### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 444 -CV
Cy nt hia Ul e tt

Lync h , A ppe lla nt
v. Jack in the Box , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B ELL COUNTY , 146TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 217, 739- B , HO NORAB LE RICKMO RRIS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Cy nth ia Ul e tt Ly nc h a pp e a ls f ro m th e dis mis sa l of

he r p e rs on a l in

jur y laws uit a g a ins t J ack in the B ox . I n a si ng le issue on appe al, Ly nch cha lleng es the district cour t’s finding that her
s u it w a s “ f r iv o lo u s an d

ma li c io u s b e cause her claim h a s n o ar g u a b le b a s is in

la w o r in f a c t. ” We
a ff ir m th e jud g me nt. BACK GR OUND

On J une 26, 2006, Ly

nch filed w hat she styled a “ Motion for Request for Permission to F il e a L a te Cl a im
. ” I nth e mo ti o n , L y n c h a s s erte d various cla im s a g a in s t Ja c k in th e B o x, including “ dece ption,” “fa lse statements , ” and “produc t liabilit y based on misre prese ntation.” Although L

y nch did not explain the basis of t hese claims in her pleading s, in her appellate br ief she explains t hat on May

17, 2004, she ordered a chicke n sandwich from J ack in the B ox but was insteadL y nch attac hed to her

motion a letter fr om an elder at her ch u rc h , i n which the e lder 1 explains that the churc h is una ble to pr ovide her with f

inancial assistance . L y

nch appa rently attache d this letter to her motion as “e vidence of har dship.” 2 g iven a ham and eg g sandwich. L y nch alleg es that she “g ot sick approximately eig hty minutes after eating[t he] sandwich.”

L y nch a lso fi le d a

“ Mo tio n f

or Re qu e st f

or Pe rm iss ion

to P ay F ili ngF e e s in I n s t al l m en t s . ” In t h i s m o t i o n , L y n ch s t at edt h e f

o l l o wi n g: Applicant is filing he rew ith a voluntary petition. Iam unable to pa

y the filing fee s beca

use I have no inc ome. Ipr op os e to p ay

my fi lin g fe e s o n th e date of

se ttl e me nt. Wherefor e applica

nt pray s that she be pe rmitted to pay the fil ing fee s on the date of se ttl e me nt. 1
Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

int e rp re te d thi s mot ion a s a state me nt of ina bil ity to pa

y c os ts. I n a c c or da

nc e wi th chapte r 13 of the Texas Civi l Practice and Remedie s Code, the district court then f ound that L y

nch’s
s u i twa s fr i v o l o u s an d

m al i ci o u s an d

h adn o ar gu ab l e b as i s i n l aw o r i nfa ct an d , wi t h o u ta h ea ri n g, dismiss ed Ly

nch’s suit without prejudice. T his appea l followed.
DI SCU SSIO N Th e on ly iss ue in t

his c a se is w hethe r the d ist ri c t c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in dismiss ing L

y nch’s suit pursuant to sec tion 13.001 of the civil p rac tice and r emedies c ode, which pr ov ide s: (a) A cour

t in which an af

fidavit of inability

to pay under Rule 145, Tex as Rules of Civ il Pr oc e dure , h a s b e e n f ile d ma y dis mis s th e a c tio n o n a

fi nd ingthat:3 (1) the a lleg ation of pover ty in the aff idavit is false; or (2 ) t he a c tio n is fr ivo lou s o r m a lic iou s. (b) In deter

mining whether an action is frivolous or m alicious, the cour t may consider whether : (1 ) t he a c tio n’ s r e a lis tic c ha

nc e of ult imate su c c e ss i s sl ig ht; (2) the c laim has no arguable ba sis in law or in fac t; or (3 ) it is c le ar that the pa

rt y c ann ot p ro ve a

se t of fa c ts i n s up po rt

of the c la im. (c) An ac tion may

be dismissed under Subsec tion (a) a s frivolous or malicious either be fo re or a ft e r s e rv ic e of

pr oc e ss.
Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 13.001 (West 2002).

We must first determine i f cha pter 13 a pplies to this case. Chapter 13 only applies to lawsuits in which an af fidavit of inability

to pay court c osts under rule of

civil proce dure 145 ha s been f iled. Id . § 13 .0 01 (a ). Rul e 14 5 pr ov ide s that a “ pa rt y wh o is un a

ble to a ff or d c os ts” mus t f

ile an af fidavit with the trial cour

t. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 45 (a ). A “ pa rt y wh o is un a

ble to a ff or d c os ts” is defined a s a person who is prese ntly rec eiving a g overnme ntal entitlement based on indig ency or any other person who has no ability to pa y costs. Id
. Rul e 14 5 a lso pr ov ide s th a t th e a ff ida vit “ mus t contain complete inform at i o n ” as to the party ’s identity and income, inc luding a ny debts and monthly expenses. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 145(b). The a ffid av i t shall also contain the f ollowing statements: “I

am unable to pa

y the cour t costs. Iverify

that the statements in this affidavit are true and cor rec t.” Id . In h e r mot io n, L y nc h d id n ot v e ri fy

he r s tate me nts or

pr ov ide c omp le te inf or matio n a bo ut h e r i nc ome . Thu s, L y nc h’ s motio n did not c omp ly wi th t he a ff ida vit re qu ir e me nts of rule 145.See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.002 (West 2002). Prior to the ena ctment of 2 chapte r 14 in 1 9 9 5 , ch ap t er 13 a pplied to lawsuits filed by both inmates and non-inmates. See Hickson v . Moya , 926 S.W .2d 397 , 398 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, no writ). Chapte r 13 no long er applies to inmate litigation. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 13.004 (West 2002). 4 No ne the le ss, the me re fa c t th a t Ly nc h’ s st a te me nt o f i na

bil ity to p ay costs f a ils to comply with rule 145 does not mean that her suit is not subject to chapter 13. I n Johnson v. Tex as Departme nt of Cri minal Justice , 7 1 S. W.3 d 4 92 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 20 02 , n o p e t.) , th e El Pa so court of a ppeals fa ced a

simil ar situation involving c hapter 1 4 , t h e co unterpa rt to chapte r 13 that applies spec ifically

to inmate litigation. J ohnson sued the Te x as De partment of Criminal J ustice, 2 al leg ing that the depar

tment destroy ed two pair s of his sungla sses. Id
. a t 4 9 2
. A t t a c he d to his petition was a “ decla

ration to pay

cost,” in which Johnson stated that he was a ble to p ay c ourt c os ts. Id . Howeve r, Johns on never paid the filing fees or ser vice f ees a ssociated with his lawsuit. Id
. No tin g that th e g ov e rnme nt c od e re qu ir e s th a t th e dis tr ic t c le rk c oll e c t f e e s at the tim e t he suit or action is fil ed , see Te x. Go v’ t Co de Ann. § 5 1. 31 7( a ) ( Wes t Sup p. 20 06 ), the c ourt re a so ne d th a t, beca use J ohnson did not pay costs, the trial court was justified in concluding th at J o h n s o n was actua lly attempting to pr ocee d in forma pa uperis. Johnson , 71 S.W .3d at 493. Thus, the t rial cour t did no t a bu se its dis c re tion in a

pp lyingc ha

pte r 1 4 o f t

he c ivi l pr a c tic e and

re me die s c od e to J ohnson’s lawsuit. Id . The c ourt explained:
John so n’ s p os iti on , h ow e ve r, is that hi s su it d oe s n ot f a ll w ith in C ha

pte r 1 4 b e c a

us e he ne ve r f ile d a de c laratio n of ina

bil ity to pa

y c os ts in the tr ia l c ourt
. We c ann ot h old that si mpl y st atin g an a

bil ity to p ay c os ts, wi tho ut e ve r p ayingthe m, e xemp ts a prisoner f rom the re quirements of Chapter 14. To do so would cle arly thwart the leg islature’s intent to control the number of fr ivolous lawsuits being filed by prison inm a te s, c on sumin g jud ic ia l r e so ur c e s w ithlittle of fs e tti ngbe ne fi t. Id
. (c i t i n g Hickson v . Moya , 926 S.W .2d 397, 398 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, no writ))
.5 Whil e cha

pter 14 a pplies only

to lawsuits broug ht by

inmates, see Tex
. C i v . P rac. & Re m. Code Ann. § 14.002 (a ) (W est 2002), we conclude that the re asoning in Johnson c an a lso be applied to chapte r 13. The purpose of cha pter 13 is to preve nt abusive litigation by litigants who “lac k[] an ec onomic incentive to re fra in from filing frivolous, malicious, o r repetitive lawsuits.” S p el l mo n v. Swee ney , 8 1 9 S. W. 2 d 2 0 6 , 2 1 0 ( T e x. A p p . —Wa c o 1 9 9 1 , n o w r it )
. T o h o ld th a t t rial courts ca nnot dismi ss such sui ts simply beca use the indig ent litigant, who ma y often be proce eding pr o s e , d id n ot c omp ly

wi th a ll o f t

he pr oc e dura l r e qu ir e me nts of ru le 14 5 w ou ld d e fe a t th e purp os e of the statute a

nd could ac tually

rew ard nonc ompliance with rule 145 by cre ating an ince nt i v e for lit ig ants to f

ile a ff ida vit s o f i nd ig e nc e that do no t me e t th e ru le ’s re qu ir e me nts
. Although L

y nch’s motion did not comply with rule 145, Ly nch cle arly

stated that she was “ unable to pay

the filing fee s” bec ause she had “no inc ome.” Ly nch’s “ p ro p o s al ” to pay the filing fee s “on the date of settlement” is irreleva nt, as the g overnme nt code r equire s the district cler k to collect the fee s at t he ti me t he sui t or action is filed. See Tex. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 51.317(a ). On this recor d, we hold that the di strict court did not abuse its discre tion in concluding that L y nch
wa s atte mpt ingto p ro c e e d in fo rm a pa up e ri s and th us in a

pp lyingthe pr oc e dure s o f c ha pte r 1 3 to he r l aws uit
. Havingdeter mined that chapte r 13 appli es t o L y nch’s law suit, we must now deter mine whether the di strict court abused i ts discretion in dismiss ing L y nch’s suit as fr ivolous and
ma lic iou s. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt state d th a t it wa s dism iss ing L y nc h’ s suit be c a

us e it h a d “ no argua

ble basis in law or fa ct.” See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 13.001(b)( 2). B eca use the district court dismiss ed L y

nch’s suit without a hear ing on fac tual issues, the only possible r eason fo r t he6

district court’s dismissal is t hat there was no ba sis in law for the suit. See M oore v. Collins , 897 S.W .2d 496, 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1995, no writ).

We r eview dismiss al under chapte r 13 for a buse of discr etion. Jones v . CGU Ins. Co. , 78 S.W .3d 626, 628 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). The test for de termining whether the cour t abused its discre tion is whether it acte d wi t h o ut refe renc e to any g uiding r

ules or princ iples
an d whether

it acted a rbitrar ily and ca priciously
. McD aniel v. Y arbrough , 8 9 8 S. W. 2 d 251, 253 (T e x. 19 95 ); Jones , 78 S.W .3d at 628. A trial c ourt’s cle ar f ailure to prope rly analy

ze and apply

the law constitutes an a

buse of discr etion. McD aniel , 898 S.W .2d at 253. Construing L y

n ch ’s pl eading s liberally , she alleg ed possible ca uses of a ction for neg lige nce a

nd pro d u ct l i ab i l i ty

under the DTPA. Ther e is a two-year statute of limitations for neg lige nce a

nd DTPA claims. See KPMG Peat M arwick v. Harrison Co u n t y Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W .2d 746, 749-50 (Tex. 1999) (citing Tex. B us. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.565 (W es t 2002) (DTPA cla ims); Tex . Civ. P rac . & Re m. Code Ann. § 16.003 (West S u p p . 2 0 06) (ne g lige nce cl ai m s ))
. L y

nch’s c auses of

action ar ose on May

17, 2004, the day

that she alleg edly

boug ht her
sand wi c h f ro m Jac k in

the B ox and

be c a me sic k. She did

no t f ile su it unti l June 26 , 2 00 6. Th us, beca use Ly nch’s ne g lige nce a

nd DTPA claims wer e not filed wi t hin the two-y ear statute of limit ations, they

have no a

rg uable ba sis in law. L y nc h’ s p e tit ion

a lso re fe rr e d to “ fr a

ud .” F ra ud is s ub je c t to a fou r-y e ar s tatut e
o f limit ations. See Shannon v . Law-Y one , 9 5 0 S. W. 2 d

4 2 9 , 4 3 3 ( T e x. A p p . — F o rt W o rth 1 997, pet. denied)
. Thus, this cause of action is not barr ed as a

matter of la

w by the applica

ble limitations period. How ever , to state a c laim for fr aud, a plaintiff must a lleg e that: (1) the defe ndants made a7

mate ri a l r e pr e se ntatio n th a t w a s f a lse ; ( 2) the y

kn e w that th e re pr e se ntat ion wa s f a lse or ma de it
rec klessly as a positive a ssertion without any knowledg e of its truth; (3) they intended to induce the plaintiff t o act upon the represe ntation; and (4) the pl aintiff actually and justifiably relied upon the repr esentation a

nd there by suffe red injury
. See Ernst & Y oung, L.L.P. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 51 S.W .3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2001).

These e lements are entirely absent fr o m L y

nch’s pe tition. There is no alleg ation about what mate rial misrepre sentations wer e made , whether J ack in the Box knew that they wer e false or made them r eckle ssl y , wh et h er J ack in the B ox intended to induce L y nch to ac t on the repr esen tations , o r whe the r L y nc h a c tua lly

and jus tif ia bly re lie d u po n th e re pr e se ntatio ns . Wh ile pleading s are to be construed l ibera lly , liberal construction does not mean that we impl y claims that
are not alleg ed. See Toles v. Toles , 113 S.W .3d 899, 911 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2 0 0 3 , no pet.). Although L

y nch included the term “f rau d ” i n h er pe tition, her petition cannot rea sonably be
c on str ue d a s r a isi ngthat c la im. We conclude that the only cause s o f ac t i o n that can r easona bly be construe d from L y nc h’ s p e tit ion , n e g lig e nc e and pr od uc t lia bil ity un de r the DT PA, are ba rr e d b y the tw o- y e ar s tatut e of limitations. Therefor e, we hold that the district c ourt did not a buse its discretion in deter mining that L y nch’s law suit had no arguable basis in law and thus in dismissi ng L y nch’s suit as fr ivolous
and ma lic iou s.
CO NC LU SION

We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.8 __________________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: August 9, 2007