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S. HRG. 110–5

EXAMINING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

IMPROVEMENTS TO IRAQ’S JUSTICE SYSTEM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 31, 2007

Serial No. J–110–7

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

MICHAEL O’NEILL, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page

Durbin, Hon. Richard J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois .................... 18

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 1

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37

Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania ................. 3

WITNESSES 

Hamilton, Lee H., former Member of Congress, Director, The Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, and Co-Chair, Iraq Study Group, Washington, D.C.; and Edwin Meese III, former Attorney General, Ronald 

Reagan Chair in Public Policy, The Heritage Foundation, and member, 

Iraq Study Group, Washington, D.C. ................................................................. 5

QUESTION AND ANSWER 

Response of Lee H. Hamilton to a question submitted by Senator Specter ....... 28

(Note: Mr. Meese did not respond to this question.) 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Hamilton, Lee H., former Member of Congress, Director, The Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, and Co-Chair, Iraq Study Group, Washington, D.C.; and Edwin Meese III, former Attorney General, Ronald 

Reagan Chair in Public Policy, The Heritage Foundation, and member, 

Iraq Study Group, Washington, D.C., statement .............................................. 30

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont, letter 

to Attorney General Gonzales (Dec. 11, 2006) and response (Jan. 16, 2007) .. 39

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Sector Report 

(Jan. 30, 2007), Arlington, Virginia, excerpts .................................................... 50

United States Institute of Peace, Robert M. Perito, Senior Program Officer, 

Washington, D.C., statement .............................................................................. 70

ADDITIONAL SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Submissions for the record not printed due to voluminous nature, previously 

printed by an agency of the Federal Government, or other criteria determined by the Committee, list .............................................................................. 75

(1)

EXAMINING THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP’S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO 

IRAQ’S POLICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 

SYSTEMS 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2007

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Leahy, Feinstein, Durbin, Specter, Sessions, 

Graham, and Coburn. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Chairman LEAHY. Good morning. The Committee today will continue to focus its attention on the enduring conflict in Iraq. Just 

yesterday, this Committee, chaired by Senator Feingold, had an important hearing on the powers of Congress to contribute to finding 

a better solution. Today, we concentrate on the challenges of training the Iraqi police and building a working criminal justice system. 

A competent police force and a functioning criminal justice system 

are crucial benchmarks in getting the Iraqi Government to stand 

on its own. You might say that of any country. 

I am very pleased that Congressman Hamilton and Attorney 

General Meese have come here, and I want to thank both of them 

for taking the time. They are both well known to the members of 

the Committee. 

I am concerned that the situation in Iraq continues to worsen on 

all fronts. In the last couple of days, the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction—the office that some tried to shut down 

and fortunately we kept open—has released reports indicating that 

the U.S. Government has squandered millions intended for police 

training programs because of ‘‘rampant problems overseeing contractors,’’ as the Washington Post summarized in its story this 

morning. The article details an unauthorized Olympic—sized swimming pool, VIP trailers, shoddy construction, and unsanitary conditions at the Baghdad Police College. On television this morning, 

they were showing raw sewage leaking out through the light fixtures, the overhead light fixtures, as well as evidence of fraud, as 

millions—actually, tens of millions of dollars are wasted. Not only 

does this undercut efforts in Iraq; it is doubly shameful because we 

2

are trying to restore places like New Orleans and the Gulf Coast 

here in this country. And that has been held up, and this money 

is being wasted in Iraq. 

It is an issue of overriding importance. In the most recent congressional elections, the American people spoke loudly and clearly. 

They wanted a new direction, and this week we are charting that 

new direction by considering better ways to serve our national interests. 

At its outset, the Iraq Study Group report states that the situation in Iraq is ‘‘grave and deteriorating.’’ I looked at the membership of the committee, the Iraq Study Group. I know every one of 

the people who served there. I have high regard for all of them. But 

this is not a monolithic, ideological group. It goes across the political spectrum. And I appreciate their honesty. This grim assessment should have been a wakeup call to the President and his advisers, and a clear message that it was time to not only listen to 

others but to act upon their sound advice. I am concerned that it 

appears that the White House has rejected much of the hard work 

and advice of the Iraq Study Group and instead decided to go it 

alone. During the last few days, the Vice President went further by 

rejecting contrary views as ‘‘hogwash’’ and seeking to trumpet the 

‘‘enormous successes’’ supposedly made in Iraq. 

We now know that the predictions by the Vice President and others of being welcomed as liberators in Iraq and an easy transition 

to a Western-style, secular, peaceful, pluralistic democracy were a 

very costly fantasy. As the Study Group report indicates, the best 

we can salvage may be the safe return of our soldiers and some 

measure of stability for the people of Iraq. The damage already 

done in terms of providing al Qaeda with new recruits and the 

alienation the extended occupation by American forces has caused 

among young people in the Middle East will be felt for decades, 

maybe even generations. Moreover, we have lost focus on what 

should have been our No. 1 goal: bringing Osama bin Laden to justice. He is the man who, after all, hit us. 

As Senator Webb and many others I trust from both sides of the 

aisle have said, it is time for Congress to help guide the way. I 

hope the President will take good advice when it is offered—no 

matter the source. I urge him to work with Congress rather than 

defy it and to listen to the will of the American people in order to 

avoid a confrontation. 

I am grateful to the Iraq Study Group for its express recognition 

that ‘‘Americans can and must enjoy the right of robust debate 

within a democracy.’’ I might add, within the greatest democracy 

in the world. The scare tactics and attacks on the patriotism of 

those who question the President’s plan are corrosive, and they are 

wrong. The work of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group is in the best 

tradition of America. The hearings this Committee held on the 

Iraqi refugee crisis and this week on congressional authority under 

our Constitution, as well as this hearing on the Iraq Study Group’s 

recommendations for improvements to Iraq’s police and criminal 

justice system, are part of that great traditions. 

I am concerned that after all the work—and I must say not only 

the work, but you made visits to a very, very dangerous part of this 

world—it seems to be ignored by the people who could make the 

3

decisions. In two major addresses to the Nation that President 

Bush has given recently -his escalation announcement of January 

10th and his recent State of the Union address—he barely mentioned the Iraq Study Group’s work. He said nothing about the critical importance of Iraq’s civilian police. Of course, he also did not 

mention Louisiana and the Gulf Coast, perhaps the largest domestic disaster and displacement of people in our history. 

So this hearing is going to give us a chance to go further. I hope 

we can discuss better ways to contribute to peace and stability 

throughout the Iraqi neighborhoods. How can we help ensure better police forces? How can we better ensure that the principles of 

the Leahy law, which prohibit American financial assistance to 

those forces that engage in human rights violations, are honored 

rather than ignored? 

[The prepared statement of Senator Leahy appears as a submission for the record.] 

There is much at stake. Again, I must thank our two witnesses 

for being here. With their own busy schedules, we very much appreciate that, and especially when talking about law enforcement 

matters, I am very happy that we have Senator Specter here, who 

has had even more experience in law enforcement than I did. 

Please go forward. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator SPECTER. I thank the distinguished Chairman for convening this hearing on a very important subject. In trying to deal 

with the multilayered problems in Iraq, the police force in Iraq and 

the judiciary in Iraq are very high on the list, along with reconstruction and economic development and oil revenues—all part of 

a multifaceted program, in addition to the military action, to try 

solve the problems in Iraq. And I am very pleased to see two very 

distinguished authorities here today—former Attorney General 

Edwin Meese and former Congressman Lee Hamilton—who have 

performed such extraordinary service after their formal connection 

to Government. 

The issue of what has happened with the 38 volumes on construction is the subject of a voluminous report. It has just become 

available in the last couple of days, and as the Chairman had referenced, this report contains repeated examples of wasteful spending—Olympic pools and not-ordered items and the squandering of 

an enormous amount of money. So that will receive attention as 

well. 

I think it is important to examine in detail what the Iraq Study 

Group has done, and too often, I think the executive branch gives 

only pro forma consideration really only going through the motions—you might call it lip service to what the Iraq Study Group 

has reported. 

It is my view that as a Nation we would be much better off if 

the executive branch was not so insular and undertaking a position 

that, as we discussed yesterday, the President articulates as he is 

the sole decider. But under the Constitution, separation of power 

and checks and balances, the Congress has standing as a co-equal 

branch of Government. And when a distinguished group like the 

4

Iraq Study Group comes into the picture, I think the executive 

branch would be well advised to do more than have a meeting and 

a news conference to give in-depth consideration to what is being 

proposed here. 

We have the military in Iraq essentially being called upon to perform a police function, not a military operation. It is trying to stop 

street violence, very much as Senator Leahy worked on in Burlington and I worked on as district attorney in Philadelphia. And 

the judicial system is indispensable if Iraq is going to have a stable 

government. 

I think it was very regrettable that that judicial system was not 

able to try Saddam Hussein at an earlier date. The President was 

in Pennsylvania extensively in 2004 when he was running for reelection, and I was running at the same time, and 1 day when we 

had a spare moment, I urged him to have the U.S. Government do 

what it could to bring Saddam to trial at an early date. We have 

a lot of criticism as to what the United States was doing there. And 

I said the obvious to the President; that if the world saw what a 

butcher he was with the Iraqi people and what he had done in the 

Iran-Iraq war with chemical warfare and how he had plundered 

the treasury, there would be a greater understanding as to the purpose of our action in Iraq. 

The President, in a perhaps playful mood, asked me if I would 

be willing to prosecute Saddam Hussein, and I immediately took 

him up on the offer. Things were a little slow in the Senate in 

2004, and with the campaign, the thought ran through my mind 

about Justice Jackson leaving the Supreme Court and going to 

prosecute war criminals. And as soon as I accepted, the President 

withdrew the offer. 

But I contacted our liaison people in Baghdad to inquire about 

what were the prospects of an early trial, and it just could not be 

done. The Iraqi court had not been set up, and there had to be an 

appellate court. But there is nothing like a prompt prosecution—

a prompt prosecution—not to have it tarry. 

In December of 2005, I visited Iraq and talked to the presiding 

judge in the Saddam Hussein trial, made a suggestion to him as 

to some of our practices when you had a defendant out of control. 

A defendant can be restrained in a variety of ways so that there 

is not an outburst. And he listened and said he had a little different view. 

But with the background of Attorney General Meese and the 

background of the Iraq Study Group generally, there is much of 

value in this report. So I am glad to see the Judiciary Committee 

focusing on it because it is an integral part of solving the problem 

in Iraq above and beyond the military action to see to it that they 

have a police force and to see to it that they have a functioning judicial system. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Specter noted when he was Chairman we do have our 

rules. We are supposed to receive testimony by 10:00 a.m. the day 

before. Mr. Meese, your summary arrived in the afternoon. If nobody objects, I am not going to enforce that rule. You are not GovVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:19 Mar 23, 2007 Jkt 033819 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\33819.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
5

ernment witnesses. You are private witnesses. You have worked 

hard to be here, and I appreciate that. 

Would you both please stand and raise your right hand? Do you 

solemnly swear that the testimony you give in this matter will be 

the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 

God? 

Mr. HAMILTON. I do. 

Mr. MEESE. I do. 

Chairman LEAHY. Please go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF LEE H. HAMILTON, FORMER MEMBER OF CONGRESS, DIRECTOR, THE WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, AND CO-CHAIR, IRAQ 

STUDY GROUP, WASHINGTON, D.C.; AND EDWIN MEESE III, 

FORMER U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, RONALD REAGAN CHAIR 

IN PUBLIC POLICY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, AND MEMBER, IRAQ STUDY GROUP, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Specter, Senator Specter, distinguished members of the Committee 

on Judiciary. It is an honor, of course, to appear before you. We 

thank you for the invitation and the opportunity to testify on the 

recommendations of the Iraq Study Group report, particularly 

those recommendations relating to police training and the criminal 

justice system. 

May I say it is a very great pleasure to appear with former Attorney General Ed Meese. He contributed in many, many ways to 

the work of the Iraq Study Group, but he was particularly helpful 

on the area that we are discussing today. And all of us on the 

group recognized his expertise in law enforcement and police matters. 

We think it is critically important to look at the totality of the 

U.S. effort in Iraq. All of the attention right now, of course, is focused on the military surge. Whether you think the surge is a good 

idea or not, the Iraq Study Group made clear that no policy in Iraq 

is going to succeed unless there is very comprehensive political, 

military, economic, and diplomatic effort. 

If you are going to stabilize Baghdad, you need to have a capable, 

trained professional police force in place. If you are going to stabilize Baghdad, you need a functioning criminal justice system. The 

same holds true, of course, for the rest of Iraq. 

As our testimony will make clear, there is a very long way to go 

to achieve these two goals. So we commend this Committee for 

shining a bright light on these questions. We hope that you will 

pursue questions of police training and the criminal justice system 

in Iraq at future hearings with administration officials. Your oversight is certainly needed. 

I also want to say a word of appreciation to Chairman Leahy for 

his support in the Appropriations Committee for the funding of the 

Iraq Study Group through the United States Institute of Peace. 

The work of the Study Group simply could not have been done 

without that support. 

The Study Group’s recommendations are in the public record, 

and so we will not repeat them. If it is agreeable to the Chair, we 

6

would like to explain some of the thinking behind some of the recommendations. 

The recommendations for police training and the criminal justice 

system in Iraq follow from the assessment we made. 

There are, as you know, three major police forces in Iraq. The 

Iraqi Police Service, about 135,000 in strength, is responsible for 

local policing. The Iraqi National Police numbers roughly 25,000, 

and its officers have been trained in counterinsurgency operations, 

not police work. The Iraqi Border Police number roughly 28,000. 

The Iraqi Police Service has neither the training nor the legal 

authority to conduct criminal investigations. It does not have the 

firepower to take on organized crime, insurgents, or the militias. 

Iraqi police cannot control crime. They routinely engage in sectarian violence, including unnecessary detention, torture, and targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. 

Furthermore, the Iraqi National Police and the Iraqi Border Police are charged with tasks that are not traditional policing missions. 

The National Police operate within heavily armed commando 

units. They are engaged in counterinsurgency. These units have 

been particularly vulnerable to infiltration by sectarian militias. 

The Border Police also have a mission that is decidedly military 

in nature, particularly given the importance of sealing and securing 

Iraq’s borders. They have to protect against arms and foreign fighters coming into Iraq. They have to work with coalition forces. 

Yet all of these forces—the Iraqi Police Service, the Iraqi National Police, and the Iraqi Border Police—are organized under the 

Ministry of the Interior. The ministry is confronted by corruption 

and militia infiltration and lacks control over the police in the 

provinces. 

There are ample reports of Iraqi police officers participating in 

training in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, and ammunition for 

use in sectarian violence. Some are on the payroll but do not show 

up for work. The report that you referred to, Mr. Chairman, of the 

Study Group, the Inspector General’s report, says that one of the 

challenges relating to the maintenance of force levels is that leave 

and immature personnel management policies may account for up 

to 40 percent of police not being present for duty. 

The current Minister of the Interior has called for purging militia 

members and criminals from the police force. He has been in the 

post since May 2006. He has made a start at reform. Over 1,200 

Interior Ministry personnel with criminal records have been identified and removed from the force. Just yesterday, we read reports 

that several leaders of the National Police were removed because 

they had ‘‘turned a blind eye’’ to Shiite militias. These are good 

steps, but everyone acknowledges that reform is a long road. 

The criminal justice system in Iraq is weak. Much has been done 

to establish an Iraqi judiciary, including a supreme court, and Iraq 

has some dedicated judges. Criminal investigations are conducted 

by magistrates. They are too few and inadequately trained to perform this function. Intimidation of the Iraqi judiciary has been 

ruthless. 

7

As one senior U.S. official said to us, ‘‘We can protect judges, but 

not their families, their extended families, their friends.’’ Many 

Iraqis feel that crime not only is unpunished, it is rewarded. 

In short, we believe the problems in the Iraqi police and criminal 

justice system are profound. Reforms are essential. They are urgently needed. 

Organizational reforms are necessary, and it is up to the Iraqis 

to carry them out. 

The Ministry of Interior has too large a span of control over too 

many diverse police and security activities. As presently organized, 

the ministry is not capable of effective and timely reform. If reconstituted to focus on the police mission, we believe there is a better 

chance that reform in the Ministry of Interior will take place and 

take hold. 

The Iraqi National Police and its commando-style units should be 

transferred to the Ministry of Defense. This move will place them 

under better and more rigorous Iraqi and U.S. supervision and will 

enable these units to better perform counterinsurgency missions. 

Similarly, the mission of the Iraqi Border Police bears little resemblance to ordinary policing. It, too, should be under the Ministry of Defense. 

The Ministry of the Interior needs to concentrate on the police 

mission. It needs to concentrate on professionalizing—and gaining 

control of—the nationwide Iraqi Police Service. Before it can do so, 

it must purge its own ranks of bad elements. It needs legal authority, it needs training, it needs equipment, it needs to exert more 

authority over these local leaders. 

The ministry needs to expand the capability and reach of the current major crime unit, the Criminal Investigation Division, so that 

there will be a national capability for police investigations, similar 

to our FBI. The ministry also needs to regain control of the salaries 

of local police forces, as a powerful tool to press them for reform, 

and to prevent sectarian militias from controlling local police in 

Iraq’s provinces. 

The ministry also must take on the various units of the Facilities 

Protection Service. Each ministry has its own security force. The 

Health, Agriculture, and Transportation ministries are controlled 

by al-Sadr. As described to us, this 145,000-man force is ‘‘incompetent, dysfunctional, or subversive.’’ Several Iraqis simply referred 

to them as ‘‘militias.’’ 

All Facilities Protection Service personnel should be brought 

under the authority of a reformed Ministry of the Interior. They 

need to be vetted, retrained, and closely supervised. They must not 

serve as de facto militias for each Iraqi ministry. 

For the balance of the statement, I will turn to General Meese. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Congressman Hamilton. I read the whole statement. We are going to go back to some 

of your conclusions in that in the questions. 

Attorney General Meese, again, thank you, sir, for being here, 

and please proceed. 

Mr. MEESE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Senator 

Specter, and members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to talk with you about our report. First let me say that it 

is true that many more of our recommendations have actually been 

8

accepted by the executive branch than is generally known or made 

known in the press. But the ones that we are talking about today 

are particularly important because the necessary concomitant to 

military success in Iraq is the ability to hold after the bad guys, 

as they say, are cleared from neighborhoods. It is necessary to hold 

and to preserve the security and stability of those neighborhoods 

on a long-term basis. And as has been pointed out by the Chairman, this is really a job for police. 

When I was in Iraq with the Chairman and others, one of the 

things that impressed me was the ability already—the work that 

our Department of Justice is doing over there in very limited numbers. There were people there from the Bureau of Prisons, from the 

Marshals Service, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, people who are expert 

in police work and so on. So there has been a start. But we believe 

that the principal responsibility for the training of police should be 

in the Department of Justice rather than in the military forces over 

there. 

Right now, of the 6,000 trainers for police, 5,000, it is my understanding, of them are military police, only 1,000 are civilian police. 

We think that while military police are very good in their field, the 

training of the civilian police force and the culture that needs to 

be developed, as Chairman Hamilton mentioned, is really a job for 

civilian police executives and police supervisors. And so our recommendations include the fact that the Department of Justice, 

which is already experienced in this field under the International 

Criminal Investigation, Training, and Assistance Program, where 

they have done this in other countries working on this subject, that 

they would be a good—the principal agency of the Federal Government to pursue this particular task. It would mean an enlargement 

of the kinds of things they have been doing overseas, but we think 

that they are the best agency to do that and that they should leave 

this work of organizational transformation in the Ministry of the 

Interior, which was mentioned by Mr. Hamilton. 

We also think that the current practice of embedding U.S. police 

trainers should be expanded and that the number of civilian training officers increased so that the teams can cover all levels of the 

Iraqi Police Service. The Police Service is that group of the police, 

as Mr. Hamilton mentioned, that does what is the principal police 

work. The officers are devolved down to the various provinces, and 

they are what you might call the street police of the Iraqi police 

regime. 

What we really need is someone to handle police training in the 

same manner as we expect General Petraeus to take over the military activities over there. There are some very excellent people 

available—a number of them come to mind—such as Tom 

Constantino, formerly the Superintendent of the State Police in 

New York; or Mark Croaker, who handled our policing activities in 

Bosnia. But someone like that who has the status ought to really 

be in charge of the police training and in the Department of Justice 

to do that kind of work rather than, as you suggest, private contractors for whom this is not their principal forte. 

In addition, we feel the FBI should expand the investigative and 

forensic training and technical assistance so that it would include 

the coverage of terrorism, so that forensic activity in regard to the 

9

making of these improvised explosive devices and things such as 

that could be traced back to their point of origin, so that the same 

kind of investigative activity, tracing networks of terrorist groups 

and the like that we would do with organized crime in this country, 

can be applied to the situation in Iraq. 

Likewise, the expansion of current programs that are there to do 

as was mentioned to be necessary, establishing courts, training 

judges, prosecutors, investigators, the whole legal side to be concomitant with the investigative and policing side of the situation. 

We also recommend that the CIA and the FBI together work to 

establish in Iraq a more effective counterterrorism center, intelligence center, and fusion center, just as we have done here in the 

United States, so that we can have intelligence-led responses to the 

terrorism attacks that are taking place there. 

And, finally, mention was made by Mr. Hamilton about the salaries. Right now, the Ministry of the Interior does not have control 

over the payment of police salaries or the funding of these police 

organizations. It is in the Ministry of Finance, and very little connection is made between the performance and competence of the 

police agencies and funding them and paying the salaries. And so 

it is very important that as a part of the reorganization and reinvigoration of the Ministry of the Interior that they have control of 

the funding, because as you know, the person—the Golden Rule: 

He who has the gold makes the rules. And just as in—I think England probably has one of the best patterns that might be followed 

where the national government pays a good portion of the police 

salaries so, therefore, they have the authority to enforce certain 

standards on the police, and that is what is necessary in Iraq, particularly, so that there is a professional responsibility and professional standards organization and inspection service that would 

function as the Inspector of Constabulary does in England. I think 

those models would be very good ones for the national police in 

Iraq. 

These are just a few ideas. As was mentioned, more is included 

in our report. But this has to be a fundamental part of our efforts 

in Iraq, along with the military effort, in order to maintain the 

safety, security, and stability that is necessary to then carry on the 

reconstruction work which is so important in that nation. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Messrs. Hamilton and Meese appears 

as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Attorney General Meese. 

Both of you are basically saying you want the police departments 

to be police departments, and instead we have something very different there. In your testimony, you mentioned the need to followup with the administration, particularly the Department of Justice. So many of your recommendations involve them. I agree. After 

I reviewed your report, I sent a letter requesting information and 

views from the Attorney General back on December 11th. I received the courtesy of an acknowledgment from his staff, and in my 

letter, I extended an invitation for them to send a representative 

to this hearing, which they declined. I will make a copy of my letter 

and their response part of the record. 

10

I would also include in the record a very helpful statement from 

Robert Perito as well, who is, of course, a staff advisor, as you 

know, to your Study Group. That will be part of the record. 

I am wondering, do you get a sense—we spent about half a trillion dollars so far, both in the invasion and in the occupation of 

Iraq. How much of that has been devoted to developing an effective 

criminal justice system, effective police training, our of all that 

money we spent there? Do you have any sense how much has been 

spent and even how much is going to be required to be spent? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator, I don’t think we have a figure on that 

except it would be a very, very small part of that total amount. 

Very small. 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, I wonder, because when we went into 

the war, Secretary Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz told us that Iraqi 

oil revenues would, in effect, pay for the war. 

Now, we spent half a trillion dollars there. Are the Iraqis paying 

for any of this training or running of the—I would like to see somebody other than the U.S. pay for it. We are told we have to cut our 

COPS program in the United States because we need the money 

for Iraq. We do not have the money for police down on the Gulf 

Coast because of the costs. Are the Iraqis going to pay for any of 

this? Or are we, Uncle Sam and the American Taxpayer, going to 

pick up the tab? 

Mr. HAMILTON. I think the largest part of the funding comes 

from us. One of the peculiarities of the Iraqi Government is that 

they in their various ministries have substantial amounts of money 

that they cannot spend or do not spend. They are just not capable 

organizationally or bureaucratically of getting the money out. So it 

is not always a problem of lack of funds. The funds are just tied 

up in knots in the bureaucracy of the Iraqi Government there. 

Mr. MEESE. One of our recommendations, of course, is that Iraq 

pick up the funding, particularly of the police activities, including 

the training. 

One of the difficulties—you mentioned oil—has been to have a 

continuing source of the flow of the oil because of the terrorist activities against the utilities there, including the oil pipelines. It is 

kind of a Catch–22 situation because the—

Chairman LEAHY. It is there but you cannot get it? 

Mr. MEESE. Well, you have the oil, but the terrorists disrupt the 

pipelines, and we need more police to catch the terrorists to protect 

the pipelines. 

Actually, protecting infrastructure is a very important part of 

both the military and the police activities there. But it certainly is 

our recommendation that Iraq pay for these. 

I would also suggest that good policing there and good handling 

of the funds within the Ministry of the Interior would go a long 

ways. As Mr. Hamilton mentioned, the funds are there. Right now, 

the ability to disburse the funds and account for funds is lacking, 

and that is part of the training that needs to be going into the Ministry of the Interior. Right now, many of the officials within the 

government are afraid to spend the funds because of the corruption 

that takes place and the fear that they will be accused of corruption. And so there has to be extensive work on the administrative 

activity and the administrative structure within the Ministry of the 

11

Interior—as well as other ministries, for that matter—in order to 

have the proper handling of funding over there. 

Chairman LEAHY. It sounds like you are doing kind of a Rubik’s 

Cube as you try to do this. Probably based on my own law enforcement background, I have always felt that good law enforcement is 

just so essential for a civil society to operate. I really feel that is 

essential. And we know in this country, when we have good law enforcement, how well it has run, and we know what has happened 

when we have had bad law enforcement. We have had examples of 

each. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman—

Chairman LEAHY. And I worry here that—well, go ahead. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Excuse me. I did not mean to interrupt. 

Chairman LEAHY. That is all right. 

Mr. HAMILTON. One of the problems throughout the Iraqi Government is capabilities. They just do not have the capability in 

ministry after ministry to perform. And, therefore, we have recommended that the U.S. aid to Iraq, economic aid, be concentrated 

in two areas: one, job creation, for obvious reasons; and, second, on 

trying to improve the capabilities of the Iraqi Government. You 

cannot help but be impressed how weak and how thin these ministries are in Iraq and what enormous responsibilities they have. 

Chairman LEAHY. In fact, in that regard, I worry—you know, we 

are talking about embedding our troops with them. Well, if you 

have an unreliable Iraqi police force, if you have corruption, I wonder about asking our American men and women—aren’t we putting 

them in horrible danger if we ask them to embed with them? We 

have seen the abductions. We have seen torture. We have seen beheadings. We have seen people captured and used as pawns. Normally, you would think it would be the easiest thing in the world 

to put your folks in with the police force, that it would be the safest 

place. But for the life of me, I do not see where we guarantee the 

safety of Americans—and this may go to Mr. Meese’s Catch–22. 

But I do not see where we can embed these people, our Americans, 

and trust to their safety? 

Mr. HAMILTON. There is not any doubt at all that when you 

embed American forces or American police trainers with Iraqi 

units, it is a high-risk business. Any task, I guess, in this country 

is risky, but it is very dangerous to embed. 

Now, that is one of the reasons we recommend why you have to 

have a residual force in Iraq, American combat forces, that could 

come to the aid of any American in danger. We believe that course 

of action will bring less casualties than our current strategy. But 

there is not any denying the risk involved when you embed. It is 

a dangerous business. 

Chairman LEAHY. Do you agree with that, Mr. Meese? Mr. 

Meese. Yes, but I think we should recognize the fact that the military experience has shown that when American forces are present, 

the Iraqi forces, out of professionalism, actually behave much better and are much bolder in the actions they are willing to take. 

And I think this would be true of the police as well. 

One of the problems with the police is the culture of the police 

has to be built from the ground up. When Saddam Hussein was in 

power, the police were essentially groups of thugs that stayed in 

12

the police stations. They were very political in their orientation. 

When someone was accused of crime, it depended on the accuser. 

If the accuser was on the political good side, they went out and arrested the alleged culprit, brought him back to the police station, 

used what I suspect were unconventional methods to obtain a confession, and then threw him in jail. 

As a result, they do not have a very good reputation with the 

people in Iraq, so a part of the problem is to develop a culture of 

respect among the people, which means extensive police training in 

the kind of community policing activities, which they have started 

with the training but needs to be expanded. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Specter? 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you gentlemen 

outlined the problem, it is just gigantic, really overwhelming. When 

Congressman Hamilton talks about people volunteering to get a 

gun so that they can use it in sectarian violence, how do you check 

that out? When Attorney General Meese talks about professionals 

going through the organization of the Department of Justice, with 

the FBI and bringing in the CIA and the Marshals, it is extraordinarily difficult. 

When you read about the debates, Prime Minister Maliki is 

charged by one of the opposing members of their parliament with 

being partial to his group, and Maliki retorts, ‘‘Well, I have a document showing you were involved in an assassination,’’ it is pretty 

hard to know where you go for law and order. 

So the question comes to my mind. You have outlined an excellent blueprint based on our experience. How do you implement it? 

Is it possible to condition some of U.S. aid on hiring professionals, 

General Meese, as you suggest? How do you get a sense of responsibility in the officials who are directing the Iraqi Government to 

do the job? 

Mr. MEESE. I think that Prime Minister Maliki has indicated numerous times his commitment to professionalism and to changing 

things in the country. 

Senator SPECTER. Has he been willing to appoint a professional 

like your group suggests? Mr. Meese. I think that in terms of the 

Ministry of 

the Interior, there is general agreement that he is trying very 

hard. One of the things I think we have to recognize is that for virtually all the ministries—and, for that matter, the Prime Minister—this is on-the-job training for them. When the Saddam government fell, he had so centralized the control of everything that 

when he and his partisan henchmen essentially were thrown out 

of office, there was a vacuum there, which is now attempting to be 

being filled by the government that is there. So I think it is a matter of training. It is a matter of support. But I believe—and I think 

Chairman Hamilton would agree with me—that what we saw appeared to be a genuine interest among those leaders, President 

Talabani and others, to do the right thing. It is a matter of giving 

them the support and the education, really, in order to do that. 

Senator SPECTER. Let me turn to the very high profile—

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator, may I just say, in this Inspector General’s report they mention that—they quote Lieutenant General 

13

Dempsey, who has had responsibility for this. He estimates 20, 25 

percent of the national police need to be weeded out, and they say 

that the local police are infiltrated by and possibly coordinated 

with sectarian militias. 

Senator SPECTER. How do you weed them out, Congressman 

Hamilton? How do you weed them out? 

Mr. HAMILTON. I think the answer is—

Senator SPECTER. You need a really good weeder. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, you need a bushwhacker. You need a real 

vetting process. 

Today, for example, the Interior Ministry checks criminal records 

prior to 2003, but there is no check at all for militia membership. 

So there has to be a lot of vetting done with these people. 

How do you correct it? I think you have put your finger on one 

thing, and that is conditionality of aid. Now, this is one of the 

things we recommend in the report, that the Iraqi Government 

must make substantial progress—and that language, incidentally, 

comes from the El Salvador language of several years back. 

Senator SPECTER. May I interrupt you? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Sure. 

Senator SPECTER. Because my time is almost up, and I want to 

cover one other issue, and that is, the most high-profile matter that 

the judiciary has handled, of course, is the trial of Saddam Hussein. And it would be hard to find a less professional execution—

not that executions are very pleasant matters in any event—but it 

was extraordinarily botched, with taunting and sectarian ridicule 

at a time when there ought to be respect of some sort. And those 

high-profile trials are not over, and one way that the world is looking at their judicial system and the administration comes down to 

the execution. 

What steps can be taken to see to it that there is not a repetition 

of the disgraceful executions which have taken place so far? 

Mr. MEESE. Well, I would suggest that—of course, one of the 

things when we talk about embedding our people, this would be at 

all levels. I think the more we can do to build up their professional 

standards inspection service, and when you talk about weeding out, 

this includes building an intelligence system that would utilize information that is available, getting information from people in the 

neighborhoods and so on about these individuals and building a 

comprehensive intelligence system so you can know who is there. 

In terms of the execution aspects of it, it is a matter of taking 

extra care to make sure you have trustworthy people there. It is 

my understanding that people infiltrated that execution that 

should never have even been on the scene, came in from the outside and participated in some of the things you have mentioned. So 

it is a matter of just vastly improving the controls that people at 

the top have over what is going on. 

Senator SPECTER. Congressman Hamilton, do you want to supplement that or go back to your prior point and finish it? 

Mr. HAMILTON. No, no. That is all right. On the point that the 

General was making, we recommend that the Department of Justice has to take this responsibility. You have got to create an entire 

criminal justice system in this country. Today, ordinary crime is 

14

committed with impunity. There is no system of criminal justice in 

this country today. 

Now, we recognize the dimensions of this problem. It is huge. 

But we say that the programs led by the United States Department 

of Justice have to establish courts, they have to establish judges, 

prosecutors, magistrates, police, and create all of these institutions. 

And if you do not do it that way, I do not know how you get it 

done. 

Mr. MEESE. I might say that we also can use the help of other 

nations. Norway, for example, has on a very small scale taken police executives from Iraq, taken them to Norway for several weeks 

of training by their police there in command positions. I think 

other countries could be very helpful along this line also so that it 

is not just the United States but really is an international effort 

to improve policing there. And I would certainly recommend that. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Specter. 

Senator Feinstein? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Listening to you gentlemen—and thank you for being here—I am trying to read between your lines or words. You know, what I see is 

a greatly deteriorating picture in Iraq, and what I see is a very real 

—that have never known a democracy, that have no infrastructure 

of that democracy that is necessary to provide rule of law and develop this very rapidly. 

In your report on the Iraqi police, I would like to quote: ‘‘There 

are ample reports of Iraqi police officers participating in training 

in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, and ammunition for use in 

sectarian violence. Some are on the payroll but don’t show up for 

work. In the words of one senior American general, ‘2006 was supposed to be ‘‘the year of the police’’ but it hasn’t materialized that 

way.’’’ 

Is there any evidence that 2007 can be ‘‘the year of the police’’ ? 

Mr. HAMILTON. I see very little evidence thus far. So far as the 

United States is concerned, it is a question of priorities and making 

this one of our highest priorities in Iraq. 

Now, there are so many needs in that country that it is not easy 

to establish these priorities. But we are saying that there is a 

chance here to begin to develop at least a rudimentary criminal 

justice system, providing we put enough effort and resources and 

talent into it. But if you do not, and if we do not do it well, you 

simply will not achieve it. And you will not get stability in Baghdad. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Is there any evidence that that is happening? 

Mr. HAMILTON. No guarantees here. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Is the answer no, there is no evidence that 

that is happening? 

Mr. HAMILTON. No. I think there is some evidence that it is happening. I think we have learned. We began with the Department 

of State handling these criminal justice efforts in Iraq. That did not 

work. Then we turned it over to the Department of Defense. They 

had a lot more resources. But that is not the place for it either because the Department of Defense, with all of the good things they 

do, simply does not have the expertise for a criminal justice system. 

15

So this has to go to the Department of Justice. They are the only 

ones that can do it in our Government. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. And what have they said to this statement 

in your report that they take over the training? 

Mr. HAMILTON. I do not know that we have had a response from 

them on that, Senator Feinstein. I do not know. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So one would derive from that that they are 

not enthusiastic about going in and taking over the training. Is 

that not correct? 

Mr. MEESE. I do not think we can say that. We just have not had 

any response since the Committee rendered its report. And I would 

say that the people in the Department of Justice that are there 

now are doing an excellent job. It is just that this program needs 

to be expanded. 

Also, we need to have many more professional police trainers 

than we have at the present time, and I think that that is something that I would certainly commend to the Committee, that with 

the Department of Justice having a greater role, it is necessary—

and, again, this could be done by getting police executives from a 

number of countries, not just the United States. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. How many trainers, Mr. Meese, are there 

now? 

Mr. MEESE. Well, as I mentioned, there are approximately 6,000 

trainers, of which 1,000 are civilians and about 5,000 are military 

police. And I think that it would not be unusual to say that the 

number that we need is probably around 10,000 trainers, all of 

which, in my opinion, should be civilian police executives, retired 

police chiefs, retired police commanders from around the world. 

And I think that would be the kind of thing that we need. 

That is going to take time to ramp up, but it is something that 

really I think would be the best way in which to do this. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Is there any kind of a uniform training manual that is followed? 

Mr. MEESE. Oh, yes, there is, and there are examples where this 

has been done elsewhere in the world. We have done it in various 

countries in Latin America, in much smaller amounts, but, nevertheless, there are—you know, in this country, over the course of 

time from the 1930’s to the 1960’s, we had a major change in the 

culture of police departments in this country. And I think some of 

those lessons can be learned in terms of applying them to Iraq, in 

terms of professionalizing the police force there. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator, we say in the report that training has 

to be the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq. More important 

than anything else you are doing is training. And the quicker you 

do it, the earlier we are going to get out. And it is the only way 

we get out. 

Now, what we say with regard to the military forces is also true 

with regard to police. Training has to be the primary mission in 

order to correct the problems in the Iraqi criminal justice system. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. My time is up. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Graham? 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

16

I think this is a very worthwhile hearing, and I appreciate you 

both. Your recommendations make a lot of sense to me, and we will 

try to support you the best we can from our level here in Congress. 

But trying to paint for the American people a little bit about what 

lies ahead, I think the biggest mistake we have all made—and I 

will put myself in this category—is not appreciating what we were 

taking on in Iraq and how hard it is to build a democracy out of 

the ashes of a dictatorship. 

The police force, as you described it, in the Saddam era had one 

purpose: to support the dictator and his friends, and everything 

else was secondary. The economy was built around a dictator and 

his friends, and we are trying to create something new and different. 

It seems to me that we have got years of training to go, not 

months. It seems to me that it is still in our national interest that 

Iraq become a stable, functioning democracy, thus an ally in the 

war on terror. Quite simply put, if we withdrew from Baghdad 

militarily in the next 6 months and we left the capital to be defended by the army and the police that exist, would it be fair to 

say that there is a great chance of a bloodletting in Baghdad? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Oh, yes, indeed. We rejected the idea of a socalled quick or precipitous withdrawal for a variety of reasons: Iranian influence would expand, terrorists would have a sanctuary, 

energy resources would be jeopardized, our enemies would certainly 

be emboldened by all of that, we would lose a lot of standing and 

credibility, and many other reasons. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, sir. And many other reasons. And I guess 

what I am trying to say, the Maliki government, as imperfect as 

it may be—which is obviously imperfect—is 8 months old. You 

know, we declared our independence in 1776. Mr. Attorney General, it was not until 1789 we could ratify our Constitution. 

I guess what I am saying is that we need to put pressure on the 

Iraqi political leadership to do better. But never misunderstand the 

role that people find themselves in when they step forward for democracy. Our judges get beat up a lot in this country, sometimes 

physically but mostly rhetorically, by politicians. And I worry that 

we are going to drive good men and women away from wanting to 

be judges because their family -they do not want to go through 

what you have to do sometimes to be a judge. 

Is it fair to say then in Iraq that if you raise your hand, I would 

like to be a judge to govern in the best—to bring about fair judgment for the future of my country, the powers against democracy 

try to kill your family? 

Mr. MEESE. That is certainly a threat, and that is certainly a 

danger, and that is one of the things that was pointed out. 

One of the things that the Justice Department has begun is to 

have members of the Marshals Service over there to set up facilities and methods for the protection of judges, so that the point that 

you make, a very apt point, is being addressed, at least in a small 

way. And we recommend as part of the total setting up of the 

criminal justice system that that be expanded. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do either one of you believe that a functioning 

democracy can be created in Iraq with this level of violence? 

Mr. HAMILTON. No. 

17

Mr. MEESE. Not with the current level of violence and, of course, 

that is the reason behind the joint military and police actions that 

we recommend. 

Senator GRAHAM. And I share—

Mr. HAMILTON. May I interject a comment? 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, sir, please. 

Mr. HAMILTON. You hit upon something I think that is hugely 

important. One of the recommendations—and this really goes beyond Iraq, but it goes to the question of nation building. We think 

the United States Government needs the ability to handle complex 

stability operations. Senator Graham. Yes. Mr. Hamilton. You do 

it pretty well on the military side. We do not do a very good job 

on the civilian side. And it is tough. I mean, you have got so many 

aspects to it—economic, criminal justice systems, and all the rest—

and we have to develop in this Government—because we are going 

to be confronted with this in the years ahead. We are going to have 

to have the people here that can go into these countries that have 

no democracy and help them develop the institutions of democracy. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, said. And our enemies of democracy understand that as well as we do. 

Mr. HAMILTON. They do indeed. 

Senator GRAHAM. And it is fair to say that every institution of 

democracy in Iraq is under siege by foreign fighters and insurgents 

within the country. So, given that, I would like to just, if I could, 

in the next 20 seconds kind of view what I think is necessary. 

No. 1, the training part is absolutely critical. The IEDs that are 

the biggest threat to our troops, let’s look at what makes that such 

a threat. With 40 percent unemployment in Baghdad, people are 

taking the money to be in the IED business because they do not 

have a job. And your suggestion that we create a better economy 

is a good one. How do you govern a city with 40 percent unemployment? 

Second, those who participate in acts to topple the government 

or to kill Americans seem to have no consequences, so the surge 

has to be along economic lines and the rule of law. And I am going 

to propose—and I don’t know if this is a good idea or not, but it 

seems to me to be a good idea—that people involved in the IED 

business, people who are trying to topple the government, not committing domestic crime, should be treated as enemies of the state 

and tried by the Iraqi military. I think there is a role for the Iraqi 

military in the rule of law to have a tribunal that can deal with 

crimes against American forces and the state as a whole so that we 

get some swift, certain justice. 

It is my understanding that of all the institutions in Iraq, the 

military seems to have the best standing with the public at large. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. MEESE. That is correct, Senator, and along these lines, this 

is one of the reasons why we have advocated an improvement of 

the intelligence system there so you can identify who these people 

are and trace back from the IEDs and other types of terrorist activities to develop the networks and that sort of thing so there can 

be an accurate identification. 

The intelligence-led policing that I talked about earlier is absolutely critical to achieving what you have talked about. 

18

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you both for your service to our country. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Incidentally, many of you have 

probably noticed that if you have a BlackBerry, if you have your 

microphone on and your BlackBerry is near it, you will get that 

noise. Iwould suggest that while you are asking questions, turn the 

BlackBerry off or put it away. And that could be any one of us who 

are doing it. 

Senator Durbin? 

Senator DURBIN. It was me. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LEAHY. No, I do not think it was. Your microphone 

was not on. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD J. DURBIN, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you. 

Thanks for what you have done for our Nation. This Iraq Study 

Group has advanced the necessary debate on Iraq in a way that we 

were unable to on Capitol Hill. And the fact that we would have 

a good Democrat like Lee Hamilton sitting next to a good Republican like Ed Meese talking about this issue is meaningful. I thank 

you for doing this because I am sure there were other things you 

could have done with your time. But you have really done a great 

service to our Nation, and your candor and honesty really help us 

to try to come to some conclusions here. 

I visited Iraq for the second time in October, met with the provincial reconstruction team in Baghdad, and decided that I would 

focus on this issue—what is happening with police and civil justice 

in the Green Zone or in the city of Baghdad—and I have been accumulating information since. It confirms the conclusions of your 

Study Group and I think adds even more information of value. 

I would just say that any notion that we are going to surge to 

victory dies in the police stations of Baghdad. If you understand 

what really is going on in those police stations, you can understand 

how the best efforts of our military will not be translated into longterm stability without this civil justice system and without this police force. 

We all understand that the fight against terrorism involves not 

only the best intelligence and the best military, but the best police 

work that has to continue on a daily basis to give people confidence 

that they are living in a peaceful and stable setting. And the reports that I have from totally reliable local sources in Baghdad are 

very troubling, reports that tell me, as you have found, that when 

you go into a police station, you quickly determine whether it is a 

Shia or Sunni police station, and then you know whether they are 

going to enforce the laws against their group or the other group; 

that if a police station is bombed, it is basically closed for weeks, 

which means there is no police presence; that the police are afraid 

to launch investigations even into the murder of fellow police officers; that this one instance where a person went out to find a court 

that had not been visited in years, the person left the Green Zone, 

was in a car driven by an Iraqi soldier, and they could not find this 

courthouse. And he said to the soldier, ‘‘Ask the policeman on the 

corner where the courthouse is.’’ The soldier said, ‘‘We are under 

19

strict orders not to speak to the police because that may be someone wearing a policeman’s uniform who could lead us into an ambush.’’ There is no level of trust and cooperation between the two. 

And it reaches beyond that. When it comes to the so—called investigative judges, no staff, no security, no pay, and so cases are 

not even followed up on. Fewer than 10 percent of all the crime is 

even investigated in Baghdad today. 

How can we step back from this present state of affairs and suggest that we are going to surge to victory or surge to success? It 

is unrealistic. 

Let me ask you in realistic terms about your recommendations 

here, because you did speak to the first quarter of the year 2008 

and that there could be a change in troop levels, American troop 

levels, at that point, but you add some qualifiers and conditions. 

And it seems to me that you are suggesting we will still need 

American troops there for a variety of reasons, certainly to train. 

I want to say a word about training, if I can. I looked into what 

training meant for an Iraqi police officer. Here is what I found. An 

American who was sent in to train Iraqi police officers was told he 

had 200 people to train. He had 40 hours to train them. He would 

train them in a soccer stadium outside. He said, ‘‘It is impossible. 

I cannot train 200 people to be a policeman in 40 hours.’’ They 

said, ‘‘Oh, did we say 40? We meant 20 hours. You have 20 hours.’’ 

He said, ‘‘That is impossible. A group of 200 in an open soccer 

stadium? ’’ 

‘‘Oh, wait a minute. We forgot to tell you. The last 4 hours are 

for the graduation ceremony.’’ 

Sixteen hours. So when we talk about 300,000 police backing up 

our surge of new American soldiers, we are talking about people 

who sat outside in a soccer stadium for 16 hours and wear a uniform to collect a paycheck and who may sell the uniform tomorrow 

to someone. 

Honestly, could we expect any civilian employees of the Department of Justice to go into Iraq in the near term, even in 2008, 

under those circumstances? Could we expect them to risk their 

lives in terms of trying to build the system of justice without a 

massive U.S. military presence there to protect them? 

Mr. MEESE. I think, Senator, that the idea is that this would be 

concomitant with the military effort. I think there is no question 

that there are dangers and there will be dangers, but I think that 

the military effort is absolutely necessary to provide the initial stability and security. The police function is to then come in and hold 

that situation. To do it without that military assistance or with the 

military preceding it, obviously it would not work. 

In terms of the training, I think what you point out illustrates 

the fact that we do need professionals who know how to train police, who know about the amount of time that is necessary, who can 

set up the curriculum, and that sort of thing. We have done it, for 

example, I mentioned in Bosnia earlier. We have done it in other 

places, and we need to do that there with people who know how 

to do it, who have done it before, and to set up the kind of a police 

training regimen that would be successful. But it cannot be done 

in isolation. It has got to be done as part of an overall strategy. 

20

Senator DURBIN. But, Mr. Attorney General, the point I am trying to get to is—and I will stop as soon as I ask this question. I 

spoke to a man who was there on the ground trying to train police. 

He recommended that 6,000 international civilian police trainers 

and advisers were needed. It was quickly reduced to 1,500. In the 

course of the next year, there were 100 who were produced. 

My question to you: As a former Attorney General, how could we 

ask Department of Justice personnel to go into the danger of Iraq 

today without a massive U.S. military presence to protect them and 

expect them to show up, expect them to train these policemen and 

risk their lives every day? Is that a realistic recommendation? 

Mr. MEESE. It would not be without the military being there, 

and, of course, this is presumed and this is based on the assumption that we would have the military force in there training the 

Iraqi forces, as is the current strategy, and that that would be a 

predicate to any kind of police training program. 

Also, I would not anticipate that we would have primarily people 

currently in the Department of Justice as the principal trainers. I 

would have them organizing the entire thing and heading the type 

of thing, but we need to recruit police executives from among retired and in some cases serving police officers now around the 

country, around other countries, who would be commissioned to do 

this job for perhaps 2 years, and that that would have to be a revolving thing. 

The job of training police is not something that is going to happen in 1 years, 2 years. Perhaps it is going to take as much as 5 

years or more in order to have the kind of satisfactory police force. 

That has been our experience in other countries, and I am sure it 

would be in Iraq as well. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator, the challenges—the facts you lay out—

are just daunting. One of the things we ought to say is that there 

are an awful lot of civilian Americans in Baghdad who deserve just 

as much praise as the soldiers do. 

Senator DURBIN. Yes, they do. 

Mr. HAMILTON. They are doing very dangerous work and very 

important work, and there are many, many of them that are willing to take it on. Maybe not enough, but there are many of them. 

One of the things I like about your talk about the surge is you 

can make your own judgments about the military surge, but I 

think Senator Graham said you need a lot of surges in Iraq. If you 

just surge the military, you are not going to get it done. You have 

got to surge the civil law, the criminal justice system. You have got 

to surge the economic side of it as well. 

Senator DURBIN. And diplomacy. 

Mr. HAMILTON. But what is the alternative? 

Senator DURBIN. Good question. 

Mr. HAMILTON. I mean, you are where you are, and you cannot 

change the facts. You have just got to deal with the situation we 

have. 

Now, you can reach the conclusion, as a lot of people do, OK, too 

overwhelming, just leave and see what happens. We rejected that, 

and both the President and the Iraq Study Group say, look, you 

have got to deal with this government, as inadequate as it is, as 

weak as it is, with all the problems. If you have any chance of comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:19 Mar 23, 2007 Jkt 033819 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\33819.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
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ing out of this with a reasonable protection of American interests 

in the region and in Baghdad, you have to work with what you 

have got and do the best you can. But the challenge is just absolutely daunting. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Coburn? 

Senator COBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, let me personally thank each of you for your commitment on this. My background, I spent a number of months in Iraq 

after the first Gulf War as a medical missionary over there, and 

I have a pretty good insight to the Iraqi people. And it is surprising 

that most Americans do not really know the Iraqis. They are like 

us. They are just like us. They want to have children. They want 

a family. They want stability. 

I have a couple of questions, and then I will be finished. How do 

we as a Government—and I think this question may have been 

asked in an indirect way, but how does the administration pressure 

the Maliki government to clean up and transfer these areas within 

the Department of Interior? And I met with them when I was there 

last time, walked out into the streets outside of the Green Zone 

with them. That Interior Minister has a lot of guts. He puts himself on the line for assassination every day. How do we force them 

to make these changes that you are recommending in terms of the 

Border Patrol and the Iraqi National Police to move them to the 

Department of Defense, the Iraq Defense Department? How do we 

do that? 

Mr. HAMILTON. We do not do it easily. We have been working on 

it for quite a while. And I do not think, on the part of the Iraqi 

Government, that they do not understand the need to do it. Their 

rhetoric is pretty good on all of these matters. You sit down and 

talk with the Minister of Interior, and you will come away thinking, well, he has got it right. 

The real question, of course, is performance, and here there is a 

difference. We believed in the Iraq Study Group that you have to 

look for all the points of leverage you can to make them perform, 

including providing assistance, of course, but we thought that assistance ought to be conditional on benchmarks being achieved, or 

at least substantial progress toward those benchmarks. 

We extend aid all around the world, and much of that aid is conditioned on performance. My own view is that is the way to do it, 

and I certainly think it is the way to do it with the Iraqi Government because I just do not think they are going to do it without 

every possible point of leverage being exercised against them. 

Senator COBURN. Is that one of the things that you think the administration has agreed to that has not been in the public realm 

of using the—

Mr. HAMILTON. No. I think the administration takes the view 

that they really do not want to make aid conditional. They have 

not thus far. And I think the President’s view—I obviously do not 

want to try to speak for him, but he said to us on several occasions, 

‘‘My responsibility is to build confidence in the Maliki government.’’ 

This is a delicate matter. It is a difficult matter to work out. We 

22

just think additional leverage is needed, and conditionality would 

be helpful. 

Senator COBURN. There is no question this is not going to happen 

in terms of cleaning out the insurgents and professionalizing this 

police force unless you do that transfer. 

Mr. HAMILTON. That is correct. 

Senator COBURN. There is no question about that. 

Mr. MEESE. I think that is true, and I think also it has to be understood, the administration also has to be careful in the way they 

do it, the way they put pressure on. It is important that this be 

done primarily on a quiet and confidential basis; otherwise, Prime 

Minister Maliki has said he does not want to look like a tool of the 

United States. So there is a certain subtlety and a certain care that 

has to be taken in how we express this and the channels that we 

use. But it is my understanding that the administration has made 

it pretty plain in conversations between the President and Maliki 

as to what we expect. 

Senator COBURN. There also, I think, was a part of your report—

it has been a month or so since I read it—of markedly ramping up 

CERP funds for the military to have an impact. You know, I look 

at what happens with other interest groups around the world 

where a nation will influence an interest group by investing in 

them. And it seems to me that if we do not get more money on the 

ground that makes a difference in people’s lives, no matter whether 

we control Baghdad or not, if we are not making a difference in 

people’s lives that they can feel and sustain and touch, we are 

not—and there is no question in my mind in the oversight hearings 

that we have had that our foreign policy side of trying to make that 

difference is an absolute failure in Baghdad, and that the place for 

those moneys to go is through the generals on the ground rather 

than through USAID and some of these other things so that they 

can reward great behavior with economics. 

Any comments on that? 

Mr. MEESE. The record shows that this has been the most successful. General Petraeus, when he was commander of the 101st 

Airborne Division, had the whole northern area, the Mosul area, 

under control exactly by using these Commander’s Emergency Relief funds in a very good way to put young Iraqis to work. And that 

is exactly what is necessary. 

Incidentally, in the total strategy, one of the plans is to divide 

these sectors of Baghdad, for example, into accountable areas 

where military commanders and police commanders would be held 

accountable among the Iraqi Government for particular areas, so 

that our military and the embedded police advisors would be able 

to hold these people accountable. And part of that would be the reconstruction activity that you are talking about. 

So I think the point that you have made is very well taken. 

Senator COBURN. Mr. Chairman, could I have the benefit of one 

additional question? 

You know, as Americans look all around, the one thing they are 

looking for in the Iraq situation is hope—hope for our soldiers to 

be able to come home, hope for the Iraqi people, to get out of this 

depressed malaise we find ourselves in as a Nation because we 

have been at war and things are not going well. 

23

Is there hope? Congressman Hamilton, is there hope? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I think General Petraeus said that the people of Baghdad are leading—I do not think he used the words ‘‘miserable lives,’’ but he certainly indicated that. There are very few 

grounds for hope, but there are some, and you have to cling to that. 

Your point about the Iraqi Government trying to improve the 

governance—electricity, health care services, education, and protection—is just absolutely on the point, I believe. 

I do want to say—I think there was a comment made that the 

Commander is Emergency Response Program funds could be used 

for the police. They cannot. They are all for the military. 

Senator COBURN. Right. 

Mr. MEESE. Senator, I think you have really indicated the hope 

yourself when you said that the Iraqi people are very much like us, 

that they want something better than what they have at the 

present time. 

It was expressed to me that stability and peace will come to Iraq 

when the average Iraqi loves their family and their community 

more than they hate their enemies. And, essentially, I think that 

is the case. 

Senator COBURN. Well, that is the majority of them. You know, 

what we hear is not the majority of the people there. I experienced 

that, and I communicate with people there every day. That is the 

majority viewpoint. It is just that is not what we see and that is 

not what we hear. 

Mr. MEESE. And that is why the recommendations, the institutional recommendations, the cultural change in the government, 

the kinds of things we talk about, we feel there is an obligation of 

the United States to do those things that are necessary in order to 

provide the support and assistance to make these things come 

about. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for—

Chairman LEAHY. Of course. I thought you asked a very—what 

I would call a bottom-line question. But, you know, I could not help 

but think as I listened to that, I represent the small State of 

Vermont. I was born there. I love it. It is probably, or actually, the 

statistics show, the safest State in the country. And you are talking 

about the hopes of people. 

During the summer, there is a farmers market that is about 3 

or 4 miles from where I live. My wife and I go there every Saturday 

morning. It is almost like a town meeting. You see everybody you 

know. You talk about everything. You talk about your kids, their 

kids, and all that. 

The looks of the market are not dissimilar to the looks of some 

of the markets we have seen in Baghdad where the bodies are 

strewn all about, where people have been blown up, doing the same 

thing my wife and I do, just going to get some groceries, get some 

fresh vegetables, get the things that sustain life. 

We do it as a commonplace thing. I mean, the last thing I 

worry—I mean, I might worry that I might be late to something 

I was supposed to go to, but I never worry about my safety or life 

there. These are the things we worry about. That is why we talk 

about this law enforcement. 

24

That is why I was so furious as I read these reports about the 

war profiteering. These people are putting their lives on the line. 

If you look at the buildings that have been constructed with hundreds of millions of dollars of American taxpayers’ money, and now 

they are talking about needing millions more, just tear them down. 

These people who are doing this are materially overvaluing these 

goods and services with a specific intent to defraud the United 

States. We are spending fortunes there. Earlier this month, the 

President says he wants another $1.5 billion more for this kind of 

work. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction says 

millions of U.S. taxpayers’ dollars remain just totally unaccounted 

for. 

Now, I have a bill that I introduced on the first day of the new 

session, a war-profiteering bill. It would give us extraterritorial jurisdiction for these crimes so that Federal prosecutors in the 

United States can criminally prosecute individuals who are engaging in war profiteering, who are getting ill-gotten proceeds, can go 

after corrupt contractors. 

Does this legislation make sense? I mean, this is more than just 

fining. I should tell you it is more than just fining them, because 

you have some of these companies that they have $100 million 

worth of fraud, so you fine them $5 million, it is a cost of doing 

business. My experience as a prosecutor is if they thought they 

were going to go in the slammer, the bar is going to close, they are 

going to say, wait a minute, this goes beyond a cost of doing business, I might be spending 5 or 6 years with a roommate I do not 

particularly want to have. 

So tell me, is this something worthwhile? 

Mr. MEESE. Well, I think, Senator—I have not seen the legislation, of course, but I think that if there are fraudulent activities in 

which people corruptly and dishonestly misuse funds, and there is 

the criminal element of intentional crimes, then I think that this 

would be an appropriate addition. 

At the same time, I think there have to be civil remedies as well 

for those people who, not with criminal intent but just through incompetence or a lack of proper attention to accountability for the 

funds, I think that there ought to be civil penalties as well. 

Chairman LEAHY. Sure. I am not suggesting either/or, but when 

there is very specific—when it is done with a clear intent—and we 

are all lawyers; we understand what is meant by that—a clear intent to defraud and you can prove that, I think somebody ought to 

go to jail. 

Mr. MEESE. I agree. 

Chairman LEAHY. Because our people are going there and putting their lives on the line all the time. Yes, sir? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, it goes beyond the Iraq Study Group report. 

We did not get into that. But I just would say personally that when 

you read headlines in the paper and the reports like you had today, 

‘‘Reports Fault Oversight of Iraq Police Program’’ that was in the 

Post, when you have this incompetence, when you have unauthorized work, when you have shoddy facilities, when you have money 

that is squandered, there are very, very few things that hurt our 

effort more in trying to succeed in Iraq than that kind of performance because it just turns all people off to know that there are peoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:19 Mar 23, 2007 Jkt 033819 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\33819.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
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ple performing shoddy work, getting huge Government contracts. 

There are very few things that undercut our efforts in Iraq any 

more than that. 

Chairman LEAHY. I come from a little town of about 1,200 people. I live on a dirt road. And on town meeting day, we talk about 

an extra $50,000 or $60,000 for needed repairs in the school, and 

it will be debated, and can we spend it. And these same people 

read that $1 million got waste, $2 million got wasted, $3 million. 

The complaints I hear come from everybody across the political 

spectrum, as I am sure you can imagine. 

Now, I know you are looking in a forward way on these, but it 

kind of helps to know how we got there. On the police training, I 

know when former New York City Police Commissioner Bernard 

Kerik was sent to lead the police training effort in 2003, he did this 

with 10 days’ notice, no international police training experience, 

even though he had obviously run a large department here in the 

United States. It has been reported that he prepared for this by 

watching documentaries on Saddam Hussein. 

Is there anything that could have been done to put us in a better 

position today? We all agree that we need better police training. 

We all agree that we need a police force that works. What is the 

biggest mistake we made in the past? 

Mr. MEESE. Well, I think, Senator, one of the things that we did 

not do, as you point out, is look back because, for one thing, it is 

hard, without spending our energies on really looking into all of 

that, to give you an accurate answer. But in looking forward and 

at the same time answering your question, I think we do need, as 

I mentioned earlier, we need someone to head this up who has the 

international respect, and that is why I mentioned a couple of people just as examples. 

Chairman LEAHY. Sure. 

Mr. MEESE. These would be people who have already done the 

job. Tom Constantino, for example, headed up the inspection of the 

new Irish police service in Ireland. Mark Croaker headed our effort 

in Bosnia very successfully. Both had been successful as police executives in this country and then went elsewhere. I could name another half dozen if you have the time. 

Chairman LEAHY. I mean, I look at some of these things that I 

think have to be mistakes. In Jordan, we were training. We had 

a good police facility in Jordan. We had 1,800 police per month 

graduate. The importance of that, the police officers could go to 

training and not be afraid they are going to have what we have 

seen happen where the bus with the recruits is stopped, they are 

all taken out and just killed on the spot. The family watches that 

on TV that evening in the news. That facility may not have been 

perfect, may not have been as comprehensive as we wanted, but it 

was at least safe. And we just closed it down and moved it back 

to Iraq. Was that a mistake? 

Mr. MEESE. I don’t know the reasons why we closed it down in 

Jordan and moved it back to Iraq, but I think that the facility that 

they have in Iraq, while that is not something that we have looked 

into specifically, I assume that the safety of that particular facility 

has been provided, either by military or otherwise, because at least 

26

I have not heard of any major incidents happening in regard to the 

training facilities there. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator, I think an absolutely core problem in 

Iraq today is sectarian violence. You have got some foreign fighters 

that come into the country. You have got an insurgency that can 

be quite hostile and fierce. But the real threat that we confront in 

Iraq is sectarian violence. And, therefore, all of these things we are 

talking about here today with regard to police and criminal justice 

systems and the rest are only going to be dealt with if you are successful when you are attacking national reconciliation. You must 

have national reconciliation in Iraq, or you will not solve the problem of a criminal justice system or security or economic development or anything else. Sectarian violence is the core problem in 

that country today. National reconciliation is the answer to it. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Specter? 

Senator SPECTER. Let me thank the distinguished witnesses for 

coming in and for the work that they have done. It is obviously a 

labor of love for Attorney General Meese to continue his service 

long after he was Attorney General. I remember when he came in 

for his confirmation hearings, serving as domestic counselor during 

the first term at the time, the work we did together on the armed 

career criminal bill, the advice and consultation, and his work as 

Attorney General. And I think he has been more active in Government after he left Government than he was when he was in Government, so we thank you. 

And thank you, Congressman Hamilton. You are co—chairman of 

about every study group there is. I had the pleasure of being with 

Lee at Chautauqua, which I would recommend that you attend if 

you are not invited to be a 

speaker. They put you on a big stage, soft chairs—

Chairman LEAHY. Do you sleep? 

Senator SPECTER. Not when Lee Hamilton is speaking, I do not. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SPECTER. And they have several thousand people in a 

giant amphitheater there. It is really a great experience, especially 

to be with Lee Hamilton. 

But we appreciate what you are saying, and it is my hope that 

more attention will be paid to what you have said. And I respect 

what General Meese has said, that more of their recommendations 

have been accepted, but after they are accepted, they have to be 

implemented. There has to be a little greater recognition that there 

is some wisdom in this town outside of the executive branch. If 

Congress does not have any standing in the eyes of some of the executive branch, certainly the Iraq Study Group does. 

So I thank you for what you have done, and Chairman Leahy 

and I are going to continue the oversight here and do what we can 

to correct these problems. So thank you. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. I will continue. You know, we have had several hearings already on Iraq and the areas that come under the 

jurisdiction of this Committee, and we rely on people like the two 

of you to have the willingness to take the time to come and appear. 

Obviously, we can request people from the administration, have a 

27

different way of approaching that, but it is only required because 

of you. And I appreciate what you have written on this. 

You know, it is interesting. Congressman Hamilton, your wife 

and my wife had a conversation around the time you were retiring 

about the joys of retirement. And I remember my wife said to me 

on the way home, she said, ‘‘I do not really believe Lee is going to 

retire.’’ I said, ‘‘Of course, he won’t. He will be working just as 

hard.’’ And I agree with Senator Specter, you have been virtually 

every time—you have been like, you know, the fire horse, we ring 

the bell and you are there. And I mean that in the best possible 

way. 

And, Attorney General Meese, you and I have not always agreed 

on everything. In fact, during my last election, I recall you came 

to Vermont to campaign for my opponent, which just suddenly occurred to me. But he lost. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LEAHY. But I think he did probably better because you 

were there. He got up to 23 percent of the vote. But there are areas 

we agree on. We have spoken, for example, about the over-Federalization of crime, and I think that is something—and please 

keep speaking on that because—-and I think I, like everybody else, 

has probably been guilty of voting for some of these things. I worry 

about the over-Federalization of crime because I think in many instances it detracts our Federal law enforcement from the very important things that only they can do. If they are involved in the 

things that local police and sheriffs and State police could handle, 

they are not doing the things we want them to do. 

We have a shared belief—and you have spoken eloquently on 

this—about how State and local law enforcement in this country do 

a good job and they deserve our respect and they deserve things 

that we can do to help them without imposing a Federal overlay. 

So I cannot tell you how much I appreciate you taking the time. 

I know Senator Specter and I join in that, and we will continue to 

work together. 

We stand in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Additional material is being retained in the Committee files, see 

Contents.]

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