NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 16-1764

___________

NINA SHAHIN,

Appellant

v.

DELAWARE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-10-cv-00475)

District Judge: Honorable Leonard P. Stark

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 27, 2016

Before: FUENTES, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 1, 2016 )

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

In 2010, Nina Shahin filed two complaints in the District Court against Delaware 

 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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Federal Credit Union (“DFCU”) under the Expedited Funds Availability Act, (“Funds 

Act”), 12 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq., implemented through Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. pt. 229 

(2004). The actions were later consolidated. Shahin, a DFCU customer, alleged that in 

May 2010, after she deposited a check into her bank account, DFCU failed to provide her 

with proper notice that an extended hold would be placed on her account, 12 C.F.R. § 

229.13, and timely access to her funds. In a subsequent amended complaint, Shahin 

alleged claims under “common law principles of ‘principal-agent relationship’ and breach 

of fiduciary duties and the definition of ‘frauds and swindles’ provided in 18 U.S.C. § 

1341.” In addition to actual damages and costs, Shahin sought $1,000,000 “for court 

fees, loss of time, and damage to her health.”

Following discovery, the parties filed motions for summary judgment. The 

District Court granted partial summary judgment to Shahin after determining that DFCU 

violated 12 C.F.R. § 229.13(e)(2) by assessing overdraft fees under the circumstances 

presented. The District Court also granted partial summary judgment to DFCU on 

Shahin’s claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and the remaining Funds Act claims. The Court 

then entered an order directing the parties to file a status report “as to how and what 

schedule this case should proceed.” In compliance with the judgment, DFCU credited 

Shahin’s bank account in the amount of $66.00, covering the overdraft fees. 

Subsequently, DFCU notified the District Court that it had twice made an offer of 

judgment to Shahin pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, in the amount of 

 
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$1,000, the maximum amount for which it could be liable to Shahin for the notice 

violation. Based on these offers, on March 7, 2014, the District Court dismissed the 

complaint as moot and entered judgment in favor of Shahin in the amount of $1,000. The 

District Court retained jurisdiction for a determination as to costs. The Court ultimately 

re-entered judgment in accordance with its March 7th opinion and order. Shahin 

appealed.

Upon review of Shahin’s arguments on appeal, we affirmed the District Court’s 

decision to: 1) enter judgment for Shahin in the amount of $1,000; 2) deny Shahin’s 

claims for actual damages above $66.00; and 3) dismiss Shahin’s claim for breach of 

fiduciary duties. See Shahin v. Delaware Federal Credit Union, 602 F. App’x 50, 52-54 

(3d Cir. 2015) (not precedential). However, we remanded the case in part “for a 

determination as to Shahin’s costs, if any, prior to November 7, 2011.” Id. at 54.

Following remand, and in accordance with our instructions, the District Court 

reviewed whether Shahin was entitled to reimbursement of costs that she might have 

incurred prior to November 7, 2011. On August 3, 2015, the District Court entered an 

order determining that because Shahin had not incurred any costs prior to November 7, 

2011, she was not entitled to any reimbursement. Shahin filed a timely motion for 

reconsideration of that order pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
4

Procedure. The District Court denied the motion in a March 11, 2016 order. This appeal 

followed.1

 

On appeal, Shahin argues that the District Court erred in denying her motion for 

reconsideration of the Court’s August 3, 2015 order (wherein the Court determined that 

Shahin was not entitled to costs). Although Shahin’s appeal of the denial of her motion 

for reconsideration “brings up the underlying judgment for review,” McAlister v. Sentry 

Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 550, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1992), Shahin was still required to raise 

arguments in her opening brief with respect to the District Court’s August 3, 2015 order. 

See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005). Because Shahin has not 

done so, any arguments with respect to that order have been waived.2 See Kost v. 

Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993); see also LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 

71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that although “appellate courts generally do not 

hold pro se litigants rigidly to the formal briefing standards . . . we need not manufacture 

claims of error for an appellant proceeding pro se, especially when [she] has raised an 

issue below and elected not to pursue it on appeal.”).

We review the District Court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of 

discretion. See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 

673 (3d Cir. 1999). “[A] proper Rule 59(e) motion . . . must rely on one of three grounds: 

 1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

2 Even if Shahin had not waived her arguments regarding the August 3rd order, the 

District Court properly concluded that she did not incur any costs prior to November 7, 
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(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) 

the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Lazaridis v. 

Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing N. River Ins. Co. v. 

CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). Shahin, in her Rule 59(e) 

motion, asked for a complete revocation of all prior decisions and that her case be 

remanded for a jury trial. However, she did not identify any particular error with respect 

to the District Court’s August 3rd order. Rather, she generally claimed that the Court’s 

prior rulings violated her constitutional rights. Because Shahin’s arguments do not state 

valid grounds for relief under Rule 59(e), the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying her motion.

Finally, to the extent that Shahin presents arguments in her brief challenging the 

District Court’s original March 7, 2014 order, we decline to review them. We previously 

decided with finality any arguments pertaining to that order in Shahin’s earlier appeal. 

Our remand was purely limited to a determination of costs. 

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

 

2011.