J-S32028-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TYRELL JAMAR JONES

Appellant No. 2813 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order August 11, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0004523-2007

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED JUNE 09, 2016

Appellant, Tyrell Jamar Jones, appeals nunc pro tunc from the August 

11, 2015 order denying his first petition for relief under the Post Conviction 

Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.

We summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as follows. 

On January 14, 2010, a jury convicted Appellant of second-degree murder, 

third-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy for his role in a July 

8, 2007 murder-robbery.1 PCRA Court Opinion, 8/7/15, at 1.2 On April 5, 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 2502(c), 3701(a)(1), and 903(a)(1), 

respectively.

2 We note that the PCRA court’s opinion does not contain pagination. For 

ease of review, we have assigned each page a corresponding page number.
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2010, the trial court imposed an aggregate judgment of sentence of life 

imprisonment.3 On November 2, 2011, this Court affirmed Appellant’s 

convictions, and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance 

of appeal on April 26, 2013. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 38 A.3d 911 

(Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 67 A.3d 794 

(Pa. 2013). Appellant did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the 

United States Supreme Court.

On July 2, 2014, Appellant timely filed his first, pro se PCRA petition.4 

Counsel was appointed, and on April 7, 2015, counsel filed an amended 

PCRA petition. On May 28, 2015, the PCRA court held an evidentiary 

hearing. Thereafter, on August 11, 2015, the PCRA court denied the PCRA 

petition. The PCRA court served notice of its August 11, 2015 order on the 

district attorney and Appellant, but did not give notice to Appellant’s 

counsel. On September 17, 2015, with the Commonwealth’s stipulation, the 

PCRA court granted Appellant permission to file a notice of appeal nunc pro 

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3 Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison on the 

second-degree murder conviction, five to ten years’ imprisonment for 

robbery, and five to ten years’ for criminal conspiracy. The trial court did 

not impose a sentence for the third-degree murder conviction. All the 

sentences are concurrent.

4 Appellant’s sentence became final on July 25, 2013, when his time to file a 

petition for a writ of certiorari expired. See generally 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(3); U.S. S. Ct. R. 13(1). 
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tunc because it did not provide Appellant’s counsel with notice.5 That same 

day, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal nunc pro tunc.

6

On appeal, Appellant presents the following two issues for our review.

1. [Whether] [t]rial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to object to the trial judge’s charge to the jury on 

the defense of duress which was erroneous 

because the judge told the jury that “if the 

evidence matches up with the elements of the 

offense ... you should find him guilty ... If they do 

line[ ]up and you find duress, he again, is 

guilty[?]

2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 

an incorrect response by the trial judge to a 

question by the jury asking to define duress, 

because the judge told them that if duress is 

found the jury may find [Appellant] not guilty. 

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5

“Generally, an appellate court cannot extend the time for filing an appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 498 (Pa. Super. 2007), 

appeal denied, 960 A.2d 838 (Pa. 2008). “Nonetheless, this general rule 

does not affect the power of the courts to grant [nunc pro tunc] relief in the 

case of fraud or breakdown in the processes of the court.” Id. A 

“breakdown” can occur when the trial court departs from the obligations 

specified in the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. Under 

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 908, the PCRA court must serve an 

order denying a PCRA petition as specified in Rule 114. Pa.R.Crim.P. 

908(D)(1). Rule 114 provides that “[a] copy of any order ... promptly shall 

be served on each party’s attorney[.]” Id. at 114(B)(1). Here, the PCRA 

court explained that it granted Appellant the right to file a notice of appeal 

nunc pro tunc because it did not serve Appellant’s counsel with the order 

denying the PCRA petition. PCRA Court Opinion, 11/13/15, at 1. The record 

confirms that the PCRA court did not serve a copy of the order denying 

Appellant’s PCRA petition on Appellant’s counsel. Accordingly, a nunc pro 

tunc appeal is warranted due to the breakdown in the process of the court, 

and we will address the merits of Appellant’s issues on appeal.

6 Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925.
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[Whether] [t]he judge should have instructed the 

jury that if duress is found, then they must find 

[Appellant] not guilty[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 2 (emphasis in original). 

We review an appeal from the denial of PCRA relief according to the 

following principles.

Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA 

petition is limited to examining whether the court’s 

rulings are supported by the evidence of record and 

free of legal error. This Court treats the findings of 

the PCRA court with deference if the record supports 

those findings. It is an appellant’s burden to 

persuade this Court that the PCRA court erred and 

that relief is due.

Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270, 1274-1275 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citation omitted).

[Our] scope of review is limited to the findings of the 

PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party at the 

PCRA court level. The PCRA court’s credibility 

determinations, when supported by the record, are 

binding on this Court. However, this Court applies a 

de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal 

conclusions. 

Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1214-1215 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), appeal granted, 

105 A.3d 658 (Pa. 2014). Further, in order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a 

petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his 

conviction or sentence arose from one or more of the errors listed at 

Section 9543(a)(2) of the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). These errors 
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include ineffectiveness of counsel. Id. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). The issues raised in 

a PCRA petition must be neither previously litigated nor waived. Id.

§ 9543(a)(3).

In his PCRA petition, Appellant alleges ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel in not objecting to two portions of the trial court’s jury instructions. 

When reviewing a claim of ineffectiveness, we apply the following test, first 

articulated by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 

973 (Pa. 1987). 

[C]ourts presume that counsel was effective, and 

place upon the appellant the burden of proving 

otherwise. Counsel cannot be found ineffective for 

failure to assert a baseless claim. 

To succeed on a claim that counsel was 

ineffective, Appellant must demonstrate that: (1) the 

claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no 

reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or 

inaction; and (3) counsel’s ineffectiveness prejudiced 

him.

...

[T]o demonstrate prejudice, appellant must 

show there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s error, the outcome of the proceeding would 

have been different.

Commonwealth v. Michaud, 70 A.3d 862, 867 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Failure to establish any 

prong of the test will defeat an ineffectiveness claim.” Commonwealth v. 

Birdsong, 24 A.3d 319, 329 (Pa. 2011).
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Appellant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to two jury instructions. Our standard of review of a trial court’s jury 

instructions is as follows.

[T]his Court will look to the instructions as a whole, 

and not simply isolated portions, to determine if the 

instructions were improper. We further note that [] 

a trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its 

instructions, and may choose its own wording so 

long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately 

presented to the jury for its consideration. Only 

where there is an abuse of discretion or an 

inaccurate statement of the law is there reversible 

error.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 754 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014). Moreover, “[t]he 

law presumes that the jury will follow the instructions of the court.” 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 786 A.2d 961, 971 (Pa. 2001) (citation 

omitted), cert. denied, Brown v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 1187 (2003).

In Appellant’s first issue, he contends counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to the trial court’s erroneous instruction to the jury on his

duress defense. Appellant’s Brief at 6. Specifically, Appellant contends that 

the trial court’s closing instruction on duress was a misstatement of the law. 

Id. After giving all of its charges, including other duress instructions that 

Appellant does not challenge, the trial court explained, “[i]f the evidence 

matches up with the elements of the offense, the defendant is no longer 

presumed innocent, you should find him guilty. If they do not line up, then 
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he must be found not guilty. If they do line up and you find duress, he, 

again, is guilty.” N.T., 1/14/10 (vol. 1), at 103. 

Appellant asserts that this instruction was an error of law because 

duress is a complete defense. Appellant’s Brief at 6. Thus, the trial court 

should have instructed the jury that if it found duress, it must find Appellant 

not guilty. Id. Further, Appellant contends that the instruction was 

inconsistent with the other duress instructions and “could reasonably have 

caused confusion by the jury when examining the duress defense which was 

critical to [] Appellant’s overall defense strategy.” Id. at 7.

As our standard of review directs, we must look at the trial court’s 

instructions on duress as a whole. Antidormi, supra. Before giving the 

instruction that Appellant complains of, the trial court provided numerous 

charges to the jury that duress was a complete defense to the crimes. The 

trial court prefaced its instructions on the elements of the crimes by stating, 

“I’m going to talk about the general legal principles but have constant in 

your mind that the defendant’s position is that the defense of duress is there 

and he is not responsible for any of these crimes which I’ll discuss with you.” 

N.T., 1/14/10 (vol. 1), at 75-76; see also id. at 79-80, 82-83. Further, the 

trial court provided a detailed charge on duress, in part, as follows.

Now, the defendant does not deny that he was 

there. And the defendant says yes, I was there. But 

the defendant says to you I was there only as a 

result of the threat that Mr. Bermudez made to me 

and to my family. So what you’re looking for in the 

law is responsibility of a person who was 
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intentionally, knowingly or recklessly doing some 

kind of activity because obviously, we’re responsible 

for our activity.

Conversely, if someone is compelled to do 

something that they would not have otherwise done 

and they didn’t have any means to avoid that 

compulsion, then the law is not going to hold them 

criminally responsible because they are not acting of 

their own will, they are acting under duress. So 

there are certain things that have to be established 

here to accomplish the defense of duress.

Duress is a defense to all of those charges. If 

a defendant committed the acts otherwise instituting 

[sic] the crime but did so under duress, he may not 

be found guilty of that crime. So you can find that 

all of those crimes occurred. But if you find that he 

acted under duress even though you find the 

offenses have been proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt, if he acted under duress he is not responsible 

for those crimes.

...

So you have to go back and ask yourself the defense 

has been raised of duress, has the Commonwealth 

disproven that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

If they have disproven it and you find the defendant 

guilty of the other offenses beyond a reasonable 

doubt, you should go ahead and convict him. If you 

find all of the crimes have been committed but you 

find that the defendant was only involved as a result 

of duress then, of course, you can’t find him guilty. 

You must find him not guilty.

Id. at 91-92, 96. After a sidebar, the trial court restated its instructions and 

again reminded the jury that if “[t]he defendant says he acted under duress, 

[he is] not liable. You can find him [not liable of] all of those offenses 

committed [] because he acted under duress. And that is a person under his 
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circumstances given the information available, did he act reasonably or not. 

That is the duress.” Id. at 98. The trial court concluded with the 

summation that, that “[i]f the evidence matches up with the elements of the 

offense, the defendant is no longer presumed innocent, you should find him 

guilty. If they do not line up, then he must be found not guilty. If they do 

line up and you find duress, he, again, is guilty.” Id. at 103.

We agree with Appellant that the final sentence is a misstatement of 

the law. The trial court should have said “not guilty” instead of “guilty.”7 

However, we cannot review this one statement in isolation from the rest of 

the jury instructions. See Antidormi, supra. When we view the 

instructions as a whole, we conclude that this one misstatement is not 

prejudicial because the trial court repeatedly and extensively explained that 

duress was a defense to all of the crimes charged. See Commonwealth v. 

Trill, 543 A.2d 1106, 1114 (Pa. Super. 1988) (concluding that 2 

misstatements of the law in over 31 pages of jury charges are not prejudicial 

because the trial court correctly recited the law in other portions of the 

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7

In its opinion, the PCRA judge, who was also the trial judge, maintains that 

he actually said “not guilty” to the jury. PCRA Court Opinion, 8/7/15, at 2. 

Similarly, at the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified that he did not have an 

independent recollection of the duress instructions, but he would have 

objected if he heard the trial court state that Appellant was guilty if the jury 

found duress. N.T., 5/28/15, at 18. However, the parties stipulated that if 

the court reporter had testified at the PCRA hearing, she would have said 

that the transcript accurately reflected her notes taken during trial. Id. at 5. 

Given our disposition of Appellant’s first issue, we need not address whether 

the transcript accurately reflects the trial court’s instructions.
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colloquy and “[i]t would be fatuous to require a trial judge to perform such a 

lengthy charge flawlessly on each attempt[]”), appeal denied, 562 A.2d 826 

(Pa. 1989).

Even if we were to agree that the misstatement was somehow more 

significant because it was the last statement before the jury began 

deliberating, the trial court later cured its mistake. During its deliberations, 

the jury asked the trial court for a written version of the charges. N.T., 

1/14/10 (vol. 2), at 4. The trial court explained that it could not provide 

written charges, but it orally re-issued its charges. Id. at 4-5. The trial 

court explained duress as follows.

Duress is a defense to a criminal charge or charges 

and the defense says it’s a defense to each and 

every one of those charges. If a defendant commits 

the act otherwise constituting the crimes that I just 

discussed but did so under duress, he may not be 

found guilty of those crimes or any one of those 

crimes and it’s a duress analysis as to each one of 

the offenses.

...

If you find that the defense of duress has been 

properly raised, then it is the Commonwealth’s 

burden to disprove duress by proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

Id. at 14, 16-17. This instruction cured the trial court’s earlier misstatement 

by clarifying that if the jury found Appellant committed the offenses under 

duress, Appellant was not guilty. Appellant did not object to the language of 
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this instruction. As the jury is presumed to follow this instruction, we find 

Appellant’s first issue on appeal lacks merit. See Brown, supra.

In his second issue, Appellant contends that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s abovementioned duress 

instruction, given in response to the jury’s question, which stated that if the 

jury found duress, Appellant “may not be found guilty.”8 Appellant’s Brief at 

8. Appellant asserts that the proper statement of the law is that if the jury 

found duress, Appellant “must” not be found guilty. Id. However, the trial 

court’s language mirrored the language of the Pennsylvania Suggested 

Standard Criminal Jury Instructions in effect at the time of the trial. We will 

not parse out the phrasing of the jury instruction, which comported with the 

suggested standard instruction. See Commonwealth v. Towles, 106 A.3d 

591, 607 n.9 (Pa. 2014) (declining to “critique the subtleties of the language 

in the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instructions” in the absence of 

a claim that those instructions violate the appellant’s constitutional or other 

legal rights), cert. denied, Towles v. Pennsylvania, 135 S. Ct. 1494 

(2015); Trill, supra (finding the “distinction between ‘may’ and ‘will’ ... to be 

specious[]”). Instead, viewing the instructions as a whole, we conclude that 

they adequately informed the jury that if it found duress, it should find 

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8 We note that in his Rule 1925(b) concise statement, Appellant did not 

specifically frame this issue as an ineffectiveness of counsel issue. However, 

because his PCRA petition and appellate brief adequately argue it as an 

ineffectiveness issue, we will address it as such.
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Appellant not guilty. See Antidormi, supra. Therefore, we conclude 

Appellant’s second issue on appeal is meritless.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant’s ineffectiveness 

claims lack arguable merit. See Michaud, supra. Accordingly, Appellant is 

not entitled to PCRA relief. See Birdsong, supra. The PCRA court’s rulings 

are supported by the evidence of record and free of legal error. See 

Feliciano, supra. Therefore, we affirm the PCRA court’s August 11, 2015 

order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/9/2016