Hayman Fire Case Study:

Summary

Russell T. Graham, Technical Editor

United States

Department

of Agriculture

Forest Service

Rocky Mountain

Research Station

General Technical

Report RMRS-GTR-115

September 2003
Abstract __________________________________________

Graham, Russell T., Technical Editor. 2003. Hayman Fire Case Study: summary. Gen. Tech. Rep.

RMRS-GTR-115. Ogden, UT: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain

Research Station. 32 p.

This publication summarizes the findings in the 400-page companion document, Hayman Fire Case

Study, Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. This summary document’s purpose is to convey information

quickly and succinctly to a wide array of audiences.

In 2002 much of the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains in Colorado was rich in dry vegetation as

a result of fire exclusion and the droughty conditions that prevailed in recent years. These dry and heavy

fuel loadings were continuous along the South Platte River corridor located between Denver and

Colorado Springs on the Front Range. These topographic and fuel conditions combined with a dry and

windy weather system centered over eastern Washington to produce ideal burning conditions. The start

of the Hayman Fire was timed and located perfectly to take advantage of these conditions resulting in

a wildfire run in 1 day of over 60,000 acres and finally impacting over 138,000 acres. The Hayman Fire

Case Study, involving more than 60 scientists and professionals from throughout the United States,

examined how the fire behaved, the effects of fuel treatments on burn severity, the emissions produced,

the ecological (for example, soil, vegetation, animals) effects, the home destruction, postfire rehabilitation activities, and the social and economic issues surrounding the Hayman Fire. The Hayman Fire

Case Study revealed much about wildfires and their interactions with both the social and natural

environments. As the largest fire in Colorado history it had a profound impact both locally and nationally.

The findings of this study will inform both private and public decisions on the management of natural

resources and how individuals, communities, and organizations can prepare for wildfire events.

Keywords: Wildfire, fuel treatments, wildfire behavior, social and economic wildfire effects, ecological

effects of wildfires

Acknowledgments _________________________________

The Hayman Fire Case Study involved the timely assembling, analyzing, and reporting on

large volumes of data. A project of this size cannot be accomplished without the help and

understanding of the families, friends, and coworkers of all of those involved. We, the Study

Team, thank them all. We thank the many people who attended our public meetings and

those who provided critical reviews of our Interim Report and the peers who reviewed our final

reports. The devil is in the details of a study such as this, and the Publication Team is thanked

by the other Team members for their excellent work in producing the publications.

Cover photo: Photograph taken from the headquarters of the Manitou Experimental Forest

located on the eastern perimeter of the Hayman Fire, as the fire approached on June 18, 2002.
Case Study Leader

Russell T. Graham

Research Forester

USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station

Moscow, Idaho

Fire Behavior, Fuel Treatments, and Fire Suppression Team Leader

Mark A. Finney

Research Physical Forester

USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station

Missoula, Montana

Ecological Effects Team Leader

William H. Romme

Professor

Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship

Colorado State University

Fort Collins, Colorado

Home Destruction Team Leader

Jack Cohen

Research Physical Scientist

USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station

Missoula, Montana

Postfire Rehabilitation Team Leader

Pete Robichaud

Research Engineer

USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station

Moscow, Idaho

Social/Economic Team Leader

Brian Kent

Research Forester

USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station

Fort Collins, Colordao

Hayman Fire Case Study: Summary
Hayman Fire Case Study Team Members and Affiliations _________________

Executive Committee

Marcia Patton-Mallory, Station Director, USDA Forest Service,

Rocky Mountain Research Station (RMRS), Fort Collins, CO

Rick Cables, Regional Forester, USDA Forest Service, Rocky

Mountain Region, Golden, CO

Jim Hubbard, Colorado State Forester, Colorado State Government, 

Fort Collins, CO

Case Study Leader

Russell Graham, Research Forester, USDA Forest Service, Rocky

Mountain Research Station (RMRS), Moscow, ID

Fire Behavior, Fuel Treatments, and Fire Suppression Team

Mark A. Finney, Team Leader, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory,

Missoula, MT

Roberta Bartlette, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MT

Larry Bradshaw, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MT

Kelly Close, Poudre Fire Authority, Fort Collins, CO

Brandon M. Collins, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

Paul Gleason, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed

Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

Wei Min Hao, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MT

Paul Langowski, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region,

Lakewood, CO

Erik J. Martinson, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

John McGinely, NOAA Forecast Systems Laboratory, Boulder, CO

Charles W. McHugh, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory,

Missoula, MT

Phillip N. Omi, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed

Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

Wayne D. Shepperd, RMRS, Fort Collins, CO

Karl Zeller, RMRS, Fort Collins, CO

Ecological Effects Team

William H. Romme, Team Leader,Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University,

Fort Collins, CO

Geneva Chong, U.S. Geological Survey and Natural Resource

Ecology Lab, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

Jan E. Cipra, Department of Soil and Crop Sciences, Colorado

State University, Fort Collins, CO

Catherine Crosier, Natural Resource Ecology Lab, Colorado State

University, Fort Collins, CO

Lynn M. Decker, USDA Forest Service, Washington Office

Laurie Huckaby, RMRS, Fort Collins, CO

Merrill R. Kaufmann, RMRS, Fort Collins, CO

Eugene F. Kelly, Department of Soil and Crop Sciences, Colorado

State University, Fort Collins, CO

Jeffrey L. Kershner, USDA Forest Service, Washington Office,

Logan, UT

Natasha B. Kotliar, U.S. Geological Survey, Fort Collins, CO

Zamir Libohova, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

Lee MacDonald, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

Greg Newman, Natural Resource Ecology Laboratory, Colorado

State University, Fort Collins, CO

Rebecca Parmenter, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region, Lakewood, CO

Eric Patterson, Rocky Mountain Ecological Services, Fort Collins, CO

Claudia M. Regan, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region, Lakewood, CO

David A. Shadis, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region,

Lakewood, CO

Rosemary Sherriff, Department of Geography, University of

Colorado, Fort Collins, CO

Sara Simonson, Natural Resource Ecology Lab, Colorado State

University, Fort Collins, CO

Tom Stohlgren, U.S. Geological Survey and Natural Resource

Ecology Lab, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

Dave Theobold, Natural Resource Ecology Lab, Colorado State

University, Fort Collins, CO

Thomas T. Veblen, Department of Geography, University of

Colorado, Boulder,CO

David Winters, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region,

Lakewood, CO

Home Destruction Team

Jack Cohen, Team Leader, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory,

Missoula, MT

Rick D. Stratton, Systems for Environmental Management,

Missoula, MT

Postfire Rehabilitation Team

Peter Robichaud, Team Leader, RMRS, Forestry Sciences Laboratory, Moscow, ID

Louise Ashmun, RMRS, Forestry Sciences Laboratory, Moscow, ID

Jeff Freeouf, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region

Lee MacDonald, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

Deborah Martin, U.S. Geological Survey, Boulder, CO

Dan Neary, RMRS, Southwest Forest Science Complex, Flagstaff, AZ

Social/Economic Team

Brian Kent, Team Leader, RMRS, Natural Resources Research

Center, Fort Collins, CO

Greg Alward, USDA Forest Service, Inventory and Monitoring

Institute, Fort Collins, CO

Holly Wise Bender, Integrated Resource Solutions, Boulder, CO

David Calkin, RMRS, Forestry Sciences Laboratory,

Missoula, MT

Matt Carroll, Department of Natural Resources, Washington

State University, Pullman, WA

Patricia J. Cohn, Department of Natural Resources, Washington

State University, Pullman, WA

Carol Ekarius, Coalition for the Upper South Platte, Hartsell, CO

Krista Gebert, RMRS, Forestry Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MT

Yoshitaka Kumagai, Department of Natural Resources, Washington State University, Pullman, WA

Wade Martin, Department of Economics, California State University, Long Beach, CA

Ingrid Martin, Dept. of Marketing, California State University,

Long Beach, CA

Sarah McCaffrey, USDA Forest Service, North Central Station,

Evanston, IL

Ervin Schuster, RMRS, Forestry Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MT

Dan Williams, RMRS, Natural Resources Research Center, Fort

Collins, CO

Spatial Team

Jim Menakis, Team Leader, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory,

Missoula, MT

Communications Team

David Tippets, Team Leader, RMRS, Ogden, UT

Doug Young, Congressman Mark Udall’s staff, Westminster, CO

Bill Rice, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region,

Lakewood, CO

John Bustos, Front Range Fuels Partnership, Fort Collins, CO

Katharine Timm, Colorado State Forest Service, Lakewood, CO

Barbara Timock, Pike-San Isabel National Forest, Pueblo, CO

Pam Gardner, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region,

Lakewood, CO

Publications Team

Louise Kingsbury, Team Leader, RMRS, Team is stationed in

Ogden, UT

Nancy Chadwick

Suzy Stephens
Contents

Page

Introduction ............................................................................ 1

Fire Behavior .......................................................................... 9

Fire Ecology and Fire Effects ................................................. 19

Home Destruction .................................................................. 24

Postfire Rehabilitation ............................................................ 25

Social and Economic Issues .................................................. 27

Conclusions............................................................................ 31

References ............................................................................. 32

The use of trade or firm names in this publication is for reader information and does not

imply endorsement by the U.S. Department of Agriculture of any product or service
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003 1

Figure 2—Over one-third of

Wallace, ID, burned during

the wildfires of 1910.

Figure 1—The wildfires of the Northern Rocky Mountains in 1910

burned over 3.1 million acres, destroying valuable timber resources.

Introduction ______________________________________________________

Historically, wildfires burned Western forests creating and maintaining a

variety of forest compositions and structures (Agee 1993). Prior to European

settlement lightning along with Native Americans ignited fires routinely

across many forested landscapes. After Euro-American settlement, fires

continued to be quite common with

fires ignited by settlers, railroads,

and lightning (Pyne 2001). In August 1910 came a pivotal change

in how Westerners in particular,

and policymakers in general,

viewed fire. Starting early in that

summer, fires were ignited and

continued to burn throughout

western Montana and northern

Idaho. By mid August over 1,700

fires were burning throughout

the region, but most forest managers figured the area could

weather these fires if no dry strong

winds developed. On August 20

and 21, the dry winds did blow,

and by the time the flames subsided over 3.1 million acres of the

northern Rocky Mountains burned (fig. 1).

These fires killed 78

firefighters and seven

civilians and burned

several communities

including one-third of

Wallace, Idaho (fig. 2)

(Pyne 2001; USDA

1978). This event solidified the negative

aspects of wildfires in

the view of the public

and policymakers and

led to the strong

Hayman Fire Case Study:

Summary
2 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003

Figure 3—Early fire prevention posters

showing the urgency of suppressing wildfires.

firefighting ethic that prevails yet today (fig. 3) (Pyne 2001).

Wildfires continue to be aggressively extinguished with smoke-jumpers, hot-shot crews, retardant bombers, and sophisticated firefighting

organizations. Even with this aggressive approach, wildfires continue to

burn throughout the West, and the

total area burned in the United States

decreased until the 1960s when the

trend reversed with the number of

acres burned each year increasing

(Agee 1993). This trend was exemplified by the fires that burned in and

around Yellowstone Park in 1988 and

once again brought under scrutiny

the wildfire policies in the United States (fig. 4) (Carey and Carey 1989).

What appears to be different about the recent fires is the number of ignitions

that contributed to burning large areas. More than 1,700 fire starts were

responsible for burning the 3.1 million acres of the Northern Rocky Mountains in 1910, and 78 starts burned more than 350,000 acres in the Bitterroot

Valley in western Montana in July 2000 (fig. 5) (USDA 1978, 2000). Contrast

these fire events to the Rodeo-Chediski Fire where only two fire starts burned

Figure 4—Photograph showing one of the many wildfires that burned in Yellowstone

Park during the summer of 1988.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003 3

Figure 6—The Hayman Fire was ignited on afternoon of June 8, 2002, and by

the morning of June 9 it was uncontrollable.

Figure 5—Seventy-eight wildfires burned in the

Bitterroot Valley of western Montana during the

summer of 2000. (Photo by Karen Brokus)

more than 450,000 acres in 2002 in Arizona. Similarly, on

June 8, 2002, one start along the Colorado Front Range of

the Rocky Mountains led to the Hayman Fire burning

more than 138,000 acres in 20 days (fig. 6).

The weather systems along the Colorado Front Range

beginning in 1998 tended to bring below-normal precipitation and unseasonably dry air masses. These conditions

occurred approximately the same time as the phenomenon known as La Nina began forming in the eastern

Pacific Ocean. The winter of 2001 and 2002 saw a marked

worsening of drought conditions. The predominantly ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir forests throughout the region

became drier with each passing season, and by the spring
4 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003

Figure 7—On June 8, 2002, the winds in Colorado, created by

a low pressure system centered in eastern Washington, were

consistently exceeding 15 mph and gusting to over 30 mph.

of 2002 the fuel moisture conditions were

among the driest seen in at least the past 30

years. The moisture contents of the large

dead logs and stems along the Front Range

were extremely low: most less than 10 percent and some less than 5 percent moisture

content.

During the first week of June 2002 a weak

weather system passed through forests west

of Denver and Colorado Springs, Colorado,

dropping some precipitation, but this rain

had virtually no effect on the parched surface

and dormant live fuels. On Saturday, June 8

the air mass over Colorado was extremely dry

and an upper level low pressure system centered over eastern Washington brought winds

exceeding 15 mph all day with gusts exceeding 30 mph (fig. 7). The counter clockwise

winds circulating around this low aligned

perfectly with the topography of

the South Platte River corridor

(fig. 8). At approximately 4:55

p.m. just south of Tarryall Creek

and Highway 77 near Tappan

Mountain, the Hayman Fire was

reported (fig. 9). An aggressive

initial attack response consisted

of air tankers, helicopters, engines, and ground crews, but they

were unable to contain the fire

(fig. 10). Within a few hours torching trees and prolific spotting

advanced the fire to the northeast, allowing it to burn several

hundred acres.

Saturday night remained

warm and dry (60 oF and 22 percent humidity at Lake George

near fire start) and by 8:00 a.m.

on June 9, the fire was estimated

Figure 8—The southwest to northeast

orientation of the South Platte River

corridor aligned perfectly with the winds

blowing from the southwest.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003 5

Figure 9—The Hayman Fire started just south of Tarryall Creek and County

Highway 77 near Tappan Mountain on the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains

between Denver and Colorado Springs, CO.

Figure 10—An aggressive initial attack of

the fire consisting of ground crews, fire

engines, helicopters, and air tankers could

not control the fire. (Photo by Karen

Wattenmaker)
6 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003

at 1,000 to 1,200 acres in size. Downwind from the ignition location for at

least 10 miles fuels were generally continuous with little variation in both

structure and composition. Surface fuels generally consisted of ponderosa

pine duff and needle litter, short grasses, and occasional shrub patches. Low

crowns of the ponderosa pine, Douglas-fir, and blue spruce facilitated the

transition of the fire from the surface to burning tree crowns (fig. 11).

As the day progressed, the southwest winds gusted to 51 mph and the

relative humidity hovered around 5 to 8 percent (fig. 12) enhancing the

Figure 11—The fuels down wind from

the ignition point were continuous,

consisting of trees with low crowns,

shrubs, and a deep layer of needles

on the forest floor.

Figure 12—During the first

days of the fire the winds

were gusty, and the relative

humidity of the air was dry,

hovering below 10 percent.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003 7

Figure 14—From June 11 through the afternoon of June

17 the weather moderated as did the fire intensity.

Figure 13—Photographs on June 9 showing pyrocumulus

clouds developing to 21,000 feet over the fire.

spread of the fire to the northeast. The combination of fuels, weather, and

topography positioned the fire for a major run lasting the entire day and

burning 60,000 acres along the South Platte River corridor for 16 to 19 miles.

Evacuations were performed in front of the fire, but no suppression actions

were possible forward (east) of Highway 24 (fig. 9). The fire burned with

extreme intensity with long crown fire runs and long-range spotting (1 mile

or more). Fire spread rates

averaged more than 2 mph

and pryocumulus clouds developed to an estimated

21,000 feet (fig. 13).

On the afternoon of June

10, the high winds decreased

and the relative humidity

increased, moderating the

weather (fig. 12) and persisting until the afternoon

of June 17. During this period, the fire advanced

mostly to the south and several miles to the east (fig. 14).

The high winds and low humidity returned on June 17

and 18, increasing the fire

intensity across the entire

east flank of the fire, driven

by west to northwest winds
8 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003

Figure 15—On June 17 and 18 gusty winds and low humidity returned,

facilitating intense fire behavior as the fire advanced to the east.

Figure 16—By June 28 the Hayman Fire had impacted over 138,000 acres of the Front Range.

(fig. 15). The fire advanced to the east

4 to 6 miles on June 18, crossing

Highway 67 and encircling more than

137,000 acres. Because moist monsoon weather arrived, the fire burned

small amounts of additional acres

after June 18. By June 28, the

Hayman Fire impacted more than

138,000 acres of the Colorado Front

Range (fig. 16).

The mountains and forests of the

Front Range between Denver and

Colorado Springs are critical for supplying water to communities and cities, prized for their scenery, provide

numerous recreational opportunities,

are home to many fishes and animals, and are the setting for many

homes, businesses, and communities.

Because of the setting, the Hayman

Fire attracted intense local, regional, and national interest. Before the

flames had died, Congressman Mark Udall of Colorado on June 26, 2002,
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003 9

Figure 17—The moisture contents of the woody fuels

within the Hayman Fire area in 2002 were much drier

than those occurring over the previous 30 years.

indicated that it would “be instructive to take a close look at the behavior of

the fire, examine the factors that led to its intensity, and see if the way it

behaved when it encountered previously affected or treated areas can be

instructive in designing future risk-reduction projects.” He went on to

suggest that the Chief of the Forest Service establish a Hayman Fire Review

Panel. Its purpose would be to focus on the future rather than attempt to

assign blame for past events.

Congressman Udall raised several issues ranging in scope from how the

fire behaved to how the fire impacted the soil and water resources of the Front

Range. Using Congressman Udall’s suggestion as a basis, on July 22, 2002,

the USDA Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station in cooperation

with USDA Forest Service Rocky Mountain Region, and the State of Colorado

Forest Service assembled the Hayman Fire Case Study Team. This Team of

Federal, State, and local experts from throughout the United States came

together and developed an analysis to address the Congressman’s issues.

Analysis questions were divided among subteams addressing fire behavior,

home destruction, social and economic impacts, fire rehabilitation, and

ecological effects. Using the Congressman’s issues each team developed a set

of analysis questions and study direction. Techniques used by the subteams

included interviews, analysis of existing data, expert opinion, Hayman Fire

reports, and other available information. In November 2002 the Team

presented its interim findings to the Congressman, public, forest managers,

nongovernmental organizations, and the scientific community. These groups

and individuals provided critical input to the findings, and in February 2003

the subteams began assembling their final reports incorporating these

reviews and criticisms. The reports underwent scientific peer review before

the final drafts were prepared. The following highlights each subteam’s

findings addressing the analysis questions.

Fire Behavior ______________

Team Leader Mark Finney, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station,

Missoula, Montana

This team used existing and new data

on fire climatology and meteorology, fire

behavior, fuel treatments, road density,

fire suppression activities, and fire emissions. Selected findings of the team:

• The potential for extreme fire behavior was predisposed by drought. Below normal precipitation the past several years and the acute drought in

2002 brought about excedptionally low

moisture contents of live foliage, duff,

and dead fuels of all size classes (fig.

17).
10 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003

• The Hayman Fire began and ended with extreme weather episodes

lasting about 2 days each (June 8 and 9, and June 17 and 18). More

moderate weather occurred during the intervening 6 days. Extreme

weather conditions consisted of high winds (20 to 50 mph) and low

humidity (5 percent). Widespread crown fire and long-range spotting

lead to rapid growth and ultimately the large size of the fire. Abatement

of winds and higher humidity during less extreme weather moderated

fire behavior and effects, even with the abnormally low fuel moisture

contents (fig. 12).

• Different wind directions associated with the two extreme weather

episodes increased the size of the fire. The east flank of the fire that

developed under southwest winds of June 8and 9 became a heading fire

on June 17and 18 when winds shifted from the northwest and west (fig.

15).

• Continuous surface and crown fuel structure, both horizontally and

vertically, in many ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir stands rendered

them susceptible to torching, crown fire, and ignition by embers, even

under moderate weather conditions (fig. 11).

• Continuous fuels across the landscape surrounding the South Platte

River drainage afforded only limited opportunity for significant disruption of growth of the fire or for improved suppression. The few large

areas on the Hayman landscape that recently experienced wildfires or

management activities (Schoonover wildfire 2002, Polhemus prescribed

burn 2001, Big Turkey wildfire 1998) produced significant but isolated

effects on fire growth.

• Orientation of the South Platte River drainage was aligned with the

strong southwest winds on June 8 and 9 and likely enhanced the

direction and rapid spread of the fire on those dates (fig. 8).

• The presence of Cheesman Reservoir and the adjacency of the recent

Schoonover wildfire (May 2002) in the center of the spread path created

and maintained the characteristic forked shape of the Hayman Fire,

which had formed two distinct heads by the afternoon of June 9(fig. 16).

• The Hayman Fire encountered most of the fuel treatments, prescribed

burns, and previous wildfires within the perimeter on June 9 when the

weather was extreme. Continuous crown fire and long-range spotting

dominated the burning of approximately 60,000 acres that day from late

morning through late evening. These extreme conditions and fire behaviors permitted intense surface fire through treated areas, leaving them

with high levels of overstory crown damage. Fuel breaks and treatments

were breached by massive spotting and intense surface fires.

• The fire was perhaps 20,000 acres when it encountered its first fuel

treatments toward the southeastern side of Cheesman Reservoir toward mid-afternoon on June 9. At that time it was in the middle of the

burning period and had developed a large convection column (fig. 13).

• Weather conditions were relatively moderate beginning on June 10

through 16 as the fire burned through Turkey Rx1990, Rx1995, Rx1987,

and the 1998 Big Turkey wildfire. Fire behavior these days was

predominated by surface fire, although torching and some crown fire

occurred in some drainages and hillslopes (fig. 14).
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003 11

Figure 18—The Polhemus prescribed fire (fall 2001) altered the

behavior of the Hayman Fire. Note the boundary between the Polhemus

prescribed burn unit and the Hayman Fire (moving from the foreground

away from the camera). (Photo by Karen Wattenmaker)

• Extreme weather returned on June 17 and 18. Crown fire and longrange spotting was occurring just before the fire burned into fuel

treatments in the Manitou Experimental Forest and the North Divide

prescribed burns (fig. 15). Observations and weather records suggest a

wind shift occurred just before fire entered Manitou.

• Extreme environmental conditions (winds, weather, and fuel moisture)

and the large size of the Hayman Fire that developed on June 9

overwhelmed most fuel treatment effects in areas burned by the

heading fire that day. This included almost all treatment methods

including prescribed burning and thinning.

• Several exceptions to this included the Polhemus prescribed burn

(2001), the Schoonover wildfire (2002), and the Platte Springs wildfire

(2002) that occurred less

than 1 year earlier. These

areas did actually appear

to stop the fire locally,

illustrating that removal

of surface fuels alone (irrespective of thinning or

changes to canopy fuels)

can dramatically alter fire

behavior within 1 year of

treatment. The potential

for prescribed fire to mitigate wildfire behavior will

undoubtedly decrease

over time. Thus, the recent occurrence of fuel

modification in these areas suggests caution in

trying to generalize about

fuel treatment performance over many years.

Fuel treatments are expected to change fire behavior but not necessarily stop fires (fig. 18).

• Fire behavior was modified but not stopped by stand thinning operations conducted at Manitou Experimental Forest. The operations

apparently moderated fire behavior and effects during extreme weather

on June 18 (fig. 19). A fortuitous shift in winds also contributed to the

changes in fire behavior at Manitou. The fire burned rapidly through

areas of the Wildcat wildfire (1963) and the Northrup prescribed burn

(1992) south of Cheesman Reservoir, but the open forest structure of

these areas probably increased the survival of trees and stands within

them.

• Under more moderate wind and humidity conditions (June 10 through

16), recent prescribed burns appeared to have lower fire severity than
12 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003

Figure 19—A low intensity surface fire minimally scorched even the

smallest trees in a ponderosa pine stand that had been thinned.

older burns. This is consistent with trends in fuel

accretion and changes in

forest fuels over time. Examples include the sequence of Turkey (Rx1987,

Rx1990, Rx1995) prescribed burns.

• Cutting treatments

where activity fuels were

not removed experienced

high surface fire intensities but were less likely

to support crown fire. For

example, residual trees

in the Sheepnose timber

sale (2001) were scorched

and probably killed, but

their foliage was generally not consumed by

crown fire. When these

needles fall they mulch the forest floor reducing soil erosion (fig. 20).

However, the Goose Creek timber sale was followed by prescribed fire

but made little difference to severity on June 19 (fig. 21).

• Several landscape effects of treatment units and previous wildfires

were important in changing the progress of the fire. These include the

Polhemus prescribed burn (2001), which stopped the forward progress

of the eastern head burning as a crown fire under extreme weather

conditions (fig. 20), the Big Turkey wildfire (1998) and adjacent prescribed fires (Rx1990, Rx1995), which prevented initiation of crown fire

along a 2 mile segment of the perimeter when extreme weather

returned on June 17 (fig. 22), and the Schoonover Wildfire (May 2002),

Figure 20—The Sheepnose timber

sale where the surface fuels

consisting of logging slash were not

removed prior to the Hayman Fire.

The area burned as an intense

surface fire on June 9 rather than a

crown fire because of the stand

structure created by the treatment.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003 13

Figure 21—The Goose Creek timber

sale area in the foreground (1986

through 1993) in which the logging slash

was piled and burned in 1993 through

1995. Even with these fuel treatments,

adequate surface fuel was available for

a high intensity surface fire to occur on

June 9, 2002.

Figure 22—Oblique view of area burned by the Big Turkey wildfire (1998, oriented approximately along an east-west

axis) looking northeast. Area in the foreground was inside the prescribed fire unit Turkey 1990. This area was burned

between June 10 and 13. (Photo by Rick Stratton)
14 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003

which, together with Cheesman Reservoir, split the head of the Hayman

Fire on June 9 (fig. 23) and prevented it from flanking toward the town

of Deckers (fig. 24, 25).

• The size of the fuel treatment unit relative to the size of the wildfire was

probably important to the impact on both progress and severity within

the treatment unit. Large areas such as the Polhemus prescribed burn

(approximately 8,000 acres) were more effective than small fuel breaks

(Cheesman Ridge, 51 acres) in changing the fire progress. Under

extreme conditions of June 9, spotting easily breached narrow treatments, and the rapid movement of the fire circumvented small units

(fig. 26).

• No fuel treatments were encountered when the fire was small. The fire

had time and space to develop a broad front and generate a large

convection column before encountering most treatment units. Fuel

treatments may have been more effective in changing fire behavior if

they were encountered earlier in the progression of the Hayman Fire

before mass ignition was possible.

Figure 23—Green strip of underburned forest divides the Hayman Fire (left) and Schoonover wildfire (May 2002, right). The

green strip was underburned by the Schoonover Fire 3 weeks before the Hayman Fire occurred and was not reburned by the

Hayman Fire. Note the power line corridor in the picture and the inset map. (Photo by Merrill Kaufmann)
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003 15

Figure 24—Oblique photograph showing the green bands of

conifer forest at the locations where the two heads of the fire

stopped after the burning period on June 17. Note that these

heads originated from the north and south of the Big Turkey

wildfire and adjacent prescribed burns (Rx1990, Rx1995). (Photo

by Rick Stratton)

Figure 25—Satellite imagery showing burned area within

the Hayman Fire on June 13. Several points are visible, (a)

green strip separating the Schoonover wildfire on the north

(May 2002) from the Hayman Fire on the south, (b) the

green diagonal strip indicating the edge of the fire at the

end of the June 9 burning period, and (c) the Big Turkey

wildfire (1998).
16 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003

Figure 26—Strong winds on June 8 and 9 flattened the

smoke column, obscuring fire position and making fire

progression estimation difficult. Photo is from June 9.

• Few fuel treatments had

been performed recently,

leaving most of the landscape within the final fire

perimeter with no treatment or only older treatments. This is significant

because the high degree

of continuity in age and

patch structure of fuels

and vegetation facilitates

fire growth that, in turn,

limits the effectiveness of

isolated treatment units.

• Road density varied considerably within the perimeter of the Hayman

Fire but was not found to

be associated with fire severity or bio-physical conditions related to fire

behavior.

• At the time of initial attack, even the unusually strong compliment of

firefighting resources (air and ground) was not sufficient to contain or

stop the fire due to extreme weather conditions and fuel structures that

facilitated crown fire and spotting (fig. 10).

• On the days of extreme fire growth (June 8 and 9, and June 17 and 18),

burning conditions and weather dictated an indirect attack strategy

with efforts focused on evacuation, structure protection where safely

allowable, and direct methods on the heel and flanks of the fire.

• In the Lost Creek Wilderness little active suppression took place.

Efforts were primarily directed at aerial observation, patrolling, and

location and evacuation of hikers.

• Suppression efforts had little benefit from fuel modifications within the

Hayman Fire. Exceptions include the Polhemus prescribed fire (2001),

two previous wildfires (Schoonover 2002 and Big Turkey 1998), and

thinning operations at Manitou Experimental Forest. One of the only

sections of fireline indicated as controlled through June 16 (fig. 18) was

in the Polhemus burn.

• On active burning days direct line was often not held and crews

retreated to safety zones until fire conditions moderated, then returned

to mop up around structures or defend structures where safely obtainable (fig. 27).

• On days with moderate weather and fire growth, the lines were

defendable and structure protection was successful. For example, on

June 12 structures in the Sportsman Paradise as well as in the Cedar

Mountain, Turkey Creek, and along Turkey Creek were defendable

even when fire behavior picked up in the afternoon hours.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003 17

Figure 28—Night-time operations burning fuels within the fire

line that were not consumed. (Photo by Karen Wattenmaker)

Figure 27—A fire crew protecting a structure when the weather

conditions allowed. (Photo by Karen Wattenmaker)

• Indirect tactics were

used when fire behavior dictated for safety

reasons and when access and rough steep

terrain came into

play. At times, burnout operations did not

take place due to unfavorable weather

conditions, were not

completed due to

changing weather

conditions, or interrupted during operational periods because work-rest ratio

guidelines would

have been exceeded.

• Nightshifts were

used, but only on focused areas, usually

around subdivisions. Night operations primarily focused on patrolling

of subdivisions where burnout operations had taken place during the

day, structure protection in areas that had recently experienced fire

activity, patrolling of divisions, and improving and extending anchor

points (fig. 28).

• After overall weather moderated with arrival of monsoon conditions

after June 20, construction of and holding of direct firelines was

successful (fig. 29).

• The Hayman Fire was a

significant source of atmospheric carbon monoxide (CO) and fine particulates (less than 2.5

μm). For Colorado, the

CO emitted by the

Hayman Fire was at least

five times the annual

(1999) amount produced

by industry, and the fine

particulate emitted by

the Hayman Fire was

about twice that produced annually by Colorado industries (fig. 30).
18 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003

Figure 29—When the weather

moderated, direct fireline

construction was possible and

firelines held. (Photo by Karen

Wattenmaker)

Figure 30—Satellite image of Hayman Fire on June 9 shows the convection column and smoke

plume extending across Denver into Wyoming carrying carbon monoxide and fine particulates.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003 19

Fire Ecology and Fire Effects ________________________________________

Team Leader Bill Romme, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed

Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado

The ecology and fire effects team used existing data collected in and

around the Hayman area, limited observations by team members within

the burned area, and expert opinion. Fire ecology, terrestrial plant ecology,

aquatic ecology, soil science, wildlife ecology, and geospatial sciences were

included in the information they gathered in 2002 and 2003. This information was supplemented with information from the fields of fire and ecosystem management. Selected findings of the team:

• We have a high degree of confidence in many of our interpretations, but

some are offered as tentative hypotheses rather than firm conclusions

because of limited prefire research.

• Reconstructions of fire history and forest dynamics in the Cheesman

landscape, located near the center of the Hayman burn, reveal (1) an

average fire interval of about 50 years during the period 1300 through

1880, but no major fires between 1880 and 2002; (2) a mix of nonlethal

surface fire and lethal, stand-replacing fire in the historic burns; and (3)

a striking increase in forest density from 1900 to 2002.

• The extent of high-severity burn in 2002 within the Cheesman landscape was unprecedented in the past 700 years, in part because of the

dense forest conditions that had developed during the 20th century and

in part because of the extreme fire weather conditions that existed in

2002 (fig. 31).

Figure 31—The extent of the high severity burn in the Hayman Fire was unprecedented

as exemplified by the large expanses of trees totally blackened.
20 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003

Figure 32—In many areas within the Hayman Fire area,

dense forest conditions existed with tree crowns extending

to the forest floor. These conditions facilitated the

transition of fire from the surface to the tree crowns.

• Although the extent of high fire severity in the Cheesman landscape

was unprecedented, fires of comparable size and severity have occurred

elsewhere in the Front Range during

the last several centuries (for example, in 1851), especially in highelevation forests (spruce, fir, and

lodgepole pine) and possibly also in

ponderosa pine forests. Infrequent

but large, severe fires are a normal

component of many forests in Colorado and are not an artifact of 20th

century fire suppression in all forests.

• In the Colorado Front Range as a

whole, 20th-century fire suppression

probably has altered fuel conditions

and fire regimes most significantly in

low-elevation ponderosa pine forests

where fires were relatively frequent

prior to the late 19th century. In

contrast, impacts of fire suppression

probably are minimal in high-elevation forests of spruce, fir, and lodgepole pine, where fires have never been

frequent but where high-severity fires

have always been the norm. Within

the middle forest zone of ponderosa

pine and Douglas-fir, the extent to

which fire suppression has altered

forest structure and fire regimes is

uncertain, and probably varies from

place to place (fig. 32). Additional

research is needed to clarify historical fire regimes in mid-elevation

forests of the Colorado Front Range.

• Areas of high severity burn are likely to have the greatest alterations

in soil characteristics, including loss of surface soil organic matter and

fire-induced synthetic water repellency. Areas where organic matter

was entirely burned off may not return to the prefire state for decades

or centuries, but water repellent soil layers will be more ephemeral,

persisting for 2 to 6 years (fig. 33).

• Reduced ground cover in places of high fire severity will likely result in

decreased infiltration of water, increased surface runoff and peak flows,

and the formation of pedestals, rills, and gullies. Erosion rates should

substantially decline by the third summer after burning, and erosion

from winter storms is expected to be minimal.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003 21

Figure 33—In addition to burning the vegetation

of the area, the Hayman Fire in many places

burned organic materials in and on the soil

surface, decreasing productivity and creating

water impermeable layers. (Photo by Theresa Jain)

• The aquatic ecosystems of the South Platte River

within the Hayman Fire area represent a highly

altered landscape that has been influenced by a

variety of activities including mining, vegetation

management, road building, urbanization, recreation, and water development.

• The recovery of the hillslope and riparian vegetation will influence how quickly the aquatic environments recover. Clearly, areas that were less

severely burned will likely recover to prefire

conditions most rapidly. Recovery of aquatic ecosystems within severely burned watersheds will

be most dependent on riparian recovery, the

juxtaposition to high quality habitats that can

provide sources for re-colonization, and the mitigation of additional chronic disturbances.

• Rehabilitation of the aggrading perennial streams

downstream from the fire will be difficult and

costly because of the large volume of sediment in

the system and poor access in many areas. Efforts to accelerate the recovery of the hillslopes

will help by reducing the future inputs of sediment, but so much sediment has already been

mobilized, or is poised to move into the downstream areas, that relatively little can be done to

stop the problem. Hence large amounts of sediment will continue to be delivered into Cheesman

Reservoir and the South Platte River, reducing

reservoir storage capacity and

potentially affecting fish and

macroinvertebrate habitat

(fig. 34). Over a longer period,

however, the trend will likely

be toward recovery of aquatic

ecosystems if other kinds of

chronic disturbances can be

minimized.

Figure 34—The greatest risk to the

soil and water resource following the

Hayman Fire is erosion and

sediment delivery to the streams

and reservoirs.
22 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003

Figure 35—Areas within the Hayman Fire responded rapidly by

sprouting new vegetation within weeks of the fire.

• Because the ecosystems that burned in 2002 have a long history of fire,

the native species and populations in this area generally have mechanisms for enduring fire or becoming reestablished after fire. Therefore,

much or even most of the terrestrial vegetation is likely to recover

normally without intervention, and in some areas our well-intentioned

rehabilitation efforts actually could interfere with natural recovery

processes.

• Where the vegetation is dominated by sprouting species (for example,

aspen, cottonwood, many shrub species, many grasses, and other

herbaceous species), a rapid return to prefire conditions is generally

expected (fig. 35). We also expect a rapid return to prefire conditions in

areas dominated by nonsprouting species (for example, ponderosa pine

and Douglas-fir forests) wherever the fire burned at low severity and

did not kill most of the forest canopy.

• Vegetation that is different from prefire conditions, but within the

historical range of variability, is likely to develop in ponderosa pine and

Douglas-fir forests where the fire burned with moderate severity, and

also in small patches of high-severity burn. We anticipate that a new

cohort of ponderosa pine seedlings will become established in these

areas over the next several years.

• Development of vegetation that is different from prefire conditions and

also is dissimilar to or at extremes of

the historical range of variability

for this ecosystem is expected in

ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir

forests within large patches of

high-severity burn because of high

local seed mortality coupled with

long distances to seed sources

outside the burned area. Natural

reforestation of these areas may

require many decades (fig. 31).

• Development of vegetation that

is outside historical range of variability for this ecosystem is expected wherever invasive, nonnative species become dominant.

Invasion of burned areas by nonnative species is a serious threat

throughout the Hayman burn because the invasive species may

cause declines of native plant species and changes in fire regimes,

nutrient cycling processes, and

hydrology.

• Over the short term (next approximately 5 years), riparian areas are

likely to be the most vulnerable to invasion by nonnative plant species.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003 23

Rehabilitation activities may facilitate

the invasion of nonnative species and

may alter postfire dynamics of riparian

ecosystems (fig. 36).

Over a longer term (approximately 50

to 100 years), without control measures, nonnative plant species would

be expected to persist in riparian and

drainage areas, open-canopy areas,

and along disturbance corridors such

as roads.

• The potential effects of the Hayman

Fire on animal and plant species listed

as threatened or sensitive species for

the Pike National Forest are expected

to vary based on the patterns of fire

severity and rehabilitation implemented. In areas of mixed-severity

burn, we expect that the fire will create habitat for several species such

as woodpeckers, cause minimal negative impacts for most species in the

short term, and may enhance habitat availability for many native

species in the long term.

• Large patches of crown fire will also create habitat for several species

of concern but likely will diminish habitat availability and quality in

the short term for many species that prefer mature conifer forest (fig.

31). The long-term effects of the large patches of crown fire are more

equivocal and will depend on postfire response of vegetation communities.

• Rehabilitation efforts (such as salvage logging, seeding, soil scarification) and hazard tree removal may remove or diminish critical structure (for example, snags, bare mineral soil) for wildlife that was created

by fire.

Figure 36—Mulch was aerially applied to reduce

soil erosion. These activities have the potential to

introduce nonnative species and alter natural

vegetation development.
24 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003

• Concern remains for the threatened Pawnee Montane Skipper because

of its restricted habitat and range. Further research is needed to

determine how the skipper responds to burn-severity patterns and

potential interactions with effects of the 2002 drought.

Home Destruction _________________________________________________

Team Leader Jack Cohen, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station,

Missoula, Montana

An onsite assessment of each home destroyed, documentation and photographs during the fire, postfire aerial reconnaissance, and meetings with

Federal, County and private individuals were the main sources of information used in the analysis. Although the team specifically assessed the homes

destroyed, surviving homes were also considered. Home sites were visited 3

months after the Hayman Fire when much of the specific evidence describing

the nature of home destruction and survival was lost. Selected findings of the

team:

• Discussions with fire personnel and residents indicate that most homes

were not actively protected when the Hayman Fire burned in the

residential areas.

• The Hayman Fire resulted in the destruction of 132 homes (that is,

homes on permanent foundations, modular homes, and mobile homes—

both primary and secondary). Within what is now the final perimeter

of the Hayman Fire, 794 homes existed. Thus, 662 homes were not

destroyed. The Hayman Fire resulted in about 17 percent destruction

of the total homes within the fire area.

Figure 37—Expectations of home destruction as a result of wildfire. Home survival is

expected if low fire intensities occur (lower right cell) and unexpected if the home is

destroyed (lower left cell).
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003 25

• The wildland fire intensity associated with the destroyed homes varied

as much as the fire intensity associated with homes that survived.

Figure 37 shows the range of wildland fire intensities associated with

homes destroyed and a similar range with those that survived.

• Research has shown that the characteristics of the home in relation to

its immediate surroundings (within 30 to 60 m) principally determine

home ignitions during wildland fires. This area that includes the home

characteristics and its immediate surroundings is called the “home

ignition zone.”

• The wildland fire intensity in the general area does not necessarily

cause home destruction or survival. This distinguishes the difference

between the exposures (flames and firebrands) produced by the surrounding wildland fire from the actual potential for home destruction

(home ignition zone) given those exposures.

• The home ignition zone implies that the issue of home destruction can

be considered in a home site-specific context rather than in the general

context of the Hayman Fire.

• Seventy homes were destroyed in association with the occurrence of

torching or crown fire, at least in a portion of the area surrounding a

home (fig. 37 upper left case).

• Sixty-two homes were destroyed with no high intensity fire, torching,

or crown fire, in the area surrounding the home (fig. 37 lower left case).

• Significant site disturbance in the time lapsed between the fire occurrence and our assessment prohibited any further analysis as to whether

these high intensities could have directly caused home ignition.

• Significant patterns of destruction were not observed. This can likely be

attributed to the wide variety of home types, designs, building materials, the scattering of destroyed homes, the significant number of

surviving homes within the fire perimeter, and the wide range of fire

intensities associated with home destruction.

• Teller and Park Counties did not have regulations related to reducing

wildland-urban fire risks.

• In 1994 Douglas County adopted an amended version of NFPA 299

(1991) to the Uniform Building Code, making all developments after

the adoption date subject to the regulations.

• Jefferson County required “defensible space” permits on the construction of habitable space greater than 400 ft2 since 1996, but because of

little new construction, few—if any—homes fell into this category in the

Hayman Fire area.

Postfire Rehabilitation _____________________________________________

Team Leader, Pete Robichaud, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research

Station, Moscow, Idaho

Selected findings of the team:

• Postfire rehabilitation efforts in the Hayman Fire area were designed

to reduce the projected increases in peak-flows and soil erosion, and

thereby minimize adverse downstream impacts on structures and
26 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003

Figure 38—Ground application of hydromulch aimed at reducing soil

erosion.

aquatic ecosystems. The Burned Area Emergency Rehabilitation (BAER)

team report included:

1. Estimates of the potential magnitude of the increases in runoff and

erosion.

2. Assessment of the risks posed by the increases.

3. Recommendations for mitigation treatments on National Forest

lands.

• The recommended treatments were applied, with some modifications,

as soon as fire suppression activities allowed. Land treatments included aerial and ground-based hydromulch (fig. 38), aerial dry mulch

(fig. 36), and scarification with either aerial or ground-based seeding.

Each of these treatments included a 70 percent barley/30 percent

triticale seed mix. In addition to land treatments, road and site

protection treatments were applied. By the end of 2003, approximately

$18 million will be spent to provide emergency rehabilitation treatment

on 45,500 acres (39 percent) of the 116,300 acres that burned.

• Most of the treatments recommended by the postfire rehabilitation

team have not been systematically studied, making it difficult to

predict expected effectiveness. More quantitative data on rehabilitation treatment effectiveness, based on climate, burn severity, soil types,

and so forth, would enable BAER teams to refine their recommendations for each area.

• Previous experience indicates that rehabilitation treatments are least

effective in high intensity rainstorms, particularly in the first 2 years

after burning. Such storms are common in the Colorado Front Range,

but in summer 2002 there were fewer such storms than average.

• Much of the postfire treatment effectiveness monitoring that has been

done in the past has been anecdotal and qualitative. The application of

such observations to current treatment decisions is difficult without

specific information on site conditions, storm events, and measured responses (runoff, erosion

rates, and so forth). Without

quantitative measurements of

runoff and erosion rates, downstream sedimentation rates are

difficult to estimate, and predictive models cannot be rigorously

tested and calibrated to different

burned forest environments. To

discern treatment effectiveness,

it is also necessary to monitor
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003 27

comparable burned but untreated areas. Treated and control sites have

been established in the Hayman Fire area, but these monitoring efforts

need to be expanded and continued until recovery to near background

conditions. The results of this monitoring need to be regularly and

publicly reported.

• The efficient placement of rehabilitation treatments involves the use of

predictive models to locate the areas of greatest risk and greatest

potential for effectiveness. The development and adaptation of climate,

runoff, and erosion models for use in burned forest environments are

currently hindered by several knowledge gaps that include:

1. Improved mapping of burn severity and better characterization of

postfire soil water repellency (fig. 33).

2. Improved prediction of runoff responses at different spatial scales

from short-duration, high-intensity thunderstorms.

3. Relative magnitudes and consequences of hillslope verses channel

erosion.

4. Sediment deposition and routing within drainages.

Social and Economic Issues ________________________________________

Team Leader Brian Kent, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station,

Fort Collins, Colorado

The social and economic issues of the Hayman Fire were addressed by

conducting four studies: (1) on economic and social effects of the fire; (2)

prefire and postfire workshops with the Ridgewood Homeowners Association; (3) interviews with key informants in the Woodland Park area in August

2002, soon after the fire was suppressed; and (4) another set of interviews

with Woodland Park area representatives of governmental and nonprofit

organization members in February 2003, about 6 months after the fire was

suppressed. Selected findings of the team:

• The effects a catastrophic wildfire such as the Hayman has on human

social and economic systems are complex. Unlike many ecological

effects of a wildfire, the geographic scale of influence for social/economic

effects extends considerably beyond the area actually burned.

• Most likely no human alive during the Hayman Fire will live long

enough to see the burned area recover to anything like it was prefire.

Those who used this area have lost something and they will need to look

elsewhere to replace it, and the local economies likely have lost the

economic contributions those users made.

• The economic aspects of a large-scale fire occurring in proximity to

human populations, such as the Hayman Fire, are difficult to measure

and highly variable. Some aspects are straightforward and relatively

easy to measure, such as the actual suppression expenditures or

property losses. Assessing other aspects, such as the effect on a regional

economy, or changes in recreation and tourism, are easily confounded

by other factors, such as general economic downturns or a shift of

economic activity from one location to another.
28 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003

Figure 39—The costs to suppress the Hayman

Fire were not that excessive on a per acre basis,

but because of its size the fire was the most

expensive in Colorado history.

• While the Hayman Fire was not extraordinarily expensive on a cost per acre basis, the size of

the fire made it one of the most expensive fires in the

last several years. No fire in Colorado’s history has

cost as much to suppress (fig. 39). The $38 million

spent by the Forest Service on the Hayman Fire was

more than three times the average annual

suppression expenditures (1992 to 2001) for all of

USDA Forest Service Region 2 (Rocky Mountain

Region). Adding expenditures by the State and

the other Federal agencies, suppression expenditures totaled more than $42 million. In addition to the money spent fighting the fire, rehabilitation and restoration expenditures (already

expended and planned) connected with the fire

are expected to cost at least another $74 million.

• Additional expenditures related to the fire totaled almost $2 million. These expenditures included Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA) reimbursements, State of Colorado expenses, and disaster relief by the American Red

Cross.

• The proximity of the fire to human populations

led to a loss of 600 structures, including 132

residences (fig. 40). Real property losses were

substantial, totaling $24 million, with a majority

of the losses occurring in Teller County ($14

million) and Douglas County ($8 million) with

total insured private property losses estimated

at $38.7 million. Loans and grants

from Small Business Administration and FEMA for uninsured losses

totaled almost $4.9 million. Additionally, damage to transmission

lines was estimated at $880,000.

• More difficult to measure are

the effects on resource values (including tourism and recreation)

and the regional economy. The fire

Figure 40—Many structures dotted the

Hayman landscape, and 600 of them

burned during the fire, resulting in real

property losses of $24 million.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003 29

closure order occurred during the busiest time of

the tourist season (fig. 41). Concessionaires who

manage the developed recreation sites within

the affected Ranger Districts of the Pike-San

Isabel National Forest reported a total decline in

revenue in 2002 of $382,000 from 2001 levels.

• It is possible that recreation losses occurring within the vicinity of the

Hayman Fire were offset by gains to other areas of Colorado.

• On the Pike-San Isabel National Forest, financial losses attributed to

water storage decreases were estimated at $37 million, and the value

of timber lost was estimated at $34 million.

• There was little evidence of a substantial economic decline in the

Primary Impact Area – the four affected Counties during the months of

the Hayman Fire. In some areas and sectors, the Hayman Fire most

likely decreased economic activity. That more substantial effects were

not detected is probably due to: (1) tourism-related sectors constitute a

relatively small part of the economies in the Primary Impact Area and

(2) the economies of the Primary Impact Area are large, complex, and

able to withstand economic shocks.

• The Ridgewood Homeowner’s Association (RHOA), located adjacent to

the Manitou Experimental Forest on the eastern perimeter of the fire

(fig. 8, 16), comprises residents that have had notable experience with

wildfire, are quite knowledgeable on these issues, and yet are still

motivated to learn more. These homeowners recognize the need for

active management on the Forest and realize the potential dangers that

wildfire poses. The homeowners most preferred the mechanical removal of hazardous fuels (even more since the Hayman Fire). Second,

they prefer prescribed fire in combination with mechanical removal,

and third, they are somewhat neutral on prescribed fire. Interestingly,

Figure 41—The Hayman Fire occurred at the peak of the tourist season, impacting many sectors of the travel

economy from daily forest visitors to destination resorts.
30 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003

this preference has remained constant from before to 6 months after the

Hayman Fire.

• According to these residents (RHOA), the City and County fire departments are helpful and perceived as highly credible entities, while

research reports and environmental organizations were not viewed as

helpful or credible sources of help or information. The Colorado State

Forest Service is only perceived as somewhat credible as an institution.

The USDA Forest Service, bordering many of these residents’ land, is

viewed as providing somewhat helpful information and as less credible

than the USDI National Park Service, County and City fire departments, State Forest Service, and neighbors and friends. This could

explain some of the trepidation associated with prescribed fire; the

residents may view prescribed fire as something needed but not

preferable since they know the Forest Service is the entity implementing the treatments. These sentiments for prescribed fire may also

reflect the knowledge of the Forest Service employee who pled guilty to

starting the Hayman Fire.

• The residents of the RHOA feel highly vulnerable to the effects of fire,

are highly susceptible to the consequences of fire, and feel that there is

a high probability (78 percent) that a wildfire will occur near their home

in the near future. Yet the measures of perceived efficiency for both

specific and general risk reduction actions only explain a few of the

homeowners’ mitigating actions. These residents feel that mitigating

actions are, for the most part, effective, and they also believe strongly

in their ability to carry them out. The question then remains as to why

there are not more mitigating actions being implemented on homeowners’

lands.

• The residents’ (RHOA) strong feelings of vulnerability from wildfire

risks are enhanced by inaction of their neighbors, thereby negating the

effect of homeowner risk reduction actions. The residents not only

believe that they are responsible for defending their property, but also

that all neighbors, including homeowners, the Forest Service, and the

RHOA, should be involved in mitigating these risks.

• These findings suggest that information on wildfire issues should be

disseminated through City and County fire departments, which hold

more credibility with homeowners. Education should focus on including

the actions of the land management agencies and other community

projects so that homeowners feel it is truly a community effort and that

it is not something they are doing on their own.

• To gain support for prescribed fire as a treatment option, the Federal,

State, and local governments need to educate residents about the

benefits of prescribed fire, and perhaps even the benefits of prescribed

fire over mechanical removal.

• Postfire experience points to the importance of identifying and establishing relationships with preexisting community assets and organizations early on in a wildfire incident. This can help incorporate local

knowledge into firefighting and rehabilitation efforts and establish a
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003 31

recovery base that will continue once emergency Federal agency personnel and resources have left the community.

• Partnerships should be developed as early as possible during the fire by

the incident command, and several interviewees thought that they

should be developed by local Federal officials well before any fire. Such

up front collaboration was seen as a good way to systematize actions,

increase efficiency, and decrease potential contention between locals

and Federal agencies by building trust.

• While trust has been shown to be important in all natural resource

management matters, it is particularly important with wildfires where

a crisis brings in powerful outsiders to work in a community for a

limited but highly emotional period of time.

• Many evacuees expressed frustration with being forbidden to go back

to their homes. There was little understanding of how thin law enforcement was stretched, and people were restricted from going back to

houses not only just for safety reasons but also as the only manageable

means of preventing burglaries in evacuated areas on a fire the size of

Hayman (fig. 41).

• Informing the public prior to fire events about what is involved in

firefighting and rehabilitation efforts, including limitations prior to a

major event, should make public expectations more realistic

• The educational process should not be one way. Federal fire managers

need to work to better understand the actual capabilities and limitations of volunteer fire departments.

• While agencies have developed effective means of coordinating policy

and actions during a fire, similar efforts need to be made with rehabilitation work, particularly between the Forest Service and National

Resource Conservation Service.

• Given the complexity and importance of rapidly developing effective

solutions to minimize current and future wildfire damage, it is important to think out of the box as much as possible. Instead of relying on

traditional and often engrained methods and approaches, the ability to

be open to new and adaptive techniques and to meet locally identified

needs will be critical.

• The mix of social and economic effects of a large fire such as the

Hayman, especially when it occurs within the wildland urban interface,

is both complex and far ranging.

• The Hayman Fire has taken on national significance by becoming an

example of a consequence of what is wrong with current forest management policy. Consequently, the more we can learn from it, the more we

can use the Hayman experience to inform future debates over both

forest and wildfire management strategies.

Conclusions ______________________________________________________

The Hayman Fire was at the wrong place at the wrong time. The fires of

1910, and the resulting views of fire suppression, started the sequence of

events that helped facilitate the Hayman Fire. In 2002 much of the Hayman

area was rich in dry vegetation as a result of fire exclusion and the droughty
32 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003

conditions that prevailed in recent years. These dry and heavy fuel loadings

were continuous along the South Platte River corridor on the Front Range of

Colorado. These topographic and fuel conditions combined with a dry and

windy weather system centered over eastern Washington to produce ideal

burning conditions. The start of the Hayman Fire was timed and located

perfectly to take advantage of these conditions, resulting in a wildfire run in

1 day of over 60,000 acres at a distance of 16 to 19 miles.

The Hayman Fire Case Study revealed much about wildfires and their

interactions with both the social and natural environments. As the largest

fire in Colorado history it had a profound impact both locally and nationally.

We hope the findings of this study will inform both private and public

decisions on the management of natural resources and how individuals,

communities, and organizations can prepare for wildfire events. This study

was part of a learning process that began in 1910 and continues today, to

provide knowledge on the behavior, severity, and impact of wildfires.

References _______________________________________________________

Agee, James K. 1993. Fire ecology of Pacific Northwest forests. Washington, DC: Island Press.

493 p.

Carey , Alan; Carey, Sandy. 1989. Yellowstone’s red summer. Flagstaff, AZ: Northland

Publishing. 114 p.

Pyne, Stephen J. 2001. Year of fires: The story of the greast fires of 1910. New York: Penguin

Books. 322 p.

USDA Forest Service. 2000. Bitterroot Fires 2000, an overview of the events, effects on people

and resources, and postfire recovery priorities. Hamilton, MT: U.S. Department of Agriculture,

Forest Service. 108 p.

USDA Forest Service. 1978. When the mountains roared. Coeur d’Alene, ID: U.S. Department

of Agriculture, Forest Service, Coeur d’Alene National Forest. 39 p.
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The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits discrimination in all its

programs and activities on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion,

age, disability, political beliefs, sexual orientation, or marital or family status. (Not

all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Persons with disabilities who require

alternative means for communication of program information (Braille, large print,

audiotape, etc.) should contact USDA’s TARGET Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice

and TDD).

To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA, Director, Office of Civil Rights,

Room 326-W, Whitten Building, 1400 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington,

DC 20250-9410 or call (202) 720-5964 (voice or TDD). USDA is an equal

opportunity provider and employer.

The Rocky Mountain Research Station develops scientific information and technology to improve management, protection, and use of

the forests and rangelands. Research is designed to meet the needs

of National Forest managers, Federal and State agencies, public and

private organizations, academic institutions, industry, and individuals.

Studies accelerate solutions to problems involving ecosystems,

range, forests, water, recreation, fire, resource inventory, land reclamation, community sustainability, forest engineering technology,

multiple use economics, wildlife and fish habitat, and forest insects

and diseases. Studies are conducted cooperatively, and applications

may be found worldwide.

Research Locations

Flagstaff, Arizona Reno, Nevada

Fort Collins, Colorado* Albuquerque, New Mexico

Boise, Idaho Rapid City, South Dakota

Moscow, Idaho Logan, Utah

Bozeman, Montana Ogden, Utah

Missoula, Montana Provo, Utah

Lincoln, Nebraska Laramie, Wyoming

*Station Headquarters, Natural Resources Research Center,

2150 Centre Avenue, Building A, Fort Collins, CO 80526

RMRS

ROCKY MOUNTAIN RESEARCH STATION