator BYRD. It is mind-boggling that in five and half years 

since 9/11, the majority of cargo loaded in the belly of commercial 

airplanes is not inspected. This administration does not pay enough 

attention to air cargo security. Congress, not the administration, 

added funding to hire 300 air cargo inspectors to examine air cargo 

facilities between fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2006. Congress, 

Congress, not the administration, added funding to test physical inspection concepts at three airports nationwide. And last year, because of foot-dragging by the administration, Congress required 

you to submit a detailed air cargo security action plan addressing 

recommendations made by the Government Accountability Office in 

2005. 

I received the four-page response. Flimsy. Four-page response, on 

Monday. Three months late. Sadly, the report revealed that 51⁄2

years since 9/11, comprehensive assessments of air cargo 

vulnerabilities and critical assets still have not been completed. 

Now, Mr. Secretary, this committee wants real action. When will 

you have a complete assessment? When will you have a complete 

assessment of air cargo vulnerabilities and a real action plan to address them? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, Mr. Chairman let me tell you what 

we’ve done. 

In addition to spending $4.2 billion for screening, in general, on 

EDS since TSA was created, we have analyzed the air cargo process; we have imposed new regulatory requirements, including 100 

percent screening for all cargo that is checked at the airline to go 

on a specific flight; we’ve eliminated exemptions from an inspection 

requirement with respect to shippers that consolidate shipments 

and send them by air; and we have underway, programs that will 

increase the degree of review and audit of known shippers to move 

into what we call a ‘‘Certified Shipper Program’’ that would actually impose upon shippers, requirements for self-auditing and for 

security activities that will be force multipliers with respect to our 
24 

ability to be confident about the air cargo that appears on passenger aircraft. 

The challenge is to have a system that is so sufficiently efficient, 

that it does not bring the air cargo system to a halt. Because that 

system is one which requires very, very swift movement of packages. If you look at the regulations we promulgated late last year, 

you will see a dramatic increase in the amount of screening that 

we’re doing on all types of air cargo, and a path that will continue 

to make us more secure with respect to this particular issue. 

Senator BYRD. Senator Cochran. 

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, I’d like to yield to others on 

my side who have joined the hearing. I’ve already made some comments, and I’ll defer my questions until later. 

May I ask Senator Stevens to proceed, may I yield to him? 

Senator BYRD. Yes. 

IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS FOR CROSSING THE NORTHERN BORDER

Senator STEVENS. We tried to create a delay in the Western 

Hemisphere Travel Initiative, Senator Leahy and I, and we’ve tried 

to find a way to get some, you know, some recognition of the problems we face in the north country. 

I like to tell people about the time that a fellow called me on the 

Yukon River, and told me that the Coast Guard said he had to 

have a license now to run his boat. His father had been running 

similar boats, and he’d run a boat up there all his life, and he said, 

‘‘They want something called a birth certificate.’’ And, I said, ‘‘Well, 

where were you born?’’ And he said, ‘‘I don’t know, somewhere 

along the river here.’’ So, we got together, some people up there, 

and helped him find the church where it was recorded that he had 

been, recorded as having been born to a parishioner there at the 

time, so the State issued him a birth certificate. He made a statement to the press that he wasn’t born until he met me. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I guess he was born-again. 

Senator STEVENS. Yeah, that’s right. 

My problem is we have a lot of people in rural Alaska who we 

have 70 percent of our areas can only be reached by air, they don’t 

have driver’s licenses, they don’t have any need for identification, 

unless they start traveling, and they want to go across the border, 

and come down into what we call the South 48. Now, the requirement for a passport or similar documentation is abhorrent to them 

whatever they do, they’re going to have to fly into Anchorage or 

Fairbanks to get that. We want you to try to help us find some way 

to develop a pass. Are you willing to do that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, one of the things we’ve stated that we 

want to do, and we intend to do is create a PASS Card which will 

be an alternative to a passport. It will be less expensive; it will be 

something you can carry in your wallet, and would do the trick of 

making sure that we have secure identification. 

We’ve also talked to the State of Washington about an effort they 

have underway to use their driver’s license, and make that configured to be sufficient for crossing the border. It would have to meet 

certain standards. 

We’re interested in preserving efficiency here, and not inconveniencing people. But regrettably, we live in a different world than 
25 

we used to live in. I’m not confident that without secure identification, I can tell the American people that we are keeping them safe 

from dangerous individuals crossing the border from Canada. 

We’re trying to work to do this as smoothly as possible. We’re not 

insisting on one-size-fits-all, but we do need to honor the 9/11 Commission recommendation that we get some secure documentation to 

protect the people of this country. 

Senator STEVENS. Well, will you allow the States and local governments to have a role in this? I mean, our school districts, for 

instance, could very well issue passports, or city halls, other places. 

But, if they have to go to Juneau to pick up what you want to issue 

through the State, we’ve not gone very far. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, we’ve invited the States through the 

REAL ID Program to come up with an alternative. We’ve talked 

about PASS Cards and passports. 

But, Senator, here’s what the problem is. Right now I’ve got border inspectors who are obliged to take one of 8,000 forms of identification. About a year ago, GAO ran a test, and they were able to 

sneak a significant number of people by with phony documents. 

There was a big hoopla on The Hill, and people were criticizing the 

border inspectors. I thought that was a little unfair. You can’t ask 

a border inspector to be able to recognize 8,000 different kinds of 

identification. 

If we’re serious about this, we have to create a set of identification documents, maybe three or four or five, that are sufficiently 

verifiable and secure and recognizable, that we can honestly ask 

our border inspectors to be responsible for checking whether they’re 

genuine or not. 

Now, I understand Alaska has some unique geographic challenges, and we can find a way to try to work with those. But I can’t 

in good conscience step back from a commitment that I think we’ve 

owed the American people since 9/11, which is to get the system 

of documentation that allows people to enter this country, in some 

kind of good order. 

Senator STEVENS. Well, we don’t ask you to do that, all we ask 

you to do is to trust the local people to know who they’re issuing 

a card to. You know, in our areas, we know who lives there, but 

we’re told that we have to go to a Federal official to get these 

cards. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, we’ve talked about working with the 

States to let the driver’s license serve this purpose. But, here’s the 

problem I have, Senator. 

Senator STEVENS. Again, you know, over half of our people don’t 

have driver’s licenses. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, here’s the—— 

Senator STEVENS. They got an airplane license, you know. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, maybe, and maybe if Alaska wants to 

set up a REAL ID airplane license, that may do the trick. 

I am open to coming up with solutions to the problem. On the 

other hand, I’ve got to face the following challenge. If someone from 

Alaska wants to come into the United States through Detroit, 

Michigan, the border inspector in Detroit is not going to know 

whether the signature of the guy on the school board up in a remote town in Alaska is a genuine signature, or not. I’ve got to be 
26 

able to build a set of documents that can be used across our entire 

border. We’re happy, to work to try to be as cooperative as we can. 

But, I’ve got to tell you, this is a life and death principle. And—— 

IMPACT ON TOURISM

Senator STEVENS. All right, well let—I’ve only got so much time, 

I’m sure the chairman will tell me when my time’s over, but I am 

a little bit disturbed, one of our major industries now is tourism— 

we’ve lost our mining industry, our timber industry, oil industry is 

down, fishing is under attack—tourism was being a success. But, 

now we find that these international travelers are dropping off because there is not really a way for them to, to know in advance, 

the problems that they face coming into our country. We had a 

model ports, and a model airports program, we had an international travelers program suggestion from the Congress what are 

you working on in that regard? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We are working on an International Registered Traveler Program. We have begun to roll out a Domestic 

Registered Traveler Program. We are interested in working with 

passengers, and particularly regular travelers. Secretary Rice, the 

Department of State, and our Department are putting out an initiative which is designed to actually be more accommodating and 

friendlier to people who want to visit the country. 

I think we worked on a solution in Alaska for the issue of people 

who wanted to de-plane at the airport, and have an opportunity 

there to do some traveling. 

Senator STEVENS. Yes, we thank you for that. It’s worked very 

well. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We are trying to be hospitable to travelers 

because we know it’s important, not only to those in Alaska, but 

to the rest of the country as well. 

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Senator Stevens. 

Senator Leahy. 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Secretary and I have discussed what Senator Stevens just 

discussed with him, on a number of occasions. It appears the more 

I hear in these briefings, the more I see us heading toward a national ID card in the United States. I always heard over the years, 

this is something that the left was going to be pushing, but it appears to be coming from a very conservative Republican administration, which is a matter of some irony and fills the blogs, as you 

know. 

I have stated a number of concerns about the way the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State have 

pushed for the implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel 

Initiative, WHTI. I understand what you’re saying about being concerned that we protect these borders, but what I’m concerned about 

is that it be done right. 

For example, the obvious thing I talked about how you get these 

Watch Lists, and those make us secure, Ted Kennedy gets blocked 
27 

10 times from flying on a flight he’s been taking for decades even 

the President calls him and apologizes. He said, ‘‘I don’t need an 

apology, just let me get on the darn plane.’’ A 1-year old child, told 

they have to have a passport to prove they’re not a 40-some odd 

year old suspected terrorist. I won’t even go into the question of 

Catholic nuns. But I expect those who went to Catholic schools 

would have mixed emotions about whether they would fit in the 

terrorist definition or not. 

But, you know, I don’t see the technology there, I don’t see the 

infrastructure there, I don’t see the training there. And if we suddenly, on day one, said, ‘‘Boom, this is what we’re going to do, 

you’re going to see delays that are going to be on the front page 

of every newspaper in the country, probably in the world, in both 

of the Mexican and Canadian border. 

Now, Congress has given you the time to coordinate this, and get 

it right. Why not do that? You have ideas of pilot programs, and 

key points on the Canadian-Mexican border? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, we are going to take the time to do 

it right. We appreciate the flexibility, but it also can’t become a 

basis to simply kick the can down the road. 

When we rolled out the air passport requirement, in the 6 

months before the time it became effective, the press in border 

areas was full of dire predictions about the disaster at the airport. 

But, by sticking to a deadline and by being clear in the messaging, 

at the time that we actually put this into effect in January, we had 

better than 99 percent compliance. 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (NIST)

CERTIFICATIONS

Senator LEAHY. Well, then, I have no reason to assume it’s not. 

But your Department has endorsed one PASS Card technology over 

another. And yet the Congress, in the Leahy-Stevens law, clearly 

stated you had to have a NIST a National Institute of Standards 

and Technology certification on that card before you went forward. 

You ignored that part of the law, moved forward unilaterally. This 

was the so-called ‘‘vicinity-read technology’’ it is usually used on inventory control, or moving pallets of material, not people. And it’s 

going to necessitate a whole lot of new technology that is not there 

now, and again, being done by the National Institute of Standards 

and Technology. Why not wait at least? This is not kicking the can 

down the road. Why not wait for the NIST to make sure it’s going 

to work, so we don’t spend billions of dollars, and say, ‘‘Whoops, 

came close? Came close, but now we’ve got to do it again.’’ 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, Senator, we are working with NIST, 

and so I—— 

Senator LEAHY. Yeah, but you approved it without getting that 

NIST certification. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. First of all, the NIST certification, if I recall the language in the bill precisely, talked about how to comply 

with existing NIST standards. I’m not sure there actually were 

standards with respect to this particular technology. 

However, in the spirit of the law, we’re working with NIST. 

We’re comfortable that by the time this actually gets kicked off, we 
28 

will meet any NIST standards that would be applicable to this kind 

of technology. 

NEXUS CARD READERS

But, we use this technology, even as we speak, in our NEXUS 

cards which cross the border. In addition to the vicinity element, 

there will continue to be a—— 

Senator LEAHY. Is the NEXUS card readable by both the State 

Department’s computers, and DHS’s computers? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, it’s readable by our readers, as we 

speak. We’re the ones who maintain the readers at the border. 

Senator LEAHY. Okay. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. It’s not, it’s not—— 

Senator LEAHY. Okay, how many readers are there at the border? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I can get back to you on that, I don’t know 

how many NEXUS readers we have at the border. 

[The information follows:] 

NEXUS READERS AT THE BORDER

The following Ports of Entry have the indicated number of NEXUS lanes; with 

one radio frequency identification (RFID) NEXUS card reader for each lane: 

—Blaine (Pacific Highway) 2 

—Blaine (Peace Arch) 3 

—Blaine (Point Roberts) 1 

—Port Huron 1 

—Detroit (Ambassador Bridge) 1 

—Detroit (Tunnel) 2 

—Buffalo (Peace Bridge) 2 

—Buffalo (Rainbow Bridge) 1 

—Buffalo (Whirlpool Bridge) 2 

—Champlain 1 

—Highgate Springs 1 

—Lewiston Bridge 1—This lane is not open but equipment is installed. 

In summary, there are a total of 17 RFID readers on the border. 

MACHINE-READABLE ZONES

Secretary CHERTOFF. Let me just follow this up for a moment, 

Senator. Right now, the 8,000 documents require a manual check 

by every single border inspector. At a minimum, what we will have 

when this program begins next year, is on each card, a machinereadable zone, identical to the passport, that is currently readable 

by all of the technology that we have deployed at the border. 

Senator LEAHY. Is that going to include the REAL ID? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Its—— 

Senator LEAHY. National identification, ID card? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. It’s different, it’s not; this is the same item 

you have on your passport. 

Senator LEAHY. Well is this, it’s going to be able to read a REAL 

ID? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, it’s—— 

Senator LEAHY. What about this $20 billion unfunded mandate 

you’ve given to the States on a driver’s license, is it going to be able 

to read that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. For those States—— 

Senator LEAHY. Or is that separate? 
29 

Secretary CHERTOFF. For those States that chose to be part of 

the program and have REAL ID that satisfies WHTI, yes, that’s 

the entire point. The entire point is to give them the option to build 

in the same kind of machine-readable zone, and the same kind of 

architecture, so that can be—— 

Senator LEAHY. Any money in the budget to help them with 

that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. With respect to the REAL ID act, we’ve indicated that we’re talking an estimate of about $10 billion to $11 

billion in out-of-pocket costs, over a period of about 10 years. For 

this year, we’ve indicated about $100 million in the State Homeland Security grants will be made available to the States to enable 

them to do some of the work they need to do on REAL ID. 

Senator LEAHY. So, it’s about 1 or 2 percent of what they might 

need. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, it’s about 10 percent of what one year 

would be. Because if it’s $10 billion over 10 years, it’s about $1 billion a year. 

Senator LEAHY. They’re going to get this national ID card, 

whether we like it or not. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Senator, I don’t think it’s a national ID 

card, but I will tell you this. I have a very vivid recollection of the 

9/11 Commission hearings, and the discussion about how they 

showed Hanni Hanjur’s fake driver’s license, which he bought in 

the 7–11 in Virginia. We authorized the prosecution of the guy who 

sold it to him. It seems to me that I would hate to be here, or have 

my successor in 10 or 5 years from now, in front of another 9/11 

Commission, with other terrorists who are using phony driver’s licenses. 

Senator LEAHY. Yeah, but our Department of Justice had the 

names of these people, knew they were training, didn’t do a damn 

thing about them, and the day before 9/11, the Attorney General 

wanted to cut the budget for counter-terrorism, on September 10, 

he wanted to cut the budget for counter-terrorism, so don’t blame 

it on that. Your administration dropped the ball. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Senator, I can’t un-ring the bell from September 11th, but I can sure do my level best to guarantee that we 

don’t repeat the same mistake again. And part of that is having a 

secure form of ID, which is exactly what the 9/11 Commission recommended. 

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Senator Leahy. 

Senator Craig. 

Senator CRAIG. Thank you very much. 

Senator BYRD. Senator Craig. 

BORDER SECURITY ON THE UNITED STATES-MEXICAN BORDER

Senator CRAIG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Chertoff, thank you for being before the committee, obviously issues within your realm are of great importance to all of 

us. 

Let me carry on a dialogue with you for a few moments about 

border control, and border security, and the United States-Mexican 

border, and our concern there. 
30 

It’s obvious that border is tightening, and I congratulate you on 

that effort. It is not yet secured. And that’s an area of concern to 

me. 

I was having dialogue, conversation, the other day with a friend 

of mine, former Governor of Idaho, now the Secretary of the Interior, who I know has visited with you about the approximately 

3,500 acres of Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge in Texas, and 

also about the Oregon Pipe Cactus National Monument in Arizona. 

We lost a ranger down there last year, at Organ Pipe, while assisting Border Patrol, shot by drug traffickers. I was mentioning 

this at a town meeting in Idaho, and a hand went up in the back 

of the room, and a fellow said, ‘‘Senator, I just came from there not 

long ago, I’m a retired fellow, I do freelance photography, it’s a 

beautiful place, I was down there. And I was told by the Park Service, not to go into an area, that it was very unsafe, I ought to go 

armed—but of course, not in a park—and I ought to have a flak 

jacket on.’’ 

Now, there is a reality that is going on, on our Southwestern border, as the walk-across kind of illegal is being stopped. But the 

drug trafficker in his beefed-up Humvee with his Uzi is basically 

saying to our security people, and our border patrol, ‘‘Get out the 

way. We’re coming through.’’ Or, ‘‘We’re coming through at night.’’ 

And that is a great concern, I think, to all of us, that our public 

lands and our security in those respects, that we’ve still got a long 

way to. 

Would you visit with us about that, and that problem, and what 

you’re doing? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think it is a problem of increasing seriousness. Regrettably, the Border Patrol tells me that one of the signs 

of our success in cracking down on the border is that the organized 

criminal gangs, and the traffic in drugs or humans, are now getting 

more violent as they protect a shrinking market share. That’s actually a phenomenon I’ve seen in other contexts when you really start 

to crack down on criminal groups. We do have to be prepared. 

Senator CRAIG. So, the violence, tragically enough, is a good sign 

in the marketplace? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. It’s a good sign in the marketplace, but it 

suggests that we need to make sure of a couple of things. First of 

all, we have to make sure we are supporting our Border Patrol 

with the tools they need to defend themselves, and to repel violence. I’ve spoken to Secretary Kempthorne, specifically about the 

park. We’ve talked about additional measures that we can take 

with respect to fencing there, that can create more difficult obstacles for vehicles. 

In the end, this underscores the importance of moving ahead vigorously, as we have been doing, with this combination of high technology physical infrastructure, and additional Border Patrol agents, 

in order to make sure that we get control of all of the problems 

there. Because, we certainly shouldn’t have to bargain with criminals over the right to use our own national parks. 

Senator CRAIG. Bargaining with criminals, it sounds like that 

may have happened, as it relates to border patrolmen who have 

been accused of wrongdoing, and I’m not going into that at all, I’m 
31 

reading court transcripts now, and I’ve asked the Judiciary Committee to look into it, but Americans are very frustrated about that. 

BORDER PATROL TRAINING

The chairman of this committee and I partnered a few years ago, 

and got you a half a billion dollars more a year to train border patrolman. I think at that time, we called it the Craig-Byrd amendment, today we will certainly call it the Byrd-Craig amendment. Be 

that as it may, obviously the resources along that border are 

strained in relation to the situation at the border. In order to relieve the National Guard troops, we obviously need to see more recruiting of Border Patrol agents. Can you outline how well the recruiting process is working, and additionally, what can be done to 

expedite the hiring of qualified Border Patrol agents? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. It is a high priority for us. Because, as I 

said in my opening statement, the President is committed to having over 18,300 Border Patrol agents. We are on track to do that, 

we are expanding our training capabilities; so that we can move 

that number of Border Patrol through the pipeline. We recognize 

that as we have normal attrition, we have to recruit sufficiently to 

fill the empty spots, as well as the increases. 

Chief Aguilar and Commissioner Basham continue to report to 

me on this, and assure me that we are on track with recruiting 

goals. We do get a lot of folks, including other law enforcement people, and ex-military people, who are eager to join the Border Patrol. 

We are conducting extensive outreach, to make sure we are getting 

a good pool of recruits. 

Senator CRAIG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Landrieu. 

PROGRESS ON THE GULF COAST

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Senator. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, let me begin with a positive comment, 

thank you for including comments in your testimony about the gulf 

coast, because at one of the previous meetings that was, unfortunately, left out. So, we appreciate you reminding us of the efforts. 

On behalf, though, of the people I represent in Louisiana, I want 

to say that we are grateful for your effort, but we believe that the 

effort has fallen short. And we believe that the outcomes are not 

what the people of Louisiana expected, trying to recover from two 

of the worst storms to hit our Nation—Katrina and Rita. 

REALLOCATION OF FUNDING FOR INTEROPERABILITY GRANTS

But, having said that, there is progress that’s being made, and 

I want to just focus on a few things, and I brought this up at the 

last meeting, at the Homeland Security authorization level, because I really need to get this record straight I’m both an authorizer and an appropriator. And one of the main early issues that 

was apparent in the collapse of our response system, was that 

there was virtually no communication on the ground. Now, that 

has been well-documented, and I would just be surprised if anybody contradicted me. 
32 

So, I’m looking at this budget, which is subject of this hearing, 

and I want to just be clear and if the chairman could help me understand I want to be clear that the $1 billion in interoperability 

grant money that is being touted as a step in the right direction, 

and I most certainly think that we need to spend more money in 

the right way to achieve communications in the middle of a disaster, but is it not coming out of the State preparedness grant program, that was enacted last year a $525 million, and this year it’s 

only at $250 million request? And then, out of the targeted infrastructure capability grants program, there’s a reduction, and in the 

State and local training, there’s a homeland grant program reduction from $2.3 billion to $1.7 billion. So, I guess my question for 

the record is, are we maintaining funding levels for training grants, 

and then adding $1 billion? Or are we taking the $1 billion out of 

the training programs? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think that the best way to categorize it 

is, we’re re-allocating money. It is true that if you look at the State 

Homeland Security grants—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. But they increased, or decreased? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. They’re decreased. Our request is $250 million last year, what was enacted was $525 million. On the other 

hand, this billion dollars of interoperability grants is new. Net, in 

terms of a focus on communications and interoperability, which I 

think we all agree is a very, very big priority, there’s actually more 

money that’s going to be available over the next year, than was 

available last year. 

There’s no question that some things have moved up and some 

things have moved down, on our various infrastructure grants. Actually, I think we have moved up or remained level in virtually all 

of those, with the exception of trucking industry grants, which 

went down a very small amount. 

And with respect to this, some of the State and local training 

programs, some of those have been dramatically lowered, because 

we believe we’re at the point now that there’s a better way to 

spend the money. 

There’s no question, like with any budget exercise, we’re making 

choices. I think the view that we’re expressing is very similar to 

what you just said; communication is the foundation of everything. 

If we can get that right, we can then start to move to other things. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, and I don’t disagree with you, but I 

want this committee to be very clear that, I’m not sure we’re solving the problem by taking, basically, $1 billion away from general 

training, and moving it to communications just because we have a 

problem with communications, because we’re soon going to have a 

problem with training. 

And, I’d refer you to a great book that’s been written called ‘‘Disaster’’, which says that one of the problems with a Hurricanes Rita 

and Katrina, was we had a Hurricane Pam exercise—and I know 

you’re familiar with the Hurricane Pam exercise, not a real one, 

but an exercise, but all the lessons learned that came out of a 

training program were not put to a test, because of a lack of funding in this Homeland Security local grant program, Mr. Chairman. 

So, what I’m saying is, the Homeland Security had exercised, exercised Pam, and had planned for it, but then because of lack of 
33 

funding—which is well-documented—they could never train. And 

so then, the real hurricane came, and we weren’t ready. 

So, I say this to raise a flag of alarm here—taking money from 

our trainers that have general training to do, and just moving it 

to interoperability, I’m not sure solves the problem, and I think 

this committee has to look at it. 

FLOOD MAP PLANS

Let me move to my next question, if I could. Just a second the 

flood map plan, and I know that you’ve never heard anybody talk 

about flood maps, because we’re talking about the borders, et 

cetera, but all along the coast, people are going to start talking 

about these flood maps, because this is a serious issue. You have 

to have the right kind of mapping to get the levies to the right 

height, and if you don’t, then all of your communities are at risk 

when storms come. So, this is not just an issue for Louisiana. 

We’re again cutting the program of flood mapping when we, I 

think, are years behind accurate flood maps. Our whole Corps of 

Engineers relies on these flood maps to set the right levels for protection. So, why are we cutting funding for flood maps, when we 

don’t have the accurate data now, and it’s one of the major problems about why this flood occurred in the first place? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. First of all, I think the principle challenge 

in terms of doing the mapping is actually an engineering issue in 

the domain of the Army Corps of Engineers. They’ve got the responsibility of figuring out, particularly in terms of the levies, what 

the current requirements are, what the threat is, and what is necessary in order to get the desired measure of protection. I don’t 

know that that’s a funding issue within our Department. 

Obviously the flood maps that we design flow from decisions, or 

information that we get from the Army Corps of Engineers concerning what kind of force the levies can withstand, and what the 

rising water levels are that will be addressed by the levies. Based 

on that, we then can do the flood elevations. 

Now, we do have the interim, or preliminary, elevations out. I 

think that the final elevations have to wait until the Army Corps 

finishes its work. 

I don’t know that this is a funding issue in our Department, so 

much as it is with respect to—— 

INCLUSION OF LEVIES IN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, I appreciate that, my time is limited, 

but one final really brief question, do you support the inclusion of 

levies in critical infrastructure, at least for us to look at, to make 

sure that the levies around urban-populated areas are secure from 

collapse as they were in Katrina and Rita? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think it is, as you’re talking about nationally now. It is very important that one of the lessons we take out 

of Katrina and Rita and Wilma is not to avoid making necessary 

investments in infrastructure now, to protect catastrophes later. 

Otherwise, you’re playing musical chairs with people’s lives, because you’re not putting the money in until the music stops; it’s 

much better to put the money in up front. I think the analysis 
34 

that’s been done has been very helpful, and will guide us as a society in terms of our investments going forward. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. 

Senator BYRD. Senator Shelby. 

FEMA’S RESPONSE IN ALABAMA

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, first I want to say something nice about the Department of Homeland Security that you have. 

FEMA’s recent response to the tornado in my home State of Alabama was quick, and decisive. I was down there, as you well know, 

with the President on Saturday, Senator Sessions was there the 

day before, and FEMA was everywhere, they had been there, and 

that says a lot about what you’re doing in your leadership, I believe, and the Department of Homeland Security in that area of 

natural disasters. 

Now, I want to go back on the illegal immigration. Mr. Secretary, 

if there are 12 million, some say 15 million, some say 20 million— 

illegal aliens in this country, and we don’t know the figure. But if 

there—there’s the conservative figure of 12 million. Then that says 

to me that our immigration system is broken. That we have not 

protected our borders, we have not known who’s coming here legally, and overstayed their visa. And I know this has been going 

on a lot longer than you have been the Secretary of Homeland Security and before we created Homeland Security, and I’m not trying 

to lay that at your feet. But, something’s wrong, and has been 

wrong. 

I know you referenced earlier that you’re making progress at the 

border. But, I think the perception and the truth is that there’s a 

heck of a lot of work to do. That we don’t have control, even as 

today, March 2007, of our borders. We know it’s a daunting task. 

We also know there are probably several billion people in the world 

that would like to come here. We’re a Nation of immigrants. I 

would probably like to come here, if I weren’t here. 

But, I believe if we have and we do a system of laws, that we 

ought to enforce those laws, or we ought to just repudiate them, period. Because they’re being ignored, for the most part. I’m not saying for everybody. And what do you say to people, who stand in 

line, and work hard to come here legally, and they see everybody 

breaking the law—not everybody, but millions—and coming here, 

and they can’t even get their wife here, or something, through the 

channels. That’s a tough question, there’s no easy answer, I know 

that. But what do you say to that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I agree the foundation of a sound immigration policy, is requiring that the law be enforced. I think we do 

have to design an immigration reform system that ultimately addresses all of the elements of the problem. The foundation has to 

be that we are going to enforce the law. 

I see sometimes that my Department gets criticized because 

we’re arresting people or detaining people, but I have to tell you, 

Senator, as long as the law’s on the books, we owe it to the American public to enforce that law, and to do it seriously. We will continue to do that, even as we work with Congress on an approach 

to immigration that will ultimately solve this problem. 
35 

VISA ENFORCEMENT

Senator SHELBY. Sure, and I’ve been encouraged recently by 

some of your tougher worksite enforcement. And, it’s going to take 

worksite enforcement, and border enforcement and visa enforcement too, I know that. If—I could get into the overstay of visas— 

Mr. Secretary, how many people come here legally each year from 

other countries, roughly, to go to school, to visit as a tourist, to do 

business or so forth? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We have millions of visitors. 

Senator SHELBY. Millions, I know. And, some people come here 

without a visa, do they not? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Correct, there’s a visa waiver program. 

Senator SHELBY. They come here legally, but is there any way 

that you keep up with who goes back? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. That’s been challenging. We ran a pilot at 

the airports which, was not terribly successful, but we are looking 

in the next year or two, and we have money in the budget for 2008, 

to do a U.S. visa exit at the airports. 

Senator SHELBY. Sure. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. That will capture a list of who leaves by 

air. U.S. visit exit by land is much more challenging. 

Senator SHELBY. We know that. And we know it’s tough. But we 

know you’ve got energy, and you’re a determined person, I know 

you, I’ve known you a long time. 

CENTER FOR DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS

I want to shift to something else, the Center for Domestic Preparedness that you’re very familiar with. The Center for Domestic 

Preparedness, Fort McClellan, is a cornerstone, some people believe, of our Nation’s emergency responder training facilities, and 

it’s the only civilian live-agent training facility in the Nation, 

unique. The CDP is one of our several facilities where we’re training our Nation’s first responders in a variety of disciplines. This 

year, it’s expected that CDP will train close to 65,000 people 

through on-site, mobile, and the trainer programs. We know training and you’ve said this is the key to preparedness, and response. 

In the President’s budget request, the Center for Domestic Preparedness—and this is disturbing to me—the CDP’s base budget is 

reduced by $3 million from the enacted level of $57 million in 2007, 

to $54 million in 2008. And then while the transfer of the Noble 

Training Center is reflected in the President’s budget, the CDP’s 

budget is further reduced by Noble’s budget, by $5.5 million. So, 

the bottom line is, as I understand it, the 2007 proposal level for 

CDP and Noble is $62.5 million. The President’s budget request for 

2008 is $54 million, resulting in a serious shortfall of $8.5 million. 

Mr. Secretary, why would you propose to cut that at this time? Do 

you have enough trained first responders? I would think not. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, Senator, of course, we’re not zeroing 

it out, and with respect to—— 

Senator SHELBY. Oh no, we would not, we don’t plan to zero it 

out, not while I’m here. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. With respect to the CDP, just to put it in 

perspective, I think in 2007, our budget request was $50 million, 
36 

and Congress went up to $57 million. I think we’ve come to rest 

in the middle at $54 million, which we think is an adequate 

amount of funding. 

It is a valuable program, and like anything else in the budget, 

it’s rarely the case that it’s easy to make a decision about where 

to trim. We have to reconcile a lot of different elements in order 

to come in within a budget. 

Senator SHELBY. But this is a recommendation, ultimately, Congress will make that decision. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Sure, that’s right. And Congress could decide—— 

Senator SHELBY. To trim or add, right? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Correct. Congress can add or trim; this is 

the President’s recommendation for what the right way to balance 

is. Congress can put more into this, but take it away from something else. 

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, can I ask one last question? I 

know I’m over my time. 

DEEPWATER PROGRAM

The Deepwater Program that the Coast Guard could you address, 

and you can address it for the record, if you want to. Could you 

speak to what is going right with Deepwater? You know, some people criticize it. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes. 

Senator SHELBY. Some don’t. In addition, would you discuss the 

Deepwater Program the CASA 30, 300M Airtime Patrol Craft, the 

plane you know, I’ve been told by the Coast Guard it’s a crucial 

piece of this overall mission. It’s my understanding that the first 

one is set for delivery soon, and I’d like to know all about that, and 

where you are? Can you do that for the record? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. The second one, I will certainly do for the 

record. I can’t do it off the top of my head. 

[The information follows:] 

DEEPWATER MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT

The HC–144A Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) is a transport and surveillance, 

fixed-wing aircraft that will be used to perform search and rescue missions, enforce 

laws and treaties including illegal drug interdiction, marine environmental protection, military readiness, and International Ice Patrol missions, as well as cargo and 

personnel transport. The Airframe Manufacturer is EADS CASA. The Aircraft are 

delivered to the USCG Aviation Repair and Supply Center (ASRC) in Elizabeth City 

for the installation of the Mission System Pallet (MSP) which brings a new era of 

C4ISR to USCG aviation and Maritime Domain Awareness, prior to final delivery 

to the fleet. 

There are currently eight HC–144As under contract and their disposition is as follows: 

The first Deepwater HC–144A arrived in Elizabeth City in January 2007 and is 

currently in the middle of its C4ISR mission system pallet integration. Once completed, the fully missionized aircraft will be flown to Coast Guard Air Station Mobile, Ala., for operational tests and evaluation. 

The second Deepwater medium-range surveillance maritime patrol aircraft arrived in Elizabeth City for MSP installation on Feb. 19. 

The third aircraft is scheduled for delivery no later than August 31, 2007 but an 

earlier delivery is anticipated. 

Aircraft #4 & #5 have an expected delivery date of first quarter CY 2009. 

Contract award for aircraft #s 6–8 was awarded in April 2007. 
37 

Completion of Developmental Testing and Evaluation (DT&E) is projected for 

June 2007 but the actual date dependents upon successful completion of certification 

and accreditation of the Mission System Pallet. Upon successful completion of 

DT&E the aircraft will be assigned to Aviation Training Center (ATC) Mobile, AL. 

Although the aircraft will be capable of performing Coast Guard missions at that 

time (June 2007), there are additional pre-operational activities that need to be completed before the aircraft assumes official operational status. One of the significant 

events that will occur at ATC Mobile is Operational Testing and Evaluation (OT&E) 

where the aircraft will be evaluated for operational effectiveness and suitability to 

perform assigned missions. Additional pre-operational activities include training of 

instructor cadre, development of the training curriculum, follow-on training for 

flight crews and maintenance personnel, and acquisition of requisite logistics, including spares, to support operations of the aircraft. Once all these steps are completed, the aircraft will be considered ready to begin regular missions with the 

Coast Guard. This is projected to occur in January 2009. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. On the first one, I will say there is much 

that is right with the program. Admiral Allen is taking a very 

tough look at the program. He’s reconfigured the way he’s managing the program. He’s taking account of some of the criticisms. 

He is using flexibility now to pull pieces of the program out and 

have them separately bid, or separately provided for, if there’s a 

more cost-effective way to do it. I think he’s still deeply committed 

to this, as a very important and necessary program for the Coast 

Guard going into this new century. 

Senator SHELBY. Well, it’s imperative. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BYRD. Senator Murray. 

SAFE PORTS ACT

Senator MURRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to join 

you and Senator Cochran in welcoming Secretary Chertoff to our 

subcommittee today. 

Mr. Secretary, as a Senator from a State that depends on its seaports for its livelihood, the security of our Nation’s ports has been 

one of my top priorities. We spoke, I believe, for the first time 

about port security shortly after you were nominated to be Secretary of Homeland Security, and the plans formed the basis of the 

Green Lane Maritime Cargo Security legislation that you know I 

worked on with Senator Collins. 

As you are well aware, the Green Lane bill formed the backbone 

of the SAFE PORTS Act, which the President signed into law just 

a few months ago, in October. I was really pleased to hear of the 

progress in implementing the SAFE PORTS Act that you outlined 

in your testimony, and I know that we both agree that the agencies 

involved in securing these sea ports are doing an admirable job, 

and they’re working through a lot of very, very difficult issues. 

Could you speak for a minute about the Department’s initiatives 

to implement the SAFE PORTS Act to improve the security of our 

ports? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Senator, I want to thank you for your support for this very important piece of legislation. In addition to what 

I’ve described about our moving close to 100 percent radiation scanning capability, here in the United States, both at our sea and land 

ports, we are working with our foreign partners to increasingly do 

some of the scanning and x-raying overseas. I think the bill mandated that we get up and running in three foreign ports. I think 
38 

we’re going to be ahead of target on that. Ideally, we would like 

to encourage many of our overseas partners to allow us to push the 

perimeter into the port of embarkation, as opposed to the port of 

arrival. We recognize, some countries won’t be able to do it, or 

won’t be willing to do it, or in some cases, the port isn’t configured, 

but we are going to continue to push on that initiative, which we 

think is very important. 

SECURE FREIGHT INITIATIVE

Senator MURRAY. Okay, very good. I particularly wanted to ask 

you about the Secure Freight Initiative that implements multiple 

pilot projects at foreign ports, you just talked about. These pilots 

are ongoing, you said three, more than that, possibly? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes, I think we had agreements with six; 

then there was one where, it was a little bit contingent. I believe 

we had started to deploy some of the equipment overseas. I know 

the ports that come to mind, there’s a port in Pakistan, a port in 

the United Kinddom, we’re also looking at Pusan, South Korea, I 

think one or two terminals in Singapore, Hong Kong, and I know 

I’m missing a port, but we are—— 

Senator MURRAY. Do you have any results from some of the early 

testing? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I don’t know that we’re at the point now 

that we have results, but we will. I will be happy to check and get 

back to you. 

Senator MURRAY. Okay, I’d be interested in hearing that. 

[The information follows:] 

SECURE FREIGHT INITIATIVE UPDATE

Background 

Phase I of the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) was launched on December 7, 2006. 

SFI is a $60 million effort in which the U.S. Government will join with other governments and maritime terminal operators, carriers and importers to implement a 

scanning initiative that employs the use of integrated radiation detection and largescale imaging equipment in select foreign seaports. 

Included in the first phase will be the ports of Qasim, (Pakistan), Cortes (Honduras) and Southampton (UK). Additionally, DHS will partner in a more limited capacity with other the strategic container ports of Pusan, Hong Kong, Salalah, and 

Singapore. 

Qasim, PK.—Operational testing of the SFI scanning system, which includes Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) and Non-Intrusive Imaging (NII) equipment commenced on March 31, 2007. Full-scale operational status is expected in October of 

2007. 

Puerto Cortes, HN.—Deployment of RPMs began in November, 2006, (NII was 

provided by host government). Operational testing of the system commenced on 

April 2, 2007, full-scale operational status is expected in October of 2007. 

Southampton, U.K.—Discussions regarding the placement of equipment and the 

basic concept of operations are underway, with a delivery date of May, 2007. Construction will begin the 1st week of May, with operational testing scheduled to begin 

the last week of July 2007. 

Busan, KR, Singapore, SG, Salalah, OM.—Site surveys to determine the placement and operation of the equipment were conducted the 1st and 2nd week of 

March, 2007. Construction is set to begin in October 2007, with operational testing 

scheduled for January 2008. 

TESTING OF RADIATION DETECTORS

Senator MURRAY. As you know, that act requires a test center to 

test the issue of placing radiation detectors at a port where most 
39 

of the containers are loaded directly on from a ship onto a waiting 

rail car, can you comment for us on the status of that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think we are in the final process of putting together the plan for doing that, and making the final selection of the port. There’s probably one port that fits the standards 

set in the statute, probably a little bit more obviously than any 

other. Then we’re going to work to actually get a program like this 

underway. 

We’re requiring a little bit of a different architecture than we use 

at our other ports, because a critical element, is we don’t want to 

slow the port up by making people take the container out, and put 

it back in. 

Senator MURRAY. Right. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. It’s going to take a little bit of thinking 

through the business model at the port to get this done, but we are 

committed to moving forward, because that’s the last piece we have 

to get into place. 

Senator MURRAY. I appreciate that. 

PORT SECURITY

We know there’s a lot left to do in this world. And as you know, the Commandant of the Coast Guard said it would cost $5.4 billion 

over 10 years for our ports to comply with the Maritime Transportation Security Act. My ports, like a lot of them in the country, continually tell me they need more, they need more to comply with the 

security requirements that are in the Maritime Transportation Security Act and the SAFE PORTS Act. 

So, it’s a real challenge out there, and in rounds one through six 

of the Port Security Grant Program, the Department received over 

$4.3 billion in requests, but allocated only $836 million, and that 

by the way, is, not all ports are eligible for these, so we know that 

the demand is even higher than that. 

There’s a lot of significant issues out there, a lot of our smaller 

ports are very concerned they’re not getting some of their needs 

met, and there are, at the same time, some new and expensive requirements that are now being implemented. 

We’ve got the transportation worker ID card credentials and 

readers that are coming into effect, so I am concerned about the 

budget request on this, I saw the President included $210 million 

for port security grants for 2008, they’ve been eliminated in past 

budget requests, so we’re making some progress. But, that isn’t 

enough. And, the secure, or the SAFE PORTS Act, actually, authorized $400 million, I mean, it seems to me, clearly, there’s a huge 

discrepancy between what, the budget we are being asked for to 

put into effect, and what the needs are out there. 

And, I just wanted to ask you, are you confident that each of our 

360 port facilities is secure? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think that we have made them much 

more secure than they’ve ever been. None of them are perfectly secure, because that may be a standard that is unattainable. We are 

focusing on the higher-risk ports. The reality is that, based on our 

assessment of threat, vulnerability and consequence, some ports 

are more at risk than others. While I understand that every port 

has valuable assets, and every community cares about its port, I 
40 

think we have an obligation to focus on the high-risk ports first. 

That has been our template. We have, therefore, put a majority of 

the money, and done quite a bit to secure our major ports, like New 

York, and Los Angeles, Long Beach, and even up in Washington. 

Obviously this is something that’s going to be accomplished over 

a period of years. As with every other element of the budget, almost any program is worthwhile, and you could make a very powerful argument for adding more money. Then the question is, 

what’s going to have the money taken away from it? 

I think, in this budget, we have listened to Congress’ budget activity, and appropriations from last year. As you observe, we have 

actually maintained consistency with last year’s enacted in the various infrastructure areas, which I think does prove the point that 

we do listen. 

Senator MURRAY. Well, I appreciate that. 

My time is out, I do have a couple of other questions, one particularly on PNNL, which is in my State, which does a lot of research for Homeland Security. There’s an issue with moving that, 

and I want to submit some questions to the Secretary on that, and 

on Northern border. And, if I could do that, and get a written response back, I’d appreciate it. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Surely. 

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Senator Murray. Thank you, Senator 

Murray. 

Senator Alexander. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran. 

SKILLS-BASED IMMIGRATION QUALIFICATIONS

Mr. Secretary, I first want to thank you for being here, and 

thank you for your service. I think you’re providing skilled and 

principled leadership in the Department, I can’t imagine a more 

difficult, more difficult job, and I think you’re doing it very well. 

I’d like to say to you in public what I’ve said to you in private— 

I hope the President challenges those of us in the Congress, if it’s 

necessary, to pass an immigration bill this year. It is our responsibility. I think, sometimes I think the country thinks we in Washington, DC, aren’t taking the country seriously. Because they know 

whose job it is. It’s not the job of the County Commission in Tennessee, or West Virginia, or Mississippi, it’s our responsibility, 

we’re the only ones who can really deal with the rule of law on our 

borders, and we have a responsibility, I believe, to take it up soon, 

and not stop until we’re finished. And I know you’re working on 

that for the administration, and as one Senator, I support that as 

a priority. 

And within that discussion, I want to raise a point. Yesterday, 

Bill Gates testified before a committee on which I serve, and he 

made a point in a way I hadn’t quite thought of it before. He was 

talking about, he asked the question, why are there any limits in 

our immigration policy on bringing to our country highly-skilled 

people who create jobs for us, and raise our standard of living? 

Now, in the immigration bill that the Senate passed, there were 

two or three provisions, one of which—pin the Green Card on the 

lapel of a foreign student who earned a Ph.D., and I believe a Mas-
41 

ter’s Degree from an American University—and that person could 

stay here. 

So, my question to you is this—we’re talking about in-sourcing 

brain power. We talk a lot about outsourcing jobs, but we’re insourcing brain power, so we can in-source jobs. Each of these very 

smart people come here, and they’ve got 100 jobs around them that 

they create, and they’re either going to be here, or in Great Britain, 

or in China or India—I’d like for them to be here. 

So, I’m asking—can you make it a priority, or do you think that 

it’s wise to make it a priority, that as we consider immigration this 

year, we do as the Augustine Report, and the National Academy 

of Sciences suggests, which was introduced by Senator Reid, Senator McConnell last week—do we encourage more skills-based, let 

me, encourage more skills-based, preferential immigration options? 

In other words, do we make it easier for highly-talented people who 

create and bring jobs to come in here and stay here, rather than 

making it harder? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I think there’s a very powerful argument for that. I know other countries, for example, array their arrangement for whose admitted as a permanent resident based precisely on issues such as who brings the most value to the country. 

At the end of the day, as we look at immigration policy comprehensively; and particularly, the posture we have about permanent residents, the touchstone ought to be, what serves the interests of the 

United States? That is really what’s got to be our guiding star. I 

think it’s an important debate that we have, about how to promote 

that. 

Senator ALEXANDER. As a follow-up question, could I ask you in 

writing, or your staff, to provide me with an estimate of currently 

how many, how many people come into the United States each year 

now, how many have these kinds of visas, who we would call as 

having a skills-based preferential option? The way I see it, generally, is we have 500,000 to 1 million people coming in legally 

every year as new citizens, we have maybe that many coming illegally every year—that’s heavily weighted toward the lower income, 

people who aren’t skilled. And I’d, frankly, like to see us, in our 

National interest, weight it much more heavily toward people who 

have higher skills. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We can get that for you. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS SKILLS BASED QUALIFICATIONS

The number of aliens granted lawful permanent resident status under the employment-sponsored preferences has averaged 187,000 a year during the last three 

fiscal years (2004–2006). Of this total, approximately 86,000 were principals who 

qualified based on their skills and 101,000 were their family members. 

The number of admissions of highly-skilled non-immigrants averaged 968,000 during the last 3 fiscal years (2004–06): 409,000 H–1B specialty workers and 459,000 

L–1 Intra-company transferees. Note that an individual worker is counted at each 

entry so the number of admissions exceeds the number of persons admitted. 

REAL ID

Senator ALEXANDER. Now, on the REAL ID question—we’ve also 

talked about that, but my objection with REAL ID is two or three. 
42 

One, the way it was passed was absolutely wrong, and that’s not 

your fault. I mean, the only person, in my view, who could have 

passed something like this would have been a Congressman who’d 

never stood in line for a driver’s license at a State office. I mean, 

I think it’s completely unrealistic, there was never one minute of 

hearing about it in the United States Senate, never authorized, 

just popped into a bill we had to vote for. 

Second, even your Department, if I’m not mistaken, believes with the new regulations it may be up to a $14 billion mandate on the 

States, and that’s wrong for us to do. If we think it’s a good idea, 

we ought to pay for it, not send the bill to the Governors, which 

has the effect of raising tuition, and raising property taxes, and 

interfering with their decisions. 

But the other, the other concern I have about it, is that it answers a question before it needs to be answered. It may not be the 

best kind of ID card. We heard Senator Stevens talk about the 

number of people in Alaska who don’t have driver’s licenses. And 

I’ve come to the reluctant conclusion that we do need two or three 

forms of secure identification that may be used for a variety of purposes, such as crossing a border, getting on an airplane, cashing a 

check, whatever. I didn’t used to believe that, I believe it now. 

I doubt that the driver’s license is the best way to do that. I suspect that a work card, such as a social security card, or a travel 

card, such as the PASS Card might be a better way. 

So, what I would like to encourage you to do, as we have this 

extended time to consider REAL ID, is to consider REAL ID, along 

with your development of an employer verification card, which 

might be a work card. That would be a necessary part of any sort 

of immigration bill, or with a PASS Card, as you seek to implement 

these travel, or border restrictions. And if, in the end, requiring 

190 million people to go grab a birth certificate and stand in a driver’s license line, and turn driver’s license examiners into investigators about whether we’re lawfully living in this country, that may 

not be the best idea, and maybe it only is a single option for a few 

States who want to do it, and these other cards might fit into the 

whole picture. 

So, will you consider the REAL ID in that broader context, as 

you go through this immigration bill process? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. As you know, Senator, and we’ve talked 

about this, we’ve been listening on an ongoing basis to Governors. 

I think some of that was reflected in the proposed regulations we 

issued in the last couple of weeks; and we’re always open to suggestions, and looking at alternatives. At the end of the day, I’m 

going to comply with the law, but we certainly want to come up 

with solutions to problems. I think we all agree there’s a problem 

with phony ID. The question is, how do we get to the best solutions? So, I’m a good listener. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BYRD. Senator Nelson. 

RESOURCES TO SECURE THE BORDER

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I want to begin by thanking you for the informative tour of the Arizona-Mexican border last month. I think we 
43 

learned a great deal, as a matter of fact, maybe you and I want 

to compare our welding skills with Senator Tester’s, I saw that he 

got quite a bit of publicity about that. 

Senator NELSON. I suspect he knows what he’s doing, and we’re 

still learning. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think that’s probably true. 

Senator NELSON. Right. 

Well, I appreciate having had the opportunity to travel with you, 

and view the border barrier construction and the enhanced border 

security measures that are being put in place, both in urban areas, 

as well as in the more rural or desert areas. And, I especially appreciated the opportunity to meet with the dedicated men and 

women who form the border patrol, and members of our National 

Guard who were there with Operation Jump Start. 

Now, based on what I’ve learned, I believe we’re really making 

some good progress in securing our border with increased patrols, 

physical barriers, and of course, the virtual fencing that takes advantage of technologies, such as radar sensors, and aerial patrols 

in the more remote areas. 

I’m convinced that there’s more to be done, and as we’ve discussed, there is clearly more to be done. And there’s more that 

Congress can do to provide the resources necessary to secure that 

border, and to look, and I would hope that we would consider, if 

we don’t currently have, a joint study with our Canadian friends 

on the northern border to see what we can do, and what might be 

necessary there to secure that border, as well. And I remain committed to border security first. 

I know there’s a lot of interest in getting a comprehensive bill in 

place, and I think we ought to do that, but not until the border’s 

secure, my fear is from the experience of a little over 1 year ago, 

that when we start talking about the amnesty or some sort of legal 

residents here in the country before we have the border secured, 

they talk about it, and they will come. And they will come, and 

they will come, because they’ll find a way until that border is far 

more secured. 

So, I hope that we can put—keep that in overdrive, and get it 

done as quickly as we possibly can. Because it’s so critically important. 

URBAN AREAS SECURITY INITIATIVES

The second thing I want to talk about is, that with respect to the 

Urban Areas Security Initiative—I understand the GAO has recently provided the committee with a report on your administration 

of the UASI grant program, and I’m reserving judgment on the 

process outline there at the moment, but I’m wondering if you 

agree with the approach that the Senate is taking in our 9/11 Commission bill to broaden the scope of eligible cities, by allowing the 

100 largest metropolitan areas to compete for these grants. If you 

disagree, I guess I’d like to hear that as well. Why wouldn’t these 

metropolitan areas start out on an equal ground, and be allowed 

the opportunity to make the case for some funding that you would 

say would be a baseline funding, because they all have certain requirements? And, I’m a little bit concerned that we’re getting into 
44 

an all or nothing kind of, type of competition. Perhaps you could 

give me your thoughts on that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I’m going to have to say that I respectfully 

disagree with the idea of broadening the eligibility. I faced this dilemma in the last 2 years through three grant cycles, and basically 

there appear to be three views on the issue of grant funding for 

Homeland Security. 

One view is we ought to spread it out among a lot of different 

jurisdictions, the theory being that everybody has some needs. 

That’s almost kind of a revenue-sharing viewpoint. 

The other view, sometimes articulated by tabloid newspapers in 

certain big cities, is that all of the money ought to go to one or two 

cities, because that’s where all the risk is, and everybody else gets 

nothing. 

I find myself in the middle position, which I think reflects where 

we’ve been, certainly this last year. Which is, we ought to weight 

the balance in favor of the high-risk cities, but we ought to broaden 

it to include other cities that are at significant risk of being lesser 

risk. I think in the grand funding for this current fiscal year, we 

came up with about 46 cities, but we identified a number of cities 

which were high-risk. 

Now, to be perfectly forthright about this, Senator, if we broadened, and added another 50 cities, by definition those would be cities that are lower risk than the other cities. Either we would be 

telling them to apply, but there’s not much likelihood they’re going 

to get any money, in which case we’re wasting their time and effort, or we’d have to guarantee them some minimal amount, but 

that amount would come out of the high-risk cities. Then we would 

be seeing lots of stories about how New York is getting cut, and 

Los Angeles is getting cut, and I don’t think that’s necessarily 

where we want to go. 

I guess what I’m going to pitch for is our current risk-based system, one that doesn’t put it all in a handful of cities, but does put 

a significant weight in the cities which have the highest risk. 

Senator NELSON. Well, I would agree with you, but I suspect if 

I ask you the question how high would Oklahoma City have rated 

on the risk-based analysis you’re making today, it might not have 

been very high on the list. So, it’s not as though there isn’t risk 

associated with various communities, that are not based on foreign 

attempts at terrorism, but based on domestic terrorism. If you don’t 

have, basically—instead of revenue-sharing, if you consider it—a 

basic spreading of certain resources across, then you will end up 

with the chain no stronger than the weakest link. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Senator, I’m the first person to acknowledge that this is a very hard issue; you can make very good arguments on both sides of this. 

In the State Homeland Security grants, there is some guaranteed 

base funding. That program was configured a little bit differently—— 

Senator NELSON. Yes. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think with respect to the interoperability 

grants, we’re going to have money coming out that way. 

I have heard passionate, strong arguments on every different 

side of this issue, and I suspect Senator Lautenberg is going to give 
45 

an equally passionate approach about why it ought to be centered, 

all of it or at least a good deal of it—in the New York/New Jersey 

area. I think we’ve struck a balance that weights it, but doesn’t put 

it exclusively there. 

In the end, it’s for Congress to decide; and you’ll have to wrestle 

amongst yourselves. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Senator BYRD. Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary. Good to see you again. And to see you up on that tightrope 

trying to balance, I’d like you to fall my way, if you don’t mind. Our 

way, let me say. Because, as the case was made that you make, 

and I respect you greatly, and that is that we’re going to offer real 

protection that I think is two people in the country, and we spend 

so little on a relative basis in protecting ourselves against attack 

within our borders, as when compared to that which we spend outside our borders to protect our people. 

And when I look, for instance, at the law enforcement terrorism 

prevention program, that’s reduced to zero, because it’s transferred 

to UASI. And the program in 2006 was $396 million, and 2007 it 

was offered at $375 million, now it’s transferred over, and it’s at 

25 percent of the $800 million that’s requested for the UASI, it 

goes to that program. 

Now, it just doesn’t make sense, Mr. Secretary, I mean, that 

challenges the prospect of taking care of our security needs by, as 

we reduce that funding. And when you looked at the cost, I always 

ask to see the—we can’t replace the losses that took place on 9/11 

in human terms. But the financial cost is also enormous, beyond 

almost any comprehension—$15 billion in physical assets, $11 billion in cleanup costs, and $40 billion in insurance claims, and the 

estimated economic loss from the New York City controller, goes up 

past $80 billion. 

And, Secretary, it just doesn’t make sense to me to spread it 

around any thinner than we have. You’re right, you know, that— 

when I look at an area where 12 million people could be injured 

or killed in that 2-mile—as a result of an attack on that 2-mile 

stretch which has largely chlorine, and everybody knows this, so 

I’m not revealing any secrets, and now the insurgents in Iraq have 

discovered that chlorine is a deadly material to use in war, and 

here we have that kind of exposure, and we’re talking about whether or not every State is entitled to something. And it, it’s almost 

a moot case right now, because it’s just not happening and I don’t 

understand why not. 

And I would appreciate your comment to see—where the justification comes in with all of these cuts, when we know that the 

threats of attacks in any of the more apparent targets are, would 

cause such incredible damage? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. First of all, I don’t see these as cuts. Obviously there are different allocations that we’re proposing than were 

proposed last year. We’ve made a determination that having a billion dollars going to interoperability grants addresses an issue that, 

we all remember from 9/11, was a big problem. Not to make it only 

a matter of money, because there are some issues of governance 

and organization that every community has to come to grips with; 
46 

some have and some haven’t. What we’ve sought to do here is, put 

the money into buckets that are sufficiently flexible enough to 

allow communities to allocate among a number of reasonable priorities; but not so fluid that it becomes a basis to repeat some of the 

spending that we saw 4 or 5 years ago, where people were buying 

things that were really not Homeland Security-based. 

I think net, when you look at the amount of money that’s going 

to be available over the next year, it’s going to be roughly the same 

as we had last year. Through fiscal year 2007, we will have distributed about $20 billion to State and local governments. That is a 

huge chunk of change, by any measure. There’s a lot of money; $5 billion of it still remains to be drawn 

down. Now, that’s not a criticism, because the process of drawing 

down requires the vendor perform before you pay the vendor. But 

it’s to suggest that States and localities are already digesting billions of dollars. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. But, in fairness, Mr. Secretary, the threat 

hasn’t reduced, as a matter of fact, I think it’s fair to say that the 

threats have increased. Where the sophistication of weapons, where 

the, they’re—I’ll call them, I don’t mean to be kind to them in any 

way—slick operating structures, the threats are certainly more 

than there were before, and you can tell from those interceptions 

that DHS has made over the years, that there’s still a significant 

amount of energy being put into ways to destroy our well-being and 

attack our people. 

So, unfortunately, this is a pattern that we’ve seen as we try to 

get funds for security, we’re told that whether it’s environment or 

here, transportation, we’re told that we’re lucky that we’re going to 

be doing so well, as we get our funds cut. And it, I don’t think it 

squares—you’re up something like $3.5 billion, but any damage 

that we could sustain would far outweigh that amount of money. 

And that’s, as you’ve described it, change. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. There’s no question, the threat remains very significant, but we’re $20 billion further advanced in terms of 

investments. In addition to the money we pay in grants, there are 

billions of dollars we pay in our employment of the Coast Guard, 

our employment of Customs and Border Protection, and our employment of TSA screeners. Many of the measures that the Federal 

Government provides to secure the homeland, are measures we 

provide by providing people, equipment, or capabilities that we, 

ourselves, manage. 

Grants represent only one slice of the Homeland Security pie; we 

have some very generous slices that are provided through the 

Coast Guard’s budget, and Customs and Border Protection and 

TSA, as well. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Chairman, I close and point out that 

a single day’s activity in Iraq is fairly close to $3 billion. And when 

we think of what we’re doing here, we’re taking comfort that we’re 

protecting the American public at home for, and there’s a $3 billion 

increase for the year. 

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg, for your very 

good questions, and your comments. 

Thank you, thank you. 

Senator Cochran, do you have any further questions? 
47 

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

FISCAL YEAR 2007 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL

Mr. Secretary, we will soon mark up a fiscal year 2007 supplemental appropriations bill. The President’s budget includes a fiscal 

year 2007 supplemental funding request of $3.4 billion for the 

FEMA Disaster Relief Fund to support ongoing recovery costs for 

Hurricane Katrina through December 2007. Is the $3.4 billion supplemental request adequate for addressing 

the gulf coast needs in fiscal year 2007? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We believe that it is, Senator. 

[The information follows:] 

CLARIFICATION OF $3.4 BILLION FEMA DISASTER RELIEF SUPPLEMENTAL

Since September 2005, Congress has provided a net total of $41 billion in supplemental funds to FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) to support response, relief, and 

recovery activities for hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma and other disasters. Because of the unprecedented scale of damage from, and the Federal response to, the 

hurricanes in the Gulf, and with the long-term recovery effort still underway, DRF 

allocations for the hurricanes alone are already nearly $40 billion. Nearly $39 billion 

of that amount has already been obligated to major program areas to address 

Katrina/Rita/Wilma needs. 

In order to meet DRF needs through 2007 for continued recovery in the Gulf, the Administration is requesting an additional $3.4 billion in supplemental funds for the 

DRF. These funds will support on-going recovery efforts in the Gulf, including 

Human Services, Public Assistance, Mitigation, and Operations needs through December 2007. 

Senator COCHRAN. I would like to know also, if the $3.4 billion 

request includes any additional Katrina-related supplemental 

needs that have been identified since decisions were made on the 

fiscal year 2008 budget. And, if so, we trust you will let us know 

about them so we can consider including them in the supplemental 

appropriations bill. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We will do that. 

GULF COAST HOUSING ASSISTANCE

Senator COCHRAN. The housing assistance made available to gulf 

coast, the gulf coast region, following Hurricane Katrina has been 

deeply appreciated, and it has been extended for 6 months and is 

now scheduled to expire on August 28, 2007. What is the FEMA 

agency plan for those who are still living in temporary housing beyond the new expiration date? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Senator, this is a discussion that we’re having internally. The people living in temporary housing fall into two 

categories. There are those people who are in apartments, distributed in various parts of the country, many of them not in the gulf 

coast. We’re working with the Department of Housing and Urban 

Development to see what is the best way to address that population. 

The second, are people who are currently located in trailers. 

Trailers are not really a long-term housing solution. They degrade 

over time, and that becomes a problem. 

I think one of the challenges we’re trying to consider, and I don’t 

think we’ve completely come to rest on what the right answer is, 

is how can we help to accelerate the move of people out of trailers. 

Those people who are waiting to get their houses fixed, ideally 
48 

they’ll get those houses fixed before this hurricane season. What is 

a better long-term solution for those people who are still occupying 

trailers, and won’t have their houses fixed? 

We don’t want to leave people out on a limb. At the same time, 

we have to manage this process to a conclusion; because I don’t 

think anybody has much relish for what we saw 10 or 15 years ago, 

where out of Hurricane Andrea, you had people living in trailers 

for years. I don’t think that’s a very good solution. We are working 

with the Governors, and talking about ways we might think outside the box in trying to come to a more settled resolution of this. 

INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS

Senator COCHRAN. Last year, you announced that the Department of Homeland Security will ensure that the highest-risk urban 

areas have interoperable communications equipment by the end of 

the year, and that all States have it by the end of 2008. 

The budget request the Administration has submitted assumes 

reductions in Homeland Security State and local grant programs, 

and many of these grants are used to fund interoperable communications. Do you think it’s possible to reach these interoperable 

communications goals, in view of the budget request? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, that’s because it’s offset by $1 billion 

that’s specifically dedicated to interoperability. As I’ve said previously, interoperability is not just about equipment; it’s about governance and communities finally reaching agreement on what the 

rules of the road are. 

I spent a fair amount of time talking to first responders. Many 

of them tell me the problem that they’re having is not lack of 

equipment. The problem that they’re having is getting the leadership of various communities to come to the table and agree on what 

is going to be the right process, procedure, language, and protocol. 

We’re going to have to drive behavior, as well as push out more 

technology. 

I think $1 billion certainly gives us the funding that we need, to 

do what we have to do. 

OPTIMAL STAFFING LEVEL OF THE BORDER PATROL

Senator COCHRAN. The budget request for next year funds 3,000 

additional Border Patrol agents. Will this get the Border Patrol to 

the optimal staffing level to control the border? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. With the additional amount that we would 

anticipate in the 2009 budget, first quarter, that will get us up to 

18,319, which is what we have judged will be an optimal size for 

the Border Patrol. 

PHASING OUT NATIONAL GUARD TROOPS ON THE BORDER

Senator COCHRAN. In addition, Operation Jump Start placed 

6,000 National Guard troops on the Southwest border. That deployment was complete in July 2006. Does the Department have a plan 

for replacing the National Guard troops with support positions for 

the Border Patrol? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. As we phase-out the National Guard at 

some point, we would like to replace the back-office jobs with peo-
49 

ple who are not Border Patrol that are less expensive to train and 

maintain, because we want to keep our border patrol on the front 

line. Eventually, we want to fill some of the back office slots with 

less expensive and less expert personnel. 

Senator COCHRAN. When will the draw-down of National Guard 

troops begin, and when does the plan call for all National Guard 

troops to be removed from the border? How will the deployment be 

perceived to have helped to secure the border? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, there’s no question it has been perceived, particularly by the people who want to come in illegally, as 

a huge deterrent. We’re working with the National Guard now on 

what is the best path for re-deployment, recognizing that the National Guard has turned out to be even a better deterrent than we 

expected. We obviously want to respect the Guard’s other challenges, but we are discussing with them now, what is the best way 

we can achieve all of our purposes in conducting any re-deployments. 

SECURE FENCE ACT

Senator COCHRAN. My last question deals with the Secure Fence 

Act. It was passed and signed into law at the end of last year. Will 

this budget request for the coming year, $1 billion for border security, fencing, infrastructure and technology, give the Department 

the resources to meet the requirements of the Secure Fence Act? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, let me begin, Senator, by saying that 

I think what we would prefer, would be to get a measure of flexibility in the appropriation that would allow us to deploy the kind 

of fencing that’s appropriate in the right place at the right time. 

The budget would support, pretty close to 700 miles of some kind 

of fencing in various places. It wouldn’t necessarily support a double-layered fence, 700 miles straight across the Arizona border, 

without essentially robbing all of the other parts of what is a balanced enforcement program. 

The operators, those with the real expertise, and those who visited the border, really understand that what you want to do is not 

mandate a specific type of fence, but give the Department and the 

Border Patrol the flexibility to build the right kind of fencing in the 

right place at the right time. That’s part of what our request is, 

to get that flexibility, so we could spend this billion dollars wisely, 

instead of pushing it all in a cookie-cutter approach. 

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BYRD. Thank you, thank you, Senator. Do you have any 

further questions? 

Senator COCHRAN. I have no further questions. 

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS OF AIR CARGO SECURITY

Senator BYRD. Well, thank you very much. 

I thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your answers. But you didn’t answer my question on air cargo. Your report, which we received 3 

months late says that vulnerability assessments of air cargo security nationwide have not started. When will they start? And when 

will they be completed? So that we can develop a real action plan? 

How can the airline passengers feel safe without such assessments, 

and a real plan? 
50 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Senator, I want to begin by saying, we are 

taking action. We’ve put out regulatory requirements. We are assessing vulnerability at various locations. 

I will have to get back to you as to the point at which we would 

have completed all of those assessments. I suspect it’s going to be— 

more or less of an ongoing process. We’re not waiting until everything is done to continue to raise the level of security. Even as we 

speak, we have significantly added requirements to what would 

have been the case a year ago, in terms of screening of counter 

packages, and also requirements that there be screening of consolidated packages that come from shipping companies. 

We are out assessing the system all of the time, but we are not 

waiting until everything is done to take action. We are constantly 

raising the bar on air cargo. 

I can get you a more specific answer in writing, though, about 

a particular end date. 

[The information follows:] 

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS OF COMPLETE AIR CARGO SECURITY SUPPLY

CHAIN

The Transportation Security Administration developed a methodology to conduct 

a vulnerability assessment analysis of the complete air cargo supply chain from 

shippers to air carriers which was approved in November 2006. Three two-week pilots were conducted at three different airports to test and improve this methodology. 

All three pilots were completed by March 28, 2007. The results of these assessments 

are being analyzed to identify potential trends, threats, risks, and vulnerabilities 

across the air cargo supply chain at the pilot locations. 

DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTIVES

Senator BYRD. Please do that, please do that. 

Recently, I sent you a letter outlining the unacceptable record of 

the Department in responding to congressional directives. Every 

Senator takes very seriously his or her role in fiscal oversight of 

the Department of Homeland Security. Your Department’s failure 

to respond impedes our ability, impedes our ability to make budget 

decisions, and set priorities critical to homeland security. 

For example, an expenditure plan for catastrophic planning is 

late—late, late. A strategic plan for screening passengers for explosive is late, late, late. Your biological countermeasures strategic 

plan is late, and the list goes on and on and on. This performance 

cannot be tolerated. What do you think about that? Mr. Secretary. 

Following this hearing, my colleagues and I will submit questions for the record. As you know, we need to have responses to 

these questions so we can do a proper job of appropriating resources for your Department. Last year, your Department took 5 

months to respond, which was well after the bill passed the Senate. 

Now, will you commit to us to send us responses to questions by 

May 1? And submit to us statutorily-required reports on time? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Mr. Chairman, we will send you the responses by May 1. I think we’ve also sent a report that was done 

in January 2007, in which I asked the Department to analyze and 

establish a set of metrics for our responsiveness on questions for 

the record, correspondence, and reports. 

I acknowledge the fact that we have a huge number of reporting 

requirements. Nevertheless, I sent a letter, which I think I’ve also 
51 

sent up to the committee, instructing my senior managers that failure to meet these metrics in terms of getting reports and responses 

to Congress in a timely fashion will start to result in adverse performance evaluations. To put it in plain English, we’re going to 

start punishing people if they don’t produce these reports in a timely fashion. 

Sometimes we may have to come back to you and say, ‘‘We need 

more time,’’ and I think that’s a fair request. I commend to you this 

report, as well as the letter, because I do agree, it’s sloppy and unacceptable to have a lot of lateness and a lot of drift. We’re going 

to tighten the ship up, and I think we’ve actually succeeded in reducing some of the delays. I can’t say it’s compelling reading, Mr. 

Chairman, but I do think it shows a seriousness and a determination to get on top of this problem, which I think the committee will 

be pleased with. 

Senator BYRD. Well, Mr. Secretary, we look forward to improved 

responsiveness. 

PROCUREMENT SPENDING

The Homeland Security Department is a contractor’s dream. A 

bipartisan study by the House Committee on Government Reform 

last year, found that procurement spending surged, surged, surged, 

between 2003 and 2005 from $3.5 billion to $10 billion. Your Undersecretary for Management recently testified that the amount 

was now $12 billion. While the contractors get richer, reports 

stream in on DHS contractors run amuck, and since the last time 

you testified before the committee, 82 independent reports on major 

DHS programs have been written most citing wasteful spending, or 

mismanagement. 

The latest problem is the contract to recapitalize the Coast 

Guard called Deepwater. A systems engineer who worked on the 

contract referred to Deepwater as the ‘‘fleecing,’’ I’ll say it again, 

‘‘fleecing of America.’’ 

Well, Mr. Secretary, Deepwater is just one example of a larger 

systemic problem at the Department. In 2002, when the Senate debated the bill to create the Department of Homeland Security, I 

warned that the creation of the Department was intended to eliminate large numbers of dedicated, trained, experienced, loyal, patriotic Federal workers, so that lucrative contracts for their services 

may be awarded to favor, to favored private entities. Sadly, that 

has come true. 

Mr. Secretary, this Department shouldn’t be for sale. You owe 

the American taxpayers a solution. Please, tell me, and tell the 

committee, and tell the American taxpayers what you are doing to 

get more value and more accountability out of the billions, billions, 

billions of dollars of Department contracts. Will you do that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes, I’d be happy to, Mr. Chairman. 

Ironically, the Deepwater Program was actually awarded before 

the Department was brought into existence. The flaws in that contract pre-date the Department, and indicate that contracting challenges exist in every department. 

I also wanted to emphasize that Admiral Allen has really taken 

the helm on Deepwater. He has reconfigured the contract to give 

him much greater control over the way it actually operates, includ-
52 

ing the right to pull out of the contract, elements that he thinks 

he can get satisfied more cheaply and more efficiently outside of 

the framework of the integrator; and I’ve encouraged him to do 

that. 

There’s no question that one of the keys to managing acquisitions 

is to have an appropriate workforce. One of the things that we’ve 

asked for in this budget, is almost $10 million in additional money 

that would allow us to expand our acquisition-capable workforce so 

we have the personnel we need in place to monitor the contracts 

and make sure that the contracts are being written and designed 

properly. These are enormously complex procurements. 

There is actually a shortage of good, well-qualified contracting officers in the U.S. Government. We’re competing for them. Ironically, sometimes you almost find yourself in the position of having 

to hire contractors to write contracts for other contractors, which 

is an unhappy scenario. We are eager to get this additional amount 

of money, to really build an in-house capability to manage these 

contracts. 

I take this very seriously. I think that as we’ve issued the big 

contract with respect to our SBInet, I’ve repeatedly told the head 

of the Border Patrol, ‘‘These guys work for you, you don’t work for 

them.’’ Meaning, you tell them if there’s a piece of equipment or a 

piece of technology that we’ve proven works in the real world, let 

them use that, instead of letting them invent their own, or buy it 

and then mark it up. I’ve told the folks from the company, pretty 

much every time I see them, that we’re going to watch them like 

a hawk. 

I do think we have a responsibility as operators to make sure 

that we’re constantly kicking the contractors where they need to be 

kicked in order to make sure they’re doing their job properly. 

Senator BYRD. I thank you, then, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony and your responses to our questions. We all share the goal 

of securing our homeland. 

We look forward to your rapid response to our written questions, 

as we prepare the fiscal year 2008 Homeland Security appropriations bill. 

Did you have any further questions, Senator? 

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, I don’t. I think it is good 

though that we are able to work together on this committee in a 

bipartisan fashion, and I want to congratulate you for that. We’ve 

been taking turns chairing this subcommittee, although Senator 

Gregg had the honor of chairing this subcommittee during the last 

Congress, and I chose not to chair a subcommittee since I was full 

committee chairman, but I want you to know, and I wanted to say 

for the record, that I appreciate the opportunity of serving with you 

when you are acting as chairman. 

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were 

submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:] 
53 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

IMMEDIATE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Question. Mr. Secretary, I’ve long been concerned that the creation of the giant 

Department of Homeland Security would create more problems than it would solve. 

Sometimes these problems show up in big ways, such as the mismanagement of 

FEMA during the Katrina fiasco, and in smaller ways, such as the recent OPM survey showing the department’s employees have little job satisfaction or faith in their 

leadership and management. The Department ranks at the bottom. 

How can we expect the Department to perform when it greatest resource, its people, have little faith in their management? What are you doing to fix the management at DHS? 

Answer. The positive findings from the FHCS survey all revolve around our employees feeling positive about the actual work that they do—89 percent of our employees believe that the work they do is important, almost 80 percent believe that 

the people they work with cooperate to get the job done, and 80 percent like the 

work that they do. 

In light of these positives, it is clear that our employees deserve better from senior 

leadership. My senior leadership team and I are taking these results very seriously. 

I asked Deputy Secretary Jackson to immediately send out a message to all employees communicating our results and letting them know that we were very disappointed with our scores and would be taking immediate steps to try to effect 

changes which would lead to improved morale. 

However, as you know, our Department is large and made up of components with 

diverse missions. Our score on the Federal Human Capital Survey is really a compilation of the scores of our components, weighted to reflect the component’s relative 

population within the Department. It should be noted that not all of our components 

scored poorly. For example, US VISIT, within Headquarters; U.S. Secret Service and 

U.S. Coast Guard all scored very well. The components which scored poorly already 

have efforts underway to try to improve scores. 

From the Department-wide perspective, we are taking a two-pronged approach— 

activities at the Enterprise level and also at the component level. These activities 

include: 

—Ongoing data analysis for actionable conclusions 

—Focus groups (Department-wide on leadership and communication issues) 

—Component action plans to address top 2 to 3 areas of weakness 

—Sharing component best practices across the Department 

At the corporate level we are also focusing on Performance Management, Leadership and Communications. 

In the area of Performance Management, we believe we will see an impact 

through the performance management system we started implementing in 2005. We 

will continue to expand coverage of this program and also continue to revamp and 

reissue performance management tools which we believe will contribute to changing 

the negative employee perception of performance management within the Department. These initiatives include: 

—Holding managers accountable for addressing FHCS issues as a corporate requirement 

—Ensuring all employees in the new performance system are on performance 

plans 

To enhance leadership skills, we will also continue to provide the leadership training initiatives which we started to implement last year. Additional efforts include: 

—Delivering new leadership training programs to focus on core skills identified 

in the survey (leveraging existing component programs, where possible) 

—Rolling-out existing leadership development programs, including the SES Candidate Development Program and the DHS Fellows Program 

To improve communications, the Office of Public Affairs will work with the Office 

of the Chief Human Capital Officer to: 

—Enhance DHS web sites to include more messages from senior leaders topics 

relevant to the workforce 

—Structure a series of all hands meetings in coordination with components to address key issues 

—Prepare an abbreviated DHS 101 module that explains DHS, what it does, who 

is in it, the Secretary’s priorities and how each organization relates to them 

—Maintain a robust FHCS website to ensure employees have access to all information on the Department’s activities 

Finally, we have also taken action to address low scores dealing with the receptivity of management to employee suggestions, innovation and creativity. We plan 
54 

to complete a robust, automated Homeland Security Employee Suggestion Program. 

We also plan to have an Innovation Council led by Policy Development and Science 

and Technology. We have also highlighted the importance of managers and supervisors recognizing innovation and suggestions through the awards program in the 

DHS Management Directive for Awards and Recognition. 

While we hope that the Suggestion Program will have an immediate impact on 

the scores for questions which deal with suggestions and innovation, I think that 

for other issues, particularly in the areas of performance culture and leadership, it 

will take years to actually see the results from any of the changes which we have 

ongoing. But through these coordinated efforts, we aim to address the areas for improvement identified by the survey and put in place new accountability structures 

to help us implement, communicate and measure our effectiveness in doing so. 

As initial steps toward improving employee satisfaction both at the headquarters 

and within the operating components, we have already identified the need for better 

communication throughout the workforce, continued emphasis of performance management training at the individual supervisor and employee level and implemented 

improved recognition of good performance. Although the general results of the survey were disappointing we are encouraged by the fact that DHS employees have 

passion for our mission. Eighty-nine percent of employees report that they believe 

the work they do is important, and 80 percent like the work that they do. This is 

a strong foundation to build upon for improvement. 

We will continue to evaluate the detailed results of the survey, analyze the practices of Departments that are recognized for their high performance, and use this 

information to develop additional steps that will lead to DHS’ employee satisfaction. 

This summer, we will conduct another survey of our workforce to ensure that our 

efforts are on track with addressing key employee concerns. 

Additionally, the leadership team in each operating component and headquarters 

unit will discuss details of the survey with our workforce in order to gather employee suggestions and recommendations that will inform the way forward. 

Question. Provide the number of contractors employed within offices of the OSEM 

and USM. Provide their average salary by office. 

Answer. DHS does not track contractor FTE because we often acquire support on 

a fixed price basis or based on performance objectives. The number of personnel the 

contractor employs is not transparent or relevant since we are paying for a deliverable or outcome rather than man-hours. In those instances where DHS is acquiring 

a specific ‘‘level of effort’’ or man-hours, contractors may use several employees to 

accomplish tasks that total the number of man-hours in one FTE. 

Question. According to DHS Spokesman Russ Knocke, the DHS contract for limousine service was to be rebid during the winter [of 2006–2007] or spring [of 2007]. 

Has this contract been rebid? If not, what is the timeline? Ref: Washington Post article on October 18, 2006. 

Answer. On November 20, 2006 the Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Procurement Operations (OPO) issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) on Federal 

Business Opportunity (FedbizOpps) for DHS-Wide Transportation services. Two protests were filed with the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

during the preaward phase of the procurement that delayed the original anticipated 

award date of February 2, 2007. On March 15, 2007, GAO denied the first protest. 

OPO’s record for the second protest was submitted to GAO on February 22, 2007 

with GAO decision due date of April 30, 2007. The Agency now anticipates award 

during early June. 

OFFICE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT

Question. Department of Defense documents indicate that P–3 aerial patrol hours 

in the Caribbean in support of the counternarcotics mission declined from 6,062 in 

fiscal year 2002 to only 1,432 in fiscal year 2005. While there was a slight improvement in patrol hours last year, the Pentagon has apparently grounded much of the 

P–3 fleet for long periods due to a lack of pilots, money for flying time, or maintenance. Combined with the significant decommissioning of tethered aerostats in the 

Gulf Coast, it appears that there is a significant gap in our Nation’s ability to both 

detect and interdict narcotics, as well as migrants and potential terrorists, in this 

area. What DHS resources currently are being directed to fill this gap and what is 

requested in the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget to specifically fill this gap? 

Answer. CBP’s support for Transit Zone drug interdiction efforts expanded significantly from 886 hours in fiscal year 2002 to 2,225 hours in fiscal year 2005. In fiscal 

year 2006, CBP discovered structural problems in several P–3’s that required CBP 

to inspect bathtub fittings in the entire P–3 fleet. Inspections resulted in major repairs on 9 aircraft. 
55 

CBP is dedicated to long-term sustainment and systems modernization of the P– 

3 Fleet. CBP is currently conducting a Service Life Assessment Plan (SLAP). The 

assessment will drive the P–3 Service Life Extension Plan (SLEP) requirements 

CBP received $70 million in fiscal year 2007 for the P–3 SLEP and additional flight 

hours. 

USCG increased their Drug Interdiction hours from 2,803 hours in fiscal year 

2002 to 4,863 hours in fiscal year 2005 (continued growth to 5,066 hours in fiscal 

year 2006). The fiscal year 2008 budget includes funding for fully mission-capable 

HC–130J’s Maritime Patrol Aircraft which should be available by at least fiscal year 

2009, replacing the vintage HC–130H aircraft. 

OFFICE OF POLICY

Question. Explain why Singapore was chosen as a site to have an attache ́ and ten 

program analysts vice another international destination (Ref: OSEM0915). 

Answer. The Office of International Affairs requests to fund an Attache ́ in Singapore and 10 program analysts in Washington D.C. to better support the Headquarters’ burgeoning overseas presence. As the number of DHS international initiatives continues to increase, the demands placed upon the small Office of International Affairs staff increases proportionately. A key objective of the fiscal year 

2008 budget request is to not only keep pace but tackle long-term projects and concentrate on addressing international issues in a strategic fashion. The 10 program 

analysts will assist in that effort. 

The DHS Attache ́ program affords the Department the ability to promote overarching DHS goals and objectives that strategically guide the operational responsibilities of our myriad component representatives abroad. As the Secretary’s personal representatives, the DHS Attache ́s actively engage our international partners 

on the full breadth of the DHS mission, to include immigration policy, transportation security, traveler screening, border management, and cargo security. The eyes 

and ears of the Office of International Affairs around the globe, these senior-level 

attache ́s dramatically increase the Office’s ability to provide DHS leadership with 

real-time information exchange, negotiating strategies and expert advice on international security policy. Singapore was chosen as a critical regional deployment site 

to best address the significant security challenges throughout Asia-Pacific as a 

whole. Out year plans may include an Attache ́ in Beijing, China, for bilateral engagement but, near-term, Singapore presented the greatest opportunity for theaterwide coordination. 

Question. Explain how the Office of Strategic Plans is different than the Screening 

Coordination Office (Ref: OSEM–16). 

Answer. The Office of Strategic Plans expresses the long term view of the Department by translating the Secretary’s priorities into capstone planning documents 

such as the Department Strategic Plan. The office also establishes the processes and 

relationships necessary to infuse a clear Policy role in setting budget priorities in 

order to ensure informed resource allocation decisions. 

The Screening Coordination Office’s (SCO) primary objective is to strengthen 

Homeland Security by enhancing screening processes and technologies to deter and 

detect those who pose a threat to the United States. The SCO’s primary goals consist of identifying opportunities to harmonize and enhance screening processes 

across the Department’s ‘‘people screening’’ programs, rationalizing and prioritizing 

investments in screening technologies and systems, developing metrics for evaluating and improving screening processes, and establishing standards for biometrics 

use in screening. 

GENERAL COUNSEL

Question. What is the anticipated timeline to appoint a new General Counsel? 

Answer. The General Counsel of the Department of Homeland Security is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The President 

will submit a nomination to the United States Senate at his discretion. 

OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

Question. Provide a breakdown by component agency regarding the number of 

personnel assigned to deal with civil rights/civil liberties complaints. What is your 

plan to reduce this backlog? 

Answer. 
56 

Staffing of the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Review and Compliance Unit 

To effectively handle a growing inventory of complaints, the Office for Civil Rights 

and Civil Liberties (CRCL) (a Headquarters element of the Department) established 

a Review and Compliance unit in December 2005. This Unit is responsible for investigating complaints ‘‘retained’’ by CRCL and reviewing outcomes of complaints ‘‘referred’’ to other components by CRCL. Headquarters elements rely on the staff of 

this Unit to handle civil right/civil liberties complaints. The Review and Compliance 

Unit reports to the Deputy Officer for Programs and Compliance. This unit meets 

regularly with CRCL staff working to provide proactive advice to ensure program 

consistency. 

As of March 30, 2007, the staffing allocation for the Review and Compliance was: 

10 full-time personnel [7 FTEs; 3 contractors]: 

—1 FTE senior program manager 

—4 FTE program analysts 

—2 FTE investigators 

—2 contract analysts 

—1 contract administrative support (currently vacant) 

Staffing of DHS Components to Review Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Complaints 

FEMA—Office of Equal Rights: 2 Civil Rights Specialists. 

TSA—Office of Civil Rights and Liberties, External Compliance Division: 2 FTE; 

1 contractor. 

The division handles civil rights/civil liberties issues concerning the traveling public. 

USCG—Coast Guard Headquarters Office of Civil Rights, Compliance and Liaison 

division: 5 personnel [4 civilian; 1 military]. 

The Coast Guard centrally manages external (non-EEO) civil rights/liberties enforcement through the division. The division employs 5 personnel in total who perform a variety of functions related to compliance. Of the 5 employees, 1 civilian is 

responsible for tracking external, non-EEO civil rights/liberties complaints. 

CBP and ICE do not have dedicated personnel to perform this function but, rather, rely on numerous in-house personnel on an as needed basis to respond to complaints and inquiries from the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (discussed above), and to liaison with the CRCL staff. 

In addition, civil rights/civil liberties complaints may be processed or investigated 

by the DHS Office of Inspector General. 

CRCL plans a two-pronged attack to reduce its discrimination complaint backlog. 

With contract support CRCL was able to reduce the backlog of cases for final adjudication inherited from legacy agencies in fiscal year 2004 by over 1,800 cases to 

the current level of 311. By replacing the five contractors who left and with the requested fiscal year 2008 positions, CRCL expects to further reduce the inventory of 

cases to a more manageable 200 cases or less at given time. CRCL will also use 

requested funding to lead the Components in programs of early intervention and 

conflict resolution. Such programs have been proven to promote settlement of issues 

and reduce filing of complaints. Further CRCL is undertaking a program of Component evaluation and technical assistance to address compliance with Equal Employment Opportunity regulations regarding processing of EEO complaints. 

Question. OSEM page 26 indicates there is a 2,000 backlog of discrimination complaints which grows approximately 100 new cases each month. Provide a breakdown 

of the current cases by component agency. 

Answer. Generally, each Federal agency must take final action in employment 

discrimination complaints filed by employees and applicants pursuant to the requirements of 20 CFR Part 1614. Prior to taking final action, employment discrimination complaints are reviewed and either accepted for investigation or proposed for 

dismissal based on the complainant’s failure to fulfill regulatory procedural requirements in Part 1614. After investigation complainants are given to option of either 

a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Administrative Judge (AJ) or 

an immediate final agency decision from the agency without a hearing. Where a 

complainant opts for a hearing, final action on the decision of the AJ is taken by 

informing the complainant whether the decision will be implemented or appealed. 

Where the complainant opts for an immediate final agency decision, the agency’s decision is the final action. Both may be appealed by the complainant to the EEOC’s 

Office of Federal Operations. 

At DHS, the Deputy Officer, Equal Employment Opportunity Programs, Office for 

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) has been delegated departmental responsibility for taking final action in departmental employment discrimination complaints 
57 

and issuance of decisions on the merits of those complaints. Pursuant to Part 1614, 

employment discrimination cases are submitted to CRCL for final action when: 

—The complainant proposes dismissal of the complaint because of procedural deficiencies; 

—The complainant, after investigation in a DHS component, elects a final agency 

decision without a hearing; 

—After a hearing by an EEOC AJ; or; 

—The case is remanded back to the agency after an appeal is heard by the EEOC 

of Office of Federal Operations 

There are 311 employment discrimination complaints in CRCL’s current inventory 

for adjudication. The component breakdown is as follows: 

—CIS: 29 

—CBP: 46 

—USSS: 3 

—TSA: 131 

—HQ: 2 

—FEMA: 24 

—USCG: 17 

—ICE: 58 

—FLETC: 1 

Furthermore, there are 2001 formal complaints of discrimination at the component level. The component breakdown is as follows: 

—CIS: 127 

—CBP: 402 

—USSS: 21 

—TSA: 928 

—HQ: 13 

—FEMA: 151 

—USCG: 70 

—ICE: 276 

—FLETC: 13 

Upon completion of an investigation, EEOC hearing or Appeal decision, CRCL will 

be required to take final action in each case. 

CIS OMBUDSMAN

Question. Provide an update on the extent of backlog case files. 

Answer. The latest Backlog Elimination Report for Congress for fiscal year 2006, 

4th Quarter (July–September 2006) Update, reflected a net backlog of 9,482 cases 

that met the USCIS definition of backlog over 6 months and within our control. 

Still, there were more than one million overall pending cases outside USCIS control 

due to pending FBI background checks, requests to applicants for further evidence 

associated with an application or appeal, and visa applications where no visa is 

available due to statutory caps. 

As of December 31, 2006, there was a gross total of 1,212,567 applications pending that met the USCIS definition of backlog over 6 months. Of these, 103,272 were 

pending USCIS action and 1,109,295 applications were outside USCIS control due 

to pending FBI background checks, requests to applicants for further evidence associated with an application or appeal, and visa applications for adjustment where no 

visa is available due to statutory caps. 

Question. Your annual report to Congress submitted in June, 2006, contains a list 

of pervasive and serious problems. On page iii, you write: ‘‘Legitimate customers pay 

for services they would not need if the underlying petition were timely processed, 

while ineligible and fraudulent applicants receive work authorization and travel documents because of processing delays.’’ How would the proposed USCIS fee increase 

impact this serious concern you raise? 

Answer. The USCIS Director has stated in Congressional testimony (2/14/07) that 

the increase in fees will allow the agency to reduce average processing time by 20 

percent. To the extent this is achieved, the fee increase will begin the process of 

mitigating the problems we see as arising from untimely processing. Additionally, 

the restructuring of fees associated with adjustments of status (Form I–485) and 

employment authorizations (Form I–765) will have a positive impact. By combining 

the current separate fees into a single fee collected for applying for adjustment of 

status, the current institutional bias to delay processing in order to collect the income from processing multiple annual renewals of employment authorizations 

(EAD’s) is removed. Instead, the agency should now have an incentive to complete 

the I–485 as quickly as possible to avoid processing EAD’s, for which USCIS no 

longer will be able collect a separate fee under the proposed fee schedule. 
58 

Question. What are the initial results of your initiative to create a ‘‘virtual ombudsmen’’? What metrics and performance standards are (or will be used) to measure the effectiveness of this idea? 

Answer. Initial results have been promising. We established a web site that invites comments on topical concerns or top priorities and began a regular call-in or 

teleconference program on specific USCIS topics and offices. These two aspects of 

our virtual ombudsman has provided additional access to our office for individuals, 

representatives of community organizations and immigration stakeholders whose 

opinions and concerns are further evaluated by our analysts and shared with 

USCIS. At the same time, we have completed with counsel from the DHS Office of 

Science and Technology the formulation of a comprehensive functional description 

of a Virtual Ombudsman system and its adherence to departmental informationsharing criteria. Further discussions have commenced with DHS CIO on this 

project, as the DHS CIO will be the technical controller and procurer of the system 

pursuant to departmental policy to center IT spending activities with the DHS CIO. 

The Virtual Ombudsman System will allow us to better track and report on the 

number and types of complaints we receive from individuals and employers as they 

interface with USCIS. These data, in conjunction with feed-back from the Ombudsman’s research and travels, will allow us to both measure the effectiveness of virtual 

ombudsman and to supplement our other efforts to obtain information from stakeholders that is the basis of our substantive recommendations to USCIS for improving the current immigration benefits system. In terms of the metrics and performance standards in the development of the system and the acquisition process, these 

will be determined by the DHS CIO in accordance with departmental policy to center IT spending activities with the DHS CIO. 

PRIVACY OFFICER

Question. OSEM page 27 provides justification for additional positions and FTE 

to support FOIA work. When can we expect to receive the fiscal year 2006 annual 

FOIA report? 

Answer. The DHS fiscal year 2006 Annual Freedom of Information Act Report 

was cleared for release by the Department of Justice on March 21, 2007. The report 

is attached. 

Question. When will Congress receive the FOIA annual report for 2006? 

Answer. The DHS fiscal year 2006 Annual Freedom of Information Act Report 

was cleared for release by the Department of Justice on March 21, 2007. The report 

is attached. 

[The information follows:] 
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Question. How many threshold analyses need to be submitted and reviewed before 

a determination is made that a formal privacy impact assessment should be performed for a given project? 

Answer. A Privacy Threshold Analysis (PTA) is submitted to the Privacy Office 

for review. If sufficient information is contained in the PTA, the Privacy Office will 

make a determination whether a PIA is required. Sometimes additional information 
118 

is required to make an appropriate determination, but the majority of the PTAs are 

validated based on the initial information provided. 

Question. The Winter 2006 Newsletter article regarding the first Privacy Office 

workshop indicated panelists identified ways to strengthen compliance with the Privacy Act through the development of sound privacy guidance. Please provide an 

overview of the panelists’ recommendations. (Ref: Winter 2006, Page (2). 

Answer. The Privacy Office has published a summary of its first Public Workshop 

Privacy and Technology: Government Use of Commercial Data for Homeland Security, held on September 8 and 9, 2005. The summary is available on the DHS Privacy Office website at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacylwkshopl09–2005lhighlights.pdf and is provided as an attachment to this 

response. The recommendations of the panelists are discussed on pp. 4–7 of the attached summary. 

Question. At the conclusion of the first Privacy Office workshop—the panel was 

tasked with recommending a roadmap on the fair information privacy principles of 

transparency, collection limitation, accountability, redress and due process rights. 

What is the status of this roadmap? (Ref: Winter 2006, Page (2). 

Answer. The Privacy Act articulates concepts of how the Federal Government 

should treat individuals and their information. These concepts are known as the 

Fair Information Principles (FIPs). The FIPs impose duties upon Federal agencies 

regarding the collection, use, dissemination, and maintenance of personally identifiable information. The Privacy Act applies specifically to records that hold personally 

identifiable information, in a system of records under the control of an agency, about 

individuals who are U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents. DHS policy extends the protections contained in the Privacy Act to all systems that maintain information on not only U.S. Citizens and Legal Permanent Residents, but visitors as 

well. 

Furthermore, the Privacy Act applies to any personally identifiable information 

controlled by DHS, no matter if DHS maintains information in a classified system, 

if DHS handles information about government officials, or if the system is run by 

a contractor. 

DHS applies the Fair Information Principles underlying the Privacy Act to the full 

breadth and diversity of the information and interactions of DHS. The DHS Fair 

Information Principles account for the nature and purpose of the information being 

collected in relation to DHS’s mission to preserve, protect, and secure. 

The following is a brief summary of how the Privacy Office applies these principles: 

—Principle of Transparency 

—Principle of Individual Participation 

—Principle of Purpose Specification 

—Principle of Minimization 

—Principle of Use Limitation 

—Principle of Data Quality and Integrity 

—Principle of Security 

—Principle of Accountability and Auditing 

Principle of Transparency 

DHS implements the Principle of Transparency through the publishing of Privacy 

Impact Assessments, System of Records Notices, and Privacy Act notices. 

Principle of Individual Participation 

DHS implements the Principle of Individual Participation by providing the public 

and individuals notice of access and redress programs through the publishing of the 

Privacy Impact Assessment, System of Records Notice, and Privacy Act Statements 

(also known as (e)(3) Notices). DHS implements this through DHS redress processes 

and through DHS Privacy Act and FOIA programs that provide for access to an individual’s personally identifiable information. 

Principle of Purpose Specification 

DHS implements the Principle of Purpose Specification by ensuring that the purpose of a program is specified through out the development of the underlying system. 

Principle of Minimization 

DHS implements the Principle of Minimization of personally identifiable information by ensuring that only relevant and necessary information is collected for the 

underlying system. 
119 

Principle of Use Limitation 

DHS implements the Principle of Use Limitation by requiring a program to document why the program needs particular data elements and through the System of 

Records Notice, where the program describes the purposes for the collection and the 

type of sharing anticipated. These Notices must be completed prior to the system 

becoming operational. 

Principle of Data Quality and Integrity 

DHS implements the Principle of Data Quality and Integrity by requiring programs have standard operating procedures outlining the regulation of information 

collection, storage integrity and how to review information for compliance with the 

relevant and necessary standard. These procedures should be documented in the 

Privacy Impact Assessment and System of Records Notice. Programs should develop 

and implement records retention schedules. 

Principle of Security 

DHS implements the Principle of Security through the Certification and Accreditation process outlined by Federal Information Security Management Act and the 

Chief Information Security Officer. 

Principle of Accountability and Auditing 

DHS implements the Principle of Security throughout the life cycle of a program. 

First, during the development of the program, the program must identify the needs 

for certain audit capabilities and training requirements. These will be captured in 

the C&A and the Privacy Impact Assessment. Second, on a daily basis, personnel 

are required to be vigilant in their handling of personally identifiable information 

to ensure that the information is not subject to loss, unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. 

As demonstrated above, the Privacy Office relies on these Fair Information Principles in all of its efforts to build privacy protections into the operations of the Department. Whether discussing the privacy considerations associated with implementation of the REAL ID Act, international agreements addressing Passenger Name 

Records, Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, or the Information Sharing Environment, the Privacy Office relies on the 

FIPs as the roadmap for analysis and implementation of privacy protections. In 

short, every activity of the Office is considered through the lens of the FIPs. 

The fall 2005 Workshop on Privacy and Technology: Government Use of Commercial Data for Homeland Security, described in the Winter 2006 newsletter, helped 

to focus the Privacy Office on the special concerns surrounding the use of commercial data. On December 6, 2006, the DHS Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee issued a paper on The Use of Commercial Data, which has become the basis 

of a supplement to our PIA template for all instances in which programs use commercial data. Building on a FIPs analysis, this paper provided useful guidance on 

the specific issues related to the collection and use of commercial data. 

In addition, the Office has drafted a guidance memorandum outlining its articulation of the FIPs and intends to submit it for Department clearance later this spring. 

This guidance will further educate the Department on how to embed these 

foundational principles into the planning and operation of the Department. 

Question. Please provide an update on the new electronic learning course entitled: 

‘‘Privacy Awareness’’. Has it been fully deployed? (Ref: Winter 2006, Page 4) 

Answer. The Privacy Office has developed and distributed an e-learning privacy 

training course entitled ‘‘Privacy Awareness,’’ which expands upon the basic concepts presented in the orientation to develop an understanding in the essentials of 

the Privacy Act and E-Government Act. This training permits DHS employees and 

contractors to recognize situations in which privacy issues arise and how best to 

mitigate risks to privacy in the development and operation of a program. This 

course is available across DHS and has been or will soon be incorporated into the 

various training programs, including privacy training programs conducted by the 

U.S. Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration, along with and 

specific programs in the Department. The course is currently being integrated into 

DHScovery, which is the learning management system completing development at 

the Department. In addition, the Privacy Office has shared this training course with 

other Federal agencies, including the Office of Personnel Management, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of the Interior. 

Question. Please comment on the level of commitment and concern by the Canadian and Mexican governments in supporting identity theft initiatives. Supporting 

evidence to include number of issues jointly resolved would be beneficial. (Ref: 

Spring 2006, Page 3) 
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Answer. International aspects of identity theft have been handled by the Federal 

Trade Commission (FTC). The DHS Privacy Office has had no discussions or contacts with either the Canadian or Mexican governments on identity theft. The FTC 

would likely have agreements or a history of contacts with the Canadian and Mexican governments pertinent to this issue. 

Question. Please provide an update as to where the Privacy Office is at in developing privacy technology guidance for integration into the preparation process leading up to the Enterprise Architecture Center of Excellence (EACOE) review. When 

will the review take place? 

Answer. The DHS Privacy Office is currently working on an overall Privacy Technology Implementation Guide Framework document which will provide privacy 

guidance for all uses and reviews of technology across the Department. This Framework document will be used to create specific privacy guidance for individual programs and technologies, including the technology investment process managed 

through the EACOE. 

Once the DHS Privacy Office completes the Privacy Technology Implementation 

Guide Framework and the specific version Privacy Technology Implementation 

Guide for the Department technology investment review process, the DHS Privacy 

Office will integrate that guidance into its current role within the ongoing EACOE 

review process. 

UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT

Question. GAO Report 07–310 documented areas deemed to be of ‘‘high risk’’. GAO 

writes on page 45: DHS has not institutionalized a strategic framework for information management to, among other things, guide technology investments; and DHS 

human capital and acquisition systems will require continued attention to help prevent waste and ensure that DHS can allocate its resources efficiently and effectively.’’ What is your response? 

Answer. The Department has many substantial challenges to overcome in its effort to improve its financial management processes. Chief Financial Officer David 

Norquist and I are working to make measurable, demonstrable progress in the following areas: 

—To improve systems and processes eventually leading to sustainable clean audit 

opinions. 

—To provide assurance about our internal controls over financial reporting via a 

sound internal controls program. 

—To provide greater visibility into DHS’ financial activity through timely accurate 

and useful financial related data. 

—To provide efficient financial management services. 

Success in these areas rests upon a framework of people, policies, processes, systems and assurance. We have efforts underway in each of these areas which include: 

aggressive hiring and development programs; the ‘‘Internal Controls over Financial 

Reporting (ICOFR) Playbook’’—a corrective action plan that addresses identified 

audit weaknesses; the development of a comprehensive set of financial management 

policies which represent the best practices of the Federal Government; and a plan 

to continue the migration and reduction in the number of our financial management 

systems. 

Of particular importance are internal controls. Sound internal controls are essential to effectively meeting the Department’s mission. DHS must have a process in 

place by which it can test whether our internal controls are well designed and operating effectively on a continuous basis. This means that management must move 

away from reliance on what outside auditors determine is wrong, and be able to 

independently prevent and address issues before they become problems. 

DHS CONTRACTING OUT

Question. Mr. Secretary, the Homeland Security Department is a contractor’s 

dream. A bi-partisan study by the House Committee on Government Reform last 

year found that procurement spending ‘‘surged’’ between 2003 and 2005 from $3.5 

billion to $10 billion. Your Undersecretary for Management recently testified that 

the amount was now $12 billion. 

While the contractor ‘‘fat cats’’ get fatter, reports stream in on DHS contractors 

run amok. Since the last time you testified before the Committee, 82 independent 

reports on major DHS programs have been written—most citing wasteful spending 

or mismanagement. The latest problem is the contract to recapitalize the Coast 

Guard, called Deepwater. A systems engineer who worked on the contract referred 

to Deepwater as the ‘‘fleecing of America.’’ Deepwater is just one example of a larger, systemic problem at the Department. 
121 

You owe the American taxpayers a solution. Please tell me and the American taxpayers what are you doing to fix this problem? I’m also concerned about the Department’s reliance on contractors to perform work that is inherently governmental. Are 

you aware, Mr. Secretary, that 60 percent of your intelligence office is staffed by 

contractors? Are you aware these contractors cost 60 percent more than a Federal 

employee? One contractor, I am told, is paid $490 per hour. How is that allowed 

to happen? 

Answer. The Department takes its responsibilities of being good stewards of the 

taxpayers’ dollars seriously and is committed to obtaining the required goods and 

services in support of the DHS mission using sound procurement practices. To that 

end, the Chief Procurement Officer has established the following priorities to enhancing the Department’s acquisition function: 

—To build the DHS acquisition workforce to enhance the Department’s acquisition program; 

—To establish an acquisition system whereby each requirement has a well defined 

mission and a management team that includes professionals with the requisite 

skills to achieve mission results; 

—To ensure more effective buying across the eight contracting offices through the 

use of strategic sourcing and supplier management; and 

—To strengthen contract administration to ensure that products and services purchased meet contract requirements and mission need. 

These four goals were communicated to contracting offices through the component 

heads to ensure alignment and focus on these high priority items. Progress in these 

four areas will significantly strengthen the Department’s ability to perform its mission and implement acquisition programs successfully. 

We are aware that contractors are expensive. The fiscal year 2008 Budget provides for conversion of certain contractor ‘‘billets’’ to Federal positions and, in addition, the Department’s long range plans include further conversion to Federal positions in the out years. 

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Question. Seven recent audits have highlighted financial weaknesses and exposed 

alarming examples of waste, fraud, and abuse. For example, as of September 30, 

2006, the Department could not reconcile $3.5 billion of transactions and balances 

with our trading partners. One report, released by the Office of the Inspector General last November, documented ten material weaknesses, two other reportable conditions in internal control, and instances of noncompliance with eight, that’s right— 

eight—laws and regulations. 

When will the Department receive a clean financial audit? What steps are you 

taking to produce a clean financial audit. 

Answer. An audit opinion is dependent upon execution of corrective action plans. 

Currently corrective actions are scheduled to be completed by 2010. 

To resolve the internal control weaknesses, the Department issued its first ever 

Department-wide corrective action plan in a document entitled the Internal Controls 

Over Financial Reporting (ICOFR) Playbook. The ICOFR Playbook outlines the additional steps the Department will take to resolve material weaknesses and build 

management assurances. 

Substantial progress was achieved in our fiscal year 2006 financial statement 

audit. Two components, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Federal 

Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) received favorable audit outcomes. CBP 

obtained an unqualified opinion on all financial statements and FLETC achieved an 

unqualified opinion on its first ever balance sheet audit. Significant progress has 

also been achieved in reducing conditions that comprise the Department’s material 

weakness structure. For example, most significantly the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) eliminated five of its seven component-level material weakness conditions. 

OFFICE OF SECURITY

Question. Explain why this office is investigating threats to foreign intelligence, 

terrorism, or criminal activities within or directed against DHS. Why are these 

issues not referred to the Office of the Inspector General, the FBI, or the Justice 

Department (Ref: USM–9)? 

Answer. The Office of Security is responsible for protecting the Department’s personnel, information, and property. To that end, the Office conducts audits, inspections, and investigations involving alleged crimes against DHS or its employees and 

allegations of illegal activities by DHS personnel. These activities are closely coordinated with the investigations of fraud, waste, and abuse conducted by the Office of 
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Inspector General. In practice, if the Inspector General declines to investigate allegations involving DHS Components that do not have investigative authorities or capabilities, it refers those allegations to the Office of Security. For issues involving 

foreign intelligence or terrorism threats, the Office works closely with the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) through the assigned FBI detailees, and refers investigations as appropriate. 

CHIEF PROCUREMENT OFFICER

Question. When will Congress receive the Procurement Oversight Plan and an assessment of the adequacy of the numbers and training of those personnel? 

Answer. The Department is in the final review of the Procurement Oversight Plan 

before sending it to the Hill. For fiscal year 2007 the Acquisition Oversight Office 

is authorized ten billets by the Chief Procurement Officer. As of March 1, 2007 there 

are five personnel in place performing the oversight function in accordance with the 

plan. The personnel on board have an average of 18 years of relevant procurement 

experience, and are all certified as Level III Acquisition professionals by virtue of 

their training and experience. Of the remaining billets, four people have been tendered offers of employment and are pending the clearance process before coming 

aboard. The DHS Acquisition Oversight Directorate currently has one vacant position. As with the current on-board personnel, all are experienced, senior procurement professionals, fully trained and certified in their current agencies. Upon arrival, they will each apply for DHS certification as Level III Acquisition Professionals. The DHS certification requirements include continuous education in order 

to maintain certification. The authorized billets for fiscal year 2007 are sufficient 

to address the initial oversight program in DHS. As the program progresses the 

workload will be continuously assessed and the CPO will address workload and personnel requirements as they arise. 

CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICER

Question. Has the compensation committee been established? What were the results and observations of the initial phase converting select employees to the market-based compensation system? 

Answer. The Department has not established the Homeland Security Compensation Committee (HSCC). A draft committee charter, proposed members, and training 

requirements have been developed for consideration. The HSCC will be established 

prior to the implementation of classification and pay administration changes. 

To date, the Department has not converted employees to the new pay system. We 

are considering implementing a pilot for a small group of employees to evaluate the 

effectiveness of the planned classification and pay system changes and will be happy 

to report out on observations and results at the conclusion of the pilot. 

Question. What retention incentives are being considered for Department-wide 

adoption? 

Answer. Department-wide policy establishes parameters within which the Components may establish their own plans for the use of retention incentive programs. All 

components of the Department are delegated authority to offer any of the retention 

incentives, such as student loan repayment, that are available under Title 5 United 

States Code. The extent to which the incentive programs are implemented depends 

upon each Component’s funds availability and staffing needs. 

Question. Provide a summary of the nine required training activities to be deployed on the Learning Management System DHScovery. Why are the standards 

and model being developed after the three programs are scheduled for deployment? 

Answer. The nine required training courses/activities to be deployed on the Learning Management System are Federally mandated to ensure that all DHS personnel 

comply with Federal laws and regulations, Executive Orders, DHS rules and regulations, and other applicable guidance in reference to any and all mandatory training 

requirements for U.S. Government employees. These courses are: 

—IT Security Awareness 

—Prevention of Sexual Harassment 

—Privacy Act/FOIA 

—Constitution Day 

—No FEAR Act/Whistleblower 

—Thrift Savings Plan 

—Ethics 

—General Security Refresher 

—Leadership Training Program 

Two of the three (Prevention of Sexual Harassment and Constitution Day) will be 

deployed by the end of fiscal year 2007 on the DHScovery Learning Management 
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System. The ‘‘No FEAR/Whistleblower Training’’ has recently been delivered for fiscal year 2007 through the DHS portal. 

The answer as to ‘‘why standards and content models are being developed after 

three programs are scheduled for deployment’’ requires clarification. The DHS Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) Policies & Standards Guide Version 3.0 dated 

May 2006 was developed in collaboration through the DHS Training Leaders Council (TLC) ADL Working Group and will remain a dynamic document to meet the 

needs of the department and changing technology. The intent is to deliver all nine 

courses enterprise-wide through the Learning Management System with a training 

schedule that cycles on a fiscal year basis with each course available every year. 

DHS components have the option of supplementing the online course offerings with 

traditional classroom instructor-led courses as logistical requirements permit. 

All courses should adhere to generally accepted principles of sound instructional 

systems design (ISD) as the universal standard while the Policies & Standards 

Guide ensures ADL content is designed and developed to platform and Department 

specifications. The DHS ADL Program Office continues to work with subject matter 

experts and components through the ADL Working Group to ensure that the courses 

meet Section 508 Compliance criteria as well as SCORM (Shareable Content Object 

Reference Model) specifications. 

Question. Provide an update on the SES Candidate Development Program. Has 

it been submitted to OPM and been approved? 

Answer. OPM Approval: The SES Candidate Development Program (CDP) was 

submitted to OPM for review in November, 2003, and received OPM’s approval February 4, 2004. 

Candidate Selection.—Candidates were selected by a panel of DHS executives. Selection to this program was highly competitive, resulting in 15 Candidates being selected from applicants across the Department and other Federal agencies. 

Program Participants.—The resulting inaugural CDP includes two non-DHS participants (State Department and DOD) and 13 DHS participants from a cross-section of DHS: US SIT, DNDO, FLETC, ICE, CBP, TSA, USCG, USM/CFO, USM.CPO, 

HQ Policy, Science and Technology, and HITRAC. 

Competency Assessment and Benchmarking.—Candidates completed an executive 

level simulation-driven Assessment Center process conducted by (OPM) to identify 

relative strengths and weaknesses of each Candidate’s initial leadership skill. Additionally, each Candidate received 360 feedback from peers and supervisors. In combination, these assessments established individual Candidate development goals. 

Program Activities.—— 

Development of broad ECQ competencies ............................... Federal Executive Institute, ‘‘Leadership for a Democratic Society’’ 

Federal Executive Institute, ‘‘Partnering with the Legislature: 

Working with Congress’’ 

Treasury Executive Institute, ‘‘Gettysburg, Lessons from the 

Battlefield’’ 

SES Mentoring ........................................................................... Each Candidate is assigned a member of the DHS SES for 

the duration of the 18 month program 

Executive Development Plan (EDP) ........................................... Working with the mentor, each candidate will identify training, conferences, meetings, or other activities selected to 

meet specific individual development goals 

Each candidate will receive a ‘‘DHS learning account’’ to 

fund developmental activities targeted to address individual needs 

Rotational or developmental assignment (DA) ........................ Each candidate will complete a 4-month Headquartersbased assignment designed to put the candidate in a 

senior-level ‘‘deputy’’ capacity 

Assignment performance will be assessed by the DA supervisor against position performance goals, standards, and 

execution of ECQs 

E-learning ................................................................................. Each Candidate will select and complete 1 e-course per ECQ 

based on individual development needs 

SES Certification.—Candidates will progressively develop their portfolio of activities and program results for submission to, and certification by, OPM at the end 

of the 18-month program. Upon certification, successful candidates will be eligible 

for non-competitive assignment to the SES. 

Orientation Program.—This event marks the beginning the Candidates’ development period. During the Orientation, candidates will receive briefings from guest 
124 

speakers and DHS senior leaders, meet their mentors, participate in OPM-facilitated training with their mentors to establish a successful mentoring partnership, 

and begin developing their Executive Development Plans. 

CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

Question. The fiscal year 2008 request includes 139 FTE for Departmental Operations. Presumably, if approved, the bulk of these FTE would be working at the 

NAC. Is there enough room and infrastructure at the NAC to accommodate this 

FTE increase? 

Answer. No, there is not enough room to accommodate this full request at the 

NAC, nor is it envisioned all of these elements would be housed there. 

OSEM growth will need to be accommodated at the NAC and it is anticipated that 

re-shuffling of existing NAC elements and some reconfiguration will be needed to 

accommodate this growth. 

For the remaining elements, the best fit would be to house these personnel with 

their elements which currently reside off-NAC. Some reconfiguration work off-NAC 

will be accomplished to handle a portion of this growth, and it is anticipated new 

space would need to be acquired to accommodate this added increase in personnel. 

During fiscal year 2008, plans are to update the DHS HQ Occupancy Plan to determine best options for housing at DHS locations, keeping an eye on leasing terms 

and relocation plans to St. Elizabeths. 

Question. USM page 5 requests an increase of $2.357 million for ‘‘facilities, property, equipment and material resources; safety, health and environmental programs.’’ Please provide further justification for this budget increase. Congress was 

briefed that the new NPPD would be responsible for coordinating safety, health and 

environmental programs across the Department. 

Answer. See the table below for a breakout of the increase. 

New Personnel, 8 FTE (16 FTP) Salary and Benefits .......................................................................................... $1,000,000 

Inflation on existing S&B ..................................................................................................................................... 193,000 

Rent increase in excess of inflation .................................................................................................................... 1,164,000 

Total budget Request for fiscal year 2008 ............................................................................................ 2,357,000 

Safety, health and environmental programs are managed Department-wide by the 

DHS Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). They have been the responsibility of the 

CAO since the inception of the Department. The statement about NPPD’s coordinating role in environmental, safety and health is not accurate. NPPD does have 

a coordinating role in specific issues, for example, IP Sector. 

Question. Provide an update on money obligated/expended for the following NAC 

projects: perimeter fencing, security card access/recognition at building entry points, 

and renovations for buildings 17 and 19. 

Answer. Fiscal year 2005 and 2006 appropriations have been obligated via a Reimbursable Work Authorization to GSA. Fiscal year 2007 appropriations of $8.2 million have not been fully committed as of March 2007. 

Campus-Wide Physical Security Upgrades.—A number of vital security upgrades 

have been identified for several buildings and the perimeter of the campus. The design contract has been awarded; the concept of operations is defined: and the program requirements are complete. Final design work and construction documents are 

anticipated to be complete by the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2007; however elements 

of this project are expected to be awarded sooner. It is planned that construction 

work on the command center will be started in early spring. We are evaluating the 

entire construction phasing of this project to determine which elements can be 

awarded separately in order to improve the physical security of the NAC. Project 

elements include a vehicle screening facility, visitor processing center, employee 

processing facility, new lighting, cameras, sensors, guard booths, bollards, fencing 

and roadway modifications. 

Building Security Access Control.—In order to control access control to individual 

buildings, card swipes and a control system was installed throughout the NAC. This 

work is complete. 

NAC 17.—Ground floor, 1st floor, 2nd floor work is complete. Design of the space 

reconfiguration for 3rd floor is complete and construction has begun. GSA is planning to repair the NAC 17 roof. Move in after roof repair and 3rd floor construction 

is estimated to be completed in the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2007. 

NAC 19.—The design of the basement of NAC 19, to convert industrial warehouse 

space to intelligence and analysis collaboration space, is underway. The basement 

project for NAC 19 includes upgrade of all mechanical and electrical systems to sup-
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port the completely renovated NAC 19 and to support NAC 18. This project includes 

the demolition of NAC 61. Construction is expected to be complete by the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2008. 

The construction of SCIF office space in Building 19 1st and 2nd floors and is 

complete. Tenants have moved in. 

CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

Question. There are several agencies that have noteworthy problems that have 

prevented the Department from receiving a clean financial audit. The Coast Guard 

seems to have the most number of areas that have to be corrected. How are you 

sharing the best practices of financially ‘‘sound’’ agencies to improve the performance of the Coast Guard and other agencies? 

Answer. DHS is committed to sharing best practices. Throughout the summer of 

2006, the DHS CFO sponsored a series of Corrective Action Plan workshops designed to help USCG and other DHS Components identify crosscutting root causes 

of internal control deficiencies focusing on the areas of people, policies, processes, 

and systems. These workshops led to the establishment of the Department’s first 

ever Department-wide corrective action plan in a document entitled the Internal 

Controls Over Financial Reporting (ICOFR) Playbook. The ICOFR Playbook outlines 

the additional steps the Department will take to resolve material weaknesses and 

build management assurances. 

To help improve the performance of the Coast Guard and other agencies, corrective action plan efforts are formally monitored on a monthly basis by the DHS CFO, 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Office of Inspector General. On 

a quarterly basis, progress will be reported to the Office of the Secretary to hold 

both Component and Departmental Management accountable for results. 

Question. The Inspector General’s recent report on the National Security Cutter 

(OIG–07–23) referred to a comment by the U.S. Coast Guard on page 38 of the report that the DHS Office of the Chief Financial Officer and the Office of General 

Counsel currently are working on Department-wide guidance and process procedures concerning relations between the DHS OIG and DHS components. Why is this 

necessary? DHS Management Directive 0810.1 already requires all DHS employees 

to ‘‘cooperate full’’ with the DHS IG. The IG requested departmental support and 

enforcement of the existing procedures. What is DHS doing to respond to that request? 

Answer. As indicated, Management Directive 0810.1 directs DHS employees to 

‘‘[c]ooperate fully by disclosing complete and accurate information pertaining to matters under investigation or review’’ by the Office of Inspector General (OIG). The 

directive further requires the component agencies to ‘‘provide prompt access for 

auditors, inspectors, investigators, and other personnel authorized by the OIG to 

any files, records, reports, or other information that may be requested either orally 

or in writing’’ and encourages employees to ‘‘inform the investigating entity of other 

areas or activities they believe require special attention.’’ DHS supports this Management Directive and strongly encourages compliance by DHS personnel. 

The current Management Directive 0810.1 provides full guidance and appropriate 

procedures. We are nevertheless working cooperatively with the IG to find ways to 

improve the process by which the OIG is given access to information. As is the case 

when an issue arises, the Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Officer routinely works 

to facilitate the process, take appropriate action, and resolve the matter. In addition, 

the IG meets regularly with senior DHS officials to work through overarching concerns, including the application of this MD. We are also considering efforts to better 

educate DHS employees regarding the existing Management Directive and to ensure 

consistency in its execution by DHS component agencies. 

DHS will continue to work towards improvement of the processes in order to ensure full cooperation with the Inspector General. 

US VISIT AIR EXIT PILOTS

Question. I have heard that the Department of Homeland Security intends to cancel the pilot airport exit portion of US VISIT next month. My staff had been briefed 

earlier that the pilots—currently underway in 12 airports and 2 seaports—would 

continue throughout this fiscal year. In its place, the Department plans to create 

one pilot program with one airline at one airport that places 2 kiosks at a ticket 

counter to capture biometrics of passengers. That’s a far cry from commitments 

you’ve made to roll out the remaining portion of the US VISIT airport exit program 

by the end of the calendar year. What are your intentions with the airport exit portion of US VISIT? 
126 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) remains committed to a 

comprehensive exit deployment. DHS will begin with the integration of the collection of a biometric into the traveler’s departure process at the airline check-in 

counter. The feasibility of maintaining the current air exit pilot process is being 

evaluated. Additionally, as part of the air solution, an analysis will be completed 

to determine the approach for integrating the biometric collection with the implementation of other DHS programs that impact the transportation companies, such 

as Custom and Border Protection’s Advance Passenger Information System’s Quick 

Query and the Transportation and Security Administration’s Secure Flight. 

SECURE FENCE ACT AND FLEXIBILITY

Question. The Secure Fence Act (Public Law 109–367), which President Bush 

proudly signed into law on October 26, 2006, directs the construction of approximately 700 miles of double layer fencing at specific locations along the Southwest 

border. In a separate action, as part of the fiscal year 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Congress appropriated $1.2 billion for border security fencing, infrastructure, and technology. Additionally, we gave you the flexibility to use the 

funds for border security needs in a manner that you believe will best secure the 

border. 

Please describe your goals for using the flexibility we have given to you to secure 

the border and how those goals relate to the requirements of the Secure Fence Act. 

Answer. Tactical infrastructure, such as fencing and vehicle barriers, is a critical 

part of the DHS strategy to gain effective control of our Nation’s borders. However, 

neither fencing nor technology, alone, will provide the most effective or cost-efficient 

means of securing the border. One of the core elements of the DHS strategy is obtaining and deploying the right combination of personnel, technology, and infrastructure at the border. 

By the end of calendar year 2008, DHS will deploy 370 miles of primary fencing. 

Through SBInet, DHS will also deploy an integrated, optimized solution, to include 

tactical infrastructure, technology, and response platforms. This solution may involve ground sensors, cameras, radars, roads, barriers, and fences—all integrated to 

provide maximum security. Developing and fielding the appropriate combination of 

technology and tactical infrastructure will depend on the requirements and needs 

of the selected areas of deployment, encompassing several geographically diverse 

border areas. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) recently submitted a refined SBInet 

Expenditure Plan to Congress, reflecting the Department of Homeland Security’s 

continued efforts to secure the border through the proper mix of technology, personnel, and tactical infrastructure. The enclosed chart depicts the revised plan, 

which was modified to reflect the Congressional intent, as expressed in the Secure 

Fence Act. This acceleration of physical infrastructure construction reinforces the 

Administration’s commitment to the ultimate goal of securing the border. 
127 

[Dollars in thousands] 

WBS Name/Effort Fiscal Year 2005 Annual Approp Fiscal Year 2006 Supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Enacted Dec 4 Exp Plan Totals Feb 4 Exp Plan Totals Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request 

1 ............................................................... Mission Engineering .................................................................. ........................ ........................ ........................ $71,866 $77,400 $46,000 

Management Task Order ........................................................... $36,800 ........................ $13,066 49,866 60,000 30,000 Mission Engineering .................................................................. ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 1,400 2,000 1.2 Advanced Technology Development .................................... ........................ ........................ ........................ 10,000 10,000 10,000 Advanced Technology ................................................................ ........................ $5,000 ........................ 5,000 5,000 10,000 FenceLab .................................................................................... ........................ 5,000 ........................ 5,000 5,000 ........................1.3 Systems Engineering ........................................................... ........................ 6,000 6,000 12,000 6,000 4,000 Systems Engineering Support ................................................... ........................ 6,000 6,000 12,000 6,000 4,000 

2 ............................................................... Prime Mission Product—Technology ......................................... ........................ ........................ ........................ 354,000 304,800 554,100 

TUCSON ...................................................................................... ........................ ........................ 150,000 150,000 110,000 45,000 Project 28 .................................................................................. ........................ 20,000 ........................ 20,000 20,000 ........................YUMA ......................................................................................... ........................ 39,000 25,000 64,000 45,000 25,000 EL PASO ..................................................................................... ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 20,000 210,000 RIO GRANDE VALLEY ................................................................. ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 20,000 132,000 FOLLOW-ON SECTOR DESIGNS ................................................... ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 41,900 TEXAS Mobile System ................................................................ ........................ ........................ 20,000 20,000 20,000 ........................Common Operating Picture Phase 1 (Design) .......................... ........................ ........................ 12,000 12,000 12,000 ........................Common Operating Picture Spiral 1 ......................................... ........................ ........................ 88,000 88,000 57,800 30,200 Communication Upgrades/Interfaces ........................................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 70,000 

3 ............................................................... 3.1 Infrastructure and Facilities ............................................... ........................ ........................ ........................ 947,757 997,223 204,400 

Tactical Infrastructure ............................................................... ........................ ........................ ........................ 947,757 997,223 204,400 
128 

BORDER PATROL ON THE NORTHERN BORDER

Question. The fiscal year 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations Act directed 

that a number equaling 10 percent of the newly hired Border Patrol agents be stationed on the Northern Border in this fiscal year. Are you adhering to that direction? How many additional Border Patrol agents will be stationed on the Northern 

Border in fiscal year 2007? 

Answer. In fiscal year 2007, the Office of Border Patrol plans to hire approximately 2,500 Border Patrol Agents. CBP is currently in the process of moving approximately 100 agents to the Northern Border, with an additional 150 to follow by 

the end of calendar year 2007. 

Question. If your request for new agents is fully funded, what do you envision will 

be the total number of agents on the Northern Border by the end of fiscal year 

2008? 

Answer. Approximately 1,195 agents will be assigned to the Northern Border Sectors by the end of fiscal year 2008. 

NORTHERN BORDER AIRWINGS

Question. Are the existing Northern Border air wings operating on a 24/7 basis? 

If not, what are the current levels of operation and are there plans to bring them 

up to a 24/7 level of operations? If so, when? Is the lack of a 24/7 operation the result of limited aircraft, personnel, and/or other issues? How much additional funding 

would be required to achieve 24/7 operations? 

Answer. The three existing Northern Border air wing locations include Plattsburgh, Bellingham and Great Falls. Currently, none of the three are operating on 

a 24/7 basis. 

The current levels of operations for the Northern Border air wing sites are as follows: 

Plattsburgh and Bellingham are currently conducting operations 5 days per week, 

16 hours per day, Monday through Friday and 8 hours per day Saturday and Sunday. CBP Air and Marine plans to bring them both up to 16 hours per day, 7 days 

per week in fiscal year 2008 with the addition of Air Interdiction Agents (Pilots) in 

fiscal year 2007. 

Great Falls is currently conducting operations 5 days per week, 8 hours per day, 

Monday through Friday. CBP Air and Marine plans to bring them up to 16 hours 

per day, 7 days per week in June or July of this year with the completion of their 

new hire basic training requirements. 

All three currently opened Northern Border air wing locations may be able to increase to 7×24 operations in mid fiscal year 2008, depending upon pilot hiring and 

training remaining consistent with current projected levels. 

The following tables detail staffing, aircraft, and marine vessels needed to fully 

develop CBPs Northern Border air and marine. sites: 
129 

CBP A&M’s Strategic End State calls for 24/7 operations at all of our Primary 

air wing locations; the current lack of 24/7 operations is directly attributed to a lack 

of personnel. According to the CBP A&M position model, it requires 2.1 persons per 

seat per shift to operate A&M aircraft. An example of this would be a C550 Interceptor that requires 3 Agents to operate (Pilot, Co-Pilot and Sensor Operator). By 

shift this equates to the following: 

Shift—Persons 

7×8 —6.3 (7) 

7×16—12.6 (13) 

7×24—18.9 (19) 

However, as A&M continues its Northern Border expansion with Grand Fork’s 

opening this fiscal year, followed by Detroit in the summer of fiscal year 2008, limited aircraft numbers will also become an issue that impedes 24/7 operations. Northern Border standup aircraft are currently being drawn from a slight excess in select 

Southern Border locations. This process is reaching its limit as little further drawdown can be accomplished without incurring a detrimental impact on the Southern 

Border missions. CBP A&M has various new aircraft acquisitions currently in 

progress with funds made available by Congress in fiscal year’s 2006 & 2007. However, the procurement lead time for law-enforcement-configured aircraft can vary 

from 10 months to over 2 years, depending on type and competition from commercial users and/or other government agencies. 

SAFE PORT ACT REQUIREMENTS

Question. What funds, and in which account(s), are included in the fiscal year 

2008 budget request to meet the requirements of Sections 122, 123, 126, 203, 205, 

and the sections in Subtitles B and C of Title II of Public Law 109–347, the SAFE 

PORTS Act? If funds were not requested for any of these authorizations, please explain why for each section. 

Answer. Congress passed the SAFE PORTS Act on September 30, 2006 and the 

President signed the bill into law on November 13. CBP has either met, or is on 

track to meet, all of the provisions mentioned in the question above. Moreover, CBP 

is already including needs arising from the SAFE PORTS Act provisions as we deliberate in the fiscal year 2009 budget process. The following is an update of the 

provisions: 
130 

Sec. 122. Inspection of Car Ferries Entering From Abroad 

This section requires CBP to develop a plan for inspecting passengers and vehicles 

before boarding ferries bound to the United States. The plan has been completed 

and CBP is preparing notifications to Congress. No additional fiscal year 2008 funding is required. 

Sec. 123. Random Searches of Containers 

This section requires CBP to develop and implement a plan to conduct random 

searches of containers. CBP has a program in place to conduct random searches of 

containers and will provide a report to Congress by the due date of August 13, 2007. 

No additional fiscal year 2008 funding is required. 

Sec. 126. Border Patrol unit for United States Virgin Islands 

Office of Border Patrol (OBP) does not plan to establish a Border Patrol Station 

in the United States Virgin Islands (USVI) at this time. OBP’s Ramey Sector is an 

integral part of the DHS/DOJ Caribbean Border Interagency Group (CBIG), which 

uses an integrated federated approach towards border security. The USVI is in the 

Ramey Sector’s area of responsibility and its security levels are measured through 

close interagency partnerships and intelligence sharing. By developing joint operations to meet traditional and emerging threats, OBP and CBIG mitigate the 

threats in the USVI. OBP will continue to monitor the USVI through CBIG and will 

staff operations there as needed. Any additional budget or staffing requirements are 

addressed by OBP Ramey Sector’s Operational Requirements Based Budget Plan 

(ORBBP). No additional fiscal year 2008 funding is required. 

Sec. 203. Automated Targeting System 

This section authorizes CBP’s Automated Targeting System (ATS) and includes 

additional requirements. For fiscal year 2008, CBP requests $27,580,000 in PPA: 

‘‘Systems for Targeting.’’ This funding will be sufficient to fulfill the requirements 

of Section 203 for fiscal year 2008. 

Sec. 205. Container Security Initiative 

This section authorizes CBPs Container Security Initiative. For fiscal year 2008, 

CBP requests $156,130,000 in PPA: ‘‘Container Security Initiative.’’ These funds are 

sufficient to fulfill the requirements in Section 205 for fiscal year 2008, and CBP 

is on target to produce the report to Congress required by this section by the due 

date of September 30, 2007. 

Title II, Subtitle B—Customs—Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C–TPAT) 

This subtitle authorizes CBP’s C–TPAT program. For fiscal year 2008, CBP requests $55,560,000 in PPA ‘‘C–TPAT.’’ This funding is sufficient to fulfill most of 

the requirements of Title II, Subtitle B for fiscal year 2008. 

Title II, Subtitle C—Miscellaneous Provisions 

This subtitle includes provisions establishing a pilot integrated scanning system 

(Section 231), screening and scanning of cargo containers (Section 232), international cooperation and coordination Section 233), foreign port assessments (Section 234), pilot program to improve the security of empty containers (Section 235), 

and information sharing relating to supply chain security cooperation (Section 236). 

Sections 231, 232, and 233—In the fiscal year 2008 Budget Request CBP requests 

an enhancement of $15,000,000 and 17 positions for the Secure Freight Initiative 

(SFI) in PPA: ‘‘Container Security Initiative.’’ This funding is sufficient to fulfill the 

requirements of Section 231 for fiscal year 2008. Additional funding in this same 

PPA is sufficient to fulfill the requirements of Section 232 and 233 for fiscal year 

2008. 

Section 234—Foreign Port Assessments. 

No funding was requested in 2008 to meet requirements from the SAFE PORTS 

Act. [NOTE—Response provided by Coast Guard] 

Section 235—CBP has completed an action plan for the 1-year pilot and will be 

implementing the pilot this spring. Funding requested for PPA: ‘‘Inspections, Trade 

and Travel Facilitation at the Ports of Entry’’ is sufficient to fulfill the requirements 

of this section. 

Section 236—Funding requested in fiscal year 2008 for PPA ‘‘C–TPAT’’ is sufficient to fulfill the requirements of this section for fiscal year 2008. 

NATIONAL GUARD ON THE SOUTHWEST BORDER

Question. When do you anticipate reducing the number of National Guard troops 

supporting Operation Jump Start? If the troops like the work they are doing, are 
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performing their jobs well, and are placing no additional financial burden on DHS, 

why make any reductions? 

Answer. The anticipated drawdown date is between July 15 and September 1 of 

2007. During this period, as previously planned and as agreed to with DOD, the National Guard force is scheduled to be reduced to a total of 3,000 National Guard 

troops. 

Phases of the Operation: 

First Year Deployment—The initial commitment was up to 6,000 military personnel for the first 12 months of Operation Jump Start (July 15, 2006–July 15, 

2007). 

Second Year Deployment—The second phase is scheduled to commence on July 

15, 2007. There will be up to 3,000 military personnel for the second year of Operation Jump Start (July 15, 2007–July 15, 2008). 

On May 15, 2006, President Bush announced his plan to deploy up to 6,000 National Guard personnel for a period of up to 2 years, in support of U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection’s (CBP) comprehensive strategy for gaining control of our 

Southern border. The plan was not intended as a long-term solution. Instead, it was 

designed to provide temporary mission-enhancing, though non-law enforcement, capabilities while CBP’s own resources were increased. Throughout this period, CBP 

has continued to recruit, hire, and train [new] Border Patrol agents, with an anticipated total personnel increase of 6,000 by the end of calendar year 2008. Additionally, tactical infrastructure and technology are being added to the Southwest border 

through SBInet and other programs. 

MASTER PLAN

Question. When will we receive the CBP Construction Master Plan? 

Answer. The CBP Construction Master Plan is currently being revised to support 

the deployment of 6000 new Border Patrol Agents through fiscal year 2009. Projects 

in the construction plan need to be adjusted to emphasize rapid response facility solutions that support the schedule and dispersed locations in the agent deployment 

plan. It is anticipated that an updated CBP Construction Plan will be available in 

the near future. 

C–TPAT

Question. There was no increase in positions in the budget for the Customs-Trade 

Partnership Against Terrorism. With only 157 Supply Chain Security Specialists, 

how can you ensure rigorous compliance with, and regular validation of, the more 

than 6,300 partners in over 50 counties? How long does it take before a partner enters the program and receives C–TPAT benefits before the initial validation occurs? 

And once validated, how often are partners re-validated? Are these validations unannounced? Why was no increase in positions requested in the budget? 

Answer. With a current staffing level of 157, the C–TPAT program will be able 

to meet the established performance levels of the SAFE PORTS Act for fiscal year 

2008. Due to current available technology and operational processes combined with 

the fact that only 400 companies were validated in the years of 2002, 2003 and 2004 

and now require revalidation; the work volume is consistent with current staffing. 

A partner that applies to the program will have its complete application reviewed 

within 90 days of submission. Once that review as well as vetting is complete, they 

are certified and the partner attains only Tier 1 benefits. Within 1 year of certification, the partner is then validated and is then eligible for Tier 2 or Tier 3 consideration. 

Under the SAFE PORTS Act, partners are to be revalidated every 4 years. The 

2007 Appropriations Act calls for revalidations every 3 years. Accordingly, the C– 

TPAT program will validate partners once every 3 years. 

No. Validation notices are sent to the partner at least 30 days in advance. 

The fiscal year 2008 Budget Request includes sufficient resources for the C–TPAT 

program to meet the established performance levels of the SAFE PORTS Act for fiscal year 2008. 

COLLECTION OF OVERDUE DUTIES

Question. What prevents CBP from collecting overdue duties on goods entering 

the United States, especially from China? Would more duties be collected if additional staff and resources were provided and dedicated to this activity? Absent the 

responsibilities and actions of other Departments (i.e. Commerce), what more can 

CBP do unilaterally to increase the collection of duties (and/or increase the pressure 

on other Federal Departments to step up and do their share)? 
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Answer. Most uncollected duties are antidumping or countervailing duties rather 

than regular Customs duties. The underlying reason U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has difficulty collecting these types of duties is that they are assessed 

1 to 3 years after the merchandise enters the United States. Under this U.S. antidumping system, the Department of Commerce (DOC) conducts an investigation and 

calculates an estimated antidumping and/or countervailing duty rate, which importers must pay to enter their goods into the United States. DOC then conducts a review of these entries, usually 1 to 3 years after the goods have entered, and calculates an actual/final assessment duty rate, which can and does fluctuate widely 

from the estimated duty rate. When the final duty rate is greater than the estimated duty rate, CBP must issue a bill to the importer for the difference. Unfortunately, the importer is all too often unable or unwilling to pay the bill issued by 

CBP and declares bankruptcy or simply disappears. 

In order to protect the revenue and minimize revenue loss, CBP requires companies to maintain a bond, which acts as an insurance policy against non-payment of 

duties. However, importers are usually only bonded for the minimum amount of 

$50,000, so any additional antidumping or countervailing duties owed over and 

above this amount are usually uncollectible. To collect above the bond amount, CBP 

can go after assets. However, in most cases, the importers of these goods are either 

unable to be located or do not have adequate assets to cover the liability. 

Since uncollected antidumping duties are most often the result of companies declaring bankruptcy or simply disappearing, it is very unlikely that more duties 

would be collected if additional staff and resources were provided and dedicated to 

duty collection. 

CBP has taken steps to protect the revenue, including monitoring more closely 

whether the value of imported merchandise differs from the estimate of such value 

provided by the importer on the bond application. CBP revised its continuous bond 

policy to address the risk to the revenue posed by a potential change in the applicable rate of duty between the Commerce order rate and the final assessment rate. 

CBP also published a Federal Register Notice in October 2006 regarding the process 

used to determine bond amounts for importations involving elevated collection risks. 

INSPECTION OF CONTAINERIZED CARGO

Question. How many cargo containers arrive in this country each year? How many 

are physically inspected? How many are screened? How many and what percent are 

screened for nuclear materials? 

Answer. 11,615,595 vessel containers arrived the United States in fiscal year 

2006. There were 11,323,070 in fiscal year 2005 9,796,282 in fiscal year 2004. 

568,186 or 4.9 percent of all vessel containers arriving the United States in fiscal 

year 2006 were physically inspected. 

Seventy-seven percent or 8,944,008 of all vessel containers arriving the United 

States in fiscal year 2006 were screened for nuclear materials. 

Screening Defined: Scanning of a container using a radiation portal monitor or 

other radiation detection equipment. 

INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

Question. You have stated that three things are needed to achieve true border security. One of those is enforcement of our immigration laws in the interior of the 

United States I concur. But your budget request does not appear to support this 

statement. No new funds are requested for vital interior enforcement activities such 

as more fugitive operations teams or growth in worksite enforcement and alternatives to detention. Is this because you have caught, detained, and removed all of 

the illegal aliens in the interior of this country? 

Answer. In fiscal year 2007 and in fiscal year 2008, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is improving its ability to catch, detain, and remove illegal aliens 

from the interior of the country. In fiscal year 2008, ICE requested an increase of 

$28.7 million for the Criminal Alien Program. This increase will provide the resources for 22 additional teams to identify and remove criminal aliens from the 

United States. ICE requested additional resources for its IMAGE program, which 

helps employers identify authorized workers for its operations. ICE also requested 

additional funds for its 287 (g) program to train State and local law enforcement 

officials to assist ICE in the enforcement of immigration laws. And in the fiscal year 

2008 request, ICE is requesting an additional 950 detention beds to detain illegal 

aliens. 

ICE/DRO is funded for 75 teams, and during the remainder of the fiscal year will 

be deploying the remaining 22 teams. As a result of this growth, fiscal year 2008 

will be the first full fiscal year when all teams are operational and will enhance 
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ICE’s interior immigration enforcement activities. ICE will evaluate the success of 

the teams during fiscal year 2008 to determine the impact on the fugitive case backlog and evaluate how to reduce the fugitive population 

In March of 2006, ICE/DRO had 18 operational Fugitive Operations Teams deployed. By March 2007, 35 additional teams were deployed, bringing the total number of deployed operational teams to 53, tripling the number of operational teams 

in just 1 year. 

In fiscal year 2007, ICE/DRO is improving its Alternatives to Detention program. 

It is working with the service providers (private contractors) to modify the existing 

contracts to upgrade electronic monitoring in EMP and develop contract modifications to existing contracts that will expand enhanced supervision programs with emphasis on intensive case management. These ATD programs are designed to provide 

Field Office-specific enhanced supervision models that meet the particular requirements of each DRO Field Office. They promote public safety and enforce compliance 

with court orders. While immigration, district and circuit courts will continue to 

order the release of aliens from custody, these programs are an integral part of the 

case management process used to reduce absconder rates. In fiscal year 2008, the 

modification and upgrades will be fully realized and utilized to evaluate the success 

of the programs. These evaluations will be the basis for evaluating enhanced supervision programs nationwide, prioritized and based on demographics and size of the 

non-detained docketed alien population. Implementation will include intensive case 

management training, expansion of existing contracts, and solicitation for new contracts in participating sites and will enhance ICE’s interior immigration enforcement activities. 

Question. I know that during fiscal year 2006, your agents achieved 716 criminal 

arrests involving employers of illegal aliens. This is a major increase from the mere 

25 arrests in fiscal year 2002. I also know that you removed over 404,000 illegal 

aliens last year. I applaud your recent highly visible worksite enforcement actions, 

but the work is not yet done. There are still between 11 million and 12 million illegal aliens residing in this country. Your budget request just scratches the surface. 

How can you achieve more robust enforcement if your budget request for fugitive 

operations, alternatives to detention, and worksite enforcement remains stagnant? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is grateful for the strong 

support of Congress in providing the resources necessary to achieve improved enforcement of our immigration laws. The DHS approach to immigration enforcement 

is a layered one, which begins abroad, extends to our borders and ports of entry, 

and proceeds inward into the interior of the United States. The front line in this 

layered approach, located abroad, includes pre-inspection of foreign visitors by U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at certain foreign airports, DHS Visa Security 

Program oversight of the issuance of visas by the Department of State, investigative 

efforts by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Attach ́ s in more than 

50 overseas offices, and the Department of State’s Bio-Visa program. At our ports 

and borders, CBP’s inspectors and Border Patrol agents prevent aliens from entering the United States illegally, thereby deterring future illegal immigration. Finally, 

for those aliens who do surreptitiously enter the United States or fail to comply with 

the terms of their admission to the United States, ICE has a comprehensive interior 

immigration enforcement strategy that includes efficient detention management, a 

robust National Fugitive Operations Program, and aggressive worksite enforcement. 

For aliens who are apprehended, either attempting to enter the United States illegally or following an immigration violation, ICE has increased its detention capacity 

during fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007, while using its existing bed space more 

efficiently. The average length of stay in ICE detention facilities has dropped from 

90 days to 40 days. And with aliens subject to expedited removal, that time has 

dropped even more significantly. Since the end of fiscal year 2005, ICE has increased its bed space by 9,000 detention beds and has requested an additional 950 

detention beds for fiscal year 2008. 

Another important component of managing our detention capacity is the use of 

alternatives to detention designed to ensure that aliens appear for their scheduled 

hearings. 

ICE’s Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program, which includes both intensive supervision and electronic monitoring elements, allow certain aliens to be closely monitored in a non-custodial setting, thereby ensuring their cooperation with immigration enforcement efforts and optimizing the use of available bed space. The Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP), a component of ICE’s ATD, has demonstrated significant potential in preventing aliens from absconding, as ISAP participants both appear for immigration court hearings and depart the United States 

when required at greater rates than their non-detained counterparts. Another ATD 

component, the Electronic Monitoring Program (EMP), which serves as a reporting 
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and case management tool for aliens released from custody, utilizes telephonic reporting and electronic devices (radio frequency and Global Positioning System (GPS) 

technology) and assists ICE officers in streamlining non-detained docket case management activities. Since its inception in 2003, the EMP has been used for over 

9,000 aliens, the vast majority of whom (98 percent) were monitored under the telephonic report variant of the program. 

ICE is working to increase both the profile and efficiency of the ATD program in 

a number of ways. First, appropriations to the ATD program increased from 28.5 

million in fiscal year 2006 to 43.6 million in fiscal year 2007, reflecting more than 

a 50 percent increase in funding. Second, ICE is looking at optimizing ATD costs 

and increasing program efficiency through improved contracting and contract renegotiation with ATD service providers. Other initiatives to improve ICE’s ATD programs are underway, as well: improving national program management by filling 

headquarters vacancies; redefining the ISAP supervision model to allow increased 

flexibility in precise intensity of supervision (e.g., intense, intermediate, regular), 

thereby enabling ICE personnel to tailor the intensity level to the specific circumstances of an alien’s case (e.g., whether immigration court proceedings are still 

pending and whether the alien has a criminal record); refining contractor case management tasks to focus on alien court appearances, compliance with court orders, 

and cooperation with ICE efforts to obtain travel documents; exploring additional 

supervision technologies, such as GPS ankle bracelets; developing a memorandum 

of understanding with the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) to fasttrack ATD participants through the EOIR immigration hearing process; and reevaluating the geographical locations of certain ATD programs. 

While increased detention efficiencies and innovative initiatives like ATD help to 

ensure compliance with U.S. immigration laws, DHS recognizes that it is also important to target aliens who have failed to comply with those laws. ICE has the National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP), dedicated to ensuring that aliens who 

fail to depart after being lawfully ordered to do so in the context of removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings, or fail to report to DHS after receiving notice to 

do so, thereby becoming ‘‘fugitive’’ aliens, are located and removed from the United 

States. In March 2006, ICE had 18 operational Fugitive Operations Teams (FOTs) 

deployed nationwide. By March 2007, this number had nearly tripled, with 53 FOTs 

now locating and arresting fugitive aliens. ICE plans to deploy the remaining 22 

teams by the end of fiscal year 2007, bringing the total number of FOTs to 75. In 

fiscal year 2006, the work of the NFOP resulted in the removal of over 12,000 fugitive aliens from the United States. The number of NFOP enforcement activities 

have increased as the program has grown; for each of the last 4 fiscal years (fiscal 

year 2003, fiscal year 2004, fiscal year 2005, and fiscal year 2006), the NFOP conducted 3,390, 10,986, 11,210, and 23,536 fugitive enforcement activities, respectively. To date, in fiscal year 2007, the NFOP has conducted 31,975 fugitive enforcement activities. 

ICE’s interior enforcement strategy includes an aggressive worksite enforcement 

component aimed at deterring employers from hiring unauthorized workers and 

thereby reducing the financial incentive for aliens to enter the United States illegally. Aliens who commit identity fraud in order to work illegally are prosecuted administratively, criminally, or both, and then removed from the United States. Illegal 

employers are criminally prosecuted and their ill-gotten gains seized. These efforts 

send a strong message of deterrence and serve to combat the powerful economic incentives to illegal immigration created by the availability of unlawful employment. 

By reducing these incentives, which draw illegal aliens into the U.S. interior, ICE 

and CBP will be able to focus their border security resources on other criminal violations at the border. Thus, these worksite enforcement efforts, combined with detention alternatives, fugitive operations, and other initiatives, create a layered, strategic approach to immigration enforcement. 

DEFICIENT DETENTION BEDSPACE REQUEST

Question. As the Border Patrol increases its presence and activities along the 

Northern Border, apprehensions of illegal aliens can be expected to increase. It 

would seem that to avoid reverting to a policy of ‘‘catch and release’’ of illegal aliens 

along the Northern Border, additional detention beds will be required. 

In fiscal year 2007, Congress funded a healthy ratio of 1,500 new agents and 

6,700 new beds. However, the fiscal year 2008 request is for 3,000 new agents but 

only 950 new beds. 

Given the increased presence and level of activity along the Northern Border, to 

say nothing of the different illegal alien population in the North, as well as further 
135 

increases in enforcement of immigration laws in the interior, doesn’t that require 

a more robust number of detention beds? 

Answer. In order to determine the number of beds required for detention operations, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Detention 

and Removal Operations (DRO) has developed a customized bed space forecasting 

model, which factors apprehension ‘‘input’’ from the ICE Office of Investigations 

(OI), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (which includes inspectors at the ports of 

entry and Border Patrol agents), DRO’s Criminal Alien Program and National Fugitive Operations Program, as well as State and local immigration enforcement activity performed under the authority conferred by section 287(g) of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act. Based on apprehension forecasts provided by these entities, the 

DRO model calculates detention capacity requirements by timeframe, DRO Field Office location, and key detention category. These apprehending agencies use various 

methodologies to generate detention capacity forecasts, including historical data, 

seasonality trends, current and planned staffing levels, length of detention, case 

type, geographic region, and other criteria. To ensure the accuracy of the detention 

capacity model, DRO conducts monthly capacity planning meetings with the apprehending agencies to analyze and compare actual apprehensions to forecasted data. 

For fiscal year 2008, DRO requested additional resources to provide necessary and 

appropriate detention capacity to support 600 additional detention beds, contract 

services and support personnel for the Detention Management program. The fiscal 

year 2008 bed space request is $31 million, which includes 600 additional beds at 

$23.2 million and 56 positions at $7.8 million. In addition, DRO has also requested 

funding to support implementation of the 287(g) program. In fiscal year 2007, a 

minimum of 33 State and local jurisdictions are expected to participate in the 

‘‘287(g)’’ program and are collectively forecasted to produce a minimum of 66,000 apprehensions, with an average length of detention of 33 days. The fiscal year 2008 

bed space request for 287(g) program support is for $16.9 million, which includes 

350 additional beds at $12.4 million and 33 positions at $4.5 million. Combined, 

these budgetary requests reflect our predicted detention capacity needs, as derived 

from the DRO bed space forecasting model 

FINDING VISA OVERSTAYS

Question. The Government Accountability Office’s Director of Homeland Security 

and Justice have testified that Immigration and Customs Enforcement ‘‘has between 

200 and 300 agents out looking for’’ more than 5 million visa overstays. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement employs over 8,000 special agents, yet only between 200 

and 300 of them are looking for visa overstays. If we know someone has overstayed 

his or her visa, should not we be direct more agents to finding these millions of individuals and removing them? 

Answer. ICE has a comprehensive strategy to immigration enforcement. For 

aliens who receive visas and fail to depart as required, ICE targets its investigative 

resources to locate and apprehend those who pose an elevated national security or 

public safety threat. The Compliance Enforcement Unit (CEU), created in June 

2003, to specifically target such visa violators. Prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 

no process existed to identify and prioritize visa violators according to risk. The 

CEU uses nonimmigrant registration and tracking systems, including the Student 

and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), the National Security Entry/ 

Exit Registration System (NSEERS), and the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US VISIT), to identify overstays and student status violators for 

field investigation. (Law Enforcement Sensitive Document will be transmitted under 

separate cover) 

SWIFT WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT

Question. How many illegal aliens where arrested in the so called ‘‘Swift’’ worksite 

enforcement? For all illegal aliens taken into custody in these actions, how many 

were criminal aliens, how many are still in detention today, how many have been 

removed, how many were bonded out—as of March 1, 2007? Also, what was the 

total cost of this one worksite enforcement action—in terms of investigative man 

hours, overtime, detention and removal costs, and any reimbursements to State, 

local, or other participating Federal law enforcement agencies? 

Answer. As part of ‘‘Operation Wagon Train,’’ the December 2006 worksite enforcement initiative that targeted widespread employment violations at Swift & 

Company, ICE arrested 1,297 aliens who were present in the United States in violation of law. Of this number, 274 have been charged criminally. 

Based on its Deportable Alien Control System (DACS), ICE’s Office of Detention 

and Removal Operations reports that, as of March 8, 2007, 158 aliens apprehended 
136 

as part of Operation Wagon Train remain in ICE custody, 774 aliens have been removed from the United States and 107 aliens were released on bond pending adjudication of their cases by an immigration judge. 

It is not possible for DHS to account for the full cost of Operation Wagon Train 

itself since many non-DHS entitites were involved in the effort. However, ICE was 

able to identify the bulk of the costs associated with this operation incurred by its 

Office of Investigations, Office of Detention and Removal Operations, and Office of 

the Principal Legal Advisor. 

The ICE Office of Investigations incurred costs of approximately $1.9 million for 

travel, overtime, and IT costs related to Operation Wagon Train. As of March 27, 

2007, the ICE Office of Investigations has expended a total of 115,377 man-hours 

on the Wagon Train investigation. 

As of March 8, 2007, the ICE Office of Detention and Removal Operations had 

incurred approximately $3,891,606 in costs. This total includes $3,079,615 in detention-related costs (32,417 detainee-days × $95 per day detainee cost), $483,734 in 

general operational expenditures (including employee travel and lodging), and 

$328,257 in employee overtime costs. 

ICE’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA), which is responsible for representing DHS in all proceedings before the Executive Office for Immigration Review, including bond hearings presided over by immigration judges, estimates, while 

it does not discretely track worksite enforcement-related expenditures, its costs exceed $135,000. This total includes $10,835 in travel costs for OPLA attorneys deployed to provide on-site support for the operation, and $124,873 in salary and benefit costs (based upon an estimated total of 1,737 attorney-hours committed to the 

operation by senior OPLA attorneys). This does not include costs incurred by the 

Department of Justice in defending ICE’s worksite enforcement authority in Federal 

court during the course of the lawsuits brought by alien advocates in response to 

Operation Wagon Train. 

These three ICE programs collectively spent more than $5.9 million in executing 

this operation. 

FAMILY DETENTION CENTERS

Question. There have been recent negative press reports about the Hutto family 

detention facility in Texas. Please describe how this facility complies with all DHS, 

Bureau of Prisons, and Congressional detention standards and guidance as well as 

what additional steps if any need to be made to bring it fully into compliance with 

these standards. 

Answer. The family detention at the T. Don Hutto Residential Center has been 

overseen by the National Juvenile Coordination Unit, a headquarters component of 

the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Detention and Removal Operations (DRO). This Unit has administered the reviews of facilities used 

to hold alien juveniles and families. In recognition of the unique challenges presented in the area of alien juvenile and family detention, ICE recently created a new 

headquarters unit dedicated to ensuring that ICE meets the highest standards in 

providing a safe and humane environment for family detention, the Juvenile and 

Family Residential Management Unit (JFRMU). The JFRMU, which was formally 

announced on March 30, 2007, will report directly to senior DRO leadership, have 

direct management authority of conditions of confinement at ICE’s family facilities, 

and bring a fresh approach to the oversight of juvenile and family detention issues. 

As with all DRO detention facilities, facilities used to hold alien juveniles and 

families are inspected at least once per year to ensure that ICE requirements for 

appropriate conditions of confinement are being upheld. This is a robust inspections 

program that provides a series of requirements designed to ensure that inspections 

of facilities are conducted in a uniform manner and focus on the safety, security, 

and welfare of ICE detainees. During the annual inspection, ICE uses established 

procedures and guidance to conduct the facility review. 

In order to ensure the highest level of care and treatment for its detainee population, and to ensure independent internal management controls, the ICE Office of 

Professional Responsibility (OPR) has created a Detention Facilities Inspection 

Group (DFIG) within its Management Inspections Unit. The DFIG will independently validate detention inspections conducted by DRO by performing quality assurance over the review process, insuring consistency in application of detention standards, and verifying corrective action. OPR oversight will complement existing ICE 

efforts to provide appropriate conditions of conditions of confinement for all aliens 

in ICE custody, including alien juveniles and families. 

ICE strives for complete compliance with all applicable standards. If a facility is 

found to be ‘‘deficient’’ or ‘‘at risk’’ in implementing ICE standards, the facility is 
137 

required to provide a Plan of Action (POA) that outlines the corrective actions to 

be taken. DRO inspectors follow up with facility staff to ensure that all actions identified in the POA have been implemented in a timely manner. When warranted, special assessments and quality assurance reviews are also conducted. Special Assessments are on-site evaluations conducted within 1 to 2 days of a triggering event 

(e.g., escape, disturbance, allegations of staff mistreatment). Quality assurance reviews are on-site visits conducted as an additional quality control measure of the 

inspection process. 

ICE’s current standards applicable to the T. Don Hutto facility are tailored to address the needs of that facility’s detainee population, from religious services, to 

recreation, to access to legal services, to educational services for school-aged children. These standards are drawn from the 38 National Detention Standards applicable to all facilities used for ICE detainees and the 151 ICE Juvenile Shelter Care 

Standards, adopted from the American Correctional Association (ACA) In assessing 

these sets of standards, ICE determined that some, such as the National Detention 

Standard on detainee ‘‘classification’’ (i.e., classification based on risk level), were 

not applicable to a non-secure facility like Hutto, while others, such as the ACA Juvenile Shelter Care Standards on sleeping arrangements and telephone usage, needed to be modified for a family residential facility to preserve family unity and to 

maintain parental authority (specifically, by allowing family units to sleep in the 

same room and requiring parental permission for telephone service use by children). 

Moving forward to address the evolving nature of family detention, ICE is developing its own juvenile and family detention standards. As with the National Detention Standards, these family standards will incorporate input from the NGO community and will ensure the safe, secure, and humane treatment of aliens in ICE’s 

custody. Taking into account lessons learned from the Hutto facility and the expertise of the NGO community and other professionals, these standards will address 

the needs of a family detainee population, including education, recreation, nutrition, 

health care, and custody. These draft standards are currently undergoing review 

within ICE. 

AIR CARGO—COMPLIANCE

Question. TSA does not require cargo inspectors to address all security requirements during each inspection. On the other hand, while the Coast Guard conducts 

spot checks of port facilities, they also require one inspection each year that addresses all security requirements for port facilities. Shouldn’t DHS have a consistent 

policy for compliance exams? Which approach will you use for chemical facility compliance? 

Answer. DHS uses risk based methodologies for the conduct of compliance exams, 

including both spot checks and in-depth inspections. While this may, at times, lead 

to the appearance that different policies are being followed, the fundamental principle applied is the same: directing limited resources toward areas of highest threat 

and vulnerability. 

The Coast Guard conducts spot checks of facilities as part of its overall port security and safety missions. In addition, it uses risk based decision making to target 

facilities for further attention, including increased spot checks and additional facility inspections, as a means of maximizing operational performance within the constraints of USCG resources. 

TSA’s approach to compliance inspections of air cargo is also risk-based. TSA has 

prioritized the regulatory air cargo requirements for air carriers and Indirect Air 

Carriers (IACs, also referred to as freight forwarders or consolidators) and has identified critical security elements for the various regulated parties. In some cases the 

security programs followed by the air carriers and IACs contain more than 100 

pages of specific air cargo mandates; TSA believes applying equivalent scrutiny to 

each mandate is not an effective or efficient use of agency resources and is not 

aligned with the Department’s risk based approach. 

The critical security elements are the regulatory requirements that if found to be 

non-compliant, pose greater risk to the cargo security supply chain. They include 

such vital topics as known shipper qualification, access control to vehicles and cargo 

facilities, and completion of background checks for employees and contractors with 

access to the restricted areas of an airport. TSA’s fiscal year 2007 Compliance Work 

Plan calls for critical air cargo security elements to be evaluated twice annually for 

all air carriers and IACs. Critical inspection elements are those security requirements which, if compromised, could more likely lead to an air cargo related incident. 

Examples of critical air cargo inspection elements are requirements related to 

known shipper qualification, access control, and cargo screening. Compliance inspections for the remaining security requirements are conducted based on risk analysis 
138 

decisions by the local Federal Security Director and as specified by TSA Headquarters. 

The Department’s initial inspection efforts—following the guidance given in Section 550 of the 2007 DHS Appropriations Act—will focus on chemical sites determined to have the highest risk to national security. The Department has structured 

its chemical security regime along a four tiered system, with those sites posing the 

highest risk warranting placement in Tiers 1 and 2, and those of lower risk falling 

into tiers 3 and 4. 

Following this structure, the Department’s initial inspection priority will be on 

the highest risk facilities, or Tier 1 facilities. Each Tier 1 facility will be inspected 

by the Department, and those inspections will address all of the risk-based performance standards appropriate to that facility. The Department will then begin to expand inspections to include all Tier 2 sites, and then address Tier 3 and 4 sites. 

It is important to note that throughout this inspection cycle the Department will 

be continually evaluating its facility tier structures, and will frequently conduct additional inspections of both legacy and redetermined Tier 1 and 2 sites (initial demarcations will fluctuate due to security enhancements). This consistent inspection 

approach ensures that those facilities that present the most risk receive the proper 

evaluation and inspection by the Department, and that the dynamic nature of the 

chemical sector does not impede the Department’s ability to secure these high risk 

facilities. 

AIR CARGO—INTERNATIONAL IN-BOUND CARGO

Question. TSA has 300 air cargo inspectors focusing on domestic air cargo and 10 

inspectors focusing on international in-bound air cargo. What are TSA international 

inspectors responsible for? How many international airports and facilities send air 

cargo via commercial or all-cargo aircraft to the United States? How often does TSA 

assess the security of these facilities? 

Answer. The 300 Cargo Aviation Security Inspectors were hired to conduct domestic cargo inspections. Ten International Cargo Aviation Security Inspectors (ICASIs) 

will be hired and assigned to the International program and conduct cargo inspections outside the United States. These 10 positions are in addition to the 300 domestic positions. ICASIs will conduct All-Cargo Air Carrier inspections at last points of 

departure to the United States. ICASIs will also assist in conducting cargo related 

inspections on passenger aircraft with last points of departure to the United States. 

Approximately 120 international airports and 180 foreign air carriers transport 

cargo via passenger aircraft and all-cargo aircraft to the United States. 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) inspects domestic U.S. flag aircraft operators and foreign flag air carriers at foreign airports at least once a year 

and conducts airport assessments (including cargo facilities) every 1, 2, or 3 years. 

The frequency of airport assessments is determined by a risk-based methodology. 

TSA will assess All-Cargo carriers at foreign locations at least once a year. 

AIR CARGO—COVERT TESTING

Question. Does TSA have a covert testing program for air cargo? If so, describe 

how air cargo facilities are tested. Provide the funding level and FTE dedicated to 

this effort. Does TSA have the authority it needs to effectively assess security at 

these facilities? 

Answer. Yes, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does have a covert testing program for air cargo. Current protocols involve TSA staff posing as an 

unknown shipper and attempting to tender cargo to an Indirect Air Carrier or directly to a passenger air carrier. The testing is coordinated and overseen by the 300 

TSA cargo inspectors as part of their routine inspection related activities. Other 

TSA personnel that are not known to the regulated parties are utilized as ‘‘testers’’ 

under the direction of the cargo inspectors. Approximately $500,000 was budgeted 

for the covert testing in fiscal year 2007. 

Yes, the Transportation Security Administration’s compliance inspection authority 

under 49 CFR sections 1503.3, 1542.5, 1544.3, 1546.3, and 1548.3, extends to all aspects of the air transportation supply chain. Specifically, this applies to airports, air 

carriers, indirect air carries, and other entities. 

AIR CARGO SCREENING

Question. Currently, a small percentage of air cargo is physically screened and the 

limited responsibility falls on industry. What are the most prevalent methods of 

physical screening today for such inspections? 

Answer. The most prevalent methods used by industry to screen air cargo are 

manual search, followed by the use of Explosive Trace Detection and x-ray. 
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AIR CARGO COMPLIANCE DATABASE

Question. TSA’s recent report on air cargo security notes ‘‘enhancements to PARIS 

are planned.’’ This refers to the Performance and Results Information System 

(PARIS). What changes are planned to enhance the system? 

Answer. Recently, the inspection prompts in the Performance and Results Information System (PARIS) were updated to match the new requirements stemming 

from the air cargo final rule published last year and revised security programs finalized in January 2007. Also, new ‘‘critical’’ prompts were added to the air cargo inspection fields in PARIS that identify the highest priority compliance requirements. 

Additional planned enhancements include mandating that enforcement reports are 

linked to a specific inspection record, which will allow for upgraded tracking and 

analysis of security program violations, as well as synchronization between PARIS 

and hand held digital devices used by cargo inspectors to conduct their compliance 

inspections, which will provide for increased efficiency of the cargo inspectors’ efforts. 

AIR CARGO EXEMPTIONS

Question. TSA’s recent report on air cargo security notes that air cargo exemptions have been eliminated. Is that true for all cargo, including international inbound air cargo? What proportion of previously exempted air cargo is now being 

screened and inspected? 

Answer. In October 2006, the Transportation Security Administration enhanced 

security measures for cargo accepted for transport on domestic and foreign passenger aircraft operating within the United States on routes departing the United 

States. As a result of these enhancements, previously exempted cargo is subject to 

screening. Since the enhanced security measures were implemented, 100 percent of 

previously exempted cargo is subject to screening. 

TRAVEL DOCUMENT CHECKERS

Question. The TSA request includes $60 million for 1,425 travel document checkers. Does the budget assume that all 1,425 TDC’s will be on-board October 1, 2007? 

Answer. Yes, the budget assumes that all 1,425 Travel Document Checker positions (1,329 Full-Time Equivalents) will be on-board by October 1, 2007. 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

Question. Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen recently released the Coast 

Guard’s strategic course for the future. It includes current and future challenges 

and threats in the maritime domain. 

The Commandant warns of the current gap in monitoring vessel movements within many ports and inland waterways. While significant focus has been given to nuclear detection in maritime containers, the Commandant stresses that it is equally 

probable, if not even more likely, that such a device would be loaded on a fishing 

boat or a recreational craft. Over 6 years ago, terrorists struck the USS Cole in foreign waters. A similar attack in a U.S. port with a nuclear device could kill tens 

of thousands and cripple the economy; yet, addressing this gap is not a priority in 

your budget. 

What needs to be done to address this threat today? 

Answer. The President’s fiscal year 2008 budget includes several items which contribute to improving the overall multi-mission capability of the Coast Guard. Specifically, the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request supports the following initiatives to increase specialized forces and intelligence capability to meet the small boat 

Improvised Explosive Device threats. 

—Nationwide Automatic Identification System 

—Maritime Security Response Team Shoothouse 

—Response Boat-Medium 

—Rescue 21 

—Deployable Operations Group 

—Coast Guard Counterintelligence Service 

Addressing the concern of the Coast Guard and the Department about the threat 

of small vessel attacks in the United States requires continual review of security 

gaps in information and coordination with small vessel stakeholders which include 

commercial and recreational vessel operators in U.S. waters. To further such dialogue with these stakeholders, DHS has scheduled a National Small Vessel Security 

Summit for June to begin a robust conversation to fully understand the gaps in 

maritime border security and collaboratively develop what is needed to close those 

gaps. For the future, among the things the Coast Guard is vigorously exploring are: 
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unambiguous warning capability to determine intent of small craft approaching high 

value assets; technologies appropriate for use within crowded ports to deter or stop 

small vessel attacks, including non-lethal options; regulations expanding current requirements for tracking of small vessels; and improved sensors (radars, offshore 

buoys, etc.). 

Question. Since going to Sectors, Coast Guard tours of duty have been decreased 

from 4 to 3 years. What is the benefit of this policy versus 4 years rotation? Is the 

Coast Guard losing expertise in certain areas, such as inspectors? 

Answer. The intent of this policy was to standardize tour lengths at these units. 

It will also increase the flow of personnel through specialized billets (e.g., inspections, investigations) to meet both the growth demands in prevention billets at midgrade levels and the need for Sector skills at senior officer levels. This rotation was 

suggested by field commanders during a survey conducted by Perot Systems in 

order to align tour lengths with training expectations. In addition, it gives officers 

opportunities, through follow-on assignments, to cross-train outside their primary 

specialty and prevents ‘‘burn-out’’ in highly demanding billets. 

Yes, the Coast Guard has noticed some early trends suggesting slight erosion in 

inspection expertise, especially in the engineering skill set. A lot of this was attributed to an unintended consequence from the creation of the Chief Warrant Officer 

(CWO) Marine Safety Specialist rating which merged deck and engine inspection expertise. We have taken corrective actions to reverse the trend including restoring 

the CWO Engineering billets to the Marine Inspection Mission. 

Question. The CG has argued in the past that it doesn’t have the authority to 

surge acquisition personnel to AC&I projects requiring additional oversight. Is 

Deepwater an example of this problem and if so, would the proposed transfer of 

AC&I personnel to OE fix that problem? 

Answer. Yes, Deepwater is an example of this situation, and would benefit from 

the proposed transfer. This transfer would allow the Coast Guard to view billets 

(both OE and AC&I) holistically, allowing all directorates to equally request and 

compete for billets and personnel funding in the budget build process. This will 

allow the Coast Guard to make a higher level prioritization of personnel resources, 

placing AC&I priority needs along side operations and support priority needs. 

Question. The fiscal year 2007 conference report provided additional funding to increase unannounced inspections at domestic port facilities. The SAFE PORT Act required no less than two inspections with one unannounced check. Will all ports receive an unannounced check that includes all aspects of the Facility Security Plan 

similar to the annual planned check? If not, how many additional inspectors would 

be needed for every facility to have a full unannounced spot check with all aspects 

of the Facility Security Plan? What is the total number of Coast Guard inspectors 

for MTSA compliance? 

Answer. The Coast Guard will conduct an unannounced inspection of each regulated facility under 33 CFR 105 during fiscal year 2007. The SAFE PORTS Act requires the Secretary to conduct at least two inspections annually of maritime facilities, one of which is to be an unannounced inspection of the facility. However, there 

is no expressed Congressional requirement that both inspections include ‘‘all aspects’’ of the Facility Security Plan as has been customary for the annual announced 

inspection. The unannounced inspection may include all aspects of the approved Facility Security Plan or focus on specific items based on the security awareness and 

concerns of the local Captain of the Port (COTP). The Coast Guard does not necessarily believe it would be appropriate or necessary to perform two ‘‘all aspect’’ inspections of every facility every year, and such is not expressly required by law. It 

is more appropriate for the COTPs to focus resources on facilities they feel are more 

at risk, based on threats/intelligence, prior poor performance by the facility, or other 

factors. The COTP has the authority to determine the scope of spot inspections in 

follow-on inspection cycles. The COTP can also determine whether the annual inspection will serve as the unannounced inspection through evaluation of on-going 

risk assessment and management activities. 

There is no need for additional inspectors because the increase in the complement 

of facility inspectors made possible through fiscal year 2007 appropriations will be 

sufficient to meet the mandate of the SAFE PORTS Act. 

The Coast Guard has 389 facility inspector billets that support MTSA compliance. 

The 389 include 39 new positions funded through 2007 appropriations. 

Question. The SAFE PORTS Act requires the Coast Guard to establish interagency operation centers for all high-priority ports by October 2009. What is the 

Coast Guard’s schedule to meet this requirement? What is the cost to meet this requirement? What ports does the Coast Guard consider high-priority ports requiring 

an interagency center? What benefits will these ports provide? 
141 

Answer. The Coast Guard has operations centers at each of its 35 Sectors that 

can be expanded to support joint operations. Presently, the existing infrastructure 

at these sector command centers is insufficient to meet all of the SAFE PORTS Act 

requirements. The Coast Guard is in the planning stages for a project called Command 2010, which will install sensors (cameras and radars) in high priority ports, 

develop and install software to control those sensors and automatically analyze their 

data, make that data available to appropriate agencies, and enlarge the existing operations centers to accommodate other agencies. The act authorized $60 million annually; however, funding for this purpose has not been appropriated. 

The Coast Guard estimates the cost to meet the requirement for establishing 

interagency operations centers, including Command 2010 implementation, will total 

$260 million for 24 Coast Guard Sectors, including those high priority ports, as required by the SAFE PORTS Act. Below is a breakdown of the overall costs associated with each of the three cost elements for 24 interagency sector command centers 

(SCCs). 

[Dollars in millions] 

Cost Element Cost Description 

Information System ........................................................ $35 Develop software that controls the sensors, fuses

track information with intelligence and tactical 

plans, coordinates interagency resources, 

automates decision making and displays tactical 

views. This system will be developed in four spirals 

which will be fielded to an increasing number of 

locations each year ahead of the sensor installations. Each spiral will add capabilities and incorporate lessons learned from previous spirals. 

Sensor Network ............................................................... 155 Deploy cameras, radars and other surveillance equipment in critical areas. These costs include the sensors themselves, the towers and platforms to support the sensors, the associated real property 

costs, and the communications network of fiber optics and microwave equipment to link the sensors 

to the Sectors. Costs also include detailed surveys 

at each port to discover and address each location’s unique geography, environment, and existing 

infrastructure. Work will incorporate to the extent 

possible existing sensor systems such as Rescue 

21, Nationwide AIS, Vessel Traffic Systems, and 

sensors already fielded by other agencies. 

Facility Re-Cap ............................................................... 70 Expand existing SCCs to facilitate multi-agency operations and planning, host port partners on the 

watch floor, and provide extra capacity for hightempo and surge operations. SCCs will provide an 

appropriate security boundary to safeguard intelligence information vital to national security that 

will be handled there. 

TOTAL ................................................................ 260 

The following 24 Coast Guard Sectors encompass the Nation’s high priority ports. 

This list is arranged in alphabetic order by U.S. Coast Guard District and represents potential candidate locations for interagency operations centers. 

CG Sector CG District Primary Port(s) 

Boston .................................................................................................. 1 Boston, MA 

Long Island Sound ............................................................................... 1 New Haven & New London, CT 

New York .............................................................................................. 1 New York/New Jersey 

Northern New England ......................................................................... 1 South Portland, ME 

Southeastern New England ................................................................. 1 Providence, RI and Woods Hole, MA 

Baltimore ............................................................................................. 5 Baltimore, MD 

Delaware Bay ....................................................................................... 5 Philadelphia, PA 

Hampton Roads ................................................................................... 5 Norfolk and Newport News, VA 

Charleston ............................................................................................ 7 Charleston, SC and Savannah, GA 

Jacksonville .......................................................................................... 7 Jacksonville and Kings Bay, FL 

Miami ................................................................................................... 7 Miami and Fort Lauderdale, FL 
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CG Sector CG District Primary Port(s) 

Corpus Christi ...................................................................................... 8 Corpus Christi, TX 

Houston/Galveston ............................................................................... 8 Houston/Galveston and Freeport, TX 

Mobile .................................................................................................. 8 Mobile, AL 

New Orleans ......................................................................................... 8 New Orleans and Baton Rouge, LA 

Buffalo ................................................................................................. 9 Buffalo, NY 

Detroit .................................................................................................. 9 Detroit, MI 

Lake Michigan ..................................................................................... 9 Chicago, IL 

LA/LB .................................................................................................... 11 Los Angeles and Long Beach, CA 

San Diego ............................................................................................ 11 San Diego, CA 

San Francisco ...................................................................................... 11 Oakland and San Francisco, CA 

Portland ............................................................................................... 13 Portland, OR 

Seattle .................................................................................................. 13 Seattle, Tacoma, Bremerton, Port Angeles, Vancouver, WA 

Honolulu ............................................................................................... 14 Honolulu and Pearl Harbor, HI 

Note: These implementation priorities balance a number of factors, including: Marine Safety Risk Assessment Matrix data, port criticality 

ratings, DOD/DOJ partnership priorities and other business factors such as existing investments in facilities and sensors. 

Based on the Coast Guard’s experience with interagency operations centers in 

Charleston, San Diego and Hampton Roads, the following benefits have been observed: 

—Cooperative targeting and coordination of intelligence has increased the efficiency of all agencies by allowing the selection of the most appropriate asset to 

respond to a threat. 

—Daily field-level coordination has broken down barriers between agencies and 

helped to establish regular work relations, which smoothes the transition from 

normal to crisis operations. 

—Collective use of tactical sensors (radars/cameras) has saved time and effort by 

remotely identifying potential targets or illegal activity before sending an asset. 

—Cooperative planning has improved the readiness and efficiency of all response 

and prevention activities. 

—Sharing of law enforcement information among communities has helped reduce 

criminal activity in the port and cut off potential funding to terrorist groups. 

—Eliminates potential seams in coverage and increases the number of units available for dispatch. 

The interagency operation center model has been cited as a best practice for increased cooperation and coordination during recent Congressional visits to the interagency operations center at Seahawk Charleston, as well as in the language contained in the SAFE PORTS Act legislation. 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Question. Last year a provision of mine, albeit a modified one, was passed into 

law requiring the Department to regulate chemical site security at chemical plants 

across the Nation. Your budget submission seeks $25 million to enforce the rules 

in fiscal year 2008. When the Coast Guard was tasked to regulate security at ports 

through the Maritime Transportation Security Act, $102 million was requested to 

enforce that regulation. Why do you believe a quarter of this sum is sufficient to 

guarantee security at chemical facilities across the Nation? 

Answer. In fiscal year 2008, the Department anticipates that staffing will reach 

full levels, and that the IT system and tools supporting the regulation, both for purposes of government analysis and for private-sector compliance, will move from development and initial operations capability into implementation. The Department 

intends to closely monitor the costs associated with the implementation and enforcement of its security regime and will use this information to help guide the future 

resource requirements necessary for its expansion and maintenance. 

Question. Why have we not received a plan to finance chemical plant site inspections beginning in fiscal year 2007? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is finalizing the plan referenced 

and will forward it once it is complete 

RISK MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

Question. Will establishment of this office harmonize the various risk methodologies used across the department? 

Answer. The Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) will focus on synchronizing and integrating risk programs across the Department by developing a 

common approach/lexicon. This will be accomplished by leveraging and integrating 
143 

risk expertise across the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) components and 

external stakeholders. 

Question. If so, will it change the way current assessments are done and will that 

lead to significant changes in current requirements and practices? For instance, 

Coast Guard may use a set of risk tools, which, if modified will yield different results. With these different results, new regulations may be more appropriate. 

Answer. The Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) will ensure that a 

common approach/lexicon can be applied across the Department of Homeland Security. 

Managing risk is a primary responsibility of all the components. Making the decisions effectively requires each component to have a better understanding of Department risk goals and how the component risk programs interrelate. As RMA facilitates this process, the USCG may identify ways to improve current risk practices. 

Equally important, components may recognize, leverage, and implement strategies 

from other components that may supplement, replace, or otherwise improve their 

own internal processes. 

The Department’s components with risk programs will retain operational control 

of their specific programs. 

Question. If the creation of the office does not change the risk mythologies, why 

establish this office? 

Answer. In the area of risk, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) component risk programs are not standardized, integrated, or developed using a common lexicon. This has made it difficult for DHS leadership to prioritize resources. 

The Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) will focus on synchronizing and 

integrating individual risk programs across the Department by developing a common approach/lexicon. 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Question. Mr. Secretary, I think you would agree the gravest terrorist threat facing our Nation is a nuclear weapon. We comfort ourselves by believing terrorists 

don’t have the bomb, but its easy to imagine ways they might get one—suppose one 

of the unaccounted ‘‘suitcase’’ weapons from the former Soviet Union comes up for 

sale. Fears of such ‘‘loose nukes’’ has led us toward screening cargo containers entering the country for radiation—a good effort—but perhaps a terrorist who is smart 

enough to acquire a nuclear bomb is smart enough not to ship it in a container. Perhaps he’ll put it in his boat, or fly it on his plane, or stick it to the bottom of a 

cruise ship, or send it by rail car—all of these paths to our country would avoid the 

containers that we are working so hard to screen. 

Mr. Secretary, your budget dedicates significant resources to screening cargo containers for nuclear materials, but virtually nothing for deterring other delivery systems for bringing nuclear materials into the country. Why is this? 

Answer. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO) architectural analysis 

concluded that we must finish the work of securing our Nation’s ports of entry 

(POEs). However, we cannot ignore the possibility that a terrorist might attempt to 

illicitly transport a nuclear device or radioactive material across one of our borders 

between official POEs. While DNDO’s near term focus remains on making further 

improvements to radiation detection capabilities for the Nation’s POEs, the organization is also focusing on developing detection solutions for non-POE applications. 

Over $100 million of DNDO’s fiscal year 2008 budget request is in the area of ‘‘other 

architectural challenges.’’ This money will be used to perform detailed architectural 

analyses on gaps in the detection architecture and developing solutions for those 

gaps. The funds will also be used for STC and developing technological solutions for 

use in non-POE settings. These technologies include mobile and human portable detection systems. Once systems are developed, they must be deployed across the nuclear detection architecture through implementing partners. For instance, DNDO 

and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) have a joint acquisition program that will outfit 

all boarding parties with preventive rad/nuc detection systems that starts to address 

the maritime threat. In addition, DNDO is looking to develop solutions for general 

aviation and areas between our land POEs. The Department has also placed emphasis on protecting the interior of the United States through programs like the Securing the Cities (STC) Initiative. STC will begin with New York City region and will 

assist the region in developing a coordinated and integrated architecture for detection and interdiction of illicit radiological materials. 

Question. If preventing a nuclear attack fails, what concrete actions has DHS 

taken to prepare our cities to react? 

Answer. DHS has been working diligently with cities across the Nation on various 

aspects of planning our ‘‘all hazards’’ response to catastrophic incidents, including 
144 

response to improvised nuclear devices. The response starts with the National Response Plan, which identifies all of the agencies, both governmental and non-governmental, State, local, tribal and private sector responsibilities for dealing with such 

an attack. The National Incident Management System (NIMS), to which all grantees must subscribe, defines the roles of responders at all levels. All of the Executive 

Branch departments have engaged in planning around various scenarios in response 

to various top official exercises and senior official exercises. All of the resources of 

the various Departments, including the Departments of Energy and Health and 

Human Services (HHS) will be applied to characterize and initiate a coordinated respond to the threat. The responsibility for providing public health and medical support is the responsibility of HHS, as the lead agency for Emergency Support Function #8—Public Health and Medical Answer. DHS is also engaged in detailed concept and operational planning through the interagency Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT), a part of the Operations Directorate. Identification of specific 

tasks for appropriate agencies is a key part of the planning process, to include responsibilities for State and local government. DHS has performed a MTA on this 

threat and has issued an MTD in support of BioShield activities headed by HHS. 

Question. Do you know if radio and TV stations in high risk cities such as Washington D.C. have pre-packaged messages in place to broadcast seconds after the explosion to advise the population what and what not to do; to shelter in place or to 

flee? 

Answer. At present, there are no pre-packaged Federal messages to broadcast to 

the public after such an event as identified in the QFR. There have been discussions 

within the Federal Government and emergency managers on establishing such a capability; however, it is viewed that each event is dynamic and fluid and the broadcasted message with its commensurate public guidance would have to be tailored 

to meet each situation as an unique requirement. We have been told that at the 

State and local level, they have not proceeded on establishing pre-packaged messages until the Federal Government establishes the framework. 

Question. What agency is responsible for and has determined whether or not public fallout shelters are necessary or not? 

Answer. DHS has no authority to designate buildings as public fallout shelters. 

The capability to provide this information, and the entity or agency responsible for 

that capability will be part of the IMPT plan. 

Question. What is the state of fallout shelters in the highest risk urban areas? 

Answer. The Fallout Shelter program was an element of the U.S. Civil Defense 

program, authorized by the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. As a result of that 

program Fallout Shelters were identified and evaluated and some were stocked with 

food and water. Those shelters were marked with special signs to indicate their existence. It has been nearly 20 years since that program was in operation and we 

do not have information on the state of those shelters. 

Question. It appears public education before a nuclear event may be the most critical action to take to help an urban population survive a nuclear explosion. 

Has the Department established any sort of baseline understanding of the public’s 

preparedness level for a nuclear event? 

Answer. We agreed that public education and public action in the event of a nuclear explosion can affect morbidity and mortality dramatically. The IMPT playbook 

and incident management plan will address the existing and required capabilities 

related to public communications. 

Question. What office is tasked with educating the public to, for instance, remain 

indoors, in the basement, etc. after a blast? 

Answer. The responsibility for educating the public regarding shelter-in-place will 

be a capability that is a key part of the plan generated by the IMPT. Subject matter 

expertise to address the content of public messaging will be coordinated internally 

through the Office of Health Affairs, the DNDO, the Operations Directorate, the 

Federal Emergency Management Administration, and the Office of Public Affairs. 

Question. What request for fiscal year 2008 was made for this office’s educational 

activities? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2008 budget contained no specific request for educational 

activities for a nuclear threat. However, the budget did contain sufficient funds for 

the Office of Health Affairs to engage in end-to-end planning in coordination with 

DNDO and the Operations Directorate to scope out future requirements. The Department has been funded for all-hazards preparedness, including www.ready.gov. 

The guidance from the Cold War era advises sheltering in place for 2 weeks for 

those trapped within the fallout plume. 

Question. Does this length of time still seem appropriate today? If not, why? 

Answer. The length of time required to shelter-in-place depends on the nature of 

the attack, the isotope used in the device, and other characteristics of the detona-
145 

tion. In the case of an attack, these characteristics would be assessed quickly, and 

communication would be made through public emergency management, public safety, and State and Local public health authorities using the joint information center 

at DHS. Some threats will degrade very quickly, and other may require a period 

of hours to weeks. 

Question. What are DHS’ internal guidelines for sheltering in place during a nuclear even, that is, how many days are you prepared to shelter your staff in place 

assuming no replenishment of food and water? 

Answer. Internal guidelines for sheltering in place are in place and are frequently 

exercised. DHS facilities do not uniformly contain sufficient food and water, at the 

current time. The new Office of Health Affairs Component Services and Workforce 

Protection will be addressing these concerns in coordination Office of the Under Secretary for Management. 

Question. Clearly, coordination needs to occur between Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Defense and other agencies after a nuclear event. 

Who is ‘‘quarterbacking’’ that effort? For instance, if HHS procures a treatment for 

Acute Radiation Syndrome, who will assure the drug will be deployed in sufficient 

quantities and early enough to be useful? 

Answer. The responsibility for countermeasure research and development, advanced development, acquisition, storage and distribution is the sole responsibility 

of the Department of Health and Human Service. The planning for a coordinated 

effort to mitigate the event will be part of the overall end-to-end plan being developed by DHS. 

Question. Mr. Secretary, most of the deaths resulting from a nuclear attack will 

come from Acute Radiation Syndrome. On March 7, 2007, the Department of Health 

and Human Services canceled its BioShield solicitation for a treatment for this illness. What are your thoughts on this cancellation and do you believe this will have 

a chilling effect on other companies developing other such drugs? 

Answer. The Department of Health and Human Services uses the material threat 

determinations and population threat assessments developed by DHS to determine 

what type of and how much countermeasure should be acquired for various threats 

based on the limitations imposed by BioShield funding. The preparation for and 

mitigation of a nuclear attack is a very complex and a difficult scenario. HHS has 

recognized the difficulty associated with drug delivery and administration for patients with potential acute radiation syndrome following an incident, and their requirements reflect those limitations and difficulties. DHS is confident that, through 

their new Public Health and Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise, the 

operational planning process for the response to an IND attack, and the scientific 

merit of a proposal for potential countermeasures, will guide appropriate future investments by Project BioShield. 

Question. Currently there are no treatments for Acute Radiation Syndrome that 

can be administered outside of a hospital. Available hospital beds and treatments 

will be used up within minutes of a nuclear emergency, leaving thousands, if not 

tens of thousands, of people to die. Is the Department of Homeland Security still 

supportive of the Department of Health and Human Services BioShield procurement 

of an effective treatment for this syndrome? 

Answer. The Department of Health and Human Services uses the material threat 

determinations and population threat assessments developed by DHS to determine 

what type of and how much countermeasure should be acquired for various threats 

based on the limitations imposed by BioShield funding. The preparation for and 

mitigation of a nuclear attack is a very complex and a difficult scenario. HHS has 

recognized the difficulty associated with drug delivery and administration for patients with potential acute radiation syndrome following an incident, and their requirements reflect those limitations and difficulties. DHS is confident that, through 

their new Public Health and Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise, the 

operational planning process for the response to an IND attack, and the scientific 

merit of a proposal for potential countermeasures, will guide appropriate future investments by Project BioShield. 

PUBLIC SAFETY INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS GRANT PROGRAM

Question. Is the Public Safety Interoperable Communications Grant Program, that 

will be co-administered with the Department of Commerce and is funded though a 

provision that was secured in the Deficit Reduction Act, meant to be an enhancement in funding for State and local capability or a substitute for the $1.2 billion 

reduction in the grant programs in fiscal year 2008 President’s Budget? 

Answer. The $1 billion from the Department of Commerce is separate funding. 

The 2005 Deficit Reduction Act directed the creation of the $1 billion grant program 
146 

for Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC). The $1 billion is derived 

from the expected sale of spectrum as part of the Digital Television Transition 

scheduled for February 2009. Section 4 of the Call Home Act of 2006 subsequently 

mandated that the interoperable communications grants be awarded by the end of 

fiscal year 2007. The PSIC Grant Program will be jointly administered by the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

The partnership between DHS and NTIA, constructed through the Deficit Reduction and Call Home Acts, was affirmed in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 

signed on February 16, 2007. The MOU defines the roles and responsibilities and 

the implementation of the PSIC Grant Program. More specifically, the MOU indicates that NTIA will transfer PSIC funds to DHS and NTIA will obtain the grant 

administrative services and expertise of DHS. DHS will support the administration 

of those funds while NTIA will retain ultimate approval authority over all aspects 

of the PSIC Grant Program. Through DHS’ strong working relationship with NTIA, 

the Department has outlined a program plan and aggressive schedule of activities 

for meeting the Call Home Act deadline. 

FIRST RESPONDER GRANTS

Question. Is there specific intelligence that provides the basis for the proposed 

$1.2 billion cut in funding levels in the President’s Budget for State and Local Assistance Grant Programs (provide in classified document if necessary)? 

Answer. The level of funding for the Homeland Security Grant Program funding 

is based on several factors, including the substantial level of funding awarded over 

the past 6 years and the level of unexpended funding currently in the State and 

local programs’ pipeline. In addition to approximately $5 billion in unexpended 

funds and approximately $2 billion in additional grants to be awarded in the spring 

and summer of 2007, a total of $3.2 billion will be made available for State and local 

preparedness expenditures, as well as assistance to firefighters, in fiscal year 2008. 

Of this amount, $2.2 billion is requested for the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) to fund grant, training and exercise programs. Funds requested through 

these programs will (1) provide critical assistance to State and local homeland security efforts, (2) support resources available through other Federal assistance programs that center on first responder terrorism preparedness activities, and (3) deliver ample support to all State and local first responder organizations to obtain the 

equipment, training, and other resources required to protect the public in the event 

of a terrorist attack or other major incident. 

Question. Is there a measurable benchmark proving sufficient progress in our national capacity to protect and respond that was used to establish the amount requested? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) tracks progress made 

through the use of Federal grant funds via regular grant reporting processes, as 

well as a robust grant monitoring program. Through grant reporting, DHS is able 

to review the amounts of funding expended by State and local grantees through program activities such as planning, training, equipment acquisition, and exercises. 

The monitoring program provides the Department with a mechanism by which to 

evaluate the progress being made toward both the National Priorities in the National Preparedness Goal, as well as specific goals and objectives that are part of 

State/urban area homeland security strategies. The Department considered activities achieved to date and historical expenditures in determining the overall funding 

requests for fiscal year 2008 grant programs that will support prevention, protection, response, and recovery initiatives. 

Question. Would State and local governments waste funding if the grant programs 

were restored to fiscal year 2007 level? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security recognizes that the process of implementing the National Preparedness Goal, achieving its vision, and building and 

sustaining capabilities is a long-term process that requires an enduring national 

commitment from Federal, State, and local partners. Much work remains to be done 

across the country, not only in terms of enhancing critical capabilities but also in 

sustaining these achievements in the future. Since the inception of these grant programs, State and local governments have made sound investments in support of 

their strategic goals and objectives, not only in the acquisition of critical equipment 

but also in related planning, training, and exercise activities. The Department expects that these sound investment decisions will continue as implementation of the 

National Preparedness Goal moves forward. Moreover, the Department places a premium on ensuring accountability for the use of taxpayer funds allocated through 
147 

preparedness assistance programs. The Department achieves this objective through 

regular grant reporting processes, as well as a robust grant monitoring program. 

INTEROPERABILITY GOAL

Question. On November 28, 2006, Secretary Chertoff said at the 2006 Grants and 

Training National Conference, ‘‘First, we are determined to ensure that the Urban 

Area Security Initiative cities, the major cities, have inter-operable communications 

in effect by the end of this coming year, and that all States have inter-operable communications in effect by the end of 2008.’’ How will this be measured and enforced? 

How will Congress and the public know that a State and/or Urban Area is in compliance? How is compliance facilitated by proposing to cut first responder grant 

funding by $1.2 billion? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently completed the 

Tactical Interoperability Communication Scorecards, which measured tactical interoperable communications capabilities in 75 major urban/metropolitan areas. These 

scorecards were developed by subject-matter expert panels that reviewed documentation on current communications plans, exercises, and a self-assessment to arrive at consensus findings and recommendations for each region on how to best improve that region’s communications capabilities. The scorecards demonstrated that 

every urban/metropolitan area has a baseline capability to achieve interoperable 

communications; however, continued training on available technical solutions and 

procedures for their use is critical to operational success. 

Statewide interoperability is being addressed through the creation of the Statewide Communications Interoperability Plans, which are due on November 1, 2007. 

Once submitted, these plans will be peer-reviewed and evaluated for completeness. 

The new Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC) grant program is also 

being tied to the Statewide plan. The goal is to ensure that investment justifications 

for the PSIC grant program are consistent with the statewide plan. Once the statewide plans have been submitted and reviewed, DHS will ensure that all future 

grant investment justifications are consistent with the goals established in the 

plans. In addition, States will submit State preparedness reports in January 2008 

that will highlight accomplishments including progress toward improving Statewide 

and regional interoperability. DHS is also in the process of determining the feasibility of conducting a statewide exercise to test interoperable communications capabilities at the State level. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published the results of the Tactical 

Interoperability Communication Scorecards in January 2007. As previously described in the response to question 67, the results indicate that every urban/metropolitan area has a baseline capability to achieve interoperable communications. 

Statewide Communication Interoperability Plans are to be submitted to DHS on November 1, 2007, and those plans will be peer-reviewed and evaluated for completeness. The results of that process can be shared with Congress. In addition, DHS will 

continue to conduct monitoring visits with States and urban areas to track grant 

funding and determine if grantees are making meaningful progress toward achieving their interoperability goals. If DHS decides to pursue developing additional 

scorecards that measure interoperability, those results will also be made public. 

From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2006 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has provided more than $2.9 billion to States for interoperable communication projects. In addition, the Public Safety Interoperability Communications 

grant program administered jointly by the Department of Commerce and DHS will 

provide an additional $1 billion to States in fiscal year 2007 to support interoperable 

communications initiatives. As such, DHS believes that first responders have and 

will continue to be supported through Federal grant programs to improve their communications capabilities. 

COMPLYING WITH THE LAW

Question. The fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security Appropriations Act included a 

provision that required the Department to issue the National Preparedness Goal no 

later than December 31, 2005, in accordance with the Department’s implementation 

plan. The National Preparedness Goal is not final today. The fiscal year 2007 Appropriations Act required that the Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance be 

issued by November 17; it was issued over a month late, on January 5. The fiscal 

year 2007 Appropriations Act also required that the Infrastructure Protection Grant 

Guidance be issued by December 18; it was issued on January 9. The fiscal year 

2007 Appropriations Act provided applicants with 45 to submit applications. The 

grant guidance issued by the Department gives applicants 56 days. 
148 

1The letter was copied to various members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, including then-Chairmen Thad Cochran and Jerry Lewis. 2 Although the December 19, 2006 letter was the formal notice required by section 508, FEMA 

had, at least as early as August 14, 2006, provided Congress with its plan for implementing 

the AHPP. And, on August 21, 2006, FEMA met with staff from the offices Senators Landrieu, 

Vitter, Nelson, and Martinez to discuss this plan. FEMA did the same with staff for the Senate 

Appropriations Committee on August 22, 2006. 

Senate Chairman Byrd and House Chairman Price wrote a letter to Secretary 

Chertoff on January 18, 2007 regarding these violations and have yet to receive a 

response. Does the Department intend to respond to that letter? If so, when? 

Answer. A response to the letter from Chairman Byrd and Chairman Price was 

provided on March 7, 2007. However, the reply was sent to the personal offices of 

Chairman Byrd and Chairman Price rather than their respective committee offices. 

A copy of this response was then sent to the Senate Appropriations Committee Offices on March 28, 2007 as part of the official ‘‘getbacks’’ for this hearing. 

Question. Under what authority did the Department of Homeland Security ignore 

these appropriations laws? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security did not ignore appropriations law. 

Please see the letter from Secretary Chertoff to Chairman Byrd dated March 7, 2007 

for further information in response to this question. Copy of March 7, 2007 letter 

attached. 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC, March 7, 2007. 

Hon. DAVID E. PRICE, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. 

Senate, Washington DC. 

DEAR CHAIRMAN PRICE AND SENATOR BYRD: Thank you for your January 18, 2007 

letter regarding your concerns with recent actions relating to the issuance of grant 

allocations and grant guidance by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

However, I respectfully disagree with the suggestion that DHS has in any way violated the fiscal year 2007 DHS Appropriations Act. 

Your letter appears to focus on section 508 of the act, which requires that the Department notify Congress in advance of awarding grants in excess of $1 million, or 

publicly announcing an intention to do so. Specifically, section 508 requires DHS to 

‘‘notif[y]’’ the House and Senate Appropriations Committee three business days prior 

to a public announcement, or, for particular types of grants, to ‘‘brief’ the committees 5 business days before making a public announcement. In each of the instances 

referenced in your letter, the Department complied with this mandate. 

You raise questions about the Department’s notification on three occasions—the 

announcement of proposed recipients for Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) Alternative Housing Pilot Program (AHPP) grants; the release of guidance 

for the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP); and the release of guidance for 

the Infrastructure Protection Program (IPP). The Department complied with section 

508 on these occasions as follows: 

Alternative Housing Pilot Program (AHPP) 

The Department provided formal notification of its planned public announcement 

concerning AHPP grants on December 19, 2006. In a letter to the House and Senate 

Appropriations Committees, then-Acting Under Secretary for Management Scott 

Charbo wrote, ‘‘the Department of Homeland Security intends to publicly announce 

on Friday, December 22, 2006, our intention to make grant awards under the $400 

million Alternative Housing Pilot Program created by Section 2403 of Public Law 

109–234.’’ 1 The letter enclosed copies of the plan for implementation of the AHPP 

program, grant guidance, and other information, and further requested a briefing 

with committee staff onthe morning of December 22, 2006. The Department announced the projects to be considered for grant awards under the AHPP on December 22, 2006, 3 business days after the Department notified the committees.2

Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and Infrastructure Protection Program 

(IPP) 

The Department provided briefing on the programmatic guidance for the HSGP 

and IPP on December 28, 2006. Departmental officials, led by Under Secretary for 

Preparedness George W. Foresman, gave a briefing to members of the House and 

Senate Appropriations Committees that included an explanation of the risk methodology employed by DHS for the HSGP and IPP programs, as well as a timeline for 

the grant programs that indicated January 4, 2007, as the date on which programmatic guidance was to be released. At the request of committee staff, DHS pro-
149 

vided certain additional information concerning risk methodology and HSGP eligibility that was not available on the date of the briefing. This briefing was not required under section 508 of the fiscal year 2007 Appropriations Act because the 

issuance of guidance does not ‘‘award’’ funds to a particular recipient or constitute 

an ‘‘intention to make’’ an award to a particular recipient. Nevertheless, in the interests of cooperation and comity, the Department chose to provide congressional notice prior to the public release of the grant guidance. The Department publicly released the programmatic guidance for the HSGP and IPP on January 4, 2007, 5 

days after the Department briefed the committees. 

I welcome a discussion about the provisions contained in section 508. The Department understands the aims of the section, including to provide Congress with the 

opportunity to conduct an advance review of the Department’s proposals and give 

members whose constituencies are affected the opportunity to communicate accordingly. The notifications provided by DHS to the committees are designed to convey 

sufficient detail to accomplish these goals, while maintaining the Department’s responsibility to speak about the grant programs. The Department does not believe 

that the provisions of section 508 are violated when additional detail is supplied to 

the committees after the date of notification. Such a restrictive reading of the act 

would present significant concerns for DHS. 

The Department is the party most knowledgeable about the methodology and justifications for the grant awards, and it is not in the best interest of the government, 

the grant candidates, or the American people to restrict (for 3 or 5 days) the Department from speaking about these important issues. Our recent experience has shown 

that some of the DHS grant briefings provided to Congress have been shared with 

the press prior to release by the Department. This places the Department in the 

untenable position of being unable, sometimes for several days, to respond to press 

stories while respecting the statutory requirements not to discuss these matters 

prior to the end of the congressional notification period. Due to the complexity of 

these awards, this can result in inaccurate or misleading speculation by the public 

or potential awardees during this ‘‘quiet period’’ required by the act. 

To the extent that section 508 limits the Department’s ability to communicate 

with the public about grant awards affecting homeland security while requiring advanced disclosure to Congress of all grant program specifics, it raises serious concerns which I hope we can address in the next appropriations cycle. 

Finally, as to your comment that the Department failed to comply with the legislated timeframe for releasing programmatic guidance to eligible applicants, any 

delay on the part of DHS was necessary to ensure effective administration of these 

grants. The act provided the Department only 45 days and 75 days, respectively, 

to release comprehensive guidelines for the HSGP and IPP programs. Before releasing the guidance documents, the Department wanted to ensure that the risk methodology was accurate, and that the Department had an opportunity to collaborate 

both internally and with affected parties, including States, local governments, and 

national organizations. The Department worked diligently on drafting the guidelines, releasing them to the public on January 4, 2007. Had the Department forced 

the release of the guidelines earlier than it did, it risked a flawed implementation 

of these programs, which would have undermined the important purposes for which 

these funds were allocated. 

I appreciate your interest in the Department of Homeland Security, and I look 

forward to with working with you on future homeland security issues. An identical 

letter was sent to Chairman Price. Thank you again for your letter. 

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, 

Secretary. 

ALL-HAZARDS

Question. Paul Stockton from the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University testified before the House on January 30, 2007. He stated that ‘‘natural hazards preparedness should be made part of the core of homeland 

security, rather than a function defined out of it.’’ 

Is this Department committed to an all-hazards approach to homeland security? 

If so, how are resources in fiscal year 2008 to be distributed at the Federal, State 

and local level to ensure that the all-hazard approach is not adopted just for planning and response functions but also in fulfilling prevention and preparedness functions? 

Answer. The Department is absolutely committed to an all-hazards approach to 

homeland security. The National Preparedness Goal emphasizes a capabilities-based 

approach to addressing risk, rather than focusing on specific scenarios. This approach emphasizes the building and sustaining of capabilities to prevent, protect 
150 

against, respond to, and recover from all hazards in a way that balances risk with 

resources. Many capabilities that are included in the Target Capabilities List are 

dual-use in nature in that they can apply both to terrorism preparedness and as 

other natural or manmade hazards. 

In fiscal year 2008 and beyond, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will 

continue to emphasize the criticality of capabilities-based planning as called for in 

the National Preparedness Goal across all four mission areas: prevent, protect, respond, and recover. Although several grant programs are statutorily required to 

focus on addressing risks associated with terrorism, the range of activities allowed 

as part of program implementation has been expanded to include catastrophic 

events. This broadened scope of program implementation activities recognizes and 

supports ongoing preparedness initiatives addressing such issues as pandemic influenza and the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita that are of critical national 

importance, and recognizes the regional and national impacts that such events can 

have. Moreover, this approach recognizes the reality that many capabilities are 

dual-use in nature in that they can apply across all hazards and threats. 

CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS

Question. The Department’s Nationwide Plan Review shows that 61 percent of 

States and 69 percent of urban areas do not have adequate plans to manage a catastrophic event. The National Capitol Region has been reluctant to work with West 

Virginia on mass evacuation on the premise that dollars are better spent on planning to shelter-in-place than on planning to evacuate. Yet there are not fall out shelters signs around the region. On Capitol Hill shelter-in-place has not been drilled. 

In fact, buildings are evacuated during threats. 

Recognizing that Federal, State and local efforts to address risks are managed 

through many documents such as the interim National Preparedness Goal, the National Incident Management System, Grant Guidance and State Homeland Security 

Strategies, among others—it is still unclear how national risk assessments are 

translated to local preparedness efforts. 

How is risk being connected to planning? Who is the lead person in the Department to ensure this coordination is taking place, not just in the Washington DC 

area but across the Nation? How specifically is this function funded? What incentives are provided to State and local governments to orient there Federal grant dollars to address their specific highest risks? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is committed to the effective use of risk to inform a broad range of decisions, including planning decisions. 

At its core, homeland security is about managing risk—characterizing the threat, 

vulnerability, and consequences—and developing a plan to mitigate the risk. Success demands that we make difficult choices in how we apply resources most effectively based on a common understanding of risk and strategic objectives. 

The Department has established the Office of Risk Management and Analysis 

(RMA) to address the discrepancies between risk methodologies across DHS. RMA 

will lead the Department’s efforts to establish a common framework to address the 

overall management and analysis of homeland security risk. Within this capacity, 

RMA will ensure that Department component risk programs are synchronized and 

integrated, and use a common approach/lexicon. The funding strategy for this office 

is currently being developed. 

The workable approach that Federal, State, and local governments can take is to 

manage the risk we know we face, evaluating threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences and using that analysis to determine the most cost-effective way to enhance security against those risks. Dedicating funds—whether they are grant funds 

or State/local resources—to the greatest risks is a critical function of responsible 

government. The greatest incentive that a risk-management approach can provide 

to State and local governments is that they can clearly demonstrate to their citizenry that they not only understand the risks they face but are methodically applying a portfolio of resources to address them. 

GRANT FORMULA MATRIX

Question. On January 23, 2007, the Homeland Security Advisory Council Culture 

Task Force (CTF) found that there must be a ‘‘change in the historic tendency to 

create Federal/DHS Centric and top down plans/templates/frameworks that perhaps 

are not executable within States and communities and in the private sector.’’ The 

CTF recommends that, ‘‘A cohesive, comprehensive and coordinated grant formula 

matrix should be developed with [a] partnership.’’ Does the Department concur with 

this finding and this recommendation? If so, how will it be implemented? If not, 

why? 
151 

Answer. As part of this recommendation, the Culture Task Force called for a collaborative, transparent, and stable process for the State, local, and tribal partners 

seeking Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grants. It noted a need for DHS 

to recognize and engage State, local, and tribal components within the planning 

stages for DHS grant funding. The Department absolutely concurs with this recommendation and is committed to building upon and expanding partnerships with 

State, local, and tribal stakeholders and making grant programs as transparent as 

possible. For example, the Department has consistently sought input from partners 

in developing grant program guidance each year. In fiscal year 2006, the Department hosted an after-action conference on the new processes supporting the Homeland Security Grant Program in which feedback was received on the overall planning process, grant guidance and application procedures, risk analysis, and effectiveness analysis. In November 2006, the Department hosted an additional stakeholder meeting to solicit comments from State and local officials on draft program 

guidance. Finally, as in fiscal year 2006, the Department is developing a peer-review 

process for Homeland Security Grant Program applications through which State, 

local, and tribal experts will review and evaluate proposed investments. These activities provide examples of DHS’s commitment to involving State, local, and tribal 

expertise in the development and implementation of its grant programs. The Department fully recognizes the criticality of strategic and program planning activities 

that reflect State and local priorities. State and urban area homeland security strategies outline critical goals and objectives, and provide a foundation for homeland security planning that takes into account National, State, and local priorities. 

NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

Question. The President’s Budget proposes for elimination the following language 

that was included in the fiscal year 2007 Appropriations Act, ‘‘That for purposes of 

planning, coordination and execution of mass evacuation during a disaster, the Governors of the State of West Virginia and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or 

their designees, shall be included in efforts to integrate the activities of Federal, 

State, and local governments in the National Capital Region, as defined in section 

882 of Public Law 107–296, the Homeland Security Act of 2002.’’ Why is this language proposed for elimination? 

Answer. The proposed legislative language presented in the President’s Budget 

addresses the funding level for all program activities within NCRC to include mass 

evacuations and is consistent with the language presented in the fiscal year 2007 

Presidents Budget request. It is the intention of NCRC to comply fully with the language in the fiscal year 2007 act, thereby making continuation of this language in 

the fiscal year 2008 request unnecessary 

GRANTS MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

Question. The President’s Budget request continues the practice of allowing up to 

3 percent of the amount appropriated for grants to be used for management and 

administration. Since fiscal year 2005, what is the breakdown of management and 

administration expenses and the number of FTE? Although the volume of grants 

can impact the level needed for management and expenses, what is the minimum 

level of funding the Department would require assuming all the current grant programs for management and administration? 

Answer. In fiscal year 2005 there were 220 full-time employees, and management 

and administration expenses associated with grants totaled $89.2 million. Of this 

amount, approximately $66.2 million was directly related to the grant programs and 

the remaining $23.0 million was related to the management and administration of 

the training, exercise, and technical assistance program. In fiscal year 2006, there 

were 237 full-time employees, and management and administration expenses totaled 

$110.4 million. Of this amount, approximately $66.7 million was directly related to 

the grant programs and the remaining $43.7 million was related to the management 

and administration of the training, exercise, and technical assistance program. For 

fiscal year 2007 there are 279 full-time employees, and management and administration expenses are projected to total $106.3 million. Of this amount, approximately 

$67.7 million was directly related to the grant programs and the remaining $38.6 

million was related to the management and administration of the training, exercise, 

and technical assistance program. 

The fiscal year 2008 Budget assumes Management and Administration (M&A) 

costs of approximately $95.5 million would be sufficient to adequately sustain all requested programs. Of this amount, approximately $66.2 million will be directly related to the grant programs and the remaining $29.3 million will be related to the 
152 

management and administration of the training, exercise, and technical assistance 

program. 

REGIONAL TRANSIT SECTOR WORKING GROUPS

Question. In the fiscal year 2007 Transit Security Grant Program Guidance, the 

Department discontinues the requirement of Regional Transit Sector Working 

Groups. Why did the Department make this decision? How can the Department be 

certain that Federal dollars will drive coordination and create efficiencies at the 

local level without this process? 

Answer. Regional coordination remains a high priority for the Department of 

Homeland Security. In previous years, participation in the Regional Transit Security 

Working Groups was a requirement in order to receive grant funds. In some cases, 

this resulted in an additional hurdle that the transit systems had to pass in order 

to receive funds. In fiscal year 2006, this requirement was removed in order to facilitate an expeditious release of the funds to the transit systems. 

The Regional Transit Security Working Groups (RTSWG) are led by the State Administrative Agencies (SAA) which must approve the investment justifications submitted by the transit systems. In addition, in fiscal year 2007 the grants will be 

awarded as cooperative agreements. The Department of Homeland Security will 

work closely with the transit systems through the RTSWGs to ensure that the regions coordinate and that the grant funds are used to effectively address regional 

risk. 

FLOOD MAPS

Question. The National Academy of Sciences released a report in January entitled, 

‘‘Base Map Inputs for Floodplain Mapping.’’ The report focuses on the adequacy of 

data in the two ‘‘base’’ layers of floodplain maps: imagery and elevation. The report 

concludes that the floodplain maps need land surface elevation data that are about 

ten times more accurate than data currently available for most of the Nation. Does 

the Department concur with these findings? Please explain why or why not. 

Answer. The Department concurs with these finding, although the ratio of the accuracy of 1-arc second USGS National Elevation Dataset (NED) data to the FEMA 

requirement for mapping high risk areas may be somewhat lower than the factor 

of 10 used in the report. FEMA’s Flood Mapping Standards do not allow the use 

of 1-arc second NED data for flood hazard analysis in high risk areas. Instead 

FEMA works with local, State and Federal agencies to identify better elevation data 

that can be used for flood map update projects in these areas. In the majority of 

the highest risk counties, FEMA has successfully identified and obtained existing 

elevation data that does meet our accuracy standards. This approach is recognized 

in the NAS report, which States on page 44: 

‘‘In some cases, countywide, statewide, or region wide elevation data will be available. Prior to a study, FEMA performs a comprehensive information search to identify the best available elevation data sources for use in the performance of the 

study.’’ 

Typically for high-population counties, the local government does have good elevation data, but in low-population areas USGS 71⁄2-minute quadrangle maps are the 

best available elevation data. 

Question. The report also reviews emerging technologies being used to generate 

base elevation data. It states that lidar technology, which is based on laser measurements collected from aircraft, should be used to update the Nation’s base elevation 

data. Does the Department concur with these findings? Please explain why or why 

not. 

Answer. The Department agrees the lidar technology is the best solution for a national elevation mapping effort. It is both very accurate and cost effective relative 

to other available technologies. FEMA published the first Federal specification for 

lidar mapping and it is still among the most widely used standards in the industry. 

FEMA frequently uses lidar as the preferred technology when new elevation is needed for a flood map update. 

However, the Department believes that a national update of base elevation data 

is beyond the scope of the current Flood Map Modernization effort. Despite the cost 

reductions achieved by lidar technology, elevation mapping remains expensive. The 

cost for a national update of elevation might approach the entire budget for the current Map Modernization efforts, leaving no budget for flood map updates. 

Question. The report proposes creating a program called ‘‘Elevation for the Nation’’ to parallel the existing Imagery for the Nation concept. The program would 

employ lidar as the primary technology for digital elevation data acquisition. The 

report also recommends the new data should be input into the National Elevation 
153 

Dataset that the U.S. Geological Survey maintains for use in support of flood map 

modernization and other applications. Would this program benefit the flood mapping 

efforts at the Department? Are there other efforts at the Department that this information might benefit? If so, how specifically? Is it the Department’s opinion that 

other Federal agencies could participate in this program and if so which agencies? 

Answer. Yes, an effort like this would be a benefit for flood mapping. Substantially improved national elevation data would also benefit other hazard mitigation 

efforts at FEMA, the States and in local governments. Improved national elevation 

could support a more quantitative risk based approach to flood hazard mitigation 

using FEMA’s HAZUS software to evaluate the impacts of floods of varying magnitudes. Detailed elevation could also be used to identify areas susceptible to landslide hazards and lidar data has proven extremely effective at identifying earthquake faults in forested areas. Detailed elevation data also supports analysis of potential hurricane inundation and hurricane evacuation planning. 

There are programs within DHS that can benefit from improved elevation data. 

Notable among these are: 

Law Enforcement U.S. Customs and Border Patrol 

Accurate elevation data greatly enhances the ability of border patrol agents to determine line-of-sight to identify areas where foot and vehicle traffic cannot be readily observed. It is important to note that an essential element of this type of analysis includes elevation points that fall on structures and vegetation which is often 

not available in a base elevation model. The border patrol can also perform 

trafficability studies that are based on terrain severity to identify those areas where 

incursions are more likely. 

Law Enforcement Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 

Accurate elevation data is an important tool in operations planning but typically, 

surveillance or raids involve structures so the elevation data must include measurements on above-ground features. 

Common Operating Picture 

Access to elevation data supports the development of visualizations that contribute to situational awareness. This is a potentially important component of the 

National Operations Center (NOC) and the National Response Coordination Center 

(NRCC) during emergencies. Elevation data is an essential tool in planning for National Special Security Events (NSSE) but this application also requires accurate 

elevation points for structures and vegetation. 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Elevation data is an important component for development of plans for port security. Major ports tend to fall in those coastal areas where FEMA will also require 

high accuracy elevation data. 

Other agencies can and do participate in this program. FEMA has worked actively 

with the USGS, USACE, NRCS, NOAA, the Forest Service, BLM, Census, NASA 

and NGA through the National Digital Elevation Program to coordinate on elevation 

mapping and mapping standards. All of these agencies, and others such as EPA and 

DOT, could benefit from a national elevation data update. 

CERRO GRANDE

Question. Are there any fiscal year 2008 balances expected in the Cerro Grande 

account? If so, what is the need for balance? When does the Department anticipate 

that the need for the balance will expire? 

Answer. The need for the balance is to satisfy subrogation claims from insurance 

companies (4,500 claims) and any liability determined for the one unresolved individual claim. The liability for the individual claim is pending and will be determined 

by the 10th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals. 

Administrative: $250,000.00 

Claims Payments: $8,500,000.00 

The Administrative Balance account will show normal change from the above 

amount. The Claims Payment Balance will remain the same until the determination 

is made on the final individual claim by the court. 

Pending the outcome of the one remaining individual claim the best estimate of 

completion would be the first quarter fiscal year 2008. 

INCREASE IN IMMIGRATION FEES

Question. On February 1, 2007, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services published in the Federal Register a proposed restructuring of fees charged for legal im-
154 

1Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A–25 (‘‘User Charges’’) directs Federal 

agencies to charge the ‘‘full cost’’ of providing a special benefit to an identifiable recipient when 

calculating fees. It provides that ‘‘full cost’’ includes ‘‘all direct and indirect costs to any part 

of the Federal Government of providing a good, resource or service.’’ 2 See GAO, Immigration Application Fees: Current Fees are Not Sufficient to Fund U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Operations (GAO–04–309R, Jan. 5, 2004). 3GAO, Immigration Application Fees: Current Fees are Not Sufficient to Fund U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Operations pg. 3 (GAO–04–309R, Jan. 5, 2004). 4Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 8 CRF Part 

103, Adjustment of the Immigration and Naturalization Benefit Application and Petition Fee 

Schedule, Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 4887 (Feb 1, 2007). 

migration and naturalization benefits and petitions. I understand that the average 

fee for these benefits would increase by 66 percent. Do your existing fees cover the 

cost of doing the business of processing and evaluating immigration applications? 

Answer. No, USCIS currently does not recover the full cost of adjudicating applications and petitions. In his fiscal year 2007 budget request, the President called 

for USCIS to reform its fee structure—in line with Federal fee guidelines 1—to ensure the recovery of operational costs. Additionally, a January 2004 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 2 to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees indicated that USCIS’ fees were insufficient to fund our operations. As a result, the 

GAO recommended that USCIS ‘‘perform a comprehensive fee study to determine 

the costs to process new immigration applications.’’ 3 In 2006, USCIS undertook a 

careful and comprehensive fee review to revise its application and petition fees to 

ensure it recovers its full business costs. On February 1, 2007, USCIS published a 

notice of proposed rule making in the Federal Register 4, which reflects the application of USCIS’ review to the current fee schedule. 

The proposed rule outlines USCIS’ intended fee schedule, which is designed to enhance USCIS’ ability to address national security and public safety concerns, prevent and detect fraud, and invest in comprehensive transformation efforts to result 

in a more efficient and effective organization. Moreover, the proposed rule is consistent with the policy of the United States government, as reflected in OMB Circular A–25, to recover the full costs of providing special benefits to identifiable recipients. 

Under the notice of proposed rule making, applicants and petitioners will see substantially improved service under a new fee structure, with average processing 

times projected to be reduced by as much as 20 percent by the end of fiscal year 

2009. 

Question. Has there ever been a fee increase of this magnitude before? If so, when 

was it proposed and what was the increase? 

Answer. Yes, the last comprehensive fee adjustment was based on an inclusive fee 

study that occurred in 1998, when fees increased approximately 76 percent. USCIS 

has marginally increased fees since this time, usually for inflation, but these adjustments never fully recovered costs accrued. The Government Accountability Office 

found that USCIS fees were insufficient to recoup our operating expenses and that 

remains true today despite a fee increase in April 2004 and an inflationary increase 

in October 2005. The comprehensive fee review has made clear, however, that these 

marginal increases have not allowed USCIS to meet its mission responsibilities. 

FBI BACKGROUND CHECKS

Question. Please describe the extent of the backlog in getting background checks 

conducted by the FBI on those individuals seeking immigration benefits. How extensive is the backlog and what is the cause of these delays? 

Answer. As of April 4, 2007, 339,415 name checks are pending with the FBI. Of 

that number, 162,394 are older than 6 months. USCIS requests FBI background 

checks on all applicants applying for adjustment of status and naturalization benefits and conducts an IBIS name check on all applicants and petitioners applying for 

any immigration benefit; thus, approximately 28–30 million background checks are 

conducted each year which include the following: 

FBI Fingerprint Check.—Applicants are scheduled at one of the USCIS Application Support Centers (ASC) where full, 10-print fingerprints are taken and electronically forwarded to the FBI. The response to the FBI fingerprint check is usually 

returned within 24 to 72 hours after the fingerprints are taken. In fiscal year 2007, 

USCIS expects to request more than 2.6 million fingerprint checks from the FBI. 

There are 129 Application Support Centers (ASCs) nationwide where fingerprints 

are taken; 44 are co-located within a USCIS district or sub-office and 85 are standalone facilities. 
155 

FBI Name Check.—This check, based on the applicant’s name and date of birth, 

is conducted to determine whether the FBI has information related to the applicant. 

The FBI database is searched to determine whether an individual has been encountered by the FBI in connection with an investigation of criminal, security, or other 

activities that might render him or her ineligible for benefits. Such information may 

have an impact on the final adjudication of the case. Approximately 80 percent of 

the name check requests are resolved after a few weeks, and 99 percent are resolved 

within 6 months. 

Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) Name Check.—IBIS resides on the 

Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) and is operated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). IBIS houses multi-agency data that includes information relating to national security, narcotics trafficking, other law enforcement 

violations, and persons who may be of interest to the government or local law enforcement agencies. 

FBI ‘‘hits’’ are forwarded to USCIS through a Letter Head Memorandum (LHM). 

The time necessary to review and resolve the name check response varies depending 

upon the nature of the information summarized in the LHM, which generally contains investigative information collected by the FBI during the course of its duties. 

Variables that affect the length of time for USCIS to process these responses include: 

—the completeness of the summary, 

—whether the investigation is open or closed, 

—whether the investigation is a matter of public record or known to the applicant, 

—the relationship of the applicant to the investigation, 

—the availability of the FBI to work with USCIS on the case, 

—the availability of other information about the subject of concern, 

—whether the investigation requires that applicant to submit additional evidence 

prior to adjudication of the case, and 

—at least 5 percent of the positive responses point USCIS to a third agency. 

The additional funding generated by the proposed fee increase will improve the 

timeliness of future background checks by expanding current name check resolution 

capacity, establishing co-located name check resolution capacity, and funding the 

new FBI fees for background checks. Additionally, USCIS is working closely with 

the FBI to address the name check backlog. Both parties are committed to enhancing the current process and working to eliminate the backlogs and discussions to 

flesh out program specifics are currently underway. USCIS remains steadfast in its 

commitment to ensure all necessary security checks are conducted and that no one 

will receive an immigration benefit or service until all background checks are fully 

resolved. 

DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE

Question. It seems the simplest technological leap for rogue nations to make nuclear weapons is to enrich uranium ore to extract uranium 235 (rather than reprocessing to purify plutonium). Is that true? 

Answer. Both pathways are possible and within reach of rogue nations, although 

each country may have its own reasons for choosing one pathway versus the other. 

Some countries have pursued plutonium, while others have pursued uranium. A key 

factor in the decision, in many cases, may be the availability of technology or technical assistance from outside sources. 

Question. What is the most likely isotope to be used by terrorists in an improvised 

nuclear weapon? 

Answer. Special Nuclear Material (SNM) is required to make a nuclear device. 

Uranium enriched in isotope Uranium-235 and Plutonium are the most common 

materials that could [to] be used in an improvised nuclear weapon. Terrorists are 

likely to use whichever material they can get their hands on. Both types of material 

are in widespread use around the world. 

Question. What is our Nation’s capacity to detect shielded quantities of this material? 

Answer. Well-shielded materials must be detected with active imaging (radiography systems). Currently, radiography systems are deployed with trained operators 

in locations like our Ports of Entry, and they may be able to detect substantial 

quantities of shielded special nuclear material (SNM). The challenge is that current 

radiography systems require an operator to study a radiographic image—a time consuming process with an outcome that depends on the ability of an operator to visually discern a potential threat object. Moreover, current radiography systems were 

developed for purposes other than detection of shielded materials; purposes like detecting illicit drugs and human smuggling. Therefore, the performance of these cur-
156 

rent generation radiography systems does not fully address the threat of shielded 

highly enriched uranium (HEU). 

DNDO believes in an integrated system approach that includes deployment of 

passive detection systems such as Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) in concert with 

active imaging, or radiography, systems. This integrated approach provides the ability to directly detect unshielded nuclear and radiological materials (using RPMs), 

as well as materials that could be used to shield nuclear and radiological materials 

(using radiography systems). 

DNDO is currently investing in programs to improve the capabilities of each these 

technologies—the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program to improve identification capabilities in RPMs and the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System (CAARS) program to provide improved penetration and automated processing 

for imaging systems. Additionally, CAARS will be operating at higher energy levels 

than imaging systems currently used. These higher energy levels will allow greater 

radiographic penetration, which will in turn yield a higher probability of automatically detecting shielding or SNM that has been heavily shielded. 

Question. Would technologies deployed for Securing the Cities detect this shielded 

isotope? 

Answer. The program is still in the planning phase and final determinations have 

yet to made regarding the exact types of equipment that will be deployed for Securing the Cities. DNDO is working closely with State and local authorities in the New 

York City area to select the right detection equipment for a challenging operational 

environment like the New York metropolitan area. Radiography systems that could 

detect shielded materials (along with passive systems like Radiation Portal Monitors, back pack and handheld detectors) are on the table as options for deployment. 

DNDO’s Transformational Research and Development (TRD) Directorate is looking at advanced concepts and technologies for detecting shielded SNM that are relevant for operations in urban environments. However, research conducted by TRD 

has a long-term focus. Therefore, these concepts would be integrated into urban operations at a later date. 

Question. Will Advance Spectroscopic Portal monitor technology increase our capacity to detect this isotope—i.e. operationally, is it more sensitive? 

Answer. The primary benefit of the ASP technology, when compared to currentgeneration RPMs, is the ability to not only detect the presence of radiation, but to 

also identify the source material for the detected radiation. 

More specifically, current equipment in the field is based on plastic scintillation 

technology using polyvinyl toluene (PVT) detectors. These PVT detectors can be 

made in large sizes and have fast response times. PVT-based detectors are adequate 

for large area and fast gross counting of gamma ray ‘‘hits’’ within a specific time 

period. However, due to their low efficiency and poor energy resolution, spectral images provided by PVT systems are inadequate to determine if material causing an 

alarm is an actual threat or a normally occurring radioactive material (NORM) 

source. 

ASP systems utilize thallium-doped sodium iodide (NaI) or high purity germanium (HPGe) crystals as the scintillation material. NaI detectors have a much 

greater efficiency and better energy resolution, producing very clear source spectra. 

This improved resolution provides that added ability to quickly and accurately identify sources of detected radiation. This identification then allows system operators 

to determine if an alarm is an actual threat or naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) source much faster, and causes less of an impact to commerce with no 

loss of screening efficiency and improved security to the Nation. 

This past month, we finished another round of testing at the Nevada Test Site 

as part of our validation process to determine that next-generation systems are indeed providing the improvements in performance that we seek. We have also placed 

ASP systems at the New York Container Terminal as part of our evaluation. These 

activities are separate from Securing the Cities, but will provide data to support 

Secretarial certification of the performance of ASP systems and the eventual fullscale deployment of ASP into the field. 

Question. Are there currently or soon to be deployed technologies that actively interrogate the object of interest in a way they could be deployed in the Securing the 

Cities initiative? (For instance, something traffic could pass through to look for a 

signature). 

Answer. The current generation of active interrogation systems would not be feasible for screening traffic in a dense urban environment like New York. Aside from 

performance limitations of current generation systems (for example, speed at which 

radiography can take place), there are also health effects concerns related to exposing individuals to high energy systems. DNDO is looking at advanced concepts and 

technologies for detecting shielded SNM that are relevant for operations in urban 
157 

environments. However, this research is likely to yield results that would be integrated into urban operations at a later date. 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. For years, the Department has argued against physically screening air 

cargo on passenger aircraft because a technology does not exist for screening bulk 

cargo. Yet, little has been invested to divulge that technology. Describe progress and 

detail investments made to develop that technology. 

Answer. There are two main activities underway at the Department to address 

technology development for screening air cargo. 

The first is advanced air cargo research and development of technologies to address capability gaps in cargo screening. Technology gaps being addressed include 

the inability to penetrate dense, heavy cargos to find potential threats hidden in 

such things as machine parts, auto parts or other heavy machinery and the inability 

to screen whole-pallet-sized cargo at one time. The addition of these capabilities 

would improve screening efficiency and speed. 

The second activity that addresses screening of bulk cargo is the Air Cargo Explosives Detection Pilot Program (ACEDPP). The Department established this program 

in response to congressional direction in the fiscal year 2006 Appropriations Bill. 

These activities are being carried out in close collaboration between the Science and 

Technology Directorate (S&T) and the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA). The program is being executed at three different airports, San Francisco 

International Airport (SFO), Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky International Airport 

(CVG), and Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA–TAC). Two of these airports 

are among the 20 largest airports in the country. The third campaign, at SEA, is 

in an all-freight facility. 

The purpose of the ACEDPP is to determine the performance of technologies—e.g. 

X-ray, computed tomography, trace detection, canine and physical inspection—in detecting explosives in belly-loaded cargo. The X-ray-based technologies (CTX–9000s 

and CTX–5500) are adapted from applications used in checked baggage. The SFO 

campaign assesses the implications of screening significantly greater cargo amounts 

with dedicated facilities. The CVG campaign assesses the implications of screening 

significantly greater cargo amounts utilizing existing infrastructure and existing 

screeners. At SEA we are working to determine the performance of specialized technologies for stowaway detection. In addition to technology performance, the pilot 

project is developing an understanding of appropriate Concepts of Operation 

(ConOps), training requirements and the costs associated with screening significantly more cargo than is presently being screened. 

GIFTS AND DONATIONS

Question. Provide a breakdown in the source of funding for the $66 million indicated in receipts under gifts and donations. Clearly indicate the name of ‘‘private 

sources’’ that contributed funds as well as their intended purposes. 

Answer. The $66 million was transferred to FEMA from the State Department. 

It was charitable money that came to the State Department from foreign sources 

for Katrina. 

Question. Provide a summary covering the period fiscal year 2004–fiscal year 2007 

of money made available to victims of natural disasters through the Cora Brown 

Fund. 

Answer. During the period of fiscal year 2004—fiscal year 2007 no money was 

made available to victims of natural disasters through the Cora Brown Fund. 

Question. Provide the justification as to why $66 million will be obligated towards 

object class 26.0 which is intended for ‘‘Supplies and materials’’. 

Answer. The correct object class for this obligation should be 41.01, not Object 

26.0. The $66 million represents donations from foreign governments and international entities to support Hurricane Katrina relief and recovery efforts. The Dept 

of State (DOS) acted as the intermediary for these foreign offers of assistance. DOS 

collected the funds and converted them to U.S. dollars and transferred them to 

FEMA. These funds were recorded as donations in the Trust fund in October 2005. 

They were obligated in fiscal year 2006 with object class 41.01 which is Grants, Subsidies and Contributions. 
158 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE (WHTI)

Question. As I have said on many occasions, I have serious reservations about the 

way the Departments of Homeland Security and State have pushed forward with 

implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, or WHTI, before the 

necessary technology, infrastructure and training preparation takes place at our 

border stations. If these critical features are not in place, we will see severe delays 

at our border and law-abiding citizens from the United States, Canada and Mexico 

will have great difficulty moving between our countries. Most importantly, a hasty 

implementation will undermine the intended goals of the program. 

Why not take the time Congress gave the Department to do this right? 

Answer. As permitted by law, DHS intends to begin to implement WHTI at the 

earliest possible date in order to enhance border security by closing the 

vulnerabilities created by passport and documentation waivers currently in effect. 

Section 546 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, 

Pub. L. No. 109–295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1386 (Oct. 4, 2006) (DHS Appropriations Act 

of 2007), outlines a number of requirements that DHS and DOS must meet for implementation of WHTI. DHS is working diligently to address each of those requirements. For example, on February 22, 2007, DHS announced its intention to propose 

flexibility for United States and Canadian children entering the United States at 

land and sea ports of entry. In addition, as contemplated in section 546, DHS and 

DOS have been in extensive discussions with the National Institute of Standards 

and Technology (NIST) regarding card security standards and best available practices for protection of personal identification documents. DHS also continues sharing 

information regarding WHTI implementation with the Governments of Canada and 

Mexico. 

Question. What steps has the Department taken to address potential problems 

concerning implementation, and to prevent a major disruption of commerce across 

the Canadian border? 

Answer. The potential of the rule to cause economic impacts has been a primary 

concern for DHS and DOS in developing WHTI in the land/sea environment. DHS 

is preparing an extensive regulatory impact analysis that is fully compliant with Executive Order 12866 and Office of Management and Budget Circular A–4 for an economically significant regulatory action. The analysis will be published concurrently 

with the proposed rule. 

DHS will implement the law in a way that makes sense in terms of both security 

and facilitation. As more people obtain passports or other acceptable, secure identity 

documents to comply with WHTI, border crossing will be faster, more efficient and 

more consistent. A list of acceptable identity documents will be proposed in the DHS 

Sea/Land Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. DHS continues to work with the State of 

Washington and the Canadian government regarding alternative documents, and 

DHS remains open to working with other States to that end. Those documents will 

have both a machine-readable zone (MRZ) and a vicinity RFID chip. 

DHS currently has the infrastructure in place at all ports of entry to swipe documents with MRZs. In order to ensure the facilitation of trade and travel across the 

land borders, DHS is building upon the infrastructure it already has in place with 

its Trusted Traveler programs by incorporating vicinity RFID into border crossing 

documents and deploying RFID readers to the 39 busiest land ports of entry. 

In addition, education and outreach will be critical to compliance and facilitating 

trade and travel. DHS and DOS are planning an aggressive outreach program. DHS 

has conducted a number of listening sessions with stakeholders, including the 

States. 

Question. I am concerned that your department has prematurely endorsed one 

PASS card technology over another without first securing the required certification 

and then notifying Congress. The Leahy/Stevens law clearly states that the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) must certify, prior to implementation 

that the card safeguards privacy. By unilaterally moving forward with vicinity-read 

technology—a technology, by the way, that is approved for palettes not people—DHS 

would be choosing an insecure technology that has not been proven effective at ensuring privacy protection, and it would be necessitating the installation of new technological infrastructure at every U.S. land and sea port of entry. 

Has the Department decided upon a technology to use in the PASS Card? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of State 

(State) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) are working 

collaboratively to address the certifications from Section 546 of the Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 (Public Law 109–295). Specifically, the relevant pro-
159 

vision calls for NIST certification that ‘‘the Departments of Homeland Security and 

State have selected a card architecture that meets or exceeds International Organization for Standardization (ISO) security standards and meets or exceeds best available practices for protection of personal identification documents.’’ 

NIST will certify based upon its review of State’s draft Request for Proposals 

(RFP) for the procurement of the Passport Card, developed in cooperation with 

DHS. 

The technology solution that has been selected and is currently going through the 

NIST certification process is the vicinity radio frequency identification technology. 

Question. If the recommendations from NIST run contrary to what you anticipate 

using, will you seriously consider their recommendations? Do you believe you can 

ignore them? 

Answer. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been 

working collaboratively with the DHS and DOS for the past year to develop the 

method by which it would meet the requirements of section 546 of the Homeland 

Security Appropriations Act of 2006 (Public Law 109–295). This relationship has 

proven to be very beneficial and NIST has provided valuable input. DHS expects 

that relationship to continue as NIST completes its certification. 

REAL ID

Question. I believe there are troubling parallels between the WHTI and REAL ID 

programs, as both face serious flaws and dim prospects of success. In the case of 

the WHTI border-crossing system, the Administration continues to pretend the reform path ordered by Congress was never enacted. And now the new draft REAL 

ID regulations released last week confirm the worst suspicions that this program 

will impose a massive $20 billion unfunded mandate on State governments while 

raising innumerable civil liberties and privacy concerns. It is ironic that we probably 

would have stronger drivers’ licenses today if the original shared rulemaking procedures that Congress agreed to in 2004 had been allowed to move forward. 

How much is in your budget request this year to help the States comply with the 

unfunded mandate placed on them by REAL ID? 

Answer. We requested $3 million in the fiscal year 2008 budget for the Department to more effectively assist and monitor State compliance with REAL ID. Additionally, Congress provided $40 million in grants for REAL ID in fiscal year 2006. 

We plan to use up to $34 million of this amount to assist the States in the development of the virtual database of driver’s license data called for under the Act. 

Question. I understand your department has proposed that States pay to meet 

these requirements by using their State homeland security dollars. Are you aware 

that there has been a 60 percent drop in appropriations for these accounts since 

2003—often at the behest of this administration? On top of that, are you aware that 

your budget request for this year slashes the State homeland security grant program by over half—over half—from the enacted level this year? 

Answer. DHS announced that up to 20 percent of a State’s Homeland Security 

Grant Program funds can be used to help implement REAL ID. This additional 

flexibility will be made available during the current 2007 grant cycle. This step provides an additional funding source for States and while the fiscal year 2008 budget 

represents a decrease in grants from fiscal year 2007, there are approximately $5 

billion in prior awards to States that remain unspent. This $5 billion does not include the $2 billion yet to be awarded in fiscal year 2007. 

INTERAGENCY THREAT ASSESSMENT AND COORDINATION GROUP (ITACG)

Question. As I am sure you will agree, State and local partners must be a part 

of any planning for the threats to our Nation, as they are truly our first responders, 

and we cannot protect our Nation without their full participation with Federal efforts to secure the homeland. 

Unfortunately, DHS has not fully supported the participation of State and local 

officials in your recent efforts to create the Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group. Despite recent assurances from Assistant Secretary Charlie Allen in 

testimony before the House, it appears the problems may be continuing, as State 

and local officials have not been included as full partners in planning meetings for 

the ITACG. 

Do you stand by Assistant Secretary Charlie Allen’s statement that the ITACG 

must have the ‘‘full engagement’’ of State and local partners, including at the planning stages, and will you assure me that State and local officials will not be excluded from the planning for ITACG? 

Answer. I stand by Assistant Secretary Allen’s statement, and can assure you we 

have engaged—and will continue to engage—with State and local partners on plan-
160 

ning for the Group’s standup and continued operations. Our commitment here is unchanged. 

DHS has engaged with numerous State and local officials regarding three phases 

of State and local involvement in the Group: 

Planning.—As noted above, DHS has supported full, open, and transparent planning for the Group in collaboration with State and local participants at every step 

along the way. It is important to note that the planning effort for the Group was 

an open interagency effort, with over 40 representatives from 10 different Federal, 

State, and local organizations. DHS, as planning co-chair, made a special effort to 

facilitate openness and full participation by all parties. 

Operations.—As you have noted, Charlie Allen has testified publicly to the Department’s support for initially placing 2 State and local officials in the Group to 

represent their information needs and perspectives. We are actively working with 

State and local members of the Implementation Team to establish joint nomination/ 

selection protocols, and mechanisms under which State and local representatives 

can be detailed to year-long rotational tours within the Group’s offices. 

Continuing Engagements.—DHS also identified the need very early in the planning stage to establish a State and local advisory council to provide Group’s leadership valuable feedback on its perceptions of Group challenges and successes and 

how the Group can improve and fine tune its operations to support State and local 

needs. Such an advisory panel will provide for wide State and local participation in 

the Group’s process. This recommendation has been endorsed by the Implementation Team, and State and local officials on that team are currently drafting the 

charter and protocols to govern this advisory panel. 

Question. As you are aware, the 9/11 bill requires the full participation of State 

and local officials in the ITACG and mandates that you include them. Do you have 

any concerns about living up to the requirements of this bill if it becomes law? 

Answer. Yes. I am concerned that the draft legislation exceeds the language approved in Guideline 2 by giving the PM–ISE oversight of Group operational responsibilities, which are—at least in part—the statutory responsibility of DHS—this altered language potentially limits the effectiveness and sustainability of the Group. 

—Language in draft Senate Bill (S.4) expands the PM–ISE’s operational role at 

the expense of Federal departments with statutory missions that overlap Group 

functions. This provision would seriously impede DHS’ ability to execute our 

homeland security responsibilities, and would confuse important authorities relating to the coordination of time-sensitive threat assessments and related information. (See the highlighted portions below, which give the PM the responsibility to ‘‘oversee’’ not only the creation, but the ‘‘operation’’ of the Group.) 

—IN GENERAL.—As part of efforts to establish the information sharing environment established under section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), the program manager shall 

oversee and coordinate the creation and ongoing operation of an Interagency 

Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (in this section referred to as the 

‘‘ITACG’’). 

—MANAGEMENT.—(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall assign a senior 

level officer to manage and direct the administration of the ITACG. 

—The draft legislation weakens DHS’ ‘‘manage and direct’’ role approved in 

Guideline 2 to the naming of a senior official to manage and direct the administration of the Group. The word ‘‘administration’’ does not appear in Guideline 

2, and its introduction would significantly limit DHS’ responsibility to lead the 

Group, not just administer it. The Group cannot run itself. Guideline 2’s information sharing framework recognized DHS’ preeminent equities in sharing terrorism information with State and local partners by assigning it a clear leadership role, while still requiring consultation and ‘‘collaborative decision making’’ 

on substantive issues. Under Guideline 2, DHS would ‘‘manage and direct the 

day-to-day operations of the Group,’’ in consultation with the FBI and the other 

stakeholders. By contrast, in the current draft legislation, that leadership role 

would be unmet and replaced by an administrative function, confusing the 

Group’s authorities and threatening its ability to operate on behalf of our collective State and local stakeholders. 

Question. Can you explain to me why State and local officials were not allowed 

to participate fully in earlier stages of planning for the ITACG? 

Answer. State and local officials have been actively involved in every step of the 

interagency planning and coordination process for the Group. From the Guideline 

2 Implementation Team’s December 6, 2006 official kickoff session—designed to 

stand up and develop an operating concept for the Group—to the present, State and 

local officials have participated fully and directly in the effort. 
161 

During the Implementation Team’s planning work, the DHS and FBI co-chairs 

hosted twice-weekly planning sessions—one at NCTC and one via teleconference to 

facilitate out-of-town State and local participation. 

All materials developed to reflect the Implementation Team’s deliberations were 

disseminated electronically to all participating State and local officials, who were in 

turn encouraged to distribute to their wider State and local constituencies as appropriate, as part of the interagency coordination process. 

Question. Please tell me when the ITACG will be up and running? 

Answer. Interagency endorsement for the Group by the Deputies Committee is anticipated on March 30 2007; Group operations are expected to commence in the coming weeks. 

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS

Question. We can probably all agree that an effective Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) is absolutely critical for every State. This is the hub of decision-making, 

communications, and overall management of an emergency. It is troubling then that 

many States do not have an adequate emergency management facility. The center 

in my home State in Vermont is in a floodplain. A little over 75 years previously, 

it location was covered with tens of feet of water. The reality is that many States 

do not have the resources to outfit a state-of-the-art facility, and Federal funding 

is needed to complete these projects. Any Federal response to an emergency will be 

highly reliant on the available State infrastructure. 

Does the Department of Homeland Security have an assessment of the current 

state of EOCs in all 50 States and the District of Columbia? 

Answer. DHS has not conducted a formal assessment of EOCs. However, the 

Technical Assistance Program has conducted an initial review of EOCs around the 

country to identify ‘‘best practices’’ in design and management. 

Question. If so, could you please provide what standards the Department sets for 

state EOCs and a list of the assessment of the center in each State? 

Answer. At present, the Department has not performed a formal assessment of 

EOCs, nor have Federal standards been established. However, the Technical Assistance Program has conducted an initial review of EOCs around the country to identify ‘‘best practices’’ in design and management. 

Question. Would you be supportive of a Federal grant program that would assist 

States with bringing their EOCs up to adequate standards? 

Answer. The Department does not support additional grant funds beyond existing 

programs to address the need for EOC upgrades. Currently, States are using EMPG 

funds and other grant resources as well as State and local capital funds to conduct 

improvements to their facilities to address urgent requirements for interoperable 

communications, incident management, and other key capabilities. As such, there 

is no need to provide additional grant funding for duplicative purposes. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BARBARA A. MIKULSKI

Question. What is the Department’s inspection process for roll-on/roll-off cargo before it enters U.S. ports? 

Answer. Containerized and break-bulk cargo manifest are required to be submitted to CBP 24 hours prior to laden at the foreign port. Bulk cargo is transmitted 

24 hours prior to arrival. All cargo designated as high-risk targets are identified, 

scanned and/or examined either at the foreign port of lading or upon discharge in 

the United States. In addition to incorporating the layered enforcement process defined above, CBP conducts operations that involve the scanning of bulk and roll-on/ 

roll-off cargo upon discharge using hand-held (Portable Radiation Detection Pagers 

(PRD), Radiation Isotope Identification Devices RIIDs) and large-scale RPM capabilities. 

Question. How is the Department ensuring that weapons of mass destruction are 

not being smuggled into the United States in roll-on/roll-off cargo? 

Answer. In addition to incorporating the layered enforcement process defined 

above, CBP routinely conducts random screening of roll-on/roll-off cargo using handheld (Portable Radiation Detection Pagers (PRD), Radiation Isotope Identification 

Devices RIIDs) and large scale RPM capabilities. 

Question. Can you explain the President’s decision to cut Fire Grant funding by 

$245 million when there is a demonstrated need for this program? 

Answer. The Administration provides billions of dollars in annual support training, exercise, and equipment to State and local public safety personnel, including 

firefighters, so that they are adequately prepared to respond to a terrorist attacks 

or other major incidents. Federal support has been directed in order to better focus 
162 

scarce resources on enhancing target capabilities, and to avoid supplanting basic 

public safety investments at the State and local level. A Federally funded hiring 

program for firefighters risks replacing State and local funding for general purpose 

public safety staffing with Federal resources, and, therefore, does not forward the 

Federal goal of enhancing local preparedness capabilities. The administration believes that $287 million is an appropriate level of funding 

given the availability of significant amounts of funding for first responder preparedness missions from other DHS grant programs which are better coordinated with 

State and local homeland security strategies and, unlike AFG, are allocated on the 

basis of risk. 

Question. Can you explain why the President’s budget has not included any specific funding for high risk non-profits when terrorists are increasingly attacking soft 

target, like hospitals, synagogues, schools and museums? 

Answer. The Department provides maximum flexibility through the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) for States to identify those priorities which require 

resources. States are concerned about soft targets and have previously made investments towards items such as physical security enhancements and target hardening 

devices (sensors, etc). As these activities are already allowable under programs such 

as the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), the Law Enforcement Terrorism 

Prevention Program (LETPP) and the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), the 

Department has not specifically requested set-aside funds for these constituencies. 

It is also worth noting that the Department has previously administered (and will 

again in fiscal year 2007) a small grant program in two rounds of $25 million each 

which will specifically target the non-profit sector, and could include synagogues, 

museums and other entities. 

Question. USCIS has still not issued the necessary regulations pursuant to the 

Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 for U-visas. It has been 

7 years since Congress passed this law and no regulations for U-visas have been 

promulgated. Can you please tell what is causing this delay and when you expect 

the Department to release these regulations? 

Answer. The U-visa rule is under review and we anticipate that it will be issued 

within the next few months. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATTY MURRAY

PNNL FUNDING

Question. What are your plans for ensuring that the critical Homeland Security 

research at PNNL proceeds without disruption by the Hanford Clean-up? 

Answer. DHS continues to sponsor technical activities at the Pacific Northwest 

National Laboratory (PNNL) in research, development, testing, and evaluation of 

science and technology projects. Continued funding of these activities will help sustain the laboratory’s technical expertise that is necessary for the execution of the 

DHS mission related projects at PNNL which are accessed by several other Federal 

agencies as well. 

Question. Do you support the addition of $25 million in the Homeland Security 

appropriations bill for the Area 300 facility at Hanford? 

Answer. DHS fully supports the replacement of the PNNL 300 Area facilities that 

will be decommissioned at the Hanford site. The critical work being done at that 

facility benefits many agencies within DHS and we look to continue leveraging those 

facilities and expertise. DHS will continue to be supportive of the PNNL 300 Area 

Capability Replacement Laboratory (CRL) construction project and recognizes its 

importance to offer infrastructure for future technical work critical to the DHS mission. 

NORTHERN BORDER PROSECUTIONS

Question. What can your Department do to help communities like Blaine along 

the northern border? 

Answer. In 2006, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael 

Chertoff adopted the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) initiative to 

leverage Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement resources in an effort to 

identify, disrupt, and dismantle organizations that seek to exploit vulnerabilities at 

the border and threaten the overall safety and security of the American public. (Law 

Enforcement sensitive response will be submitted under separate cover) 

In fiscal year 2008, ICE has requested $10.67 million to support the expansion 

of the BEST concept nationwide. A portion of these funds will be utilized during the 

BEST Northern Border expansion. 
163 

Counter Narcotic Operations 

ICE has 19 northern border offices routinely interacting with other Federal, State, 

local, tribal, and Canadian authorities to coordinate law enforcement efforts. 

Smuggling organizations operating along the northern border are adept in utilizing various smuggling methods to facilitate their operations. The primary narcotics threat along the northern border is the smuggling of ‘‘BC Bud’’ marijuana into 

the United States. In addition, there has been an increase in the number of seizures 

and investigations related to pre-cursor chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, ecstasy and other controlled substances. In fiscal year 2006, ICE investigations resulted in 115 seizures, totaling 98 pounds of methamphetamine, 

along the U.S.-Canadian border. 

Recent Successes 

In June 2006, ICE Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Seattle completed Operation 

Frozen Timber. Operation Frozen Timber targeted a Canadian drug smuggling organization that utilized helicopters to bi-directionally smuggle drugs, bulk cash, and 

firearms into and out of National Forest and National Park lands in Washington 

State. The ICE investigation resulted in the seizures of 8,000 pounds of marijuana, 

800 pounds of cocaine, three aircraft, and $1.5 million in U.S. currency. 

In December 2006, ICE SAC Seattle seized 14 pounds of methamphetamine and 

arrested a member of a Mexican drug-trafficking organization. This joint Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) investigation resulted in 43 suspects facing Federal 

narcotics charges. 

In January 2007, ICE SAC Boston arrested four suspects in connection with 

smuggling 108 pounds of ‘‘BC Bud’’ marijuana from Canada. The four defendants 

are pending Federal prosecution. 

IBETS 

ICE currently participates in the Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBETs) 

program with personnel from six SAC offices across the U.S.-Canadian border. The 

IBET concept currently operates in 15 individual regions across the Northern U.S. 

border with co-located personnel in four. 

The IBET concept was developed by ICE, other U.S. law enforcement representatives and Canadian law enforcement agencies to promote joint operational coordination while: 

—Enhancing border integrity and security between designated ports of entry 

—Exchanging cross border actionable intelligence, and 

—Identifying, investigating and interdicting persons, organizations and goods that 

threaten the national security 

ICE, as part of the IBET, combats criminal organizations seeking to exploit the 

northern border as a vector for their illicit actions by: 

—Using an integrated, cooperative and strategic approach to enable the establishment of joint goals and priorities; 

—Focusing on continuous improvement through the effective and efficient use of 

human resources, technology and accountability frameworks; 

—Incorporating a mobile response capability, to prevent potential threats of terrorism as well as impeding the smuggling of humans and contraband. 

Intellectual Property Rights 

ICE has started to see a growing problem with the stockpiling and transshipment 

of Chinese counterfeit goods through Canada and into the United States. 

ICE has started working with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who also recognize the problem. 

ICE had also seen in a prior operation (Operation Apothecary), the transshipment, 

and outright sale of pharmaceuticals via the internet from Canada. 

Other Operations 

In addition to the above items, ICE has 7 SAC offices that have a nexus to the 

northern border: Seattle, Denver, St. Paul, Chicago, Detroit, Buffalo, and Boston. 

Each SAC allocates resources based upon the threat within its area of responsibility. 

SAC offices in St. Paul, Boston, Denver, and Detroit have document and benefit 

fraud task forces that deal with northern border identity and benefit fraud. 

Question. Why should Federal support for local law enforcement efforts be limited 

only to southern border communities? 

Answer. ICE support for local law enforcement efforts are not only limited to the 

southern border. ICE has many activities throughout the country. Please see our 

previous response for additional details on our northern border activities. 

Question. Do you think that northern border communities should be eligible for 

assistance programs? 
164 

Answer. The Department has made funding available to northern border communities under the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), a component of the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP). Up to 25 percent of fiscal 

year 2004–2007 LETPP funding may be used to support costs associated with border 

protection activities when the Department is operating at Code Yellow or above. All 

56 States and territories receive LETPP funding and border communities are eligible to use this funding for border protection activities. These activities must be coordinated with the Department’s Office of Grants and Training and Customs and 

Border Protection. Funding is administered by each State Administrative Agency 

(SAA). The SAA must pass-through 80 percent of its annual LETPP award to local 

units of government. 

COAST GUARD DEEPWATER

Question. Can you please discuss what steps the Department has taken to improve its oversight of the Integrated Coast Guard Systems and the Deepwater 

project? 

Answer. The Coast Guard has devoted considerable attention to concerns raised 

by the Congress, GAO, and the DHS OIG. As such, the Coast Guard is actively assuming a greater oversight and management role in the Deepwater Program. Several changes have been made that will address the challenges facing the Deepwater 

Program. They include: 

—Moving Deepwater acquisition function into the Acquisition Directorate to form 

one Acquisition structure to increase efficiency and improve processes; 

—Designating the Assistant Commandant for Engineering & Logistics Resources 

(CG–4) as the Coast Guard’s Technical Authority for all new ship acquisition 

designs. 

—Adding staff on the government side to the Deepwater Program to perform 

greater contractor oversight and assume a portion of the system integrator duties; 

—Initiating a Business Case Analysis for all new acquisition decisions to ensure 

we are building and buying the right tools for our Coast Guard men and women 

for the best price; and 

—Conducting more third party analyses. 

Some of these changes will take both time and funds to establish. The 2008 Request for a $4 million increase in Government Program Management is to develop 

the required staff competencies and capabilities over the next few years. It will also 

help fund ongoing and new independent analyses and provide specific support to address recommendations from GAO and DHS–OIG reviews. In the short term, the 

Coast Guard will continue to utilize private sector and other government agencies 

to support technical support not available within the Coast Guard. 

Government Program Management funds are not used to expand the military/civilian government workforce. Funding for additional military and/or civilian personnel is provided through a separate Program, Project or Activity (PPA) budget 

line. 

Based on preliminary analysis, the Deepwater Program initially identified a need 

for an additional 31 government billets to efficiently obligate Deepwater Program 

funding and ensure successful delivery of needed assets to the fleet. The estimate 

does not consider the move to form one Acquisition structure and its attendant efficiencies. Formulation of staffing needs for the new organization will be identified 

and implemented as this initiative evolves. In addition, a Deepwater Review to determine resource needs has been directed by the DHS Undersecretary for Management, Paul Schneider. 

Question. The President’s budget requests $788.1 million to complete the acquisition of four National Security Cutters. Admiral Allen’s testimony stated that the 

Coast Guard will fix Cutters 1 and 2, which are currently being built, and design 

a fix for future boats. What steps has the Department taken to ensure that the 

Coast Guard will ensure that future cutters do not include any defect? What actions 

are you prepared to take if these proposed fixes are inadequate? 

Answer. The President’s fiscal year 2008 Budget Requests $165.7 million to fund 

long lead material for the fifth NSC as well as to complete the funding for NSC 1– 

4. The Department has initiated a review of the entire Deepwater Program. A portion of the review is a thorough cost realism analysis by a third party. The Department is conducting market research to see what Federal agencies are available to 

do the third party independent cost realism assessment. One piece of the cost realism assessment would be the review of the proposed design fixes and the current 

costs associated with them. The Department’s goal is to ensure that the proposed 
165 

fixes are adequately funded to avoid any further problems with flawed design specifications. 

In addition, the Coast Guard requested Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock 

Division (NSWC–CD) to conduct an independent analysis of the fatigue tolerance of 

NSC critical areas. With the results of this model in hand the Deepwater PEO in 

concert with the Coast Guard’s Technical Authority, are working with ICGS, in developing a full technical solution that will be incorporated into production of NSC 

3 through 8. A proposal has been submitted by ICGS in concert with the Coast 

Guard request to accomplish these changes. With regard to NSC 1 and 2, the USCG 

intends to implement similar enhancements during normal post-delivery availabilities that will be well before any fatigue service-life limitations are reached. 

Question. For the Fast Response Cutter, a GAO report last year stated, ‘‘The 

Coast Guard has expended about $25 million and does not have a viable FRC design 

to date.’’ How can you reassure the Committee that the next $25 million we spend 

on the Fast Response Cutter, which is included in the President’s budget request, 

is spent more effectively than the first $25 million? 

Answer. On March 14, 2007, the Commandant of the Coast Guard signed a decision memorandum approving the termination of the current FRC–B acquisition with 

Integrated Coast Guard Systems and reassigning it to the Coast Guard’s Acquisition 

Directorate. This action will ensure full and open competition, enable the Coast 

Guard to control costs and in the shortest time possible deliver urgently needed patrol boats that help mitigate the existing patrol boat operating hour gap. The Acquisition Directorate’s strategy is to use a fixed-price contract based on an existing, inservice, proven patrol boat design requiring limited modifications to meet basic requirements. This ‘‘parent craft’’ acquisition strategy will reduce technical risk and 

design development time. A Request for Information conducted in mid-2006 confirmed the existence of several patrol boat designs that could meet the Coast 

Guard’s basic patrol boat requirements with limited modifications. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

Question. Secretary Chertoff, during Hurricane’s Katrina and Rita, emergency responders from around the country deployed to South Louisiana, neither Local, State 

nor Federal responders could communicate with each other, to coordinate command 

and control activities. 

You have proposed in your fiscal year 2008 budget a proposed $1 billion joint effort between the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of 

Commerce. 

Please explain how long you think it will be before the Nation’s responders at the 

Local, State and Federal Level, including the military will be able to communicate 

with each other during a disaster? What are the timelines for results? 

Answer. From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2006, G&T has provided more 

than $2.9 billion for communications interoperability initiatives, making it the largest category of expenditure through the Homeland Security Grant Program due in 

part to it being one of the National Priorities under the National Preparedness Goal. 

These funds support a host of interoperability activities in line with the Interoperability Continuum (i.e., governance, standard operating procedures, usage, technology, and training and exercises), which was designed to help the public safety 

community and local, tribal, State, and Federal policy makers address critical elements for success as they plan and implement interoperability solutions. In addition 

to its other grant programs, in fiscal year 2007 DHS will co-administer a $1 billion 

Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC) Grant Program in partnership 

with the Department of Commerce National Telecommunications and Information 

Administration (NTIA). 

DHS has learned through our partnership with State and local emergency responders that addressing interoperable communications is about more than simply 

purchasing equipment. This fact was emphasized in the December 2006 release of 

the SAFECOM National Baseline Assessment of thousands of State and local emergency response agencies. The need to emphasize training, exercises, standard operating procedures, and constant application and usage of equipment was also illustrated throughout 2006 when DHS worked with 75 urban and metropolitan areas 

to develop tactical interoperable communications plans (TICP). These plans were 

tested and validated through full-scale exercises, and further assessed through the 

development of Tactical Interoperable Communications Scorecards. In January 

2007, DHS released these Tactical Interoperable Communications Scorecards and 

provided them to each of the participating urban/metropolitan areas with recommendations on how they can continue to improve their interoperable communica-
166 

tion capabilities. As illustrated by the scorecard effort, all urban and metropolitan 

areas have made progress in the maturity of interoperable communications and 

have achieved at least a minimal level of tactical interoperability. Although some 

of our major Urban Areas remain more prepared than others, it may take several 

years before such preparations are completed Nation-wide. 

To broaden the capabilities beyond just Urban Areas, the fiscal year 2006 and 

2007 State Homeland Security Grant Program requires each State and territory to 

submit a Statewide Communications Interoperability Plan in November 2007; 

States and Territories can use 2006 and 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program 

funds, as well as up to 5 percent of their allocated PSIC funds, to develop these 

plans. The Department is committed to improving interoperable communication capabilities for our Nation’s first responders while acknowledging that interoperability 

is an issue that requires ongoing attention as technologies evolve, regional planning 

matures, and procedures continue to be tested. 

Question. And is this an additional $1 billion, or is this money being reallocated 

from another critical program? 

Answer. The $1 billion from the Department of Commerce is additional funding. 

The 2005 Deficit Reduction Act directed the creation of the $1 billion grant program 

for Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC). The $1 billion derived from 

the expected sale of spectrum as part of the Digital Television Transition scheduled 

for February 2009. The Call Home Act of 2006 (Sec 4) subsequently mandated that 

the interoperable communications grants be awarded by the end of fiscal year 2007. 

The PSIC Grant Program will be administered jointly by the Departments of Commerce National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) and 

Homeland Security (DHS). 

The partnership between DHS and NTIA constructed through the Deficit Reduction and Call Home Acts was affirmed in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 

on February 16, 2007. The MOU defines the roles and responsibilities and the implementation of the PSIC Grant Program. More specifically, the MOU indicates that 

NTIA will transfer PSIC funds to DHS and NTIA will obtain the grant administrative services and expertise of DHS. DHS will support the administration of those 

funds while NTIA will retain ultimate approval authority over all aspects of the 

PSIC Grant Program. Through DHS’ strong working relationship with NTIA, the 

Department has outlined a program plan and aggressive schedule of activities for 

meeting the Call Home Act deadline. 

Question. For example, in fiscal year 2007, State Preparedness Grants programs 

were funded at $1.1 billion, this year the program is funded at $465,000.00, with 

$1 billion being moved to radio interoperability. 

How do we believe State and Governments will make up for the short fall in Preparedness Grants? We need a fully funded State and Local Government preparedness grant program. 

Answer. The level of funding for State Homeland Security Grant program is based 

on several factors including, the substantial level of funds awarded over the past 

6 years and the level of funding currently in the State and local programs’ pipeline. 

A total of $3.2 billion will be available for State and local preparedness expenditures 

as well as assistance to firefighters in fiscal year 2008. Of this amount, $2.2 billion 

is requested for DHS to fund grant, training and exercise programs. Funds requested through these programs will (1) provide critical assistance to State and local 

homeland security efforts, (2) support resources available through other Federal assistance programs that center on first responder terrorism preparedness activities, 

and (3) deliver ample support to all State and local first responder organizations to 

obtain the equipment, training, and other resources required to protect the public 

in the event of a terrorist attack or other major incident. 

The $1 billion Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC) grant program 

is additional funding. The 2005 Deficit Reduction Act directed the creation of the 

PSIC grant program for $1 billion derived from the expected sale of spectrum as 

part of the Digital Television Transition scheduled for February 2009. The Call 

Home Act of 2006 (Sec 4) subsequently mandated that the interoperable communications grants be awarded by the end of fiscal year 2007. The PSIC Grant Program 

will be administered jointly by the Departments of Commerce National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) and Homeland Security 

(DHS). 

Question. Secretary Chertoff, the Federal Emergency Management Agency has the 

responsibility for managing the Nation’s incident command system. In order to promote this system, exercising the Incident Command System is very important. 

Your budget proposal only adjusted the National Exercise Program for inflation 

only. Our Nation continues to be threatened by natural disasters and terrorism, it 
167 

would seem that we need to increase opportunities for the Nation’s responders and 

command and control elements to exercise and train together. 

How does decreasing the State and Local Training program and only adjusting 

the National Exercise program for inflation accomplish this? How many exercises 

are planned for this year? 

Answer. Funding for exercise activities and the National Exercise Program (NEP) 

specifically continues to be a priority for the Department. Resourcing for State, 

local, and tribal (S/L/T) exercise activities are allowable expenses through a variety 

of homeland security and health grant programs. Such decisions reflect the priorities of the respective jurisdiction. At the Federal level, the codified NEP—for the 

first time—establishes a requirement for Federal Departments and to assess their 

respective agencies exercise activities and to account for the resource impacts with 

their internal programming processes. With the advent of DHS’ reorganization, the 

Exercise and Evaluation Division is actively engaging with FEMA leadership to galvanize a regional approach to the NEP. The NEP will rely heavily on FEMA Regional Directors and State Homeland Security Advisors to ensure both forward-deployed Federal assets and S/L/T assets are using the NEP and HSEEP. Following 

those efforts, any resources identified as a priority but without a supporting programmatic basis will be brought forward through the established budget submission 

process. This will include a detailed requirement to establish and maintain the required National Exercise Simulation Center. 

There is a variety of approach’s that have been developed and implemented specifically designed to utilize existing funding sources to plan and conduct exercise activities. To meet the mandated multi-year exercise planning system, an interactive 

system has been developed, along with procedures for adjudicating exercise activities. All exercises can be entered in the National Exercise Scheduling System 

(NEXS); those exercises determined to include Federal participation are posted to 

the Five-Year Schedule, which is organized and agreed upon by the Homeland Security Council. 

Each Federally organized and conducted, Homeland Security-related exercise can 

be input into the National Exercise Scheduling System (NEXS) while Tiers 1–3 exercises are included in the NEP Five-Year Schedule. 

According to the Five Year Schedule, in fiscal year 2007 the following exercises 

are planned: 

Tier 1—National Level Exercise: 

—NLE 1–07: Positive Response/Vigilant Shield 12/07 (Nuclear weapons accident) 

—NLE 2–07: Positive Response/Ardent Sentry/Northern Edge 5/07 

—NLE 1–08: TOPOFF 4 Full Scale Exercise /Positive Response /Able Warrior 

/Global Lightning 10/07 

—PLE Tabletop 2/07 (IED) 

—PLE Tabletop 4/07 (Nuclear-prep for the NLE 2–07) 

—PLE Tabletop 7/07 (Biological-focus on Pandemic Influenza) 

—PLE Tabletop 9/07 (Radiological-prep for the NLE 1–08) 

Tier 2: 

—Golden Guardian 06 11/07 

—Positive Force (DOD) 3/07 

—PINNACLE 5/07 

—Pandemic Influenza Exercise 11/07 

—Hurricane Preparedness Exercises 3–6/07 

—Vigilant Shield (DOD) 2008 12/07 

—TOPOFF 4 LSG 12/07 

Tier 3—Other Federal Level Exercises: 

—JLOTS (DOD) 2/07 

—Able Warrior (DOD) 3/07 

—Unified Support (DOD) 3/07 

—Spills Of National Significance (SONS) 6/07 

—Able Warrior (DOD) 6/07 

—DHS Infrastructure Protection Functional Exercise 3–6/07 

Tier 4—Non-Federal Exercises: 

—Senior Official Exercises /National Special Security Events 

—Non-Governmental Organization SOE 4/07 

To accommodate participation levels required to meet the tiered approach, the Department of Homeland Security is developing a National Exercise Simulation Center 

(NESC). Capabilities-based planning requires an integrated approach that pools resources, maximizes efficiency, and provides sustained exercise and training support. 

The NESC will provide a central resource facility and interface to support the Department of Homeland Security’s exercise programs, activities, training, and initiatives. It will address current exercise and training deficiencies by: 
168 

—Coordinating management of training for exercise and evaluation programs, activities, and initiatives through expanded exercise participation; 

—Enhancing exercise reality by using real-world command, control, and communication networks; 

—Simulating non-participating Federal, State, local (FSL), NGO, and private sector entities; and 

—Streamlining preparedness objectives and issue resolution through information 

management and exercise scheduling. 

Question. Secretary Chertoff, the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program is currently authorized at $375 million, however the current EMPG need 

as we’ve heard from the Emergency Management community is $487 million. 

As I understand it, the EMPG formula and authorization for EMPG will be linked 

to homeland security grant reform package. We’ve heard from the Emergency Management Community and many complain the allocations do not take an all hazards 

approach and do not allow flexibility. 

Every Community has different funding needs, the All Hazards approach provided 

some flexibility in the way communities could plan and respond to the numerous 

types of threats that exists. 

You have proposed a metric system for how we measure our emergency management capacity, explain why you think the homeland security specific measures 

would work better that voluntary system for performance measures? Do we not 

trust our State and local governments to spend the money wisely? 

Answer. The EMPG program has been administered by the Office of Grants and 

Training (G&T) since the fiscal year 2005 cycle, when the program was transferred 

from FEMA, and has continued to provide critical assistance to sustain and enhance 

State and local all-hazards emergency management capabilities. G&T has administered the program consistent with previous fiscal years under FEMA, including the 

allocation formula, per congressional direction. In addition, G&T has worked closely 

with the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) to develop EMPG 

program guidance each fiscal year to meet the needs of the emergency management 

community, including the decoupling of EMPG from the Homeland Security Grant 

Program after fiscal year 2005. 

EMPG work plans identify a State’s all-hazards emergency management priorities 

for the fiscal year. States have the flexibility to use any combination of the following 

criteria to develop EMPG work plans: the Emergency Management Accreditation 

Program (EMAP) Standard (April 2006), the Nationwide Plan Review, the National 

Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, the National Preparedness Goal, or State homeland security strategies. As noted in NEMA’s EMPG Report 

2006, ‘‘EMPG has the flexibility to allow for all-hazards preparedness. The fact that 

States can decide how to use the funds—based on identified needs and priorities— 

makes EMPG a vital program in building the country’s emergency management capacity.’’ 

In ongoing dialogue with NEMA and the emergency management community, the 

continued need for performance measures to demonstrate the progress accomplished 

with limited tax-payer dollars has been reinforced. Through the EMPG work plans, 

States identify the projected outcomes for their EMPG funds. Again, States have the 

flexibility to determine the performance measures that will be used to evaluate their 

efforts and the basis for developing the measures, including the criteria noted above. 

This approach is not a new requirement, as projected outcomes were an element of 

EMPG work plans prior to fiscal year 2005 when the program was administered by 

FEMA. EMPG continues to be an all-hazards program implemented to flexibly support States’ emergency management needs. 

Question. Secretary Chertoff, Fire Chiefs, Emergency Managers and City Officials 

from around the country came to capital hill several weeks ago to ask that Congress 

continue to fund the Metropolitan and Medical Response System (MMRS), they 

spoke of the value of the program. 

And as I understand, the Federal Emergency Management Agency funded the 

program directly to municipalities and County governments with a contract between 

the Federal Government and the local governments. 

In fiscal year 2007, the program received $33 million in funding. It looks as 

though you plan to consolidate the program with other grant programs. 

Many local elected officials are concerned the program will lose its emphasis, 

please explain the consolidation, and how you think it better serves the local communities that support the program, as it was administered last year, to consolidate 

it with other grants? 

Answer. The Administration supports continuation of the MMRS capability; however, the Administration and the Department firmly believe that the MMRS mission 

should be consolidated and integrated within the overall homeland security funding 
169 

made available under the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and the 

Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). HSGP and UASI will remain eligible to be 

used to maintain MMRS-like capabilities in the future. This reinforces DHS commitment to consolidate all grant programs that distribute Federal funds to State and 

local first responders. 

Question. How do you plan to administer this money and continue to maintain 

the Medical Response System that currently exists? 

Answer. The Administration supports continuation of the MMRS capability; however, the Administration and the Department firmly believe that MMRS should be 

consolidated and integrated within the overall homeland security funding made 

available under the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and the Urban Area 

Security Initiative (UASI). HSGP and UASI will remain eligible to be used to maintain the established MMRS capabilities. In fiscal year 2007, MMRS was funded $33 million which provided $254,113 per 

jurisdiction. The grant funds are provided and administered by G&T, which is being 

transitioned into FEMA on April 1, 2007. The Federal Government will continue to 

maintain the Metropolitan Medical Response System by working in collaboration 

with local MMRS jurisdictions/regions so that they may gain maximum benefit and 

synergy from multiple funding streams from DHS, HRSA, and CDC. 

Question. Secretary Chertoff, communities large and small throughout the country 

have relied on the SAFER Grant program to assist in meeting manning requirements in fire stations around the country for basic first responder fire protection. 

Your budget eliminates the program completely. 

How do we expect communities to continue to meet the rigorous standards, and 

provide basic fire protection for their citizens with the threats that exist in our 

country today? 

Answer. The administration provides billions of dollars in annual support to train, 

exercise, and equip State and local public safety personnel, including firefighters, so 

that they are adequately prepared to respond to a terrorist attack or other major 

incident. Federal support has been directed so as to focus scarce resources on enhancing target capabilities and to avoid supplanting basic public safety investments 

at the State and local level. A Federally funded hiring program for firefighters risks 

replacing State and local funding for general purpose public safety staffing with 

Federal resources, and is therefore not consistent with the goal of enhancing local 

preparedness capabilities. Further, a hiring program creates an obligation which 

State and local governments must then fund once the Federal grant is exhausted 

which may or may not align with their funding priorities. 

Question. Secretary Chertoff, communities in Louisiana have participated in the 

Flood Plain Modernization program for the last several years. The Flood Plain Map 

Modernization program assisted communities in Louisiana from being impacted 

more severely, you budget cuts the program by more than $4,000,000.00. 

After Hurricane Katrina and Rita, 15 communities received Advisory Base Flood 

Elevation recovery maps, 12 of 15 communities adopted the Advisory Base Flood 

Elevations to show good faith in mitigating risk of flooding as we rebuild. 

The communities adopted them based on the hope that new maps would soon be 

forth coming. We were told the new maps would be out by this summer, now we 

are being told the new maps will not be out till this fall for levee protected parishes 

and next year for non levee protected parishes. 

Does your budget reduction impact FEMA’s ability to create new Flood Insurance 

Risk Maps that will replace the Advisory Maps? 

Answer. The Flood Map Modernization program is an approximately $1 billion effort over 5 years. The base level of funding was originally $200 million annually. 

To date, approximately $800 million has been provided for this program. While 

there is a $4.2 million reduction in the requested level of funding in the final year 

of the program, there would not be a reduction in the number of maps produced. 

The fiscal year 2008 budget proposal also directs that any excess flood insurance 

fee collections be allocated to the floodplain management program area which includes flood hazard mapping, which is expected to make up for the reduction in directly appropriated funding. At this time, however, it is not known to what extent 

the reduction in our request for the Flood Map Modernization program will be offset 

by this source of funding. The mapping for coastal LA and MS updates is already 

budgeted, so this reduction will not impact producing products in these areas. 

Question. Do you plan to increase funding for FEMA’s FIRM program to assist 

in getting new maps out to the most impacted areas in Louisiana? 

Answer. FEMA does not believe that additional Flood Map Modernization funding 

is needed because it is able to leverage data that is being developed for other purposes. Specifically, FEMA will benefit from the flood hazard data that the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers is developing as part of their efforts to improve and repair 
170 

levee systems. Additionally, FEMA will utilize any relevant flood hazard data developed as part of the disaster recovery process. 

Question. Secretary Chertoff, on page 13 of your testimony, you state the following: ‘‘With a goal of 90 percent satisfaction with Individual Recovery Assistance 

Programs, during fiscal year 2006 we achieved a customer satisfaction rating of 91 

percent in response to the question.’’ Overall, how would you rate the information 

and support you received from FEMA since the disaster occurred? 

Answer. Beginning with Hurricane Wilma in Florida and ending with severe 

storms and flooding in New Mexico, there were twenty-five major disaster declarations that required Individual Assistance in fiscal year 2006. FEMA’s customer satisfaction rating of 91 percent for fiscal year 2006 is the average survey response 

from applicants from each of these disasters. 

Question. Which disaster are you referring too? And please share with me and the 

criteria used to gather this information and what methodology did your department 

use to analyze the results? 

Answer. FEMA’s major call center activities include Registration Intake, Helpline 

and Casework. FEMA conducts telephone surveys of 368 applicants per activity for 

every major disaster that includes Individual Assistance as part of the recovery 

package. There are 368 surveys conducted on Registration Intake activity approximately one week after the applicant has registered. Another 368 surveys are conducted on Helpline activity approximately one week after the applicant has contacted our Helpline number to check status on their case, change information on 

their registration, or to ask any number of questions regarding their registrations 

or our programs. 

Finally, we conduct 368 surveys after the applicants have had time to receive 

their initial eligibility determination, as well as payment, if they are qualified. We 

use this number per function because it provides 90 percent statistical validity with 

∂/¥error rate of 5 percent. This percentage of accuracy is in accordance with industry standard. All surveys are conducted over an 8-week period in order to measure 

customer satisfaction throughout the application period. The final report is published after all surveys have been completed. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

Question. Based on your department’s own staffing models, how many TSA 

screeners are going to be needed next year in order to keep system-wide average 

wait times to less than 10 minutes per passenger? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Screener Allocation 

Model (SAM) incorporates a 10-minute wait for passenger and baggage screening at 

the Nation’s airports. The current congressional allocation for Transportation 

Screening Officers (TSOs) allows TSA to adequately maintain a 10-minute standard 

on 93 percent of calendar days. The remaining days need to be supplemented with 

overtime personnel. When 10-minute wait times are exceeded, it is primarily due 

to excessive volume demand and input configurations not meeting volume demands. 

TSA uses people, training, equipment, and technology-based strategies to efficiently 

manage each checkpoint. The newly improved SAM objectively measures and adjusts staffing levels, scheduling, configurations, and the use of differing technologies 

at each airport. This allows TSA to operate efficiently within the 45,000 TSO cap 

while maintaining high security levels. 

Question. When do you anticipate transmitting the report to Congress on the vulnerability of bridges and tunnels, as required by a provision I wrote in the fiscal 

year 2007 Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration is diligently working on this 

report, and a draft is nearing completion at which time an executive level review 

can begin. The report should be ready for delivery to Congress by summer 2007. 

Question. The Rail and Transit Security Grant is critical toward securing and protecting the nearly half a million commuters who use New Jersey Transit on a daily 

basis. Funding for Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras, protective suits, radiation pagers, interoperable communications equipment, portable radios and explosive device mitigation & remediation. Though APTA is calling for more than $545 

million for this program, the Administration is only requesting $175 million for fiscal year 2008. In light of the recent Mumbai, Madrid and London train bombings, 

would you reconsider your support for a higher level of funding? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) supports the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request. 

The primary focus for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA in 

mass transit and passenger rail has been on information sharing, preparedness, do-
171 

main awareness, training, and using a risk-based management approach to maximize the impact of available resources through random, visible security activities. 

We have employed wide-ranging strategies that engage our stakeholders and help 

ensure the security of mass transit and passenger rail systems. The TSA budget involves programs and funding that may seem to be specific to certain modes when, 

in fact, they impact security across all modes. TSA has learned much in aviation 

security that is being used in the surface transportation modes. Budgets allocated 

to aviation security actually provide real benefit throughout the entire transportation system. 

For example, Federal Security Directors work closely with the surface modes to 

make many aviation security measures available to surface transportation security. 

TSA Explosives Detection Canine Teams, Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response teams, portable screening equipment, and the National Screening Force have 

been deployed to provide enhanced security to surface transportation. 

Much of the Nation’s aviation infrastructure is Federally owned, which requires 

a Federal budget. The surface modes of transportation are approximately 95 percent 

privately owned and operated, and receive security funding from multiple streams 

(i.e., State, local, private). The Department has consistently stated that responsibility for mass transit security and passenger rail security is a shared responsibility 

among a variety of stakeholders, including State, local, and Federal agencies, and 

private owners and operators. To that end, TSA works in partnership with the DHS 

Office of Grants and Training and will award $199 million in surface transportation 

security grants in fiscal year 2007. These grants are awarded in direct relationship 

to a program’s value in mitigating the greatest risk to surface transportation. 

Since 9/11, the Federal Government has dedicated an estimated $900 million to 

transit security alone. This figure encompasses grant programs administered by the 

Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal Transit Administration (FTA), DHS, 

and TSA. 

Additionally, FTA annually awards more than $3.5 billion in capital improvement 

grants. These funds may be used for capital security enhancement. Under the Safe, 

Affordable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act—A Legacy for Users, up to 

2 percent of these grants may be dedicated to security training and exercises. 

The $900 million cited does not reflect the value of supporting services the Federal Government provides to transit security through funding of broader security efforts, such as the Transportation Security Operations Center, the Transportation 

Security Intelligence Service, and DOT’s Crisis Management Center. These and 

other programs contribute to accomplishing the surface transportation security mission. The intelligence and information-sharing and alert capabilities maintained 

through these processes are key components of the layered approach to transit and 

rail security. In summary, budgets seen as specifically dedicated to surface transportation security are not reflective of the overall effort of TSA or the Federal Government in these areas. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BEN NELSON

Question. Back in September I wrote a letter to you, Secretary Chertoff, requesting information about term employees at Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(CIS) whose contracts were to be terminated at the end of 2007. (I never received 

a response to that letter, so I’d like the opportunity to discuss this issue now.) I understand that some of these employees have been hired permanently and that others have had their contracts extended to June 30, 2007. We have several employees 

at our CIS center in Lincoln who are expecting to lose their jobs in June, so I want 

to be sure I understand why these contracts are being terminated. 

Let me start by saying that I applaud your efforts at reducing this backlog and 

simply want to be sure that terminating these employees will not adversely impact 

those efforts, especially at effective regional CIS centers such as those in Nebraska. 

I am concerned that terminating these employees could result in an increase in 

backlogged applications again, and the government would then be faced with hiring 

new employees to process those applications at a later date. It seems it would be 

more cost effective to either extend the contracts of the current employees or else 

make them permanent employees, given their expertise in processing applications 

and given the taxpayer dollars which have already been spent to train them. 

What is the status of backlogged immigration applications? 

Answer. The latest Backlog Elimination Report for Congress for fiscal year 2006, 

4th Quarter (July–September 2006) Update, reflected a net backlog of 9,482 cases 

that met the USCIS definition of backlog over 6 months and within our control. 

Still, there were more than one million overall pending cases outside USCIS control 
172 

due to pending FBI background checks, requests to applicants for further evidence 

associated with an application or appeal, and visa applications where no visa is 

available due to statutory caps. 

As of December 31, 2006, there was a gross total of 1,212,567 applications pending that met the USCIS definition of backlog over 6 months. Of these, 103,272 were 

pending USCIS action and 1,109,295 applications were outside USCIS control due 

to pending FBI background checks, requests to applicants for further evidence associated with an application or appeal, and visa applications for adjustment where no 

visa is available due to statutory caps. 

Question. How have you determined that ending these term employees’ contracts 

is appropriate at this time? 

Answer. The end of fiscal year 2006 marked the conclusion of the President’s 5- 

year Backlog Elimination program, and with it came an end to dedicated appropriated funding for USCIS that had been used in part, to support the employment 

of more than 700 term appointments. 

Additionally, in 2006, USCIS conducted a comprehensive fee study to identify the 

full costs associated with processing immigration applications. A key component in 

determining those costs was maintaining the processing goals achieved under backlog elimination. The proposed fee rule will allow USCIS to ensure the appropriate 

staff level to adjudicate applications while also improving and automating our business processes, making it easier and faster for adjudicators to review applications. 

However, recognizing that there were numerous full time permanent position vacancies within USCIS field offices, USCIS decided to extend the appointments of all 

term employees while recruitment of permanent staff was initiated. The extension 

of the term appointments was made possible by diverting permanent position vacancy funds to cover the cost of the term employees. 

Since the beginning of the fiscal year USCIS has experienced a steady decrease 

in the number of term employees who have elected to continue their employment 

with USCIS. As of March 17, 2007, the number of term employees on board was 

535 versus 725 at the start of the fiscal year. The reduction in term employees is 

a reflection of the fact that many have applied and been selected for permanent employment with USCIS, while others have chosen to discontinue their service. 

USCIS has decided to extend the term appointments of all currently on-board 

staff through June 30, 2007, based upon available funding. USCIS will continue to 

monitor on-board staffing levels and reevaluate its budget picture as it approaches 

the June 30 deadline. 

Question. Do you know what effect terminating these employees will have on the 

amount of time it will take to process new applications? 

Answer. Case processing will be affected as the loss of this staff reduces the agency’s overall adjudicative capacity. The loss of capacity associated with these 400 

FTEs represents 45,240 officer hours per month, which translates to approximately 

35,000 I–485 completions or 36,500 N–400 completions per month. The proposed fee 

restructuring rule will add 1,004 new positions in the field that will allow USCIS 

to restore currency in its case processing and ultimately support a 20 percent improvement in processing times. 

Question. Do you have information as to the cost and time involved in training 

new employees for these positions? 

Answer. New adjudications officers are required to attend Basic Adjudications Officer Training, a course currently provided at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, GA for 6.5 weeks. The average cost is approximately 

$5,600 per student in fiscal year 2007. This cost does not include the instructors 

and staff that support new officer training and other types of core mission training 

for USCIS. Training costs for other types of term positions are not tracked centrally 

and vary depending on type of position and location where they work. 

Concerns have been raised by my constituents about the hiring procedures for 

permanent employees at CIS. The term employees who have contacted me recognize 

that they were hired for non-permanent positions. However, they are confused as 

to the hiring criteria used to determine which term employees will be hired as permanent employees. Specifically, complaints have been raised about a new writing 

test that employees must take in order to be hired as a permanent employee or to 

be promoted to a higher position. Complaints have been made that this test is very 

subjective and that there is a high fail rate for this test. 

Question. Are you familiar with this writing test and the reasoning behind implementing this new test? 

Answer. Yes. In April 2005, USCIS posted a Nation-wide Public Job Notice (PJN) 

through OPM’s USA staffing for Permanent Adjudications Officers. As part of the 

applications process, qualified applicants who scored highly enough on the OPM assessment of experience and qualifications to be within reach for selection were asked 
173 

to take a writing test. The writing test portion of the application process was instituted by USCIS in 2005, in order to ensure that newly hired ‘‘permanent’’ Adjudications Officers possessed the necessary writing skills to perform the functions of the 

position. District and Center Adjudications Officers write decisions, memoranda, requests for evidence, and notices to revoke or deny relating to adjudication of formal 

petitions and applications for immigration-related benefits. These memoranda and 

documents may be used in courts of law and must be legally sufficient. The preparation of these agency decisions and dated memoranda requires the Adjudications Officer to review and apply the law, USCIS policies, USCIS guidelines, and legal opinions and then create documents in standard written English that may be comprehended by petitioners and used as evidence in a court of law. Accordingly, the 

ability to communicate effectively in writing is a critical core competency for an Adjudications Officer. 

Experience gained over the past year has lead USCIS to reconsider the audience 

to which it applies the testing criteria. After hearing the concerns raised by USCIS 

term employees and reviewing test scores of those having gone through the process, 

it was recently decided to change the policy regarding who would be tested. Rather 

than test all candidates that applied for a permanent full time Adjudications Officer 

position regardless of the Federal general schedule (GS) grade level, the decision 

was made to administer the test to only those applying at the GS 5–9 levels. Effective April 1, 2007, all GS 11–12 level applicants will no longer be required to take 

the writing test. This decision was made based upon the fact that many of the applicants applying at these grade levels are currently employed by USCIS in term appointments, and in many cases have been for a number of years and received satisfactory performance appraisals. Recognizing this fact it was deemed appropriate to 

revise the test policy. It is anticipated that this change in practice will open the door 

to greater opportunities for those currently employed term staff who wish to pursue 

full time permanent employment with USCIS. 

Question. Does it make sense to implement this new test for employees who have 

been doing these jobs for, in some cases, years? Does it make sense to hire a new 

employee who passes this writing test—one that must be cleared for security and 

trained—over an existing employee who is already doing the job, and in some cases, 

has been doing the job for years, but who does not pass the writing test? 

Answer. As stated in the previous response, experience gained over the past year 

has lead USCIS to reconsider the audience to which it applies the testing criteria. 

After hearing the concerns raised by USCIS term employees and reviewing test 

scores of those having gone through the process, it was recently decided to change 

the policy regarding who would be tested. Rather than test all candidates that applied for a permanent full time Adjudications Officer position regardless of the Federal general schedule (GS) grade level, the decision was made to administer the test 

to only those applying at the GS 5–9 levels. Effective April 1, 2007, all GS 11–12 

level applicants will no longer be required to take the writing test. This decision was 

made based upon the fact that many of the applicants applying at these grade levels 

are currently employed by USCIS in term appointments, and in many cases have 

been for a number of years and received satisfactory performance appraisals. Recognizing this fact it was deemed appropriate to revise the test policy. It is anticipated 

that this change in practice will open the door to greater opportunities for those currently employed term staff who wish to pursue full time permanent employment 

with USCIS. 

Question. The DHS budget suggests the cuts in first responder grant programs 

are mitigated by the fact that DHS intends to work with the Department of Commerce to allocate $1 billion to the States through an interoperability grant program. 

As a member of the Committee when this bill was passed out of Commerce, I can 

tell you we did not intend for this money to be used as a substitute for prevention 

and preparedness programs to first responders in States and localities. I’m concerned DHS’s approach to use this money violates congressional intent, which was 

to enhance the communications capabilities of first responders, but certainly not at 

the expense of prevention and preparedness activities. What is your response to this 

concern? 

Answer. In formulating the fiscal year 2008 budget request, the level of funding 

for grant programs was based on the following factors; the level of funds provided 

over the past 6 years, the level of funding currently in the State and local programs’ 

pipeline, and the influx of the PSIC grant program funding. Based on these factors, 

the Administration feel this request provides first responders with a sufficient level 

of prevention and preparedness activities. The PSIC funding should be viewed as 

a compliment to these grant activities and not as a substitute. 

Question. I understand GAO recently provided the Committee with a report on 

your administration of the UASI grant program. Reserving judgment on the process 
174 

outlined there, I am wondering if you would agree with the approach the Senate 

is proposing in its 9/11 Commission bill to broaden the scope of eligible cities by allowing the 100 largest metropolitan areas to compete for these grants? If you disagree that this is a fair way to determine eligibility for UASI funding I’d like to 

hear why? Why shouldn’t these metropolitan areas start out on equal ground and 

be allowed the opportunity to make their case for funding? Especially since there 

is no guaranteed minimum requirement—if a City doesn’t provide appropriate justification then they won’t succeed in the grant process. 

Answer. The Department does not support the expansion of the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program to the 100 largest metropolitan areas. The UASI 

program is a risk-based initiative that was established to dedicate resources to highthreat, high-density metropolitan areas to prevent, protect against, respond to, and 

recover from terrorism. In order to determine eligibility for this program, the Department analyzes the relative risk of metropolitan areas to terrorist attacks. Risk 

is defined as the product of three principal variables: threat, vulnerability, and consequence. The risk model considers the potential risk of terrorism to people, critical 

infrastructure, and economic security in a given area. In evaluating risk, DHS considers the populations in an area that could be at risk, the concentration of people 

in that area, and specific characteristics of their location that might contribute to 

risk, such as Intelligence Community assessments of threat, proximity to nationally 

critical infrastructure, and the economic impact of an attack. Thus, although population is a critical factor, UASI eligibility determinations are based upon additional 

considerations that provide a more comprehensive analysis of relative risk. In addition, expanding the program to 100 jurisdictions creates the potential for final 

awards to be dramatically reduced to levels that cannot support the implementation 

of activities that will have a meaningful impact on risk reduction and the enhancement of preparedness capabilities. The Department will continue to require UASI 

candidates to build investment justifications for proposed activities, as part of a 

broader effort to consider both relative risk as well as how effectively proposed solutions address need and ultimately mitigate risk. 

Question. This question was actually asked at the hearing but there seemed to 

be a misunderstanding about what I was asking. I am not suggesting a ‘‘cost sharing’’ program by any means. Rather, I would like to know why you believe it is a 

bad idea to allow for the top 100 metropolitan areas to compete for funding—understanding that the applicants that do not make a compelling case for the money 

would not receive funding. 

Answer. The Department does not support the expansion of the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program to the 100 largest metropolitan areas. The UASI 

program is a risk-based initiative that was established to dedicate resources to highthreat, high-density metropolitan areas to prevent, protect against, respond to, and 

recover from terrorism. In order to determine eligibility for this program, the Department analyzes the relative risk of metropolitan areas to terrorist attacks. Risk 

is defined as the product of three principal variables: threat, vulnerability, and consequence. The risk model considers the potential risk of terrorism to people, critical 

infrastructure, and economic security in a given area. In evaluating risk, DHS considers the populations in an area that could be at risk, the concentration of people 

in that area, and specific characteristics of their location that might contribute to 

risk, such as Intelligence Community assessments of threat, proximity to nationally 

critical infrastructure, and the economic impact of an attack. Thus, although population is a critical factor, UASI eligibility determinations are based upon additional 

considerations that provide a more comprehensive analysis of relative risk. In addition, expanding the program to 100 jurisdictions creates the potential for final 

awards to be dramatically reduced to levels that cannot support the implementation 

of activities that will have a meaningful impact on risk reduction and the enhancement of preparedness capabilities. The Department will continue to require UASI 

candidates to build investment justifications for proposed activities, as part of a 

broader effort to consider both relative risk as well as how effectively proposed solutions address need and ultimately mitigate risk. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PETE V. DOMENICI

Question. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is tasked with deploying 

radiation detection technologies and systems designed to detect attempts to smuggle 

nuclear materials or weapons into the United States. As such, DNDO is likely to 

play a critical role in testing and evaluating current and next generation technologies to assure that DHS agencies have the most effective and accurate tools. 
175 

How is DNDO interacting with the Department of Energy’s efforts in the same 

areas? 

Answer. The DNDO (particularly the transformational research and development 

program) works closely with the NNSA Office of Nonproliferation Research and Engineering (NA–22). The planning process for the DNDO transformational research 

agenda was coordinated with partners, including NA–22. Staff from both NA–22 and 

DNDO served on each others’ proposal review panels, in part to ensure that duplication of funding is avoided. In addition, this interaction helped ensure that DNDO 

transformational R&D programs are well coordinated, enabling the U.S. Government to best utilize the expertise of the National Labs. DNDO conducted similar 

proposal reviews with DTRA. 

DNDO, as an interagency office, has full-time detailees from agencies such as 

DOE. These individuals have provided invaluable expertise in all aspects of the 

DNDO mission. Our detailees enable us to maintain an open and productive dialogue with our interagency partners so that we can avoid duplication of effort and 

make strides toward the complete implementation of the proposed architecture. 

The frequent dialogue with DOE personnel results in a thorough understanding 

of DOE operations, technological requirements, reporting and information analysis 

needs—all of which are elements of the DNDO architectural analysis. As the global 

detection architecture evolves, the DNDO will bring forward options and recommendations to DOE programs. In fact, the DNDO is now working with DOE/ 

NNSA to acquire ASP systems for deployment through the Megaports Initiative, further enhancing the broader United States strategy to scan incoming cargo before it 

reaches our borders. This demonstrates that the development of the global detection 

architecture, and proposed improvements to that architecture, do not require a management construct that infringes or subsumes the statutory responsibilities of partner agencies. 

Question. How is DNDO balancing the needs to rapidly deploy detection systems 

and develop technologies that can best fulfill its mission? 

Answer. The DNDO has, from its beginning, adopted the risk-based methodology 

espoused by the Secretary to support both short-term and long-term planning. In 

a highly simplified form, the DNDO measures overall risk-mitigation, and, hence, 

success, as a combination of several factors. Ultimately, to successfully prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism, authorities must be able to (1) encounter the adversary; (2) detect and identify successfully encountered threats; and (3) interdict successfully detected and identified threats. Resources must be balanced to improve 

each of these success factors, with increasing levels of overall success creating ever 

larger budgetary and personnel requirements. Given the limited nature of resources, 

deployment and operational strategies must be employed with the realization that 

100 percent success against all threats may never be achievable. Instead, available 

resources must be allocated in such a way as to achieve the highest utility given 

existing constraints. 

As part of this resource allocation process, the DNDO has stated that all acquisition decisions will be informed by robust test and evaluation programs. The DNDO 

has made a commitment to fully characterize all technologies prior to large-scale acquisition decisions, to ensure that DNDO understands all potential performance improvements and liabilities. 

Take as an example DHS efforts to instrument the Nation’s ports of entry (POEs) 

with radiation portal monitors (RPMs). By late CY 2004, there was a general realization that operational challenges (throughput and nuisance alarm rates) at high 

volume POEs meant that deployed RPMs, while providing improved coverage (‘‘encounter’’), still had limited capabilities (‘‘detect and identify’’) as operated, and thus 

continued to limit overall probability of success. In response, the Department 

launched the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program to develop next-generation RPMs (to improve the probability of ‘‘detect and identify’’), while at the same 

time continuing to allocate resources to acquiring additional current-generation 

RPMs to continue to improve overall detection capacity. 

Two years ago, less than 40 percent of incoming containerized cargo was being 

scanned for radiological and nuclear threats at our land borders. RPM deployments 

to the Nation’s 22 busiest ports are now complete. We are currently scanning 89 

percent of cargo coming through our seaports using 333 RPMs. By the end of calendar year 2007, it is our goal to screen at least 98 percent of all containers entering the United States by sea for radiological and nuclear material, using Radiation 

Portal Monitors (RPMs). 

DNDO’s current deployment plan to all POEs is described in its RPM Program 

Project Execution Plan (PEP), which details the schedule for remaining deployments. The project baseline outlined in the PEP is aligned with the Joint DNDO/ 

CBP Deployment Strategy for Domestic Border Crossing Nuclear Detection System 
176 

document, which describes how we can deploy an optimized mix of both current and 

next-generation systems (i.e. Advanced Spectroscopic Portals, or ASP). Both the PEP 

and the Joint Deployment Strategy were developed in conjunction with CBP. We 

had to consider how to best balance our need for better detection capabilities with 

wisely managing cost and minimizing the impact to the flow of legitimate commerce. 

Overall, the ASP and RPM programs, as described, represent a balanced approach 

to the need for better capability and coverage. As next-generation technologies were 

identified, DHS made the deliberate decision to continue procuring current-generation systems, realizing that the marginal improvements provided by these procurements continued to increase overall probability of success. However, at the same 

time, DHS began to make an additional investment in next-generation technologies, 

realizing the potential improvements that would be realized in successive years. Finally, by developing plans to transition from current-generation to next-generation 

technologies, including a continued use for current-generation capabilities, the Department has sought to ensure that prior investments in systems acquisition continue contribute to improving the overall security of the Nation. 

Question. How is DNDO developing and supporting the nuclear facilities and infrastructure needed to test and evaluate evolving technologies, missions, and operational concepts? 

Answer. The DNDO relies heavily on the ability to obtain high fidelity, defendable 

test data in support of development, acquisition, and deployment decisions. DNDO 

testing activities are conducted throughout the product development process, and involve the National Labs, private industry and academia. The construction of the 

DNDO Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex 

(Rad/NucCTEC) offers the opportunity for high-fidelity test and evaluation. The 

Rad/NucCTEC is authorized to handle SNM for the purpose of testing developed 

technologies against actual samples of these materials which provide the greatest 

threat to the Nation for use in a nuclear attack. 

Prior to the construction of this facility, no location existed that allowed access 

to these quantities of materials while maintaining the flexibility to place these materials into relevant threat scenarios and cargo configurations. The DNDO will afford all developers with the opportunity to gather data against threat sources as 

part of their technology development programs. We will also conduct independent 

evaluations of their prototypes and products in support of a fair and open acquisition process. 

It is our belief that this testing environment, one which provides access to realistic threat scenarios in the spirit of independent assessment, provides a unique opportunity. While there are radiological and nuclear detection technology test activities at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Sandia National Laboratory 

(SNL), and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), none currently have access to 

the kinds of materials that will be available at the Rad/NucCTEC. The National 

Labs certainly possess other testing capabilities, such as the environmental test 

chambers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Therefore, the DNDO hopes 

to leverage, not duplicate these capabilities. Experts from the National Labs have 

been, and hopefully will continue to be, members of DNDO test teams. They help 

scope tests, conduct data analysis, and provide support personnel for operational 

evaluations at the DHS Science & Technology CounterMeasures Test Beds. They 

have also worked with us on pilot deployments for CBP, as is the case with PNNL. 

Question. What role are the Department of Energy, national weapons labs, and 

other experts playing in DNDO? 

Answer. The DNDO (particularly the transformational research and development 

program) works closely with the NNSA Office of Nonproliferation Research and Engineering (NA–22). Staff from both NA–22 and DNDO served on each others’ proposal review panels, in part to ensure that duplication of funding is avoided. In addition, this interaction helped ensure that DNDO transformational R&D programs 

are well coordinated. 

DNDO, as an interagency office, has full-time detailees from agencies such as 

DOE. These individuals have provided invaluable expertise in all aspects of the 

DNDO mission. Our detailees enable us to maintain an open and productive dialogue with our interagency partners so that we can avoid duplication of effort and 

make strides toward the complete implementation of the proposed architecture. 

The frequent dialogue with DOE personnel results in a thorough understanding 

of DOE operations, technological requirements, reporting and information analysis 

needs—all of which are elements of the DNDO architectural analysis. As the global 

detection architecture evolves, the DNDO will bring forward options and recommendations to DOE programs. In fact, the DNDO is now working with DOE/ 

NNSA to acquire ASP systems for deployment through the Megaports Initiative, further enhancing the broader United States strategy to scan incoming cargo before it 
177 

reaches our borders. This demonstrates that the development of the global detection 

architecture, and proposed improvements to that architecture, do not require a management construct that infringes or subsumes the statutory responsibilities of partner agencies. 

The DNDO recognizes that the national weapons laboratories have long been one 

of the Nation’s preeminent sources of critical nuclear expertise. That expertise, 

along with the expertise found in other National and Federal Labs, academia, and 

industry, is vital in developing technologies to mitigate the threat of radiological and 

nuclear terrorism. 

The largest role that the National Labs will have within the DNDO is within the 

transformational research and development program that seeks advanced, novel solutions to develop significantly more effective, capable, and operable nuclear and radiological countermeasures. In December 2005, the DNDO released a call for proposals (CFP), soliciting nuclear detection exploratory research proposals from the 

National Labs. The DNDO received over 150 proposals, selected 44 projects, and 

awarded over $35 million for these research efforts. Work began in June 2006 and 

we are already seeing some very promising outcomes. 

Additionally, the DNDO relies on the nuclear expertise within the National Labs 

to support efforts across the office. For instance, National Labs provide analysis towards the development of the global nuclear detection architecture, deployment support to the Radiation Portal Monitor program, testing support at the Nevada Test 

Site, and operational support through the Nuclear Assessment Program (NAP) and 

the Technical Reachback (TRB) program. The DNDO intends to continue to rely 

heavily on this expertise as the global architecture continues to evolve and mature. 

NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS CENTER

Question. We visited the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center 

(NISAC) about a year ago. As you know, NISAC is funded by DHS to evaluate the 

effects of disruptions to America’s infrastructure, and much of NISAC’s work is done 

by New Mexico’s two National Laboratories. 

I understand that NISAC has been very useful to the department during Hurricane Katrina and during preparations for an avian flu outbreak. In fact, NISAC’s 

importance was noted in the White House’s ‘‘Federal Response to Hurricane 

Katrina: Lessons Learned,’’ and as a result Congress expanded NISAC’s role in last 

year’s Homeland Security Appropriations bill. 

I am concerned NISAC is not being used by the Department of Homeland Security 

and the rest of the Federal Government to its full extent. 

What funding does the Department propose for NISAC in fiscal year 2008? 

Answer. The final fiscal year 2008 funding request for the National Infrastructure 

Simulation and Analysis Center is $16 million. 

Question. What are your plans to coordinate the Department’s efforts so NISAC 

is utilized by the entire Department? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recognizes that the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) and other Office of 

Infrastructure Protection (OIP) programs must collaborate and work with many 

partners to successfully accomplish the OIP mission and the wide range of 2006 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) requirements. NISAC has been working with multiple DHS partners and is in the process of expanding its information 

sharing, outreach, and education circle within DHS and across the Federal interagency community, as well as Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD– 

7) and NIPP infrastructure protection partners. 

NISAC undertook the mandate to become the source of national expertise to address critical infrastructure protection, counterterrorism, threat assessment, and 

risk mitigation from natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other manmade disasters; and to be the leader in modeling, simulation, and analysis to enhance domestic 

preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation activities. 

NISAC’s mission and analytical capabilities (simulation, modeling, and analysis) 

emphasize information sharing and effective collaboration with a variety of partners 

to provide operations support to decision makers. Currently, for example, NISAC is 

conducting a Pandemic Influenza modeling and analysis program in collaboration 

with the DHS Office of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO). In March 2007, NISAC 

researchers presented the Phase 1 briefing with a Phase 2 update for the Pandemic 

Influenza model to the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, who then 

directed NISAC to present the same briefing to the CMO Office and share all data, 

as well as coordinate all details, including assumptions, scenarios, variables, etc. 

OIP and NISAC, in particular, have fostered an unprecedented partnership with 

the DHS Office of Science & Technology (S&T). S&T had financed the Critical Infra-
178 

structure Protection Decision Support System national-level interdependency model 

program for several years. In 2007, this program is transitioning to operational status, becoming another tool in NISAC’s analytical toolbox, a helpful addition to 

NISAC’s suite of capabilities. OIP has also partnered closely with S&T on its Integrated Process Team program, establishing sector plans and critical infrastructure/ 

key resources annual reports as sources of both research and development and simulation/modeling/analysis requirements from the sectors. 

Another Department-wide outreach/information sharing development is NISAC’s 

new deliberate exercise planning and support program. NISAC is contributing to 

several multi-departmental exercises this year, including Ardent Sentry. Upcoming 

tabletop exercises in April 2007 will use NISAC products. NISAC is participating 

in exercises in fiscal year 2007 to develop better products for interdepartmental decision makers at various levels, from senior leaders to field officers, and to educate 

the wide variety of players on NISAC analytical capabilities. This exercise outreach 

program has already begun and is part of the NISAC 5-year plan. 

Question. How will you work with other Departments to make sure NISAC’s capabilities are available across the Federal Government? 

Answer. To facilitate information sharing and encourage feedback from the sectors 

and National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) partners, the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) will establish formal relationships with each of the Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) and will continue to share 

information and partner with those agencies, as appropriate. These relationships 

and new information-sharing processes are being implemented in fiscal year 2007 

through the Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP) in a joint effort by the OIP 

Partnership and Outreach Division (POD), the NISAC program manager, and the 

NISAC laboratory representative onsite at OIP, who is specifically tasked to spearhead NISAC information sharing, outreach, and education within DHS and across 

the spectrum of Federal Government agencies and other NIPP partners. 

There have been many examples of ongoing interagency information sharing, outreach, and NISAC education efforts. The NISAC program manager has already 

briefed the Federal Senior Leadership Council as well as several SSAs. Using NIPP 

as a guide, NISAC is continuing to reach out to the interagency community. The 

program manager has also briefed the interagency exercise committee and incident 

management program, and has spoken at a NIPP technical assistance meeting with 

interagency SSAs. During the week of March 26, 2007, OIP Assistant Secretary 

Robert Stephan and the program manager spoke at the 2nd Annual Risk Symposium in Santa Fe, New Mexico, hosted by Los Alamos and attended by many interagency representatives. Considerable interface occurred throughout the conference. 

The program manager’s briefing was titled: ‘‘National Infrastructure Simulation and 

Analysis Center: Interagency Infrastructure ‘‘Center of Gravity.’’ 

There are also many upcoming events planned for the interagency informationsharing, outreach, and NISAC education efforts. In the coming weeks, the NISAC 

program manager and the NISAC scientific advisor will meet with the Department 

of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Health and Human Services, among others. The NISAC program manager works closely with the U.S. Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM) liaison; in addition to interacting and arranging DOD and 

NORTHCOM tours of NISAC operations in New Mexico, they are establishing a 

more extensive NISAC briefing program to share information with appropriate offices and leaders in NORTHCOM and DOD, and for NORTHCOM personnel traveling to Washington, DC. 

SECURITY UPGRADES AT LAND PORTS

Question. Mr. Secretary, America has a vast number of land ports of entry, and 

it has been more than 20 years since we launched a major effort to upgrade infrastructure at those ports. That last effort occurred in 1986, when former Senator 

DeConcini and I developed the Southwest Border Improvement Program to improve 

border infrastructure so that States could better take advantage of commerce and 

trade opportunities with Mexico. That was 15 years before September 11, 2001. 

Since September 11, we have placed increasing emphasis on upgrading security 

for our airports and seaports, but we must also improve land port security. To that 

end, I plan to introduce legislation that authorizes additional funds for investment 

in our Nation’s border crossings. 

Have you considered what kinds of improvements are necessary at our land ports 

of entry and how much these upgrades might cost? 

Answer. We have. Many land ports are in need of replacement or renovation to 

meet the DHS/CBP mission, as they were designed and constructed several decades 

before the September 11, 2001 attacks and the creation of DHS. First, many ports 
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need to increase site size, change exterior layouts, and add additional traffic lanes. 

This is necessary to provide for site security, to ease congested traffic flows, and to 

allow for productive use of electronic screening and trusted traveler technologies, as 

well as modern operational concepts. Second, many port buildings need more space, 

improved layout, and better infrastructure to handle modern work processes and 

high public volume. This is also necessary to provide better security. The most current port spaces were segmented for legacy Customs, INS, and USDA functions of 

the past and many are grossly undersized. Furthermore, most security aspects of 

land ports are retrofits rather than designed ‘‘from the ground up.’’ Third, the physical conditions in many of our facilities are poor. Many were built before or during 

the Great Depression, and few of these have had significant renovations other than 

some rudimentary maintenance. 

CBP developed a multi-year Land Ports of Entry (LPOE) Capital Investment Plan 

(CIP) that began in 2003. The CIP includes Strategic Resource Assessments (SRAs), 

a project prioritization method, portfolio planning tools, and a 5-year investment 

strategy. The SRAs are (1) a physical assessment of all exterior spaces and buildings by trained architects and (2) a current and forecasted needs assessment of 

space and facilities. Facilities are assessed and ranked into a prioritization, based 

on their ability to support the overall CBP mission. This prioritization drives our 

requests to the GSA Federal Buildings Fund (FBF). 

The LPOE Modernization Program received $211 million in fiscal year 2006 from 

the GSA FBF. The President’s fiscal year 2007 budget requested $96.5 million for 

LPOE Modernization. 

Question. Are there any New Mexico land port improvement projects in your Department’s fiscal year 2008 budget request? 

Answer. CBP has not included any land port of entry projects in its fiscal year 

2008 budget request. Presently, major capital construction projects for land port of 

entry inspection facilities are funded through the Federal Buildings Fund administered by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA). 

GSA received funds in fiscal year 2007 for site acquisition and design for facility 

upgrades at the inspection facility in Columbus, New Mexico. 

BORDER SECURITY AIRCRAFT

Question. I applaud your efforts to provide more assets for border security, including budgeting $4.6 million to upgrade CBP aircraft. This area is important to me 

because in New Mexico, I am told CBP aircraft are from the Viet Nam era. 

Which border patrol sectors’ helicopters would be upgraded with this funding? 

Answer. CBP Air and Marine has made great strides in replacement of our aging 

Viet Nam era helicopters in fiscal year 2007. To date we have taken delivery of ten 

EC–120 Light Observation Helicopters (LOH), with five more to be delivered prior 

to the end of the fiscal year. Also in fiscal year 2007, we will order eight AS–350 

Law Enforcement Helicopters, with initial delivery expected to begin in January 

2008. The budget request also contains $52.4 million in recurring procurement funding for the purchase of one new Medium Lift Helicopter (MLH) and the conversion 

of 1–2 of CBPs existing UH–60A MLHs to UH–60L versions. The new MLH acquisition and the conversion effort are being pursued in cooperation with the U.S. Army, 

and the conversions will extend the helicopters’ service lives and reduce annual operating costs. The early, rough-order-of-magnitude (ROM), estimate for the conversion effort is $6–8 million per aircraft. To date, the specific UH–60A aircraft to be 

converted beginning in fiscal year 2008 have not been selected, but CBP plans to 

eventually convert all 16 of its 25-year old UH–60A MLHs to UH–60Ls. As CBP 

takes delivery of these new and restored helicopters, we will begin removing some 

of the Viet Nam era helicopters from our inventory at all operating locations to include those in New Mexico. 

The $4.6 million shown in the fiscal year 2008 budget request will be used to 

begin the upgrade of 10 of CBPs C–550 Interceptor Aircraft currently deployed to 

both the northern and southern borders. The upgrades will include a new air search 

radar system, an improved forward-looking infrared sensor package, and possibly a 

‘‘glass cockpit’’ with improved indicators and sensor reads 

Question. How much money does your budget request include for new Customs 

and Border Protection helicopters? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2008 budget request contains $52.4 million in recurring 

procurement funding for the purchase of one new Medium Lift Helicopter (MLH) 

and the conversion of 1–2 of CBP’s existing UH–60A MLHs to UH–60L versions. 

The new MLH acquisition and the conversion effort are being pursued in cooperation with the U.S. Army, and the conversions will extend the helicopters’ service 

lives and reduce annual operating costs. The early, rough-order-of-magnitude 
180 

(ROM), estimate for the conversion effort is $6–8 million per aircraft. To date, the 

specific UH–60A aircraft to be converted beginning in fiscal year 2008 have not been 

selected, but CBP plans to eventually convert all 16 of its 25-year old UH–60A 

MLHs to UH–60Ls. 

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND BORDER SECURITY

Question. As you know, I am an advocate for the use of unmanned aerial vehicles 

to help secure our borders, but I am concerned about the length of time it takes 

DHS and the Federal Aviation Administration to finalize agreements regarding the 

flight of UAVs along our southern international border. 

In New Mexico, we have some experience with UAVs and the FAA because our 

university near the southwestern U.S. border operates a UAV validation and test 

facility sponsored by the Department of Defense. Because of the established presence of UAVs at New Mexico State University, and because of our location as a border State, I believe New Mexico would be an asset in the use of UAVs for border 

surveillance. 

How much does your fiscal year 2008 budget allot for UAVs and where do you 

intend to station those UAVs? 

Answer. Recurring funding of $10.6 million in fiscal year 2008 will not purchase 

one full system, therefore funds will go towards sensors, ground controls systems, 

and spares for UAS already in inventory. 

CBP A&M is conducting initial operations on the SW border from Sierra Vista, 

AZ. As access to the national air space and satellite command capabilities mature, 

the usage of UAS will encompass the entire SW border. Ongoing threat analysis will 

dictate operational focus. 

Tactically, CBP plans include the expansion of the UAS program into three operational areas: the Southwestern Border Region, the Northern Border Region, and 

the Southeastern Border Region. Each region would maintain a squadron of 6 systems each for a total of 18 UAS. In addition to border security operations, the UAS 

has the capability to support interior enforcement, maritime security, cross border 

operations, and critical incident response. 

CBP A&M selected Grand Forks, ND as the base for the CBP A&M UAS Northern Border Operation Center. CBP plans to initiate a UAS pilot program in the 

northern border region by late 2007. CBP will determine the use and number of 

UASs for Northern Border protection operations by using information gleaned from 

this pilot program. CBP A&M is evaluating flight operations from Tyndall, AFB to 

support Southeastern Border Region UAS operations. The UAS pilot on the Northern Border and operations in the Southeastern Region will enable CBP A&M to determine the appropriate number of UASs operating on the Borders and coastlines 

of the United States. 

Question. Will your staff evaluate the existing UAV facility at New Mexico State 

University and the Las Cruces International Airport as a potential partner for the 

Department’s UAV program? 

Answer. CBP is always looking for opportunities to advance persistent UAS surveillance capabilities and also to enhance border security. 

CBP has visited the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program at New Mexico 

State University (NMSU) and understands NMSU conducts limited tactical level 

UAV operations from Las Cruces Airport, NM through the use of a Temporary 

Flight Restriction (TFR). 

CBP Air and Marine will continue exploring the possibility of working with 

NMSU. 

Question. What do you need from Congress in order to move forward with a plan 

to fly UAVs along the entire southwestern border? 

Answer. CBP is updating its Air Strategic Plan to include marine, staffing, infrastructure, facilities, and an expanded discussion on unmanned aircraft systems. 

This plan describes the resource requirements to provide persistent systematic surveillance of the Nation’s borders and coastlines through the use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. CBP expects to deliver the updated plan to the committee in May 

2007. 

First Responder Training at Playas 

Secretary Chertoff, New Mexico Tech opened the Playas Training Center for first 

responders in 2004 and has had much success at the facility. 

Playas’ remote location and open space makes it an ideal place for New Mexico 

Tech to develop a wide range of research and training activities to support homeland security efforts nationwide. 

Question. How does DHS utilize Playas and what additional training activities 

could DHS use at Playas? 
181 

Answer. The Playas Training and Research Center (PTRC) in Playas, New Mexico 

is utilized by FEMA and Training through its cooperative agreement with New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, National Energetic Materials Research and 

Testing Center (NMT), for conducting full-scale homeland security, homeland defense, first responder, law enforcement and counter-terrorism training, and research. One example of training conducted there is a 35-hour specialized resident 

training course to prepare first responders for potential suicide bombing threats. 

The Prevention and Response to Suicide Bombing Incidents (PRSBI), as the course 

is called, (and related SWAT training courses) provides advanced Weapons of Mass 

Destruction training focusing on the unique threat posed by suicide bombers. The 

course features a blend of classroom presentations, field laboratories, a case study, 

and practical exercises designed to familiarize participants with actions required at 

State and local levels to prevent, deter, and respond to potential suicide bombing 

attacks. The PRSBI course equips participants with the skills and knowledge necessary to develop policies, tactics, techniques, procedures and operational capabilities required to prevent, interdict, respond to, and mitigate the effects of a suicide 

bombing attack. 

The PRSBI course is currently the most significant training offered at PTC. The 

five-day, train-the-trainer course emphasizes the importance of prevention and deterrence of suicide bombers. This course addresses policies and procedures designed 

to prevent the successful execution of a suicide bombing attack. Participants are 

senior level decision makers in State and local police, fire, emergency medical services, and emergency management operations. Course methodology includes classroom presentations, field laboratories, and practical exercises. 

The PTRC has also been the venue for joint civilian law enforcement and National 

Guard anti-terrorism training exercises involving National Guard units from several 

different sates as well as from numerous different Federal, State and local agencies. 

Additionally, the center has been used by military special operations and conventional units to train in preparation for deployment overseas to Afghanistan and 

Iraq. Some of this training has been conducted jointly with the U.S Border Patrol 

and involved the use night surveillance techniques and procedures to be used by the 

military units near the border areas of the country to which they were deploying. 

Question. How much is included in the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget for 

training first responders? 

Answer. The total amount requested for the State and Local Training program in 

the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request is $95 million. Those funds are distributed as follows: 

Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) ............................................................................................................ $54,000,000 

National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC) ......................................................................................... 38,000,000 

Continuing Emerging Training Program .............................................................................................................. 3,000,000 

USFA 2008 Budget Request (All Training) .......................................................................................................... 42,000,000 

Emergency Management Institute (EMI) .............................................................................................................. 11,900,000 

Note: The total does not include the additional $2 Billion in DHS State & Local Grants to be awarded to State and Local First Responders 

who can apply, and are eligible for First Responder training funds, and other DHS components such as U.S Coast Guard and DNDO who also 

fund first responder training. 

Question. What are the Department’s plans to make State homeland security directors aware of the Playas Training Facility in an effort to help local first responders receive adequate training? 

Answer. Through the Office of Grants and Training (G&T), New Mexico Tech has 

conducted training for many of the State Homeland Security Training Points of Contact at PTRC. In addition, thousands of multidiscipline first responders have been 

trained at New Mexico Tech and either have attended training at PTRC or have 

been provided detailed information concerning the Center’s capabilities while training at the New Mexico Tech facilities in Socorro, New Mexico. Additionally, New 

Mexico Tech trainers provide 4-hour IRTB and PRSBI training classes to first responders in their own jurisdictions in cities throughout the United States and its 

territories. Information concerning the PTRC is provided to the students during 

these classes and also during Homeland Security related conferences and training 

events held in locations throughout the United States. FEMA also has plans to highlight the PTRC in its monthly newsletter and will work with New Mexico Tech on 

the possibility of producing a 1-hour live broadcast through the National Terrorism 

Prevention Institute at St. Petersburg College that will reach first responders across 

the Nation. 
182 

DIRTY BOMB TRAINING

Question. New Mexico Tech and New Mexico State University (NMSU) have suggested an expansion of anti-terrorism training for first responders. This expansion 

would include a course about radiological dispersal devices or dirty bombs. 

I believe this proposal has merit because the aftermath of a dirty bomb attack 

is one of our gravest anticipated terrorist attacks, and our first responders need appropriate training to respond to such a threat. New Mexico Tech and NMSU’s Carlsbad Environmental Monitoring and Research Center have the scientific expertise, 

radiological handling capabilities, radioactive material license, and trained staff to 

address both the scientific and training aspects of dirty bombs, and collaboration between these universities and New Mexico’s national nuclear weapons labs could provide ideal training first responders to counter dirty bomb risks. 

What dirty bomb training do first responders currently receive? 

Answer. FEMA uses the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, also known as the Nevada Test Site (NTS), to provide classroom and hands-on instruction in radiological fundamentals, interdiction 

and response to nuclear and radiological WMD incidents, decontamination processes, and other aspects of operations in nuclear and radiological environments. 

Training courses are delivered on-site at NTS and across the United States and its 

territories through the use of mobile training teams. The NTS is the lead agency 

of the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC) for training in Radiological Dispersion Devices (dirty bombs) training. Because dirty bombs and Improvised Nuclear Devices (IND) are key drivers of potential manmade catastrophic 

events, training on RDDs and INDs are incorporated in all NTS courses. All response courses contain training and information on RDDs/INDs and NTS uses field 

scenarios that are based on dirty bomb events. NTS prevention level courses specifically target detection of materials that would be used in RDD or IND devices. 

The following is a list of courses offered by NTS: 

AWR–140—WMD Radiological/Nuclear Awareness Course 

This course is a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) radiological/nuclear overview 

designed for first responders and other personnel who are likely to be the first to 

arrive on the scene of a radiological/nuclear incident. It focuses on the basics of radiation, possible health effects, hazard identification, and proper notification procedures. The course consists of classroom instruction. 

AWR–141—WMD Radiological/Nuclear Awareness Course (Train-the-Trainer) 

This course will prepare trainers to deliver a 6-hour Radiation Awareness Course 

using a prepared lesson plan. Each participant will have an opportunity to learn the 

basics of platform presentation and classroom discussion and will present a portion 

of the Radiation Awareness Course as part of his or her training. The course consists of classroom instruction. After completing the train-the-trainer course, participants are eligible to conduct (indirect) courses for their agency and surrounding jurisdictions. 

PER–240—WMD Radiological/Nuclear Responder Operations 

Training focuses on basic radiological detection, survey instruments, risk-based 

response, crime-scene preservation, personal protective equipment (PPE), radiological decontamination, and mitigation of radiological incidents. The course consists 

of both classroom instruction and scenario-driven, hands-on, performance-oriented 

practical exercises. Responders are presented with realistic, stressful conditions in 

their own jurisdiction and will work with their counterparts from other disciplines 

from within their community. The exercises provide realistic weapons of mass destruction (WMD) scenarios with a culmination exercise that includes radiological 

sources, smoke, pyrotechnics, emergency response vehicles, and role players. Air purifying respirators may be worn (for training purposes only) during the final exercise 

by those who are certified by their organization to wear respirators (bring documentation to the course). Although every participant will be issued a respirator, dosimeter, and radiation survey meter, participants are encouraged to bring their own 

from their department or jurisdiction. 

PER–241—WMD Radiological/Nuclear Responder Course for HazMat Technicians 

The course covers weapons of mass destruction (WMD) training for the hazardous 

materials (HazMat) technician and is focused on the current threat of radiological 

or nuclear attacks, fundamental principles of ionizing radiation, biological health 

and medical effects of radiological and nuclear material, hazard and risk assessment, entry and egress planning considerations, radiological survey instruments, dosimetry, appropriate situation-dependent personal protective equipment (PPE), ra-
183 

dioactive waste-related transportation issues, and radiological decontamination considerations. The course will provide classroom instruction and scenario driven, 

hands-on practical exercises, culminating in an exercise that includes radiological 

sources, smoke, emergency response vehicles, and role players. 

PER 242—Radiological/Nuclear Personal Radiation Detector Course 

The course provides training so that personnel who employ a PRD can: 

—Detect and locate the presence of radiation and/or radiological material. 

—Receive an alarm, identify and distinguish between the following: 

—False alarms 

—Alarms due to background radiation 

—Alarms due to legitimate causes 

—Alarms due to illicit nuclear material 

—Upon detecting, locating, and assessing the alarm, measure the approximate radiation level that generated the alarm. 

—Use radiological/nuclear material recognition factors to assist in categorizing the 

situation. 

—Upon discovery of the illicit use of radiological/nuclear material, initiate organizational protocols to ensure the health and safety of responders and the public. 

Additionally, New Mexico Tech However addresses RDD prevention and response 

in its Incident Response to Terrorist Bombing (IRTB) and Prevention and Response 

to Suicide Bombing Incidents (PRSBI) training and scenarios. 

Question. Could New Mexico Tech’s training facility in Playas, New Mexico be the 

ideal place to base such training? 

Answer. The PTRC, has potential for any type of Homeland Security WMD training. The PTRC is located in a very remote area of southwestern of New Mexico and 

is a secure site that permits training to be performed unobserved in an isolated setting. The empty suburban environment, which has infrastructure typically found in 

a small city, allows for training that cannot be conducted realistically by first responders in their own cities and towns. The entire town can be used for decontamination exercises. The unique setting and resources at PTRC greatly facilitate 

scenario based training. Frequently, a training scenario will require a multi-agency 

response to interdict a terrorist cell occupying several buildings. Exercises include 

tactical training with explosive breachings on hollow and solid interior and exterior 

wood doors, inward and outward opening metal doors, metal security doors and 

shooting ports in walls. Additionally, all participants have an opportunity to participate in Dye Marking Cartridge Reality-Based training, a training weapons system 

that shoots paint cartridges. When possible, training also utilizes air and ground operations. 

CONCLUSION OF HEARING

Senator BYRD. Well, you certainly set a high standard. And it’s 

hard for me to live up to that. 

Thank you again, Mr. Secretary. And thank all of you folks who 

have been waiting, and listening, patiently. They also serve, you 

know, who only stand and wait. 

The subcommittee stands in recess, subject to the call of the 

Chair. 

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., Thursday, March 8, the hearing was 

concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.] 

(185) 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, DC. 

NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES 

[The following testimonies were received by the Subcommittee on 

Homeland Security for inclusion in the record. The submitted materials relate to the fiscal year 2008 budget request for programs 

within the subcommittee’s jurisdiction.] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION

APTA is a nonprofit international association of over 1,500 public and private 

member organizations including transit systems and commuter rail operators; planning, design, construction and finance firms; product and service providers; academic institutions; transit associations and State departments of transportation. 

APTA members serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient and economical 

transit services and products. Over 90 percent of persons using public transportation in the United States and Canada are served by APTA members. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to submit testimony to the Senate 

Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security on the security and safety of 

public transportation systems. We appreciate your interest in improving security for 

the millions of Americans who use transit daily, and look forward to working with 

the Subcommittee as it develops the fiscal year 2008 appropriations bill for the Department of Homeland Security. 

ABOUT APTA

The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is a nonprofit international association of more than 1,500 public and private member organizations, 

including transit systems and commuter rail operators; planning, design, construction, and finance firms; product and service providers; academic institutions; transit 

associations and State departments of transportation. APTA members serve the 

public interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical transit services and products. More than 90 percent of the people using public transportation in the United 

States and Canada are served by APTA member systems. 

OVERVIEW

Mr. Chairman, public transportation is one of the Nation’s critical infrastructures. 

We cannot overemphasize the critical importance of the service we provide in communities throughout the country. Americans take more than 10 billion transit trips 

each year. People use public transportation vehicles more than 34 million times 

each weekday. This is more than 18 times the number of daily domestic boardings 

on the Nation’s airlines. 

Safety and security are the top priority of the public transportation industry. The 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report several years ago which 

said ‘‘about one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target transportation systems, 

and transit systems are the mode most commonly attacked.’’ Transit agencies took 

many steps to improve security prior to 9/11 and have significantly increased efforts 

since that date. Since September 11, 2001, public transit agencies in the United 

States have spent over $2.5 billion on security and emergency preparedness programs, and technology to support those programs, from their own budgets with only 
186 

minimal Federal funding. Since 9/11, the Federal Government has spent over $24 

billion on aviation security while has only allocated $549 million for transit security. 

Last year’s attacks in Mumbai and previous attacks in London and Madrid further 

highlight the need to strengthen security on public transit agencies in the United 

States and to do so without delay. We need to do what we can to prevent the kind 

of attacks that caused more than 400 deaths and nearly 3,000 injuries on rail systems in Mumbai, London and Madrid. 

We urge Congress to act decisively. While transit agencies are doing their part, 

we need the Federal Government to be a full partner in the fight against terrorism. 

Terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens are clearly a Federal responsibility and the 

Federal Government needs to increase its support for transit security improvements. 

In light of documented needs, we urge Congress to increase Federal support for 

transit security grants to assist transit agencies in addressing the $6 billion in identified transit security needs. We ask that Congress provide funding in the fiscal year 

2008 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill at levels authorized in 

legislation now moving through Congress but at a level no less than $545 million. 

Funding at the $545 million level annually would allow for significant security improvements in the Nation’s transit agencies over a 10-year period while authorization bills passed by the Senate and the House would help address transit security 

needs more quickly. Federal funding for additional security needs should provide for 

both hard and soft costs as described below and be separate from investments in 

the Federal transit capital program. 

We also urge Congress to provide $500,000 to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) so that DHS can provide that amount in grant funding to the APTA security standards program, under which APTA is working with its Federal partners 

to develop transit security standards. Finally, we request that Congress provide 

$600,000 to maintain the Public Transit Information Sharing Analysis Center 

(ISAC) which provides for the sharing of security information between transit authorities and DHS. 

To improve the distribution of funds under the existing transit security programs, 

we recommend that the existing process for distributing DHS grants be modified so 

that grants are made directly to transit agencies, rather than through State Administrating Agencies (SAA). We believe direct funding to the transit agencies would 

be quicker and cheaper. The current process and grant approval procedures have 

created significant barriers and time delays in getting funds into the hands of transit agencies for security improvements. 

As transit security is part of the larger war on terrorism, we urge Congress to 

continue providing transit security grants with no State or local match requirement. 

A local or State match requirement would have detrimental consequences by making security improvements contingent on a community’s ability to raise local funding. A local match would require the approval of a local governing body. The local 

governing body might need to approve funding in an open, public forum, where specific project information would be discussed. This is problematic for security sensitive projects. 

BACKGROUND

In 2004 APTA surveyed its U.S. transit agency members to determine what actions they needed to take to improve security for their customers, employees and 

facilities. In response to the survey, transit agencies around the country have identified in excess of $6 billion in transit security investment needs. State and local governments and transit agencies are doing what they can to improve security, but it 

is important that the Federal Government be a full partner in the effort to ensure 

the security of the Nation’s transit users. 

In fiscal year 2003, $65 million in Federal funds was allocated for transit agencies 

by DHS for 20 transit agencies. In fiscal year 2004, $50 million was allocated by 

DHS for 30 transit agencies. In fiscal year 2005, Congress specifically appropriated 

$150 million for transit, passenger and freight rail security. Out of the $150 million, 

transit received $135 million. In fiscal year 2006, Congress appropriated $150 million. Out of the $150 million, transit received $136 million. In fiscal year 2007, Congress appropriated $175 million. Out of $175 million, transit is slated to receive 

$163 million. We are very appreciative of these efforts. However, in the face of significant needs, more needs to be done. We are encouraged that the Senate fiscal 

year 2007 Emergency Wartime Supplemental includes an additional $625 million, 

and that the House version includes an additional $225 million. 

It is important to point out that there have been other significant efforts in support of transit security authorization legislation in the Congress. The Senate in 2004 

and 2006 unanimously passed legislation that would have authorized $3.5 billion 
187 

over 3 years for transit security. Earlier this week, the House approved transit and 

rail security authorization legislation that would provide $3.36 billion for transit security grant funding over a 4-year period. Earlier this year, the Senate approved 

similar legislation that would provide $3.5 billion for transit security grant funding 

over a 3-year period. We look forward to working with the Congress on these and 

other issues important to the transit industry. 

Transit agencies have significant and specific transit security needs. Based on 

APTA’s 2003 Infrastructure Database survey, over 2,000 rail stations do not have 

security cameras. According to our 2005 Transit Vehicle Database, 53,000 buses, 

over 5,000 commuter rail cars, and over 10,000 heavy rail cars do not have security 

cameras. Less than one-half of all buses have automatic vehicle locator systems 

(AVLs) that allow dispatchers to know the location of the bus if an emergency occurs. Nearly 75 percent of demand response vehicles lack these AVLs. Furthermore, 

no transit agency has a permanent biological detection system. In addition, only two 

transit agencies have a permanent chemical detection system. A more robust partnership with the Federal Government could help to better address many of these 

specific needs. 

We are disappointed that the Administration proposed only $175 million for transit, passenger and freight rail security in the fiscal year 2008 DHS budget proposal. 

Regrettably, the Administration budget would fail to make any significant improvement in the current Federal transit security program. The Administration proposes 

to freeze security funding for transit, passenger rail, and freight rail security at 

$175 million—the same amount appropriated by Congress for fiscal year 2007. This 

funding level falls well short of the funds needed to ensure the safety of Americans 

who take public transportation. We are also disappointed that the Administration 

failed to propose funding for transit security standards or the Public Transit Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC). Both of these programs are important national efforts that could significantly enhance transit security for a minimal cost. 

APTA is a Standards Development Organization (SDO) for the public transportation industry. We are now applying our growing expertise in standards development to transit industry safety and security, best practices, guidelines and standards. We have already begun to initiate our efforts in security standards development and we have engaged our Federal partners from both the DHS and Department of Transportation in this process. We look forward to working with the Administration and Congress in support of this initiative. Unfortunately, DHS has not 

agreed to provide funding to APTA in this effort. We respectfully urge Congress to 

provide $500,000 to the DHS so that it can in turn provide that amount in grant 

funding to the APTA security standards program. Our efforts in standards development for commuter rail, rail transit and bus transit operations have been significant 

and our status as a SDO is acknowledged by both the FTA and the Federal Railroad 

Administration (FRA). The FTA and the Transportation Research Board have supported our standards initiatives through the provision of grants. 

We also would like to work with Congress and the Department of Homeland Security’s Directorate of Science and Technology to take a leadership role in advancing 

research and technology development to enhance security and emergency preparedness for public transportation. 

INFORMATION SHARING

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, public transit agencies across 

the country have worked very hard to strengthen their security plans and procedures. They have been very active in training personnel and conducting drills to test 

their capacity to respond to emergencies. Also, to the extent possible within their 

respective budgets, transit agencies have been incrementally hardening their facilities through the introduction of additional technologies such as surveillance equipment, access control and intrusion detection systems. While transit agencies have 

been diligent, they have been unable to fully implement programs with the current 

levels of assistance from the Federal Government. 

A vital component of ensuring public transit’s ability to prepare and respond to 

critical events is the timely receipt of security intelligence in the form of threats, 

warnings, advisories and access to informational resources. Accordingly, in 2003, the 

American Public Transportation Association, supported by Presidential Decision Directive #63, established an ISAC for public transit systems throughout the United 

States. A grant in the amount of $1.2 million was awarded to APTA by the Federal 

Transit Administration to establish a very successful Public Transit ISAC that operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and gathered information from various sources, 

including DHS, and then passed information on to transit systems following a careful analysis of that information. However, given that the Federal Transit Adminis-
188 

tration was subsequently unable to access security funds, and given the decision of 

DHS to not fund ISAC operations, APTA has had to look for an alternate method 

of providing security intelligence through DHS’s newly created Homeland Security 

Information Network (HSIN). APTA continues to work with DHS staff to create a 

useful HSIN application for the transit industry. It is clear, however, that while the 

HSIN may become an effective resource, it does not replace the 24/7 two-way communication functions provided through the Public Transit ISAC. We believe that 

consistent, on-going and reliable Federal funding should be provided for the Public 

Transit ISAC that has been proven an effective delivery mechanism for security intelligence and respectfully urge Congress to provide $600,000 annually to maintain 

the Public Transit ISAC. 

In addition, APTA’s membership includes many major international public transportation systems, including the London Underground, Madrid Metro, and the Moscow Metro. APTA also has a strong partnership with the European-based transportation association, the International Union of Public Transport. Through these relationships, APTA has participated in a number of special forums in Europe and Asia 

to give U.S. transit agencies the benefit of their experiences and to help address 

transit security both here and abroad. 

COST OF HEIGHTENED SECURITY

Following the attacks on London in 2005, APTA was asked to assist the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in conducting a teleconference between the 

TSA and transit officials to discuss transit impacts pertaining to both increasing 

and decreasing the DHS threat levels. There is no question that increased threat 

levels have a dramatic impact on budget expenditures of transit systems and extended periods pose significant impacts on personnel costs. These costs totaled 

$900,000 per day for U.S. public transit agencies or an estimated $33.3 million from 

July 7 to August 12, 2005 during the heightened state of ‘‘orange’’ for public transportation. This amount does not include costs associated with additional efforts by 

New York, New Jersey and other systems to conduct random searches. 

Many transit systems are also implementing other major programs to upgrade security. For example, New York’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority (NY–MTA) 

is taking broad and sweeping steps to help ensure the safety and security of its 

transportation systems in what are among the most extensive security measures 

taken by a public transportation system to date. NY–MTA will add 1,000 surveillance cameras and 3,000 motion sensors to its network of subways and commuter 

rail facilities as part of a $212 million security upgrade announced late in 2005 with 

the Lockheed Martin Corporation. In fact, NY–MTA plans to spend over $1.1 billion 

through 2009 on transit security. 

SECURITY INVESTMENT NEEDS

Mr. Chairman, since the awful events of 9/11, the transit industry has invested 

more than $2.5 billion of its own funds for enhanced security measures, building on 

the industry’s already considerable efforts. At the same time, our industry undertook a comprehensive review to determine how we could build upon our existing industry security practices. This included a range of activities, which include research, 

best practices, education, information sharing in the industry, and surveys. As a result of these efforts we have a better understanding of how to create a more secure 

environment for our riders and the most critical security investment needs. 

Our survey of public transportation security identified enhancements of at least 

$5.2 billion in additional capital funding to maintain, modernize, and expand transit 

system security functions to meet increased security demands. Over $800 million in 

increased costs for security personnel, training, technical support, and research and 

development have been identified, bringing total additional transit security funding 

needs to more than $6 billion. 

Responding transit agencies were asked to prioritize the uses for which they required additional Federal investment for security improvements. Priority examples 

of operational improvements include: 

—Funding current and additional transit agency and local law enforcement personnel 

—Funding for over-time costs and extra security personnel during heightened 

alert levels 

—Training for security personnel and personnel replacement for those in training 

—Joint transit/law enforcement training 

—Security planning activities 

—Security training for other transit personnel 

—Priority examples of security capital investment improvements include: 
189 

—Radio communications systems 

—Security cameras on-board transit vehicles and in transit stations 

—Controlling access to transit facilities and secure areas 

—Automated vehicle locator systems 

—Security fencing around facilities 

Transit agencies with large rail operations also reported a priority need for Federal capital funding for intrusion detection devices. 

Mr. Chairman, the Department of Homeland Security issued directives for the 

transit industry in May 2004 which would require that transit agencies beef up security and to take a series of precautions to set the stage for more extensive measures without any Federal funding assistance. Transit agencies have already carried 

out many of the measures that Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is 

calling for, such as drafting security plans, removing trash bins and setting up procedures to deal with suspicious packages. The cost of these measures and further 

diligence taken during times of heightened alert is of particular concern to us. We 

look forward to working with you in addressing these issues. 

ONGOING TRANSIT SECURITY PROGRAMS

Mr. Chairman, while transit agencies have moved to a heightened level of security 

alertness, the leadership of APTA has been actively working with its strategic partners to develop a practical plan to address our industry’s security and emergency 

preparedness needs. In light of our new realities for security, the APTA Executive 

Committee has established a Security Affairs Steering Committee. This committee 

addresses our security strategic issues and directions for our initiatives. This committee is serving as the mass transit sector coordination council that will interface 

with DHS and other Federal agencies forming the government coordinating council. 

In partnerships with the Transportation Research Board, APTA supported two 

Transportation Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Panels that identified and 

initiated specific projects developed to address Preparedness/Detection/Response to 

Incidents and Prevention and Mitigation. 

In addition to the TCRP funded efforts, APTA has been instrumental in the development of numerous security and emergency preparedness tools and resources. 

Many of these resources were developed in close partnership with the FTA and we 

are presently focused on continuing that same level of partnership with various entities within DHS. Also, APTA has reached out to other organizations and international transportation associations to formally engage in sharing information on 

our respective security programs and to continue efforts that raise the bar for safety 

and security effectiveness. 

APTA has long-established safety audit programs for commuter rail, bus, and rail 

transit operations. Within the scope of these programs are specific elements pertaining to Emergency Response Planning and Training as well as Security Planning. 

In keeping with our industry’s increased emphasis on these areas, the APTA Safety 

Management Audit Programs have been modified to place added attention to these 

critical elements. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, in light of the Nation’s heightened security needs since 9/11, we 

believe that increased Federal investment in public transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical. The public transportation industry has made great strides 

in transit security improvements since 9/11 but much more needs to be done. We 

need the Federal Government to increase its support for transit security grants that 

will help transit systems continue to address the $6 billion in identified transit security investment needs. We urge this Subcommittee to provide funding at amounts 

authorized in legislation now moving through Congress or at no less than $545 million in the fiscal year 2008 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill. 

We also urge Congress to fund the APTA security standards program and the Public 

Transit ISAC as previously described. 

We have also found that investment in public transit security programs, resources 

and infrastructures provides a direct benefit in preparation and response to natural 

disasters as well. We look forward to building on our cooperative working relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and Congress to begin to address 

these needs. We again thank you and the Subcommittee for allowing us to submit 

testimony on these critical issues and look forward to working with you on safety 

and security issues. 
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, INC. 

The Association of State Floodplain Managers (ASFPM) and its 25 State Chapters 

represent over 9,000 State and local officials and other professionals who are engaged in all aspects of floodplain management and hazard mitigation. This includes 

floodplain management, mapping, engineering, planning, community development, 

hydrology, forecasting, emergency response, water resources and insurance. All 

ASFPM members are concerned with working to reduce our Nation’s flood-related 

losses. Our State and local officials are the Federal Government’s partners in implementing flood mitigation and insurance programs and working to achieve effectiveness in meeting our shared objectives. Our State members’ head offices that are designated by the governors to coordinate the National Flood Insurance Program 

(NFIP) with their communities and many others are involved in the administration 

of and participation in FEMA’s disaster mitigation programs. For more information 

on ASFPM, our website is: http://www.floods.org. 

Overall, the Association of State Floodplain Managers is pleased with the budget 

request for FEMA in fiscal year 2008. We particularly note the essentially full funding of the Map Modernization Initiative and the full funding (by transfer from the 

Flood Insurance Fund) of the two newly-authorized programs to mitigate severe repetitive flood loss properties. We also are pleased to see the request of $100 million 

for the Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) program to restore this nationwide, competitive program to a functional level. 

Flood Mitigation Assistance Program (Sec. 1366) 

The budget request includes $34 million (by transfer from the National Flood Insurance Fund) for the regular Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) program (Sec. 

1366). The FMA supports local mitigation planning and projects to help reduce the 

drain on the NFIP that is attributed to flood-prone properties that are repetitively 

flooded or at high risk of significant damage. 

It is our understanding that FEMA has determined that the authority does not 

exist to use premium income to support the FMA, and must constrain the amounts 

transferred to available funds generated by the policy service fee assessed on each 

flood insurance policy. FEMA’s determination is that it has the authority to use premium income only for the two repetitive loss mitigation programs (Sections 1361A 

and 1323, authorized by the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004). It is this constraint that limits the Administration’s request to an amount less than the fully authorized amount. 

—ASFPM urges the Committee to provide the authorized $40 million for the 

Flood Mitigation Assistance Program, and to clarify that the transfer for FMA 

may come from fee and/or premium income. 

ASFPM also notes that the Administration unnecessarily constrains the FMA 

funds to a period of two years. The Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 specifically 

calls for these funds to remain available until expended. Many of the projects undertaken by communities involve careful planning, sensitive work with homeowners, 

and in some cases, lengthy construction periods (such as may be need for elevating 

or reconstructing homes, or floodproofing public buildings). Further, if a project 

comes in under budget, the unused funds should become available for use by other 

communities to mitigate flood damages. 

The original authorization for FMA set per State and per community limitations 

on the amount of funds that may be provided in a five year period. With the doubling of the amount authorized for FMA, those limitations may constrain some of 

the States and communities that have active mitigation programs and large numbers of repetitive loss properties. 

—ASFPM urges the Committee to clarify that the FMA funds are to remain available until expended and that per State and per community limitations are 

waived. 

NFIP’s Pilot Program for Severe Repetitive Loss Properties (Sec. 1361A) and Individual Property Program (Sec. 1323) 

ASFPM is pleased to see the budget request for funding of the Pilot Program for 

Severe Repetitive Loss Properties (Sec. 1361A) and the Individual Property Program 

(Sec. 1323), which FEMA refers to as the ‘‘Repetitive Flood Claims’’ program. While 

the Individual Property Program is now operational, the regulations for the Severe 

Repetitive Loss programs regulations are anticipated this spring—nearly four years 

after authorization. It is important that FEMA and DHS issue the rules as soon as 

possible. FEMA has estimated that mitigation of the top-tier of repetitive loss properties can improve the stability of the National Flood Insurance Fund over the longterm, by avoiding an average of $200 million per year in claims. 
191 

The Severe Repetitive Loss program is authorized as a 5-year pilot with a termination imposed by directing that FEMA may not provide assistance after September 

30, 2009. It is notable that the authorization also specifically provides that the 

funds shall remain available until expended. Because the program has been unduly 

delayed the termination date virtually guarantees that funds will not be used completely, given the length of time it takes for communities to develop projects and 

to prepare and submit applications, and for FEMA’s lengthy application review and 

approval process. In addition, a large percentage of repetitive loss properties are located in areas affected by the hurricanes of 2004 and 2005, so the availability of 

these programs during reconstruction remains important to help reduce future 

losses. 

—ASFPM urges the Committee to waive the termination date for the Pilot Program for Severe Repetitive Loss; the duration of the program is already limited 

by the amount of funds authorized and appropriated. 

Flood Map Modernization 

ASFPM is pleased that the budget request includes $195 million for continued implementation of FEMA’s nationwide, multi-year initiative to modernize and update 

flood hazard maps. It is important to realize that maintaining and continuing to improve the flood maps is a long-term, ongoing process. Without adequate assessments, revisions, and maintenance, in 20 years we may find that the maps are, once 

again, out of date. FEMA needs to prepare for and have sufficient funds for a transition to a vibrant assessment and maintenance program when the current initiative 

is completed. 

—ASFPM urges the Committee to provide the full fiscal year 2008 budget request 

for the multi-year Map Modernization initiative. 

—ASFPM suggests that the Committee direct FEMA to report on its plans, and 

estimated funding needs, to transition from Map Modernization to an ongoing 

assessment and maintenance program. 

Recently, a report entitled ‘‘Base Map Inputs for Flood Mapping,’’ published by 

the National Research Council concluded that new digital, high-resolution land elevation maps are useful in the Map Modernization initiative. The report recommends 

a new program called ‘‘Elevation for the Nation’’ and concludes that a seamless nationwide elevation dataset would not only be beneficial for flood hazard maps, but 

would have many other applications as well. Furthermore, the report recommends 

that data collected in such a program should be open source data, and disseminated 

to the public at no additional cost as part of an updated National Elevation Dataset. 

While ASFPM agrees that more accurate ground elevation data will improve the 

utility of the FEMA flood maps, we are concerned that such an effort could shift 

resources from Map Modernization. Map Modernization is focused on creating the 

flood data layer—information pertaining to the extent and depth of floodwaters 

along our coasts, rivers, streams and other bodies of water. Even with that focus, 

there are not enough resources to develop the flood data layer as robustly as communities need to manage present and future flood risks. ASFPM would be supportive of a separate initiative, under the leadership of the U.S. Geological Survey, 

to implement ‘‘Elevation for the Nation.’’ 

Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grants 

Last year, an independent study of the benefits of mitigation, requested by Congress, was completed by the National Institute of Building Sciences. The report 

found an overall benefit-to-cost ratio of 4 to 1 for mitigation investments. For flood 

mitigation, the benefit-to-cost ratio was found to be even greater, with benefits of 

$5 for every $1 invested. Clearly these mitigation projects are important in the Nation’s efforts to reduce future flood losses. 

Nationwide, interest in mitigation has never been higher. As a result of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, communities throughout the Nation have developed 

local hazard mitigation plans which identify specific mitigation actions. Collectively 

these plans identify large numbers of mitigation actions—including many that will 

be supported solely by local funds, as well as many that will be eligible under PDM 

and other FEMA grant programs. To preserve this interest and momentum, even 

in areas of the country that have not experienced a recent disaster, the Pre-Disaster 

Mitigation Program should be funded as requested. 

—ASFPM urges the Committee to provide full funding of the Administration’s 

budget request of $100 million for the competitive Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program. 

Promising FEMA Initiatives 

Flood Control Levees.—Although a national dialog between FEMA, the Corps of 

Engineers and key stakeholders had been taking place regarding flood protection 
192 

levees, the issue was thrust into the forefront after Hurricane Katrina. The levee 

failures in New Orleans, in addition to issues related to FEMA’s Map Modernization 

initiative and the need to recertify the level of protection of levees, has required 

FEMA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to collaborate closely on levee issues. 

This renewed dialog appears to be vigorous and ASFPM is hopeful it will bring longlasting results to improve the public’s awareness of the benefits and the risks of levees. We support an improved program for the Corps to develop a levee inventory 

and work with FEMA and stakeholders to develop standards and guidance for properly operating and maintaining levees. 

Improved Mitigation Grant Processes.—In recent years FEMA has worked to improve its mitigation grant review and approval process, yet it continues to take as 

long as 12 to 18 months in some instances. States and communities report that 

sometimes the process can be frustrated at the FEMA Regional Office level by multiple reviews and redundant requests for information and data. It is also frustrating 

that FEMA has declined to provide feedback on specific weaknesses of applications 

(much less suggestions for improvement) that were submitted for the competitive 

Pre-Disaster Mitigation grant program. We are pleased that FEMA National continues to seek ways to improve the process, including its initiative to ‘‘unify’’ grant 

programs and tools where possible. Although this initiative is just beginning, 

ASPFM is encouraged by FEMA’s stakeholder based approach. 

All of FEMA’s mitigation grant programs require an analysis of benefits and costs 

to ensure that mitigation dollars are providing a return on investment to the taxpayer. Given that the aggregate of FEMA’s mitigation grant programs, on average, 

approaches $500 million nationwide, it is imperative that the tools for benefit-cost 

analyses are accurate, updated, and user friendly. In 2007, FEMA kicked off an initiative to update these tools. ASFPM is supportive of this effort. 

New FEMA, Staff Vacancies, and DHS Reductions 

This past fall, Congress passed the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform 

Act which sought to restore FEMA by transferring preparedness functions back into 

the agency and limiting the Department of Homeland Security’s interference in 

FEMA’s programming and budgeting. In the past few months, FEMA Director 

Paulison unveiled a vision for a ‘‘New FEMA.’’ This vision focuses on core competencies, increased staffing to a level appropriate to fulfill such core competencies, 

and strengthening FEMA’s regional offices. While we are encouraged by FEMA’s initial plans, it will be critical that Congress continue close oversight to ensure that 

FEMA is, indeed, restored with the autonomy and adequate resources and staffing 

to undertake the responsibilities Congress has established. 

For information about ASFPM and this testimony, contact Larry Larson, Executive Director, at (608) 274–0123 (asfpm@floods.org) or Merrie Inderfurth, Washington Liaison, at (703) 448–0245 (inderfurth@aol.com). 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EMERGENCY

MANAGERS

Chairman Byrd, Ranking Member Cochran, and distinguished members of the 

Subcommittee, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to provide testimony on 

the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security and on the need for a strong national emergency management system. 

I also want to express my sincerest gratitude to this subcommittee for the great 

support you have provided to the emergency management community over the past 

few years, particularly your support for the Emergency Management Performance 

Grant Program and for the reform of FEMA. We very much appreciate your including an additional $100 million for EMPG in the recent fiscal year 2007 supplemental bill. 

I am Michael D. Selves. I am currently the Emergency Management and Homeland Security Director for Johnson County, Kansas. Johnson County constitutes the 

Southwest suburbs of the Kansas City Metropolitan Area and, with a population of 

approximately a half million, is the most populous county in Kansas. I currently 

serve as the President of the International Association of Emergency Managers 

(IAEM) and am providing this testimony on their behalf. I am also a Certified 

Emergency Manager (CEM), and have served IAEM for 5 years as chair of the Government Affairs Committee prior to becoming a member of the presidential team. 

For the past 12 years I have been an active participant in the National Association 

of Counties, chairing their Subcommittee on Emergency Management, as a charter 

member of their Homeland Security Task Force as well as serving 2 years on their 
193 

Board of Directors. I served for 7 years in emergency management at the State level 

as well as serving for 20 years in the United States Air Force. 

The International Association of Emergency Managers has over 3,000 members 

including emergency management professionals at the State and local government 

levels, the military, private business and the nonprofit sector in the United States 

and in other countries. Most of our members are city and county emergency managers who perform the crucial function of coordinating and integrating the efforts 

at the local level to prepare for, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from 

all types of disasters including terrorist attacks. Our members include emergency 

managers from large urban areas as well as rural counties. 

Last year about this time, I provided written testimony to this subcommittee regarding the President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request. In that testimony I made 

reference to the fact that the devastating hurricanes along our Gulf Coast in 2005 

had brought to light significant gaps in our emergency preparedness and emergency 

management posture. To address those problems, it is important that we look at the 

total, national system of emergency management as it is at present, and upon which 

we will have to rely in the future. Quite honestly, this is a system which we have 

neglected and allowed to become fragmented. 

Critical Elements of a National Emergency Management (E.M.) System 

After the terrible events of 9/11/2001, we unfortunately lost sight of the fact that 

there are three critical elements to any effective emergency management system. 

First, that system must be comprehensive, in that it must encompass all potential 

hazards and all potential impacts relevant to any community in this Nation. In this 

regard, the function of emergency management must take into account the impact 

of disasters from not only a physical perspective, but from a political, economic, sociological and even psychological one as well. In this respect, emergency managers 

are charged with establishing a broad, comprehensive framework within which the 

legal elected authority of their jurisdictions is exercised during a disaster event. 

This framework must take into account governmental, private sector and volunteer 

activities far beyond those associated with emergency services. 

Second, it is essential that our national E.M. system must be integrated. Without 

unity of effort before, during and after any disaster, the effort is going to be chaotic 

at best and, at worst, doomed to failure. Emergency managers at all levels of government are responsible for ensuring that the highest levels of horizontal and 

vertical integration exist among all levels of government and across all elements of 

a community to support disaster response and recovery activities. Such integration 

demands that linkages are in place and that all relevant agencies at the local, State 

and national level are involved and engaged. 

Third, there must be well established and maintained coordination among all 

stakeholders in the system to ensure that it is effective. Comprehensive and integrated plans on paper are not sufficient. Key stakeholders—like local government 

emergency managers—must be constantly consulted to ensure that the plans are 

based on reality and have ‘‘buy in’’ from those same key stakeholders through discussion and consensus. Essential understandings regarding roles, responsibilities 

and relationships must be maintained among everyone involved for the system to 

be truly effective. 

It is the revitalization and continued maintenance of this comprehensive, integrated and coordinated national emergency management system that IAEM feels is 

of primary importance. That is why we have given heavy emphasis in our discussions with the staff of this subcommittee and other relevant committees within Congress to two priority issues: 

—The timely and complete implementation of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. 

—Greatly enhanced funding of Emergency Management Performance Grants 

(EMPG). 

Reforming and Strengthening FEMA 

In order for a truly effective national emergency management system to exist, 

there must be a strong and empowered Federal agency in a leadership position. 

FEMA must have the authority and credibility essential to performing its role in 

the integrated system. Unfortunately, after being consolidated into DHS, FEMA not 

only lost resources and experienced personnel—most importantly they lost authority 

to make decisions and direct Federal efforts during disasters. Bad decisions—like 

subordinating the role of the FEMA Director, reducing funding, and removing preparedness—led to the problems encountered during Hurricane Katrina. As a result, 

IAEM established a position on reforming FEMA which called for: 

—Maximum amount of access of FEMA Director to the White House. 
194 

—FEMA clearly responsible for coordination of the Federal response to disasters. 

—Adequate funding, resources and personnel for FEMA which cannot be reallocated without legislative action. 

—Experienced, qualified and knowledgeable leadership in all key FEMA positions. 

—Establish and maintain a culture of empowerment within FEMA that promotes 

the maximum level of autonomy and supports the independent actions necessary to deal with the consequences of disaster. 

—Abolish the Principal Federal Official (PFO) position. It leads to confusion. 

—Strengthen the FEMA regional offices. 

—Ensure opportunity for local emergency managers to have meaningful participation in the policy development process. 

—Return to established emergency management doctrine—all hazards, integrated, 

all phases (Return preparedness to FEMA). 

Last fall, Congress passed and the President signed, the Post-Katrina Emergency 

Management Reform Act of 2006 which included most of these recommendations. 

We are aware and very much appreciate the important role played by this Subcommittee. If you had not agreed to include the Reform Bill in the Conference 

Agreement on the fiscal year 2007 DHS Appropriations Bill, it would not have had 

final action. 

We urge the Congress to exercise aggressive oversight of the implementation of 

the Act to ensure that Congressional intent is complied with fully and in a timely 

manner. Some issues which we are particularly concerned about follow: 

—The actual chain of command which will be in place during a disaster situation. 

It is not clear that the FEMA Administrator will have the authority he needs 

to direct the Federal response to disasters and emergencies. We believe it is important that this committee insist the authority to accomplish the mission clearly resides with the Administrator. We believe that the National Response Plan 

should be written to require this. There are law enforcement incidents where 

this might not be applicable, but when it is incident management for the Department of Homeland Security it is appropriate for the FEMA Administrator 

as the department’s incident manager to be in that chain of command. 

—Position of Administrator. Congressional intent clearly stated that the FEMA 

Administrator was to report directly to the Secretary and that the FEMA Administrator position was to be established as a Deputy Secretary level position. 

We understand the Department intends for the Administrator to report to the 

Deputy Secretary. 

—The role of the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and the Principal Federal 

Official (PFO). Even though the (PFO) was not abolished under the Post 

Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, there was a clear intention that 

the PFO’s role was to act only as an advisor to the Secretary and not have operational control. Our members want the Federal Coordinating Officers to have 

the authority to make decisions and for them not to be reversed. If the PFO 

program is not abolished, it will be important the Congress insist that FEMA 

manage the doctrine, training, and exercising of the PFOs to insure no conflict 

between the PFO doctrine and the FCO responsibilities. This is clearly a FEMA 

function under the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act and the 

law does not permit the Secretary to move FEMA functions to other parts of 

the Department. 

—Transfer of all the preparedness support positions and the appropriate funding. 

We applaud the preparedness functions being moved to FEMA. However, it will 

be vital that all the positions to support those functions be moved as well. We 

understand funding was taken from preparedness programs for ‘‘shared services’’. Will those funds be transferred with the programs? When FEMA was created in 1979, departments and agencies did not send the support positions with 

the programs—this history should not be repeated. 

—Transfer of the Intergovernmental Affairs Staff. This office which includes approximately 17 positions was clearly transferred as part of the preparedness 

functions to FEMA. It is our understanding that DHS may ask for a modification to keep these positions in the National Protection and Programs Directorate. This function and these positions will be important to FEMA as they rebuild their crucial relationships with the many State and local stakeholders and 

should be transferred. 

We look forward to the naming of the National and Regional Advisory Councils 

as provided for under the Reform Act. IAEM has offered our services to assist the 

FEMA Administrator in identifying qualified and certified local emergency managers to serve on these councils. 
195 

Enhance Funding for EMPG 

One factor which is essential to the restoration of a national emergency management system is the ability of State and local governments to participate as full partners in that system. In order to do this, the long-standing funding mechanism of 

EMPG must continue and be enhanced. All of the elements I’ve outlined above require that there be responsible, knowledgeable and empowered people at the State 

and local government levels who are focused on maintaining the emergency management capability needed to adequately support national objectives and provide the 

services our citizens expect and deserve. 

The Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG) is the single 

Federal all hazards emergency preparedness grant program in support of capacity 

building at the State and local level. EMPG funds support the State and local foundation upon which our Nation’s emergency response system is built. The program 

supports State and local initiatives for planning, training, exercise, public education, 

command and control, as well as emergency operations personnel. Emergency management is the governmental function that coordinates and integrates all activities 

necessary to build, sustain, and improve the capability to prepare for, protect 

against, respond to, recover from or mitigate against threatened or actual natural 

disasters, acts of terrorism or other man-made disasters. 

The EMGP program is authorized by the Stafford Act and has been in existence 

since the 1950s. It was created to be a 50/50 cost share to ensure participation by 

State and local governments in building and maintaining strong emergency management capability. 

Administration proposals have attempted in the past to reduce the percentage of 

funds which could be used for personnel and to combine the funds with the homeland security grant programs. Congress has rejected the request to limit the percentage for personnel and has kept the EMPG program as a separate account. 

The International Association of Emergency Managers recommends the following 

regarding the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG): —EMPG should be funded at $375 million, the amount authorized in Public Law 

109–295, the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. We appreciate the $200 million you provided last year to begin to address the shortfall. 

—EMPG should be retained as a separate account. The Administration’s request 

to combine EMPG with other programs should be rejected. 

—The EMPG match should be maintained at 50–50 to continue to reflect the 

State and local commitment to the emergency management program in partnership with the Federal Government. 

—EMPG allocation and uses should be based on emergency management plans 

and all-hazard capacity, rather than terrorism based capabilities. 

—Performance metrics based systems like the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) standards should be used to measure the capacity being 

built by EMPG, rather than homeland security specific measurables. 

I’m often asked to give specific examples of the additional responsibilities which 

have occurred in the past few years which make the enhancement of funding for 

EMPG so critical. Here are some examples: 

Planning for the Deployment of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).—Most 

public health departments do not have a planning capability and will turn to the 

local emergency manager for assistance in this area. As the coordinator of plans, 

this is appropriate. It just takes staff and time to do it. The stockpile from the CDC 

must be broken down, plans must be made on where it is to be distributed, volunteers must be recruited and trained, exercises have to be conducted, and public information programs must be developed and implemented. Planning must be integrated at the local level for the vaccination of first responders and then the general 

population. Local emergency managers, in close coordination with public health 

agencies, will be responsible for seeing it gets done. 

Assessing Threats and Administering Allocation of Funding for Homeland Security.—As an outgrowth of the continuing hazard/threat assessment engaged in by 

local emergency management agencies, additional responsibilities for homeland security needs and threat assessments are being required by Federal agencies, usually 

as a prerequisite for grant funding. If money is received, leadership is needed at 

the community level to work with all stakeholders on the appropriate and most cost 

effective distribution of funding. In most communities the allocation of funds among 

competing stakeholders requires an ‘‘honest broker’’ to facilitate the achievement of 

consensus; this task generally falls to the emergency management agency. 

Implementation of NRP/NIMS Requirements.—A major additional workload has 

been generated by the need to revise and overhaul State and local emergency operations plans to conform to the NRP/NIMS requirements. Then, additional effort is 
196 

necessary to determine what training is needed by the different elements of the 

community (elected officials, public works, EMS, fire, police, public health, hospitals, 

etc.), acquire the needed training, find funding to pay for it and implement the actual delivery of the training program. 

Managing and Coordinating Citizen Corps.—It will be essential that this program 

be managed and coordinated. Experience all across the country has shown that Citizen Corps Councils don’t just spring up unassisted. Certainly these Councils cannot 

operate outside of a local strategy for community preparedness and without the support of local governments. This support role invariably falls to emergency managers 

and requires staff resources and time. 

Public Private Partnerships for Homeland Security.—These partnerships do not 

just happen. The local emergency manager is the one to develop and maintain these 

partnerships so that the community can make full use of all its resources both public and private. Once again, it takes time and staff. 

All of these efforts are additional requirements over and above the normal work 

of State and local emergency management agencies to mitigate, prepare for, and respond to the many hazards found in the country such as severe weather, tornadoes, 

ice storms, flooding, earthquakes, hurricanes and hazardous materials incidents due 

to transportation and fixed facilities. 

While not directly related to our primary concerns of implementing the Post 

Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 and increasing funding for the 

Emergency Management Reform Act, IAEM would like to offer these comments regarding other related national preparedness issues: 

—Congress, DHS and FEMA need to place greater emphasis and attention on the 

support of States and communities who must receive evacuees when disasters 

cause the relocation of large numbers of persons from the affected areas. For 

example, in our work within the Kansas City Metropolitan Area, we have determined that our greatest catastrophe-related threat is the need to be prepared 

to house and care for massive numbers of evacuees from the St. Louis area 

should the New Madrid Fault produce a major disaster there and we (KC) have 

to play ‘‘Houston’’ to St. Louis’ ‘‘New Orleans’’. 

—IAEM fully endorses the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) 

concept and emphasizes that, except for the participation of the National Guard, 

the majority of personnel deployed under EMAC are emergency managers, first 

responders and other support personnel from local governments. 

—As DHS and FEMA seek to implement standards and credentialing criteria at 

the direction of Congress, IAEM urges the use of the Emergency Management 

Accreditation Program (EMAP) and the Certified Emergency Manager Program. 

(CEM). 

EMAP is a joint NEMA/IAEM program utilizing NFPA 1600 as the basis for 

establishing standardized emergency management programs. Over a dozen national level key stakeholder organizations worked together to create this voluntary accreditation process for State, territorial, and local programs. EMAP 

provides the process and the opportunity to be recognized for compliance with 

national standards, to demonstrate accountability, and to focus attention on 

areas and issues where work or resources are needed. Its intent is to encourage 

examination of strengths and weaknesses, pursuit of corrective measures, and 

communications and planning among different governmental sectors and the 

community. 

The Certified Emergency Manager Program (CEM) is administered by IAEM 

and is the defining credential for emergency managers. Those emergency managers so credentialed can effectively accomplish the goals and objectives of any 

emergency management program in all environments with little or no additional training orientation. Currently there are nearly 1,000 of these qualified 

individuals contributing to the success of emergency management programs in 

State, local and Federal Government as well as private enterprise. 

—We want to emphasize our support for the Emergency Management Institute. 

It is the primary Federal entity for the development of general emergency management education, training and doctrine and should be funded appropriately. 

There are many excellent institutions providing education and training targeted 

to specialized emergency response disciplines; however, EMI has long provided 

the premier vehicle for promoting total community preparedness through its Integrated Emergency Management Course (IEMC) and has provided guidance 

and coordination of emergency management and homeland security university 

programs through its Higher Education Project. 

In closing, your emergency managers at all levels of government are constantly 

working to restore and improve this national system upon which so much depends, 
197 

we thank you for your support and understanding in the past and ask for your consideration of our needs and recommendations for the future. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY ASSOCIATION MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Thank you Chairman Byrd, Ranking Member Cochran, and distinguished members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity to provide you with a statement for the record on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) fiscal year 

2008 budget. I am Albert Ashwood, the President of the National Emergency Management Association and Director of the Oklahoma Department of Emergency Management. In my statement, I am representing the National Emergency Management 

Association (NEMA), whose members are the State emergency management directors in the States, the U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia. NEMA’s members are responsible to their governors for emergency preparedness, homeland security, mitigation, response, and recovery activities for natural, man-made, and terrorist caused disasters. 

In 2006, FEMA declared 52 major disasters; 6 emergency declarations; and 86 fire 

management assistance declarations. Overall, 39 States were impacted. The multihazards emergency management system continues to be the means to practice and 

exercise for devastating acts of terrorism, while at the same time preparing the Nation for hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, hazardous materials spills, and floods. 

We respectfully ask for your Committee to consider the role of emergency management as you address the fiscal year 2008 appropriations and ask for your serious 

consideration of additional Federal support for the only all-hazards Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) to build State and local emergency management capacity. EMPG is the only State and local matching grant program supporting preparedness efforts. 

The Department of Homeland Security budget provides critical support to State 

and local emergency management programs. NEMA would like to address four critical issues regarding the proposed Federal budget for Department of Homeland Security: 

—Concern for maintaining the Emergency Management Performance Grant 

(EMPG) program at the fiscal year 2007 level while requirements increase for 

State and local governments; 

—The need for oversight on the implementation of the Post-Katrina FEMA Reform Act; 

—Federal support for the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC); 

and 

—Significant deficits for improving State and local Emergency Operations Centers 

(EOCs). 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING

EMPG is the only program for All-Hazards Preparedness 

Natural disasters are certain and often anticipated. Every State must be able to 

plan for disasters as well as build and sustain the capability to respond. EMPG is 

the only source of funding to assist State and local governments with planning and 

preparedness/readiness activities associated with natural disasters. At a time when 

our country is recovering from one of the largest natural disasters in history and 

making strides to improve the Nation’s emergency preparedness/readiness, we cannot afford to have this vital program be just maintained. EMPG is the backbone of 

the Nation’s all-hazards emergency management system and the only source of direct Federal funding to State and local governments for emergency management capacity building. EMPG is used for personnel, planning, training, and exercises at 

both the State and local levels. EMPG is primarily used to support State and local 

emergency management personnel who are responsible for writing plans; conducting 

training, exercises and corrective action; educating the public on disaster readiness; 

and maintaining the Nation’s emergency response system. EMPG is being used to 

help States create and update plans for receiving and distribution plans for emergency supplies such as water, ice, and food after a disaster; debris removal plans; 

and plans for receiving or evacuating people—all of these critical issues identified 

in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the following investigations and reports. 

The State and local government partnership with the Federal Government to ensure preparedness dates back to the civil defense era of the 1950s, yet increased responsibilities over the last decade have fallen on State and local governments. 
198 

NEMA’s 2006 NEMA Biennial Report shows that the shortfall has reached $287 

million. 

State and Local Match 

EMPG is the only all-hazards preparedness program within the Department of 

Homeland Security that requires a match at the State and local level. The match 

is evidence of the commitment by State and local governments to address the urgent 

need for all-hazards emergency planning, to include terrorism. EMPG requires a 

match of 50 percent from State or local governments. According to the NEMA 2006 

Biennial Report, States were continuing to over match the Federal Government’s 

commitment to national security protection through EMPG by $96 million in fiscal 

year 2005, which is an 80 percent State and 20 percent Federal contribution. To 

bring all State and local jurisdictions up to the 50 percent level, $135 million is 

needed; however, it would bring as many as 3,030 additional local jurisdictions to 

become part of the program. To bring non-participating jurisdictions into the program at the 50 percent level requires an additional $152 million. 

EMPG Helps Ensure Personnel for Mutual Aid 

During the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, the interdependencies of the Nation’s emergency management system were demonstrated and one of the success stories was the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). EMAC enabled 

48 States, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico to provide 

assistance in the form of more than 2,100 missions of human, military and equipment assets and over 65,000 civilian and military personnel and equipment assets 

to support the impacted States. The estimated costs of these missions may exceed 

$829 million and the missions and requests for aid are continuing. Of the personnel 

providing assistance through EMAC, 46,503 were National Guard personnel and 

19,426 were civilians. Many of the civilians sent to provide assistance are supported 

by the EMPG program in their State. The nature of the Nation’s mutual aid system 

vividly shows the need for all States to have appropriate capabilities to respond to 

disasters of all types and sizes. EMPG allows States and local governments to build 

this capacity both for their own use and to share through EMAC. The increased reliance on mutual aid for catastrophic disasters means additional resources are needed 

to continue to build and enhance the Nation’s mutual aid system through EMAC. 

Appropriate Support Needed to Strengthen Program 

While EMPG received modest increases in 2003 and 2004 after 10 years of 

straight-lined funding, the program needs to be adequately resourced based on 

building capacity. We appreciate all of the efforts of members of Congress and the 

Administration to allow for modest increases to the EMPG program, however adjusted over the last 15 years the increases have not kept pace with inflation at a 

time when capacity is supposed to be increasing. Continued funding increases are 

necessary to make up for over a decade of degradation of funding and increased 

State and local commitments. The increased flexibility of EMPG is offset by funding 

shortfalls estimated in the NEMA Biennial Report in 2006 to be over $287 million 

for all 50 States. The current total need is $487 million. The Post-Katrina FEMA 

Reform Act authorized EMPG at $375 million for fiscal year 2008. 

Clearly, Congress wants to understand what is being built with these investments, especially in tight fiscal conditions. The 2006 Quick Response Survey found 

that if States were to each receive an additional $1 million in EMPG funding for 

fiscal year 2007, States would use the following percentages for each the following 

activities: 88 percent of States responding would use the funding to support the update plans including evacuation, sheltering, emergency operations, catastrophic disasters and others; 83 percent would provide more training opportunities for State 

and local emergency preparedness and response; 88 percent would provide additional preparedness grants to local jurisdictions; 69 percent would conduct more 

State and local exercises; and 61 percent would use funding for State and local 

NIMS compliance. (States were able to respond to multiple activities, as each State 

has multiple emergency preparedness priorities.) 

Last year’s Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report completed by the Department 

of Homeland Security found that current catastrophic planning is unsystematic and 

not linked within a national planning system. The report cites that, ‘‘This is incompatible with 21st century homeland security challenges, and reflects a systematic 

problem: outmoded planning processes, products, and tools are primary contributors 

to the inadequacy of catastrophic planning. The results of the Review support the 

need for a fundamental modernization of our Nation’s planning process.’’ The report 

goes on to explain that all States do not adequately address special needs populations, continuity of operations, continuity of government, evacuation plans, and resource management. EMPG is the ONLY source of funding that can address these 
199 

significant and immediate needs. The current EMPG shortfall does not take into account these findings. 

Accountability Measures 

Many States have various accountability measures in place to track the use of 

EMPG funding and NEMA supports the development of a national system that 

quantifies the uses of the funding. In fact, NEMA through the National Homeland 

Security Consortium is working closely with the new Preparedness Directorate at 

DHS to collaborate on performance metrics for HSPD–8 and the Target Capabilities 

List. The DHS effort will help to develop a national picture of EMPG metrics as 

well. At the same time, States already have measures in place at the State level 

to track the use of EMPG funding in their States. 46 States utilize the EMAP 

Standards or the National Emergency Management Baseline Capability (NEMBCAP) process to address shortfalls in the State emergency management program. 11 

States require local emergency management agencies to use the EMAP standards 

in the development of annual work plans with an additional 9 States requiring 

EMAP as a performance measurement. 

EMPG as a Separate Account 

The President’s Budget proposal for fiscal year 2007 suggests combining the 

EMPG account with the Citizen Corp account to form a formula-based grant account. NEMA strongly disagrees with this approach, as EMPG must be maintained 

as a separate line item account as Congress has affirmed since fiscal year 2003. 

Congress agreed at that time that the program account needed to be visible and 

easy to find in the budget because of the importance of the program. The separate 

account is critical because the program is the only all-hazards grant program being 

administered through the Grants and Training Office to emergency management 

agencies. Additionally, NEMA suggests that Congress maintain the method of distribution for EMPG, similar to the language in the fiscal year 2006 appropriations, 

however continuing to allocate the funding through the State Administrative Agencies (SAAs) continues to cause delays in some States. NEMA supports language that 

would expressly restore the direct allocation and administration of the EMPG 

grants to State emergency management agencies. This will facilitate the process of 

expediting funding to State and local emergency management agencies without adding unnecessary steps. 

All-Hazards Approach 

The Federal Government must continue its commitment to ensuring national security though all-hazard preparedness. Without adequate numbers of State and 

local personnel to operate the all-hazards emergency management system, the infrastructure used to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from all disasters 

will collapse. Unfortunately, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita illustrated the need for 

adequate emergency management systems from the ground up. Daily disasters 

make the case for every State and local government to have an emergency management capacity. Instead of making unbalanced investments towards terrorism preparedness, we must maintain an all-hazards approach and shore up the foundation 

of our response system for all disasters regardless of cause. We strongly ask for Congress to ensure predictable and adequate funding levels for the EMPG in fiscal year 

2008. 

FEMA REORGANIZATION

The passage of the Post Katrina FEMA Reform Act was an important priority for 

the Nation’s emergency managers. Congress should be applauded for their action to 

take significant and serious steps to reform and repair the Nation’s emergency management system. As the March 31, 2007 transition deadline approaches, Congress 

must support full implementation of the Act to ensure that the intent of the reforms 

are put into practice to build a strong national emergency management system. Additionally, Congress must continue to work beyond the transition period to ensure 

that the new dynamic is not only working, but that adequate resources and leadership is provided as a critical ingredient toward successful integration of preparedness activities. DHS must implement a true ‘‘all-hazards’’ mission within the Department and in all grant guidance. 

FEMA’s regional offices are strengthened in the legislation, and as we move forward Preparedness and Department of Defense positions must be clearly defined 

and integrated. We must ensure that Federal preparedness coordinators are made 

part of the regional structure on a day-to-day basis. Relationships with State offices 

must be reestablished to ensure coordination and synchronization in preparedness, 

response, recovery and mitigation activities. The creation of the National Advisory 
200 

Council is lauded by NEMA and we hope that the new organizational system will 

enable DHS and FEMA to include stakeholders on the front end of new or revised 

policy and program development. 

As a participant on the initial National Response Plan State and Local Team, I 

still remain concerned about the differentiation between the Federal Coordinating 

Officer (FCO) and the Principal Federal Official (PFO). NEMA strongly urged Congress to abolish the PFO, but language was included in the final reform bill to limit 

the PFO’s roles and responsibilities. The Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) must 

have the authority in the field to carry out the responsibilities of the position. The 

FCO’s authority and responsibilities are clearly delineated in the Robert T. Stafford 

Disaster Relief and Emergency Relief Act (41 U.S.C. 5143 Section 302). The statute 

outlines the functions and appointment of the FCO and the National Response Plan 

(NRP) must follow the Stafford Act authorities that empower the FCO to serve on 

behalf of the President in a declared disaster area. NEMA strongly supports eliminating the role of the Principle Federal Official (PFO). In NEMA’s view, the position 

is duplicative. NEMA opposed the creation of this position in the drafting process 

for the NRP and now we are revisiting this in the re-write. Initially, the PFO was 

included in the NRP to address an incident prior to a formal disaster or emergency 

declaration. The PFO role adds additional bureaucracy and confusion to any disaster. The PFO position should be eliminated, consistent with the Senate report on 

Hurricane Katrina. Other issues we need to revisit include an ‘‘incident of national 

significance’’, defining ‘‘catastrophic’’ disaster, and maintaining Governors’ control of 

the National Guard in a disaster. 

The current plans for reorganization are not entirely clear on the subject of grant 

administration. The plan calls for separation of the Office of Grants and the National Preparedness Office within FEMA. Grants must be closely linked with the 

overall preparedness strategy to ensure we are building the right capabilities. I ask 

Congress to look closely at how these offices can be formally linked within FEMA. 

I want to reiterate my concern that FEMA needs to have the ability to not only send 

out the grant checks, but to ensure that grants are awarded based on priorities 

identified by the emergency management coordinating functions. 

FEMA has the ability to tap into the emergency responder community to build 

relationships through training and exercises. FEMA also has the skills to work cooperatively with State and local elected and appointed officials towards comprehensive 

recovery. FEMA has the coordinating function in the Federal Government and 

should have the ability to tap all the resources at the Federal level to respond to 

a disaster. However, all these areas need to be strengthened with an all-hazards 

focus to ensure that Federal, State, and local governments are building relationships 

before a disaster and understand how to work together cohesively. FEMA also needs 

financial support to maintain and build their capacity. We hope that Congress will 

partner with NEMA as you provide oversight and direction towards to new role of 

FEMA. 

BUILDING OUR NATION’S MUTUAL AID SYSTEM THROUGH EMAC

The response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita resulted in the largest deployment 

of interstate mutual aid in the Nation’s history through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). As mentioned previously, EMAC deployed personnel comprised of multiple disciplines from all member States to respond to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas. The process enabled National 

Guard, search and rescue teams, incident management teams, emergency operations 

center support, building inspectors, law enforcement personnel, and other disciplines 

to immediately assist the requesting States in need of support. The National Guard 

even chose to continue under EMAC when deployed under Title 32 because of the 

organization, liability protections, accountability, and tracking abilities EMAC provides. 

EMAC was created after Hurricane Andrew by then-Florida Governor Lawton 

Chiles. The system was developed through the member States of the Southern Governors’ Association to establish mechanisms to enable mutual aid among member 

sates in emergency situations. The Southern Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact (SREMAC) was signed by participating Governors in 1993. Following recognition of SREMACs nationwide applicability by the National Governors’ 

Association and FEMA, Congress enacted EMAC in 1996 (Public Law 104–321). 

Currently 49 States, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia are members of EMAC. EMAC requires member States to have an implementation plan and to follow procedures outlined in the EMAC Operations Manual. EMAC 

takes care of issues such as reimbursement, liability protections, and workers’ compensation issues. 
201 

Prior to the historic 2005 deployments, EMAC’s largest previous deployment was 

during the 2004 Hurricane season in Florida, Alabama, and West Virginia, which 

enabled 38 States to provide assistance in the form of more than $15 million in 

human, military, and equipment assets and over 800 personnel to support the impacted States for over 85 days of continuous response operations. NEMA completed 

a 2005 After Action Report, which identified areas for continuous improvement for 

the EMAC systems. EMAC has since worked to draft a strategic plan to implement 

the lessons learned into practice. The support of EMAC is critical to helping offset 

the costs of disasters and maintaining the need for a massive Federal workforce for 

response to catastrophic disasters. The beauty of EMAC is that it provides assistance to those in need, but allows others to assist and learn from disasters in other 

States. 

In order to meet the ever-growing need for and reliance on interstate mutual aid, 

EMAC is seeking $4 million over 3 years to continue to build EMAC capabilities. 

This funding will allow EMAC to focus on the implementation of lessons learned 

from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, such as training and education for all mutual 

aid stakeholders, resource typing and credentialing, and information and resource 

management. Since EMAC’s inception in 1993, EMAC was funded by member 

States until 2003. In 2003, FEMA funded EMAC with a 3 year grant of $2 million. 

This funding expires on March 31, 2007. Funding has been used for administrative 

support of EMAC, development of the EMAC Operations system whereby all resources deployed under the Compact are tracked from when it is requested until reimbursement is paid, and the 2004 and 2005 after action reports. NEMA has also 

has established an EMAC Advisory Group that is already working to better integrate mutual aid partners into the EMAC system before future disasters occur. 

Specific Funding for EMAC is needed to continue to build capabilities. The PostKatrina FEMA Reform Act authorized $4 million annually for EMAC, but no funds 

were appropriated. NEMA supports inclusion of an annual budget line item in 

FEMA to assist in training and education, resource typing requirements in the fiscal 

year 2007 DHS appropriations, credentialing, and information and resource management. Including an annual $2 million budget line item for building EMAC capabilities and our Nation’s mutual aid system in the DHS budget for fiscal year 2008 

will help to address these specific actions to improve mutual aid. 

IMPROVING STATE AND LOCAL EMERGENCY OPERATION CENTERS

During emergencies and disasters, emergency operations centers (EOCs) serve as 

the nerve center for State and local coordination. Federal agencies as well use these 

facilities act as a central point for communication during response and recovery 

phases. After the 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress provided some funding to States 

to update their EOCs. Additionally, Congress temporarily changed the State local 

cost share from 50–50 to 75–25 for these funds. 

States continue to require more monies to enhance State primary and alternate 

EOCs. According to data in the 2006 NEMA Biennial Report, it is estimated that 

almost $393 million would be needed to build, retrofit and upgrade the facilities. For 

local EOCs, that number increases to $1.1 billion, for a total of almost $1.5 billion. 

This includes the costs to upgrade equipment and software, train personnel, and 

conduct operations during emergency and non-emergency situations. A separate line 

item is needed in the budget for EOC improvements. Congress should make a $160 

million commitment to upgrading EOCs as a downpayment to address the significant deficits. 

CONCLUSION

With the passage of the Post-Katrina FEMA Reform Act, Congress has affirmed 

their support for ensuring preparedness for our Nation’s continuous vulnerability 

against all-hazards. We must continue to build national preparedness efforts with 

a multi-hazard approach. In this year’s appropriations process Congress will make 

critical decisions that shape the future of emergency management in this country. 

As you begin your consideration, we ask you to recognize the importance of adequately funding the EMPG program in building capacity through people at the State 

and local level for all disasters. I thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf 

of NEMA and appreciate your partnership. 

(i) 

LIST OF WITNESSES, COMMUNICATIONS, AND 

PREPARED STATEMENTS 

Page 

American Public Transportation Association, Prepared Statement of ................ 185 

Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc., Prepared Statement of ............ 190 

Byrd, Senator Robert C., U.S. Senator From West Virginia: 

Opening statement of ....................................................................................... 1 

Questions Submitted by ................................................................................... 53 

Chertoff, Hon. Michael, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security .............. 1 

Prepared Statement of ..................................................................................... 6 

Cochran, Senator Thad, U.S. Senator From Mississippi, Statement of .............. 3 

Domenici, Senator Pete V., U.S. Senator From New Mexico, Questions Submitted by ............................................................................................................... 174 

International Association of Emergency Managers, Prepared Statement of ...... 192 

Landrieu, Senator Mary L., U.S. Senator From Louisiana, Questions Submitted by ............................................................................................................... 165 

Lautenberg, Senator Frank R., U.S. Senator From New Jersey, Questions 

Submitted by ........................................................................................................ 170 

Mikulski, Senator Barbara A., U.S. Senator From Maryland, Questions Submitted by ............................................................................................................... 161 

Murray, Senator Patty, U.S. Senator From Washington, Questions Submitted 

by ........................................................................................................................... 162 

National Emergency Association Management, Prepared Statement of ............ 197 

Nelson, Senator Ben, U.S. Senator From Nebraska, Questions Submitted 

by ........................................................................................................................... 171 

Shelby, Senator Richard C., U.S. Senator From Alabama, Prepared Statement 

of ............................................................................................................................ 3 

(iii) 

SUBJECT INDEX 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Page 

Additional Committee Questions ............................................................................ 52 

Air Cargo: 

Compliance ........................................................................................................ 137 

Database .................................................................................................... 139 

Covert Testing .................................................................................................. 138 

Exemptions ........................................................................................................ 139 

International In-Bound Cargo ......................................................................... 138 

Screening ........................................................................................................... 138 

Security ............................................................................................................. 23 

All-Hazards .............................................................................................................. 149 

Border: 

Patrol: 

On the Northern Border ........................................................................... 128 

Training ...................................................................................................... 31 

Security: 

Aircraft ....................................................................................................... 179 

On the United States-Mexican Border .................................................... 29 

Center for Domestic Preparedness ......................................................................... 35 

Cerro Grande ........................................................................................................... 153 

Chief: 

Administrative Officer ...................................................................................... 124 

Financial Officer ............................................................................................... 125 

Human Capital Officer ..................................................................................... 122 

Procurement Officer ......................................................................................... 122 

CIS Ombudsman ...................................................................................................... 57 

Clarification of $3.4 Billion FEMA Disaster Relief Supplemental ...................... 47 

Coast Guard Deepwater .......................................................................................... 164 

Collection of Overdue Duties .................................................................................. 131 

Complying With the Law ........................................................................................ 147 

Culture of Preparedness .......................................................................................... 150 

C–TPAT .................................................................................................................... 131 

Deepwater: 

Maritime Patrol Aircraft .................................................................................. 36 

Program ............................................................................................................. 36 

Deficient Detention Bedspace Request .................................................................. 134 

Department: 

Major Priorities for Fiscal Year 2008 ............................................................. 19 

Response to Congressional Directives ............................................................. 50 

DHS Contracting out ............................................................................................... 120 

Dirty Bomb Training ............................................................................................... 182 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office ......................................................................... 155 

Effective Emergency Response System and a Culture of Preparedness ............. 21 

Emergency Operations Centers .............................................................................. 161 

Explosive Detection Technology ............................................................................. 22 

Family Detention Centers ....................................................................................... 136 

FBI Background Checks .......................................................................................... 154 

FEMA’s Response in Alabama ................................................................................ 34 

Financial Management ............................................................................................ 121 

Finding Visa Overstays ........................................................................................... 135 

First Responder Grants ........................................................................................... 146 

Fiscal Year 2007 Supplemental Appropriations Bill ............................................ 47 

Five Overarching Strategic Missions ..................................................................... 19 
Page

iv 

Flood Map Plans.................................................................................................... 33, 152 

General Counsel ....................................................................................................... 55 

Gifts and Donations ................................................................................................. 157 

Goal: 

1: Potect our Nation From Dangerous People ................................................ 7 

2: Protect our Nation From Dangerous Goods ............................................... 12 

3: Protect Critical Infrastructure .................................................................... 13 

4: Guild a Nimble, Effective Emergency Response System and a Culture 

of Preparedness ............................................................................................. 14 

5: Strengthen and Unify DHS Operations and Management ....................... 18 

Grant: 

Formula Matrix ................................................................................................ 150 

Management and Administration ................................................................... 151 

Gulf Coast Housing Assistance ............................................................................... 47 

Identification Documents for Crossing the Northern Border ............................... 24 

Immediate Office of the Secretary .......................................................................... 53 

Impact on Tourism .................................................................................................. 26 

Inclusion of Levies in Critical Infrastructure ........................................................ 33 

Increase in Immigration Fees ................................................................................. 153 

Infrastructure Protection ........................................................................................ 142 

Inspection of Containerized Cargo ......................................................................... 132 

Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) .................... 159 

Interior Immigration Enforcement ......................................................................... 132 

Interoperability Goal ............................................................................................... 147 

Interoperable Communications ............................................................................... 48 

Lawful Permanent Resident Status Skills Based Qualifications ......................... 41 

Machine-Readable Zones ......................................................................................... 28 

Master Plan .............................................................................................................. 131 

National: 

Guard on the Southwest Border ...................................................................... 130 

Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center ............................................ 177 

Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Certifications ...................... 27 

Region ................................................................................................................ 151 

Nexus: 

Card Readers .................................................................................................... 28 

Readers at the Border ...................................................................................... 28 

Northern Border: 

Airwings ............................................................................................................ 128 

Prosecutions ...................................................................................................... 162 

Office of: 

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties ....................................................................... 55 

Counternarcotics Enforcement ........................................................................ 54 

Policy ................................................................................................................. 55 

Security ............................................................................................................. 121 

Optimal Staffing Level of the Border Patrol ......................................................... 48 

Phasing out National Guard Troops on the Border .............................................. 48 

PNNL Funding ......................................................................................................... 162 

Port Security ............................................................................................................ 39 

Privacy Officer ......................................................................................................... 58 

Procurement Spending ............................................................................................ 51 

Progress on the Gulf Coast ..................................................................................... 31 

Protecting: 

Critical Infrastructure ...................................................................................... 20 

The Nation From Dangerous: 

Cargo .......................................................................................................... 20 

People ......................................................................................................... 19 

Public Safety Interoperable Communications Grant Program ............................ 145 

REAL ID................................................................................................................. 41, 159 

Reallocation of Funding for Interoperability Grants ............................................ 31 

Regional Transit Sector Working Groups .............................................................. 152 

Resources to Secure the Border .............................................................................. 42 

Risk Management and Analysis ............................................................................. 142 

SAFE PORTS Act .................................................................................................... 37 

Requirements .................................................................................................... 129 

Science and Technology ........................................................................................... 157 

Secure Fence Act ..................................................................................................... 49 

And Flexibility .................................................................................................. 126 

Secure Freight Initiative ......................................................................................... 38 
Page

v 

Secure Freight Initiative—Continued 

Update ............................................................................................................... 38 

Security Upgrades at Land Ports ........................................................................... 178 

Skills-Based Immigration Qualifications ............................................................... 40 

Strengthening and Unifying DHS Management and Operations ........................ 22 

Swift Worksite Enforcement ................................................................................... 135 

Testing of Radiation Detectors ............................................................................... 38 

Training and Deploying Screening Officials .......................................................... 23 

Travel Document Checkers ..................................................................................... 139 

Under Secretary for Management .......................................................................... 120 

United States Coast Guard ..................................................................................... 139 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Border Security .................................................. 180 

Urban Areas Security Initiatives ........................................................................... 43 

US VISIT Air Exit Pilots ........................................................................................ 125 

Visa Enforcement ..................................................................................................... 35 

Vulnerability Assessment: 

Analysis of Complete Air Cargo Security Supply Chain ............................... 50 

Of Air Cargo Security ....................................................................................... 49 

Weapons of Mass Destruction ................................................................................. 143 

Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative................................................................ 26, 158 

Æ