SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3279-21 

ROBERT J. TRIFFIN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

ONE NJ NEPTUNE 230 

MANAGEMENT LLC, and 

CHRIS RUSSELL, 

 Defendants-Respondents, 

and 

JUNIOR M. MATHEO, 

 Defendant. 

__________________________

Argued December 5, 2023 – Decided December 22, 2023 

Before Judges Rose and Perez Friscia. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. DC-008989-

21.

Robert J. Triffin, appellant, argued the cause pro se. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Shane P. Simon argued the cause for respondents (Saul 

Ewing, LLP, attorneys; Shane P. Simon, on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

 Plaintiff Robert J. Triffin appeals from a February 16, 2022 order, which 

granted summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice his claims against 

defendant One NJ Neptune 230 Management, LLC (NJ Neptune). We affirm. 

 We discern the relevant facts from the record. On July 9, 2021, NJ 

Neptune issued its employee, co-defendant Junior M. Matheo, a $1,125.43 

payroll check from its JPMorgan Chase Bank (Chase) account. The same day, 

Matheo deposited the check into his PNC Bank account through a mobile 

electronic deposit. Matheo then indorsed1 the check to Cash N Carry LLC, a 

check-cashing business, receiving a second payment. Four days later, Cash N 

Carry presented the check for payment, but Chase dishonored payment as a 

duplicate presentment. 

On July 23, 2021, NJ Neptune issued Matheo a second payroll check for 

$838.06 from its Chase account, which he electronically deposited into his PNC 

1

 N.J.S.A. 12A:3-204 defines "indorsement" as "a signature, other than that of 

a signer as maker, drawer, or acceptor, that alone or accompanied by other words 

is made on an instrument for the purpose of negotiating the instrument, 

restricting payment of the instrument, or incurring indorser's liability on the 

instrument." 
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account. Matheo indorsed the check to Cash N Carry, again receiving a second 

payment. Chase denied payment to Cash N Carry as a duplicate presentment. 

Cash N Carry assigned the denied checks to Triffin. 

In September, Triffin filed an action in the Special Civil Part seeking 

recovery of the dishonored check amounts, fees, and costs under N.J.S.A. 

12A:3-414(b), obligation of drawer. Triffin attached copies of both dishonored 

and returned checks. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted in lieu of an answer under Rule 

4:6-2(e), arguing they did not owe any funds because the checks had been paid. 

Defendants attached the certification of Michelle Reitan, the Vice President of 

Shared Services for Aimbridge Employee Service Corporation, an affiliate of 

NJ Neptune, and copies of the cashed electronically-deposited checks. Triffin 

opposed the motion. 

Reitan certified she had "firsthand knowledge of the facts and 

circumstances . . . having reviewed [the] records maintained in [NJ Neptune]'s 

ordinary course of business." Further, she attested that both payroll checks were 

deposited through "mobile deposit application[s]" and paid by Chase to PNC 

Bank. Thereafter, Chase dishonored the checks Cash N Carry presented for 

payment because they had been "previously honored."
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On February 16, 2022, after hearing argument and issuing an oral 

decision, the motion judge entered an order granting summary judgment and 

dismissing Triffin's claims against defendants NJ Neptune and managing 

member Chris Russell. The judge converted the motion to "one for summary 

judgment," based on the submission of "the checks and the documents" outside 

of Triffin's complaint. After providing plaintiff "every reasonable inference," 

the judge found summary judgment was warranted because "the checks 

appended to the plaintiff's complaint each contained [i]ndorsements" after they 

had been previously "electronically deposited." Relying on Triffin v. SHS 

Group, LLC, 446 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 2021), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 191 

(2022), the judge found NJ Neptune established the "previously paid defense" 

under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c) because the un-indorsed checks were 

electronically deposited first. The judge relied on the unrefuted copies of the 

electronically-deposited cashed checks, dishonored checks, and Reitan's 

certification finding that no material "issues of fact" were in dispute. The judge 

reasoned no "reasonable fact finder could find . . . [Triffin was] entitled to . . . 

payment on the dishonored check[s]" and "no further discovery would lead to 

any other conclusion." Triffin thereafter voluntarily dismissed claims against 

defendants Russell and Matheo. 
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On appeal, Triffin argues the judge erred in granting summary judgment 

because: Neptune failed to demonstrate through admissible evidence, pursuant 

to N.J.R.E. 1001 or the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (Check Clearing 

Act), 12 U.S.C. § 5001-04, that the checks were "previously paid"; the produced 

dishonored checks did not meet the required definition of an accepted check 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c); and the Supremacy Clause mandates that 12 

U.S.C. § 5003 preempts the holding in SHS Group. 

We review a motion judge's grant of summary judgment de novo. Branch 

v. Cream-O-Land, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). We apply the same standard as the 

motion judge and "consider whether the competent evidential materials 

presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are 

sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in 

favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 

520, 540 (1995). "We therefore must first determine whether, giving the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the movant has 

demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact." Walker v.

Choudhary, 425 N.J. Super. 135, 142 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Atl. Mut. Ins. 

Co. v. Hillside Bottling Co., 397 N.J. Super. 224, 230-31 (App. Div. 2006)). A 

dispute of material fact is "genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion 
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at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all 

legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require 

submission of the issue to the trier of fact." Grande v. Saint Clare's Health Sys., 

230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017) (quoting Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)). 

A motion to dismiss may be converted to a motion for summary judgment 

where the "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the 

court . . . and all parties [are] given reasonable opportunity . . . to present all 

material pertinent to such a motion." R. 4:6-2(e). Where "the motion was based 

upon evidence, including certifications, outside of the pleadings," the court 

applies the summary judgment standard. Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 562 (2010). 

Under New Jersey's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 3 

governs negotiable instruments, N.J.S.A. 12A:3-101 to -605, and Article 4 

governs bank deposits and collections, N.J.S.A. 12A:4-101 to -504. N.J.S.A. 

12A:3-414(b) provides, "If an unaccepted draft is dishonored, the drawer is 

obligated to pay the draft according to its terms at the time it was issued . . . . 

The obligation is owed to a person entitled to enforce the draft or to an indorser 

who paid the draft under [N.J.S.A.] 12A:3-415." However, "[i]f a draft is 

accepted by a bank, the drawer is discharged, regardless of when or by whom 
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acceptance was obtained." N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c); see also SHS Group, 466 

N.J. Super. at 467 ("Previous payment of a draft is a defense to enforcement."). 

Triffin's argument that summary judgment was erroneously granted 

because NJ Neptune did not produce "legally admissible evidence" as required 

under N.J.R.E. 1002 or the Check Clearing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5003, to 

demonstrate it "previously paid the two dishonored checks," is without merit. 

The judge appropriately considered the copies of the checks submitted. Triffin 

failed to demonstrate a "genuine question" of "authenticity" regarding the 

duplicate copies of the electronically deposited checks. See N.J.R.E. 1003. 

Under N.J.R.E. 1001(d) a "duplicate" is defined as: "a counterpart, other than 

an original, produced by the same impression as the original . . . or by means of 

photography." The judge also permissively relied on Reitan's certification, 

which she attested was on personal knowledge of banking records held in the

normal course of business and, based on her review, the checks were deposited 

through "mobile deposit applications" and paid by Chase to PNC Bank. 

Further, under the Check Clearing Act, we observe that Congress provided 

the Act's purpose was to: "facilitate check truncation by authorizing substitute 

checks"; "foster innovation in the check collection system without mandating 

receipt of checks in electronic form"; and "improve the overall efficiency of the 
8 A-3279-21

Nation's payment system." 12 U.S.C. § 5001(b). Triffin's argument that 12 

U.S.C. § 5003(b) requires a "compliant copy" of a cashed check to state "[t]his 

is a legal copy of your check. You can use it the same way you would use the 

original check" to be admissible is without merit. The legal equivalence of a 

substitute check codified under the statute does not require an original check nor 

preclude admissibility of a copy of an honored check to establish a previous 

payment defense. Triffin's argument that the Check Clearing Act was "enacted" 

to provide "an objective mechanical test" to determine "whether a check [w]as 

paid" is unsupported by a plain reading of the stated legislative purpose. 

Concluding 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b) is inapplicable, we need not further 

address Triffin's additional argument that 12 U.S.C. § 5003 preempts the holding 

in SHS Group, 446 N.J. Super. at 470, which elucidated that a previous payment 

defense under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c), may be established through the 

production of a copy of defendant's check which "referenc[es] the electronic" 

deposit. 

 In summary, based on our de novo review of the record, we are satisfied 

the judge correctly granted summary judgment determining no material issues 

of fact disputed NJ Neptune was relieved from payment, under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-
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414(c), as the checks were honored by Chase to PNC upon Matheo's mobile 

electronic deposit. 

 Triffin's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

 Affirmed.