2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-24-2002

United Mobile Homes v. ING Inv Mgmt LLC

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 01-1753

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Recommended Citation

"United Mobile Homes v. ING Inv Mgmt LLC" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 299.

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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

 

 No. 01-1753 

 

 

 UNITED MOBILE HOMES, INC. 

 Appellant 

 

 v. 

 

 ING INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC 

 

 Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

 (D.C. Civil Action No. 00-cv-3375) 

 District Judge: Honorable William H. Walls 

 

 

 Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

 February 25, 2002 

 

 Before: ROTH and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 

 GIBSON*, Circuit Judge 

 

 ( Opinion filed : May 24, 2002 ) 

 

 * Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior Circuit Court Judge for the Eighth Circuit, 

sitting by designation. 

 

 - OPINION - 

 

ROTH, Circuit Judge: 

 Appellant United Mobile Homes (UMH) appeals the order of the United States 

District Court for the District of New Jersey, granting appellee ING Investment 

Management, LLC’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). 

 We have appellate jurisdiction from a final order of judgment pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. 1291. We exercise plenary review over complaints dismissed for failure to state 

a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Ditri v. Caldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, 

Inc., 954 F. 2d 869, 871 (3d Cir. 1992) and Breyer v. Meissner, 214 F.3d 416, 421 (3d 

Cir. 2000). 

 In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the non-moving party is given the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the allegations in the complaint, and the 

court must accept these allegations as true. Breyer v. Meissner, 214 F. 3d 416, 421 (3d 

Cir. 2000) citing Lake v. Arnold, 112 F. 3d 682, 642 (3d Cir. 1997) and D.R. v. Middle 

Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1367 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 

113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993). A court may also consider an undisputedly authentic document 

that a party attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) if the party’s claims are based on that document. See Pension Ben. 

Guar.Corp. V. White Consol. Ind., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied 114 

S. Ct. 687 (1994). 

 In April 1999, UMH applied for a commercial loan from ING and submitted a 

deposit. ING rejected the loan application and returned the deposit. One year later, 

UMH brought suit against ING, alleging (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) misrepresentation, (4) promissory estoppel, 

(5) quantum meruit, (6) negligent misrepresentation, and (7) tortious bad faith. The 

District Court granted ING’s motion to dismiss all seven counts pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 

12(b)(6). We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

 Based upon the provisions of the loan applications and of the New Jersey Statute 

of Frauds, N.J.S.A. 25-1(f), the District Court found that no enforceable written 

contract/agreement was formed between UMH and ING. UMH contends, however, that 

the Statute of Frauds was satisfied because an actual "writing" did exist. This alleged 

writing was the modified loan application submitted to UMH from ING. UMH returned 

the completed loan application to ING with a deposit of $75,000. UMH contends that 

this act of returning the completed loan application with a deposit was its acceptance of 

ING’s "offer" and the completed loan application was the written contract/agreement. 

 The District Court correctly concluded that for this "writing" to be considered a 

contract, ING would have had to accept the loan application as the contract. ING, 

however, denied the loan application. Therefore, no written contract/agreement existed. 

 In addition, the District Court found that no intentional or negligent 

misrepresentation had occurred. UMH alleges, however, that ING falsely represented 

that, if UMH qualified for a multi-million dollar loan, ING would be willing to lend 

UMH the money. The District Court found this to be a conditional statement that does 

not misrepresent a presently existing or past fact. It was nothing more than a statement 

of a possible future conditional event. Thus, this statement fails to meet the requirements 

of a claim of intentional misrepresentation. 

 The District Court also found that UMH had failed to meet the elements of the 

doctrine of promissory estoppel and that UMH’s claim for quantum meruit was deficient 

on its face. 

 Our review of the record convinces us that the District Court did not err in 

dismissing the complaint. For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 

District Court. 

 

TO THE CLERK: 

 Please file the foregoing Opinion. 

 By the Court, 

 /s/ Jane R. Roth 

 Circuit Judge