12634 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 45 / Tuesday, March 8, 2011 / Proposed Rules 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 

22, 2011. 

Kalene C. Yanamura, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2011–5161 Filed 3–7–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–28661; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–013–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Model 737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, and –900 Series Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Supplemental notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM); 

reopening of comment period. 

SUMMARY: We are revising an earlier 

proposed airworthiness directive (AD) 

for the products listed above. That 

NPRM proposed to require installation 

of an automatic shutoff system for the 

center tank fuel boost pumps, 

installation of a placard in the airplane 

flight deck if necessary, and concurrent 

modification of the P5–2 fuel control 

module assembly. That NPRM also 

proposed to require revisions to the 

Limitations and Normal Procedures 

sections of the airplane flight manual to 

advise the flightcrew of certain 

operating restrictions for airplanes 

equipped with an automated center tank 

fuel pump shutoff control. Additionally, 

that NPRM proposed to require a 

revision to the Airworthiness 

Limitations (AWL) section of the 

Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness (ICA) to incorporate AWL 

No. 28–AWL–19 and No. 28–AWL–23. 

That NPRM further proposed to require 

installation of a secondary control relay 

for the electrical control circuit of each 

of the two center tank fuel boost pumps. 

That NPRM was prompted by fuel 

system reviews conducted by the 

manufacturer. This action revises that 

NPRM by adding airplanes, adding 

additional operational testing of the 

automatic shutoff system for certain 

airplanes, removing the requirement for 

incorporating AWL No. 28–AWL–19 

into the AWL section of the ICA, and 

adding an option of installation and 

maintenance of universal fault 

interrupters using a certain 

supplemental type certificate. We are 

proposing this supplemental NPRM to 

prevent center tank fuel pump operation 

with continuous low pressure, which 

could lead to friction sparks or 

overheating in the fuel pump inlet that 

could create a potential ignition source 

inside the center fuel tank. These 

conditions, in combination with 

flammable fuel vapors, could result in a 

center fuel tank explosion and 

consequent loss of the airplane. Since 

these actions impose an additional 

burden over those proposed in the 

NPRM, we are reopening the comment 

period to allow the public the chance to 

comment on these proposed changes. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this supplemental NPRM by April 4, 

2011. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services 

Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, 

Seattle, Washington 98124–2207; 

telephone 206–544–5000, extension 1; 

fax 206–766–5680; e-mail 

me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet 

https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You 

may review copies of the referenced 

service information at the FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. 

For information on the availability of 

this material at the FAA, call 425–227– 

1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 

9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this proposed AD, the 

regulatory evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Office 

(phone: 800–647–5527) is in the 

ADDRESSES section. Comments will be 

available in the AD docket shortly after 

receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tak 

Kobayashi, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; phone: (425) 

917–6499; fax: (425) 917–6590; e-mail: 

Takahisa.Kobayashi@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

relevant data, views, or arguments about 

this proposed AD. Send your comments 

to an address listed under the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2007–28661; Directorate Identifier 

2007–NM–013–AD;’’ at the beginning of 

your comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of this proposed AD. We will 

consider all comments received by the 

closing date and may amend this 

proposed AD because of those 

comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 

Discussion 

We issued an NPRM to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an airworthiness 

directive (AD) that would apply to 

certain Model 737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, and –900 series airplanes. That 

NPRM published in the Federal 

Register on July 10, 2007 (72 FR 37479). 

That NPRM proposed to require 

installation of an automatic shutoff 

system for the center tank fuel boost 

pumps, installation of a placard in the 

airplane flight deck if necessary, and 

concurrent modification of the P5–2 fuel 

control module assembly. That NPRM 

proposed to require revisions to the 

Limitations and Normal Procedures 

sections of the airplane flight manual to 

advise the flightcrew of certain 

operating restrictions for airplanes 

equipped with an automated center tank 

fuel pump shutoff control. Additionally, 

that NPRM proposed to require a 

revision to the Airworthiness 

Limitations (AWL) section of the 

Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness (ICA) to incorporate AWL 

No. 28–AWL–19 and No. 28–AWL–23. 

That NPRM also proposed to require 

installation of a secondary control relay 

for the electrical control circuit of each 

of the two center tank fuel boost pumps. 

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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 45 / Tuesday, March 8, 2011 / Proposed Rules 12635 

Actions Since Previous NPRM Was 

Issued 

Since we issued the previous NPRM, 

we received a report of failure of the 

left-hand fuel pump of the center wing 

tank (CWT) to shut off after being 

selected ‘‘OFF’’ by the flightcrew during 

flight on a Model 737–700 airplane. 

Subsequent to that report, the failure 

was found on two additional airplanes. 

Information indicated that the 

autoshutoff system appeared to function 

normally; however, when the flightcrew 

manually turned off the CWT pump 

switches, that action turned off the 

right-hand pump, but re-energized the 

left-hand pump due to incorrect wiring. 

The low-pressure lights turned off, 

incorrectly indicating to the flightcrew 

that power to both pumps had been 

removed. The failure condition results 

in continual running of the left-hand 

fuel pump without indication to the 

flightcrew, which could lead to 

localized overheating of parts inside the 

fuel pump, and which could produce an 

ignition source inside the fuel tank. 

Investigation revealed that incorrect 

wiring could occur on airplanes on 

which an autoshutoff system was 

installed in accordance with Boeing 

Alert Service Bulletin 737–28A1206, 

dated January 11, 2006; or Revision 1, 

dated January 30, 2008. Functional tests 

conducted in accordance with Boeing 

Alert Service Bulletin 737–28A1206, 

dated January 11, 2006; or Revision 1, 

dated January 30, 2008; alone are not 

adequate to detect the incorrect wiring 

condition. 

As a result, on November 18, 2008, we 

issued emergency AD 2008–24–51, 39– 

15781, for Model 737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, and –900 series airplanes to 

prevent extended dry-running of the 

fuel pump. (That AD published in the 

Federal Register on February 24, 2009 

(74 FR 8155)). That AD requires 

accomplishing a wiring test of the 

autoshutoff system to verify continuity 

and a visual verification that the wiring 

is correctly installed; doing corrective 

actions, if necessary; and doing a 

functional test of the autoshutoff 

system, and applicable maintenance 

actions. 

The preamble to AD 2008–24–51 

explains that we consider the 

requirements of that AD ‘‘interim 

action.’’ We did not require the 

corrective actions provided in AD 2008– 

24–51 to be accomplished on airplanes 

for which the power-failed ‘‘ON’’ (i.e., 

uncommanded pump ’’ON’’) protection 

system was installed in accordance with 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1248, dated December 21, 2006, or 

Revision 1, dated January 9, 2008; 

however, we were considering further 

rulemaking that might require 

additional testing for those airplanes. 

We now have determined that 

additional testing, which has been 

incorporated into Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28–1206, Revision 2, dated 

May 21, 2009 (described in the Relevant 

Service Information section of this 

supplemental NPRM), must be 

accomplished. This supplemental 

NPRM follows from that determination. 

In addition, AD 2008–24–51 provides 

an optional installation of the power 

failed ‘ON’ protection system for the 

center tank fuel boost pump in 

accordance with Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28A1248, dated December 

21, 2006; or Revision 1, dated January 

9, 2008. That AD states that the optional 

installation terminates the automatic 

shutoff system wiring test required by 

paragraphs (f) and (g) of AD 2008–24– 

51. 

Since we issued that AD, we have 

determined that installation of that 

protection system does not correct 

potential incorrect wiring that could 

exist on airplanes on which an 

autoshutoff system was installed in 

accordance with Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28A1206, dated January 

11, 2006; or Revision 1, dated January 

30, 2008. Therefore, we have revised the 

proposed actions specified in this 

supplemental NPRM to require 

accomplishment of Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28A1206, Revision 2, 

dated May 21, 2009. 

However, we have also added new 

paragraph (r) to this supplemental 

NPRM to allow accomplishment of 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1206, dated January 11, 2006; or 

Revision 1, dated January 30, 2008; as 

acceptable for compliance with the 

corresponding actions specified in 

paragraph (g) of this supplemental 

NPRM, provided one of the following 

actions has been accomplished: (1) The 

procedures specified in paragraph (f) of 

AD 2008–24–51, or (2) the actions 

specified in Part 3 of the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Alert Service Bulletin 737–28A1206, 

Revision 2, dated May 21, 2009. 

Relevant Service Information 

Since we issued the original NPRM, 

Boeing has issued Alert Service Bulletin 

737–28A1206, Revision 2, dated May 

21, 2009; and Alert Service Bulletin 

737–28A1248, Revision 2, dated August 

28, 2009. In the original NPRM, we 

referred to Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

737–28A1206, dated January 11, 2006, 

as the appropriate source of service 

information for installing the automatic 

shutoff system, and to Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1248, dated 

December 21, 2006, as the appropriate 

source of service information for 

installing the secondary pump control 

relays. 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1206, Revision 2, among other 

changes, introduces new operational 

tests in Part 3 of the Work Instructions 

for airplanes that have incorporated 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1206, dated January 11, 2006; or 

Revision 1, dated January 30, 2008; but 

have not accomplished paragraph (f) of 

AD 2008–24–51. Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28A1206, Revision 2, also 

clarifies instructions and incorporates 

additional operational tests to ensure 

the system is installed properly for new 

installations. 

The actions specified in Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1248, Revision 

2, are essentially the same as the actions 

specified in Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28A1248, dated December 

21, 2006 (referred to in the original 

NPRM), although certain illustrations 

showing the location of certain 

connectors have been corrected. 

We have revised this supplemental 

NPRM to refer to Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28A1206, Revision 2; and 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1248, Revision 2. 

We have also added a new paragraph 

(q) to this supplemental NPRM 

specifying that accomplishing the 

actions in accordance with Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1248, dated 

December 21, 2006; or Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1248, Revision 

1, dated January 9, 2008; before the 

effective date of the AD is acceptable for 

compliance with the proposed 

requirements of paragraph (j) (specified 

as paragraph (l) of the original NPRM) 

of this supplemental NPRM. 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1206, Revision 2, dated May 21, 

2009, refers to Boeing Component 

Service Bulletin 233A3202–28–03, 

dated January 12, 2006, as an additional 

source of guidance for replacing the left 

and right center boost pump switches, 

and changing the wiring, of the P5–2 

fuel control module assembly. 

Boeing has issued Service Bulletin 

Information Notice 737–28A1206 IN 05, 

dated October 7, 2010, to inform 

operators of the following items: 

• Sheet 2 of 4 of Figure 11 of Boeing 

Alert Service Bulletin 737–28A1206, 

Revision 2, dated May 21, 2009, was 

inadvertently replaced with Sheet 2 of 

4 of Figure 11 from Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28A1206, dated January 

11, 2006. That figure was corrected in 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1206, Revision 1, dated January 30, 

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12636 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 45 / Tuesday, March 8, 2011 / Proposed Rules 

2008, and did not need to be changed 

in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1206, Revision 2, dated May 21, 

2009. We have added Figure 1 in this 

supplemental NPRM to provide the 

correct Sheet 2 of 4 of Figure 11. 

• A typographical error appears in the 

name of the part in the first row of the 

‘‘Parts Modified and Reidentified’’ table 

in paragraph 2.C.3. of Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1206, Revision 

2, dated May 21, 2009. 

Boeing intends to correct these errors 

in the next revision of Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1206. 

Other Relevant Rulemaking 

On April 29, 2008, we issued AD 

2008–10–10, Amendment 39–15516 (73 

FR 25986, May 8, 2008), applicable to 

certain Model 737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, and –900 series airplanes. On 

December 23, 2009, that AD was revised 

and reissued as AD 2008–10–10 R1, 

Amendment 39–16164 (75 FR 1529, 

January 12, 2010). AD 2008–10–10 R1 

requires revising the maintenance 

program by incorporating new 

limitations for fuel tank systems to 

satisfy Special Federal Aviation 

Regulation (SFAR) No. 88 requirements. 

That AD also requires an initial 

inspection to phase in certain repetitive 

AWL inspections, and repair if 

necessary. That AD resulted from a 

design review of the fuel tank systems. 

We issued that AD to prevent the 

potential for ignition sources inside fuel 

tanks caused by latent failures, 

alterations, repairs, or maintenance 

actions, which, in combination with 

flammable fuel vapors, could result in a 

fuel tank explosion and consequent loss 

of the airplane. 

We have added a new paragraph (o) 

to this supplemental NPRM specifying 

that incorporating AWL No. 28–AWL– 

23 into the maintenance program in 

accordance with paragraph (g)(3) of AD 

2008–10–10 R1 terminates the 

corresponding action specified in 

paragraph (k) (specified as paragraph 

(m) of the original NPRM) of this 

supplemental NPRM. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

comment on the previous NPRM. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the NPRM and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Support for the NPRM 

AirTran Airways supported the 

NPRM. 

Request To Clarify the Scope of the 

Original NPRM 

Boeing requested that we add a 

statement to the Summary section of the 

original NPRM specifying that the 

original NPRM will not be extended to 

the main wing tanks, as discussed in 

meetings between Boeing and the 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office 

(ACO), FAA. Boeing stated that the 

original emergency AD was based on 

discrepancies in the manufacturing 

process, and that the original emergency 

AD was later expanded because 

inspection of in-service units showed 

that the units could possibly overheat in 

service or during manufacture. Boeing 

further stated that there is no service 

history of incidents or accidents for the 

main wing tanks on Model 737–600, 

–700, –700C, –800, and –900 series 

airplanes to support the proposed AD 

action for main tanks as well as center 

tanks. 

We infer that Boeing is referring to 

certain fuel pump operating restrictions 

mandated by AD 2002–19–52, 

Amendment 39–12900 (67 FR 61253, 

September 30, 2002), that were later 

mandated by AD 2002–24–51, 

Amendment 39–12992 (68 FR 10, 

January 2, 2003), to address an unsafe 

condition pertaining to fuel pump 

overheating. (AD 2002–19–52 provided 

optional terminating action, which, if 

accomplished, removed certain 

operating restrictions; AD 2002–24–51 

reinstated those operating restrictions 

because the terminating action provided 

in AD 2002–19–52 was not effective in 

eliminating the unsafe condition 

addressed in AD 2002–24–51— 

overheating of parts in the priming and 

vapor section of the fuel pump.) We 

agree that the requirements of this 

supplemental NPRM will not be 

expanded to address the main wing 

tanks because the fuel pumps for those 

tanks should never run dry. Since the 

Summary section of this supplemental 

NPRM discusses only the center fuel 

tanks, it is not necessary to revise it. 

Therefore, we have not changed the 

supplemental NPRM in this regard. 

Request To Issue Separate ADs 

KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) 

requested that we issue separate ADs for 

installation of the automatic shutoff 

system for the center tank fuel boost 

pumps in accordance with Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1206, and 

installation of the secondary pump 

control relays in accordance with 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1248. KLM stated that combining 

these modifications makes compliance 

with the original NPRM very complex 

for industry. 

We disagree with issuing separate 

ADs. Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1206 and Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28A1248 address separate 

parts of the same unsafe condition (the 

extended dry running of the pumps) on 

the same airplanes. We have not 

changed the supplemental NPRM in this 

regard. 

Request To Clarify Unsafe Condition 

Goodrich Corporation (Goodrich) 

requested that we provide a clear 

definition of the proposed requirements 

of the original NPRM regarding the 

pump/airplane operating limitations. 

Goodrich pointed out that the stated 

purpose of the original NPRM is to 

‘‘prevent’’ fuel pump operation with 

‘‘continuous’’ low pressure, and that the 

word ‘‘prevent’’ implies that the fuel 

pumps should never be operated with 

the inlets uncovered (low pressure). 

Goodrich stated that it is also unclear as 

to what ‘‘continuous low pressures’’ 

means, and that the terms ‘‘prevent’’ and 

‘‘continuous’’ seem to conflict. Goodrich 

also stated that the intent of AD 2002– 

19–52 and AD 2002–24–51 is to require 

a predetermined fuel mass in the center 

tank to ensure that the pumps will never 

run dry during operation of an airplane, 

and that the unsafe condition described 

in the original NPRM seems to conflict 

with the unsafe condition identified in 

these ADs. Goodrich asked if the pumps 

can run dry for 15 seconds, or if they 

must be shut off as soon as the pump 

inlets are no longer covered. Goodrich 

also asked if a momentary uncovering of 

the inlets is acceptable, due to sudden 

maneuvers or fuel slosh. 

We agree to provide clarification. This 

supplemental NPRM is intended to 

prevent the fuel pumps from continuing 

to run after the tank is empty. The 

possible ignition source is not dry 

running by itself, but overheating or 

sparking that could occur when the 

pump components are no longer bathed 

in fuel. Boeing and Hydro-Aire 

conducted testing that showed the 

pumps can run at a low pressure 

condition for significantly longer than 

15 continuous seconds without leading 

to overheating or sparking. Momentary 

uncovering of the pumps for less than 

15 continuous seconds is safe and 

allowing 15 seconds of continuous 

pump low-pressure conditions prevents 

pumps from automatically shutting off 

during maneuvering or sloshing, which 

would create unnecessary pilot 

workload. No change to the 

supplemental NPRM is necessary in this 

regard. 

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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 45 / Tuesday, March 8, 2011 / Proposed Rules 12637 

Request To Revise the Unsafe Condition 

Boeing requested that we clarify the 

unsafe condition specified in the 

Summary section and in paragraph (d) 

of the original NPRM (specified as 

paragraph (e) of this supplemental 

NPRM). Boeing stated that the unsafe 

condition is indicated continuous low 

pressure when the pump is operated 

with no fuel available to its inlet, not 

pump operation with the inlet covered 

with fuel. Boeing suggested using the 

following statement: 

We are proposing this AD to prevent center 

tank fuel pump operation with continuous 

low pressure (with no fuel passing through 

the pump), which could lead to friction 

sparks or overheating in the fuel pump inlet 

that could create a potential ignition source 

inside the center fuel tank. These conditions, 

in combination with flammable fuel vapors, 

could result in a center fuel tank explosion 

and consequent loss of the airplane. 

We agree that the unsafe condition is 

present only when there is no fuel 

available to cover the pump inlet. 

However, the continuous low pressure 

condition indicates that the fuel pump 

inlet may be uncovered, which could 

result in extended dry running of the 

fuel pump and possible overheating or 

sparking. The automatic shutoff system 

is designed to prevent fuel pump 

operation with continuous low pressure, 

and it is not dependent on whether fuel 

is still passing through the pump. 

Therefore, we have not added the 

phrase ‘‘with no fuel passing through the 

pump’’ to this supplemental NPRM. We 

have, however, reworded the summary 

section and paragraph (e) of this 

supplemental NPRM slightly to specify 

‘‘* * * overheating in the fuel pump 

inlet that could create a potential 

ignition source. * * *’’ 

Request to Revise Estimated Costs 

The Air Transport Association (ATA), 

on behalf of its member Delta Air Lines 

(DAL), stated that it disagrees with the 

cost estimates proposed in the original 

NPRM because the costs do not include 

the time required to accomplish the 

initial and repetitive AWL inspections. 

We infer that the commenters request 

we revise the Estimated Costs table in 

this supplemental NPRM to reflect the 

cost of accomplishing the initial and 

repetitive AWL inspections. We 

disagree, since the initial and repetitive 

AWL inspections are not directly 

required by this supplemental NPRM. 

The cost information provided in this 

supplemental NPRM describes only the 

direct costs of the specific actions 

proposed by this supplemental NPRM. 

This supplemental NPRM requires only 

revising the maintenance program to 

incorporate the AWL inspections, and 

provides a compliance time to phase in 

the initial actions. Section 91.403(c) of 

the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 91.403(c)) requires the inspections 

once the maintenance program is 

changed. Therefore, we have not 

changed this supplemental NPRM in 

this regard. 

Request To Add Terminating Action 

TDG Aerospace, Inc. (TDG) stated that 

it is currently certifying its universal 

fault interrupter (UFI) technology for 

use on Model 737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, and –900 series airplanes. TDG, 

therefore, requested that we revise the 

original NPRM to allow the installation 

of its UFI as a means of compliance with 

the proposed requirements of the 

original NPRM, if the UFI is approved 

prior to issuance of the final rule. TDG 

also stated that the same UFI hardware 

has already been approved under 

Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) 

ST01950LA for Model 757–200 and 

–300 series airplanes. TDG noted that 

AD 2008–11–07, Amendment 39–15529 

(73 FR 30755, May 29, 2008), presently 

incorporates TDG’s UFI under STC 

ST01950LA as an approved alternative 

method of compliance with certain 

requirements of that AD. 

We agree. Since the issuance of the 

original NPRM, we have evaluated STC 

ST02076LA and have determined that 

installing and maintaining TDG 

Aerospace UFIs in accordance with that 

STC would also address the unsafe 

condition addressed in this 

supplemental NPRM for Model 737– 

600, –700, –700C, –800, and –900 series 

airplanes. Therefore, we have added 

paragraph (s) to this supplemental 

NPRM to allow installation of STC 

ST02076LA as a terminating action for 

paragraphs (g) through (k) of this 

supplemental NPRM. 

Request To Clarify the Applicability of 

the Original NPRM 

Boeing requested that we clarify that 

the original NPRM would not apply to 

Model 737–100, –200, –200C, –300, 

–400, and –500 series airplanes (Model 

737 classics). Boeing stated that the 

‘‘FAA’s Determination and 

Requirements of the Proposed AD’’ 

section of the original NPRM discusses 

the installation of a placard for mixed 

fleet operations. (In the original NPRM, 

we stated that placards are necessary 

only for ‘‘mixed fleet operation,’’ which 

means that some airplanes in an 

operator’s fleet are equipped with 

automatic shutoff systems while other 

airplanes are not.) Boeing pointed out 

that, for many operators, this includes 

operation of 737 Classic models that are 

not affected by this supplemental 

NPRM. Boeing stated that we need to 

clarify that the placard would be 

required only on Model 737–600, –700, 

–700C, –800, and –900 series airplanes 

(Model 737 Next Generation airplanes). 

We agree that placard installation is 

required only for mixed fleet operation 

of Model 737 Next Generation airplanes. 

Paragraph (c) of this supplemental 

NPRM clearly states that this 

supplemental NPRM applies to Model 

737–600, –700, –700C, –800, and –900 

series airplanes. Therefore, we have not 

changed the supplemental NPRM in this 

regard. 

Request To Incorporate Latest Service 

Information 

Boeing requested that we revise 

paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(3) of the 

original NPRM to account for the 

information notices against the service 

bulletins referred to in the original 

NPRM. Boeing, AirTran Airways, and 

the ATA, on behalf of its member DAL, 

noted that both Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28A1206, dated January 

11, 2006; and Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28A1248, dated December 

21, 2006; have had information notices 

issued against them since the original 

NPRM was issued. DAL notes that the 

information notices specify that they are 

not FAA-approved and are not intended 

to be used as the basis for deviation 

from the approved service bulletins. 

However, in the absence of revisions to 

the service bulletins, DAL believed that 

the AD should include the information 

in these information notices. 

We do not agree to include 

information notices in this 

supplemental NPRM. As DAL notes, 

information notices are not FAAapproved. Therefore, it is inappropriate 

to refer to an information notice in an 

AD action. However, we removed the 

‘‘Service Information References’’ 

paragraph from this supplemental 

NPRM. That paragraph was identified as 

paragraph (f) in the original NPRM. 

Instead, we have provided the full 

service document citations throughout 

this supplemental NPRM. We have 

reidentified subsequent paragraphs 

accordingly. 

Request To Extend Compliance Time 

KLM and the ATA, on behalf of its 

member American Airlines, requested 

that we extend the compliance time 

specified in paragraph (g) of the original 

NPRM from 36 months to 72 months to 

align with their heavy maintenance 

programs. KLM estimated that the 

proposed modification will take 

between 250 and 300 work hours. The 

commenters stated that the modification 

will also require extensive ‘‘power off 

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12638 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 45 / Tuesday, March 8, 2011 / Proposed Rules 

A/C time,’’ and that the only scheduled 

maintenance that can accommodate this 

modification is a heavy maintenance 

check (4C-check), which is scheduled 

every 72 months by most operators. 

KLM stated that the proposed 36-month 

compliance time will force operators to 

accomplish the modification in an 

extended light C-check, adding 2–3 days 

of ground time. The commenters also 

stated that the proposed compliance 

time will have a substantial impact on 

operators, requiring special scheduling 

and out-of-service time. KLM is 

convinced that the compliance time can 

be extended safely, while operating 

under the condition of AD 2002–24–51 

(i.e., maintaining the wet shutoff of the 

fuel pumps). 

We disagree with extending the 

compliance time proposed in the 

original NPRM. In developing an 

appropriate compliance time for this 

action, we considered the urgency 

associated with the subject unsafe 

condition and the practical aspect of 

accomplishing the required 

modification within a period of time 

that corresponds to the normal 

scheduled maintenance for most 

affected operators. In consideration of 

these items, in addition to the unsafe 

condition being suspected as the cause 

of fuel tank explosions in 1991 and 

2001, we have determined that a 36- 

month compliance time is necessary to 

ensure an acceptable level of safety. 

However, according to the provisions of 

paragraph (t) of this supplemental 

NPRM, we may approve requests to 

adjust the compliance time if the 

requests include data substantiating that 

the new compliance time would provide 

an acceptable level of safety. We have 

not changed the supplemental NPRM in 

this regard. 

Request To Allow Use of Existing 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOC) 

Boeing requested that we revise the 

original NPRM to specify that operators 

may continue using the procedures 

specified in AD 2002–19–52 and AD 

2002–24–51, or the procedures 

approved as an AMOC for paragraph (b) 

of AD 2002–24–51 by FAA Approval 

Letter 140S–03–189, dated June 30, 

2003, until an operator has inspected all 

center tank fuel pumps and modified all 

airplanes in its fleet. As justification, 

Boeing stated that the AMOC has 

already been accepted as a valid means 

of fulfilling the intent of the original 

NPRM pending hardware installation. 

We agree that the procedures 

specified in AD 2002–24–51, or the 

procedures approved by FAA Approval 

Letter 140S–03–189 as an AMOC to AD 

2002–24–51, continue to be acceptable 

until all airplanes in an operator’s fleet 

are in compliance with all the proposed 

requirements of this supplemental 

NPRM. 

It should be noted that, although AD 

2002–24–51 and AD 2002–19–52 

require identical airplane flight manual 

(AFM) procedures, the unsafe 

conditions addressed by those ADs are 

not the same. This supplemental NPRM 

does not address the unsafe condition 

addressed by AD 2002–19–52; therefore, 

it is inappropriate to include alternative 

procedures for that AD in this 

supplemental NPRM. We have made no 

change to the supplemental NPRM in 

this regard. 

Request To Revise the AFM 

Instructions 

Boeing requested that we revise the 

original NPRM as follows, in order to 

match the current AFM instructions: (1) 

Add the title ‘‘Center Tank Fuel Pumps’’ 

to the limitation in paragraph (j)(1) of 

the original NPRM (specified as 

paragraph (i)(3) of this supplemental 

NPRM), and (2) change ‘‘900 kilograms’’ 

to ‘‘907 kilograms’’ in the fifth paragraph 

under the heading ‘‘Defueling and Fuel 

Transfer’’ in paragraph (j)(2) of the 

original NPRM (specified as paragraph 

(i)(4) of this supplemental NPRM). 

Boeing also requested that we replace 

the words ‘‘main tanks’’ with ‘‘center 

tank’’ in the third paragraph under the 

heading ‘‘Defueling and Fuel Transfer’’ 

in paragraph (j)(2) of the original NPRM, 

in order to correct a typographical error. 

For accuracy, we agree with the 

wording changes provided by Boeing. 

We have revised paragraphs (i)(3) and 

(i)(4) of this supplemental NPRM 

accordingly. 

Request To Clarify Requirement for 

Installing Secondary Control Relays 

Boeing requested that we revise the 

original NPRM to clarify that only one 

additional secondary control relay must 

be added to each center tank boost 

pump control system. Boeing stated that 

the wording in Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28A1248, dated December 

21, 2006, which we referred to in the 

original NPRM, is incorrect. Boeing also 

stated that the word ‘‘override’’ should 

not be used—in order to maintain 

consistency with Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28A1206 and the 

nomenclature on the cockpit P5–2 fuel 

control panel. Boeing also stated that 

the clarification will be included when 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1248 is revised. Boeing requested 

that the clarification be included in the 

‘‘Summary,’’ ‘‘Relevant Service 

Information,’’ and ‘‘FAA’s Determination 

and Requirements of the Proposed AD,’’ 

sections and paragraphs (l) and (m) of 

the original NPRM (paragraphs (j) and 

(k) of this supplemental NPRM). 

We agree to revise the Summary 

section and paragraphs (j) and (k) of this 

supplemental NPRM (paragraphs (l) and 

(m) of the original NPRM) accordingly, 

for the stated reasons. We have not 

revised certain other sections of the 

original NPRM that Boeing referred to 

because, although those sections do 

appear in this supplemental NPRM, the 

text of those sections has been revised 

to reflect information new or specific to 

the supplemental NPRM, and no longer 

contains the text referred to by Boeing. 

Request To Delete AWL Revision 

Requirements From the Original NPRM 

KLM and the ATA, on behalf of its 

member DAL, requested that we remove 

the proposed requirements from the 

original NPRM to incorporate AWL No. 

28–AWL–19 and No. 28–AWL–23 into 

the AWL of the ICA. The commenters 

noted that we issued an NPRM (Docket 

No. FAA–2007–28384, Directorate 

Identifier 2006–NM–165–AD) that 

proposed to require revising the AWL 

section of the ICA to incorporate the 

AWL in Subsection F of the Boeing 737– 

600/700/700C/700IGW/800/900 

Maintenance Planning Data (MPD) 

Document, D626A001–CMR, Revision 

March 2006. (As explained previously, 

on April 29, 2008, we issued AD 2008– 

10–10 mandating that NPRM.) The 

commenters stated that the original 

NPRM appears to duplicate the 

requirements to incorporate AWLs No. 

28–AWL–19 and No. 28–AWL–23 into 

the AWL of the ICA provided in AD 

2008–10–10 R1, and that it is more 

appropriate to require those AWLs in 

AD 2008–10–10 R1 rather than the 

newly proposed action. 

From the commenters’ request and 

statements, we infer that the 

commenters requested we delete 

paragraphs (k) and (m) of the original 

NPRM (paragraph (k) of this 

supplemental NPRM). We partially 

agree. 

We agree to delete paragraph (k) of the 

original NPRM from this supplemental 

NPRM because the incorporation of 

AWL No. 28–AWL–19 is currently 

required by AD 2008–10–10 R1, as 

pointed out by the commenters. We do 

not agree to remove paragraph (m) of the 

original NPRM (paragraph (k) of this 

supplemental NPRM), because the 

incorporation of AWL No. 28–AWL–23 

is optional in AD 2008–10–10 R1, and 

therefore that AWL may not have been 

incorporated into operators’ 

maintenance programs. 

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We also have added a new paragraph 

(o) to this supplemental NPRM 

specifying that incorporating AWL No. 

28–AWL–23 into the maintenance 

program in accordance with paragraph 

(g)(3) of AD 2008–10–10 R1 terminates 

the corresponding actions required by 

paragraph (k) of this supplemental 

NPRM. No further change to the 

supplemental NPRM is necessary in this 

regard. 

Explanation of Additional Changes 

Made to This Supplemental NPRM 

We have revised this supplemental 

NPRM in the following ways: 

• We have revised this supplemental 

NPRM to identify the legal name of the 

manufacturer as published in the most 

recent type certificate data sheet for the 

affected airplane models. 

• We revised Note 1 of this 

supplemental NPRM to clarify that 

requests for approval of an AMOC with 

the proposed requirements of this 

supplemental NPRM should include a 

description of changes to the required 

inspections that will ensure the 

continued operational safety of the 

airplane. 

• We added a new paragraph (d) to 

this supplemental NPRM to provide the 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America subject code 28, Fuel. This 

code is added to make this 

supplemental NPRM parallel with other 

new AD actions. We have reidentified 

subsequent paragraphs accordingly. 

• We added a new Note 2 in this 

supplemental NPRM to explain that 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747– 

28A1206, Revision 2, dated May 21, 

2009, refers to Boeing Component 

Service Bulletin 233A3202–28–03, 

dated January 12, 2006, as an additional 

source of guidance for replacing the left 

and right center boost pump switches 

with new switches and changing the 

wiring of the P5–2 fuel control module 

assembly. 

• We revised paragraph (h) in this 

supplemental NPRM to remove the 

statement indicating that installing a 

placard in accordance with paragraph 

(c) of AD 2002–19–52 is acceptable for 

the compliance with the requirements of 

paragraph (h) of this supplemental 

NPRM. This change was made to 

eliminate confusion between the 

requirements of this supplemental 

NPRM and AD 2002–19–52. 

• We added a new Note 3 in this 

supplemental NPRM to clarify that the 

AFM limitations required by AD 2002– 

19–52 continue to be required until the 

optional terminating actions specified in 

paragraph (g) of that AD are 

accomplished. 

• We removed paragraph (i) of the 

original NPRM from this supplemental 

NPRM. That paragraph would have 

required operators to modify the P5–2 

fuel control module assembly in 

accordance with Boeing Component 

Service Bulletin 233A3202–28–03, 

dated January 12, 2006. However, 

operators have the option to obtain 

modified P5–2 assemblies from the 

supplier, instead of making 

modifications by themselves. The action 

we intend to require is the replacement 

of the P5–2 fuel control module 

assembly having certain part numbers 

with the modified P5–2 assembly 

having new part numbers. Because that 

action is already provided in the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Alert Service Bulletin 737–28A1206, 

Revision 2, dated May 21, 2009, we 

have determined that paragraph (i) of 

the original NPRM is not necessary. We 

have also removed the corresponding 

cost for the concurrent requirement 

proposed in paragraph (i) of the original 

NPRM from the Costs of Compliance 

section of this supplemental NPRM. 

• We removed all references to the 

use of ‘‘later revisions’’ of the applicable 

service information from this AD to be 

consistent with FAA and Office of the 

Federal Register policies. We may 

consider approving the use of later 

revisions of the service information as 

an AMOC with this AD, as provided by 

paragraph (t) of this AD. 

• We removed Note 3 of the original 

NPRM from this supplemental NPRM; 

that note was redundant to Note 2 of the 

original NPRM. Instead, Note 4 of this 

supplemental NPRM addresses all AFM 

revisions required by this supplemental 

NPRM. 

• We have revised paragraph (k) in 

this supplemental NPRM (paragraph (m) 

of the original NPRM) to require 

revising the maintenance program to 

include AWL No. 28–AWL–23, instead 

of revising the Airworthiness 

Limitations section of the Instructions 

for Continued Airworthiness. We have 

also included an initial compliance time 

of 1 year for doing the actions specified 

in AWL No. 28–AWL–23. 

• We added a new paragraph (l) in 

this supplemental NPRM to specify that 

no alternative inspections or inspection 

intervals may be used unless they are 

approved as an AMOC. Inclusion of this 

paragraph in the supplemental NPRM is 

intended to ensure that the ADmandated airworthiness limitations 

changes are treated the same as the 

airworthiness limitations issued with 

the original type certificate. 

• We added a new paragraph (p) in 

this supplemental NPRM to specify that 

accomplishing the actions required by 

paragraph (g) of this supplemental 

NPRM terminates the requirements of 

paragraph (f) of AD 2008–24–51. 

FAA’s Determination 

We are proposing this supplemental 

NPRM because we evaluated all the 

relevant information and determined 

the unsafe condition described 

previously is likely to exist or develop 

in other products of these same type 

designs. Certain changes described 

above expand the scope of the original 

NPRM. As a result, we have determined 

that it is necessary to reopen the 

comment period to provide additional 

opportunity for the public to comment 

on this supplemental NPRM. 

Proposed Requirements of the 

Supplemental NPRM 

This supplemental NPRM would 

require accomplishing the actions 

specified in the service information 

described previously. 

Explanation of Change to Costs of 

Compliance 

Since issuance of the original NPRM, 

we have increased the labor rate used in 

the Costs of Compliance from $80 per 

work-hour to $85 per work-hour. The 

Costs of Compliance information, 

below, reflects this increase in the 

specified hourly labor rate. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this proposed AD 

affects 685 airplanes of U.S. registry. 

We estimate the following costs to 

comply with this proposed AD: 

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12640 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 45 / Tuesday, March 8, 2011 / Proposed Rules 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product 

Number of 

U.S.-registered 

airplanes 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Installation of the automatic shutoff system (Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737–28A1206).Between 94 and 117 (depending 

on airplane configuration) workhours × $85 per hour = Between $7,990 and $9,945.

Between 

$22,994 and 

$30,197 (depending on 

airplane configuration).

Between 

$30,984 and 

$40,142.

538 Between 

$16,669,392 

and 

$21,596,396. 

Placard installation, if necessary 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = 

$85.

$10 .................... $95 .................... 685 $65,075. 

AFM revision ................................ 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = 

$85.

None ................. $85 .................... 538 $45,730. 

Installation of secondary pump 

control relays (Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1248).

68 work-hours × $85 per hour = 

$5,780.

$3,274 ............... $9,054 ............... 685 $6,201,990. 

AWL revision to add 28–AWL–23 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = 

$85.

None ................. $85 .................... 685 $58,225. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this proposed AD 

would not have federalism implications 

under Executive Order 13132. This 

proposed AD would not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

Government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this proposed regulation: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Proposed Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 

39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

The Boeing Company: Docket No. FAA– 

2007–28661; Directorate Identifier 2007– 

NM–013–AD. 

Comments Due Date 

(a) We must receive comments by April 4, 

2011. 

Affected ADs 

(b) Accomplishing certain requirements of 

this AD terminates certain requirements of 

2001–08–24, Amendment 39–12201; AD 

2002–24–51, Amendment 39–12992; and AD 

2008–24–51, Amendment 39–15781. AD 

2002–19–52, Amendment 39–12900, is 

affected by this AD. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to the airplanes 

identified in paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of 

this AD, certificated in any category. 

(1) The Boeing Company Model 737–600, 

–700, –700C, –800, and –900 series airplanes 

identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

737–28A1206, Revision 2, dated May 21, 

2009. 

(2) The Boeing Company Model 737–600, 

–700, –700C, –800, and –900 series airplanes 

identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

737–28A1248, Revision 2, dated August 28, 

2009. 

Note 1: This AD requires revisions to 

certain operator maintenance documents to 

include new inspections. Compliance with 

these inspections is required by 14 CFR 

91.403(c). For airplanes that have been 

previously modified, altered, or repaired in 

the areas addressed by these inspections, the 

operator may not be able to accomplish the 

inspections described in the revisions. In this 

situation, to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), 

the operator must request approval for an 

alternative method of compliance (AMOC) 

according to paragraph (t) of this AD. The 

request should include a description of 

changes to the required inspections that will 

ensure the continued operational safety of 

the airplane. 

Subject 

(d) Joint Aircraft System Component 

(JASC)/Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 28, Fuel. 

Unsafe Condition 

(e) This AD was prompted by fuel system 

reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We 

are issuing this AD to prevent center tank 

fuel pump operation with continuous low 

pressure, which could lead to friction sparks 

or overheating in the fuel pump inlet that 

could create a potential ignition source 

inside the center fuel tank. These conditions, 

in combination with flammable fuel vapors, 

could result in a center fuel tank explosion 

and consequent loss of the airplane. 

Compliance 

(f) Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

Installation of Automatic Shutoff System for 

the Center Tank Fuel Boost Pumps 

(g) For airplanes identified in paragraph 

1.A.1. of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1206, Revision 2, dated May 21, 2009: 

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Within 36 months after the effective date of 

this AD, install an automatic shutoff system 

for the center tank fuel boost pumps, by 

accomplishing all of the actions specified in 

Part 1 and Part 2 of the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

737–28A1206, Revision 2, dated May 21, 

2009, except that Figure 1 of this AD must 

be used in lieu of Sheet 2 of Figure 11 of 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737–28A1206, 

Revision 2, dated May 21, 2009. If a placard 

has been previously installed on the airplane 

in accordance with paragraph (h) of this AD, 

the placard may be removed from the flight 

deck of only that airplane after the automatic 

shutoff system has been installed. Installing 

automatic shutoff systems on all airplanes in 

an operator’s fleet, in accordance with this 

paragraph, terminates the placard installation 

required by paragraph (h) of this AD for all 

airplanes in an operator’s fleet. 

Note 2: Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1206, Revision 2, dated May 21, 2009, 

refers to Boeing Component Service Bulletin 

233A3202–28–03, dated January 12, 2006, as 

an additional source of guidance for 

replacing the left and right center boost 

pump switches of the P5–2 fuel control 

module assembly with new switches and 

changing the wiring of the P5–2 fuel control 

module assembly. 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–C 


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Placard Installation for Mixed Fleet 

Operation 

(h) Prior to or concurrently with installing 

an automatic shutoff system on any airplane 

in an operator’s fleet, as required by 

paragraph (g) of this AD, install a placard 

adjacent to the pilot’s primary flight display 

on all airplanes in the operator’s fleet that are 

not equipped with an automatic shutoff 

system for the center tank fuel boost pumps. 

The placard must read as follows (unless 

alternative placard wording is approved by 

an appropriate FAA Principal Operations 

Inspector): 

‘‘AD 2002–24–51 fuel usage restrictions 

required.’’ 

Installing an automatic shutoff system, in 

accordance with paragraph (g) of this AD, 

terminates the placard installation required 

by this paragraph for only that airplane. 

Installing automatic shutoff systems on all 

airplanes in an operator’s fleet, in accordance 

with paragraph (g) of this AD, terminates the 

placard installation required by this 

paragraph for all airplanes in an operator’s 

fleet. If automatic shutoff systems are 

installed concurrently on all airplanes in an 

operator’s fleet in accordance with paragraph 

(g) of this AD, or if operation according to the 

fuel usage restrictions of AD 2002–24–51 is 

maintained until automatic shutoff systems 

are installed on all airplanes in an operator’s 

fleet, the placard installation specified in this 

paragraph is not required. 

Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Revision 

(i) For airplanes on which Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1206, Revision 2, 

dated May 21, 2009, has been accomplished: 

At the applicable time specified in paragraph 

(i)(1) or (i)(2) of this AD, do the actions 

specified in paragraphs (i)(3) and (i)(4) of this 

AD. 

(1) For airplanes on which the terminating 

action specified in paragraph (g) of AD 2002– 

19–52 has been done: Concurrently with 

accomplishing the actions required by 

paragraph (g) of this AD. 

(2) For airplanes on which the terminating 

action specified in paragraph (g) of AD 2002– 

19–52 has not been done: Concurrently with 

accomplishing the terminating action 

specified in paragraph (g) of AD 2002–19–52. 

(3) Revise Section 1 of the Limitations 

section of the Boeing 737–600/–700/–700C/– 

800/–900 AFM to include the following 

statement. This may be done by inserting a 

copy of this AD into the AFM. 

‘‘Center Tank Fuel Pumps 

Intentional dry running of a center tank 

fuel pump (low pressure light illuminated) is 

prohibited.’’ 

Note 3: For clarification purposes, the AFM 

limitations required by AD 2002–19–52 

continue to be required until the optional 

terminating actions specified in paragraph (g) 

of AD 2002–19–52 have been done. 

(4) Revise Section 3 of the Normal 

Procedures section of the Boeing 737–600/- 

700/-700C/-800/-900 AFM to include the 

following statements. This may be done by 

inserting a copy of this AD into the AFM. 

Alternative statements that meet the intent of 

the following requirements may be used if 

approved by an appropriate FAA Principal 

Operations Inspector. 

‘‘CENTER TANK FUEL PUMPS 

Alternative Method of Compliance (AMOC) 

to AD 2001–08–24 and AD 2002–24–51 for 

Aircraft with the Automated Center Tank 

Fuel Pump Shutoff 

Center tank fuel pumps must not be ‘‘ON’’ 

unless personnel are available in the flight 

deck to monitor low pressure lights. 

For ground operation, center tank fuel 

pump switches must not be positioned ‘‘ON’’ 

unless the center tank fuel quantity exceeds 

1000 pounds (453 kilograms), except when 

defueling or transferring fuel. Upon 

positioning the center tank fuel pump 

switches ‘‘ON’’ verify momentary 

illumination of each center tank fuel pump 

low pressure light. 

For ground and flight operations, the 

corresponding center tank fuel pump switch 

must be positioned ‘‘OFF’’ when a center tank 

fuel pump low pressure light illuminates [1]. 

Both center tank fuel pump switches must be 

positioned ‘‘OFF’’ when the first center tank 

fuel pump low pressure light illuminates if 

the center tank is empty. 

[1] When established in a level flight 

attitude, both center tank pump switches 

should be positioned ‘‘ON’’ again if the center 

tank contains usable fuel. 

Defueling and Fuel Transfer 

When transferring fuel or defueling center 

or main tanks, the fuel pump low pressure 

lights must be monitored and the fuel pumps 

positioned to ‘‘OFF’’ at the first indication of 

the fuel pump low pressure [1]. 

Defueling the main tanks with passengers 

on board is prohibited if the main tank fuel 

pumps are powered [2]. 

Defueling the center tank with passengers 

on board is prohibited if the center tank fuel 

pumps are powered and the auto-shutoff 

system is inhibited [2]. 

[1] Prior to transferring fuel or defueling, 

conduct a lamp test of the respective fuel 

pump low pressure lights. 

[2] Fuel may be transferred from tank to 

tank or the aircraft may be defueled with 

passengers on board, provided fuel quantity 

in the tank from which fuel is being taken is 

maintained at or above 2000 pounds (907 

kilograms).’’ 

Note 4: When statements identical to those 

in paragraphs (i)(3) and (i)(4) of this AD have 

been included in the general revisions of the 

AFM, the general revisions may be inserted 

into the AFM, and the copy of this AD may 

be removed from the AFM. 

Installation of Secondary Pump Control 

Relays 

(j) For airplanes identified in paragraph 

1.A.1. of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1248, Revision 2, dated August 28, 2009: 

Within 60 months after the effective date of 

this AD, install one secondary control relay 

for the electrical control circuit of each of the 

two center tank fuel boost pumps, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

737–28A1248, Revision 2, dated August 28, 

2009. 

Airworthiness Limitations (AWL) Revision 

for AWL No. 28–AWL–23 

(k) For airplanes identified in paragraph 

1.A.1. of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1248, Revision 2, dated August 28, 2009: 

Concurrently with accomplishing the actions 

required by paragraph (j) of this AD, or 

within 30 days after the effective date of this 

AD, whichever occurs later, revise the 

maintenance program by incorporating AWL 

No. 28–AWL–23 of Subsection G of Section 

9 of the Boeing 737–600/700/800/900 MPD 

Document, D626A001–CMR, Revision July 

2010. The initial compliance time for the 

actions specified in AWL No. 28–AWL–23 is 

within 1 year after accomplishing the 

installation required by paragraph (j) of this 

AD, or within 1 year after the effective date 

of this AD, whichever occurs later. 

No Alternative Inspections or Inspection 

Intervals 

(l) After accomplishing the applicable 

actions specified in paragraph (k) of this AD, 

no alternative inspections or inspection 

intervals may be used unless the inspections 

or inspection intervals are approved as an 

AMOC in accordance with the procedures 

specified in paragraph (t) of this AD. 

Terminating Action for AD 2001–08–24, 

Amendment 39–12201 

(m) Accomplishing the actions required by 

paragraphs (g), (h), and (i) of this AD 

terminates the requirements of paragraph (a) 

of AD 2001–08–24, for Model 737–600, –700, 

–700C, –800, and –900 series airplanes that 

have the automatic shutoff system installed. 

After accomplishing the actions required by 

paragraphs (g), (h), and (i) of this AD, the 

AFM limitation required by paragraph (a) of 

AD 2001–08–24 may be removed from the 

AFM for those airplanes. 

Terminating Action for AD 2002–24–51, 

Amendment 39–12992 

(n) Accomplishing the actions required by 

paragraphs (g), (h), and (i) of this AD 

terminates the requirements of paragraph (b) 

of AD 2002–24–51 for Model 737–600, –700, 

–700C, –800, and –900 series airplanes that 

have the automatic shutoff system installed. 

After accomplishing the actions required by 

paragraphs (g), (h), and (i) of this AD, the 

AFM limitations required by paragraph (b) of 

AD 2002–24–51 may be removed from the 

AFM for those airplanes. 

Terminating Action for AWL Revision 

(o) Incorporating AWL No. 28–AWL–23 

into the maintenance program in accordance 

with paragraph (g)(3) of AD 2008–10–10 R1, 

Amendment 39–16164, terminates the 

corresponding action required by paragraph 

(k) of this AD. 

Terminating Action for AD 2008–24–51 

(p) Accomplishing the actions required by 

paragraph (g) of this AD terminates the 

requirements of paragraph (f) of AD 2008– 

24–51. 

Credit for Actions Accomplished in 

Accordance With Previous Service 

Information 

(q) Actions accomplished before the 

effective date of this AD in accordance with 

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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 45 / Tuesday, March 8, 2011 / Proposed Rules 12643 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737–28A1248, 

dated December 21, 2006; or Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1248, Revision 1, 

dated January 9, 2008; are considered 

acceptable for compliance with the 

corresponding actions specified in paragraph 

(j) of this AD. 

(r) Actions accomplished before the 

effective date of this AD in accordance with 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737–28A1206, 

dated January 11, 2006; or Revision 1, dated 

January 30, 2008; are considered acceptable 

for compliance with the corresponding 

actions specified in paragraph (g) of this AD, 

provided one of the actions specified in 

paragraph (r)(1) or (r)(2) of this AD have been 

done. 

(1) The procedures specified in paragraph 

(f) of AD 2008–24–51 have been 

accomplished. 

(2) The actions specified in Part 3 of the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1206, Revision 2, 

dated May 21, 2009, have been 

accomplished. 

Optional Terminating Action 

(s) Installing and maintaining TDG 

Aerospace, Inc., universal fault interrupter 

(UFI), in accordance with Supplemental 

Type Certificate (STC) ST02076LA, issued 

October 26, 2007, terminates the actions 

required by paragraphs (g) through (k) of this 

AD; provided that, concurrently with 

installing a UFI on any airplane in an 

operator’s fleet, a placard is installed 

adjacent to the pilot’s primary flight display 

on all airplanes in the operator’s fleet not 

equipped with a UFI or an automatic shutoff 

system. The placard reads as follows, except 

as provided by paragraph (t) of this AD: 

‘‘AD 2002–24–51 fuel usage restrictions 

required.’’ 

Installation of a placard in accordance with 

paragraph (h) of this AD is acceptable for 

compliance with the placard installation 

required by this paragraph. Installing a UFI 

in accordance with STC ST02076LA on an 

airplane terminates the placard installation 

required by this paragraph for only that 

airplane. Installing UFIs in accordance with 

STC ST02076LA, or automatic shutoff 

systems in accordance with paragraph (g) of 

this AD, on all airplanes in an operator’s fleet 

terminates the placard installation required 

by this paragraph for all airplanes in an 

operator’s fleet. If operation according to the 

fuel usage restrictions of AD 2002–24–51 and 

AD 2001–08–24 is maintained until UFIs or 

automatic shutoff systems are installed on all 

airplanes in an operator’s fleet, the placard 

installation specified in this paragraph is not 

required. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(t)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in the 

Related Information section of this AD. 

Information may be e-mailed to: 9-ANMSeattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

Related Information 

(u) For more information about this AD, 

contact Tak Kobayashi, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Ave., 

SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; 

phone: (425) 917–6499; fax: (425) 917–6590; 

e-mail: Takahisa.Kobayashi@faa.gov. 

(v) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services 

Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, 

Seattle, Washington 98124–2207; telephone 

206–544–5000, extension 1; fax 206–766– 

5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; 

Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You 

may review copies of the referenced service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 

25, 2011. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2011–5156 Filed 3–7–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 71 

[Docket No. FAA–2011–0078; Airspace 

Docket No. 10–AEA–20] 

RIN 2120–AA66 

Proposed Establishment of Helicopter 

Area Navigation (RNAV) Routes; 

Northeast United States 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: This action proposes to 

introduce low altitude helicopter RNAV 

routes into the United States domestic 

Air Traffic Service (ATS) route structure 

to be used by suitably equipped 

helicopters having IFR-approved Global 

Positioning System (GPS)/Global 

Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) 

equipment. Additionally, the FAA is 

proposing to establish two such routes 

in the northeast corridor between the 

Washington, DC and New York City 

metropolitan areas. The FAA is 

proposing this action to enhance safety 

and to improve the efficient use of the 

navigable airspace for en route IFR 

helicopter operations. 

DATES: Comments must be received on 

or before April 22, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments on this 

proposal to the U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, Washington, DC 20590–0001; 

telephone: (202) 366–9826. You must 

identify FAA Docket No. FAA–2011– 

0078 and Airspace Docket No. 10–AEA– 

20 at the beginning of your comments. 

You may also submit comments through 

the Internet at 

http://www.regulations.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Paul 

Gallant, Airspace, Regulations & ATC 

Procedures Group, Office of Airspace 

Services, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 800 Independence 

Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; 

telephone: (202) 267–8783. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

Interested parties are invited to 

participate in this proposed rulemaking 

by submitting such written data, views, 

or arguments, as they may desire. 

Comments that provide the factual basis 

supporting the views and suggestions 

presented are particularly helpful in 

developing reasoned regulatory 

decisions on the proposal. Comments 

are specifically invited on the overall 

regulatory, aeronautical, economic, 

environmental, and energy-related 

aspects of the proposal. 

Communications should identify both 

docket numbers (FAA Docket No. FAA– 

2011–0078 and Airspace Docket No. 10– 

AEA–20) and be submitted in triplicate 

to the Docket Management System (see 

ADDRESSES section for address and 

phone number). You may also submit 

comments through the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

Commenters wishing the FAA to 

acknowledge receipt of their comments 

on this action must submit with those 

comments a self-addressed, stamped 

postcard on which the following 

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to FAA 

Docket No. FAA–2011–0078 and 

Airspace Docket No. 10–AEA–20.’’ The 

postcard will be date/time stamped and 

returned to the commenter. 

All communications received on or 

before the specified closing date for 

comments will be considered before 

taking action on the proposed rule. The 

proposal contained in this action may 

be changed in light of comments 

received. All comments submitted will 

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