INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: 

Lack of Bureau Connectivity Remains A 

Weakness In Treasury Communications System’s 

Disaster Recovery Capability 

OIG-03-079 April 28, 2003 

Office of Inspector General

******* 

The Department of the Treasury 
Contents 

Audit Report.................................................................................................. 3 

 Results In Brief............................................................................................. 4 

 Background ................................................................................................. 7 

Results and Recommendations....................................................................... 9 

 Weaknesses Could Impair TCS’ Disaster Recovery Capabilities ...................... 9 

 Recommendations....................................................................................12 

Appendices

 Appendix 1: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology .......................................16 

 Appendix 2: TCS’ Disaster Recovery Capability Implementation Phases..........17 

 Appendix 3: Services Impacted Without Bureau Connectivity To TCS-MCC ....18 

 Appendix 4: Management Comments.........................................................19 

 Appendix 5: Major Contributors.................................................................24 

 Appendix 6: Report Distribution.................................................................25 

Abbreviations

 AOF Alternate Operating Facility 

 ASMS Automated Security Management System 

 CIO Chief Information Officer 

 COOP Continuity of Operations Plan 

 DNS Domain Name Server 

 DO Departmental Offices 

 FMS Financial Management Service 

 FY Fiscal Year 

 INMS Integrated Network Management System 

 IRS Internal Revenue Service 

 KMC Key Management Center 

 NOC Network Operating Center 

 OIG Office of Inspector General 

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Contents 

 OMB Office of Management and Budget 

 PMO Program Management Office 

 PVC Private Virtual Circuit

 SOP Standard Operating Procedure

 TCC Treasury Communications System Communications Center 

 TCS Treasury Communications System 

 TCS-MCC TCS Back-Up Facility-Martinsburg, West Virginia 

 TCS-W2 TCS McLean, Virginia 

 TIAS TCS Internet Access Solution 

 Treasury Department of the Treasury 

 VoIP Voice Over Internet Protocol 

 VPN Virtual Private Network 

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OIG Audit 

Report

The Department of the Treasury 

Office of Inspector General 

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Drew Ladner 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Information Systems 

and Chief Information Officer 

Department of the Treasury 

The Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) Annual Audit Plan for Fiscal 

Year (FY) 2002 included the audit, Disaster Recovery Exercises. 

This review was classified as a high priority audit in response to 

the events that occurred on September 11, 2001. Losing the 

capability to process, retrieve, and protect information maintained 

electronically can significantly affect an agency’s ability to 

accomplish its mission. The Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) requires that controls for major applications and general 

support systems must provide for contingency planning and/or 

continuity of support. A backup facility can provide the capabilities 

to replicate and restore critical applications and functions, in order 

to resume operations in the event of a disaster. 

The lack of an emergency backup facility for the Treasury 

Communications System (TCS) in McLean, Virginia (TCS-W2) was 

identified as a security weakness in a prior OIG audit report.1

 As a 

result, we recommended that the Department create a secondary 

TCS Communications Center (TCC), with adequate physical 

security. The weakness cited in the report was subsequently 

classified as a material weakness in the Department of the 

Treasury’s (Treasury) FY 2000 Accountability Report. 

In response to the lack of a backup facility being declared a 

material weakness, Treasury developed a remediation plan to assist 

in establishing a disaster recovery site to support TCS’ Continuity 

1

 Audit of Treasury Communications System Automated Information System Security Program, dated 

February 1999, (OIG-99-039). 
 

of Operations Plan (COOP). The remediation plan was implemented 

in three phases beginning in January 2002. An acceptance test 

was conducted at the end of the first two phases to evaluate 

whether disaster recovery capabilities and critical system 

functionalities were working as designed. 

The objectives of this review were to determine if the Department 

implemented our prior audit recommendation and evaluate TCS’ 

disaster recovery acceptance testing. In May and October 2002, 

we observed the acceptance testing for phases one and two 

conducted at TCS’ primary operating facility in McLean, Virginia, 

and the backup facility in Martinsburg, West Virginia (TCS-MCC). 

During these observations, we evaluated TCS’ ability to start up 

critical backup systems; and resume processing at TCS-MCC after 

the Private Virtual Circuit2

 (PVC) between TCS-W2 and TCS-MCC 

was disabled. Specifically, we determined whether TCS was able 

to (1) replicate data from primary systems at TCS-W2 to stand-by 

backup systems at TCS-MCC; (2) promote stand-by backup 

systems to primary systems; (3) run critical applications; and 

(4) perform key operations and functions (e.g., opening trouble 

tickets, generating reports, retrieving files and e-mails, dialing into 

remote routers, and establishing connection with Voice Over 

Internet Protocol (VoIP) phones). Because bureaus had not

established connectivity to TCS-MCC, critical functionalities, such 

as network monitoring, were not performed. A more detailed 

description of our objectives, scope, and methodology is provided 

in Appendix 1. 

Results In Brief

TCS management has taken actions to remedy the material 

weakness by establishing a backup facility at TCS-MCC. In 

addition, TCS management succeeded in recovering critical 

systems during acceptance testing. Test procedures used to verify 

communication, key functions, and operations were also 

successfully executed and completed during the disaster recovery 

acceptance testing conducted in May and October 2002. During 

2

 A PVC is a logical connection between two sites. 

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the tests, data from selected critical systems was backed up at 

TCS-W2, and replicated to systems at TCS-MCC. After disabling 

the network communication between TCS-W2 and TCS-MCC, the 

recovery team at TCS-MCC began executing the recovery 

procedures by (1) promoting the backup Domain Name Server 

(DNS) to primary; (2) configuring the system to point to the DNS 

for internet protocol address resolution; and (3) opening individual 

applications and querying records previously created from systems 

at TCS-W2. 

Although disaster recovery capabilities exist for TCS, we identified 

a number of weaknesses that need attention: 

Bureaus had not established connectivity to TCS-MCC to ensure 

networking services would not be interrupted in the event of a 

disaster. 

Performance testing was not conducted for systems at 

TCS-MCC. 

Disaster recovery exercises were not conducted, and disaster 

recovery standard operating procedures (SOP) were not 

documented. 

Access to the Network Operating Center (NOC) at TCS-MCC 

was not restricted. 

The purpose of a backup facility is to minimize service interruption 

in the event of a disaster. Although a backup capability exists, 

without connectivity, TCS-MCC cannot provide essential services 

(e.g., network and router management, Internet access, Virtual 

Private Network (VPN), X.500 Directory, and e-mail) to the 

bureaus. The Chief Information Officer’s (CIO) memorandum dated 

October 2002, required bureaus to establish connectivity between 

TCS-MCC and both their headquarters and alternate operating 

facilities (AOF). Each bureau was required to submit its plan and 

service order to TCS for establishing connectivity by 

October 31, 2002. As of November 2002, no circuits were 

installed and only four bureaus (Departmental Offices (DO), the 

Financial Management Service (FMS), Office of Thrift Supervision, 

and the U.S. Customs Service) indicated that they would fully 

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comply with the requirement to establish connectivity with 

TCS-MCC. 

Our report includes the following recommendations that, in our

opinion, will assist the Treasury in remedying the deficiencies 

identified above. Specifically, we are recommending the CIO: 

• Ensure bureau connectivity to TCS-MCC is established for 

uninterrupted services. 

• Conduct performance evaluations on systems at TCS-MCC to 

ensure that the systems are operating as designed and have the 

capacity to handle normal processing activity in the event of a 

disaster. 

• Conduct disaster recovery exercises to prepare staff for 

disasters and to evaluate the effectiveness of TCS’ disaster 

recovery plan; and document disaster recovery standard 

operating procedures. 

• Improve security for the TCS-MCC NOC. 

The intent of our prior audit report3

 recommendation was to ensure 

that, with the creation of a backup facility, TCS could continue to 

provide uninterrupted services in the event of a disaster. Although 

TCS established TCS-MCC as a backup facility, TCS-MCC requires 

connectivity with the bureaus to provide essential services or 

minimize service interruptions. The Treasury may consider 

downgrading the material weakness associated with the lack of

TCS’ backup facility when (1) all bureaus have established 

connectivity to TCS-MCC, and (2) disaster recovery exercises are 

successfully conducted. 

In its response to our draft report, TCS management concurred 

with all our findings and recommendations. In addition, TCS 

management has already commenced efforts to implement our 

recommendations. Their response is summarized and evaluated in 

the body of this report and included, in detail, in Appendix 4, 

Management Comments. 

3

 See the report cited in footnote 1. 

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Background 

The TCS provides the framework for Treasury’s information 

infrastructure. This infrastructure enables a wide selection of 

applications, which include simplified tax and wage reporting, 

linking law enforcement agencies and public safety, and the 

development of an international trade database. The TCS provides 

services to more than 4,500 locations around the nation with 

approximately 120,000 users operating on a single integrated 

network. The mission of TCS is to design, build, manage, and 

operate Treasury’s Wide Area Communications Network. There are 

five components of TCS: 

Network and Services – The Network and Services component 

consists of an Asynchronous Transfer Mode super backbone 

that provides integrated data, voice, and video capabilities. 

• TCC – The TCC component houses the integrated network 

management system, the automated security management 

system, the operations and maintenance staff, and the 

executive agent and bureau representatives. 

• Integrated Network Management System (INMS) – The INMS 

system component consists of an open system compliant 

application that provides network performance monitoring and 

management, help desk operations, trouble ticket management, 

automated service ordering, configuration management, 

network change management, and billing. 

• Automated Security Management System (ASMS) – The ASMS 

provides for a secure network with system link level encryption 

and C2 security level controlled access protection. 

• Internet Services – The Internet Services component includes 

services such as the electronic commerce application; web 

application server hosting; e-mail; X.500 Directory service; 

DNS; firewall management for public internet access; VPN; 

network management and control; and the Internet service 

provider digital subscriber line. 

The lack of a TCC emergency backup facility was identified as a 

security weakness in a prior OIG audit report. In the report, the 

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OIG recommended that Treasury create a secondary TCC site with 

adequate physical security. In September 2001, Treasury set 

about to establish a disaster recovery site to support TCS’ COOP. 

A remediation plan was developed and then implemented in three 

phases. In January 2002, Treasury began assembling the 

TCS-MCC. The three phases of the remediation plan are as 

follows: 

Phase-one consisted of two parts. Part-one, phase-one 

established interim capability and was completed in 

January 2002. The completion of this part of phase-one 

provided the capability to operate TCS functions remotely at 

TCS-MCC. Part-two, phase-one established partial capability 

and was completed in April 2002. The completion of part-two 

provided the necessary infrastructure to support the TCS 

Internet Access Solution (TIAS) initial operational capability, Key 

Management Center (KMC), and emergency ticket and e-mail 

functionality.

Phase-two, which provided limited capability, was completed in 

October 2002. With the completion of this phase, the 

infrastructure established at TCS-MCC allowed the site to 

duplicate the functions of TCS-W2. Phase-two also provided 

for functional database synchronization, and the capability to 

operate autonomously in the event of a disaster.

Phase-three is currently in process. Once completed, TCS will 

have full operational capability to implement its COOP. The 

bureaus are required to establish connectivity to the TCS-MCC 

infrastructure during this phase. There are plans to increase 

TCS-MCC’s capacity to support future requirements in this 

phase.

In addition, acceptance testing was conducted at the completion of 

the first two phases to ensure that disaster recovery capabilities 

would work as designed. Phase-one and phase-two of the TCS 

disaster recovery capability implementation are illustrated in 

Appendix 2.

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Results and Recommendations 

Results Weaknesses Could Impair TCS’ Disaster Recovery 

Capabilities

TCS management has taken actions to remedy the material 

weakness by establishing a backup facility at TCS-MCC. In 

addition, TCS was successful in recovering critical systems during 

acceptance testing. During our review, we identified a number of 

controls that had been implemented which strengthen TCS’

disaster recovery capability and minimize unexpected service 

disruption in the event of disaster. For example: 

The TCS-MCC operates in a hot failed-over mode4

 with 

duplicate systems serving as backups for primary systems at 

TCS-W2. In the event of a disaster, operating in a hot 

failed-over mode enables a quick turn around to restore critical 

systems and services. Data is also automatically replicated 

from the TCS-W2 site to the TCS-MCC site. 

The CIO memorandum issued in October 2002, mandates that 

all bureaus establish connectivity to TCS-MCC from both its 

headquarters and AOF. Frame relay circuits should be installed 

between the bureaus and TCS-MCC. When the circuits are 

installed, traffic can be redirected with a network software 

change in the event of disaster.

A draft TCS disaster recovery plan was developed to restore 

critical services and functions within the 12-hour timeframe of a 

declared disaster. The draft disaster recovery plan includes the 

requirements for maintaining TCS-MCC; the organization, 

resources, and staffing required to effectively respond to a 

disaster; and the process to restore systems and begin AOF 

operations. 

4

 A mode of operation for failure tolerant systems in which the component has failed and its functions 

have been assumed by a redundant component. 

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Although TCS management established a backup facility at 

TCS-MCC, we identified weaknesses in TCS’ disaster recovery 

capabilities that would impact TCS and Treasury bureaus in the 

event of disaster or unplanned disruption at TCS-W2. 

Bureaus Had Not Established Connectivity To TCS-MCC 

All bureaus currently receive TCS services through connections to 

TCS-W2 from their individual headquarters. Although TCS-MCC is 

established as the backup facility for TCS-W2, without direct 

bureau connectivity to TCS-MCC, TCS cannot provide its full 

services to the bureaus in the event of a disaster. For instance, in 

the event of a disaster and without bureau connectivity to 

TCS-MCC, (1) TCS cannot proactively monitor bureaus’ routers or 

manage the telecommunication services and circuits from 

TCS-MCC; (2) all bureaus will loose Internet access, 

X.500 Directory, and e-mail services; and (3) several bureaus 

(Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Financial Crimes Enforcement 

Network, FMS, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and Office of 

the Comptroller of the Currency) will experience service 

interruption on application and web hosting/housing. Appendix 3 

lists the service interruption to the bureaus in the event of a 

disaster where connectivity to TCS-MCC is not established. 

Bureaus need to establish connectivity to TCS-MCC to ensure 

networking services are not interrupted. 

Performance Testing Was Not Conducted 

Network traffic and transactions are equally distributed and 

processed among the TCS-W2 and TCS-MCC sites. The TCS-MCC 

was established as a backup facility to minimize service 

interruptions and provide essential services in the event of a 

disaster. Thus, both network connectivity to TCS-MCC and the 

systems at TCS-MCC must be capable of individually processing all 

TCS network traffic and transactions in the event of a disaster. 

Since connectivity was not established between TCS-MCC, 

bureaus’ headquarters, and AOFs, performance evaluations were 

not conducted on systems at TCS-MCC. Without a performance 

evaluation, there is no guarantee that the systems at TCS-MCC 

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have the capacity to handle normal processing activity in the event 

of a disaster. 

Disaster Recovery Plan Was Not Tested And Site Transitioning 

SOPs Were Not Documented 

Although TCS management was successful in recovering all critical 

systems selected for acceptance testing, we found that TCS 

management had not conducted disaster recovery exercises nor 

documented disaster recovery SOPs for transitioning TCS-MCC 

from a secondary site to a primary site. We found that TCS’ 

disaster recovery plan was drafted, but was not finalized, 

approved, or tested. The disaster recovery plan should be tested 

periodically to ensure the plan would work as intended. The lack 

of disaster recovery exercise and training increases the risk of an 

unsuccessful recovery, or delaying the time of recovery. The SOPs 

are needed to systematically guide the operators in promoting a 

backup facility to a primary facility. 

Access Was Not Restricted And Logged At TCS-MCC 

The TCS-MCC is located in the IRS data room and shares the space 

with DO and Emergency Preparedness staff. Currently, there are 

no perimeter walls separating the TCS area from the rest of the IRS 

data room. In addition, physical access to the TCS area is not 

logged. Therefore, anyone with physical access to the IRS data

room has unrestricted access to the TCS area. Although there are 

strong physical controls at TCS-MCC NOC, access to the TCS area 

should be restricted to need-to-know, or only those personnel who 

require access to perform their duties. 

OMB Circular A-130, “Management of Federal Information 

Resources”, establishes policy for the management of federal 

information resources. Appendix III, “Security of Federal 

Automated Information Resources”, of this circular establishes a 

minimum set of controls to be included in federal automated 

information security programs. According to Appendix III, 

managers should plan for how they will perform their mission 

and/or recover from the loss of existing application support, 

whether the loss is due to the inability of the application to 

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function or a general support system failure. Experience has 

demonstrated that testing a recovery plan significantly improves its 

viability. Untested plans, or plans not tested for a long period of 

time, may create a false sense of ability to recover in a timely 

manner. Also, per the Federal Information System Controls Audit 

Manual, physical access should be limited to personnel with a

legitimate need to perform their duties. 

Since TCS is the conduit for disseminating Treasury information 

and data, any major TCS service disruption can impede Treasury 

and bureaus’ operations and missions. In the event of a disaster, 

inadequate recovery capabilities would cause mission critical 

operations to cease. Conducting disaster recovery exercises 

ensures that the disaster recovery plan can be successfully applied 

and evaluated for effectiveness, revealing any shortcomings and 

providing valuable training experience to team members. 

Restricted access to the Treasury area at TCS-MCC is critical to 

controlling the overall integrity of information systems and data and 

also reducing the risk of damage to the systems from malicious 

acts. 

Recommendations 

The Treasury CIO should: 

1. Ensure bureau connectivity to TCS-MCC is established for 

uninterrupted services. 

Management response: 

TCS management concurred with this recommendation. The TCS 

Program Management Office (PMO) will continue to track bureau 

progress in establishing connectivity to TCS-MCC. Bureau 

connectivity status is shared with Treasury components at 

quarterly Information Sharing Sessions. The TCS PMO will also 

provide status reports regarding the progress bureaus make on 

their connectivity to TCS-MCC during monthly CIO Council 

meetings. In addition, operations personnel at the TCS PMO are 

continuing to work with bureaus that are not in compliance 

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regarding connectivity to TCS-MCC by assisting them in ordering 

service to TCS-MCC. The target date for bureau connectivity is 

November 2003. 

2. Conduct performance evaluations on systems at TCS-MCC to 

ensure that the systems operate as designed and have the 

capacity to handle normal processing activity in the event of a 

disaster. 

Management Response: 

TCS management concurred with this recommendation. 

Performance load testing is scheduled for FY03 after bureau 

connectivity is established to TCS-MCC. Critical TCS applications 

will continue to be evaluated to ensure that TCS-MCC can handle 

the traffic load through site simulation and testing. Furthermore, 

TCS-MCC’s operating procedures and traffic capacity are 

continually evaluated based on Treasury contingencies. The target 

date for this action is December 2003. 

3. Conduct disaster recovery exercises to prepare staff for 

disasters and to evaluate the effectiveness of TCS’ disaster 

recovery plan; and document disaster recovery standard 

operating procedures. 

Management Response: 

TCS management concurred with this recommendation. Continuity 

of operations exercises are being conducted, and will continue to 

be planned and conducted based on the availability of resources 

and travel funds. The TCS Disaster Recovery Plan has been 

updated as of April 2003 and is currently under review. A 

TCS-level disaster recovery exercise is planned in calendar year 

2003 upon completion of bureau connectivity into TCS-MCC. The 

TCS PMO will continue to validate and verify emergency business 

processes and operating procedures in TCS’ COOP, disaster 

recovery plan, and operating guides during all exercises. The target 

date for this action is November 2003. 

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4. Improve security for the TCS-MCC NOC. 

Management Response: 

TCS management concurred with this recommendation. To control 

and monitor access to the TSC-MCC area, a steel mesh cage and a 

closed-circuit television system will be installed. The closed-circuit 

television system will be monitored by Internal Revenue Service 

Security Personnel in the TCS-MCC Annex. In addition, a 

stand-alone electronic access control system will be installed to 

meet Treasury security requirements. The target date for this 

action is June 2003. 

OIG Comment:

The OIG agrees that the formal steps TCS management has taken, 

and plans to take, satisfies the intent of the recommendations. 

The intent of our prior audit report recommendation was to ensure 

that, with the creation of a backup facility, TCS could continue to 

provide uninterrupted services in the event of a disaster. Although 

TCS management established TCS-MCC as a backup facility, 

TCS-MCC requires connectivity with Treasury bureaus to provide 

essential services or minimize service interruptions. The Treasury 

may consider downgrading the material weakness associated with 

the lack of a TCS backup facility when all bureaus have established 

connectivity to TCS-MCC, and disaster recovery exercises are 

successfully conducted. 

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* * * * * * 

I would like to extend my appreciation to TCS for the cooperation 

and courtesies extended to my staff during the review. If you have 

any questions, please contact me at (202) 927-5774, or 

Joseph A. Maranto, Audit Manager, Office of Information 

Technology Audits, at (202) 927-5014. Major contributors to this 

report are listed in Appendix 5. 

/s/ 

Louis C. King 

Director, Office of Information Technology Audits 

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Appendix 1 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

The objectives of this review were to determine if the Department 

implemented our prior audit recommendation, and evaluate the 

Department’s disaster recovery capabilities at TCS-MCC. These 

objectives were accomplished by identifying if TCS had taken 

corrective actions to remedy the weakness identified, and 

evaluating TCS’ disaster recovery capabilities by observing the 

acceptance testing conducted at TCS-MCC. 

We observed TCS’ disaster recovery acceptance testing for phases 

one and two in Martinsburg, West Virginia (i.e., TCS-MCC) in May 

and October 2002, and in McLean, Virginia (i.e., TCS-W2) in 

October 2002. Data used to recover critical systems at TCS-MCC 

was created at TCS-W2 and replicated at TCS-MCC. Testing 

resumed at TCS-MCC after the PVC between TCS-W2 and 

TCS-MCC was disabled. Once the PVC was disabled, we observed 

operators at TCS-MCC began the recovery process by promoting 

the local DNS server from backup status to primary and entered 

router changes. After promoting major systems from backup to 

primary, we observed operators using test procedures to restore

data and perform key operations, such as retrieving and viewing 

records previously created at TCS-W2, testing key functions, 

operations, and communication. Testing was performed for NT 

servers, Network Information Service Plus, NFS, Oracle, VoIP, 

INMS applications, X.500, VPN, and Security Management 

applications. 

The results of this report are based solely on our observation of the 

acceptance testing at TCS-MCC. We only evaluated TCS’ ability to 

restore critical systems selected. We did not evaluate TCS-MCC’s 

disaster recovery capabilities, as the backup facility is isolated 

without bureau connectivity.

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Appendix 2 

TCS’ Disaster Recovery Capability Implementation Phases 

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Appendix 3 

Services Impacted Without Bureau Connectivity To TCS-MCC 

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Appendix 4 

Management Comments 

Appendix 4 

Management Comments 

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Appendix 4 

Management Comments 

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Appendix 4 

Management Comments 

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Appendix 4 

Management Comments 

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Appendix 4 

Management Comments 

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Appendix 5 

Major Contributors 

Office of Information Technology Audits

Edward G. Coleman, Former Director 

Joseph A. Maranto, IT Audit Manager 

Tram J. Do, Computer Specialist 

Tom Tsang, IT Auditor 

Stacey Ansell, Referencer 

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Appendix 6 

Report Distribution 

The Department of the Treasury

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Information 

Systems/Chief Information Officer 

Office of Accounting and Internal Control

Office of Management and Budget

Office of Inspector General Budget Examiner

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