IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ronda Carosello, :

Appellant :

:

 v. : No. 938 C.D. 2022

: SUBMITTED: June 5, 2023

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: June 27, 2023

Licensee Ronda Carosello appeals from an order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Montgomery County dismissing her appeal from a one-year 

suspension of her operating privilege imposed by the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing 

(Department). The suspension was imposed pursuant to what is commonly known 

as the Implied Consent Law, Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547, 

because Licensee refused to submit to chemical testing when she was arrested for 

driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance (DUI). Upon review, 

we affirm. 

Background

On February 17, 2022, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Kole 

Rodrigues arrested Licensee for DUI. By official notice mailed April 21, 2022, the 
2

Department informed Licensee that it was suspending her operating privilege for one 

year pursuant to Section 1547(b)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code for refusing a chemical 

test. (Reproduced Record “R.R.” at 7a-10a.) Licensee timely appealed the 

suspension, and the trial court held a de novo hearing. (R.R. at 1a, 3a-6a.) 

Trooper Rodrigues testified that just after 12:00 a.m., he was on patrol 

with Trooper Seth Heffner driving along U.S. Route 422 in Montgomery County 

when he observed a red Toyota Corolla directly in front of him weave in and out of 

the traffic lanes several times and cross the white fog line. Trooper Rodrigues 

engaged his emergency lights and sirens and initiated a traffic stop of Licensee’s 

vehicle. He then approached and made contact with Licensee, whom he observed 

as “having glossy eyes and her eyes were very sensitive to [his] patrol unit’s lights 

and [his] hand-held flashlight.” (R.R. at 23a.) 

Given his observations of Licensee and her driving, Trooper Rodrigues 

requested that she exit her vehicle and perform standardized field sobriety tests. 

Licensee agreed and displayed multiple signs of impairment with each of the three 

tests. More specifically, with the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, Licensee had 

difficulty tracking the stimulus and could not focus due to light sensitivity; with the 

walk-and-turn test, she was unable to maintain the starting position, used her arms 

for balance, and missed the heel-to-toe on multiple steps; and with the one-leg stand 

test, Licensee put her foot down, used her arms for balance, and used both feet. 

Trooper Rodrigues ultimately stopped this last test short due to his concern for 

Licensee’s safety. 

Trooper Rodrigues then observed Trooper Heffner administer the 

Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement (ARIDE) testing to Licensee to 

test for possible drug-based impairment. Specifically, he observed Trooper Heffner 
3

administer the Modified Romberg test twice, wherein Trooper Heffner asked 

Licensee to stand with her feet flat on the ground, tilt her head back, and estimate 

when 30 seconds had transpired. Both times, Trooper Rodrigues observed Licensee 

estimate that 30 seconds had elapsed in just 7 seconds. When Trooper Rodrigues 

was questioned about what Trooper Heffner relayed to him regarding the outcome 

of the ARIDE testing, Licensee lodged a hearsay objection. The trial court sustained 

the objection given that Trooper Rodrigues was not trained to perform or interpret 

the results of ARIDE testing and Trooper Heffner was not present to testify. (R.R. 

at 31a-32a.) 

Based on these circumstances, Trooper Rodrigues arrested Licensee for 

DUI and placed her in the back of his patrol vehicle. Trooper Rodrigues read the 

warnings on the Department’s DL-26B Form to Licensee verbatim and requested 

that she submit to a chemical blood test, but she refused. While Trooper Rodrigues 

could not remember the exact words used, he repeatedly testified that Licensee 

refused, noting that she was very uncooperative in the patrol vehicle and “she may 

have stated that she was not going to the hospital.” (R.R. at 34a; see also R.R. at 

55a.) 

On cross-examination, Trooper Rodrigues conceded that he did not 

observe Licensee fumbling for her identification, and she did not exhibit slurred 

speech or a staggered gait. (R.R. at 47a-48a, 53a.) He also stated that he did not 

recall if he gave Licensee Miranda1 warnings. (R.R. at 55a.) Trooper Rodrigues 

confirmed that Licensee refused the chemical test, stating she was not going to the 

hospital, at which point he believed he related to her that they could “possibly get an 

ambulance to the Skippack station as we have done in the past.” (R.R. at 57a.) 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
4

Licensee did not testify or present any evidence on her own behalf. 

Following post-hearing briefing, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion and 

order denying Licensee’s appeal. Licensee then appealed to this Court. 

Issues

Licensee raises the following three issues for this Court’s review:2

whether the trial court erred in determining that the Department sustained its burden 

of proof for the suspension of Licensee’s operating privilege; whether the trial court 

erred in accepting into evidence Licensee’s 35-year-old driving record because it is 

prejudicial and irrelevant to the suspension; and whether the trial court erred by 

admitting into evidence the hearsay conclusion of Trooper Heffner as to Licensee’s 

ARIDE testing because Trooper Heffner was not called as a witness and his absence 

was unexplained.3 

2 We have reordered Licensee’s arguments for clarity and ease of discussion. 

3 Licensee purports to raise a number of additional issues on appeal, including whether 

Trooper Rodrigues failed to advise her that the Miranda warnings do not apply to a request for 

chemical testing; whether the trial court erred by failing to consider and rule upon Licensee’s 

request for an adverse inference given the Department’s failure to produce Trooper Heffner as a 

witness; and whether the Department’s failure to produce video of the traffic stop violated 

Licensee’s right to a fair trial. However, these issues are neither listed in the statement of questions 

involved portion of Licensee’s brief, nor are they fairly suggested thereby. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) 

(“No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is

fairly suggested thereby.”). Moreover, these issues are not set forth in separate parts of the 

argument section of her brief and are not fully developed, with appropriate discussion and citation 

to authorities or facts of record, to provide for meaningful appellate review. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). 

Several of these arguments consist of no more than a single sentence and lack merit as they are not 

supported by the record. For example, Trooper Rodrigues testified that he did not recall if he gave 

Licensee Miranda warnings, and Licensee herself did not testify so there is nothing in the record 

to support this claim. (R.R. at 55a.) As the trial court summarized, “there was only an oblique 

reference to the Miranda [w]arnings that may have been given by a[ Trooper], off to the side, and 

not related, whatsoever, to the reading of the DL[-26B] Form and the immediate refusal by 

[L]icensee.” (R.R. at 76a.) Given these significant deficiencies, we find that Licensee’s additional 

issues have been waived. See Wirth v. Commonwealth, 95 A.3d 822, 858 (Pa. 2014) (finding no 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
5

Discussion

Licensee’s main arguments concern the requirements for sustaining a 

civil suspension of a licensee’s operating privilege for failure to submit to chemical 

testing and whether the Department has met its burden here. It is well established 

that to sustain such a suspension under the Implied Consent Law, the Department 

has the burden of proving 

that the licensee (1) was arrested for [DUI] by a police 

officer who had reasonable grounds to believe that the 

licensee was operating a vehicle while under the influence 

of alcohol or a controlled substance, (2) was asked to 

submit to a chemical test, (3) refused to do so, and (4) was 

warned that a refusal would result in a license suspension. 

Regula v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 146 A.3d 836, 842 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2016) [quoting Zwibel v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 832 

A.2d 599, 604 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (emphasis in original)]. 

First, we reject Licensee’s assertion that the Department must prove the 

lawfulness of the underlying DUI arrest or that Trooper Rodrigues had probable 

cause to effectuate the traffic stop. See Licensee’s Br. at 14. To the contrary, “[b]oth 

the Supreme Court and this Court consistently have held that the result of a criminal

DUI proceeding and the legality of the underlying traffic stop are not relevant to an 

appeal of a civil license suspension matter based on a licensee’s refusal to submit to 

a chemical test[.]” Regula, 146 A.3d at 843 (emphasis in original). See also Banner 

error in determination that issue was waived under Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) for underdevelopment, and 

further stating Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) “is to be considered in the highest degree mandatory, admitting 

of no exception; ordinarily no point will be considered which is not set forth in the statement of 

questions involved or suggested thereby”) (citation omitted); Dep’t of Transp. v. McCafferty, 758 

A.2d 1155, 1164 (Pa. 2000) (holding claim was waived because it was not included in statement 

of questions involved and not developed as a separate argument). 
6

v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 737 A.2d 1203, 1206 (Pa. 1999);

Kachurak v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 913 A.2d 982, 986 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2006) (“[t]he law is clear that the legality of the underlying DUI arrest is 

of no moment” in a civil license suspension appeal and “[i]t is irrelevant whether 

[the arresting officer] had probable cause for executing the traffic stop”). Licensee 

has confused the legal concept of probable cause in criminal cases and reasonable 

grounds in license suspension civil cases. 

Licensee also argues that the Department did not meet its burden with 

respect to the first prong, that of reasonable grounds. The test for whether a police 

officer had reasonable grounds “is not very demanding,” and it is not necessary for 

the police officer to be correct in his belief. Vinansky v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of 

Driver Licensing, 665 A.2d 860, 862 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). While there is no bright 

line test, our courts have concluded that reasonable grounds are established 

if a reasonable person in the position of a police officer, 

viewing the facts and circumstances as they appeared to 

the officer at the time, could conclude that the driver drove 

h[er] car while under the influence[.] The issue of 

reasonable grounds is decided on a case-by-case basis . . . 

. Moreover, the existence of reasonable alternative 

conclusions that may be made from the circumstances 

does not necessarily render the officer’s belief 

unreasonable. 

Regula, 146 A.3d at 842-43 (citations and quotation omitted). Finally, “[a]n officer 

may acquire reasonable grounds to believe that a licensee was driving under the 

influence [] at any time during the course of [the] interaction[.]” Kachurak, 913 

A.2d at 985. 

Here, Trooper Rodrigues testified that he observed Licensee driving 

erratically, with her vehicle weaving in and out of the traffic lanes several times and 
7

crossing the white fog line. When he approached her vehicle, he observed 

Licensee’s eyes to be glossy and very sensitive to light. Licensee also displayed 

multiple signs of impairment with each of the three field sobriety tests Trooper 

Rodrigues administered, to the point that he stopped the final test short due to 

concerns for Licensee’s safety, and she was uncooperative while in his patrol 

vehicle. The trial court found Trooper Rodrigues to be credible and Licensee herself 

did not testify or dispute the Department’s evidence. See Factor v. Dep’t of Transp., 

Bureau of Driver Licensing, 199 A.3d 492, 497 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (noting wellsettled principle “that the trial court’s credibility determinations in a license 

suspension appeal will not be second-guessed on appeal”). Licensee argues that 

reasonable grounds do not exist because there is no evidence that she had slurred 

speech or was staggering, or that Trooper Rodrigues observed an odor of alcohol or 

other controlled substance emitting from her or her vehicle. However, we have 

repeatedly held that an officer does not lack reasonable grounds simply because he 

did not observe every indicator of intoxication that this Court has outlined in prior 

decisions. See Jessen v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 250 C.D. 2019, filed December 4, 2019), slip op. at 94[quoting Farnack v. Dep’t 

of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 29 A.3d 44, 48 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)]. The 

trial court determined that reasonable grounds existed based on the totality of the 

circumstances, and we discern no error in this regard. 

Licensee also appears to argue that she did not refuse the chemical test. 

“The question of whether a licensee refuses to submit to a chemical test is a legal 

one, based on the facts found by the trial court.” Nardone v. Dep’t of Transp., 

4 Unreported panel decisions of this Court may be cited for their persuasive value pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1), and Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. 

Code § 69.414(a). 
8

Bureau of Driver Licensing, 130 A.3d 738, 748 (Pa. 2015). Our “courts have long 

and consistently held that anything less than an unqualified, unequivocal assent to 

submit to chemical testing constitutes a refusal[.]” Factor, 199 A.3d at 497. In 

addition, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Department 

as the party that prevailed before the trial court. Bradish v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau 

of Driver Licensing, 41 A.3d 944, 945 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). 

Here, Licensee failed to give an unqualified, unequivocal assent to 

chemical testing. While Trooper Rodrigues could not recall the exact response 

Licensee provided, he repeatedly testified that Licensee refused to submit to the 

chemical test and that she was uncooperative. See Factor, 199 A.3d at 497-98 

(finding no abuse of discretion in trial court’s determination that the licensee refused 

to consent where officer could not recall the exact words used but testified repeatedly 

that it was a refusal); Fleet v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 1025 C.D. 2021, filed November 7, 2022). Throughout her brief, 

Licensee claims that she told Trooper Rodrigues she did not want to go to a hospital 

for testing because of the COVID risks and because she is the caregiver for her 

elderly father. See Licensee’s Br. at 6, 16. However, Licensee did not testify or 

present any other evidence before the trial court, and these claims are not 

substantiated by the credible testimony of Trooper Rodrigues. 

Licensee’s remaining arguments lack merit as they simply are not 

supported by the record. Contrary to Licensee’s claim, the trial court sustained her 

objection to the admission of her driving record as part of the Department’s certified 

record. The transcript from the trial court hearing indicates that only a portion of the 

Department’s certified record was admitted into evidence – that being the cover 

sheet, notice of suspension, and DL-26B Form – while Licensee’s actual driving 
9

record was explicitly precluded. (See R.R. at 41a-44a, 61a.)5 As such, Licensee’s 

driving record was not transmitted to this Court as part of the record and was not 

considered by the trial court when rendering its decision. 

Similarly, the trial court sustained Licensee’s objection to what Trooper 

Heffner told Trooper Rodrigues regarding the results of her ARIDE testing. The 

trial court allowed Trooper Rodrigues to testify as to his own observations since he 

witnessed Licensee perform the test twice. (See R.R. at 28a-32a.) However, the 

following colloquy is instructive: 

THE COURT: And your objection is to when he 

said about, I think he said that she might be, she may be 

under impairment, [sic] and you’re objecting to that? 

[LICENSEE’S COUNSEL]: I am objecting to that. 

I am objecting to the word “may.” I’m objecting. 

THE COURT: I think I’m going to sustain that, 

because you’re not trained to draw any conclusions; am I 

correct? 

[TROOPER RODRIGUES]: Yes, Your Honor. 

. . . . 

THE COURT: And you have some general 

understanding, or he told you some general understanding 

of the test, but you’re not qualified for the test; right? 

[TROOPER RODRIGUES]: Correct, Your Honor. 

[DEPARTMENT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, 

he’s indicating what was told to him. 

5 The trial court explained that the Department’s certified record “[wa]s admitted, except for 

the last several pages.” (R.R. at 61a) (emphasis added). Moreover, both the trial court and counsel 

for the Department noted that Licensee’s driving record was “not going to be used against 

[Licensee].” (R.R. at 43a.)
10

THE COURT: But you’re going to have a hard 

time. Let’s say it was seven seconds, but you don’t have 

an officer to say the relevancy of that seven seconds. 

So I’ll allow him saying that, but it’s not going to 

matter. Next. 

[LICENSEE’S COUNSEL]: Again, Your Honor --

THE COURT: I’m sustaining your objection to the, 

to anything that he might have said about that she “may be 

under,” that’s totally -- “she may be under the influence of 

drugs.” 

That’s not -- I hold no relevancy to that, so I sustain 

that objection. 

Next question. 

(R.R. at 31a-32a) (emphasis added). Given these evidentiary rulings, Licensee’s 

remaining arguments fail. 

Conclusion

Based on all of the above, the Department met each element of its 

burden and the trial court appropriately denied Licensee’s appeal. Accordingly, we 

affirm. 

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

President Judge Emerita
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ronda Carosello, :

Appellant :

:

 v. : No. 938 C.D. 2022

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 27th day of June, 2023, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Montgomery County in the above-captioned matter is hereby 

AFFIRMED.

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

President Judge Emerita