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ENSURING OPERABILITY DURING CATASTROPHIC

EVENTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY 

PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 26, 2005

Serial No. 109–49

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington, Chairman 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency 

Preparedness, Science, and Technology ............................................................. 1

The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency 

Preparedness, Science and Technology .............................................................. 2

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania .................................................................................................... 45

The Honoprable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 40

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York .......................................................................................................... 42

The Honorable Michael McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 34

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alabama ............................................................................................................ 46

WITNESSES

PANEL I 

The Honorable Mark Rey, Under Secretary, Natural resources and 

Environment, U.S. Department of Agriculture: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7

Dr. David Boyd, Director, SAFECOM, Office of Interoperability and 

Communications, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10

Prepared Statement for the Record .................................................................... 12

Dr. Peter Fonash, Deputy Manager, National Communications System, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 18

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20

Mr. Ken Moran, Director, Office of Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau, 

Federal Communications Commission: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 25

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 27

Dr. Linton Wells, II, Acting Assistant Secretary, Networks and Information, 

Integration and Chief Information Officer, U.S. Department of Defense 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 29

Prepated Statement ............................................................................................. 31 

(1)

ENSURING OPERABILITY DURING 

CATASTROPHIC EVENTS 

Wednesday, October 26, 2005

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:42 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. David Reichert [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Reichert, Rogers, Harris, McCaul, Dent, 

Pascrell, Sanchez, Dicks, Harman, Lowey, Christensen, and 

Thompson (Ex Officio). 

Mr. REICHERT. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness Science and Technology 

will come to order. The subcommittee will hear testimony today on 

ensuring operable communications during catastrophic events. I 

would first like to welcome our witnesses and thank them for taking time out of their busy schedules to be here with us today. 

We are here today to discuss a topic that is fundamental in preparing our State and local communities to respond to a major disaster or terrorist attack. The purpose of this hearing is to examine 

the problem of responding effectively and efficiently to catastrophic 

incidents when the everyday communication infrastructure is severely damaged or destroyed. I would like to welcome our witnesses 

once again who are joining us today, and each of you bring a 

wealth of knowledge and I look forward to hearing from each of you 

on how the government can insure operability during a catastrophic event. The ability to communicate is absolutely essential 

to mounting a well-coordinated response to any catastrophic event. 

First responders, Federal State and local officials cannot establish meaningful command and control in the absence of functioning 

communications system. Last month we heard testimony on incident command and control. We learned that communication is absolutely critical to having a unified approach to respond to a catastrophic event. 

In the absence of communication and effective planning, incident 

command and control is severely hindered. An incident commander 

may have difficulty in establishing situational awareness. The operations chief must be able to issue instructions to first responders 

in the field to direct resources and personnel to areas of most need. 

Without the ability to call for help, citizens cannot reliably seek 

medical or other emergency assistance, as demonstrated by Hurri-
2

cane Katrina command and control directly depends upon the ability of all levels of government to communicate effectively with one 

another. 

Since the events of September 11th of 2001, many in the media 

and Congress have focused rightly on a problem of interoperability. 

Simply stated, interoperability is the ability of the public safety 

agencies to communicate with one another via radio communications systems to exchange voice and/or data with one another on 

demand in real-time when needed. Until September 11, however, 

many people just assumed that first responders from different disciplines could easily communicate with one another. Unfortunately, 

that was not the case. The inability of the New York City police, 

fire and emergency medical services personnel to communicate 

with one another effectively undoubtedly led to the loss of lives in 

the World Trade Center. 

Four years later, the inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina 

has highlighted a separate but equally fundamental problem. Before first responder equipment can be interoperable, their equipment must first be operable. Interoperability presumes the existence of an operable communications network. As we saw in the 

aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, there can be no guarantee of communication. Communications operability in the aftermath of a catastrophic natural disaster. Hurricane Katrina destroyed more than 

3 million customer telephone lines in Louisiana, Mississippi and 

Alabama. The region’s wire line network sustained enormous damage. A thousand cell sites were completely out of service. 

Of the 41 broadcast radio stations located in New Orleans and 

the surrounding areas, only two AM radio stations and two FM 

radio stations remained on the air in the wake of the hurricane. 

As a consequence, first responders had no choice but to rely on the 

old fashioned paper relays to communicate critical information between emergency operation centers and the field. And on a personal note, I know that communication is one of, if not the most 

important aspect in handling and controlling stressful and high impact critical incidents. Back in 1999 I was deeply involved as one 

of the leaders in managing the WTO riots in Seattle as the sheriff 

in King County. 

And I know if we didn’t have the ability to communicate with the 

various agencies, multitude of agencies who were partners in that 

effort to bring peace and control back to the city of Seattle, we 

would have been in serious trouble. I believe it is critical that we 

have coordination between the Department of Homeland Security, 

other Federal departments and State and local officials, to assume 

operability during a catastrophic event. The Chair now recognizes 

the ranking minority member of the subcommittee, the gentleman 

from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell for any statement he may have. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding 

a timely hearing on an issue of profound importance, an issue that 

this committee and its full committee has discussed time and time 

again. Indeed, ensuring communications operability during a catastrophic event can result in the significant reduction of lives lost. 

For this fact alone, the Congress and this committee must do everything in our power to ensure that the operational elements of 
3

communications systems throughout our Nation’s infrastructure 

can withstand an onslaught of a disastrous incident. 

And as we have seen, Hurricane Katrina and Rita highlighted 

how this currently is not the case. Coordination of initial rescue efforts in the days immediately following the landfall of Hurricane 

Katrina were severely frustrated by the inability to communicate. 

The hurricane knocked out, and as this chairman has pointed out 

very succinctly, more than 3 million customer phone lines in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. The hard wire telecommunications network sustained enormous damage, both to the switching 

centers that route calls and to the lines used to connect buildings 

and customers to the network. Now, according to the FCC, of the 

41 broadcast radio stations, I want to reiterate this. It is very important to everybody on this committee. The ones that were located 

in New Orleans and the surrounding area, of all of those, only two 

AM and two FM stations remained on the air in the wake of the 

hurricane. 

In a number of cases, reporters were actually asked to brief public officials on the conditions in the areas where information was 

not reaching them in any other way, which brings me to a subject 

that I talked about long before and the members of this committee 

long before there was a committee talked about, and that is what 

is the role of the FCC in all of this. What is the role of the FCC? 

Well, let’s take a look at the national response plan which very 

clearly states in chapter and verse that providing on-call support 

to identify sources of radio frequency interference and to resolve 

civil frequency interference issues and frequency assignment requests that is the role, one of the roles of the FCC. 

And it goes on to talk about the national communication system. 

This is all in the national response plan, all things that this committee, before it was a committee, when it was a select committee, 

discussed time and time again. The extension, the discontinuance 

and reduction of common carrier facilities, the control of common 

carrier rates, charges, practices, classifications. And I would say, 

before I go on with my opening statement, that before 9/11, the 

FCC did not do, did not respond to its own responsibilities with regard to providing the first responders of this country with the necessary networking, the necessary bands so that they could communicate with one another. 

And since—past administration, this administration, didn’t matter. And we have left our first responders out to dry. And somebody’s got to be held accountable. Someone has to be held accountable. Now we are more interested in how many swear words are 

on radio and television, and more interested in how we can get conglomerates to get larger than we are at helping our first responders. This is our legacy right now. The New Orleans Police Dispatch 

Center and the New Orleans Fire Dispatch Center were flooded 

and had been evacuated already. 911 was totally inaccessible. The 

majority of public safety communications were simply not functioning. 

Clearly, the absence of a reliable network across which first responders and State and local officials could coordinate severely impeded any response to this catastrophic event. We need to know 

how to ensure that a failure of this magnitude does not happen 
4

again. After any major test of our response system, it is crucial to 

assess what worked and what did not work. The backbone of our 

Federal response is the national incident management system and 

the national response plan. These two documents must work in 

tandem. 

In light of the Federal response to the Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita, I believe that both documents must be reevaluated to improve 

the response and coordination for major disasters. Do the NRP and 

do—and is the NIMS, have they taken into account that possibility 

that during a disaster there may be an inability to communicate? 

Do State and local officials understand their roles within the national response plan and the NIMS? The answer to both appears 

to be no. And this must be improved. We know that communications is a DHS responsibility. We voted on this. Emergency support 

function number two of the national response plan gives the information analysis and infrastructure protection directorate the leading coordinating Federal actions to provide the required temporary 

emergency telecommunications and the restoration of the telecommunications infrastructure. 

Again, another point Mr. Chairman. We had 7 days to prepare 

for these storms. We will not have seven seconds to prepare for a 

terrorist attack. What exactly is DHS doing to prepare for catastrophic events that wipe out communication systems? What have 

they done already? 

And Federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense, the 

U.S. Forest Service, have hands-on experience in establishing communication in areas where they do not exist. What has DHS done 

to reach out to these agencies to assist them during catastrophic 

events? Are we at the right level of funding? Do we have the appropriate standards? Do we know the technological needs to adequately provide communications support to the State and local government agencies before, during and after a catastrophic event? So 

I look forward to the hearing, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

your due diligence. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. The Chair now recognizes the ranking minority member of the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for any statement that he 

may have. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look 

forward to the testimony of our witnesses here this morning. In the 

past 2 months, Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma have devastated much of the gulf coast. I have spoken to local officials, mayors, firefighters and police officers throughout the gulf coast, and 

have heard uniformly about the inability to communicate between 

levels of government and first responder disciplines. While some 

progress has been made since the attacks on September 11, these 

hurricanes once again have revealed severe problems in our public 

safety communications infrastructure. 

Many first responders still cannot talk with one another because 

their radios and communications network are not compatible. In 

many cases, the lack of proper equipment or the lack of radio spectrum are the root causes of the problem. Congress must act quickly 

to address these issues. However, compounding the problem in catastrophic events is the partial or total destruction of the commu-
5

nications infrastructure. During Katrina, cell and radio towers, 911 

call centers and all switching centers were all damaged as a result 

of the wind and flooding and the subsequent loss of power. This 

was not an issue of interoperability, but of basic operability resulting from the damage. In the future, DHS and FEMA must not only 

increase its own communications capacity, but must give more assistance to local and State officials to get their capabilities back online. 

As a former volunteer firefighter and local official, I know that 

the ability to communicate is essential in establishing command 

and control of an emergency situation. The Federal Government 

has the ability, assets and responsibility to help State and local 

governments achieve operability when the local infrastructure is 

overwhelmed. I look forward to the hearing from the witnesses 

today on how their agencies are looking at ways to coordinate with 

each other and adopt military and private sector communication 

technology for use in these catastrophic situations and how these 

efforts will benefit local first responders. Thank you, Mr. Chairman 

and I yield back 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. Other members of the 

committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel 

of witnesses with us here today. We have the Honorable Mark Rey, 

Undersecretary of Natural Resources and Environment, the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture,; Dr. David Boyd, Director of Office of 

Interoperability and Communication, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Dr. Peter Fonash, deputy manager, National Communications System, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Mr. 

Kenneth Moran, director, Office of Homeland Security Enforcement 

Bureau, Federal Communications Commission; and Dr. Linton 

Wells, II, Acting Assistant Secretary, Networks and Information 

Integration and chief information officer, U.S. Department of Defense. 

Let me remind the witnesses, please, that their entire written 

statement will appear in the record. And we ask that due to the 

number of witnesses on our panel today that you strive to limit 

your comments and testimony to no more than 5 minutes. The 

Chair now recognizes the Honorable Mark Rey, Under Secretary 

for Natural Resources and Environment for the United States Department of Agriculture to testify. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK REY 

Mr. REY. Thank you for inviting me to talk with you today about 

the forest service and interagency partners experience with the incident command system and communications during emergency response. The Forest Service, the Department of the Interior agencies 

and our partners operate the largest wildland fire management 

program in the world. These agencies and partners pioneered the 

use of the incident command system as a component of the natural 

interagency incident management system in the early 1970s in 

order to respond to wild fires. Wild land firefighters realized that 

a standard organizational structure would help to communicate, set 

priorities and be more effective in a rapidly changing situation. The 

incident command system provides common terminology for posi-
6

tion titles, resources and facilities, common responsibilities for each 

position, common planning, common communications, common locations and common incident objectives. For large multi jurisdictional 

incidents, a unified command system is used. 

The ability of the Forest Service and its partners to respond with 

trained and experienced personnel is based upon the interagency 

incident qualifications and certifications. The incident qualification 

and certification system is described in greater detail in my testimony. The Department of Homeland Security directed the use of 

the incident command system as part of the national incident management system in 2004 to organize incident management for all 

agencies on a nationwide basis. An example of the adaptability of 

the incident command system after September 11, 2001 is that the 

Forest Service trained the Fire Department of New York City in 

the incident command system. 

In response to Hurricane Katrina, the Fire Department of New 

York incident management team assisted the New Orleans Fire 

Department initially in fire protection and then in the inspection 

of buildings and reopening fire stations in New Orleans. With regard to communications, effective communications are critical in all 

emergency responses. When the concept of the incident command 

system was developed, three components were identified involving 

communications. First, common terminology, including clear text; 

second, a communications plan to provide information to responders via radio; and third, an incident management plan to provide 

common written descriptions. 

Over the past 30 years, these components have proven essential 

during the response to wild fires and other emergencies. Wildland 

firefighting agencies reduce the potential for radio frequency incompatibility problems by planning and providing communications 

systems during emergencies. The radio cache located at the National Interagency Fire Center is the largest civilian cache of radios 

in the United States. Fully half of those radios were devoted to the 

response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. I would like to say a few 

words about the Forest Service’s involvement in the two incidents. 

Forest Service response efforts covered the entire spectrum of the 

disaster. The Forest Service was tasked with more than 50 missions since requests for assistance from FEMA began shortly before 

Hurricane Katrina struck. Our interagency support peaked on October 1 with 29 incident management teams that used the incident 

command system in the management of their operations. Approximately 5,500 people, including 139 crews, all qualified in the incident command system were assigned. 

In addition, 2,700 pieces of equipment and 20 helicopters and 

fixed wing aircraft were mobilized as well. In the days after Hurricane Katrina, interagency management teams managed all agency 

radio phone data communications, coordinated the receiving and 

distribution of trailers for housing and thousands of truckloads of 

supplies, provided evacuees with food, clothing and shelter and 

supported emergency medical operations at the New Orleans Airport. Interagency incident management teams managed evacuation 

centers in Phoenix, Houston and San Antonio. Teams were providing base camp operations and support to emergency responders 

in 14 locations in Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas. Camp oper-
7

ations including feeding, building, showers and laundry for emergency personnel, disaster and mortuary operations have also been 

supported by incident management teams. 

Additionally, 17 interagency buying teams have been an integral 

part of the hurricane response effort. These teams have purchased 

food, portable toilets, fuel safety gear, medical supplies or leased 

land building or equipment as needed to support the relief effort. 

Mr. Chairman, the Forest Service and its 100-year history has responded to many emergencies and incidents ranging from major 

fires to hurricanes. All of these have tested the agencies and its 

partners management skills and abilities. The systems that have 

been developed and tested over and over again have proven useful 

and adaptable. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify 

today. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Under Secretary Rey. 

[The statement of Mr. Rey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK REY

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, Thank you for inviting me to 

talk with you today about the Forest Service and its interagency partners experience with the Incident Command System and communications during emergency response. I understand the Subcommittee is familiar with the Incident Command System so I would like to describe how the Forest Service and its partners use the Incident Command System and related systems developed over the years to respond to 

wildland fires and also to all-hazard incidents.

Incident Command System 

The Forest Service, the Department of the Interior agencies, and our partners operate the largest wildland fire management program in the world. These agencies 

and partners pioneered the use of the Incident Command System (ICS), as a component of the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) in the 

1970s, in order to respond to wildland fires. Wildland firefighters realized that a 

standard organizational structure would help them communicate, set priorities, and 

be more effective in a rapidly changing situation. Emergency and crisis events are 

often chaotic and highly dynamic; they create physical, emotional, and social disruption. The Incident Command System provides common terminology for position titles, resources, and facilities; common responsibilities for each position, common 

planning, common communications, common locations, and common incident objectives to unify the Forest Service, Department of the Interior agencies, Tribal, State, 

and local organizations to fight a fire or respond to other types of emergency situations. 

During fire season, critical firefighting needs are coordinated through the National Interagency Coordination Center, located at the National Interagency Fire 

Center in Boise, Idaho. If fire-fighting resources are strained as a result of multiple 

simultaneous fires, resources are prioritized and allocated by the National MultiAgency Coordinating Group. These efforts ensure assets are appropriately 

prioritized, allocated, and can be positioned based on the most up-to-date information. 

Interagency Incident Management Teams dispatched to incidents are comprised 

of emergency response professionals from Federal, Tribal, State, and local wildland 

fire organizations. These teams are able to use their logistical, organizational, and 

adaptation skills to rapidly deploy people and resources from many areas and respond to a wide variety of tasks needed during emergencies. For large multi-jurisdictional incidents, a unified command is used. In many cases, the use of unified 

command is the most efficient means to facilitate communications with all first responders. By having a representative of each jurisdiction at the incident command 

post, managers can share incident information down to each of their respective responders. 

The ability of the Forest Service, the Department of the Interior agencies, and 

their partners to respond with trained and experienced personnel is based upon the 

interagency incident qualifications and certifications. These were developed in conjunction with the Incident Command System and are overseen by a group of fire 

directors for all five federal land management agencies and representatives of 

States that have wildfire suppression responsibilities. The system documents all 
8

training, experience, certifications, authorities, licenses, minimum qualifications, 

and physical fitness standards for about 28,000 permanent and temporary employees of the Forest Service. The automated part of this system is known as the Incident Qualification and Certification System (IQCS). IQCS stores data, prints reports 

and qualifications cards, and provides data to other systems. 

IQCS is tied to the Resource Ordering and Status System (ROSS); qualified personnel can be quickly identified and dispatched to an incident. ROSS is used by 

more than 400 dispatch offices serving numerous Federal, State, County and municipal agencies. ROSS assists dispatchers and coordinators with information on the 

availability and location of crews, management personnel, equipment, aircraft, supplies, and services. Resources can be requested, mobilized, and tracked to and from 

the incident. In addition, allocation of resources at a regional or national level can 

be accomplished. ROSS, along with interagency dispatch and coordination, allows 

managers to identify and mobilize resources from around the country to the incident 

within 12 to 24 hours. At the incident, Incident Management Teams use ROSS data 

to support resource status tracking, cost reporting, and planning efforts. 

Forest Service units across the nation have had emergency operations plans for 

many years. They also developed interagency operating plans describing how the 

unit and its other Federal, Tribal, State, and local cooperators will work together 

during an emergency incident. A key component to emergency operations plans is 

communications. These plans include items such as which radio frequencies are 

going to be used, the sharing of radio equipment, and standardized formats for information flow from the incidents. All of this planning is to improve communications 

and effective incident management. 

In his Directive on Management of Domestic Incidents (HSDP–5), President Bush 

instructed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a National Incident Management System that is closely modeled on the wildland fire system, including the 

use of the Incident Command System. In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security issued the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Under the terms of 

HSPD–5, all Federal Departments and agencies will use the NIMS in their domestic 

incident management activities, as well as those actions taken in support of State 

or local entities. In addition, state and local entities are to adopt the NIMS a requirement for receiving Federal preparedness assistance through grants, contracts, 

or other activities. I would like to give you an example of the adaptability of the 

Incident Command System. After September 11, 2001, the Forest Service trained 

the Fire Department of New York City in the Incident Command System. In response to Hurricane Katrina, the Fire Department of New York Incident Management Team assisted the New Orleans Fire Department initially in fire protection 

and then in the inspection of buildings and reopening fire stations in New Orleans. 

Incident Management Teams are managing or managed the base camps in Jackson 

Square and Holy Cross and are providing the New Orleans Fire Department preliminary training in the Incident Command System.

Communications 

Effective communications are critical in all emergency responses. When the concept of the Incident Command System was developed, three components were identified involving communications: 1) common terminology including clear text; 2) a 

communication plan to provide information to responders via radio; and, 3) an incident management plan to provide common written direction. Over the past 30 years, 

these components have proven essential during the response to wildfires and other 

emergencies. The result is improved communications within the emergency response 

community. 

In an emergency, all forms of communications must be well organized and coordinated. As the Forest Service prepares each year for the upcoming fire season, many 

units agree to mutual aid frequencies and protocols with their interagency cooperators. Wildland fire agencies reduce the potential for radio frequency and compatibility problems by planning and providing communications systems during emergencies. The radio cache located at the National Interagency Fire Center is the largest civilian cache—over 5000—of radios in the United States. Radios are dispatched 

in kits including repeaters, hand held radios, and necessary antennas to set-up communication systems. These systems allow responders to be given radios and assigned frequencies which are sometimes added for unique situations. Every Incident 

Management Team mobilized by wildland fire agencies has access to these systems. 

This was done after September 11, 2001 when the National Interagency Fire Center 

communications personnel were dispatched to New York City within 12 hours to set 

up the necessary communication links so critical in an emergency. 

A vital link to success for the National Incident Management System (NIMS) is 

communication interoperability at a level appropriate to the requirements of each 
9

circumstance. Radio frequency and equipment compatibility issues among Federal, 

Tribal, State, and local emergency responders, as well as the Department of Defense, National Guard, and Reserves have been noted in past incident response evaluations. One example is the California Governor’s Blue Ribbon Fire Commission report which found communications to be a major problem during the fires in Southern California in October 2003. The Commission’s Finding #1 states ‘‘Communications interoperability is essential in the effective command and control of personnel 

and resources during multi-agency, multidiscipline responses to major incidents.’’ 

Local agencies often operate on different bandwidths than do Federal, Tribal, 

State and other local agencies. During joint responses, communications protocols 

must be pre-planned to ensure a positive communications capability is in place. Congress mandated a restructuring of the Federal Radio Frequency Spectrum requiring 

Federal Agencies to transition to narrowband FM frequencies by January 1, 2005. 

Each wildland fire agency is currently planning, executing, and funding the transition. State, local, Tribal, and cooperating agencies are not required to transition 

until 2013, although many have implemented or started the transition process.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

I would like to say a few words regarding the Forest Service involvement following two major hurricanes: Category 4 Hurricane Katrina, which made landfall 

on the Gulf coast of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and the Florida Panhandle on 

August 29, and Category 3 Hurricane Rita which made landfall on the southwest 

coast of Louisiana and northeast coast of Texas on September 24, 2005. Forest Service response efforts really cover the entire spectrum of the disaster. The ability of 

the Forest Service and its partners to respond is based upon years of experience in 

the use of the Incident Command System, IQCS, ROSS, and communications during 

wildfires. 

The Forest Service is the primary agency for the Emergency Support Function 

#4—firefighting—and is also a support agency to 11 of the 15 Emergency Support 

Functions in the National Response Plan. The Forest Service has been tasked with 

more than 50 missions since requests for assistance from FEMA began shortly before Hurricane Katrina struck. The National Interagency Fire Center and the Geographical Area Coordination Center in Atlanta, Georgia managed the mobilization 

of crews and interagency Incident Management Teams from across the country and 

assigned those teams to missions along the Gulf Coast. 

Interagency support peaked October 1 with 29 Incident Management Teams that 

used the Incident Command System in the management of their operations. Approximately 5,500 people including 139 crews, and 1,300 management and support 

personnel, all qualified in the IQCS system were assigned. In addition, 2,700 pieces 

of equipment and 20 helicopters and fixed winged aircraft were mobilized and 

tracked through ROSS. 

In the days after Hurricane Katrina, interagency Incident Management Teams 

managed all-agency radio/phone/data communications, coordinated the receiving and 

distribution of trailers for housing and thousands of truckloads of supplies, provided 

evacuees with food, clothing and shelter, and supported emergency medical operations at the New Orleans base camp. Interagency Incident Management Teams 

have managed evacuation centers in Phoenix, AZ, and Houston and San Antonio, 

TX. Teams are providing base camp operations and support to emergency responders in 14 locations in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. Camp operations include 

feeding, billeting, showers, and laundry for emergency personnel. Disaster mortuary 

operations have been supported by base camps run by interagency Incident Management Teams. 

Seventeen Interagency Buying Teams have been an integral part of the hurricane 

response effort. These teams have purchased food, portable toilets, fuel, safety gear, 

medical supplies, or leased land, buildings, or equipment as needed to support the 

Incident Management Teams. 

The National Forest, Research, and State and Private Forestry branches of the 

Forest Service have begun extensive coordination with the affected states, other federal agencies, and industry associations to assist with managing the large scale ecological disturbance caused by the hurricanes. The Forest Service is working in concert with the State Foresters of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas to help private landowners with immediate problems of downed timber removal 

and longer term questions involving storage and production capacity. Interagency 

teams are in place and are working with the States to plan for long range fuel mitigation, fire readiness and prevention, and fire suppression. Fire prevention education teams are also working with local agencies, media, and publics in stressing 

caution about hurricane debris disposal. Additional firefighting crews and equipment have been moved to the Gulf Coast in anticipation of increased fire activity.
10

Summary 

Mr. Chairman, the Forest Service, in its one hundred year history, has responded 

to many emergencies and incidents ranging from major fires, to insect infestations 

to hurricanes. All of these have tested the agency’s and its partners’ management 

skills and abilities. The systems that have been developed and tested over and over 

again are useful and adaptable. I am glad the Forest Service could contribute to responding to the emergency after the hurricanes. I would be happy to answer your 

questions.

Mr. REICHERT. The Chair now recognizes Dr. David Boyd, director of the Office of Interoperability and Communications of the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security to testify. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID BOYD 

Dr. BOYD. Good morning and thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

members of the committee, for this invitation to speak to you 

today. As you have already observed, Mr. Chairman, interoperability requires before all else simple operability. As Katrina demonstrated, in the absence of a reliable network across which responders within an agency can effectively communicate, interoperability is both irrelevant and impossible. Some seem to believe the 

introduction of new technologies alone can solve our interoperability problems. But adding equipment addresses only part of 

what a fully robust reliable and both operable and interoperable 

public safety communications system requires. For example, on the 

technology side alone, when we lose towers, first responders have 

only their mobile or portable units available, so range is dramatically reduced and control of the incident is severely compromised. 

Portable units permit some short range communications until the 

proprietary battery packs begin to fail and cannot be recharged because the chargers are typically attached to the power grid. 

911 centers are tied to the wired telephone network and so is the 

cellular system which also depends on cell phones that use proprietary batteries. No single fix alone can address all these elements. 

Many solutions have been offered and many claims have been 

made for each solution and all do have a role. But none is the silver bullet. Satellite phones are extremely useful for command elements but often hopelessly impractical for individual first responders. They require training and signals can be blocked by vegetation, 

buildings, terrain and even weather. They also use batteries that 

need recharging, and the first responder in the middle of a rescue 

or up to his armpits in water will find aiming the antenna hard 

or impossible. Van—and trailer-mounted communication systems 

dropped into an incident nearly always offer substantially less coverage than the original system and may require significant training 

to use. 

And all of these, without solid prior planning, will add to the difficulties of achieving interoperability once operability is achieved. 

We believe that what we have developed to support interoperability 

can also help first responders successfully navigate any communications emergency. We in the public safety community have identified six key building blocks required to achieve interoperability—

governance, standard operating procedures, technology, training 

and exercises, and routine use of interoperable systems. Crosscutting all of these is the sixth and most important element, a high 
11

degree of leadership, planning and collaboration with a commitment to and investment in sustainability. 

To help public safety agencies and especially the policy levels of 

government understand the interrelationship of all of these factors, 

we developed a tool called the Interoperability Continuum. This 

planning tool explains how all these elements relate to each other 

and makes clear all of these elements need to be addressed before, 

not for the first time during an emergency. Interoperability is not 

a new issue. It was a problem in Washington D.C. when the Air 

Florida flight crashed into the Potomac in 1982, in New York City 

when the Twin Towers were first attacked in 1993, in 1995 when 

the Murrah Building was destroyed in Oklahoma City, and in 1999 

at Columbine. 

Too many public safety personnel cannot communicate by radio 

because their equipment is still incompatible or the frequencies 

they are assigned to are different. They operate on 10 different frequency bands that run communication sytems that are often proprietary and too often 30 or more years old. Over 90 percent of the 

Nation’s public safety wireless infrastructure is financed, owned, 

operated and maintained by the more than 60,000 individual local 

jurisdictions, police, fire and emergency medical services that serve 

the public. National efforts to fix the problem have historically 

been erratic, uncertain and until recently uncoordinated. 

Worst, the efforts have too often been designed without the direct 

involvement of the people with the greatest stake in effective communications, the first responders. The attacks on September 11 

made clear this had to change. Since September 11, significant 

progress has been made in interoperability, thanks to the priorities 

both the administration and Congress have placed on it. In 2001, 

SAFECOM was established as a presidential management initiative. 

In 2004, the Department established the Office for Interoperability and Compatability to further strengthen and integrate both 

interoperability and compatibility efforts and in the Intelligence 

Reform Act Congress gave it a legislative charter. While fixing the 

Nation’s interoperability problem will require a sustained effort, we 

recognize that we cannot wait to move things forward. That is why 

SAFECOM has initiated a number of near-term initiatives, including work with the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 

to accelerate the development of standards, development of the 

Interoperability Continuum and statewide planning tools, 

RAPIDCOM, a program executed in about 150 days which helped 

ensure that 10 high risks urban areas had an emergency command 

level interoperability capability. 

Creation of a public safety architectural framework, creation of 

a P–25 conformance testing program, development of coordinated 

grant guidance for use in all Federal grant programs, creation of 

a national baseline and identification of public safety spectrum 

needs are all near term initiatives. This Nation is heavily invested 

in an existing infrastructure that is too often inadequate to the 

basic communications requirements of individual agencies and not 

interoperable. We must continue to pursue a comprehensive strategy that takes into account technical and cultural issues associated 

with improving interoperability which recognize the challenges as-
12

sociated with incorporating legacy equipment and practices in constantly changing technology, cultural environments and which encourages strong local leadership in insuring that the needs of the 

front line of emergency response, the first responders, are met. 

Though many challenges remain, we believe we have accomplished a great deal in the short time DHS has managed the program. And I would be happy to answer any questions the committee may have 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Dr. Boyd. 

[The statement of Dr. Boyd follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD OF DR. DAVID G. BOYD, 

Introduction 

Good morning and thank you, Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell, and 

Members of the Subcommittee, for the invitation to speak to you today. 

Today’s testimony will focus on SAFECOM and its role in improving public safety 

communications. SAFECOM is the communications program of the Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC), which resides in the Office of Systems Engineering and Development, Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate, Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS). SAFECOM provides research, development, testing, 

evaluation, guidance, and assistance for Federal, State, local, and tribal public safety agencies working to improve public safety response through more efficient and 

effective interoperable wireless communications. Communications interoperability 

refers to the ability of public safety agencies to talk across disciplines and jurisdictions via radio communications systems, exchanging voice and data with one another on demand, in real time as authorized. 

Since September 11, 2001, significant progress has been made to improve communications for the public safety community as more and more jurisdictions move from 

being simply operable to being interoperable. However, it is apparent that more 

progress must be achieved. Much of this advancement can be attributed to the priority that both the Administration and Congress have placed on achieving communications interoperability. In 2001, SAFECOM was established as a Presidential 

Management Initiative and charged with strengthening interoperability at all levels 

of government by coordinating Federal programs, initiating a comprehensive standards program, and developing a national interoperable communications architecture. 

In 2004, the Department established OIC to further strengthen and integrate interoperability and compatibility efforts to help improve Federal, State, local, and tribal 

public safety preparedness and response. OIC was directed to: 

• Identify and coordinate all DHS programs that address interoperability; 

• Support the creation of interoperability standards; 

• Establish a comprehensive research, development, testing, and evaluation 

(RDT&E) program for improving public safety interoperability; 

• Integrate coordinated grant guidance across all DHS grant-making agencies 

that address public safety interoperability; 

• Oversee the development and implementation of technical assistance for public safety interoperability; 

• Conduct pilot demonstrations; 

• Create an interagency interoperability coordination council; and 

• Establish an effective outreach program.

Relationship between Operability and Interoperability 

Communications operability refers to the functional capability of a communications system that makes a specific operation possible. For example, operability exists when all responders within one agency can speak with each other by radio. The 

next step is to become interoperable—which we at SAFECOM define as facilitating 

communications between and among agencies and jurisdictions. 

From its creation, SAFECOM has always emphasized the importance of operability within an organization because it is a prerequisite for interoperability. As 

Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, in the absence of a reliable network across which 

responders within an agency can effectively communicate, interoperability is neither 

possible nor relevant. 

For agencies that already have communications operability, SAFECOM has created a number of highly successful tools and methodologies that can be used to help 

achieve interoperability. For agencies that do not yet have communications operability, much of SAFECOM’s work is still applicable. When operability itself is in-
13

complete, , it is usually the result of technical issues. SAFECOM’s work in helping 

to develop standards, encouraging system migration, and participating in the coordination of communications spectrum policy have all helped improve operability across 

the Nation. Once basic operability is achieved, agencies can then focus on achieving 

interoperability.

SAFECOM’s Vision for Improving Communications 

Practitioners have helped SAFECOM articulate a long-term vision for interoperability which projects that in the future emergency responders will operate on a national system-of-systems using standards-based equipment that provides the capability to respond to an incident anywhere in the country, using their own equipment, on any network, and on dedicated public safety spectrum. They will be able 

to communicate with each other, as authorized, in real time via voice, data, and 

video-on-demand. Achieving this vision will require effort in five critical areas, including: 

1. Development of guidelines and criteria for public safety communications systems; 

2. Coordination of testing and evaluation processes; 

3. Standardization of equipment fortified by grant guidance; 

4. Coordination of communications spectrum policy; and 

5. Coordination of communications planning. 

These efforts will take time to achieve, but many of them are already beginning 

to strengthen communications and interoperability in the public safety community.

Development of Guidelines and Criteria for Public Safety Communications 

Systems 

Communications plans to support incident response should be developed based on 

a national architecture framework with common guidelines and criteria for public 

safety communications systems. Only when these guidelines are universally broadly 

recognized and followed will emergency responders and the larger public safety community be able to communicate effectively. To that end, SAFECOM published 

Version 1.0 of the first ever comprehensive Statement of Requirements (SoR) for 

Public Safety Wireless Communications and Interoperability. Developed with public 

safety practitioner input, the SoR defines the functional requirements for public 

safety communications. Subsequent versions will further refine these technical requirements so that industry will have a blueprint from which to build technologies 

that address public safety needs. This SoR also serves as the basis for developing 

a national architecture framework for public safety communications interoperability. 

SAFECOM is working to develop a Public Safety Architecture Framework (PSAF) 

that, along with the SoR, will serve as a tool to help the Nation’s emergency responder agencies understand the technical requirements and national migration 

path toward fully interoperable communications systems without imposing requirements that stifle innovation. 

For agencies that do not yet have communications operability, the SoR and PSAF 

are useful tools for analyzing options to achieve basic operability and to achieve 

interoperability in the near future. The PSAF allows agencies to understand that 

they need to have a communication system that is not only operable, but also interoperable with other systems in the region, while the SoR identifies technical requirements needed for new systems.

Coordination of Testing and Evaluation Processes 

The testing and evaluation of equipment will help communities identify their levels of operability. Coordinated testing and evaluation processes will ensure communications equipment meets the critical needs of emergency responders; the first critical need being operability. Public safety agencies face many complex procurement 

decisions and do not always have in-house expertise to validate manufacturer’s 

claims. To ensure that public safety agencies can trust the claims made by vendors, 

communications equipment needs to be independently tested and evaluated. To do 

this, SAFECOM created a testing and evaluation working group to help ensure that 

methodologies for testing and evaluation of interoperability products are technically 

sound and comparable across testing laboratories. The working group members are 

practitioners and subject matter experts from law enforcement, fire services, and 

emergency medical services. These members help review and develop test criteria 

and serve the program by determining which products should be evaluated.

Standardization of Equipment Fortified by Grant Guidance 

Standardization of equipment, fortified by grant guidance measures, is an essential step in achieving improved communications. The equipment must adhere to 

communications standards that allow for operability as well as interoperability. As 

standards are created, funding solutions must also be implemented to help jurisdic-
14

tions focus on meeting interoperability goals and requirements. To better coordinate 

funding for interoperability solutions, such as purchasing new equipment, developing State plans, and other activities, SAFECOM coordinated resolution of conflicting Federal grant guidance. This will help maximize the impact of limited Federal resources to create systems that improve interoperability rather than making 

it more difficult to achieve. 

SAFECOM’s coordinated grant guidance outlines eligibility for grants, the purposes for which grants can be used, and the guidelines for implementing a wireless 

communications system in order to help maximize the efficiency with which public 

safety communications related grant dollars are allocated and spent. To ensure consistency in interoperability grant solicitations, this guidance has been included in 

grant programs administered by the Department of Justice and other agencies within DHS. 

Within DHS, the Office for State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP) reports that more than $1.6 billion in homeland security assistance to local jurisdictions, urban areas, and states has been spent on interoperable 

communications over the past two years alone. SLGCP has three primary grant programs that have incorporated SAFECOM’s grant guidance on issues regarding communications interoperability. These programs are the State Homeland Security 

Grant Program, Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) Grant Program, and the 

Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Grant Program. Many of the system procurements and enhancements supported by this funding are in the process of being 

implemented. 

It is important to note, however, that although SAFECOM has developed consensus guidance and tools to improve the grant-making process, SAFECOM does not 

directly manage nor provide funding to State or local agencies for communications 

projects. Given the sheer number of state and local public safety agencies, regional 

communication implementation simply cannot be managed centrally from Washington. Grant guidance is an important step toward improving national interoperability because it helps to align public safety communications-related grant dollars 

with the national effort to improve interoperability at all levels of government. 

In addition, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires that all Federal agencies demonstrate their programs are fully aligned with SAFECOM guidance in developing their own communications plans.

Coordination of Communications Spectrum Policy 

The communications spectrum is a critical component for operability; it is the 

highway over which voice, data, and image communications travel. Radio spectrum 

is a finite resource—there is only so much available, and it is shared by public safety, radio broadcasters, government users, and other commercial and private consumers. The large demand for this resource can lead to overcrowding, which in turn 

can cause delays in or disruption of communication for public safety. The Federal 

Communications Commission (FCC) has allocated certain frequencies to public safety, but these allocations are fragmented, creating challenges for communications 

among different agencies and jurisdictions. In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108–458), Congress required the FCC, in consultation with DHS and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), to conduct a study to assess the spectrum needs for Federal, State, 

and local emergency responders, which is due in December 2005. SAFECOM is currently assessing public safety spectrum needs in support of the President’s national 

spectrum management initiative. DHS, in consultation with the Department of 

Commerce and other relevant agencies, is developing a Spectrum Needs Plan based 

on these assessments, which will be delivered to the President by the end of November 2005. SAFECOM believes in maintaining the current schedule to open the 24 

megahertz (MHz) of spectrum in the 700 MHz band allocated by the FCC in 1998 

for public safety use in accordance with recommendations from the Public Safety 

Wireless Advisory Committee.

Coordination of Communications Planning 

Strengthening and ensuring basic-level public safety communications capabilities, 

as well as backup communications, are key tasks in improving communications. 

Once agency-specific operability is ensured, it is essential to progress towards multijurisdictional and multi-disciplinary interoperability, which requires attention to 

more than technology. SAFECOM has identified five interrelated building blocks 

that are essential to forming a foundation for multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary communications capabilities that include governance, standard operating procedures (SOP), technology, training and exercises, and usage. 

SAFECOM has developed an interoperability continuum to measure a community’s level of progress in these elements. The continuum helps communities assess 
15

where they are deficient and provides valuable insight to Federal policy makers for 

targeting interoperability assistance. 

As the continuum provides a guide for communities to progress towards interoperability, the National Interoperability Baseline study, a major initiative undertaken 

by SAFECOM, will provide a statistically significant, quantitative measurement of 

where communities stand on the path towards interoperability. The development of 

the survey methodology was initiated in January 2005, and the resulting study will 

allow SAFECOM to identify areas with operability and interoperability shortfalls, 

track the impact of Federal programs and measure the success of these programs, 

establish an ongoing process and mechanism to measure the state of interoperability 

on a recurring basis, and develop an interoperability baseline self-assessment tool 

for State and local public safety agencies.

Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning (SCIP) 

SAFECOM has made considerable progress in developing statewide planning 

tools. In 2004, SAFECOM partnered with the Commonwealth of Virginia and the 

Department of Justice to develop a strategic plan for improving statewide interoperable communications for the state. The effort was based on SAFECOM’s ‘‘bottomup,’’ locally-driven approach, which improves upon many previous statewide communications planning efforts that use a top-down approach by considering the requirements of the emergency responders who are the primary users and who control most 

of the wireless infrastructure. Based on lessons learned from the Virginia planning 

process, SAFECOM published the Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning (SCIP) Methodology as a model for integrating practitioner input into a successful statewide strategic plan for every state.

Regional Communications Interoperability Pilots 

SAFECOM is also implementing Section 7304 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–458), which authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to carry out at least two Regional Communications 

Interoperability Pilots (RCIP). In accordance with Congressional criteria for determining the location of the pilot sites, as well as criteria outlined by the program 

itself, SAFECOM selected the State of Nevada and the Commonwealth of Kentucky 

as RCIP locations. SAFECOM, in coordination with SLGCP’s Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program, is helping both states implement the SCIP 

methodology. 

Building on lessons learned from the SCIP Methodology and earlier SAFECOM 

initiatives, the RCIP projects will help OIC identify models for improving communications and interoperability that take into account the wide range of challenges 

across the Nation. When the projects are complete, Nevada and Kentucky will each 

have improved interoperability plans, and we will be able to use the lessons learned 

to better develop or strengthen replicable tools and methodologies that will be made 

available to public safety practitioners, as well as to State and local governments. 

An interim report regarding the progress of the pilot projects has been submitted 

to Congress. A final report will be provided to Congress in June 2006. 

SAFECOM believes that statewide emergency communications plans are fundamental to an effective response to a catastrophic event. As States continue to develop their own plans, SAFECOM recommends that they do so in coordination with 

SAFECOM methodologies and guidance.

RapidCom 

SAFECOM has always emphasized that mission-critical operations are the primary concern of public safety. Through efforts such as RapidCom, SAFECOM initiated a program to help improve capabilities for immediate incident-level interoperable emergency communications in ten high-threat urban areas centered in Boston, 

Chicago, Houston, Jersey City, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Philadelphia, San 

Francisco, and the Washington metropolitan area. In coordination with SLGCP, the 

Department of Justice’s 25 Cities Program, and the DHS Wireless Management Office, SAFECOM worked closely with public safety leaders in the ten high-risk urban 

areas to assess their communications interoperability capacity and needs, and to 

identify and implement solutions. In keeping with SAFECOM’s ‘‘bottom-up’’ approach, local officials drove the design and implementation of solutions in their jurisdictions. 

With the on-time completion of the RapidCom project, incident commanders in 

each of the urban areas have now confirmed they have the ability to communicate 

adequately with each other and their respective command centers within one hour 

of an incident. The lessons learned from RapidCom can be applied to all public safety agencies at the Federal, State, local, and tribal levels. 
16

In the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, Congress has 

provided $5 million in funding to expand RapidCom to other urban areas.

Conclusion 

SAFECOM will continue to emphasize that before progress can be made to improve interoperable communications, operability must first be in place. The initiatives described above are helping to advance operability and interoperability of public safety communications. We must continue to pursue a comprehensive strategy 

that takes into account all issues associated with improving communications while 

ensuring that the needs of emergency responders are met. Though many challenges 

remain, we believe we have accomplished a great deal in the short time DHS has 

managed this program. 

We are confident that with your continuing support and the assistance of our 

many Federal partners, we will continue to move towards a world where lives and 

property are never lost because public safety agencies are unable to communicate 

or lack compatible equipment and training resources. 

This concludes my prepared statement. With the Committee’s permission, I request my formal statement be submitted for the record. Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Pascrell, and Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and will be happy to answer any questions that 

you may have. 

Appendix I: OIC Authorities from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004

Congress, with the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 

Act of 2004 (PL 108–458) less than a year ago, gave OIC and SAFECOM legislative 

authority to carry out its responsibilities. Before passage of this act, responsibility 

for addressing interoperability was spread across three different agencies. The following is a scorecard of OIC legislative authorities, activities that have been conducted under those authorities, and the progress achieved on each activity:

OIC Authority from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004

OIC Activities Progress 

Coordinate with other Federal agencies to establish a comprehensive national approach to achieving public 

safety interoperable communications; 

• Developing a national strategy, which 

leverages work conducted by other agencies across the Federal government 

• On schedule 

• Working with the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop communication standards 

• On schedule

Develop, with Federal agencies and 

state and local authorities, minimum 

capabilities for communications interoperability for Federal, State, and 

local public safety agencies; 

• Created the Statement of Requirements 

for Public Safety Wireless Communications 

and Interoperability (SoR) 

• Completed 

• Working with the Office for Domestic 

Preparedness (ODP) on the Target Capabilities List 

• On schedule

Accelerate voluntary consensus standards for public safety interoperable 

communications; 

• Developed a plan, with NIST, and delivered a report to Congress on accelerating 

the development of national voluntary consensus standards for public safety interoperable communications 

• Completed 

• Working with NIST to develop a P25 

Conformance Testing program that will use 

independent labs 

• On schedule

Develop and implement flexible open 

architectures for short- and long-term 

solutions to public safety interoperable communications; 

• Developing the Public Safety Architecture Framework • On schedule
17

OIC Authority from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004

OIC Activities Progress 

Identify priorities for research, development, and testing and evaluation 

within DHS and assist other Federal 

agencies in doing the same with regard to public safety interoperable 

communications; 

• Created a Testing and Evaluation working group to identify testing priorities for 

interoperability gateways and is currently 

evaluating other potential communications 

products for lab testing 

• On schedule 

• Developing a standardized report format 

for presenting test results 

• On schedule

Establish coordinated guidance for 

Federal grant programs for public 

safety interoperable communications 

SAFECOM’s grant guidance has been incorporated in public safety communications related grant guidance including the 

FY 2003 Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) grants, the FY 2003/FY 

2004/FY 2005 Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grants, the FY 2004/FY 2005 

ODP grants 

• Completed

Provide technical assistance to State 

and locals regarding planning, acquisition strategies, and other functions 

necessary to achieve public safety 

communications interoperability; 

• Implemented the RapidCom Initiative • Completed 

• Developed the Interoperability Continuum • Completed 

• Conducting Regional Communications 

Interoperability Pilots (RCIP) in Kentucky 

and Nevada 

• On schedule

Develop and disseminate best practices to improve public safety communications interoperability; • Created SAFECOM Grant Guidance • Completed 

• Developed the Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning (SCIP) Methodology • Completed 

• Developed the Interoperability Continuum • Completed 

• Developed the Communications Tabletop 

Exercise Methodology 

• Completed 

• Created additional tools and models to 

help public safety users 

• Completed

Develop appropriate performance 

measures and milestones to measure 

the nation’s progress to achieving 

public safety communications interoperability; 

• Developing the National Interoperability 

Baseline 

• On schedule.

Provide technical guidance, training, 

and other assistance to support the 

rapid establishment of consistent, secure, and effective interoperable communications capabilities in the event 

of an emergency in urban and other 

areas determined by the Secretary of 

Homeland Security to be at consistently high levels of risk from terrorist 

attack; and develop minimum interoperable communications capabilities 

for emergency response providers..

• Implemented the RapidCom Initiative • Completed 
18

OIC Authority from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004

OIC Activities Progress 

• Conducting Regional Communications 

Interoperability Pilots (RCIP) in Kentucky 

and Nevada 

• On schedule

Appendix II: Tools and Methods based on State and Local Pilots 

Tools and methods that SAFECOM has developed based on State and local pilot 

efforts include: • Communications Tabletop Exercise Methodology, a process for a communications-focused tabletop exercise replicable across urban areas. 

• Tabletop Exercise After-Action Report, a template for capturing key findings and identifying gaps following each tabletop exercise. 

• Interoperability Pocket Guide, a process for creating an area-specific 

interoperability pocket guide to ensure local public safety officials are aware of 

current capabilities available in their areas. 

• Templates for Improving Interoperability, including governance charter, 

standard operating procedure, and memorandum of agreement templates to 

help communities improve interoperability. 

• Operational Guide for the Interoperability Continuum—Lessons 

Learned from RapidCom, which outlines the importance of each element of 

the Interoperability Continuum, provides common challenges to consider when 

working towards improved interoperability and recommends key actions to increase an area’s capabilities.

Mr. REICHERT. The Chair now recognizes Dr. Peter Fonash, deputy manager of the National Communications Systems of the U.S. 

Department Homeland Security. 

STATEMENT OF PETER FONASH 

Mr. FONASH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee. I am Dr. Peter Fonash, and I am honored 

to testify before you today. I am the deputy manager of the National Communications Systems, NCS. In my testimony today, I 

will explain the role that the NCS played in preparing for and responding to Hurricane Katrina. NCS started under President Kennedy in the 1960s. The NCS is a consortium of Federal departments and agencies that have assets, resources, requirements and/

or regulatory authority regarding National Security and Emergency Preparedness, NS/EP. Communications. The NCS assists the 

executive office of the President in ensuring NS/EP communications for the Federal Government under all circumstances. 

A key tenet of ensuring communications is reliance on the resiliency and rapid restoration capabilities of the commercial communications infrastructure, necessitating strong relationships with industry. The NCS’s National Coordinating Center for telecommunications, or NCC, is a joint industry/government body within the 

NCS. The operational mission of the NCC is the coordination of 

communications restoration efforts in an emergency. The NCS has 

a major communications role in the current National Response 

Plan, or NRP. The NCS is the lead agency for emergency support 

function number 2 (known as ESF#2), which is the communications 

component of the National Response Plan. 

The purpose of ESF#2 is to ensure the provision of Federal communications support to Federal, State, local, tribal and private sector response efforts during an incident of national significance. 

Under the National Response Plan, the NCC is the Federal office 
19

for national telecommunications domestic incident management. To 

facilitate coordination of industry/government operations during an 

emergency, the NCS has established and continuously operates 

several priority service programs which help to ensure critical calls 

are completed in the event of congestion or damage to the national 

commercial communications infrastructure. 

The Nation heavily used each of these programs during Hurricane Katrina. These programs include the Government Emergency 

Telecommunications Service, (GETS) program, the Wireless Priority Service, (WPS) program, and the Telecommunications Service 

Priority, (TSP) program. The NCS (also manages another program, 

the Shared Resources High Frequency Radio, (SHARES), which 

provides voice and low speed data communications independent of 

the commercial communications infrastructure. 

In anticipation of Hurricane Katrina, the NCS conducted various 

preparations including: heightening the alert status of the NCC’s 

24-hour watch; placing key programs such as GETS, WPS, TSP 

and SHARES on alert; providing personnel to staff ESF#2 regional 

offices and the FEMA headquarters; and conducting analysis of 

critical communications assets in the projected impact area. Industry worked equally hard to prepare. Companies moved emergency 

response teams and equipment to the region, established communication and bridges among carriers, activated damage assessment 

teams and kept in constant communication with the NCC. Bell 

South opened its operations center to all carriers for coordination 

purposes. 

As of August 28, the NCS was ready. All systems and personnel 

were in place for the ESF 2 elements to receive communications 

support requests from the States impacted by Katrina. Katrina and 

the flooding in New Orleans caused unprecedented damage to the 

communications infrastructure. More than 3 million phone customers were out of service. For the first time in history, switching 

centers were out of operation due to water damage. Numerous 911 

call centers were down and up to 2,000 cellular towers were out of 

service. In addition, significant damage had been inflicted on first 

responder land mobile radio communications. 

At the NCC in Washington, industry identified three priorities to 

the NCS: security, fuel and access. The NCC assisted industry by 

coordinating security forces and requirements between industry 

and government to protect repair teams, communications sites and 

staging areas. In addition, in a limited number of circumstances, 

the NCC arranged to provide communications carriers and broadcast companies with generators where the power was out, fuel for 

generators and power outage maps. 

The NCS coordinated closely with FEMA and local authorities to 

provide the carriers access to locations in need of repair. In the impacted areas, ESF#2 worked with State and local governments to 

help identify and provide solutions to the communications needs. 

ESF#2 arranged for mobile satellite and cellular vans and for hundreds of satellite phones. The extent of the destruction and damage 

to communications infrastructure and services caused by Katrina 

greatly exceeded any other disaster previously encountered by the 

NCS. A hurricane of the historical magnitude of Hurricane Katrina 

stressed the processes and procedures of the NCS and required 
20

ESF#2 to perform new functions, such as, providing an interim 

land mobile radio system to three parishes in Louisiana. 

Currently the NCS is fully engaged in assisting with the restoration efforts in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and now 

Wilma. In an ongoing effort to improve communications, the NCS 

is currently examining its actions regarding Hurricane Katrina, 

identifying issues and lessons learned and developing recommendations. We are fully committed to incorporating lessons learned in 

future plans, procedures and capabilities. 

This concludes my oral statement. I have submitted a written 

statement for the record. Thank you for the opportunity to address 

this distinguished subcommittee. I will be pleased to answer any 

questions you have. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Dr. Fonash. 

[The statement of Mr. Fonash follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PETER M. FONASH

I. Introduction 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee. I am Dr. 

Peter M. Fonash and am honored to testify before you today. I am the Deputy Manager of the National Communications System (NCS), which is aligned within the 

Preparedness Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

In my testimony today, I will explain the role that the NCS played in preparing 

for and responding to Hurricane Katrina. The NCS’ greatest concern was meeting 

the needs of those affected by Hurricane Katrina and our first priority was trying 

to facilitate provisioning and restoration of communications services. 

As you know, Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst natural disasters in our 

nation’s history, impacting an area of approximately 90,000 square miles. For perspective, the area impacted by Hurricane Charley in 2004 was 1,500 square miles. 

Also as a result of Charley, more than 150,000 customers were without phone service. In contrast, more than 3 million people in the Gulf States lost phone service 

due to Hurricane Katrina, and over 180 central office locations were running on 

generators due to loss of commercial power. 

The NCS’ authorities and responsibilities regarding emergency communications 

stem from two principal federal documents. I will give a very brief overview of these, 

and then detail the NCS’ Hurricane Katrina actions for you. 

The NCS started under President Kennedy in the 1960s and was formalized in 

a 1983 Executive Order under President Reagan called E.O. 12472. The NCS is a 

consortium of federal departments and agencies that have assets, resources, requirements and/or regulatory authority regarding national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications. Today, the NCS has 23 different federal entities, including the Department of Defense, General Services Administration, FEMA, 

National Telecommunications and Information Administration, intelligence agencies, State Department and the Federal Communications Commission, among others. The Office of the Manager NCS, comprised of approximately 100 civilian and 

military personnel assigned to DHS, executes the programs and activities of the 

NCS. As set forth in the governing Executive Order, the NCS assists the President, 

The National Security Council, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Homeland 

Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget in coordinating the 

planning and provision of NS/EP communications for the Federal Government under 

all circumstances, including crisis or emergency, attack, recovery, and reconstitution. 

The NCS has a history of addressing issues that cut across the Executive Branch. 

One important effort has been the establishment and tasking of the Continuity 

Communications Working Group (CCWG). The CCWG, within the past year, has initiated work on a Continuity Communications Enterprise Architecture. This effort 

will help to support Minimum Essential Functions of the Federal Government under 

all circumstances, including crisis, emergency, attack, recovery, and reconstitution. 

As mandated by the Executive Order, the NCS also includes an industry component, which was especially valuable during Hurricane Katrina, called the National 

Coordinating Center for Telecommunications, or NCC, a joint industry/Government 

body within the NCS. The operational mission of the NCC is the coordination of restoring and reinstituting NS/EP communications in an emergency. The NCC oper-
21

ates a 24 hour, 7-day a week watch center-which during Hurricane Katrina conducted daily analysis and situational monitoring of ongoing events and response capabilities. The NCC houses both industry representatives and Government counterparts in the same physical space to facilitate information sharing and coordination 

of activities. 

The Executive Order also charges the NCS to ensure development of a national 

communications infrastructure for a range of national security/emergency purposes, 

including preparing for and responding to hurricanes such as Hurricane Katrina. 

This includes critical features such as priority communications, and infrastructure 

redundancy. A key tenant of ensuring communications is reliance on the resiliency 

and rapid restoration capabilities of the commercial communications infrastructure 

(e.g., BellSouth, AT&T) necessitating strong relationships with industry. 

The NCS works closely with organizations within the Federal government to ensure NS/EP communication requirements are built into technology solutions. For example, the NCS engages with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, Office 

for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) on the development and creation of 

standards pertaining to communications. NCS also works with the DoD on the development of security standards for next generation networks. 

In addition to the Executive Order, the NCS has a specific communications role 

in the current National Response Plan, or NRP. Specifically, the NCS is the lead 

agency with responsibility for Emergency Support Function #2 (known as ‘‘ESF 2’’), 

which is the communications component of the National Response Plan. The Communications annex ‘‘ensures the provision of Federal communications support to 

Federal, State, local, tribal and private-sector response efforts during an Incident 

of National Significance.’’ 

In support of the ESF 2, the NCS’s NCC functions as a central point of coordination and information sharing for communications infrastructure operators. Once notified of a Federal disaster, the NCC works with its federal government and industry partners to: • Assess anticipated/actual damage • Identify communication requirements • Prioritize requirements • Monitor the developing situation/response • Render status reports • Coordinate communication service provisioning and restoration as required 

with industry members and other communication providers 

To facilitate coordination of industry/Government operations during an emergency, the NCS has established and continuously operates several priority service 

programs, which help to ensure critical calls are completed in the event of congestion or damage to the national commercial communications infrastructure. The nation heavily used each of these programs during Hurricane Katrina. For example: 

The Government Emergency Communications Service (GETS) program provides 

priority treatment for authorized users to ensure a higher rate of call completion 

during periods of outages or congestion resulting from disasters. Simply put, the 

phone call of a GETS user such as a state employee or hospital worker could go 

through before others. During Hurricane Katrina, the NCS issued over 1000 new 

GETS cards and over 40,000 GETS calls were made in the ensuring recovery period. 

The Wireless Priority Service (WPS) program established a wireless counterpart 

of GETS, providing priority treatment for calls made during periods of wireless network congestion by personnel with NS/EP missions, such as those experienced on 

SeptemberΩ, 01. The need for this program was recognized after 9/11 because many 

Federal, State and local Government and industry leaders utilize wireless as a primary means of mobile communications. During Hurricane Katrina, the NCS enabled 

over 4,000 cellular phones with WPS capability. 

The Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) program establishes a regulatory, 

administrative and operational framework for restoring and provisioning of priority 

communications services. Through this program, the FCC authorizes and requires 

service vendors to give priority to restoration and provision of service to those with 

TSP assignments. TSP is distinct from GETS and WPS, which provide priority for 

individual calls over the network in an emergency. During Hurricane Katrina, the 

NCS completed more than 1500 TSP assignments. Restoration of these services supported key Federal, State, local and commercial activities, such as emergency response at all levels, hospitals, and the military. 

The Shared Resources High Frequency Radio Program (SHARES) provides a single, interagency emergency message handling system using High Frequency (HF) 

radio when other communications methods are unavailable. SHARES uses common 

radio operating and message formatting procedures and more than 250 designated 

frequencies. Participation in SHARES is open to all Federal departments and agen-
22

cies and their designated affiliates on a voluntary basis. More than 90 Federal, 

State, and industry organizations currently contribute resources. The use of 

SHARES was an overwhelming success within the first few days of the aftermath 

of Hurricane Katrina. The NCS coordinated participation by 431 SHARES stations. 

Some of the accomplishments of SHARES include: 

• Assisted local Governments and Federal entities with search and rescue missions for over 100 missing people in the affected area by relaying critical information regarding those persons to the appropriate agency. 

• Relayed critical logistical and operational information from FEMA and Atlanta’s EOC into the Mississippi and Louisiana EOC’s. 

• Coordinated with National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) 

Disaster Assistance and Rescue Teams, Communications Group, assisting them 

in their preparations for deployment to Stennis Space Center. 

• Provided frequency coordination with Department of Energy, FCC, Military 

Affiliate Radio System, the U.S. Navy, FEMA, Civil Air Patrol, Amateur Radio 

Emergency Services (ARES)/Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES), 

Louisiana EOC’s and Mississippi EOC’s. 

• Coordinated inter-communications between SHARES and ARES/RACES 

emergency networks. 

• Established contact with deployed Navy ships USS Truman and USS Bataan 

which were detailed to New Orleans to assist with the Katrina disaster. 

• Relayed health and welfare message traffic between volunteer agencies in 

Georgia and the National Red Cross Headquarters in Washington, D.C. 

The Alerting and Coordination Network (ACN) coordinates communications restoration efforts among service providers when the public service network is inoperable or congested. ACN membership includes major communications companies and 

certain Federal agencies. Operating independently of the public switched network, 

the ACN supports the NCC-Telecom Information Sharing and Analysis Center 

(ISAC) 24 hours a day, 7 days a week during both emergency and normal conditions. ACN was not utilized during Katrina. 

Now I will detail many NCS’s critical actions before and during Hurricane 

Katrina.

Pre-landfall Preparation: 

Hurricane Katrina made its second landfall (Gulf Coast) on August 29, 2005. As 

of August 28, 2005, the NCS’ preparations for Hurricane Katrina included: 

• Heightened the alert status of the NCC’s 24 hour Watch which provides monitoring and reporting capabilities 

• 24 hour Emergency Operations Teams support on stand-by 

• National and regional ESF 2 staffing structure for standing up on short notice. GSA and DoD provided personnel to staff ESF–2

• Issued TSP assignments, GETS cards, and WPS procedures 

• SHARES activated 

• GETS and WPS user support on 24 hour alert 

• Activated National Response Coordinating Center ESF 2 desk at the FEMA 

Headquarters to provide level 1 (24x7) support (effective August 27, 2005, at 7 

am Eastern Standard Time (EST)) 

• Began staffing Region IV, Atlanta, Georgia, Regional Response Coordinating 

Center 

• ESF 2 at Region VI, Denton, Texas, activated on August 28, 2005, at 7 am 

EST 

• NCC Watch providing 24/7 monitoring and reporting capability 

• Industry/Government staging of mobile communications 

• SHARES contacted local High Frequency organizations in Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Alabama and conducted a teleconference with Nationwide 

Emergency Communications Service controllers 

• Conducted analysis of critical communications assets in the projected impact 

area 

All impacted communications companies moved Emergency Response teams and 

equipment to the region, established communication bridges among carriers, activated damage assessment teams, and Bell South opened its Operations Center to 

all carriers for coordination purposes. 

Industry and Government participated in joint conference calls, which were conducted daily through the NCC. Communications companies performed assessments 

from Hurricane Katrina’s Florida landfall and continued with preparations for Hurricane Katrina’s second landfall. As of August 28, 2005, the NCS/NCC coordinated 

with communication companies the following preparations: 

• Moving company personnel to safety 
23

• Rerouting of traffic loads away from projected impact areas 

• Movement of Emergency Response Teams into staging areas 

• Identification of over 427 Cell on Wheels (COWs) and Cell on Light Trucks 

(COLTS) to be deployed into damaged areas to meet initial cellular communication requirements while the infrastructure is being restored 

• Identification of communication vans, satellite packages, and pre-deployment 

of MCI and AT&T mobile communications vans that could be contracted by the 

Government if needed 

• Coordinating with fuel and equipment suppliers 

• Deployment and staging of generators 

• Identification of 250+ satellite handsets that could be deployed in the event 

of major cellular system damage 

• Coordination for satellite capacity 

• Requesting relief from Federal and State reporting and service requirements 

due to evacuation of personnel from call centers, service centers, and other operations such as remote monitoring and control

III. RESPONSE: 

From Monday August 29, 2005 the day of landfall on the Gulf Coast, through the 

levee breech and the following days, the NCS engaged in many round-the-clock actions. In addition to exercising the priority programs discussed, the NCS’ NCC 

played numerous coordination and facilitation roles. Specifically, the NCS activated 

SHARES on August 29th and worked to coordinate with United States Northern 

Command (USNORTHCOM) to identify and deploy communication assets. At this 

point, communications service providers were awaiting physical access to facilities 

to evaluate their networks and reporting was sparse during the first 24 hours of 

the storm. 

Katrina caused unprecedented damage to the communications infrastructure. In 

the telecommunications sector, More than three million phone customers were out 

of service. For the first time in history, switching centers were out of operation due 

to water damage. Numerous 9-1-1 call centers were down and up to 2000 cellular 

towers were out of service shutting down telecommunications networks throughout 

the area. In addition, significant damage had been inflicted on first responder Land 

Mobile Radio (LMR) communications. 

As of September 2, 2005, all systems were in place for the ESF 2 elements to receive communications requests from the affected region, both through the JFOs and 

independent requests. In the ensuing period, the ESF–2 elements on location: 

• Identified and dispatched satellite vans to various locations affected by the 

hurricane, including New Orleans City Hall, State Police in Baton Rouge, the 

Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) at New Orleans Airport, and to the National Guard in Jefferson Parish 

• Dispatched mobile capabilities, such as COLTs, to provide communication to 

the JFO and offer cellular service to the Louisiana State Emergency Operations 

Center (EOC) 

• Delivered mobile communications trucks to the State EOC and to staging 

areas for Federal and Industry responders 

• Delivered satellite handsets to emergency responders in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama 

• Initiated contacts with State EOCs to determine communication requirements 

• Identified the requirement to replace the destroyed LMR infrastructure in 

eight parishes in Louisiana. Worked with FEMA to initiate contract to provide 

replacement system 

• Designed and installed new E–911 System in Plaquemines Parish 

• Within 48 hours of Hurricane Rita making landfall, arranged for installation 

of a 106 foot, portable, Emergency Response Tower to Jefferson Parish to replace the destroyed 400 foot permanent tower supporting first responders in Jefferson Parish 

• Deployed cellular capabilities were deployed to Cameron Parish to replace 

communications devastated by Hurricane Rita 

At the NCS’s NCC in Washington, industry identified three priorities to the NCS: 

fuel, security and access. Throughout the crisis, industry repeatedly made clear that 

in order to maintain existing communications, to assess damage to its communications infrastructure and to begin to make repairs and deploy alternative services, 

it needed to get fuel to locations, to have security to protect personnel, communications infrastructure, staging areas and fuel convoys, and to have access to locations 

in need of repairs. 

The NCC assisted industry by coordinating security forces and requirements between industry and Government to protect repair teams, communications sites, and 
24

staging areas. In addition, in a limited number of circumstances, the NCC arranged 

to provide communications carriers and broadcast companies with generators where 

the power was out, fuel for generators, and power outage maps. The NCS recognizes 

the interdependencies on other infrastructures and has established a relationship 

with the Energy Information Sharing Analysis Center through the response to previous disasters. Close coordination was achieved through the hurricane response period. 

Highlights of the NCS’s NCC activities include: 

• NCC conducted twice daily conference calls with government and industry 

representatives. Participants included representatives from communications 

companies (wireline, wireless, satellite) and from numerous federal entities located in the field and in Washington, including NCS, GSA, FEMA. These calls 

facilitated information sharing and coordination of response actions. 

• Facilitated the provisioning of the United States Marshals Service and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel to protect the most important communications center in New Orleans. These law enforcement officers provided security for employees who felt threatened by individuals outside the facility. The 

U.S. Marshals and FBI escorted employees and fuel trucks to and from the facility as well as providing facility security. 

• Provided the local carrier with detailed satellite images which the carrier had 

been unable to access until the NCC stepped in to help. This enabled the carrier 

to prioritize its restoration efforts by providing information on which areas were 

still totally flooded. 

• Successfully Coordinated offers for assistance of communications resources 

and assets (such as satellite phones) from local, national and international 

sources 

• Facilitated fuel delivery for Broadcasters in the region 

• Maintained full time liaison with DoD’s U.S. Northern Command for coordinating communication support to effected area. 

• Provided commercial emergency mobile assets and coordinated military assets 

to support local authorities following Hurricane Rita 

• Provided status reports to DHS and White House

IV. CONCLUSION: 

Next Steps: 

The extent of the destruction and damage to communications infrastructure and 

services caused by Hurricane Katrina greatly exceeded any other disaster previously 

encountered by the NCS. A hurricane of the historical magnitude of Hurricane 

Katrina stressed the processes and procedures of the NCS and required ESF 2 to 

perform functions, such as providing an interim Land Mobile Radio system to 8 parishes, which has never been done before. 

Currently, the NCS is fully engaged in assisting with the restoration efforts in 

the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and now Wilma. In an ongoing effort to 

improve communications, the NCS is currently examining its actions regarding Hurricane Katrina, identifying issues and lessons learned and developing recommendations. We are fully committed to incorporating lessons learned into future plans, 

procedures, and capabilities. 

Some of the areas that will be considered are: standardized and pre-approved 

emergency credentials to vital communications and other key infrastructure providers, examination of mechanisms for improved facilitation of industry assessment 

and repair efforts, consideration of increased level of exercises with industry, state 

and local government and improved acquisition of and coordination for emergency 

communication capabilities. 

The NCS will continue to work with industry and government to improve the perseverance and restorability of the nation’s communications network

Mr. REICHERT. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Kenneth Moran, 

director of the Office of Homeland Security on the Federal Communications Commissions Enforcement Bureau to testify. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH MORAN 

Mr. MORAN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee. My name is Ken Moran, and I serve 

as the director of the Federal Communications Commissions Office 

of Homeland Security. In that role, I am primarily responsible for 

consolidating support for the homeland security and emergency 
25

preparedness responsibilities of the Commission. Today, I will describe the Commission’s efforts to assist consumers, the communications industry and other Federal agencies in response to the 

extensive damage inflicted by the recent hurricanes. 

As we all know, Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma devastated 

large areas of the southeastern United States. People lost their 

homes, their businesses, and even their lives. Our hearts go out to 

all of those who are now struggling to put their lives back together. 

The chairman and ranking member described the destruction of 

these hurricanes very well, the destruction inflicted upon the communications infrastructure, so I won’t repeat it now. But I will say 

that the resulting communications breakdowns made it extremely 

difficult for millions of people to communicate with their families 

and friends or to receive news and emergency information. 

Also, emergency workers and public safety officials had great difficulty communicating. While no communications network could be 

expected to remain fully operational in the face of a direct hit from 

hurricanes of this magnitude, that fact was of little consolation to 

the people on the ground. Fortunately, the communications companies began to restore services almost immediately. They have overcome significant obstacles including flooding, lack of power, dwindling fuel resources for generators and security problems to rebuild, reconnect and broadcast. These extraordinary efforts were 

performed by industry employees, many of whom had suffered their 

own personal losses yet still continued to work to restore services 

to all. 

The Commission has devoted significant time and resources to 

enable first responders to communicate and to facilitate restoration 

of communications services. On August 30, Chairman Martin established an internal task force to coordinate the FCC’s hurricane 

response efforts, which fall into three categories, regulatory relief, 

industry outreach and coordination with other Federal agencies. To 

date, nearly 200 FCC employees have assisted this effort. The 

Commission has taken a number of steps to facilitate the resumption of communication services and to authorize the use of temporary services for use by disaster relief personnel and evacuees. 

At the outset, the Commission notified the communications providers that it would provide streamlined treatment for requests for 

special temporary authority or STAs to aid them in resuming and 

maintaining operations in areas impacted by the hurricanes. The 

FCC has granted more than 90 STA requests and more than 100 

temporary frequency authorizations for emergency workers and 

communications companies to provide wireless and broadcast service in the areas affected, and also in the shelters around the country. 

The Commission has granted the vast majority of these requests 

within 24 hours. In addition, the Commission has released several 

public notices and quickly adopted orders to provide temporary relief. The Commission works closely with the National Communications System and FEMA in accordance with the national response 

plan. We are continuously reaching out to communications companies serving the affected areas, wire line and wireless broadcasters, 

cable and satellite providers to assess the companies status and determine what they need to continue or resume operations. 
26

Mr. MORAN. The FCC continues to gather critical information 

about resources that communications providers need to restore and 

maintain service in the affected areas and provides this information to the NCS and FEMA who are responsible for ensuring that 

the priority needs are met. The Commission also is responsible for 

providing information on communications companies’ operational 

status for incorporation into the governmentwide situation reports. 

In addition, the FCC works closely with industry to identify resources for use by disaster response personnel. We provide this information to the NCS and facilitate industry communications with 

other Federal officials. We also work on a wide range of providers, 

including those who offer satellite, wireless, wireless Internet access and WIFI services to identify those providers capable of offering facilities and services that can assist those in the affected area. 

In the aftermath of these hurricanes the Commission has devoted significant time and resourced to enable first responders to 

communicate. For example, the Commission granted STAs to allow 

first responders to use through-the-wall imaging equipment to locate hurricane victims and to help emergency response organizations to facilitate communications on the ground. These recent disasters are also prompting the Commission to reassess steps that 

have been taken to address interoperability issues. These steps 

consist mainly of efforts to provide additional spectrum to public 

safety entities, to promote technological development to enhance 

interoperability, and to provide technical expertise on input to 

interagency efforts. 

In addition, Chairman Martin has announced his intention to establish an independent expert panel to review the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the public communications infrastructure. The 

panel will be composed of public safety and communications industry representatives and will make recommendations for approved 

disaster preparedness, network reliability, and communications 

among first responders. 

In conclusion, the Commission is continuing to work with other 

Federal agencies and the industry to determine what additional actions can be taken to assist in disaster relief and restoration efforts. We will also continue to reach out and respond to many consumers affected by these tragedies and we stand ready to work 

with the Congress and our colleagues at the Federal, State, and 

local levels to do whatever we can do to help with disaster relief 

and restoration. 

I would be pleased to answer your questions. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Moran follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH P. MORAN

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. 

My name is Ken Moran and I serve as the Director of the Federal Communications 

Commission’s Office of Homeland Security. In that role, I am primarily responsible 

for consolidating support for the homeland security and emergency preparedness responsibilities of the Commission. 

In my testimony today, I will describe some of the damage wrought by Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita to the communications industry and the Commission’s efforts to 

assist consumers, the industries the agency regulates, and other Federal Agencies 

during this difficult crisis. Finally, I will also address the Commission’s efforts to 

ensure public safety operability during catastrophic events such as the recent hurricanes. 
27

As we all know, Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita devastated the Gulf Coast. 

People lost their homes, their businesses, and even their lives. Hurricane Wilma has 

also brought devastation to the people of Florida. Our hearts go out to all of those 

who are now struggling with putting their lives back together. 

The destruction that Hurricane Katrina caused to the facilities of communications 

companies, and therefore the services upon which citizens rely, was extraordinary. 

More than three million customer telephone lines were knocked down in the Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama area. Significant damage was inflicted both on the 

wireline switching centers that route calls and on the lines used to connect buildings 

and customers to the network. Thirty-eight 9-1-1 call centers went down. Local wireless networks also sustained considerable damage with more than one thousand cell 

sites out of service. Over 20 million telephone calls did not go through the day after 

the hurricane. While we were not able to contact every station in the immediate 

aftermath, we estimate that approximately 100 broadcast stations were knocked off 

the air. Hundreds of thousands of cable customers lost service. 

Hurricane Rita, which struck parts of Texas and Louisiana, also caused significant damage. It produced extensive flooding throughout the affected area, including 

many of the same parishes in Louisiana still working to recover from Hurricane 

Katrina. The hurricane left more than 80,000 consumers without telephone service, 

damaged more than 20 telephone company switches, and knocked out more than 

250 cell sites in the vicinity of Beaumont, Texas and Lake Charles, Louisiana. In 

addition, at least five broadcasters went off the air in the affected area as a result 

of the hurricane’s wind and flooding damage. 

As a result of the communications breakdown, it was extremely difficult for hundreds of thousands of people to receive news and emergency information and to communicate with their loved ones. Emergency workers and public safety officials had 

difficulty coordinating. It was at times like these that we were reminded of the importance of being able to communicate. While no communications network could be 

expected to remain fully operational in the face of a direct hit from a category four 

or five hurricane, that fact was little consolation to the people on the ground. 

Fortunately, the work to restore communications services began almost immediately. While considerable problems remain, the companies in the region have 

made meaningful progress. They have overcome significant obstacles—including 

flooding, lack of power, dwindling fuel resources for generators, and security—to rebuild, reconnect and broadcast. After Hurricane Katrina, three radio stations in 

New Orleans continued to operate throughout the storm, and a fourth resumed operations within several hours of losing power. Wireline carriers were able to begin 

restoring service within five days, with significant improvement accomplished within a week, and wireless carriers began to restore service within two days, with substantial improvement by the first weekend. These extraordinary efforts were performed by employees, many of whom had suffered their own personal losses, yet still 

continued to work to restore services to all.

COMMISSION ACTIONS 

The Commission has devoted significant time and resources to enable first responders to communicate and to facilitate companies’ ability to quickly restore services in the region. On August 30th, Chairman Martin established an internal Task 

Force consisting of senior executives and management from within the Commission. 

Chairman Martin directed the Task Force to coordinate the FCC’s hurricane response efforts, which fall into two categories: (1) regulatory relief; and (2) industry 

outreach and coordination with other federal agencies. The Task Force has been 

working on these assignments continuously since August 30th. To date, nearly 200 

FCC employees have assisted in this effort.

Regulatory Relief 

The Commission has taken a number of steps to facilitate the resumption of communications services in the affected areas and to authorize the use of temporary 

communications services for use by disaster relief personnel and evacuees in shelters. 

At the start of the disaster, the Commission notified communications providers 

that it would provide streamlined treatment for requests for special temporary authority (STA) in order to aid them in resuming and maintaining operations in areas 

impacted by Hurricane Katrina. The FCC has granted more than 90 STA requests 

and more than 100 temporary frequency authorizations for emergency workers, organizations and companies to provide wireless and broadcast service in the affected 

areas and shelters around the country. The Commission has granted each of these 

requests within 4 hours of receipt of all necessary information from the requestor, 

except in instances requiring coordination with other government agencies. Even in 

those cases, requests have been granted within 24 hours. In addition, the Commis-
28

sion has released several public notices and quickly adopted orders to provide temporary relief.

Industry Outreach and Coordination with Other Federal Agencies 

The Commission has been working closely with industry as well as the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Communications System 

(NCS) pursuant to the procedures established in the National Response Plan. The 

Commission is continuously reaching out to communications companies serving the 

affected area—wireline and wireless network providers, broadcasters, cable providers, satellite providers—and to trade associations for these providers to assess 

the companies’ status and determine what they need to resume operations. These 

efforts include Commission staff contacting each of the broadcast stations in the affected region. 

The FCC provides the critical information about resources that communications 

providers need to restore and maintain service in the affected area to FEMA and 

NCS, who are responsible for ensuring that priority needs are met. For instance, 

the Commission identified wireline central offices and radio and television broadcasters that could be operational if provided fuel to power on-site generators. The 

agency updates FEMA and NCS daily on evolving needs. 

The Commission also is responsible for providing the National Coordinating Center (NCC) with information on communications companies’ operational status for incorporation into the government--wide situation reports. Again, the agency gathers 

and submits this data daily. 

In addition, the FCC has worked closely with the communications industry to help 

identify resources for use by disaster response personnel. The agency both transmits 

this information to NCC and facilitates industry’s communication with other federal 

officials. For example, Commission staff coordinated discussions between FEMA and 

a major Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) provider to set up free televisions at disaster relief facilities and to provide a nationwide channel for disaster emergency 

services programming. Staff also worked with a wide range of providers—including 

those offering competitive facilities-based telecommunications, satellite, wireless, 

wireless internet access and Wi-Fi services—to identify those providers capable of 

offering facilities and services that can assist those in the affected area. 

Finally, the Commission has been coordinating with the Interagency Coordinating 

Council on Individuals with Disabilities, organized by the Department of Homeland 

Security, to ensure that the needs of the disability community are addressed in the 

coordinated federal relief efforts.

INTEROPERABILITY 

In the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Commission has devoted 

significant time and resources to enable first responders to communicate and to help 

facilitate companies’ ability to quickly restore communications services in the region. For example, the Commission granted special temporary authorities (STAs) to 

allow first responders to use ‘‘through-the-wall’’ imaging equipment to locate hurricane victims and to emergency response organizations to facilitate communications 

on the ground. 

These recent disasters are also prompting the Commission to reassess the steps 

that have been taken to address interoperability in recent years. These steps have 

consisted mainly of efforts (1) to provide additional spectrum to public safety entities; (2) to promote technological developments that enhance interoperability; and 

(3) to provide technical expertise and input on a number of interagency efforts. 

The Commission has designated approximately 97 MHz of spectrum from ten different bands for public safety use throughout the country. Public safety entities also 

actively use spectrum-based services in other spectrum bands. In addition, the Commission has designated certain channels in these public safety bands specifically for 

interoperability. By ‘‘interoperability,’’ we generally mean radio communications between public safety agencies (usually of different jurisdictions) in furtherance of 

both day-to-day and emergency operations. Frequencies designated for interoperability include 2.6 MHz of the 700 MHz band, 5 channels in the 800 MHz band, 

5 channels in the 150 MHz band (VHF band), and 4 channels in the 450 MHz band 

(UHF band). A public safety entity may use these designated frequencies only if it 

uses equipment that permits intersystem interoperability. In response to requests 

from public safety entities, the Commission designated 50 MHz of spectrum at 4.9 

GHz for public safety users. The 4.9 GHz band rules also foster interoperability by 

providing a regulatory framework where traditional public safety entities can pursue strategic partnerships with others, including critical infrastructure entities, as 

necessary for the completion of their mission. And, last year the Commission released its decision regarding public safety interference in the 800 MHz band, which 
29

will not only promote effective and robust public safety communications but ultimately, will make additional spectrum available for public safety use. 

Other steps the Commission has taken to facilitate interoperability include: 

• To facilitate interoperability on a regional basis, the Commission reallocated 

television spectrum in the New York City area for public safety use to promote 

interoperability among area public safety entities. 

• The Commission has developed policies and rules to promote the sharing of 

spectrum. For example, the Commission’s rules permit the shared use of radio 

stations where licensees may share their facilities on a non-profit, cost-shared 

basis with other public safety organizations, including Federal government entities, as end users. 

• The Commission modified its rules to eliminate regulatory barriers to help 

speed introduction of software defined radio (SDR) technology. Radios traditionally have been built with unalterable hardware components that perform specific functions. SDR technology allows radios to cover multiple frequency bands 

and signal formats by simply sending different software instructions to a microprocessor instead of using additional (frequently bulky and heavy) parts. Although this technology is not currently available for public safety use, we are 

aware that public safety entities and industry are actively exploring these applications. 

Chairman Martin has announced his intention to establish an independent expert 

panel to review the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the communications infrastructure. The panel will be composed of public safety and communications industry representatives and will make recommendations to the Commission regarding ways to 

improve disaster preparedness, network reliability and communications among first 

responders such as police, fire fighters and emergency medical personnel.

CONCLUSION 

The damage wrought by the recent hurricanes is tremendous and its effects will 

be felt for months and possibly years to come. The Commission is continuing to 

work with other Federal agencies and the communications industry to determine 

what additional actions can be taken to assist in the disaster relief and restoration 

effort. The Commission also will continue its important work in reaching out, and 

responding to, consumers affected by this tragedy. 

The Commission stands ready to work with Congress, our colleagues at federal, 

state, and local agencies, and the American public to do whatever we can to help 

with the disaster relief and restoration efforts. I would be pleased to respond to your 

questions.

Mr. REICHERT. The Chair now recognizes Doctor Linton Wells, II, 

Acting Assistant Secretary of Networks and Information Integration, Chief Information Officer of the United States Department of 

Defense. 

STATEMENT OF LINTON WELLS, II 

Mr. WELLS. Chairman Reichert, thank you very much, Ranking 

Member Pascrell, and members of the committee. 

The lessons learned, if you will, from the Federal, State, and 

local responses to Katrina parallel the lessons that DOD has 

learned in the series of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief operations around the globe, and also the stabilization and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. All of these have involved complex situations involving large populations without basic 

access to services, including communications and often power. 

I will focus on four lessons out of these. The first is communications command and control and the sensors to provide situational 

awareness are not techie adjuncts, if you will, to major muscle 

movements like the delivery of food, water, and shelter, but in fact 

the critical enablers of everything else that will happen. We need 

to be able to move these equipments contemporaneously with the 

rescue efforts and actually before the restoration of things like 

water, power, and shelter. In addition, power needs to be included. 
30

Self-powered units for erectable towers and equipment need to be 

included in these first deployments. 

The second point is that our military has to be able to reach out 

beyond the boundaries of the traditional military networks in order 

to communicate, collaborate, in some cases translate and engage 

with nontraditional partners such as State and local first responders, the commercial partners, and overseas people like nongovernmental organizations. This is important because so much of the information as well as the recipients of the services reside outside 

these government boundaries. In this area commercial technology 

is very important. And it has been true for both domestic and for 

international situations. 

The third piece that is important is the social networks we have 

to have in order to make this work, the personal and professional 

relationships to interact in really three different spheres: We have 

the military-to-military command and control sphere; we have got 

the military to the State and local first responders, and we have 

got the military to the commercial partners. All of these are quite 

different environments. 

Working with police and firemen has been very important. DOD 

has been trying to learn from the way they handle incident responses, and in this we greatly appreciate the Chairman and Ranking Member’s work with the police and fire over the years. I would 

also say for the Department of Defense in the last year, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has introduced a new topic, a doctrinal topic called integrated operations. We have long been working towards joint operations among services and combined operations among the militaries of several nations. This year the Chairman introduced the importance of working in integrated operations 

with nontraditional partners such as State and local first responders, with indigenous security services overseas, with nongovernmental organizations, et cetera. 

The fourth lesson then is that information sharing is absolutely 

critical. Communications is one piece but the goal ultimately is to 

share information. The Defense Department and the Intelligence 

Community have a common set of data standards that has stood 

us in very good stead in terms of sharing information in, say, 

counterterrorist domains. It would be a great help if the rest of the 

government were able to adopt these sorts of standards to allow for 

the sharing of information not just in counterterrorist situations 

but also in the source of situations we saw in Katrina and Rita. 

So I look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

for the opportunity to be here today. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Doctor Wells. 

[The statement of Mr. Wells follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. LINTON WELLS, II 

Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell, distinguished members of the 

Committee, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the subject of ensuring 

operability during catastrophic events. As the acting Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Networks and Information Integration (NII)/Chief Information Officer (CIO) of 

the Department of Defense, I am responsible for enabling the warfighting, business 

and intelligence processes of an enterprise by ensuring agility, situational awareness, and effective corporate decision-making through the use of information and 

communications technology (ICT). 
31

Warfare in the 21st Century, the core business process of the Defense Department, must be net-centric, meaning so well connected that well-trained professionals 

can self-synchronize their behavior with many others across vast distances, with 

devastating effect. Victory is dependent on discovering the enemy, accessing data, 

making decisions, and executing operations more rapidly and effectively than your 

adversary. Let me begin by saying that the communications and command and control (C2) lessons we are learning from the Federal, state, local, and commercial responses to Hurricane Katrina appear consistent with the lessons DoD has learned 

in the conduct of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions 

across the globe. Moreover, these lessons appear consistent with those lessons 

learned during stabilization and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

All of these situations involve high-levels of complexity, large populations, and the 

destruction of basic information and communications infrastructure. There is also 

a commonality of purpose that must be organized, coordinated, deconflicted, and executed as efficiently and effectively as possible, using multiple sources of support—

some of them totally unfamiliar with one another. 

Communications—particularly wireless communications—are the critical enabler 

of all other functions in any disaster relief operation, along with the sensors to let 

you know what’s happening and share the information and the ability to command 

and control those functions and information. These are all mission-critical functions. 

Hurricane Katrina was no exception. Without effective communications, every operation will suffer debilitating inefficiencies, some leading to ineffectiveness. My experience indicates that the first priority in both international and domestic situations 

is the establishment or restoration of wireless communications. Establishing or reestablishing communications has become a first-order requirement that must occur 

contemporaneously with rescue operations. Communication and information, when 

used appropriately, synergize the rescue response. It is imperative to take advantage of everyday technology to rapidly coordinate the rescue of our citizens across 

the entire spectrum of the crisis until its conclusion. 

By now, the members of this Subcommittee recognize that the Department of Defense and civilian responders from across the spectrum of Federal, state, and local 

authorities have matured into the post-September 11 world with different lexicons. 

The mission of fighting and winning this nation’s wars is very different from responding to catastrophes spread across vast distances, regardless of their cause. Different lexicons are to be expected. America has a long tradition of carefully separating military and civilian functions, especially in our homeland. My experience, 

however, tells me that when Mr. Canterbury of the Fraternal Order of Police testified before this Subcommittee on September 29, his reference to command and control is the same concept that General Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

refers to using the same words. The ability to lead a complex organized operation 

requires situational awareness and the ability to communicate with everyone participating in that operation. The planning process establishes the social networks 

and procedures that give people the agility to adapt and overcome the unanticipated.

CATEGORIZING CHANGE 

From my experiences since September 11, I have come to use a three-part construct to describe the actions necessary to ensure operability in catastrophic events 

internationally and domestically. These categories include: 1) technical capacity development; 2) ‘‘social network’’ development through planning, interaction, and collaboration; and 3) doctrinal changes and training.

TECHNICAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT 

During the past 10 years, the U.S. military has honed its C2 skills in multiple 

deployments involving a mixture of war-fighting, civil affairs, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and stabilization and reconstruction operations. The 1990’s saw 

such deployments in Haiti and the Balkans, and they have only accelerated since 

the 9-11 attacks, with deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq. More recently, U.S. 

forces have been instrumental in providing key elements of the initial humanitarian 

responses to global disasters, including the tsunami in Southeast Asia, the recent 

earthquake in Pakistan and the subject of today’s hearing, Hurricane Katrina. All 

of these deployments have highlighted the increased need in the Department to 

communicate, collaborate, translate, and cooperate outside the closed networks required for military operations. Unlike the military, which always travels with its 

own power and infrastructure, civilian responders encountered command and control issues at the operational and tactical levels due to the devastation of the civilian-response infrastructure. Technology designed to operate without stable power 

sources in the austere environments of developing countries, is available today. 
32

Working with industry, these innovations can help to increase the survivability of 

tactical civil responder systems. 

As stated earlier, when forces assigned to U.S. Northern Command and National 

Guard units deployed with military communications, they were once again illequipped to communicate with civilian responders struggling with a lack of communications infrastructure. Therefore, the Federal government must expand its capability to rapidly deploy commercial-off-the-shelf networks making use of satellite 

links, wireless local area networks (LANs), laptop computers and ‘‘plug-and-play’’ 

equipment to bridge the gap created by a devastated civil infrastructure. 

The lack of interoperability of first responders’ communication equipment also 

hindered the effectiveness of operations. This problem won’t be resolved by everyone 

buying the same product. It will likely be solved through collaborative efforts involving spectrum allocation and agreement both within industry and in the first responder community on common data standards. In the near term, we must continue 

to encourage the development and purchase of technology that bridges these disparate systems. 

In the area of technical standards, one of the critical waveforms that DoD and 

DHS have agreed upon as essential to become interoperable under DHS’s 

SAFECOM Program has been the Association of Public Safety Communications Officials (APCO) Project 25 (APCO–25) standard. The primary objectives of APCO 

Project 25 are to: (1) enhance functionality of equipment and capabilities focused on 

public safety needs, (2) ensure competition among multiple vendors through an open 

systems architecture approach and (3) achieve effective, efficient and reliable intraagency and inter-agency communications. Our two agencies have mutually agreed 

that this is the best approach at this point in time. Although DoD is making efforts 

to adopt and implement APCO–25, SAFECOM has had success in influencing the 

public first responder community to implement this standard. 

From a DoD perspective, we believe the APCO–25 implementation is an important step to solve some of the current interoperability problems in the first responder community. As an example, DoD is complying with National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) narrowbanding mandate by implementing APCO-25 in DoD Land Mobile Radios (LMR). In addition, DoD is examining the development of an APCO–25 waveform that will work in the Joint Tactical 

Radio System so when our military deploys to support homeland security missions, 

no matter what they are, we will have an immediate communications capability 

with First Responders.

SOCIAL NETWORK DEVELOPMENT 

Much of the work that needs to be done at the strategic level in the wake of what 

we have learned revolves around social networks rather than any lack of technology. 

Hurricane Katrina showed us that a key source of the problem stemmed from a lack 

of familiarity with each other’s operating practices—what DoD calls tactics, techniques, and procedures. What was lacking was familiarity with the National Response Plan, a shared understanding of how NORTHCOM was to support that plan, 

and experience gained through exercises between US military and Federal, state, 

and local responders. A nationally focused effort to generate a truly collaborative information environment is feasible through coordinating the resolution of legal, policy 

and technical issues across all agencies and all levels of government. Ideally, there 

would be full interoperability among systems for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (known together as 

‘‘C4ISR’’). In addition, there needs to be broader, more fully articulated planning for 

multiple kinds of disaster events, ranging from natural disasters such as Hurricane 

Katrina up through a nuclear strike. Command and control, which is a social process augmented by communications and information, must extend to all appropriate 

locations, from a local sheriff’s car to the White House. Moreover, we must exercise 

and train in a common environment to be better prepared to respond to such crises 

in the future. 

Multiple efforts have addressed, or are addressing, segments of the need for a national response capability. These include: 

• National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems—Developing 

plans and programs, including the development of architectures, to ensure security 

on National Security Systems; 

• Continuity Communications Enterprise Architecture—Architecture to enable 

the Federal Executive Branch to execute mission-essential functions under all circumstances; 

• Intelligence Community Architecture—Architecture to enable the intelligence 

community to share information; 
33

We must vigorously support collaborative planning and interoperability at all levels of government, ensuring that decision-makers have unencumbered access to the 

best available information and enabling interoperable command and control operations. The Federal government must have command and control capabilities, supporting facilities, and infrastructure to ensure uninterrupted connectivity and coordination in support of essential functions in accordance with constitutional authorities. Our goal should be to provide assured services across government by: 

• Making information available on a network that is dependable and trusted, 

• Providing the available and appropriate bandwidth, frequency and computing 

capabilities within the spectrum management process, 

• Assuring appropriate and effective collaboration capabilities and other performance support tools, 

• Supporting secure and assured information sharing, without disadvantaging the 

responder lacking a security clearance, 

• Continuously refreshing the information content of a shared situational awareness capability, 

• Promoting infrastructure transparency (to the user), 

• Assuring independence of information and data for consumers and producers, 

• Considering that all users of information are also suppliers (and therefore encouraging parties to contribute data rather than just downloading it), 

• Supporting information transactions that are asynchronous in time and place, 

• Supporting the disadvantaged user with intermittent access to limited data 

services, and 

• Applying federal data tagging standards and information assurance policies. 

I have learned a great deal about ‘‘social networks’’ in the international context 

in the past three years. It is critical to develop purposely professional and personal 

links among experts and practitioners from multiple fields and sectors in humanitarian relief, disaster relief, and stabilization and reconstruction operations. These 

ties, built up over time and through enormous effort, are absolutely vital to organizing an effective response when catastrophic disasters occur. Unless working arrangements to communicate and share information among all of these types of entities can be formulated, the success of any operation can be compromised, with results that can prolong or even exacerbate the effects of the disaster. Extensive planning and training is essential before the crisis.

DOCTRINAL CHANGES AND TRAINING 

In the area of doctrinal change in the international context, DoD is embracing the 

concept of ‘‘integrated operations.’’ This reflects a new battlespace management concept that will transform our military competencies from joint operations to operations that are fully integrated and coordinated with those of the military’s partners 

in an operation. In the case of humanitarian assistance activities, these partners 

may include other U.S. agencies, allied militaries and governments, nongovernmental organizations, local populations, and private industry. And to maximize our 

effectiveness, DoD will integrate from planning to execution and then on to the transition to a restored local authority. Employing a coherent strategy that uses all instruments of the state in concert will ensure success in relief operations over the 

long term. 

This doctrine also better prepares DoD to fulfill domestic response missions, 

bringing together civilian responders and military planners to synergize their efforts. Within the United States, DoD has conducted many scenario-driven exercises 

designed to prepare the military to support humanitarian assistance across a broad 

range of natural disasters—and also with regard to protecting potential terrorist 

target sites. Exercises and training opportunities between the U.S. military and civilian responders are critical to achieving this level of integration. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address the Subcommittee.

Mr. REICHERT. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from 

Texas, Mr. McCaul. He is apparently a busy man. He has two other 

appointments he needs to be at, so we are going to allow him the 

courtesy to ask the first questions. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. 

We also after the events of Katrina and to some extent Rita, we 

weren’t interoperable, we weren’t operable. All the communication 

went down. And when that happens, when Rita occurred—I am 

from Texas—they actually gave me a satellite phone. I had never 

used one of those before. But when all the communications go 
34

down, we really have to rely on satellite technology and satellite 

communications. 

My question to the panel as a whole, but more directed at Doctor 

Fonash and Boyd with the Department of Homeland Security, does 

your NCS—or does DHS in a broader scale have a program to 

preposition this satellite capacity and equipment in the regions of 

the Nation where we do have these critical threats either from terrorist attacks or from Mother Nature so that we can respond better 

to the needs of the first responders in a more efficient manner? 

Dr. BOYD. The Office of State and Local Government Coordination Preparedness and a number of others are working to try to 

identify what needs to be placed in the field. I don’t work directly 

with the program that would place those phones in the field but 

I am sure we can get answers for you on exactly what the status 

of that is. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Obviously the problem is if it is a terrorist attack, 

or in this case a hurricane, and all the communications go down, 

it greatly impairs our ability to respond. So that is why the satellites and that technology and prepositioning those assets is so important. 

Doctor Fonash. 

Mr. FONASH. Sir, what I would like to say is, first of all, that we 

do have satellite vans. The industry has satellite vans and DOD 

has satellite vans and what they do is they don’t deploy them in 

the vicinity because they are concerned about damage; what we do 

is we deploy them outside the area of potential impact. As soon as 

the disruption is over with, we bring those vans in and we restore 

communications at that point in time. 

FEMA has MERS vans, if you are familiar with MERS vans. We 

arrange the mission assignments through FEMA, through the National Response Plan. We arrange for vans to come in from the 

commercial carriers, AT&T and MCI to establish satellite communications. Actually satellite dishes provide much more than 

handheld satellites but also give you full telephone capabilities and 

things like that. 

One of the things that we are looking at that we did for Hurricane Wilma as a lessons-learned from Rita and Katrina was that 

we actually pre-identified satellite capabilities with the companies. 

We went to Global Star, one of the biggest providers of satellite 

phones, and identified how many phones they had. We also worked 

with the State and local emergency operations centers, and one of 

the recommendations we made to them is that they should have 

some satellite phones on hand. 

But also a caveat, again, and I think Doctor Boyd mentioned this 

before, satellite phones are limited. The battery life is limited. You 

cannot get satellite capability in an urban environment because the 

antennas will not work. Again, you have to look at it as a set of 

tools that you can have. Satellite phones are just one of the tools 

you have to look at using. 

Dr. BOYD. If I could add one key point that you also have to consider. The satellite phones and satellite capabilities provide critical 

elements of the communications piece for the command level. Getting to the individual rescue officer, the guy who needs to be coordinated by the local chief of police or the fire chief, Twin Towers 
35

is probably an ideal example of that, where there were literally 

tens of thousands of State and local officials, officers who are directly involved in the operation, satellite phones tend not to be 

practical for them. 

So there are two levels of communications that you need to address: that command-and-control level where satellites become a 

crucial piece, and then that level that goes out to the individual officer in the field where satellite phones are generally not as practical, partly because they are hard to use and partly because bandwidth to support that number of responders is not always available. 

Mr. MCCAUL. If I understand the satellite capabilities, they are 

better at the command and control level. 

Dr. BOYD. I think to connect commanders to commanders. It is 

crucial at the national level to allow that common operating picture 

to be transmitted up the line so that at the national command level 

they can make decisions across the larger command levels. But 

there is that other level that you don’t want to leave out, which is 

the guy who is going into the attic and saving the drowning victim, 

and that level of communications is not terribly well supported by 

satellites. 

Mr. MCCAUL. One follow-up. Are you coordinating with the Department of Defense and the FCC on these issues at all with respect to—

Dr. BOYD. I think we are probably going to give the same answer; yes, we deal with them in a variety of ways. In SAFECOM 

interoperability we work very closely both with the National Guard 

Bureau, with the Joint Tactical Radio Aystem, with the J6. I am 

part of the senior advisory group that deals with the J6. When they 

look at how communications that deal with local domestic authorities, particularly in base defense kinds of communications requirements, I am sure you will get the same answer. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Is that your understanding, Doctor Wells? 

Dr. WELLS. The Department of Homeland Security has come to 

us on a number of occasions; for example, work on the homeland 

security network, SAFECOM, a variety of interoperability efforts. 

We have an assistant secretary for homeland defense who works 

very closely with the interoperability office at DHS. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Lastly, let us take Katrina, for instance. When was 

this technology deployed? You mentioned the mobile units. At what 

point in time was that deployed to Louisiana, for instance? 

Mr. FONASH. The initial deployment of those mobile units occurred on September 1st. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. 

Pascrell, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first question is to 

Mr. Moran. You said in your testimony that, if I may quote you, 

sir, these recent disasters are also prompting the Commission, the 

FCC, to reassess the steps that have been taken to address interoperability in recent years. These steps have consisted mainly of 

the following efforts: Number one, to provide additional spectrum 

to public safety entities; number two, to promote technological developments that enhance interoperability; and number three, to 
36

provide technical expertise and input on a number of interagency 

efforts. 

Mr. Moran, we have been discussing additional spectrum for over 

a decade. Over a decade. It takes a hurricane, it takes a disaster 

to bring us to our senses. I didn’t detect any sense of urgency in 

your presentation, and I wish that you could correct me, sir. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, there definitely was a sense of urgency at the 

Commission with regard to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. 

The Commission, as I said, over 200 people at the Commission actually have worked on those matters. We have people that we put 

onsite in the ESF2 process that Doctor Fonash talked about earlier; 

we have people today in Louisiana, we have people in Florida, and 

we had people in Texas when the Rita situation was going on. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Moran, could you explain to our audience and 

the panel what is spectrum? 

Mr. MORAN. What is spectrum? 

Mr. PASCRELL. Yeah. 

Mr. MORAN. The portion of electromagnetic—

Mr. PASCRELL. In English. 

Mr. MORAN. It is the portion of the radio and—radio—it is radio 

spectrum that various hat TV stations use to broadcast TV, radio 

stations use to do radio and public safety communications and cellular operators use to communicate. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Why is it so important in the discussion in terms 

of communication for our first responders? What does spectrum 

have to do with first responders which we have been discussing for 

a decade? 

Mr. MORAN. Because the amount of spectrum you have determines how much communications you have available. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Okay. So in other words, it is up to the FCC to 

expand spectrum so that first responders have a greater ability and 

opportunity to communicate in the first place. Is that an exaggeration, what I just said? 

Mr. MORAN. I think that is correct. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Why haven’t we done that? Why hasn’t the FCC 

stepped up to the place in this matter? 

Mr. MORAN. The Commission has stepped up to the plate. 

Mr. PASCRELL. How? 

Mr. MORAN. The Commission made more spectrum available. 

Mr. PASCRELL. After emergencies happen. After emergencies happen. This is what your testimony says: that after the fact you 

have—in fact, what you said was that we have allowed consideration after the hurricane hits, in this example. What we do is we 

short-circuit the bureaucracy and we extend those stays so we can 

have exceptions. That is what you say in your testimony. 

Mr. MORAN. We have done all those things. 

Mr. PASCRELL. What else have you done before the hurricane? 

Mr. MORAN. Prior to the hurricane the Commission made available 24 megahertz of spectrum in the

Mr. PASCRELL. That is for the hurricane. 

Mr. MORAN. Prior to the hurricane. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Was that done 2 years ago, 3 years ago? 
37

Mr. MORAN. It is actually in a transition right now that is in part 

related to the spectrum will be fully usable with the digital TV 

transition. 

Mr. PASCRELL. One final question along those lines, Mr. Moran. 

What has been done by the FCC in the last 5 years, 6 years, 7 

years, to expand spectrum for first responders, when we know that 

is the most critical question facing us in communications? You tell 

us. 

Mr. MORAN. We made the 24 megahertz available in the 700 

megahertz range and we have made I think 50 megahertz available 

I believe in the—it is much higher, I think it is in the 3.5 gigahertz 

range for more data. So we made a lot of spectrum available for 

the public safety community. We have done that in the last several 

years. 

Mr. PASCRELL. It is a good thing Congressman Curt Weldon isn’t 

here. It is a good thing. I am mild compared to that. But it is interesting, your responses about trying to make us believe—me believe 

that this has been a priority on the FCC list. Long before 9/11 FCC 

dropped the ball, was not paying attention to our first responders, 

and maybe you are listening with one ear now. I don’t know. 

Can I have one more question, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. REICHERT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PASCRELL. To Mr. Fonash. 

You stated in your presentation that you provided frequency coordination with the Department of Energy, FCC, the military affiliate radio programs. I believe that was you. 

Mr. FONASH. No, sir, I did not. 

Mr. PASCRELL. You said on page number 4. 

Mr. FONASH. You’re talking about my written testimony? 

Mr. PASCRELL. That is exactly what I am talking about. On page 

number 4 you said that some of the accomplishments of the 

SHARES program we are referring to include—and I am referring 

to the fourth one down—provided frequency coordination with the 

Department of Energy, FCC, military affiliate radio system, the 

U.S. Navy, FEMA, civil air patrol, amateur radio, et cetera, et 

cetera. You said that, right? 

Mr. FONASH. Yes, sir, I did; in my written testimony. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Now I want to ask you this question. I want to 

know what are the specific problems you encountered. 

Mr. FONASH. Sir, what that is referring to is SHARES, which is 

an HF radio network that enables people to communicate. What 

you have to do is agree on certain frequencies that people will communicate on. And what that is referring to is what we did to coordinate with all these different agencies the frequency they would 

use on the HF. 

Mr. PASCRELL. My question is what problems did you encounter 

in acting out that coordination? 

Mr. FONASH. Sir, the only problems was making contact. We published a common frequency that everybody would have. Once we 

published the common frequency, everybody would sign onto that 

common frequency. After that, we would get agreement by working 

with the different organizations on what were the frequency assignments for use of the HF radio during Katrina. 
38

Mr. PASCRELL. This is what you consider to be coordination of all 

of these entities dealing with communication? 

Mr. FONASH. Yes, in reagards to dealing with the HF radio and 

the SHARES network. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I have no further questions. 

Mr. REICHERT. The Chair will recognize himself for about 5 minutes or so. 

I want to just mention there has been some progress made and 

I think most members of the audience and the panel may also be 

aware, some of the members here of the committee, this afternoon 

at 3 p.m., the Energy and Commerce Committee will mark the Digital Television Transition Act of 2005. This bill will set a firm deadline for the transition of television technology from analog to digital, which will free up some spectrum space for first responders. 

So there is some progress being made, but I have the same passion that Mr. Pascrell and others on this committee have and I 

agree with Mr. Pascrell, too. It is fortunate that Mr. Weldon isn’t 

here because he does get very, very passionate, as some of you may 

have been present for some of his questioning. 

I want to go back to 1972. That may seem a little bit odd, but 

I started as a police officer on the street back in 1972. So when you 

talk about we have been discussing interoperability or operability 

for the last 10 years, it is not exactly true; it has been highlighted 

for the last 10 years, but it has been a problem for 30, 35, and 40 

years. 

I am just going to relay, I think pictures or stories draw a very 

clear picture of the problem because it is still happening today. In 

the mid-seventies I responded to a call as a deputy on the street 

in South King County. It was a young boy with a gun who had shot 

up the neighborhood. And when I arrived, he took aim at me and 

fired a shot. 

He disappeared into the neighborhood and I took up a perimeter 

along with other police officers and I had a portable radio with me. 

A neighbor ran across the street from the opposite side of the road 

and said, hey, my neighbor just called me on the telephone. First 

line of communication. Hard-line telephone to the neighbor across 

the street. The man with the gun is behind my home, laying on his 

belly with the gun cradled in his arm, and he’s ready to shoot some 

police officers who are walking his way with a K–9 unit who are 

in search of him. 

I tried to get on my portable radio to let my supervisors know 

that I knew where the man with the gun was but I couldn’t get 

through. It would not work. So I knew I had to take action, so I 

ran across the street and slid alongside the house and I saw the 

young boy with the gun laying in a prone position, aiming at the 

police officers that were approaching. I still couldn’t get on the 

radio. No communication after all. Back then we had one frequency 

for the entire county in King County. It was not operable. 

I had to run across the yard, threw the radio to the ground and 

wrestled the rifle away from the young man. Fortunately he was 

not hurt, the officers were not shot, and neither was I. But it is 

an example of a problem that is still happening today and we have 

to take—when you talk about immediate action, we can talk about 

Department of Homeland Security, we can talk about all the acro-
39

nyms that you have used to describe the different systems, but 

what we are talking about, as Mr. Pascrell said, is life and death. 

So my first question is we do have to have this spectrum, we 

have to have additional wavelengths to work from. What do you 

see—and anyone on the panel, please answer—what do you see as 

the biggest vulnerability, the biggest challenge, the biggest hurdle 

that we need to overcome in making this work for our first responders whose lives are put on the line each and every day? 

Dr. BOYD. Interestingly, I think the first problem is not a technical one, and let me make clear that we think release of the 24 

megahertz is essential. They need that spectrum desperately. This 

will more than double what they have. Even once we get that, what 

is going to be required above all else is a willingness among public 

safety organizations to build cooperative agreements, build cooperative governments so they can put the agreements in place. 

What we have discovered is that when we can work with communities together to bring together all of the players, and once we can 

get agreement on that, a lot of the basic technologies that will 

allow communications at least that command level—not the ideal 

interoperability we would like to get to—but that command level 

that is required to be able to pass the kind of message you talked 

about in your scenario is available now. 

What we have to do, however, is to have the kind of leadership 

and commitment that will allow that to happen, and that is why 

most of what SAFECOM has been involved in is working directly 

with the public safety community to develop the kinds of tools that 

communities, collections of communities can use to put together 

that kind of governance and that kind of agreement. 

Mr. MORAN. Yes, sir. I agree with what Doctor Boyd said there. 

More spectrum has been made available, more will be freed up 

when the DTV transition completes, and the Commission is looking 

now to see if additional spectrum is needed. And I believe we owe 

a report to the Congress in December in which we will make some 

recommendations in that regard. But I will say the Chairman has 

said to the Congress before that if additional spectrum is needed 

for public safety, the Commission—he will do what he can to have 

the Commission make it available. 

Mr. REICHERT. Again, to point out, this is really a very urgent 

issue. Now we are talking about December, then January. I still go 

back to 1972. 

Mr. MORAN. Absolutely. And I think it has been alluded to a little bit and I think Doctor Boyd mentioned it perhaps in his oral 

statement, but I think you said something like, I forget, how many 

thousands of—all of these public safety communications systems 

are owned and operated by State and local jurisdictions and it will 

be very expensive to get them into the 21st century to do a number 

of things, including interoperability. So a lot of these are aging systems and it is not going to be cheap. And there has to be leadership 

and there has to be commitment to get to where we need to get 

to and spectrum is part of it, and the Commission is committed to 

make sure that that works, but there is a lot more and a lot of investment that will have to be made. 

Mr. REICHERT. In 1997 when I was first appointed sheriff in Seattle, we moved—began to move to 800 megahertz, and in that 
40

process it was a mess. It still is a problem today in trying to communicate across that county of 2,200 square miles. And some of the 

competing interests, we know, as we drive by cell towers and we 

all of a sudden lose total communication on an 800 megahertz system, brand-new system that just falls apart when you drive by a 

cell tower. What are the competing interests that is prohibiting the 

advancement of our progress in this area to help first responders? 

Mr. MORAN. Along with what you just mentioned about interference issues, the Commission—we do have—we are working on a 

plan to eliminate some of the interference problems I believe in the 

800 megahertz area, so we are working that. We know that there 

had been issues. The Commission in the last year and a half, I 

think, has worked out a system that will over the next couple of 

years resolve a lot of those issues, but I still submit the big thing 

that is out there is it is going to be very expensive, and these 

things are owned and operated by State and local governments and 

it is going to be hard to do it. Even when spectrum is available, 

even when the systems are available, even when we know how to 

do the operating systems and we have the standards, it is going to 

be expensive. 

Mr. REICHERT. Okay. Thank you. Chair recognizes the other gentleman from Washington. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations on 

your new assignment as subcommittee chairman. 

In looking at what happened down with the military, another lesson Pentagon planners will be studying after Katrina communications problems severely hampered the military’s ability to talk to 

first responders. In some cases the military was reduced to using 

runners to physically carry messages between units and first responders. Part of the problem was that the storm destroyed some 

of the first responders’ radio equipment, another factor was desertion in the New Orleans Police Department, which meant some 

people who were needed to operate radio equipment were gone, still 

other problems was many radios simply could not talk to each 

other. 

Now, I don’t know if the Chairman knows about this, but we 

have a company out in Seattle called—we have a number of companies in Seattle, by the way, but this one is called CoCo Communications, that has developed a system that enables people using 

different kinds of communications systems to share voice and data 

signals with each other. It does this by capturing the signals from 

each system, performing necessary translation through software 

routines, and then transmitting the signals on the appropriate 

channel. They refer to their technology as cryptographic mesh protocol. 

Doctor Boyd, you should know about this because you have 

awarded a grant I think through your—to Love Field in Dallas to 

use this. There was a story in the Washington Post about a Prince 

William school district awarded a contract to CoCo. There’s one at 

Franklin High School in Seattle. The Washington Port article said 

this: William County School System will be the first in the country 

to deploy at several schools a new technology that will offer administrators, teachers, police and rescue authorities a better way to 

communicate during emergencies, officials announced yesterday. 
41

The technology developed by a Seattle-based CoCo Communications 

Corp and funded with a $246,000 grant from U.S. Department of 

Justice will enable school and public safety workers to share information, even if one person is using a cell phone and another a 

radio. 

In the next several weeks, two Prince William Schools, a middle 

and elementary school, will be equipped with a software program 

that seamlessly links different devices on a single network. Only 

one other school in the country in Seattle is using the technology, 

according to Mike Berman, a CoCo spokesman. The technology has 

implications for the whole Nations’ security, Lucy S. Beauchamp, 

the Prince William school board chairman, said at a news conference yesterday. She pointed to the September 11th terrorist attacks, the Washington area sniper shootings, and hurricane 

Katrina as crises during which this kind of communications made 

possible by the CoCo software would have increased public safety. 

With this software, teachers trapped in a school with their students 

would use their cell phones or handheld computers to talk with police officers outside with walkie talkies. Officials would also be able 

to download images from the school or school bus video surveillance 

cameras onto their own devices, and instead of having to wait for 

police to call during a terrorism threat, school officials would be 

able to get urgent news to teachers who might be locked inside 

schools—inside classrooms with students. Schools are isolated. 

They have their own radios and telephones but they are not as integral part of our traditional first responder community, said Peter 

Ericson, vice present of CoCo. We’re hoping to spread the technology to other schools and build what it calls the National School 

Protection Network. 

Now, would this kind of technology help, Doctor Boyd? Is this the 

kind of thing we need to allow these disparate forms of communication to interact through this software? Do you know anything about 

this? 

Dr. BOYD. Yes, I have met with CoCo Communications on a number of occasions, and in fact it addresses an important piece of the 

communications issue, because what it does is to provide what in 

the parlance of the communities is sometimes called an overlay, 

which allows the exchange of data across disparate systems. What 

it does not do, and it is important to understand these boundaries 

as well, it doesn’t replace the radio itself, and so the radio still has 

to be able to make that RF communication with another radio. The 

answer is we think this is a very powerful—

Mr. DICKS. Is this a problem with Motorola? Is this a Motorola 

problem? I think we have heard about 80 percent of these radios 

are Motorola, and they have been unwilling or unable to fix these 

systems. 

Dr. BOYD. Well, I can’t speak for Motorola. 

Mr. DICKS. You are the expert now. 

Dr. BOYD. I understand, but I can’t speak for Motorola. 

Mr. DICKS. You can speak for the Federal Government. 

Dr. BOYD. It is true, and I don’t want to address this just to Motorola, because I think we need to talk about the industry at large 

and not just the RF pieces but communications pieces as well, and 

that is that there is an inevitable tendency—and we find this in 
42

the cellular industry as well and all those manufacturers—to build 

proprietary components which make it extraordinarily difficult, especially in an emergency, to tie these things together. It also tends 

to tie you to a particular manufacturer’s equipment when you move 

forward. 

So a major part of what we are trying to do is to create open architecture, nonproprietary standards, so that we can—when local 

public safety agencies come out with their requests for proposals, 

require that they be nonproprietary. One of the nice parts about 

the CoCo application is that it doesn’t matter what the underlying 

radio is. There are a couple of other software applications we also 

think are promising in the same way. It makes sure that the underlying equipment doesn’t matter. As long as you make the two 

radios talk together, you can lay this on top and be able to communicate across proprietary systems. But it is entirely true that there 

are some issues that we are trying very hard to address to open 

up some of the proprietary elements of the infrastructure and it is 

entirely true that cause is part of our problem. 

Mr. DICKS. Doctor Wells, we have been trying to get the National 

Guard to look at this system. I have talked to General Blum about 

this. Has the Defense Department looked at this technology at all? 

Dr. WELLS. We have. But let me State for the record where we 

are with the National Guard. I have looked at CoCo in conjunction 

with Iraq, when we were looking at that. I need to get up to speed 

with what is happening on CoCo. I would second what Doctor Boyd 

said about the importance of open standards and open architecture. 

We are trying to move away from proprietary systems in DOD to 

get to maximum interoperability and that is really important. I will 

get back to you on where we stand on CoCo. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. The Chair will recognize the 

gentlelady from New York, Mrs. Lowey. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I personally want to thank the Chairman for your 

powerful presentation. And to all the panel I want to thank you. 

However, we all understand the complexity of this. We have been 

talking about it for years, you have been aware of the challenge for 

much longer because of your own personal experiences. 

I want to make it clear to all of us the reason we keep pressing 

is that this didn’t appear overnight. Nine years ago, the final report of the Federal Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee concluded, quote, unless immediate measures are taken to promote 

interoperability, public safety agencies will not be able to adequately discharge their obligation to protect life and property in a 

safe, efficient, and cost-effective manner. 

In 2004 a GAO study on project SAFECOM began by stating in 

its 2-year history it has made very limited progress in addressing 

its objective. Now the study is a year and a half old—and we appreciate your presentation, Doctor Boyd—however, we understand 

that the agency still has problems and a project to establish a nationwide baseline for interoperability has been undertaken by 

SAFECOM. However, the assessment was to have been undertaken 

in 2004, it was delayed until 2005. It is now promised for the summer of 2006. And in addition, the President promised to cut overall 
43

funding for the Office of Interoperability and Compatibility in the 

fiscal year 06 budget request by 11.5 million, or 35 percent. 

Now, given the fact that the President has proposed to slash the 

budget of your office that is supposed to oversee emergency communications systems, the poor performance of existing programs, the 

fact that recent emergencies have highlighted the major problems 

that still exist, I think we have all good reason to question the commitment of the administration to get serious about this. 

In fact, Doctor Boyd, I understand that given your huge responsibility, you have four people working in your office, and we understand that this is a huge challenge, but I can’t help wonder how 

serious we are about this. Are we going to be sitting here a couple 

years from now talking about how this is a serious problem? In 

fact, in legislation I introduced, it included a $5 billion over 5 years 

appropriation, because my concern is—and you talk about problems 

with Motorola and how important standards are—this goes back to 

our questions to Secretary Ridge, to establish standards. 

If the Federal Government has real dollars to give out, then you 

could command that standards are going to be followed and that 

you are providing the dollars so you have the responsibility to demand results. You have laid out a very important program, but I 

would still like to ask you why it is taking so long. What can we 

do to move the process? 

I am not going to get back to the spectrum issue because that 

has been adequately discussed, but even if—we know from the Baltimore experience, there have been articles on that—even if you 

have a system that is being developed by a particular community, 

if there are not Federal standards moved in place quickly, if you 

are not providing the money and requiring State and local governments to comply, I worry about where we are going to be next year 

and the year after. Doctor Boyd. 

Dr. BOYD. Okay. Well, that is a lot of territory to cover but let 

me try. In response to the first issue, I first got involved in interoperability back in 1993, and the first project I tried to undertake 

was in San Diego County where we were able to put together a 

fairly primitive but effective interoperability solution. Took about 

30 days to put the technology in place. It took 2 years to get all 

the players in the county to agree they wanted to play as part of 

it. So we have been working at this for some time, and understand 

that. 

In 2003 when the Department of Homeland Security stood up, a 

decision was made then, and I was asked if I would come from Justice to Homeland Security to take over SAFECOM. At that point 

the first thing that I felt that we needed to do was to go back to 

those first responders and say what exactly is it that SAFECOM 

needs to do to meet your needs? What is it you have to have from 

us? 

Out of that, we built a series of things, the first statement of requirements, we built common grant guidance where we in an interesting sort of way went to the folks who were going to be the recipients of the grants and said what it is you want us to require in 

these grants in order to make those things happen because we understand, first off, that while at the Federal level we often think 

we are providing humongous amounts of money, in fact more than 
44

97 percent of the money that is spent in these communications systems is their money. 

So our question was how do we fit this, how do we make this 

work the way you want? In working with them we created common 

grant guidance, which now for the first time at executive direction 

is included in every grant program touching on interoperability in 

the United States. We put it into place the first time in 2003, we 

had to do some adapting because we were following after the appropriation and had to fit what the law said for the COPS program 

and FEMA and those providing those grants. 

For the first time, in 2001 SAFECOM was elevated as an executive level—a Presidential Management Initiative. Before then it 

had never been that. In fact, the way I funded interoperability attempts before that was to try to scrape off things from other programs where I could put that into place. Congresswoman Jane 

Harman will be familiar with that because we worked together in 

some of that in the Los Angeles arena as we tried to do those 

things. It wasn’t until this became a Presidential Management Initiative that it began to arrive at that level. 

In the current President’s budget, as I understand it, we are 

budgeted for 28 for the office. We have been just like the Department of Homeland Security, the rest of the Department. We have 

been building a Department, a very large and complex Department 

over some time. I will also tell you the public safety community 

was in fact so happy with the way we have put things together, 

that in April of 04 they issued a joint statement which was signed 

by the chiefs of police, the fire chiefs, the major city chiefs, the 

major county sheriffs, League of Cities, Council of Mayors, Association of Public Safety Communications Officers, the National Public 

Safety Telecommunication Council, all of those expressing strong 

support for the way the program was put together, and it genuinely 

represented their interests. So that is what we have been working 

to do. 

One of the things we have also been addressing is that 24 megahertz of spectrum to be released, and one thing that I think may 

be unclear that everybody needs to understand is one of the reasons the 24 megahertz has not yet come available is because legislation requires—the law requires that before the 24 megahertz can 

be released to public safety, at least 85 percent of each of the affected areas has to be capable of receiving and using high definition television. The consequence of that was a chicken-and-egg 

problem. You had broadcasters uninterested in building high definition television capabilities where nobody had high definition television receivers, and nobody interested in buying high definition 

television receivers because you didn’t have the transmitters. So it 

is also important to understand that there is a legislative impediment in releasing the 24 megahertz. 

Mr. REICHERT. The Chair likes to thank the gentlelady. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much. I appreciate the amount of 

time, and perhaps you can follow up because according to our information, the committee gave you marginally more than the President’s request. So I think we still wonder, if this is a top priority—

and it certainly seemed to be with Katrina—why there was a recommendation to cut the budget by 35 percent. So I thank you very 
45

much for your skillful presentation. I look forward to working with 

my colleagues on this. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to clarify a few 

points here and ask a few questions. It is my understanding that 

between the State homeland security grant program, UASI, EDPP, 

for 2004 there have been $2 billion available, a third of which have 

been drawn down for interoperability, not to mention the fact there 

are probably literally billions of dollars stuck in a pipeline, dollars 

that for whatever reasons have not been drawn down by the States 

that can be used for interoperability. And I also want to point out 

for the record too, there are certainly Department of Justice funds, 

COPS program, that is available for interoperability. That is an important issue and I support funding for it. There is a lot of money 

stuck in the pipeline that needs to be drawn down and a lot of reasons it hasn’t been, but I want to put that out there for the record. 

Question to Doctor Boyd, actually. How do you see the role of the 

World Wide Web in development of emergency communications systems and a dissemination of information by the government to the 

public during times of disaster, man-made or otherwise? 

Dr. BOYD. Two pieces to that. One is obviously the Web provides 

some really useful capabilities because it tends to be very robust 

and it is a thoroughly redundant system. As you begin to lose 

pieces of it, it still works. So the Internet provides some real opportunities. What we have to make sure we do, though, is as we capitalize on and plan on and make use of the Internet is that when 

you have a major catastrophic failure, you also tend to use the public switch telephone network, for example, on which most of the 

Internet rides, essential as a backbone piece. So if you have access 

to the Internet, it offers powerful, powerful capabilities. The IP protocol, which some people sometimes confuse with the Internet, is 

the same kind of protocol that is used on the Internet but is in fact 

a protocol which offers some powerful capabilities in the wireless 

world independent of the Internet because it provides real possibilities for some serious interoperability. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. The next question is we have heard that 

amateur radio is effective and a highly regarded means of ensuring 

operability during disaster situations. Does any Federal agency direct the coordination of the use of amateur radio during disasters; 

and, if not, should amateur radio be coordinated on a State or Federal or regional basis? 

Mr. FONASH. That’s my answer. We have a program called 

SHARES which utilizes the HF radio. SHARES is a network of networks. It can include DOD, the amateur radio-operator, and, State 

and local operators. And so when SHARES comes up, all those networks come up. For example, in the Louisiana EOC, we actually 

had an amateur operator working SHARES in the State EOC. So, 

yes, we actually do use that. One of the basic tools that we use is 

HF amateur radio. There are limitations with the HF amateur 

radio, so it is one of the tools you have to use, but the power of 

it is that it is totally independent of the public network, so if the 

public network goes down, you have that as an alternative means, 
46

but it is a limited alternative means and it does have problems; for 

example, atmospheric problems and limited data rates. 

Dr. BOYD. I have been a licensed amateur radio operator since 

I was about 13. It is important to understand the amateur radio 

community, in addition to this capability, also has VHF, UHV and 

SHF capabilities because they have bands throughout the spectrum 

and there are, in fact, a number of activities that provide training. 

What I would suggest, having dealt with this for a long time, is 

that it is also important if you are going to use this—and local 

agencies and a number of sheriffs departments, police departments 

use this—you have to integrate them early, you have to train them 

properly, and you have to make sure they understand what their 

boundaries and rules are and how they fit, and they can become 

a powerful capability because in a lot of respects they probably own 

more equipment than the public safety community does. 

Mr. DENT. My final question. I understand that the private sector, basically commercial communications operators rolled out temporary cell phone towers and distributed cell phones to first responders and victims of Hurricane Katrina. Was this coordinated 

by the local, State, and Federal governments, and are there agreements in place between the private sector and governmental entities to take advantage of the resources of private sector in such situations? 

Mr. FONASH. Again, sir, we are responsible as the lead agency for 

ESF2. One of the key tenets of that is we have something called 

the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications. It actually coordinates, between State, local and Federal Government and 

industry, solutions. And so many of those solutions were brokered 

through the NCC or through ESF#2 functions on a local basis. So, 

yes, we are involved in those. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. Anybody else wish to comment on that? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. REICHERT. As you can tell by the buzzers and pagers going 

off, we are going to be voting soon, but we have time to recognize 

the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Rey, I wanted to ask you about the communication kits that you all have given out through the buyer service. Tell 

us about those kits and what they do, how you deploy them, what 

timeline. 

Mr. REY. Early on in the 1970s as we began to organize the incident command system to fight wildfires, we knew that we would 

be operating in fairly remote areas where traditional communication technology was nonexistent, and we also knew that we would 

be working with other Federal and State and local responders. So 

what we have done is two things. One is we have developed memoranda of agreement with our cooperators so we know how to make 

sure our communications systems are interoperable, theirs and 

ours. Second, we have developed a fire communications cache so 

that we can stand up an entire communications system with radios 

and repeating towers so that all of the responders to a particular 

incident are using similar or comparable equipment. 

Mr. ROGERS. So when you say you stand up those towers, so if 

you are fighting a forest fire in a remote area that doesn’t have any 

towers, you can put up temporary towers? 
47

Mr. REY. That is correct. 

Mr. ROGERS. What kind of timeline, how quickly? 

Mr. REY. If we are deploying an incident command team we will 

have those established as they arrive on the scene, within 24 

hours. We also set up the same systems in New Orleans, providing 

the equipment to other responders and particularly so we could 

communicate within our own incident command structure with 

interoperability. 

Mr. ROGERS. So those you sent to New Orleans, you had those 

up and running within 24 hours. 

Mr. REY. Twenty-four hours of our arrival, yeah. 

Mr. ROGERS. Excellent. You stated that the incident management 

teams managed all agency radio, phone, data communications in 

the days following the hurricane. Can you explain exactly what the 

teams did to facilitate communications other than what you just 

described? 

Mr. REY. Pretty much what I described is it. We wanted to make 

sure that we had communications within our own incident command structure as well as with the other responders that we were 

serving. Our role in this case was a supporting role, but both from 

a communications standpoint as well as all of the other logistical 

functions that we were providing. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. That’s all I have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. Just one quick statement. As you 

have, I am sure, have taken in the feeling here of the committee, 

this is an important issue for us and we hope that you will go back 

to your respective work areas and assignments and convey our sincere and express desire to move this along at a quick pace. 

I want to thank all of you for being here today, for your valuable 

testimony. I want to thank the members for their questions. The 

members of the committee may have some additional questions for 

the witnesses, and we will ask that they submit those questions in 

writing. The hearing record will be open for 10 days. Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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