J-S35022-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INT. OF: K.A.Z., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.E.S., A/K/A M.L., 

MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 887 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Dated May 10, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 23 AD 2022

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 16, 2022

M.E.S., a/k/a M.L., (“Mother”) appeals from the order terminating her 

parental rights as to her minor child, K.A.Z. (“Child”).1 Mother’s counsel has 

filed an Anders2 brief and a petition to withdraw as counsel. We grant 

counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the termination order.

Child was born in February 2019. In February 2020, Dauphin County 

Social Services for Children & Youth (“Agency”) received a referral concerning 

domestic violence between Mother and Father, substance abuse, and lack of 

supervision of Child. N.T., 5/9/22, at 5. The Agency had previous involvement 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, E.Z., 

(“Father”) and his appeal is pending separately at No. 877 MDA 2022. 

2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also In re V.E., 611 A.2d 

1267, 1275 (Pa.Super. 1992) (holding Anders protections apply to appeals 

of involuntary termination of parental rights).
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with the family. Id. In July 2020, Child was adjudicated dependent and was 

placed in the custody of the Agency. Id. at 6. Child has remained in the 

custody of the Agency since that time. Id. Child’s current foster home is a 

pre-adoptive home. Id. at 32.

In March 2022, the Agency filed petitions for involuntary termination

of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. A hearing on the petitions was held 

on May 9, 2022. Despite being served with notice of the hearing,3 neither 

parent appeared at the hearing, although each was represented by counsel.

Id. at 3-4, 10. During the hearing, Mother’s counsel received a text message 

from Mother stating that she had not had a phone for some time and could 

not get a ride to the hearing. Id. at 8. Based on this message, Mother’s 

counsel asked for a continuance. Id. The court denied the request and found 

that the parents had received notice of the hearing based on the publication 

notice, the caseworker’s testimony, and Mother’s own admission in her text 

message to counsel. Id. at 12. However, the court agreed to keep the record 

open to allow Mother and Father a second opportunity to appear the following 

day. Id. at 13-14. Mother and Father’s counsel notified Mother and Father 

that they were ordered to appear in court the next day. N.T., 5/10/22, at 54-

55. However, neither parent appeared. Id. at 54.

At the hearing, the Agency presented the testimony of its caseworker, 

Amber Torres. Torres testified that Mother’s goals were to cooperate with the 

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3 Notice of the hearing was made by publication in the Philadelphia Inquirer 

and the Dauphin County Reporter. See Termination H’rg Ex. 37.
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Agency, complete a parenting program, maintain sobriety, complete domestic 

violence treatment, visitation, and complete a psychological evaluation. N.T., 

5/9/22, at 15-26.

Torres testified that Mother was not compliant with her goal of 

cooperating with Agency. Id. at 15. She stated that Mother failed to keep the 

Agency informed of her whereabouts and had recently informed the Agency 

that she and Father were homeless. Id. at 24-25.

Torres said although Mother completed a parenting program, she was 

unsuccessfully discharged from numerous drug and alcohol programs and 

failed to consistently provide the Agency with urine screens. Id. at 17, 19-20, 

25. Torres testified that Mother tested positive for methamphetamines, 

amphetamines, and marijuana as recently as one month prior to the filing of 

the termination petition. Id. at 19. Torres said that Mother has not taken 

responsibility for her substance abuse and instead blames the Agency as the 

reason she uses drugs. Id. at 18, 40. 

Torres testified that Mother failed to complete domestic violence 

treatment. Id. at 23. She pointed out that Mother filed three protection from 

abuse complaints against Father, but failed to appear at the hearings, 

resulting in their dismissal. Id. at 22. Mother also minimized any domestic 

violence between her and Father and claimed that her black eyes were the 

result of walking into a broomstick. Id. at 22-23.

In terms of visitation with Child, Torres testified that although Mother 

and Father had unsupervised visits for a short period of time, visits were 
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reverted to supervised in January 2022 following a referral from the 

Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) regarding allegations of 

substance abuse, domestic violence, and lack of supervision of Child. Id. at 

6-7. DHS reported that the parents were found to have been fighting over a 

crack pipe in front of Child. Id. at 16. The foster parent also reported concerns 

regarding Child’s appearance, demeanor, and care after she returned from an 

unsupervised weekend visit with the parents. Id. at 7. Mother and Father have 

not visited Child since January 2022. Id. at 26.

Torres testified that Mother failed to comply with her final goal of 

completing a psychological evaluation. Id.

Torres stated that although Child has a bond with Mother and Father, 

she has been in care for over 19 months, and she is very happy in her foster 

home. Id. at 31, 33-34. Torres said that all of Child’s needs are being met in 

her foster home and the foster home is willing to provide permanency for her. 

Id. at 31-33. Torres believed it was in Child’s best interest for the parental 

rights to be terminated and that Child would suffer no detrimental harm. Id.

at 31.

Foster mother testified that she is willing and able to be a long-term 

resource for Child. Id. at 47. She stated that Child is very loved in the home, 

and Child has built a relationship with her husband and four other children. 

Id. at 51. Foster mother testified that neither parent has reached out to her 

to try to communicate with Child but that she would encourage contact
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between the parents and Child if the parents were safe, sober, and healthy. 

Id. at 47, 49. 

At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the court involuntarily 

terminated Mother and Father’s parental rights. This appeal followed.

Mother’s counsel’s Anders brief identifies one issue:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of 

law by determining it was in the [C]hild’s best interest to 

have [M]other’s parental rights terminated by clear and 

convincing evidence despite the court’s refusal to provide 

[M]other with an opportunity to present evidence, on her 

behalf, at the termination hearing[?]

Anders Br. at 4.

Before reviewing the merits of this appeal, we must first determine 

whether counsel has satisfied the necessary requirements for withdrawing as 

counsel. See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa.Super. 

2007) (en banc) (“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may 

not review the merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining 

counsel’s request to withdraw”). To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel 

must: 1) “petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after making a 

conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined that the 

appeal would be frivolous;” 2) furnish a copy of the brief to the client; and 3) 

advise the client that he or she has the right to retain other counsel or proceed 

pro se. Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa.Super. 2013) 

(en banc).

Additionally, in the Anders brief, counsel seeking to withdraw must:
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(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, 

with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the 

record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; 

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that 

the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the 

relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or 

statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the 

appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). If counsel 

meets all of the above obligations, “it then becomes the responsibility of the 

reviewing court to make a full examination of the proceedings and make an 

independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly 

frivolous.” Id. at 355 n.5 (quoting Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 

1185, 1187 (Pa. 1981)).

We find that counsel has complied with all of the above technical 

requirements. In his Anders brief, counsel has provided a summary of the 

factual history of the case with citations to the record. Further, counsel’s brief 

identifies one issue that could arguably support the appeal, as well as 

counsel’s assessment of why the appeal is frivolous, with citations to the 

record. Additionally, counsel served Mother with a copy of the Anders brief 

and advised her of her right to proceed pro se or to retain a private attorney 

to raise any additional points she deemed worthy of this Court’s review. See

Letter, filed 8/24/22.4 Mother has not responded to counsel’s petition to 

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4 Counsel initially filed a deficient letter, which improperly framed Mother’s

ability to respond to counsel’s motion. On August 18, 2022, this Court directed 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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withdraw. As counsel has met the technical requirements of Anders and 

Santiago, we will proceed to the issue counsel has identified.

The issue raised in counsel’s Anders brief claims that Mother was not 

provided an opportunity to present evidence at the termination hearing. We 

readily dispose of this issue. The record is clear that Mother failed to appear 

at the termination hearing and conveniently texted her counsel during the 

hearing stating that she needed transportation. Mother knew how to contact 

her caseworker prior to the hearing to request assistance with transportation. 

Despite Mother’s failure to appear, the court was courteous enough to 

continue the matter until the next day to allow Mother to appear. Mother again

failed to appear the next day. Counsel for the Agency stated that the Agency

would have assisted in providing transportation but neither parent contacted 

the Agency. The court gave Mother every opportunity to present evidence on 

her behalf, but Mother failed to do so. Her claim is without merit.

We now turn to address the court’s decision in terminating Mother’s 

parental rights. We review an order involuntarily terminating parental rights 

for an abuse of discretion. In re G.M.S., 193 A.3d 395, 399 (Pa.Super. 2018). 

In termination cases, we “accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record.” In re 

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counsel to file a letter in compliance with Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 

A.3d 509, 512 (Pa.Super. 2016) (clarifying that counsel’s letter to the client 

shall inform appellant that upon the filing of the petition to withdraw, the client 

has the immediate right to proceed in the appeal pro se or through private 

counsel). Counsel complied on August 24, 2022.
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T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (quoting In re Adoption of S.P., 47 

A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012)). “If the factual findings have support in the record, 

we then determine if the trial court committed an error of law or abuse of 

discretion.” In re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa.Super. 2018). 

We will reverse a termination order “only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” In re Adoption of 

S.P., 47 A.3d at 826.

A party seeking to terminate parental rights has the burden of 

establishing grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re 

Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d at 473. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence 

“that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact 

to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise 

facts in issue.” Id. (quoting In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 728-29 (Pa.Super. 

2008)).

Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007). Under this 

provision, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated analysis prior to 

terminating parental rights:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only 

if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court 

engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to 

Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of 

the child under the standard of best interests of the child. 
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One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond 

between parent and child, with close attention paid to the 

effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

Id. (citations omitted). To affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court 

need only affirm the trial court’s decision as to any one subsection of section 

2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc).

The court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). As only one basis for termination under Section 

2511(a) is necessary, we will focus our attention on the court’s termination of 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8). That subsection 

states: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

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(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an 

agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of 

removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

Section 2511(a)(8) “sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to remedy 

the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” In re A.R., 

837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa.Super. 2003). Once the 12-month period has been 

proven, the court “must next determine whether the conditions that led to the 
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children’s removal continue to exist.” Id. “As a result, the relevant inquiry in 

this regard is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied 

and thus whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of 

the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa.Super. 2009). “Termination under 

Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s current 

willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused placement 

or the availability or efficacy of Agency services.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 

1118 (Pa.Super. 2010).

Here, it is undisputed that, at the time of the filing of the termination 

petitions, Child had been out of Mother and Father’s care in excess of 19 

months. Therefore, we next focus our inquiry on whether the conditions that 

led to Child’s removal from parental care continued to exist at the time the 

court terminated the parental rights.

The record supports the court’s finding that the conditions that led to 

Child’s removal from Mother's care continue to exist. The conditions that led 

to removal were domestic violence, substance abuse, and lack of supervision 

of Child. The record shows that Mother failed to complete domestic violence 

treatment. Although Mother filed at least three protection from abuse 

complaints against Father, she failed to appear at the hearings, resulting in 

their dismissal. Mother also minimized any domestic violence between her and 

Father and stated that her black eyes were the result of an accident. 

Mother also failed to complete drug and alcohol treatment and continued 

to test positive for drugs one month before the filing of the termination 
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petition. It was evident that Mother failed to take any responsibility for her 

drug use and blamed the Agency as the reason she uses drugs. It was also 

reported at the termination hearing that Mother and Father were homeless. 

After the last visit with the parents, Child was returned to foster mother 

in a disheveled state. Mother has had no contact with Child since January 

2022. Child cannot linger in care waiting for Mother to be in a position to meet 

Child’s needs. This Court has explained:

We recognize that the application of Section (a)(8) may 

seem harsh when the parent has begun to make progress 

toward resolving the problems that had led to removal of 

her children. . . . However, by allowing for termination when 

the conditions that led to removal of a child continue to exist 

after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a child’s 

life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to 

attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting 

responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a 

parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006).

Because Mother failed to remedy the situation that led to Child’s removal 

from her care, and as discussed below, termination of parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of Child, we find no reasonable basis on 

which to argue that the trial court improperly concluded that the requirements 

of Section 2511(a)(8) were satisfied. This issue is frivolous. 

Under Section 2511(b), the trial court must consider “the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child” to 

determine if termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. 
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See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). This inquiry involves assessment of “[i]ntangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability[.]” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 

1287 (Pa.Super. 2005). The court must also examine the parent-child bond, 

“with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond.” Id. However, the “mere existence of an emotional bond does not 

preclude the termination of parental rights.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 

(Pa.Super. 2011). Rather, the trial court must consider whether severing the 

bond “would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court must also examine 

any pre-adoptive home and any bond between the child and the foster 

parents. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.

Here, the court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was 

in Child’s best interests. There was evidence that Child is happy, secure, loved, 

and thriving in her foster home, and there was testimony that Child would 

suffer no detrimental harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. We 

perceive no reasonable basis on which to challenge the court’s conclusion that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights would be in Child’s best interests.

To summarize, we find that the issues raised in counsel’s Anders brief 

are wholly frivolous. Further, after an independent review of the record, we 

conclude that no other, non-frivolous issue exists. Therefore, we grant 

counsel’s petition to withdraw. Having determined that the appeal is wholly 

frivolous, we affirm the order terminating Mother’s parental rights. 

Petition to withdraw as counsel granted. Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/16/2022