The Honorable Joseph E. Stevens, Jr., United States District 1

Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

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No. 96-1025

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Ronald Marriott, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Randy Strong; City of * Appeal from the United States

Maryville, MO, a municipal * District Court for the

corporation; State of * Western District of Missouri

Missouri, Division of Family *

Services; Jody Starr; Life * [UNPUBLISHED]

Long Learning Center, Inc.; *

Ada Silvy; Brenda McCoy, *

*

Appellees. *

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 Submitted: November 7, 1996

 Filed: November 25, 1996

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Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Ronald Marriott appeals from the final judgment of the District

Court for the Western District of Missouri granting defendants summary

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judgment in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. For the reasons discussed below,

we affirm.

On January 21, 1992, Missouri Division of Family Services employee

Jody Starr received a hotline call stating Marriott's four-year-old

daughter showed signs of behavior typical of a child who had been sexually

abused, and the suspects included Marriott. 
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Starr called police officer Randy Strong for assistance in investigating

the allegation. Starr and Strong interviewed Marriott's daughter and wife.

Strong also spoke with four caseworkers who had observed the daughter's

behavior at a women's shelter. On January 24, Starr told Strong that the

Marriotts had left their home on the night of January 21 after their

interviews. On January 27, Strong learned that the Marriott car was back

at the house and someone was removing items as if preparing to leave.

Strong contacted the prosecuting attorney, who told Strong to have the

Marriotts brought in on a twenty-hour investigatory hold. Marriott was

taken to the county jail and later posted bond; he was never charged. In

the course of subsequent divorce proceedings, the state court made a

finding that Marriott had sexually abused his daughter. 

Marriott filed the instant section 1983 action against, inter alia,

Starr and Strong, claiming that Strong wrongly arrested him and falsely

imprisoned him, and that Strong and Starr filed false reports against him

which interfered with his relationship with his child. Marriott moved for

summary judgment, and attached documentation, including a deposition from

a psychology professor who had reviewed the transcript of the daughter's

interview and criticized the interview techniques Starr and Strong had

used. 

 

The district court concluded that Strong was entitled to qualified

immunity on the arrest claim, because he reasonably believed probable cause

existed. The district court noted that before arresting Marriott, Strong

had sought and relied on advice and guidance from a social worker

specializing in children's issues, had observed the daughter, and had

obtained advice from the prosecutor. The district court further held that

Strong had actual probable cause to arrest Marriott, and thus the

subsequent brief detention was not improper. The district court also

concluded that Marriott's allegations that Strong and Starr interfered with

his relationship with his daughter did not
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implicate a constitutional right. The district court concluded Strong and

Starr were each entitled to qualified immunity. 

We agree with the district court that it was objectively reasonable

for Strong to believe he had probable cause to arrest Marriott, and that

he was thus entitled to qualified immunity. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.

224, 227 (1991) (qualified immunity supported if reasonable officer could

have believed probable cause existed); Gorra v. Hanson, 880 F.2d 95, 97

(8th Cir. 1989). We also agree that Marriott did not show the interviews

Strong and Starr conducted were so fundamentally flawed that it was

objectively unreasonable to believe that the resulting information, taken

together with the other information Strong possessed, gave Strong probable

cause to detain Marriott. We further agree that Marriott's arrest was

supported by probable cause under Missouri law, see Mo. Rev. Stat. §

544.216 (1994), and thus no false imprisonment claim lies.

To the extent Marriott raises a separate due process argument, "an

imperfect investigation without more does not deprive the investigators of

qualified immunity." Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1460 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987). We conclude that the interviews were

not so outrageous as to offend the substantive component of the Due Process

Clause. See Manzano v. South Dakota Dep't of Soc. Servs., 60 F.3d 505, 513

(8th Cir. 1995). Further, the interview did not result in any other

deprivation of Marriott's constitutional rights. See DeCosta v. Chabot,

59 F.3d 279, 280 (1st Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (no constitutional right to

be free from child-abuse investigation). Thus, we conclude the district

court correctly granted Starr and Strong summary judgment on the basis of

qualified immunity.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.