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34–274 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 109–844

THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 2006

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, Jr., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared statement . 23

Carothers, Thomas, senior associate and director of the Democracy and Rule

of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, Washington,

DC .......................................................................................................................... 53

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 56

Gershman, Carl, president, National Endowment for Democracy, Washington,

DC .......................................................................................................................... 28

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 31

Halperin, Dr. Morton H., director of U.S. Advocacy, Open Society Institute,

executive director, Open Society Policy Center, Washington, DC ................... 43

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45

Lowenkron, Hon. Barry F., Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights

and Labor, Department of Labor, Washington, DC .......................................... 3

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Biden .................................... 85

Lugar, Hon. Richard, U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ................ 1

Palmer, Hon. Mark, vice-chairman, Freedom House, Washington, DC .............. 36

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 39

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Human Rights First, prepared statement ............................................................. 76

SUMATE, prepared statement ............................................................................... 80

(III)

(1)

THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY

THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 2006

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Martinez, Biden, and Sarbanes.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD LUGAR, U.S.

SENATOR FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee is called to order. Today the committee will meet to examine the role of nongovernmental organizations, that is NGOs, in

the development of democracy. Support for democratic grassroots

organizations in many countries around the world has become a

centerpiece of America’s international outreach.

The American people see this most clearly in the United States

Government’s efforts to set the foundation for democracy in Iraq

and Afghanistan. Less well known is our Nation’s broader push for

democracy all around the globe. Within the past 3 years, the socalled Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in

Ukraine, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan have opened new

space for democracy in those nations, thanks primarily to the efforts of civil society members and organizations.

Unfortunately, the success of these generally peaceful ‘‘color revolutions’’ has prompted a counteroffensive by some authoritarian regimes against prodemocracy groups. A report I commissioned from

the National Endowment for Democracy notes, and I quote, ‘‘Representatives of democracy assistance NGOs have been harassed, offices closed, and staff expelled. Even more vulnerable are local

grantees and project partners who have been threatened, assaulted, prosecuted, imprisoned, and even killed,’’ end of quote

from the NED report. The report, entitled ‘‘The Backlash Against

Democracy Assistance,’’ is being made available to the public today.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The report could not be printed in this hearing,

but will be retained in the permanent record of the committee.]

A number of governments are tightening the legal constraints

against democracy assistance. In January, President Vladimir

Putin of Russia signed a controversial new law, imposing heightVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:35 Mar 28, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\ROLEOF.TXT mich PsN: mich
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ened controls on local and foreign NGOs operating in that country.

Governments in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Belarus

have followed Russia’s lead in cracking down on NGO activity.

Outside the former Soviet states, China has tightened its controls against foreign NGOs. And according to the NED report,

Egypt and Zimbabwe have done so, as well.

This issue was brought to my personal attention last October

when I met with Maria Corina Machado, the founder and executive

director of Sumate, an independent democratic civil society group

in Venezuela, which monitors the performance of Venezuela’s electoral institutions. She has been charged with treason simply for receiving a grant from our own NED.

Unfortunately, authorities in Russia, Venezuela, and other nations have been able to persuade many of their citizens that the

work of these NGOs is a form of American interventionism and

that opposition to the groups is a reaffirmation of sovereignty. As

the NED report states, NGOs today, compared to the situation immediately following 1989, face a new reality, one that is dramatically different. Groups that promote democracy must come to grips

with the fact that they are being vilified for allegedly promoting regime change.

American-funded democracy promoters should underscore that

democracy is not a singularly American endeavor. The European

Union, the U.N. Democracy Fund, and NED-like initiatives sponsored by Germany, Taiwan, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic,

and others are part of the democracy-promotion community. American democracy groups should stress that they often work with

such organizations and they should cultivate these relationships.

In this environment, where democracy promoters are regularly

being accused of crossing the line into domestic partisan politics,

they must redouble their efforts to be open and transparent with

the host regimes to assure those regimes of their nonpartisan intent. At the same time, when these NGOs come under assault and

in pursuit of legitimate activities that are often protected by international agreements, they should be flexible and resourceful in

finding ways to continue their work and in marshaling support for

expanding the democratic space.

This morning, we are joined by two distinguished panels. First,

we welcome Barry Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary of State for the

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.

On the second panel, we will hear from Carl Gershman, president of the National Endowment for Democracy; Ambassador Mark

Palmer, the current vice chairman of Freedom House; Morton

Halperin, director of U.S. Advocacy at the Open Society Institute;

and Thomas Carothers, senior associate and director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

We thank our witnesses for coming to the hearing this morning

and we look forward to our discussion with them.

At the time that my distinguished ranking member, Senator

Biden, appears, we will recognize him, of course, for an opening

statement, if he has one at that time. I am delighted to see Senator

Martinez with us today. Do you have any opening comments?

3

Senator MARTINEZ. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman, only to highlight the importance of the issue and to thank you for holding this

important hearing.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Lowenkron, as always, it is good to have you here at the

hearing; you are an old friend of the committee. And we appreciate

the opportunity, once again, to hear from you this morning and to

question you, as the case may be. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. BARRY F. LOWENKRON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. LOWENKRON. Thank you very much, Chairman Lugar. I am

particularly grateful for the active interest that you and other

members of the committee, Senator Martinez and others, have

shown and are showing on the essential role that NGOs can play

in defense of freedom and development of democracy worldwide.

President Bush has committed us to seek and support the growth

of democratic movements and institutions across the globe. And the

work of NGOs is crucial to reaching that goal. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I request that my full testimony be entered into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be entered in the record in full.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Thank you.

When I appeared before this committee, seeking confirmation as

Assistant Secretary, I stated that one of my highest priorities

would be to protect the work of NGOs. The activities of human

rights and democracy NGOs mirror the discussions I had with Secretary Rice on three main areas of democracy promotion.

One, electoral, the right of assembly, free speech, and other elements that constitute representative democracy.

Two, good governance, government that is accountable and willing to accept constraints on power and cede it peacefully.

And three, a flourishing civil society.

There are those in power, however, who do not welcome such

NGOs. The work of these NGOs may vary widely. But what they

have in common is an independent voice distinct from, and at times

in disagreement with, the government’s views.

I experience this every day as Assistant Secretary. I often agree

with NGOs; at times, I disagree with them. But I never view them

as a threat to our democratic way of life. Other governments, however, do feel threatened by NGOs’ vital work.

The assessment done by the National Endowment for Democracy

captures this growing challenge. States are developing tools to subvert, suppress, and silence NGOs. They impose burdensome registration and tax requirements; charges are vague, enforcement is

arbitrary, fostering a climate of self-censorship and fear. And when

states find these efforts insufficient, they resort to extra-legal forms

of persecution. Often, these regimes justify their actions by accusations of treason, espionage, foreign interference, or terrorism; but

the real motivation is political.

From Russia to China to Venezuela, no region has been spared

this push-back. Russia’s new restrictive NGO law is now in effect.

Recently, the Russian Ministry of Justice issued extensive and burVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:35 Mar 28, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\ROLEOF.TXT mich PsN: mich
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densome regulations, along with dozens of forms for NGOs to complete on their financial and programmatic activities. Foreign NGOs

appeared to be singled out for even more extensive reporting requirements.

The Chinese Government studied the role that NGOs played in

the ‘‘color revolutions’’ and ordered an investigation into the activities of foreign and domestic NGOs in China. In Venezuela, the

leadership of the electoral watchdog, Sumate, awaits trial on

charges of conspiracy and treason for accepting a $31,150 grant

from the NED for voter education and outreach activities.

I describe other disturbing cases in my written testimony, including Ethiopia, Uzbekistan, Syria, and Egypt.

Mr. Chairman, when NGOs are under siege, freedom and democracy are undermined. How then can we best support and defend

the work of NGOs worldwide? We need to push back. We need to

defend the defenders of human rights and democracy. Let me suggest seven ways.

First, we need to speak out. We must counter what I call the

‘‘NGO legal equivalency’’ argument that all countries regulate NGO

activity in some fashion. There is an enormous difference between

giving NGOs the opportunity to register for nontax status and demanding that NGOs register to simply function.

Second, we need to ensure that NGO protection is an integral

part of our diplomacy. We must highlight the protection of NGOs

in our foreign policy and we must multiply our voices. Time and

again, NGOs have told me that their work would be further protected if others would join us. Russian NGOs were heartened that

German Chancellor Merkel spoke out in defense of NGOs and met

with them while she was in Russia earlier this year.

Third, we must expand the role of regional organizations in protecting NGOs. We are developing and enhancing partnerships with

leading regional democracies and working with the European

Union and others to support the work of NGOs.

Fourth, we must maximize global opportunities to raise concerns

about the treatment of NGOs and to take coordinated action in

their defense. We will work with like-minded members of the new

U.N. Human Rights Council. NGOs must retain the same access to

the new body that they had to its predecessor. The U.N. Democracy

Fund will support projects implemented by NGOs. And the time

has come to institutionalize the Community of Democracies and to

use its members to press for the protection of civil society, including NGOs.

Fifth, we must protect and nurture new organizations that allow

NGOs to flourish. We and our G–8 partners, together with countries of the broader Middle East, established the Forum for the Future to advance reforms in the region. At the Bahrain Ministerial

Forum last fall, countries agreed to establish a Foundation for the

Future to help fund NGO activity. And I am pleased to tell you

today that Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has agreed to the be the

U.S. representative on the foundation’s board.

Sixth, we must ensure that NGOs have the resources they need

to carry out their vital work. We, in government, can often provide

the needed seed money for democracy promotion programs or assistance to maintain ongoing programs. Here, I would also want to

5

express my appreciation to the Congress for its support of the

Human Rights and Democracy Fund, a program managed by my

Bureau. I call it the ‘‘venture capital’’ of democracy promotion, for

it gives us the flexibility to support innovative NGO programming

targeted at key countries and issues.

Seventh, we should consider elaborating some guiding principles

by which we would assess the behavior of other governments toward NGOs and which we will take into account in our bilateral

relationships. I would welcome consulting with the Congress on the

drafting of these principles. The principles could be distilled from

basic commitments to rights enshrined in such documents as the

U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international documents, including those of the OSCE.

We would encourage the embrace of the principles by other countries, as well. These principles could include: That an individual

should be permitted to form, join, and participate in NGOs of his

or her choosing and peaceful exercise of freedom of expression and

assembly; that any restrictions that may be placed on the exercise

of the rights to freedom of expression and assembly must be consistent with international law; that governments will not take actions that prevent NGOs from carrying out their peaceful work

without fear of persecution, intimidation, or discrimination; that

laws, administrative measures, regulations, and procedures governing or affecting NGOs, should protect, but not impede, the operation of NGOs; and that they should never be established or enforced for politically motivated purposes; that NGOs, like all other

elements of a vibrant civil society, should be permitted to seek and

receive financial support from domestic, foreign, and international

entities. And perhaps the most important principle of all that,

whenever NGOs are under siege, it is imperative that democratic

nations act to defend their rights.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Martinez, in closing, I want to emphasize

the value of your active involvement in the worldwide defense and

support of NGOs. Efforts you make to encourage foreign leaders to

press these issues would be extraordinarily helpful in advancing

the goal we all share—a world of democracy and freedom.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Lowenkron follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BARRY F. LOWENKRON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Lugar, members of the committee. Thank you for your active interest

in the essential role that nongovernmental organizations play in the defense of freedom and the development of democracy across the globe. I welcome this opportunity

to highlight the contributions of NGOs, to share with you our concerns about the

restrictions that a growing number of governments are placing on NGO activities,

and to offer suggestions on how we can protect NGOs’ vital work.

I will summarize my prepared remarks, Mr. Chairman, and request that my full

testimony be entered into the record.

When I appeared before this committee last September seeking confirmation as

the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, I stated that, if

confirmed, one of my highest priorities would be ‘‘to consult and partner closely with

the many dedicated and capable NGOs working on human rights and democracy.’’

I also pledged to ‘‘make every effort to protect the work’’ of NGOs against efforts

by foreign governments to constrain, harass, intimidate, and silence their work.’’

As Assistant Secretary, I have had the privilege of meeting with many NGOs,

both here and abroad, and I have greatly benefited from their information, their insights, and their ideas.

6

As President Bush stated in his second inaugural address, ‘‘ . . . it is the policy

of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and

institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny

in our world.’’

The work of NGOs is crucial to reaching that goal.

A WIDE WORLD OF NGOS

The rise of NGOs as international actors, as well as shapers of national policy,

is one of the most important trends in international relations. NGOs encompass the

entire range of civil society—from lobbying for better health, protection of the environment, and advancement of education for all, to delivering humanitarian relief

and securing and protecting basic civil and political rights.

There are NGOs devoted to specific health issues, such as women’s health care

or HIV/AIDS. I note the tireless effort and good work of the Whitman Walker Clinic

here in the Washington metropolitan area. There are also NGOs based thousands

of miles away that are battling these same concerns. For example, the Kenya AIDS

NGO Consortium is a coalition of some 600 NGOs and religious organizations that

deal with AIDS-related activities in Africa. Indeed, the AIDS pandemic has spawned

a host of indigenous NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa.

Environmental NGOs in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe played a

vital role in the political, social, and economic changes of the 1980s. Today, they

continue to have an enormous impact in countries across the globe, pushing for governmental transparency and accountability which, in turn, can fuel political reform.

Today, my primary focus will be the so-called political NGOs—those that advocate

for human rights and democratic principles and practices. Although they constitute

only a small component of the global NGO community, they are the ones that draw

the most fire from governments who view them as a threat to their power.

These NGOs build on a legacy of championing human rights through norm-setting

and monitoring. They have helped to shape international agreements, instruments,

institutions, and human rights mechanisms over decades. NGOs were key to shaping the language of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the United Nations

Charter and of the U.N. Universal Declaration on Human Rights itself. These NGOs

courageously defend human rights activists, often while risking reprisal themselves.

Together with the increasing worldwide demand for greater personal and political

freedom often reflected in the work of these NGOs is the growing recognition that

democracy is the form of government that can best meet the demands of citizens

for dignity, liberty, and equality.

Today, all across the globe, NGOs are helping to establish and strengthen democracy in three key ways:

• First, NGOs are working to establish awareness of and respect for the right of

individuals to exercise freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, which

is crucial to participatory democracy.

• Second, NGOs are working to ensure that there is a level playing field upon

which candidates for elective office can compete and that the entire elections

process is free and fair.

• Third, NGOs are working to build and strengthen the rule of just laws and responsive and accountable institutions of government so that the rights of individuals are protected regardless of which persons or parties may be in office at

any given time.

These efforts by NGOs mirror the discussions I have had with Secretary Rice on

democracy promotion in which she outlined the three main areas that inform our

democracy activities: Electoral—the right of assembly, free speech, and all other elements that constitute representative democracy; the importance of good governance—a government by the people that is accountable, transparent, and willing to

accept constraints on power and cede it peacefully; and a flourishing civil society.

NGOs play a vital role in all three areas.

U.S.-based NGOs such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the Center for

International Private Enterprise, the American Center for International Labor Solidarity, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the International

Republican Institute, IFES and Freedom House actively promote democracy across

the globe. This type of activity is not unique to the United States. The German political Stiftungen served as models for the creation of the NED family in the 1980s.

The British Westminster Foundation is a leader in democracy promotion. The Danes

promote worker solidarity and labor rights. The Czech Aide to People in Need actively supports human rights. All of these efforts are conducted openly and transparently and are consistent with international standards and practices.

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THE PUSH-BACK

Not surprisingly, there are those in power who do not welcome NGOs and other

agents of peaceful, democratic change. After all, the work of NGOs may vary widely,

but what they all have in common is enabling individuals to come together to create

an independent voice distinct from, and at times in disagreement with, the government’s views.

Mr. Chairman, I experience this every day as Assistant Secretary when I meet

with NGOs who want to discuss the U.S. Government’s human rights record here

and abroad. I often agree with NGOs. At times, I disagree with them. But I never

view them as a threat to our democratic way of life. Indeed, their contribution to

our debate on America’s role in the world can only strengthen our democratic ideals

at home and advance them abroad.

Other governments, however, feel threatened by their work.

In many countries, we see disturbing attempts to intimidate NGOs and restrict

or shut them down. The recent assessment of the National Endowment for Democracy captures this growing challenge. The conclusions are sobering. States are developing and using tools to subvert, suppress, and silence these organizations. They

invoke or create restrictive laws and regulations. They impose burdensome registration and tax requirements. Charges are vague, such as ‘‘disturbing social order,’’ and

implementation and enforcement are arbitrary, fostering a climate of self censorship

and fear. Governments play favorites, deeming NGOs ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad,’’ and they

treat them accordingly. NGOs deemed ‘‘good’’ are often ones created by governments

themselves—Government Organized NGOs or ‘‘GONGOs.’’ The Tunisian Government established a GONGO staffed by members of its intelligence service to attend

conferences and monitor what is being said about the government. China sends

GONGOs to U.N. NGO functions to defend China’s human rights policies.

When states find that their efforts to pass or apply restrictive laws and regulations against NGOs are not enough, they resort to extralegal forms of intimidation

or persecution.

Often these regimes justify their actions by accusations of treason, espionage, subversion, foreign interference, or terrorism. These are rationalizations; the real motivation is political. This is not about defending their citizens from harm—this is

about protecting positions of power.

From Russia to China, Zimbabwe to Venezuela, no region has been spared this

push-back. Mr. Chairman, we can point to individual cases unique to each country.

A key impetus for the recent crackdown has been reaction by many rulers to the

‘‘color revolutions’’ of 2003–2005. They believed that the popular pressure for change

was instigated and directed from abroad through U.S. and other foreign support for

NGOs on the ground. They have not grasped that the ‘‘color revolutions’’ were examples of citizens standing up for their right to free elections and demanding accountability when election results did not reflect the clear will of the people because of

manipulation.

During my trip to Moscow in early January, the deep suspicion that Western

states had manipulated election outcomes was evident from my discussions with officials and lawmakers. Our promotion of democracy is seen as part of a zero-sum

game of geopolitical influence. I emphasized to my Russian interlocutors that they

were fundamentally mistaken about what happened in Ukraine and Georgia, that

our NGO funding and activities there were transparent, fully in keeping with the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s and other international

norms, and designed to help ensure that elections are free and fair, not to pick winners and losers.

After he had signed the restrictive new NGO law in January, Russian President

Putin acknowledged that NGOs can and do contribute to the well-being of society,

but he added that their financing must be transparent and efforts to control them

by ‘‘foreign puppeteers’’ would not be tolerated.

The new Russian law has the potential to cripple the vital work of many NGOs,

including foreign NGOs there to support the local NGOs, and could retard Russia’s

democratic development. The new law is now in effect. Recently, the Russian Ministry of Justice issued extensive implementing regulations along with dozens of

forms for NGOs to complete. These detailed reporting requirements on NGOs’ financial and programmatic activities allow for broad review and oversight by Russian

officials that could go beyond international norms. The authorities have wide discretion to implement the law. The authorities can request various documents and information or attend any NGO event to verify that an organization’s activities comply

with the goals expressed in its founding documents. Foreign NGOs appear to be singled out for even more extensive reporting requirements, including quarterly financial reports and annual reporting on planned activities, subject to review by authoriVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:35 Mar 28, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\ROLEOF.TXT mich PsN: mich
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ties. Officials could order a foreign NGO to cease funding a particular program, ban

the NGO from transferring funds to certain recipients, or shut it down completely.

While we are told such measures would be subject to court approval, this could entail lengthy and expensive litigation that could cripple an NGO.

The Russian government has claimed that the new NGO law is similar to United

States and other Western regulations regarding civil society. As a basis for that

claim, the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has posted an

unattributed chart on its Web site comparing selected provisions from the new NGO

law with the laws of the United States, France, Finland, Israel, and Poland. An

NGO called the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law has done a careful analysis of the chart and the laws of the various countries cited and has found the contrary. According to this center of legal expertise, the Russian law is ‘‘substantially

different from the laws of the selected countries’’ and is actually ‘‘more restrictive,’’

both in terms of the specific provisions of the Russian law and in its cumulative

effect.

We continue to urge the Russian Government to implement the new law in a way

that facilitates, not hinders, the vital work of NGOs and is in compliance with Russia’s international commitments.

Russia is not the only country where NGOs face serious challenges.

In Belarus, the Lukashenko Government increasingly uses tax inspections and

new registration requirements to complicate or deny the ability of NGOs, independent media, political parties, and minority and religious organizations to operate

legally. All but a handful of human rights NGOs have been deregistered or denied

registration. In February, Belarussian KGB spokesman, Valeriy Nadtochayev, stated, ‘‘Such political events inside our country as . . . elections attract the attention

of foreign secret services, diplomats, and representatives of various nongovernmental organizations and foundations like magnets. All of them are united by a

common task involving the collection of biased information about events in our country and the creation of newsbreaks, especially those connected with so-called human

rights violations . . . ’’

The Chinese Government applies burdensome requirements to groups attempting

to register as NGOs. They must first find a government agency sponsor before they

can register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. NGOs must have more than 50 individual members—a catch-22 situation since hosting such large gatherings without

a license can lead to official persecution. This means that groups that do not have

adequate government ties have no hope of meeting legal requirements to register.

The financial requirement of $12,000 makes it difficult for many nascent, cashstrapped organizations to register. Moreover, sponsoring agencies and the Ministry

of Civil Affairs can refuse applications without cause or recourse.

The government closely scrutinizes NGOs working in areas that might challenge

its authority or have implications for social stability, such as groups focused on

human rights and discrimination. It is more amenable to groups that it sees as supporting social welfare efforts rather than operating in a political role. In this context, some NGOs are able to develop their own agendas and, in some cases, even

undertake limited advocacy roles in public interest areas like women’s issues, the

environment, health, and consumer rights.

The Chinese Government studied the role that NGOs ostensibly played in the

‘‘color revolutions’’ and ordered an investigation into the activities of both foreign

and domestic NGOs in China. The government also established a task force to monitor the activities of NGOs, especially those with links overseas.

In Venezuela, the leadership of the electoral watchdog NGO, Sumate, awaits trial

on charges of conspiracy and treason for accepting a $31,150 grant from the NED

for voter education and outreach activities consistent with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. While Sumate is the most well known target

of harassment by the Venezuelan Government, it is not alone. The government continues to restrict the ability of NGOs to conduct their activities and to cut off

sources of international support for their work.

In May 2005, Eritrea issued an NGO Administration Proclamation that imposes

taxes on aid, restricts NGOS to relief and rehabilitation work, increases reporting

requirements for foreign and local organizations and limits international agencies

from directly funding local NGOs. All NGOs must meet demanding annual registration requirements. The few local NGOs that are allowed to register also face new

funding barriers. In a televised speech last November, Eritrean President, Isaias

Afwerki, stated, ‘‘In many cases, spy agencies of big and powerful countries use

NGOs as smokescreens.’’ In March 2006, in the midst of a devastating drought, Eritrea expelled the United States-based humanitarian NGO Mercy Corps, the Irish

NGO Concern, and the British NGO Accord.

9

In March 2005, the Ethiopian Government expelled MI, NDI, and IFES shortly

after their arrival in advance of the May national legislative and regional council

elections. The three organizations had never before been expelled from any country.

They had made numerous attempts to register with the government. The government cited ‘‘technical difficulties related to their accreditation and registration’’ as

reasons for the expulsions.

Blatantly disregarding the welfare of its people, the concerns of its neighbors, and

the call of the United Nations, the regime in Burma has not eased, it has increased,

restrictions on U.N. agencies and international NGOs doing humanitarian work in

Burma, particularly in ethnic areas. For example, Medecins Sans Frontieres was

forced to close its French Section that was responsible for programs in the conflictridden Mon and Karen states. As the manager of the French Section put it, ‘‘It appears the Burmese authorities do not want anyone to witness the abuses they are

committing against their own people.’’

The cases I mentioned are only a few examples what I call rule by law—of governments seeking to control, restrict, or shut down the work of NGOs by appropriating

the language of law and the instruments and institutions of democracy.

When states wield the law as a political weapon or an instrument of repression

against NGOs, they rule by law rather than upholding the rule of law. The rule of

law acts as a check on state power; it is a system designed to protect the human

rights of the individual against the power of the state. In contrast, rule by law can

be an abuse of power—the manipulation of the law, the judicial system and other

governmental bodies to maintain the power of the rulers over the ruled.

To suppress the work of NGOs, states also employ more blatant forms of persecution.

Since the uprising and violent suppression in Andijan, Uzbekistan, in May 2005,

the government has harassed, beaten, and jailed dozens of human rights activists

and independent journalists, sentenced numerous people to prison following trials

that did not meet international standards, and forced many domestic and international NGOs to close, including Freedom House. Those that continue to operate

are severely restricted. Local NGO employees have been convicted of criminal offenses for their work, making it virtually impossible for them to find other jobs.

The Sudanese Government’s obstruction of humanitarian assistance and support

for civil society has severely hampered relief efforts in Darfur. Domestic and international NGOs and humanitarian organizations are constantly harassed and overburdened with paperwork. The Sudanese Government has expelled international

NGO and humanitarian personnel, delayed their visas, and placed restrictions on

their travel inside Darfur. Sudanese police and security forces have arrested, threatened, and physically harmed NGO and humanitarian workers. In April 2006, the

Sudanese Government expelled the Norwegian Refugee Council from Kalma Camp,

the largest internally displaced persons camp in Darfur with over 90,000 internally

displaced persons. Prior to its expulsion, the Norwegian Refugee Council had served

for 2 years as the Kalma ‘‘camp coordinator,’’ in charge of coordinating all humanitarian programs and protection for the camp’s residents and serving as a liaison for

community leaders, government officials, humanitarian agencies, and African Union

peacekeepers. On May 31, the South Darfur State Security Committee approved an

agreement allowing the Council to return as camp coordinator. Nevertheless, Sudanese Government obstructionism caused Darfur’s largest IDP camp to go without a

camp coordinator for 2 months, during which time insecurity and tension rose.

The last remaining civil society discussion group in Syria, the Jamal al-Atassi

Forum, has been prevented from meeting for almost a year and many of its members have been arrested or intimidated into silence. The forum is a predominantly

secular group encouraging dialog among political parties and civil society to promote

reform.

We are concerned that the situation in Egypt for politically active NGOs is deteriorating. For example, last week, Egyptian civil society activists Mohammed elSharkawi and Karim Shaer were beaten and arrested for participating in demonstrations in support of the independence of the judiciary. Reportedly, they were

subsequently tortured while in custody and denied medical treatment. International

democracy NGOs active in Egypt are also facing increasing government pressure.

WHAT WE AND OTHER DEMOCRACIES CAN DO TO DEFEND AND SUPPORT NGOS

Mr. Chairman, in today’s world, the problems confronting states are too complex,

even for the most powerful states to tackle alone. The contributions of NGOs are

crucial in addressing a host of domestic and international challenges. Restricting the

political space of NGOs only limits a society’s own political and economic growth.

A strong nation fosters the development of NGOs and other elements of a vibrant

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civil society; a state that tries to control everything from the center becomes brittle.

A society that allows broad participation by its citizens in national life is a society

that will flourish from the contributions of its own people.

When NGOs are under siege, freedom and democracy are undermined.

How then can we best support and defend the work of NGOs in countries across

the globe?

The United States must continue to stand up for what President Bush calls ‘‘the

nonnegotiable demands of human dignity,’’ and that includes the exercise by individuals of their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly through

their membership in NGOs.

As we monitor and report on conditions for human rights and democracy in countries worldwide, we in DRL, our posts overseas, and the State Department, generally, must sharpen our focus on the increasing pressures governments are putting

on NGOs. We must think creatively about how we might help to open political space

for NGOs and create opportunities for NGOs and their governments to exchange

views in an honest and constructive manner. We must ensure that a government’s

treatment of NGOs is an element in our bilateral dialog and that it factors into the

decisions we make on developing our bilateral relationships.

Mr. Chairman, we need to defend human rights and democracy promotion. To do

so, we need to defend the defenders. In short, we need to push back. Let me suggest

seven ways:

• First, we need to speak out.

We must be prepared to counter what I call the NGO ‘‘Legal Equivalency’’ argument made by governments that unduly restrict NGOs, namely that since all countries regulate NGO activity in some fashion, criticism is unwarranted. For example,

there is a difference between giving NGOs the opportunity to register for nontax

status, and demanding that NGOs register to simply function. Most countries, including ours, only require notification of registration, not permission from authorities, in order to operate as a formal, legal entity.

We must not succumb to arguments that the prime reason that governments

which impose burdensome registration and other reporting requirements on NGOs

is to combat terrorism or other criminal behavior. All governments have a responsibility to protect their populations from acts of terrorism and crime, and it is of

course appropriate to subject NGOs to the same laws and requirements generally

applicable to all individuals and organizations. At the end of day, however, a burdensome registration and reporting process is unlikely to sway determined terrorist

organizations, but very likely to weaken legitimate NGOs.

We must counter false charges that U.S. activities tied to NGOs are led covertly

by the United States and other democracies. We must reiterate that our support is

out in the open and that thousands of NGOs never even approach our Government.

And when they do, it is more likely than not that they are pressing us on our own

behavior, or on individual cases, and not soliciting funding.

• Second, we need to ensure that NGO protection is an integral part of our diplomacy.

We must highlight the protection of NGOs as a legitimate issue on our government-to-government agenda. This spring, when Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov

came to Washington, Secretary Rice had an extensive discussion with him on our

NGO concerns, a discussion in which I participated. The Secretary raises our concerns in her bilateral meetings, as do I and many of my colleagues at the State Department. When I travel, I insist on seeing NGO representatives, as does the Secretary.

We must also continue to multiply our voices. Time and again NGOs have told

me that their work would be further protected if others would join us. Russian

NGOs were heartened that, just prior to my arrival in Moscow in January, German

Chancellor Merkel paid an official visit and not only spoke out in defense of NGOs

but met with them to hear first-hand their concerns. In the case of China, my Bureau has taken the initiative to develop a coordinated approach among all members

of the so-called Bern process—the process that brings together all countries which

have human rights dialogs with China. We meet twice yearly, to exchange lists of

political prisoners, to compare best practices, and to monitor Chinese behavior toward NGOs.

• Third, we must expand the role of regional organizations in protecting NGOs.

Acting in defense and support of NGOs on a bilateral basis is essential, but it is

not sufficient. NGOs are a global phenomenon; they are facing pressures in countries in every region. I believe that there is greater scope for us to partner with

11

leading regional democracies and to work with regional organizations to defend and

support the work of NGOs.

The OSCE and the European Union have adopted some of the most advanced provisions regarding the role and rights of NGOs, as well as guidelines on how they

can interact and participate in OSCE and European Union activities.

In the OSCE context, the role of NGOs in pressing for adherence to democratic

standards and practices including monitoring elections remains vital. We will do all

we can to ensure that the defense and promotion of human rights and democratic

principles remain central to OSCE’s mandate.

Every quarter I hold consultations with the European Union on a host of human

rights and democracy issues worldwide. These consultations are also a good vehicle

to take up the cause of NGO protection.

The OAS has formal structures for NGO participation and Secretary General

Insulza has said that he seeks greater engagement by civil society organizations.

Last month, I held a roundtable with a diverse group of NGOs from Latin America.

The NGOs were in Washington to attend an OAS ministerial. We intend to build

on that dialog through the OAS and among the NGOs themselves as they press for

implementation of the OAS Democratic Charter.

NGO engagement with the African Union remains limited. However, prior to the

African Union Heads of State Summit July 1–2 in Banjul, the Australian Union will

host a Civil Society Forum and a Women’s Forum. Later this year I hope to travel

to Addis Ababa to meet with the Australian Union and place protection of NGOs

on our agenda.

ASEAN has formal guidelines for NGO participation in its activities. To date, the

NGOs affiliated with ASEAN do not tend to have a democracy or human rights

focus, but operate in other fields such as business and medicine. ASEAN’s recent

steps to press the regime in Burma is an encouraging sign that countries in the region are beginning to recognize that the protection of human rights, and of human

rights defenders, is a legitimate issue, and not one to be dismissed as interference

in the sovereignty of its neighbors. We will encourage ASEAN to take further steps

on this path.

• Fourth, we must maximize global opportunities to raise concerns about the

treatment of NGOs and take coordinated action in their defense.

We will work to that end with like-minded members of the new U.N. Human

Rights Council. I would note that in negotiating the creation of the Council, the

United States successfully insisted that NGOs must retain the same access to the

new body that they had to its predecessor.

The U.N. Democracy Fund, proposed by President Bush in September 2004 and

launched in September 2005, is another important instrument for supporting NGOs.

The Fund will support projects implemented by NGOs as well as governmental and

multilateral entities. Recognizing the important contributions that NGOs make, the

designers of the Democracy Fund ensured that 2 of the 17 members of the fund’s

advisory board are NGO representatives. To date, 19 countries have contributed or

pledged approximately $50 million to this voluntary fund. The United States has

contributed $17.9 million to date, and the President’s budget has requested an additional $10 million to support the fund in fiscal year 2007. We have successfully

pushed for the fund to focus on support for NGOs and other elements of civil society

in states transitioning to democracy, complementing existing U.N. programs on free

and fair elections and the rule of law.

The Community of Democracies and the collective action of its members can be

an important focal point within the international community and international organizations in helping sustain and protect NGOs across the globe. The time has come

to institutionalize the community itself, and to use its members to press for fundamental freedoms, including with regard to the protection of NGOs.

• Fifth, we must protect and nurture new organizations that allow NGOs to flourish.

Here, let me single out the Middle East. The Forum for the Future was established in the summer of 2004 at the G–8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia. In partnership with the countries of the broader Middle East and North Africa, the Forum

seeks to advance political, economic, and educational reforms in the region. From

its inception, we have pressed for inclusion of NGOs indigenous to the Middle East.

At the first meeting of the Forum in Rabat, in December 2004, there were five

NGOs. By the time I accompanied Secretary Rice to the second meeting, held in

Bahrain a year later, the 5 had grown to 40. At the conference, leaders of these

NGOs participated, pressing an agenda of political reform, economic opportunity,

educational advancement, and gender equality.

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Among those serving on this civil society delegation in Bahrain were representatives from the Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD)—a dialog led by Italy, Turkey,

and Yemen, as well as three NGOS from each country. The DAD presented the outcomes of discussions and debates held over the course of the year between civil society leaders and their government counterparts. The growing DAD network includes

hundreds of civil society leaders from the region. The level and depth of civil society

participation at the forum was historic and positive, and has set an important precedent for genuine dialog and partnership between civil society and governments on

reform issues.

At Bahrain, all the participating countries agreed to establish a Foundation for

the Future to help fund NGO activity. We did not agree on a Bahrain declaration

of principles, however, because a number of countries wanted to include in that declaration language to constrain NGOs. In the end, the United Kingdom as G–8 cosponsor that year, supported by us and others—walked away from the declaration.

Our reason was simple: We could not cripple in the afternoon what we had created

in the morning. I applaud the host of the next forum, Jordan, for its unwavering

commitment to a continued robust role for NGOs. We are already acting in concert

with the Jordanian Government and others to ensure that the NGO presence grows

for the meeting this December.

• Sixth, we must ensure that NGOs have the resources they need to carry out

their vital work.

Many NGOs look to a variety of funding sources, both government and private,

to ensure a diverse support base. Many of them never approach the U.S. Government for any funding at all.

A number of private, grant-making foundations specialize in supporting the work

of other nongovernmental organizations, and here I cite the MacArthur Foundation,

the Ford Foundation, the Open Society Institute, and other well-known foundations.

Organizations such as the independent, nonprofit Pew Charitable Trusts, the International Crisis Group, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and its

Moscow Center often fund or produce reports on topics which contribute to public

policy discourse on the development of civil society, conflict prevention and management, and other goals compatible with advancing freedom and democracy. We must

continue to encourage more private sector support.

We, in government, can often provide the needed seed money for democracy promotion programs, or assistance to maintain ongoing programs. This is a dynamic

process that adjusts to new demands, shifting priorities, and different emphases. We

must continue to seek out innovative solutions that merit our support, for example,

programs that monitor and publicize attacks on NGOs, much as the MacArthur

Foundation, has funded the Berkman Center at Harvard University to monitor

worldwide constraints on Internet freedom.

I also want to express my appreciation to the Congress for its support of the

Human Rights and Democracy Fund, a program managed by my Bureau. I call it

the ‘‘venture capital’’ of democracy promotion for it gives us the flexibility to support

innovative programming by NGOs targeted at key countries and issues. We are able

to make hundreds of grants a year to organizations around the world addressing

vital democracy and human rights issues.

All free nations have a stake in the strengthening of civil societies and the spread

of democratic government worldwide, and we welcome and encourage contributions

from other donor countries and institutions in support of the work of NGOs.

• Seventh, we should consider elaborating some guiding principles by which we,

as a country, would assess the behavior of other governments toward NGOs,

and which we would take into account in our bilateral relationships.

I would welcome consulting with Congress on the drafting of these principles. I

would envision a short list of principles—no more than a page. They would be userfriendly in nonlegalistic language. The principles would proceed from the premise

that NGOs, as elements of a vibrant civil society, are essential to the development

and success of free societies and that they play a vital role in ensuring accountable,

democratic government. The principles should pass the ‘‘reasonableness test’’ in any

open society. We would pledge our own adherence to the principles and we would

of course encourage their embrace by other countries as well.

I do not see these principles as being duplicative of other efforts. The best word

is still the plainspoken word, and in plainspoken words, these principles would distill the basic commitments to the rights to freedom of expression, association, and

assembly enshrined in such documents as: the U.N. Universal Declaration on

Human Rights and other international documents such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, relevant International Labor Organization Conventions, the Helsinki Final Act, and subsequent OSCE Copenhagen and Moscow

13

documents, and the European Convention on Human Rights and relevant documents of the Council of Europe.

Among the possible principles we could elaborate could be:

• That an individual should be permitted to form, join, and participate in NGOs

of his or her choosing in peaceful exercise of his or her rights to freedom of expression and assembly. • That any restrictions which may be placed on the exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and assembly must be consistent with international law. • That governments will not take actions that prevent NGOs from carrying out

their peaceful work without fear of persecution, intimidation, or discrimination. • That laws, administrative measures, regulations, and procedures governing or

affecting NGOs should protect—not impede—their operation, and that they

should never be established or enforced for politically motivated purposes. • That NGOs, like all other elements of a vibrant civil society, should be permitted to seek and receive financial support from domestic, foreign, and international entities. • And, perhaps the most important principle of all, that whenever NGOs are

under siege, it is imperative that democratic nations act to defend their rights.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, in closing I cannot emphasize enough

the value of the continued active involvement of this committee and of other Members of Congress in the worldwide defense and support of the work of NGOs. It

greatly strengthens my hand when I meet with foreign officials, to know that I have

your strong bipartisan backing. It is profoundly important that you continue to demonstrate your support for NGOs and raise concerns about their treatment to foreign

governments. And any efforts you could make to encourage your counterparts in the

legislatures of other democracies to press these issues and to work in concert on

them would be extraordinarily helpful.

As President Bush has said, ‘‘Freedom, by its nature, must be chosen, and defended by citizens, and sustained by the rule of law and the protection of minorities

. . . America will not impose our own style of government on the unwilling. Our

goal, instead, is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and

make their own way.’’

By America’s leadership in supporting and defending the work of NGOs, that is

exactly what we are doing—helping men and women across the globe shape their

own destinies in freedom, and by so doing, helping to build a safer, better world for

us all.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Secretary

Lowenkron.

I want to commence a round of questions. We will have a 10-

minute limit in our first round. And I would like to begin by asking

a broad question. How does the Department of State monitor the

effectiveness of NGO promotion programs? Can you give us some

idea of what you believe are the criteria for success based upon this

administration’s objectives in conducting democracy-promotion programs? How do you measure that overall success? What part do

NGOs play in this or, ideally, what part should they play?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Mr. Chairman, we measure it in two ways.

First, when we select the NGOs that we fund, which is generally

through an open competition, our tendency is to favor those NGOs

that have counterparts in host countries. We want to fund work on

the ground. So, there is a tendency for funding a more active agenda, more active work on the part of NGOs.

We also get quarterly reports from many of these NGOs. It is a

constant give and take. So, we measure when we launch these programs and when we review these programs.

In terms of the output at the end of the day, we take a look at

such issues as is civil society now growing in countries where it

had not been. So, for example, working with NDI, have we been

able to establish a string, a web of local NGOs throughout Iraq or

with other NGOs in Afghanistan? We look at electoral results, not

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in terms of who won or who lost, because we are not here to pick

winners or losers. But in terms of—is there a level playing field,

are there sufficient observers of elections, is the press free, is it

free from intimidation? These are standards that we can measure,

working closing not only with the NGOs but certainly with our embassies overseas.

The CHAIRMAN. You have touched upon this but can you describe

what the extent of democracy assistance may be from other international donors, other countries, or other international organizations? To what extent are the efforts of the United States supplemented in the international community?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Let me say that I have been heartened by the

fact that every year more of our allies, as well as regional organizations that we partner with, are willing to partner with us and to

advance democracy promotion. Let me give you several examples.

India joined with the United States. The Indian Prime Minister

and our President both made significant contributions at the

launching of the U.N. Democracy Fund earlier last year—I believe

it was in September of 2005.

I have quarterly meetings, video conferences with my counterparts in the European Union. And in it, we actually do a whole

tour of global issues, human rights, and democracy concerns in

every continent. And we discuss our strategies, we discuss our commitments, we discuss the resources that we put out in the field.

We have cooperated very closely with the European Union to try

to deal with a reprehensible state of affairs in Belarus. That is another example.

We also work very closely to encourage cooperation across the

globe among nongovernmental organizations. So, for example, the

nongovernmental organizations that were instrumental in the success of the Community of Democracies meeting in Santiago, Chile,

are now working with NGOs in Mali in order to help them as they

host the Community of Democracies meeting in 2007.

So, we have a whole range of cooperative efforts, two in particular that I am excited about. One is that we are beginning to

develop relationships with NGOs through the OAS. The OAS General Secretary wants to see the OAS bring Latin American NGOs

more into the mainstream of democracy promotion. I have met with

these individuals and I am going to develop a very good relationship, not only with the groups, but we will also work through the

OAS.

And second, we also want to develop a strategic relationship with

the African Union, which is now taking steps on issues of governments and democracy in the African continent.

The CHAIRMAN. I know that the assistance programs are spread

among various accounts in the State Department, as well as the

USAID, and grants specifically to groups such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the ASEAN Foundation. How much

money is the United States spending governmentally? Can you get

your arms around that with a democracy programs total? And to

what extent are all of these accounts coordinated in your Branch

or somewhere else in our Government?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Well, in the aggregate, Senator, the total is

roughly $1.4 billion in democracy promotion.

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The CHAIRMAN. Each year.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Yes. Well, this is the current level.

The CHAIRMAN. Current level.

Mr. LOWENKRON. The trends have been going up. This year, we are programming roughly $90 million to support the work of nongovernmental organizations, excluding the money that we administer for programs in Iraq. About $600 million—$650 million comes

from USAID, and the rest from various programs like the Middle

East Partnership Initiative and the Freedom Support Act.

In terms of getting our arms around it below the aggregate number, this was central to the Secretary of State’s decision to bring

together the various elements of democracy promotion and development under the structure under Ambassador Tobias. The Secretary’s view—I have had a number of conversations with her—is

that we need to ensure that when democracy funds go to any country, any region, we need to know how they are allocated in terms

of electoral issues, in support of NGOs, in terms of governments,

as well as development issues. I want a comprehensive look because we have to make sure that we maximize the return on our

investment in democracy promotion.

The CHAIRMAN. Obviously, in instances where the governments

unfriendly to the United States are involved, your reaction might

be one course, but how do you handle in a friendly, even-handed

way the approach to democracy when you are dealing with autocratic governments that are friendly to our country? This is constantly before us in one form or another and has been for decades.

But in the current situation, what is your general view of how to

move in those cases?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Thank you for asking that question. When I

started with the Government at the U.S. Information Agency, the

bureau that I now head had just been created. And these issues

have been with us, as you said, for decades. My view is clear that

we have a voice and a vote at the table on all foreign policy issues;

the Secretary has ensured that. I meet with her on a regular basis.

When we come to the table, we come with our concerns about

human rights issues, democracy concerns. Others come with the

other elements to the table. So, for example, there are issues of

combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction. There are

issues involving terrorism. There are regional issues in the context

of dealing with Iran or the Israeli-Palestinian issue. All of these

have to be factored into the equation as we proceed.

At times, there will be a focus more on one part of the foreign

policy than the other. But the Secretary of State has made it clear

we need to speak out, we need to be active, we need to support the

human rights defendants.

The one issue that we have been heavily involved in is Egypt. It

is clear that there is a movement in Egypt, a good movement, that

is showing progress on economic reform but not on political reform.

And as we are pushing, as we are supporting the nongovernmental

organizations in Egypt, as we are trying to create open space, there

is push-back from President Mubarak.

What we need to do is to continue our conversations with President Mubarak while, at the same time, reaching out and protecting

nongovernmental organizations. And this is replicated with other

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countries, as well. It is a constant debate, a tug of war—from in

the State Department, as well as in the administration. I could cite

other examples, as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, one other example that you mentioned—

Egypt was current—would be Pakistan. We have had meetings

with our Foreign Relations Committee members with President

Musharraf during his visits. Clearly, his situation is one in which

there is not a great base of constituent support without getting into

all the details with Pakistan.

Whether one is looking at the military or President Musharraf

or whoever else, a broad number of Pakistanis maybe are not given

an opportunity to vote for any of the above. Yet at the same time,

President Musharraf would argue with, I am sure, the President of

the United States, or with our Secretary of State, or with us in the

committee, that we do not understand security dilemmas, or how

tenuous sometimes just control, everyone’s control, may be at a

time when NATO allies are working close by in Afghanistan. We

certainly have great hopes for continuity of civil government in

Pakistan itself.

How do you begin work with a case like that one?

Mr. LOWENKRON. What we do is not accept the either/or argument that some people want to—that we hear from some foreign

leaders and officials. So, it means that even as we work with the

Pakistani Government in the war on terror, even as we work with

them, along with India, to develop new relations on the subcontinent, we also have to focus on democracy promotion. And I would

put it in kind of five broad categories.

First, it is the issue of governance. It is working with President

Musharraf to try to open up the political arena so that you can

have the evolution of governmental institutions, which still are

weak.

Second, I think we need to work with the political parties. You

are absolutely right that the political parties themselves have been

in a tug of war with each other and with President Musharraf. But

we need to work with them even at the grassroots level, to try to

look at new leadership, emerging leadership. This is not going to

happen overnight but we need to be able to foster political party

development in Pakistan.

Third, we need to focus on the elections that are coming up in

2007. We need to work as hard as we can to ensure that those elections are credible, that they meet our standards for fair elections.

Fourth, we need to ensure that NGOs can operate in Pakistan,

so they can support the electoral process, as well as the government’s process.

And fifth, we need to recognize that the issue of governments

and the issue of democracy cannot be pursued unless there is also

an opening economically, as well. You cannot have economic reform

in Pakistan without political reform; they have to go hand in hand.

So, it is a difficult road but it is a multilayered approach that

we need to pursue. We cannot focus solely on one of those elements.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Martinez, do you have questions of our witness?

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17

I wonder if you can touch on the issue of—I was very interested

in knowing that you are working with the OAS in the Latin American region. I am very concerned about, of course, the ever-decreasing space in the supposedly democratic-elected Government of Venezuela and the work of Sumate, which the chairman pointed out

has been so important but also so under siege.

And I am just wondering how—if you could outline for us, perhaps, what the challenges are that you face in a situation like Venezuela where, under the aura of a democratic election, a government functions increasingly autocratically. And of course, there are

elections upcoming this year. So, it is also of interest to me whether or not there is anything we can effectively do to assist the electoral process to ensure that it is a fair and open electoral process.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Senator, Venezuela is an example, as the Secretary has put it, of a country where you can win democratically

but you don’t govern democratically. When you go region to region,

country to country, there are different challenges. That is the challenge in Venezuela, the erosion of liberties, the evisceration of the

free press, the weakening of the judiciary, and, of course, Sumate

and others who are being hounded by the Venezuelan Government

for trying to exercise their basic freedoms.

We need to respond in several ways. I think first we need to

stand by Sumate and we need to stand by these NGOs. The fact

that a trial date has not been set does not mean that they are out

of the woods. And even if at the end of the day the charges are

dropped, there is no indication they will be, but even if they are

dropped, the fact of the matter is that Chavez wins if NGOs have

to spend all their time, their energy, and resources defending themselves as opposed to defending the rights of the Venezuelan people.

Second, we need to work with our allies and we need to work

with the OAS. I have been heartened by the fact that over the last

several months, a number of countries in Latin America, Brazil,

and others, have now spoken up, spoken up against what Chavez

is doing. And it is not just the issue of whether or not we should

expropriate businesses. It is the issue of whether Latin America

wants to turn the clock back 30 years and engage in Chavez’s definition of Bolivarian democracy, or whether Latin American wants

to continue in the trajectory, the positive trajectory that we have

had in the last 20 years.

They are pushing back and we need to work with them. We need

to support those voices and we also need to work with the OAS.

And there is a democratic charter that was signed by the OAS

members. And what the OAS General Secretary Insulza wants to

do now is to ensure that governments live up to that charter and

that NGOs play a role in defense of that charter.

I would just note in passing that the Venezuelan Government

has tried to undermine the ability of NGOs to even register to work

in the OAS context. So, I see it both in terms of supporting the

NGOs through our own NGOs but also working with OAS and

other countries.

Senator MARTINEZ. Well, to that point, I appreciate your answer.

It was very complete and confirms, you know, what I perceived to

be the situation there. But at the same time, I wonder if not here,

then how could we ever be successful in terms of highlighting the

18

need for there to be a fair and open election? I understand the election is in December. If, in fact, there is an electoral commission

that is rigged, as it appears there is, is there a possibility that

through the work of NGOs, through the work of, frankly, your portfolio at the State Department, that we can create a conscience in

the region and the world that this election must be fair and open

to all comers, and that there must be not only the opportunity to

go cast a ballot and that—that ballot was fairly counted, but also

in the lead-up to the election that there be the opportunity for

there to be free expression, for there to be the opportunity to organize political parties and to, you know—with opposition people rallying around one candidate, which is a good thing.

I would also point out, by the way, that turning the clock back

30 years apparently was rejected by the people of Peru this week,

you know.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Absolutely.

Senator MARTINEZ. And I do believe that interference as nowPresident-elect Garcia pointed out, imperialism does not always

come from just one big country to the north but it can come from

neighbors.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Absolutely.

Senator MARTINEZ. Anyway, if you could comment on the upcoming election, specifically, and what we might be able to do to uphold

the charter of the OAS on democracy, but also the very specific

yearning ones have to have an opportunity to participate in a fair

and open process.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Senator, I appreciate that question because it

is not just in the context of Venezuela. But every day we get questions about, well, was not this election free and fair. And there are

two elements in a free and fair election. It is not just what happens

on election day. It is what happens in the run up to the election.

Can you compete on a level playing field, which we do not have in

Venezuela.

What we, our allies, and the NGOs need to do now is focus on

terms, and continue to focus on the electoral commission. We need

to focus on whether the opposition party, or the opposition candidate, or the opposition in general, can get access to media? Can

they campaign short of—without violence, without intimidation,

without harassment, without lawsuits? Can they have a clear playing field, a level playing field?

The Venezuelan Government had a rigged election for their senate, about 15 percent of the vote. And now they have an upper

chamber. This is the kind of phony democratic practice that they

have, which is then supposed to be presented to the world to say:

See, we had an honest election.

So, we need to highlight it every single step of the way because,

at the end of the day, if it is an uneven playing field, and at the

end of the day Chavez and his party, if they do win, that was not

a free and fair election.

Senator MARTINEZ. There are other countries in which the political system does not even permit the opportunity for dissent. I

think it is located in this study or this—and I presume it might be

appropriate to ask about this. But in those entities where the democracy assistance and independent NGOs are effectively prohibVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:35 Mar 28, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\ROLEOF.TXT mich PsN: mich
19

ited, I guess that is how they are described, what opportunity do

we have? And I know in places like Cuba and Zimbabwe, that perhaps we already do work with some existing NGOs that seek to

further the space that may be available to dissident movements.

What can you tell us about those situations?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Well, if I could just briefly focus on three examples.

First in Cuba—in Cuba we have our mission. Our mission is contact with the members—with the family members of those dissidents who are still in prison from the crackdown in 2003. And we

will make it clear—clear to the Cuban authorities—that we will

continue to reach out and to provide support to the family members. We will also engage in a dialog with others who want to step

forward and who want to press for their basic rights in Cuba.

We will also partner with other countries, the Czechs, for example. The Czech Republic has done great work reaching out to the

Cuban dissident community. Several of them were even expelled by

Castro. So, we need to focus on it in terms of our mission and in

terms of our close allies and partners. And we need to keep this

front and center.

I, for one, do not believe that we can just wait it out, wait for

some sort of ultimate change, for the biological clock to solve this

problem, because I am concerned for the fate of those roughly 60

leaders of the dissident community that are still in prison.

Let me give you another example; that is in Burma. We support

programs in Burma, in the refugee camps in northern Thailand

with the Burmese community. We provide them assistance. They

are also a valuable conduit for information that comes out of

Burma.

We also work with the United Nations. I just met with Secretary

General Annan’s special envoy, Gambari, who just came back and,

to our relief, actually got to see Aung San Suu Ky. But the fact of

the matter is that they extended her house arrest and they are nowhere nearer to starting a national reconciliation and dialog that

we need.

We used our mission in Burma, but we used our programming

outside of Burma. And we also work with the regional countries,

with the ASEAN members, and also with the European Union to

try to have an effective unified voice against the Burmese regime.

And just briefly, the third example is Uzbekistan, where virtually

all the NGOs were thrown out. What we do is we try to set up a

regional base outside of Uzbekistan to try to coordinate the efforts

to help those that are in prison in Uzbekistan itself.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you very much.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez.

We have been joined by our distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden. And I will call upon him for his opening statement.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I will just go to questions, if I

may, and ask unanimous consent for my statement to be entered

in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record in full.

20

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, I apologize for not being here for

your statement. Let me ask you a couple questions as rapidly as

I can.

You are Secretary of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Prior

to the fall of the wall, American labor unions played a major role,

particularly in Poland. How do we promote labor rights in various

countries we are engaged with now? And to what extent is there

a coordination with and/or conversations with the AFL–CIO’s efforts along these lines?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Senator, I do not believe you can have democracy unless you have a voice for labor. And we work with the Solidarity Center. In my view, the labor had a great success story. And

there is a great story in Central and Eastern Europe. We need to

replicate that elsewhere around the globe. We need to replicate

that in Africa, in Latin America, in parts of Asia. We will ensure

funding for the Solidarity Center and labor-related programs.

My Deputy Assistant Secretary, Jeff Krilla, is in Geneva now

with Secretary Chow, to talk about labor issues in the U.N. context. I think there is a lot of work we need to do in the context of

labor but also in the context of having labor officers tackle corporate social responsibility, as well.

Senator BIDEN. But how much encouragement is there? I do not

hear much about the trade union movement being promoted in the

countries you mentioned. Maybe you could tell me what tools you

are using. Do you feel part of the responsibility of your is office to

promote the growth of trade unions in the countries in question?

And if so, what are you doing to do it? What tools are you using?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Well, when I mentioned labor, it was in the

context of the right of the force to organization themselves as fully

independent trade unions. And it is in that context that we fund

programs in parts of the world to focus on creating, nurturing, and

sustaining labor union movements.

Senator BIDEN. Well, to the extent you can submit for the record

those programs that——

Mr. LOWENKRON. Yes, sir.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. You are funding specifically to accommodate that. We have a whole lot of assistance programs that

are spread across a number of accounts—the State Department,

USAID, Departments of Defense and Justice, as well as through

funding grants to organizations like the National Endowment for

Democracy and the ASEAN Foundation. Is there a need for improvement in the coordination of these various programs?

I think you have a pretty tough job. No one seems to be in charge

in the sense of much coordination. That is not a criticism, but an

observation.

Would we get more bang for the buck if the programs were more

coordinated? Or maybe there is more coordination than I think.

Could you speak to that?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Yes. Yes, Senator. We need to get more bang

for the buck. Early on, we had a conversation with the Secretary

of State about how democracy is defined and how funds are allocated for democracy. I had the same conversation with USAID and

also with my counterparts within the State Department, Freedom

Support Act, and the Middle East Partnership Initiative. And it is

21

in that context that the Secretary has decided on this reorganization to create a structure that brings USAID, State, and all the

various components of State together so we can better coordinate

our efforts.

Each one of these organizations—they have comparative advantages but there also are overlaps among them. And the way we

have done that in the past is we have developed democracy strategies. I have sat down with my counterparts in the regional bureaus, with the National Security Council, with USAID, to develop

democracy strategies.

Senator BIDEN. Is there democracy strategy in Latin America

and the Caribbean? From 2005 to 2007, political and economic instability in Latin America has been particularly high in countries

such as Haiti, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru. And yet, during this

same period, we have cut funding from $215 million to $135 million. Is that part of the strategy?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Senator, I do not have the exact figures that

go to each of the countries in Latin America.

Senator BIDEN. I have the exact figures for the region.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Pardon?

Senator BIDEN. I have the exact figures for the region. It is down

from $215 million to $135 million. Is that part of your strategy, to

spend less?

Mr. LOWENKRON. No. Part of our strategy is to spend more effectively and in a more coordinated fashion.

Senator BIDEN. Do you think that is happening?

Mr. LOWENKRON. I do not have the specifics on USAIDs budgeting plans, but with fiscal year 2006 funds, my Bureau is committed to spend no less than $6 million on democracy and human

rights initiatives in countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala,

Peru, Haiti, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba. Last year, we spent

$300,000 in the region. Thus, while we realize this as a beginning,

my Bureau has increased our human rights and democracy programming in the region.

Senator BIDEN. Well, maybe you could submit for the record,

what justification there is for cutting money for any country in that

region. Pick any one country in the entire region that is covered by

the $135 million—show me how spending less there has done more.

OK? That would be a good thing.

With regard to Iran, this administration has requested $75 million for democracy programs in Iran for fiscal year 2006, in the

emergency supplemental, which is currently in conference. How do

you plan to identify these partners inside of Iran? And how are you

going to go about assessing—and I think you should do this—the

capacity for this? And has the executive order, which currently

bans democracy-building activities in Iran been withdrawn? Has

the President withdrawn that executive order?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Well, in terms of how we go about the issue of

spending democracy money—and I take it your question is there—

are there organizations out there? Is there——

Senator BIDEN. In Iran.

Mr. LOWENKRON [continuing]. In Iran.

Senator BIDEN. Yes.

22

Mr. LOWENKRON. What we do is, when we submit a statement

of interest, when we publicize a statement of interest for nongovernmental organizations to compete, they come in with proposals in which they have counterparts in Iran, either individuals

or organizations, in Iran. And it is in that context that we fund

these programs.

Senator BIDEN. Are they going to be funded? Has the executive

order been withdrawn?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Senator, we funded $3 million in democracy

promotion activity last year.

Senator BIDEN. That is not my question. I know we did. My question is that you needed a general license to permit American nongovernmental organizations to financially support a broad range of

civil society, cultural, human rights, democracy building. Has that

ban been lifted?

Mr. LOWENKRON. I am sorry. My apologies. You are talking about

the OFAC license.

Senator BIDEN. Yes.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. That ban is lifted.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Yes. We are now—we have——

Senator BIDEN. Good.

Mr. LOWENKRON [continuing]. We have issued statements of interest and we are now taking proposals in from NGOs; then we can

proceed.

Senator BIDEN. Let me shift to Mongolia. Mongolia has been heralded by many as a success story of democratic development. As

you know, there is endemic corruption in the country, which prevents Mongolia from qualifying for participation in the Millennium

Challenge Account. And the institutions of democratic governments

remain pretty weak.

Now, the administration cut funding for democracy programs

there, which are different than the millennium challenge account,

from $10 million to $7.5 million. Is that because they could not be

effectively spent or can you tell me the reason for that cut?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Senator, I am going to have to take that question for the record.

Senator BIDEN. OK. I would appreciate your answer in writing,

if you would.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Yes.

[The written information submitted by Mr. Lowenkron follows:]

Question. Mongolia has been heralded by many as a success story of democratic

development. Yet, endemic corruption continues to prevent Mongolia from qualifying

for participation in the Millennium Challenge Account, and the institutions of democratic and governance programs remain very weak. The administration reduced support for democracy and governance programs from $10 million in FY–04 to $7.5 million in FY–05. The same amount was requested in FY–06. Why are we reducing

United States funding for democracy programs in Mongolia at this pivotal moment

in its political development?

Answer. Currently, all United States economic assistance to Mongolia is distributed by USAID, which has identified two priorities: Private sector-led economic

growth and more effective and accountable governance. Over the past 3 years, good

governance assistance has remained constant at $2.7 million. The decrease in

USAID funding from $10 million to $7.5 million can be attributed to a decline in

economic growth assistance from $7.22 million to $4.8 million in FY–06.

Mongolia’s Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) proposal is also currently under

review. To address Mongolia’s worsening performance on corruption, the Millennium

23

Challenge Corporation (MCC) has officially notified Mongolia that passage of

anticorruption legislation is a prerequisite for signing a compact. MCC had underscored the importance of fighting corruption and strengthening the rule of law as

essential to the success of any MCA program in promoting economic growth and reducing poverty. If Mongolian authorities are responsive in enacting anticorruption

legislation, Mongolia also stands to gain aid through the Millennium Challenge Account.

Mongolia’s transformation from authoritarian communism to democratic governance is a remarkable ongoing success story. But this transition is far from complete,

and many development challenges remain. Despite achieving peaceful and constitutional transitions of power between governments since the early 1990s, holding elections that are largely free and fair, and recording impressive 6–10 percent GDP

growth rates over the past few years, Mongolia’s continued democratic and economic

successes hinge on its ability to manage a series of ‘‘good governance’’ issues, including establishment of greater accountability, transparency, and anticorruption measures.

Senior Mongolian officials have also expressed concerns about cuts in economic assistance levels for Mongolia. We will continue working actively with Mongolian officials to develop a balanced assistance program, and given our concerns of corruption, our funding level over the past 2 years reflects a sustained commitment to

helping Mongolia’s democratic development.

Senator BIDEN. And Kazakhstan. Vice President Cheney expressed ‘‘admiration for all that’s been accomplished here in

Kazakhstan,’’ yet we think it has one of the worst records on all

counts. Does the Vice President speak for the administration? And

is this the position the administration, one of admiration with regard to that country?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Senator, my work on democracy promotion is

in the context of sitting with the Secretary of State, working with

the Secretary of State. So, I can address it in that context.

Senator BIDEN. That would be helpful.

Mr. LOWENKRON. And in that context, the question that the Secretary always asks me is not is the country bad or good. Tell me

about the trajectory. And even if it is weak, is it slowly heading in

the right direction? Or is it not heading in the right direction? Are

there backsliding countries?

Kazakhstan is very much still in this picture. In August of last

year, the good news is that there was a constitutional council in

August of last year that determined that legislation passed by the

parliament to restrict NGOs was unconstitutional. And in September of last year, President Nazarbayev said, ‘‘I do not object to

that ruling and that ruling will stand.’’

They have taken tentative steps on political reform but there is

still a long way to go. The picture throughout Central Asia is a

mixed picture. Better than Kyrgyzstan, a lot worse than

Uzbekistan.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM

DELAWARE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing to examine our efforts to promote democracy around the world, and the role of nongovernmental organizations

as our partners in this effort.

In his second inaugural address, the President spoke eloquently about the need

to advance democracy. And in our struggle against terrorism, and in promoting security and stability, the administration is right: Democracy is our most powerful

weapon.

But I am concerned that we are not getting it right.

24

Fairly or not, the administration has created the impression around the world

that it believes democracy can be imposed by force. And it has created the perception that it equates democracy with elections.

We have to recognize that democracy can’t be imposed by force from the outside.

Instead we should work with moderates from the inside, and over the long haul.

And we must understand that an election does not a democracy make.

In the Middle East, Islamist groups have made huge strides—Hamas in the Palestinian territories, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, religious parties in Iraq,

Hezbollah in Lebanon. Holding elections without doing the hard work of building

democratic institutions may leave us less, not more, secure.

A democracy must rest on the foundation of a strong civil society—on building the

institutions of democracy: Political parties, effective government, independent media

and judicial systems, nongovernmental organizations, and civil society. Yes, elections are important, but so is support for things like grassroots governance, human

rights, and education for girls. We must put more emphasis on this necessary, comprehensive approach.

A case in point is Iraq. President Bush has spoken of Iraq being a ‘‘beacon of freedom’’ in the Middle East. But unfortunately—and inexplicably—he has not put his

money where his mouth is. Last summer, this committee heard from both the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute that their critical programs in Iraq were in jeopardy—precisely as Iraqi negotiators were burning

the midnight oil to hash out their constitution—if they did not receive additional

funding. Senators Lugar, Kennedy, and I managed to get each of the institutes an

additional $28 million through appropriations last year—and we are working to increase the funding by $104 million in the Emergency Supplemental. But the situation of these groups remains extremely precarious.

I realize that many of our nongovernmental partners recognize the need for a

comprehensive approach—and it is because of their good work, dedication, and courage that we have seen many of the gains that we have. I will be interested in learning more this morning about their efforts.

But our aid programs in places like Egypt and Pakistan, for example, have lagged

in supporting democratic institution building. And Latin America and the Caribbean

have experienced a significant decrease in democracy assistance funding—nearly 66

percent since 2005—even as political and economic instability has increased.

So, the question in my mind is, ‘‘What more do we need to do?’’ Or, perhaps more

appropriately, ‘‘What do we need to do more effectively?’’

Again, I thank the chairman for calling this hearing today. I look forward to a

productive and helpful exchange on how we can work together on this critical issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Secretary Lowenkron, let me just pick up that last question-andanswer situation. I remember 20 years ago, in this committee, a

hearing that we had that was a question with regard to the Philippines. And we were simply exploring, as we are today, a number

of situations. There were two very vital players in the State Department. Mr. Wolfowitz and Mr. Armitage came before the committee and were, I thought, passionate in their thoughts about

potential developments in the Philippines, views that were not necessarily shared by then-President Ferdinand Marcos and his Government at the time.

Now, one difference between discussing the Philippines at that

point and, say, Uzbekistan today, or central Asian countries, as you

have said, is that at least in the Philippines, there appeared to be

some tradition, or structure, or institutions that were important, if

you were going to have a so-called free and fair election. It might

not occur, in any event, but at least there was a context in which

it was conceivable. Under the best of the circumstances, it might

occur.

Whereas, in some of the instances that we have been discussing

this morning, there does not appear to be that kind of institutional

structure. This has led some critics of democracy movements to

suggest that the United States is preoccupied with having elecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:35 Mar 28, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\ROLEOF.TXT mich PsN: mich
25

tions, which may, in certain contexts, simply be very polarizing affairs. Some have characterized, for example, the elections in Iraq

in that way, leaving aside the overall strategy that may be involved

there. They have said that it does in fact define who is a Shiite,

who is a Sunni, who is a Kurd. It does not necessarily lead to institution building, in which the Iraqi Government now is moving ardently to try to see the context or maybe even to have some revisions of the constitution.

In the case, for example, of Iran, some have pointed out that the

current president did come through an election. But they also, of

course, point out that the mullah not only screens the numbers of

candidates but eliminated almost everybody who had been participating in a democratic way in the previous legislature.

So even after you press for freedom for elections, it is not really

clear in some cases what you have. And that seems to me to be an

important development in the last 20 years, as those who have opposed democracy have become more sophisticated. Maybe that is

not the correct word. There simply were not institutional frameworks there that looked toward law as we know it, or human

rights, or equal rights, or what have you.

In this context, what are you doing in your Department as you

survey the scene of the predicament of democracy beyond the talk

of having free and fair elections; that is, try and provide the ballot

paper, the registration process, all the rest that are rudiments of

this? What do you do with regard to the context in which these ballots might be occurring?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Well, Senator, if I can make several points.

First, what we do in my Bureau and also working with the Secretary and my colleagues in the Department is that we do focus on

elections but we also focus on governance. As the Secretary has put

it, what happens the day after an election is just as important as

what happens before the election.

But we also need to work on civil society. We have to ensure that

the roots that were established can kind of open it—open up the

system—particularly in a system where they did not have such

practices in the past, to try to make it more fertile so democracy

could take root and elections can proceed apace. That is for elections and democracy promotion. As I tell people who work for me,

this is uneven. We are going to have setbacks. Some states will

backslide. Some states will exploit their victories, such as what

happened in Venezuela.

But we cannot be deterred. We have to focus on governance

issues. And we have to focus on civil society.

If I may, I would like to make one point about getting the soil

ready for democracy. And I will be brief.

When President Bush pressed for reform, for change, in the

greater Middle East, we developed a proposal to establish this

forum for the future in the Middle East that I mentioned in my

statement. We, with our G–8 partners and with several countries

in the countries in the region, we were told this was never going

to have any effect. At worst, you have Iraq in slow motion. These

regimes would collapse and this is not a part of the world that has

ever exercised these kinds of basic rights.

26

In December of 2004, at the first meeting of the forum, there

were only five NGO leaders in Rabat. When I accompanied Secretary Rice to Bahrain last year, there were more than 40. And so

you are now having the centers of a civil society building in the

Middle East. And the Jordanian Government, which is going to

host the next one in December, has pledged to actually not only increase the number but the quality and the influence of NGOs to

kind of flesh out civil society.

So, it cannot just be about elections all the time, I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just ask one more question. Recently, at

an Aspen Institute conference in which Members of Congress were

discussing democracy in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, that

part of the world, there was testimony from some on the Iranian

picture. They are getting fairly good reception of Radio Free Europe

coming out of Prague. And that was an interesting thought. Their

feeling was essentially that the public diplomacy efforts, which the

United States has been involved in, were sometimes heard in the

country, and that there is not that degree of repression in which

signals are not ever found or heard. The remnants of the program

in Prague seemed to have a great deal more resonance.

I raise this question because, as a part of the building of the

background, the institutions, and the framework for free and fair

elections, the whole public diplomacy effort seems to me to be extremely important and one in which we regularly have testimony

before this committee. Things are not going particularly well, although those trying to do them ardently and passionately point out

how difficult it is and the strains that they are under.

What is your own take on this? This is obviously a side issue for

you, and I think probably an important one. And maybe you are

engaged in your department in some public diplomacy of your own.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Well, two things. First of all, I do think Radio

Farda through RFE, I think, is doing a terrific job. And it is my

understanding that we want to explore as many avenues as possible, because we have not had eyes or ears or footprints in Iran

for a quarter of a century.

In terms of public diplomacy, I tell everybody in my staff that we

can debate democracy promotion among ourselves and we know

that it is elections, civil society, and governance. But unless we go

out and talk about it, unless we talk about the relationships we are

forging with key allies and institutions, nobody is going to hear

about it.

And what will exist out of the press is what I fear is kind of a

caricature that the United States in a simple-minded fashion runs

around and says, I want an election tomorrow, and that is it. There

is no thought out strategy. There is no effort to develop the basis

or the foundations of it. And there is more that needs to be done,

absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we thank you very much for your testimony today and for your responses to our questions. We look forward to working with you, because it is an area obviously in which

the committee shares your passion and interest. We appreciate

your coming.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just ask Senator Biden, do you have——

27

Senator BIDEN. No, no. I just wanted to express my thanks, as

well. I think you have done a good job there. You are devoted to

this effort, and you have been straightforward about it, and I appreciate that.

As clarification, I may not have asked the question correctly

about general licenses versus specific licenses. I know of no general

license that has been issued but maybe there has been, from Treasury. My staff will clarify that question with you. I do not want to

hold you up now.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Thank you, Senator. I will get back to you on

that and all the other questions.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The Chair would like to call now our second panel of distinguished witnesses. These will include Mr. Carl Gershman, president of the National Endowment for Democracy; the Honorable

Mark Palmer, vice-chairman of Freedom House; Dr. Morton

Halperin, director of U.S. Advocacy, Open Society Institute; and

Mr. Thomas Carothers, senior associate and director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we appreciate your coming today. I

want to make just one general announcement for the benefit of the

members and staff and audience. It is likely that we will have a

rollcall vote on the floor of the Senate at about 10:45, which is 10

minutes from now, plus or minus minutes as the case may be.

When that happens, we will have a short recess of the committee

so that all members can hear the full testimony of each of you, who

will be in the process of giving testimony, I suspect, at that point.

And we will return then to make certain we hear the full testimony

and have questions afterwards.

Second, I would like, before I call upon Carl Gershman, to recognize again the extraordinary report that has just been issued by

the National Endowment for Democracy and that is being made

public, as has been mentioned before, today. This report came in

large part at the request of our committee for NED to delve into

many of the issues that we have been discussing already here this

morning and that you will discuss, I am certain, in your testimony.

So, we appreciate the work of NED, specifically, in providing this

report not only to us but to the general public. We will find it extremely useful as a framework for this debate for further initiatives.

At this point, it is my privilege to call upon Carl Gershman, with

the thought that I had served for 9 years on the board of NED, and

admired his leadership in that period, as well as subsequently. We

are delighted to have you here this morning.

Let me just say each of you will have opening statements. Your

full statements will be made a part of the record. And I will ask

you to proceed with summaries, hopefully within the 10-minute period each, if that is reasonable.

Carl.

28

STATEMENT OF CARL GERSHMAN, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL

ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. GERSHMAN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. It is great to see

you again. And I want to reiterate the sentiments you expressed.

It was a great pleasure for us to have had you on the board for 9

years. We miss you. Although I must say I really do not miss the

fact that you used to go on the floor periodically every year to defend our budget. And the fact that you do not have to do that every

year now is also something that we welcome.

And it is great to see Senator Biden and also to note that two

of your colleagues on the committee, Senator Sarbanes, is now a

very active member of the NED board, and Senator Coleman is a

new member of the NED board. And we welcome them.

I also want to take this opportunity just to thank once again, as

mentioned in the report, the International Center for Not-for-Profit

Law for its assistance in preparing this report. The report notes

that we are dealing with a new environment today. And I might

note that today is the 24th anniversary of President Reagan’s address at Westminster, where he launched this whole effort.

In that time, a great deal has changed; there has obviously been

a great expansion of democracy. But now, partly as a result of that

expansion, we are dealing with a new problem. Many of the countries where old dictatorships fell but have not really successfully

made the transition to democracy—we call them hybrid regimes—

now have kind of a mixture of autocratic elements that has spaces

for civil society and political opposition parties to operate.

In some of the cases, such as Yugoslavia in 2000, and Georgia

in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, independent groups rightly use those

spaces to expand their opportunities and to achieve breakthroughs.

And that is one of the reasons we are faced with this problem

today, as you noted in your introductory remarks.

So, I want to begin by saying that I think the problem we are

dealing with today is an inevitable problem. We have long faced

the problem of dictatorships, which block any kind of assistance to

NGOs or even the ability of NGOs to exist. What we have today

is a struggle that exists in many of these countries. And I am reminded of the statement that President Lincoln made when he was

campaigning and debating Senator Stephen Douglas, where he said

that no government can permanently be half-slave and half-free; it

will have to be one way or the other. And the governments will

seek to maximiize their power and people who want freedom will

seek to enlarge political space.

And that is an inevitable struggle. And I think that is what we

are dealing with in this report and in this hearing.

The methods by which these hybrid regimes or semi-autocratic

governments seek to control civil society are becoming more sophisticated. And we spell it out in the report: The registration requirements, the restrictions on political activities, the interference in

NGOs’ internal affairs, the establishment of fake NGOs, GONGOs,

the restrictions on foreign funding, the harassment of individual

activists.

I have just returned from Russia where I was meeting with

many of the activists, and they explained to me that the laws

sometimes are vague and require the NGOs to negotiate with repVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:35 Mar 28, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\ROLEOF.TXT mich PsN: mich
29

resentatives in the president’s office for their very survival. So, it

gives the government the opportunity to control these groups.

Senator Martinez was asking about Venezuela. Just yesterday, a

law modeled on the Russian law was introduced in the Venezuelan

parliament, and is being debated today, as we speak, in the Venezuelan parliament. And this law, again, establishes mandatory

registration requirements, which could be used in the same way

that the Russians plan to use the registration process there. There

is a new enforcement body. The NGOs will be interfered with in

their internal affairs. And the law will be applied selectively. This

is the great fear that people have.

Another recent development is that a body established in

Ukraine, the Bahrain Institute for Political Development, required

NDI to clear its contacts with local groups with that body. And

they refused to do that and were restricted in that way, and NDI

was forced to leave the country. So, this is a fairly expanding problem.

But I want to keep it in perspective and to note that we are dealing here with maybe 20 or 25 countries that exist in this hybrid

category. Many of these governments are defensive. They feel they

have to restrict political participation in this way. Otherwise, they

feel they will not be able to survive; and the activists are resilient.

The response to this problem needs to take place at three different levels: The tactical level, which is the response undertaken

by NGOs, by newspapers, by independent parties, by trade unions,

at the grassroots level; the response of the international assistance

organizations, such as NDI and IRI and our other two institutes,

labor and business; and finally, the response at the level of the

NED, the funding agencies which seek to directly assist these

NGOs. It is different in every case.

And I would just like to note that even in a country like Belarus,

where you have onerous legislation that has been passed, it has not

stopped the ability of NGOs to function, nor has it prevented the

NED or its institutes from assisting democrats in Belarus. The

groups continue to operate, even though they do not have registration. And until now, at least, nobody has been arrested for doing

that.

The borders of the country are relatively open. And so, the ability

of groups in other countries to provide assistance to democrats in

Belarus is possible and is taking place. Newspapers are publishing

in exile. The Internet is used very, very actively. And so, a very active democratic movement continues to exist, even in a country like

Belarus, which is much worse than Russia is today. So, I think in

that sense, the situation needs to be put in context.

The way these new laws affect the international NGOs requires

them in many cases to engage in their own kind of diplomacy when

they are on the ground in countries, to explain who they are, to engage with broad political forces, including political forces that

might be part of the ruling establishment. Sometimes, where it is

not possible for them to function in countries like in Belarus, they

leave, but they function from outside. IRI is functioning in Belarus

from an outside office and NDI from an office in Kiev.

I just want to underline that it is possible, even in the tougher

situations, to try to continue to be active here. And the NED, in

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part because the NED is a nongovernmental entity, which can operate flexibly, it can continue to provide funding, sometimes directly to NGOs still in Belarus, but sometimes through intermediaries based in exile.

I should note, Mr. Chairman, we have a board meeting tomorrow. There are 283 proposals in this board book for tomorrow’s

meeting. The work is expanding. There are many proposals in this

book, in Zimbabwe, in China, in Belarus, in Russia, in Venezuela,

in Egypt; all of the countries that are discussed in this report.

So in no way—I want to underline this—in no way are these restrictions stopping us, but more importantly, are they stopping the

Democrats on the ground who, as I say, are resilient and are prepared to take risks to continue to fight for democracy.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the report also speaks about the response

that has to take place at what we call the political level and the

normative level. On the political level what we urge is that, in addition to the funding of these activities, that the United States and

Congress treat democracy work the way you have treated human

rights work in the past, where you have protected people and you

have linked our relations with countries to the readiness of these

countries to permit NGOs to function. And also, for institutions like

our party institutes, and other institutes, and the NED to provide

assistance; in other words, to permit democracy assistance.

In this respect, I want to call attention to the G–8 meeting that

is taking place next month in St. Petersburg. And to note that before the G–8 meeting in Moscow on July 11 and 12, the NGOs and

the democratic civil society and political groups will be meeting in

Moscow to try to rally support for their cause. And they are inviting international participants. And Members of the Congress will

be invited, as well as from the other G–8 countries and other countries in Europe and elsewhere.

And we hope that this can become not only a rallying point for

the Democrats in Russia, but also an opportunity to engage with

Russian Democrats and to establish a long-term strategy for assisting. This is one of the things that I heard most repeatedly from

Democrats when I was in Russia. They do not want just a statement here. They do not want to be forgotten after the G–8. They

need support in a steady way, in every way that we can provide

it.

I might note that President Putin has spoken about making the

ruble convertible. He is obviously very interested in the way Russia

can enlarge its economy, possibly become part of the World Trade

Organization. And this gives us leverage in that situation to try to

protect the NGOs. And we have to try to look for that kind of leverage in every situation.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, we speak about the need for action

at the normative level. And what that means is that we think it

is important for the international community to accept democracy

assistance, the kind of assistance that is provided by the community of institutions that the Congress supports, private foundations

in Europe and elsewhere, as you noted, that this is part of the

international assistance today. And its violation should be seen as

a violation of an international norm. And we urge the Community

of Democracies to take hold of this issue, to approve democracy asVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:35 Mar 28, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\ROLEOF.TXT mich PsN: mich
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sistance as a norm of international activity, and to carry that norm

and support for that norm into the United Nations and into the regional bodies to have it accepted by the international community.

In closing, I just want to note something that Ludmilla Alexyva,

the head of Moscow Helsinki Group, said in Moscow on May 12, the

30th anniversary of the Moscow Helsinki Group’s establishment in

1976. She said, ‘‘Times are tough today. But let us remember that

back then we were just 11 people with a typewriter. And look what

happened.’’ And I think we have to keep that perspective as we

move forward.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gershman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARL GERSHMAN, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR

DEMOCRACY, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Lugar, ranking member Biden, and members of the committee. Let me

begin by expressing my appreciation to the committee for the opportunity to address

you on such a vital matter, and particularly to thank each of you for your commitment to the mission of the National Endowment for Democracy and for your strong

support for our program over the years. Mr. Chairman, you made a personal commitment to the Endowment through your exemplary service to the NED board during the 1990s, and we are delighted that Senator Sarbanes has continued in that

tradition of active involvement in our work. We should note that Senator Coleman

has become the newest member of our board and we very much look forward to his

contribution in the years ahead.

Today I want to address a serious issue that is the subject of a report that NED

is releasing today. The report is entitled, ‘‘The Backlash Against Democracy Assistance,’’ and it was written in response to the concerns raised by Senator Lugar in

a letter to us last November about reports of the growing efforts of foreign governments to impede U.S. programs for democracy assistance.

My testimony presents, in part, a distillation of the report’s main findings. Senator Lugar’s letter expressed particular concern about restrictions on democracy assistance in such countries as Belarus, Uzbekistan, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and

China. Subsequent developments, including legislation in Russia that imposes new

restrictions on nongovernmental organizations, have further highlighted this disturbing trend.

THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

Since the inception of the National Endowment for Democracy, the environment

for democracy promotion work has changed profoundly. Most developments have

been positive, justifying the NED’s mission, validating its approaches, and facilitating continuing work in the field. These changes include:

• A dramatic increase in the number of viable democracies, providing regional

partners and improving access to previously closed states, particularly in the

former Soviet bloc;

• The collapse of any viable alternative to democracy as a legitimate political

order;

• A robust bipartisan consensus within the United States on the desirability and

effectiveness of democracy assistance through nongovernmental efforts;

• The expansion and increasing international acceptance of democracy assistance;

and

• The growing cooperation among democracies in providing such assistance.

Yet certain adverse factors have arisen which, while not threatening to reverse

the democratic trend, do present challenges to democracy assistance. These include:

• The emergence of semi-authoritarian hybrid regimes characterized by superficially democratic processes that disguise and help legitimate authoritarian

rule;

• The emergence of new actors and agencies committed to undermining, countering, and reversing democratic progress; and

• New restrictive measures of a legal and extra-legal nature, specifically directed

against democracy promotion groups.

The efforts of foreign governments to impede democracy assistance—from legal

constraints on NGOs to extra-legal forms of harassment—have intensified and now

32

seriously impede democracy assistance in a number of states. This backlash is particularly pronounced in the former Soviet states of Eurasia as well as in China, Venezuela, Egypt, and Zimbabwe. Representatives of democracy assistance NGOs have

been harassed, offices closed, and staff expelled. Even more vulnerable are local

grantees and project partners who have been threatened, assaulted, prosecuted, and

imprisoned.

In addition to impeding democracy assistance efforts, regimes are adopting

proactive approaches, channeling funds to antidemocratic forces and using fake

NGOs to frustrate genuine democratization. All of this has had a ‘‘chilling effect’’

on democracy assistance, intimidating some groups, and making it more difficult for

them to receive and utilize international assistance and solidarity. These actions seriously threaten the ability of Democrats abroad, operating peacefully and openly,

to continue to work with U.S. organizations that receive congressional funding in

order to carry out their mandate.

Despite these disturbing developments, which in some cases are prompting practitioners in the field to revert to methods used in closed societies during the 1980s,

democracy assistance NGOs are today active in more countries than ever before.

The new climate has actually validated the mission and the nongovernmental structure of the NED ‘‘family,’’ which has proven its ability to work effectively in sensitive and repressive political climates.

Democracy assistance NGOs have long been active within a diverse range of

states—from closed societies to fragile or emerging democracies—for which the

strategies, operating procedures, and funding arrangements honed over more than

20 years remain relevant and effective. The NED family, in particular, has extensive

experience of channeling assistance to dissidents, labor unions, human rights activists, and other advocates for democratic change within repressive societies.

THREATS TO DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: CONTEXT AND CHARACTER

Repressive regimes have always sought to prohibit, frustrate, or undermine the

activities of democratic and civil society groups and individual activists. Under the

totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, political repression took extreme forms, including the mass arrest, incarceration, and physical liquidation of opponents.

More recently, however, the ‘‘color revolutions’’ in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and

arguably, Kyrgyzstan, have demonstrably alarmed authoritarian governments,

alerting them to the precariousness of their hybrid, pseudodemocratic regimes. The

scenario of popular protests, mobilized through opposition groups and NGOs, pressuring ruling elites to surrender state power, had a chastening effect and prompted

a reassessment of strategies and ‘‘political technologies’’ required to maintain authoritarian rule.

It is pertinent here to raise the issue of the association of democracy assistance

with regime change, a position taken by honest, if impatient, advocates of democracy, as well as by more malicious critics. This misleading equation has been taken

up by authoritarian rulers to deny the legitimacy of democracy assistance and to

portray these efforts as an instrument of foreign policy designed to undermine U.S.

adversaries.

NED’s position has always been that regime change and democracy assistance are

not synonymous. Democracy assistance does not actively promote domestic policy

agendas or champion opposition forces. Achieving democracy is the purpose of democracy assistance groups’ efforts, and the fall or removal of a nondemocratic regime does not automatically produce democracy as an outcome. The replacement of

Batista by Castro or the Shah by Khomeini makes that clear.

Democracy assistance focuses not on determining short-term or partisan outcomes

in the sense of changing regimes or backing certain parties or candidates in elections. The outcomes we work toward are those of strengthening democracy, safeguarding human rights, and enhancing democratic institutions, practices, and culture. So our objective is not regime change per se. To be sure, ending a dictatorship

can provide the space and opportunity for people to build democracy, but that is a

long-term and arduous task, entailing a process of work, learning, and the cultivation of civic values and institutions of governance that enable pluralist societies to

resolve differences through peaceful means.

Ukraine’s Orange Revolution serves as a powerful reminder that democracy promotion is a process, not an event. NED and its institutes actively invested resources

in sustaining democratic and civil society groups for 15 years prior to the democratic

breakthrough, demonstrating the need for a long-term approach. In addition, such

breakthroughs confirm the benefits of a ‘‘venture capital’’ approach whereby ‘‘seed

funding’’ is provided to democratic and civil society groups in countries and contexts

that initially appear unpromising for democratic change.

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1For further details of ICNL’s distinctive and pioneering work on these issues, go to

http://www.icnl.org/.

Still, it is important to note that the offensive against democratization, and particularly against forms of internationally-funded democracy assistance, predates the

color revolutions.

Ominously, there is growing evidence of collusion and collaboration on the part

of authoritarian regimes seeking to undermine democracy assistance and independent civil society groups. We see this in the marked similarity between legislation restricting NGO activity and the sharing of Internet monitoring and censorship

technologies.

In this regard, we draw the committee’s attention to the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization (SCO), comprising Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. This organization is emerging as the core of what has

been called an ‘‘authoritarian internationale’’—an axis of antidemocratic regimes—

across Eurasia. We note with particular concern that at its forthcoming summit on

June 15, in Shanghai, the organization is expected to embrace the Islamic Republic

of Iran as a new member.

Disturbing countertrends and tendencies have emerged in part as a reaction to

the success of democracy promotion in general and, in some cases, to the efficacy

of the modus operandi of the NED and its institutes, in particular. While such adverse factors do not threaten a reversal of the historic trend towards democracy,

they do represent serious setbacks in specific countries and regions, particularly in

the former Soviet Union.

LEGAL AND EXTRA-LEGAL MEASURES

Of course, governments may legitimately seek to regulate foreign funding of domestic political actors and/or to regulate NGOs. Most democracies have regulations

governing and, to some extent, restricting foreign funding and interference in domestic political affairs. But they exist in a context of genuine political pluralism and

institutional checks and balances. Nor, of course, are they designed to suffocate or

impede relatively young and still-fragile civil society organizations.

Our report details the legal restrictions being imposed on democracy assistance

NGOs, drawing heavily on research undertaken by the International Center for Notfor-Profit Law,1 for which we are especially grateful. In practice, of course, legal constraints are supplemented and reinforced by extra-legal sanctions, ranging from surveillance and harassment to expulsion of democracy assistance NGOs.

Democracy assistance groups have experienced the following legal and extra-legal

constraints:

1. Restrictions on the right to associate and freedom to form NGOs: In China and

Vietnam, NGO operations are strictly monitored and controlled, and subject to arbitrary interference by the authorities.

2. Impediments to registration and denial of legal status: In Belarus,NGOs have

waited over a year only to be denied registration without explanation. Russia’s NGO

law requires foreign and—de facto—domestic NGOs to reregister with a state agency which will examine their activities before determining whether they can continue

operations.

3. Restrictions on foreign funding and domestic financing: In Venezuela, the Chavez regime is prosecuting civil society activists from Sumate, a voter education

NGO, on charges of ‘‘conspiracy’’ resulting from a NED grant to promote education

on electoral rights prior to the 2004 recall referendum.

4. Ongoing threats through use of discretionary power: Some regimes, as in Egypt,

retain discretionary powers to shut down civil society groups, keeping NGOs in a

political limbo in which they are apparently tolerated but remain vulnerable to arbitrary termination.

5. Restrictions on political activities: Governments consistently equate democracy

assistance with oppositional activity, ‘‘regime change’’ or political subversion.

Zimbabwe denies registration to groups receiving foreign funding for ‘‘promotion and

protection of human rights and political governance issues.’’

6. Arbitrary interference in NGO internal affairs: In China, civil society groups

are frequently impeded and harassed by bureaucratic red tape, visits by the tax

inspectorate, and other below-the-radar tactics.

7. Establishment of ‘‘parallel’’ organizations or ersatz NGOs: Repressive governments have sought to undermine the NGO sector by establishing captive NGOs, or

Government-Organized NGOs (GONGOs), as in Tunisia, where state-sponsored

GONGOs monitor the activities of independent NGOs.

34

8. Harassment, prosecution, and deportation of civil society activists: Individuals

engaged in certain NGO activities can be held criminally liable and fined or imprisoned. In Uzbekistan, approximately 200 domestic nonprofit organizations have been

closed.

IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE GROUPS

The impact of the above measures on democracy assistance is, to use a phrase

frequently used by respondents, one of a ‘‘chilling effect,’’ with some democratic activists and groups deterred and intimidated from engaging with United States, European, and other sources of democracy assistance and solidarity. While programs

often continue in the face of repressive actions, partners and grantees nevertheless

become more cautious, circumspect, and wary of adopting a high profile. In some

countries, for example, NED grantees have asked program officers not to visit them

for fear of drawing the attention of the authorities. In other instances, prospective

program partners or grantees have suggested that while they need external assistance and are willing to work with or accept grants from democracy promotion

groups, the risks are too great to do so.

Yet these instances are relatively rare and practitioners in the field are not encountering obstacles qualitatively different from challenges previously experienced

(and generally overcome) in closed or authoritarian societies. What does seem to be

different and problematic is, first, the emergence of a twilight zone of uncertainty

in which programs are prone to arbitrary interference or cancellation; and, second,

the growing prevalence of low-intensity harassment, including arbitrary tax inspections, onerous reporting requirements, and ostentatious surveillance by security

services.

The new repressive climate in certain states has, in fact, highlighted the benefits

of nongovernmental and civil society-based approaches. Maintaining and highlighting independence from government, such initiatives demonstrate that democracy promotion is generally most effective when undertaken by nongovernmental organizations, particularly in regions such as the Middle East and Central Asia where

official United States support is sometimes shunned.

Unlike official government agencies often constrained by diplomatic or security

considerations, democracy promotion NGOs, operating openly but largely below the

radar screen, are able to avoid compromising the integrity and efficacy of programs.

Groups like the NED are able to engage and fund unlicensed organizations that

tend to undertake cutting edge programs but cannot ordinarily access official funds.

Democracy promotion NGOs are not constrained by the diplomatic considerations

that affect governmental initiatives.

Nongovernmental groups have a greater facility in adapting flexibly and swiftly

to deteriorating or repressive conditions. When democracy assistance aid is primarily channeled through official conduits, using bilateral agreements, its impact

and effectiveness are blunted. In some regimes, governmental programs’ reliance on

the approval of host-country authorities virtually guarantees such programs will be

compromised.

Indeed, the consensus on the desirability and legitimacy of democracy promotion

and civil society-oriented approaches in particular now extends beyond the United

States. The advantages of a nongovernmental approach are informing and inspiring

current efforts to restructure the European Union’s work in this field, while leading

members of the European Parliament have been campaigning for a ‘‘European

NED.’’

THE RESPONSE OF DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE GROUPS

Democracy assistance groups have in some circumstances been forced to change

their modus operandi and adapt practices they have previously employed in formerly or currently closed societies. Such efforts include financing in partnership

with non-American groups, running trainings and other programs in adjacent territories, and channeling support through exile groups.

Different contexts demand different responses, but democracy assistance NGOs

have always worked within a diverse range of situations and states—closed societies, authoritarian and semiauthoritarian or hybrid regimes, and fragile or emerging democracies—for which the strategies, operating procedures, and funding arrangements honed over more than 20 years remain relevant and effective.

The NED has extensive experience of channeling aid and assistance to dissidents,

labor unions, intellectual and civic groups, and other agencies for democratic

change. Many of these initiatives take advantage of the Internet and other forms

of communication that were unavailable to democratic activists in the communist

bloc only two decades ago.

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New technologies and forms of communication, including the Internet, e-mail, cellular and satellite phone technologies, have dramatically improved the provision of

information and facilitated innovative funding of Democrats in closed, authoritarian

or backsliding societies. They have enhanced contacts and coordination between actors—democracy promotion groups, donors, funders, grantees, and project partners.

Thus, while new restrictions undoubtedly impede or at least complicate the provision of democracy assistance, in other respects conditions have actually improved.

Democracy assistance groups have also been innovative in response to new challenges, including:

• Improving communication and coordination between civil society groups in the

field, and developing common responses and strategies in the face of new restrictions;

• Engaging reform-minded elements within state bureaucracies in hybrid or

semiauthoritarian regimes where backsliding is an ever-present possibility;

• Engaging activists from new democracies to work in countries where their personal experience has great resonance, generalizes best practice, and helps puncture the myth that democracy promotion is an attempt by the United States to

impose democracy; and

• Promoting multilateral approaches that help reduce the ‘‘Made in USA’’ profile

of democracy assistance and also leverage additional resources.

SUGGESTED RESPONSES FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

It is worth recalling that the backlash against democracy promotion inadvertently

acts as a reminder that this is not an uncontested field or a one-way process and

that it is the success of our efforts that has prompted the current reaction. Yet the

evidence of democracy assistance groups’ resourcefulness and adaptability, allied

with the remarkable resilience and application of grassroots democratic activists,

provide strong grounds for cautious optimism that these challenges will be overcome. In this process, the support of the U.S. Congress will be a significant factor.

Consequently, in response to the new backlash, Congress should:

• Ensure that adequate funds for democracy assistance are appropriated, and be

wary of rewarding regimes for ostensibly democratic but cosmetic change;

• Urge the administration to issue with other members of the G–8, a memorandum raising concerns over Russia’s democratic retrenchment;

• Promote a rigorous policy of linkage, by associating a state’s treatment of Democrats and civil society groups to the political and economic dimensions of interstate relations, including: tightening eligibility criteria for membership of international associations of democracies; and making foreign assistance and trade

benefits conditional on democratic performance; and

• Encourage the administration, working through the Community of Democracies,

to gain acceptance of democracy promotion as a normative practice within the

international system. The Community in turn should reaffirm and further

elaborate its founding Warsaw Declaration, which endorsed democracy promotion, and to seek approval for the Declaration from governments, parliaments, regional forums, and global institutions, including the United Nations.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much for that historical

perspective. You mentioned 24 years ago and President Reagan’s

administration. The audience does not understand the NDI, the

National Democratic Institute; the IRI, the International Republican Institute; and the Chamber of Commerce and Labor components. Senator Biden asked very appropriately about the labor

component today in terms of your current administration’s work.

All four of these are contributing in a remarkable way and are

learning a great deal from each other during the process.

It is a pleasure now to recognize another gentleman whom I had

the privilege of sitting next to at the board meetings of that entity

for quite a long while. This followed a distinguished diplomatic career that he had commenced a long time ago.

It is a real privilege to have you again, Mark, before our committee today. Would you please proceed?

36

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PALMER, VICE-CHAIRMAN,

FREEDOM HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. PALMER. Thank you, Senator. And thank you and Senator

Biden for holding this hearing. You are both long-time supporters

of democracy promotion and I want to thank you for that.

In my view, our NGOs operate in two different universes, one in

which the dictator is still in power and the other in which he has

been ousted. And different strategies and tactics flow from those

two different situations.

I wanted this morning—and my testimony focuses on what to do

while the dictators are still in power, because in my view that is

the most difficult, most challenging, most important situation that

our NGOs face and paradoxically, in my view, receives fewer, historically at least, has received fewer resources, less boldness, less

imagination, not only by our NGOs but by many administrations.

We have now an immense body of knowledge about how to oust

dictators peacefully. Freedom House, my organization, recently

published a study, ‘‘How Freedom Is Won,’’ which covers 67 different transitions. And it states, and I want to quote, ‘‘that far

more often than is generally understood, the change agent is broadbased, nonviolent civic resistance, which employs tactics such as

boycotts, mass protests, blockades, strikes, and civil disobedience to

delegitimize authoritarian rules and erode their sources of support,

including the loyalty of their armed defenders.’’

Top down reform by dictators is, in my view, infrequent. It is an

exception. There are virtually no cases of a dictator remaining in

power and becoming a Democrat. I would like to be corrected about

that but I do not know of many, if any, cases of that.

Generally, dictators need to be and have been forced out. And the

key question is, what kind of force is used? And the conclusion of

Freedom House’s study, and I think probably all four of us would

agree, is that when nonviolent force is used, it works in the sense

both that you have been able to get rid of dictators through nonviolent force. And most importantly, what comes afterwards is, in

accordance with the findings of this study, a democratic, durable,

peaceful regime. Whereas when force has been used, most often

you find a new regime emerge which itself is based on the use of

force and is not democratic.

In my view, facilitating the creation of such national movements

should be the primary objective of our NGOs in this field. Unfortunately, our NGOs and their governmental and private funders have

not made a priority of funding groups that are focused on nonviolent resistance or on activist youth groups that have provided

much of the courage and dynamism of successful struggles.

In my view, at least 50 percent of democracy funding should be

directed to the world’s remaining 45 dictatorships. These are the

real problem for the United States. They are our strategic enemies.

In almost all cases, they are behind all of the problems that we

face in the world.

So, I wanted quickly to go through an action agenda of things

that I think we could do, because I think the best response to what

Carl has very well outlined in terms of the current situation in

many of these countries, which is a kind of reaction, the best deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:35 Mar 28, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\ROLEOF.TXT mich PsN: mich
37

fense is a good offense, in my judgment. And I think we need bold

new proposals, new initiatives to meet these challenges.

First, communication is a tremendously important tool. It is the

key to building noncooperation and the organization of such broad

coalitions for those inside a dictatorship, to realize that they are

not alone. For example, in China, where we know there were

87,000 major protests last year, according to official statistics, if

you could link up those who are protesting, the farmers and the

workers, those who are against corruption, those who want independent trade unions, farmer organizations, leading democratic

lawyers, intellectuals, and students, if you could link them altogether through communications, we would have the beginning of a

national movement to get the Communists out and have the Democrats in.

I want to quickly say there are three ways that I think that

could be done. First, the Internet, as we know, is now an extraordinary tool. The dictators, of course, know that and are trying to

block it, including cooperating among themselves. Hu Jintao is now

working with a Supreme Leader Kharmenei in Iran to block the

use of the Internet.

What I think would be possible would be a massive effort against

what is called the Great Firewall of China, the massive, now global, Internet project. Some of my Chinese-American friends in the

last few years have developed some very good software and techniques to defeat this censorship. And they have proposed to your

colleagues here on the Hill and to the administration an NGO global Internet freedom consortium with funding of $50 million a year,

which I strongly support. They have demonstrated in action that

they can defeat this firewall. The BBG is now using their services

with regard to the Iranian firewall. I think this needs major effort

given the scale of the effort on the other side where you have

50,000, at least 50,000, Chinese Government-hired people censoring

the Internet. We need an equally massive effort on our side to ensure a free Internet.

Second, I strongly feel that there is a role for independent media.

Most of our NGO funding is focused on training. But what really

matters is actually having independent media; particularly, I would

say, having independent radio and television stations, but other

forms of independence, as well. For example, it would be really

wonderful if the young Iranian students movement had their own

voice, their own radio station. Well, they do not. And Radio Farda

is no substitute.

A representative of Radio Farda was quoted in the Washington

Post this week as saying, and I quote, ‘‘that the topic of ‘should the

mullahs be overthrown’ is an unacceptable topic for Radio Farda.’’

Well, if Radio Farda cannot talk about it, at least the Iranian students should be able to talk about what is most on the minds of

at least 70 to 80 percent of the Iranian people who do not accept

a theocratic dictatorship in their country and want to find peaceful

ways of getting rid of it. We ought to be able to help them talk

about that among themselves.

So, I propose an independent TV and radio fund be established

with its own independent board to ensure that the stations adhere

to international broadcasting standards and promote nonviolent

38

transitions to democracy. I think a fund of $100 million a year

could be well spent.

Third, in the communications field, telephones and cell phones

offer an extraordinary underutilized and understudied way of promoting democracy inside dictatorships. My Chinese-American

friends, for example, have the phone numbers of 500,000 Chinese

who work in jails, torturing prisoners, who work in the regime repressing democratic movements, and are able to actually call them.

But we need a democracy technology fund to really develop this

field; that is, for example, to develop some new technologies, the

use of mass text messaging devices to call people to and manage

demonstrations, to do the equivalent of what now has created immense excitement in the Middle East. The equivalent of the American Idol shows are now on Middle Eastern television. And people

are able, through their cell phones and text messaging, to vote for

their idols, their singers and dancers that they want to support.

In the digital era, we can disintermediate the dictators by organizing direct referenda, even elections, through cell phones and

other technologies.

Now, let me move away from communications and say that another area on my own action agenda would be very much enhanced

support for students. Students really are the moving force from Indonesia to Hungary. When I was there in Budapest, it was very

clear it was the students really more than anyone else who were

behind change.

And I do not think, as I look at NGO programs, I do not see

enough money going to students. I really think that is an underutilized resource. And I really believe that we need—and some students at Indiana University in your own State have organized

something called Students for Global Democracy. I really believe

that if we could get the world’s democratic universities together,

the students of those universities together, and give them the

money to in turn help student movements inside Iran, China,

Burma, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere, that that could make an immense difference. And I think $50 million would be well spent in

that regard.

The next item on my agenda, Mr. Chairman, is the ADVANCE

Democracy Act, which is supported by a number of your colleagues

here in the Senate and passed the House last year. And it would

turn my old institution, the State Department, into a real fighting,

freedom house kind of place. It would make of our embassies a real

asset, an ally for NGOs inside these 45 dictatorships.

It would transform our diplomacy permanently. I think this administration is very sympathetic to what you and Senator Biden

believe in. But who knows what will come next? We are a nation,

unfortunately, of flavors. And I do not know what the flavor will

be 3 years from now. There has been a countermovement against

democracy support. I think we need the ADVANCE Democracy Act

to make permanent certain changes in the way our diplomacy is

conducted. And specifically, we need plans for each of the 45 dictatorships, which this act would require, working with NGOs to develop these plans to bring about permanent change.

Next on my own list would be Sullivan Principles for Democracy.

We do not think normally of our corporations as NGOs, but they

39

are often the most powerful nongovernmental presence of the democracies inside these dictatorships. I think that our key NGOs,

NED and others, ought to sit down with you here in the Congress,

with the executive branch, and with other key democratic governments and key corporate leaders, to establish a business community for democracy and to develop a code similar to the Sullivan

Principles which would require of our corporations that they support democracy in China and elsewhere.

For example, it would be entirely possible for the huge number

of companies financed from outside China by democratic country

origin companies to allow trade unions. Senator Biden, you talked

about the importance of trade unions. I could not agree more. In

Serbia, in Poland, in many places, workers are the key change

agent, along with students. And in China now, the workers are

showing a real serious interest in defending their rights. These

87,000 demonstrations last year are an extraordinary thing.

So, if our companies in China would begin to allow labor organizing inside their premises, that would make a huge difference.

And I think that is something that we ought to support.

Let me finally say, Mr. Chairman, that it was exactly 25 years

ago this year that a small group of us here in Washington began

meeting—Dante Fascell and Lane Kirkland and others. And that

led to the creation of our new democracy institutions, as you mentioned, and to the speech that President Reagan gave that I spent

a lot of time working on.

I think we are now at a moment when we need a similar burst

of thought and creation. Because we have been at this for 25 years,

it is time to appoint an independent body. And the ADVANCE Democracy Act proposes that a democracy promotion human rights

advisory board be established. And I think Secretary Rice is working on this, that a body be established of independent people to

look at how we are spending this $1.4 billion, ask ourselves some

really basic, zero-based questions. Is the money going to the right

place or not? Do we need more? Which I personally think we do.

In sum, what should our priorities be over the next 25 years,

with the goal of making dictators an extinct species, which I think

is entirely doable if we put our minds to it.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Palmer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PALMER, VICE-CHAIRMAN, FREEDOM HOUSE,

WASHINGTON, DC

Achieving a 100 percent democratic world is possible over the next quarter century—but only with radical strengthening of our primary frontline fighters for freedom.

We can build upon our nongovernmental organizations’ strong base of experience

and success. From Freedom House rallying the democratic world against fascism beginning in 1940, to the League of Women’s Voters building democracy in post-World

War II Europe and Japan, through the German political party stiftungen’s contributions to Portugal and Spain’s breakthroughs to democracy in the 1970s, to America’s

own new democracy promotion institutions’ contributions beginning in the early

1980s, NGOs have assisted a massive expansion in freedom. Over the 33 years of

its annual Freedom in the World survey, Freedom House finds that the percentage

of not-free countries has been cut in half.

Our NGOs have been essential players in many, but by no means all of these

breakthroughs. I can attest firsthand to the critical role which the AFL–CIO played

40

in building and bolstering solidarity in Poland and the National Democratic Institute played in training fellow Democrats in the living room of the Ambassador’s residence in a still-communist Hungary. From my days marching in the civil rights

movement here, to a foreign service career focused on and in dictatorships, to many

years on the boards of the National Endowment for Democracy, Freedom House, the

Council for a Community of Democracies, to work with innumerable Chinese, Saudi,

Libyan, and other democracy groups, to researching and writing a book about how

to achieve universal democracy, and over a decade as an investor in emerging markets, what have I learned about NGOs in the promotion of democracy?

NGOs operate in two different universes—where the dictator is still in power, and

where he has been ousted. Different strategies and tactics should flow from this

fact.

Let us focus on the stage of dictatorship as it is, in my view, by far the most important and challenging, but paradoxically has had and has less NGO resources,

imagination, and boldness. And to the extent NGOs are active on dictatorships the

vocabulary is often wrong.

We have an immense body of knowledge now about how dictators leave power and

durable democracy ensues. A recent Freedom House study, ‘‘How Freedom Is Won,’’

covers 67 transitions and finds that ‘‘far more often than is generally understood,

the change agent is broad-based, nonviolent civic resistance—which employs tactics

such as boycotts, mass protests, blockades, strikes, and civil disobedience to

delegitimate authoritarian rulers and erode their sources of support, including the

loyalty of their armed defenders.’’ Top down reform by dictators is the infrequent

exception; there are virtually no cases of a dictator becoming a Democrat and remaining in power. Generally, dictators have been and need to be forced out. As the

study also finds, there is a clear relationship between the type of force used and

durable democracy emerging. Violence engenders successor governments based on

violent repression of their people. Broad-based coalitions committed to the strategic

use of nonviolent force have been the best avenue for freedom’s march.

Facilitating the creation of such national movements should be the primary objective of our NGOs. Unfortunately, our NGOs and their governmental and private

funders, have not made a priority of funding groups that are focused on nonviolent

resistance or on activist youth groups that have provided much of the courage and

dynamism of successful struggles.

In general, the priority for funding of our NGOs has been for countries which already have ousted the dictator. While there has been some progress in recent years,

the disparities remain striking. Programs for China, with over 60 percent of the

world’s people still living under a dictator, are the most striking with around 1 percent of USG democracy funding, and a hunk of that agreed to with the Chinese

authorities as has also been the case with Egypt, Pakistan, and some other key dictatorships. The cause of promoting real political progress in Saudi Arabia gets virtually no funding. North Korea was getting virtually none until Congress pushed

through a specific act, which has been true of other not-free countries, as well. Our

foundations, corporations, and other private donors are even more reluctant to fund

democracy programs for dictatorships. Yet, the most fundamental challenges to

American national interests all emanate from the world’s remaining dictatorships—

from weapons of mass destruction, to regional instability, to energy dependence, to

harboring and funding terrorists.

At least 50 percent of democracy funding should be directed to the world’s remaining 45 dictatorships. Some have long argued that the repressive conditions inside

dictatorships make more programs and spending impossible. This stems from a congenital and breathtaking lack of imagination and boldness. Our NGOs did over $30

million of programming in Serbia helping a broad-based coalition of particularly

younger Serbs to oust Milosevic peacefully. We should have programs and funding

of similar or larger scale for each of the remaining dictatorships. As conditions in

each of them vary, we will need to consult with local Democrats to tailor make each

national program. But here are some of the tools which will help.

COMMUNICATIONS

The key to building the will for noncooperation and the organization of a coalition

is for those inside a dictatorship to realize they are not alone, to facilitate communications among them and with their allies outside. In China, for example, if those

who conducted some 87,000 major protests last year, those who want to organize

independent trade unions, farmers organizations, and leading democratic lawyers,

intellectuals and students could be linked together, and they could synchronize their

actions on a national basis.

41

• The Internet provides an extraordinary new means for such just such communication. Dictators have recognized that fact and are repressing its use—individually and increasingly collectively—for example, Chinese Communist, Hu

Jintao, is now helping Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei. The Saudi’s Abdullah

has long allowed just one Internet pipe into that country. Fortunately, American NGOs, particularly Chinese-Americans Ph.D.s in computer sciences, have

developed ways and are having success in defeating the Great Firewall of

China. The BBG recently recognized their success on China and has started

working with them on Iran. But a much larger, global program is required.

These same Chinese-Americans have proposed a Global Internet Freedom

project which is scalable and can be applied to any dictatorship. To defeat the

massive efforts on the other side, including in the case of China—over 50,000

censors—we should fund this United States NGO Global Internet Freedom Consortium project with $50 million per annum. • The U.S. Government-run radios and television make important contributions

in this struggle, but there is a huge unmet opportunity in independent radio

and television. Our NGO funding for media is overwhelmingly for training.

Imagine the credibility and influence if Iran’s national student movement had

its own radio, and therefore voice. Similarly, an open radio broadcasting platform for North Korea, produced by Koreans for Koreans, could have a huge impact. The ‘‘Washington Post’’ this week quoted a Radio Farda representative

saying that ‘‘should the mullahs be overthrown’’ would be an unacceptable topic

for Farda. But a nonviolent overthrow is precisely the main topic on the minds

of a majority of Iranians. I propose an Independent TV and Radio Fund be established, with its own board, to ensure that stations receiving support adhere

to international broadcasting standards and promote nonviolent transitions to

democracy. Such a fund could easily and wisely spend $100 million per year. • Telephones, including cell phones, are another major and largely underexplored

and supported means for communications and organization within dictatorships

and with the outside world. For example, one American NGO has proposed a

massive program of calling the personal and official phones of those persecuting

people in China to explain that what they are doing is morally wrong and that

they will be held accountable when the rule of law and democracy arrives. This

group states that it has over 500,000 such phone numbers and success with its

limited resources in talking with some people. I believe a Democracy Technology

Fund devoted to uses and programs for existing technologies like cell phones

and developing new technologies (mass text messaging devices to call people to

and manage demonstrations) for communications among democrats could wisely

spend another $50 million per annum. Immense excitement and ‘‘voter’’ participation in American Idol clones on a Middle Eastern television show that popular referenda can be done via cell phones and text messaging. The digital

world can disintermediate the dictators by organizing direct referenda, even

elections.

STUDENTS

From Indonesia to Hungary, and more recently from Serbia, to Ukraine and

Nepal, students and young people have been at the forefront of a majority of peaceful ousters of dictators over the past four decades. Those who founded Students for

Global Democracy at Indiana University recognized that students outside dictatorships can help. For students from democratic countries to show solidarity by visiting

their colleagues inside dictatorships, and—where they are willing to take the risks

to join in demonstrations, sit-ins, and other nonviolent actions, could make a massive difference—just as northern students like me gave encouragement to those on

the front line in the South during our own civil rights struggle, merely by our presence. Training by young people experienced in nonviolent conflict for those inside

is increasingly taking place but is still underfunded. And funding, direct or indirect,

of student and youth groups committed to action is even more grossly underfunded.

We need a special Students for Global Democracy Fund which would be run by student and youth leaders from democratic universities and groups across the democratic world—who would give direct financial assistance to their colleagues inside

the not-free countries. The middle-aged, both inside our existing NGOs and within

governments, somehow are not comfortable aiding students and youth. Another $50

million per year would be money very well spent.

ADVANCE DEMOCRACY ACT

As a Chinese dissident said last month to President Bush, the U.S. Embassy in

Beijing should be more welcoming to Chinese Democrats. The Act would require the

42

State Department and our embassies to meet and work with local Democrats and

NGOs to develop long-term strategies for harnessing U.S. Government resources to

promote democracies in each not-free country. Inside all 45 dictatorships there are

upwards of 100 embassies of democratic countries. Beginning with American embassies, they should be key partners for local and foreign NGOs. The ADVANCE Democracy Act, which was passed by the House last year with broad bipartisan support and is now before the Senate, would transform our embassies into freedom

houses and our ambassadors and other diplomats into active, trained supporters of

nonviolent campaigns for democracy. Unfortunately, in too many cases, embassies—

and the larger United States foreign policy apparatus—are not playing the role they

should. In the case of Uzbekistan, for instance, while the U.S. Government should

be praised for calling for an international inquiry into the events in Andijian, they

have been strangely silent on following through with targeted sanctions aimed at

key supporters of the regime. Most of the NGOs active in the country have been

kicked out, and the U.S. Government has yet to authorize a continuation of efforts

of Freedom House, ABA, Internews, and others, to provide a lifeline to human rights

defenders and other activists within the country. Indeed, the latest USAID strategy

for the entire Central Asia region makes no mention of a need to provide support

to frontline human rights defenders in any country in Central Asia at all in the future. On the other hand, our Interest Section in Cuba and Embassy in Zimbabwe

are showing some of the creative methods that can be applied. The Act also provides

the Community of Democracies the ability to become an alliance of democratic actors, not just talkers, and provides funding for its affiliated NGO—the International

Center for Democratic Transition, which was established to transfer the experience

of successful transitions to those still under repression.

TIME AND SPACE

Dictators are far more vulnerable than most recognize. Their ouster is virtually

never predicted by the world’s cognoscenti and sometimes happens with breathtaking speed. But often building the individual will and national coalition to oust

one takes time and experiences setbacks. Once they are ousted, the most dramatic

improvements in freedom tend to come quickly in the successful transitions, but

time is often required for real consolidation. NGOs and their supporters therefore

need programs which persevere, sometimes over a decade and more, on either side

of the ouster. Similarly, they need space, to be as present inside as possible. We

should establish and maintain a diplomatic presence inside every dictatorship, including Tehran and Pyongyang, to assist local and our own NGOs. Our goal should

be to open, not further close off these repressed societies and to do so through every

form of exchange. By not dealing with them in this brief testimony, I do not mean

to underestimate the critical importance of many traditional NGO programs designed to open these countries and build civil society. Over time and with expanding

space, we should move from general assistance to civil society forces, to targeted assistance focused on education and training in civic nonviolent resistance, to assistance for cohesive civic coalitions through which such resistance is expressed. And

when the ouster occurs, we should not abandon our democracy programs too soon,

as we are on the verge of doing in Serbia.

SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES FOR DEMOCRACY

We do not think of our corporations as NGOs, but they are often the most powerful nongovernmental presence of the democracies inside dictatorships. I propose that

key human rights and democracy NGOs and key democratic governments meet with

leading businessmen to formulate a code of conduct for businesses inside dictatorships, and establish a Business Community for Democracy to work with the Community of Democracy and its NGO partners to enforce the code. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides a good basis for such a code. For example, the

Declaration provides workers the right to organize independent unions and our companies could and should allow labor organizing within their factories and other enterprises inside dictatorships. Organized workers, with students, have been the

most powerful agents of change in numerous successful nonviolent campaigns.

Trade unions are critical NGOs. It would be appropriate for all S & P listed companies to contribute $250,000 each to a Global Democracy Fund to ensure the BDC

has real clout, with companies contributing to censorship and other problems like

Google, CISCO, and Microsoft contributing substantially more. There would be

‘‘safety in numbers’’ for each of these companies vis-a-vis their Chinese and other

dictator hosts.

It has been precisely 25 years since a small group met here in Washington to conceive and push through major new democracy promotion organizations: NED, CIPE,

43

IRI, NDI, as well as the AFL–CIO’s already existing programs. As one of those

present at that moment of creation and active in this field since then, I think the

time has come for another moment of creation and another push. Immense progress

has been made and with another quarter century’s effort we could finish the job.

The House and Senate sponsors of the ADVANCE Democracy Act propose that a

Democracy Promotion and Human Rights Advisory Board be established to review

and make recommendations regarding the overall United States strategy for promoting democracy and human rights. We need an independent, in-depth, zero-based

look at what works and what our priorities should be for the future.

The administration states that we are now spending $1.4 billion on democracy

promotion. While that is certainly a substantial increase over previous years, why

are the sorts of initiatives I have outlined not receiving serious or any funding? Why

do NGO programs focused on dictatorships get well under 50 percent of the money?

Is $1.4 billion insufficient? Do our priorities need fixing? Do we need to support new

NGOs and should some of the existing ones lose their funding? Painful as some of

these choices may be, the task is of such fundamental strategic importance to the

United States and the entire world that we should not shrink from basic questions.

At the same time, we should not allow the complexities of Afghanistan and Iraq

to obscure the successes of nonviolent democracy promotion or to sap our will to persevere. Making dictators an extinct species has been and can be done without firing

a shot in almost all situations. A world without dictators would be peaceful, prosperous, and just. Surely that goal is worth sustained commitment and substantial

funding by the American people for their NGOs—the heirs of Mahatma Gandhi,

Martin Luther King, and Lech Walesa in this noble struggle.

The CHAIRMAN. On that ringing high note, we will take a recess

for about 10 minutes while Senators vote. And then we will return

for Dr. Halperin’s testimony.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I want to apologize in advance to

the panel. I have agreed to meet with a group of democratic leaders

relating to a matter on the floor. And I am not sure I will be back

before the panel is over. That was supposed to take place after the

first vote but it may not. If it does not, I will be back. I apologize

if I do not get back.

[Recess: 11:03 a.m. to 11:18 a.m.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order again. Thank

you.

We will proceed now to the testimony of Dr. Halperin. It is a

pleasure, as always, to have you before the committee, sir, and we

look forward to your words today.

STATEMENT OF DR. MORTON H. HALPERIN, DIRECTOR OF U.S.

ADVOCACY, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OPEN SOCIETY POLICY CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. HALPERIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear again before this committee, in this

case to discuss the role of NGOs in helping individuals and governments to get on the path to democracy and to remain on that path.

And I want to say I agree with the previous witness that helping

countries get on that path is very important. But I guess I would

give equal emphasis to helping countries stay on that path. I think

that is an equally difficult and important challenge.

And the Open Society Institute and its related entities, often referred to collectively as the Soros Foundation Network after its

founder and patron, George Soros, plays, I think, a unique role in

that process. And I appreciate the opportunity to have a few minutes to discuss that here with the committee.

In more than 20 years that the network has functioned, it has

adopted some principles which we think explain why it has been

44

effective and which we think are worth emulation by other groups.

And in my prepared statement, I provided some specific examples

of how those principles work.

The network has been in operation since 1984. And over that pe- riod of time, it has spent approximately $5 billion in over 70 countries in the support of development of open societies. Almost all of

that work is done through local foundations operating in the country where the network is functioning.

As a fundamental principle, we rely on the judgment of local

boards and staff that decide what should be done and who carry

on the activities. The network does not impose a strategy but gives

grants to local foundations after evaluating the locally-developed

strategy and then provides programmatic and technical assistance,

in addition to financial support. We think this distinctive way of

operating is in fact the key to the successes that we have.

A second general principle is that we operate in a strictly nonpartisan manner. We are not in the business of favoring one

political party, faction, or candidate over another. And we do not

advocate for ‘‘regime change.’’ In the few instances in which the

network has been involved in election-related activities, it is to promote an honest and level playing field. Our elections activities are

transparent. And information is disseminated openly, not to ensure

any particular outcome, but to try to provide an equal opportunity

for all. And that was the case in Ukraine recently, a matter which

has received a lot of attention, not only in Ukraine but in Russia

and other countries in the region.

A third principle is that we operate independent of the U.S. Government and any other government. It is not our mission to implement the policies of any government. Like many donors, however,

there are times when we support the efforts of government to promote reforms in their own countries, particularly in the earliest

stages of the transition to democracy. Such is the case now in Liberia, where the Soros Network is working very closely with the

United Nations Development Fund to provide assistance in various

ways to the new democratically elected Government of Nigeria.

Throughout the network’s history, there has been numerous instances where U.S. Government democracy assistance has complemented OSI’s efforts to promote an open society. And at various

times and in various places, the Soros Foundation Network has cofunded initiatives with the U.S. Government and other governments in such areas as civil society development, public health, and

education. Bosnia is a good example of where we have been working with local governments and other governments over a long period of time; and where we think it is solely yielding results in consolidating democracy in that country.

The last general principle I mention is that we believe that private, nongovernmental funding directed at local groups is always

an essential element of democracy building. Government funding,

especially from major powers such as the United States, is most

likely to be effective if it comes through entities like the National

Endowment for Humanities and its related institutions, rather

than from governments directly. However, government funding

given to American and local NGOs can play an important role. But

when the U.S. Government is providing such assistance, we believe

45

it must pay careful heed to what we are hearing from the local

NGOs in a particular country.

In Egypt, for example, the message is very clear. Local NGOs

desperately want assistance, including assistance from the U.S.

Government, because they think that assists them in establishing

their legitimacy and their ability to struggle for democracy. In Iran,

on the other hand, I think we are hearing the opposite from those

struggling for democracy in that country—that any hint that they

are associated with the United States, and particularly with the

perceived policy of regime change, is the kiss of death for those

NGOs. And I think in those circumstances we should do things like

the radio broadcasts that have been discussed, but we should be

careful not to taint NGOs, who are signaling that they need to

show a separation from the United States.

And we think, as I have said, that we need to be prepared to stay

for the long haul, that a single election does not democracy make,

even two elections. And our work in Bulgaria, as well as many

other countries, shows that an extended participation, building up

open society institutions, youth groups, other kinds of advocacy

groups, is important to the process.

And equally important is what has been discussed so far by the

other people who have testified; that is, support for NGOs. OSI

itself is often subject to attack in various countries. We have had

our foundations closed in a few countries and have moved them

just out of reach of those dictators, as the endowment. We have

also worked with the U.S. Government and with other NGOs to try

to fight against these laws in Russia and other countries; and to

try to fight for their women in application and have provided assistance to NGOs struggling to maintain themselves.

I also want to express my support for the position that the administration witness indicated support for, and that is to make

sure that in the new Human Rights Council, NGOs have the same

right of access as they had in the old commission. I cannot help but

note that the U.S. Government would be in a better position to endorse and support that position, if it had stood for election to the

Human Rights Council. But it is not too late for the administration

to appoint a special high-level ambassador to attend those talks

and to lead the fight at those talks, as an observer nation, to maintain the role of NGOs in that process.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate all that you and this committee have

done to support democracy promotion and particularly the work of

NGOs. And I would be pleased to respond to questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Halperin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MORTON H. HALPERIN, DIRECTOR OF U.S. ADVOCACY,

OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OPEN SOCIETY POLICY CENTER,

WASHINGTON, DC

I much appreciate this opportunity to appear before this distinguished committee

to participate in your consideration of how nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)

can help individuals and governments get on the path to democracy and remain on

that path. The Open Society Institute and its related entities, often referred to collectively as the Soros Foundations Network, after its founder and patron George

Soros, plays a unique role in this process. I and my colleagues very much welcome

this opportunity to explain our approach and to provide some examples of what we

have done in the more than 20 years that the Network has functioned. I want to

46

lay out some general principles and then to illustrate how the Foundations Network

works by describing briefly our efforts in a few specific countries.

The Soros Foundations Network has been in operation since 1984. In the last decade alone, the Network has expended approximately $5 billion in over 70 countries

to support the development of open societies. Most of our work is done through local

foundations in the countries in which the Network is operating. As a fundamental

principle, we rely on the judgments of local boards and staff that decide what should

be done and who carries out the activities. The Network does not impose a strategy

but grants funds to local foundations after evaluating strategies developed locally

and provides programmatic and technical assistance in addition to financial support.

We think that this distinctive way of operating is the key to the success of our efforts.

A second general principle is that the Network operates in a strictly nonpartisan

manner. We are not in the business of favoring one political party, faction, or candidate over another, and we do not provide support for ‘‘regime change.’’ In the few

instances in which the Network has engaged in election-related activity, it is to promote an honest and level playing field. Our efforts in the elections area are related

to transparency and information dissemination, not to ensure any particular outcome. I will describe one such set of efforts in Ukraine in 2004, shortly.

A third principle is that the Network operates independently of the United States

Government and of any other government. It is not our mission to implement the

policy of any government. Like many donors, however, there are times when we

have supported the efforts of governments to promote reform in their own countries,

particularly in the earliest stages of the transition to democracy. Such is the case

in Liberia, where we have teamed with the United Nations to create a Capacity

Building Fund to support the reform efforts of President Sirleaf. I will discuss this

ongoing effort, as well.

Throughout the Network’s history, there have been numerous instances where

U.S. Government democracy assistance has complemented OSI’s efforts to promote

an open society. At various times and in various places, the Soros Foundations Network has co-funded initiatives with the U.S. Government and other governments in

areas such as civil society development, public health, and education. Bosnia, where

we have been working with the local governments and other governments over a

long period, is one example where this cooperation is yielding results, as I shall discuss.

Our ability to work effectively with the U.S. Government has varied over time.

At the current moment, perceived association with the U.S. Government is not always helpful. The last general principle I will mention is that we believe that private, nongovernmental funding directed to local groups is always an essential element of democracy building. Government funding, especially from a major power

such as the United States, is most likely to be effective if it comes through entities

like the National Endowment for Democracies and its associated institutes rather

than from the government directly. However, government funds given to support

American and local NGOs can also play an important role.

I would be pleased in the question period to elaborate further on these general

principles and to explain in more detail how the Soros Foundations Network operates. However, I would like to use my remaining time to illustrate our operational

approach by focusing on a few specific cases. These reports are very different in

style precisely because they reflect, as does all our work, direct input from the local

Soros Foundation. I thought this was a useful way to underscore our conviction that

local leaders must be allowed to speak for themselves and to present the challenges

and opportunities as they see them.

UKRAINE

Because of its nonpartisan mandate and concrete programmatic orientation, the

International Renaissance Foundation (IRF, the Kyiv-based Soros body in Ukraine)

viewed the recent elections as more of a means than an end. The elections were considered a significant institutional milestone, to be sure, but one which presented a

challenge to be sure that IRF remained faithful to its key priorities. Those efforts

focused on election-monitoring (most notably via an exit poll that they helped spearhead with other donors), voter education, public opinion analysis and regional debates, and guarantees of voter rights.

2004 Presidential election

The IRF supported complex programming during the presidential contest of 2004.

Needless to say, the funded projects did not seek to support a particular candidate,

but worked to create an environment conducive to compliance with Ukrainian elecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:35 Mar 28, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\ROLEOF.TXT mich PsN: mich
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toral law, respect of voters’ rights, and open access to information. A few key examples of their work:

• Monitoring election financing: Identifying the total cost of the candidates’ campaigns, the distribution of federal electoral funds, and the transparency and accountability of both;

• Monitoring media coverage of the election period;

• Supporting NGO coalitions, working on voter rights and civic engagement; and

• Supporting exit polls (widely viewed to be the crucial impetus for the mobilization of the Orange electorate in protesting the election’s falsified results).

2006 Parliamentary election

During the March 2006 parliamentary elections the IRF supported many of the

same initiatives as discussed above, including key exit polls which provided laudably accurate results. In light of the increased power of Ukraine’s parliament due

to constitutional reform, the foundation focused on enhancing the quality and availability of information and analyses of party platforms so that voters could make,

as the IRF called it, a ‘‘deliberate choice.’’ Amid this effort, Ukrainian NGOs were

provided with support to enable them to study campaign promises and party political records on concrete issues and to distribute the findings to the media and on

the Internet. Public forums were held all over Ukraine about the results, with journalists, experts, and average citizens participating. IRF also supported a series of

round tables, debates, and interviews with leading politicians that were broadcast

on television and the radio. Not only did this effort improve the quality of information provided to Ukrainian citizens, it also set a higher standard for public scrutiny

of political choices. Correspondingly, the initiative encouraged Ukrainian politicians

to establish a political culture characterized by competing public policies, programs

and individuals, rather than vague populist pledges.

Other International Renaissance Foundation activities

The areas focused upon by the foundation during the recent electoral period—freedom of expression, transparency and accountability, and human rights work, broadly defined—are those in which the foundation has had a long-term interest and

which constitute the core of Network-supported activities. The IRF also supports

projects and programs which foster the development of civil society and promote the

rule of law and the independence of mass media. For instance, the IRF has provided

funding to diversify information sources for civil society, democratize education and

public health, and protect minority rights.

A major advocate for transparency in Ukraine, IRF is a model of transparency

itself, openly conducting tenders for its funding and informing the public regularly

of its activities through press conferences, bulletins, and Internet publications.

Several key examples of the IRF’s current work include:

• Supporting legal aid and creating a pilot network of legal aid centers (in most

parts of the former Soviet Union, a formal system of legal aid is absent);

• Supporting publication of a seminal report on the state of human rights in

Ukraine, prepared by a network of Ukrainian human rights organizations;

• Supporting public access to government information through information requests to various public bodies and legal action against those bodies which

refuse to release requested material (In part, due to this effort, the Ministry of

Justice recently affirmed that the widespread practice of secret decrees was illegal.); and

• Supporting a pilot testing initiative in 33 universities to eliminate the rampant

corruption inherent in entrance examinations.

BULGARIA

The Open Society Institute has been the primary private funder of NGOs in Bulgaria for the last 16 years and has consistently promoted the fundamental values

and processes of liberal democracy. These programs demonstrate the importance of

a long-term commitment to help institutionalize key elements of democracy over

time and to create the needed civil society components.

The foundation has played a decisive role in creating and maintaining the infrastructure of Bulgaria’s civil society. It has founded more than 20 NGOs and has provided support to more than 50 others. These organizations constitute the most active segment of Bulgaria’s civic sector and include watchdog groups, think tanks,

grassroots NGOs, and educational institutions such as the American University in

Bulgaria.

Among the keys achievements of the foundation are the following:

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• Opening the world for a generation of students, academics, and intellectuals

through scholarships, exchange programs, and fellowships; close to 4,000 individual grants have been awarded, many of them to opinion-leaders and decision-makers in Bulgaria; • Filling voids in Bulgaria’s public life with books, publications, and information

resources; the translation program single-handedly made available the basics of

philosophy, sociology, political science, anthropology (more than 200 titles), subjects that had been ‘‘closed’’ by the communist regime; • Dramatically improving the civic awareness and skills of NGO practitioners,

civil servants, and politicians at the central and local levels; • Calling attention to the plight of the country’s Roma citizens and supported a

broad program of advocacy, self-help, and social service to that community; OSI

also initiated the Decade of Roma Inclusion (with the World Bank as partner),

which led the Bulgarian Government to adopt an $800 million 10-year program

for improving housing conditions for the Roma minority; • Initiating public debates on issues previously left off the agenda, such as access

to justice, the rights of people with mental, intellectual, and physical disabilities, and palliative care; and • Introducing innovative approaches to social problems piloted in other countries,

such as community policing, diversity management in local government and minority community centers. Many of these were later institutionalized within

government agencies.

Here are some specifics on a few key programs:

Human rights

OSI has been a major architect of the human rights infrastructure in Bulgaria.

It helped create and maintain a network of human rights NGOs, which produced

the first voices promoting radical reforms to the old totalitarian system. Through

public awareness raising and strategic litigation, these organizations have brought

about a sea-change in Bulgaria’s public sphere, including the adoption of modern

regulations on antidiscrimination and access to public information.

Rule of Law

OSI has promoted equal access to justice for all citizens. The foundation initiated

the first research studies on this issue, advocated for the new law on Legal Aid

(adopted in 2005), and supported a network of NGOs providing free legal advice to

vulnerable social groups. It also supported public interest lawsuits on a variety of

issues. OSI has established a number of legal clinics and helped design national

standards for clinical legal education. Much of this work has been done in partnership with USAID-funded programs (specifically ABA–CEELI) and the European

Union.

Media

During the first 7 years of Bulgaria’s transition to democracy, OSI promoted the

development of independent media by providing funding, training, and expertise to

reporters and editors. These efforts included the development of a code of ethics and

support for investigative journalism. In 1998, the foundation established the Media

Development Center, which is dedicated to the development of a professional journalist community in the country. OSI continues to support diversity in media by

helping Roma journalists break into mainstream news outlets.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1992–2006

The Soros Foundation Network activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates

the diverse roles which the Network plays in responding to threats and opportunities and in empowering a local population to seek its own path to democracy.

Work began during the siege of Sarajevo begun in November 1992. In December

1992, a $50 million gift by George Soros was given to UNHCR for redistribution to

international NGOs to address the desperate humanitarian situation. The intent

was not only to help alleviate the suffering of those in need of humanitarian assistance; the foundation also hoped to attract international humanitarian NGOs to

work in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, through their presence, provide international

witnesses who would speak out against the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in connection with the policies of ethnic cleansing. Among the projects

funded in Sarajevo through the Soros humanitarian fund was one which established

a new water system; another that connected 60 percent of the homes to natural gas

for heating and cooking purposes; another that brought seeds to Sarajevo to permit

residents to grow vegetables on terraces and in gardens; and another, kept secret

during the war so as not to endanger those involved with it, that increased the elecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:35 Mar 28, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\ROLEOF.TXT mich PsN: mich
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tricity supply to Sarajevo by 30 percent to ensure uninterrupted operation for hospitals, the central bakery, the TV station, the Presidency, and other facilities necessary for the survival of the city.

Humanitarian assistance activities during this period of necessity focused on bare

survival in times of war. Foundation projects included donations of equipment and

supplies, medical facilities, food aid, and clothing for the most badly affected groups;

establishment of e-mail links in many institutions, scholarships, computer courses

in Zenica, Mostar, and Sarajevo, pen-pal project with Sarajevo children, solar lamps

to academics and intellectuals, hospitals, and morgues, and an open phone line so

relatives and friends from around the world could call in.

From 1995–1999, with the relative normalization of the situation following the

Dayton Peace Accords, the focus moved to building civil society and institutions

from the remains of the war. A new local board was appointed from people all over

Bosnia and Herzegovina (not only Sarajevo, now that people could travel). Opening

of a branch office in Banja Luka brought new challenges of working within

Republika Srpska, new media, new NGOs, more projects to fight nationalism and

the high influence of Milosevic and Karadzic. Among the new programs:

• Priority shifted to education and cultural programs involving young people

(anti-brain-drain);

• Creating highly specialized centers for media, law, contemporary art, management, and information technology; children education centers;

• Publishing program supported together by the foundation and modern Bosnia

and Herzegovina literature, as well as authors in social and natural sciences;

• Over $8 million supporting independent media (print and electronic) on the

premise that there can be no democracy without free media ensuring a truly

autonomous space for open public dialog on key social and political issues; and

• Other programs included debate and library programs, as well as thousand of

grants given to high school and university students, journalists and scientists,

professors, musicians, writers, economists, painters, actors and directors, persons with disabilities, doctors, engineers, IT specialists, and linguists.

Beginning in 2000, the foundation began to focus on a limited number of areas

identified as priorities on the road toward open society. The current approach is the

determination to work on long-term projects with clear targets which would contribute to a systemic change in the society. An important element of the new approach is various forms of partnership and cofinancing with other international organizations/agencies. Priorities have been selected on the basis of an assessment of

the relative significance of the subject matter for the democratization process.

The priorities are youth and long-term education reform, promoting rule of law

and good governance, and protecting minorities and other vulnerable groups. The

foundation prioritized youth since they can serve as advocates of a better and more

open society, and long-term education reform programs, since they use ‘‘top-down’’

and ‘‘bottom-up’’ approaches equally, thus improving both levels at the same time.

The impact is felt at the system level in its institutions and at the local level in

the schools themselves.

The second priority—building an open society through the promotion of the rule

of law and principles of good governance—is the focus of the law program and the

local governance program. The law program is dedicated to creating an ambience

that would lead toward the rule of law, in general, as well as human rights protection and improvements in knowledge and skills of those who are supposed to be the

pillars of the rule of law in society. Promoting a culture of transparency and accountability among local authorities and strengthening democratic values through

civic participation in decision making is at the core of the local governance program.

The third priority concerns minorities and other vulnerable groups. The Roma

Program tries to bridge the gap that still divides the Roma and the rest of society,

through capacity building in Roma associations, inclusion of Roma children into the

education system, as well as protection and support to Roma culture and ethnic

identity. Although statistically they are not a minority, women qualify as a ‘‘vulnerable group’’ on the basis of their position in society. The women’s program promotes

upgrading women’s human rights, equality, and empowerment, while also focusing

on combating violence against women.

In 2000, the foundation undertook a huge research project called ‘‘Developing the

New Policies of International Support in Bosnia and Herzegovina—Lessons (Not)

Learned,’’ that ended with an international conference and publication of a book.

In 2005, the foundation conducted a democracy assessment project which aimed

to provide systematic evidence of the actual state of the democracy in Bosnia and

Herzegovina. Based on the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance’s methodology, the assessment represents the first-time research done by

50

local people and not international organizations; by identifying weaknesses of current political practice, the assessment also provides a platform for an already established NGO coalition, supported together by the foundation and USAID, that pursues the promotion of ‘‘issue-based’’ instead of ‘‘ethnic-based’’ voting as the country

approaches general elections in October 2006. This assessment also created the base

for a further, continuous engagement of the foundation in the monitoring of democratic development in the country.

INDONESIA

While Suharto was in power, the Network assisted media in Indonesia by supporting publications under attack by the regime and by connecting radio stations

across the archipelago and enabling them to form a network, known as 68H, capable

of broadcasting national newscasts. Our support was provided through the Media

Development Loan Fund which was established by OSI in the mid-1990s, and is

now an independent organization that OSI continues to support. At the outset, the

radio network in Indonesia provided connections by Internet to about 150 stations;

today, it continues to operate with about 300 member stations connected by satellite. We are currently supporting 68H by providing funds to radio stations damaged by the recent earthquake. Now, the Open Society Institute’s primary grantee

in Indonesia is Yayasan Tifa, one of the largest grant-giving indigenous foundations

in the country. Soon after the fall of Suharto, OSI brought together a group of Indonesian public intellectuals, NGO leaders, and other like-minded persons to formally

launch a foundation that would promote open society values. OSI was the sole

funder for the first years; now Tifa has been able to attract other funds, though OSI

is still the main funder.

Through this foundation, OSI supports programs in the areas of human rights,

local governance, media, conflict prevention, pluralism, and access to justice in the

most populous Muslim country in the world. In each programmatic area, Tifa begins

the process of defining its strategy by consulting with NGOs and civil society organizations about what the local communities and individuals feel are the issues of

greatest concern and need. The foundation, staffed completely by local Indonesians,

develops its program and grant-making strategies from this initial feedback. The

grant decisions are then made by a combination of recommendations by program officers to Tifa’s senior administration and members of the board of directors, who are

also all Indonesians.

Two of the priorities of OSI in Indonesia have been support for the peace process

in Aceh and support to local media.

Revitalizing and Supporting Civil Society in Aceh 2005–2006

Tifa made a number of grants to help civil society respond after the tsunami.

These included:

• A meeting of civil society groups in Aceh—140 members of civil society and

donor institutions met to discuss priorities and strategy;

• A meeting of religious leaders—600 religious leaders from Aceh and surrounding districts met and wrote a letter of recommended actions to government officials;

• Providing grants to rebuild structure of NGOs effected by the tsunami;

• Partnering with women’s organizations to help them foster a stronger role for

women in the post-conflict society through providing model quality programming for their community; and

• Supporting advocacy NGOs that focus on budget monitoring and corruption

watch.

Tifa also developed a Conflict Prevention: Early Warning System (EWS) based on

the view expressed by interim Tifa executive director, Budi Santoso, that, ‘‘If conflict

prevention is done by strengthening communal rights of local people and enlightening them to democratic values, we believe that they can work for preventing conflict.’’

The EWS teams in Aceh, Ambon, and West Kalimantan organize networks of local

people (multi-stakeholder network, both at the village and district level) to analyze

the situation on the ground to better forecast the potential of conflict or tension in

their area. They are also trained to analyze the potential of using local capacity to

settle conflicts.

Tifa and EWS Jakarta are working to rebuild the Aceh EWS post-tsunami. They

will begin by developing baseline data and conflict mapping and then reorganize the

network or organizations committed to EWS. There have been several NGOs that

have voiced their commitment to EWS; Tifa feels it is important to support.

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The post-tsunami peace agreement is fragile and facing a most difficult time with

the reintegration of the Indonesian military and separatist movements’ members

back into the community. There are many unresolved issues, including alleged unequal compensation that appears to favor the ex-separatists versus their victims.

Meanwhile, reconciliation is an urgent need. Tifa is supporting the ulemas (religious

leaders) to make a community reconciliation plan by consulting all of the conflicting

parties, including the government, military, police, and ex-separatist members. The

perpetrators are being asked for forgiveness before the community with a promise

to make peace, in a local ritual called ‘‘pesijeu.’’ This locally organized peace and

reconciliation effort has been attempted in several areas, such as Aceh Utara, Aceh

Barat Daya, and Aceh Besar. Tifa has worked with religious organizations in Aceh,

namely Rabitha Taliban, HUDA, and Insafuddin, to bring about this peace and reconciliation effort.

Independent media

A second major area of Tifa’s work is supporting independent media. Among the

key activities:

• In 2005, Tifa supported nine local media organizations.

• Most support goes to community radios outside of Jakarta to help the grassroots

stay better informed.

• The long-term goal is to help the community radio stations draft legislation that

will regulate and support the use of community radio as part of the community

development process.

• Example: COMBINE Research Institute of Yogyakarta helps communication between grassroots and mainstream through activists and advocates who use

radio and multiple forms of media.

LIBERIA IN TRANSITION

After a quarter century of war, corruption, state failure, and massive human

rights abuses, Liberia is taking the difficult but necessary first steps toward reform.

The new President, the first female elected to the post on the African continent, is

motivating international actors, West African states, and Liberia’s citizens for participation in a package of needed and possible reforms. Prospects for Liberia’s future

appear positive at the moment. Failure would undoubtedly contribute to regional

instability, a proliferation of mercenaries, further exploitation of Liberia’s natural

resources and a return to war. The present juncture, where a fair and democratic

electoral process has culminated in prospects for development rather than for ethnic-based conflict, is a rare and catalytic opportunity to help forge a beacon of stability in an otherwise tense regional context.

The unique architecture of the Open Society Network provides a readily accessible

and locally informed means to support and help sustain transition in Liberia. A

combination of local representation and expertise and international policy experience ensures a locally owned process for capacity building and sustainable reform

in the country. In addition, thematic expertise in the network in such areas as public heath, revenue transparency, and independent media increases the depth and

breadth of Open Society engagement.

The distinctive and multilayered architecture helps to prioritize and amplify Liberian voices. The Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), a regional foundation of the Soros foundation network supported nongovernmental and communitybased organization in Liberia during the turbulent years of war. OSIWA held a

consultative meeting in Monrovia in March 2006 to reengage with partners, listen

to the needs of local communities, and deepen its commitment to Liberia. The

OSIWA delegation visited the newly established Truth and Reconciliation Commission, legislators, government ministries, and international agencies such as the

United Nations Mission in Liberia. The visit offered a means to develop a calibrated

strategy of engagement centered on the core value of entrenching local solutions to

local challenges.

The following examples illustrate the range and characteristics of the strategy:

An urgent need for accountability, justice and reconciliation—requires an accessible Truth and Reconciliation Commission. OSIWA provided a grant to the Commission, thereby allowing activities to begin while it raises funds regionally and

internationally. Network offices in Washington, New York, and Brussels complement the grant by coordinating fundraising tours and visits with the Diaspora

for commissioners.

Responding to a need for amalgamation among civil society actors and ethics

training to avoid corruption in the sector—OSIWA programs are working with civil

society actors on coalition building and will create a forum for civil society organizaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:35 Mar 28, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\ROLEOF.TXT mich PsN: mich
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tions to meet counterparts in neighboring countries such as Sierra Leone to share

best practices. Support to civil society not only provides opportunities to grow a new

tier of civil society leaders, but also ensures the development of watchdogs that are

a critical element of open and democratic space.

Capacity building is an essential element of reconstruction.—OSIWA and the

Open Society Institute (OSI) in New York support the UNDP-administered Liberia

Emergency Capacity Building Support Project. The project provides support to the

Government in its efforts to attract Liberian experts to manage key public service

positions and to initiate a series of major reforms needed to transform and restore

the twin attributes of efficiency and integrity to the Liberian public service. Additionally, OSI supports the Center for Global Development which is assisting Liberians in a project to implement an economic strategy and partner coordination

mechanism, and assisting with IMF and World Bank negotiations.

Reforms are of course impossible without the requisite funding. Lost revenue from

corrupt extractive industries in the past drained the Liberia economy.—OSI provides funds to the International Senior Lawyer’s Project to support their review of

the Firestone and Mittal Steel contracts on behalf of the Government of Liberia.

Raising the living standards of a deeply impoverished populace will assist in

peace building and alleviate suffering.—OSIWA and the Network Public Health Program are jointly funding programs to map the legal framework for HIV/AIDS and

supporting projects for communities to heal from massive gender-based violence, a

hallmark of the war years.

Education can counter the ignorance that fuels ethnic-based rivalries.—The war

largely destroyed infrastructure including schools. OSI therefore supports the Liberia Educational Trust, which makes small- and medium-sized grants to Liberian

community-based organizations to rebuild schools, provide scholarships, distribute

teaching materials, develop teachers’ capacity, and support accelerated learning programs for older war-affected youth.

Independent media offers a valuable tool for social dialog.—OSIWA has just

launched West African Democracy Radio, an outfit linking community stations in

the Mano River Union (Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone). The radio is the first

of its kind and allows sharing among and within communities engaged in peace

building.

Local, national, regional, and international advocacy is an essential ingredient in

motivating support for all reform activities.—OSIWA and OSI representative offices

in New York, Washington, DC, and Brussels have joined forces to raise the profile

of Liberian voices among the diverse actors assisting the country.

In conclusion, OSI, particularly OSIWA, holds firm to the belief that democratization is a participatory process that must involve indigenous voices, not generic solutions provided by outsiders who lack local knowledge and often do not involve the

populations they claim to serve. The multilayered and multidimensional input provided by the Open Society Network enshrines local ownership and local capacity

building necessary to affect positive change.

CLOSING REMARKS

These words, Mr. Chairman, accurately reflect the view, not only of OSIWA as

it relates to Liberia, but of the network as a whole as it seeks to support civil society

struggling to establish and maintain democratic regimes.

I want to close by expressing the appreciation of the Network for all that you,

Mr. Chairman, and this committee do to promote respect for human rights and to

help people struggle for democracy. We are grateful for the opportunity to describe

what the Soros Network does and what its philosophy is and to participate in this

important discussion.

I would be pleased to answer your questions and to provide any additional information that members of the committee might wish to have made part of this record.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much for your testimony

and for your thoughtful comments about our committee. We appreciate that.

Mr. Carothers, would you proceed with your testimony?

53

STATEMENT OF THOMAS CAROTHERS, SENIOR ASSOCIATE

AND DIRECTOR OF THE DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW

PROJECT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL

PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. CAROTHERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to testify at this hearing. And I also want to

thank you personally for your deep and sustained interest in democracy promotion over the years.

The subject of democracy promotion has in recent years moved

to the center stage of American foreign policy as a result of the

heightened awareness of the strong connections between the advance of democracy in the world and vital U.S. national interests.

The U.S. Government is devoting greater resources today than ever

before to the task of supporting democracy abroad.

Nongovernmental organizations play a crucial role in implementing many U.S. democracy assistance programs. Yet many

organizations involved in the democracy field are encountering significant obstacles and difficulties in the current international context. Understanding these new challenges and their causes is

crucial to improving the effectiveness of democracy promotion efforts, both governmental and nongovernmental alike.

As the chairman has indicated in his opening statement, resistance to and measures opposing democracy aid are multiplying in

the world. This is not just occurring in governments or in countries

where the governments are hostile to the United States. Perhaps

the leading proponent of such measures is a government which is

one of our G–8 partners, the Government of Russia.

In part, these actions are due, as the chairman mentioned in his

opening statement, as a reaction to the color revolutions that have

occurred in different countries in recent years. But I think the picture is more complicated than that and it is important that we understand the full range of causes that are at work.

In addition to the color revolutions, we also have to note the fact

that the Bush administration’s emphasis on the Iraq war as the

leading edge of its democracy promotion policy in the Middle East

has closely associated democracy promotion with the assertion of

American military power and security interests. With the United

States intervention in Iraq unfortunately viewed as illegitimate in

most parts of the world, the legitimacy of the general concept of democracy promotion has suffered accordingly.

Although these two developments, the color revolutions and the

Iraq war, are essentially unconnected, their simultaneous or relatively simultaneous occurrence has caused many people in the

world, as well as many authoritarian and semi-authoritarian governments, to take a new and much harder look at U.S. democracy

promotion activities on their territory.

Second, the status of the United States as a symbol of democracy

and human rights in the world has been greatly damaged by the

abuses committed by the United States military and intelligence

personnel in Iraq, in Afghanistan, at Guantanamo Bay, and elsewhere. And our reputation as a promoter of democracy and a symbol of democracy has also been hurt by other elements of the war

on terrorism, including the secret rendition of foreign terrorism

suspects to countries that regularly practice torture, reliable reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:35 Mar 28, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\ROLEOF.TXT mich PsN: mich
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ports of covert prisons in Europe, governmental eavesdropping

without court warrants within the United States, and so forth.

Unfortunately, U.S. abuses empower foreign leaders to say to

U.S. democracy promoters who are trying to get them to conform

to standards of human rights and democracy: Who are you to tell

us what to do in this regard?

Third, I also have to note the high price of oil and gas is bolstering the position that many nondemocratic governments around

the world, especially in the former Soviet Union, and the Middle

East, but also in Africa and Latin America. Almost all oil-rich

states outside Europe and North America are autocratic. And the

surge of oil and gas revenues that they are enjoying are strengthening their hand at home.

Moreover, some of these governments, particularly in Russia,

Iran, and Venezuela, are taking advantage of this revenue windfall

to fund their own cross-border political work. They are passing

money to political allies or favorites to help influence the domestic

politics of nearby countries in ways they hope will be favorable to

their own interests. This challenging new context creates a number

of imperatives, both for nongovernmental organizations and the

U.S. Government alike.

Quickly, with respect to nongovernment organizations, I think

first these organizations, whether funded by the U.S. Government

or in some cases privately funded, must adjust to operating in a

context of heightened suspicion about democracy promotion generally and United States-funded efforts, in particular. In some

cases, this means choosing between the path of greater secrecy or

less transparency on the one hand and more openness. And I have

watched some of the democracy promotion organization face this

choice. And I think it is very important that these organizations try

to communicate more fully and effectively with citizens in host

countries about what they do and why they do it and not take the

path of secrecy.

Misunderstanding about the nature of democracy aid is very

common in recipient countries. And many democracy promotion organizations have not taken serious steps to change that situation.

Second, it means that democracy promotion groups need to refine

their strategies for pushing back against push-back. Now in some

cases, this means pushing back hard and publicly against measures

to block democracy aid. In other cases, such sort of active pushback will only fuel national sentiments and be counterproductive.

Figuring out the right approach in different situations is difficult

but crucial.

Third, U.S. democracy promotion organizations, as they develop

their strategies and tactics for pushing back, have to be reasonable

and realistic about what sort of access they expect in host countries. The United States and all other established democracies do

put some limits on the political activities of foreign organizations

operating within their borders. Expecting other governments to

allow greater access to foreign organizations not allowed by the

United States in the political realm is unrealistic, especially in situations of tense relations between the United States and the country in question.

55

With respect to the U.S. Government and its response to this

challenging context, I would emphasize five things. First, the U.S.

Government must not make the mistake of confusing regime

change with democracy promotion. Regime change policies in which

the U.S. Government seeks to oust foreign governments it views as

hostile to U.S. interests, whether through military force or diplomatic and economic pressure, fail to gain international legitimacy.

And they contaminate democracy promotion when they are presented as such.

The danger of such confusion is especially high today with regard

to Iran. It is extremely difficult and potentially counterproductive

for the United States to try to carry out democracy promotion activities in Iran if the underlying motivation is regime change.

Second, the United States must get its house in order with regard to violations by U.S. military and intelligence personnel of the

rights of foreign detainees and prisoners abroad. The repeated

tendency of the Bush administration to downplay serious abuses by

U.S. personnel, to fail to pursue responsibility up the chain of command, and to not take clear steps at the top to make sure there

is no ambiguity about the impermissibility of torture by U.S. personnel must be reversed if U.S. democracy promotion efforts are to

operate from a base of significant credibility in the world.

Third, the Bush administration must steer clear of its growing

habit of taking sides in foreign elections, whether through statements of preference about electoral outcomes by United States ambassadors, as has occurred in several Latin American countries in

recent years, or aid programs which are designed to make the incumbent party look good against a challenger that the United

States disfavors, as occurred prior to the recent Palestinian elections.

Fourth, the Bush administration must reduce the glaring double

standard in democracy promotion in which unfriendly nondemocracies are singled out for pointed attention to their political

failings, while those nondemocracies that are helpful to the United

States, economically or in security terms, get close to a free pass.

To give just one recent example, the weak United States response

to the manipulated 2005 elections in both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan undercut the United States assertion of democratic principles in Belarus.

Finally, and in closing, the U.S. Government must give greater

emphasis and prominence to efforts to work in partnership with

European governments and international organizations on democracy promotion. Although the United States is a leading actor in

democracy promotion, it is only one of many in what has become

a widely populated field. Portraying the United States as a city on

the hill or having a uniquely special calling for democracy promotion sends the incorrect and unhelpful message to the world that

democracy promotion is all about the assertion of the United States

and its interests, rather than something that nearly all established

democracies are concerned with and involved in.

If a freedom agenda is to be effective, it must not be a solely U.S.

agenda but a global one.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carothers follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS CAROTHERS, SENIOR ASSOCIATE AND DIRECTOR OF

THE DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW PROJECT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC

Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this hearing. The subject of democracy

promotion has in recent years moved to the center stage of U.S. foreign policy as

a result of the heightened awareness of the strong connections between the state

of democracy in the world and vital U.S. national interests. The U.S. Government

is devoting greater resources than ever before to the task of supporting democracy

abroad. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play a crucial role in implementing

U.S. democracy assistance programs. Many organizations involved in the democracy

field are encountering significant obstacles and difficulties in the current international context, some of which are the result of problematic U.S. policies and some

of which are the result of causes outside the control of the United States. Understanding these new challenges and their causes is crucial to improving the effectiveness of all democracy promotion efforts, governmental and nongovernmental alike.

THE CHALLENGING INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Democracy promotion is never easy. In the past several years, however, a number

of events and trends have rendered the overall context for democracy promotion unusually challenging.

First, suspicion about and resistance to U.S. democracy promotion activities in developing countries and postcommunist countries is at an all-time high. Democracy

building work has long been greeted with skepticism abroad by persons unsure

about the true motivations of democracy promoters and wary of what sometimes appears to them as foreign-sponsored political interference. But a combination of two

different developments in the past several years has greatly increased such negative

attitudes around the world:

• The Bush administration’s emphasis on the Iraq war as the leading wedge of

its democracy promotion policy in the Middle East has closely associated democracy promotion with the assertion of American military power and security interests. With the United States intervention in Iraq viewed as illegitimate in

most parts of the world, the legitimacy of the general concept of democracy promotion has suffered accordingly.

• The recent ‘‘color revolutions’’ in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan have also

contributed to growing global unease about democracy promotion. The dramatic,

inspiring political breakthroughs in these countries were an important advance

for democracy. Yet, as accounts of U.S. support for key civic and political opposition groups in these countries spread, so too did the incorrect but seductive idea

that the United States was the shadowy guiding hand behind those events.

Although these two developments—the Iraq war and the color revolutions—were

unconnected, their coincidence has caused many authoritarian and semiauthoritarian governments to take a new, much harder look at U.S. democracy promotion activities on their territory. Many governments have started actively pushing back against democracy assistance, arguing that blocking such programs is

necessary to defend their national security against what they portray as a United

States bent on carrying out regime change against governments it does not like.

Although this new pushback against democracy promotion is occurring in many

places, including Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the most concerted resistance is

coming from Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has mounted a major campaign against Western democracy promotion, not only taking a series of punitive

measures to limit the activities of Western democracy groups in Russia but also encouraging neighboring governments, especially those in Central Asia, to do the

same. Nondemocratic governments have often put up obstacles to democracy promotion. This is the first time since the cold war, however, that a major government

has made such a systematic and public campaign against democracy aid and worked

across borders to enlist other governments in the cause. The fact that the campaign

is originating not from a hostile government but from one of the United States’s G–

8 partners is especially significant.

Second, the high price of oil and gas is bolstering the position of many nondemocratic governments around the world, especially in the former Soviet Union and the

Middle East, but also in Africa and Latin America. Almost all oil-rich states outside

Europe and North America are autocratic; the surge of oil and gas revenues they

are currently enjoying is helping strengthen their hand at home. Moreover, some

of these governments, particularly those in Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, are taking

advantage of this revenue windfall to fund their own cross-border political work.

They are passing money to political allies or favorites to help influence the domestic

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politics of nearby countries in ways they hope will be favorable to their own interests. More than almost any other single factor, a significantly lower price of oil

would be a tremendous boost to the fortunes of democracy abroad.

Third, again for the first time since the end of the cold war, democracy no longer

enjoys an unchallenged place on the international scene as the only political system

viewed as successful and credible. China’s continued economic success has elevated

the ‘‘strong-hand’’ political approach to managing economic development as an attractive model in many parts of the developing world. Authoritarian leaders in the

Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere justify their repressive tactics by citing the Chinese example. Citizens in some countries with poor development records show a

willingness to sacrifice some of their freedoms for the possibility of better economic

development. Although Russia’s recent economic growth is substantially due to high

energy prices, President Putin has received much of the credit for it, bolstering his

popularity and contributing to the growing appeal of the strong-hand political

model.

Fourth, the status of the United States as a symbol of democracy and as a leading

promoter of democracy has been greatly damaged by the abuses committed by U.S.

military and intelligence personnel in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, and

elsewhere, as well as by other elements of the war on terrorism, such as the secret

rendition of foreign terrorism suspects to countries that regularly practice torture,

reliable reports of covert prisons in Europe, and governmental eavesdropping without court warrants within the United States. The damage to America’s image has

been enormous, a fact that is plainly and painfully obvious to anyone who is internationally aware, either abroad or at home, but which the administration refuses

to acknowledge. The widespread perception that the war on terrorism entails the

frequent violation of individuals’ rights by the U.S. Government sharply contradicts

President Bush’s efforts to tell the world that liberty is the best antidote for terrorism.

Fifth, a narrower development, but one that goes to the heart of the United States

push for democracy abroad, is the success of Islamist groups in two recent elections

in the Middle East, in Egypt, and the Palestinian territories. The surprisingly

strong showing of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and the victory of Hamas reopened

old debates about whether democratization in the Middle East might actually be

harmful to American interests by allowing Islamists parties or groups to come to

power. Some commentators and some quiet voices in the U.S. Government have reacted by urging the administration to retreat from its embrace of a democracy agenda for the Middle East. The United States now faces some very hard choices about

whether to sacrifice its commitment to democracy for the sake of opposing political

forces it believes are dangerous to U.S. interests.

The fact that the international context for U.S. democracy promotion work has become more difficult does not mean that the United States should give up trying to

support democracy’s advance in the world. But it does mean that U.S. democracy

promotion actors, nongovernmental and governmental alike, must take adaptive

steps.

IMPERATIVES FOR NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ENGAGED IN DEMOCRACY

PROMOTION

U.S. nongovernmental organizations engaged in democracy promotion should do

several things to respond to this unusually challenging international environment

for their work.

First, they must adjust to operating in contexts of heightened suspicion about democracy promotion generally and about U.S.-funded efforts, specifically. This means

they need to communicate more fully and effectively with citizens in host countries

about what they do and why they do it. Misunderstanding about the nature of democracy aid is very common in recipient countries and many democracy promotion

organizations have not taken serious steps to change that situation. Rather than assuming that most people will be neutral or favorably inclined toward democracy promotion work, as many democracy promoters seem to do, they need to proceed from

the assumption that many people, both political elites and ordinary citizens, will

start with a negative view of any U.S. organization working on democracy issues.

It also means that democracy promotion groups need to refine strategies for pushing back against pushback. In some cases, pushing back hard and publicly against

measures to block outside democracy aid will be the right approach. In other cases,

it will only fuel nationalist sentiments and be counterproductive. Figuring out what

is the right approach in different situations is difficult but crucial. Also critical is

knowing when to push for broader diplomatic support from the U.S. Government

against resistant host governments. The recent United States effort to counteract

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the Kremlin’s proposal to prohibit Western organizations from operating representative offices in Russia was successful but had the quality of an improvised campaign

rather than one drawing upon a well-planned response strategy to democracy

pushback. Furthermore, as they develop their strategies and tactics for pushing

back, U.S. democracy groups need to be reasonable and realistic about what sort of

access they expect to get in host countries. The United States and all other established democracies put limits on the political activities of foreign organizations operating within their borders. Expecting other governments to allow greater access to

foreign organizations than that allowed by the United States is unrealistic, especially in situations of tense relations between the United States and the country in

question.

Second, U.S. democracy promotion groups must focus attention on the fact that

they can no longer assume a majority of citizens in countries where they work believe that democracy is necessarily the best possible political system. Dissatisfaction

with the social and economic performance of new democratic systems is rife in the

developing world. The growing attractiveness of the ‘‘strong-hand’’ model in many

places means that democracy promoters must think about how to engage citizens

in host countries in fundamental debates about the strengths and weaknesses of

competing systems. Simplistic civic educational efforts extolling the virtues of democracy are inadequate; more sophisticated efforts that explore the complexities of

the issues at stake are needed, especially efforts that seek to reach youth.

Third, given the sensitivities in many societies about U.S. Government intentions

with respect to democracy and political change, U.S. nongovernmental organizations

must take advantage of their organizational (though often not financial) independence from the U.S. Government to reach out to political actors in other societies who

may be important parts of potential democratic processes but are wary of close contact with the U.S. Government. A good example in this regard are moderate

Islamist parties and groups in the Middle East and parts of South and Southeast

Asia. Such parties and groups often have a crucial role to play in political life but

prefer to keep their distance from the U.S. Government. U.S. nongovernmental organizations can establish important lines of communication with such groups, helping expose them to democratic practices and norms as well as increasing understanding in both directions about intentions and outlooks. They may be able to do

the same with populist movements and leaders in other parts of the world, especially Latin America and Central and Southeastern Europe.

IMPERATIVES FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

Although this hearing is focused on the democracy-promotion role of publicly and

privately funded NGOs, the role of the U.S. Government in democracy promotion

is so crucial, and has in recent years been so troubled, that I feel impelled to note,

at least briefly, several imperatives for the U.S. Government as well.

First, the U.S. Government must not make the mistake of confusing regime

change with democracy promotion. Regime change policies, in which the U.S. Government seeks to oust foreign governments it views as hostile to U.S. interests,

whether through military force or diplomatic and economic pressure, fail to gain

international legitimacy and contaminate democracy promotion when they are presented as democracy promotion efforts.

Second, the United States must get its house in order with regard to violations

by U.S. military and intelligence personnel of the rights of foreign detainees and

prisoners abroad. The repeated tendency of the Bush administration to downplay serious abuses by U.S. personnel, to fail to pursue responsibility up the chain of command, and to not take clear steps at the top to make sure there is no ambiguity

about the impermissibility of torture by U.S. personnel must be reversed if U.S. democracy promotion efforts are to operate from any base of significant credibility.

Third, the Bush administration must steer clear of its growing habit of taking

sides in foreign elections, whether through statements of preference about electoral

outcomes by U.S. ambassadors (as has occurred in several Latin American countries) or aid programs which are designed to make the incumbent party look good

against a challenger the United States happens to disfavor (as occurred prior to the

recent Palestinian elections).

Fourth, the Bush administration must reduce the glaring double standard in democracy promotion in which unfriendly nondemocracies are singled out for pointed

attention to their political failings while those nondemocracies that are helpful to

U.S. economic and security interests get a free pass. The weak United States response to the manipulated 2005 elections in both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, for

example, undercuts the United States assertion of democratic principles in Belarus.

The same kinds of disparities also hurt U.S. democracy policies in the Middle East.

59

Perfect consistency in democracy-related policies is not possible given the varying

mix of U.S national interests in different parts of the world. Yet, at least some effort

to push harder on friendly autocratic regimes that are undermining democratic reforms is necessary to give credibility to forceful U.S. criticisms of unfriendly autocratic regimes.

Fifth, the U.S. Government must give greater emphasis and prominence to efforts

to work in partnership with European governments and international organizations

on democracy promotion. Although the United States is a leading actor in democracy promotion, it is only one of many in what has become a very widely populated

field. Portraying the United States as a ‘‘city on a hill’’ or having a uniquely special

calling for democracy promotion sends the incorrect and unhelpful message to the

world that democracy promotion is all about the assertion of U.S. power and interests rather than something that nearly all established democracies are concerned

with and involved in. If a ‘‘freedom agenda’’ is to be effective it must not be a U.S.

agenda but a global one.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Carothers, for

your testimony.

I will proceed to a round of questions. We will have 10 minutes

each.

Let me start by asking you, Mr. Gershman; you mentioned that

at the board meeting of NED tomorrow there will be 283 proposals.

Characterize: Where do these proposals come from, and what kind

of proposals are they? In other words, what do they propose to do?

Can you give some idea? There is a huge number of groups that

is apparently interested in promoting democracy in some fashion.

Who are these people?

Mr. GERSHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It gives me also an

opportunity to brief Senator Sarbanes on the meeting tomorrow,

since he will be there.

The CHAIRMAN. Try to get him up to speed for the agenda.

Mr. GERSHMAN. Right. I have not had a chance of speaking with

him before the meeting.

The proposals that the NED supports are of two kinds. Some of

them are programs of the four institutes, and they are all over the

world in all of the major regions, which is to say East Asia, both

Southeast and Northeast Asia. South Asia is now treated as a separate region. We did not do that when you were on the board. Also

Africa and Latin America, Central Europe with a special focus on

the Balkan region, the former Soviet Union, which involves the

Caucasus and Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, as well as Central Asia,

and then, of course, the vastly growing area, which is really the

main change since you were on the board, Senator, which is the

Middle East.

And so, the institutes come in for funding for these proposals.

You know, it is the things that they really cannot get government

money to do, if they want to go to the State Department or AID

or other places. But then we have a vast aspect of the NED program, which are independent, indigenous NGOs. Many of them operate—some of them in Burma or in North Korea or operating in

exile in Cuba. Obviously many of them operating, as I mentioned

in Belarus, without registration. But wherever they exist and want

the support, they come to us, they come for support.

A lot has been said about Iran this morning. But let me just note

one of the proposals in the book on Iran—very interesting, given

all the sensitivities that have been expressed this morning. It is a

Web site that has been established here by two daughters of an

Iranian Democrat, who was assassinated in 1991, in memoriam to

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their father. It is really a memorial Web site, which documents the

executions of 9,000 people by the Islamic regime starting in 1979.

And it is a Web site which people in Iran can write in to provide

new information. And they have had over a million hits on it already. It was just opened in January. And it is becoming a substitute for a truth and reconciliation process in Iran. And this is

an Iranian initiative and I think it is a very important one.

But there are many initiatives of this kind that seek to take advantage of whatever available space that exists. The independent

libraries movement in Cuba, independent workers, newspapers and

NGOs focusing on human rights in Belarus, many groups in Russia

which are focusing on all the problems that we are aware of there.

Many groups in Venezuela, as worried as they are about this new

law that I mentioned this morning, they are not hesitating to come

to the NED for support and want to mobilize support in Latin

America, obviously, to defend their right to receive such support.

And the OAS and the Inter-American Commission on Human

Rights are very sympathetic to the NGOs in Venezuela, and we

need to work with them.

So, it is global and it is in all these different areas of not just

the work that the institutes do, but independent media, human

rights, civic education, conflict resolution, groups that are working

on all of these different areas depending on the situation.

And let me maybe just say one more word. The NED, in thinking

about the world, divides up the countries in which we are active

into four different categories. I understood the topic for this morning’s hearing to be really on the category of semiauthoritarian,

what we call hybrid regimes. That is really what we are talking

about. But also in the category of countries where the NED is active are the countries that Mark Palmer talked about, the dictatorships, but also then what we might call emerging democracies. And

then, finally, countries that have been through terrible conflict, and

where they really had all of the institutions, and the state structures destroyed, and where you really need a process of rebuilding

after conflict, where it is state building, as well as NGOs and civil

society trying to do their share.

And that is really a fourth and very, very difficult category of

country, countries, like Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and Congo,

Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq in the Balkan region, and so forth. This

is another very important category of country. But in order to understand what needs to be done, it is important to disaggregate

these different situations.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate your response because it

shows the vibrancy of people throughout the world who are

interested——

Mr. GERSHMAN. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And who come to the NED board to

try to gain some substance, some backing for a variety of proposals,

including, for instance, the Web site you suggested of the two ladies in Iran, and all sorts of indigenous forces quite apart from the

labor unions, the Chamber of Commerce, the Republicans, the

Democrats.

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Part of the genius of that whole idea was that these would all

be combined. And it is good to know that they are vibrant after 25

years; likewise, they are proposing consistently new approaches.

But I appreciate that answer because it illuminates for our public record the degree and the scope of responses.

I wanted to pick up on that a little bit with you, Ambassador

Palmer, because you had some thoughts about the Internet. For example, you mentioned that the Chinese reportedly have 50,000 persons attempting to censor the Internet and that there is some affinity between this and Iranian authorities, maybe others in between.

Now without, you know, going into all the nitty gritty of this, it

would be fascinating if we could, but how effective are these new

ideas of software or Web sites that somehow get around the 50,000

people in China or however many there are in Iran? What degree

of confidence do you or anybody else have at Freedom House in the

efficacy of this business?

Mr. PALMER. Well, I am pleased to report, Senator, that the

Dutch foreign ministry has some confidence in the ability to get

around it. And they funded a Freedom House project for Iran precisely to do this, to get around—I think they gave us $900,000.

So——

The CHAIRMAN. The Dutch foreign ministry?

Mr. PALMER. Yes. Isn’t that interesting, an American NGO getting funding from a European government? The answer is not simple. That is, you cannot just do one thing to defeat the great China

wall, firewall, or what the Iranian thugs are doing. You have to

work at it every day. You have to change e-mail addresses all the

time. You have to keep switching servers. It requires manpower

but it can be done.

My Chinese-American—Ph.D. in computer engineering from

Princeton and MIT—friends who have been without any compensation, spending the last several years doing exactly this report extraordinary success in people being able to get around. And part of

the theory behind the project that I mentioned, for large-scale financing, is to create a kind of firewall outside the country through

which Chinese, or Iranian, or Saudi, or other Internet users could

go so that the regime could not trace them. Once they got through

the firewall, they would not know where they had gone. That is,

were they using Google, normal Google, or what were they doing?

They would be free on the other side of this new firewall to operate

the way a normal human being should be free to operate on the

Internet.

So, we believe that with adequate resources and with the brains

that exist here and abroad, because many Chinese and Iranians—

Iran has the second largest number of users of blogs in the world.

It is an extraordinarily active Internet-using country. And China

will shortly be the largest Internet user in the world—larger than

the United States. It is just about to pass the United States on the

Internet front.

And there are many smart people inside each of these countries,

working away at the same thing and succeeding to extraordinary

degrees. But it does require manpower and some money. And if we

could do it on a larger scale, we really could assure Internet freedom globally.

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The CHAIRMAN. Just following up on another aspect of this, you

talked about the TV and radio work that might be done by Iranian

students. How does that happen anywhere in the world, or how

could it happen?

Mr. PALMER. Well, it does not cost, fortunately, a huge amount

of money to have a student radio station. The particular situation

of Iran would mean that the station would have to broadcast from

outside Iran. But it could get much of its information from inside

Iran. There is still enough porousness that a lot of the programming could come from inside. We estimate that for $2.5 million a year, you could do a hell of

a student radio station. Just to cite an example, the Swedish aid

agency funded a talk radio station in Iraq, which is the No. 1 radio

in Iraq. It is called Radio Dijla and it is open to everybody. Everybody can get on it. And that is why it is the most popular radio

station in Iraq today.

We think that we could do something similar on the Iranian side

with an offshore radio station run by the student movement.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want

to thank the panel. And I also want to thank the NED for the report that they have submitted in response to the chairman’s inquiry.

I would like to put this question: How important is it for the

NGOs that are engaged in democracy encouragement to be perceived as not carrying out a governmental policy?

Mr. GERSHMAN. The question is the U.S. governmental policy or

their own government?

Senator SARBANES. I guess in this context, the U.S. Government.

Mr. GERSHMAN. Well, I think it is critically important, critically

important.

Senator SARBANES. Do the others agree with that?

Dr. HALPERIN. Yes. I think absolutely they have to be seen as

functioning for themselves and I think have to design their own

plan, which will be effective in their own country.

Mr. PALMER. I am not sure I agree with that. I think it is very

important that the U.S. Government be seen to be its own democratizing agent, radical democratizing agent. And for NGOs to work

closely with our embassies, for example, my experience, and I have

been on both sides, both working as a diplomat and working on the

NGO side, I think on the whole is a good thing. But as Tom mentioned, and I agree with him, the Iraq situation has complicated

our image as a government and made it sometimes more difficult.

But I would rather see a partnership rather than, you know, we

have to stay away from each other; that is, embassies stay away

from our NGOs.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Carothers.

Mr. CAROTHERS. It is a very good question and I appreciate it,

Senator Sarbanes. I think how we use the term NGOs here, and

know it often is perceived in the world are very different. Some of

these nongovernmental organizations like the U.S. party institutes

are funded by the State Department, USAID, and the National Endowment for Democracy. So when they go to another country, in

63

some cases they are carrying out a State Department policy in the

country in which the State Department has made some money

available for that. Sometimes they are operating with a great degree of freedom that comes from having NED money. And sometimes they are carrying out a USAID-sponsored initiative.

How are the people in that country supposed to get it clear? It

is not always clear to the people in that country. And so if, say,

NDI is training different political parties in Morocco and the

Islamist party wonders who are you and why are you doing this,

it is probably a complicated answer. It may be that USAID decided

that NDI should be training Moroccan political parties. Maybe it is

a special grant from the State Department. Maybe it is a grant

from the National Endowment for Democracy.

In general, I think these organizations are more effective if there

is a certain amount of space between them and the U.S. Government. And they can say we are acting on the basis of our own prodemocracy agenda. Yes, we are funded by the Government but we

are not carrying out specific policies at the direction of the State

Department or USAID. We have a certain amount of independence

that allows us to make choices about whom to work with and what

to do that are based on our own agenda and not the U.S. Government’s.

Senator SARBANES. Three of the four of you, at least, think that

it is important to have some room in between the government and

the NGO. My next question is: Has the perception changed with respect to democracy promotion so that these NGOs are increasingly

seen as an agent of the U.S. Government?

Mr. GERSHMAN. Senator, let me just clarify one point. First of all,

in relation to what Mark Palmer said—I was not saying that the

United States should not be seen as supporting democracy. But

they should be seen as supporting, if they are supporting it, authentic Democrats who are supporting their own agenda and not

implementing a U.S. agenda. That was my only point.

Similarly, I think that it is very important to distinguish different kinds of NGOs. In my testimony this morning, I said that

the laws that are being adopted by the governments are affecting

indigenous NGOs and newspapers and parties and trade unions. It

even affects them differently but it affects them on one level. And

then you have, I think, what Tom Carothers was just referring to,

which was the U.S. democracy assistance implementers, like NDI

and IRI, that operate in country. And then you have an institution

like the NED, which is an independent, nongovernmental grantmaking institution.

In all of these cases, I think the independence is important. I

think it was very wise to take the NED out of the U.S. Government

so it could have that kind of independence. I do think, getting at

your question, that when the United States makes democracy promotion so central to its foreign policy objectives and to its national

security, it will be seen by some people as if this is implementing

a U.S. objective, even though we were there long before, and we are

going to be there hopefully long after this particular period passes.

And we must be seen as following a consistent, long-term democracy agenda and not to have any other agendas. I think our credibility is at stake in doing that. I think we have established a good

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track record of credibility. But inevitably, in the current situation,

you are going to have this problem.

I will just say one other thing, though. The governments that

will use arguments that Tom Carothers spelled out, many of these

governments are looking for pretexts to oppose what we do. They

are going to be attacking the U.S. Government for its policies. And

it may be more difficult to respond, given the current circumstances.

One issue that Tom did not mention, which they use in the Middle East and other Muslim countries, is the threat of Islamism.

And you have many dictators that will say that—that is the problem and that is why we want to oppose democracy.

I think these are pretext. I think there are fundamental problems that we are facing which will be there, you know, regardless

of some of the political issues that these governments may raise,

which is the basic desire on the part of these semiautocratic governments to hold on to power and to resist any effort from below

which might challenge that power.

But I think the answer to your question is yes, it probably is

more of a problem today in terms of associations with U.S. policy

than it was before, precisely because this U.S. policy has made democracy promotion such a central objective.

Senator SARBANES. Does anyone else want to add anything to

that?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I would. I think you put your finger on the central point, which is the following. Currently, the U.S. Government

would like to make democracy promotion central to American foreign policy. Yet it is doing so at a time at which America’s credibility as a democracy promoter, both due to the war in Iraq and

due to American actions on the war on terrorism, I believe is at an

historic low. There is a central contradiction there.

If American democracy promotion organizations are held too

close to the U.S. Government, they are going to be contaminated

by that contradiction. I think some space is important. And I think

that there are differences between operating, let us say, NED funding than operating with State Department funding. The greater the

independence they have at this current juncture, the greater they

are going to be able to stay away from the accusation that they are

simply carrying out the policy of the government whose democracy

credentials are suspect in many parts of the world.

Senator SARBANES. Did you want to add anything?

Dr. HALPERIN. Just let me say I think the—I agree with all of

that. I think this additional point, which I think was actually made

before, that because our policy is selective, that is, we seem to

press governments that we do not like about their democracy policies and shy away from criticizing countries that we do like, even

when we do start down that path; and I think Egypt is the clearest

case. You know, the President said, I think correctly, that the policy of many different administrations since the end of World War

II to support dictatorships in that region had to be seen as a failed

policy and our policy was now going to be to support a transition

to democracy.

And then Egyptians, I think partly responding to that, tried to

organize and participate in the election. The Egyptian Government

65

did not permit that. And the U.S. Government turned a blind eye

to that and suggested it was satisfied. And I think all of those elements of being tougher with our enemies than with our friends,

promising and encouraging people to come out and then, in effect,

not supporting them. All of those, I think, undercuts the effectiveness of a democracy policy.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think to be perceived as consistent,

we have to have a program in every country? Suppose we significantly reduce the list and said we can only do a few things, and

so we will focus on a few countries and get away from doing something everywhere, which then raises some of these related questions that you have now talked about. Or does the pressure to demonstrate consistency require that there be a position and a program

in every country?

Dr. HALPERIN. If I could start, Senator, I do not think we need

a program in every country. I think my view is we ought to be consistent, again in what President Bush has said, to make it clear

that we have aspirations to see democracy established in every

country on the globe, but that we recognize that that has to be a

largely indigenous effort of the people in each country, and that we

will try to provide support to the degree, (A) that our resources permit it; and (B) to the degree that the people in that country working for democracy want our support.

And taking those two elements in account, I think we can have

very different policies in different countries and still be consistent

with our basic principles.

Senator SARBANES. Mark, you wanted to speak to that?

Mr. PALMER. I think we should have a program in every country.

It is possible. The intelligence community, the academic community, the journalistic community, everybody has failed consistently

to predict any single democratic transition from a dictator to democracy. I do not know of any exception to that. We totally miss

every prediction.

What does that mean in this context? Well, to me what it means

is that you simply do not know which of these many countries—

let us say there are 100 countries still out there that are still either

not free or very partially part-free. You do not know which one is

coming next. You know they are coming but you do not know

which. And you do not know where, therefore, some extra effort

could make a difference to the local people who are trying to have

a breakthrough.

So, I would say that at a minimum, we need to be present in all

45 dictatorships, not-free countries using Freedom House’s definition of not-free. And then beyond that, I think—and I take the

point that Mort made earlier—that it is not enough to just get the

dictators out. You have to stay the course. And I think very often

you have to stay the course for a full decade, sometimes maybe

longer. Democracy does not, as we know in this country, always

come very fast.

So, I would say that particularly in key countries in transition,

after the dictator has gone, like Serbia today, we should stay the

course. We at Freedom House are very concerned that the U.S.

Government is cutting back its funding for democracy promotion in

Serbia. And I think personally that is a mistake. It is too soon in

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Serbia. And that would be the case, I think, in a number of other

critical situations.

Mr. GERSHMAN. Senator, I think in responding to your question,

it is just very important to distinguish between what the Government does and what can be done through institutions like the National Endowment for Democracy. And the Government is—and

this is one of the reasons why we were taken out of the Government again. The Government is going to have many different kinds

of interests, security interests, economic interests, and so forth.

And it is going to pursue those interests with some governments

that are not democratic. That is inevitable.

And should it be pushing for democracy? How should it push for

democracy in those situations? The Government will have to decide

what it can do. But we know what our job is and our job is to be

engaged in those countries, supporting democratic forces, democratic movements, regardless of whether they are friendly tyrants

or unfriendly tyrants. We have to have a consistent approach.

And in a certain sense, the establishment of an institution like

the NED allows our country to walk and chew gum at the same

time. It can do what governments have to do. It can do more than

what governments generally do, when it has ambassadors like

Mark Palmer and a country like Hungary. But also, it has the capacity, independent of the government, to pursue a consistent approach to supporting democratic forces in the world.

Mr. CAROTHERS. If I could comment. I think the perception and

the reality of inconsistency comes much more from American diplomatic statements and stances than it does from whether or not we

have programs in particular countries or not. When the United

States President or the Secretary of State singles out a list of countries and says these are the six or eight greatest tyrannies in the

world, and those countries happen to only be countries that are unfriendly to the United States, whereas other countries, which are

equally or in some cases more tyrannical, like Saudi Arabia, are

not on that list, people in the world see and are facing a reality

of inconsistency and double standards.

And so the perception of double standards comes much more at

the diplomatic level. When critical statements are made about

Belarus, but then soft-pedal statements are made about

Kazakhstan, people in the world watch that and say the explanation is obvious. Where there is oil, you soft pedal. Where there

is no oil, you come down hard. How else can we understand this?

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. Thank

you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Let me just pick up on the dialog that just ensued with Senator

Sarbanes’ question. It would seem to me, although it may be a historic time, inaccurate that, picking up your point, Mr. Gershman,

governments sometimes are inconsistent in terms of either their

idealism or their practical realities. In other words, they have a

problem, day by day, of managing the security of the country and

the rest of the world.

And as you gave us the idea of walking and chewing gum at the

same time, so there may be a very important role to be played by

NGOs—that they are really able to maintain maybe more consistVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:35 Mar 28, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\ROLEOF.TXT mich PsN: mich
67

ency with regard to the democratic dream, if we know in a sophisticated way how that might be furthered. And sometimes they are

going to be at variance with some of the governments that are supporting them and giving them money, or by the context of legislation in which they are involved, and that—that is understood. In

other words, it may be that the Secretary of State will not be furious at the NED because you have a program that is running off

somewhere, even while the diplomatic corps may have been countenancing some activity which would seem to be very adverse to that.

And I suspect that in the best of all worlds, there would be a purity of truth and justice in all of this, but that has not characterized American diplomacy in any administration I can remember,

having heard a good number of people testify before this committee. At this particular stage, I am intrigued by Mr. Halperin’s

observation, which I think is impractically true, that there may be

a difference between the embrace that we give to democratic advocates in Egypt for the moment and those in Iran.

Now, in this Aspen Institute conference I just mentioned in

which some of us have been arguing about this type of thing, those

arose specifically with regard to those two countries. And the

thought that was that however ardently we feel about democracy

in Iran, embracing those who are on the firing line, so to speak,

out there, it can be deadly for them. They may need to get out of

the country rather rapidly.

On the other hand, we have been discussing today, student radio

and the Internet, freeing that up and so forth. This is somewhat

more of an indirect way of support for persons who may not really

want to be embraced by a United States organization. But it is an

important point, because there are many arguing in the Congress

right now that what we ought to be involved in doing is, in fact,

organizing people in Iran, or people outside of Iran, to go to Iran.

And at least many people that I listen to, who are very sophisticated, say that just is not a very good idea in this particular instance.

In Egypt, maybe there is a variety of responses that are different, given the context. I am just curious because you, all four of

you, deal with these issues every day. Is there this degree of sophistication in the NGO movement? What kind of advice do you

give those who are, say, in the diplomatic movement with regard

to this? And is there some dialog, whether it be covert, quite apart

from overt, so that we all understand each other, because it seems

to me very important that we do.

Mr. Halperin, do you have any observations, having sort of intrigued us to begin with, with this Egypt-Iran contrast?

Dr. HALPERIN. Yes, I think people do. Certainly the NGOs understand the difference. And Egypt, you know, is a major recipient of

American economic and military assistance. The Egyptian Government is eager not to lose the congressional support for that assistance. And I think that people in Egypt understand the degree to

which the government is cracking down, if it is noticed in Washington that the government is cracking down, the government is

also going to be able to crack down on those people because it

needs the support of the United States Government.

68

In the case of Iran, the government exists on anti-Americanism.

And if we taint the people struggling for democracy, I think we

hurt them. And they say that to us. I mean, there are many people

who have informal contact with people in Iran. And I think it is

the overwhelming majority of the people in that country who want

democracy. And they will tell you every statement by us about regime, by the U.S. Government, about regime change and the hint

that we are secretly providing money to those people undercuts

their efforts and strengthens the dictatorship.

So, you do not have to listen too carefully to hear those clear

messages. Now, that does not mean that we should not be doing

things about Iran. I think we should be broadcasting. I think we

should be supporting the student broadcasters. I think if there are

groups in Iran that want money from the National Endowment for

Democracy, there should not be a budget constraint on how much

money comes.

So, I am not suggesting that there are not things that we cannot

do to support Democrats in Iran and other countries in a parallel

situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Carl.

Mr. GERSHMAN. Senator, just first on Iran, what we have heard

from many people is that even though the government lives off of

anti-Americanism. When people go to Iran, they say that the people are more pro-American than almost any other country in the

world. And what they want to hear—they would like to hear some

words of support. They would like the United States and Europe

and other countries to recognize that they exist and to endorse

their aspirations. That can be done. I do not think that is necessarily going to hurt them. And this is what we are hearing from

people, which is what they want. Obviously, we will tailor what we

do to what is possible in terms of providing assistance.

One other point that I just want to make. When I talked about

the different functions of government and nongovernmental organizations, I want to underline that one of the central points in the

report that we presented to you is the policy of linkage. And we

hope that even where our Government has relatively friendly relations with other countries, that it will use those friendly relations

or whatever relations exist to provide support for the kind of work

that we do.

And that may very well mean that it cannot do both at the same

time. But we need ambassadors. We need a State Department. We

need a government, even economic ministers, as I mentioned in my

testimony, where Russia right now is going to be looking to the

West for economic cooperation, that we will get their attention if

we note that democracy and political rights are necessary if a country is going to move into the WTO, if it is going to make its currency convertible and so forth that we need to use all the leverage

that we have on these governments to keep the spaces open. And

that is a governmental responsibility, as well as a responsibility of

private organizations and citizens to speak out.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mark.

Mr. PALMER. I entirely agree with what Carl just said. And let

me just take it one step further, that it is really critical for us to

be present as a government in Tehran, and I would add in

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Pyongyang. In any dictatorship, by definition it is much harder to

help create the space and to have a dialog with the people that you

most care about if you are not there. When I arrived in Budapest

as Ambassador, almost the first thing I did in 1986 was to sit down

with the two leading Democrats in the country and ask them what

I could do to help them. And I think that is the beginning of wisdom, in answer to your question, of how to avoid doing things that

are going to harm young Iranians or young anybody else.

You ask them what they want you to do and what they are comfortable with doing. And if they are comfortable with being associated with you, either in the form of NED, or Freedom House, or

the U.S. Government, or whatever, then you do it. If they are not,

you do not. But you have to at least be able to talk to them. And

right now, we are not even there.

There are 35 Iranian diplomats in this town right now, working

in the Pakistani Interests section. There is not a single American

in the Swiss Embassy in our Interests section in Tehran. I mean,

that is just absolutely ridiculous. And I have met repeatedly the

Iranian diplomats who are here in Washington, and they are doing

what an embassy should do. They are going around. They are doing

public diplomacy. They are having meetings. I just sponsored—I

just hosted a dinner for two ayatollahs. And these guys from the

embassy from their Interests section were there, doing what I

would have—what I did do in Budapest.

I mean, why are we not in Tehran? Why are we not in

Pyongyang? I think you agree with that, Senator. But anyway, I

just wanted to say as an NGO representative today, it is very, very

important for us to be on the scene in these places, never to withdraw, voluntarily at least.

Dr. HALPERIN. Senator, can I just make one point? I want to

strongly endorse the comments about the ADVANCE Democracy

Act. I think it can play an enormous difference. And I would hope

that we could support that and find a way to move it forward.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just ask, picking up from a comment that

Carl Gershman made, just playing the devil’s advocate for a moment. Some commentators in Russia would say that although they

certainly would not favor what they see to be an authoritarian

push by the Putin Government, on the other hand, they appreciate

that in approval-disapproval polls of Vladimir Putin, he is doing

well in Russia. He does much better than most other Russian leaders presently.

So, we ask: Why is this so? Well, some people would say that he

has brought a degree of stability and security to the situation. He

has cracked down on robber barons or however one wants to characterize those, who at least ordinary people feel have taken off the

assets of the state in abnormal ways, and in sort of a popular way

has fought for the populace. Some would even say he has brought

back a prestige for Russia that might have been lost in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union.

So for example, in that particular instance, without prejudging

what is going to occur there, presumably somebody else will be

elected president of the country in the next election. But at the

same time, if he were to run for reelection, many people would say

he would be very likely to be reelected in a free and fair election.

70

He could—much as Ferdinand Marcos as cited before. After we

had all these hearings in our committee, President Marcos went on

American television in a November talk show, and called a snap

election, and challenged everybody to come over and watch it, to

observe that he was going to win, and that he was popular, and

so forth.

Now, probably, President Putin would not resort to those sorts

of situations but, nevertheless, this is a reasonably popular regime.

Having said that, why are we concerned about that? And you raise

the question, perhaps as the WTO membership is sought or currency convertibility or—these are points of leverage. But then others would argue that, after all, it might be better for Russia, as we

have already accepted China into the WTO, to come into the trading atmosphere, that if you are really looking for dialog, openness,

people rubbing shoulders, that Russians as a part of this would be

healthier than Russians outside of it.

And so, you know, again and again we get into arguments over

what are the points of leverage or what are the points of openness.

I do not have a strong belief one way or another. I am just raising

the fact that it appears to me that some arguments that we have

not heard today sort of transpire on this.

You know, getting back to just the Russian case itself, and we

raised the WTO and that business, some would say that for years

we have been watching the Jackson Vanik Act. We have finally liberated Ukraine from that in the last few months but it was an arduous procedure. That was the single most important element in

dialog most of us had with Ukrainian officials in the post-election

period with President Yvschenko. You know, it is very difficult to

get one of those things on. A lot of people see a lot of leverage in

various ways, for whatever cause that may be involved.

And so I ask you, you know, stick with me for a moment, where

does leverage lie in these things? Because in the report that NED

has given, and you brought some pretty stringent points, when you

get to the action steps for Congress, if we enacted all of that simultaneously, we might be accused of being fairly heavy-handed or obtuse or not really opposed to openness and dialog but inhibiting it

very substantially.

Can you give some more thinking to that?

Mr. GERSHMAN. Well, I think the point was made in the report

that each of these situations has to be addressed on a case-by-case

basis. And there will be different points of leverage in every one.

And I do not think we are recommending a policy that you would

consider to be rash. But we are recommending that where we do

have that leverage, we should use it.

There is going to be a meeting in Moscow, July 11 and 12, as I

said, called the ‘‘other Russia.’’ There is another Russia. I am not

suggesting or saying that it represents the majority. Nobody knows

that. But it is the ‘‘other Russia.’’ It is the democratic Russia. If we

have leverage in that situation because of the issues that you mentioned, I think that we should try to use that leverage so that when

they implement this NGO law, they do not put these civil society

groups out of business. That is what they can do. They have given

themselves leverage over them. We have leverage in this situation.

I believe we have to, and we should, use that leverage or use the

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leverage that Mort talked about in Egypt. I mean, where we have

it, we should use it.

On the issue of popularity, I just want to say that in some countries today, that popularity rests on a sea of oil and higher oil

prices. When I was just in Russia, I did see all the things you just

said about the return of Russia to greatness and so forth. I also

saw a country that is in deep trouble over demographics, over

many, many serious problems. The long-term future is not necessarily a bright future. And I believe it is in the interest of Russia

and it will be good for Russia to really become a more democratic

country and to become more integrated into the world. But it is not

going to do that if it is allowed to move forward with Putin’s economic program while at the same time it crushes political opposition, civil society, and all the other institutions that we associate

with democracy.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mark.

Mr. PALMER. I think if we look at the record of broad-scale economic sanctions on the whole, they have not worked very well and

that we really need to rethink the whole area of sanctions. What

we most want to help the Democrats inside these countries is to

open the countries up, to integrate them, to increase the space for

personal freedom. Investment and trade help in that regard; it is

not the full answer but it helps.

I think we need new sanctions, smart-targeted sanctions at the

people who are responsible for the depredations, at the dictator and

the people, the support mechanisms around him. And it is possible

to design those smart sanctions. We are doing some of them already. The Treasury Department’s asset program, I think is great.

We have begun to develop a practice of actually bringing these

guys to justice with Taylor and Miloscevic.

I personally strongly favor the creation of a ‘‘crime of dictatorship’’ under which we would collect data and eventually indict and

try all dictators for violations of basic human rights, which are

guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

under their own constitution.

So, I think there are a new set of sanctions that would make a

lot more sense than keeping people out of the WTO.

The CHAIRMAN. Thomas.

Dr. HALPERIN. Senator, I agree with that. I think that we need

to use our leverage effectively where we have it and not use it in

ways that cut access. I think it is not an accident that most of the

surviving dictatorships in the world are countries that we imposed

an economic embargo on. I think that just does not work.

But I think what we need to do is to work more towards positive

incentives for countries to get on the path of democracy and stay

on the path of democracy. And I must say participation in the G–

8 seems to me should have been one of those. And when we invited

the Russians in, it seems to me they were very close to the line.

They have long since gone in the other direction. And I think we

should have considered, much more carefully, telling the Russians

that this was not the moment for them to chair the G–8, after all.

ASEAN said that to the Burmese Government. And even the African Union said it, at least temporarily, to Sudan.

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So, I think we lost a real opportunity there to send a message.

We heard strong support today for the Community of Democracies.

I think we ought to be doing more to make that something that

countries really want to be a part of and that therefore they will

question whether they can participate. And I think linking that to

NGO standards is a good idea, in saying to countries: You will not

be able to continue to be part of the Community of Democracies if

you move against allowing your NGOs to operate.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation is, I think, another program that moves very much in that direction. It says to countries:

Substantial American economic assistance requires you to govern

justly and to involve your NGOs in the process of designing the

program that we are going to support.

So, I think positive incentives to countries, that if you behave as

democracies, there is a path to better economic development, to

greater participation in the world, is likely to be more effective

than broad sanctions.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just ask this question, because a comment has been made about the importance of dialog with leadership. As you just mentioned, Mr. Halperin or Mr. Palmer, that

sanctions, per se, may not work with many situations. It is possible, however, that if we were able to enter into some dialog with

countries, even those that are very hostile, there would be some

entry. Now, by and large, you are correct in engaging my prejudices in that direction. But it is a legitimate argument.

For the moment, obviously, our Government has decided in the

case of Iran—and we have discussed Iran a good bit today—to become more involved, to come up to the table with the European

three. Thoughts have been given that Russia and China have been

broadly consulted about a common program that we might be able

to support, both in those negotiations and perhaps in further

United Nations Security Council activity. And that has been characterized as new.

And there are many reports about how Secretary Rice has been

persuasive with the President. Only history will tell.

But just to take another more difficult example in North Korea,

certainly the Chinese have taken the position that they do not

want to see so-called regime change. They do not want to go

through the process of many North Koreans heading into China. If

there is to be a miserable government, they want it to be in North

Korea, to deal with it, even to the point of providing huge resources

of food and energy to keep everybody alive.

Younger South Koreans feel about the same way. They do not

want to see a violent overthrow. They want to see an evolution, apparently, which makes diplomacy very difficult in the Six Party

Talks without there being some more direct engagement with the

North Koreans.

And yet this is clearly not a process that is going to necessarily

lead to democracy in this particular case. It may be a national security or international security problem dealing with weapons of

mass destruction and some movement back into the world community. And therefore, as you make distinctions, Mr. Gershman, of

countries that are dictatorships, as opposed to those that are in between or hopeless or so forth, it is probably important to try to

73

think through where we head, quite apart from how we advise others.

This may be beyond the scope of the NGOs and the democracy

movements. To what extent could you make the case that the

NGOs, in fact, even if our official diplomats are not involved in direct dialog or communication, serve a very helpful purpose in being

involved? It occurs to me there have been many cases in which

NGOs have had contacts with governments, not on behalf of our

country or anything, but they have sort of kept the conversation

alive. They have made suggestions that were helpful. This may

lead to world peace or to some equanimity in cases that may have

been very, very difficult. And is this still a further item in the case

to be made for NGOs and democracy, that there is a diplomatic

front?

Yes, Mr. Carothers.

Mr. CAROTHERS. I think it is. A good example of that comes in

the Muslim world, where a number of U.S. democracy promotion

organizations have been able to develop pretty fruitful contacts and

relationships with modern Islamist groups, who are often not comfortable having direct contacts with the U.S. Government or want

to keep that to a minimum but do participate in programs.

I was in Indonesia doing some research. And I met with the

small Islamist party, which is quite a fundamentalist party there.

And they are very hostile to the U.S. Government in various ways.

Yet they are participating in U.S. party training programs. I asked

them, ‘‘Who would you rather have as your closer friend, the International Republican Institute or the Muslim Brotherhood in

Egypt?’’ And they laughed a little bit. And they said, ‘‘Well, the

International Republic Institute seems to be able to teach us a lot

more about how to win an election. So, we enjoy taking part in the

training.’’

And by being included, they did not feel quite as hostile as their

instinct is towards the U.S. Government and realized something

about the U.S. approach democracy, which is something about tolerance, and tolerance of different points of views, a message they

are not getting from other parts of the U.S. Government at this

point.

So, I think there is a role for U.S. nongovernmental organizations that have a fair amount of independence from the U.S. Government to go out and make those kind of contacts and facilitate

a broader dialog with other societies.

Dr. HALPERIN. Mr. Chairman, in relation to North Korea, I think

it is more complicated, because I am favor of the U.S. Government

both engaging more with North Korea. I think we ought to negotiate a peace treaty. I think we ought to open an embassy there.

And at the same time, I think we ought to speak out more forcefully about the human rights situation in North Korea. It is probably the worst country on earth now. And yet you hear much less

about the human rights situation there than you do in other countries.

Congress has spoken a little bit about it. But I think there is

more to be done. I think we need to put pressure on them and on

the Chinese, who are not honoring their obligations under the Refugee Act to allow refugees from North Korea who come there, be

74

seen by the U.N., and move to other countries. And we have only

begun to take refugees from North Korea.

But I think in terms of NGO contact, certainly third party contact with the government, to try to understand better what it is

about is perfectly legitimate and useful but I am really about what

might be viewed as contacts with NGOs in North Korea, because

I do not think there are any. I do not think that is a country which

leaves any space for legitimate NGOs. And therefore, I think we

need to be careful that we do not seem to be giving legitimacy to

what are, in fact, government entities by having our NGOs have

relationships with them.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be so. So, let me just add a footnote.

For instance, the World Food Program works in North Korea. Now,

this is not a democracy NGO. But my good friend, Jim Morris, as

head of that, I know, has made a number of trips there. This has

been helpful for my understanding. I learn what he has seen, who

he has visited with.

Likewise, we have had staff members from our committee who

went with the distinguished group to the Yongbyon facility in

North Korea. They were looking at weapons of mass destruction

situations. But nevertheless, it was an unusual dialog with some

people who are right on the front of one of the major things we are

doing. And this appears to me to be important. And this is why I

sort of zeroed in a little bit on that.

Granted, they were not talking about democracy or performing in

the next election. But if North Korea is the worst case, the question

is, how do you open it up at all? Who gets in and begins to talk?

This is important.

Yes, Mark.

Mr. PALMER. Armand Hammer, who was my teacher in a way in

this field, who was a great scoundrel, he knew more dictators than

anybody else I ever met. He knew Lenin and Stalin. He knew King

Idris. He knew Qaddafi. I mean, he—Occidental Petroleum and Armand, dealt with everybody.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. PALMER. And Armand said to me about dictators—that they

are extremely distrustful and lonely men. They do not trust their

own family. They do not trust their security services. They do not

trust those who are supposedly part of their regime, whatever it is.

So, I think almost any way that you can get in and talk both to

that lonely man, evil man, but any way, to that man and at least

as important to those around him, the better it is. Because what

we really know now from watching these systems collapse is that

they are weak, really weak. And there is every opportunity to implode them, if you can get in their knickers. But you have to get

in the knickers. And if it is NGOs that do that, terrific. But in any

way that you can get in there and fool around, the better it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Carl.

Mr. GERSHMAN. North Korea—one point I would like to make is

that it is a unique situation. It is, as Mort suggested, probably the

most closed country in the world. But it also exists across the border from South Korea. And you have a single culture divided by a

political system, which I think underlies more clearly than anything else the relative virtues of those systems.

75

And what makes the situation in North Korea so incredibly unstable, in my view, is that they have imposed a complete information blockade in order to enforce the view, which the regime constantly feeds to the people, that they live in paradise and that

across the border people live in hell.

If you can break the information blockade, even in a marginal

way—and I think it is happening even with people leaving, refugees, and then going back. And now North Koreans who have left

are broadcasting back into North Korea. If you break the information blockade and it becomes clear that everything that the regime

has been saying is a complete lie, I think that is a very destabilizing factor. And that is part of the reality. There is nothing we

can do to change that because there is no way, under current circumstances, whether you support engagement or whether you support human rights, ultimately that isolation is going to be ended.

And that is a very destabilizing thing.

One final point, though, which I think in this case some NGOs,

more policy groups than NGOs working on democracy, have been

promoting, but some of them are human rights organizations, is to

begin to explore the possibility of a Helsinki process for Northeast

Asia involving North Korea, so that you can begin to link the security negotiations to the basket three human rights provisions in the

way that Helsinki did back in 1975.

I realize that there is, in a sense, a certain contradiction in that,

because North Korea is such an insecure regime. But part of the

Helsinki process, as we know, had to do with recognition of borders, state-to state relations. This would be part of the package.

But it should not be part of the package if it is not linked, in my

view, to opening up human contacts. And I think that is possible.

And I would hope that the Congress would even consider a way in

which a Helsinki process dealing with North Korea can be initiated. I think the administration might even be very interested in

that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is a good suggestion along with, once

again, reinforcing the communications suggestions that several of

you have made today that are really critically important. I suppose

that there are cases that are not as extreme as North Korea in all

of this. It is very possible that, as some of you have pointed out,

there has been greater preoccupation with students, as well as exchanges of all sorts, scholarships, this sort of thing.

One of the things we have been gripped with here in this committee is the problem since 9/11 imposed by Homeland Security or

the visa regime or immigration or so forth, in which a number of

foreign students coming to the United States have been inhibited

in that quest and have gone to other countries instead to pursue

their studies.

And furthermore, as opposed to boosting the numbers, we have

been doing well just to maintain the numbers or to get back to

where we were. That has been particularly true of students from

Middle Eastern countries, but sometimes it has been even more difficult for Chinese students and others whom we are discussing

today.

Now there are clearly, and I accept the fact, we have heard it

vividly from testimony, problems with many young people. Some

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are maybe studying to be terrorists and to do us in, in the process.

So, I appreciate those who are arguing in terms of our security that

we really cannot have just sort of a free coming and going.

On the other hand, there is clearly a case to be made that the

students who have come to the United States, whether they like

this or not, or whether they imbibe in all of our culture, make a

difference upon their return within their home countries. So, I am

really hopeful that we can move strongly in that direction, too, as

part of the democracy movement. And the NGOs in various ways

are extremely important in this aspect, quite apart from the technical work you may be doing in democracies generally.

I think likewise in Russia—and I had a conference not long ago

with Mr. Karagonov, who many of you know is a very interesting

and sometimes leading intellectual. He was lamenting the fact that

the dialog among intellectuals, among persons of very diverse

views, has not broken down. It has just almost dissipated entirely,

with regard to the United States. Those who are talking about the

‘‘other Russia’’ or the ‘‘new Russia’’ or so forth, they would be like

Mr. Karagonov. They are very much involved always in each Russian regime or each iteration of this. And that is true of others who

are survivors of the process.

But I have a feeling they are lonely. They are looking for a dialog. They would like to see more visitors and persons such as yourselves and others who come from the NGO community, as well as

Members of Congress and others. And it is one of those circumstances in which you cannot do everything at once. Today this

is a good opportunity to catalog a list of things to think about, to

do in terms of our Government or in terms of our legislative effort

or at least our understanding and support of what you are able to

do independently with the finances that come from right-thinking

people who want to help.

Well, let me thank you again for your interesting testimony and,

more importantly, your responses to our questions and the dialog

that we have had. We look forward to staying in close touch with

all four of you and your organizations. And as you have suggestions, do not wait for the next hearing. Write to me or the committee or our staff, because we are eager to hear and are receptive.

Thank you and the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Human Rights First thanks the Foreign Relations Committee for convening this

important and timely hearing on the role of nongovernmental organizations in the

development of democracy. We are grateful for the opportunity to share with the

committee not only our own views, but also the perspectives and experiences of

some of our international partners who are human rights leaders in their own countries. This testimony, consistent with our organization’s focus and particular concern, centers on the role of local human rights defenders in the promotion of democracy.

Democracy promotion today is championed as a remedy for many of the world’s

ills—from poverty to war and terrorism—vociferously and eloquently by the Bush

administration, and also by an increasing number of the world’s governments and

multilateral institutions. Human Rights First welcomes this increased international

focus on democracy promotion at all levels, recognizing the strong correlation beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:35 Mar 28, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\ROLEOF.TXT mich PsN: mich
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tween democratic forms of governance and respect for internationally-recognized

human rights standards.

At the same time, we are concerned that all too often, authoritarian governments

claim to be making progress on building democracy when the reality is that they

are masking their authoritarianism with false democratic trappings. Furthermore,

as the emergence in several countries of popularly elected governments which nevertheless fail to respect basic human rights reminds us, elections alone do not automatically guarantee improved human rights conditions.

Independent human rights activists therefore have a dual role in their societies:

To be both advocates for the essential elements of democratic development and, at

the same time, vigilant watchdogs concerning the integrity of any democratic

progress that may be claimed to have taken place.

We submit that the primary measure of progress toward democracy must be success in the promotion and protection of human rights. Years of experience have

taught us that exactly at the most critical moments of democratic transformation,

when accurate reporting about human rights performance is most badly needed, too

many governments instead work to stifle independent, often critical, voices.

Human Rights First’s mission to protect and promote human rights is rooted in

the premise that global security and stability depend on long-term efforts to advance

justice, human dignity, and respect for the rule of law in every part of the world.

Since our establishment in 1978, Human Rights First has worked in the United

States and abroad to support human rights activists who, at great risk to their own

liberty and security, fight for basic freedoms and peaceful change in their countries.

It is no accident that in countries in transition from authoritarianism to democracy, the agendas of political reformers and champions of democracy and of human

rights activists tend to converge. Indeed, the agenda championed by those fighting

autocracy is rooted in human rights—in implementing the basic freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, and more broadly in restoring the rule of law and

creating the core institutions of a functioning democracy: A free press, an independent judiciary, and systemic checks on executive power.

Human rights activists share, and also champion, these demands because they are

also necessary for ensuring respect for basic human rights. These local human

rights defenders inside countries that are undergoing democratic transition or still

contending with entrenched and resilient authoritarianism have an essential role to

play as independent evaluators and guarantors of democratic progress—and their

voices must be protected.

We are reminded again and again that despite the efforts of repressive governments to maintain control over and restrict the activities of these human rights activists, such efforts are ultimately futile because basic human rights standards—the

concrete objectives that the activists are striving to implement—exist beyond the

scope of control of any single government, and enjoy support from governments and

nongovernmental bodies around the world. But in many parts of the world, much

more needs to be done to ensure that human rights defenders are protected from

retribution for their critical work.

Below, we illustrate several examples of the efforts being made by human rights

defenders, and the significant challenges that many of them still face. The examples

from the four countries cited represent the kinds of harassment and physical attacks

on individuals, and actions against independent human rights organizations, that

remain all too common across many parts of the world.

INDONESIA

One of Indonesia’s foremost human rights defenders, Munir Said Thalib, died on

September 7, 2004, after he was poisoned with arsenic during a flight to the Netherlands. Known throughout Indonesia simply as Munir, this activist was known for

his fearless advocacy and careful research on human rights violations. A trial led

to the conviction of a pilot named Pollycarpus Budihari Priyanto on December 20,

2005. The judge noted that there was a need to investigate former senior intelligence officials implicated in the murder, but there has been little follow up since

the verdict.

One of Munir’s greatest impacts came from his refusal to show fear, despite repeated threats and prior attempts on his life. His murder, and the failure to hold

those who planned or ordered it responsible, remains a major setback for human

rights and democratization in Indonesia.

THAILAND

In a similar case in Thailand, leading Muslim lawyer, Somchai Neelaphaijit, disappeared in March 2004, just days after filing a complaint against the police for torVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:35 Mar 28, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\ROLEOF.TXT mich PsN: mich
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turing several of his clients. His body has never been found. One policeman was sentenced to 4 years in connection with the disappearance, but he was charged only

with coercion, not kidnapping or murder. Four others were acquitted due to lack of

evidence following a highly inadequate police investigation.

Somchai is one of at least 20 human rights defenders killed in Thailand in the

last 5 years. Most were local activists who organized their communities to take on

locally powerful figures in conflicts over land, forests, or other natural resources.

One local activist, who had survived multiple bullet wounds in one attack and later

watched a colleague die as a result of another, told Human Rights First, ‘‘This is

government by force, not democracy. Defending our rights, we started with a small

issue and began to fight, and found big men.’’

RUSSIA

Over the past year, Russian authorities have stepped up efforts to weaken independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in promoting democracy

and human rights. On January 10, 2006, President Putin signed a new law regulating the activities of all NGOs operating in Russia. Under this law, government

agencies are authorized to deny registration to domestic and foreign organizations—

or force them to close down altogether—on loosely defined grounds. Using the vague

and sweeping provisions of this law, human rights defenders who have been the target of politically motivated prosecutions or smear campaigns could be prohibited

from holding leadership positions or being actively involved with human rights

groups.

No single case exemplifies the mounting legal pressures exerted on Russian

human rights organizations better than the multifaceted persecution endured by the

Russian-Chechen Friendship Society (RCFS). The government campaign to discredit

and ultimately close the organization has included the use of tax and administrative

challenges and the criminal prosecution of Stanislav Dmitrievsky, the managing director of RCFS, under a counter-extremism law. On February 3, 2006, a court in

Nizhny Novgorod convicted Dmitrievsky, who is also editor-in-chief of the newspaper, Pravozaschita, of violating a law intended to combat religious and nationalist

extremists who incite hatred and violence against minority groups. The conviction

sets a dangerous example for all Russians—including human rights defenders and

independent journalists—who exercise their right to question and criticize government policies.

COLOMBIA

A central premise of Colombia’s 3-year-old ‘‘democratic security policy’’ is that

there is no internal armed conflict, but rather simply a ‘‘war against terrorism.’’ As

part of the government’s ‘‘war on terror,’’ hundreds of nonviolent human rights defenders, community leaders, and trade unionists have been arrested and arbitrarily

detained, often based solely on the information provided by paid informants. On

September 17, 2004, sociologist, Alfredo Correa, was killed by alleged paramilitaries

in Baranquilla, Atlantico Department. He had been detained by the security forces

in June and released in July after claims that he was a member of the FARC guerrilla group proved unfounded.

On May 24, 2006, 22 individuals on the front lines of the fight for democracy and

human rights around the world came together at the third annual Human Rights

Defenders Policy Forum cohosted by Human Rights First and the Carter Center.

This year’s Policy Forum, a 3-day conference in Atlanta followed by 2 days of meetings attended by many of these leading human rights defenders in Washington, focused specifically on the relationship between democracy promotion and respect for

human rights. Participants identified the following trends in democracy promotion

efforts:

(1) Rather than rejecting democracy outright, many authoritarian governments

adopt the language of democracy and human rights for their own purposes. Imitation or ‘‘hollow’’ democracies, where dictators pay lip service to democratic ideals,

have allowed autocratic governments to receive the support of the international

community, including many democratic states. Authoritarian governments may also

create state-sponsored ‘‘nongovernmental organizations’’ to provide the international

community with a false sense of the freedom with which civil society operates inside

the country. External donors may inadvertently help to create and sustain imitation

democratic institutions that consolidate authoritarianism, rather than diminish it.

(2) Authoritarian governments also suggest that ‘‘premature’’ democracy would

produce negative effects for the country and delay the transition to meaningful democracy. Western governments accept this self-serving reasoning all too readily and

therefore hesitate to push for democratic reforms.

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(3) Other factors tend to encourage the international community to overlook undemocratic state practices, such as the exploitation of natural resources, including

oil and gas, and strategic partnerships in the ‘‘war against terror.’’

(4) Inconsistent messages in democracy promotion result from these influences.

Such double standards undermine the impact of these programs, while fueling cynicism and rising anti-Western and antidemocratic sentiments in authoritarian states.

(5) Authoritarian governments propagate the idea of being a ‘‘fortress under siege

surrounded by enemies,’’ which enables them to subvert their internal critics from

civil society and independent media and to dismiss external criticism of poor human

rights conditions as aimed at undermining national interests and sovereignty.

(6) Democratization is seriously undermined when democratic governments that

seek to promote democracy and human rights abroad fail to respect human rights

in their own practices, such as by condoning torture, secret detention, detention

without trial, or other denials of due process.

(7) Elections without attention to long-term, sustainable, institutional human

rights safeguards, including civic education, an independent media, enjoyment of

basic freedoms of expression and association, and an independent judiciary risk the

election of populist leaders who do not respect human rights and who actively undermine democracy once in office.

(8) In many countries, the transition to democracy has been accompanied by economic hardship and a growing gap between the rich and the poor, leading to erosion

of public support for democratization. However, poverty is not always caused by a

lack of resources, but often linked to poor management of public resources and an

absence of democratic control on public goods.

(9) Provision of technical assistance to governments has been meaningless in

countries where civil society is being suffocated and in contexts where governments

lack the political will to implement human rights reform. The training of journalists

in the absence of a free and independent media, or of judges where there is no independent judiciary is ineffective or even counterproductive. Training and other programs should be geared toward the creation of a free media and an independent judiciary as priorities.

(10) Where human rights standards and principles are not enshrined in a constitution and safeguarded by an independent judiciary, nominally democratic structures—such as local and national elective bodies—are passing laws that infringe on

the rights of women and minorities.

In short, while free and fair elections undoubtedly offer a sign of hope to many,

they alone are not enough. Strengthening of rule of law and democratic institutions,

and ensuring a greater focus on implementing and upholding human rights in transitional societies, are necessary to better ensure democratic progress. What is needed most is a renewed commitment to uphold international human rights standards

through both bilateral and multilateral channels, long after the headlines and

media spotlight on elections have faded.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To address the above concerns, the Policy Forum participants crafted the following recommendations directed at leading democracies and other institutions at

the forefront of democracy promotion:

(1) Demonstrate consistency in promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms in each region, applying the same standards across the region yet using different tools in different countries depending on the specific national context, human

rights track record, and participation of respective governments in international organizations.

(2) Democratic states should work together—unilateral calls for democracy are

less effective. The United States and the European Union have to elaborate detailed,

well-conceived, and clear policies aimed at reversing authoritarian developments

and deterioration of human rights. Ideally, this should be a common policy implemented by the United States, the European Union, and other leading democracies.

(3) Do not abandon new democracies simply because an election has taken place;

rather, continue supporting human rights defenders and work with them to develop

independent human rights organizations and to build state institutions that legitimately protect human rights and promote democratic principles. International funding commitments to promote democracy should likewise prioritize long-term, sustainable support for true democratic institutions.

(4) Focus support on promotion of media that is independent of political or commercial influence and provides information on public affairs, governance, and international standards. Access to information is universally cited as one of the most important aspects of a true democracy.

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(5) Ensure that indigenous and other disadvantaged or marginalized groups with

limited access to democratic institutions and education are included in all democratic processes.

(6) Democratic governments and intergovernmental organizations should demonstrate their strong solidarity with human rights defenders and effectively intervene on all levels in those cases when defenders come under threat from authoritarian regimes. They should increase the visibility of human rights defenders, and

engage them in regular dialog as effective monitors of democracy promotion programs.

(7) Governments should stop using security concerns as pretexts to undermine democracy and human rights; such efforts are ultimately counterproductive and selfdefeating.

(8) Democratic governments should reaffirm their own commitments to human

rights standards, including cooperation with international and regional mechanisms,

and call for the same by democratizing states. The U.N. human rights protection

system should be reinforced. The newly created Human Rights Council should

renew and strengthen the mandates of the special procedures, including special

rapporteurs and representatives.

(9) Human rights organizations promote, defend, and sustain democracy. Besides

providing resources and aid directly to such organizations, the international community should exact prompt and effective pressure on governments that attempt to restrict NGO human rights activities—including through adoption of legislation—and

maximize their opportunities to build strong roots and constituencies of support

within their own countries.

(10) Democratic countries should adopt targeted diplomatic and economic sanctions against individual public officials from authoritarian states that are responsible for gross human rights abuses and involved in corruption.

Human Rights First appreciates the interest of the committee in these important

issues, and welcomes this opportunity to submit our testimony in writing as part

of the hearing record.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUMATE SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SUMATE thanks the Foreign Relations Committee for convening this important

hearing on the role of nongovernmental organizations in the development of democracy. We are grateful for the opportunity to share with the committee our own

views. This testimony centers on the role of NGOs in the promotion of democracy

and the challenges that human rights defenders face in their work.

I. INTRODUCTION

SUMATE is a Venezuelan citizens’ movement that defends democracy by the permanent exercise of citizens’ rights and the demand for faithful observance of the

law.

SUMATE has pursued the following activities toward building a culture of democracy in Venezuela:

1. Promote citizens’ participation in public affairs.

2. Promote citizens’ supervision over governmental administration.

3. Provide support to democratic institutional systems, especially to carry out

transparent electoral processes.

4. Broaden awareness of Venezuela and of SUMATE’s programs among citizens

at international level.

5. Manage aptitudes and resources of the organization to ensure feasibility.

II. THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES FOR THE

PROMOTION, PROTECTION, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

The human rights instruments enshrine rights and fundamental freedoms that

the states must respect, protect, promote, and guarantee for all persons under their

jurisdiction, individually and in association with others. The work of human rights

defenders is fundamental for the universal implementation of those rights and freedoms, and for the consolidation of democratic institutions.

This vital role of human rights defenders has over the years become more recognized. However, this progress has been achieved at a high price: The defenders

themselves have increasingly become targets of attacks and their rights are violated

in many countries. Human rights defenders are often subjected to physical attacks,

acts of intimidation, and other forms of repression.

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1 Human rights defenders need adequate resources to carry out their activities. They frequently depend on donations from individuals, private foundations, corporations, and governments to conduct their work, but often face extensive government control and arbitrary limitations. Restrictions on receiving funds by human rights organizations have often been imposed

as a measure to impede their activities for the protection of human rights. States have often

raised this as an issue of national security or sovereignty. But promotion of human rights and

fundamental freedoms can hardly be seen as interference in the internal affairs of the state or

an infringement of the sovereignty of the state. 2General Assembly resolution 53/144.

3 Article 1.

4 Article 12.

5 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas (OEA/Ser.L/

V/II.124 Doc. 5 rev.1, March 2006). 6The full text of the Guidelines is available at http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/

GuidelinesDefenders.pdf.

In some cases, criminal prosecution and judicial repression are being used to silence human rights defenders and to pressure them into discontinuing their activities. In other cases, laws, regulations, and administrative practices impose lengthy

registration procedures or restrictions on the right to obtain funding for human

rights activities, particularly from outside the country.1 Freedoms of speech, association, and assembly are being threatened by these actions. SUMATE firmly believes

that the denial of rights, such as freedom of association as well as repressive actions

against human rights defenders, has serious implications for the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy.

In this context, it is important to note that the work of human rights defenders

has been recognized by several international organizations:

1. The Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society To Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms 2 (hereinafter ‘‘the U.N. Declaration’’) establishes: ‘‘Everyone

has the right, individually, and in association with others, to promote and to strive

for the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the

national and international levels.’’ 3 It also provides that:

• Everyone has the right, individually, and in association with others, to participate in peaceful activities against violations of human rights and fundamental

freedoms.

• The state shall take all necessary measures to ensure the protection by the competent authorities of everyone, individually, and in association with others,

against any violence, threats, retaliation, de facto or de jure adverse discrimination, pressure, or any other arbitrary action as a consequence of his or her legitimate exercise of the rights referred to in the Declaration.

• In this connection, everyone is entitled, individually and in association with others, to be protected effectively under national law in reacting against or opposing, through peaceful means, activities and acts, including those by omission,

attributable to states that result in violations of human rights and fundamental

freedoms, as well as acts of violence perpetrated by groups or individuals that

affect the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.4

2. The human rights organs of the inter-American system have repeatedly highlighted the importance of the work of those persons who promote and seek the protection and attainment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the

oversight of democratic institutions. These organs have emphasized that:

• ‘‘Human rights defenders play a leading role in the process of pursuing the full

attainment of the rule of law and the strengthening of democracy’’; and

• ‘‘Human rights defenders play an irreplaceable role in building a solid and lasting democratic society.’’ 5

3. On June 15, 2004, the Council of the European Union established the Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, 6 which underline that individuals, groups, and

organs of society all play important parts in furthering the cause of human rights,

and support the principles contained in the U.N. Declaration.

However, it must be noted that despite these international mechanisms of protection, in recent years the danger and insecurity human rights defenders face have

worsened in many countries.

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7 Anteproyecto de Ley de Cooperacion Internacional.

III. PROBLEMS FACED BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS

1. The use of legal actions against human rights defenders

SUMATE would like to draw particular attention to the situation of human rights

defenders in Venezuela, where judicial processes are increasingly being used to punish them and impede their work.

Since 2003, criminal charges have been filed against several Venezuelan human

rights and prodemocracy NGOs for having raised and utilized funds from foreign

sources. Our case clearly illustrates this point.

On February 15, 2004, the President of Venezuela publicly accused SUMATE of

‘‘conspiracy and treason.’’ On March 4, 2004, in clear response to the above accusation, the Sixth National Prosecutor opened an investigation against the most visible

members of SUMATE: Its founders—Alejandro Plaz and Maria Corina Machado,

and Luis Enrique Palacios and Ricardo Estevez. They were charged with ‘‘conspiracy

to destroy the country’s republican form of government.’’

The sole basis for this accusation was having sought and obtained funding from

the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Funds from the NED were used exclusively for educational activities such as: Workshops on democratic principles and

citizen’s rights, and television and radio ads, which were designed to inform the general public on the various mechanisms established in the Bolivarian Constitution for

political and civic participation.

Plaz, Machado, Palacios, and Estevez were also charged—under Venezuelan

Criminal Code, Article 132—of requesting foreign intervention in Venezuela’s domestic political affairs. An unlikely charge given that SUMATE’s sole intention was

to raise funds to finance the legitimate exercise of constitutionally and internationally recognized citizens’ rights and the legal promotion of political participation.

According to the law, Plaz, Machado, Palacios, and Estevez should be tried by a

mix court consisting of three (3) people: A judge and two citizens designated randomly (the jurors). Nevertheless, on Nov. 2, 2005, in clear breach of the law, Judge

Elias Alvarez ruled that the SUMATE trial would be judged by him—without the

participation of jurors.

On February 9, 2006, the Court of Appeals upheld the motion presented by the

defense of Maria Carina Machado, against the constitution of the Seventh Trial

Court as a unipersonal court. The appeals court found that Judge Alvarez’s pretension was inappropriate and it decided as follows:

• It voided the act which constituted the court without jurors. • It ordered a new call to potential jurors, and if this were not feasible, mandated

a new drawing. • It ordered the case to be sent to a different court.

While the above ruling delayed the case for a few months, the case is set to resume in the very near future as a new judge has now been selected.

The context of the renewed proceeding is likely to be quite different now that the

government has introduced—and will likely force passage of—a highly restrictive

draft Law on International Cooperation.7

2. The use of legislative measures against human rights defenders

In Venezuela, a new draft law regulating NGOs strengthens control over civil society institutions, in particular those that are funded from abroad.

It is our opinion that a number of the provisions in the draft law do not conform

to international legal standards governing freedom of association and basic civic liberties. The likely adoption of this restrictive instrument will result in the gross violation of human rights and will have a harmful impact on civil society and democratic practices in Venezuela. Our main areas of concern are as follows:

1.1. The draft law imposes restrictive conditions on civil society institutions in violation of constitutional and international law.—The current draft violates the constitutional precepts related to the freedom of association and citizen’s right to participate in public affairs. Articles 52, 62, and 132 of the Venezuelan Constitution

provide:

‘‘Article 52: Everyone has the right to assemble for lawful purposes, in accordance

with law. The state is obligated to facilitate the exercise of this right.’’

‘‘Article 62: All citizens have the right to participate freely in public affairs, either

directly or through their elected representatives.

‘‘The participation of the people in forming, carrying out, and controlling the management of public affairs is the necessary way of achieving the involvement to ensure their complete development, both individual and collective. It is the obligation

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8 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas . . . op.cit . . .

of the state and the duty of society to facilitate the generation of optimum conditions for putting this into practice.’’

‘‘Article 132: Everyone has a duty to fulfill his or her social responsibilities and

participate together in the political, civic, and community life of the country, promoting and protecting human rights as the foundation of democratic coexistence and

social peace.’’

Additionally, SUMATE notes that according to the Inter-American Commission on

Human Rights (IACHR), any act that tends to impede the association of human

rights defenders, or in any way impedes the purposes for which they have formally

associated, is a direct attack on the defense of human rights.8

Furthermore, the draft law restricts the right of freedom to association as guaranteed under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article

22(1) of the ICCPR states: ‘‘Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association

with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of

his interest.’’

In addition to this, it is counter to the U.N. Declaration, which establishes:

‘‘Article 13: Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others,

to solicit, receive, and utilize resources for the express purpose or promoting and

protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms through peaceful means, in accordance with article 3 of the present Declaration.’’

1.2. It is not necessary. Venezuela already has a legal framework that governs

NGOs activities.—A complete and effective regulatory frame already regulates the

activities of Civil Society Organizations, universities, unions, companies, and cooperative organizations. In addition to the standard requirements placed on NGOs to acquire legal status, these organizations will also have to register in a new, integrated

registry controlled by the government. Registration would be a precondition to

achieve national recognition to be able to perform activities of cooperation to receive

funding and to enjoy tax benefits.

1.3. It provides for excessive government intervention in the activities of NGOs.

The current draft imposes a wide range of restrictive conditions on the management, operations, and financing of NGOs and will allow authorities to intervene relations at the international level—including funding and activities at the domestic

level.—Under the terms of this draft, specifically, as it refers to the creation of the

Integrated Registry System, rigorous state control is guaranteed. Far from promoting the civil society, such controls would significantly hamper the participation

of citizens in social matters. For instance, given the intent of article two, the national government would have a say on the decisions of NGOs, universities or

unions in matters as basic as receiving donations or provisioning of bibliographical

material or even the purchase and use of computers. The exchange of information

among international entities would also be subject to controls. The issue of invitations for speakers, and the attendance to international forums, would be controlled

by the state in those cases in which the resources for these activities come from

international cooperation.

1.4. It promotes bureaucracy. The draft law contemplates two governmental agencies to control the NGOs activities.—The first one will be the entity charged with

receiving all documentation and incorporation files of the NGOs. NGOs will have

to inform this entity on their organization and management, sources, and uses of

their resources. This entity would be in a position to audit any aspect of the NGOs

operation at any point in time. A second entity would be charged with providing financing for programs, projects, international attendance, and any other activities

that the government undertakes in the area of international cooperation. The disbursement of these funds would be according to the priorities set by the government’s foreign policy (and its interpretation of ‘‘the national interest’’).

1.5. It is selective in scope. Instead of imposing restrictive conditions on civil society institutions, the Venezuelan National Assembly should regulate the disproportionate use of public monies in other countries.—The awarding of grants for not-forprofit civic projects and activities by foreign donors is a practice commonly accepted

throughout the world. Our country, with its deep democratic tradition, should not

be an exception. If this source of financing is ultimately banned, it would be impossible for organizations working in the area of human rights to operate. History

proves that at this stage of political, social, and economical development, countries

such as ours benefit from the constructive involvement of individuals and NGOs focused on the promotion of democratic practices. It is unconscionable to respond to

this natural development and expectation with a legislated witch hunt against those

seeking greater freedom.

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9Legislation in the name of national security, public order, or emergency must not be allowed

to silence dissent.

It must be mentioned that it is essential to establish strict rules to ensure the

transparency and adequate oversight of the government’s discretionary international ‘‘cooperation’’ activities. These unchecked flows need to be brought under

better supervision. Here we refer to such things as the $100 million oil donation to

Bolivia and Argentina; the oil agreements with Cuba; the donation of heating oil

to ‘‘the poor people’’ of the United States or England, the urea shipments to

Nicaragua’s Sandinista party, and the funding of Bolivarian circles around the

world.

IV. TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS

Based on the international standards established by the legal and normative instruments in the field of human rights:

1. SUMATE emphasizes the important role that individuals, nongovernmental organizations, and groups play in the promotion and protection of democracy, human

rights, and fundamental freedoms.

2. SUMATE expresses its gravest concern over efforts to suppress democracy promotion activities and demand these actions should cease. Furthermore, any existing

legal restrictions in this regard should be expeditiously repealed.9

3. SUMATE has identified the following priorities for a strategic approach to the

situation and role of human rights defenders:

3.1. Governments must acknowledge the legitimacy and value of the work of

human rights defenders.

3.2. In accordance with human rights instruments adopted within the United Nations system, as well as those at the regional level, all members of the international

community shall fulfill their obligation to promote and encourage respect for human

rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction of any kind.

3.3. All countries must adhere to and comply with the relevant international

norms and standards, in particular the U.N. Declaration. States must fully implement the principles included in this Declaration through the following actions:

• The adoption of the Declaration by national parliaments;

• The dissemination of human rights information; and

• The implementation of awareness-raising and solidarity campaigns with defenders.

3.4. The international community should exert effective pressure on governments

that attempt to restrict NGO activities (including through adoption of legislation).

Sufficient attention has not been given to modification of national laws that contradict the principles of international instruments and commitments applicable in

the field of human rights.

3.5. The international community should adopt a mechanism of systematic alert

on cases of repression against human rights defenders.

3.6. The collaboration between universal and regional mechanisms for the protection of human rights is fundamental for ensuring a coordinated and effective strategy of protection of human rights defenders worldwide.

4. SUMATE would also like to recommend the following actions in support of the

aforementioned objectives:

• Condemning threats and attacks against human rights defenders; and

• Maintaining contacts with human rights defenders;

• Attending and observing trials of human rights defenders;

• Providing, as and where appropriate, visible recognition to human rights defenders;

• Assisting in the establishment of networks of human rights defenders at an

international level, including by facilitating meetings of human rights defenders;

• Seeking to ensure that human rights defenders can access resources, including

financial, from abroad.

SUMATE appreciates the interest of the committee in these important issues, and

welcomes this opportunity to submit our testimony in writing as part of the hearing

record.

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RESPONSES OF BARRY LOWENKRON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BIDEN

Question. Please clarify your reply regarding the current status of OFAC licensing

regulations for the work of United States nongovernmental organizations to financially support a broad range of civil society, cultural, human rights, and democracybuilding activities in Iran.

(a) If there is a general license covering nongovernmental organization activities,

please describe which organizations are eligible and what activities are permitted.

(b) If there is not general license, please describe the average wait time for nongovernmental organizations to obtain specific licenses, the number of license applications received and the number of licenses issued since January 2002. Do you believe the absence of a general license and specific licensing process has prevented

NGOs from applying for specific licenses. Does the administration intend to issue

a specific license for NGO activity in Iran?

Answer. Under the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (OFAC) Iranian Transactions Regulations, most commercial and financial activities with Iran by United

States persons are prohibited absent a license. In order to facilitate democracybuilding activities, OFAC issued a license to the Bureau of Democracy, Human

Rights and Labor (DRL) and its grantees in July 2005 to cover DRL-funded programs in Iran. Currently, the license is limited to DRL ‘‘and U.S. persons receiving

grants from DRL.’’ DRL awarded S4 million to six different grantees for programs

in Iran; these programs represent the first Department-funded democracy and

human rights programs in Iran since 1979.

As the fiscal year 2006 foreign appropriations bill and the fiscal year 2006 supplemental provide funding to the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) and DRL to

advance democracy in Iran, in order to facilitate Iran democracy programs, DRL and

NEA will ask that OFAC issue a new license to cover activities funded by both NEA

and DRL under this program. In addition, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural

Affairs (ECA) will ask that OFAC issue a separate license to ECA and its grantees,

modeled on the existing DRL license, to cover ECA-sponsored human rights projects,

democracy, educational and cultural exchange programs, and other programs aimed

at furthering Iranians’ appreciation of democratic values and practice through exchange and other activities.

In order to better facilitate non-USG-funded NGOs applying for a license from

OFAC to do work in Iran, OFAC will issue a Statement of Licensing policy to be

posted on OFAC’s Web site. The State Department will also post information on its

Web site explaining the process and directing potential applicants to the OFAC

Statement of Licensing Policy. OFAC retains records of all license requests. For

more specific information regarding licensing processing we would refer you to the

Office of Foreign Assets Control.

Question. The administration requested funds in the fiscal year 2006 supplemental for democracy programs in Iran.

(a) How do you plan on identifying partners inside of Iran? How will you assess

their capacity and credibility? Is there a way to provide funding without stigmatizing or undermining their work?

(b) What role do you anticipate Iranian exile groups will play in implementing

this program? Please identify and describe those Iranian exile groups you have consulted.

Answer. The Department of State will spend the S20 million Democracy Fund to

promote human rights and democracy in Iran. The two Bureaus managing these

programs, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) will concentrate programming on political party

development, labor, civil society, human rights and rule of law. DRL-funded programs administered by my Bureau support respect for freedom of association and

speech, and more open and free participation in the political process. Presently,

DRL grants funds to established United States NGOs and academic institutions

that work with individuals and organizations inside Iran. Projects focus on influential democratic actors and groups, including labor, women, and students. For practical reasons of safety, we are cautious about publicizing our work with governments

and activists across the globe to protect human rights. We would, of course, be

happy to provide a classified briefing for the committee.

The desire for an active civil society in Iran has not been diminished by the numerous attempts by the Iranian Government to silence human rights and democracy

activists. Iranians know that their government may punish them for voicing their

views on the Internet or in the newspaper, and yet journalists continue to write provocative pieces that demonstrate tremendous moral courage, and thousands of other

Iranians post their thoughts on Web blogs every day. They gather on the streets

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to demand better working conditions and equal rights for women although the forceful reaction of the regime’s thugs is a bitter reality. Iranians have found ways to

endure in a system that strives to deprive them of their legitimate rights—and we

are confident that they will also find ways to change that system.

The State Department regularly meets with members of the Iranian diaspora

community. We see exile groups as one of many sources of information about Iran

and Iranian people, but recognize that many individuals have not been back to Iran

since the revolution. Although the funding of exile groups has not been a major

focus of these efforts, we are willing to consider qualified proposals submitted by

any credible organization.

Question. Russia has been hostile to the use of Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) election monitors in former Soviet republics. Recently, Moscow started financing its own group of election ‘‘monitors’’ who routinely ignore the

findings of other international observers and return results that match the Kremlin’s desired outcome. The most glaring example of this phenomenon occurred recently following Belarus’ so-called elections.

(a) What is the United States doing to preserve the integrity of election monitoring missions mounted by the OSCE and other international bodies?

(b) What can be done to ensure that the findings of legitimate election monitors

are not obscured by the claims of politically-motivated observers?

Answer. Russia has used two different approaches to try to undercut the reports

of Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) election monitoring

missions: Sending separate Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) monitoring

teams to cover elections in some CIS states, for example Ukraine and Belarus, and

routinely publicly criticizing ODIHR for alleged bias and methodological flaws—a

claim we completely reject. Under the first approach, for instance, the CIS teams

issued separate reports proclaiming the first round of the October 2004 Ukrainian

Presidential elections and March 2006 Belarusian elections ‘‘free and fair,’’ in

marked contrast to ODIHR’s very critical reports. In addition, Russia has recently

decided to participate more actively on ODIHR observation missions, and sent a considerable number of Russian observers to ODIHR missions, including Kazakhstan

and Azerbaijan late last year. We welcome Russian participation in ODIHR monitoring missions, because it will help Moscow better understand the methodology and

recognize the strengths and impartiality of the process, and that the standards applied are identical in the West as well as CIS countries. However, Russia also clearly hopes to influence, i.e., tone down, ODIHR’s criticism of the conduct of elections

particularly in CIS states. Russia has used the reports of its own observers as a

basis for accusing ODIHR of making biased, predetermined negative politicized evaluations of various elections, and has further argued that ODIHR team evaluations

should have no standing in OSCE because they do not represent participating state

consensus positions.

The United States, the European Union and other OSCE states publicly, emphatically, and consistently reject such Russian (and other CIS) accusations against

DDIHR. We believe that the current methodology of the OSCE, which is the ‘‘gold

standard’’ emulated by other international monitors such as those from the European Union, provides objective and unbiased assessments of electoral practices in

participating states both east and west of Vienna. If an evaluation is critical, it is

because the concrete circumstances of the election required it, and not because of

any inherent bias or predetermined conclusion. Critical comments have been made,

for example, of some aspects of recent U.S. elections that were assessed by DDIHR.

We believe that ODIHR’s methodology itself works to protect against tainting by

politically motivated observers within its missions. Its assessments are objective and

accurate precisely because ODIHR’s missions include large numbers of observers all

operating under the same rules that get a statistically meaningful sample. In addition, ODIHR makes every effort to organize its observers into mixed nationality

teams, which must reach consensus on their observations, to dilute any politically

motivated reports made by individuals or secondees of particular countries. ODIHR

has also codified its practice of limiting the total number of participants of a given

nationality in an electoral monitoring mission to 10 percent of the overall team’s

size, preventing any one country from unduly swaying the evaluation of an election

mission.

Efforts to make significant changes in how ODIHR conducts election monitoring,

in particular how it appoints election mission heads and when and with what focus

it issues its evaluations, can only be achieved via an OSCE consensus decision. The

United States, joined by a majority of other participating states, has made unambiguously clear that it will reject any proposal that might undermine ODIHR’s electionrelated efforts.

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Question. Mongolia has been heralded by many as a success story of democratic

development. Yet, endemic corruption continues to prevent Mongolia from qualifying

for participation in the Millennium Challenge Account, and the institutions of democratic and governance programs remain very weak. The administration reduced support for democracy and governance programs from $10 million in fiscal year 2004

to $7.5 million in fiscal year 2005. The same amount was requested in fiscal year

2006. Why are we reducing United States funding for democracy programs in Mongolia at this pivotal moment in its political development?

Answer. Currently, all United States economic assistance to Mongolia is distributed by USAID, which has identified two priorities: Private sector-led economic

growth and more effective and accountable governance. Over the past 3 years, good

governance assistance has remained constant at $2.7 million. The decrease in

USAID funding from $10 million to $7.5 million can be attributed to a decline in

economic growth assistance from $7.22 million to $4.8 million in fiscal year 2006.

Mongolia’s Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) proposal is also currently under

review. To address Mongolia’s worsening performance on corruption, the Millennium

Challenge Corporation (MCC) has officially notified Mongolia that passage of

anticorruption legislation is a prerequisite for signing a compact. MCC has underscored the importance of fighting corruption and strengthening the rule of law as

essential to the success of any MCA program in promoting economic growth and reducing poverty. If Mongolian authorities are responsive in enacting anticorruption

legislation, Mongolia also stands to gain aid through the Millennium Challenge Account.

Mongolia’s transformation from authoritarian communism to democratic governance is a remarkable ongoing success story. But this transition is far from complete,

and many development challenges remain. Despite achieving peaceful and constitutional transitions of power between governments since the early 1990s, holding elections that are largely free and fair, and recording impressive 6–10 percent GDP

growth rates over the past few years, Mongolia’s continued democratic and economic

success hinges on its ability to manage a series of ‘‘good governance’’ issues, including establishment of greater accountability, transparency, and anticorruption measures.

Senior Mongolian officials have also expressed concerns about cuts in economic assistance levels for Mongolia. We will continue working actively with Mongolian officials to develop a balanced assistance program, and given our concerns of corruption, our funding level over the past 2 years reflects a sustained commitment to

helping Mongolia’s democratic development.

Question. Please provide information on positions abroad, by post, that were designated as ‘‘labor’’ positions in fiscal year 2004 and are currently so designated (in

fiscal year 2006).

Answer. The following positions were designated as ‘‘labor officer’’ in fiscal year

2004: Ankara; Beijing; Berlin; Bridgetown; Canberra; Geneva; Guatemala City; Jakarta; Johannesburg; La Paz; Lagos; London; Mexico City; Nairobi; Ottawa; Paris;

Rome; San Salvador; Santiago; Sao Paulo; Tokyo; Tunis; USEU Brussels; and Warsaw.

Officers assigned to some other political or economic positions overseas have labor

responsibilities in their portfolios. Some of these positions are ‘‘dual designated’’ as

either political/labor or economic/labor, including, for instance, ones in Baghdad,

Bangkok, and Hanoi.

All positions designated as ‘‘labor officer’’ in 2004 continue, with the following exceptions:

• Bureau of African Affairs—The Lagos position was abolished in 2004. AF has

agreed that a new political position in Abuja will also have labor responsibilities. This is in process.

• Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs—The Tokyo position has been abolished

as of July, 2006.

• Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs—The full-time Berlin labor position

will be eliminated in July, 2007. A lower ranking economic position will be designated as having labor responsibilities. The Warsaw position is being eliminated.

• Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs—A labor position was established in

Brasilia, while the labor position in Sao Paulo was abolished. By virtue of global

repositioning, there will be a new political officer position established in Managua. This position will also have labor responsibilities.

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Question. Please describe how the Secretary’s ‘‘transformational diplomacy’’ initiative will affect labor-designated positions. What is the process for reviewing such positions, and what are the criteria being used?

Answer. Secretary Rice defined the objective of transformational diplomacy this

way: ‘‘To work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people—and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.’’

One important way of helping to realize the Secretary’s objectives is through repositioning our employees globally to successfully meet the challenges that transformational diplomacy presents. We are expanding the role and function of the

current labor officer positions to include a wider range of transformational responsibilities in such areas as human rights, democracy, and other regional and

transnational political and economic issues. In many cases, this reflects a continuation of a process that had already begun.

Under the Global Repositioning Initiative, an integral element of the Secretary’s

vision of transformational diplomacy, the Department is shifting its resources to

more effectively and efficiently deal with transformational issues globally. The Department is reviewing the work and location of current labor officer positions. Positions with significant labor responsibilities will continue to be labor-designated assignments for which officers will receive labor training.

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