Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 31, 2019. 

In the

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-18-00520-CV

LATIA M. JONES, Appellant

v. 

TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION, Appellee

On Appeal from the 55th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2018-26830

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Latia M. Jones filed suit against the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) 

based on a denial of her claim for Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) after 

Hurricane Harvey. See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 

Act (Stafford Act), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5121–5208 (West 2012 & Supp. 2019); id.

§ 5177 (West 2012) (“Unemployment Assistance”); 20 C.F.R. § 625 (2019). TWC 

filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on Jones’s pleadings. The trial court granted this 

plea and dismissed all Jones’s claims. Jones appeals, and we affirm.
2 

I. BACKGROUND

In August 2017, Jones applied for federal DUA benefits administered by 

TWC. In September 2017, TWC issued a decision that Jones’s unemployment was 

not a direct result of a major disaster and she was ineligible for DUA benefits. See 

20 C.F.R. §§ 625.5, .9 (2019). 

Jones requested an administrative appeal of this determination. TWC 

conducted an administrative hearing by telephone. In November 2017, the TWC 

appeal tribunal issued its decision affirming the denial of Jones’s DUA application. 

See id. § 625.10(a). Jones requested further administrative appeal of the TWC appeal 

tribunal’s decision.

TWC forwarded Jones’s appeal to the United States Department of Labor 

(DOL) for a final administrative decision. See id. § 625.10(c) (providing for review 

by appropriate regional administrator, employment and training administration). In 

December 2017, the DOL regional administrator issued his decision denying Jones’s 

DUA claim.

At the same time Jones’s administrative appeal was proceeding, TWC 

inadvertently released DUA benefits to Jones. In January 2018, after TWC realized 

the error, TWC began the administrative process to recover the DUA benefits paid 

to Jones to which she was not entitled. See id. § 625.14. Jones attempted further 

administrative appeals with both TWC and DOL. TWC and DOL informed Jones 

that the decision of the DOL regional administrator was the final and conclusive 

administrative decision on her DUA claim and there was no further administrative 

appeal available.

In March 2018, Jones filed a petition in Harris County District Court against, 

and sought damages from, TWC and TWC employees Chris Oakley, Francis Brown, 
3 

Jimmy Mullens, Lasha Lenzy, and Melissa M. Butler.

1 In pertinent part, Jones 

alleged that she was entitled to “trial de novo as a matter of right” under Texas Labor 

Code section 212.202 to challenge TWC’s “reversed decision/determination” on her 

DUA claim.

TWC and the TWC employees answered with a general denial. They also filed 

a plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court initially signed an order denying the plea to 

the jurisdiction without prejudice. After a hearing by phone, the trial court signed an 

order on June 11, 2018, granting TWC and the TWC employees’ plea to the 

jurisdiction and dismissing all Jones’s claims against them for lack of jurisdiction.

II. ANALYSIS

In two related issues, Jones argues that the trial court erred by granting TWC’s 

plea to the jurisdiction and disallowing her “request for judicial review Trial de novo

as a matter of law.” In her brief, Jones does not identify the TWC employees as 

appellees. Significantly, Jones does not raise or argue any “issues or points of error” 

against them. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(a), (f), (i); Showbiz Multimedia, LLC v. 

Mountain States Mortg. Ctrs., Inc., 303 S.W.3d 769, 771 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (appellee must be party against whom appellant raises 

 1 Additional defendants were DOL Employment and Training Administration Region IV 

(Texas), and DOL employees Nanette Green, Nicholas Lalpuis, and Robert S. Kenyon. On May 

30, 2018, the trial court signed an order dismissing all Jones’s claims against these defendants with 

prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Jones did not mention this dismissal order in her 

amended notice of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(d). Nor does Jones identify DOL and the DOL 

employees as appellees or otherwise bring any “issues or points of error” against them in her brief. 

See id. 38.1(a), (f), (i); Showbiz Multimedia, LLC v. Mountain States Mortg. Ctrs., Inc., 303 

S.W.3d 769, 771 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). In passing in her brief, Jones 

asserts that the trial court had jurisdiction over DOL and the DOL employees pursuant to title 28, 

section 1346, of the United State Code. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West 2019). But Jones fails to 

mention, much less substantively explain or analyze, any such issue in the argument section of her 

brief. We therefore find briefing waiver. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Canton–Carter v. Baylor 

Coll. of Med., 271 S.W.3d 928, 931–32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). 
4 

issues or points of error in appellant’s brief). We conclude that the only appellee is 

TWC.

In its plea, TWC argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to review 

TWC’s decision denying Jones’s DUA claim. Generally, sovereign immunity, 

unless waived, protects the State, its agencies, and its officials from lawsuits for 

damages, absent legislative consent to sue the State. Fed. Sign v. Texas S. Univ., 951 

S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex. 1997). TWC is a state agency. Tex. Labor Code Ann. 

§ 301.001(a). “Sovereign immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction.” Tex. Dep’t of 

Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26 (Tex. 2004). A plea 

questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction raises a question of law that we review de 

novo. Id. at 226, 228. 

A plea challenging jurisdiction may challenge the pleadings, the existence of 

jurisdictional facts, or both. See id. at 226–27. When, as here, the plea challenges the 

sufficiency of the pleadings, we determine whether the plaintiff has met her burden 

by pleading facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s subject-matter 

jurisdiction. Id. at 226. In doing so, we construe the pleadings liberally in favor of 

the pleader, look to the pleader’s intent, and accept as true the factual allegations in 

the pleadings. See id. If the pleadings are insufficient to establish jurisdiction but do 

not affirmatively establish an incurable defect, then the plaintiff should be afforded 

an opportunity to replead. Id. at 226–27; see State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 643 

(Tex. 2007). However, if the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of the trial 

court’s jurisdiction, then such a motion may be granted without allowing the plaintiff 

an opportunity to amend. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227.

The federal government provides various types of disaster relief, including 

unemployment assistance, under the Stafford Act and regulations promulgated 
5 

thereunder. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 5177 (West 2012); 20 C.F.R. § 625 (2019). Here,

Jones’s application for benefits concerns the federal DUA program, which is

administered by TWC under the supervision of DOL. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 5177 (West 

2012); 20 C.F.R. §§ 625.9, .10 (2019). Under these regulations, the benefits 

entitlement determination made by TWC may be administratively appealed to the 

TWC appeal tribunal, as Jones did. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 625.9, .10(a) (2019). Further 

administrative appeal may be taken to the appropriate DOL regional administrator, 

as Jones did; however, the DOL regional administrator’s decision “shall be the final 

decision under the [Stafford] Act and this part, unless there is further review by the 

Assistant Secretary as provided in paragraph (d) of this section.” Id. § 625.10(c)(1), 

(5).2 Nothing within the regulations provides for any judicial review of DUA 

administrative decisions in either federal or state court. And nothing within the 

regulations provides any waiver of sovereign immunity by the State for DUA claims.

Both in her petition and in her appellate brief, Jones relies on various Labor 

Code provisions governing dispute resolution, including a provision for judicial 

review.

3 See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 212.052 (“Determination by Examiner on 

Examiner’s Own Motion”), .054 (Redetermination by Examiner”), .202 (“Standard 

of Judicial Review; Exceptions Not Necessary”), .205 (“Petition; Supersedeas”). 

 2 The record does not indicate that the DOL assistant secretary for employment and training 

reviewed the DOL regional administrator’s decision regarding Jones’s DUA application. See 20 

C.F.R. § 625.10(d) (2019). Even when such further review takes place, “[t]he decision of the 

Assistant Secretary shall be final and conclusive, and binding on all interested parties, and shall be 

a precedent applicable throughout the States.” Id. § 625.10(d)(7). 

3 Jones generally asserts that “evidence she submitted” “supports her request for a trial de 

novo.” However, TWC correctly points out that Jones includes no record citations in the argument

section of her brief. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Jones instead cites to an appendix to her brief and 

to a motion she claims to have filed with the trial court. These items do not appear in the record, 

and we do not consider them. See Sabine Offshore Serv., Inc. v. City of Port Arthur, 595 S.W.2d 

840, 841 (Tex. 1979) (per curiam); Carlton v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 32 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). 
6 

However, these provisions apply only to TWC administrative decisions made on a 

claimant’s application for unemployment benefits under the Texas Unemployment 

Compensation Act. See generally Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 201.001–217.007 (Supp. 

2019). They do not apply to TWC decisions regarding a claimant’s application for 

federal DUA benefits under the Stafford Act, much less waive TWC’s sovereign 

immunity for lawsuits related to DUA claims. Even construing Jones’s petition 

liberally, we conclude that she seeks damages for, and her allegations solely relate 

to, the adverse decision made by TWC on a claim for DUA benefits. 

We conclude that Jones’s pleadings affirmatively negated the existence of the 

trial court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the trial court did not err by granting TWC’s 

plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing all Jones’s claims against it. See Miranda, 133 

S.W.3d at 227.

We overrule Jones’s two issues.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order granting TWC’s plea to the 

jurisdiction. 

 

 /s/ Charles A. Spain

 Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Spain and Poissant.