IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 27 / 06–1735 

Filed June 6, 2008 

STATE OF IOWA, 

 Appellee, 

vs. 

ERIC RICHARD HANSEN, 

 Appellant. 

 On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Bruce 

B. Zager, Judge. 

 State seeks further review of court of appeals’ decision finding 

insufficient evidence to convict defendant of enticing away a minor. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT REVERSED; AND CASE REMANDED. 

 Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and David A. Adams, 

Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant 

Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Charity 

McDonnell, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
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STREIT, Justice. 

 Eric Richard Hansen met online an undercover police officer who 

was posing as a fifteen-year-old girl. The topic of their conversation was 

sexual at times. They agreed to meet at a Wal-Mart in Cedar Falls. 

When Hansen arrived at the store, he was arrested for enticement of a 

minor. He was found guilty as charged. Because the crime of 

enticement requires the victim to be “entice[d] away,” Hansen is guilty of 

attempted enticement. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings. 

On May 22, 2006, a Cedar Falls police officer was in an internet 

chat room under the assumed identity of a fifteen-year-old girl, “Suzi.” 

Hansen, using the screen name “Rick H.,” approached the undercover 

officer online. The officer told Hansen he was a fifteen-year-old girl from 

Cedar Falls. Hansen, who was twenty-three years old at the time, 

claimed he was nineteen and indicated he was interested in meeting 

Suzi. He said he was available to meet the next day but twice asked 

“what was in it for him” to drive from Des Moines to Cedar Falls. When 

Suzi said she had a friend on the other line, Hansen wrote “she can join 

in lol [laugh out loud].” The officer asked Hansen if they could speak on 

the telephone. The officer gave Hansen a telephone number. Shortly 

thereafter, Hansen called and reached an investigator posing as Suzi. 

During their conversation, Hansen discussed “messing around” with Suzi 

and also spoke extensively about being careful and ensuring the girl 

would not get in trouble. When their conversation continued online, he 

confirmed they would be safe: “Trust me. I’ll bring a full pack.” 

 The next morning, Hansen contacted Suzi just after 7:30 a.m. 

They arranged to meet at the Wal-Mart in Cedar Falls around 9:45 or 

10:00 that morning. Hansen said he would be driving a red Chevy S-10 
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pick-up. At 10:20 a.m., Hansen pulled into the parking lot in a truck 

matching the description he provided. Hansen walked into the store and 

called Suzi from a pay phone. No one answered. Hansen returned to his 

truck, and two Cedar Falls police officers approached him. Initially, 

Hansen claimed he did not know Suzi’s age. Later he admitted he 

believed she was fifteen or sixteen years old. Although he conceded “the 

pack” referred to condoms, he said he only intended to “h[a]ng out at 

Wal-Mart or [go] to lunch” with Suzi. He did not have any condoms with 

him. 

 Hansen was charged with enticing away a minor, in violation of 

Iowa Code section 710.10(2) (2005). The case was tried to the court on 

the minutes of testimony. Hansen argued he could at most be guilty of 

attempted enticement. The district court found Hansen guilty as 

charged, and he appealed. The court of appeals found there was not 

substantial evidence to support an enticement conviction. It reversed 

Hansen’s conviction with instructions to enter a finding of guilt for 

attempted enticement. We granted further review and affirm the decision 

of the court of appeals. 

II. Scope of Review.

Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed for 

correction of errors at law. State v. Quinn, 691 N.W.2d 403, 407 (Iowa 

2005). The district court’s findings of guilt are binding on appeal if 

supported by substantial evidence. State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 

377 (Iowa 1998). Evidence is substantial if it would convince a rational 

trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

III. Merits.

We must decide whether there is sufficient evidence to find Hansen 

guilty of enticement of a minor. He apparently concedes there is 
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sufficient evidence to find him guilty of attempted enticement. Iowa Code 

section 710.10 makes it illegal for adults to solicit sexual contact with a 

minor or a person reasonably believed to be a minor. It states: 

2. A person commits a class "D" felony when, without 

authority and with the intent to commit an illegal act upon a 

minor under the age of sixteen, the person entices away a 

minor under the age of sixteen, or entices away a person 

reasonably believed to be under the age of sixteen. 

3. A person commits an aggravated misdemeanor when, 

without authority and with the intent to commit an illegal 

act upon a minor under the age of sixteen, the person 

attempts to entice away a minor under the age of sixteen, or 

attempts to entice away a person reasonably believed to be 

under the age of sixteen. 

(Emphasis added.) A sexual act between a twenty-three-year old man 

and a fifteen-year-old girl would constitute third-degree sexual abuse. 

Iowa Code § 709.4(2)(c). 

Hansen claims he cannot be guilty of enticement because he did 

not successfully “entice away” either a minor or a person reasonably 

believed to be a minor. Without someone being enticed away, Hansen 

argues the offense was not completed, only attempted. We agree. 

 The statute does not define “entice.” In State v. Osmundson, 546 

N.W.2d 907 (Iowa 1996), we rejected a vagueness challenge to section 

710.10. There, we noted “a statute is not unconstitutionally vague if the 

meaning of the words used can be fairly ascertained by reference to their 

ordinary and usual meaning, the dictionary, similar statutes, the 

common law, or previous judicial determinations.” Osmundson, 546 

N.W.2d at 909. We then quoted from two dictionaries. Webster’s defined 

“entice” as “ ‘to draw on by arousing hope or desire’ or ‘to draw into evil 

ways.’ ” Id. (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 757 

(1986)). “Synonymous words include ‘allure,’ ‘attract,’ and ‘tempt.’ ” Id.
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(quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 757). We also 

quoted from Black's Law Dictionary, which defined “entice” as 

“[t]o wrongfully solicit, persuade, procure, allure, attract, 

draw by blandishment, coax or seduce. To lure, induce, 

tempt, incite, or persuade a person to do a thing. 

Enticement of a child is inviting, persuading or attempting to 

persuade a child to enter any vehicle, building, room or 

secluded place with intent to commit an unlawful sexual act 

upon or with the person of said child.” 

Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 477 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added)). 

We concluded “[t]hese definitions and the commonly understood meaning 

of ‘entice’ are specific enough to provide guidance to ordinary citizens 

and fair notice of what actions are proscribed” in section 710.10. Id. at 

910. 

 According to the State, the definition found in Black’s focuses 

entirely on the defendant’s conduct and supports its contention Hansen 

is guilty of enticement. The State argues the victim or purported victim’s 

response to the defendant’s actions is irrelevant because all that is 

required is “inviting, persuading or attempting to persuade.” Black’s 

Law Dictionary 477. The problem with the State’s contention is the 

Black’s definition encompasses both enticement and attempted 

enticement. That distinction did not matter in Osmundson because 

Osmundson was convicted of attempted enticement. Osmundson, 546 

N.W.2d at 908. We simply referenced definitions from the two 

dictionaries in order to illustrate the meaning of “entice” was readily 

ascertainable. Our intent was not to wholly incorporate these definitions 

into section 710.10. 

If we were to use the Black’s definition of “entice” to establish the 

parameters of the crime of enticement, we would virtually eliminate any 
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distinction between enticement and attempted enticement.1 Our 

legislature clearly intended to establish separate crimes with separate 

penalties. Thus, when defining “entice” for purposes of section 710.10, 

we believe Webster’s definition is more succinct: 

 “Entice” is defined as “to draw on by arousing hope or 

desire” or “to draw into evil ways.” Synonymous words 

include “allure,” “attract,” and “tempt.” 

Id. at 909 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 757). 

Moreover, the State’s interpretation of the statute renders the word 

“away” meaningless. Section 710.10 refers to the defendant “entic[ing] 

away” or “attempt[ing] to entice away” a minor or a person reasonably 

believed to be a minor. Iowa Code § 710.10(2), (3). The State notes we 

said in Osmundson the word “away” “does not add to or alter the 

meaning of the word ‘entice.’ ” Osmundson, 546 N.W.2d at 910. The 

State takes this quote out of context. We were simply stating the word 

“away” does not make the word “entice” vague or confusing. In 

Osmundson, we said the meaning of “away” is clear: “Applied to the facts 

of this case, no person of ordinary intelligence would be left in doubt as 

to the meaning of the word ‘away’; the defendant attempted to persuade 

the boys to leave the area where they were talking and go to [the 

defendant’s] apartment.” Id. 

 As we said in Osmundson, the word “ ‘entice’ focuses on the 

actions of the defendant; it does not matter what the victim thought.” Id. 

For example, if a defendant with the intent to molest a child asks that 

 1The State claims even under a broad definition of enticement, there would be at 

least some circumstances where a defendant is only guilty of attempted enticement. 

According to the State, a defendant would be guilty of attempted enticement if he tried 

to make contact with a minor with the requisite intent to commit the illegal act but was 

unsuccessful in reaching the minor. Presumably, the State is referring to 

circumstances where a defendant called a minor and got a busy signal or a defendant’s 

email to a minor was blocked by filters. We do not believe this is the type of conduct 

the State meant to outlaw when it created the attempted enticement statute. 
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child to help him find his puppy, it does not matter what the child 

thought was going to happen if she went with the defendant. However, 

the phrase “entices away” requires the fact finder to look not only to the 

actions and conduct of the defendant but also to the impact of those 

actions upon the victim. A perpetrator entices, but it is the victim who is 

enticed away. Thus, under our example, the defendant is guilty of 

enticement if the child goes with the defendant and guilty of attempted 

enticement if the child runs away from the defendant. 

We find substantial evidence lacking to support Hansen’s 

conviction for enticement. While Hansen had the requisite intent, he 

failed to lure or tempt away a minor or someone reasonably believed to 

be a minor. We doubt any of the Cedar Falls police officers were “enticed 

away” from their offices to the Wal-Mart store because of Hansen’s 

blandishments. Thus, he is guilty of attempted enticement. We affirm 

the court of appeals. 

IV. Conclusion.

We agree with the court of appeals there is insufficient evidence to 

support Hansen’s conviction for enticement. We agree the case should 

be remanded with instructions to enter a verdict of guilty for attempted 

enticement. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED; AND CASE REMANDED.