UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4391

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KERNEY RAY THORNSBURY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Bluefield. Irene C. Berger, 

District Judge. (1:09-cr-00148-1)

Submitted: January 21, 2011 Decided: February 11, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, 

Appellate Counsel, David R. Bungard, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. 

Miller, United States Attorney, John Lanier File, Assistant

United States Attorney, Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kerney Ray Thornsbury 

pleaded guilty to possession of ammunition by a felon, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2006). The 

district court sentenced Thornsbury to thirty-three months’ 

imprisonment.

Thornsbury’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in his 

view, there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but asking 

this court to review the reasonableness of Thornsbury’s 

sentence.*

This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness, 

applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. 

Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010). This review requires 

appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In 

determining procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the 

district court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory 

Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) 

factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and 

 For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

 * Although advised of his right to do so, Thornsbury has not 

filed a pro se supplemental brief. 
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sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. “Regardless 

of whether the district court imposes an above, below, or 

within-Guidelines sentence, it must place on the record an 

individualized assessment based on the particular facts of the 

case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 

(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court 

next assesses the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, 

“taking into account the ‘totality of the circumstances, 

including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines 

range.’” United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 

2007) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). 

On appeal, Thornsbury maintains that, given the 

particular facts of this case, a thirty-three-month term of 

imprisonment is greater than necessary to fulfill the purposes 

of sentencing and thus constitutes an abuse of discretion. We 

disagree. The district court considered defense counsel’s 

arguments for a downward variance, but ultimately found them 

unavailing. Based on our review of the record, we cannot say 

that decision is unreasonable. See United States v. McNeill, 

598 F.3d 161, 166 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining that this court 

will not reverse a sentence unless it is unreasonable, “even if 

the sentence would not have been the choice of the appellate 

court”), cert. granted, __ S. Ct. __, 2011 WL 48124 (U.S. Jan. 

7, 2011) (No. 10-5258). 
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Having denied counsel’s motion for a downward 

departure, the district court sentenced Thornsbury to thirtythree months in prison, a sentence at the high end of his 

properly calculated Guidelines range. In setting forth the 

reasons for this sentence, the district court relied on the 

relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors that informed its decision 

and offered a detailed and individualized explanation for the 

sentence. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th 

Cir. 2010). For these reasons, we hold that Thornsbury’s 

sentence is procedurally reasonable. Further, we also afford 

Thornsbury’s within-Guidelines sentence a presumption of 

substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Wright, 594 

F.3d 259, 267 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 507 (2010); 

see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) 

(upholding rebuttable presumption of reasonableness for withinGuidelines sentence). 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record for any meritorious issues and have found none. The 

district court complied with the mandates of Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting Thornsbury’s guilty plea. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This 

court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of 

his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If the client requests that a petition be 
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filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED