[Cite as State v. Mohamed, 2019-Ohio-3785.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 17AP-920 

 (C.P.C. No. 16CR-4257) 

v. : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Muhuba Mohamed, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on September 19, 2019 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 

Taylor, for appellee. 

On brief: Sanjay K. Bhatt, for appellant. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

BROWN, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal by defendant-appellant, Muhuba Mohamed, from a 

judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the Franklin County Court of Common 

Pleas following a bench trial in which the trial court found appellant guilty of aggravated 

vehicular homicide, a felony of the third degree. 

{¶ 2} On August 5, 2016, appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated 

vehicular homicide, in violation of R.C. 2903.06, a felony of the second degree. The 

indictment, which arose out of the death of a seven-month-old child, alleged the offense 

occurred on June 2, 2016. Appellant waived her right to a jury trial, and the trial court 

conducted a bench trial beginning October 2, 2017. Two court interpreters translated on 

behalf of appellant, a Somali native. 
No. 17AP-920 2 

{¶ 3} Prior to trial, plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, provided notice of its intent to 

introduce other acts evidence with respect to a driving citation issued by a highway patrol 

officer to appellant four days prior to the events at issue in the instant case. Specifically, 

State Highway Patrol Trooper Tiffany Kohls testified that, on May 29, 2016 (part of the 

Memorial Day weekend), she responded to a one-vehicle accident on Interstate 71 in 

Delaware County. The vehicle, driven by appellant, had "crashed into the median cable 

barrier which rendered it undriveable." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 18.) The trooper determined 

appellant was driving alone at the time of the incident. Appellant provided the trooper 

with an operator's license that was "not just a standard operator's license." (Oct. 2, 2017 

Tr. at 20.) Due to a busy workload during the Memorial Day weekend, the trooper 

"basically just assumed that it was a valid operator's license." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 20.) 

Had Trooper Kohls been aware at the time that appellant only possessed a temporary 

license, and "without a valid licensed driver in the vehicle," the trooper "would have cited 

her for driving without a valid operator's license." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 21.) 

{¶ 4} Appellant "had a bunch of warrants out for her arrest." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 

19.) However, because of the busy holiday weekend, the trooper only issued her a citation 

for failure to control and permitted her to leave the scene with "friends or family" who had 

arrived shortly after the incident. (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 19.) Following the trooper's 

testimony, the trial court determined the evidence was admissible under Evid.R. 404(B). 

{¶ 5} Steve New, age 35, resides on Westerville Road. At trial, New identified 

several pictures depicting a Toyota Rav4 that "ran into my house" on June 2, 2016. 

(Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 26.) On that date, New was outside watering flowers when he heard a 

sound near his mailbox. New observed "a young fellow * * * flying over the top of the car." 

(Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 27-28.) New was unaware at the time that a baby was also involved. 

{¶ 6} The driver hit a mailbox, and then "she went right straight through the yard 

and ran into my house." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 29-30.) New was "standing there going, stop, 

stop, stop, stop." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 30.) New did not observe any effort on the part of 

the driver to apply brakes to the vehicle, nor did he observe anyone else inside the vehicle. 

New ran out to the front of his house and told his wife to dial 911. 

{¶ 7} The driver, a female, exited the car and "ran back to where the accident 

scene was, screaming and hollering." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 28.) New first made contact 
No. 17AP-920 3 

with the driver when she returned to her vehicle to retrieve something. New asked the 

driver if she knew what happened and if she was okay, but the driver did not respond. At 

one point after the incident, New observed the driver speaking on her phone. New had 

also observed the phone in the driver's right hand "when she was coming through the 

yard." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 36.) 

{¶ 8} A van subsequently approached the area; the "side door was open" and 

individuals inside the van were talking to the driver. (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 37.) New "was 

telling her that she can't leave." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 37.) A police officer soon arrived, as 

well as an emergency vehicle. New, who has a security camera installed at his residence, 

identified state's Exhibit B as video of the incident captured from his surveillance system. 

The state played the recording during the bench trial. 

{¶ 9} On June 2, 2016, Kenneth Ray Stepp, age 46, was riding a motorcycle 

southbound on Westerville Road at approximately 3:30 p.m. As he was approaching a 

corner, he observed "the guy coming off the top of the car." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 54.) Stepp 

pulled his motorcycle up to where the accident occurred, and he observed "a baby laying 

there on the ground." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 54.) At trial, Stepp identified a photograph 

depicting his motorcycle and a baby stroller at the scene. When Stepp arrived at the 

scene, the baby was approximately five to seven feet from the stroller. 

{¶ 10} Stepp, as well as a female motorist who had stopped at the scene, performed 

CPR on the baby. He noticed "immediate swelling * * * of the baby's head." (Oct. 2, 2017 

Tr. at 59.) Stepp testified that he "literally saw the baby take its last breath." (Oct. 2, 2017 

Tr. at 59.) Paramedics soon arrived at the scene. 

{¶ 11} Stepp observed only "the lady in the car. There was nobody else in the car 

with her." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 60.) At trial, Stepp identified appellant as the driver of the 

vehicle. Following the incident, the father of the baby "wanted to go after the lady, but I 

was holding him back from doing that." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 61.) Another female at the 

scene "went * * * after her. But the police officer was able to grab her and tackle her 

down, to keep her from getting hold of her." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 61.) Stepp observed 

"many people there, trying to pray for the baby." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 61.) 

{¶ 12} Nafiso Jamale is employed as a unit coordinator at Nationwide Children's 

Hospital. On June 2, 2016, Jamale was driving southbound on Westerville Road when 
No. 17AP-920 4 

she observed a car had driven through a yard. Jamale also observed a man along the side 

of the road with a baby. Jamale exited her vehicle, and the man was "saying, My baby. 

My baby." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 65.) Jamale and another man at the scene performed CPR 

on the baby. 

{¶ 13} Jamale, who speaks Somali, began talking to appellant at the scene. Jamale 

helped appellant write out a statement to police. Jamale wrote down what appellant was 

saying. Appellant stated that she was driving and she "didn't know where the man and 

the baby came from." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 70.) Further, "she doesn't know how she lost 

control." (Oct. 2, 2017 Tr. at 72.) Jamale asked appellant whether anyone was with her 

and she said no, but then said yes. 

{¶ 14} Franklin County Sheriff's Deputy John Kirby is assigned to the department's 

accident and investigation unit. Deputy Kirby determined that appellant was the driver of 

the at-fault vehicle on June 2, 2016. Deputy Kirby stated there was no evidence anyone 

else was in the vehicle with appellant at the time of the accident. The deputy identified 

the adult male struck by appellant's vehicle as Kenan Ferebee. Appellant had a temporary 

driver's permit, requiring the permit holder to be accompanied by a licensed driver. 

Appellant underwent blood tests, and no alcohol or drugs were detected. 

{¶ 15} Deputy Kirby obtained appellant's cell phone records as part of the 

investigation. The records indicated appellant was not making or actively receiving a 

phone call at the time of the accident. The records would not indicate activity with respect 

to multimedia messages, text messages sent as multimedia messages, or internet usage. 

{¶ 16} Kenan Ferebee, age 24, is the father of M.F., age seven months. On the 

afternoon of June 2, 2016, Ferebee walked to a nearby drive-thru, located approximately 

ten minutes walking distance from his residence. Ferebee was pushing his son in a 

stroller. On his return from the store, Ferebee was walking northbound on the shoulder 

of Westerville Road. One of the stroller wheels became stuck, and he "stopped to fix it. 

The next thing I know I was in the air." (Oct. 3, 2017 Tr. at 107.) The car struck Ferebee 

in the back. As soon as he got up, he observed his baby "laying on the ground." (Oct. 3, 

2017 Tr. at 107.) Ferebee "ran over there and took the stroller off of him." (Oct. 3, 2017 

Tr. at 107.) Ferebee picked up his son and then motioned to passing motorists for help. A 
No. 17AP-920 5 

sheriff later took Ferebee to a hospital; approximately 15 minutes after arrival, a doctor 

informed Ferebee that his son had died. 

{¶ 17} At trial, the parties entered into certain stipulations. If called to testify, 

Adam Balle, the owner of Balle Auto Sales, would have testified that on June 2, 2016, he 

was working at Balle Auto Sales, located on 3444 Westerville Road. On that date, he 

agreed to sell a Toyota Rav4 "with the VIN number that matches to" appellant. (Oct. 3, 

2017 Tr. at 112.) Shortly before 4:50 p.m., appellant left Balle Auto Sales "as the sole 

occupant and driver of the Toyota Rav4 with the appropriate VIN number." (Oct. 3, 2017 

Tr. at 112.) 

{¶ 18} It was further stipulated that, if called to testify, Dr. Kent Harshbarger, a 

forensic pathologist with the Franklin County Coroner's Office, would testify he 

performed an autopsy of M.F. on June 4, 2016. Dr. Harshbarger "would testify that 

[M.F.] suffered multiple blunt force injuries to the head and torso, including a fractured 

skull, a fractured clavicle, a fractured femur and multiple internal injuries." (Oct. 3, 2017 

Tr. at 113.) Dr. Harshbarger would further state that "the cause of death * * * was blunt 

force injury of the head." (Oct. 3, 2017 Tr. at 113.) 

{¶ 19} Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court found appellant guilty 

of the lesser-included offense of aggravated vehicular homicide, a felony of the third 

degree.1 By judgment entry filed November 29, 2017, the trial court imposed a 36-month 

sentence, as well as a lifetime driver's license suspension. 

{¶ 20} On appeal, appellant sets forth the following three assignments of error for 

this court's review: 

[I.] The evidence was legally insufficient to support 

Appellant's conviction for Aggravated Vehicular Homicide. 

[II.] The trial court prejudicially erred when it permitted the 

State to present, over objection, testimony and evidence 

concerning Appellant's driving and involvement in a onevehicle accident on May 29, 2016. 

[III.] Appellant's conviction was against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. 

 

1 The trial court reduced the offense from a second-degree felony to a third-degree felony based on the 

court's determination that the state failed to prove appellant was operating the vehicle without a valid 

license. 
No. 17AP-920 6 

{¶ 21} For purposes of review, we will consider appellant's first and second 

assignments of error in inverse order. Under the second assignment of error, appellant 

contends the trial court erred in permitting the state, over objection, to present evidence 

concerning her driving and involvement in a one-vehicle accident on May 29, 2016, four 

days prior to the events at issue in this case. Appellant, asserting that the record does not 

indicate the reason for the one-vehicle accident on Interstate 71, maintains the evidence 

was not admissible under Evid.R. 404(B) as it served only to offer a description of 

character and tendency to act in conformity therewith. 

{¶ 22} In response, the state argues that evidence related to the single-car crash 

just four days earlier was relevant for the non-propensity purpose of showing appellant's 

level of knowledge and recklessness at the time of her driving on June 2, 2016. The state 

further argues appellant provided no evidence to suggest the crash may have occurred due 

to other reasons; rather, the state maintains, the evidence at trial excluded adverse 

weather conditions, and the crash report indicated the sole contributing circumstance to 

the crash was appellant's failure to control the vehicle in veering to the left and crashing 

into the median cable. 

{¶ 23} Evid.R. 404(B) provides: 

Other crimes, wrongs or acts. Evidence of other crimes, 

wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 

person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 

may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 

{¶ 24} The Supreme Court of Ohio has set forth a "three-step analysis" for trial 

courts in considering whether to admit other acts evidence. State v. Williams, 134 Ohio 

St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, ¶ 19. Specifically, a trial court is to (1) "consider whether the 

other acts evidence is relevant to making any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence" 

under Evid.R. 401, (2) "consider whether evidence of the other crimes, wrongs or acts is 

presented to prove the character of the accused in order to show activity in conformity 

therewith or whether the other acts evidence is presented for a legitimate purpose, such as 

those stated in Evid.R. 404(B)," and (3) "consider whether the probative value of the 
No. 17AP-920 7 

other acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Id. at 

¶ 20. 

{¶ 25} An appellate court's "review of a trial court's decision regarding the 

admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts under Evid.R. 404(B) is conducted under an 

abuse-of-discretion standard." State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, ¶ 1. 

{¶ 26} On review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 

evidence of appellant's single-car crash four days prior to the events at issue in this case. 

Evid.R. 404(B) allows the admission of other acts evidence if offered for a permissible 

purpose, including knowledge. For purposes of R.C. 2903.06, the culpable mental state 

for the offense of aggravated vehicular homicide is recklessness. State v. Shutes, 8th Dist. 

No. 105694, 2018-Ohio-2188, ¶ 42. Under Ohio law, "proof of knowledge is also proof of 

recklessness." State v. Chambers, 4th Dist. No. 10CA902, 2011-Ohio-4352, ¶ 34. See also 

State v. Villa-Garcia, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-384, 2004-Ohio-1409, ¶ 28, citing R.C. 

2901.22(E) ("When recklessness is an element of an offense, knowledge or purpose is also 

sufficient culpability to establish this element."). 

{¶ 27} Here, we agree with the state that the evidence was presented for a proper 

purpose to prove appellant's knowledge that, without the presence of a licensed driver in 

the vehicle, she had been unable to control the vehicle she was driving, i.e., the fact 

appellant was involved in a one-vehicle accident only four days prior to the offense of 

June 2, 2016, in which she was cited for failure to control, went to her knowledge of the 

risk she posed to others in choosing to drive unaccompanied by a licensed driver. We also 

agree with the state that the evidence meets the low threshold of relevancy in showing 

that appellant was on notice of her inexperience and lack of control when unaccompanied 

by a licensed driver. Further, evidence of knowledge was probative as to the issue of 

recklessness, and the potential of unfair prejudice was reduced as this was a bench trial. 

See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. No. 87776, 2006-Ohio-6593, ¶ 14 (finding admission 

of Evid.R. 404(B) evidence proper and noting "[i]n a bench trial, it is presumed that the 

court considers only relevant, material, and competent evidence in reaching its decision"). 

{¶ 28} Finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting evidence as to 

the prior accident, appellant's second assignment of error is not well-taken and is 

overruled. 
No. 17AP-920 8 

{¶ 29} Appellant's first and third assignments of error are interrelated and will be 

considered together. Under these assignments of error, appellant challenges her 

conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide as not supported by sufficient evidence and 

as against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 30} With respect to her sufficiency argument, appellant contends there was no 

evidence she was reckless in her conduct on June 2, 2016. Appellant maintains she was 

driving on Westerville Road at 4:50 p.m. and lost control of her vehicle. In that brief 

moment, Ferebee and his son had stopped on a narrow shoulder of the road; the stroller's 

wheel was struck, and Ferebee stopped to fix it. Appellant argues she was not impaired at 

the time, and was not using her phone when she lost control of the vehicle. Appellant 

further argues the evidence did not indicate she was an inexperienced driver. 

{¶ 31} In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, "the test is 

whether after viewing the probative evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

all the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Martin, 20 

Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). 

{¶ 32} By contrast, in addressing a manifest weight challenge, an appellate court 

"must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider 

the credibility of witnesses and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, 

the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that 

the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered." State v. Munoz, 10th Dist. No. 

11AP-475, 2011-Ohio-6672, ¶ 8. Under Ohio law, "[t]he power to reverse on manifestweight grounds should only be used in exceptional circumstances when 'the evidence 

weighs heavily against the conviction.' " State v. Phillips, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-79, 2014-

Ohio-5162, ¶ 125, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). 

{¶ 33} R.C. 2903.06 sets forth the offense of aggravated vehicular homicide, and 

R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a) states in part: "No person, while operating or participating in the 

operation of a motor vehicle * * * shall cause the death of another * * * [i]n one of the 

following ways: * * * [r]ecklessly." Pursuant to R.C. 2901.22(C), "[a] person acts 

recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a 

substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct is likely to cause a certain 
No. 17AP-920 9 

result or is likely to be of a certain nature." Further, "[a] person is reckless with respect to 

circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person 

disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances are likely to exist." 

Id.2 

{¶ 34} As noted, appellant contends the evidence fails to support a finding of 

recklessness. At the close of the bench trial, the trial court made the following findings on 

the issue of recklessness. The trial court initially deemed it "notable" that appellant, 

several days prior to the incident at issue, "had just been cited for failure to control on the 

freeway in a one-car accident where she went off the side of the [roadway] striking the 

barrier." (Oct. 3, 2017 Tr. at 137.) 

{¶ 35} As to the events of June 2, 2016, the court noted appellant was driving in a 

"residential neighborhood during the busy time of day where people were getting off of 

work, kids were getting out of school," and "there was heavy traffic." (Oct. 3, 2017 Tr. at 

137.) The trial court found appellant "was an inexperienced driver with no one in the car 

with her," that she "veered to the right" and "hit a mailbox, continued through two or 

three yards, and then hit a house. But even before the mailbox that she hit, there was a 

bright orange fire hydrant, and for some reason that did not stop her." (Oct. 3, 2017 Tr. at 

137-38.) 

{¶ 36} In reviewing the surveillance video of the events, the trial court noted the 

fact that, after appellant "hit the victim and his father, she still did not hit the brakes. The 

only thing that stopped her was the house. She kept going at a speed, and she did not hit 

her brakes. She did not even turn the steering wheel." (Oct. 3, 2017 Tr. at 138.) Citing 

evidence that "[i]t was daytime," there was "ample lighting," the father was wearing "a 

white tank top and he was pushing a brightly-colored stroller," the court found "there was 

no reason to think that [appellant] did not see them." (Oct. 3, 2017 Tr. at 138.) Further, 

"[t]here was nothing obstructing her view," and "[s]he hit the victims hard enough to 

injure the father and kill the baby." (Oct. 3, 2017 Tr. at 138.) The court also found 

appellant "knowingly violated the restriction on her license a week after being in a car 

 

2 Pursuant to R.C. 2901.01(A)(7), "[r]isk" is defined to mean "a significant possibility, as contrasted with a 

remote possibility, that a certain result may occur or that certain circumstances may exist." R.C. 

2901.01(A)(8) defines "[s]ubstantial risk" to mean "a strong possibility, as contrasted with a remote or 

significant possibility, that a certain result may occur or that certain circumstances may exist." 
No. 17AP-920 10 

accident." (Oct. 3, 2017 Tr. at 138.) Based on the "totality of the circumstances," the trial 

court concluded appellant's conduct "does amount to reckless conduct," and the court 

therefore found her guilty of "aggravated vehicular homicide, a felony of the third degree." 

(Oct. 3, 2017 Tr. at 138.) 

{¶ 37} On review, we find sufficient evidence supports the trial court's 

determination. Here, the evidence indicates appellant had a temporary driver's permit 

during the relevant time period, requiring her to be accompanied by a licensed driver. 

Four days prior to the events at issue, appellant was cited for failure to control after the 

car she was driving, unaccompanied by a licensed driver, "went off the left side of the 

roadway striking the median cable barrier." (May 29, 2016 Traffic Crash Report.) 

{¶ 38} On June 2, 2016, appellant was again driving without the presence of a 

licensed driver, having just purchased a vehicle from a dealership on Westerville Road; 

appellant's vehicle traveled only a short distance from the car dealership before striking 

Ferebee and his infant son. The state's evidence included surveillance video of the events 

supporting the trial court's finding there was nothing to obstruct appellant's view of 

Ferebee walking on the shoulder of the road, i.e., it was daytime, Ferebee was wearing a 

white shirt and pushing a brightly-colored stroller. The evidence also supported a 

reasonable inference as to appellant's inexperience and/or lack of driving skill and 

inability to control her vehicle. Specifically, the surveillance video indicates that, even 

after the vehicle veered toward the shoulder of the road and hit Ferebee and his infant 

son, appellant made no attempt to apply brakes or to correct the course of the vehicle as it 

traveled through the yard; rather, the vehicle only came to a stop as a result of striking the 

house. Testimony by the homeowner indicated appellant was holding her cellphone in 

her right hand as she traveled through the yard, and appellant subsequently indicated she 

"didn't know where the man and baby came from," strongly suggesting that her focus was 

elsewhere at the time of the events. 

{¶ 39} At trial, the state argued the incident four days earlier, in which appellant, 

driving alone, veered off the road and crashed into a median cable, "would place her on a 

heightened sense of awareness that perhaps she is not a good driver and needs someone 

else with her," and that such factor "goes to her knowledge about disregarding a 

substantial and unjustifiable risk." (Oct. 3, 2017 Tr. at 120-21.) We agree. The evidence 
No. 17AP-920 11 

presented gave rise to a reasonable inference that appellant, who was required to have a 

licensed driver with her at all times, had knowledge of the danger she posed driving alone 

based on her failure to control the vehicle she was operating just four days before the 

tragic events at issue. Despite that knowledge, she again chose to drive unaccompanied 

by a licensed driver. Here, the trier of fact could have reasonably concluded that the 

evidence, in its totality, supported a finding that appellant, with heedless indifference to 

the consequences, disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk in operating a vehicle 

on the date of the events. Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the state, we 

find there was sufficient evidence as to the element of recklessness and, therefore, the 

conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide was supported by legally sufficient evidence. 

{¶ 40} As indicated, appellant also challenges her conviction as against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. We note that, in a bench trial, "the trial court assumes 

the fact-finding function of the jury." Cleveland v. Welms, 169 Ohio App.3d 600, 2006-

Ohio-6441, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). Further, under Ohio law, "the weight to be given evidence 

and credibility to be afforded testimony are issues for the trier of fact." State v. Simmons, 

4th Dist. No. 13CA4, 2013-Ohio-2890, ¶ 11. 

{¶ 41} Appellant's manifest weight argument is similar to her sufficiency challenge, 

i.e., she contends the record does not support a finding that her conduct was reckless. We 

find, however, the record contains evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could find 

recklessness, and we conclude the trial court did not lose its way or create a manifest 

miscarriage of justice in finding appellant guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide. 

{¶ 42} Appellant's first and third assignments of error are not well-taken and are 

overruled. 

{¶ 43} Based on the foregoing, appellant's three assignments of error are 

overruled, and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

SADLER and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 

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