NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

FLORENCE SMITH, Petitioner Employee, 

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent, 

WASHINGTON ELEM SCHOOL DIST, Respondent Employer, 

WASHINGTON ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT #6, Respondent 

Carrier.

No. 1 CA-IC 19-0054 

Special Action - Industrial Commission

ICA Claim No. 20182-820128 

Carrier Claim No. 18723292 

The Honorable J. Matthew Powell, Administrative Law Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Florence Smith, Phoenix

Petitioner Employee 

Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix

By Gaetano J. Testini 

Counsel for Respondent

FILED 7-16-2020
2 

Jardine Baker, Hickman & Houston, PLLC, Phoenix

By Charles G. Rehling

Counsel for Respondent Employer and Carrier

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins1 delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 In this statutory special action, Florence Smith challenges an 

Industrial Commission of Arizona (ICA) award and decision upon review 

finding her injury was not caused by her employment and therefore noncompensable under Arizona’s Workers’ Compensation Act. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in 

the light most favorable to upholding the ICA’s findings and award. Polanco 

v. Indus. Comm’n, 214 Ariz. 489, 490–91, ¶ 2 (App. 2007) (quoting Roberts v. 

Indus. Comm’n, 162 Ariz. 108, 110 (1989)). 

¶3 At the end of the 2017-18 school year, Smith, a sixty-nine-yearold reading specialist with the Washington Elementary School District 

(WESD), was cleaning her instructional area in preparation for the summer 

break. Smith sat down on the floor to clean under some counters, but when 

she stood back up, she felt intense pain in her right knee. This pain 

continued as she walked to the office to report the injury. The knee swelled 

and, two days later, she was examined in the emergency room, where xrays showed effusion and arthritis in the knee. Smith was discharged with 

crutches and a knee brace and instructed to rest the knee. She saw her 

primary care physician a few days later, who instructed her to rest and 

continue to use the brace, and referred her to physical therapy when the 

swelling resolved. 

1 Judge Perkins replaces the Honorable Kenton D. Jones, who was originally 

assigned to this panel. Judge Perkins has read the briefs and reviewed the 

record.
SMITH v. WASHINGTON ELEM

Decision of the Court

3 

¶4 Smith filed a workers’ compensation claim in August 2018. 

When WESD denied the claim, Smith requested a hearing to challenge the 

denial.

¶5 At the hearing, Smith described the knee injury and 

treatment. On cross-examination, Smith admitted she had right-knee

surgery in 2005, and, at the time, had been advised her knee was 

degenerating and would likely need to be replaced at some point. She also 

acknowledged she was told the emergency room x-rays reflected

degenerative disease and osteoarthritis within the knee.

¶6 An orthopedic surgeon who reviewed Smith’s records and 

performed an independent medical examination at WESD’s request

testified that pain may occur absent injury or trauma, and he could identify 

no evidence of trauma or acute injury that might have caused the right knee

pain Smith experienced. The surgeon explained that a prior knee surgery 

can accelerate knee degeneration and opined that Smith’s pain was likely a 

manifestation of an existing condition. The fact that Smith’s pain and 

swelling resolved within two weeks further indicatedthat no acute injury 

or trauma had occurred. Thus, the surgeon concluded that Smith’s pain 

and/or injury were a manifestation of her underlying arthritis and 

degeneration, not a separate or new injury, and unrelated to her work 

activities or the the act of standing from a seated position. No other 

witnesses testified. 

¶7 After consideration, the administrative law judge (ALJ)

accepted the orthopedic surgeon’s testimony that the pain and swelling 

Smith experienced were secondary to her pre-existing arthritis and not 

caused by work activities. Accordingly, Smith’s claim was noncompensable. Smith timely requested administrative review and the judge 

summarily affirmed the award. Smith now petitions for review via

statutory special action, which we have the authority to review pursuant to 

A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(2) and 23-951(A) and Arizona Rule of Procedure for 

Special Actions 10. 

DISCUSSION

¶8 Smith argues the ALJ erred in finding the industrial incident 

did not cause or contribute to her knee injury and concluding her claim was 

non-compensable. We will affirm the ICA’s decision and award unless 

there is no reasonable evidence to support the ALJ’s findings. Lovitch v. 

Indus. Comm’n, 202 Ariz. 102, 105, ¶ 16 (App. 2002) (citing Salt River Project 

v. Indus. Comm’n, 128 Ariz. 541, 544–45 (1981)). 
SMITH v. WASHINGTON ELEM

Decision of the Court

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¶9 To prevail on her workers’ compensation claim, Smith bore 

the burden of proving she suffered an injury by accident arising out of and 

in the course of her employment. A.R.S. § 23-1021; Ibarra v. Indus. Comm’n, 

245 Ariz. 171, 174, ¶ 14 (App. 2018). Under Arizona law, an accident arising 

out of and in the course of employment that aggravates a pre-existing 

condition to produce further injury is compensable. Martinez v. Indus. 

Comm’n, 192 Ariz. 176, 180, ¶ 17 (1998) (citing Murray v. Indus. Comm’n, 87 

Ariz. 190, 199 (1960)). In this situation, “an industrial accident need not be 

the sole cause of an injury, as long as it is a cause.” Id. (citing Allen v. Indus. 

Comm’n, 124 Ariz. 173, 175 (App. 1979)). Moreover, “[i]t has long been the 

law of this jurisdiction that where the result of an accident is not clearly 

apparent to a layman, [the causal connection] must be determined by expert 

medical testimony.” W. Bonded Prods. v. Indus. Comm’n, 132 Ariz. 526, 527 

(App. 1982) (collecting cases). 

¶10 We find guidance in the analogous case of in Kentucky Fried 

Chicken v. Indus. Comm’n, 141 Ariz. 561 (App. 1984). There, a worker with a 

hip condition that periodically bothered him before the incident slipped 

and fell at work. Id. at 562. The worker lost five days of work and eventually 

had surgery to repair the hip, but the uncontested medical testimony was 

that the fall did not cause or aggravate the underlying hip condition; it

“merely increased the [worker]’s awareness of his preexisting condition” 

and the need to get medical care. Id. at 562–65. We affirmed the ICA’s 

conclusion that the industrial accident did not even partially contribute to 

the hip condition. Id. at 564–65. We also held that “expert medical testimony 

establishing causation was indispensable.” Id. at 565 (citing W. Bonded, 132 

Ariz. at 527). 

¶11 Here, the undisputed facts reflect that Smith had a preexisting degenerative and arthritic condition in her right knee. The 

uncontested expert testimony established that it was this condition, and not 

anything that happened at work, that caused the pain and swelling Smith 

experienced. As in Kentucky Fried, without expert medical testimony linking 

the industrial activity to an aggravation of the pre-existing condition, Smith 

fails to prove her claim is compensable. Accordingly, we find no error.
SMITH v. WASHINGTON ELEM

Decision of the Court

5 

CONCLUSION

¶12 The ICA’s decision and award are affirmed.