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U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

COPS COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO 

COMBAT IDENTITY THEFT
This project was supported by cooperative agreement #2003CKWX0343 by the Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions contained herein are those of 

the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

References to specific companies, products, or services should not be considered an endorsement of 

the product by the author(s) or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to 

supplement discussion of the issues. 

www.cops.usdoj.gov

ISBN: 1-932582-64-9

May 2006
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A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO 

COMBAT IDENTITY THEFT

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The crime of identity theft is relatively new to American law enforcement and is rapidly increasing in 

frequency. In 2003, Chief Darrel Stephens, Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) Police Department, 

surveyed members of the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA) to ascertain the level of preparedness 

among major police agencies. Results of the survey suggested that law enforcement had not developed 

standardized, effective practices to deal with the increasing number of reported cases of identity theft. 

Agencies were using a variety of policies and procedures, for example, to define the crime and establish the 

threshold levels required to initiate an investigation. In addition, the survey concluded that training levels and 

the topics covered varied greatly, as did the relationship that law enforcement agencies had with colleagues 

in their districts and with state attorneys and business communities. Similarly, crime analysis for the efficient 

detection of patterns and perpetrators was inconsistent across jurisdictions.

The U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office) partnered 

with the MCCA to further explore the identity theft issue and to develop recommendations to support federal, 

state, and local law enforcement agencies in organizing and improving the police response. Johns Hopkins 

University, Division of Public Safety Leadership, in cooperation with the MCCA and the COPS Office, 

conducted the research. In November 2004, a focus group consisting of representatives of federal, state, and 

local law enforcement, and victims, prosecutors, and the business community was formed to develop an 

understanding of identity theft that led to the development of a series of policies and practices that collectively 

comprise a national strategy.

The national strategy delineates seven components: partnerships and collaboration, reporting procedures, 

victim assistance, public awareness, legislation, information protection, and training. A National Strategy to 

Combat Identity Theft describes the needs associated with each component, recommends action, and describes 

common practices. We hope that this national strategy will assist federal, state, and local law enforcement and 

related professions to develop stronger and more effective means to deal with this mounting national crisis.

The COPS Office and the MCCA are pleased to bring these recommendations to our profession. We believe 

that they will enable us to more ably protect the citizens of our nation and reduce the threat of this pervasive 

and growing crime. 

Carl R. Peed Thomas Frazier Harold Hurtt

Director, COPS Office Executive Director, MCCA Chairman, MCCA

iii

Foreword

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The Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA) and the Division of Public Safety Leadership (DPSL) of Johns Hopkins 

University gratefully acknowledge the contributions of our numerous partners in completing A National Strategy to Combat 

Identity Theft. Director Carl Peed, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office), U.S. Department of 

Justice, Deputy Director Pam Cammarata, and Program Manager Rob Chapman provided invaluable assistance through 

progress reviews, insightful recommendations, and presence at all critical meetings. Chief Darrel Stephens, CharlotteMecklenburg (North Carolina) Police Department, and MCCA Executive Director Thomas Frazier offered critical 

analysis and direction throughout the course of the project. At DPSL, Dr. Sheldon Greenberg provided wisdom and 

leadership; consultants John Dentico, Barbara Boland, and Miguel Ferrer offered their creativity, imagination, experience, 

energy, and hard work; and Shannon Feldpush, research assistant, attended to the many critical details of the survey and 

focus groups. The contributions and assistance of focus group participants were invaluable in developing the baseline 

understanding of this complex issue. The project produced A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft, a Final Technical 

Report, and a PowerPoint presentation. A cooperative agreement with the COPS Office provided funding to support this 

project.

Phyllis P. McDonald, Ed. D., Assistant Professor

Johns Hopkins University

Project Director

February 2006

v

Acknowledgments

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Identity theft has swiftly become a serious issue for victims, police, and prosecutors, and is a problem that is requiring an 

increased commitment of resources by private enterprise. The Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA) recognized the 

severity of this problem in 2003 and surveyed its members to explore police-related identity theft issues. Survey results 

demonstrated that deterring identity theft was impeded for the most part because police departments were functioning 

in isolation from each other and other parts of the criminal justice system. The MCCA concluded that new levels of 

prevention, response, and collaboration were needed to stop this rapidly increasing crime.

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office), equally concerned, funded a project to examine 

the issues and develop recommendations for a national strategy for policy makers and to identify best practices for 

practitioners. The MCCA, the Division of Public Safety Leadership (DPSL) at Johns Hopkins University, and the COPS 

Office conducted this project. 

The purpose of the project was to identify common practices and to develop components that would comprise a national 

strategy for law enforcement. (Other nations curently pursuing national strategies include Great Britain, Canada, Australia, 

and New Zealand.) 

To gain greater insight into the challenges facing police in responding to the identity theft problem, the MCCA and the 

DPSL conducted two surveys to obtain a broad base of information from police and others on the problem and potential 

solutions. The project also organized two focus groups comprising police, prosecutors, federal officials, victim assistance 

professionals, and representatives from the private sector. The first focus group discussed the problem in detail, shared 

experiences, and provided the background needed to develop the surveys. The second focus group discussed the survey 

results, framed recommendations for a national response to identity theft, and identified best practices. Participants are 

listed in Appendix B. This report, A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft, describes the components of a national 

strategy, the interrelationships of the components, and best practices to illustrate each component.

The components of a national strategy are as follows:

I. Partnerships and Collaboration

Recommendation: Create state-level coordinating centers (or an adjunct function within all-crimes intelligence reporting centers) to provide crime 

analysis, victim assistance, statewide investigations, and other services; promote collaboration, cooperation, and intelligence fusion among public 

law enforcement agencies and other relevant entities.

II. Reporting Procedures

Recommendation: All police agencies would take reports of identity theft in the geographic jurisdiction where the victim lives, regardless of where 

the crime occurs. The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) section of the FBI would develop a consistent definition of identity theft for use by all 

agencies in reporting criminal incidents to the FBI.

III. Victim Assistance

Recommendation: All police agencies would develop policies for responding to victims of identity theft that include written standard operating 

procedures and procedures to help victims find the assistance needed to resolve the impact on financial accounts, credit, and personal records. 

vii

Executive Summary
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IV. Public Awareness

Recommendation: Create a national public awareness campaign focusing on prevention and response techniques, as well as reporting 

of identity theft crime. 

V. Legislation

Recommendation: Compile and maintain a comprehensive document outlining identity theft legislation for all 50 states and the federal 

government.

VI. Information Protection

Recommendation: Provide funding for national public education for consumers and merchants that focuses specifically on information 

protection; undertake legislation and/or public education targeting specific audiences for information protection.

VII. Training

Recommendation: All police, prosecutor, victim-assistance, and private-sector organizations impacted by any of the various facets of 

identity theft would conduct an assessment of identity theft training needs and seek training needed.

The full national strategy report contains examples of best practices and chapters that discuss the problem of 

defining the terms related to identity theft, the process for developing the national strategy, and the description 

viii

A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft
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CONTENTS

ix

Foreword ................................................................................... iii 

Acknowledgements ........................................................................v

Executive Summary ..................................................................... vii

Introduction ................................................................................. 1

Components of the National Strategy .................................................. 9

I. Partnerships and Collaboration ............................................... 9

II. Reporting Procedures .......................................................... 17

III. Victim Assistance ............................................................... 22

IV. Public Awareness ............................................................... 26

V. Legislation ........................................................................ 28

VI. Information Protection ......................................................... 30

VII. Training ........................................................................... 33

Developing a Comprehensive Strategy to Combat Identity Theft .............. 39

Defining Identity Theft ................................................................... 49

Appendixes ................................................................................ 53

A: Identity Theft Survey ............................................................ 53

B: Identity Theft Focus Groups, May 3-4, 2004; November 4, 2004 ....... 54

References ................................................................................. 65

Resources .................................................................................. 69

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Introduction

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Introduction

Identity theft, a relatively new phenomenon in the United States, has swiftly become 

a serious problem for victims, police, and prosecutors that is requiring an increasing 

commitment of resources by private enterprise. In the Identity Theft and Assumption 

Deterrence Act of 1998, the United States Congress defined identity theft as a federal 

crime when someone:

“...knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of 

another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that 

constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable State 

or local law.” §

The most frequent form of identity theft is the fraudulent use of someone’s name 

and identifying data to obtain credit, merchandise, and services. It is considered an 

equal-opportunity crime, affecting victims of all races, incomes, and ages — even 

the deceased. The magnitude of the problem ranges from simple to highly complex. 

Often victims do not recognize the problem until they have been denied the capacity 

to make a purchase with the credit card, a loan is denied based on bad credit, or 

a credit card company calls to determine if the individual had actually approved 

purchases made in another locale or unusual establishment. While most often victims 

are individual citizens, it is possible for the identity of whole corporations to be 

stolen, with the thief/thieves purchasing large items such as real estate, for example. 

One of the most challenging aspects of identity theft is its potential relationship to 

international terrorism. Identity theft could be used broadly by crime rings that may 

include international members; therefore, whenever transnational crime is discussed 

authorities should look for a connection to terrorism. Identity theft demands the most 

effective police response possible. 

The popularity of identity theft is no mystery, considering that criminals recognize it 

as a high-reward, low-risk undertaking in today’s environment. Criminals are more apt 

to pursue crimes that are easy to commit, protect their physical safety and anonymity, 

yield lucrative returns, and reduce risk of detection. The advent of information 

technology and computer literacy has joined with the accessibility of personal 

information to produce a rapid increase in identity theft as the method of choice 

for criminals. The lack of severe consequences and consistency of investigation and 

prosecution adds to the value of identity theft for criminals.

A Federal Trade Commission survey conducted in 2003 (see Appendix A) estimated 

the annual number of victims of some form of identity theft at 9.91 million adults 

or about 4.6 percent of the United States population. Approximately 27.3 million 

adults were estimated to have become victims during the previous 5 years. Actual 

dollar losses for businesses and victims in the United States are estimated roughly at 

$53 billion for 2004. These figures do not take into account expenses incurred by the 

victims to recover losses; the cost to the criminal justice system to detect, investigate, 

and prosecute offenders; or the expenditures of time and money to develop, 

promulgate, and enforce legislation to control this crime.

§ Identity Theft and Assumption 

Deterrence Act (The Identity Theft 

Act, U.S. Public Law 105-318, 112 

Stat. 3007 (1998) (codified at 18 

USC § 1028).

Introduction
In 2003, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services of the U.S. Department 

of Justice, the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA), and the Division of Public 

Safety Leadership (DPSL) at Johns Hopkins University engaged in a collaborative 

project to identify best practices and to develop the components of a national police 

strategy. (Other nations pursuing national strategies are Great Britain, Canada, 

Australia, and New Zealand.)

To gain greater insight into the challenges facing the police in responding to the 

identity theft problem, the MCCA and the DPSL conducted two surveys and 

two focus groups. The first focus group discussed the problem in detail, shared 

experiences, and provided the background needed to develop the surveys. The surveys 

obtained a broad base of information from police and others on the problem and its 

potential solutions. The second focus group discussed the survey results and framed 

recommendations for a national response to identity theft. Focus group participants 

included police, prosecutors, federal officials, victim assistance professionals, and the 

private sector. Appendix B lists the participants.

Need for a National Strategy

The need for a national strategy begins with an understanding of the complexity 

of identity theft compared, for example, with violent crime. A violent act usually 

is committed against an individual or several individuals, in close proximity, in a 

clearly identifiable geographic location. Most often, it is discovered quickly and the 

circumstances of the crime dictate the investigative strategy. In addition, trends and 

patterns of violent crimes can be identified, allowing for predictability and prevention 

for targeted groups. For example, there may be more acts of violence in a low-income 

neighborhood riddled by drug dealing than in a middle-class bedroom community. 

Trends and patterns provide direction for police response and prevention tactics. 

Identity theft, by comparison, may be against a single individual, corporation, or 

multiple victims. It may be even more complex because there is dual victimization: 

an individual and a financial entity. Frequently, the crime may not be discovered until 

long after its commission. Perpetrators may not live in the same jurisdiction as the 

victim and may commit the crime in several jurisdictions simultaneously, making it 

difficult for the individual police agency to detect patterns and the actual magnitude 

of the crime. Finally, potential perpetrators find identity theft attractive because they 

considered it a low-risk, high-reward crime. Given all of the above, it is clear that 

identity theft is difficult to investigate and prosecute, diminishing the effectiveness of 

usual deterrence measures.

As identity theft was recognized as a pervasive crime that could be either minor 

or devastating in impact, police departments and federal agencies initiated coping 

mechanisms. Initially, police agencies, victim assistance advocates, and private industry 

operated independently, not understanding the roles of others in the system or how to 

cooperate with others to develop comprehensive and effective means of responding 

to and preventing identity theft.

2

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The project team recognized early that each sector plays a critical role in combating 

identity theft and deserves respect. Each sector has its own priorities for action and, 

more important, each has a slightly different perspective on the problem. Federal 

agencies, police departments, and prosecutors, for example, are interested primarily in 

serious cases or offenses, whereas victims and victim advocates are interested in the 

investigation of even the most minor monetary loss caused by identity theft because 

it can be emotionally traumatic. There was also the understanding that while a police 

department may perceive the complaint of an individual as minor, a series of related 

acts could raise the level of severity of the crime. Individual police departments may 

have no vehicle to detect these broader patterns.

The challenge of the project was to develop a set of components comprising a 

national strategy that would be representative of the priorities of all involved, ensure 

collaboration among sectors, and become an effective deterrent to identity theft. It 

was equally important to identify best practices as illustrations of the recommended 

components. The components of a national strategy are displayed in the illustration, 

“Systems View of Strategic Intent: Identity Theft.” 

The column on the left represents the complainant reporting the crime or loss. At 

this point in the process, data are collected, synthesized, analyzed, and displayed to 

detect patterns or trends. If the complaint meets the criteria for investigation and 

prosecution, the case is forwarded to the appropriate investigative unit. 

The center box represents a different analytic approach applicable to the information 

protection component. Channels for information transmission are identified and the 

location of vulnerability is plotted, then methods to interrupt or stop the vulnerability 

are developed. 

Introduction

Systems View of Strategic Intent: Identity Theft. 
The right side of the display represents long-term responses. The responses are not 

listed in order of priority because all may be implemented simultaneously, resulting in 

a comprehensive prevention program. Components include the following: 

Public awareness campaigns: Public education has proven highly successful in 

the past to curtail national levels of alcohol and cigarette use. 

Victim assistance: Frequently, victimization focuses on dollar loss and dismisses 

the emotional trauma or time needed to restore records and identity. 

Partnership and collaboration: A staple for police departments, private 

industry, and others following the September 11 terrorist attacks. Many 

permutations and combinations are available when one considers the many 

functions within a jurisdiction: for example, a single function across jurisdictions, 

such as a statewide or regional collaboration, or multiple functions across several 

jurisdictions.

Legislation: Legislative action is needed for several reasons: private industry may 

not be willing to enact certain protections without a federal government mandate, 

or local police agencies may overlook the significance of taking identity theft 

reports, no matter how minor, to feed into a larger data bank for analysis.

Information protection: A critical variable and those combating identity theft 

should be as imaginative as needed.

Training: There was no doubt throughout the project that training is paramount, 

especially for police officers, investigators, and prosecutors.

All professionals involved in the project were aware that there was a distinct 

possibility that the number and growth of identity theft crimes could overwhelm 

law enforcement and, consequently, they designed components within the national 

strategy to offset that reality. In addition, the media have reported the compromise of 

several major databases. Protecting these databases is the responsibility of industry 

and government regulation and, as such, is not addressed in this strategy.

In a recent article in USA Today, an identity theft victim reported his experience and 

described a series of situations that work to the benefit of identity thieves. These 

same situations correspond to components recommended in the national strategy.

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

A Victim Speaks Out

Arrest me...before I strike again 

By Jonathan Turley

“For the past month, a detective has been trying to arrest me in New York. Most people in such 

a position would be highly distressed, but I am frankly delighted. Perhaps an arrest will bring 

an end to a criminal life that began for me in December, when I started buying luxury cars for 

friends in The Bronx. Of course, when I first learned that I was on the lam, I was more than a 

little surprised because I was in Washington at the time, driving a beat-up green Volvo wagon. 

I had become the latest victim of identity theft, joining tens of millions of other victims across 

the country...

...In my case, I was apparently saved by a news junkie who’d seen me on TV. When the suspect 

and a friend appeared at the Courtesy Auto Mall in The Bronx to buy two luxury cars, they had 

neither the money nor the credit to make the purchases. Explaining that he was an employee at 

CBS News, the suspect, according to police reports, then returned with his “uncle” Jonathan 
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5

Introduction

Turley, who, generous to a criminal fault, promptly signed for both cars. Before the cars were 

handed over, someone apparently noticed that the last time I was on television, I was neither 

African-American nor particularly young.

Police have now charged an individual who is believed to be a former CBS security employee. He 

stands accused of stealing my Social Security number when I worked for CBS as its legal analyst 

during the 2004 presidential election. A second man has been arrested. Police are now hot on the 

trail of the final suspected culprit, Jonathan Turley himself.

...Last week, after giving the keynote address at the federal conference on identity theft, I was able 

to speak to government and private experts from around the world. They are not an optimistic 

lot. Though strides have been made, it’s clear who is winning that war: the identity thieves...

...Identity thieves are winning because they are playing on the known weaknesses of the 

system.

First, turf barriers still exist between law enforcement agencies. It took the 9/11 attacks to 

dissolve such bureaucratic barriers in the area of intelligence, but identity theft lacks such a 

defining moment to shock the public to action.

Second, detectives uniformly complain about a lack of commitment from prosecutors. With 

an average loss of $700, prosecutors view these cases as small potatoes. By keeping thefts 

small, these criminals can operate with near impunity. The Bronx, where I went on my carbuying spree, is considered a haven for identity theft.

Third, citizens lack information on hot spots for identity theft. There is no annual report on 

the relative prosecution rates of different cities so that voters can hold politicians accountable. 

For example, Manhattan recently started a task force on identity theft, but this may simply 

shift activities to softer jurisdictions such as The Bronx.

Fourth, the greatest source for Social Security numbers remains the government itself. More 

than 75% of counties include Social Security numbers on public documents, exposing as 

many as 94% of citizens to identity theft. In addition, states have been gushing with other 

confidential information on their citizens.

Finally, there is no international agreement to bar the sale of phishing kits or to coordinate 

information and enforcement.

With the arrest of the suspects in New York, my own problems with identity theft may be at least 

temporarily halted. I may, indeed, be a little bit wiser, but I’m also still monitoring my credit record 

... and I’m still driving a beat-up green Volvo wagon.”

The REAL Jonathan Turley is the Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law at George Washington University 

and a member of the USA TODAY board of contributors.

Turley, J. (2005). Arrest me...before I strike again. USA Today. Retrieved 2005, from www.

usatoday.com/news/opinion/2005-02-21-identity-theft_x.htm.

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6

Organization of the Document

This document offers recommendations that combined would comprise a national 

strategy. In addition, actual applications of components of the national strategy or 

best practices are included. A discussion of strategy development processes and the 

issue of defining the crime follow the recommendations. 

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Components of the 

National Strategy

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Components of the National Strategy

I. Partnerships and Collaboration

Recommendation: Create state-level coordinating centers (or an adjunct function within all-crimes 

intelligence reporting centers) to provide crime analysis, victim assistance, statewide investigations, and 

other services; promote collaboration, cooperation, and intelligence fusion among public law enforcement 

agencies and other relevant entities.

Discussion: An incident of identity theft requires a two-pronged response. First, a 

victim desires to end his or her financial vulnerability by closing accounts and clearing 

his or her name from potential credit damage. Second, a victim is a key information 

resource in helping law enforcement pursue, capture, and prosecute identity theft 

criminals. The essence of the task is to reverse the trend from a low-risk, high-reward 

enterprise for criminals to one of high risk and low reward. To achieve this goal, 

data and information obtained following an incident of identity theft should fulfill 

the requirements of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Consumer Information 

System as well as those of a centralized, state-level identity theft database or an 

all-crimes intelligence fusion (ACIF) database. Crime analysis designed to capture 

patterns could be performed at the state level to address the problem of criminals 

who do not operate neatly in a single police jurisdiction.

Establishing either the state-level identity theft coordination centers or ACIFs is a 

necessary step in facilitating information flow and collaboration among state, local, 

and federal law enforcement agencies, the FTC, and corporate entities. State-level 

identity theft coordination centers and/or ACIFs would be tasked with the following:

(1) Encouraging and collecting identity theft police reports, among other 

information, to identify patterns and suspects. 

(2) Referring victims to local assistance centers or to the FTC. 

(3) Submitting all police reports to the federal identity theft databases including the 

FTC, National White Collar Crime Center (N3WC), U.S. Postal Service, and the 

FBI.

(4) Acting as an information resource for state task forces. 

(5) Investigating statewide or interstate cases.

(6) Providing prevention resources. 

(7) Developing investigative protocols for intra- and interstate identity theft 

incidents.

(8) Working in consonance with the state attorneys general offices on investigations. 

(9) Working with bank and financial institution fraud and security units to develop 

audit trails and evidence in a comprehensive approach to discovering, arresting, 

and prosecuting identity theft criminals. 

(10) Working with federal authorities on the national level to corroborate and 

integrate information and its potential implication in other crimes. 

Components of the National Strategy
The state-level crime patterns would provide state and local law enforcement agencies 

with the information needed to more quickly pursue and prosecute criminals within 

their jurisdictions. By acting in coordination and using the same database structure and 

common data elements as federal agencies, the state-level identity theft coordination 

centers and ACIFs could share and directly exchange information. This would be 

helpful if a series of multiple attacks or a multistate identity theft crime occurred. 

The complexity associated with restoring the good name and credit worthiness of a 

victim of identity theft, and pursuing and prosecuting an identity thief, are substantial. 

The FTC noted in 2002 that inaccuracies in credit reports is one of the most 

common consumer complaints the agency receives. As long as efforts directed toward 

correcting information and pursuing the criminal remain uncoordinated and unilateral, 

identity thieves will enjoy a strategic and tactical advantage. Repairing this situation 

falls to the credit reporting industry and government regulation.

Another of the most fundamental hindrances to an effective strategy to combat 

identity theft is the lack of a national focus built on public and private partnerships 

and true cross-jurisdictional collaboration. This hindrance exists because the crime 

of identity theft is relatively new and agencies and consumers are involved in 

sorting through actions, procedures, and behaviors to combat the crime. It is not a 

small task to know which identity theft crime issues and response and prevention 

components agencies need to collaborate. Simply stated, complexity drives the need 

for collaboration and partnerships. 

This reality is a driving force in the establishment of the state-level identity theft 

coordination centers and ACIFs which, when properly funded, can provide a 

comprehensive collaborative network of law enforcement and security directed assets 

to both intra- and interstate crime-fighting activities. Moreover, as the accompanying 

best practices indicate, local and state law enforcement must form partnerships with 

other constituents such as private security and banking services to develop leads, 

study trends, and pursue with greater diligence identity thieves operating in their 

jurisdictions.

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft
Best Practice: Atlanta, Georgia Interagency Group

The Atlanta Metropolitan Police Department’s Major Fraud Unit has developed multiple 

partnerships to pursue identity theft cases. The unit sergeant reviews all victim reports 

of identity theft and assigns cases with the most leads to unit investigators for follow 

up. (The victims in cases with few or no leads receive a letter advising them of other 

possible actions they can take to help with developing leads.) All unit investigators 

are required to attend MetroTec meetings every month. MetroTec is a joint venture 

of all police departments in metropolitan Atlanta, federal law enforcement, private 

security, and banking institutions. Participants share information about cases, suspects, 

methods of operation, and so forth. The group discusses all types of crimes, but fraud 

is the primary topic. All investigators also attend the MetroPol Fraud Group, which 

has a similar format but focuses solely on fraud. The unit is also a member of the U.S. 

Secret Service Organized Fraud Task Force. The Major Fraud Unit handles the primary 

investigation and the U.S. Secret Service sponsors the case for prosecution by the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office. The Organized Fraud Task Force also assists the unit in following up 

on information from other jurisdictions or states.

Contact: Atlanta Police Department, Major Fraud Unit, 404.817.6810 

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Components of the National Strategy

Best Practice: U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

 The Financial Institution Fraud/Identity Theft Section of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for 

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania performs an overarching coordination function in 

cases of identity theft and financial fraud for federal, state, and local law enforcement 

and prosecution agencies in the Eastern District. It coordinates efforts among all 

federal investigative agencies (FBI, Secret Service, U.S. Postal Inspection Service), the 

Pennsylvania State Police, the Pennsylvania Attorney General, the Philadelphia Police 

Department, and all district attorneys in the Philadelphia metropolitan area. In addition 

to cooperating on specific cases (for example, with the Philadelphia Police Department 

and the district attorney), the section sponsors regular meetings for the above agencies 

to share information on actives cases and suspects. It also is sponsoring the development 

of a database to aid law enforcement investigations and data sharing within the Eastern 

District. In addition to information collected from victim complaints, investigators and 

prosecutors routinely want to know what other agencies are working on cases involving 

known suspects and crimes and the information these investigations are generating. The 

database is also designed to allow analysis of data to locate identity theft rings and highvalue criminal targets. It is the intent of the working group to roll out the database to 

all local law enforcement agencies to enable them to share information in identity theft 

cases.

Contact: U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 215.861.8200 
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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Best Practice: Georgia STOP I.T. Network

 The Georgia STOP I.T. Network, formed under the auspices of Georgia Attorney 

General Thurbert Baker, brings together federal, state, and local law enforcement, 

federal and local prosecutors, corporations, and financial institutions to educate 

the public and businesses, provide training for law enforcement, and establish a 

centralized database for victims to report identity theft. Georgia’s identity theft statute 

mandates that local law enforcement take reports of identity theft in the jurisdiction 

where the victim resides, regardless of where the crime occurs. Legal venue is defined 

as either where the victim resides or where any part of the crime occurs. When the 

Georgia legislature mandated police reporting it also mandated that local agencies 

provide the identity theft report data to a central repository. 

The Georgia identity theft centralized database initiative is a test program with the 

National White Collar Crime Center, using the infrastructure of the Internet Fraud 

Complaint Center (IFCC). The program aims to provide a one-stop shop for victims 

to report identity theft.§ Under the Georgia model, an identity theft victim reports 

the crime through the STOP I.T. Network’s web site. Local Georgia law enforcement 

agencies are asked to direct identity theft victims to the web site to report crime 

(www.stopidentitytheft.org). If neither the victim nor the law enforcement agency has 

access to the Internet, the local agency will take the report and forward a copy to the 

Governor’s Office of Consumer Affairs where it will be entered into the database. 

That information will be forwarded to the appropriate law enforcement agencies 

in Georgia and any other jurisdictions affected across the country and the FTC will 

receive a digital copy of the complaint. In addition, the information will be sent 

digitally to a database in Georgia that can be accessed by law enforcement at any time. 

The information collected in the complaint is identical to that collected by the FTC 

complaint database (www.FTC.gov) and includes the following:

Personal information: Name, address, telephone number, social security number, 

date of birth, e-mail. 

Type of identity theft experience: Credit card, securities and other investments, 

checking or savings accounts, Internet or e-mail, loans, government documents 

or benefits, telephone used in fraud, other.

•

•

§ The initial proposal was to have 

included the private sector as well 

as the public sector. Unfortunately, 

under the current setup at IFCC this 

was not possible.
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13

Components of the National Strategy

Narrative complaint describing crime including but not limited to: How the theft 

occurred; who may be responsible for the theft, actions taken by victim since the 

theft occurred; list of companies where fraudulent accounts were established or 

current accounts were affected.

Details of the identity theft: Date of first noticed occurrence; number of 

accounts opened, amount of money lost by victim; amount of money obtained 

from companies in victim’s name; other problems (none; time lost to resolve 

problems; denied employment or lost job; harassed by debt collector or creditor; 

civil suit filed or judgment against victim; criminal investigation, arrest or 

conviction; denied credit or other financial services, other: describe).

The identity thief or thieves: name, address, and relationship (family member; 

friend, neighbor, in-home employee; roommate/cohabitant; workplace coworker, 

employer, employee; otherwise known).

Contact steps already taken: Credit bureaus called; fraud alerts on victim’s credit 

reports; ordered credit reports; contacted police (department, indicate if report 

taken, complaint number). Indicate any problems with credit bureaus.

Problems with companies: Identify companies, and indicate if notified, notified 

in writing.

Source: Georgia Identity Theft Network web site, www.stopidentitytheft.org

•

•

•

•

•
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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

 Best Practice: Minnesota Financial Crimes Task Force

In 1999, law enforcement agencies in Minnesota began to form small, localized task forces to 

communicate about known criminals and groups committing identity theft. In 2000, these efforts 

lead to the creation of the statewide Minnesota Financial Crimes Task Force (MNFCTF). Initially, 

the MNFCTF operated from one office in the Minneapolis metropolitan area with a staff of one 

commander, three detectives detailed by memoranda of understanding with local police departments 

and sheriffs’ departments (throughout the state), and one postal inspector. (Subsequently, additional 

coordinating offices were set up in Rochester and Duluth.) Additional detectives have been added 

to the original core group.

 Through business partnerships with the Minnesota Retailers Protection Association, this core group 

of investigators coordinates with private-sector investigators to detect, investigate, and prosecute 

career criminals and organized crime groups who commit identity theft and other financial crimes. 

Investigative teams comprising MNFCTF members and private-sector investigators are created on a 

fluid, dynamic basis to pursue active criminals operating anywhere in Minnesota. The MNFCTF has 

created lines of communication among local law enforcement inside and outside of the state and 

with federal agencies.

 The MNFCTF detectives are highly trained in the area of financial crime investigation, fieldwork, 

interviewing techniques, and other high-tech areas. The MNFCTF has established a sophisticated 

computer forensics lab with two detectives highly trained in this area. State legislation authorizing the 

MNFCTF confers statewide jurisdiction, which gives the task force statewide investigative authority, 

and allows MNFCTF investigators to pursue prosecution in any Minnesota state prosecutor’s office. 

This has allowed task force investigators to develop a network of experienced attorneys with expertise 

in prosecuting white-collar crime to prosecute task force cases. Prosecution of cases through the 

federal system is also done because law enforcement members of the MNFCTF are special deputy 

U.S. marshals and can present cases in the federal system. This Marshal status also allows MNFCTF 

detectives to pursue these criminals anywhere in the U.S. Statistical results indicate the effectiveness 

of the MNFCTF approach.
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15

Components of the National Strategy

During the 15-month period ending October 2004, task force investigations resulted in 264 

individuals charged in Minnesota state courts, 16 indictments in federal court, and 10 other federal 

indictments. These cases involved more than 10,000 individual victims and fraud losses of more 

than $5 million. The MNFCTF has identified 10 traits that promote task force success and 10 that 

are barriers to success.

Traits that Promote Success:

1. One commander/leader structure, operations statewide, and police chiefs’ support.

2. Open structure (extremely fluid) for nontraditional approaches.

3. Focus on career offenders and organized groups.

4. Secure source of funding; eliminate politics associated with funding.

5. Statewide legal jurisdiction for financial and property crimes.

6. Network of experienced white-collar crime prosecutors.

7. Business partnerships (business association leadership is critical).

8. Only the best and brightest financial crime investigators (not a training facility).

9. Knowledgeable investigators with high-tech expertise.

10. A small oversight committee to provide guidance to agencies and businesses.

Traits that Reduce Success:

1. No ongoing funding source.

2. Multiple supervisors, no one commander.

3. Lack of legislative support (criminal laws and jurisdictional authority).

4. Lack of flexibility among participating agencies.

5. No business buy-in.

6. No prosecutor buy-in.

7. Having a federal structure for operations, including large regional task forces.

8. No forensic training and no equipment to conduct exams.

9. Heavy, unproductive bureaucratic processes.

10. Ability to remove unproductive or burned-out investigators.

Contacts: Minnesota Financial Crimes Task Force, 763.502.7756

Retailers Protection Association, 612.328.3651
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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Best Practice: Project WHO? A Law Enforcement-Centric Framework for 

Combating Identity Theft

Project WHO? began in the fall of 2004 as a National Institute of Justice-funded pilot program to address 

the problem of identity theft crime. The primary goal of the program is to enhance law enforcement’s ability 

to manage the complaints, investigation, and eventual prosecution of Internet-related identity theft through 

the processing, presentation, and geospatial analysis of identity theft data. Core project partners include the 

San Diego Police Department, the Computer and Technology Crime High-Tech Response Team (part of 

the Southern California High-Technology Crime Task Force), the San Diego District Attorney’s Office, and 

eLCHEMY, Inc.*

Law enforcement operations are an information-intensive process in which government agencies collect and 

interpret large data sets in an effort to serve and protect citizens, while at the same time maintaining their 

trust. There are significant technical, managerial, and legal hurdles to integrating, correlating, and interpreting 

identity theft crime data between sources on the Internet and traditional law enforcement databases. The 

challenge lies in developing a systematic framework to descriptively analyze and effectively share identity 

theft crime data within and across jurisdictional, geospatial, and virtual (Internet) data spaces. 

To address this need, Project WHO? is developing a model framework for the management, analysis, and 

visualization of identity theft crime data stored in stand-alone law enforcement databases and across the 

Internet. This framework will address the technical and analytical models, methods, tools, and techniques 

required to effectively share and correlate local law enforcement identity theft reports with identity theft data 

that are currently captured in other governmental and private databases. This will enhance the understanding 

of the problem and improve law enforcement’s ability to detect, prevent, and respond to this crossjurisdictional problem. 

A transparent, replicable, and objective framework for identity theft knowledge management and information 

sharing will provide law enforcement with the capability to more efficiently process and resolve these cases, 

regardless of jurisdictional boundaries. The significance of this sharing and analysis will extend beyond the 

pilot project in southern California to include other law enforcement agencies and public-private partnerships, 

demonstrating an applied model of how to leverage the strengths of individual public, private, and academic 

communities toward a better collective whole. 

*eLCHEMY, Inc., is a nonprofit corporation that provides specialized and applied research and development, 

strategic advisement, and training and education tools and solutions to federal, state, and local organizations 

at the intersection of information science and technology, the law, and nonpartisan policy.

Contacts: San Diego District Attorney’s Office, 619.615.6846 

eLCHEMY, 858.232.6255 
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17

II. Reporting Procedures

Recommendation: All police agencies would take reports of identity theft in the geographic jurisdiction 

where the victim lives regardless of where the crime occurs; the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) 

section of the FBI would develop a uniform definition of identity theft for use by all agencies in 

reporting criminal incidents to the FBI.

Discussion: For law enforcement, one of the difficulties in combating identity 

theft arises from a unique feature of the crime pertaining to legal venue (the 

jurisdiction responsible for adjudication of a crime). Legal venue typically resides 

with the authorities of the geographic area in which the crime occurred. The 

ancillary responsibility to investigate, prepare police reports, and record criminal 

incidents follows that of legal venue. Because identity theft may comprise a series of 

geographically dispersed events, jurisdictional responsibilities are frequently blurred. 

The theft of a person’s identifying information may occur in one location, while the 

subsequent fraudulent use of that information (for example, illegal use of the credit 

card accounts) may occur in one or more different jurisdictions. In addition, victims 

may reside in yet another geographic location and many defendants are known to be 

geographically mobile. Confusion over who should investigate and prosecute leads to 

inconsistency in reporting and frequent lack of action. The frustration is enormous 

for a victim of identity theft who is forced to call from jurisdiction to jurisdiction to 

find an agency that will take a report and actually investigate.

A number of states have recognized the legal venue problem and passed legislation 

that either requires local police departments to take reports if the victim resides 

within the jurisdiction, regardless of where the fraudulent use or information theft 

occurred (as in California); or have a specifically defined legal venue as either where 

the crime occurs or where the victim resides (as in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, and 

Minnesota). If a state has adopted a statute prohibiting identity theft, police officers 

in that state are as obligated to take a report on identity theft as they are on any other 

type of crime. Even without legislation, police departments can voluntarily prepare 

reports for incidents of identity theft for all victims who reside in their jurisdiction, 

regardless of where the crime occurred. The study group survey of practices in major 

cities’ police agencies found that 53 percent of survey participants reported having 

adopted this reporting practice, either voluntarily or to comply with state statutes.

Adopting such a policy will accomplish two things. First, it will provide victims with 

ready access to the official police reports they need to resolve the impact of misused 

personal identifying information in their financial accounts, credit, and other personal 

records. This is particularly important with the new rights provided to victims by 

the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACT Act) that amended the Fair 

Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) (15. U.S.C. Section 1681, et seq.). Second, it will lay the 

foundation for building the consistent and comprehensive databases of identity theft 

crimes that are necessary for effective investigation and development of enforcement 

strategies and tactics. 

Components of the National Strategy
18

The latter task also requires a consistent definition of identity theft. Traditionally, law 

enforcement has relied on the UCR section of the FBI to develop definitions used 

in reporting criminal incidents. The FBI’s central role in collecting crime statistics 

is the critical factor in achieving cross-jurisdictional uniformity and near universal 

participation by local departments in the FBI’s national crime reporting program. 

UCR reporting does not now distinguish identity theft from other types of fraud. 

Currently, identity theft means different things to different people. A common 

difference in definition involves the distinction between credit card and bank account 

fraud (which involves the illegal use of existing accounts) and “true name” identity 

theft (which involves the use of a person’s identity to open new accounts, obtain 

loans, incur debts, or commit other crimes). In part, the lack of a common definition 

arises because, until recently, state and federal statutes did not distinguish identity theft 

from other types of fraud. With new legislation, a number of states and the federal 

government have legally defined the elements of identity theft in separate identity 

theft statues. The federal legislation has clearly adopted a comprehensive rather than 

restrictive definition (that is, true name identity theft, credit card fraud, and bank 

fraud are covered by the legal definition). This broad definition is consistent with the 

data-collection activities of the FTC. The national strategy suggests that local law 

enforcement follow the federal definition until the UCR develops a formal definition 

for UCR reporting purposes.

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Best Practice: Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) Police Department 

North Carolina statutes do not mandate that police take victim reports of identity theft crimes that occur 

outside of Charlotte-Mecklenburg. As a matter of practice, however, the department will take a report from 

any victim who is a resident regardless of where the crime occurs. The Fraud Unit of the Criminal Investigation 

Bureau recently reviewed its reporting procedures with the aim of developing a consistent department-wide 

reporting strategy. The new procedures simultaneously improve the quality of the information the unit 

receives for its own investigations, the quality of the reports it forwards to other agencies for investigation, 

the assistance the department provides to victims, and the efficiency of the report-taking process. The 

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department can take initial reports of identity theft either face-to-face by a 

patrol officer (at the victim’s request), over the telephone by nonsworn personnel, online by the victim at 

the department’s web site, or directly by the Fraud Unit. The department uses an automated report-writing 

system that has been modified so that whoever prepares the initial report must now provide answers to a 

list of specific questions about identity theft (below). In developing the reporting template, the head of the 

Fraud Unit closely followed the information template used by the FTC’s Sentinel database. The Fraud Unit 

added questions about possible related crimes to elicit potential information on how identities are being 

stolen, both to assist investigations and to track crime trends. They also discovered that having victims 

prepare the reports provides much better information, especially in the narrative section. This conserves the 

use of detectives’ time for report taking, thereby freeing them for investigation.

However a report is initiated, it is forwarded within 24 hours to the head of the Fraud Unit who assigns the 

case to a detective on the same business day. The victim receives a letter identifying the assigned detective 

(with telephone number and e-mail address) along with a copy of the police report. The letter explains that 

an arrest in the case is dependent on the ability to identify a suspect and that the police can prosecute only the 

crimes that occur in Mecklenburg County. Victims are also advised of the steps they need to take to protect 

themselves from further damage and to provide contact information. This information is also available on 

the department’s web site and nonsworn personnel who take reports by telephone are trained to provide the 

same information to victims.

Contact: Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, Fraud Unit, 704.336.2311
19

Components of the National Strategy

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department Identity Theft Report Questions

In addition to your name, what type of information was used to open or access accounts?

When did you first learn that you were a victim of ID theft? 

Do you know the name, address, or telephone where any bills were sent (suspect)?

Have you placed a fraud alert on your credit report?

Have you ordered a copy of your credit report?

Have you contacted any other law enforcement agencies?

If yes, please provide agency name and any report numbers.

Is this ID fraud related to a previous report filed with Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (Larceny, 

Breaking and Entering, Automobile Theft)?

Related complaint number.

Your Social Security number is needed to properly investigate this crime. (This must telephoned in or 

mailed with other documents.)

How many accounts were opened or accessed using the your name and identifying information?

Do you know the name of company where accounts were opened or accessed?

ACCOUNTS

Is there a name other than the victim’s name associated with this account?

List other name(s) associated with this account. (Please also list name and other information in suspect 

section.)

Name of company where the accounts were opened or accessed.

Account Number.

Address of company where accounts were opened or accessed.

Contact person with company.

Telephone number for company or representative.

Dollar amount of loss.

Please add as many additional accounts as needed.

When you e-mail, mail, or telephone the information, please describe in narrative form all other 

information you have about this ID theft and the suspect. 

Note: These questions are for cases of ID theft involving the opening of new accounts. Similar questions 

are used for other types of ID theft.

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Best Practice: Michigan State Police 

As of March 2005, Michigan law enforcement agencies are required to take reports 

of identity theft in the jurisdiction where the victim lives, where the fraud occurred, 

or where the identifying information was stolen. The Michigan State Police’s reporting 

protocol has the following steps:

Obtain brief initial summary of incident.

Have victim fill out a release of information form.

Explain that ID theft cases take time.

Issue the FTC workbook and explain victim’s responsibilities for blocking fraudulent 

use of his or her information. Tell the victim to file a report with the FTC.

Tell the victims to order credit reports.

Ask the victim to draft a detailed timeline of events according to credit reports.

Advise the victim that investigation will begin upon receipt of timeline and crime 

victim’s rights report.

The detailed victim report, with timeline, provides investigators with the information they 

need to pursue the case. Although filling out the 8-plus-page report requires a considerable 

amount of work for the victim, law enforcement cannot proceed without the active 

participation and willingness of the victim to provide information about the identity 

theft events. With experience, investigators have discovered that willingness to prepare 

such a report identifies cooperative witnesses and cases worthy of investigation. 

Contact: Michigan State Police, 877.MI.ID.THEFT

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Best Practice: Atlanta (Georgia) Police Department 

Georgia statutes mandate that local police take reports of identity theft in the jurisdiction 

where victims live. (Legal venue is defined as either where the victim resides or where any 

part of the crime occurred.) The Atlanta Police Department takes an identity theft report 

if the victim lives or owns a business in Atlanta, regardless of where the crime occurred 

and regardless of whether the department can investigate the crime. Beat officers, the 

department’s teleserve (phone-in line), or an investigator with the Major Fraud Unit 

take initial reports. All reports are sent to the Major Fraud Unit for review, and those 

with potential leads are assigned to an investigator for follow up. The cases that are not 

assigned receive a letter with information on seeking assistance from Equifax, FTC, and 

other federal agencies. Victims also receive a copy of the police report and are advised to 

forward a copy to appropriate jurisdictions for follow up. The Major Fraud Unit recently 

implemented a program to provide every identity theft victim with a “Victim’s Fraud 

Resource Guide.” It contains all the telephone numbers that the victim might need for 

assistance and tells victims what to do after filing a report. It also provides information 

on how to protect themselves from ID Theft, ATM safety, and online fraud.

Contact: Atlanta Police Department, Major Fraud Unit, 404.817.6810
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Components of the National Strategy

Best Practice: Report-Taking Training for Officers: El Paso (Texas)

Police Department

The El Paso, Texas, Police Department provides identity theft training for all sworn 

personnel so that all officers have the foundation to initiate a proper complaint report. 

Detectives who have been trained in developing probable cause for identity theft cases 

investigate the case. Thus, the department’s procedures are consistent in all identity theft 

cases.

Contact: El Paso Police Department, 915.564.7000 
22

III. Victim Assistance

Recommendation: All police agencies would develop policies for responding to victims of identity theft 

that include written standard operating procedures and procedures to help victims find assistance 

needed to resolve the impact on financial accounts, credit, and personal records. 

Discussion: The effects of identity theft on the victim are different from other 

common crimes. Street-crime victims, for example, suffer either psychological or 

physical injury (e.g., rape and assault), loss of personal property (e.g., burglary and 

auto theft), or both (e.g., robbery). In contrast, identity theft victims are not subject to 

direct threats to their personal health or safety and in many cases (those that involve 

fraud against the financial services industry), business and financial institutions absorb 

the financial loss.§ Still identity theft can be, and often is, a significant emotional 

experience. In cases where misuse is repetitive, “victims suffer some of the same 

emotional damage as victims of repeated physical assault. It feels like it will never 

end.”§§ 

 The Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) reports that one of the most frequent 

victim complaints it receives is that police do not care. “Far too often complainant are 

told they are not the true victims, and do not receive follow-up about their case.”§§§

Clear policies on how officers should handle identity theft complaints and how to 

communicate with victims at all stages of criminal processing are important to assure 

victims that law enforcement is concerned about the problem of identity theft and to 

ensure effective victim cooperation in helping solve identity theft crimes.

In addition to sensitivity to victims when handling criminal complaints, law 

enforcement also needs to formally recognize that criminal investigation and 

prosecution for victims is only one part of the problem they face in resolving the 

impact of identity theft. Most victims will never experience a successful investigation 

and prosecution of their case. Their concerns—to minimize damage and restore 

their credit—are immediate. In congressional testimony, an experienced New 

York City detective articulated this problem: “Once the crime is discovered and 

reported, victims are left to fend for themselves in attempting to clear their credit 

history and good name . . . Although we in law enforcement garner some sense of 

satisfaction when we make arrests for these crimes, it is not enough when compared 

to the amount of time and energy a victim spends trying to undo the work of these 

criminals.” 

§ The Federal Trade Commission 

(FTC) victimization survey report 

states that 90 percent of total 

identity theft losses are borne by 

businesses and financial institutions.

§§ Identity Theft Resource Center. 

Online Commerce: Is shopping or 

Banking Online Safe? Fact Sheet 

301, page 2.

§§§ Identity Theft Resource Center.

Identity Theft: The Aftermath 2003, 

page 40.

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft
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23

The FTC survey of identity theft victims found that, on average, victims of all types 

of identity theft spend 30 hours, or about 1 workweek, to clear their names and credit 

records. A 2004 survey conducted by the ITRC reported that victims spent an average 

of 330 hours repairing the damage.§ Not only is this process time consuming, it can 

also be extremely frustrating because victims must deal with an array of different 

agencies and institutions. Contact with these agencies generally needs to be made 

during business hours and creates havoc for a victim who works and doesn’t have the 

flexibility to make time-consuming personal calls. The ITRC reports that “Every day, 

identity theft counselors deal with people who are angry and tired of fighting a losing 

battle on their own. They have been considered guilty until they prove their innocence 

to credit card and bank fraud investigators, collection agencies, and, at times, doubting 

law enforcement officers.”

Components of the National Strategy

Best Practice: Los Angeles Sheriff ’s Department Victim’s Guide

The Los Angeles Sheriff ’s Department Victim’s Guide is a single-sheet, three-fold 

brochure containing detailed information on the steps victims need to take to report 

and disrupt identity theft (including contact telephone numbers). The guide covers nine 

common types of identity theft involving unauthorized use of credit card accounts, 

stolen checks, ATM cards, fraudulent change of address, social security number misuse, 

passports, telephone service, driver’s license number misuse, and false civil and criminal 

judgments for actions committed by an imposter. The brochure also informs the victims 

of their right to have a police report taken in the jurisdiction where they live under 

the California Penal Code Section 530.6 enacted in 1998 and the kind of information 

they need to provide to law enforcement to assist them in investigating the crime. It 

offers victims valuable advice; “In dealing with the authorities and financial institutions, 

keep a log of all conversations, including dates, times, names, and phone numbers. 

Note the time spent and any expenses incurred. Confirm conversations in writing. Send 

correspondence by certified mail (return receipt requested). Keep copies of all letters 

and documents.” 

Contact: Los Angeles Sheriff ’s Department, Commercial Crimes Bureau, 562.946.7877

§ Identity Theft Resource Center. 

Identity Theft: The Aftermath 

2004, page 10.
24

The specific needs of identity theft victims that require attention in developing 

policies and procedures include the following:

1. Information about the immediate steps they should take to stop fraudulent use, 

such as notifying affected financial institutions, calling the three credit reporting 

agencies to initiate fraud alerts, and obtaining credit reports to identify open 

fraudulent accounts.

2. Information on department procedures so they will know how their case is being 

processed, and telephone numbers of persons to call if they have questions.

3. Guidelines on the information they will need to provide to investigators.

4. Realistic assessment of the difficulty of solving this type of case and what they can 

expect.

5. Assistance the department can (and cannot) offer to help them clear their name and 

credit and personal records and where they can get a list of telephone numbers and 

names of people to contact.

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Best Practice: Federal Trade Commission Web Site

The FTC’s web site contains comprehensive information on federal laws that protect 

identity theft victims. The site also provides valuable resource materials (and links to 

other resources) to assist victims in working through the process of clearing their names 

and correcting credit reports. The FTC workbook ID Theft: When Bad Things Happen to 

Your Good Name, available at the site, provides a step-by-step guide for victims, including 

a sample identity theft affidavit form which outlines the information they will need to 

provide to investigators. 

Contact: www.ftc.gov and www.consumer.gov/idtheft

Best Practice: Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC)

The ITRC, headquartered in San Diego, California, is a national nonprofit victimadvocate organization dedicated to the problem of identity theft. “ITRC’s mission is to 

research, analyze, and distribute information about the growing crime of identity theft. 

It serves as a resource and advisory center of identity theft information for consumers, 

victims, law enforcement, the business and financial sectors, legislators, media, and 

governmental agencies.” ITRC also provides direct assistance to victims of some of the 

most difficult cases of identity theft who need help in clearing their names. Headquarters 

staff and a national network of volunteers in 24 states provide assistance. Many of 

the volunteers are prior victims of identity theft, former law enforcement officers, or 

private fraud investigators who have the requisite knowledge and skills to assist victims. 

All volunteers are carefully screened and trained in an 8-hour teleconference training 

program. In addition to victim assistance, the volunteer network makes presentations 

to local audiences, participates in media interviews, and tracks local developments for 

headquarters staff.

Contact: www.idtheftcenter.org
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25

Components of the National Strategy

Best Practice: Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) 

Police Department Volunteers

 As one of its community volunteer initiatives, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police 

Department has created a victim alert program to prevent theft victims from also 

becoming victims of identity theft. Citizen volunteers receive training on identity theft 

and how personal information is compromised. They are taught to pull crime reports on 

the types of thefts (stolen wallets, thefts from autos, etc.) that are a precursor to identity 

theft crimes. Volunteers contact the theft victims and advise them of the actions they 

should take to avoid becoming victims of identity theft, such as canceling lost or stolen 

credit cards and activating a fraud alert with the three credit reporting agencies.

Contact: Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, Fraud Unit, 704.336.2311
26

IV. Public Awareness

Recommendation: Create a national public awareness campaign centering on prevention and response 

techniques and reporting of identity theft. 

Discussion: A key component of a national strategy is a sustained and comprehensive 

national public awareness program that centers on preventing identity theft as well 

as reporting and responding to incidents when they occur. The optimum tactic to 

combat identity theft is for individuals, public agencies, and private enterprise to 

safeguard personal information to prevent identity theft from occurring in the first 

place. To that end, safeguarding personal information should be everyone’s highest 

priority. Doing everything in one’s own power to prevent information from being 

taken by identity thieves as it flows through the various information channels is the 

most effective safeguard people and organizations can take in the face of such a 

serious threat. Yet prevention is only a single-dimension approach to stemming the 

tide of identity theft. Even with robust preventive measures and increased public 

awareness in place, identity thieves are resourceful and are able to shift tactics quickly; 

therefore, a corresponding reporting and response portion of the awareness program 

to inform the public of how the crime occurs must also be created and distributed. 

An awareness program of this magnitude and importance requires an imaginative, 

innovative, and widely disseminated series of messages that prompt citizens to protect 

their identity and report incidents if they occur. 

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is tasked under section 151 (b) of the Fair and 

Accurate Credit Transactions Act to establish and implement a media and distribution 

campaign to teach the public how to prevent identity theft. The FTC is in the process 

of outlining the focus and establishing appropriate funding for its public awareness 

campaign as it relates primarily to the prevention aspect of consumer awareness. 

However, a unique opportunity exists for a multitude of partners, such as the FTC, 

Major City Chiefs Association, Johns Hopkins University, U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, and the International Association 

of Chiefs of Police to join with private corporations in a public service message 

program created and funded by the Ad Council, focusing on prevention, reporting, 

and recovery of identity theft incidents. This opportunity would not only signify the 

types of partnerships needed to successfully stem the spread of identity theft, but 

make available the resources of the Ad Council which has launched some of the most 

successful and effective consumer education programs in the history of advertising. 

The Ad Council maintains a substantial private budget to use for support of public 

service and is the largest provider of public service messages in the world. Some of 

its current ad campaigns include tsunami relief, terrorism prevention, second-hand 

smoke prevention, and the prevention of online sexual exploitation of children. The 

Ad Council’s educational programs, such as smoking cessation, have been attributed 

to significantly reducing the number of smokers in America to just over 25 percent, 

down from 41 percent in 1944. The greatest drop came during the late 1980s when 33 

percent of Americans smoked and the smoking cessation ads were in full swing. 

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Components of the National Strategy

Best Practice: Ad Council Campaign: Keep America Beautiful!

The Keep America Beautiful campaign was introduced in 1971 with the now famous 

weeping Indian, Iron Eyes Cody, sitting atop his horse looking at a river as different 

kinds of garbage floated by. Since its introduction, the campaign helped to usher in 

Earth Day, the Environmental Protection Agency, motivated 100,000 people in the first 

4 months to request a booklet on how to reduce pollution, and helped reduce litter by as 

much as 88 percent by 1983. Even though the campaign ended in 1983, the long-term 

effect is evident 3 decades later in myriad ways: people no longer litter with impunity, 

tough environmental laws keep flagrant pollution in check, and as a society we think very 

differently about protecting our land and water than we did in the 1970s.

Best Practice: Ad Council Campaign: Only You Can Prevent Forest Fires!

The campaign to prevent forest fires in America began in 1944 when the world met 

Smokey Bear, the second most recognized image in America today. It remains the longest 

running public service announcement campaign in U.S. history. Smokey’s message of 

personal responsibility resonated with millions of Americans and resulted in a dramatic 

decrease in forest fires during the past 60 years. Specific results: loss of forestland from 

fire has dropped from 22 million acres in 1944 to less than 8 million acres today; and 

thousands of boys and girls have joined the Junior Forest Ranger program. Since 1980, 

the Ad Council received more than $1 billion in donated media and in 2002 distributed 

more than 15, 000 kits to educate children aged 4 to 11 in preventing wildfires. Since 2001, 

the Ad Council updated its campaign to the tagline “Only you can prevent wildfires,” 

and included an updated interactive web site. In the first 5 months of 2005 the web site 

recorded 524,451 visitors.
28

V. Legislation

Recommendation: Compile and maintain a comprehensive document outlining identity theft legislation 

for all 50 states and the federal government.

Discussion: Successful partnerships among law enforcement, the financial industry, 

and other public agencies require, at a minimum, a common language and common 

understanding of the prevalence, characteristics, and effects of all types of identity 

crime, irrespective of semantic labels or enforcement responsibilities. Identity theft 

is a subset of criminal activity associated with identity crime. Identity crime consists 

of identity theft, credit card fraud, check fraud, bank fraud, false identity fraud, 

and passport/visa fraud. In light of this, legislation that deals with identity crime at 

both the federal and state levels should be accessible to all state-level prosecutors, 

legislators, and analysts who may be involved with identity theft. In fact, many current 

laws may provide the necessary prosecutorial authority to deal with identity theft. In 

addition, prosecutors at the federal, state, and local levels may have used different 

approaches to prosecute identity theft and this information needs to be collected and 

disseminated for use by others. The information discussed below provides a general 

background for the recent legislation enacted to fight identity theft.

In 1998, Congress enacted the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act that 

makes identity theft a federal crime, with penalties of up to 25 years of imprisonment 

and a maximum fine of $250,000 (Title 18, USC Section 1028). In 2004, Congress 

enacted the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act that not only expanded the 

scope and increased certain penalties in Section 1028, but established the new crime 

of aggravated identity theft. Under the aggravated identity theft provisions, a person 

who commits identity theft during and in relationship to any of an extensive list of 

federal felonies would receive a 2-year mandatory term of imprisonment (or a 5-year 

term in terrorism-related cases) in addition to any other sentence that a court would 

impose for all other offenses of conviction.

The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act establishes that the person whose 

identity was stolen is a true victim. Previously, only credit grantors who suffered 

monetary losses were considered victims. This legislation enables the U.S. Secret 

Service, the FBI, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and other law enforcement agencies 

to combat this crime. It also allows the identity theft victim to seek restitution if there 

is a conviction. The legislation provides that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will 

act as the clearinghouse for complaints. Section 5 of Title 18 USC 1028 mandates the 

FTC to refer complaints of identity theft to the appropriate law enforcement agencies 

(including local agencies) for potential action.

The Fair and Accurate Transactions Credit Act (FACT Act), which amended the Fair 

Credit Reporting Act, became effective in December 2004. The FACT Act establishes 

requirements for consumer reporting agencies, creditors, and others to help remedy 

identity theft. It also provides certain rights and privileges to victims of identity theft 

to recuperate losses and damages made by the perpetrator of the crime. Some of 

these rights and privileges include, but are not limited to, the following:

One-call fraud alerts to consumer reporting agencies

Access to free consumer credit reports

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•

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Access to all application and business records evidencing any transaction alleged 

to be a result of identity theft upon providing a police report

Access to all application and business records evidencing any transaction alleged 

to be a result of identity theft by law enforcement agencies, when acting as the 

agent of the victim

Blocking information resulting from identity theft on consumer credit reports

Access to blocked information by law enforcement agencies.

Accessing information is lengthy and difficult for the victim, and before the victim 

can exercise the above rights and privileges, he or she is required to file a crime report 

with a local law enforcement agency. 

An unpublished study of identity theft by the National White Collar Crime Center has 

as one of its objectives to determine the scope of each state’s statutes. The findings 

demonstrated the disparity among states regarding reporting, investigating, and 

prosecuting identity theft crimes. Some states, for example, specifically require that 

law enforcement agencies take the identity theft report if the victim resides in their 

jurisdictions. Other states are either silent or overly broad on which law enforcement 

agency must take the report, based on where the victim resides, where the crime was 

committed, or where the perpetrator resides. This situation causes problems for both 

the police and the victims.

The disparity in dealing with identity theft on the state level tacitly underscores 

one of the key issues associated with prosecuting identity crimes. At issue are the 

definitional concerns associated with segmenting identity theft from identity crimes. 

Numerous state laws are in force against what might be characterized as identity 

crimes, that is, check fraud and visa/passport fraud. In fact, many of the participants 

at the November 2004 National Strategy Meeting view these laws as providing ample 

prosecutorial power to arrest and prosecute identity thieves, yet no compilation 

or reference document is available to states attorneys general, law enforcement 

agencies, or local prosecutors outlining federal and individual states’ statutes. Since 

a high percentage of identity theft occurs through multistate and multijurisdictional 

connections, prosecutors and law enforcement officials should have at their disposal 

a comprehensive document outlining state and federal laws that can be used as a 

resource for prosecuting identity crimes. 

This document would be a valuable resource for legislators and their staffs at both the 

federal and state levels to determine the types of identity theft legislation currently in 

effect. It would provide legislative and policy analysts with a compilation of identity 

theft laws and their corresponding impact on the effectiveness of the national 

strategy. In addition, security and fraud departments of businesses and financial 

institutions would have a ready reference for understanding the laws of their local 

jurisdictions, as well as federal statutes that can be invoked for multistate prosecution. 

This reference work brings an inherent need to update the document as state and 

federal statutes change.

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•

Components of the National Strategy
30

VI. Information Protection

Recommendation: Provide funding for national public education for consumers and merchants that 

focuses specifically on information protection; undertake legislation and/or public education targeting 

specific audiences for information protection.

Discussion: Since the crime of identity theft is relatively new to the population of 

the United States and there is ample evidence that public education programs are 

effective, funding the development of a national education campaign will result in a 

highly effective method of curtailing identity theft. The public education campaign 

would target consumers, merchants, and any other company that maintains records 

containing personal identifying information.

Identity theft is facilitated when consumers and businesses are careless with credit 

card information and social security numbers. In addition, consumers are unaware 

of how to protect their computers from someone intent on stealing personal 

information. 

A public education campaign would warn consumers and businesses to shred 

documents containing personal information, to not leave mail containing personal 

information in mailboxes, and provide instructions on how to obtain software to 

protect home computers. Currently, consumers receive some advice in the media; for 

example, vendors of shredding machines warn consumers to shred all documents 

containing personal information so it is not stolen from trash bins. These ads, 

however, are not necessarily seen by large segments of the population. And while 

Citigroup Inc., is credited with running ads that warn consumers of identity theft, 

these ads contain information only on how Citigroup protects the consumer but 

offers no advice about personal protection for and by the consumer. 

Merchants can contribute to identity theft by being careless with receipts that show 

full credit card numbers, thereby providing easy access to those numbers by sales 

clerks, waiters, and others who may have criminal intent. Federal legislation prohibits 

merchants from printing out the full credit card number, but enforcement is slow 

to follow legislation. Some merchants voluntarily put only the last four digits of 

the credit card on both the merchant/signature copy and the consumer copy, in an 

attempt to decrease availability of the full card number. A public education campaign 

would remind merchants and retailers of the new laws.

Training institutions have found that an easy method of identifying students is to use 

their social security numbers on application and course registration forms. Several 

cases of identity theft resulting in massive losses have been blamed on this practice, 

but public education campaigns or state-level legislation could effectively curb this 

practice.

The use of photographs and PINs as easily verifiable identification are used in many 

venues, such as on a driver’s license. Some bank-issued credit cards offer the option of 

having one’s photograph on the card. While the practice may be a cost consideration 

for private enterprise, ultimately the decrease in identity theft losses may offset the 

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cost of the photos. The project team recommends that legislation and/or a public 

education campaign targeting credit card companies be undertaken to improve 

information protection.

The practice of contacting the purchaser directly before processing an order could 

protect millions of consumers. Verification that the order is being placed by the 

rightful credit card holder, when a signature or photo are not available, is critical and 

could be accomplished by telephoning the permanent residence of the card member/

purchaser. This practice should be promulgated as a preferred practice through 

legislation and/or a public education campaign. 

§ “Advances and Applications: 

Minnesota Awards New Secure 

Driver’s License Contract,” The 

Police Chief magazine, January 

2005, page 12. International 

Association of Chiefs of Police, 

Alexandria, Virginia.

Components of the National Strategy

Best Practice: Verification of Purchaser

Two computer companies verify credit card purchases differently. The first company 

verifies the credit card purchaser by calling a credit bureau while the second company 

calls the credit card company. The first company experiences greater losses from 

credit card fraud than the second company. A certain company that offers Internet 

purchasing has a policy of calling the credit card holder before approving the 

purchases. If the credit card holder does not answer the telephone, the order is 

immediately canceled. 

Best Practice: State of Minnesota

Minnesota recently took action to implement security protection for drivers’ licenses. 

The newly designed card includes advanced, interlocking security features designed 

to thwart duplication or alteration of the state’s cards, and a covert digital watermark 

feature can verify the authenticity of a driver’s license at point of inspection. The 

new card design also incorporates a custom security laminate and other unique design 

features that will make it extremely difficult to counterfeit or alter the card without 

obvious detection.§ 
32

Myriad actions are possible by government and social agencies that may deter identity 

theft effectively; however, research is needed to identify those actions. For example, 

vast amounts of personal information are available through state motor vehicle 

offices, health providers (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare), 

the Social Security Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service. Yet there does 

not appear to be any large-scale effort to protect the information and prevent identity 

theft in a coordinated or collaborative way. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 

established the Subcommittee on Identity Theft in 1999 devoted to identity theft to 

discuss a wide range of issues. While the subcommittee has no authority to implement 

the suggestions developed, many of the member agencies have taken significant 

action. The U.S. Secret Service (USSS), for example, developed a CD-ROM containing 

resources for law enforcement agencies. DOJ, in cooperation with the USSS, FTC, 

U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and the American Association of Motor Vehicle 

Administrators, developed a series of regional training seminars on identity theft for 

state and local law enforcement. For a greater impact on identity theft, additional 

coordinated response and prevention could be developed through research that 

identifies gaps and needs.

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Best Practice: The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), 

U.S Department of Justice

On January 27 and 28, 2005, the NIJ held a 2-day focus group to identify research 

areas pertinent to identity theft to help practitioners improve their practice. Examples 

of research questions posed were: To what extent are public and private organizations 

perpetuating this crime? What are the effects of identity theft on health care costs? To 

what degree, and how, is identity theft related to terrorism, immigration? Are gangs 

frequent identity theft thieves or involved with crime rings? What are the high-risk 

factors for victims? How many identity theft perpetrators have been investigated and 

prosecuted successfully, or prosecuted at all? What are the most effective deterrence 

mechanisms? What is the geographic spread of identity theft? What is the optimum 

point for crime analysis for identity theft: local, state, federal?
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VII. Training

Recommendation: All police, prosecutor, victim assistance, and private-sector organizations affected 

by any facet of identity theft conduct an assessment of identity theft training needs, and seek training 

to meet needs. 

Discussion: The crime of identity theft is legally, socially, and (in some of its most 

sophisticated cases) technologically complex. Developing effective responses will 

require addressing a broad range of issues including legislative and legal reform; 

new coordinating structures among law enforcement, victim, and private-sector 

organizations; new reporting and data-sharing procedures; information security 

procedures; and victim assistance and public awareness programs. Because 

tactical and strategic responses are still being formulated, it is premature to lay 

out a comprehensive program of training needs. Yet it is not too soon for the 

affected parties to begin to address the training needs of their respective agencies 

systematically. In a project literature review, focus groups, project surveys, and a major 

cities chiefs survey identified numerous training needs and existing training initiatives. 

Taken together, these needs and initiatives suggest that, at least for law enforcement, 

four areas of training have already been identified: 

Training by law enforcement for businesses and citizens

In-house training for all police officers on the proper way to process identity theft 

complaints

Specialized training for investigators from agency and contractor sources

Training for officers and investigators on handling victim assistance. 

•

•

•

•

Components of the National Strategy

Best Practice: The National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C)

The NW3C offers training in computer crime and forensics and in financial crime 

investigation. A new course on white-collar crime and terrorism addresses money 

laundering, identity theft, and prosecuting cases under the RICO-type law as it relates 

to terrorism financing. NW3C also offers analytical services. For more information and 

a list of all NW3C law enforcement training, please visit the web site at 

www.nw3c.org, or call NW3C at 804.323.3563 or 800.221.4424.
34

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Best Practice: Training for Business and Citizens: Carson City (Nevada) 

Sheriff ’s Department

The Carson City Sheriff ’s Department (CCSD) conducts a biannual training seminar 

to enlist the help of the city’s businesses and citizens in combating identity theft. The 

seminars focus primarily on stopping check fraud, a common form of identity theft 

related to casino operations because customers expect casinos to cash checks so they 

can gamble. Because perpetrators are hard to catch and cases are difficult to prosecute, 

the CCSD enlisted business and citizen cooperation to help stop thieves. Initially, 

the 6-hour classes included only casino operators, along with the department’s fraud 

detectives, an attorney from the district attorney’s office, a check fraud investigator, 

and crime lab technicians. Casino operators were taught how to identify counterfeit 

checks, advised of their legal right to require fingerprints on checks, and coached on 

the importance of obtaining a positive identification. A major emphasis of the class 

is to educate casino operators on the critical importance of collecting information 

from check cashers that will allow investigators to make a positive identification of 

those who commit check fraud. Recently, classes have been open to the general public 

to educate people about preventing the theft of checks, the precursor crime of much 

of the fraud, and meetings held with casino security so they can help with on-site 

apprehension. The frequency and flexibility of the training seminars allows the CCSD 

to adjust the content to changes in criminal behavior.

Contact: Carson City Sheriff ’s Department, 775.887.2020

Best Practice: Training for Investigators—Michigan State Police

As part of its mission to investigate identity theft cases statewide, the Michigan State 

Police ID Theft Unit developed a training program to assist local law enforcement 

officers in investigating and preparing identity theft cases for warrants and trial. The 

Michigan State Police wanted to ensure that officers did not miss opportunities to 

pursue identity theft cases because of a lack of legal knowledge of what is needed 

to investigate and prosecute successfully. The MSP unit works with prosecutors in all 

parts of the state and they are able to share the legal insights of prosecutors in one 

jurisdiction with investigators statewide. For example, based on techniques developed 

by local prosecutors in Ingham County (Lansing), ID Theft Unit personnel teach 

police officers how to authenticate business records for preliminary hearings and trial. 

Based on the work of prosecutors in Wayne County (Detroit), they are spreading the 

practice of substituting witness affidavits for in-person appearances of witnesses at 

trial. They also have created a network of contacts and provide local officers with a 

directory of who to call, along with questions and a list of contacts at local banks and 

credit card companies.

Contact: Michigan State Police, 877.MI.ID.THEFT 
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Components of the National Strategy

Best Practice: Federal Regional Training Seminars for Local Law Enforcement

Since 2002, a consortium of federal agencies (U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Postal 

Inspection Service, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission, and 

recently the Federal Bureau of Investigation) have hosted a series of regional seminars 

for local law enforcement. The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators 

is also a principal sponsor. The 1-day seminars include presentations by the federal 

agencies on the resources and assistance they can provide to local officials on identity 

theft. The Secret Service presents an introduction to the use of its Identity Crime 

video and CD-ROM resource guide and demonstrates its E-information Network. 

Other federal agency representatives demonstrate how to use federal databases such 

as the FTC’s Sentinel identity theft database and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service’s 

financial crimes and fraudulent address databases. A panel of local prosecutors 

discusses suggested practices for prosecuting ID theft cases. Representatives from 

private industry explain the role of the private industry fraud investigator. State motor 

vehicle investigators explain new developments in driver’s license security features. 

Currently, the group sponsors an average of four to six seminars a year.

Contacts: Fraud Section of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice: 

www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud.html, 202.514.7023 

American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators: www.aamva.org, 703.522.4200

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Developing a 

Comprehensive Strategy 

to Combat Idenity Theft

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Developing a Comprehensive Strategy to 

Combat Identity Theft

In the context of identity theft, strategy evolves from a strategic thinking process 

instead of a strategic planning effort. Strategic thinking is a threat-based formulation 

process that enables decision makers to step out of the box and make no 

preconceived decisions about an issue until they have developed a list of types and 

specific threats. In this way, strengths, weaknesses, and solutions are not defined by 

organizational policy or limited by any individual in a preemptive attempt to confine 

the solution to what is possible at present. Instead, the strategic thinking process 

seeks to unbridle the solutions from what is possible now, to what must be done in 

the future to close the gaps between current and future capability and the capacity to 

hinder and stop criminal identity theft attacks. Strategic thinking uses a synthesizing 

process of intuition and imagination to develop an integrated perspective of the 

threats posed by identity theft criminals. Strategy development in this sense has two 

dimensions coalescing into a workable and effective complimentary relationship, each 

working in the interest of the other. 

The first step in the process is to develop an overarching or umbrella strategy that 

lays out broad guidelines or the big picture of the magnitude of the issue and its 

potential threats. Without this overarching strategy any meaningful investment 

approach would be hampered by a disjointed approach to the design, development, 

and implementation of actions designed to foster progress. 

The next step in strategy development is best described as emergent. The emergent 

phase allows senior decision makers to control or manage the process of strategy 

formation while leaving the content to others. The key to managing strategy is 

the ability to detect emerging patterns and help them take shape. To that end, 

management in this context is defined as creating the climate within which a wide 

variety of strategies can develop.§ 

Individuals who must deal with the aftermath of the damage caused by identity 

thieves have the experience to develop true knowledge of the complexities of the 

challenges. This knowledge is derived from deep insights into trends, the type, and 

the frequency of identity crime. Technology, demographics, regulations, laws, and 

prosecution efforts can be harnessed to rewrite organizational and governmental rules 

and laws to create a strategic and tactical advantage over the identity criminal.§§ One 

of the most compelling requirements in developing an umbrella strategy to deal with 

identity theft, therefore, is the ability to create a complementary set of efforts and 

actions designed to build synergy among the different functions or sectors. 

During the strategic development meeting held by the Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, Johns Hopkins University, and the Major City Chiefs Association 

in November 2004 in Baltimore, Maryland, the participants heard a presentation 

offering this threat-based approach to strategic thinking. Following a presentation 

on strategic thinking and planning, participants engaged in a three-step approach to 

developing elements of the national strategy on identity theft. The steps included: 

(1) identification of threats: present and future; (2) identification of strengths and 

§ Mintzberg, H. Crafting Strategy, 

Harvard Business Review; July–

August 1987, pages 65–74.

§§ Hamel, G. and C. K. Prahald. 

Competing for the Future, Harvard 

Business Review; July–August 

1994, pages 2–9.

Developing a Comprehensive Strategy to Combat Identity Theft
weaknesses within the current sectors; and, (3) gap analysis, definition of, and 

recommendations for, filling the gaps.

1. Identification of Threats: Perpetrator Tactics: In the first part of the strategic 

thinking meeting held on November 2004, participants were split into four groups 

representing four sectors: law enforcement, corporate entities, prosecutors, and 

federal agencies. (Victim assistance professionals became members of those sectors 

most appropriate to their location in the government structure.) Each group was 

asked to identify current and potential identity theft perpetrator threats to, and tactics 

for, citizens in the United States. 

40

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Common: Present

Camera phone

Internet scams

Convict labor taking catalog orders

Social engineering: posing as 

reputable agent

Instant credit at cash registers

Hotel key cards

Microfiche checks

Online order takers

Reservation clerks

Skimming: skimmer-specific laws

Office “creeps”: impersonating 

employees

State ID card theft 

Transactional fraud

Nontransactional fraud

Dumpster diving

Shoulder surfing

Burglary

Phishing/spoofing

Computer intrusion

Pre-texting

Common: Future

Credit card crime

Checks, balance transactions

Account information

Ongoing technical sophistication

Easier access to information

Increase in network thefts

Youth awareness/access growth in 

the arms race

Youth online misconduct

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Serious: Present

Mail theft

County/city jail check fraud

Physical entry

Inside fraud

Computer security intelligence: improper disposal, phishing

Credit pre-approval

Mortgage frauds

True name identity theft

Transactional

Hacking

Personal fraud

Organized groups

Identity takeover

Networked (informal and organized)

Anonymity

Vulnerable victims

Multijurisdictional

Increased dependency on technology

Mobility 

Serious: Future

Creation of criminal enterprises

Epidemiological character

Wireless networks

Improved theft technologies/methods

Growth of database information

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Types of Perpetrator Tactics
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2. Identification of Strengths and Weaknesses: Each group identified the current 

strengths and weaknesses of each of their respective sectors. Lists were shared among 

the groups.

Developing a Comprehensive Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Strengths and Weaknesses: Law Enforcement Sector

Strengths: Present

Broad laws to cover future thefts

Check 21: image instant access

FTC/identity theft/other reports/common data elements/statistics

 Weaknesses: Present

Absence of video/teleconferencing

Absence of certification/standards initiatives across local and state agencies

Absence of ability to analyze crime

Absence of consistent training

Strengths: Future

Partnerships

National report/national database

Law wording

Education/training for patrol officers

Check 21

Legislation for federal 

o Victims

o Law enforcement cooperation (labor intensive)

o Cooperation

o Multijurisdictional cooperation

o Government public service announcement delivery

 Weaknesses: Future

Lack of interagency cooperation

o Databases

Senior administrator support and education

Victim runaround

Lack of sufficient resources

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Strengths

Multidimensional database

Security systems: provide photos

Tight application processes for 

credit

Uniform training for investigators 

and prosecutors

Tight background checks

Fingerprint records

Development of model curriculum 

for training of investigators and 

prosecution

Perp ID (fingerprints, photos/

video)

System flexibility

Private/public-sector partnerships

Point of sale/transaction increased 

security

Financial institution deposit 

protocols

Identification and integration of 

benefits of increased security and 

enforcement to all sectors (quantify)

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Weaknesses

Inability to seize assets

Uniform Crime Report (UCR) not used 

as reporting code

Lack of current partnerships

Lack of training

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Strengths and Weaknesses: Prosecution Sector

Strengths

Technology developments

o Reactive

o Proactive

Consumer education

Increasing defenses

o More data elements to authenticate

Keeper of identities is a position of 

strength

Financial services lead on best 

practices/models

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Weaknesses

No sense of urgency, acceptable margins 

of losses

Anonymity/privacy is a cultural fight

Convenience is a cultural trait

Availability of information facilitated by 

continued improvements in technology

Limits on data sharing within industry; 

within and without of law enforcement

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Strengths and Weaknesses: Private-Industry Sector
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Developing a Comprehensive Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Strengths and Weaknesses: Federal Sector

Strengths: Present

Corporate consumer goodwill increased

Increasing training for law enforcement

Improving cooperation with law enforcement and other groups

FTC clearinghouse

Citibank ads: public awareness 

Verification/authentication

Automated account transactions

Corporate enforcement/prosecution/investigation

Organized groups

Ability to obtain evidence

 Weaknesses: Present

Lack of prosecution/inconsistent

Poor collection of information/data

Inconsistent sensitivity to victims

Privacy groups/advocates

Lack of technology at local level

Strengths: Future

Improve data exchange/sharing

o Systems

o Procedures

o Analysis

Consistent collection/dissemination policy/procedures

Improve education/awareness

o Law enforcement 

o Public/victims

Improve technologies/systems

 Weaknesses: Future

Change the corporate policy/philosophy

Enriched database information

Shortcoming in public awareness of weaknesses in Internet system accuracy

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Strengths: Prepetator

Knowledge of system regularities 

(thresholds) and skills to carry out

Access to info (how) and equipment

Knowledge of sophistication of 

equipment

Anonymity

Fluid and flexible

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Weaknesses: Prepetator

Repeats same behavior until caught

Not savvy; keeps evidence, uses own 

info

Record of financial problems

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44

3. Identification of and Recommendations for Filling the Gaps: Once the threats, 

strengths, and weaknesses had been defined, the next step was to delineate the gaps 

between the strengths and weaknesses and develop specific recommendations for 

filling the gaps. 

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Channel Interrupt Analytic: Developed by the U.S. Department of Justice 

Subcommittee on Identity Theft, channel-interrupt analytic is an analytic approach 

that provides a different perspective on identity theft and is another, more disciplined 

means of identifying possible weaknesses in information flow channels.

Channel-interrupt analytic is based on the idea of a stream or channel of information 

into which interruptions can be inserted to disrupt the ability of criminal elements to 

obtain or freely use personal information. It provides a systematic way of detailing 

information flow and potential points of intrusion by identity thieves.

Prevention

Awareness campaigns: seniors, 

adults, children 

ID theft victims’ assistance centers 

Analyze channels to develop points 

for intervention (e-mail, mail, credit 

cards, banks, new accounts)

Consent release of social security 

numbers 

Develop models of detection

Statutory reform; uniform state 

statutes

Analyze business/victim 

demographics 

UCR category for identity theft 

Develop partnerships with MVA 

Centralized data collection and 

investigation by state 

Invest in technology

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Enforcement

Partnerships/task forces

Training-officers, investigators, 

prosecutors

Enhanced penalties

Identifiable points of contact: federal, 

state, local

Increased data sharing: corporate and 

law enforcement

Public/private partnerships and 

undercover operations

Identify optimal location for database 

clearinghouses

Apply RICO statute

Develop models for multijurisdictional 

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Summary Recommendations: Prevention and Enforcement
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45

Developing a Comprehensive Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

The illustration demonstrates an example of the channel-interrupt analytic as it 

applies to the mail. Within the channel, there are five points where an agency, 

organization, or individual has the responsibility of providing safeguards against 

identity crime. At point 1, financial and personal information originates at a financial 

or agency site for transmission through the mail to an individual. Since such 

information is most likely sent in bulk, a reasonable question to ask is: How can a 

financial institution prevent an employee from taking a letter or statement from the 

mass mailing to use criminally? At point 2, the information enters the mail system to 

begin its journey to the individual. What safeguards does the U.S. Postal Service have 

to prevent unauthorized people from taking information? At point 3, the individual 

receives the information in his or her mailbox. What safeguards, if any, are at the 

individual’s residence to safeguard the information while it remains in the mailbox; 

for example, is the mailbox locked or is the mailbox a slot in the door? At point 4, 

once the information is taken from the mailbox, how long and where is the mail kept 

before a person acts on its contents? When acting on the contents, either by replying 

or paying by check, what happens to the information? Is it kept in a secure place or is 

it discarded? At point 5, when the mail is discarded, is it shredded or just thrown out? 

As demonstrated, these interrupt points provide insight into places along the channel 

where safeguards can be inserted to provide an extra measure of safety and security 

for personal information.

Financial 

and Personal 

Information 

Originates

Information 

Mailed

Information 

Received in 

Individual’s 

Mailbox

Individual 

Discards 

Information

Individual 

Acts on 

Information

Mail Channel

Channel-Interrupt Analytic
46

Identifying Channels: Different types of information channels could be analyzed 

using the channel-interrupt process. The analyst can begin with one of the starting 

points, for example, a credit card company, and specify the specific channels used in 

the transmission of personal information. Such channels include the mail system; 

cyber, including web sites and e-mail; wireless communications, both computer and 

cell phones; telephone; in person, including retail; government records; and trusted 

providers such as medical offices, auto service centers, and insurance companies.

 As detailed earlier in this report, the participants in the strategic thinking meeting 

recommended seven components as the basis of a national identity theft strategy: 

1) partnerships and collaboration; 2) reporting procedures; 3) victim assistance; 4) 

public awareness; 5) legislation; 6) information protection; and 7) training. Added to 

this as part of the national strategy is the channel-interrupt analytic. Each component 

demonstrates its efficacy for enhancing the ability of citizens, private institutions, 

and law enforcement to defend, track, pursue, arrest, and/or prosecute identity theft 

criminals. Using the channel-interrupt process, the information protection component 

can be analyzed to ensure that all points of vulnerability are secure. 

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft
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Defining Identity Theft

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49

Defining Idenity Theft

The problem of defining identity theft arises because the term covers a variety of 

criminal behaviors and means different things to different people. Members of the 

financial industry, for example, typically exclude the unauthorized use of existing 

credit card accounts (which accounts for a large proportion of all identity theft crime) 

from the definition of identity theft. Typically, they view identity theft as an issue 

restricted to the less frequent and more serious incidents involving the use of another 

person’s personal information to take over existing accounts, open new credit card 

or bank accounts, obtain loans, incur debts, or commit other financial crimes. Law 

enforcement, on the other hand, typically views the above behaviors as incidents of 

identity theft along with the use of another person’s identity to commit nonfinancial 

crimes such as using another person’s identity to avoid criminal arrest and prosecution. 

Successful partnerships between law enforcement and the financial industry (where 

the vast majority of all identity crimes occur) requires a common language and 

common understanding of the prevalence, characteristics, and effects of all kinds of 

identity crime, irrespective of semantic labels or enforcement responsibilities. 

Until recently, state and federal statutes did not distinguish identity theft from other 

types of fraud. With new legislation, a number of states and the federal government 

have legally defined the elements of identity theft in separate identity theft statutes. 

The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 defines identity theft 

as a federal crime when someone “knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful 

authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or 

to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that 

constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law.” The statute is broad in 

scope, which gives federal agents and U.S. Attorneys flexibility in enforcement. The 

federal statutory definition includes crimes involving the misuse of existing credit card 

accounts, in line with the law enforcement view of identity theft. 

For the purpose of collecting statistical information and the analytic development of 

law enforcement strategies and tactics, both comprehensive and specific definitions 

are needed to capture the range of empirically observed behaviors that fit within 

broad statutory definitions. Among the numerous government reports on identity 

theft, the most specific and comprehensive empirical definition is that developed for 

the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) “Identity Theft Survey Report” (prepared by 

Synovate, September 2003). It is the report of the findings of a comprehensive survey 

of the adult population in the United States to estimate the incidence (frequency), 

characteristics, and effects of different types of identity theft. Survey questions 

elicited information about five major categories of identity theft. The five categories 

listed in reverse order of seriousness are the following:

1) The unauthorized use of existing credit card accounts.

2) The unauthorized use of other types of existing accounts, such as bank and 

telephone accounts. 

3) The takeover of existing credit card accounts, for example, by changing the billing 

address or adding unauthorized users to the account.

Defining Identity Theft
4) The unauthorized use of personal information to obtain new credit cards, incur 

debts, open other new accounts, or commit some other financial crime in the 

victim’s name.

5) The unauthorized use of personal information to commit a nonfinancial crime 

in the victim’s name, such as using the victim’s name as one’s own when caught 

committing a crime or using the victim’s name to obtain government documents, 

such as a driver’s license.

Statisticians estimated that in 2002, the year preceding the survey, 4.6 percent of the 

adult population in the United States, or 9.91 million persons, had been the victim 

of one or more of these kinds of identity theft. Of these roughly 10 million victims 

(categorized by the most serious theft of which they were a victim), statistics showed 

the following:

Fifty-two percent reported being the victim of only the unauthorized use of an 

existing credit card account.

Fifteen percent reported being the victim of unauthorized use of other types of 

existing accounts.

Eleven percent reported being the victim of the takeover of an existing credit 

card account (this category is not mutually exclusive of other categories).

Seventeen percent reported the unauthorized use of personal information to 

obtain new credit cards or loans, incur debts, open other accounts, or commit 

other types of financial crimes. 

Fifteen percent reported the unauthorized use of personal information to commit 

nonfinancial fraud or crimes such as using the victim’s name as one’s own when 

caught committing a crime, or using the victim’s name to obtain government 

documents such as a drivers license, or to rent a house or gain employment.

The survey documents the high proportion of identity theft that involves credit card 

misuse. In addition to the 52 percent of victims who reported only unauthorized 

use of an existing credit card account, another 15 percent reported unauthorized 

use of an existing credit card account as one of several kinds of identity theft of 

which they were a victim, and 8 percent reported that a new credit card account was 

opened in their name. Between 67 percent and 75 percent of all identity theft victims 

reported some form of credit card theft. Overall, the FTC survey data indicate that 85 

percent of all identity theft crimes involve the financial services industry. Of the total 

estimated financial loss from identity theft of $52.6 billion, 90 percent involves losses 

to businesses and financial institutions.§

•

•

•

•

•

50

§ Federal Trade Commission. 

Identity Theft Survey Report, 2003.

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft
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10101010101000101010

Appendixes

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53

Appendix A

Federal Trade Commission: Identity Theft Survey 

In telephone interviews, 4,057 adults were asked the following questions about 

identity theft:

1. Has anyone ever misused your credit card or credit card number to place 

charges on your account without your permission? Did the misuse of your credit 

card(s) involve the use of lost or stolen credit cards?

 

2. Did someone attempt to take over the credit card account that had been 

misused, for example, by changing the billing address on the account or adding 

himself or herself as an authorized user of the account?

3. Has anyone ever misused any of your existing accounts other than a credit 

card account, for example, a bank or wireless telephone account, without your 

permission to incur charges or to take money from your accounts?

4. Have you ever been the victim of a different form of identity theft, one that 

involved more than just the misuse of existing accounts or numbers? That is, has 

anyone used your personal information without your permission to obtain new 

credit cards or loans in your name, incur debts in your name, open other accounts, 

or otherwise commit theft, fraud, or some other crime?

Question 3 included a series of questions to determine types of existing accounts 

misused: checking or savings, insurance (medical, automobile, life), Internet or e-mail, 

telephone, or others.

Question 4 included a series of questions to determine how personal information 

was misused: to obtain new credit cards, loans, insurance policies, incur debts, open 

Internet or e-mail accounts, open telephone accounts, open other accounts, or 

otherwise commit theft, fraud, or some other crime such as the following:

File a fraudulent tax return

Obtain medical care

Obtain employment

Provide name and ID information to police when arrested for a crime

Rent an apartment or house

Obtain a driver’s license, social security card, or other government documents

Do anything else.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Appendixes
54

Appendix B

Identity Theft Focus Group

May 3-4, 2004

Charlotte Marriott City Center

Focus Group Participants

0011001100110101011100010100010100100011110000101

A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Sergeant Chris Abbas

Minneapolis Police Department

350 South 5th Street

Minneapolis, MN 55415

cmabbas@netscape.net

612.328.7490

Captain John Bell

Virginia Beach Police Department

Detective Bureau

2509 Princess Anne Road

Virginia Beach, VA 23456

jobell@vbgov.com

757.427.4709

Chief Vince Bevan

Ottawa Police Service

P.O. Box 9634, Station T

Ottawa, ON K1G6H5

Canada

BevanV@ottawapolice.ca

613.236.1222

Ms. Kathy Buller

Counsel

Office of the Inspector General, SSA

6401 Security Boulevard

Baltimore, MD 20235

Kathy.buller@ssa.gov

410.966.5136

Ms. Ronni Burns

Director of Business Practices

CitiCards

One Court Square, 41st floor

Long Island City, NY 11120

Ronni.burns@citigroup.com

718.248.4110

Ms. Kathleen Claffie

Investigator, ID Theft Program

Federal Trade Commission

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20580

kclaffie@ftc.gov

202.326.3888

Ms. Joanna Crane

Attorney

Federal Trade Commission

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20580

jcrane@ftc.gov

202.326.3258

Mr. Wayne DelTufo

U.S. Secret Service, NC SAC

6302 Fairview Road, Suite 400

Charlotte, NC 28210

Wayne.deltufo@usss.dhs.gov

704.442.8370

Mr. Christer Di Chiara

ID Analytics

9444 Balboa Avenue, Suite 200

San Diego, CA 92123

cdichiara@idanalytics.com

858.427.2833

Major Anthony Ell

Kansas City Police Department

1125 Locust Street

Kansas City, MO 64106

aell@kcpd.org

816.234.5159
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55

Appendixes

Ms. Caroline Farmer

Special Counsel

North Carolina Office of the Attorney 

 General

North Carolina Department of Justice

P.O. Box 629

Raleigh, NC 27602-0629

cfarmer@ncdoj.com

919.716.0126

Chief David Fisher

Denver Police Department

1331 Cherokee Street

Denver, CO 80204

fisherd@ci.denver.co.us

720.913.6037

Mr. Selden Fritschner

Law Enforcement Liaison

American Association of Motor Vehicle 

 Administrators

4301 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 400

Arlington, VA 22203

sfritschner@aamva.org

703.908.5855

Detective Chaughan Garvey

Ottawa Police Service

P.O. Box 9634, Station T

Ottawa, ON K1G6H5

Canada

garveyc@ottawapolice.ca

613.236.1222

 Lieutenant John Hagen

Milwaukee Police Department

749 West State Street

Milwaukee, WI 53233

jmhage@milwaukee.gov

414.935.7360

Ms. Susan Hall

901 Metro Center Boulevard

Foster City, CA 94404

shall@visa.com

650.432.2964

Trooper Jesse Harper

Michigan State Police

First District ID Theft Task Force

7119 North Canal Road

Lansing, MI 48913

harperjj@michigan.gov

517.322.0675

Sergeant Don Hensick

San Francisco Police Department

850 Bryant Street

Room 419, Fraud Detail

San Francisco, CA 94103

cutbait@ix.netcom.com

415.553.9069

Lieutenant Chip Johnson

South Carolina Law Enforcement 

 Division

P.O. Box 21398

Columbia, SC 29221-1398

cjohnson@sled.sc.gov

803.772.5868

Mr. Mark Johnson

Supervisory Special Agent

Federal Bureau of Investigation, SAC

400 South Tryon Street, Suite 900

Charlotte, NC 28285-0001

704.331.4540

Sergeant Terry Joyner

Atlanta Police Department

675 Ponce De Leon Avenue, N.E. 

6th floor

Atlanta, GA 30308

tjoyner@atlantapd.org

404.853.4240

Assistant Chief Andrew Kirkland

Glendale Police Department

6835 North 57th Drive

Glendale, AZ 85301

akirkland@glendaleAZ.com

623.930.3051
56

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Deputy Chief Anthony Lanata

Columbus Police Department

120 Marconi Boulevard

Columbus, OH 43215

alanata@columbuspolice.org

614.645.4715

Mr. Max Marker

Supervisory Special Agent

Federal Bureau of Investigations

935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20536

mmarker@leo.gov

202.324.5659

Assistant Chief Charles McClelland

Houston Police Department

1200 Travis Street

Houston, TX 77002

camcclelland@hotmail.com

713.308.1583

Mr. John McCullough

Minnesota Financial Crimes Task Force

P.O. Box 21007

Columbia Heights, MN 55421

612.328.3651

Mr. Brian McGinley

Wachovia Corporation-NCO290

1525 West W.T. Harris Boulevard

Charlotte, NC 28288

Brian.mcginley@wachovia.com

704.590.4108

Director Marna McLendon

Arizona Attorney General’s Office

Office of Victim Services

1275 West Washington Street

Phoenix, AZ 85007

Marna.mclendon@ag.state.az.us

602.634.3329

Mr. Graeme Newman

Professor, University of Albany

School of Criminal Justice

135 Western Avenue

Albany, NY 12203

harrowhest@aol.com

518.442.5223

Attorney George Penn

Office of the Inspector General, SSA

6401 Security Boulevard 4-M-1 Ops.

Baltimore, MD 20235

George.penn@ssa.gov

410.965.7429

Ms. Sheryl Robinson

Kroll

1000 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

slrobinson@krollworldwide.com

202.371.6777, ext. 232

Mr. Greg Rothwell

Counsel

Baltimore County Police Department

700 East Joppa Road

Towson, MD 21286

grothwell@co.ba.md.us

410.887.2211

Major Cities Chiefs Association 

(MCCA)

Thomas Frazier

Director, MCCA

Johns Hopkins University 

6716 Alexander Bell Drive, Suite 200

Columbia, MD 21046

tfrazier@attach.net

410.312.4419

Chief Darrel Stephens

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police 

Department

601 East Trade Street

Charlotte, NC 28202

Dstephens1@cmpd.org

704.336.5714
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57

Appendixes

U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ)

Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services (the COPS Office)

Mr. Carl Peed

Director, COPS Office

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

Carl.peed@usdoj.gov

202.616.2888

Mr. Robert Chapman

USDOJ, COPS Office

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

Robert.chapman@usdoj.gov

202.514.8278

Ms. Laurel Matthews

USDOJ, COPS Office

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

Laurel.matthews2@usdoj.gov

202.616.6694

Johns Hopkins University

Division of Public Safety Leadership 

(DPSL)

Ms. Barbara Boland

Johns Hopkins University, DPSL

6716 Alexander Bell Drive, Suite 200

Columbia, MD 21046

barbara.boland@verizon.net

410.312.4416

Ms. Shannon Collins

Johns Hopkins University, DPSL

6716 Alexander Bell Drive, Suite 200

Columbia, MD 21046

shannonc@jhu.edu

410.312.4403

Dr. Phyllis McDonald

Johns Hopkins University, DPSL

6716 Alexander Bell Drive, Suite 200

Columbia, MD 21046

mcdonald@jhu.edu

410.312.4413
58

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Identity Theft Focus Group

November 4, 2004 

Johns Hopkins University Downtown Center

Focus Group Participants

Sergeant Chris Abbas

Minneapolis Police Department

350 South 5th Street

Minneapolis, MN 55415

cmabbas@netscape.net

612.328.7490

Mr. Edward Appel

6116 Overlea Road

Bethesda, MD 20816

appel@jciac.org

301.263.9332

Sergeant Robert Berardi

Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Office

11515 South Colima Road

Whittier, CA 90605

rfberard@lasd.org

562.946.7186

Sergeant Walter Bolling

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police 

 Department, Fraud Unit

601 East Trade Street

Charlotte, NC 28202

704.336.8292

Ms. Kathy Buller

Counsel

Office of the Inspector General, SSA

6401 Security Boulevard

Baltimore, MD 20235

Kathy.buller@ssa.gov

410.966.5136

Mr. Peter Cassidy

Triarche

38 Rice Street, Suite 2022

Cambridge, MA 02140

pcassidy@triarche.com

617.491.2952

Mr. Chuck Chaiyarachta

Los Angeles County District Attorney’s 

 Office

201 North Figueroa Street, 12th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90012

cchaiyar@da.co.la.ca.us

213.580.3316

Ms. Kathleen Claffie

Investigator, ID Theft Program

Federal Trade Commission

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20580

kclaffie@ftc.gov

202.326.3888

Ms. Joanna Crane

Attorney

Federal Trade Commission

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20580

jcrane@ftc.gov

202.326.3258

Sergeant John Davis

2509 Princess Anne Road

Virginia Beach, VA 23456

JBDavis@vbgov.com

757.427.8133

Sergeant Nicole Eiker

Division of Criminal Justice

5 Executive Campus

Cherry Hill, NJ 08002

eikern@njdcj.org

856.486.3118
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59

Appendixes

Mr. Selden Fritschner

Law Enforcement Liaison

American Association of Motor Vehicle 

 Administrators

4301 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 400

Arlington, VA 22203

sfritschner@aamva.org

703.908.5855

Lieutenant John Hagen

Milwaukee Police Department

749 West State Street

Milwaukee, WI 53233

jmhage@milwaukee.gov

414.935.7360

Mr. Glenn Hall

Discover Financial Services

12 Read’s Way

Newcastle, DE 19720

glennhall@discoverfinancial.com

302.323.7362

Ms. Susan Hall

901 Metro Center Boulevard

Foster City, CA 94404

shall@visa.com

650.432.2964

Trooper Jesse Harper

Michigan State Police

First District ID Theft Task Force

7119 North Canal Road

Lansing, MI 48913

harperjj@michigan.gov

517.322.0675

Mr. Sean Hoar

U.S. Attorney’s Office, Oregon

701 High Street

Eugene, OR 97401

541.465.6792

ergeant Terry Joyner

Atlanta Police Department

675 Ponce De Leon Avenue NE 

6th floor

Atlanta, Gaa 30308

tjoyner@atlantapd.org

404.853.4240

Lieutenant Jeffrey Kaer

Portland Police Bureau

1111 SW 2nd Avenue, Suite 1326

Portland, OR 97204

jkaer@police.ci.portland.or.us

503.823.0407

Ms. Laurel Kamen

American Express

801 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., 

Suite 650

Washington, DC 20004

laurel.kamen@aexp.com

202.434.0159

Chief Andrew Kirkland

Glendale Police Department

6835 North 57th Drive

Glendale, AZ 85301

akirkland@glendaleAZ.com

623.930.3051

Detective Jennifer Lafortune

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police 

 Department, Fraud Unit

601 East Trade Street

Charlotte, NC 28202

jlafortune@cmpd.org

704.353.1733

Mr. Max Marker

Supervisory Special Agent

Federal Bureau of Investigations

935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20536

mmarker@leo.gov

202.324.5659

Ms. Lynn Marshall

Howard County State Attorney’s Office

Carroll Building

3450 Court House Drive

Ellicott City, MD 21043

410.313.3151

Mr. John McCullough

Minnesota Financial Crimes Task Force

P.O. Box 21007

Columbia Heights, MN 55421

612.328.3651
60

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Mr. Brian McGinley

Wachovia Corporation, NCO290

1525 West W.T. Harris Boulevard

Charlotte, NC 28288

Brian.mcginley@wachovia.com

704.590.4108

Director Marna McLendon

Arizona Attorney General’s Office

Office of Victim Services

1275 West Washington Street

Phoenix, AZ 85007

Marna.mclendon@ag.state.az.us

602.634.3329

Mr. Peter A. Modaffere

1 South Main Street

New City, NY 10956

845.638.5001

Mr. Graeme Newman

Professor, University of Albany

School of Criminal Justice

135 Western Avenue

Albany, NY 12203

harrowhest@aol.com

518.442.5223

Special Agent in Charge Kevin Perkins

Maryland FBI

2600 Lord Baltimore Drive

Baltimore, MD 21244

k.perkins@fbi.gov

410.277.6201

Ms. Sheryl Robinson

Kroll

1000 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

slrobinson@krollworldwide.com

202.371.6777, ext. 232

Mr. Greg Rothwell

Counsel

Baltimore County Police Department

700 East Joppa Road

Towson, MD 21286

grothwell@co.ba.md.us

410.887.2211

Mr. John Rusch

USDOJ, Crime Division, Fraud Section

10th Street and Constitution Street, N.W.

Bond Building, Room 4300

Washington, DC 20530

Jonathan.rusch2@usdoj.gov

202.514.0631

Chief Jerry Schmiedeke

Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Office

4700 Ramona Boulevard

Monterey Park, CA 91754

jwschmie@lasd.org

323.526.5165

Special Agent in Charge 

 Edmund Skrodzki

United States Secret Service

Edmund.skrodzki@usss.dhs.gov

443.263.1000

Director Jeff Spivey

Security Risk Management

5200 Park Road, Suite 122

Charlotte, NC 28209

jspivey@srmsig.com

704.521.8401 

Mr. Alan Trosclair

13420 Torrington Drive

Midlothian, VA 23113

804.334.6095

Chief Mary Ann Viverette

Gaithersburg Police Department

7 East Cedar Avenue

Gaithersburg, MD 20877

301.258.6400

Mr. Daniel Wortman

Montgomery Co. State Attorney’s Office

Judicial Center, 5th Floor

50 Maryland Avenue

Rockville, MD 20850

daniel.wortman@

 montgomerycountymd.gov

240.777.7442
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61

Appendixes

Mr. James Wright

National Sheriff ’s Association

1450 Duke Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

jwright@sheriffs.org

703.836.7827

Major Cities Chiefs Association 

(MCCA)

Thomas Frazier

Director, MCCA

6716 Alexander Bell Drive, Suite 200

Columbia, MD 21046

tfrazier@attach.net

410.312.4419

Chief Darrel Stephens

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police 

 Department

601 East Trade Street

Charlotte, NC 28202

Dstephens1@cmpd.org

704.336.5714

U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ)

Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services (the COPS Office)

Mr. Carl Peed

Director, COPS Office

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W. 

10th Floor

Washington, DC 20005

Carl.peed@usdoj.gov

202.616.2888

Ms. Pam Cammarata

Deputy Director, COPS Office

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W. 

10th Floor

Washington, DC 20005

pam.cammarata@usdoj.gov

202.514.9193

Mr. Robert Chapman

USDOJ,COPS Office

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005 

Robert.chapman@usdoj.gov

202.514.8278

Ms. Laurel Matthews

USDOJ, COPS Office

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W. 

10th Floor

Washington, DC 20005

Laurel.matthews2@usdoj.gov

202.616.6694

Mr. Gilbert Moore

USDOJ, COPS Office

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

Gilbert.moore@usdoj.gov

202.616.9602

Ms. Maria Carolina Rozas

USDOJ, COPS Office

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

Mariacarolina.rozas@usdoj.gov

202.514.1086
62

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A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft

Johns Hopkins University

Division of Public Safety Leadership 

(DPSL)

Johns Hopkins University, DPSL

6716 Alexander Bell Drive, Suite 200

Columbia, MD 21046

Dr. Sheldon Greenberg

Director, 

Johns Hopkins University, DPSL

Greenberg@jhu.edu

410.312.4400

Ms. Barbara Boland

barbara.boland@verizon.net

410.312.4400

Mr. John Dentico

leadsimm@earthlink.net

410.312.4400

Mr. Chris Dreisbach

cdreisbach@jhu.edu

410.312.4412

Ms. Shannon Feldpush

shannonf@jhu.edu

410.312.4403

Mr. Miguel Ferrer

maferrer@jhu.edu

410.312.4432

Mrs. Corinne Martin

cmunday1@jhu.edu

410.312.4429

Dr. Phyllis McDonald

mcdonald@jhu.edu

410.312.4413
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References

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References

Anti-Phishing Working Group. What is Phishing and Pfarming? 2004. 

www.antiphishing.org.

Australasian Centre for Policing Research. Australasian Identity Crime Policing Strategy 

2003–2005. 2003.

BITS., Financial Identity Theft: Prevention and Consumer Assistance. The BITS Fraud 

Reduction Steering Committee, Washington, D.C., 2003.

Canada. Privy Council Office. Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy. 

April 2004.

Congressional Research Service. Identity Theft: The Internet Connection. March 16, 2005. 

italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RS22082.pdf.

CSL Bulletin. Guidance on the Legality of Keystroke Monitoring. March 1993. 

www.net.ohio-state.edu/security/links/Keystroke_monitoring.html.

Federal Trade Commission. Identity Theft Survey Report. Prepared by Synovate, 

September 2003.

Frank, M.J. From Victim to Victor: A Step-by-Step Guide for Ending the Nightmare of Identity 

Theft. 1998. www.identitytheft.org.

Gaudin, S. Identity Theft—The Problem, EarthWeb White Papers. 2003. 

www.idynta.com/idtheft.htm. 

General Accounting Office Report to the Honorable Sam Johnson, House of 

Representatives, Identity Theft: Greater Awareness and Use of Existing Data Are Needed. 

(GAO-02-766). 2002.

Hamel, G., and Prahalad, C. K. StrategyIntent. Harvard Business Review, May–June 

1989, pages 63–76.

Hamel, G. and C. K. Prahald. Competing for the Future. Harvard Business Review, 

July–August 1994, pages 2–9.

House Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Technology 

Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census. Hearing: 

Identity Theft: The Cause, Costs, Consequences, and Potential Solutions, September 22, 

2004. Opening Statement of Congressman Adam Putnam, Chairman. reform.

house.gov/UploadedFiles/Final%20Press%20Opening%20Statement%202.pdf.

House Passes Anti-Identity Theft, National Credit Reporting Legislation. Information 

Week, Sept. 11, 2003. www.informationweek.com/showArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=J

2RZZ5ETEEOB4QSNDBECKH0CJUMEKJVN?articleID=14704670. 

References
66

Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (U.S. Public Law 105-318, 112 Stat. 

3007 (1998) (codified at 18 USC § 1028).

Identity Theft Resource Center. Current Laws: ITRC Recommendations for Legislation. 

2004. www.idtheftcenter.org/lawsrecomm.shtml. 

Identity Theft Resource Center. Online Commerce: Is Shopping or Banking Online Safe?

Fact Sheet 301, page 2. www.idtheftcenter.org/vg103.shtml.

International Association of Chiefs of Police. “Advances and Applications: Minnesota 

Awards New Secure Driver’s License Contract,” The Police Chief, January 2005, 

page 12.

International Association of Chiefs of Police. Local Law Enforcement’s Response to Identity 

theft Crimes: strategies to support the Investigative Role of the Police and Compliance with the 

F.A.C.T. Act of 2004. (2005). 

www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/WhatsNew/IdentityTheft.pdf.

Internet Security Systems. Shoulder Surfing (amplification of). www.iss.net/security_

center/advice/Underground/Hacking/Methods/WetWare/Shoulder_Surfing/

default.htm.

Kowalski, W. J. The Tylenol Murders. 2004. 

www.personal.psu.edu/users/w/x/wxk116/tylenol. 

Mintzberg, H. Crafting Strategy, Harvard Business Review; July–August 1987, pages 

65–74.

Office of the District Attorney of Saratoga County, New York. Protect Yourself from 

Identity Theft. (Contains a one-sentence definition of skimming). 2004. www.

co.saratoga.ny.us/da/daidtft.html.

Raimond, P. Two Styles of Foresight: Are We Predicting the Future or Inventing It? 

Long Range Planning, Volume 29, Number 2, April 1996, pp. 208–214.

SpectorSoft Product page for Spector Pro 5.0 Internet monitoring and surveillance 

software. www.spectorsoft.com/products.

Stacey, R.D. Managing the Unknowable: Strategic Boundaries Between Order and Chaos in 

Organizations. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, California. 1992.

Word Spy. Definition of shoulder surfing. 

www.wordspy.com/words/shouldersurfing.asp.

Turley, J. Arrest Me...Before I Strike Again. USA Today, February 21, 2005. 

www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/2005-02-21-identity-theft_x.htm.

U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Postal Service, Federal Trade Commission, International 

Association of Chiefs of Police. Identity Crime: An Interactive Resource Guide for Law 

Enforcement. 2003.

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Resources

Help for Victims and Others

Major credit reporting agencies:

Equifax 

P.O. Box 740256 

Atlanta, GA 30374

Telephone: 800.685.1111

www.equifax.com

Experian (formerly TRW) 

475 Anton Boulevard

Costa Mesa, CA 92626

Telephone: 888.397.3742

www.experian.com

TransUnion

P.O. Box 2000

Chester, PA 19022

Telephone: 888.916.8800 

www.transunion.com

To file an identity theft complaint:

Toll-free: 877.438.4338 (877.IDTHEFT)

Online: www.consumer.gov/idtheft

Mail: Identity Theft Clearinghouse 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W. 

Washington, DC 20580

To opt out of prescreened credit card offers:

Toll-free: 888.567.8688 (888.OPTOUT)

To learn about privacy choices for personal financial information online:

www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/privacy/default.htm

Federal Government Resources

U.S. Department of Justice: www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/idtheft.html

FBI: www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm

Federal Trade Commission: www.consumer/gov/idtheft and www.ftc.gov

National Criminal Justice Reference Service: www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/

grants/210459.pdf

Resources
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Consumer Advocacy

AARP: research.aarp.org/consume/dd85_idtheft.html

CALPIRT and USPIRG: www.pirg.org

ID Theft Resource Center for Law Enforcement: 

www.idtheftcenter.org/lawenforcement.shtml

Privacy Rights Clearinghouse: www.privacyrights.org

Law Enforcement Consortia

International Association of Financial Crime Investigators:

www.iafci.org/home.html

Useful Documents

Coping with Identity Theft: What to Do When an Impostor Strikes

Fact Sheet 17. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 

Available at www.privacyrights.org.

Identity Theft Survival Kit, by Mari Frank 

From Victim to Victor: A Step-by-Step Guide for Ending the Nightmare of Identity Theft, 

by Mari Frank

Available at www.identitytheft.org.

Identity Theft: When Bad Things Happen to Your Good Name

Federal Trade Commission. September 2002

Telephone: 877.438.4338 (877.IDTHEFT)

www.consumer.gov/idtheft

Identity Theft Literature Review, 

by Graeme R. Newman, Megan M. McNully 

Available at www.ncjrs.gov.

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For More Information:

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

To obtain details on COPS programs, call the

COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770

Visit COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov

e03062303 May 2006

ISBN: 1-932582-64-9