United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Committee on Small Business, 

House of Representatives 

SMALL BUSINESS 

ADMINISTRATION 

Response to the Gulf Coast 

Hurricanes Highlights Need 

for Enhanced Disaster 

Preparedness 

Statement of William B. Shear, Director 

Financial Markets and Community Investment 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST 

Wednesday, February 14, 2007 

 

GAO-07-484T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

February 14, 2007

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes 

Highlights Need for Enhanced Disaster 

Preparedness 

Highlights of GAO-07-484T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Small Business, 

House of Representatives

The Small Business Administration

(SBA) helps individuals and 

businesses recover from disasters 

such as hurricanes through its 

Disaster Loan Program. SBA faced 

an unprecedented demand for 

disaster loan assistance following 

the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes 

(Katrina, Rita, and Wilma), which

resulted in extensive property 

damage and loss of life. In the 

aftermath of these disasters,

concerns were expressed regarding

the timeliness of SBA's disaster 

assistance. 

GAO initiated work and completed 

two reports under the Comptroller 

General's authority to conduct 

evaluations and determine how 

well SBA provided victims of the

Gulf Coast hurricanes with timely 

assistance. This testimony, which is 

based on these two reports,

discusses (1) challenges SBA 

experienced in providing victims of

the Gulf Coast hurricanes with 

timely assistance, (2) factors that

contributed to these challenges, 

and (3) steps SBA has taken since 

the Gulf Coast hurricanes to

enhance its disaster preparedness. 

GAO visited the Gulf Coast region, 

reviewed SBA planning documents,

and interviewed SBA officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that SBA take 

several steps to improve its 

disaster preparedness, and SBA 

agreed with these 

recommendations. 

GAO identified several significant system and logistical challenges that SBA 

experienced in responding to the Gulf Coast hurricanes that undermined the 

agency’s ability to provide timely disaster assistance to victims. For example, the

limited capacity of SBA’s automated loan processing system—the Disaster 

Credit Management System (DCMS)—restricted the number of staff who could 

access the system at any one time to process disaster loan applications. In

addition, SBA staff who could access DCMS initially encountered multiple

system outages and slow response times in completing loan processing tasks. 

SBA also faced challenges training and supervising the thousands of mostly 

temporary employees the agency hired to process loan applications and 

obtaining suitable office space for its expanded workforce. As of late May 2006,

SBA processed disaster loan applications, on average, in about 74 days 

compared with its goal of within 21 days.

 

While the large volume of disaster loan applications that SBA received clearly

affected its capacity to provide timely disaster assistance to Gulf Coast

hurricane victims, GAO’s two reports found that the absence of a comprehensive 

and sophisticated planning process beforehand likely limited the efficiency of

the agency's initial response. For example, in designing the capacity of DCMS, 

SBA primarily relied on historical data such as the number of loan applications 

that the agency received after the 1994 Northridge, California, earthquake—the

most severe disaster that the agency had previously encountered. SBA did not 

consider disaster scenarios that were more severe or use the information 

available from disaster simulations (developed by federal agencies) or 

catastrophe models (used by insurance companies to estimate disaster losses). 

SBA also did not adequately monitor the performance of a DCMS contractor or

completely stress test the system prior to its implementation. Moreover, SBA did

not engage in comprehensive disaster planning prior to the Gulf Coast 

hurricanes for other logistical areas, such as workforce planning or space 

acquisition, at either the headquarters or field office levels. 

In the aftermath of the Gulf Coast hurricanes, SBA has planned or initiated 

several measures that officials said would enhance the agency’s capacity to

respond to future disasters. For example, SBA has completed an expansion of 

DCMS’s user capacity to support a minimum of 8,000 concurrent users as 

compared with just 1,500 for the Gulf Coast hurricanes. Additionally, SBA 

initiated steps to increase the availability of trained and experienced disaster

staff and redesigned its process for reviewing loan applications and disbursing

funds. However, SBA has not established a time line for completing key

elements of its disaster management plan, such as cross-training agency staff not

typically involved in disaster assistance to provide back up support in an 

emergency. SBA also has not (1) assessed whether its disaster planning process 

could benefit from the supplemental use of disaster simulations or catastrophe

models and (2) developed a long-term strategy to obtain suitable office space for 

its disaster staff. While SBA agreed with GAO’s report recommendations to 

address these concerns, it remains to be seen how comprehensive the agency’s 

final disaster plan will be and how the agency will respond to a future disaster. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-484T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William B. 

Shear at (202) 512-8678 or shearw@gao.gov. 
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to have the opportunity to be here today to discuss the Small 

Business Administration’s (SBA) response to the 2005 Gulf Coast 

hurricanes (Katrina, Rita, and Wilma), which caused more than 1,400 

deaths and more than $80 billion of estimated property damages. While 

SBA is generally known for the financial support it provides to small 

businesses, the agency also plays a critical, if less publicized role, in 

assisting the victims of natural and other disasters. Specifically, SBA 

provides financial assistance through its Disaster Loan Program to help 

homeowners, renters, and businesses of all sizes recover from disasters 

such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorist attacks. Due to the damage

associated with the Gulf Coast hurricanes, SBA faced unprecedented 

demand for its disaster loan services and, 9 months following the 

hurricanes, had approved nearly 150,000 such loans totaling nearly $10 

billion. However, concerns have been expressed that SBA’s response to 

the hurricanes was slow, leaving many disaster victims without the timely

assistance that they needed. 

My statement today is based on two reports that we issued under the 

Comptroller General’s authority to initiate reviews of federal programs. 

The first report, which was released in July 2006, discussed SBA’s planning 

for and implementation of the Disaster Credit Management System 

(DCMS), which the agency uses to process disaster loan applications.1

 The 

second report, which is being released today, discusses SBA’s disaster 

planning for other logistical areas, such as hiring and training a capable 

workforce and acquiring necessary office space.

2

 I note that these reports 

are part of a larger effort by GAO to assist Congress in assessing the 

response of federal, state, and local agencies to the Gulf Coast hurricanes 

and to identify steps that such organizations could take to improve the 

provision of assistance and services to the victims of future disasters.3

 1

GAO, Small Business Administration: Actions Needed to Provide More Timely Disaster 

Assistance, GAO-06-860 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006). 

2

GAO, Small Business Administration: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance Agency

Preparedness for Future Disasters, GAO-07-114 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2007). 

3

See, for example, GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 

Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness,

Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

Page 1 GAO-07-484T 
In my testimony, I will discuss (1) challenges SBA experienced in 

providing victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes with timely assistance, (2) 

factors that contributed to these challenges, and (3) steps SBA has taken 

since the Gulf Coast hurricanes to enhance its disaster preparedness. 

To address these objectives, we visited the Gulf Coast region, reviewed 

documents related to SBA’s acquisition and implementation of DCMS, 

reviewed reports that discuss disaster planning, analyzed relevant SBA 

planning documentation, and interviewed disaster planning experts and 

SBA officials in headquarters and field offices. We conducted the work on 

our reports from November 2005 through January 2007 and in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

In summary: 

• We identified several significant system and logistical challenges SBA 

experienced in responding to victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes that 

compromised the agency’s ability to provide timely disaster assistance. 

First, due to DCMS’s limited capacity, the number of staff who could 

concurrently access the system to process disaster loans was restricted. 

Further, SBA staff who were able to access DCMS often encountered 

system outages and slow response times. Second, SBA faced challenges in 

training and supervising thousands of mostly temporary employees hired 

to process loan applications and encountered difficulties in obtaining 

suitable office space for the expanded workforce. As a result of these and

other challenges, SBA averaged about 74 days to process disaster loan 

applications, as of late May 2006, compared with the agency’s goal of 

processing applications within 21 days. 

• While the unprecedented volume of disaster loan applications clearly 

affected SBA’s capacity to provide timely assistance to Gulf Coast 

hurricane victims, the absence of a comprehensive and sophisticated 

planning process beforehand likely limited the efficiency of the agency’s 

initial response. For example, in designing the maximum user capacity of

DCMS, SBA primarily relied on historical data such as the number of loan 

applications that it received after the 1994 Northridge, California, 

earthquake—the most severe disaster that the agency had previously 

encountered. SBA did not consider any disaster scenarios that were more 

severe or use the information available from disaster simulations or 

Page 2 GAO-07-484T 
catastrophe models to help design DCMS’s capacity.4

 SBA also did not 

adequately monitor a DCMS contractor or completely stress test DCMS 

prior to its implementation. Moreover, SBA did not engage in 

comprehensive disaster planning for other logistical issues, such as 

workforce or space acquisition planning, prior to the Gulf Coast 

hurricanes at either the headquarters or field office levels. 

• In the aftermath of the Gulf Coast hurricanes, SBA has planned or initiated 

several measures that officials said would enhance the agency’s capacity

to respond to future disasters. For example, SBA officials said that the 

agency has completed an expansion of DCMS’s user capacity to support a 

minimum of 8,000 concurrent users as compared with 1,500 concurrent 

users supported for the Gulf Coast hurricanes. Additionally, SBA initiated 

measures or established plans to address the logistical challenges that it 

faced in responding to the disasters, such as taking steps to increase the 

availability of trained and experienced disaster staff. However, we have 

also identified several apparent limitations in SBA’ disaster planning 

process, including that the agency has not established time lines for 

completing key elements of the plan, assessed whether the supplemental

use of simulations and models would enhance the planning process, and

developed a long-term strategy to obtain suitable office space in a disaster 

situation. 

We recommended in our July 2006 report that SBA take several actions to

enhance DCMS, such as reassessing the system’s maximum user capacity

in light of information available from catastrophe risk modeling firms and 

disaster simulations. As I discussed earlier, SBA officials said that DCMS’s 

capacity has been enhanced. We also recommended that SBA strengthen 

its DCMS contractor oversight and further stress test the system. In the 

report we are releasing today, we recommended, among other things, that 

SBA develop time frames for completing key elements of its disaster 

management plan. SBA agreed with these recommendations. However, it 

remains to be seen how comprehensive the agency’s final disaster 

management plan will be and how it will help SBA respond to a future 

disaster. 

 4

Federal agencies and other organizations have developed assessments of the potential 

destructive consequences of varying disaster scenarios, which are intended to help federal, 

state, and local agencies enhance their disaster planning. Moreover, many insurance 

companies and state entities that provide catastrophe insurance coverage currently use 

computer programs offered by several modeling firms to estimate the financial 

consequences of various natural catastrophe scenarios. 

Page 3 GAO-07-484T 
SBA was established by the Small Business Act of 1953 to fulfill the role of 

several agencies that previously assisted small businesses affected by the 

Great Depression and, later, by wartime competition. SBA’s stated purpose 

is to promote small business development and entrepreneurship through 

business financing, government contracting, and technical assistance 

programs. In addition, SBA serves as a small business advocate, working 

with other federal agencies to, among other things, reduce regulatory 

burdens on small businesses. 

SBA also provides low-interest, long-term loans to individuals and 

businesses to assist them with disaster recovery through its Disaster Loan 

Program—the only form of SBA assistance not limited to small businesses. 

Homeowners, renters, businesses of all sizes, and nonprofit organizations 

can apply for physical disaster loans for permanent rebuilding and 

replacement of uninsured or underinsured disaster-damaged property. 

Small businesses can also apply for economic injury disaster loans to 

obtain working capital funds until normal operations resume after a 

disaster declaration. SBA’s Disaster Loan Program differs from the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Individuals and Households 

Program (IHP). For example, a key element of SBA’s Disaster Loan 

Program is that the disaster victim must have repayment ability before a

loan can be approved whereas FEMA makes grants under the IHP that do

not have to be repaid.5

 Further, FEMA grants are generally for minimal 

repairs and, unlike SBA disaster loans, are not designed to help restore the 

home to its predisaster condition. 

In January 2005, SBA began using DCMS to process all new disaster loan 

applications. SBA intended for DCMS to help it move toward a paperless 

processing environment by automating many of the functions staff 

members had performed manually under its previous system. These 

functions include both obtaining referral data from FEMA and credit 

bureau reports, as well as completing and submitting loss verification 

reports from remote locations. 

Background 

 5

FEMA grants are also not available to businesses. 

Page 4 GAO-07-484T 
Our July 2006 report identified several significant limitations in DCMS’s 

capacity and other system and procurement deficiencies that likely 

contributed to the challenges that SBA faced in providing timely 

assistance to Gulf Coast hurricane victims as follows: 

• First, due to limited capacity, the number of SBA staff who could access 

DCMS at any one time to process disaster loans was restricted. Without 

access to DCMS, the ability of SBA staff to process disaster loan 

applications in an expeditious manner was diminished. 

• Second, SBA experienced instability with DCMS during the initial months 

following Hurricane Katrina, as users encountered multiple outages and

slow response times in completing loan processing tasks. According to 

SBA officials, the longest period of time DCMS was unavailable to users 

due to an unscheduled outage was 1 business day. These unscheduled

outages and other system-related issues slowed productivity and affected 

SBA’s ability to provide timely disaster assistance. 

DCMS’s Limited 

Capacity and 

Difficulties in Other 

Logistical Areas

Impeded SBA’s 

Response to the Gulf 

Coast Hurricanes 

• Third, ineffective technical support and contractor oversight contributed 

to the DCMS instability that SBA staff initially encountered in using the 

system. Specifically, a DCMS contractor did not monitor the system as 

required or notify the agency of incidents that could increase system 

instability. Further, the contractor delivered computer hardware for DCMS 

to SBA that did not meet contract specifications. 

In the report that we are releasing today, we identified other logistical 

challenges that SBA experienced in providing disaster assistance to Gulf

Coast hurricane victims. For example, SBA moved urgently to hire more 

than 2,000 mostly temporary employees at its Ft. Worth, Texas disaster 

loan processing center through newspaper and other advertisements (the 

facility increased from about 325 staff in August 2005 to 2,500 in January 

2006). SBA officials said that ensuring the appropriate training and 

supervision of this large influx of inexperienced staff proved very difficult. 

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, SBA had not maintained the status of its 

disaster reserve corps, which was a group of potential voluntary 

employees trained in the agency’s disaster programs. According to SBA, 

the reserve corps, which had been instrumental in allowing the agency to

provide timely disaster assistance to victims of the September 11, 2001 

Page 5 GAO-07-484T 
terrorist attacks, shrank from about 600 in 2001 to less than 100 in August

2005.

6

Moreover, SBA faced challenges in obtaining suitable office space to 

house its expanded workforce. For example, SBA’s facility in Ft. Worth 

only had the capacity to house about 500 staff whereas the agency hired

more than 2,000 mostly temporary staff to process disaster loan 

applications. While SBA was able to identify another facility in Ft. Worth 

to house the remaining staff, it had not been configured to serve as a loan 

processing center. SBA had to upgrade the facility to meet its 

requirements. Fortunately, in 2005, SBA was also able to quickly 

reestablish a loan processing facility in Sacramento, California, that had 

been previously slated for closure under an agency reorganization plan. 

The facility in Sacramento was available because its lease had not yet 

expired, and its staff was responsible for processing a significant number 

of Gulf Coast hurricane related disaster loan applications. 

As a result of these and other challenges, SBA developed a large backlog 

of applications during the initial months following Hurricane Katrina. This

backlog peaked at more than 204,000 applications 4 months after 

Hurricane Katrina. By late May 2006, SBA took about 74 days on average 

to process disaster loan applications, compared with the agency’s goal of

within 21 days. 

 6

SBA’s disaster reserve corps consists of individuals, including retirees and students, who

have backgrounds in the agency’s disaster assistance programs (e.g., finance and customer

support) and who are willing to work on a temporary basis for the agency in an emergency 

situation. Such individuals must agree to relocate within 40 hours of notification of a 

disaster situation where their services are required by SBA. 

Page 6 GAO-07-484T 
As we stated in our July 2006 report, the sheer volume of disaster loan 

applications that SBA received was clearly a major factor contributing to 

the agency’s challenges in providing timely assistance to Gulf Coast 

hurricane. As of late May 2006, SBA had issued 2.1 million loan 

applications to hurricane victims, which was four times the number of 

applications issued to victims of the 1994 Northridge, California, 

earthquake, the previous single largest disaster that the agency had faced.

Within 3 months of Hurricane Katrina making landfall, SBA had received 

280,000 disaster loan applications or about 30,000 more applications than

the agency received over a period of about 1 year after the Northridge 

earthquake.

However, our two reports on SBA’s response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes 

also found that the absence of a comprehensive and sophisticated 

planning process contributed to the challenges that the agency faced.7

 For 

example, in designing DCMS, SBA used the volume of applications 

received during the Northridge, California, earthquake and other historical 

data as the basis for planning the maximum number of concurrent agency

users that the system could accommodate. SBA did not consider the 

likelihood of more severe disaster scenarios and, in contrast to insurance 

companies and some government agencies, use the information available 

from catastrophe models or disaster simulations to enhance its planning 

process. Since the number of disaster loan applications associated with 

the Gulf Coast hurricanes greatly exceeded that of the Northridge 

earthquake, DCMS’s user capacity was not sufficient to process the surge 

in disaster loan applications in a timely manner.

Additionally, SBA did not adequately monitor the performance of a DCMS 

contractor or stress test the system prior to its implementation. In 

particular, SBA did not verify that the contractor provided the agency with

the correct computer hardware specified in its contract. SBA also did not 

completely stress test DCMS prior to implementation to ensure that the 

system could operate effectively at maximum capacity. If SBA had verified

the equipment as required or conducted complete stress testing of DCMS 

prior to implementation, its capacity to process Gulf Coast related disaster

loan applications may have been enhanced. 

Unprecedented Loan 

Application Volume 

and SBA’s Limited 

Disaster Planning 

Contributed to 

Challenges in 

Providing Timely 

Assistance to 

Hurricane Victims 

 7

The report we are issuing today (GAO-07-114) discusses the need for federal agencies and

other organizations to engage in comprehensive disaster planning based on previous GAO

work, reports by other investigative organizations, and the views of disaster planning 

experts.

Page 7 GAO-07-484T 
In the report we are releasing today, we found that SBA did not engage in 

comprehensive disaster planning for other logistical areas—such as 

workforce or space acquisition planning—prior to the Gulf Coast 

hurricanes at either the headquarters or field office levels. For example, 

SBA had not taken steps to help ensure the availability of additional 

trained and experienced staff such as (1) cross-training agency staff not 

normally involved in disaster assistance to provide backup support or (2) 

maintaining the status of the disaster reserve corps as I previously 

discussed. In addition, SBA had not thoroughly planned for the office 

space requirements that would be necessary in a disaster the size of the 

Gulf Coast hurricanes. While SBA had developed some estimates of 

staffing and other logistical requirements, it largely relied on the expertise

of agency staff and previous disaster experiences—none of which reached 

the magnitude of the Gulf Coast hurricanes—and, as was the case with 

DCMS planning, did not leverage other planning resources, including 

information available from disaster simulations or catastrophe models. 

In our July 2006 report, we recommended that SBA take several steps to 

enhance DCMS, such as reassessing the system’s capacity in light of the 

Gulf Coast hurricane experience and reviewing information from disaster 

simulations and catastrophe models. We also recommended that SBA 

strengthen its DCMS contractor oversight and further stress test the 

system. SBA agreed with these recommendations. I note that SBA has 

completed an effort to expand DCMS’s capacity. SBA officials said that 

DCMS can now support a minimum of 8,000 concurrent agency users as 

compared with only 1,500 concurrent users for the Gulf Coast hurricanes. 

Additionally, SBA has awarded a new contract for the project management 

and information technology support for DCMS. The contractor is 

responsible for a variety of DCMS tasks on SBA’s behalf including 

technical support, software changes and hardware upgrades, and 

supporting all information technology operations associated with the 

system. 

In the report we are releasing today, we identified other measures that 

SBA has planned or implemented to better prepare for and respond to 

future disasters. These steps include appointing a single individual to 

coordinate the agency’s disaster preparedness planning and coordination 

efforts, enhancing systems to forecast the resource requirements to 

respond to disasters of varying scenarios, and redesigning the process for 

SBA Has Taken Steps 

to Better Prepare for 

Future Disasters, but 

Their Effectiveness 

Remains to Be Seen 

Page 8 GAO-07-484T 
reviewing applications and disbursing loan proceeds.8

 Additionally, SBA 

has planned or initiated steps to help ensure the availability of additional 

trained and experienced staff in the event of a future disaster. According 

to SBA officials, these steps include cross-training staff not normally 

involved in disaster assistance to provide back up support, reaching 

agreements with private lenders to help process a surge in disaster loan 

applications, and reestablishing the disaster reserve corps with 750 

individuals as of January 2007. 

However, the report also discusses apparent limitations we found in SBA’s 

disaster planning processes. For example, SBA has not established a time 

line for completing the key elements of its disaster management plan, such

as cross-training nondisaster staff to provide back up support. In addition,

SBA has not assessed whether the agency could leverage outside 

resources to enhance its disaster planning and preparation efforts, such as 

information available from disaster simulations and catastrophe models.9

Finally, SBA had not established a long-term process to help ensure that it

could acquire suitable office space to house an expanded workforce to 

respond to a future disaster. 

To strengthen SBA capacity to respond to a future disaster, the report 

recommends that SBA 

• develop time frames for completing key elements of the disaster 

management plan (and a long-term strategy for acquiring adequate office

space); and

• direct staff involved in developing the disaster plan to continue assessing 

whether the use of disaster simulations or catastrophe models would 

enhance the agency’s overall disaster planning process. 

SBA agreed to implement each of these recommendations. However, it 

remains to be seen how comprehensive SBA’s final disaster management 

plan will be and how effectively the agency will respond to a future 

disaster. 

 8

As described in the report we are issuing today (GAO-07-114), SBA faced a significant 

backlog in disbursing the funds associated with approved disaster loans in July 2006. SBA

has redesigned the loan review and disbursement process in such a way that agency 

officials believe disbursement performance has been improved significantly. 

9

SBA has contacted FEMA for more information about a catastrophe model that FEMA has 

developed.

Page 9 GAO-07-484T 
Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be 

happy to answer any questions at this time. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact William B. Shear 

at (202) 512- 8678 or Shearw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Affairs and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of

this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony 

included Wesley Phillips, Assistant Director; Marshall Hamlett; Barbara S. 

Oliver; and Cheri Truett. 

Page 10 GAO-07-484T 

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