In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐3473

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

TYREE M. NEAL, SR.,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 4:00‐cr‐40101‐06 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JULY 8, 2015 — DECIDED JANUARY 21, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Appellant Tyree Neal was sen‐

tenced to prison and supervised release after pleading guilty

to federal drug crimes in 2001. He was released from prison

in 2010 but was sent back in 2013 for another eight‐

een months after violating several conditions of his super‐

vised release. When Neal completed the new term of impris‐

onment in 2014, he asked the district court to rescind a spe‐
2 No. 14‐3473

cial condition of supervised release authorizing warrantless

searches of his person and residence. That condition, Neal

argued, is inappropriate for drug offenders. The district

court denied the motion to rescind the condition, prompting

this appeal regarding the search condition. But on appeal

Neal also challenges for the first time the legality of all of the

standard conditions of supervised release that were imposed

initially in 2001 and again in 2013.

A threshold question is whether a district court is author‐

ized to revisit an arguably unlawful condition of supervised

release if that condition could have been challenged on di‐

rect appeal but was not. We conclude that 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e)(2) permits a defendant to request relief from a con‐

dition of supervised release on substantive grounds, such as

that the condition is substantively unlawful or that it no

longer serves the purposes of supervised release. Section

3583(e)(2) does not authorize such late challenges based on

asserted procedural errors from the time of the original sen‐

tencing, such as a claim that the court failed to provide a suf‐

ficient explanation for the condition or that there was not

sufficient evidence to support the then‐unchallenged condi‐

tion. On the merits, however, we uphold the search condi‐

tion. We also decline to address Neal’s appellate challenge to

the standard conditions of supervised release. He waived

that claim by not raising it in the district court.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Neal pled guilty to a conspiracy charge and to substan‐

tive counts involving powder and crack cocaine. In

June 2001 the district court sentenced him to a total of

137 months in prison to be followed by three years of super‐
No. 14‐3473 3

vised release. He did not appeal the sentence. Neal was re‐

leased from prison in December 2010.

A month later, in January 2011, Neal’s probation officer

petitioned the district court to add a special condition of su‐

pervised release requiring Neal to submit to mental‐health

treatment. After a hearing the district court imposed that

condition and modified another condition prohibiting Neal

from possessing controlled substances unlawfully and also

requiring periodic drug testing. Neal appealed the drug‐

testing condition. We affirmed based on Neal’s history of

drug abuse. United States v. Neal, 662 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2011).

In December 2012 the probation officer again asked the

district court to modify Neal’s conditions of supervised re‐

lease. The probation officer proposed a curfew, requiring

Neal to be at home from 9:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. for six

months. The probation officer also sought a special condition

requiring Neal to submit to warrantless searches of his “per‐

son, residence, real property, place of business, computer or

electronic communication or data storage device or media,

vehicle, or any other property” if there was a reasonable

suspicion of finding contraband or evidence of a violation of

a supervised‐release condition. Before the district court had

acted on that request, however, the probation officer peti‐

tioned for revocation of Neal’s supervised release based on

numerous violations, including lying to the probation officer

and possessing cocaine and marijuana.

During a revocation hearing in March 2013, Neal

admitted the violations. The district court revoked his

supervised release and imposed eighteen more months of

prison, plus a new three‐year term of supervised release to

follow. The court orally imposed eight special conditions,
4 No. 14‐3473

including the search condition that the probation officer had

requested. The court’s written judgment also listed

thirteen “standard conditions of supervised release” that

were not mentioned during the hearing. These same

standard conditions, with only minor differences, had been

imposed at Neal’s sentencing in 2001.

Neal filed a notice of appeal, but his lawyer sought leave

to withdraw on the ground that an appeal would be

frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). No

concern was raised about any condition of supervised

release in counsel’s submission or in Neal’s response in

opposition filed under Circuit Rule 51(b). In February 2014,

we granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed

Neal’s appeal. United States v. Neal, 556 F. App’x 495 (7th Cir.

2014).

Neal was released from prison again in June 2014 and

began his second term of supervised release. Two weeks

later he filed a pro se motion to modify conditions of super‐

vised release and asked that counsel be appointed. That mo‐

tion did not identify any statute or rule authorizing relief. It

sought to have the special conditions of supervised release

set aside as “inappropriate” but did not single out any par‐

ticular condition. The district court appointed counsel, who

did not file an amended motion.

At a hearing on Neal’s motion, his lawyer explained that

Neal was contesting only four of the eight special conditions

of supervised release. After the hearing, Neal dropped his

challenges to all but the condition requiring him to submit

to warrantless searches of his person and property based on

a reasonable suspicion of contraband or violations of super‐

vised release. We limit our discussion to that condition.
No. 14‐3473 5

Neal’s probation officer testified that the search condition

was necessary because Neal had failed three drug tests and

had a history of deceiving probation officers and using

drugs while on supervised release. Neal argued that a condi‐

tion authorizing warrantless searches can be imposed only

on persons convicted of sex offenses against minors, not

those convicted of drug offenses. Neal also argued, citing

United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2014), that the

district judge had erred in the 2013 revocation hearing by

imposing the search condition without making a specific

finding of necessity.

The district court concluded that the search condition

was necessary because Neal had previously used drugs

while on supervised release and yet was balking at even

drug treatment. The court noted that the search condition is

“not a wide‐open, ‘I can come to your house at any time day

or night’” provision. Instead, the court explained, any search

must be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable

manner based on reasonable suspicion of finding contraband

or some other evidence of a violation. Neal filed a notice of

appeal and was assigned new counsel.

II. Analysis

On appeal Neal continues to insist that a special condi‐

tion authorizing warrantless searches is appropriate only for

those convicted of sex offenses against minors, not drug

crimes. Neal also argues, citing United States v. Thompson, 777

F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015), that a “full remand is required” be‐

cause, when his present term of supervised release was im‐

posed in 2013, the district court did not justify re‐imposing

the thirteen standard conditions. Before we can turn to these

questions, we must consider under what circumstances a
6 No. 14‐3473

defendant may use a post‐judgment motion to contest a

condition of supervised release that could have been chal‐

lenged on direct appeal but was not.

A. Availability of Motion Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2)

Conditions of supervised release are part of a defendant’s

sentence, Thompson, 777 F.3d at 373, and the avenues

available to alter a sentence are limited. Apart from a direct

appeal, a defendant’s options might include a prompt mo‐

tion to correct a clear error, Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) (fourteen

day limit); a motion for a sentence reduction to reward sub‐

stantial assistance, Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b); a petition for a sen‐

tence reduction under a retroactive amendment to the Sen‐

tencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); or an application

to vacate an illegal conviction or sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

See Suggs v. United States, 705 F.3d 279, 281 (7th Cir. 2013);

United States v. Redd, 630 F.3d 649, 650–51 (7th Cir. 2011);

Romandine v. United States, 206 F.3d 731, 734–35 (7th Cir.

2000); United States v. Vilar, 645 F.3d 543, 546 (2d Cir. 2011);

United States v. Blackwell, 81 F.3d 945, 947–48 (10th Cir. 1996).

In addition, as a general proposition, a district court may

modify conditions of supervised release at any time under

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). See United States v. Ramer, 787 F.3d

837, 838–39 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Evans, 727 F.3d

730, 732 (7th Cir. 2013). At oral argument Neal identified

§ 3583(e)(2) as the authority for his “Motion to Modify Con‐

ditions of Supervised Release.” We agree that his use of

§ 3583(e)(2) was proper, but the path to that conclusion is not

as simple as the “at any time” text might suggest.

Section 3583(e)(2) provides:
No. 14‐3473 7

Modification of conditions or revocation. —

The court may, after considering the factors set

forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),

(a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7) —

(2) extend a term of supervised release if less

than the maximum authorized term was previ‐

ously imposed, and may modify, reduce, or en‐

large the conditions of supervised release, at

any time prior to the expiration or termination

of the term of supervised release, pursuant to

the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure relating to the modification of pro‐

bation and the provisions applicable to the ini‐

tial setting of the terms and conditions of post‐

release supervision ... .

The references in § 3583(e) to portions of § 3553(a) incor‐

porate, for purposes of decisions to modify conditions of su‐

pervised release, nearly all of the original sentencing goals,

excepting only the need for a sentence to reflect the serious‐

ness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to

provide just punishment, and the directive to consider the

“kinds of sentences available.”

There may be many reasons for a district court to modify

or clarify a defendant’s conditions of supervised release,

even long after the term of supervision was imposed.

See Evans, 727 F.3d at 732–33 (modification permitted with‐

out violation or even changed circumstances; modification is

permitted to respond to changes in the supervisee’s circum‐

stances and new ideas and methods of rehabilitation); United

States v. Lilly, 206 F.3d 756, 759, 761–62 (7th Cir. 2000); Fed.

R. Crim. P. 32.1, Advisory Committee notes (1979).
8 No. 14‐3473

Other circuits, too, recognize that § 3583(e)(2) can be used

to alter conditions of supervised release to promote effective

supervision. This is true even if the change is prompted not

by changed circumstances but by a court’s or a probation of‐

ficer’s recognition of a shortcoming in the original conditions

that arguably could have been foreseen when the term of

supervised release was first imposed. See United States v.

Bainbridge, 746 F.3d 943, 946–50 (9th Cir. 2014); United States

v. Lonjose, 663 F.3d 1292, 1296, 1302–03 (10th Cir. 2011); Unit‐

ed States v. Begay, 631 F.3d 1168, 1170–73 (10th Cir. 2011);

United States v. Davies, 380 F.3d 329, 332 (8th Cir. 2004); Unit‐

ed States v. Lowenstein, 108 F.3d 80, 84–85 (6th Cir. 1997).

We have not yet decided whether the scenarios allowing

for modification include a defendant’s delayed contention

that a condition of supervised release was imposed errone‐

ously in the first place. However, we recently adopted a fair‐

ly broad approach to the “at any time” language in

§ 3583(e)(2), holding that it allows a defendant to challenge

the lawfulness of a condition of supervised release even

while an appeal is pending. See Ramer, 787 F.3d at 838 (dis‐

trict court could act on parties’ joint motion un‐

der § 3583(e)(2) to correct unlawful condition relating to col‐

lecting restitution).

We are aware of three circuits with precedential opinions

addressing the scope of § 3583(e)(2) in language that is not

consistent with our approach, though we do not necessarily

disagree with the results in those cases. In United States v.

Lussier, 104 F.3d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1997), the Second Circuit held

that a defendant whose conviction and sentence were al‐

ready final could not use § 3583(e)(2) to challenge anew the

legality of the restitution term of his original sentence. The
No. 14‐3473 9

defendant in Lussier had not challenged the restitution term

on direct appeal or even under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because one

term of his supervised release was to make restitution pay‐

ments, however, he argued that he could use § 3583(e)(2)

years later to bring, in effect, a collateral challenge to that

restitution order. The Second Circuit rejected that effort. We

agree with the core reasoning of Lussier that § 3583(e)(2)

should not be used in that manner, which would evade the

detailed statutory scheme for orderly and timely appellate

review of sentences, including restitution orders.

The Lussier opinion also used broader language, howev‐

er, seeming to extend its reasoning to any argument that any

condition of supervised release is illegal in any respect: “The

plain language of subsection 3583(e)(2) indicates that the il‐

legality of a condition of supervised release is not a proper

ground for modification under this provision.” 104 F.3d at

34. The Lussier court reasoned that illegality is a basis for a

challenge to a sentence on direct appeal under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3742(a) or in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, while

§ 3583(e)(2) directs a district court to consider the goals of

sentencing under § 3553(a) but makes no reference to illegal‐

ity.

The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have followed this broader

language and reasoning in Lussier. In United States v. Hatten,

167 F.3d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1999), a defendant tried to use

§ 3583(e)(2) to challenge a condition of supervised release

that had delegated to the probation officer decisions about

his restitution payment schedule. The government agreed to

correct the error. The district court did so, adopting as the

court’s order the same schedule the probation officer had

chosen. On the defendant’s appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that
10 No. 14‐3473

the district court lacked jurisdiction to make the correction,

following the broad language in Lussier about any challenges

to legality of supervised release conditions.

In United States v. Gross, 307 F.3d 1043, 1044 (9th Cir.

2002), the Ninth Circuit also followed the broad language of

Lussier and Hatten. The defendant in Gross was still appeal‐

ing his original sentence for bankruptcy fraud when he tried

to use § 3583(e)(2) in the district court to modify conditions

of his supervised release that limited his business and prop‐

erty dealings. The Ninth Circuit held that modification could

not be based on a finding that a condition was illegal, but it

remanded the matter for the district court to consider

whether the statutory factors or changed circumstances

would call for modification of the conditions. But see United

States v. Miller, 205 F.3d 1098, 1101 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2000)

(reading both Lussier and Hatten narrowly, limited to chal‐

lenges based on legality of original sentence).

Also consistent with these decisions, the Second Circuit

in United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 2005),

considered on direct appeal the defendant’s constitutional

challenge to a condition of supervised release. The court re‐

jected the government’s argument that the issue should be

deferred on the theory that the sentencing court could revisit

the challenged condition of supervised release at any time

under § 3583(e)(2). The constitutional issue (restrictions on

the defendant’s contact with his own son) had been raised in

a timely and proper way on direct appeal. The Second Cir‐

cuit found no reason to defer a decision on that issue until

the defendant completed his prison sentence and began his

term of supervised release.
No. 14‐3473 11

The parties have not addressed these decisions, nor have

we found a precedential appellate opinion disagreeing with

the broader language in them. We have no disagreement

with the results in Lussier or Myers. In each case the court of

appeals reached a result aimed at ensuring orderly pro‐

cessing of appeals. In Lussier, the defendant tried to use

§ 3583(e)(2) to bring a late and collateral challenge to the res‐

titution component of the original sentence itself. In Myers

the defendant had brought a timely challenge to supervised

release on his direct appeal, and the Second Circuit under‐

standably saw no need to defer a decision. (We are less con‐

fident about the results in Hadden and Gross, but they are al‐

so factually distinguishable from our case.)

We are not persuaded, however, by the broader language

interpreting § 3583(e)(2) as implicitly barring challenges to

the legality of current conditions of supervised release.

When confronted with a serious challenge to the legality of a

currently binding condition—one that could be enforced by

sending the defendant back to prison—we believe a court

would need much more explicit statutory direction than we

find in the text of § 3583(e) to refuse to consider the issue.

The alternative view would require a person under supervi‐

sion who sought to challenge an ambiguous or arguably il‐

legal restraint on his liberty to violate the condition and to

risk a return to prison. Consistent with this concern, the ad‐

visory committee notes to Rule 32.1 explain that a person on

probation (and now supervised release) should be able to

obtain clarification or modification of an ambiguous condi‐

tion without first having to violate it. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1,

Advisory Committee notes (1979).
12 No. 14‐3473

We conclude that § 3583(e)(2) is better interpreted to al‐

low a defendant to bring substantive challenges to the cur‐

rent legality of conditions of supervised release. This view is,

we believe, more consistent with the aims of supervised re‐

lease and with the language and evident purpose of

§ 3583(e)(2), which, again, allows modification “at any time.”

This approach is consistent with and follows from our

earlier decisions in closely related circumstances. In United

States v. Silvious, 512 F.3d 364, 370–71 (7th Cir. 2008), the de‐

fendant argued on direct appeal that some conditions of su‐

pervised release were overbroad. Because he had not raised

the issues in the district court, we reviewed only for plain

error. We held there was no plain error precisely because the

challenged conditions would be “readily modifiable at the

defendant’s request” under § 3583(e)(2) and Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32.1. We explained: “Encouraging this

simple expedient to remedy erroneously imposed condi‐

tions, rather than perpetuating expensive and time‐

consuming appeals and resentencings, promotes the integrity

and public reputation of criminal proceedings.” 512 F.3d at

371.

Similarly, in United States v. Tejeda, 476 F.3d 471, 475–76

(7th Cir. 2007), we held in direct appeals that a district

court’s erroneous delegations of authority to a probation of‐

ficer to determine the details of drug treatment and testing

programs on supervised release did not amount to a plain

error requiring immediate correction because § 3583(e)(2)

provided a means for correcting the error once the defend‐

ants actually began their supervised release. And in United

States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 726 (7th Cir. 2005), we held in

a direct appeal that an overly broad condition of supervised
No. 14‐3473 13

release was not a plain error requiring immediate correction

because the defendant could obtain correction later, when

his term of supervised release began, under § 3583(e)(2).

The point of supervised release is to rehabilitate persons

discharged from prison and to assist their law‐abiding re‐

turn to society. See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59

(2000); United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 836–37 (7th Cir.

2015); United States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, 252 (2d Cir. 2015);

United States v. Sullivan, 504 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 2007);

United States v. Armendariz, 451 F.3d 352, 361 (5th Cir. 2006).

Conditions of supervised release should facilitate an offend‐

er’s transition back to ordinary life rather than stand as

“’a significant barrier into a full reentry into society.’” United

States v. Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511, 522 (7th Cir. 2013), quot‐

ing United States v. Perazza‐Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 71 (1st

Cir. 2009). Protection of the public from further crimes by the

defendant is also an important goal of supervised release.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), referring to § 3553(a)(2)(C).

To these ends, the law gives district courts flexibility and

discretion to formulate a beneficial plan of supervised re‐

lease. But “a judgeship does not come equipped with a crys‐

tal ball,” so predictions about appropriate conditions of su‐

pervised release are imperfect. Kappes, 782 F.3d at 838.  

Section 3583(e)(2) accommodates these uncertainties by

allowing changes to an offender’s conditions of supervised

release at any time. Evans, 727 F.3d at 732–33; Davies, 380

F.3d at 332. It gives the parties and district judges a mecha‐

nism to ensure that the conditions they impose remain rele‐

vant and beneficial. Conditions may need to be altered to fit

changes in society (a good example in recent years has been

the practical necessity for some access to the internet, which
14 No. 14‐3473

had earlier been considered a luxury) or to account for “’new

ideas and methods of rehabilitation.’” Davies, 380 F.3d at 332,

quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1, Advisory Committee note on

Rule 32.1(b) (1979); see Evans, 727 F.3d at 732–33; Begay, 631

F.3d at 1171 n.2.

Modification might also be warranted to address issues

arising with real‐world applications of particular conditions.

Lilly, 206 F.3d at 762 (explaining that § 3583(e)(2) authorizes

defendant to seek “clarification of a term or condition of su‐

pervised release so that the defendant may have an oppor‐

tunity to comply with the court’s order without first having

to violate it”); see also United States v. Mickelsen, 433 F.3d

1050, 1057 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming supervised release con‐

dition requiring probation officer’s permission for contact

with any children under 18 years old; defendant could use

§ 3583(e)(2) to seek relief from arbitrary denial of permission

to have contact with his grandchildren).

We do not see a reason to treat a condition of supervised

release that arguably is facially invalid or even unconstitu‐

tional differently from conditions that are ambiguous or

outdated. A term of supervised release should “simulate life

after the program’s end.” Perazza‐Mercado, 553 F.3d at 71.

That goal would be defeated by subjecting offenders to con‐

ditions of release that are unconstitutional or otherwise fa‐

cially invalid. An offender saddled with fatally vague or

overbroad conditions may be more likely to fail. The very

nature of some invalid conditions makes compliance diffi‐

cult or uncertain, and a misstep risks an unjustified return to

prison.  

It might be argued that it is not necessary to read “at any

time” in § 3583(e)(2) literally since a defendant already has
No. 14‐3473 15

available a direct appeal and sometimes § 2255 to contest the

legality of conditions of supervised release. And we certain‐

ly do not mean to suggest that § 3583(e)(2) can be used for a

collateral challenge to terms of the underlying sentence,

which the Second Circuit rejected in Lussier. But the detailed

conditions of a distant term of supervised release are typical‐

ly far from the mind of a defendant at sentencing.

See Thompson, 777 F.3d at 373; United States v. Bryant, 754

F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2014); Siegel, 753 F.3d at 711. Most

fundamental, it is difficult for the judge, the probation office,

counsel, and the defendant to predict reliably which condi‐

tions will best fit the defendant’s situation years hence. The

“at any time” term of § 3583(e)(2) provides all actors with a

means to tailor the conditions to the defendant’s situation.

The appropriate balance should bar a defendant from

using § 3583(e)(2) to argue that a facially valid condition of

supervised release must be rescinded simply because of a

misstep in the manner it was imposed long ago. Examples

would include arguments that the condition was not

adequately explained or linked to the offense of conviction,

or that evidence or other information presented at the

original sentencing did not provide sufficient support. To

stay consistent with the statutory scheme for appeal of

sentences, and to avoid appeals of waived or forfeited issues,

where it is likely to be difficult for the government or the

probation office to prepare a fair “do‐over” of the original

sentencing, those sorts of procedural shortcomings must be

raised at the first opportunity or not at all. That should leave

for § 3583(e)(2) only substantive challenges that raise real

concerns about the offender’s and society’s prospects of

benefitting from a term of supervised release. Under this

interpretation of § 3583(e)(2), Neal’s motion calling into
16 No. 14‐3473

question the substantive legality of several of the special

conditions then governing his term of supervised release

was within the scope of the statute.

B. Special Condition Authorizing Warrantless Searches

We turn to the merits of Neal’s challenge to the search

condition, and we can be brief. Neal cites no authority from

Title 18 of the United States Code, from the Sentencing

Guidelines, or from any court suggesting that a special con‐

dition of supervised release permitting warrantless searches

can be applied only to sex offenders, not to drug offenders.

In fact, while the Sentencing Commission recommends that

persons convicted of sex offenses against minors always be

subject to a special condition permitting warrantless search‐

es, U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(7), the Commission has also said that

the same condition “may otherwise be appropriate in partic‐

ular cases.” § 5D1.3(d).

Special conditions authorizing warrantless searches are

imposed frequently in prosecutions for other crimes, includ‐

ing drug crimes, most often without objection. See, e.g.,

United States v. Monteiro, 270 F.3d 465, 469–70 (7th Cir. 2001)

(access‐device fraud); United States v. Betts, 511 F.3d 872, 876

(9th Cir. 2007) (conspiracy to defraud United States); United

States v. Kingsley, 241 F.3d 828, 837 (6th Cir. 2001) (possession

of firearm by a felon); United States v. Germosen, 139 F.3d 120,

131–32 (2d Cir. 1998) (conspiracy to commit wire fraud);

United States v. Sharp, 931 F.2d 1310, 1311 (8th Cir. 1991)

(drug conspiracy). There is no legal obstacle to the search

condition in this case.

As noted, a defendant cannot use § 3583(e)(2) to argue

years after the sentence was imposed that a condition of su‐
No. 14‐3473 17

pervised release was imposed without adequate supporting

evidence or explanation, or through some other procedural

error. To the extent Neal has raised any substantive chal‐

lenge not already addressed, the search condition is reason‐

able. Neal objected to participating in drug treatment, yet he

had used drugs while on supervised release in violation of a

condition prohibiting unlawful possession and use of con‐

trolled substances. The district court sought to discourage

further drug use. Given Neal’s background, the search con‐

dition is reasonably related to that goal.

C. Thirteen Standard Conditions of Supervised Release

All that remains is Neal’s disagreement with the stand‐

ard conditions of his supervised release, many of which we

have criticized in Thompson and later decisions. We conclude

that Neal waived any claim about the standard conditions

by saying nothing about them in the district court. True, his

pro se submission was open‐ended, but as the government

notes, his appointed lawyer explicitly narrowed the dispute

to the search condition and other special conditions that no

longer are contested. By doing so, Neal intentionally relin‐

quished any claim about the standard conditions of super‐

vised release. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733–34

(1993); United States v. Jacques, 345 F.3d 960, 962 (7th Cir.

2003); United States v. Staples, 202 F.3d 992, 995 (7th Cir.

2000). When the defense has identified specific conditions

for the court to evaluate, we do not expect a district court to

hunt for other problematic conditions of supervised release.

See United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991).

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the denial of Neal’s motion to

modify conditions of his supervised release.