COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Petty, Malveaux and Senior Judge Annunziata Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

ROLAND BALDWIN OPINION BY v. Record No . 0740-17-4 JUDGE W ILLIAM G. PETTY JULY 17, 2018 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF FAIRFAX COUNTY Randy I. Bellows, Judge Melissa Hasanbelliu, Assistant Pu blic Defender, for appellant. Rachel L. Yates, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on br ief), for appellee.
Roland Baldwin pled guilty to one count of sending a written th reat to kill or do bodily injury in violation of Code § 18.2- 60. On appeal, Baldwin argu es that the trial court allowed, and considered, improper testim ony at sentencing and in the vic tim impact statement before giving Baldwin the maximum sentence permitted by statute. Find ing no error, we affirm.
B ACKGROUND Baldwin was convicted in 2012 for m aking a written threat to ki ll or do bodily injury to M.T.; he was sentenced to five years, with four years suspended . Approximately two months after his release, Baldwin’s fou r-year suspended sentence was r evoked when he violated his probation by violating a protective order. 1 The protective order prohibi ted contact with M.T., the victim of the written threats f or which Baldwin was convicted. Baldwin violated the protective order by waiting near an organi zation he knew M.T. visited ofte n (the Center). When he began

1 Baldwin was convicted of viola ting the protectiv e order and se ntenced to 360 days in jail with all but one day suspended.PUBLISHED- 2 - walking toward M.T.’s van, appr oaching to with in one hundred fe et, several people from the Center helped M.T. escape. After Baldwin’s suspended sente nce had been rev oked, Baldwin wr ote new letters which contained threats against M.T., he r daughter, and the Center. Baldwin’s letters included the following excerpts: 2 People at the [Center] I will never forget what you have done. You have awaken the evil beast inside me. I have nothin g to lose. Don’t try me. This is between me and [M.T.]. Trust me, next time I won’t let no one ge t in my way. I will achieve my objective by any means necessary; I promise. I have a new famil y now. Signed, 666. [January 28, 2013] Enjoy yourself while you can. If I was [M.T.] and [her sister], I would try to crawl bac k into my mother’s womb when I get out. A great darkness is co ming. I can’t hear -- I can’t wait to hear your screams, I can promis e you that. All hail the great dragon. Signed, 666. [February 8, 2013] Satan is great. All I think a bout is what [M.T.] did to me and what she took from me. So I am going to take everything fr om her. She will be living the same hell I am but much much worse

. Her soul belongs to me. [M.T.] ’s nightmare is just beginning. See you all in hell. All hail the great dragon. Signed, 666. [Feb ruary 22, 2013] I have one year left, which I’m very glad. After having 5 years of my life taken away fro m me for words I didn’t mean. .

. . What [M.T.] did to me was very evil. Waiting 2 months to call the police to tell them I was at the bus stop waiting to do my resu me at the library. I had long forgotte n her then. But I remember [M .T.] now! [M.T.] and the entire [Center] should be on its knees praising God I won’t make a very b ad decision when I get out! [March 30, 2015]

2 These excerpts from Baldwin’s letters were proffered by the Co mmonwealth prior to Baldwin’s guilty plea. There were additional excepts proffered that did not include threatening material. The letters themselve s were not admitted into eviden ce, and the victim, M.T., referenced in her testimony other excerpts from letters and tex ts she received from Baldwin before and during this time pe riod. Baldwin did not deny writi ng any of the excerpts attributed to him.- 3 - In 2016, when Baldwin finished ser ving his sentence for the 201 2 threat, but before he was released, he was arrested a nd charged with making a written threat to kill or do bodily harm against M.T. through the letters referenced above. Baldwin ple d guilty to the charge, and he does not challenge his convicti on on appeal. He challenges the trial court’s consideration, during the sentencing phase of his trial , of M.T.’s statements regardi ng Baldwin’s first conviction for making written threats to her. According to M.T.’s victim impact statement and testimony, she met Baldwin at the Center and had dated him a few ti mes. The Center is a gatherin g place for vulnerable and homeless individuals, and M.T . often took her severely handicap ped daughter there. It provided her and her daughter a support ne twork. M.T. ended the relatio nship with Baldwin when he began sending her threatening tex t messages. She stated that B aldwin “ended up sending twenty-five explic it death threats describing how he was going to brutally kill [M.T.], [her] severely handicapped daughter, [he r] sister and others to punis h [M.T.] for ending contact and ignoring his pleas to give him a2nd chance.” According to M.T ., Baldwin described how he “staked out” the Center ever y day, watching for her van. He sa id he would have a gun so he could murder her, her daughter, a nd anyone from the Center who interfered. M.T. explained that on her first visit to the Center after Baldwin was released in 2012, Baldwin was waiting across the street from the Center jus t as he had described. When he s aw her van, he began walking towards her and got within one hundred feet, in violation of th e protective order to stay at least one thousand feet away. It terrifie d M.T. that even after a ye ar of incarceration, Baldwin was stalking her in the manner he ha d described in his threats. In his subsequent threats, Baldw in blamed M.T. for reporting hi s violation of the protective order. M.T. explaine d that she found the later thre ats more terrifying than the first ones because prior to his arrest Baldwin only knew M.T.’s first name, and Baldwin said he was- 4 - “hunting” her. M.T. hoped she c ould hide. However, when M.T. reported Baldwin’s violation of the protective order, Baldw in received through case document s M.T.’s personal contact and identification information. Baldw in then sent letters to M.T.’ s sister’s home enumerating personal details about M.T. tha t he had uncovered, including M. T.’s prior residences, her work resume, her parents’ names and a ddress, where she has her car r epaired, where she vacations, and even the hospital in which M .T. gave birth to her now-adult daughter. Additionally, Baldwin wrote in one letter deta ils of how he would use the new ly acquired information to track her down and harm her and her family. M.T. wrote in her victim impact statement that one of Baldwin’s statements at issue i n this offense, “Trust me, next time I won’t let no one get in my way! I will achieve my objective by any means necessary! I pr omise!”, was more terrifying “in light of his long history of death t hreats written with similar wording; it’s horribly clear to us what he means.” M.T. explained that because of t he history of escalating threat s from Baldwin, she was compelled to take painful measures to protect others. She left a job she loved at a preschool in order to protect the children f rom potential harm. She stopped volunteering at the Center in order to protect the people ther e, which was a painful emotiona l loss to her. M.T. was terrified because “in spite of his felony c onviction for [prior] death th reats, [Baldwin] has continued to send similar unwanted letters a nd threats through out his incarc eration featuring many of these alarming themes.” Baldwin pled guilty to writing t he threats. Baldwin objected to the victim impact statement submitted by M.T., and her testimony at sentencing, a rguing that her reference to the substance and effect of prior t hreats to M.T., for which he had previously been convicted, were not admissible testimony under the Crime Victim and Witness Rig hts Act.- 5 - A

NALYSIS On appeal, we review de novo the application of statu tory provisions. Harvey v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 280, 283, 777 S.E.2d 231, 233 (2015). “We apply the plain meaning of the language appearing i n the statute unless it is a mbiguous or applying the plain language leads to an absurd r esult.” Id. at 285, 777 S.E.2d at234 (quoting Commonwealth v. Amos, 287 Va. 301, 305-06, 754 S.E.2d 304, 306-07 (2014)). Add itionally, we recognize that “[c]ircuit court judges are ve sted with broad discretion in adm itting evidence, and can be expected to exercise that discre tion to exclude evidence that d oes not aid the court in the sentencing phase.” Id. at 286-87, 777 S.E.2d at 235 (internal citation omitted). “Such weighing is left to the discretion of the trial court and will not be di sturbed on appeal, absent an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 287, 777 S .E.2d at 235 (quoting Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 482, 643 S.E.2d 708, 723 (2007)). “In 1995, in recognition of the c oncern for the victims and wi tnesses of crime, the General Assembly enacted the C rime Victim and Witness Rights Ac t, Code §§ 19.2-11.01-11.4.” Rock v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 254, 258, 610 S.E.2d 314, 315 (2005). The purpose of the Act is “to ensure that the fu ll impact of crime is brought to the attention of the courts of the Commonwealth; that crime victims and witnesses are treated with dignity, respect and sensitivity; and that their privacy is prot ected to the extent permissible under law.” Id. at 258, 610 S.E.2d at 315-16 (quoting Code § 19.2-11.01(A)). Under the Act, a victim must be given the opportunity “to prepare a wri tten victim impact statement p rior to sentencing of a defendant . . . .” Code § 19.2-11.01(4). “If prepared by someone other than the victim , ” the victim impact- 6 - statement shall include six factors. 3 Code § 19.2-299.1. If the victim testifies in court to the impact of the crime, “[t]he court shall limit the victim’s test imony to the [six] factors set forth in clauses (i) through (vi) of subsection A of § 19.2-299.1.” Cod e § 19.2-295.3. While providing for victim impact testimony, “Code §§ 19.2-295 .3 and 19.2-11.01(B) do not limit the admission of [other] relevant evidence.” Rock, 4 5 Va. App. at 263, 610 S.E.2d at
318. Both Code § 19.2-295.3 and the factors it references from Code § 19.2-299.1 expressly apply to victim impact testimony. They do not, by their text or by implicati on, preclude a trial court fr om considering testimony from a vi ctim at the sentencing hearing about the underlying facts of the crime, provided that the tria l judge concludes, within his broa d discretion, that such evidenc e would help the court fashi on an appropriate sentence. Harvey, 65 Va. App. at 285-86, 777 S.E.2d at 234. Moreover, “[ t]he court must take into account a wide range of informa tion, including the defendant’s remorse or lack thereof, in determining ‘a sentence that best effectuates the criminal just ice system’s goals of deterrence (general and specific), incapaci tation, retribution and rehabil itation.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 363, 499 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1998) (citation omitte d). “Consideration of a

3 Code § 19.2-299.1 provides in part, If prepared by someone other tha n the victim, it shall (i) iden tify the victim, (ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the vict im as a result of the offense, (iii) i dentify the nature and extent o f any physical or psychological injur y suffered by the victim as a re sult of the offense, (iv) detail a ny change in the victim’s personal welfare, lifestyle or familial relationships as a result of the offense, (v) identify any request for psyc hological or medical services initiated by the victim or the vic tim’s family as a result of t he offense, and (vi) provide such othe r information as the court m ay require related to the impact of the offense upon the victim. Nothing in the plain text of the s tatute limits what a victim m ay include in his or her own victim impact statement. The trial c ourt has the discretion to determ ine which parts of the victim’s impact statement are relevant a nd therefore admissible. Harvey , 65 Va. App. at 286, 777 S.E.2d at 235.- 7 - defendant’s attitude ‘plays an i mportant role in the court’s de termination of the rehabilitative potential [and future dangerous ness] of the defendant.’” Id. ( alteration in origin al) (quoting State v. Howry, 896 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995)). Thus, “t he circumstances of the individual case will dictate what evidence will be necessary an d relevant, and from what sources it may be drawn.” Rock, 45 Va. App. at 262, 610 S.E.2d at 318 (quoting Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 384, 484 S.E.2d 898, 905 (1997)). Baldwin acknowledges that the r ecord of prior convictions and probation violations was properly before the court as pa rt of the presentence report. M oreover, Baldwin acknowledges that this Court recognized in Har vey, that the code sections pe rtaining to victim impact testimony do not preclude a court from cons idering a victim’s testimony r egarding the underlying facts of the crime if such evidence woul d help the court fashion an appr opriate sentence. See Harvey, 65 Va. App. at 285-86, 777 S.E.2d at 234. Nevertheless, Baldwin a rgues that M.T.’s testimony regarding the underlying facts of Baldwin’s prior convictions on related cri mes, where she was a victim, was inadmissible. We disagree. Here, M.T.’s testimony regard ing the underlying details of Bal dwin’s prior convictions 4 was relevant in “ensur[ing] tha t the full impact of [Baldwin’s] crime [was] brought to the attention of the court[].” Code § 19.2-11.01(A). In the conte xt of the guilt phase of a trial, this Court has previously held, Where a course of criminal c onduct is continuous and interwoven , consisting of a series of relate d crimes, the perpetrator has n o right to have the evidence “sanitized ” so as to deny the [factfinder] knowledge of all but the immediate crime for which he is on tri al. The fact-finder is entitled to a ll of the relevant and connecte d facts, including those which followe d the commission of the crime on trial, as well as those which preceded it; even though they may show the defendant guilty of other offenses.

4 Baldwin does not argue that th e details provided by M.T. aboutthe prior crimes are incorrect, and Baldwin had the opportunity to challenge the wri tten victim impact statement and to cross-examine M.T. when she testified.- 8 - Currier v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 605, 615, 779 S.E.2d 834, 838-39 (2015) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 526-27, 323 S.E.2d 572, 577 (1984 )). We see no reason that this principle would not apply withthe same force during the s entencing phase of a trial. Far from being an isolated event, Baldw in’s threats in the current offense were part of an ongoing pattern of threatening and psychol ogically tormenting this part icular victim. Therefore, Baldwin’s prior relationship wit h M.T., including his threats t o her and his violation of the protective order, provided the cont ext for the current offense. Furthermore, M.T. had the statu tory right to “identify the nat ure and extent of any physical or psychological injur y suffered by [her] as a result of the offense.” Code § 19.2-299.1(iii). M.T.’s testimony r egarding her disabled dau ghter and the early relationship with Baldwin explained why the progressive nature of the threat s made them more terrifying to her. M.T.’s testimony that Baldwin became “more specific about how, when and where he would kill [her] and what weapon he would use” explained the am plified impact of the later threats, which showed Baldwin w as still determined to carry out this threats. M.T.’s victim impact statement specifically li nked the details of Baldwin’s p rior crimes against her to the psychological impact of the current offense: It terrifies me that in spite of his felony conviction for thes e death threats, Baldwin has continued t o send similar un wanted letters and threats throughout hi s incarceration featur ing many of these alarming themes. I asked Mr. B aldwin to leave us alone on Augu st 3, 2011. Yet four years into his sent ence for threats of death or bodily injury, Mr. Baldwin was s till making terri fying written statements from behind bars that strike fear into my heart and cause me and many in the commun ity to fear for the safety and lives of me, my profoundly disabled daughter, my sister, my parents, and all the communities in which I am involved. (Name of daughter omitted). Additionally, M.T.’s victim impact statement used the details of the prior crimes to explain the amplified effect of the current offense:- 9 - Here is the crux of why I fi nd this second crime so much more terrifying and serious tha n the first. There is one big difference, a life or death diffe rence. Prior to his arrest, Mr. Baldwin knew only the first names of me and my daughter. We had gone on only a handful of dat es. That’s all he knew. H e couldn’t carry out his threats b ecause he couldn’t find me. Th at’s the one thing we had going for us . He wrote about how he was hunting me, how it was only a matter of time before he found me , and revealed several incidents in which he had successfully min ed information from unwitting mutual acquaintances about my whereabouts. The information was correct and we actually had a couple of near misses. I t was very scary. The only thing standing in the w ay of our murders was our anonymity. That’s gone now. The price my family has paid for reporting Mr. Baldwin’s crimes t o the police, is that he’s been able as a suspect and defendant, to lear n our identities. In these new threats, Mr. Baldwin has let us know that this changes everythi ng. While turning him in gained my family and our community five years of safety, it gained him our identities. I burst into te ars when I learned that Mr. Baldwin ha d been provided with the very information he needed to hunt us down and murder me and the people I hold most dear. I tri ed desperately to get that information redacted to save our lives. I hadn’t known that was going to happen but it was too late. I can ’t describe the feeling of se eing my innocent sister’s name in his writing in letters he then sen t from jail. I can’t describe the sorrow I felt. Indeed, M.T. described how Baldwi n taunted her with the informa tion and detailed how he would use it to hunt her down w hen he was released. A primary purpose of the Crime V ictim and Witness Rights Act i s “to ensure that the full impact of crime is brought to the attention of the courts of th e Commonwealth.” Code § 19.2-11.01(A). M.T.’s testimony br ought to the attention of the court the scope of Baldwin’s written threats, espec ially the increasingl y specific and perso nal nature of the threats. See Holcomb v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 339, 349, 709 S.E.2d 711, 716 (2011) (finding that although “[t]o the casual observe r the [written statements] may have seemed somewhat innocuous,” the “specificity dem onstrate[d] appe llant’s hostili ty towards [the victim]” because he “coupled each of these references with desires to violently retaliate against [the victim] and her family”). Thus, M.T.’s refere nces to Baldwin ’s prior threa ts, and her explana tion of why the- 10 - threats in the current offense were more terrifying, ensured th at the trial court was aware of the full impact of Baldwin’s current offense. Moreover, M.T. had a statutory r ight to testify to “any change in [her] personal welfare, lifestyle or familial relationships as a result of the offense. ” Code § 19.2-299.1(iv). M.T. referenced Baldwin’s prior act ions to explain her need to give up a job she loved in order to protect children from Baldwin’ s threatened violence. She expla ined the change in her relationship with her daughter a nd her sister, and especially h er increased fear on their behalf, when Baldwin threatened to harm t hem as a way to hurt her. The threats of the current offense against the Center caused M.T. t o give up her volunteer work at the Center in an effort to protect the people there from Baldwin. S he testified that this was a p ainful loss. M.T.’s testimony regarding her history with Baldwi n ensured that the court under stood M.T.’s well-founded fear that Baldwin might find her a nd harm those she loved as well. As a whole, M.T.’s written vict im impact statement and testimo ny were articulate summaries of the history of Baldw in’s threats against her and a lerted the trial court to the full psychological impact of the curre nt offense. To the extent tha t M.T.’s testimony did not fall squarely under the Code provisions permitting victim impact tes timony, the statements were still admissible if they were relevant information for sentencing. S ee Harvey, 65 Va. App. at 285-86, 777 S.E.2d at 234 (“[The code sec tions] do not, by their text o r by implication, preclude a trial court from considering testimony from a victim at the sentencin g hearing about the underlying facts of the crime, provided that the trial judge concludes, wi thin his broad discretion, that such evidence would help the court fashion an appropriate sentence.” ); Rock, 45 Va. App. at 263, 610 S.E.2d at 318 (“Code §§ 19.2-295.3 and 19.2-11.01(B) do not lim it the admission of [other] relevant evidence.”). “The cour t must take into account a wide range of information, including the defendant’s remorse or lack thereof, in determining ‘a sent ence that best effectuates the- 11 - criminal justice system’s goals of deterrence (general and spec ific), incapacitation, retribution and rehabilitation.’” Sm ith, 27 Va. App. at 363, 499 S.E.2d at 14. “Consideration of a defendant’s attitude ‘plays an i mportant role in the court’s de termination of the rehabilitative potential [and future dangerous ness] of the defendant.’” Id. ( alteration in original) (quoting Howry, 896 P.2d at 1004). Here, the written threats that f orm the basis for this offense did not occur randomly or in isolation. The current threats we re part of a multi-year campa ign by Baldwin to terrorize M.T. The details of Baldwin’s prior c onduct against the same victim were part of the “wide range of information” needed to effectua te an appropriate sentence. See id. The trial court was required to take into account Baldwin’s l ack of remorse, as evidenced by testimony that Baldwin blamed the victim for his incarcerati on, continued to make threats, an d vowed revenge. Incapacitation is a recognized purpose of incarce ration. See id. Baldwin’s taun ting of M.T. with the revelation that he had obtained her persona l information and his declarati on that he would enjoy her screams when he hunted her down, s upported the trial court’s co nclusion that incapacitation was an important purpose of in carceration in this case. Moreover, the trial judge , by virtue of his training and experience, is presumed to have s eparated the permissible victi m impact evidence from any potentially prejudicial statements, if any, concerning sentencing and to have considered only the former. The record amply supports the c onclusion that this was done in this case and that the trial court ’s judgment was not made in an arbitrary manner. Beck, 253 Va. at 386, 484 S.E.2d a t 906. “A judge, unlike a ju ror, is uniquely suited by training, experience and judicial disciplin e to disregard potentially pre judicial comments and to separate, during the mental process of adj udication, the admissible from the inadmissible, even though he has heard both.” Eckha rt v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 213, 216, 27 9 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1981).- 12 - The record reflects that the j udge was aware of the need to sep arate admissible from inadmissible testimony.
C ONCLUSION Clearly, Baldwin’s prior convict ions were admissible and relev ant during sentencing as part of a pre-sentencing report . However, to restrict the vict im’s reference to the previously adjudicated threats to the col d record would be t o sanitize the facts of the case and ignore the foundation of terror that Baldwin c onstructed prior to the curr ent offense. Such restriction would be the antithesis of the goal of the Crime Victim and Witness R ights Act, which is to ensure that the victim has the opportunity t o convey to the court the full impact of the crime. Baldwin’s prior detailed threats amplifie d the psychological injury M.T. suffered from the current offense. M.T. was entitled to identify these details to the court. Deta ils about the prior threats also provided vital information for the trial court’s determination of a proper sentence. Finding no abuse of the trial court’s cons ideration of M.T.’s testimony an d victim impact statement, we affirm. Affirmed.