NATIONAL STRATEGY

TO COMBAT TERRORIST

TRAVEL

May 2, 2006



NATIONAL STRATEGY

TO COMBAT TERRORIST

TRAVEL

May 2, 2006

Table of Contents

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel i 

Introduction .....................................................................................1

Summary of Proposed Actions .........................................................5

Pillar I: Enhance US and Foreign Partner Capabilities to Constrain 

Terrorist Mobility Overseas ..............................................................9

Strategic Objective 1: Suppress Terrorists’ Ability to Cross International 

Borders .......................................................................................................9

Signifi cance ......................................................................................................9

Current Initiatives ..........................................................................................10

Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Production, and Dissemination ..............10

Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force .................................................................10

Joint Intelligence Task Force—Combating Terrorism ............................................10

National Counterterrorism Center ......................................................................10

Human Smuggling and Traffi cking Center .........................................................10

Terrorist Screening and Information Sharing with Foreign Partners ...........11

Terrorist Interdiction Program ...........................................................................11

G8 Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative .....................................11

Watchlisting .....................................................................................................11

Technical Support Working Group ......................................................................11

Strategic Objective 2: Help Partner Nations Build Capacity to Limit 

Terrorist Travel .........................................................................................13

Signifi cance ...................................................................................................13

Current Initiatives ..........................................................................................14

Engagement with Multilateral Organizations .............................................14

International Civil Aviation Organization ..........................................................14

INTERPOL .....................................................................................................14

International Financial and Technical Assistance ........................................15

Antiterrorism Assistance Program ........................................................................15

Counterterrorism Action Group ..........................................................................15

International Law Enforcement Assistance ..........................................................15

International Port Security Program ...................................................................16

DOD Combatant Commander Theater Security Cooperation ..............................16
Table of Contents

ii National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

Denial of Safe Havens to Terrorists ............................................................16

UN Obligations ................................................................................................16

Strategic Objective 3: Deny Terrorists Access to Resources That Facilitate 

Travel ........................................................................................................17

Signifi cance ...................................................................................................17

Current Initiatives ..........................................................................................17

Implementing Global Standards for Travel Documents ..............................17

ICAO Guidelines ..............................................................................................17

Visa Waiver Program .........................................................................................18

Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative .........................................18

Monitoring and Defeating Terrorist Travel Facilitator Networks ................19

Disrupting Financial Networks That Facilitate Terrorist Travel ............................19

Executive Order 13224 .....................................................................................19

UN Sanctions Authority ....................................................................................19

Pillar I: Continuing Challenges and Proposed Actions ............................21

Terrorist Screening and Information Sharing .................................................21

Capacity Building ..........................................................................................21

International Travel Document Security ........................................................22

Terrorist Travel Facilitation Networks ............................................................23

Pillar II: Deny Terrorists the Ability to Enter, Exit, and Travel Within 

the United States ............................................................................25

Strategic Objective 1: Inhibit Terrorists From Crossing US Borders ........25

Signifi cance ....................................................................................................25

Current Initiatives ..........................................................................................26

Visa Screening Process ...............................................................................26

Visas Viper Program ..........................................................................................26

Visas Condor Program .......................................................................................26

Consolidated Consular Database ........................................................................26

Visa Waiver Program ........................................................................................27

Visa Security Program ........................................................................................27
Table of Contents

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel iii 

Western Hemisphere Partnerships ..............................................................27

Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative ..................................................................27

Security and Prosperity Partnership ....................................................................27

North American Aerospace Defense Command ....................................................27

Domestic Risk Management Initiatives—Traveler Screening and Inspection 

Processes ....................................................................................................28

Terrorist Screening Center ..................................................................................28

Customs and Border Protection Initiatives ...........................................................28

National Targeting Center ................................................................................28

US-VISIT ........................................................................................................28

Registered Traveler Program ...............................................................................29

Advance Passenger Information System ...............................................................29

US Border Security Initiatives ....................................................................29

Secure Border Initiative ....................................................................................29

National Strategy for Maritime Security .............................................................30

COASTWATCH Program .................................................................................30

Coast Guard Notice of Arrival Screening .............................................................30

Strategic Objective 2: Enhance US Government Capabilities to Detect 

and Constrain Terrorist Travel Within the United States .........................31

Signifi cance ...................................................................................................31

Current Initiatives ..........................................................................................32

Coordination and Information Sharing Between State and Local Law 

Enforcement and the Federal Government .................................................32

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ...................................32

Homeland Security Act ......................................................................................32

Joint Terrorism Task Forces .................................................................................32

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Initiatives ...............................................33

Executive Order 13388 .....................................................................................33

National Crime Information Center ..................................................................33

Transportation Security Measures ..............................................................34

Transportation Security Administration .............................................................34

Federal Air Marshal Service ..............................................................................34
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iv National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

Secure Flight ....................................................................................................34

Northern Command .........................................................................................34

Strategic Objective 3: Strengthen US Identity Verifi cation Systems ........35

Signifi cance ....................................................................................................35

Current Initiatives ..........................................................................................35

Standard Format and Security Features for Identifi cation Documents ........35

US Passport Enhancements ................................................................................35

Document Standardization ................................................................................35

Database of US Lost and Stolen Passports ............................................................36

Document Fraud Detection Initiatives .......................................................36

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Forensic Document Laboratory ................36

Pillar II: Continuing Challenges and Proposed Actions ...........................37

Terrorist Screening and Information Sharing ................................................37

US Border Security ........................................................................................38

US Document Security ..................................................................................38

Immigration Laws and Policies ......................................................................38

Intelligence Capabilities and Training ............................................................39

Moving Forward .............................................................................41

Appendix: List of Acronyms and Abbreviations .......................................43
 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel v 

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vi National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

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Introduction

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 1 

Introduction

Targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as 

targeting their money. Th e United States should combine terrorist travel 

intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept 

terrorists, fi nd terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility.

 Th e 9/11 Commission Report

 July 22, 2004 

Constraining the mobility of terrorists is one of the most effective weapons in the War 

on Terror. Limiting their movements markedly diminishes terrorists’ ability to attack 

the United States, our interests abroad, or our allies. As both the 9/11 Commission 

noted in its main report and the 9/11 Commission staff noted in its separate 

monograph on terrorist travel, constraining the mobility of terrorists should be a key 

focus of the US Government’s counterterrorism initiatives over the coming years. In 

light of the Commission’s fi ndings, Congress required the National Counterterrorism 

Center (NCTC) to submit this National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel (NSCTT) 

pursuant to Section 7201 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004 (IRTPA).

The 9/11 terrorist attacks highlighted the need to improve the monitoring and control 

of the domestic and international travel systems as a means to constrain terrorist 

mobility. Since then, the US Government has made considerable progress toward 

achieving this objective. The post-9/11 security environment consists of strengthened 

travel document security, enhanced screening of all visitors to the United States, 

improved information-sharing relationships with foreign partners, and increased 

vigilance of the American people and our allies in the War on Terror. Our foreign 

partners have also made progress in strengthening border security and providing 

terrorist-related information to the United States in a timely and effi cient manner. 

The terrorist enemies we face remain determined, patient, and adaptable. While new 

security measures are making terrorist travel more diffi cult, terrorists and illicit travel 

facilitators are continually seeking new ways to exploit perceived weaknesses in travel 

security: 

• Terrorists seek to defeat travel and border systems by using illicit travel 

networks, including professional human smugglers. 

• As legal entry into the United States becomes more diffi cult, terrorists 

increasingly may seek ways to exploit what they perceive as weaknesses in US 

and foreign border control operations. 

• Further progress inhibiting terrorist mobility and suppressing the illicit 

travel industry will require sustained bilateral and multilateral international 

cooperation, including coordinated law enforcement, intelligence, and 

diplomatic initiatives.
Introduction

2 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

The goal of the NSCTT is to fi ght terrorist travel globally. The NSCTT identifi es eight 

key steps necessary to achieve that goal. 

1. Identify known or suspected terrorists.

2. Ensure broad data sharing across the US Government and with partner 

nations.

3. Screen travelers eff ectively both before reaching and at ports of entry into the 

United States.

4. Build partner capacity to limit and screen for terrorist travel.

5. Detect and apprehend terrorists who intend to enter, or who may have 

entered, the United States.

6. Dismantle infrastructures and networks that facilitate terrorist travel.

7. Strengthen travel and document security at home and abroad to ensure that 

terrorists cannot acquire documentation through legal or illicit means.

8. Collect, analyze and disseminate all terrorist travel information to key 

consumers across the counterterrorism and law enforcement communities.

In view of these fi ndings, the NSCTT addresses two main topics. First, the NSCTT 

captures current US Government capabilities to confront the problem of terrorist travel 

around the globe. Second, the NSCTT recommends how the US Government should 

enhance or expand its capabilities to address the problem.

The NSCTT rests on two pillars, each supported by three strategic objectives: 

Pillar I: Enhance US and Foreign Partner Capabilities to Constrain 

Terrorist Mobility Overseas

 Strategic Objective 1: Suppress Terrorists’ Ability to Cross International Borders

Strategic Objective 2: Help Partner Nations Build Capacity to Limit Terrorist Travel

 Strategic Objective 3: Deny Terrorists Access to Resources Th at Facilitate Travel
Introduction

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 3 

Pillar II: Deny Terrorists the Ability to Enter, Exit, and Travel Within the 

United States

 Strategic Objective 1: Inhibit Terrorists from Crossing US Borders

Strategic Objective 2: Enhance US Government Capabilities to Detect and 

Constrain Terrorist Travel Within the United States

 Strategic Objective 3: Strengthen US Identity Verifi cation Systems

Beneath each pillar, the NSCTT describes the initiatives currently in place to support 

the strategic objectives. Next, the NSCTT identifi es ongoing challenges confronting 

both domestic and international efforts to combat terrorist travel. Finally, the NSCTT 

sets forth proposed actions, all to be conducted within the constraints of US law and 

with appropriate privacy protections, to confront these challenges. 

NCTC submitted a classifi ed version of the NSCTT to Congress on February 17, 

2006. While consistent with the classifi ed strategy, this unclassifi ed version of the 

NSCTT does not reveal sensitive national security information.

The United States has achieved signifi cant progress since 9/11 in detecting and 

capturing terrorists as they move around the world. Still, work remains to be done 

to prevent terrorists from exploiting the international and US travel systems to wage 

attacks on US and foreign partner interests. By utilizing our own extensive arsenal of 

tools to fi ght terrorist travel, and by partnering with other nations to prevent terrorist 

mobility, the United States and its allies in the War on Terror will continue to cripple 

terrorists’ ability to perpetrate attacks around the world.
4 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

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Summary of Proposed Actions

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 5 

Summary of Proposed Actions

Pillar I: Enhance US and Foreign Partner Capabilities to 

Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas

Terrorist Screening and Information Sharing

(1) Develop and share terrorist mobility information with allies to the fullest 

extent possible consistent with US national security interests. 

Capacity Building

(2) Utilize State Department–administered law enforcement and counterterrorism 

assistance programs to work with other countries to strengthen laws designed 

to limit terrorist mobility; build political will to implement measures against 

terrorist travel; train investigators and prosecutors on terrorist travel tradecraft; 

and monitor results. 

(3) Working with Canada, examine the feasibility of developing and implementing 

compatible procedures and systems to screen individuals traveling between the 

United States and Canada. 

(4) Continue to work with foreign governments to develop identity verifi cation 

systems aimed at detecting and intercepting high-risk travelers. 

(5) Encourage foreign governments to adopt or strengthen current practices 

for issuing passports and recording incidents of lost and stolen passports, to 

facilitate eff ective information exchanges bilaterally and with INTERPOL, and 

to ensure the eff ective use of such records in screening travelers at the border 

while reducing incidents of false positives. 

(6) Encourage the UN Security Council’s Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) 

to develop standards to measure UN member states’ eff orts to implement the 

obligations imposed by Security Council Resolution 1373 to prevent terrorist 

travel. Th e United States, working through mechanisms such as the G8 

Counterterrorism Action Group, should work to coordinate assistance with 

donor countries to build the capacity of states with insuffi cient resources to 

meet these obligations. 

International Travel Document Security

(7) Encourage foreign governments to adopt or strengthen existing laws 

criminalizing the counterfeiting, alteration, and misuse of identifi cation and 

travel documents. In addition, the US Government, in conjunction with 

partner nations, should coordinate US assistance to foreign governments with 

limited resources to fi ght corruption and fraud in their identifi cation and 

travel document issuance systems. 
Summary of Proposed Actions

6 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

(8) Encourage other governments to meet or exceed the International 

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) guidelines on minimum security 

standards for the handling and issuance of machine-readable and other 

passports. Encourage the UN Counterterrorism Committee to endorse these 

guidelines as best practices for member states to adopt as part of their eff orts to 

implement their obligations under Security Council Resolution 1373. 

Terrorist Travel Facilitation Networks

(9) Designate as supporters of terrorism those who facilitate terrorist travel under 

Executive Order 13224, and support listings of such individuals and entities 

who are associated with al-Qa‘ida and the Taliban by the United Nations 

Security Council’s 1267 Sanctions Committee to deter others from providing 

this type of facilitation. 

(10) Coordinate Interagency eff orts to encourage foreign jurisdictions to impose 

criminal, civil, or administrative penalties on individuals who knowingly 

conceal, transport, or transfer currency with the intent to evade reporting 

requirements. 

(11) Increase eff orts to encourage other countries to identify and close down 

alien smuggling networks and document forgery cells, to criminalize alien 

smuggling and document forgery in countries where current laws are 

insuffi cient, and to build the capacity of countries less able to do so. 

(12) Continue to work with multilateral organizations, such as the International 

Maritime Organization, to strengthen international ship and port security 

standards to reduce the incidents of alien smuggling, stowaways, and ship 

jumpers. 
Summary of Proposed Actions

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 7 

Pillar II: Deny Terrorists the Ability to Enter, Exit, and 

Travel Within the United States

Terrorist Screening and Information Sharing 

(13) Consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11, fi nalize 

transition of the US Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 

(US-VISIT) system, including VWP travelers, and consular processing of 

visa applicants from a two-fi ngerprint to a ten-fi ngerprint screening system 

managed within established databases.

(14) Grant the appropriate security clearances to consular, CBP, and US 

Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) offi cers, and establish 

the required technical infrastructure to support the sharing of classifi ed 

information on travelers with potential ties to terrorism. 

(15) Leverage the Information Sharing Environment to establish minimum system 

interoperability standards for agencies involved in sharing information on 

terrorists’ identities, and to establish systems’ connectivity to state and local 

law enforcement agencies. 

US Border Security

(16) Fully implement the US-VISIT system across the immigration and border 

management enterprise. 

(17) Implement pre-departure Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) 

to improve the US Government’s ability to vet international air and sea 

passengers against the consolidated terrorist watchlist maintained by the 

Federal government to identify and interdict potential terrorists before they 

depart the United States. 

(18) Establish international registered traveler programs, on a multilateral basis, 

with partner nations to increase advance information on a greater number of 

travelers and allow for increased scrutiny of higher risk travelers attempting 

entry into the United States. 

(19) Fully implement US Government supporting plans for the National Strategy 

for Maritime Security to defend US coastlines from terrorists seeking entry 

into the United States by sea. 

US Document Security

(20) Fully implement and leverage authorities of the REAL ID Act, and develop 

regulations for state motor vehicle bureaus and state bureaus of vital statistics.
Summary of Proposed Actions

8 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

Immigration Laws and Policies

(21) Expand eff orts to control borders, address interior enforcement and attack 

immigration fraud, including through the Secure Border Initiative (SBI). 

Intelligence Capabilities and Training

(22) Ensure that an appropriate number of intelligence analysts in the US 

Intelligence Community are dedicated to the problem of global terrorist 

mobility. 

(23) Increase the number of actionable leads to Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) and FBI by continuing to develop analytical capabilities 

surrounding information derived from US-VISIT and other border security 

systems. 

(24) Provide suffi cient resources to enable the Human Smuggling and Traffi cking 

Center (HSTC) to fulfi ll its responsibilities to conduct analysis of clandestine 

terrorist travel and support the US Government’s coordination of eff orts to combat 

terrorist travel, as required in Section 7202 of the IRTPA. 

(25) Capitalize on curricula currently employed by CBP, the Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center, ICE, and the US Secret Service to develop 

a comprehensive document fraud prevention curriculum to train federal, 

state, and local document issuers and reviewers on establishing document 

fraud prevention and risk management programs, intelligence methods used 

to identify fraudulent travel documents, and how intelligence analysts can 

support fi eld operators whose work involves the review of travel documents.
Pillar I: Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 9 

Pillar I: Enhance US and Foreign Partner 

Capabilities to Constrain Terrorist Mobility 

Overseas

Three strategic objectives are key to US efforts to combat terrorist mobility outside the 

United States:

1. Suppress Terrorists’ Ability to Cross International Borders

2. Help Partner Nations Build Capacity to Limit Terrorist Travel

3. Deny Terrorists Access to Resources Th at Facilitate Travel

Strategic Objective 1: Suppress Terrorists’ Ability to Cross 

International Borders

Signifi cance

Terrorists are intent on harming Americans and American and allied interests 

throughout the world. Constraining terrorists’ ability to move freely across borders 

overseas is critical to diminishing their potential to perpetrate acts of terrorism. The US 

Government, often acting in concert with partner nations, has a number of tools at its 

disposal to prevent terrorists from exploiting the international travel system. These tools 

fall into two categories. The fi rst is the collection and analysis of information on matters 

related to global terrorist mobility. The second is terrorist screening and information 

sharing with foreign partners.

Critical Mission Areas

• Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Production, and Dissemination

— Harness the US Government’s intelligence capabilities to track 

terrorist mobility globally

— Ensure that US military forces stationed around the world 

contribute and have access to terrorist mobility information

• Terrorist Screening and Information Sharing with Foreign Partners

— Share known or suspected terrorist identities with foreign 

partners

— Detect terrorists at international borders
Pillar I: Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas

10 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

Current Initiatives

Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Production, and Dissemination

Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force 

In Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2 (HSPD-2), the President directed the 

Department of Justice to establish the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) 

to ensure that federal agencies coordinate programs to: (1) deny entry into the United 

States of aliens associated with, suspected of being engaged in, or supporting terrorist 

activity; and (2) locate, detain, prosecute, or deport terrorist-related aliens in the United 

States. The FTTTF engages in efforts to identify foreign terrorists and their supporters 

who have entered or seek to enter the United States and US territories; and to detect 

such factors as violations of criminal or immigration law which would permit exclusion, 

detention, or deportation of such individuals.

Joint Intelligence Task Force—Combating Terrorism

The Defense Intelligence Agency’s Joint Intelligence Task Force—Combating Terrorism 

(JITF-CT) provides analytic support to US military and defense collection operations 

to disrupt terrorist travel and acquire related data. JITF-CT also reviews DOD unique 

and unserialized datasets to identify and nominate watchlist candidates. 

National Counterterrorism Center

The 9/11 Commission recommended the establishment of a National Counterterrorism 

Center (NCTC), built on the foundation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center 

(TTIC), to be a center for joint strategic operational planning and intelligence, staffed 

by personnel from across the US Government. NCTC is charged with ensuring that 

agencies, as appropriate, have access to and receive all-source intelligence necessary to 

execute their counterterrorism plans and perform independent, alternative analysis. 

Human Smuggling and Traffi cking Center 

Section 7202 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) 

established the Human Smuggling and Traffi cking Center (HSTC) as an Interagency 

intelligence/law enforcement/diplomacy fusion center and information clearinghouse 

composed of representatives from the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland 

Security and the Intelligence Community. The HSTC fosters greater integration 

and overall effectiveness in US Government efforts to combat migrant smuggling, 

traffi cking in persons, and clandestine terrorist travel. It facilitates the broad 

dissemination of intelligence and drafts strategic assessments on smuggling and 

traffi cking-related matters. The HSTC is charged with strengthening partnerships with 

foreign governments and international organizations to combat human smuggling 

and traffi cking. The IRTPA also requires HSTC to support NCTC’s counterterrorism 

efforts.
Pillar I: Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 11 

Terrorist Screening and Information Sharing with Foreign Partners

Terrorist Interdiction Program 

The Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) enhances border security capabilities of 

those countries at risk for terrorist activity. TIP provides participating countries with a 

computerized watchlisting system to help constrain terrorist mobility globally. 

G8 Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative

The Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative (SAFTI) includes a focus on 

international information exchange. Under this initiative, G8 members are committed 

to: (1) develop mechanisms for real-time data exchange to validate travel documents, 

watchlist information, and advance passenger information; (2) provide effective and 

timely information exchange on the terrorist watchlist and lookout data of participating 

countries on a bilateral basis; (3) provide input to the INTERPOL database that allows 

for real-time information sharing on lost and stolen international travel documents; 

and (4) share best practices on effective cooperation between intelligence and law 

enforcement offi cials. SAFTI also calls on members to strengthen standardized practices 

for secure passport issuance and improve capacities and collaboration to ensure that civil 

aviation systems are secure from terrorist attacks.

Watchlisting 

The President issued HSPD-6 on September 6, 2003, to further the integration 

and widen the use of terrorist screening information. Pursuant to HSPD-6, the 

Attorney General established the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) to consolidate 

US Government terrorist screening information. In addition, HSPD-6 directs federal 

agencies to provide appropriate terrorist information to the TTIC, now NCTC, which 

in turn provides the TSC access to all appropriate terrorist information or intelligence. 

HSPD-6 also requires federal agencies to conduct their own terrorist screening at all 

appropriate opportunities using TSC information; and requires that DHS develop 

guidelines on the use of this information in state, local, territorial, and tribal screening 

processes as well as private sector screening processes with a substantial bearing on 

Homeland security. Finally, HSPD-6 requires the Secretary of State to develop a means 

for enhancing cooperation with foreign governments, beginning with the 27 Visa 

Waiver Program (VWP) countries, to establish appropriate access to terrorist screening 

information of participating governments.

Technical Support Working Group

The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)—co-chaired by DOD and State—is 

the national forum to identify, prioritize, and coordinate US Government Interagency 

and international research and development requirements to combat terrorism. The 

Department of Energy (DOE), DHS, and FBI also participate in this working group. 

The TSWG focuses on enhancing technologies to detect, locate, identify, track, 

apprehend, and prosecute terrorists and terrorist travel facilitators, and shares those 

technologies with international counterterrorism partners as appropriate. 
Pillar I: Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas

12 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

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Pillar I: Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 13 

Strategic Objective 2: Help Partner Nations Build 

Capacity to Limit Terrorist Travel

Signifi cance 

The United States partners with foreign governments and with regional and 

international organizations to detect and deter terrorists’ movements around the world. 

These partnerships are founded on international laws and agreements, as well as on 

bilateral or multilateral initiatives to combat terrorist travel. Multilateral organizations, 

particularly the UN, also are platforms for adopting and implementing policies, 

strategies, and best practices to combat terrorist mobility globally. In addition, such 

multilateral organizations can monitor the implementation of international obligations, 

identify capacity gaps, and work with bilateral and multilateral assistance providers to 

ensure that such gaps are fi lled. 

Critical Mission Areas

• Engagement with Multilateral Organizations

— Work through the International Civil Aviation Organization 

(ICAO) to press for stronger international standards on the 

composition and security features in travel documents

— Strengthen INTERPOL’s monitoring of lost and stolen passports 

and improve the timeliness of sharing lost and stolen passport 

information with the United States and partner nations

— Work with foreign law enforcement organizations to pursue 

criminal investigations/prosecutions of illicit travel facilitators, 

including fraudulent document providers, travel agencies, airline 

employees, and corrupt offi cials 

— Encourage the UN Counterterrorism Committee and the 1267 

Sanctions Committee to devote more attention to monitoring 

and measuring the implementation of terrorist travel-related 

aspects of their respective mandates

• International Financial and Technical Assistance

— Build partner nation capacity to combat terrorist travel

— Assist partner nations in using their intelligence and law 

enforcement capabilities to detect terrorist movements across and 

within their borders, and to disrupt terrorist travel facilitation 

networks
Pillar I: Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas

14 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

• Denial of Safe Havens to Terrorists

— Encourage partner nations to implement binding obligations 

under UN Security Council resolutions to disrupt terrorist 

networks and terrorist facilitators operating within their borders

— Continue to enforce multilateral agreements requiring foreign 

governments to prevent their countries from becoming terrorist 

safe havens

Current Initiatives

Engagement with Multilateral Organizations

International Civil Aviation Organization

The United States is an active member of ICAO, which was established by the 

Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 (Chicago Convention) to secure 

international cooperation and the highest possible degree of uniformity in regulations, 

standards, procedures, and organization regarding civil aviation matters. ICAO is the 

sole international body that establishes global standards for travel document content 

and format. As such, ICAO has established travel document standards that include 

various security features. The United States, working closely with ICAO and all VWP 

countries, developed proposed standards for a new system for international travel 

documents in which identity is verifi ed through the use of electronic passports, or “epassports.” 

The United States also assists with drafting new ICAO standards and working with less 

developed countries to increase their capacity to comply with them. The United States 

has encouraged ICAO partners to attack persistent and pervasive corruption in the 

travel systems of many countries around the world and to build foreign governments’ 

capacity to prevent the issuance of fraudulent travel documents.

INTERPOL

The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) provides resources to 

assist its 184 member countries with fi ghting terrorism. In the area of terrorist travel, 

INTERPOL has established a lost and stolen passport database. Denying terrorists 

access to lost and stolen passports is an effective way to limit their travel. INTERPOL 

and the United States intend for this database to be made available in real time for 

primary screening at ports of entry and consular posts to ensure that, when passport 

information is received by the US Government, a Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) or consular offi cer can determine if it has been reported lost or stolen. In 

addition, the US Government is promoting globally acceptable standards for nations 

reporting to the INTERPOL database to ensure accuracy, completeness, timeliness, and 

standards for the use of the database in border screening. 
Pillar I: Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 15 

International Financial and Technical Assistance

Antiterrorism Assistance Program

The Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA), implemented by the State Department’s 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security, provides foreign partners with training on the 

identifi cation of fraudulent travel documents. This course is administered jointly 

with the TSA and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ATA trains foreign 

offi cials in preventing unauthorized access to aircraft. In addition, ATA develops 

regional law enforcement relationships and mechanisms for sharing information related 

to terrorist threats and operations.

Counterterrorism Action Group

The G8 established a Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) composed of donor 

countries—that include the G8 members and others—to expand and coordinate 

training and assistance for countries that have the political will but lack the capacity 

to combat terror. CTAG provides an active forum for donor countries to coordinate 

counterterrorism cooperation with, and assistance to, countries in support of the UN 

Counterterrorism Committee’s efforts to oversee implementation of UN Security 

Council Resolution 1373. This resolution obligates all states to deny safe haven to 

those who fi nance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts. CTAG has coordinated 

efforts to assist countries to assess and improve airport security and has promoted 

and assisted with the implementation of travel security and facilitation standards and 

practices developed by G8’s SAFTI. In conjunction with the Asia-Pacifi c Economic 

Coordination (APEC), CTAG also has worked to improve APEC countries’ port and 

maritime security.

International Law Enforcement Assistance

The Department of State, in coordination and partnership with nearly 20 US law 

enforcement and related organizations, leads the US Government’s efforts in providing 

international law enforcement assistance. For example, the Departments of State and 

Justice have provided numerous delegations to assist in rewriting terrorist laws to meet 

the post-9/11 threat. Training assistance is also provided by DOD’s International 

Military Education and Training (IMET) program and DOJ’s Law Enforcement 

Academy that train foreign military personnel in improved border security. This 

assistance may directly combat illegal travel by strengthening port inspections, border 

and maritime patrol, or passport controls. Additionally, it may impact terrorist travel 

indirectly by improving law enforcement management and strengthening identifi cation 

capabilities. Likewise, stabilization efforts in confl ict-torn countries may render the 

climate inhospitable to terrorists.

Furthermore, criminal investigations and prosecutions can be monitored and used 

as a means for disrupting the activities of illicit travel facilitators abroad. A robust 

effort involving both US and foreign law enforcement agencies focuses resources on 

illicit travel facilitators abroad and improves our understanding of the terrorist travel 

problem. 
Pillar I: Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas

16 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

International Port Security Program

Under the International Port Security program, US Coast Guard–led teams visit 135 

US trade partners to assess their implementation of the International Ship and Port 

Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Additional security measures are imposed by the Coast 

Guard on vessels arriving from ports failing to comply with the ISPS Code. The Coast 

Guard also uses this program to engage in bilateral and multilateral security discussions 

with US trading partners to better align maritime security programs and protocols and 

to share best practices.

DOD Combatant Commander Theater Security Cooperation

DOD Combatant Commanders engage with foreign militaries within their areas of 

responsibility in order to encourage and assist partner nations in building military 

capacity to deter, detect, interdict and, if necessary, defeat terrorist threats.

Denial of Safe Havens to Terrorists

UN Obligations

As mentioned previously, UN Security Council Resolution 1373 obligates all states 

to deny safe haven to those who fi nance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts. In 

addition, this resolution contains provisions requiring the freezing of terrorists’ assets, 

preventing the movement of terrorists by imposing effective controls on borders, 

requiring secure travel documents, and instituting measures to prevent counterfeiting, 

forgery, or fraudulent use of identity papers or travel documents. 
Pillar I: Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 17 

Strategic Objective 3: Deny Terrorists Access to 

Resources That Facilitate Travel

Signifi cance 

Denying terrorists the tools that enable them to travel internationally signifi cantly 

impedes their mobility and can inhibit their effectiveness. Travel documents can be 

strengthened with advanced security measures. Such measures make it more diffi cult 

for terrorists to forge legitimate documentation. Terrorists also rely on document 

falsifi cation and terrorist fi nancing networks to support their travel around the world.

Critical Mission Areas

• Implementing Global Standards for Travel Documents

— Reduce travel document fraud in the international travel system

— Promote the adoption of technologies that make it diffi cult to 

falsify travel documents

• Monitoring and Defeating Terrorist Travel Facilitator Networks

— Monitor and disrupt fi nancial networks that support terrorist 

travel

— Ensure that foreign partners freeze terrorists’ fi nancial assets, as 

required by the United Nations Security Council

— Work with foreign governments to target cash couriers who 

funnel funds to terrorists

Current Initiatives

Implementing Global Standards for Travel Documents

ICAO Guidelines

As previously noted, ICAO has provided guidance to its members in improving the 

security of travel document issuance processes. These guidelines have been adopted 

by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). ICAO has 

recommended that all governments issue machine-readable passports no later than 

2010. 

ICAO also has issued guidelines for governments to prevent the issuance of fraudulent 

travel documents. These “Guidelines for Dealing with External Passport and Other 

Travel/Identity Document Fraud” are aimed at building foreign governments’ capacity 

to comply with ICAO standards. 
Pillar I: Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas

18 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

Visa Waiver Program

The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) generally enables citizens of 27 countries to travel to 

the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without obtaining a visa. 

By eliminating the need for a visa and bypassing the checks that are performed during 

the visa screening process, the VWP makes traveling to the United States—and US 

citizens’ travel to participating countries—less onerous than the full visa process. 

To qualify for VWP designation, a country must meet statutory requirements per 

Section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Those requirements include: 

an average nonimmigrant visa refusal rate of less than 3 percent; low overstay and 

immigration violation rate by nonimmigrant travelers; production of machine-readable 

passports; an acceptable plan in place for producing e-passports by October 26, 2006; 

prompt reporting of lost and stolen passports to the US Government; and an ability 

to demonstrate strong document and border security, immigration controls, and law 

enforcement cooperation such that the country’s participation in the program would 

not constitute a threat to US security or law enforcement interests. 

Every two years, DHS, in consultation with the Department of State, performs a 

country-specifi c review and determines whether to continue the VWP designation 

of each participating country. The country review process requires that US security, 

general law enforcement, and immigration interests are not compromised by the 

country’s VWP designation. A report is then submitted to Congress explaining the 

determination of whether to continue a country’s VWP status. VWP countries also 

must designate an offi cial point of contact to coordinate and share lost and stolen 

passport information with the United States. This information must be supplied 

directly to DHS within 10 days of its being recorded. DHS and VWP countries 

will also work toward more effective sharing of analysis of lost and stolen passport 

information.

Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative 

As noted previously, the G8’s SAFTI encourages its members to share terrorist-related 

information. Furthermore, in accordance with the SAFTI commitments on document 

interoperability through international standards, the Department of State works actively 

with G8 partners to develop and export best practices that ensure document security 

while facilitating travel of the great majority of legitimate travelers across international 

borders. The Department of State also works to strengthen international standardized 

practices for passport issuance, and encourages their adoption and implementation by 

all governments. Efforts are also underway to accelerate developments of international 

issuance security standards for the interoperability of government-issued e-passports.
Pillar I: Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 19 

Monitoring and Defeating Terrorist Travel Facilitator Networks

Disrupting Financial Networks That Facilitate Terrorist Travel

Since 9/11, the US Government has focused many of its resources in a comprehensive 

and sustained campaign against the sources and conduits of terrorist fi nancing. These 

efforts intersect with terrorist travel in two ways: (1) the fi nancial networks facilitating 

terrorist travel, and (2) the fi nancial networks using cash couriers to move money 

outside of the formal fi nancial system. Some of these efforts address issues broader than 

terrorist travel, but are worth noting in the context of limiting terrorist mobility. The 

general focus of the US counterterrorist fi nance strategy is to detect and prevent the 

physical movement of illicit funds.

Executive Order 13224

On September 23, 2001, the President issued Executive Order 13224, which provides 

the means to disrupt terrorist support networks. Under this order, the US Government 

may block the assets of individuals and entities providing support—fi nancial and 

otherwise—to designated terrorists and terrorist organizations. This authority has been 

used on numerous occasions to target individuals actively engaging in terrorist-related 

activities, including providing false documentation to illegal aliens to facilitate travel.

UN Sanctions Authority

The United Nations has consistently emphasized its commitment to countering 

terrorism and has affi rmed the use of its sanctions provisions against those who facilitate 

terrorist travel. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1617 in July 2005 

reaffi rmed existing UN Security Council sanctions programs against al-Qa‘ida, Usama 

bin Laden, the Taliban, and their associates; and reinforced key provisions of previous 

UN Security Council counterterrorism resolutions. For example, UN member states are 

required to prevent non-nationals, designated by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee 

because of their ties to al-Qa‘ida, the Taliban, or Usama bin Laden, from transiting 

their territories. Members of the UN also are urged to invalidate lost and stolen 

passports and other travel documents, and to share this information with other UN 

member states in a timely manner.
Pillar I: Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas

20 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

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Pillar I: Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 21 

Pillar I: Continuing Challenges and Proposed Actions

As a result of US Government and foreign partner initiatives, terrorist mobility has 

become increasingly diffi cult in the post-9/11 security environment. However, terrorists 

continue to adapt to their environment, and the United States and our allies continue 

to confront new challenges in constraining terrorist travel globally. This section lists 

four categories of ongoing challenges, followed by corresponding proposed actions 

necessary to achieve continued success in constraining terrorist travel globally:

• Terrorist Screening and Information Sharing

• Capacity Building 

• International Travel Document Security

• Terrorist Travel Facilitation Networks

The proposed actions are to be conducted within the constraints of US laws, especially 

those aimed at protecting the privacy and civil liberties of US persons.

Terrorist Screening and Information Sharing

The United States continues to work with foreign governments to ensure that terrorist 

watchlists are accurate and managed effectively, and to establish mechanisms and 

processes to share terrorist identity information with our key allies in the War on Terror. 

To this end, the United States should continue to: 

(1) Develop and share terrorist mobility information with allies to the fullest 

extent possible consistent with US national security interests. 

Capacity Building

Providing training, funding, and law enforcement assistance, as well as establishing 

entry/exit procedures with our foreign partners, are critical to combating terrorist travel. 

The US Government should augment current efforts and:

(2) Utilize State Department–administered law enforcement and counterterrorism 

assistance programs to work with other countries to strengthen laws designed 

to limit terrorist mobility; build political will to implement measures against 

terrorist travel; train investigators and prosecutors on terrorist travel tradecraft; 

and monitor results. 

(3) Working with Canada, examine the feasibility of developing and implementing 

compatible procedures and systems to screen individuals traveling between the 

United States and Canada. 
Pillar I: Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas

22 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

(4) Continue to work with foreign governments to develop identity verifi cation 

systems aimed at detecting and intercepting high-risk travelers. 

(5) Encourage foreign governments to adopt or strengthen current practices 

for issuing passports and recording incidents of lost and stolen passports, to 

facilitate eff ective information exchanges bilaterally and with INTERPOL, and 

to ensure the eff ective use of such records in screening travelers at the border 

while reducing incidents of false positives. 

(6) Encourage the UN Security Council’s Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) 

to develop standards to measure UN member states’ eff orts to implement the 

obligations imposed by Security Council Resolution 1373 to prevent terrorist 

travel. Th e United States, working through mechanisms such as the G8 

Counterterrorism Action Group, should work to coordinate assistance with 

donor countries to build the capacity of states with insuffi cient resources to 

meet these obligations. 

International Travel Document Security

Because of enhanced international security standards, it is increasingly diffi cult to 

counterfeit travel documents. Terrorists, however, are adaptable and resourceful, 

continually seeking to develop new ways to acquire travel documents. Consequently, 

the US Government should: 

(7) Encourage foreign governments to adopt or strengthen existing laws 

criminalizing the counterfeiting, alteration, and misuse of identifi cation and 

travel documents. In addition, the US Government, in conjunction with 

partner nations, should coordinate US assistance to foreign governments with 

limited resources to fi ght corruption and fraud in their identifi cation and 

travel document issuance systems.

(8) Encourage other governments to adopt the International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) guidelines on minimum security standards for the 

handling and issuance of machine-readable and other passports. Encourage 

the UN Counterterrorism Committee to endorse these guidelines as best 

practices for member states to adopt as part of their eff orts to implement their 

obligations under Security Council Resolution 1373. 
Pillar I: Constrain Terrorist Mobility Overseas

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 23 

Terrorist Travel Facilitation Networks

Eliminating terrorist travel facilitation networks is critical to preventing the movement 

of terrorists around the world. To help identify and thwart these networks, the US 

Government should continue to:

(9) Designate as supporters of terrorism those who facilitate terrorist travel under 

Executive Order 13224, and support listings of such individuals and entities 

who are associated with al-Qa‘ida and the Taliban by the United Nations 

Security Council’s 1267 Sanctions Committee to deter others from providing 

this type of facilitation. 

(10) Coordinate Interagency eff orts to encourage foreign jurisdictions to impose 

criminal, civil, or administrative penalties on individuals who knowingly 

conceal, transport, or transfer currency with the intent to evade reporting 

requirements. 

(11) Increase eff orts to encourage other countries to identify and close down 

alien smuggling networks and document forgery cells, to criminalize alien 

smuggling and document forgery in countries where current laws are 

insuffi cient, and to build the capacity of countries less able to do so. 

(12) Continue to work with multilateral organizations, such as the International 

Maritime Organization, to strengthen international ship and port security 

standards to reduce the incidents of alien smuggling, stowaways, and ship 

jumpers. 
24 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

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Pillar II: Deny Terrorist Mobility At and Within US Borders

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 25 

Pillar II: Deny Terrorists the Ability to Enter, Exit, 

and Travel Within the United States

Three strategic objectives are key to denying terrorists the ability to enter, exit, and 

travel within the United States:

1. Inhibit Terrorists From Crossing US Borders

2. Enhance US Government Capabilities to Detect and Constrain Terrorist Travel 

Within the United States

3. Strengthen US Identity Verifi cation Systems

Strategic Objective 1: Inhibit Terrorists From Crossing US 

Borders

Signifi cance

Preventing terrorists from entering and traveling within the United States is 

fundamental to thwarting their ability to perform surveillance on targets, to conduct 

planning, and to launch attacks against the United States. US border control measures 

begin overseas with visa applicants in non-visa waiver countries and with travelers 

subject to pre-inspection at foreign airports. These measures continue at and between 

ports of entry and involve all modes of transportation. Interdicting terrorists before they 

are able to set foot on American soil limits the serious problem of locating terrorists 

who have gained access to the United States. If terrorists have made their way into 

the United States, capturing them as they travel within the country is of paramount 

national security concern. Moreover, the United States must be prepared to capture 

terrorists who—after planning or conducting operational activities—attempt to leave 

the country.

Critical Mission Areas

• Visa Screening Process

• Western Hemisphere Partnerships

— Strengthen North American borders by requiring US citizens 

and all foreign nationals to present a passport or other secure 

document when crossing international borders

— Prevent terrorists from entering countries in the Western 

Hemisphere while ensuring streamlined movement of legitimate 

travelers and cargo

• Domestic Risk Management Initiatives—Traveler Screening and 

Inspection Processes
Pillar II: Deny Terrorist Mobility At and Within US Borders

26 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

— Share known or suspected terrorist identities with immigration, 

border, and law enforcement offi cials across the US Government

• Border Security Initiatives

 — Prevent terrorists from entering the United States through land, 

sea, and air ports of entry, and increase enforcement between 

ports of entry 

 — Detect and prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from 

entering the United States

 — Increase interior enforcement of US immigration laws to locate, 

detain, and remove terrorists who have entered the United States 

 — Prevent the US maritime industry from being used by terrorists 

to infi ltrate the United States 

 — Enhance maritime surveillance capabilities to achieve an eff ective 

understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain 

that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment 

of the United States within US territorial seas and internal 

waters

Current Initiatives

Visa Screening Process

Visas Viper Program

The Visas Viper Program, instituted in 1993, is a Department of State mechanism 

used to enter suspected terrorists’ names into appropriate watchlists. This ensures 

that suspected terrorists are identifi ed appropriately should they later apply for visas 

or entry into the United States. The Viper Program fi rst was intended to disseminate 

information on potential terrorists to US embassies and consular posts around the 

world and is now a powerful tool for US Border Patrol authorities.

Visas Condor Program

The Visas Condor Program, instituted in 2002, is a mechanism that requires consular 

offi cials to refer certain visa cases to law enforcement and intelligence agencies for 

further review under the visa Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) process. The SAO 

process enables consular offi cers to confi rm visa applicants’ eligibility to travel to the 

United States. 

Consolidated Consular Database

The Consolidated Consular Database (CCD) maintains detailed information in 

a single system, including photos of all overseas visa applicants. Data from all visa 

applicants is relayed for use at ports of entry.
Pillar II: Deny Terrorist Mobility At and Within US Borders

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 27 

Visa Waiver Program 

As discussed previously, 27 countries participate in the US Visa Waiver Program 

(VWP), which generally allows nationals from those countries to enter and remain in 

the United States for up to 90 days without a visa for tourism or business purposes. The 

VWP currently requires that participating countries issue machine-readable passports. 

This will enable inspectors at the border and ports of entry to validate electronically a 

traveler’s identifi cation and travel documents.

Visa Security Program

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has deployed senior special agents to 

serve as ICE Visa Security Offi cers (VSOs) in selected US embassies and consulates 

overseas as part of the Visa Security Program. ICE VSOs have extensive expertise in the 

full range of border enforcement functions, and training and experience in key subject 

matter areas such as counterterrorism investigations, document examination, interview 

techniques, intelligence research, and immigration and national security law. 

Western Hemisphere Partnerships

Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative

The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), announced in 2005, resulted from 

a mandate within the IRTPA for the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State to 

develop and implement a plan that requires US citizens and foreign nationals to present 

a passport or other secure document when entering the United States. The WHTI 

requires by January 2008 that the US Government have a plan in place for all US 

citizens, citizens of the British Overseas Territory of Bermuda, and citizens of Canada 

and Mexico to present a passport or other secure document that establishes the bearer’s 

identity and nationality upon entry or return to the United States.

Security and Prosperity Partnership 

The Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) establishes a common security strategy 

for Canada, Mexico, and the United States to prevent terrorists from entering these 

countries while ensuring streamlined movement of legitimate travelers and cargo 

across shared North American borders. The goals of SPP are threefold: (1) secure 

North America from external threats; (2) prevent and respond to threats within North 

America; and, (3) further streamline the secure movement of low-risk traffi c across 

shared North American borders.

North American Aerospace Defense Command

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) conducts aerospace 

warning and control operations to deter, detect, interdict and, if necessary, defeat air 

threats to North America, including those posed by terrorists.
Pillar II: Deny Terrorist Mobility At and Within US Borders

28 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

Domestic Risk Management Initiatives—Traveler Screening and 

Inspection Processes

Terrorist Screening Center

The 9/11 attacks prompted signifi cant enhancements in how the US Government 

screens for potential terrorists attempting to enter the United States and how screening 

information is shared with law enforcement agencies and transportation carriers. In 

September 2003, the President signed HSPD-6, which ordered the establishment of 

the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) to create a consolidated US Government terrorist 

watchlist and make it available to relevant US agencies and appropriate private sector 

entities at home and abroad—from consular offi cers and Border Patrol agents, to state 

and local law enforcement, to US airlines. The TSC receives information on terrorist 

identities from various US Government agencies and departments.

Customs and Border Protection Initiatives

At US borders, CBP exercises its priority mission of preventing terrorists from entering 

the United States without unduly impeding legitimate travel. CBP’s approximately 

20,000 law enforcement offi cers employ a layered, risk-management approach to 

identify and interdict potential terrorists attempting to enter the United States using 

sophisticated automated analytical tools, extensive anti-terrorism training, national 

policy and procedures, close Interagency coordination, and effective international 

cooperation. In addition, CBP Border Patrol agents perform checks to verify that 

individuals apprehended while attempting to enter the United States illegally between 

ports of entry do not have terrorist ties. 

At ports of entry, CBP has instituted Counterterrorism Response (CR) protocols 

that require thorough questioning and searching, as appropriate, of subjects who are 

suspected of having ties to terrorists. Port of entry personnel determine admissibility 

and deny entry when a traveler may pose a threat.

National Targeting Center 

CBP’s National Targeting Center (NTC) conducts national level targeting and analysis 

in support of border-related efforts to identify and interdict terrorists. Established 

in November 2001, NTC’s primary mission is to provide round-the-clock tactical 

targeting and analytical support for CBP antiterrorism efforts. In January 2005, 

CBP created a Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit (FDAU) to support the removal 

of fraudulent travel documents from circulation. The NTC supports all CBP fi eld 

elements, as well as ICE and US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). 

US-VISIT

United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) 

encompasses a series of measures that enable DHS and State to conduct watchlist 

checks and confi rm the identities of travelers seeking to enter the United States. USVISIT is part of a continuum of security measures that begins overseas and continues 

through a visitor’s arrival in and departure from the United States. US-VISIT 
Pillar II: Deny Terrorist Mobility At and Within US Borders

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 29 

incorporates eligibility determinations made by both the Departments of Homeland 

Security and State to facilitate legitimate travel while enhancing the security of US 

visitors and citizens.

Registered Traveler Program 

DHS is working with US and international partners to expand and enhance 

international registered traveler programs to improve risk management by consolidating 

travelers’ required information. 

Advance Passenger Information System 

The Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) was developed by the legacy US 

Customs Service in 1988. Airline carriers collect passenger and crew data from the 

plane manifest and transmit this data to the CBP Data Center. CBP uses APIS to 

identify suspect passengers, while facilitating the majority of law-abiding passengers 

through the clearance process. APIS information can be used to interdict and 

apprehend potential terrorists before they depart the United States.

US Border Security Initiatives

Secure Border Initiative 

The Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is a comprehensive plan to secure America’s borders 

and reduce the threat posed by illegal migration. SBI is composed of fi ve key elements: 

• Increase the number of agents patrolling US borders, securing our ports of 

entry, and enforcing immigration laws

• Expand detention and removal capabilities

• Implement a comprehensive and systemic upgrading of the technology used 

in controlling the border

• Increase investment in infrastructure improvements at the border—

providing additional physical security to sharply reduce illegal border 

crossings

• Increase interior enforcement of our immigration laws—including more 

robust worksite enforcement

The SBI focuses broadly on three major areas of enforcement. The fi rst area is border 

control in order to prevent illegal entry through security breaches. The second area 

deals with immigration enforcement, such as locating, detaining, and removing aliens 

who are present in the United States in violation of our laws. The third area addresses 

immigration reform through legislation. 
Pillar II: Deny Terrorist Mobility At and Within US Borders

30 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

National Strategy for Maritime Security

In addition to entry into the United States by land and air, terrorists may attempt 

to travel by sea and enter the country along US coastlines. In September 2005, the 

US Government published the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS), 

an integrated set of plans and objectives aimed at: (1) strengthening US capabilities 

to protect the nation’s critical maritime interests; (2) preventing terrorists and rogue 

states from exploiting the maritime domain to attack US interests; and (3) defending 

US coastlines from terrorist entry. The strategy, composed of an overarching national 

strategy and eight supporting component plans, articulates efforts to be undertaken 

across the Federal government, with state and local law enforcement agencies, and the 

private sector to guard against maritime threats to national security. The following three 

component plans are of particular relevance to this NSCTT.

The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan, one of the supporting plans of the 

NSMS, establishes requirements for coordination between US Government maritime 

agencies, coordination protocols, and agency roles and responsibilities to enable the 

Federal government to respond quickly and decisively to threats. Such threats include 

but are not limited to terrorists attempting to exploit the maritime domain to conduct 

attacks against the United States or commit illegal acts, including unlawful entry to the 

United States.

The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, which also supports 

the NSMS, lays the foundation for achieving an effective understanding of anything 

associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, 

or environment of the United States, and aims to identify threats as early and as distant 

from US shores as possible.

The International Outreach Plan, also developed to support the National Strategy for 

Maritime Security, directs the Department of State to coordinate all maritime security 

initiatives undertaken with foreign governments and international organizations, and 

solicits international support for enhanced maritime security.

COASTWATCH Program

The mission of the COASTWATCH program is to identify vessels of interest that may 

elicit national security concerns because of suspect people or cargo aboard, suspect 

business practices, or suspect crew or ownership associations. Conducted in partnership 

with the Offi ce of Naval Intelligence and CBP, COASTWATCH observes suspected 

vessels until their arrival at US ports. 

Coast Guard Notice of Arrival Screening

A US Coast Guard National Vessel Movement Center (NVMC) has been established 

to receive vessel advance Notice of Arrival (NOA) reports and screen crew lists against 

various watchlists.
Pillar II: Deny Terrorist Mobility At and Within US Borders

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 31 

Strategic Objective 2: Enhance US Government 

Capabilities to Detect and Constrain Terrorist Travel 

Within the United States

Signifi cance 

The United States faces capable and adaptive enemies who may reside within US 

borders—legally or illegally—and conduct activities clandestinely. Terrorists seek 

individuals who have both the expertise and ability to enter and reside in the United 

States to conduct reconnaissance of the attack area, practice dry runs, and eventually 

conduct the attack. Terrorists also require logistical support in the United States to 

facilitate transportation, safe housing, and fi nancial transactions. 

In many cases, information on these terrorists can be derived from the vast array 

of US and foreign investigative and intelligence databases. Interior immigration 

enforcement mechanisms and better training for screening at federal, state, and local 

levels will magnify the US Government’s ability to detect and constrain terrorists who 

have entered the United States. Enhancing the US Government’s ability to detect and 

constrain terrorist travel within the United States could result in preventing the next 

terrorist attack against the Homeland.

Critical Mission Areas

• Coordination and Information Sharing between State and Local Law 

Enforcement and the Federal Government

— Share relevant Homeland security and terrorism information 

among Federal, state, and local government entities to detect and 

constrain terrorist movement within the United States

— Identify, investigate, and disrupt terrorist travel-related threats to 

the United States

• Transportation Security Measures

— Strengthen US transportation security by screening all 

passengers, operators, crew members, and baggage

— Enhance aircraft security by providing air marshals aboard fl ights 

traveling to or within the United States
Pillar II: Deny Terrorist Mobility At and Within US Borders

32 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

Current Initiatives

Coordination and Information Sharing Between State and Local Law 

Enforcement and the Federal Government

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) created 

the position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), tasked to lead a unifi ed 

Intelligence Community. The IRTPA, through the Offi ce of the Director of National 

Intelligence (ODNI), also created the position of Information Sharing Program 

Manager, who is tasked with overseeing the implementation and management of 

an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) to facilitate the sharing of terrorism 

information, including terrorist screening information across the US Government and 

with foreign partners. The President issued requirements and guidelines for establishing 

the ISE on December 16, 2005. In addition, the IRTPA establishes mechanisms that 

improve transportation security, such as airline passenger pre-screening, detection 

equipment at ports of entry, and employment of federal air marshals.

Homeland Security Act

In November 2002, the President signed into law the Homeland Security Act. 

Provisions of this law require federal agencies to: (1) share relevant and appropriate 

Homeland security information with other federal agencies and appropriate state 

and local personnel; (2) identify and safeguard Homeland security information that 

is sensitive but unclassifi ed; and (3) determine whether, how, and to what extent to 

remove classifi ed sources and methods to facilitate information sharing. As with the 

IRTPA, this legislation fosters the dissemination to appropriate parties of terrorist 

travel-related data pertaining to potential threats to the United States, US interests, and 

allies. 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces

FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) were established in the 1980s and grew 

signifi cantly after 9/11. The JTTFs serve three main purposes: (1) prevent terrorist 

attacks; (2) respond to and investigate terrorist incidents or terrorist-related activity; 

and (3) identify and investigate domestic and foreign terrorist groups and individuals 

targeting or operating within the United States. The cooperation and coordination 

fostered by the JTTFs between local, state, and federal agencies has resulted in a 

number of successful operations to thwart terrorist activity inside the United States.

Today, JTTFs exist in 103 cities throughout the nation, with at least one in each of 

the FBI’s 56 fi eld offi ces, as well as others in outlying FBI resident agency annexes. 

The National JTTF (N-JTTF), located at FBI headquarters, includes representatives 

from a number of other agencies. Local JTTFs are composed of participants from 

federal agencies as well as state and local law enforcement personnel. As the frontline 

against terrorism, JTTF members are highly trained and locally based, and include 

investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT experts, and other specialists. 
Pillar II: Deny Terrorist Mobility At and Within US Borders

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 33 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Initiatives

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has established or realigned a number 

of organizational entities to assist in identifying, investigating, and disrupting terrorist 

threats against the Homeland. The ICE National Security and Threat Protection 

Unit works with various members of the Intelligence Community to identify and 

develop national level initiatives that support the War on Terror. Similarly, the 

ICE Compliance Enforcement Unit oversees the generation and assignment of leads 

about individuals who have overstayed their visas or who have violated the National 

Security Entry-Exit Registration Program (NSEERS), the Student and Exchange 

Visitor Information System (SEVIS), or the Visa Revocation program. In addition, the 

ICE Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) is a national, single point-of-contact 

entity that provides timely immigration status and identity information and realtime assistance to the entire local, state and federal Law Enforcement community on 

immigrants suspected, arrested, or convicted of criminal activity. 

The ICE Threat Analysis Section (TAS) is also tasked with identifying individuals 

previously unknown to authorities who may pose a threat to national security. 

Additionally, the ICE offi ce of investigations created a liaison section at the CBP’s 

NTC that is staffed by ICE special agents. Anytime CBP is notifi ed of an inbound 

watchlisted individual, an ICE special agent will respond at the port of entry to conduct 

an interview of the watchlisted subject. 

Executive Order 13388

Signed by the President on October 25, 2005, Executive Order 13388 was crafted to 

strengthen the sharing and dissemination of terrorism information across government 

agencies. E.O. 13388 mandates that US departments and agencies give high priority 

to detecting, preventing, disrupting, preempting, and mitigating the effects of terrorist 

activities targeting the United States. Sharing information about these activities extends 

beyond the federal level to include state, local, and tribal governments, as well as 

appropriate private sector entities. 

This Executive Order also establishes an Information Sharing Council chaired by the 

Program Manager and composed of designees of the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, 

Defense, Commerce, Energy, and Homeland Security; and the offi ces of the Attorney 

General; the DNI; the Director of the CIA; the Director of OMB; the Director of the 

FBI; and the Director of NCTC. This Council provides advice and information about 

an Information Sharing Environment to facilitate the automated sharing of terrorism 

information among appropriate agencies. 

National Crime Information Center 

FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) maintains the Violent Gangs 

and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF), which is a database indexing criminal 

information and terrorist identities. VGTOF can be made available to police offi cers on 

mobile patrol, thereby providing information immediately to frontline law enforcement 

offi cials.
Pillar II: Deny Terrorist Mobility At and Within US Borders

34 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

Transportation Security Measures

Transportation Security Administration 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was established in the wake of 

the 9/11 attacks to strengthen passenger and baggage security at US airports and 

ensure that terrorists cannot stage similar attacks. Originally part of the Department 

of Transportation, TSA became part of DHS and is responsible for aviation security 

screening. Since February 2002, many security enhancements have been implemented 

through TSA to ensure the safety of travelers. Examples include the installation of 

hardened cockpit doors on commercial airlines and the use of canine teams to screen 

suspect baggage and cargo.

Federal Air Marshal Service 

The modern day Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), which is a component of TSA, 

was established in 2001. Since the 9/11 attacks, FAMS has increased the number of 

semi-cover air marshals who provide enhanced security on US air carriers for both 

domestic and international fl ights. The FAMS’ mission is to detect, deter, and defeat 

hostile acts targeting US air carriers, airports, passengers, and crews.

Secure Flight 

Section 4012 of the IRTPA requires the TSA to pre-screen passengers using the 

consolidated terrorist watchlist maintained by the Federal government. The TSA Secure 

Flight program will fulfi ll this requirement. Under this program, which focuses on 

domestic US travelers, airlines will provide a limited set of passenger information to 

TSA when a reservation is made to determine whether a passenger should undergo 

further screening before boarding a plane or be denied boarding.

Northern Command 

The Department of Defense established US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) 

in 2002 to consolidate under a single unifi ed command existing missions that were 

executed previously by other military organizations. NORTHCOM is charged with 

Homeland defense and civil support, including conducting operations to deter, 

prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and 

interests within the assigned area of responsibility, and providing defense support of 

civil authorities as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. NORTHCOM’s 

Homeland defense mission is directed against military threats emanating from beyond 

US borders; however, the command has a cooperative relationship with federal 

agencies working to prevent terrorism. Information sharing and coordination enhance 

Homeland security efforts and may result in the prevention of threats, attacks, and 

other acts of aggression against the United States.
Pillar II: Deny Terrorist Mobility At and Within US Borders

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 35 

Strategic Objective 3: Strengthen US Identity Verifi cation 

Systems

Signifi cance

Offi cial travel documents are key enablers of terrorist travel. Terrorists may travel 

around the world, including to the United States, with the object of targeting American 

interests and facilities. The US Government therefore must be concerned about the 

quality of the documents provided to its citizens, legal permanent residents, and nonimmigrant visitors, as well as the documents of other countries used for travel to the 

United States. In protecting its Homeland, the US Government must consider the full 

range of documents—domestic as well as foreign—necessary to enter and remain in the 

United States. The ability to detect fraudulent travel documentation is vital to detecting 

terrorists as they travel.

Critical Mission Areas

• Standard Format and Security Features for Identifi cation Documents 

and Improved Reporting of Lost or Stolen Passports

• Document Fraud Detection Initiatives

— Detect and reduce travel document fraud in the domestic travel 

system

— Continue to train federal, state, and local offi cials to recognize 

counterfeit and altered documents

Current Initiatives

Standard Format and Security Features for Identifi cation Documents

US Passport Enhancements

The US passport, recognized as one of the world’s most secure and tamper-resistant 

identifi cation credentials, is ICAO-compliant, state-of the-art, and machine-readable 

with a digitized photo. The Department of State’s 10-year passport replacement 

program will ensure that passports issued or renewed after 2006 will employ features 

to ensure the ability to verify the identity of the passport holder and legitimacy of its 

issuance. The United States will begin issuing e-passports in the spring of 2006 and will 

be issuing only e-passports after October 26, 2006.

Document Standardization

A number of measures are underway to support standardization and additional security 

features of travel documents:
Pillar II: Deny Terrorist Mobility At and Within US Borders

36 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA). In 1996, 

the IIRAIRA mandated the creation of a uniform national format, content, and set 

of security features for US birth certifi cates, the most common document used to 

establish US citizenship. IIRAIRA also directed the Executive Branch to coordinate 

federal agencies and state statistic offi ces to develop standards for birth certifi cates, and 

authorized the Department of Health and Human Services to provide assistance for 

states to conform. 

REAL ID Act. Signed into law in 2005, the REAL ID Act contains a number of 

provisions related to immigration reform and document security. Title II of the REAL 

ID Act calls for improved security for drivers licenses and personal identifi cation cards, 

and establishes minimum document requirements and issuance standards for federal 

recognition. These requirements include mandatory facial image capture, physical 

security and personnel security for locations and persons involved in the production of 

licenses, and fraudulent document recognition training for employees engaged in the 

issuance of drivers licenses. 

Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI). As noted previously, the WHTI will 

require all US citizens, citizens of British Overseas Territory of Bermuda, and citizens 

of Canada and Mexico to present a passport or other accepted secure document 

that establishes the bearer’s identity and nationality to enter or re-enter the United 

States. WHTI will be implemented in phases between now and January 1, 2008. In 

response to this initiative, DHS has proposed acceptance of a card in lieu of a passport. 

Additionally, the Departments of State and Homeland Security have begun developing 

a lower-cost alternative to a traditional passport for use in crossing land borders. The 

system will be known as PASS (People Access Security System).

Database of US Lost and Stolen Passports

Since 2003, the United States has established and maintained an electronic database to 

record reported lost and stolen US passports. US regulations have also been changed 

to specify that, once reported to this database, the passport is no longer valid for travel. 

Information in this database is used at the border to screen for travelers using a passport 

that has been reported lost or stolen. Multiple losses are subject to investigation. 

Document Fraud Detection Initiatives

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Forensic Document Laboratory

The ICE Forensic Document Laboratory (FDL) focuses on detecting fraudulently 

obtained genuine travel documents by bribing corrupt offi cials or submitting false 

information, and on assisting government offi cers to identify fraud. This is done in 

many ways, including providing expert forensic examination of questioned documents 

and developing specialized training programs on fraud detection that are used across the 

Federal government. The FDL staff of certifi ed government experts provides training on 

document examination and document fraud to federal, state, and local offi cials, as well 

as to foreign government offi cials as part of ongoing US Government initiatives. 
Pillar II: Deny Terrorist Mobility At and Within US Borders

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 37 

Pillar II: Continuing Challenges and Proposed Actions

As the current initiatives demonstrate, the United States has undertaken a number of 

steps since 9/11 to prevent terrorists from entering, traveling within, and operating 

successfully in the United States. This section lists fi ve categories of continuing 

challenges, followed by corresponding proposed actions necessary to achieve continued 

success in denying terrorists the ability to enter, exit, and travel within the United 

States:

• Terrorist Screening and Information Sharing

• US Border Security

• US Document Security

• Immigration Laws and Policies

• Intelligence Capabilities and Training

The proposed actions are to be conducted within the constraints of US laws, especially 

those aimed at protecting the privacy and civil liberties of US persons.

Terrorist Screening and Information Sharing 

Identifying potential terrorists is the fi rst step in preventing them from entering and 

traveling within the United States. Building on current efforts, the US Government 

should:

(13) Consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11, fi nalize 

transition of the US Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 

(US-VISIT) system, including VWP travelers, and consular processing of 

visa applicants from a two-fi ngerprint to a ten-fi ngerprint screening system 

managed within established databases.

(14) Grant the appropriate security clearances to consular, CBP, and USCIS 

offi cers, and establish the required technical infrastructure to support the 

sharing of classifi ed information on travelers with potential ties to terrorism. 

(15) Leverage the Information Sharing Environment to establish minimum system 

interoperability standards for agencies involved in sharing information on 

terrorists’ identities, and to establish systems’ connectivity to state and local 

law enforcement agencies. 
Pillar II: Deny Terrorist Mobility At and Within US Borders

38 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

US Border Security

Since 9/11, the US Government has focused signifi cant attention and resources on 

securing US borders. Building on these efforts, the US Government should:

(16) Fully implement the US-VISIT system across the immigration and border 

management enterprise. 

(17) Implement pre-departure Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) 

to improve the US Government’s ability to vet international air and sea 

passengers against the consolidated terrorist watchlist maintained by the 

Federal government to identify and interdict potential terrorists before they 

depart the United States. 

(18) Establish international registered traveler programs, on a multilateral basis, 

with partner nations to increase advance information on a greater number of 

travelers and allow for increased scrutiny of higher risk travelers attempting 

entry into the United States. 

(19) Fully implement US Government supporting plans for the National Strategy 

for Maritime Security to defend US coastlines from terrorists seeking entry 

into the United States by sea. 

US Document Security

Offi cial travel documents are key enablers of terrorist travel. As such, the US 

Government must ensure that domestic documents that facilitate travel are standardized 

and secure.

(20) Fully implement and leverage authorities of the REAL ID Act, and develop 

regulations for state motor vehicle bureaus and state bureaus of vital statistics. 

Immigration Laws and Policies

The US Government maintains broad legal authority in the border environment to 

search conveyances, individuals, and personal effects, and to deny entry to non-US 

citizens who pose a potential terrorism threat. Still, current immigration laws and 

related policies should be enhanced to counter the continuing terrorist threat. To this 

end, the US Government should:

(21) Expand eff orts to control borders, address interior enforcement and attack 

immigration fraud, including through the Secure Border Initiative (SBI). 
Pillar II: Deny Terrorist Mobility At and Within US Borders

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 39 

Intelligence Capabilities and Training

Aside from increasing the quantity and quality of analysts and analysis, the ability to 

understand fundamental components of terrorist-related travel and document fraud is 

basic to any intelligence-driven effort against terrorist mobility. To enhance its existing 

capabilities in these areas, the US Government should:

(22) Ensure that an appropriate number of intelligence analysts in the US 

Intelligence Community are dedicated to the problem of global terrorist 

mobility.

(23) Increase the number of actionable leads to Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) and FBI by continuing to develop analytical capabilities 

surrounding information derived from US-VISIT and other border security 

systems. 

(24) Provide suffi cient resources to enable the Human Smuggling and Traffi cking 

Center (HSTC) to fulfi ll its responsibilities to conduct analysis of clandestine 

terrorist travel and support the US Government’s coordination of eff orts to 

combat terrorist travel, as required in Section 7202 of the IRTPA.

(25) Capitalize on curricula currently employed by CBP, the Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center, ICE, and the US Secret Service to develop 

a comprehensive document fraud prevention curriculum to train federal, 

state, and local document issuers and reviewers on establishing document 

fraud prevention and risk management programs, intelligence methods used 

to identify fraudulent travel documents, and how intelligence analysts can 

support fi eld operators whose work involves the review of travel documents.
40 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

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Moving Forward

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 41 

Moving Forward

The signifi cant efforts of the US Government to leverage the full range of instruments 

of national power at its disposal to combat terrorist travel worldwide are making the 

American people safer. US Government initiatives aimed at constraining terrorist 

mobility are severely limiting the ability of our terrorist enemies to plan and execute 

attacks against Americans and our allies. At home the US Government is working 

with state and local governments and law enforcement agencies to prevent terrorists 

from entering the country and perpetrating attacks within the United States. Overseas 

we are working closely with partner nations to diminish terrorists’ capacity to cross 

international borders and to secure travel documents and funding.

We seek to deny safe harbor to terrorists wherever they are or seek to move. This 

strategy demonstrates the resolve of the US Government to strengthen international 

and US travel systems and make them as inhospitable as possible to our terrorist 

enemies. Building on the progress we have made in the years since 9/11, we will see 

continuing successes in constraining terrorist movements and in fortifying the will of 

the international community to devote increased attention and resources to this critical 

front in the War on Terror.

Last year the President stated that the terrorists “are as brutal an enemy as we have 

ever faced. They’re unconstrained by any notion of our common humanity, or by the 

rules of warfare. No one should underestimate the diffi culties ahead, nor should they 

overlook the advantages we bring to this fi ght.” Indeed, we face continuing challenges 

in the overall War on Terror and in the fi ght against terrorist travel. Let it be known 

that the United States is confronting these challenges head on—and that the terrorists 

will inevitably lose the fi ght.
42 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

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Appendix: List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 43 

Appendix: List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

APEC Asia-Pacifi c Economic Coordination

APIS Advance Passenger Information System

ATA Antiterrorism Assistance Program

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CCD Consolidated Consular Database

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CR Counterterrorism Response

CTAG Counterterrorism Action Group

CTC Counterterrorism Committee

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DNI Director of National Intelligence

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DOJ Department of Justice

DOT Department of Transportation

FAMS Federal Air Marshal Service

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FDAU Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit

FDL Forensic Document Laboratory

FTTTF Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive

HSTC Human Smuggling and Traffi cking Center
Appendix: List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

44 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IIRAIRA Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act

IMET International Military Education and Training

INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization

IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

ISE Information Sharing Environment

ISPS International Ship and Port Facility Security

JITF-CT Joint Intelligence Task Force—Combating Terrorism

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force

LESC Law Enforcement Support Center

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center

NOA Notice of Arrival

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command

NSEERS National Security Entry-Exit Registration System

NSMS National Strategy for Maritime Security

NTC National Targeting Center

NVMC National Vessel Movement Center

ODNI Offi ce of the Director of National Intelligence

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PASS People Access Security System

SAFTI Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative

SAO Security Advisory Opinion
Appendix: List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

 National Strategy To Combat Terrorist Travel 45 

SBI Secure Border Initiative

SEVIS Student and Exchange Visitor Information System

SPP Security & Prosperity Partnership

State Department of State

TAS Th reat Analysis Section

TIP Terrorist Interdiction Program

Treasury Department of the Treasury

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TSC Terrorist Screening Center

TSWG Technical Support Working Group

TTIC Terrorist Th reat Integration Center

USCG US Coast Guard 

USCIS US Citizenship and Immigration Services

US-VISIT United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology

VGTOF Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File

VSO Visa Security Offi cer

VWP Visa Waiver Program

WHTI Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative