Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 44 / Monday, March 7, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 12277 

aspects of the AP/SAS with the failure 

condition categories of ‘‘no effect,’’ and 

‘‘minor,’’ and for non-complex systems 

whose failure condition category is 

classified as ‘‘major.’’ Hoh must comply 

with the requirements of these special 

conditions for all applicable design and 

operational aspects of the AP/SAS with 

the failure condition categories of 

‘‘catastrophic’’ and ‘‘hazardous severe/ 

major,’’ and for complex systems whose 

failure condition category is classified 

as ‘‘major.’’ A complex system is a 

system whose operations, failure 

conditions, or failure effects are difficult 

to comprehend without the aid of 

analytical methods (for example, FTA, 

Failure Modes and Effect Analysis, 

FHA). 

System Design Integrity Requirements 

Each of the failure condition 

categories defined in these special 

conditions relate to the corresponding 

aircraft system integrity requirements. 

The system design integrity 

requirements, for the Hoh AP/SAS, as 

they relate to the allowed probability of 

occurrence for each failure condition 

category, and the proposed software 

design assurance level, are as follows: 

• ‘‘Major’’—For systems with ‘‘major’’ 

failure conditions, failures resulting in 

these major effects must be shown to be 

remote, a probability of occurrence on 

the order of between 1 × 10¥5 to 1 × 

10¥7 failures/hour, and associated 

software must be developed to the 

RTCA/DO–178B (Software 

Considerations in Airborne Systems 

And Equipment Certification) Level C 

software design assurance level. 

• ‘‘Hazardous/Severe-Major’’—For 

systems with ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

failure conditions, failures resulting in 

these hazardous/severe-major effects 

must be shown to be extremely remote, 

a probability of occurrence on the order 

of between 1 × 10¥7 to 1 × 10¥9 failures/ 

hour, and associated software must be 

developed to the RTCA/DO–178B 

(Software Considerations in Airborne 

Systems And Equipment Certification) 

Level B software assurance level. 

• ‘‘Catastrophic’’—For systems with 

‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions, 

failures resulting in these catastrophic 

effects must be shown to be extremely 

improbable, a probability of occurrence 

on the order of 1 × 10¥9 failures/hour 

or less, and associated software must be 

developed to the RTCA/DO–178B 

(Software Considerations in Airborne 

Systems And Equipment Certification) 

Level A design assurance level. 

System Design Environmental 

Requirements 

The AP/SAS system equipment must 

be qualified to the appropriate 

environmental level per RTCA 

document DO–160F (Environmental 

Conditions and Test Procedures for 

Airborne Equipment), for all relevant 

aspects. This is to show that the AP/ 

SAS system performs its intended 

function under any foreseeable 

operating condition, which includes the 

expected environment in which the AP/ 

SAS is intended to operate. Some of the 

main considerations for environmental 

concerns are installation locations and 

the resulting exposure to environmental 

conditions for the AP/SAS system 

equipment, including considerations for 

other equipment that may be affected 

environmentally by the AP/SAS 

equipment installation. The level of 

environmental qualification must be 

related to the severity of the considered 

failure conditions and effects on the 

rotorcraft. 

Test Analysis Requirements 

Compliance with the requirements of 

these special conditions may be shown 

by a variety of methods, which typically 

consist of analysis, flight tests, ground 

tests, and simulation, as a minimum. 

Compliance methodology is related to 

the associated failure condition 

category. If the AP/SAS is a complex 

system, compliance with the 

requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘major’’ may be shown by 

analysis, in combination with 

appropriate testing to validate the 

analysis. Compliance with the 

requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

may be shown by flight-testing in 

combination with analysis and 

simulation, and the appropriate testing 

to validate the analysis. Flight tests may 

be limited for ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

failure conditions and effects due to 

safety considerations. Compliance with 

the requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘catastrophic’’ may be 

shown by analysis, and appropriate 

testing in combination with simulation 

to validate the analysis. Very limited 

flight tests in combination with 

simulation are used as a part of a 

showing of compliance for 

‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions. Flight 

tests are performed only in 

circumstances that use operational 

variations, or extrapolations from other 

flight performance aspects to address 

flight safety. 

These special conditions require that 

the Hoh AP/SAS system installed on a 

Bell model 206B, 206L, 206L–1, 206L– 

3, or 206L–4 helicopter, Type Certificate 

Number H2SW, meet these 

requirements to adequately address the 

failure effects identified by the FHA, 

and subsequently verified by the SSA, 

within the defined design system 

integrity requirements. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on February 

25, 2011. 

Kimberly K. Smith, 

Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2011–5103 Filed 3–4–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–0960; Directorate 

Identifier 98–ANE–09–AD; Amendment 

39–16620; AD 98–09–27R1] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Rolls-Royce 

plc RB211–Trent 768, 772, and 772B 

Turbofan Engines 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are rescinding an existing 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. The existing AD, 

AD 98–09–27, resulted from aircraft 

certification testing which revealed that 

stresses on the thrust reverser hinge 

were higher than had been anticipated 

during engine certification, and the 

United Kingdom Civil Aviation 

Authority, issuing AD 008–03–97. Since 

we issued AD 98–09–27, we discovered 

that its requirements were duplicated in 

airplane-level AD 2001–09–14, issued 

by the FAA Transport Airplane 

Directorate. We proposed to rescind the 

engine-level AD. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective April 

11, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: The Docket Operations 

office is located at Docket Management 

Facility, U.S. Department of 

Transportation, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., West Building Ground 

Floor, Room W12–140, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Alan Strom, Aerospace Engineer, Engine 

Certification Office, FAA, Engine & 

Propeller Directorate, 12 New England 

Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; 

e-mail: alan.strom@faa.gov; telephone 

(781) 238–7143; fax (781) 238–7199. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

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12278 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 44 / Monday, March 7, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

Discussion 

On April 23, 1998, the FAA Engine & 

Propeller Directorate issued engine AD 

98–09–27 (63 FR 24911, May 6, 1998). 

On April 30, 2001, the FAA Transport 

Airplane Directorate issued airplane AD 

2001–09–14 (66 FR 23838, May 10, 

2001). Those ADs both require the same 

initial and repetitive visual inspections 

of Rolls-Royce plc RB211–Trent 768 and 

772 series turbofan engine thrust 

reverser hinge lugs and attachment ribs 

for cracks, and, if necessary, removal 

from service and replacement with 

serviceable parts. 

Since we issued engine AD 98–09–27 

and airplane AD 2001–09–14, we 

determined that duplicate ADs to 

address the same unsafe condition were 

unnecessary. We issued a notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 

14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that 

would apply to the specified products. 

That NPRM was published in the 

Federal Register on November 15, 2010 

(75 FR 69611), and proposed to rescind 

AD 98–09–27, Amendment 39–10508 

(63 FR 24911, May 6, 1998). 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 

9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

the Docket Operations office (telephone 

(800) 647–5527) is provided in the 

ADDRESSES section. Comments will be 

available in the AD docket shortly after 

receipt. 

Comments 

We provided the public the 

opportunity to participate in the 

development of this AD. We received no 

comments on the proposal. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the available data and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

as proposed. 

Authority for this Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

Section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We have determined that this AD will 

not have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a summary of the costs 

to comply with this AD and placed it in 

the AD Docket. You may get a copy of 

this summary at the address listed 

under ADDRESSES. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the Federal Aviation Administration 

amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by 

rescinding airworthiness directive (AD) 

98–09–27, Amendment 39–10508 (63 

FR 24911, May 6, 1998): 

98–09–27R1 Rolls-Royce plc: Amendment 

39–16620. Docket No. FAA–2010–0960; 

Directorate Identifier 98–ANE–09–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This AD becomes effective April 11, 

2011. 

Affected ADs 

(b) This AD rescinds AD 98–09–27. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Rolls-Royce plc 

RB211–Trent 768, 772, and 772B turbofan 

engines. These engines are installed on, but 

not limited to, Airbus A330–341 and A330– 

342 series airplanes. 

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on 

February 24, 2011. 

Peter A. White, 

Acting Manager, Engine and Propeller 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2011–4831 Filed 3–4–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 71 

[Docket No. FAA–2011–0018; Airspace 

Docket No. 10–AWP–18] 

Amendment to and Revocation of 

Reporting Points; Hawaii 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule, technical 

amendment. 

SUMMARY: This action amends and 

removes, several Hawaiian Reporting 

Points. Specifically, the FAA is revising 

the description of EELIC, and TOADS to 

address recent technical adjustments to 

their actual locations. Additionally, the 

FAA is renaming the SILVA reporting 

point to SYVAD, and has determined 

that the LULUS, NIEMO, and PADDI 

reporting points are no longer needed. 

This action ensures the safe and 

efficient management of aircraft within 

the National Airspace System (NAS). 

DATES: Effective date 0901 UTC, May 5, 

2011. The Director of the Federal 

Register approves this incorporation by 

reference action under 1 CFR part 51, 

subject to the annual revision of FAA 

Order 7400.9 and publication of 

conforming amendments. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ken 

McElroy, Airspace Regulation and ATC 

Procedures Group, Office of Mission 

Support Services, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 800 Independence 

Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; 

telephone: (202) 267–8783. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

History 

The Honolulu Control Center 

conducted a review of their airspace and 

WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with RULES