Russia and China increasingly seek to 

offset U.S. influence in Central Asia through enhanced cooperation conducted under the banner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

(SCO). While its impact is often exaggerated, the 

SCO does offer certain benefits to the states of 

the region, as well as to Moscow and Beijing, 

that the United States can ill afford to ignore.

The United States and its North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization allies play a critical

role in Central Asia through their stabilizing 

presence in Afghanistan, something that neither Russia nor China can match. Central Asia’s 

geostrategic qualities keep America strongly 

interested in retaining access and building cooperative, stable relations with regional states.

Russia and China oppose U.S. democracy 

promotion as naïve or subversive (or both). Yet 

neither has articulated a vision for systemic 

change and long-term stability in the region. 

Russia’s influence is a matter of its imperial 

past, economic interdependence, and trading 

routes. Russia depends on Central Asian 

energy resources and labor, but its control over 

both gives it leverage over the region. China’s 

influence has been growing due to expanding 

trade, acquisition of energy resources, and 

overall rise as a major power.

China and Russia will remain significant 

actors in Central Asia, and advancing U.S. 

interests in this region will become more 

complicated if Russia and China are ignored. 

Dialogue and limited cooperation with both 

countries in areas of mutual interest should 

be important elements of a successful U.S. 

strategy for the region.

The SCO Record

Since the Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization (SCO) called upon the United 

States to commit to withdraw its military 

personnel from Central Asia at its July 2005 

summit, the SCO has acquired the reputation 

as a significant obstacle to U.S. policy. However, this reputation obscures the real state 

of affairs. Notwithstanding press reports 

about the challenge posed by the SCO to 

U.S. policy in Central Asia, a close look at the 

organization, the behavior of its members, 

their motivations, and the practical impact 

of their declarations suggests that the SCO’s 

challenge to U.S. interests and policies in 

Central Asia is less than meets the eye.

But ignoring the SCO simply because of 

its limited capabilities for action and concrete 

results would be a mistake; it is more than a 

paper tiger. As a political organization, it is 

an important vehicle for Russian and Chinese 

diplomacy aimed to counter U.S. influence 

in the region. The SCO also provides a forum 

where Central Asian states, dwarfed by their 

giant neighbors, can sit at the table with them 

as equals, at least nominally. For all these 

reasons, the SCO is worth the attention of the 

United States. The question is what kind of 

attention we should pay to it.

The SCO has its origins in the April 1996 

meeting of the heads of the Shanghai Five 

states—China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

and Tajikistan—to address border management issues, enhance cross-border cooperation, 

and promote confidence-building measures. 

In an effort to put the legacy of Sino-Soviet 

tensions behind them and to avoid new friction 

arising from the uncertainties of the postSoviet era, the heads of the Shanghai Five states 

signed the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust 

in Border Regions in 1996 and the Treaty on 

Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions 

in 1997. The annual meetings of the Five 

continued until 2001, with the addition of 

Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov as a 

guest in 2000. Beyond the annual gatherings 

and the two initial treaties, however, the Five’s 

record of accomplishment was quite slim.

In June 2001, the original five states 

and Uzbekistan established the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization and issued a declaration in which they pledged to work together 

to enhance mutual security and stability in 

their region. In 2003, a joint counterterrorism 

center was established in Shanghai; in 2004, a 

Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure was established in Tashkent; and in 2006, SCO members 

agreed to establish a new institute to fight 

transnational crime. In addition, SCO members 

have conducted several military exercises; 

pledged to promote economic cooperation; 

embraced the eventual goal of setting up a 

free trade area; and established an interbank 

council to fund future development projects.

While many of these initiatives look 

impressive on paper, the resources available to 

support them and the capabilities that member states can put into action remain uncertain. 

With the exception of China and Russia, 

SCO member states have few resources and 

capabilities for action in areas of regional 

Strategic Forum

No. 223

November 2006

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

No. 223, November 2006 Strategic Forum 

China, Russia and the Balance 

of Power in Central Asia

by Eugene B. Rumer
 Strategic Forum No. 223, November 2006

security or economic development. Thus, the 

organization remains heavily dependent on 

its two leading members to develop such 

capabilities.

China and Russia see the organization 

as a useful vehicle for forging greater regional 

political cooperation but in a manner that 

would tend to limit the role and influence of 

outsiders in the affairs of Central Asia. The 

SCO has granted observer status to India, Iran, 

Pakistan, and Mongolia but has held off on 

extending actual memberships to new prospects. The controversial issue of Iran’s potential 

membership is both a source of opportunity for 

Russia and China to demonstrate their ability 

to challenge U.S. global dominance, as well as 

a nuisance, since granting Iran full membership could prove more of an irritant for 

relations with the United States than either 

Moscow or Beijing would like.

Thus, the SCO barely surpasses the sum 

of its parts. Its capabilities are quite limited. 

Its period of greatest activity coincided with 

Uzbekistan’s decision to expel the United 

States from the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) airbase 

in 2005, but that decision was purely a matter of bilateral U.S.-Uzbek relations. The SCO 

served as a convenient forum for Uzbekistan 

to couch its demands in a multilateral setting 

and demonstrate a measure of international 

support for its action, but the SCO was most 

likely the net beneficiary of that episode, having 

seen its status as an international organization 

enhanced to the point where it could successfully challenge the United States. However, if 

Uzbekistan’s demands had been made without 

the SCO’s summit as a backdrop, the result 

undoubtedly would have been the same.

The organization’s strength is proving to 

be its chief weakness as well. Its role as Russia’s 

and China’s instrument of control in Central 

Asia is likely to come into conflict with the 

region’s desire for greater integration in the 

international arena. The SCO’s success as a 

regional security and economic development 

organization will hinge on its ability to generate the will and resources that its members 

need to address the many pressing concerns 

they have. So far, the organization’s record is 

proving to be mixed at best.

Nuisance or Threat?

How consequential is the SCO from the 

standpoint of U.S. interests? Clearly, the 

organization’s influence in the region is considerable, and its biggest members—China 

and Russia—have the ability to undercut 

American initiatives there. But the SCO’s power 

to produce concrete results where they matter 

the most to its members—security and stability—is limited at best, and all its members 

have a strong interest in the success of the 

principal U.S. mission in the region, which is 

to secure Afghanistan.

Russia and China have a big stake in 

another American mission in the region: 

setting Central Asia on the path of long-term, 

sustainable security and development. However, 

both have strong reservations about the U.S. 

approach to achieving these goals and any 

expansion of U.S. influence in their mutual 

backyard. Indeed, in 2005, the SCO established 

an Action Plan to advance trade and economic 

cooperation among member states. 

Notwithstanding its recent setbacks in 

Central Asia, most notably the withdrawal 

from the Karshi-Khanabad airbase and the 

upsurge in violence in Afghanistan, the United 

States continues to exert substantial influence 

over the region’s security. It does so despite the 

inherent challenge of operating in Afghanistan 

(which has no rail and very few paved roads), 

and the overall Herculean task of sustaining 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

and coalition operations (International 

Security Assistance Force and Operation 

Enduring Freedom, respectively) half way 

around the world with no direct land or sea 

access to the country. Nothing illustrates the 

true global reach of the United States than 

its military operations in Afghanistan—a 

capability that is unique and beyond the grasp 

of Russia or China in the foreseeable future.

Without U.S. and other NATO member 

presence, Afghanistan has few prospects to 

return to stability and regain a measure of 

prosperity; it will threaten the security and 

stability of Central Asia. The ripple effect will 

not stop at Central Asia proper and is certain 

to reverberate into Russia and China—a 

fact that no doubt is well understood in both 

Moscow and Beijing.

U.S. Interests

For the United States, Central Asia’s 

importance derives primarily from its 

geographic proximity to Afghanistan; it has 

served as a stepping stone to the remote, landlocked country, which otherwise would be 

even less accessible to the United States and its 

allies. Central Asia itself is only marginally 

more accessible than Afghanistan, but that 

margin makes an important difference, one 

that proved crucial during the early stages of 

the military campaign against the Taliban 

in 2001. Airbases in Kyrgyzstan and, until 

November 2005, Uzbekistan have played an 

important role in facilitating U.S. operations 

in Afghanistan.

The loss of K2 left the United States 

dependent on its airbase in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, 

as an important base for supporting operations 

in Afghanistan. However, Kyrgyzstan, rocked 

by instability since the 2005 “Tulip revolution” that overthrew long-time president Askar 

Akayev, has proven a difficult partner. Intense 

negotiations with the government, which 

has demanded significantly higher payments 

from the United States for the use of the 

Manas facilities, resulted in a new agreement 

in July 2006.

But Central Asia is more than a stepping 

stone to Afghanistan. It is the heartland of 

Eurasia, the continent’s crossroads surrounded 

by every important continental power—

Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and Iran. In 

the context of the U.S. global posture that puts 

a premium on unimpeded access and ability

to deploy forces quickly, the crossroads of 

Eugene B. Rumer is a Senior Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense 

University. Please address questions or comments to his attention at ndu-inss-research@ndu.edu.

SCO influence in Central 

Asia is considerable, and 

its biggest members—— 

China and Russia——have 

the ability to undercut 

American initiatives there
No. 223, November 2006 Strategic Forum 

Eurasia is an important piece of real estate. 

Its control by a hostile power resulting in U.S. 

loss of access would be fraught with negative 

consequences for U.S. interests in several 

regions—from China to the Middle East.

Central Asia has generated a good deal 

of interest in the United States and elsewhere 

because of its hydrocarbon reserves. Important 

as they are in the context of Eurasia, as well 

as for select U.S. commercial interests, these 

reserves are of relatively low significance in 

the global energy context or from the standpoint of U.S. energy security. 

Central Asian oil deposits, located 

primarily in Kazakhstan but also in smaller 

quantities in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 

are projected to generate less than 5 percent 

of the global oil supply once full production 

is achieved. The landlocked region will eventually be serviced by three pipeline routes— 

through Russia, to China, and across the 

Caspian to the recently completed BakuCeyhan pipeline to the Eastern Mediterranean. 

Given the limited volume of Caspian oil and 

its proximity to major markets in Europe and 

Asia, little, if any, of it is likely to reach U.S. 

markets. Nonetheless, as a nontrivial producer, 

Central Asia will contribute to global energy 

security through supply diversification.

Central Asia is also home to significant 

deposits of natural gas with major fields 

located in Turkmenistan, as well as in 

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. However, Central 

Asian natural gas is a prisoner of the region’s 

geography and limited export routes that 

make it hugely dependent on Russian gas 

pipelines. Because of Russia’s self-interest and 

control over export pipelines, Central Asian 

gas can reach only a handful of markets. This 

was amply demonstrated during the January 

2006 gas crisis involving Russia, Ukraine, 

European customers, and Central Asian 

producers. The latter found themselves at the 

mercy of the Russian government, locked into 

less lucrative markets.

This situation is unlikely to change 

because industry analysts widely expect 

Russian gas production from existing fields to 

decline in the years ahead. Russia’s Gazprom 

has not been able to attract investment in

volumes necessary to bring new fields online. 

The unmistakable implication of this is that 

the gap between Russia’s demand for gas— 

for domestic consumption, as well as to satisfy its export commitments in Europe—and 

its available supply is unlikely to be closed by 

domestic production alone. Russia will need 

Central Asian gas to meet these obligations. 

The bottom line with regard to Central Asian 

gas therefore is clear: its role in U.S. energy 

security is likely to be even less than that of 

Central Asian oil.

Preventing state failure and uncontrolled 

spaces in Central Asia has been an important 

U.S. interest before and especially since the start 

of the war on terror. U.S. policy in this regard 

has followed three major avenues: political 

reform as a means to broader political participation and more stable political regimes; 

economic reform as a means of sustainable 

development, prosperity, and stability; and 

security assistance as a means of countering 

key threats to the region, including traffickers, 

terrorist groups, and illegal armed formations.

Significant as they are, especially with 

Afghanistan certain to remain one of the top 

items on the national security agenda for the 

foreseeable future, long-term U.S. interests 

in Central Asia are that of a global power. In 

other words, they are regional in nature and as 

such do not rise to the top tier of U.S. national 

security agenda, dominated by global concerns, 

except in unusual circumstances. Central Asia 

is nonetheless important to the United States 

as a function of its interests in the neighboring 

regions and global security concerns.

Central Asia appears more important 

to the other two major powers—Russia and 

China—as a matter of both their regional 

and global concerns. Besides Afghanistan itself 

and the five post-Soviet Central Asian states, 

Russia and China have been the biggest beneficiaries of the U.S. military campaign against 

the Taliban and the ensuing stabilization 

and reconstruction effort. While uncomfortable with the fact of the U.S. military presence 

in their shared strategic backyard, the two 

Eurasian powers accepted it and took 

advantage of its consequences—a more stable 

Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Russia: On the Rebound?

Neither China nor Russia has ever truly 

welcomed the U.S. presence in Central Asia or 

facilitated it significantly. Neither was willing 

to combine its efforts with those of the United 

States on behalf of regional security and 

stability. As the former imperial power in 

Central Asia, Russia especially held that its 

interests would be well served by “balancing” 

U.S. presence in form, if not in style. It 

deployed a token air contingent to Kyrgyzstan 

and touted the SCO as a security organization 

poised to counter U.S. presence as the key 

factor in regional security affairs.

Russian interests in Central Asia are relatively easy to discern. They are a product of 

geography, history, economics, and culture, 

which add up to a powerful rationale for Russia to keep a close eye on the region. Concurrent with the downturn in U.S.-Uzbek relations 

in 2005, Russia has assumed a more active 

posture in Central Asia, seeking to minimize 

U.S. presence—political, economic, and especially military—and reestablish itself as the 

preeminent regional actor. A series of highlevel visits, including Russian-Uzbek summits 

and declarations, were clearly designed to send 

the message that Russia was back and resurgent. The 2005 SCO declaration calling on 

the United States to commit to a schedule for 

withdrawing its troops from Central Asia was 

reportedly adopted at Russia’s strong urging.

Besides the imagery of Russia returning 

to its former position of influence in 

Central Asia, Moscow has demonstrated little 

in the way of improved capabilities for 

projecting power into the region or securing 

its interests there by other means. In fact, 

Russian actions have revealed even less by 

way of a clear vision of Russian interests in 

Central Asia or a strategy for realizing them. 

Most if not all Russian actions appear to be 

tactical in nature with little consideration for 

their long-term consequences. Russian participation in the SCO falls into that category.

preventing state failure 

and uncontrolled spaces 

in Central Asia has been 

an important U.S. interest 

before and especially 

since the start of the war 

on terror
Russia has a strong interest in keeping 

Central Asia stable and free of radical elements. 

Given the long and unsecured border Russia 

shares with Central Asia, Moscow’s concerns 

about unrest in Andijon, explosions in Tashkent, 

or Tajikistan’s civil war are easy to understand.

Besides stability and security, Russia has 

important economic interests in Central Asia. 

The region’s economy is still closely intertwined with Russia’s as a legacy of Soviet 

central planning. Although the 15 years since 

the Soviet breakup have seen significant 

changes to that legacy, much of it is still in 

place as a matter of tradition, geography, 

transportation arrangements, and technology.

Transportation issues remain especially 

important in Russian–Central Asian relations, 

though much more as a matter of Central 

Asian interests in Russia than vice versa. 

Central Asian exports of energy and other 

goods move to markets through Russian pipelines, railroads, and ports. But that too has 

given Russia an additional economic stake in 

Central Asia as a trading partner.

Energy trade recently has emerged as an 

especially strong Russian interest in Central 

Asia, whose gas exports have figured prominently in Russian gas trade with Ukraine and 

the rest of Europe. The prospect of a significant 

shortfall in Russian domestic gas production 

and the importance for Russia to sustain its 

own lucrative gas trade with Europe make 

control of Central Asian gas flows a special 

concern for Moscow. The ability to control 

gas exports could prove decisive to Russia’s 

relations with Ukraine, which relies heavily on 

a mix of Russian and Central Asian gas, 

as well as Europe, which relies on long-term 

contracts with Russia to supply gas to its 

environmentally conscious consumers.

Besides gas, Russia is keenly interested in 

one other key import from Central Asia—its 

people. Despite the economic recovery over 

the past 7 years, the Russian population has 

been declining by as much as 750,000 people 

annually. The demographic crisis and its 

impact on Russian population statistics as well 

as on the country’s economic outlook were 

acknowledged recently by President Vladimir 

Putin in his annual address to the Federal 

Assembly and the nation. Economic growth 

has generated strong demand for labor, which 

Russia has satisfied in recent years by importing hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, 

of migrant workers from the former Soviet 

countries, including Central Asia. While the 

exact statistics on migrant labor are difficult to 

come by, media reports suggest that this traffic 

has developed into a two-way dependency—

Russia on migrant labor from Central Asia, 

and Central Asia on migrant workers’ remittances from Russia.

No list of Russian interests in Central 

Asia is complete without at least a passing 

reference to the fate of ethnic Russians in that 

region. Although many are reported to have 

moved back to the Russian Federation, as many 

as 7 million still remain. No Russian government will be able to ignore their fate in the 

event of significant disturbances in the region.

Last but not least among Russian interests 

in Central Asia is the issue of China. The 

challenge of China’s rise as a superpower is the 

single most difficult issue on Russia’s foreign 

and security policy agenda. Central Asia is but 

one theater in which Russian interests are 

bound to be challenged by the ever-expanding 

Chinese economic, political, and security footprint. Russia’s foreign policy community has 

only begun to grapple with this issue, but signs 

of future tensions are already appearing in 

Russian policy discussions and newspaper 

reporting. The future of Central Asian gas flows 

and control of oil fields have already emerged as 

contentious issues between Russia and China.

In the years to come, balancing China’s 

growing influence in Central Asia is likely to be 

an important and increasing interest of Russia’s

—one that Russia is likely to share with the 

countries of Central Asia, whose ability to deal 

with China on their own is limited at best. From 

the standpoint of both Russia and its Central 

Asian partners, the SCO could play a useful role 

as force multiplier for dealing with China and 

constraining its influence in a subtle way. 

Perhaps this is a sign of a future Russian 

strategy in the region, which could eventually 

combine elements of cooperation and competition with both China and the United States, 

while forging alliances with local regimes in 

Central Asia. This, however, would require 

Russia to muster the kind of intellectual and 

material capabilities that it has yet to 

demonstrate.

Despite an extensive list of important 

interests and considerable resources available 

to policymakers to advance those interests, 

Russian policy in the region cannot be even 

remotely considered a success. With few 

exceptions, it has been driven by near-term, 

tactical considerations at the expense of 

longterm interests and with no regard to the 

question of sustainability of Russian policy 

or the status quo in the region.

For example, the Russian tendency 

to abuse its control of gas pipelines and 

squeeze its Central Asian trading partners 

for maximum short-term concessions on price 

has undercut Russia’s long-term interest 

in securing access to Central Asian gas 

supplies. Turkmenistan has been seeking 

alternative routes to Afghanistan and China; 

Kazakhstan has made a commitment to the 

Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. All understand full 

well that they have to depend on Russia, and 

all resent this situation.

One interpretation of Russian policy 

toward the SCO is that Moscow uses the organization to reconcile its short-term interest 

in U.S. presence to help secure the region with 

its long-term interest in preventing the United 

States from establishing permanent bases 

there. The most notable aspect of Russian 

policy in this area has been its use of the SCO 

platform to encourage announcement of a 

timetable for American withdrawal from the 

region. In the short term, a withdrawal of U.S. 

and NATO troops from the one remaining base 

in Kyrgyzstan would have an adverse effect on 

U.S. operations in Afghanistan and increase 

the risk of instability spreading into Central 

Asia as well. Such a turn of events would 

presumably be very detrimental to Russian 

security interests. Yet Russia reportedly 

sponsored the 2005 SCO declaration calling 

for precisely that. However, in the long term, 

the Kremlin clearly fears a permanent U.S. 

 Strategic Forum No. 223, November 2006

the challenge of China’s 

rise as a superpower 

is the single most difficult 

issue on Russia’s foreign 

and security policy agenda
military presence in its backyard, a development also worrisome to Chinese leaders.

Russian policy in Central Asia and position with regard to Afghanistan reflect little 

if any understanding of the need for systemic 

change in the region at large. Russian 

policymakers seem content with the status 

quo with little apparent concern about its 

sustainability. Hence, their policy amounts to 

currying maximum favors with incumbent 

regimes regardless of their expected longevity.

Russia’s post-2005 rapprochement with 

Uzbekistan was heralded in the Russian press 

as a major victory of diplomacy. A more critical assessment of the relationship suggests that 

the victory was due more to Uzbek President 

Islam Karimov’s decision to break relations 

with the United States following the Andijon 

crisis than to the skill of Russian diplomats. 

Moscow simply offered a target of opportunity 

for Karimov who, having been criticized 

by the United States for his handling of the 

Andijon events, needed to demonstrate to 

his subjects that when it comes to foreign 

policy, Washington was not the only game 

in town.

Having embraced Karimov as Moscow’s 

new best friend in Central Asia and taken on 

new security commitments toward Uzbekistan, 

few in Russia’s foreign policy establishment 

seem to be concerned about internal instability 

in that country, the outlook for Uzbekistan’s 

economy, prospects for political succession 

there in the event of Karimov’s demise, and a 

whole host of other policy-relevant questions 

that analysts in the United States and Europe 

have been trying to answer for years. This 

rather lackadaisical attitude toward a key 

country in a crucial region for Russian 

security suggests that Russia still lacks a 

viable strategy for Central Asia.

However, opportunistic, tactical moves 

by Russia, perhaps in collusion with China, 

could still damage U.S. interests considerably. 

Depending on the state of U.S.-Russian 

relations in the future, the Kremlin might 

see a continued U.S. military presence in the 

region as more worrisome than the risk of 

some additional turmoil along Russian 

borders. Moscow’s lack of a long-term strategy for Central Asia is no reason to ignore 

its behavior there.

China: Rising Hegemon

China, while taking a lower profile than 

Russia with respect to a military and security 

presence in the region, has continued to 

expand its economic ties to Central Asia. But 

along with economic ties, it has begun to 

acquire political weight and recognition that 

it lacked in the region during the previous 

decade. The 5 years since the original U.S. 

deployment to Central Asia have seen China’s 

emergence as the rising economic power in 

the region formerly dominated by Russia.

China’s interests in Central Asia, while 

manifested most clearly in the economic 

sphere, are highly unlikely to be limited to 

trade, investment, and energy flows. Central 

Asia borders on China’s western provinces, 

where Uyghur separatists have long challenged 

Chinese sovereignty. The breakup of the Soviet 

Union, Russia’s loss of Central Asia, and the 

resulting destabilization of the region must 

have been a worrisome development for Chinese leaders, one that they most certainly were 

not prepared to accept as precedent-setting.

Important as they are, China’s interests 

in Central Asia pale in comparison to its 

interests in the East: Taiwan, relations with 

North Korea, Japan, the United States, and a 

whole host of neighbors in Southeast Asia. 

With its strategy for securing its western 

provinces evidently resting on the domestic 

pillars of economic development and ethnic 

assimilation, Beijing appeared content to 

leave Central Asian security to Russia and the 

United States, while expanding its economic

ties in the region. The fruit of that expansion 

has begun to show in recent years, as China 

emerged as a major player with regard to 

Central Asian energy. It is close to completing 

an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang; 

it has signed an agreement to build a gas 

pipeline from Turkmenistan to China; and it 

has acquired stakes in Caspian oil fields.

Membership in the SCO has served 

China well, giving it a major voice in Central 

Asian affairs without antagonizing Russia 

and alarming regional leaders, while keeping 

the United States at bay. However, beneath 

this low-key, patient approach to the region 

lies the same lack of strategic direction seen 

in Russian policy toward Central Asia. While 

reaping the benefits of U.S. security assistance 

to Central Asia in the short run and letting 

Russia play the “heavy” role in the regional 

tug of war with the United States, China 

appears to heed the same policy of adhering 

to the political status quo as Russia with no 

questions asked about the future. This reflects 

China’s longstanding policy of noninterference in the internal political affairs of other 

countries. This policy has been welcomed by 

the authoritarian leaders of other SCO countries and enshrined in various SCO summit 

declarations as a rallying cry against the 

more forceful democracy promotion activities 

of the United States and its allies. As the 2005 

SCO summit declaration contended:

multilateral cooperation, which is based on 

the principles of equal right and mutual 

respect, nonintervention in internal affairs of 

sovereign states, nonconfrontational way of 

thinking and consecutive movement towards 

democratization of international relations, 

contributes to overall peace and security, 

and calls upon the international community, irrespective of its differences in ideology 

and social structure, to form a new concept 

of security based on mutual trust, mutual 

benefit, equality and interaction.

Neither China nor Russia has been 

willing to sign on to the long-term vision 

put forth by the United States, which has 

always included political and economic liberalization as the twin pillars of sustainable 

regional security order. Since the beginning 

of the war on terror, political and economic 

reforms took on new urgency as an integral

element. That in turn has led to stepped-up 

tensions between the United States on the one 

hand and Russia and China on the other. The 

former is more convinced than ever before 

No. 223, November 2006 Strategic Forum 

China’s interests in Central 

Asia, while manifested 

most clearly in the economic sphere, are highly 

unlikely to be limited 

to trade, investment, and 

energy flows
and China have, and are likely to have, 

throughout Central Asia in the future, their 

reactive posture and reliance on local regimes 

make it difficult for the United States to reduce 

its own exposure to local instabilities.

Toward a New Strategy

Geography alone, to say nothing of 

history, economics, and culture, means that a 

successful U.S. strategy for Central Asia requires 

efforts aimed at bringing Russia and China 

along. Each of them is in a position to act as a 

spoiler. At the same time, neither has an interest 

in making the situation in the region worse.

It is not clear whether China and Russia 

accept the necessity of region-wide transformation but disagree with the United States only on 

the methods for achieving it. Considerable 

evidence suggests that if political liberalization 

is both the means and the end of reform in 

Central Asia, Russia and China are likely to be 

opposed to it, at least in the near term. Both are 

likely to view political liberalization as especially destabilizing and threatening the security of Central Asia and its neighbors, including 

themselves. Both Russia and China are prone 

to view the experience of the Orange, Rose, and 

Tulip revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and 

Kyrgyzstan as harmful to their interests. 

The lesson most likely drawn by Beijing and 

Moscow from those upheavals is that decisive 

use of force is critical for stability and security.

Such Russian and Chinese perceptions 

are likely to be reinforced by the experience 

of 1989 in China and the entire chaotic 

decade of the 1990s in Russia. By contrast, 

political consolidation in China post-1989, 

and in Russia post-2000, has coincided 

with periods of greater stability and unprecedented prosperity.

With regard to Central Asia, where 

democratic traditions have very shallow roots at 

best, and the prospect of instability represents 

an ever-present danger, Russian and Chinese 

policymakers must have seen U.S. attempts to 

promote democracy as destabilizing and naïve. 

They must have been reinforced in that view 

by the experience of the Tulip revolution in 

Kyrgyzstan where, since the 2005 upheaval 

triggered by charges of fraudulent elections, the 

new government has been unable to consolidate 

its power and return the country to stability.

that its emphasis on liberalization is the necessary precondition for long-term stability in 

the region. The latter, joined by regional governments, have rejected that vision and opted 

for the status quo without putting forth an 

alternative to the U.S. approach. The result has 

been an impasse.

Democracy and Stability: 

Collusion or Collision?

U.S. elevation of democracy promotion 

into an existential struggle for victory over terrorism and an essential foundation for peaceful 

relations among states has put it squarely at 

odds with China and Russia, both of whom have 

approached the task of combating terrorism as 

a matter of defeating specific organizations and 

strengthening regimes currently in power. They 

see noninterference in internal political affairs 

as the key to regional peace and cooperation. 

A free hand in dealing with internal threats of 

terrorism, separatism, and extremism is viewed 

as necessary to maintain stability.

Neither Russia nor China has developed a 

long-term vision for combating terror or a model 

for sustainable development in Central Asia. Both 

Russia and China have sought to undermine 

U.S. efforts to promote political and economic 

liberalization in Central Asia, having evidently 

determined that these efforts posed a threat 

to their influence and the region’s stability. 

The Chinese eschew any “good governance” 

conditionality on their foreign assistance, partly 

because cooperation without conditions is a 

Chinese comparative advantage in increasing 

Beijing’s influence. Moscow has reacted to 

the idea of U.S. democracy promotion even 

more vigorously. Russian policymakers have 

perceived U.S. initiatives as a challenge to the 

Kremlin’s power and authority not only in 

neighboring countries but also in Russia itself. 

They even felt compelled to articulate their own 

doctrine of “sovereign democracy,” which treats 

foreign support for domestic democratic movements and nongovernmental organizations as 

a form of external meddling in the internal 

affairs of Russia and its neighbors.

China and, increasingly, Russia under 

Putin have stressed that economic development is key to long-term political stability. 

Russian and Chinese leaders have maintained 

 Strategic Forum No. 223, November 2006

that authoritarian rule can be useful in 

promoting economic development. This claim 

grows out of China’s and Russia’s respective 

paths toward economic modernization in 

the last 15 years. It is also supported by 

development patterns of some countries in 

East and Southeast Asia. However, China’s 

and Russia’s approach to long-term stability 

in Central Asia, emphasizing economic 

development at the expense of political liberalization, does not stand up to scrutiny. 

There is no evidence to suggest that they have 

encouraged economic reform in any of the 

Central Asian countries.

Central Asia—with the notable exception 

of Kazakhstan, where economic development 

owes much to its oil wealth—has not followed 

in the footsteps of the so-called Asian Tigers 

who pursued a combination of internal economic reforms, trade liberalization, and foreign

investment, even as they moved more slowly 

on political reforms. Economic development 

has stalled in most of Central Asia; authoritarian rule has led to further corruption and done 

little to cure poverty and underdevelopment. 

Thus, the Russian and Chinese strategy of economic development first and political modernization second does not seem to be working in 

Central Asia and appears dangerously close to 

an ad hoc policy of going along with incumbent regimes as long as they are friendly.

Moscow and Beijing appear to equate 

stability with good relations with a particular 

local leader or regime. They invest heavily in

the status quo, which forces them to adopt a 

reactive, rather than proactive, approach to 

Central Asian security, and which in turn 

leaves them dependent upon events on the 

ground. Considering the influence that Russia 

geography alone, to 

say nothing of history, 

economics, and culture, 

means that a successful 

U.S. strategy for Central 

Asia requires efforts 

aimed at bringing Russia 

and China along
membership in one of the very few clubs that 

will take them is important.

The U.S. policy community has not 

recognized the importance of the SCO, which 

has been either dismissed as insignificant or 

criticized as hostile to the United States. At this 

point, it is neither. Often ignored or spurned 

by the United States, the SCO could, but does 

not have to, become the antidemocratic bloc 

of authoritarian Eurasian governments that 

rail against intervention in internal political 

affairs. A more accepting stance on the part of 

the United States, a recognition that Central 

Asian countries need the SCO for reasons 

that are not necessarily detrimental to U.S. 

interests, and exploration of ways for the 

United States (as well as NATO, OSCE, and 

the European Union) to work with SCO 

countries on mutual interests could help 

prevent this outcome.

Should the United States attempt again 

to join the SCO as an observer? The United 

States was previously rejected in its attempt 

to obtain an observer’s status with the 

organization. The potential benefits of 

American involvement would include better 

information about the organization’s activities 

and internal workings; increased diplomatic 

leverage with Russia, China, and Central Asia; 

increased ability to counter Iran’s overtures 

to the SCO and Central Asia; and improved 

ability to advance U.S. interests in Central 

Asia. The list of potential drawbacks of 

U.S. involvement in the SCO includes the 

possibility of another rejection of U.S. 

application for an observer’s status; the 

limited opportunities that such a status (if 

acquired) would confer upon the United States 

as a mere observer; and potential conflicts 

between the SCO charter and other U.S. treaty 

obligations. None of these appear as either 

a major breakthrough or a fatal flaw. The 

organization’s importance to China and 

Russia, as well as to Central Asia, suggests 

that this issue merits serious consideration. 

A U.S. decision to pursue an observer’s status 

with the SCO would send an important signal 

to all concerned that the United States views 

the organization seriously and recognizes its 

value to its members.

The U.S. position with regard to the SCO 

could be instrumental to American efforts to 

Russian and Chinese assessments of that 

experience are likely to have resonated in 

other Central Asian capitals as well, where 

the U.S. campaign of democracy promotion 

and free market reforms has been met with 

reluctance and suspicion by the communist 

era leaders still in charge. As a result, Russian 

and Chinese positions in Central Asia have 

been strengthened, most likely as a counterweight to U.S. pressures for liberalization. 

Since 1991, U.S. policy has emphasized 

dealings with Central Asian governments as 

independent and sovereign. The notion of 

consulting with Russia and China about 

Central Asian countries has at times been 

viewed in the U.S. policy community as a 

violation of Central Asian independence and 

sovereignty. Combined with Russian and 

Chinese suspicions of U.S. policy in Central 

Asia, U.S. reluctance to engage Moscow and 

Beijing in discussions about the region left 

the five Central Asian countries free to exploit 

the differences among the major powers. 

Without seriously engaging Russia and 

China in a dialogue about Central Asian security, their interests and policies in the region, as 

well as U.S. interests and policy there, the United 

States is likely to have increasing difficulty forging an effective policy and realizing its interests 

there. Such a dialogue may indeed appear as 

undercutting Central Asian sovereignty and 

independence. However, since achieving their 

independence, none of the Central Asian countries has been able to fully realize it, act truly as 

a sovereign nation, and stand on its own in the 

community of civilized nations. To some degree, 

these countries have been wards of the international community and consumers of a security 

environment shaped substantially by others. 

As their governments remain unwilling or 

unable to face up to the challenge of long-term 

sustainable political and economic development, they endanger their own citizens, as well 

as the neighboring countries. As stated in the 

2005 U.S. National Defense Strategy:

It is unacceptable for regimes to use the principle of sovereignty as a shield behind which 

they feel free to engage in activities that pose 

enormous threats to their citizens, neighbors, 

or the rest of the international community.

U.S. policy must remain respectful of 

Central Asian independence and sovereignty. 

But it cannot afford to remain blind to 

regional realities and ignore key actors in 

regional affairs. Nor should U.S. respect for 

Central Asian independence and sovereignty 

come at the expense of U.S. security interests. 

Those regional realities are such that China 

and Russia will remain significant actors in 

Central Asia for the foreseeable future. U.S. 

policy in Central Asia is bound to be more 

complicated if Russia and China are not, at

least tacitly, on board. Therefore, a deliberate effort to reach out to them would be an 

important element of a successful U.S. strategy for the region.

More dialogue between the United States 

and China/Russia could be useful concerning 

competing views on the balance between 

economic development and more representative political institutions. This dialogue could 

complement ongoing discussions between 

the United States and China on foreign 

aid and the balance between conditional 

programs that produce more growth and 

stability and unconditional programs that 

produce immediate political influence.

One further result of changing Central 

Asian politics has been the rise of the SCO. 

The organization serves a useful purpose for 

the countries of Central Asia by providing 

them with a common forum with Russia and 

China. Membership in the SCO provides 

an alternative destination for Central Asian 

leaders resentful of the United States and 

suspicious of its democracy promotion. 

Moreover, membership carries with it the 

symbolic but important benefit of belonging 

to a larger whole. For countries that are 

routinely criticized by the Organization for 

Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 

and have no prospect of joining NATO, 

No. 223, November 2006 Strategic Forum 

U.S. reluctance to engage 

Moscow and Beijing in 

discussions about the 

region left the five Central 

Asia countries free to 

exploit the differences 

among the major powers
Ultimately, the SCO is neither a paper 

tiger to be ignored nor a strategic heavyweight 

to be countered aggressively. By virtue of its 

political influence, it poses a challenge to U.S. 

interests, but one that in all likelihood can be 

managed at a relatively small cost. If successful, U.S. efforts to engage the SCO in a series 

of cooperative ventures could minimize the 

organization’s negative impact on U.S. interests and contribute to the security and stability 

of Central Asia.

engage China, Russia, and Central Asia in a

discourse about the future of the region, its 

near-term prospects, and long-term outlook. 

But it does not need to be more than that— 

a mere instrument of U.S. outreach to the key 

actors in Central Asia. A dialogue with China 

and Russia about Central Asia could lead to 

a more cooperative stance on the part of both 

Beijing and Moscow, as well as a better future 

for the region itself.

Even without observer status, the United 

States could seek to engage the SCO on a wide 

range of issues of concern to both the United 

States and SCO members. These consultations 

could include representatives of the United 

States, European Union (EU), and NATO/ 

Partnership for Peace (PFP). For example, 

they could include consultations on:

■ anti-terrorism cooperation and information 

exchanges with Central Asian governments.

■ U.S.–EU–Russia–China cooperation 

with Central Asians on enhancing border policing 

and customs procedures. This could help foster 

and safeguard trade, economic cooperation, and 

energy transit as well as help in countering terrorist 

activities, drug trade, and other illegal trafficking 

that undermine security and stability.

■ PFP humanitarian and peacekeeping 

activities/exercises in Central Asia. These have 

included the Russians and could be opened to the 

Chinese. They could even become joint PFP/SCO 

activities if SCO really develops this cooperation. 

Also, the United States has helped build a United 

Nations Center for Peacekeeping Training in 

Mongolia, which is an SCO observer. Central 

Asians could be invited to train together at this 

center to develop regional peacekeeping capability.

■ a dialogue on how enhanced governance 

and economic reforms could heighten long-term 

stability and security in the region, as a way to 

convince Russia and China that these Central Asian 

regimes need to undertake internal reforms.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at www.ndupress.edu.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of 

international security affairs and defense studies. Through an 

active outreach program, including conferences and publications, 

INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

I nstitute for N ationa L S trategic S tudies

Stephen J. Flanagan

James A. Schear Director	 David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press

 Strategic Forum No. 223, November 2006