[Cite as State v. Crump, 2021-Ohio-2574.]

 

Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Municipal Court 

 

Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: July 28, 2021 

Andrew Garth, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Meagan D. Woodall, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Lora Peters, Assistant 

Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

SHAWN CRUMP, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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: 

: 

: 

: 

APPEAL NOS. C-190636 

 C-190637 

TRIAL NOS. 18CRB-20414A 

 18CRB-20414C 

 O P I N I O N.

 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

 2

WINKLER, Judge. 

{¶1} Following a bench trial, defendant-appellant Shawn Crump was 

convicted of obstructing official business, in violation of R.C. 2921.31, and failing to 

disclose personal information, in violation of R.C. 2921.29(A)(1). On appeal, Crump 

contests the sufficiency and weight of the evidence underlying his convictions. For 

the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. 

Background Facts and Procedure 

{¶2} On August 6, 2018, Crump was arrested and charged with 

obstructing official business, disorderly conduct, and failure to disclose personal 

information. The charges arose out of a confrontation Crump had with the police on 

that day around 6 p.m. The case proceeded to a bench trial. 

{¶3} The state’s evidence showed Cincinnati police officers observed a 

teenaged girl standing alongside Hamilton Avenue near the Cincinnati Police 

Department’s District Five station. The girl was crying and wearing a four-foot long 

cardboard sign hung around her neck that read, “I’m a th[ie]f.” Police officers 

observed that she had a swollen thumb and she complained of pain. Their attempts 

to investigate the girl’s welfare were interrupted by Crump, who identified himself as 

the girl’s father and pulled her behind him. Crump delayed the investigation by 

repeatedly telling the police they could not talk to his daughter and instructing her 

accordingly. 

{¶4} When a crew from the fire department arrived at the scene, Crump 

again pulled his daughter behind him and refused requests that medical personnel be 

allowed to look at the injury. Eventually, Crump was arrested so that his daughter 

could be evaluated. Initially, Crump calmly submitted to the arresting officer, but 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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once in handcuffs he became irate, shouting profanity-laced objections and 

commanding his daughter’s silence. 

{¶5} Before the fire department’s arrival, investigating officers had asked 

Crump to provide his name and his address. He provided his full name to one 

officer, but he never provided an address, indicating only that he lived “down the 

street.” 

{¶6} Defense counsel cross-examined the two investigating officers who 

testified by showing them “relevant” portions of the encounter that had been 

captured on their body-worn cameras and saved to a DVD. Although the DVD 

accepted into evidence contained additional footage from the officers’ cameras, 

defense counsel identified “for the record” the authenticated segments he had played 

in court. 

{¶7} During closing argument, defense counsel argued that Crump had 

exercised his privilege as a parent to refuse medical treatment for his child, conduct 

that could not be sanctioned under the obstructing statute. Further, defense counsel 

contended that Crump’s failure to provide his address did not hamper the 

completion of the police report and thus did not result in a violation of the 

obstructing-official-business or failure-to-disclose statutes. Finally, defense counsel 

argued that Crump’s words and manner were not sufficiently egregious to satisfy the 

disorderly-conduct statute. 

{¶8} Ruling from the bench, the judge found Crump guilty of the 

obstructing and failure-to-identify offenses, but not guilty of the disorderly-conduct 

offense. These timely appeals followed. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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Standards of Review 

{¶9} Crump’s sole assignment of error challenges his convictions on 

sufficiency and weight-of-the-evidence grounds. When reviewing the sufficiency of 

the evidence, this court asks whether, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio 

St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶10} Conversely, when considering a claim that the evidence weighs 

against a conviction, this court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts 

in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a miscarriage 

of justice that the conviction must be reversed and new trial ordered.” State v. 

Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983), quoted in State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). 

Obstructing Official Business 

{¶11} R.C. 2921.31(A) provides: “No person, without privilege to do so and 

with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any 

authorized act within the public official’s official capacity, shall do any act that 

hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the public official’s lawful 

duties.” 

{¶12} Crump maintains the evidence fails because he acted with “privilege” 

in refusing medical treatment for his daughter. “ ‘Privilege’ means an immunity, 

license, or right conferred by law, bestowed by express or implied grant, arising out 

of status, position, office, or relationship, or growing out of necessity.” R.C. 

2901.01(A)(12). 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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{¶13} For Crump’s proposition, he cites cases supporting the argument that 

a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest to decide whether a child 

receives medical treatment. See In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 

1169 (1990), citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 

599 (1982) (“Parents have a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody, and 

management of the child.”); In re S.H., 9th Dist. Medina No. 13CA0066-M, 2013-

Ohio-4380, ¶ 15. Crump concedes that the right to refuse medical treatment for a 

child is not without limitation, but he asserts absent an urgent need for care, a 

parent’s refusal to consent to treatment must stand unless a court orders otherwise. 

See In re S.H. at ¶ 38. Because the injury in this case involved a nonurgent, nonlife 

threatening injury to his daughter’s hand, Crump concludes he had the constitutional 

right to refuse medical treatment for his daughter and thus, he acted with privilege in 

refusing a physical examination of her. 

{¶14} For purposes of this appeal, we accept Crump’s summary of the law 

regarding a parent’s constitutional right to refuse medical treatment for his or her 

child. We conclude, however, that Crump’s argument based on this law is misplaced. 

The dispositive issue here is whether Crump had a privilege to impede a police 

investigation into his daughter’s welfare, including the degree and source of her 

injury. 

{¶15} Crump argues this case does not involve an officer’s suspicion of a 

crime such as domestic violence or assault, but that argument simply ignores the 

facts. One of the investigating officers expressly testified he suspected Crump’s 

daughter had been assaulted, perhaps by him. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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{¶16} Ultimately, we conclude Crump’s privilege-based argument is 

meritless, and that his conviction for obstructing official business was supported by 

sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Failure to Disclose Personal Information

{¶17} Next we review Crump’s arguments challenging his conviction for 

failing to disclose personal information to the investigating officers. The relevant 

statute provides, “No person who is in a public place shall refuse to disclose the 

person’s name, address, or date of birth, when requested by a law enforcement 

officer who reasonably suspects * * * [t]he person is committing, has committed, or 

is about to commit a criminal offense.” R.C. 2921.29(A)(1). This subsection of R.C. 

2921.29 applies to questioning in the context of an investigative detention, or “Terry 

stop,” and not to questions posed during a consensual encounter. State v. Starcher, 

7th Dist. Jefferson No. 14JE17, 2014-Ohio-5223, ¶ 19-21. 

{¶18} Crump argues that he merely failed to provide his specific address 

during a consensual encounter, and that his conduct was not criminal because it did 

not prevent the arresting officer from obtaining his personal information in a timely 

manner for purposes of filling out the arrest form. We reject these arguments. First, 

the evidence shows the police elicited Crump’s personal information during an 

investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion of domestic violence, not 

during a consensual encounter. Second, the subject statute does not contain the 

additional element of obstruction. 

{¶19} Finally, at oral argument, appellate counsel advanced an argument 

attacking the conviction based on footage that the trial court did not view but that 

allegedly was submitted to the court on the DVD containing the videos from the 

body-worn cameras. As a reviewing court, our record is limited to the record before 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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the trial court. See State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978). 

Here, the transcript from the trial shows the court admitted only the “relevant” 

portions of the DVD, the footage that defense counsel specifically identified and 

showed in court. Because this new argument is based on evidence outside the 

record, we reject it. See id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶20} Ultimately, the evidence shows a recalcitrant father, in the process of 

disciplining a child with a visible injury, who failed to provide his street address to an 

officer seeking that information during a well-founded investigation into whether the 

father had inflicted the child’s injury. We conclude that Crump’s conviction for 

violating R.C. 2921.29(A)(1) was supported by sufficient evidence and was not 

against the weight of the evidence. The trial court was in the best position to weigh 

the evidence, and the record demonstrates the trial court did so carefully. We cannot 

say this is an “exceptional case” in which the evidence weighs heavily against a 

conviction. See Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717. 

Conclusion 

{¶21} Crump’s convictions for obstructing official business and failing to 

disclose personal information were supported by sufficient evidence and were not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Consequently, we overrule the 

assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgments. 

Judgments affirmed. 

MYERS, P.J., and SUNDERMANN, J., concur. 

J. HOWARD SUNDERMANN, JR., retired, from the First Appellate District, sitting 

by assignment. 

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry this date.