ISBN 1-932946-17-9

PCN 3866
EDUCING 

INFORMATION

Interrogation: Science and Art

Foundations for the Future

Intelligence Science Board

Phase 1 Report

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NDIC PRESS e

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Strategic Intelligenc

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National Defense Intelligence College

Washington, DC

December 2006

The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and 

refl ect the offi cial policy or position of the Department 

of Defense, the National Foreign Intelligence Communit

or the U.S. Government
Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art—Foundations for th

Intelligence Science Board.

The National Defense Intelligence College is pleased to present this 

the Intelligence Science Board on Educing Information. “Educing info

refers to information elicitation and strategic debriefi ng as well as to inter

Essays were prepared with the guidance of Dr. Robert Fein and oth

advisors. Works by authors who were employees of the Department of 

when the essays were fi rst created were reviewed and cleared for unr

public release by the Department of Defense’s Offi ce of Security Revi

book has benefi ted from reviews by authoritative professionals in gov

and academia. The College appreciates the editorial contributions made 

reviewers, and especially the detailed comments by Margaret S. McDona

Mitre Corporation. The Foreword and Commentaries included in the bo

invited by the editor and are not part of the Intelligence Science Boar

itself.

Russell.Swenson@dia.mil, Editor and Director

Center for Strategic Intelligence Research

National Defense Intelligence College

Library of Congress Control Number 20069322

ISBN 1-932946
Study on Educing Information

Phase 1 Advisors

Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.

Chair of the Study and Member, Intelligence Science Board 

Paul Lehner, Ph.D.

Senior Study Team Member, MITRE Corporation

Bryan Vossekuil

Senior Study Team Member, Counterintelligence Field Activity

Members of Government Experts Com

on Educing Information

David Becker Defense Intelligence Agency

John Berglund Department of Homeland Secur

Brian Boetig Federal Bureau of Investigation

Michael Gelles, Psy.D Naval Criminal Investigative Se

Michael Kremlacek U.S. Army Intelligence

Robert McFadden Counterintelligence Field Activ

C.A. Morgan III, M.D. Intelligence Technology Innova

Kenneth Rollins, Ph.D. Joint Personnel Recovery Agen

Scott Shumate, Psy.D. Counterintelligence Field Activ

Andre Simons Federal Bureau of Investigation

John Wahlquist National Defense Intelligence C

Members of Intelligence Science Board 

Advisory Group on Educing Informa

Randall Fort 

Vice President, Goldman Sachs

Dr. Paul Gray 

Professor of Electrical Engineering and President Emeritus, MIT
Senior Scientist, Nuclear Threat Initiative

Philip B. Heymann

James Barr Ames Professor for Criminal Justice, Harvard University

Dr. Ernest May

Charles Warren Professor of History, Harvard University

Dr. Anthony G. Oettinger 

Chairman, Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University

Dr. Ervin J. Rokke

President, Moravian College

About the Intelligence Science Board

Mission

The Intelligence Science Board was chartered in August 2002 and advise

Offi ce of the Director of National Intelligence and senior Intelligence Commu

leaders on emerging scientifi c and technical issues of special importance to 

Intelligence Community. The mission of the Board is to provide the Intellige

Community with outside expert advice and unconventional thinking, early no

of advances in science and technology, insight into new applications of exis

technology, and special studies that require skills or organizational approa

not resident within the Intelligence Community. The Board also cre

linkages between the Intelligence Community and the scientifi c and techn

communities.

Impact 

Board members initiate studies and assessments in topic areas where 

believe that the Board’s interdisciplinary expertise and experience could be

the Intelligence Community. In addition, the Board responds to tasking f

the Associate Director of National Intelligence for Science and Techno

and from the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community. All ISB t

are mutually agreed to by the ISB and by the Associate Director of Nati

Intelligence for Science and Technology. The Board’s procedures for develo

and communicating its fi ndings and advice will remain as fl exible and inform

is possible, consistent with the mission.

Membership

The Board is composed of approximately 25 members whose range of expe

encompasses the physical and biological sciences, information technology 

communications, information policy, and the law, among others.
iii

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Foreword, Robert Destro. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Prologue, Robert A. Fein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Commentaries, Pauletta Otis, John Wahlquist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Introduction, Robert A. Fein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Scientifi c Papers

1. The Costs and Benefi ts of Interrogation in 

the Struggle Against Terrorism

Robert Coulam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2. Approaching Truth: Behavioral Science Lessons on 

Educing Information from Human Sources

Randy Borum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3. Research on Detection of Deception: 

What We Know vs. What We Think We Know

Gary Hazlett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4. Mechanical Detection of Deception: A Short Review

Kristin E. Heckman and Mark D. Happel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5. KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Review: 

Observations of an Interrogator – Lessons Learned and 

Avenues for Further Research 

Steven M. Kleinman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6. Custodial Interrogations: What We Know, 

What We Do, and What We Can Learn from 

Law Enforcement Experiences

Ariel Neuman and Daniel Salinas-Serrano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7. Barriers to Success: Critical Challenges in 

Developing a New Educing Information Paradigm

Steven M. Kleinman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
iv

Daniel L. Shapiro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

9. Negotiation Theory and Educing Information: 

Practical Concepts and Tools 

M. P. Rowe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

10. Options for Scientifi c Research on Eduction Practices 

Paul Lehner. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

11. Educing Information Bibliography (Annotated)

Theresa Dillon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
v

Many individuals and organizations contributed to Phase 1 

on Educing Information (EI). I deeply appreciate the parti

encouragement of these experts from government, the academic com

other organizations. 

The staff of the Study on EI, as well as numerous consult

immensely and immeasurably in its work. Others provided spe

invaluable knowledge, editorial assistance, and moral and intelle

throughout.

The authors of the scientifi c papers responded to requests, tasks, 

with disciplined scholarship and grace. Staff from the NDIC P

skillfully, and patiently, to turn the study report into a book. 

To each and all I express my thanks.

Robert Fein

vii

Robert A. Destro*

Educing Information is a profoundly important book because 

professionals and ordinary citizens a primer on the “science and 

interrogation and intelligence gathering. Because this is a book w

for intelligence professionals, it starts exactly where one might exp

– with Dr. Robert Coulam’s superb discussion of the costs and benefi 

approaches to interrogation. For those who are (like me) unschoo

and science of intelligence gathering, careful study of the table o

perhaps the best way to decide which of the papers would prov

convenient portal through which to enter a realm that is, by the 

the authors themselves, both largely unexplored and enormously 

our national security. Steven M. Kleinman’s excellent paper on the 

Counterintelligence Interrogation Review” provided just the h

theoretical background I needed to feel comfortable with the other 

book “works” either way.

Wherever one starts or ends this book, certain conclusions are 

The fi rst is that there is ample room for inter- and multi-disciplinary 

collaboration. Each of the papers included in Educing Informatio

least one, if not many, important “Foundations for the Future.” I loo

participating in that process.

The second conclusion is that it is going to take a lot of hard wor

other disciplines that the Intelligence Community is not making 

interdisciplinary clean-up of what Dr. Robert Fein’s “Prologue” call

police-state methods of extracting information from their prison

cursory reading of the papers in this book points to the enormous 

for research and human rights protection that will fl ow from a sy

entirely legitimate, set of inquiries into the realm of information gat

I fear, however, that the authors and editors may have compounde

when they decided to characterize “interrogation” as “educing 

Though “educing information” may sound a bit more benign than 

robust-sounding image created by the concept of “interrogation,” it 

benign enough to overcome the public relations problem that led 

of the phrase in the fi rst place.1

 We lawyers call this process “char

1

 Editor’s Note: As pointed out by Robert Fein in the Introduction to this book, th

Information,” although not yet in common usage, encompasses information “elicitatio

debriefi ng” as well as interrogation. Robert Destro’s comments highlight the swift u

attend the topic at hand, and that can easily enlist adversarial stratagems. Profess

associated with the Intelligence Science Board.

__________________ *

Professor of Law and Director, Interdisciplinary Program in Law & Religion, Colu

Law, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. B.A. 1972, Miami Un

Ohio; J.D., 1975, Boalt Hall School of Law, The University of California, Berkeley

United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1983-1989.
viii

precisely the same thing – and, in this case, those “others” are likely to be 

lawyers and human rights advocates that advise the legislators who in turn co

intelligence research budgets. 

Professor Kathleen Sullivan, Dean of Stanford University Law School

observed that, in constitutional law:

Categorization is the taxonomist’s style – a job of classifi cation and labe

ing. When categorical formulas operate, all the important work in litigati

is done at the outset. Once the relevant right and mode of infringement ha

been described, the outcome follows, without any explicit judicial balanci

of the claimed right against the government’s justifi cation for the infring

ment. Balancing is more like grocer’s work (or Justice’s) – the judge’s j

is to place competing rights and interests on a scale and weigh them again

each other. Here the outcome is not determined at the outset, but depends 

the relative strength of a multitude of factors. These two styles have com

peted endlessly in contemporary constitutional law; neither has ever entire

eclipsed the other.2

Thus, it is not enough simply to choose a benign-sounding term 

“educing.” Any lawyer or human rights advocate will understand both how 

why the re-characterization was selected, and force the original discussio

how one “balances” the “need to know” against human rights concerns. T

is no point in hiding the fact that we are talking about “interrogation,” and, t

honest, reasonable minds might differ on whether the term “educing” sound

that “benign” in the fi rst place. 

All who are interested in the work product and ethics of the Intellig

Community should understand that the road ahead is going to be a long one. 

many, if not most, Americans I learned what I “know” about the “interrogatio

bad guys” (both male and female) by watching prime-time television. Law sc

was (and remains) even less informative with respect to such questions. M

lawyers and judges learn the “art” (but not the “science”) of cross-examina

of a hostile witness from either a mentor or a supervisor after embarking on 

practice of law, and supplement that “training” by watching courtroom dra

recommended by their peers. It is going to take a sustained period of intensive i

disciplinary cooperation to clean up the rather sordid images of “interrogat

that have become the stuff of movies and prime-time television.

There is a real need for “outreach” and professional collaboration h

Lawyers, judges, legislators, and human rights advocates know little to not

about either the “science or art” of intelligence gathering, but all of them k

2

 Kathleen M. Sullivan, “Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing,” 

Colo. L. Rev. 293, 293-294 (1992).
ix

expensive process, but many see absolutely nothing wrong with hid

– and the results – from the general public. We teach our law stude

about the law governing the custodial interrogation of criminal sus

too much about the theory and practice discussed in Ariel Neuma

Salinas-Serrano’s fi ne paper on custodial interrogation in the law 

context. We pride ourselves on our commitment to both human r

preservation of rule of law, but work in a profession that decries the l

brought about by the hard-hitting (and sometimes unethical), advers

we see every night on television. 

These are your critics. They are a tough audience with quite 

from you. Human rights advocates and civil rights litigators view t

“private attorneys general” whose role is to litigate in defense of ind

and they view the courts as the only branch of government capable of 

now-retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor called “sensible balances

rights of the individual and the needs of organized society. Courts an

cannot strike those “sensible balances” without fi rst acquiring 

grounding in the “science and art” of your profession. Educing Inf

welcome “fi rst installment” on that effort.

And what are we to make of “public opinion”? Unfortunat

relatively easy question. Prime-time television increasingly offers 

involving the incineration of metropolitan Los Angeles by an atom

its depopulation by an aerosol nerve toxin. The characters do not ha

refl ect upon, much less to utilize, what real professionals know to b

and art” of “educing information.” They want results. Now. The pub

same way. They want, and rightly expect, precisely the kind of “pr

only a skilled intelligence professional can provide. Unfortunately, 

idea how such a person is supposed to act “in real life.”

Is there a theme here? Yes, a simple one. Prime time televisi

entertainment. It is “adult education.” We should not be surprised wh

(and many otherwise law-abiding lawyers) applaud when an actor 

“hostile du jour” with pain or mayhem unless he or she answers a 

questions before the end of the episode. The writers craft the script usi

measures because they assume, as our own government has, tha

tactics studied for defensive purposes can be “reverse engineered” 

into cost-effective, “offensive” measures.

Though eminently understandable, such reactions are incredibly 

and profoundly unethical. We don’t need just any answers, we need g

Our health and safety, and our posterity, depend on it. 

Don’t expect Educing Information to become required readin

Hollywood screen writer set anytime soon, but it certainly should 

could learn quite a lot.

xi

U.S. Experience and Research in 

Educing Information: 

A Brief History

Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.

MIS-Y Program

In World War II, the United States military developed a secre

program, called MIS-Y, designed to obtain intelligence from capture

This “educing information” program (though it was not described 

time) was designed to obtain intelligence from senior German offi c

and scientists in U.S. custody. The prisoners were taken to a facility 

VA, specially developed for educing information. Each internee 

screened to ensure that he was likely to have information critica

security before being sent to Fort Hunt. 

Each Fort Hunt internee was paired with a trained interrog

because of his language ability, knowledge of subject matter, and per

to relate to the source. Rooms where detainees ate, slept, washed, r

talked were wired for sound. In addition, collaborators were placed 

population. The German offi cers, scientists, and offi cials were m

a 24-hour basis; information was also collected from them while 

formal interrogation sessions, while they conversed with their ro

“colleagues,” and at other times. The information was analyzed o

basis, with dossiers of the internees updated regularly. Intelligence w

and disseminated to military commands and organizations. The MI

ended with the conclusion of WWII. 

Research on Interrogation Techniques

World events in the post-war period shifted U.S. government at

techniques that other countries might apply against U.S. personnel. T

Soviet Union as a world power and the birth of the People’s Republi

to widespread concern about Soviet and Chinese interrogation cap

concerns were highlighted by a number of Communist show trials a

confessions of a few captured U.S. servicemen during the Korean W

A national debate ensued at the conclusion of hostilities in Kore

one understand U.S. servicemen who “confessed” to dropping bom

germs on civilian populations (events that did not occur)? Were thes

or had they been “brainwashed” (a term popularized by Edward Hun

The general U.S. public and researchers alike wondered whether 

and/or the Chinese (possibly building on behavioral conditionin

developed by scientists such as Ivan Pavlov) had developed scientifi c 
xii

Concerns about communist interrogation methods led to substantial 

government research programs in the 1950s into the nature of practices utilize

the Soviets and the Chinese. These studies were essentially “defensive” in na

Their goal was to learn about the interrogation behaviors of adversaries in o

to equip U.S. servicemen with needed defensive capacities. 

Noted social scientists and physicians who were affi liated with the mil

and the intelligence community (including Arthur Biderman, Robert J. Li

Edgar Schein, Lawrence Hinkle, Jr., and Harold Wolff) conducted studie

servicemen who had been prisoners of the Communist Chinese and examine

experience of persons subjected to Soviet interrogations. Respected profess

organizations such as the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry spons

scientifi c meetings at which topics relating to interrogation were explored 

discussed. Articles in distinguished professional journals (such as the Ame

Medical Association’s Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry) described Sovie

Chinese interrogation methods and techniques in detail. Several scholarly b

were published on interrogation, such as The Manipulation of Human Beha

(a series of essays that explored scientifi c knowledge about interrogation) 

Coercive Persuasion (a study of servicemen captured by the Chinese).

The overwhelming conclusion of these studies was that the Soviets and 

Chinese were using traditional police-state methods of extracting inform

from their prisoners. Hinkle and Wolff noted in 1957:

in no case is there reliable evidence that neurologists, 

psychiatrists, psychologists or other scientifi cally trained 

personnel have designed or participated in these police 

procedures. There is no evidence that drugs, hypnosis or 

other devices play any signifi cant role in them. The effects 

produced are understandable in terms of the methods used. 

There is no reason to dignify these methods by surrounding 

them with an aura of scientifi c mystery, or to denote them 

by terms such as “menticide” or “brain washing” which 

imply that they are scientifi cally organized techniques of 

predictable effectiveness.3

3

 Lawrence E. Hinkle, Jr. and Harold G. Wolff, “The Methods of Interrogation and Indoctri

Used by the Communist State Police,” Bulletin of the NY Academy of Medicine, 33 (9): 609-610
xiii

from a defensive perspective, offi cials in the Central Intelligence A

began a series of explorations about “offensive” interrogation. Th

1950s and into the 1960s, the CIA sponsored studies designed to 

drugs (LSD, for example), sensory deprivation, and hypnosis migh

techniques to elicit information. Some of this work was used in de

KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual, written in 1963 

released in the late 1990s. The CIA research, much of it condu

the MKULTRA program, became the subject of concern within 

Intelligence Community, the Congress, and the public. Although mo

concerning the program’s work reportedly were destroyed in 1972, C

hearings in 1977 put a spotlight on the research and led to widespre

Publicity and concerns about the MKULTRA program cast a p

to conduct systematic inquiry in areas of human intelligence gatheri

interrogation, during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Most interrogati

that period, including that provided by the military, was designed to e

(primarily young enlisted men) with a rudimentary set of skills an

that would permit them to gather basic tactical information from ca

soldiers on and about the battlefi eld. The techniques for interro

promulgated in Army Field Manuals, such as FM 34-52. The sev

authorized techniques in the Army manuals are believed to have be

in the period immediately following World War II. 

Although the U.S. government later engaged in interrogation a

limited extent in the fi rst Gulf War and in Bosnia, there was little 

supported research in these areas. Additionally, there was little op

U.S. interrogators to practice and hone their skills. For example, 

were trained and certifi ed as interrogators might complete their mi

without ever conducting an interrogation.

With the attacks of 11 September 2001, and the initiation of the G

Terrorism, the Intelligence Community plunged into activities that, 

involved efforts to obtain information from persons in U.S. custody 

initially appeared uncooperative. At holding facilities in Afghanistan

and perhaps other sites, active duty military personnel, reservists

offi cers, law enforcement agents, contracted interrogators, and othe

glean information and create intelligence that might help prevent ter

and contribute to national security. Since there had been little or no 

of sustained capacity for interrogation practice, training, or res

intelligence or military communities in the post-Soviet period, many 

were forced to “make it up” on the fl y. This shortfall in advanced, re

interrogation methods at a time of intense pressure from operational 

to produce actionable intelligence from high-value targets may hav

signifi cantly to the unfortunate cases of abuse that have recently c

Perhaps in the future, EI professionals and researchers can develo

that will inform and improve both practice and policy in these cri

national security.

xv

Educing Information: The Right Initia

the Right Time by the Right Peop

Pauletta Otis, Ph.D.*

Revelations surrounding the interrogation and treatment of M

at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba shocked th

provoked the collective conscience. How could this happen? What 

in this “time of terror?” Do rules always apply? Whose rules? 

the “potential and suspected” terrorist be treated? What if,... jus

had information that would save lives? International terrorists, 

unreasonable religious motives, and infl icting mass causalities on 

are not unprecedented in human history. 

Although politicians, scholars, and theologians have been quic

harsh methods, the Intelligence Community has a need to know 

particular method of obtaining information actually works. Yet 

and scientifi c community has not systematically studied eduction 

The present study is a good beginning toward redressing that ove

remarkable for its honesty, clarity, and objectivity. 

This publication does not specifi cally address ethical, moral, 

legal questions, but instead focuses on “What works?” Dr. Robert C

enumerates incentives for “getting it right”: upholding ethical con

rule of law, increasing international support, reducing the danger 

others at risk of capture, avoiding legal problems for U.S. troops 

maintaining U.S. leadership on human rights, avoiding the crea

enemies, and maintaining the integrity of the military. The researc

the book comes across as focused and disciplined. It concentrates on 

of educing information from human sources held in prison or o

situations. It does not address “fi eld interrogation.” Field interr

depend on swift movement of both military units and prisoners 

documented. The evidence we do have about fi eld interrogation is a

not subject to scientifi c investigation and validation. 

*

Pauletta Otis, Ph.D. has been a Faculty Member at the National Defense Intellige

now works with the U.S. Marine Corps’ Center for Advanced Operational Cultural L

scholar and citizen, Dr. Otis has focused on the use of military force to prevent syste

of human rights during wartime, including the treatment of prisoners of war, or detain

bellum and jus en bello conditions. Editors Note: Dr. Otis’s remarks review the histori

and the infl iction of pain by the politically powerful to gain information from the w

greater eduction the value of principles and procedures that now guide U.S. practice

“eduction,” and reinforcing the need for systematic research in the fi eld. Dr. Otis is no

the Intelligence Science Board. 
xvi

information. The common element has been “pain”: (1) pain used as punishm

(2) pain used for religious or ideological confession, and (3) pain used to e

“truthful” information and/or intelligence. 

Pain administered publicly as punishment has been used for its demonstra

effect: It is designed to deter opposition, control populations, and display the po

of the government, or of rulers. Individuals have been punished to deter others fr

proscribed acts; entire groups have been executed in painful, public ways in or

to maintain control over empires. Of course, the effect of such a public spect

has depended on the character of the viewing audience. The public might fi n

simply fascinating. Some well-known examples include Aztec fl aying, Rom

circuses, group beheadings by Genghis Khan, and public tortures known to 

Hindu dynasties in early India. It is said that Nero enjoyed watching people be

thrown off the city walls; the Nazis took pictures of their victims for later view

and drawing and quartering as well as hanging in medieval England were accep

public spectacle. Most recently and instructively, the number of people who t

to access pictures of Abu Ghraib prisoner mistreatment numbered in the milli

within 48 hours after they were posted.4

 Evidently, public fascination with 

infl iction of pain on others is not merely an historical phenomenon. 

The second focus of literature is on the use of pain to elicit confess

Between the 12th and 14th centuries, punishment was given a religious quality 

associating it with purifi cation before a Supreme Being, or God.5 The individu

infl icting pain were only instruments in the hands of the Almighty, performin

service for the targeted individual. It was reasoned that if the tortured individ

suffered suffi ciently on this earth, he would not have to undergo the sufferi

of eternal damnation. The purifi cation of each individual helped society in 

by exorcising the evil from within it – the cancer could not spread. Infl iction 

physical pain was rationalized, justifi ed, and blessed by the more powerful 

society and even by God Himself. 

The use of pain to elicit truth in these centuries and those to follow 

focused on truth as an ideological belief system congruent with church 

political authority. The church was considered to have failed if the heretic refu

to confess and recant. Only after the religious confession and ruling might 

accused be turned over to the political/secular government for punishment 

public execution, called “releasing” the prisoner to (non-ecclesiastical) autho

The secular authorities then applied punishment – ranging from public humilia

4

 Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering, trans. Graham Burchell (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Unive

Press, 1999) provides insight into why people choose to watch the sufferings of others. 5

 Purifi cation through self-fl agellation, fasting, and denial of bodily needs has been acce

practice in the Middle East for time immemorial. The concept was known from India to Spain

was manifested in traditional, indigenous religions as well as in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism
xvii

The 13th century saw the proliferation of how to manuals 

persons to help illuminate motives and circumstances, and to aid in e

magnitude of an offense, as well as how to overcome the obstacles o

presumption, despair, and denial in order to elicit a good confession

manual, Processus inquisitionis (1248-49), was relatively simple, bu

grew in size, complexity and sophistication. Nicholas Eymeric

General of Aragon (1350s), enumerates various ruses the inquisit

elicit the truth. These approaches reappear in the KUBARK Manua

In addition, specifi c guidance regarding “evasive discourse” o

when suspects are not telling the truth, is found in the 13th-cent

Nicholas Eymerich wrote of “ten ways in which heretics seek to hide 

They are: equivocation, adding a condition to the original questio

questions, feigned astonishment, twisting the meaning of words, 

subject, self-justifi cation, feigned illness, feigning stupidity or m

the use of sanctity or the “holier than thou” method.7

 Eymerich 

nature of intimidation and of foot-dragging, of tool-breaking and p

of playing one off against another; the differences between men 

social connections, and occupations, as well as how to overcome 

deception.”

Although these three approaches to the control or acquisition o

have developed sequentially, they are often overlapping, and frequen

To some extent, the U.S. Intelligence Community is “stuck” with th

Evolution of Information Elicitation by Authorities in the Com

Source: Compiled by author.

6

 Maureen Flynn, “Mimesis of the Last Judgment: the Spanish auto de fe,” S

Journal 22 (2), (Summer 1991): 281-297 7

 Found in James V. Given, Inquisition and Medieval Society: Power, Discipline a

Languedoc (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

PURPOSE AUTHORITY VENUE TECHNIQUE RESULT 

PUNISHMENT Group

 repression

Empire Public Physical

brutality

Fear to

elicit obedien

CONFESSION Cleanse;defi ne 

in-group and

out-group

Church

and

state

Private, 

secret, 

then

public

Mental 

and 

physical

Promote loya

and group 

cohesion

TRUTH Information,

Intelligence

to prevent

further

violence

State Secret Mental Useful and

timely

information

PURPOSE AUTHORITY VENUE TECHNIQUE RESULT 

PUNISHMENT Group

 repression

Empire Public Physical

brutality

Fear to

elicit obedien

CONFESSION Cleanse;defi ne 

in-group and

out-group

Church

and

state

Private, 

secret, 

then

public

Mental 

and 

physical

Promote loya

and group 

cohesion

TRUTH Information,

Intelligence

to prevent

further

violence

State Secret Mental Useful and

timely

information
deemed ineffective and counterproductive. The documents that brought the 

into being were conceived with awareness of the European history noted ab

and were a product of learning from it. The Founders’ clear purpose was to pro

human dignity by restraining government from the abuse of power. 

As public support for church-related governance diminished in the 19th 

20th centuries in favor of codifi ed public law, the rules about use of pain to e

information were consistently tightened to protect individual rights and libe

within the domestic law enforcement community. However, the needs of the 

military and Intelligence Community have been different from those of dome

law enforcement, and the history of the use of pain to elicit information 

intelligence is yet to be written. Suffi ce to say, manuals and laws have sugge

ways of educing information and have also provided information to teach ho

resist mental and physical pressure. 

If there was any case whereby harsh interrogation practices would s

justifi ed, it may have been World War II. The world was aware of the atroc

of the Nazi regime and “eye for an eye” seemed to be the rule of the day. 

actual record is somewhat surprising: The Western world was so repulsed 

the Nazi spectacle that the “high ground” seemed the safest. In fact, the m

successful British interrogator was reputedly “Old Tin Eye,” Lieutenant Col

Robert Stephens at Camp 020, Latchmere House at Ham, on the edge of Lon

According to his biographer, Alan Judd, his success was a result of thoro

preparation by the interrogators, linguistic fl uency, and the right mixture of fi rm

in questioning and sympathy in handling. Violence of any sort was forbidden. 

interrogators who worked at Camp 020 knew the difference between “talk

and “truth.” 8

After World War II, the domestic law enforcement community and the 

military community took slightly differing views on educing information. FBI 

state and local offi cials were pressured to abide by the rule of law and encoura

to apply two principles: (1) that an individual is innocent until proven guilty 

(2) that civil rights are inherent in Constitutional Law. The “enemy within” w

be interrogated as a citizen and therefore had certain rights. The “enemy witho

the Communist threat – presented a different picture. The political turbulenc

the 1950s produced new efforts at fi nding out about the Communists, discove

how to resist brainwashing, and investigating technological and chem

shortcuts in interrogation. The FBI and the CIA handled these issues and produ

a good number of reports, among which was the KUBARK Manual. Howe

for the Department of Defense it was still something of a puzzle as to whe

“foreigners,” especially those found in combat areas, were to be accorded l

rights and due process. The international community and DOD developed a 

8

 Oliver Hoare, Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies: The Offi cial History of MI5’s Wa

Interrogation Centre (Richmond, Surrey, UK: Public Record Offi ce, 2000).

xviii
of Armed Combat, which is based on rules pertaining to conventiona

therefore diffi cult to apply to genocide, international crime, and/or t

Chris Mackey and Greg Miller, in The Interrogators: Inside th

Against Al Queda, discuss the development of U.S. intelligence and 

capabilities during and after World War II. “In July 1940, a month 

troops entered Paris, the army issued its fi rst fi eld manual on interrog

specifi cally, on the “examination of enemy personnel, repatriates, d

material.” The 28-page manual described and warned interrogato

the Geneva Conventions’ ban on coercion. There was no mention 

resembling the distinct approaches outlined in today’s interrogat

Indeed, about the only guidance it offered on method was that “a 

cup of coffee will frequently elicit more accurate and important info

threats.” 9

 In 1942, the U.S. Army opened its fi rst centralized intellig

center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland; its fi rst priority was to train inte

the students learned personality analysis, ways of infl uencing peopl

friends (the Dale Carnegie approach applied to war prisoners.) 

Since the early 1950s, the U.S. military has trained professional 

and taught specifi c ways of “educing” information from unwillin

was assumed that the information needed was of a military-eng

– assuming “conventional warfare” (although realizing that Vietnam 

out of this category). The methods used were a combination of tho

from the oral histories of professional interrogators from World War 

Confl ict, and Vietnam. The other component was the list of ways o

interrogation as described in KUBARK and mostly Army trainin

such as Field Manual 34-52 (1992). Some of the training, especi

(Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape) schools, was highly 

designed to help soldiers resist interrogation and torture. The infam

a leash” tactic was ostensibly created to show that “nothing can ta

dignity.” 

This background brings us to the present work on Educing 

Interrogation: Science and Art, which has four chapters devoted to 

and analysis of U.S. interrogators, techniques, and procedures since 

The authors review what we think we know, yet wonder about wha

not know. Further, the authors note that although some interrogators 

trained in the techniques, there is no evidence that those technique

what they are supposed to do. 

Chapters 5 and 6 of this book describe how current eduction 

and note that although there is no valid scientifi c research to back th

9

 Chris Mackey and Greg Miller, The Interrogators: Inside the Secret War Agains

York: Little, Brown and Company, 2004), 27.

xix
xx

statement: “more research is necessary.”

Chapter 6 addresses “Custodial Interrogations: What We Know, What 

Do, and What We Can Learn from Law Enforcement Experiences.” It is 

written but disillusioning. If the Intelligence Community expects to learn w

law enforcement offi cials do actually know and have scientifi c evidence for, 

are in for disappointment. The interrogation processes as depicted on the 

program Law and Order and the like, and that there work clearly and clea

are a fantasy. The authors clearly state, as do others, that there is no partic

evidence that supports current interrogation (eduction) techniques and that “m

research is necessary.”

Chapters 7 through 10 provide a number of good suggestions about ho

go about doing research and fi nding out “what works.” A promising sugges

is to study eduction as a negotiation process with wins, losses, and tradeoffs 

each party. This model may prove fruitful – but the authors of this report 

repeatedly point out that more research is necessary.

The importance of this book and its topic are hard to overstate: Our inter

in Iraq and Afghanistan will be enhanced by its spurring us on to better w

of educing information; developments following from this baseline docum

can give us hope that relationships with allies and friends will be stabilized

American public will be satisfi ed that its core values are supported internation

the concerns of the U.S. Congress will be assuaged; and bureaucratic infi gh

will be dampened by reliable research. Just as important is the certifi cation by 

authors of this volume that eduction of information aims for truth and justice

do not intend to exert arbitrary power over others. The United States will be 

to do the “right thing for the right reason at the right time.”

Notably, things are already in motion to discover “better ways of d

business.” The U.S. Army has a new fi eld manual (FM 2-22.3) to guide the 

range of human intelligence collection operations. The Army also recently s

up the 201st Military Intelligence Battalion at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. It is 

fi rst of four interrogation battalions to be created and will specialize in deta

screening and interrogation. It is to be hoped that the Army will make Edu

Information required reading. 

The topic of educing information has signifi cant historical baggage, but it 

continues to carry national and global importance. The Intelligence Communi

well served by this report. When the Intelligence Community, acting throug

individual practitioners who know and understand ground truth, who appreciat

consequences of getting it wrong, and who have respect for the American pu

notes and internalizes a document like this, it deserves respect and admira

Some interrogators may take the message of this book as personal criticism 

bastions of bureaucracy may be threatened, but the realm of global security 

be better for the clear thinking and courageous writing.
xxi

John A. Wahlquist*

“The goal of the interrogation process is to develop the truth.”10 

statement captures the spirit that animates Educing Information: I

Science and Art. The “truth” awaiting development in this case is wha

know and what we really know about educing information (EI), a polit

term that encompasses often highly controversial human intelligen

activities such as interrogation, strategic debriefi ng, and elicitation. 

“Approaching Truth: Behavioral Science Lessons on Educing Info

Human Sources,” Dr. Randy Borum explains: “Almost no empirical 

social and behavioral sciences directly address the effectiveness of 

in general practice, or of specifi c techniques in generating accura

information from otherwise uncooperative persons (emphasis in the 

As a practitioner and student of educing information, I share 

surprise and concern over the lack of rigorous scientifi c examinatio

information fundamentals. What this means is that the effectivene

interrogation techniques has been accepted without suffi cient scrutiny

circumstances, any resulting ineffectiveness is attributed to improper 

the techniques rather than inherent fl aws in the techniques themselv

detecting deception, a key ingredient in evaluating the usefulness o

obtained through interrogation, is popularly and even professionall

simply the natural result of properly applying the “right” techniques

such techniques apparently have an anecdotal basis, most have not b

to recent and thorough scientifi c analysis. In the worst case some 

be counterproductive to uncovering the truth. It is to highlight thes

time when information obtained from human sources is increasing

to protecting vital national security interests, that the Intelligence S

sponsored its educing information study.

Despite a dearth of recent systematic studies on the theory an

interrogation, historical accounts, primarily anecdotal, have dealt w

in considerable detail. Some of the best documented are “how-to” 

10 John E. Reid and Associates, “Critics Corner: Defending the Reid Technique of I

http://www.reid.com/educational_info/critictechniquedefend.html, accessed 18 Augus

________________ *

Mr. John A. Wahlquist is a Faculty Member at the National Defense Intelligenc

member of the Government Experts Committee for the Intelligence Science Board S

Information. As a member of the Iraq Survey Group in Baghdad (2004-2005), h

Huwaysh, consisting of interrogator-debriefers and subject matter experts, dedicat

Iraqi detainee ‘Abd-al-Tawab Al Mullah Huwaysh, Saddam Husayn’s former fourth

Prime Minister and Minister of Military Industrialization. Previously Mr. Wahlquist se

Attaché to Oman and Deputy Director of Intelligence at U.S. Central Command. Ed

Wahlquist’s comments are not necessarily those of the Intelligence Science Board wh

as a member of the Government Experts Committee.
xxii

penitent through his or her examination of conscience, how to illuminate mot

and circumstances, and thus how to evaluate the magnitude of an offense, 

how to overcome obstacles...to a good confession.”11

The methods promoted in the handbooks, when refi ned by Roman Cath

inquisitors, evolved into more complicated and sophisticated techniques 

interrogating suspected heretics. For example, the Practica inquisitionis here

pravitatis, written in 1323 by Bernard Gui, inquisitor of Toulouse, explains 

interrogation methods used must be linked to the types of heresy encount

and then “offers suggestions on the best strategy to pursue in interrogat

members of six specifi c heretical sects.12 A later inquisitor, Nicholas Eymeric

Aragon, likely drawing on Gui’s account, “describes [in his treatise Director

inquisitorum] ten ways in which heretics try to hide their beliefs” followed 

a detailed set of interrogation “ruses the inquisitor can use to elicit the tru

Anticipating modern-day interrogation guides such as CIA’s “KUBA

Counterintelligence Interrogation” manual and U.S. Army Field Manual 34

Eymerich suggests the interrogator use “manipulative and deceptive behav

to obtain a confession.13 Another text, De inquisitione hereticorum, takes a m

direct approach, recommending that “reluctant witnesses might be persuade

confess by threatening them with death or telling them that other witnesses 

already implicated them.” 14

Not surprisingly, the inquisitors also believed that imprisonment, often 

long periods under cruel conditions including solitary confi nement, was li

their most effective interrogation technique, surpassing the utility of tor

Bernard Gui described “imprisonment as an integral component of the inquisit

interrogation strategy.... [C]oupled if necessary, with hunger, shackles, 

torture...[it] could...loosen the tongues of even the most obdurate.”15 In prac

such methods may have posed a dilemma for Gui and his fellow inquisitors, 

zealously sought truthful confessions not only to root out heresy itself but 

to save the immortal souls of the heretics – a dilemma over how to ensure 

veracity of forced confessions. An account of the conditions in one notorious 

century inquisitorial prison and their impact on the “truth” paints a grim pictu

Some of these cells are dark and airless, so that those lodged 

there cannot tell if it is day or night.... In other cells there are 

kept miserable wretches laden with shackles.... These cannot 

11 Quotation from Jean Delumeau, Sin and Fear: The Emergence of a Western Guilt Cu

13th-18th Centuries, translated by Eric Nicholson (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 199-20

presented in James B. Given, Inquisition and Medieval Society: Power, Discipline, & Resistan

Languedoc (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 45. 12 Given, 46.

13 Given, 47.

14 Given, 45.

15 Given, 54.
xxiii

to endure more torture. As a result of these false and coe

confessions not only do those making confessions perish, 

so do the innocent people named by them.... [M]any of th

who are newly cited to appear [before the inquisitors], hea

of the torments and trials of those who are detained...assert 

what is false is true; in which assertions they accuse not 

themselves but other innocent people, that they may avoid 

above mentioned pains.... Those who thus confess afterw

reveal to their close friends that those things that they said to 

inquisitors are not true, but rather false, and they confessed 

of imminent danger. 16

Sadly, the conditions described above, although 800 years in 

direct antecedents of conditions experienced by Iraqi prisoners con

Ghraib prison during 2003 and 2004, and perhaps by other priso

custody. The results of interrogations conducted under these conditi

as unreliable as those in the 13th century. Why, in the 21st century

accumulated knowledge about how human beings think and interact 

are we still repeating costly medieval mistakes? “The problem,” acc

Robert Coulam, “is that...there is little systematic knowledge ava

us ‘what works’ in interrogation. We do not know what methods 

of interrogation best protect the nation’s security (emphasis in the 

essence, this is why Educing Information: Interrogation: Science an

important and timely. Its conclusions demonstrate that the entire fi e

information needs critical reexamination; there are no easy answe

solutions when it comes to understanding these highly complex beh

Especially pertinent, since it confounds conventional wisdom 

historical practice, is Dr. Borum’s fi nding that “There is little or n

indicate whether [coercive] techniques succeed.... [B]ut the prep

reports seems to weigh against their effectiveness.... Psychological 

related research suggest that coercion or pressure can actually increa

resistance and determination not to comply (emphasis in the original

behavioral indicators of veracity, Dr. Gary Hazlett concludes “We 

know what we think we know. Overall, knowledge of behavioral in

might assist in the detection of deception is very limited (emphasis in t

Wide-ranging mechanical and chemical approaches to educing infor

thought to be a promising panacea, have not lived up to earlier expec

seventy years after the introduction of the so-called “lie-detector,” 

Heckman and Mark Happel contend that “despite the polygraph’s s

there is currently no viable technical alternative to polygraphy.”

16 Given, 64, extracted from Jean-Marie Vidal, Un Inquisiteur jugé par ses “victime

et les Carcassonnais (1285-1286) (Paris, 1903).
xxiv

relationship between interrogator and subject. Drawing on his detailed revie

the “KUBARK” manual and his extensive experience as an interrogator, St

Kleinman explains that “interrogation is defi ned both by its intensely interpers

nature and intractably shaped by the unique personalities of the interrogator 

the source.... [E]ach interrogation is unique and therefore one must be cau

in trying to apply a strategic template that would prove effective in each c

Likewise, the lengthy comparative study of interrogation in law enforcem

conducted by Ariel Neuman and Daniel Salinas-Serrano, notes that “all agen

underscored the general caution that no single interrogation technique w

with every suspect, and indeed that every suspect is different.” In prac

however, Neuman and Salinas-Serrano found that law enforcement interrog

techniques and training “takes a ‘one-size-fi ts-all’ approach and fails...to a

the techniques to differences in age, ethnicity, or culture of the suspect.” Simi

law enforcement interrogators are not necessarily specially selected and tra

for that role. Rather, interrogation is viewed as one of several general skil

which every police investigator is expected to be competent. Lastly, although 

enforcement personnel “heavily emphasize rapport-building as the main too

interrogators, it appears,” Neuman and Salinas-Serrano assert, “that without s

underlying fear interrogations will rarely succeed (emphasis added).”

According to Dr. Paul Lehner, “Experience and lessons learned off

necessary, but insuffi cient, basis for determining the effectiveness of edu

practices. A program of scientifi c research on eduction practices is 

necessary and highly feasible.” The Educing Information anthology offers s

provocative alternatives for rethinking the art and science of educing inform

and subjecting eduction practices to systematic evaluation. In separate arti

Drs. Daniel Shapiro and M.P. Rowe recommend the use of negotiation th

to tailor alternative interrogation strategies and guide empirical research on 

relationship between interrogators and sources. The goal, Dr. Rowe sugg

“would be not just to evaluate tactics ‘today,’ or in a single time period, bu

continuous improvement of EI (emphasis added).”

A key consideration in moving to what Steven Kleinman calls the “

generation of doctrine and practice for educing information (emphasis in 

original),” is overcoming three barriers to success – linguistic and cultural, scien

and technical, and interpersonal and intrapersonal. History, Kleinman argues, 

appropriate guide to developing a future strategy. In the latter years of World 

II, fi rst generation approaches to educing information that depended primari

physical force (but were of marginal value in supplying useful information) 

way among Allied and Axis interrogators alike to a more sophisticated se

generation strategy, “a systematic, outcome-oriented approach to interrog

that relied far more on fi nesse than on force.” However, with the onset of the 

War, the focus in the United States changed to developing defensive strate

to help service members counteract coercive interrogation methods encoun
xxv

including approach methodology, the detection of deception, 

body language – is...largely unsubstantiated....adulterated by the 

coercive interrogation drawn from studies of Communist methodo

result, “evidence of the employment of coercive methods by U.S. 

has appeared with alarming frequency.”

The challenge is to make constructive use of both the positive 

aspects of our historical and practical legacy and to supplement it wi

analysis of educing information data using a variety of scientifi c d

conceptual frameworks. As Dr. Lehner explains, “Information glean

experience constitutes a critical source of knowledge, and without q

of the lessons learned from such experiences are valid. But, eq

question, many are invalid. Which is which? Only objective, scien

can help to distinguish between them.” Pursuing and discovering 

central message of Educing Information: Interrogation: Science 

obvious from the hugely damaging, worldwide impact of the imag

Ghraib, and widespread allegations about abuses elsewhere, that 

information practices are ripe for review. Failure to act now risk

lives of prisoners and detainees, the success of coalition operation

Afghanistan and the war on terror, or even our country’s broader nat

interests. Hanging in the balance is our very identity as a nation – 

soul of the United States and the values of life, liberty, and justice t

service members are daily fi ghting and dying to preserve. Clea

persevere in this endeavor to fi nd the truth.

xxvii

Robert Fein is a forensic psychologist who specializes in threa

and the prevention of targeted violence. Since 2001, he has 

various entities in the Intelligence Community on questions con

assessment, roles of psychologists in the IC, and educing informa

member of the Intelligence Science Board, where he chairs the I

Educing Information. He is a director of the National Violence Pr

Study Center and a consultant to the Directorate for Behavioral Sc

Department of Defense Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA). H

appointments at the Harvard Medical School and the University of M

Medical School.

Dr. Fein has spent the last thirty years working to understand 

targeted violence. He has conducted forensic mental health evaluatio

thousand violent offenders, has testifi ed in state and federal courts o

occasions on questions of “dangerousness,” and has consulted on m

of cases of potential workplace violence. He worked with the U.S. S

for more than twenty years, and co-directed two major Secret Servic

studies of targeted violence: one on assassination; the other on schoo

Fein received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1974 in Clinica

and Public Practice. He received the American Academy of Forensic 

Award for Distinguished Career Contributions to Forensic Psycholo

rfeinm@yahoo.com 

Robert F. Coulam, Ph.D., J.D., is Research Professor at t

School for Health Studies in Boston. He is a policy analyst and law

been an academic and researcher for almost 30 years. His recent wo

interrogation and terrorism, with particular concern for legal and a

oversight of interrogation, and how the U.S. and other countries sel

train, and manage interrogators. He also performs research using com

econometric methods to evaluate policy and operational problems 

Medicaid, and other health programs. In an earlier area of work, he 

and articles on problems of weapons acquisition and military c

control. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University’s John F. Ken

of Government and his law degree from Harvard Law School. coula

edu. 

Dr. Randy Borum is a Behavioral Science Consultant on counte

and national security issues. He regularly teaches and consul

enforcement agencies, the Intelligence Community, and the De

Defense (DOD). As an Associate Professor at the University of S

he has taught courses on Terrorism, Custodial Interrogation, Intellige

and Criminal Psychology and is author/ co-author of more than 100 

In addition to having served as a sworn police offi cer for municipal 

in Maryland and Florida for more than fi ve years, he has been 

with the U.S. Department of Justice’s State and Local Anti-Terror
xxviii

protective intelligence, and he also serves on the Forensic Psychology Advi

Board for the FBI’s Behavioral Science Unit. He recently served as the Princ

Investigator on the “Psychology of Terrorism” initiative for an agency in the 

Intelligence Community, and now serves on the United Nations’ Roster of Exp

in Terrorism. borum@fmhi.usf.edu.

Dr. Gary Hazlett has over 15 years of experience working as a psycholo

with U.S. Army elements, primarily with Special Forces and Special Operat

command units. He has conducted assessment and selection of person

leadership development, intelligence acquisition, and human perform

research services for other government and DOD agencies to include the 

Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Dr. Hazlett 

conducted psychological assessments for the Special Forces candidacy prog

components of the Adaptive Thinking/Leadership Development Program, 

other SF leadership development programs. He has served and continue

serve on several national level panels on special applications of psycholog

governmental organizations and the detection of deception. During the last e

years, Dr. Hazlett has been a principal investigator in research on the impac

stress on human performance and cognition, the impact of stress on biolog

systems, stress resilience, and enhanced methodologies for source validatio

interrogation. Dr. Hazlett’s military experience includes tours of duty in the 

Persian Gulf War and in Afghanistan, where he worked directly as a consulta

intelligence operations. woodardcodyconsulting@yahoo.com.

Dr. Mark Happel is the Neuroscience Thrust Lead in The MIT

Corporation’s Emerging Technology Offi ce. Currently, he is studying the ne

basis of deception using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 

Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) in collaboration with the Center 

Functional and Molecular Imaging at the Georgetown University Medical Ce

He also holds an appointment as an Associate Professorial Lecturer at the Ge

Washington University, where he teaches courses in machine learning. mhapp

mitre.org. 

Dr. Kristin E. Heckman received her D.Sc. in computer scie

with a concentration in machine intelligence and cognition, and minor

neuropsychology and developmental psychology, from The George Washin

University in 2004. She is currently a Lead Artifi cial Intelligence Enginee

The MITRE Corporation, working in support of the Intelligence Communit

develop a science of deception. Dr. Heckman also holds an appointment a

Assistant Professorial Lecturer at The George Washington University, where 

teaches courses in computer science and artifi cial intelligence. kheckman@m

org. 

Colonel Steven M. Kleinman, USAFR, serves as the Reserve Se

Intelligence Offi cer and Mobilization Augmentee to the Director, Intellige
xxix

A graduate of the Joint Military Intelligence College, he received 

Science of Strategic Intelligence in August 2002. He is an independe

for the MITRE Corporation, where he has worked in support of the 

Science Board’s Study on Educing Information. compass1@att.net. 

Ariel Neuman currently works as an attorney in Los Angeles. 

from Columbia University in 2001, where he majored in political 

served as president of the student body. In 2005, he graduated mag

from Harvard Law School. He is looking forward to a career in pu

ariel.neuman@post.harvard.edu.

A native of San Juan, Puerto Rico, Daniel Salinas-Serrano i

admitted to practice in the State of Florida and the Commonwealth of 

He graduated magna cum laude from Georgetown University in 20

majored in international relations. In 2005, he obtained a Juris Docto

Harvard Law School. An avid boater, Daniel looks forward to a long 

law and public service. dsalinasserrano@gmail.com.

Daniel L. Shapiro, Ph.D., Associate Director of the Harvard 

Project, is on the faculty at Harvard Law School and in the psychiatr

at Harvard Medical School/McLean Hospital. He founded and direct

International Negotiation Initiative (INI), which focuses on the p

human security. He has been on the faculty at the Sloan School of M

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and teaches negotiation 

executives and senior government offi cials. He has extensive 

experience, including training Serbian members of Parliament, 

negotiators, Macedonian politicians, and U.S. offi cials. During 

War, he conducted confl ict management training in Croatia and Ser

funding from the Soros Foundation, he developed a confl ict managem

that now reaches one million people across twenty-fi ve countries

Roger Fisher (co-author of Getting to YES) Shapiro wrote Bey

Using Emotions as You Negotiate, which has appeared on numero

lists. d_shap@yahoo.com.

M.P. Rowe, Ph.D., has for two decades been Adjunct Professor o

and Confl ict Management at the Sloan School of Management. 

and research have emphasized “intangible” aspects of negotiatio

the traditional “tangibles.” She has elaborated on sources of pow

in negotiations who are traditionally seen “not to have any powe

been particularly interested in negotiations between individuals whe

covert interest of one party is to injure or seek revenge against ano

distinguished from the more common case of individuals’ negotiatin

and services. Her recent articles deal with the importance of a syste

to confl ict management as distinguished from handling individual 

encounters. Her academic work has derived in part from nearly 
xxx

Dr. Paul Lehner is currently a Consulting Scientist at the Center for Integr

Intelligence Systems in The MITRE Corporation. His research and work 

focused on supporting judgment and decisionmaking across a broad spectru

intelligence problems; including bio-surveillance, all-source analysis, techn

data analysis and counter-deception analysis. Previously within MITRE, 

Lehner was the Chief Engineer of the Center for Enterprise Modernization (1

2001) and the Chief Scientist of the Information Systems and Technology Divi

(1996 – 1999). Prior to joining MITRE, Dr. Lehner was an Associate Profess

Systems Engineering at George Mason University (1987 – 1996) and the Techn

Director of the Decision Systems group at PAR Technology Corporation (

– 1986). Dr. Lehner has a Ph.D. in Mathematical Psychology and Maste

both Mathematics and Psychology from the University of Michi

plehner@mitre.org.

An expert in online searching, MITRE Senior Information An

Theresa M. Dillon provides research and analytic support to engineers wor

for Defense Department and Intelligence Community sponsors. Ms. Dill

work focuses on research in the domains of systems engineering, informa

technology, electronics, business, and intelligence. She also provides inte

classroom training on Web-enabled literature databases and Internet search

Ms. Dillon received her master of science degree in library science at 

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and her undergraduate degree f

Tufts University. tdillon@mitre.org. 
1

Intelligence Science Board Study o

Educing Information

Phase 1 Report

Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.

June 2006

Study Background

Concerns about recent U.S. interrogation activities, subsequent i

and the effi cacy of contemporary tactics, techniques, and procedu

the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) to explore the current state 

knowledge regarding interrogation and related forms of human 

gathering. In September 2004 the ISB initiated a study on Educing 

(EI) to address these questions and to take the fi rst steps toward de

next generation of EI. The study is sponsored by the Defense Intellig

(DIA), the Intelligence Technology Innovation Center (ITIC), and 

Department’s Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA). 

The study on Educing Information began with several premises:

1. For the foreseeable future, the U.S. government will ne

information from sources under U.S. control who are thoug

information critical to national security and who present var

of cooperativeness;

2. U.S. efforts to procure information from uncooperative 

be most effective if they are based on sound knowledge 

behavioral science; and

3. There are major overt and hidden costs to getting EI efforts 

tangible benefi ts to national security to getting them “right

Terminology

The study deliberately chose to use the term “educing information

“interrogation,” to describe the focus of its activities. The term “ed

means “to draw out or bring out,” seems more accurate and useful i
2

From a technical perspective, the study teams defi nition of EI encompa

“elicitation” (engaging with a source in such a manner that he or she rev

information without being aware of giving away anything of value), “strat

debriefi ng” (systematically covering topics and areas with a voluntary source 

consents to a formal interview), and “interrogation” (interaction and conversa

with a source who appears initially unwilling to provide information). EI imp

a “system” of gathering information about and from a source and a spectrum 

approaches, tools, activities, and techniques. This may involve investigative eff

development of scenarios, and involvement of others (teams of interviewers 

analysts, willing sources, and collaborators). Effective practice of EI usu

extends beyond one-to-one interactions with a source. 

While the term “eduction” describes the scope of the study team’s investigat

and recommendations, it has not yet come into widespread use. From a prac

perspective, therefore, many of the team’s research efforts have focused 

functions and activities that are described as “interrogation,” primarily bec

the source documents or the persons interviewed used that terminology. Moreo

the processes described often had the adversarial character that the term c

to mind. “Educing information,” by contrast, encompasses the full rang

approaches that, in the opinion of the study team, the Intelligence Commu

should explore as it seeks to obtain useful information from sources in the fu

Activities

Literature Review

Since September 2004 the EI study team has conducted extensive review

the behavioral and social science literature that deals directly or indirectly w

interrogation, interviewing, and other EI-related activities. We have also exam

military, intelligence, law enforcement, and investigative accounts pertainin

interviewing, interrogation, and other areas related to EI. The historical acco

spanned interrogations conducted by the United States and its allies and th

conducted by adversaries. The Prologue above summarizes some of the m

important programs and indicates why the United States abandoned this are

research. As a result of our reviews, we have compiled a collection of open so

information on EI and a lengthy bibliography — the fi rst of their kind. We h

also studied Intelligence Community (IC) training manuals and learned f

the experience of those involved with the military’s SERE (Survival, Eva

Resistance, and Escape) programs. 

In parallel, the study team has followed public discussions about interroga

programs and practices that have received attention in the past several y

1

 One public image of the word “interrogation” is illustrated in a quote profi ling News

investigative reporter Michael Isikoff: “Mike will pull your fi ngernails out over coffee discu

lawn care. He is just a born interrogator.” (New York Times, 17 May 2005).
3

facilitate their interrogation. We have also taken note of legislative 

discourse and debate about the most appropriate interrogation “te

use in particular settings for detainees deemed to fi t into a given 

example, those in the custody of the U.S. military.

Interviews and Consultations

We have consulted with U.S. experts, both within and outside of 

who possess considerable knowledge about EI. Study team membe

enforcement and military training sites, attended training session

with instructors and students. In the course of these visits, we intervi

with a wide range of experience in interviewing and interrogatio

practitioners, trainers, supervisors, and senior managers. We 

guidance and advice from a group of government experts from IC, 

law enforcement organizations. We have collaborated with staff of 

Defense Intelligence College (NDIC) on educational activities rela

have obtained continuing counsel from senior members of the IS

experts in military intelligence, engineering, history, intelligence 

and public policy, medicine, and the workings of the Intelligence Co

Specifi cally, the study team has:

• Examined some of the costs of getting EI “wrong” and the 

getting EI “right”;

• Reviewed behavioral science studies to glean what has bee

during the past fi fty years about interviewing, interrogation

areas related to EI;

• Reviewed studies concerning both the “mechanical” and “n

mechanical” detection of deception. This task has included 

of fl edgling research efforts to use neuroimaging technolog

determine if a person is being deceptive;

• Studied the development and operation of the World War II 

program;

• Reviewed the KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation 

ascertain how approaches to interrogation have and have n

since the manual was written in 1963;

• Analyzed studies of law enforcement interviewing and inte

practices as well as law enforcement teaching and training 

these areas;

• Identifi ed the primary “barriers to success” that must be ad

the course of organizing, managing, and employing an effe

EI capability in the context of current and anticipated futur

scenarios;
4

gpg 

areas for study that may improve EI practices;

• Gathered and organized a working bibliography and a computerized 

library of scientifi c and analytic articles related to EI; and

• Worked with the NDIC to make EI a subject of professional intellige

education. 

Products of the Study

Attached to this report are ten papers commissioned by the Study on EI an

annotated bibliography of key work in English on EI from World War II to 

present. Because they report on current or historical research and practice, m

of them of necessity address aspects of “interrogation”: the standard term use

date in intelligence, military, and law enforcement contexts to describe meth

of obtaining information from sources. 

To our knowledge, none of these papers duplicates the existing literature, classi

or unclassifi ed. However, the papers do not cover the full spectrum of EI or of 

study’s investigations, nor do they collectively constitute the justifi cation for 

study team’s recommendations. Instead, they report on selected aspects of cur

research and practice that the U.S. government may wish to take into accoun

it moves toward a new model of EI for the twenty-fi rst century. The study t

offers these papers to stimulate better thinking, practice, research, teaching, 

training. They are intended as the “fi rst word” in next-generation discussion

EI, rather than as defi nitive statements. 

The papers are:

1. “Approaches to Interrogation in the Struggle against Terrorism

Considerations of Cost and Benefi t”

This paper explores areas of cost and benefi t when interrogation choices 

made. The discussion points out the complexity of our choices and the need 

additional research to inform and to discipline how we think about these cho

2. “Approaching Truth: Behavioral Science Lessons on Educing 

Information from Human Sources”

This paper reviews a wide range of material from the social and behavioral scien

on educing information. Few empirical studies directly address the effective

of interrogation in general, or of specifi c techniques, in generating accurate 

useful information. The paper concludes that virtually none of the interroga

techniques used by U.S. personnel over the past half-century have been subje

to scientifi c or systematic inquiry or evaluation, and that the accuracy of edu

information can be compromised by the way it is obtained. By contrast, a promi
5

3. “Research on Detection of Deception: What We Know v

Think We Know”

This review examines the scientifi c literature regarding our curren

detect deception by observing behavioral indicators and identifi 

research that might improve that capacity. The fi ndings indicate t

beliefs about reliable cues to deception are frequently incorrect, 

research in this area to date may be largely irrelevant to national sec

4. “Mechanical Detection of Deception: A Short Review”

This paper briefl y reviews the mechanical methods created over the 

to detect deception. The development of a more effective means 

deception is predicated on research to build a sound theoretical bas

system. The study concludes that, despite the polygraph’s shortco

is currently no viable technical alternative. While some neuros

alternatives have been proposed, these techniques pose signifi cant p

far more research is needed if they are to become suffi ciently reliab

operational settings.

5. “KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Review: 

Observations of an Interrogator. Lessons Learned and A

Further Research”

This paper examines the KUBARK Counterintelligence Interroga

produced by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1963 (and declassi

The writer, an experienced interrogator, considers how current a

interrogation compare to approaches put forward forty years ago.

6. “Custodial Interrogations: What We Know, What We D

What We Can Learn from Law Enforcement Experienc

This report explores both the literature and practice related to int

criminal suspects in custody, focusing almost exclusively — as the 

practice do — on eliciting confessions to crimes. The theoretical liter

groundwork for interrogation practice by identifying the reasons wh

or do not confess to crimes, while empirical fi ndings pinpoint facto

with admissions and denials. A comparison of theory and techniqu

the interrogation techniques advocated in the literature take little a

factors that the empirical research shows might affect a suspect’s willingn

and provide little or no guidance to varying approaches for different type
6

related activities.

7. “Barriers to Success: Critical Challenges in Developing a New Educ

Information Paradigm”

This paper analyzes three fundamental barriers to successfully educing informa

from uncooperative sources: (1) linguistic/cultural barriers; (2) scientifi c/techn

subject matter barriers; and (3) interpersonal/intrapersonal barriers.

8. “Negotiation Theory and Practice: Exploring Ideas to Aid Informat

Eduction”

Information eduction can be viewed as a complex set of negotiations. Governm

offi cials have information needs, and sources have information they can disc

The challenge is to determine how the government can negotiate most effecti

for that information. This report therefore seeks to describe negotiation conc

that might assist the information educer.

9. “Negotiation Theory and Educing Information: Practical Concepts 

Tools” 

This paper offers basic tools from negotiation theory for possible discussio

those concerned with EI. The paper presents brief discussions of different poss

strategies for EI, a brief discussion of the sources of power available to edu

and sources, and then suggestions about preparation for EI.

10. “Options for Scientifi c Research on Eduction Practices”

Surprisingly, the last forty years have seen almost no scientifi c research exami

eduction practices. The “interrogation approaches” taught in standard interroga

training (e.g., Army Field Manual 34-52) have remained largely unchanged s

World War II, yet no scientifi c research substantiates the effectiveness of th

approaches. Our current knowledge about eduction practices is based on feedb

and lessons learned from fi eld experience. 

This paper argues two points: fi rst, that scientifi c investigation of eduction practic

needed to supplement lessons learned from fi eld experience, and second, that var

research venues are available to examine these practices. Research approaches c

include both retrospective analyses of data about past interrogations (including t

that used harsh methods) and new studies that relate different eduction practices to 

value of the information obtained.

11. Educing Information Bibliography

This selected, annotated bibliography includes the most useful items in Eng

covering the theory, research, and pragmatics of interrogation over the past 

years.
7

against Terrorism: Considerations of C

Benefi t

Robert Coulam, Ph.D., J.D.

Simmons College School for Health Studies

June 2006

Abstract

The interrogation of suspects, witnesses, and others is an essentia

information in the struggle against terrorism. It is accordingly im

the United States to perform this function well. This paper conside

might think about the costs and benefi ts of different approaches to 

tion and how we might balance costs and benefi ts to support decisi

ing U.S. interrogation efforts. As will become clear, any weighin

and benefi ts faces key uncertainties and areas of ignorance – most 

little rigorous information exists about the relative effectiveness o

techniques for educing information, and diffi culties appear in iden

weighing many qualitative benefi ts and costs. This discussion u

the need for a stronger empirical foundation to support the cho

kinds that we must make to perform this function well.

Introduction

Interrogation is a promising source of information to support the 

struggle against terrorists. But there are diffi cult, competing value

interrogation, and the tradeoffs among these values are at times dis

way to improve the choices that we make on interrogation is to un

values at stake; that is, to be careful to identify all of the areas of co

that matter to us when interrogation choices are made. The discussion 

explores areas of cost and benefi t that have been the focus of c

decisions and debates. As a rule, for each of these objectives, “be

from more effective performance in areas we care about, while “cos

refl ect lesser performance.

The discussion is admittedly general in order to cover a relativ

array of costs and benefi ts in a brief paper. These generalities nece

many critical subtleties. Yet even this rudimentary summary 
8

National Security

Obviously, the principal benefi t of interrogation is to obtain information f

suspects and others that will increase our understanding of terrorist adversar

thereby helping to protect our own population, support our allies, maintain c

order and stability, and preserve important institutions.

Given the character of terrorist operations and the capacities of the Un

States, human intelligence — information gained from people rather than f

technical means, documents, and other non-human sources — is espec

important in the struggle against terrorism. The U.S. government needs deta

information about its adversaries, as well as strategic and cultural understan

of how the information fi ts together. This information can help to forestall fu

attacks and weaken terrorist organizations. But U.S. intelligence networks 

weak precisely in the regions where Al Qaeda and other terrorist cells 

signifi cant roles. Interrogation thus becomes an especially important way to 

and elicit information.

The benefi ts of interrogation can be enormous (e.g., the prevention of a nuc

explosion), quite small (e.g., fi lling in a minor part of a much larger pictur

terrorist activity, or merely showing that a suspect knows nothing of value

somewhere in between those extremes. Poor performance in the interroga

function results in the loss of these benefi ts (a cost that with poor perform

we may not always recognize — we typically will be unaware of the informa

we fail to collect). Poor performance can also impose other costs, as descr

later in this paper.

Interrogation efforts might yield greater benefi ts if the United States 

different ways to select, train, and organize interrogators, established diffe

rules and leadership to govern interrogations, or used other approaches 

might improve individual and organizational performance. The problem 

understanding the benefi ts of effective interrogations is that — unless the 

government has rigorous information we do not know about — there is 

systematic knowledge available to tell us “what works” in interrogation. W

not know what systems, methods, or processes of interrogation best protec

nation’s security. For example, we lack systematic information to guide us a

who should perform interrogations. We do not know what benefi ts would res

we changed the way we recruit, train, and manage our interrogators.

2

 We focus on the process of obtaining information from suspects, but it should be understoo

“interrogation” includes issues of how others — e.g., reluctant witnesses and intelligence sources — 

treated. We also leave aside large questions of how information might be analyzed or synthesiz

produce useful intelligence.
9

g p

interrogations — from local police precincts and petty crimes to d

of detention and serious terrorist threats. The costs of coercion in hu

political, and other terms vary, but can be enormous. Even when th

acknowledged, contemporary discussions often assume that tort

coercion, and psychological coercion are effective ways to obtain 

especially in emergencies (e.g., when there is little time, as with “tick

Torture and many forms of physical and psychological coercion ha

for centuries. Whether we like it or not, coercion might be more “ef

other methods in some circumstances. Unfortunately, much of the c

in this area proceeds as if we actually knew what those circumstan

fact, we do not, beyond anecdotal evidence adduced ad hoc. 

This lack of understanding presents a troubling diffi culty. C

be the “lesser evil”3

 when it can prevent imminent assaults on nati

that are substantially out of proportion to the costs of using coe

other interrogation approaches are available that would more effec

needed information — e.g., more informed or skillful methods — 

descending into an ethical and security abyss if we use coercion in 

all its implications. While our understanding will never be so comple

any of these choices easy or simple, we face a compelling securit

to expand our knowledge about interrogation approaches. We shou

assume that greater use of coercion will make interrogations more e

We can imagine at least four sources of information that might g

empirical guidance:

• History – To inform current choices, we might look to the 

costs of interrogation methods used in past confl icts. As of 

2001, the United States had not mounted “strategic” interro

in decades, so the relevant U.S. history is old — arguably g

World War II.4

• Comparative practices – We also might look to the experi

democratic countries that have a much longer history o

interrogations in the context of substantial and often imm

to their internal security. This source of knowledge 

3

 For a careful consideration of coercion in these terms, see Michael Ignatieff, 

Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 4

 “Strategic interrogation” is commonly distinguished from “tactical interrogation.

kind of real-time interrogation that occurs in the midst of a confl ict or battlefi eld. U.S. 

been familiar with tactical interrogation. Strategic interrogation concerns broader k

enemy forces — in the present context, knowledge about the membership, organization

fi nances, and plans of terrorist organizations. For an excellent study of strategic interr

in World War II, see Steven M. Kleinman, “The History of MIS-Y: U.S. Strategic Inte

World War II,” unpublished master’s thesis, Joint Military Intelligence College, Augu
10

pp

the problems of interrogation in any substantial way,5

 yet such an e

could obviously be undertaken and might produce substantial ben

This is especially true as the United States accumulates experienc

interrogating suspected terrorists, and producing data that could 

systematically analyzed. It is also clear that ongoing interrogation eff

present opportunities to evaluate methods with unprecedented rigor.6

example, what kinds of interrogation systems, approaches, or meth

might yield accurate and useful information with which sources in w

contexts?

• Casual empiricism and experience – Fourth, we might inform cur

policy choices on interrogation by drawing upon casual empiric

and the kind of expertise gained diffusely from experience. This 

of information often guides policy choices in areas where there is l

rigorous information — a situation that has long characterized the de

over methods and processes of interrogation.

The fourth source of instruction has been our primary guide to date (a

allowing for the possibility that more rigorous classifi ed information exists, 

has not been revealed to the public). That is an unnecessarily weak foundatio

support the choices that we must make. In essence, we do not know enough t

able to calibrate the costs and benefi ts of different methods or processes. 

The best we can do now is to recognize categories of benefi ts and c

at relatively general levels and subjectively weigh the results. We might 

undertake some kind of effort to verify empirical relationships that are b

casually inferred. 

Intimidation of Terrorists and Their Supporters

To judge from the ways governments have used interrogation, there 

pervasive belief that coercive interrogation can intimidate terrorists and t

supporters in ways that enhance the effectiveness of interrogations and perh

even reduce the underlying terrorist threat. For example, a country that insis

will observe no limits on interrogation methods — that it will “take the glo

off ”— may believe that this communicates resolve and will deter poten

adversaries. 

5

 For a review, see Randy Borum, “Approaching Truth: Behavioral Science Lessons on Ed

Information from Human Sources,” in Intelligence Science Board Study Phase 1 Report, Ed

Information (Washington, DC: NDIC Press, 2006). 6

 The point here is not that ethically improper experiments should be performed, but rathe

social science could help us to learn from data we already have or could reasonably and eth

collect. Note the discussion of research opportunities in Paul Lehner, Options for Scientifi c Rese

on Eduction Practices in Phase 1 Report (Intelligence Science Board Study Phase 1 Report, Ed

Information (Washington, DC: NDIC Press, 2006). 
11

example, would terrorists respect coercive interrogation more than 

respect less coercive, but more effective, interrogation? Or would 

any other approach that more substantially undermined terrorist netw

it may well be useful to intimidate terrorists, “intimidation” can m

than “being tough” and simply asserting physical dominance in i

Indeed, some of the most critical actions that might truly intimid

are “boringly bureaucratic, achingly administrative”7 and have n

with coercion. A skilled interrogation — which encompasses far m

exchange of questions and answers — might well elicit more in

using other methods. 

Nevertheless, many believe that at a strictly operational lev

reputation for ruthlessness might make suspects more responsive in an 

setting, even if brutality in fact is never used. To our knowledge th

on casual empiricism and has never been rigorously tested. The abs

tests is one reason for the continuing debate over whether susp

useful information when they fear coercion, (b) to avoid coercion

interrogators what they think the interrogators want to hear, or (c) 

of responses, depending on a variety of factors (e.g., personality, con

skill of the interrogator, and others). Examination of historical data m

some indications of how suspects actually behave. 

Ethical Concerns and the Rule of Law 

Given the compelling need to protect the nation’s security, 

experience considerable pressure to place the interrogation of suspec

in “the twilight shadows of the law”8

 — especially given terrorists

much demonstrated, to exploit the laws and sensitivities of others b

few limits on their own behavior. The United States must consider th

the Geneva Conventions as applied to suspected terrorists; terrorists 

few such concerns.

In a democracy the legitimacy of government action is importan

support for what the government does in this struggle. Ethical c

the rule of law are cornerstones of that legitimacy, and the prima

conducting interrogations according to a high standard of ethics m

7

 The phrase comes from Richard Cohen, discussing a very different problem

Common Sense,” Washington Post, 24 January 2006, A17. 8

 H.C. 5100/94, Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel

(1999), paragraph 40.
12

that country’s internal security service:

This is the destiny of a democracy—it does not see all means 

as acceptable, and the ways of its enemies are not always open 

before it. A democracy must sometimes fi ght with one hand tied 

behind its back. Even so, a democracy has the upper hand. The 

rule of law and the liberty of an individual constitute important 

components in its understanding of security. At the end of the 

day, they strengthen its spirit and this strength allows it to 

overcome its diffi culties.10

Thus, it is not enough to know whether “coercion works” in interroga

Interrogation practices that offend ethical concerns and skirt the rule of law 

indeed have narrow utilitarian value: It is possible that methods that “shock 

conscience” and/or violate international or domestic law are effective in edu

information in some situations.11 But costs must be recognized: such practices 

undermine the legitimacy of government action, weaken domestic support for 

long struggle against terrorism, and eventually limit the government’s ability to 

Of course, decisionmakers may believe that they can avoid this cost by kee

coercive interrogation practices secret. However, at least in the U.S. context, 

strategy is questionable: Much of the secret effort (although we cannot know 

much) will in due course become publicly known. More indirectly, such pract

run the risk of undermining the democratic institutions that the struggle aga

terrorism is meant to defend. It is therefore costly if interrogation practices ap

to violate our treaty obligations and domestic laws or offend ethical concerns, 

instead follow selective policy imperatives or beliefs. 

It is again diffi cult to evaluate how costly such behavior is. If interroga

practices undermine legitimacy, the effects will infl uence the behavior and be

of the populace in diffuse, and often indirect, ways. Obviously, behavior 

beliefs are subject to many infl uences, not only the effects of our interroga

methods. But beliefs about ethical behavior and the rule of law are powe

For example, overwhelming majorities of both parties in Congress supported 

9

 By discussing ethics and law together, we do not mean to imply that they are the same. Am

other things, interrogation practices that offend ethical beliefs may not violate the law, and prac

that are believed to be ethical may not be legal. Moreover, violations of law and ethics likely will 

different impacts or consequences in particular circumstances. Notwithstanding these difference

others, law and ethics are treated together here for convenience — at the level of generality o

discussion, the effects of undermining the rule of law are similar to the effects of offending widely 

ethical concerns. A more extensive discussion would recognize these similarities, but would ad

these two categories separately. 10 H.C. 5100/94, Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel, paragraph 

11 Note that ethics and law are linked in this context, because a “shock the conscience” stand

one test of the constitutionality of U.S. government action involving coercion. For example, see S

Kreimer’s discussion in “Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on To

in the War on Terror,” 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 278, 288-294 (November 2003).
13

humane behavior against pressures to use coercion and abuse. 

International Support to Wage the Struggle against Terroris

Domestic concerns about ethics and upholding the rule of 

important international corollary. Interrogation methods that 

country’s position as a moral leader in the struggle against terror

the ability of the United States to enlist international cooperation. 

unilateral struggle. The United States requires allied support for m

needs to be done, including:

• Intelligence.– The vital role of strategic intelligence i

terrorism demands unprecedented levels of cooperation 

intelligence agencies of the United States and other countr

encourage other countries to intensify their efforts to obtain 

that prevents attacks, share intelligence data that in the pas

been closely held, gather and share more comprehensive in

the movement of suspect funds and people, and act togeth

common enemy. 

• Diplomacy.– All of these added intelligence requirements — 

law enforcement, military, and other needs — translate 

larger agenda for diplomacy, including expanded diplomati

in law enforcement, telecommunications, commerce (e.g., 

fi nancial information), and other areas.

It is more diffi cult to make progress in needed areas of di

intelligence if U.S. interrogation methods provoke strong internatio

Danger to Troops and Others at Risk of Capture

One key benefi t that interrogation policy must address is the pro

troops (and others, such as aid workers and contractors). This benefi t 

notions of reciprocity: specifi cally, the expectation that if our troops 

they will receive more humane treatment if the United States treat

humanely. This concern over reciprocity has long been an import

international agreements on the treatment of detainees.12

Concern about reciprocity is based on the empirical assumption 

will observe fewer rules if we observe fewer rules. This assumptio

true. In a world where terrorist (and insurgent) adversaries behead 

at least arguable that terrorists assume they will receive harsh treatm

what we do, within some range at least.13 But it is also arguable that m

12 See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Histor

(New York: Basic Books, 1977), Part Three. 13 See Sabrina Tavernise, “Iraqis Found in Torture House Tell of Brutality of Insurg

Times, 19 June 2005.
14

In the absence of real evidence, we can say only that a cost of more coer

interrogations might be the harsher treatment of our troops and others. Also

the degree that international law on the treatment of detainees rests on widesp

reciprocity over time, we undermine that fabric for this and future confl icts i

fail to observe certain limits in how we interrogate others.

Legal Problems for U.S. Troops and Offi cials

If other countries suspect the United States of using unacceptably coer

methods in interrogations, the U.S. may encounter legal problems in effort

capture or extradite terrorists. For example, given obligations under the 1

Convention Against Torture, allied countries might be unwilling to extra

suspected terrorists — even Bin Laden himself — if they believe there 

substantial likelihood that these suspects will be tortured in U.S. hands.14 M

ominously, foreign prosecutors could bring charges against U.S. offi cials 

troops before international tribunals (e.g., charges of war crimes for U.S. con

in third countries) or before their domestic tribunals (for U.S. behavior within th

countries — for example, if U.S. agents break local laws by seizing or detai

terrorist suspects on foreign soil and subject them to abuse or maltreatme

Conversely, if the United States has a record of treating captives — even suspe

terrorists — humanely, other nations might be more willing to accede to 

requests for extradition, and U.S. troops might run less risk of being prosec

for practices that, to their knowledge, are acceptable.

U.S. Leadership on Human Rights

The proper place of human rights among overall foreign policy object

is a matter of debate. But there is little debate that the United States has be

leader in the human rights movement internationally for decades, and that 

leadership has had some effect on the behavior of other countries. Uphol

high standards even in its interrogation practices would further strengthen 

U.S. reputation for respecting human dignity. By contrast, if the United Stat

seen as a country that tortures prisoners, it loses the moral standing that w

allow it to press others to observe a higher standard of behavior. For exam

when a recent State Department annual report on human rights criticized C

and other countries for human rights violations, China peremptorily dismi

14 A foretaste of this diffi culty occurred shortly after 11 September 2001, a time when allies 

giving the United States enormous latitude to respond to the attacks. At this time, Britain was cl

allied to the United States in all of the U.S. responses. But Britain put the United States on n

that— if British soldiers captured bin Laden — Britain would not extradite him to the United S

unless the United States waived the death penalty. Germany declined to turn over an alleged top 

to bin Laden until the United States waived the death penalty. 15 For example, see “Italy Prosecutor Seeks Arrest Warrants,” Associated Press, 20 July 2

“U.S. Faces Questions over ‘Kidnappings’ in Europe,” Reuters, 20 May 2005; and Craig Whi

“Europeans Investigate CIA Role in Abductions,” Washington Post, 13 March 2005, A1.
15

Creation of More Enemies

We do not fully understand the social, political, religious, and ot

that give rise to terrorist activities. We also do not know the ext

specifi c actions by the United States and its allies actually change 

of the United States in Muslim and other countries. It is possible, 

that America’s culture, economy, and foreign policy (e.g., endurin

Israel) already place the country beyond the pale for much of the ra

audience. But an accumulation of specifi c actions that appear to sh

for Muslim people might well affect how we are viewed,17 espe

moderate Muslims whose opinion we seek to infl uence as part of ou

struggle against terrorism.

Integrity of the Military

The U.S. military has a long tradition of adhering to the laws of w

observance of conventions about the treatment of detainees. Part 

from self-interest (based on beliefs about how our troops will be trea

described earlier). Quite apart from concerns for reciprocity are qu

the integrity of military units and the values of military ethics. 

that treats fi ghters from other countries in the same way U.S. troop

treated might strengthen a sense of pride in the military profession

interrogation that is unbounded by rules or becomes a form of sadism

can erode military discipline and undermine the integrity and highe

military units.

Resources

The last area of concern to note is perhaps the most cons

quantifi able: fi nancial and other resources. We will not discuss this a

and benefi ts at length, but it should at least be noted that differen

to interrogation have different implications for scarce resources (m

personnel, language capacity) and will not fi t the existing capa

organizations equally well. In some contexts, those differences are i

Conclusion

Given a continuing terrorist threat, the United States must obtain 

through interrogations, but it must do so without undermining the pu

very effort that interrogations are supposed to serve. The country t

understand the relative costs and benefi ts of alternative interrogation 

programs. While it is relatively easy to imagine the costs and benefi ts 

16 Edward Cody, “China, Others Criticize U.S. Report on Rights: Double Standa

Alleged,” Washington Post, 4 March 2005, A14. 17 For example, see Somini Sengupta and Salman Masood, “Guantánamo Comes 

Muslims,” The New York Times, 21 May 2005.
16

most important relationships at stake.

Moreover, there is a trap in thinking in isolation about benefi ts and c

of any interrogation approach. The critical issue is always: “compared to wh

Decisions might be improved simply by paying explicit attention to the full ra

of costs and benefi ts at stake in decisions on interrogation and attemptin

weigh them against each other, however imperfectly. Better results will req

improved understanding, so that we can have greater confi dence in making 

diffi cult tradeoffs that are, in any event, certain to be required. 
17

Behavioral Science Lessons on Educ

Information from Human Source

Randy Borum, Psy.D.

University of South Florida

November 2005

[W]e insist, and have insisted for generations, that tr

approached, if not attained, through research guided by 

method. In the social sciences ... there is such a method. 

— Sherman Kent (1949), Strategic Intelligence for American 

Abstract

Few empirical studies in the social and behavioral sciences dire

effectiveness of interrogation in general, or of specifi c technique

accurate and useful information. This paper summarizes existing 

empirical fi ndings and analyzes them in the framework of fi ve top

educing information, strategies to increase the willingness to provi

strategies to overcome resistance, factors affecting the accuracy o

mation, and the effect of “stress and duress” techniques on obtaini

Essentially none of the interrogation techniques used by U.S. per

past half-century has been subjected to scientifi c or systematic in

ation, and the accuracy of educed information can be compromise

is obtained. By contrast, a promising body of social science rese

sion and interpersonal infl uence could provide a foundation for a 

approach to educing information in intelligence-gathering contex

persuasion, infl uence, compliance, and resistance has focused pr

sons from Western cultures, and the results and insights may not a

evenly across all cultures.

Introduction

In most cases, and for most types of threats to U.S. national 

or more people — human sources — possess the most complet
18

overstate the importance of human source intelligence. Both policymakers 

practitioners therefore need reliable information about effective and appropr

strategies and techniques to educe accurate information from human sources 

may possess information vital to our national security and who appear unwil

to provide it.

The need to understand what approaches, techniques, and strategies 

likely to produce accurate, useful information from an uncooperative hu

source seems self-evident. Surprisingly, however, these questions have rece

scant scientifi c attention in the last 50 years. Almost no empirical studies in 

social and behavioral sciences directly address the effectiveness of interroga

in general practice, or of specifi c techniques in generating accurate and us

information from otherwise uncooperative persons.

Policies that govern how U.S. personnel obtain information must 

into consideration issues of legality, ethics, morality, and national values. 

effectiveness remains the paramount issue. This paper and the larger study f

which it is drawn seek to address these issues as part of an ongoing effort to impr

human intelligence collection, and thereby protect U.S. national security. 

Background

Most of the scientifi c articles dealing with interrogation-related topics a

to, and are derived from, a law enforcement (LE) context. However, the na

and objectives of police interrogations differ signifi cantly from those in mili

or intelligence contexts. In essence, most LE interrogations seek to obta

confession from a suspect, rather than to gather accurate, useful information f

a possibly — but not necessarily — cognizant source. These are very diffe

tasks. Moreover, there are remarkably few studies of actual interrogat

in either criminal or intelligence contexts. Training manuals, materials, 

anecdotes contain information about common and recommended practices 

the behavioral assumptions on which they are based, but virtually none of th

documents cites or relies upon any original research. It even appears that som

the conventional wisdom that has guided training and policy for half a centu

at odds with existing scientifi c knowledge.

Without a scientifi c literature or systematic analysis — at least one availab

open-source information — practitioners (i.e., “boots-on-the-ground” assets) 

policymakers must make decisions on the basis of other sources and considerat

Primary among them are the iconic 17 techniques described in U.S. Army F

Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, which serves as the model or guid

intelligence interrogations for all the armed forces. These exact techniques h

been included in successive editions for more than 50 years, yet even pe

intimately familiar with 34-52 are unaware of any studies or systematic anal

that support their effectiveness, or of any clear historical record about how 
19

The effort to reevaluate, and perhaps even improve, policies 

in this area would benefi t greatly from systematic, scientifi c knowled

the effectiveness of various techniques for educing information. T

baseline for greater understanding, this review examines theoretical a

fi ndings in the social and behavioral sciences that might help polic

practitioners to understand the process of deriving accurate, usefu

from human sources. The review draws from multiple areas within 

sociology, criminology, criminal justice, cognitive science, medicine, 

cultic studies, communications theory, marketing, public health, 

and socio-linguistics. While the study reviewed materials from ma

analysis was limited to those published in English. 

The fi ndings are presented and analyzed within the functional f

fi ve guiding questions:

1. What models exist for educing information from u

sources?

2. What strategies might increase or decrease a source’s w

provide information?

3. What is resistance and what strategies exist for getting past 

4. What key factors affect the accuracy of educed information

5. What is known about the effect of “stress and duress” te

educing accurate, useful information?

Educing Information from Uncooperative Sou

Educing information is most productively envisioned as a proces

as an applied set of techniques. Moreover, the context of that proce

viewed broadly, not solely (or even primarily) as an across-the-tab

between an educer and a source. 

Many broad fi elds of study — including psychology, anthropolog

and communications — offer theories, concepts, methods, and rese

that may inform and further our understanding of the process 

information from uncooperative sources. A model for understanding 

the process of educing information could provide a platform and 

identifying actors, elements, actions, dynamics, and effects.18 Majo

models from at least four areas of social science literature fulfi ll the

18 According to the American Heritage Dictionary, a model is “a schematic descrip

theory, or phenomenon that accounts for its known or inferred properties and may be 

study of its characteristics.” As the term is used here, a model is distinguished from sp

or general themes, such as power, coercion, fear, or pain, which are discussed later. 
20

Communications Models

Educing and providing information, at the most basic level, involve a pro

of communication. Since the 1940s researchers have been working to dev

a comprehensive model of the communication process. While communicat

models cannot fully capture all key elements of information eduction, they o

some useful concepts and frameworks. First, they both identify and label 

key components in a communication encounter (e.g., sender, message, med

receiver). Second, they array these components in the framework of a dyna

process in which they interact with one another. Third, the transactive mode

particular emphasizes the centrality of “fi elds of experience” that both so

and receiver bring to the encounter and that surround the overarching proces

educing information, cultural factors and differences in experiences are cri

to understanding how to bridge the gap between the intended and rece

message.

Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis, a subdiscipline of linguistics, offers a narrower anal

framework. Its focus is strictly on discourse; that is, patterns of verbal or tex

exchange. Stubbs (1983), one of the early and leading scholars of disco

analysis, defi nes the discipline as:

the linguistic analysis of naturally occurring connected speech 

or written discourse. Roughly speaking, it refers to attempts to 

study the organisation of language above the sentence or above 

the clause, and therefore to study larger linguistic units, such 

as conversational exchanges or written texts. It follows that 

discourse analysis is also concerned with language use in social 

contexts, and in particular with interaction or dialogue between 

speakers. (Stubbs, 1983, 1; for this and other references, see 

bibliography at the end of this essay)

Persuasive Message Production/Analysis

Stephen Wilson coined the term “persuasive message production” to desc

a subdiscipline of study that integrates research on gaining compliance w

theories of message production. He poses as its central question: “When we w

to convince another person to do something, why do we say what we do?” 

Negotiation Theory

Theories and models of negotiation offer some useful concepts 

terminology to describe the process by which people with apparently diver

“positions” interact. Two of its most important aspects are the explicit emph

on understanding strategy rather than just tactics, and the distinction betw

negotiation or infl uence interactions based on “positions” versus those b
21

Negotiation theory centers on how people arrive at a solutio

which solution they choose. It identifi es three overarching stances 

The fi rst is a distributive strategy in which the negotiator’s objectiv

he/she can, regardless of equity or the perceptions of the other part

the common “pie” metaphor, the goal is to get the whole pie or at le

A second approach uses an integrative strategy, where the goal is to 

implement solutions that meet the needs of all parties in the nego

by not quibbling over the distribution of a particular limited resourc

fi nding ways beyond that resource to meet each party’s needs. Th

to as “creating value,” or, metaphorically, “expanding the pie.” T

mixed-motive strategy. As its name implies, it blends the objective

two approaches: It seeks solutions that serve the needs of as many 

negotiation as possible, but places equally high priority on getting on

share.” 

In a position-based negotiation, each party stakes out its objective 

and tries not to retreat from it. The negotiation operates within a 

strategy, creating a competitive or adversarial dynamic, with the gui

seeking justice. By contrast, interest-based negotiations operate in a

or mixed-motive strategy, creating a collaborative dynamic, with 

ethos of problem solving. 

Implications

Among these four theories, persuasive message production seem

unique methodological insights for studying the element of educing 

that involves transactive exchanges of communication between an 

source. Negotiation theory, however, seems better suited to identifyi

and overarching strategies — particularly interest-based stances — 

frame the overall information gathering process, and to providing 

perspectives that are not overtly adversarial. 

Strategies Affecting Willingness to Provide 

Information

Educers of information must be skilled in understanding an

broad range of strategies, approaches, and techniques of persuasion 

to gather information from people determined not to give it. Consid

science literature on persuasion and infl uence may be relevant to the 

of processes for educing information. Literally hundreds of rese

contributed to the thousands of studies that comprise this body 

example, in the PsycINFO database of psychology publications (wh

comprehensive nor exhaustive) between 1967 and mid-2005, the su

for “Persuasive Communication” contains 3,258 entries, the heading 

Change” contains 5,559, and the heading for “Interpersonal Infl uen
22

the way toward a more specialized body of scientifi c or systematic inquiry.

Infl uence Strategies

Knowles and Linn (2004) drew one of the most fundamental distinct

among types of infl uence strategies, and one of the most useful for thin

about applications to educing information. They assume that most attitudes 

judgments emerge from an “approach-avoidance” model of confl ict (Know

Butler and Linn, 2001). Basically, this model rests on the premise that when

we contemplate an act or objective, our decisions result from an internal stru

between forces that push or draw us toward the action (called approach moti

and those that inhibit or pull us away from it (called avoidance motives) (Dol

and Miller, 1950, Lewin, 1958, Miller, 1959). Knowles and Linn suggest that 

major implication of this model is that: 

there are two fundamentally different ways to create change, 

two different strategies for promoting movement toward 

some goal. Alpha strategies promote change by activating the 

approach forces, thereby increasing the motivation to move 

toward the goal. By contrast, Omega strategies promote change 

by minimizing the avoidance forces, thereby reducing the 

motivation to move away from the goal (Knowles and Linn, 

2004, 119, emphasis added). 

Increasing a Source’s Motivation to Share Information

Rapport

Most training materials and guides on law enforcement interroga

emphasize the need for one or more interrogators to develop a rapport with 

subject. Indeed, rapport is widely regarded as an essential foundation for m

successful LE interrogations. For example, a survey of 100 British detect

(Walkley, 1987) found that nearly half (42%) believed that a previous interview

failure to establish satisfactory rapport with a suspect had contributed to 

suspect’s denial. Once good rapport had been established with another detec

the suspects typically confessed. 

Rapport usually begins to develop during conversation — maybe even “sm

talk” — and serves at least two functions. First, research studies say, it help

“induce” or facilitate compliance with subsequent requests — and gets the so

talking. Second, it allows the educer to identify and assess potential motivat

interests, and vulnerabilities. The way the target perceives the agent (and t

relationship) — and this may be important for educing information — beco

especially critical under conditions in which the target is unmotivated or un

to devote mental energy to thinking about the agent’s arguments and analy

them.
23

y, p, p, ppy 

of existing research studies on interpersonal infl uence to make 

population more discerning about, and aware of, the persuasive 

constantly (and sometimes subtly) bombard them. Cialdini has concis

the six major strategies of persuasion that have been studied. All o

proven remarkably effective over time with a range of tasks and di

of people.

Even though the research on these factors is voluminous and rob

been systematically studied in conditions similar to those of an interro

it is unknown how their effects might change in that context or how 

might differ for persons from non-Western cultures. Nevertheless, th

promising guidance. The following summary does not do justice t

and depth of the scholarly contributions made by Cialdini and othe

but it does identify the major “tried and true” strategies of interperso

described in the social science literature.

Likeability 

One signifi cant factor (again, stronger in some situations than o

much we like the other person. Social scientists have examined 

affect one’s “likeability,” and some of them are within an individ

Specifi cally, research — conducted primarily on Westerners — sh

tend to like others who:

• Are physically attractive;

• Appear to like us (directly and indirectly communicated);

• Behave in a friendly and positive manner;

• Are similar to us;

• Are familiar to us;

• Cooperate with us or generally behave consistently with our 

and

• Appear to possess positive traits such as intelligence, compete

honesty, etc. 

Authority 

An agent’s perceived authority is another major relationship-based 

of infl uence. Social science research suggests that people are more 

infl uenced by the arguments of a person whom they perceive as an au

expert, especially on the topic of the discussion. Similarly, they ar

to comply with requests made by someone who has status or auth

someone with relevant expertise.
24

g,y ,yy 

scratch yours.” People are more likely to give to those from whom they h

already received or expect to receive something. This applies not only to mat

goods, but also to social commodities such as favors and information. Rese

suggests that people are more likely to respond positively (affi rmatively

suggestions or requests for compliance from someone who has fi rst provid

benefi t to them than from someone who has not. Perhaps sources would be m

willing to “give” to an educer if the educer has fi rst given something (e.g., spe

rations, reading material) to them.

Commitment/Consistency

People want to see themselves — and be seen by others — as fulfi lling t

promises and commitments, possessing a coherent set of beliefs and values, 

always acting in consonance with those beliefs. The implication is that people 

more likely to cooperate or be infl uenced in a particular direction if a reque

consistent with a previously declared commitment or statement of principle

at least is not inconsistent with it. If an educer can persuade a source to com

to doing something, he or she can use that as leverage to get the source to fo

through. Conversely, an educer could use the language of prior commitmen

such as the Code of Conduct and argue that a particular request does not vio

its provisions and that, perhaps, responding to the request would serve a “gre

good” related to some other personality trait that the source valued highly. 

Social Validation 

One force that inclines people to action is whether others have performed 

action before, and how many have done so. This works most powerfully w

the “others” are similar in various ways (e.g., age, race, interests, socioecono

status, etc.) to the target of the infl uence. For example, an intelligence so

might be more likely to provide information if he believes others in his captu

cohort have already done so. 

Scarcity

Something that is abundant or easily attainable is not nearly as desir

as something scarce or rare. Studies have shown that people are more dr

to particular choices if their option to exercise them is limited. In an edu

information context, an educer might offer an incentive for information 

is only available to the source if he decides immediately (or within one h

after which “all deals are off.” The diminishing availability of the incentive 

probably increase its potency. 

Fear and Coercion

Fear

Some traditional notions of interrogation suggest that fear can be a powe

motivator, and that fear of an aversive consequence often affects behavior e
25

leads to more accurate and useful information (in, for example, an 

interrogation situation). That is, fear may motivate an enemy source 

not necessarily to provide accurate intelligence. 

Research in social science, particularly in marketing and hea

suggests that the effectiveness of a threat appears to be determined l

perceived magnitude of the threat, the recipient’s perceived vuln

the perceived effectiveness of the proposed alternative to the fea

Compliance seems most likely when the appeal to fear is high and the r

behavior is perceived to be highly effective (Witte and Allen, 2000)

the source must consider the threat credible and must believe that th

withdraw it if the source complies. For example, some experienced 

have suggested that threatening a source with death is not particul

because the source may believe that an educer who is willing to k

be willing — even likely — to kill him whether he complies or not. 

motivation to comply therefore diminishes. 

Coercion

Little social science literature speaks directly to the effectivenes

tactics in educing accurate, useful information, but there is litera

coercive infl uence strategies, such as inducing fear, affects relati

induction of fear or pain appears to be a critical element. If a sour

educer as the cause of his aversive situation, he may react against it 

his resistance and determination not to comply (see the next sectio

has shown consistently that recipients of punishment or aversiv

distinguish between unpleasant sensations that are self-infl icted 

occurring and those intentionally caused by another person. One im

educing information seems to be that the source should not view 

educer as the cause of any negative consequences; someone else 

the black hat if necessary. Ideally, the source should perceive tha

responsible for his situation.

More generally, social science research indicates that a perceptio

can negatively affect the tenor of the relationship between the educer a

and decrease the likelihood that the source will comply or coopera

both in North America and in Asia (China) has shown that using coerc

strategies causes targets (or sources, in the context of educing inf

feel disrespected, whereas persuasion strategies communicate r

importantly, coercion creates a competitive dynamic that facilitate

the other party’s position where persuasion creates a cooperative 

facilitates greater openness to the other party’s position and produ

resolution (Tjosvold and Sun, 2001). A similar line of research ha

rational persuasion — and avoidance of “pressure” — increases t

of target commitment in infl uence interactions (Yukl et al., 1996). 
26

(O’Neal et al, 1994).

Under conditions that simulate an intelligence interrogation, ind

strategies for eliciting information (i.e., acquiring information through interac

by means other than asking for it directly) may be more effective than direct, h

pressure techniques. In one of the few open-source studies on the effective

of military “resistance training,” 58 cadets at the Royal Norwegian N

Academy were subjected to a simulated prisoner-of-war exercise. Some 

received a pre-training experiential exercise in resisting interrogation, ot

were given only a pre-training lecture. Perhaps of greatest interest is that the 

of indirect interrogation techniques signifi cantly reduced the amount of “priso

communication confi ned to name, rank, military number, and date of birth (f

24% to 0% in the lecture group and from 61% to 5% in the experiential 

training group). More importantly, the indirect strategy (as opposed to a d

one) also increased the percentage of compromising statements revealed by 

“prisoners” from 22% to 37% in the lecture group and from 0% to 15% in 

experiential pre-training group (Laberg, Eid, Johnsen, Eriksen, and Zacharia

2000).

New-Age Technologies

Although the social sciences provide a rich menu of proven or promi

infl uence strategies, researchers always look for ways to achieve results m

quickly, more effi ciently, or more covertly. Two infl uence strategies in the g

of “new-age technologies” have attracted the interest of some persons invo

in interrogation training: neurolinguistic programming (NLP) and sublim

persuasion.

NLP 

A blend of linguistics and psychology, NLP is more of a system 

communication than a psychological theory. NLP has many facets, but the cla

that have garnered the most attention from interrogators are the claimed ab

to unconsciously develop a powerful rapport with another person that w

virtually bring that person under a hypnotic spell, and the ability to unders

and read people’s internal mental processes by listening to the sensory words 

use and by observing their eye movements. 

Since NLP was fi rst introduced in the 1970s, many research studies in 

United States and Europe have sought to prove or disprove some of NLP’s claim

Almost none of the studies examining the effects of unconscious (covert) N

rapport-building techniques such as pacing and mirroring have found that N

techniques carry signifi cant advantages. In studies where NLP strategies h

19 A large database of abstracts from NLP articles and studies can be retrieve

 http://www.nlp.de/cgi-bin/research/nlp-rdb.cgi?action=res_entries.
27

Other work has examined NLP’s theory that people possess menta

and perform mental operations according to a “primary representat

(i.e., visual, auditory, or kinesthetic) that is refl ected in their langu

movements. NLP posits that observations of a person’s eye movemen

how the person is mentally accessing or representing the experi

response. Some interrogation trainers have applied these principl

they might also be useful indicators of deception. The preponderance 

research, however (even by “believers” in NLP) has failed to pr

evidence for the existence of primary representational systems or fo

associations between eye movement patterns and internal mental p

1987 National Research Council panel concluded that: “The comm

scientifi c evidence to support the claim that neurolinguistic progra

effective strategy for exerting infl uence.”20 No credible scientifi c 

that time would substantially modify that conclusion.

Subliminal Persuasion 

Subliminal persuasion has also been of interest to those con

strategies for interpersonal infl uence. Subliminal messages are 

those delivered “beneath the threshold of conscious awareness.” 

since the Korean War, theories have emerged that people may be 

messages that they barely notice (or do not notice) and that these m

shape behavior. If, in fact, persuasive messages can be perceived a

behavior without the subject’s awareness, this approach could hav

to managing uncooperative sources without coercion (albeit, with i

ethical dilemmas).

For more than 30 years marketing researchers have studied 

various subliminal advertising (persuasive) stimuli to affect the 

potential consumers. However, Nick Epley of Cornell Universi

researcher in the area of subliminal persuasion, concludes simply that 

body of work...has produced far from impressive results....” Simil

evaluations of audio material with subliminally embedded messages (

promoting self-esteem or weight loss) have shown that they produ

beyond what people expect to experience (Greenwald, Spangenbe

and Eskenazi, 1991; Pratkanis, 1992). Eight years later, another re

and Pratkanis, 2000) reported that “recent scientifi c evidence continu

our original appraisal that actions, motives, and beliefs are NOT s

manipulation through the use of briefl y (i.e., subliminally) presented 

20 Enhancing Human Performance: Issues, Theories and Techniques, Report of 

on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education (Washington, DC: The National A

1988), 21.
28

Overcoming Resistance

One of the central features of educing information in intelligence-gathe

contexts is that the human source, at least initially, may be uncooperativ

unwilling to provide what is requested. That unwillingness is generally regar

as “resistance,” although the term has a variety of specifi c meanings.

The previous section noted that resistance may actually increase if a so

feels coerced. Research (Brehm 1966; Brehm and Brehm, 1981) suggests 

two factors determine the strength of resistance: (1) the number and importa

of the freedoms that are threatened and (2) the nature of that threat. Threats 

are perceived to lack legitimacy (arbitrary), and are more blatant (rather 

subtle), direct (rather than indirect), and demanding (rather than delicate) 

to evoke more resistance. For example, anecdotal case analyses of actual po

interrogations have shown psychologic reactance-like effects where subj

respond to pressure and negative feedback by becoming less suggestible and 

compliant (Gudjonsson, 1995). 

Most persuasion researchers focus on inducements and Alpha strate

for interpersonal infl uence (see the discussion under “Infl uence Strategi

Knowles and Linn have produced some of the most relevant results 

potentially important road markers for the next generation of knowledge 

how to manage resistance to social infl uence. Their fi ndings (Knowles and L

2004) suggest that it is possible to minimize a person’s motivation to resist b

infl uenced. These fi ndings have direct implications for persons involved 

educing information from uncooperative sources. They recently proposed se

categories of Omega Persuasion Strategies, noting that the list is likely nei

inclusive nor exhaustive. 

I. Sidestep Resistance

The best way to handle resistance is not to raise it. To accomplish tha

an interrogation context, however, is almost impossible. Nevertheless, there 

be ways to minimize or reduce its intensity or natural escalation. One poss

strategy is to redefi ne the relationship between agent and target. For exam

salespeople have reframed their roles as consultants engaged in a long-t

(beyond the sale), collaborative relationship with the buyer (client). People 

feel less need to be wary of a consultant than a salesman (Knowles, Butler, 

Linn, 2001; Knowles and Linn, 2004). 

A second approach is to depersonalize the interaction. Rather than offe

directives, suggestions, or persuasive arguments, an agent might talk abo

parallel situation or may even develop a metaphor. Other suggested strate

to sidestep resistance are to minimize the request (Freedman and Fraser, 19

by beginning with small and less-threatening requests; propose a less desir

alternative (which accounts for the dynamic underlying the good cop/bad 
29

II. Address Resistance Directly

Another category of approaches seeks to reduce resistance by 

assuaging its causes directly. This might be done either by offering so

that the most feared outcome will not occur or by arguing against th

the target’s resistance.

III. Address Resistance Indirectly

Alternatively, one could choose to address resistance in a more 

by removing the “need” for resistance. One strategy is to bolster the 

of competence and self-esteem (Jacks and O’Brien, 2004); anothe

the resistance by casting the target in a different social role, such 

expert. 

IV. Distract Resistance

Distraction can also reduce resistance. Resistance requires so

to be optimally effective. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) have propo

of attitude change called the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM

premise is that when people have both motivation and ability, th

process a persuasive message through a “central route” in which 

derives from a careful analysis of the message quality. A mild di

occupy the target’s attention, thereby diminishing his/her resources 

counter-argue or otherwise critically analyze the quality of the mess

and Venkatesan, 1968; Petty and Brock, 1981; Knowles and Linn, 2

V. Disrupt Resistance

One of the most fascinating — and potentially promising — 

of counter-resistance strategies involves disruption. As with th

strategies, the goal of disruption is to occupy the resistance proce

persuasive message is delivered without hindrance. Disruption — 

is used here — differs from an external distraction such as a loud n

the disruption is delivered as part of the message, but is designed t

and momentary confusion (for example, by transposing “Code of C

“Conduct of Code”). According to the research, confusion reduces re

can be a particularly effective tool of infl uence when combined with 

persuasive message (reframe). Some studies have determined that t

must be mild and must occur before the reframing to get the d

Obviously, it could be nearly impossible to implement such a su

when communicating through a translator, but the effects of the tech

to date mark it as worthy of further consideration. 
30

g p, p

that of breaking is regulatory depletion, which postulates that the human capa

to control one’s own responses (self-regulation) draws on a fi nite and lim

resource. Regulation requires effort and that effort uses up some of a pers

regulatory energy, so that less is available for subsequent responses (Mura

Tice and Baumeister, 1998, 775).

Existing research suggests that one common and modestly sized stor

energy fuels any and all forms of regulatory activity. Theoretically, then, o

regulatory capacity could be entirely depleted. However, repeated cycle

exertion and restoration may serve to strengthen regulatory capacity and perh

make subjects more resilient (Baumeister, Muraven, and Tice, 2000; Strayh

2002); thus, overwhelming or depleting a person’s resistance in the short t

may be theoretically possible, but may impose a cost in the longer term. 

VII. Use Resistance to Promote Change

Never try to teach a pig to sing. It wastes your time, and it 

annoys the pig.

One of the most intriguing approaches to getting past resistance is to u

The theory and concepts behind the idea of using resistance draw from sev

sources, including the work of psychotherapists Victor Frankl and Milton Erick

who used unconventional strategies (for example, telling an insomniac to tr

stay awake) to bypass their patients’ resistance and effect therapeutic cha

(Weeks and L’Abate, 1982). Examples include what is popularly called “rev

psychology”; the professional term commonly ascribed to this techniqu

“paradoxical intention.” Other studies suggest that acknowledging (or preempt

resistance can help to reduce it, for example, by preceding a persuasive mes

by saying something like: “I know you’re determined not to listen to anything I 

but...” When this works, it appears that the target resists the acknowledgemen

suggestion of resistance (Linn and Knowles, 2002). 

Although Hans Gerz (Frankl, 1967) is said to have claimed that paradox

intention is successful in 80–90% of cases, many of the documented succe

are anecdotal and are ascribed to a small cadre of “master” therapists. Find

garnered over the last 15 years suggest that these techniques may only work 

people who are inclined to resist direct suggestions. 

Implications

Research fi ndings support the idea that different strategies may be requ

for different sources (and maybe even under different conditions). In a contex

which information is being educed, different sources will have different deg

of, and strategies for, resisting. An educer must constantly assess and mon
31

Factors Affecting Accuracy

Educing information from a human source requires some u

of how people in general acquire, process, store, and retrieve 

Without this knowledge, it is possible to misinterpret or even contam

information so that not even the source can any longer discern the “

There is a common misconception that the human mind acts 

recorder, capturing all experiences exactly as they occur and stori

cortical archive until they need to be retrieved. To put it charitably, 

over-estimates and mischaracterizes both the nature and capaci

information processing. Perceiving, storing, and retrieving informat

mental processes. A multitude of factors at any of these three level

person’s ability to acquire information, and to retrieve and represent 

(e.g., Neisser and Winograd, 1988; Roediger, 1996; Schacter, 1995)

Perception

Humans do not passively record events as they occur in the 

Rather, they are active gatherers and processors of sensory inform

selectively attend to certain elements while fi ltering out others, 

actively interpreting their possible meanings and interrelationships.

Perceptions become the assumed reality on which people o

has a number of important implications for educing informatio

educer can control many facets of the source’s detention and co

a way that “constructs” the source’s perception and construal of 

These constructions can facilitate or inhibit the source’s motivatio

information. Second, however, the educer must recognize that 

information, as stored in the source’s mind, is a product of his or her 

of it, not necessarily of how it existed in its original form. 

Memory

The “modal model” of memory is one of the most widely used c

frameworks for understanding the elements of human memory pro

model posits three stages of memory. The fi rst is sensory memo

stimuli are only momentarily registered to facilitate perception. T

short-term memory (STM) or what some call “working memory.” Th

STM is simply to hold information while it is being processed (to b

or transferred to long-term memory). The third stage is long-term me

Scholars debate whether information in LTM is permanent or not. 

Just as human perceptions are constructed, rather than recorde

themselves are “reconstructions” (Bartlett, 1932). A substantial bod

shows that event memories can be altered by information inserted or 

attempts to retrieve them (Loftus, Miller, Burns, 1978; Loftus, 1979
32

head) from externally (actual experience). Moreover, stress, even at mode

levels, has been found to impair memory recall (de Quervain et al., 2000; Hen

Shallice, and Dolan, 1999; Lupien et al., 1998; Nadel and Jacobs, 1998; Pa

Nadel, Allen, Thomas, and Jacobs, 2002). 

Accuracy of Educed Information

A variety of factors such as stress, fatigue, distraction, and intoxica

can impair the capacity to retrieve and perceive memories accurately. At 

extreme, for example, there is a signifi cant social science literature addres

the apparently rare, but disturbing, issue of people confessing to crimes they 

not commit. The most critical implications for intelligence are that interroga

tactics can lead the source to provide information that is inaccurate (intention

or unintentionally) even though the information may seem to conform to 

interrogator’s expectations, and also that the process of interrogation itself 

affect a source’s ability to recall known information accurately. 

One distinction between interrogations conducted in LE and intellige

contexts is that the primary objective in most U.S. law enforcement interrogat

is to obtain a confession rather than to educe information. The presumptio

expectation of guilt at the outset of an interrogation has been shown to infl ue

interrogators’ questioning strategy and cause them to exert more pressur

confess. It also affects the interrogator’s inferences and judgments about 

suspect’s guilt. 

This body of research underscores the importance of obtaining not me

information through education, but specifi cally accurate and useful informa

It also provides a sobering reminder that some eduction methods — suc

inducing stress, fatigue, distraction, and intoxication — have the potentia

affect not only a source’s motivation to provide accurate, useful information

also his capacity to do so. 

“Stress and Duress” 

Determining what constitutes a “stress and duress” technique is a matte

some debate. Social science research, however, has studied the effects of cer

techniques that have been used in the past (some quite widely), particul

those commonly alleged by various groups to produce undue stress and du

in detainees. True interrogative confession has been modeled as “a complic

and demanding decision-making process” (Gudjonsson, 1992, 64). Of partic

interest, then, is how those effects might alter an uncooperative individu

motivation or capacity to provide accurate, useful information. 

Research describes the psychological and emotional effects of strate

sometimes used to diminish resistance, specifi cally physical discomfort, s

deprivation, and sensory deprivation. None of the studies, however, addre

defi nitively whether these tactics indeed diminish resistance to persuasion 
33

led to changes in behavior, making at least some persons more 

pliable. However, although it was designed to inform interrogations

research was not conducted in the context of interrogation. The 196

Counterintelligence Interrogation” Manual refl ects some of th

implications of this line of research. Strikingly, since that time very li

research has been conducted on these techniques and the ways in wh

or may not affect relevant interrogation outcomes. 

Torture

Much of the social science research on the issue of torture may 

the process of educing information. The term “torture” is used wi

consistency in the literature. One basic distinction is between tor

punishment and torture used for leverage (to facilitate complianc

information). The tactics, effects, and resistance strategies may be q

from one type to the next. Research does exist on the social and p

consequences of torture (e.g., Somnier et al, 1992) but not on the ap

those effects to educing information. 

Evidence from social science suggests that there are simila

psychological effects of torture and of internment as a Prisoner of 

the common features are enforced captivity, fear and terror, pain a

and shame and humiliation. A feeling of powerlessness has been p

central component of humiliation. It is possible that future resear

experiences of POWs who have been tortured while in captivity in p

help to inform some questions about torture that relate to educing in

Pain and Physical Discomfort

Although pain is commonly regarded as a facilitator of co

diminisher of resistance, there appears to have been little or no empi

addressing these questions. The PsycINFO database contains em

headings for terms such as “Resistance,” “Aversive Stimuli,” “Pai

Change,” and Compliance,” yet, there are virtually no “hits” and 

relevant hits for any given pair of these predictor and outcome terms. 

among thousands of articles on each topic individually, there are no 

intersection of “aversive stimuli” and “resistance.”

Reports about the treatment of POWs and foreign prisone

documented the use of physical abuse, but studies of the role 

promoting attitude change and in eliciting false confessions (ev

servicemen) revealed that it was ineffective. Belief change and com

more likely when physical abuse was minimal or absent (Biderman 

Sleep Loss/Deprivation 

Sleep loss/deprivation is associated with:
34

• Diminished concentration (Williams, Lubin, and Goodnow, 1959)

• Impairment in cognitive functions associated with right anterior 

hemisphere or subcortical areas such as motor, rhythm, receptive an

expressive speech, memory, and complex verbal arithmetic function

(Kim et al., 2001)

• Impaired decisionmaking involving the unexpected, innovation, 

revising plans, competing distractions, and effective communication 

(Harrison and Horne, 2000)

• Reduced capacity for logical and sequential thought (Blagrove, 

Alexander, and Horne, 1995; Horne, 1988b; Williams and Lubin, 19

• Decreased accuracy in time estimation, and both immediate and 

delayed recall (Taylor and McFatter, 2003)

• Negative effects on mood (Lieberman et al., 2002)

• Alteration of the body’s immune system (Everson, 1997)

• Increased perception of physical pain (hyperalgesia) (Kundermann e

al., 2004)

• Decreased motivation (Wilkinson, 1961, 1964; Horne and Pettitt, 19

Meddis, 1977)

• Increased suggestibility (Blagrove, Cole-Morgan, and Lambe, 1994

Blagrove, 1996).

On this last point it is worth noting that suggestibility increases specifi c

under conditions simulating an interrogation. At least one study has found 

“the effect on suggestibility of one or two night’s sleep loss is comparable to 

difference in suggestibility between true and false confessors.” (Blagrove, 1

p. 57)

Sensory Deprivation 

Sensory deprivation is associated with:

• Impairment in higher mental functions and complex intellectual task

(Myers, Murphy, Smith, and Goffard, 1966; Kitamura, 1967)

• Increased susceptibility to infl uence (under some conditions) (Myers 

al., 1966)

• Heightened hypnotic susceptibility (Sanders and Reyher, 1969) 

• Diminished EEG activity correlated with apathetic, lethargic behavi

and a reduction in stimulation seeking behavior (Scott and Gendreau

1969)

• Behaving in a way that is more boring and unlikable (Zuckerman et 

1970)
35

(, 9; , 9)

• Cognitive disorganization (Seudfeld and Borrie, 1978)

• Increased persuadability (Seudfeld and Borrie, 1978)

• Increased compliance behavior (beyond usual social infl uen

conditions) (Moscovici and Doms, 1982)

Key Findings

The review presented above is mainly descriptive. This secti

some of the more important fi ndings and their potential implication

• From the perspectives of both research and prac

information is most productively viewed as a dynamic a

process rather than as a discrete event, task, or series of 

encounters. 

• U.S. personnel have used a limited number of 

techniques over the past half-century, but virtually none o

their underlying assumptions — are based on scientifi c res

even been subjected to scientifi c or systematic inquiry or ev

• The potential mechanisms and effects of us

techniques or torture for gaining accurate, useful infor

an uncooperative source are much more complex than 

assumed. There is little or no research to indicate whether su

succeed in the manner and contexts in which they are applie

accounts and opinions based on personal experiences are m

preponderance of reports seems to weigh against their effec

• The accuracy of educed information can be com

the manner in which it is obtained. The effects of many co

and duress techniques are known to impair various aspects 

cognitive functioning, including those functions necessar

and produce accurate, useful information. 

• Psychological theory and some (indirectly) rela

suggest that coercion or pressure can actually increas

resistance and determination not to comply. Although pain 

assumed to facilitate compliance, there is no available 

systematic research to suggest that coercion can, will, or 

accurate useful information from otherwise uncooperative 

• Research studies on important related issues such 

infl uence, compliance, and resistance have mainly (a

exclusively) focused on persons from Western cultures. Find

fi elds of intercultural psychology and anthropology suggest 

meanings and modes of interpersonal interaction may 
36

in intelligence-gathering contexts occur through translators. W

there is good reason to suspect that the effects and/or implementa

of interpersonal strategies may be different when using a translator 

conduit for communication, the exact nature and extent of that impac

educing information has not been scientifi cally determined.

• A moderately strong body of social science research prov

a potential road map to a new generation of strategies and approa

for overcoming resistance without the use of high-pressure, coer

techniques.

• Social science research on persuasion and interpers

infl uence could provide a foundation for creating an elegant, elabo

and powerful U.S. approach for educing information in intellige

gathering contexts.

Summary Highlights

What models exist for educing information from uncooperative sources?

Constructing a conceptual model of “U.S.” information eduction c

provide a platform to label and identify actors, elements, actions, dynamics, 

effects to describe and conceptualize the process. The fi eld of persuasive mes

production offers some relevant research methods, while negotiation th

offers principles and provides a language and interest-based perspective that 

not overtly adversarial. 

What strategies might increase or decrease a source’s willingness to prov

information?

Considerable social science literature on persuasion and infl uence may 

relevant to the development of processes for educing information. The six m

consistent factors affecting interpersonal infl uence are reciprocity, scarcity, lik

authority, commitment/consistency, and social validation. Fear can someti

be a motivator when apprehension is high and the recommended behavio

believed to be highly effective. People who believe they are being coerced 

likely to feel disrespected and become less likely to comply or cooperate. Nei

neurolinguistic programming nor subliminal suggestion appears to be an effec

or promising agent of infl uence.

What is resistance and what strategies exist for getting past it?

Resistance is a common reaction to infl uence or compliance attempts. 

social science literature identifi es numerous strategies to help overcome it. T

include sidestepping it, addressing it directly, addressing it indirectly, distrac

it, disrupting it, consuming it, or using it.
37

of these three levels — including questioning strategies — can affe

ability (not just willingness) to acquire information and to retrieve 

it accurately. 

What is known about the effect of “stress and duress” technique

educing accurate, useful information?

Social science research describes the psychological and emotio

strategies sometimes used to diminish resistance, specifi cally physic

sleep deprivation, and sensory deprivation. Generally speaking, th

fatigue produced under these conditions can impair the capacity 

retrieve and perceive memories. None of the studies, howeve

defi nitively the issue of whether these tactics do indeed diminish 

persuasion or infl uence, or promote compliance in relevant populatio

pain is commonly expected to facilitate compliance or diminish res

or no empirical research has addressed this topic. 
38

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45

What We Know vs. What We Think We 

Gary Hazlett, Psy.D. 

November 2005

Abstract

This review examines the scientifi c literature regarding our curr

ity to detect deception by observing behavioral indicators and id

ditional research that might improve that capacity. It focuses o

that can be used in person-to-person communication without exte

nological support. The fi ndings indicate that common beliefs abo

cues to deception are frequently incorrect, and that research in t

date may be largely irrelevant to national security needs. The stu

mends that the United States adopt an aggressive, focused plan 

research and development of enhanced capabilities to validate i

and the veracity of sources. Such a plan should concentrate on u

ing actual behavior and should prioritize projects on the basis of o

needs, operational realities, cost, and potential return on investme

Introduction 

The capacity of the United States to engage in effective 

collection and counterterrorism operations has historically been ha

the relatively low quantity and quality of human source intelligence 

inform planning and decision-making. 

In response, the U.S. government has decided to increase sig

number of human intelligence collectors operating in the fi eld. Ho

collectors will not by themselves produce real improvements in perfo

more effective tactics, techniques, and procedures, along with better 

also necessary. Specifi cally, the Intelligence Community must improv

to develop information from human sources through debriefi ng, el

interrogation efforts. Despite the best efforts of dedicated human 

collectors, the Intelligence Community has become highly dep

technical means for breakthroughs in intelligence collection. 
46

ggpy

Both practical and political considerations account for past trends away f

development and use of human sources for intelligence collection and tow

substantial reliance upon imagery and communications interception techno

First and foremost, this approach worked; in fact, for many years, it wor

extremely well. It leveraged the huge technological and fi nancial advantage

the United States over most of the rest of the world, providing data collec

capabilities that allowed the Intelligence Community access almost anywhe

cared to look. Unfortunately (in this context), the technological disparity betw

countries has grown narrower. As a result, our competitors and adversaries b

understand our capabilities, which allows them to develop countermeasures 

have diminished the return on our technology-based collection methods. 

Our adversaries are different than in the past. While it still remains alm

impossible for another nation to move an armored division without b

seen, high-tech surveillance systems offer relatively little capacity to track 

movements of individuals belonging to a terrorist organization.

Given the dispersed nature and small size of terrorist organizations, d

interaction with people is required to develop the kinds of information nee

to inform and direct intelligence operations. The challenge is to identify w

information and sources developed through human contact are valid. 

Determining Veracity

Methods of detecting when an individual is attempting to deceive a list

constitute a primary basis for assessing the potential utility and validity 

information obtained from human sources. A signifi cant amount of scien

study has focused on this topic. Overall, data to this point suggest that fo

groups, novice to professional, accuracy in determining when someone is b

deceptive is only marginally better than chance.1-22 

The two primary approaches to detecting deception rely on psychophysiolog

and behavioral indicators. Psychophysiological methods involve monitoring 

assessing physiological reactions to events; for instance, through use of heart 

and function monitors23-26, skin conductance sensors,27,28 thermal photogra

voice frequency analysis29, and brain activation patterns measured via electr

wave patterns 30-33 or via magnetic resonance imaging, etc. Detailed examinat

of these and other methods appear elsewhere in the literature16,34,35 or within pa

sponsored through the current study on educing information, such as the stud

Heckman and Happel in this document. 

The present review covers scientifi c fi ndings regarding our current capa

to detect deception by using behavioral indicators: all actions, statements

responses that another person can reasonably monitor through observatio

focuses only on those methods that can be used in person-to-person communica

without the aid of extensive technological support. While technologically b
47

or elaborate technologies impractical or impossible. The review a

additional research to enhance the ability to detect deception. 

Cues to Deception

Beliefs vs. Reality

People who adopt the belief that there are reliable cues to d

frequently incorrect. Signifi cant research has studied people’s b

indicators that someone is being deceptive and their own attitudes an

about their personal ability to be deceptive. A summary of 57 studi

beliefs about nonverbal cues to deception indicated that many p

actually know what they think they know: in other words, thei

just as often wrong as they are right.36 These patterns of erroneou

widespread and are found equally among professional interrogators/

and novices.7,37-40

Research into beliefs and attitudes about deception may ha

predicting how people might try to conceal deception on the basis 

beliefs about cues to deception. This research may also facilitate the 

of erroneous beliefs that intelligence collectors may hold and th

corrected in training. However, the study of attitudes and beliefs 

itself provide information on which cues to deception actually wor

this line of research may at best provide indirect support to the de

effective and reliable methods for detecting deception. 

Most behavioral research discusses indicators of deception 

nonverbal, paralinguistic, and verbal behaviors. The literature also co

judgments of behavior that may potentially have some utility. 

Nonverbal Behavioral Cues

Most nonverbal cues to deception do not appear useful. T

deception, individuals must control the information that they provid

generally exercise control over what they say; therefore, verbal out

to considerable crafting on the part of the individual attempting to 

The literature assumes that nonverbal behavior is more likely to f

subject’s full awareness and thus may provide a better source of cues 

deception. (Yet, as noted below, verbal cues may actually offer some 

the purposes of this review, nonverbal behaviors encompass all thos

behaviors that may or may not accompany language, such as body 

gestures, posture, eye gaze, etc. 

A recent extensive review of the literature compiled the resu

research reports involving 120 independent subject samples.41 T

identifi ed 158 cues to deception, but indicated that most of th

behaviors studied proved ineffective and unreliable as indicators. P
48

over the mouth while talking, ear tugging, etc. None of these was rigoro

substantiated by the research, although a small subset demonstrated reason

power. They included fewer hand and fi nger movements while talking, fe

illustrating gestures accompanying speech, dilation of the pupils,42 and s

elements of a system developed by Ekman and associates 43,44 for evalua

subtle, small, and short-lived shifts in facial expression. However, anal

of microfacial expressions and pupillary dilation generally requires the us

recording equipment and represents methods that may not be practicable for 

operatives. 

Verbal Cues

We should listen closely to what people say. Verbal cues to decep

involve what people actually say, i.e., the content of their communica

Researchers have attempted to develop methods for evaluating verbal behav

more systematically.45 Two approaches frequently cited are Statement Vali

Assessment and Reality Monitoring, both of which have been extensi

reviewed by Vrij.36 Overall, these methods seek to validate statements 

the assumption that true statements differ from fabricated ones in a variet

signifi cant dimensions.41,46

Statement Validity Assessment involves the use of criteria-based con

analysis,47, 48 which attempts to provide some common methodology for evalua

the content of verbal communications. These criteria include analyses of the l

and structure of verbal reports along with the presence or absence of var

types of details, context, and spontaneous, qualitative evaluations by the spe

of his or her own recall. Reality Monitoring attempts to determine the validit

statements by assessing the clarity and realism of a story, along with contex

information that indicates the presence or absence of details that link elem

of time, space, and sensory perceptions with the primary content of a subje

story.49 These techniques were originally developed to gauge whether allegat

by children represented true statements, but laboratory studies using col

students indicated that they could also be used with adults. Over time they w

used to assess the likely truthfulness of statements made by criminal defend

vs. victims. The most recent analysis of their effectiveness, conducted by Vr

was restricted to fi eld studies involving real-world criminal cases. 

The results of studies on verbal behavioral cues appear rather posi

Generally, they indicate that deceptive narratives contained less content (e.g., fe

overall details, fewer unusual details, less contextual and sensory informa

fewer quotations or descriptions of interactions), more logic problems (

unstructured reproductions, less logical structure, less plausible relations), 

differences in the subjects’ expressed evaluations of their own stories (e.g., 

expressed self-doubt, fewer tentatively phrased statements, more absolu
49

The same set of reviews, involving analysis of over 150 studi

that several criteria used in both the Statement Validity Assessmen

Monitoring failed to differentiate true from false statements. T

included the degree of apparent complexity in statements, the 

unexpected complications, self references, reports of subjective m

superfl uous details, and descriptions of verbal and nonverbal intera

as a whole, neither the criteria set from the Statement Validity As

the Reality Monitoring approach appears suffi ciently reliable and v

as a unitary technique for evaluating the veracity of subject stateme

However, some of the component elements show promise.

Paralinguistic Cues

Most paralinguistic cues do not appear to be effective; howeve

analysis may merit further investigation. Paralinguistic cues encom

behaviors associated with the production of speech but separate fro

content. As with nonverbal cues, the results appear rather disappointin

which subjects speak, the presence of various disturbances suggestin

(e.g., “ums” and “ahs”), the length of verbal response, various kin

response latency, and loudness do not appear to be reasonable cues to 

However, the amount of time spent talking in a response, higher v

other indications of voice tension appear to be potentially useful cu

changes in pitch or indications of voice tension have generally bee

small that the unaided ear cannot discriminate them reliably. Previo

voice stress technologies soundly criticized their reliability and valid

this, recurrent positive fi ndings in this area36,41,54,56 may suggest tha

analysis may have been dismissed prematurely. 

Global Judgments

Focusing on specifi c cues to deception may actually narrow a

focus to the point of neglecting data that could be important for v

source or the information itself. Instead of relying on the presenc

of a specifi c cue to deception, some research has recorded glob

of observers who are asked to synthesize their observations and a

behavior. These synthesized assessments show some promise in differ

vs. fabricated statements.41,57 Specifi cally, people who were accurat

as being deceptive were more likely to have been assessed by obse

cooperative, more uncertain, more nervous, more ambivalent, more 

in content presentation, less friendly or pleasant, and more expressiv

Moderator Variables

Many other variables may have an impact on our capac

deception effectively. Examples of relevant research include studies 

of interviewer and interviewee personality characteristics,58,59,60,61,62,

effects,13,64 social biases,65-67 and interviewer and interviewee confi 
50

Promising Avenues

Alternative methods are emerging and merit study. Some research eff

have started to explore new methods for validating information. They include 

use of probability theory to assess choice patterns, covert physiological se

systems to assist observers in real time, challenges to story construction b

on memory research,41,70 and intentional distortion methodology to assess re

stability vs. malleability.

Limitations of Current Research Findings

To this point, this review might suggest that some practical means 

available to assist intelligence personnel in validating sources and informa

Unfortunately, shortcomings in the research designs that tested these indica

dictate caution in relying upon these means at this point. 

Motivational/Stress Problem

Most research subjects are relatively calm and undermotivated and do 

represent the populations of interest. In real life, any interrogation situa

is likely to cause high levels of physiological arousal and distress in inno

and guilty parties alike. Individuals who attempt to conceal information in 

situations probably have a high level of motivation to deceive successfully. 

almost impossible to obtain the same levels of motivation and arousal in volun

subjects. With the exception of fi eld studies developed from real-world situat

most of the research conducted to date entails little or no stress or true incen

to deceive effectively: of 120 samples in the DePaulo analysis,41 68 samples w

classifi ed as using subjects who were under no stress. Researchers are acu

aware of this problem and have sought to develop laboratory situations that e

some degree of distress or arousal in subjects, but for the most part they have b

unable to sample behavior involving moderate to higher ranges of motiva

and arousal. It is not known whether these higher levels would result in diffe

patterns of response, although that assumption seems logical.71

In most studies, individuals serving as observers/judges are asked to m

assessments that have little personal signifi cance. This situation is unlike 

facing an intelligence collector, who would generally be highly motivate

obtain information. 

Sampling Problems

Subject Sampling

Research has not looked at enough of the right kind of people. Most stu

(over 80 percent) have used college students, while those in applied sett

generally involve incarcerated criminals. The resultant problem is obvious. Col

students tend to be drawn from the upper end of the intellectual range, are m

likely to come from relatively affl uent socioeconomic backgrounds, and are m
51

for the intelligence collector. The population of criminals in the U

consists disproportionately of individuals in the low average range o

or worse. In addition, criminals as a group are likely to have subst

experience in interrogation/questioning situations than the rest of th

Law enforcement may be at the point of developing real capabilities 

below-average intelligence criminals and academic researchers may 

understanding of above-average intelligence college students, but 

may have only limited relevance to intelligence collection.

Most studies also used a relatively small sample size, with an a

subjects per study.41 Such small samples may allow validation of o

powerful cues and may discount many moderately effective ones.

Behavior Sampling

Most studies typically use very short snippets of data — co

than 1 minute — whereas in a real-world situation an interviewer 

a subject over a much longer time frame, with the option of repe

Therefore, results to date may only refl ect those variables that hav

that short time frame. 

Most studies involve people in an observer role who watch a tap

being questioned. In real-world applications, the people responsible 

deception are likely to be participating in the exchange and to be 

themselves. Research suggests that in the participant mode detecti

likely to be below 50%, or at the level of chance.72,73

Finally, much of the research uses a 50/50 paradigm, wherein th

true vs. false reports is equal. The likelihood that this refl ects reality 

Our results to date may thus represent a skewed construction of th

problem.

Cross-Cultural Representation

We know almost nothing about how our current methods work 

Asian, Middle Eastern, Central and South American, or African 

Research to date has focused primarily on samples drawn from mod

countries (primarily the United States and Europe), with a few stud

Jordanian,74, 75 Saudi,58 Chinese,76,77 and Japanese78,79 subjects. Of all th

in the existing body of research literature, this is the most troubling. In 

review of studies involving 120 samples, 101 were drawn from the 

or the United Kingdomandonly 4 came from non-Western cultural g

from the standpoint of intelligence gathering, they do not address th

of interest and utility. Although Ekman and his associates hold tha

expression changes represent a fairly universal phenomenon.80,81,82 

evidence to suggest the existence of universals in nonverbal and p

behaviors across cultures. This absence of universals may also hold 
52

Summary of Findings

We do not really know what we think we know. Overall, knowledg

behavioral indicators that might assist in the detection of deception is very lim

and provides little reliable information that could assist intelligence collec

operating anywhere outside the United States or Europe. Despite some prog

in the ability to assess common criminals, results gleaned from the dome

population of criminals and college undergraduates may help us little in dea

with uncooperative detained soldiers or committed and possibly resistance-tra

followers of radical movements.

Very little is actually known about current populations of interest. In addi

this review failed to locate a single study examining the impact on decep

detection of using interpreters/translators in questioning subjects. There is l

reason to assume that data generalize across cultures, particularly Third W

populations.

The severe methodological shortcomings in research to date should lead u

question whether what we think works really does, or what we think doesn’t w

indeed does not. Existing research results, drawn from non-stressful situat

may have prompted the premature abandonment of potentially useful method

Suggested Approaches

The U.S. government needs to implement an aggressive, focused strat

plan for supporting behavioral research and developing enhanced capabilitie

validate information and sources. Such a plan should focus on understanding ac

behavior and prioritize projects on the basis of operational needs, operati

realities, cost, and potential return on investment. 

Operational Needs

The Intelligence Community should work with fi eld operatives to iden

and prioritize their most important and urgent operational needs and associ

research goals. Examples might include screening public transportation passen

improving interrogation techniques and results, validating embassy walk-in

legitimate sources, or improving fi eld operatives’ capacity to elicit and vali

information from sources in the fi eld and rebuild a viable human intellige

capability. The length of time needed to develop and fi eld a method should be 

consideration. 

Operational Realities

The primary tool in human intelligence collection is the operative on 

ground. This role necessitates moving within the society of potential sources 

talking to individuals who may or may not be motivated to assist the United St
53

of entry, where it is possible to control movement and contact w

within a fi xed facility, but such technology would be of limited 

collection tasks. Moreover, electroencephalograms and magnet

imaging are often relatively easy to defeat.2,33,83-85 The Intelligence 

needs to provide operatives the necessary tools and training to wo

with contacts on the ground. It is in this environment that behavior

may have the most potential value. 

Cost

High-technology programs naturally cost more to research a

behavioral methods.

Return on Investment

The Intelligence Community should consider the research and 

costs, the time it takes to push the results of the investment into t

the potential impact on mission accomplishment. In this light, de

behavioral methods may have an advantage, given that the near-ter

the payoffs can be high, and the techniques can be rapidly moved in

Recommendations

The Intelligence Community should follow certain guid

considering how to proceed:

1. Study actual behavior that may indicate deception, rather 

myths about such indicators. The two are not the same. 

2. Avoid simple replication of the research already conducted

we may know as much as we can and need to know about col

in the United States and Europe. New research should over

some of the limitations of previous studies outlined earlier

3. Insist on targeted populations of interest. The absence of re

subjects who represent the cultural groups of interest to the 

Community is the most signifi cant problem with research t

4. Focus on techniques that can be readily taught to the curre

of fi eld operatives. Even more important, focus on developin

that are practical in terms of the real-world parameters wh

be applied.

5. Emphasize fi eld testing to allow rapid assessment, r

adaptation of methods. 

6. Integrate fi eld operations personnel in prioritizing, dev

refi ning new tools. This will ensure a reality check before 
54

7. Stay ahead of the competition. The center of mass for research in 

area should not be China,76 Japan2,5,31,78,85,86 or even Israel.2,23 E

technique has its limitations, and aggressive discovery will also a

the United States to stay ahead of competitors and provide training 

countermeasures to ensure U.S. personnel retain a fi eld advantage. 

8. Make and maintain a commitment. When the next major terrorist at

occurs, the government should honestly be able to say, “We did the 

we could.” 
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85. Sasaki, M., Hira, S., and Matsuda, T. (2001). “Effects 

Countermeasure on the Physiological Detection of Decepti

Even-Related Brain Potentials.” Japanese Journal of Psych

323-328.

86. Yamamura, T., and Sasaki N. (1990). “Heart Rate as 

Psychophysiological Detection of Deception in the G

Paradigm Using the Paired Control Question Techniqu

Journal of Physiological Psychology and Psychophysi

61-69.

63

A Short Review

Kristin E. Heckman, D.Sc.

Mark D. Happel, D.Sc.

with the assistance of

Janice R. Ballo, Research Librarian

The MITRE Corporation

November 2005

Abstract

This paper presents a short review of the mechanical methods de

detect deception over the past century. The paper is divided into 

sections, psychophysiological mechanisms and neurological m

based on the two primary means of mechanically acquiring the m

to detect deception. Within these two sections, each mechanism 

tential for deployment is described.

The development of a more effective means for detecting deceptio

cated on research to build a sound theoretical basis on which to d

a system. The study fi nds that, despite the polygraph’s shortcomin

currently no viable technical alternative to polygraphy. While som

ence-based alternatives have been proposed, there are signifi can

with these techniques and far more research is needed if they are 

suffi ciently reliable for use in operational settings.

Introduction

Society has long wished to combat corruption, crime, and d

using scientifi c techniques and technologies. The notion that ho

found and identifi ed scientifi cally has led to the development of 

deception detection mechanisms throughout the last century. The val

these mechanisms is limited, either because the mechanism’s validi

recurrent rejection (e.g., truth serums) or for policy reasons (e.g., th

The need for accurate and reliable means of detecting attempts b

to deceive others, particularly intelligence and law enforcement 

is compelling. Yet it is all too readily apparent that the current t
64

Given this need and a century of effort, why has no effective solution b

found to the problem of detecting deception? Myriad opinions have been put f

to answer this question, but it is clear that this is an exceedingly diffi cult prob

in part because of the diffi culty of defi ning the general concept of decep

(Happel, 2005).

Psychophysiological Mechanisms

Psychophysiology is a branch of science that studies subtle physiolog

changes (such as respiration and skin surface temperature) that are not rea

evident to either an outside observer or the individual. Researchers study th

changes in autonomic (involuntary) and somatic (somewhat more controlla

responses to understand the psychological processes of the organism as a wh

These physiological changes are then used to indicate and differentiate am

these psychological processes.

Needless to say, there is much debate in the scientifi c community as to 

validity of the assumption that autonomic and somatic responses refl ect cogni

and/or emotional processing. Some evidence supports the link between spe

emotional states and certain physiological responses, such as startle/surprise 

increased periorbital temperature (Pavlidis and Levine, 2002). However, t

is no evidence supporting the assumption that autonomic and somatic respo

refl ect intentional deception. Although some of these measurements have b

correlated, to varying degrees, with intentional deception (or, at least, with 

emotional response that generally accompanies such deceptive strategies), t

is no widely accepted scientifi c theory that demonstrates a causal link betw

the cognitive processes involved in deception and the autonomic and som

responses measured by mechanisms such as the polygraph. Unanswered quest

remain with regard to individual differences in deception that result from 

impact of individual life experiences on underlying emotional, cognitive, 

social processes. These unanswered questions extend to differences in cult

and ethnic-based beliefs, attitudes, and practices regarding truth and decep

These questions must be addressed before signifi cant progress can be mad

using psychophysiological means to detect deception by individuals.

This section discusses several technologies that measure autono

and somatic responses to detect deception. These include the polygr

electrogastrogram, radar vital signs monitor, facial expressions, eye bl

saccades, and fi xations, voice stress analysis, thermal imaging, and truth seru

narcoanalysis. It should be noted that the Department of Defense Polygr

Institute (DoDPI) is researching several emerging technologies, including l

Doppler vibrometry (LDV) and Eye Movement Memory Assessment (EMM

LDV is a method of remotely measuring and assessing individual physiolog

responses to emotional stress. Changes in respiration, cardiovascular acti

muscle contraction, and body tremor can be measured from a distance of hund
65

published no review studies to date. These methods may hold promis

currently ready for deployment.

Polygraph

Subtle bodily changes such as heart rate, blood pressure, and sk

are amplifi ed and recorded onto a multichannel writing instrument 

polygraph. The polygraph is typically used in conjunction with one or 

of related tests: the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT), also known as th

Information Test (CIT) (Ben-Shakhar and Elaad, 2002); the Compari

Test or Control Question Test (CQT) (Raskin and Honts, 2002); or 

Irrelevant Test (RIT) (Iacono, 2000). It should be noted that altho

is the most widely used test in North America, its scientifi c valid

criticized (Gronau et al., 2005; Ben-Shakhar et al., 2002). In contra

CIT, widely used only in Japan, has been supported as an objective 

et al., 2005; Ben-Shakhar et al., 2002). 

The typical method of scoring the physiological records is for the 

to look globally at the charts for a “lie response”: an assumed spec

pattern uniquely associated with lying. Another, more objective, meth

the charts is to measure the relative magnitude of the responses (Bac

that is, when the difference between the relevant and control quest

levels reaches a certain quantitative point, the decision is made to 

examinee as deceptive.

The polygraph is the most widely employed technical means 

deception. It is also perhaps the most controversial. Almost since its 

polygraphy and its direct technological ancestors have been the sub

proceedings and Supreme Court decisions, including the Frye case (F

States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 [1923, D.C. Cir.], in which the 

polygraph pioneer William Marsten was excluded) and the more re

case (United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 [1998]). Ironically

government relies extensively on the polygraph for forensic inves

personnel security, yet the results of polygraph tests are generally in

federal courts (Greeley, 2004). 

Potential

The accuracy of the polygraph is a matter of controversy. Som

believe that the current system with the CQT is no better than cha

Shakhar, 1991; Furedy, 1996; Saxe, 1991). Other researchers estimate 

at 75% to 80% (i.e., one error, on average, in four to fi ve trials): Ela

(1992) with the GKT/CIT, MacLaren (2001) with the GKT/CIT, an

Iacono (1991) with the CQT. Supreme Court Justice John P. Stevens 

of studies that place the reliability of polygraph tests at 85 to 90 perc

States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 333, quoted in Greeley, 2004, p. 12
66

Krapohl, 2002). In 1983, the U.S. Congress’s Offi ce of Technology Assessm

concluded that “the available research evidence does not establish the scien

validity of the polygraph test for personnel security screening” (Offi ce 

Technology Assessment, 1983). Recently, the National Academy of Scien

published a critical review of the state of the art in polygraphy, in whic

concluded that:

Polygraph testing yields an unacceptable choice for [Department 

of Energy] DOE employee security screening between too many 

loyal employees falsely judged deceptive and too many major 

security threats left undetected. Its accuracy in distinguishing 

actual or potential security violators from innocent test takers 

is insuffi cient to justify reliance on its use in employee security 

screening in federal agencies (Committee to Review the 

Scientifi c Evidence on the Polygraph, 2002, 6-8). 

These fi ndings, particularly those related to error rates (especially the 

of false positives for innocent subjects) and the lack of basic theoretical sup

lead to the conclusion that polygraphy, as currently implemented in the Un

States, is insuffi cient for meeting the needs of national security via emplo

individual screening. The process and application of polygraph testing can 

further improved, although it cannot currently be determined whether th

improvements will meet national security requirements. However, the use of 

GKT/CIT in conjunction with other psychophysiological measures (such as 

conductance response, respiration line length, eye blink rate, and fi nger-p

volume) has shown promise in distinguishing between informed and uninfor

subjects (Ben-Shakhar and Dolev, 1996; Ben-Shakhar et al., 1999; Elaad 

Ben-Shakhar, 1997; Timm, 1982; Cutrow et al., 1972). Use of the GKT/CIT 

employee/individual screening would require pre-examination work to acq

known factual data for the development of relevant item sets to test the subje

veracity.

Electrogastrogram

The electrogastrogram (EGG) is a device used to diagnose the impr

functioning of stomach muscles or of the nerves controlling those mus

Electrodes placed on the stomach surface measure the electrical waves, or pu

as they progress downward from the top of the stomach. The stomach typic

pulses three times per minute.

Two researchers (Hutson, 2005) conducted an experiment to test t

hypothesis that the gastrointestinal tract is uniquely sensitive to mental st

because of the communication between the central nervous system and the ent

nervous system. Sixteen subjects were given a set of playing cards and told 

to reveal them. Simultaneous EGG and electrocardiogram (EKG) record

were taken as the subjects viewed pictures of playing cards on a computer, 
67

successfully. The result showed that both lying and truth-telling aff

symptoms; however, only lying was associated with gastric symptom

showed a signifi cant decrease in the percentage of normal gastric slow 

the subject was lying that corresponded to a signifi cant increase in 

heart rate. 

Potential

EGG is a non-invasive procedure that usually takes approxi

hours in a clinical, diagnostic setting. As with the polygraph, EG

would be subject to artifacts from anxiety and stress that may no

intentional deception. EGG measurements are also subject to mo

(such as respiration, cardiac signals, and possible myoelectrical 

other organs) that can spoil the results (Liang et al., 1997). These ar

removed manually with much subjectivity, or via commercially av

processing software run on a personal computer. 

The results of the EGG are analyzed by waveform and spec

methods, thereby requiring a powerful personal computer. It is lik

technique would have to be combined with another to increase its 

reliability in detecting deception. Given that only one study has be

to date using this technique in a deception detection task, more resea

to determine the accuracy and reliability of this method. 

Radar Vital Signs Monitor

The radar vital signs monitor (RVSM) remotely measures psychop

motion processes such as heartbeat, respiration, and eye b

electromagnetic waves in the gigahertz frequency range. For exampl

does not sense the actual heartbeat but the motion of the chest and 

cardiac and respiration cycles (Geisheimer and Greneker, 2000; Ge

Greneker, 2001).

This technology is the product of several research projects co

the past ten years at the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI). 

conducted at GTRI have shown that respiration and heartbeat data c

from nearly any portion or orientation of the thorax. The RVSM had 

modifi ed to detect eye blinks. Although the researchers believe other 

may be present in the signals, they produce smaller amplitudes than t

(Geisheimer and Greneker, 2000; Geisheimer and Greneker, 2001).

Potential

RVSM technology is non-invasive, portable, and remote. 

be placed out of the subject’s sight; such covert use of this techn

diminish the use of countermeasures. However, because of RVSM’s 

detecting motion, any stray motions within the sensor’s beam will 
68

the noise. Potential solutions to these movement countermeasures are b

researched (Geisheimer and Greneker, 2000; Geisheimer and Greneker, 2001

RVSM transmits at a frequency of 24.1 GHz, where skin refl 

approximately 73% of the wave; the rest of the energy is quickly dissipated in 

fi rst several millimeters of the body. Given radiation safety concerns, the Fed

Communications Commission (FCC) radio frequency exposure regulations h

set a maximum permissible exposure level of 1 mW/cm2 averaged over th

minutes for a transmission frequency of 24.1 GHz. These exposure limits 

be met at a distance of 12.85 cm from the RVSM transmitter (Geisheimer 

Greneker, 2000; Geisheimer and Greneker, 2001).

Because RVSM technology measures some of the same psychophysiolog

responses as the polygraph, it is subject to the same criticisms (see Section 

Due to the lack of published results in the literature, it appears that researc

have not yet explored this technology in the context of detecting deception. G

this lack of scientifi c validation, RVSM is probably not ready to be deployed

Facial Expressions

Human emotional responses can be recognized through facial express

(Ekman, 1994; Izard, 1994). According to Ekman (1972), a specifi c set of fa

expressions appears to be generated by the emotions of anger, disgust, 

happiness, sadness, surprise, and to a lesser degree contempt, embarrassm

interest, pain, and shame. Ekman (1972) further states that these emotions 

universally generated and recognized across all cultures. Ekman and Fri

(1978) developed the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) to measure all vis

facial muscle movements, not just those presumed to be related to emotion, as 

as head and eye movements. In approximately 100 to 300 hours, an indivi

can learn to code facial expressions based on the characteristic pattern of bu

wrinkles, and movements for each facial Action Unit (AU), as well as to code 

intensity of each AU. Ekman and Friesen (1978) identifi ed forty-four AUs 

can occur singly or in complex combinations.

A review of the literature shows that research into automatic recognitio

FACS AUs is limited (Tian et al., 2003). Deception detection experiments h

only coded FACS AUs manually (Ekman, 1985; Ekman et al., 1991; Frank 

Ekman, 1997). Despite this, the current state of the art is briefl y reviewed her

2001, two teams (Carnegie Mellon University and the University of Pittsburg

referred to as CMU/Pitt, and the University of California, San Diego, and 

Salk Institute — referred to as UCSD/Salk) were tasked to quantitatively ana

spontaneous facial expressions to estimate AUs (Cohen et al., 2001; Bartle

al., 2001). Both teams independently developed a non-intrusive automatic fa

expression recognition system capable of handling non-frontal pose, mode

out-of-plane head motion, and moderate occlusion from head motion, eyegla

gestures, talking, subtle facial actions, and rapid facial motion. It should be n
69

were tested with spontaneous facial behavior video recorded from 

of deception (Frank and Ekman, 1997). However, no analysis w

AUs based on deception/truth-telling conditions. Only two AU cat

recognized: eye blinks (see the section on “Eye Blinks, Saccades a

below) and brow region movement. The CMU/Pitt team recognize

brow region with 57% accuracy, and the UCSD/Salk team recognize

with 91% accuracy and discriminated between brow raises and br

with 94% accuracy. All of these accuracies were based on agreemen

coders.

Since these fi rst efforts in 2001, two real-time, fully automated 

been developed to recognize facial expressions (Tian et al., 2003; 

al., 2004). Both systems classify facial expressions according to t

emotion categories: happiness, sadness, surprise, disgust, fear, ange

One signifi cant difference in the testing of these two systems is th

et al. (2004) tested their system on a group of subjects instructed 

a specifi c series of facial expressions, whereas Tian et al. (2003

system on subjects looking at other subjects who displayed spont

expressions. This difference is relevant for real-world applications b

been shown that spontaneous facial expressions differ from posed e

several ways (Ekman, 1991). 

Potential

Spontaneous facial expression measures can be recorded no

and without the subject’s awareness, provided there is direct line 

measures can be made in real time via portable technology (a video 

computer system capable of high-speed image processing). How

there has been no research into an automated means of measuring 

the basis of facial expressions. Measurements of facial expressions a

have been limited to manual coding by trained humans, which is la

human-observer dependent, and diffi cult to standardize. Signifi c

efforts are required to determine whether FACS measurements are 

an automated system to distinguish between truth and deception; th

measures of additional factors, such as body posture and tone of vo

necessary.

Eye Blinks, Saccades, and Fixations

An eye blink occurs when one or both eyes are closed and op

Ocular movements are typically divided into fi xations and saccades

a rapid, intermittent eye movement that occurs when the eyes look 

one thing to another. The human eye saccades because only the cent

retina has a high concentration of color-sensitive nerve endings tha

of formulating a high-resolution mental map of the scene being view
70

The literature has explored eye blinks and their relationship to cogni

processes, particularly attention and vigilance; however, only one study of t

relationship to deception has been found. Fukuda (2001) measured subject 

blinks while performing a guilty knowledge card test using an automatic 

blink analysis system developed by Matsuo and Fukuda (1996). With this h

mounted video recording system, it is possible to identify blinks and their tim

with respect to stimuli, and to analyze the eye blink waveform. Ten subjects w

presented with eight sets of fi ve playing cards, and instructed to select one of 

fi ve cards in each of the eight sets to be the “lie” card. Subjects were then ser

presented with the fi ve cards on a computer display, and pressed a “no” ke

indicate that none of the fi ve cards presented was the card they had selected. 

results showed that subject blink rate pattern discriminated between relevant 

irrelevant stimuli.

The CMU/Pitt team (Cohn et al., 2001; Moriyama et al., 2002) measured 

classifi ed eye blinks with their automated facial expression analysis system. T

system achieved an overall accuracy of 98%, with 100% accuracy between bl

and non-blinks, in an analysis of 335 single and multiple blinks and non-bl

These accuracies were based on agreement with human coders. The UCSD/

team (see the previous section, “Facial Expressions”) also achieved an ov

accuracy of 98% for detecting blinks (Bartlett et al., 2001). Both of these stu

used spontaneous facial behavior video recorded from a prior study of decep

(Frank and Ekman, 1997) for testing. However, no analysis was made of 

blinks based on deception/truth-telling conditions.

The literature on saccadic eye movement is similar to the eye blink litera

in that much attention is paid to inferences about cognitive activity, but 

one study of saccadic eye movement and deception has been found. Bake

al. (1992) studied the horizontal eye movements of ten subjects respondin

autobiographical questions presented via a computer display. The subj

initially answered all questions truthfully, then were told to lie in response 

subset of the questions. The authors partitioned subject reaction time into t

components. The fi rst was the time spent reading the questions. This compo

did not distinguish between the deception and truth conditions. The second 

the time spent thinking of an answer (i.e., think time). This component identi

lying in fi ve of the ten subjects. The third was the time spent fi xating during t

time. The measure of this component was signifi cantly longer for nine subj

in the deception condition. These results suggest that saccadic eye movem

during response generation are irrelevant to deception. Instead, the amoun

fi xation time during think time, when it is assumed that subjects are genera

responses, is more indicative of deception. 

Baker and others (Baker et al., 1992) also studied saccadic and fi xa

activity during the fi ve-second inter-trial interval (ITI); that is, during the pe

of time after which one question has been removed from the computer sc
71

hypothesis and concluded that the effects of a trial ended with 

indication of readiness for the next trial.

Potential

Eye blink measurements can be recorded non-intrusively and 

subject’s awareness, provided there is direct line of sight. The m

can then be automatically post-processed, with some minimal amou

preprocessing required. Although this processing (both pre and po

conducted in real time, the technology (a video camera and com

capable of high-speed image processing) is portable. To date, no res

suggest any characteristic pattern(s) of eye blinks, saccades, or 

correlate with deceptive behavior. Much more research must be 

determine, fi rst, whether eye behavior is indicative of underlying d

second, the accuracy of systems measuring this behavior in real-wo

with ethnically diverse individuals.

Voice Stress Analysis

Voice stress analysis (VSA), sometimes called psycholo

evaluation (PSE), is based on the use of a machine developed in 196

R. McQuiston. Presumably, this machine detects laryngeal micro-tr

voice. When people speak, air is pushed upward from the lungs to th

This causes the vocal cords to vibrate as the air continues to fl ow u

mouth, through the tongue, teeth, and lips to form speech. According t

the amount of blood in the vocal cords drops as a result of stress a

tremors disappear. The voice stress analyzer searches for the disa

this normal tremor when the individual speaks (Van Damme, 2001)

VSA was developed because the U.S. Army wanted “a remote 

as an alternative to the polygraph (i.e., one that did not require phy

with the subject’s body). Given that the transmission of these m

and the stress occur simultaneously, VSA could be used to analyz

conversation, not just “yes” or “no” responses (this was considered 

advantage over the polygraph). The fi rst VSAs appeared on the ma

a product of Dektor Counterintelligence and Security, Inc. (McQui

of its founders). Approximately twelve years later, the Verimetrics 

invented by McQuiston) appeared. This system allowed personal 

produce charts. The Computer Voice Stress Analyzer (CVSA) app

market shortly thereafter. The CVSA allowed real-time analysis by 

the need to record on magnetic tape. There have been additional a

the VSA, such as the Diogenes Voice Stress Analysis System in 199

1997, and Truster Pro/Vericator in 1998.
72

p

in detecting deception, and that none of the VSAs has yielded detection r

above chance levels in controlled situations (Horvath, 1982; Hollien et al., 19

A 2002 fi nal report on the investigation and evaluation of VSA technology, fun

by the U.S. Department of Justice, concluded that

It is clearly unlikely that a single measure such as that based 

on the CVSA, could be universally successful in assessing 

stress (such as that which might be experienced during the 

act of deception). However, it is not inconceivable that under 

extreme levels of stress, that muscle control throughout the 

speaker will be affected, including muscles associated with 

speech production. The level and degree to which this change 

in muscle control imparts less/more fl uctuations in the speech 

signal cannot be conclusively determined, since even if these 

tremors exist, their infl uence will most certainly be speaker 

dependent (Haddad et al., 2002). 

The preliminary results from a comparative analysis of the CVSA, 

Vericator, and the polygraph showed that the CVSA and the Vericator perfor

no better than the polygraph in correctly classifying subjects as deceptive. 

Vericator, however, was more accurate than the polygraph in correctly identif

truthful subjects (Palmatier, 1996). Although VSAs are fi eld deployable, 

results to date suggest that the reliability of VSA technology does not exceed 

of the polygraph. 

Thermal Imaging

Microcirculation and changes in underlying muscle activity have an im

on skin surface temperature (SST). A variety of additional factors, such 

embarrassment and sweating, also effect changes in facial SST. Radiant en

or natural heat (infrared) emissions from the human body can be measured v

technique known as thermography. Infrared radiometry can be used to mea

body surface heat non-invasively, that is, via a camera, with no skin contact. 

camera is typically connected to and controlled by a personal computer run

software designed for thermal imaging. This technology allows for real-t

highly automated data analysis.

Two studies have been published on the use of thermal imaging to mea

facial SST during deception detection tasks. One of these studies was condu

by the DoDPI in conjunction with a group from Honeywell Laboratories le

Ioannis Pavlidis. These two groups have produced a series of publications (R

and Pollina, 2002; Pavlidis and Levine, 2001; Pavlidis et al., 2002; Pavlidis, 20

all of which appear to be based on the same study originally conducted at Do

The study used a mock crime scenario in which participants stabbed a manne

and stole its money. The papers report different results in regard to the percen

of correctly identifi ed guilty subjects (subjects who lied about their innocen
73

This thermal imaging study was conducted in conjunction with 

examination. According to the DoDPI report, thermal imaging of the 

facial region, combined with the polygraph, resulted in the highest ac

83% for polygraph and SST of the eye and nose regions, compared t

polygraph alone. It should be noted that DARPA has funded research 

Pavlidis and others (Murthy et al., 2004; Murthy and Pavlidis, 2005

breathing function remotely via thermal imaging.

The second study was conducted by Barron Associates, Inc

researchers from the University of Virginia (Burkholder and P

However, the results of this study are proprietary, and distribution 

U.S. government agencies only.

Potential

Thermal imaging allows rapid, automated analysis of change

facial blood fl ow. It can be conducted non-invasively, covertly, and i

thorough review of the literature revealed that only two investigatio

imaging and deception have been conducted to date. This suggests 

imaging is an emerging technology requiring more investigation a

review from the scientifi c community before it is ready for deploym

Truth Serums/Narcoanalysis

A variety of drugs have been referred to as truth serums: scopolam

amytal, and sodium pentothal. All of these drugs inhibit control of 

system and reduce inhibitions. Currently, sodium amytal and sodi

are used most commonly as anesthetics, and less commonly to reco

memories (Odesho, 2004). However, the three substances are bes

result of being administered as “truth drugs” during police interrog

use in all of these settings is sometimes referred to as narcoan

these serums are used, it is assumed that the subject will respond 

by providing truthful answers, or at least what the subject believes 

answers, because the drug makes it diffi cult for the subject to p

information.

Dr. Robert House initiated the use of “truth serum” in the 

he interrogated two suspected criminals injected with scopolam

2005). During the 1930s the Scientifi c Crime Detection Laborator

Northwestern University conducted experiments with scopolamine

laboratory and in criminal investigations. This highly visible work 

for scopolamine and other drugs in extracting truthful information (W

Although a number of studies were conducted in the 1940s and 19

both the accuracy and veracity of truth serum-derived information

varied signifi cantly (Odesho, 2004). In the decades to follow, truth 

used by the U.S. military and intelligence agencies during the C
74

testing drugs with truth serum properties, such as LSD (Select Committee 

Intelligence, 1977). 

Potential

Truth serums do not force the subject to tell the truth. Instead, they typic

cause the subject to become more talkative. Thus, although a subject’s inhibit

have been lowered, there is no guarantee that any of the information elicited 

be accurate. Given that none of these substances has been shown to be 10

effective in obtaining truthful information, there has been much dispute regar

the legality and ethical implications of their use. State v. Pitts was a prece

setting case on the admissibility of sodium amytal interview evidence. The N

Jersey Supreme Court concluded in 1989 that:

This evidence [sodium amytal] was excluded by the trial court. 

The Court now predicates its approval of the trial court’s 

exclusion of this evidence on two factors: the use of the 

sodium amytal interview as a means to ascertain the “truth” of 

defendant’s belief or motive for killing the victim...

The experts further concurred that the results of a sodium 

amytal interview are not considered scientifi cally reliable for 

the purpose of ascertaining truth as such. Nevertheless, the 

results of sodium amytal are useful (Supreme Court of New 

Jersey, 1989).

Although other jurisdictions reject the admissibility of truth serum interv

evidence for the purpose of establishing truth in a legal setting, the use of th

drugs for interrogation purposes has been reconsidered in the wake of re

terrorist activities (Odesho, 2004; Keller, 2005). The Department of Justi

Offi ce of Legal Counsel sent a memorandum to the President in 2002, sugges

that such use might be permissible (Bybee, 2002).

Throughout history, truth serums have been correlated with abu

interrogations and involuntary confessions (Winter, 2005). Article 17 of 

1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War pl

restrictions on the detainment powers that may be used to interrogate PO

however, the language does not outlaw the use of truth serums (Gen

Convention, 1949). Given that this international law applies only to prisoner

war, the interpretation of POW status will likely further cloud the legal and eth

debate surrounding the resurgence of truth serums.

Neurological Mechanisms

Dissatisfaction with the lack of a clear causal chain from the psycholog

decision to deceive, to the autonomic functions (e.g., skin conducta

respiration) currently measured by the polygraph, has led some researcher
75

remember” (Kandel, 2000, p. 5). Revolutionary improvements in ne

techniques, combined with the sophisticated signal processing tech

practical by advances in information processing technology over 

decades, have made it possible to observe the neurophysiological pro

brain itself with increasingly greater resolution in time and space. 

This section reviews these advanced techniques for studying the 

between cognitive and neural processes. These include electroence

magnetoencephalography, positron emission tomography, functio

resonance imaging, near infrared spectroscopy, and transcran

stimulation. Empowered by these techniques, some neuroscience 

have chosen to forgo the measurement of autonomic responses and 

to correlate deception and brain neurophysiology. 

Electroencephalography (EEG)

EEG measures the changes in the electrical fi eld potentials pro

sum of the neural postsynaptic potentials in the brain by means 

placed on the surface of the skin covering the head and face. 

directly related to specifi c perceptual or cognitive events are called 

potentials (ERPs). EEG/ERP studies require sophisticated signal p

separate the ERP components from the ongoing baseline electrica

consequently require substantial computing power. EEG laboratorie

1980s typically relied upon cumbersome, room-sized computers, wh

in information processing technology have made EEG using deskto

a practical reality. 

Investigations of EEG/ERP as a means for detecting deception 

the late 1980s. Rosenfeld et al. (1987) and Donchin and Farwell (19

success using EEG techniques to identify specifi c ERPs that were 

the recognition of guilty knowledge. In 1991 the Central Intellig

(CIA) funded Farwell to further develop his technique, but chose no

the funding after an independent panel reported in 1993 that the d

unwilling to release details of his approach, viewing them as proprie

the CIA, Secret Service, and FBI considered the technique to be of 

because it was based on a guilty knowledge paradigm and was ther

for screening applications (United States Government Accounting O

EEG-based deception detection research is ongoing (e.g., Rosenfeld 

Vendemia et al., 2003). 

Potential

EEG-based approaches have the advantages of good tempor

equipment that is relatively portable (at least in comparison to som

alternative technologies), and present few safety concerns. On the 

the higher density electrode arrays used in some approaches are tri
76

well). Rosenfeld et al. (2004) have found these techniques to be vulnerabl

certain kinds of countermeasures by the subject. Simple countermeasures suc

facial movement may create artifacts. In addition, because the P300 compo

of the ERP represents cognitive activity occurring within 300–500 milliseco

after stimulus onset, stimulus presentations must be repeated for the data t

based on summation waveforms (Donchin and Farwell, 1991). 

Magnetoencephalography (MEG) 

Neuronal activation results in a fl ow of electrical currents, which produ

a weak magnetic fi eld. The magnetic fi eld can be measured by a magnetom

placed outside the skull. This method of recording brain activity is ca

magnetoencephalography (MEG). The area in the brain that has been activate

a stimulus can be localized by detecting the magnetic fi elds measured by a se

of MEG recordings.

A thorough review of the literature revealed no studies dealing with MEG 

deception, though there is active research on a closely related topic: MEG 

memory. Temporal resolution is one reason MEG is used in studies of mem

as opposed to other neuroimaging technologies. That is, MEG allows a deta

analysis of the timing of changes in activation associated with recogni

Gonsalves et al. (2005) conducted a prototypical study using MEG and 

“remember” versus “know” recognition memory paradigm. This paradigm ca

generally described as follows. Subjects are presented with previously vie

stimuli and novel stimuli. The subjects are instructed to respond based on 

type of memory they have for the stimulus: that is, if they can recollect the e

episode in which they saw the stimulus, they would give a “remember” respo

if they have a “feeling of knowing” the stimulus, they would give a “kn

response. Finally, if the subjects believe they have never seen the stimulus be

they would give a “new” response. 

The results of the Gonsalves study suggest that the medial temporal co

rapidly signals memory strength by way of reduced activations. The aut

conclude that this may provide a basis for the subjective perception of whe

a stimulus is familiar (“remember” or “know”) or novel (“new”). The ab

to establish “ground truth” relevant to an individual’s memory would cle

assist the process of detecting deception. It should be noted that this metho

comparable to the GKT/CIT when it is used in conjunction with skin conducta

heart period variability, and respiratory sinus arrhythmia. 

Potential

MEG is a noninvasive technique. However, it is typically performed wi

large, expensive piece of instrumentation that must be contained in an expen

magnetically shielded room to reduce external magnetic disturbances. ME

therefore not portable. MEG recordings are subject to artifacts from eye bl
77

The results of the study discussed in this section suggest that 

studies may assist in understanding the role of memory within 

set of candidate neural subsystems (discussed elsewhere in the 

Mechanisms subsections) involved in the generation of deceptio

given the apparent lack of published studies on MEG and decepti

that MEG is not yet ready for deployment.

Positron Emission Tomography (PET) 

Positron emission tomography (PET) is a nuclear medic

imaging technique. The fi rst human PET scanner was developed in 

scanner produces a three-dimensional image of functional brain a

a radiolabeled positron emitting tracer is injected into a subject’s 

This tracer stays in the bloodstream and moves via circulation. B

different rates in the brain depending on the level and location of n

Areas of higher blood fl ow will contain a larger amount of radio

and will therefore emit a stronger signal. This signal is measured 

scanner, which scans slices of the brain. The images of these slices 

to compare the distribution of radioactivity, thus allowing a nucl

physician or radiologist to map the changes in regional cerebral blood 

that accompany changes in neuronal activity.

To date, only one study has been conducted using PET to m

activity during deception (Abe et al., 2005). In this study, sub

photographs related to experienced and unexperienced events. In o

condition, subjects were instructed to lie in response to the photos of 

events: that is, they were to pretend not to know the experienced 

other deception condition, subjects were instructed to lie in response 

of unexperienced events: that is, they were to pretend to know the u

event. During both types of deception, the dorsolateral, ventrolatera

prefrontal cortices were active. The anterior cingulate cortex wa

during the deception condition in which subjects were pretending no

Activation of the dorsolateral and ventrolateral cortices and 

cingulate cortex support the fi ndings of several functional magnet

imaging (fMRI—see section below) studies of deception (Langleben 

Ganis et al., 2003; Kozel et al., 2004a,b). However, there is some con

this PET study and previous fMRI studies in regard to the laterality o

prefrontal cortex activation. The PET study showed signifi cant acti

left hemisphere, whereas Kozel et al. (2004a) reported activation 

hemisphere, Lee et al. (2002) in the bilateral hemisphere, Kozel e

in the more anterior part of the prefrontal cortex with right dom

Ganis et al. (2003) reported bilateral activation. It is possible that th

due to the different experimental designs used in these studies; ho

confl icts clearly indicate the need for more neuroimaging studies 
78

Ganis et al. (2003), and Kozel et al. (2004a,b).

Potential

PET scanning is invasive and non-portable. Scientifi c PET investigat

require clearance by an ethics committee because of the injection of radioac

material, and because multiple scans of a subject should be limited. Only a 

hospitals and universities can perform PET scans because of the high cost

producing the radioisotopes used in the process. Given these limitations, and 

the laboratory results of one PET study confl icted with the results of several fM

studies of deception, this technology is not ready to be deployed.

Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)

fMRI is a relatively recent technique (circa early 1990s) that uses a powe

static magnetic fi eld, usually 1.5 to 5 tesla (T) or more, to align the nuclear s

of protons in the sample under study (e.g., the subject’s brain). If the equilibr

spin alignment is perturbed with a transmitted radiofrequency pulse, the sam

will emit a corresponding transmission as it returns to equilibrium. Because 

magnetic properties of oxygenated hemoglobin differ from those of deoxygen

hemoglobin, the emitted signal is differentiable. Consequently, the fMRI sys

can form a sequence of images of the brain indicating those areas in which 

oxidative brain metabolism — and, by inference, the neural activity — is hi

during the performance of one task than in another (e.g., lying compared to tel

the truth). fMRI relies on large superconducting magnets, cooled with cryog

to within a few degrees of absolute zero, to produce the intense static magn

fi eld required. 

The last fi ve years have seen the publication of several research pa

describing the use of fMRI as a means of detecting deception. 

• Spence et al. (2001) investigated subjects who saw or heard statem

about their own activities that day and signaled whether they concu

with the statement by pressing the appropriate button (yes or 

However, if the display used a particular color, the subject was to 

by pressing the incorrect button. 

• Langleben et al. (2002) used images of playing cards to impleme

modifi ed version of the polygraph GKT/CIT paradigm. Participants w

given a playing card and instructed to attempt to fool a computer that 

evaluating their responses by denying that they had that particular 

when queried, but to respond truthfully otherwise. The subjects w

promised a modest reward ($20) if they succeeded. 

• Lee et al. (2002) investigated a malingering paradigm in which subj

pretended to have a memory impairment by making intentional error

their own discretion, during a forced-choice memory task using num

and autobiographical information. 
79

responded to visually presented questions using button pres

responses, received auditory cues instructing them whethe

and were told that a human judge would review their respo

tell if they were lying. 

• Kozel et al. (2004a) had the subjects visit a room that 

objects, of which two were resting on $50 bills. During th

testing, the subjects were instructed to report accurately th

of one of the objects with the bill (subject’s choice), and 

the remaining bill had been located under a different objec

was the case. The subjects were promised they could keep th

were able to fool a human research assistant as to the actu

the bills. 

While each of the above studies reported the ability to distingu

and truthful responses on the basis of the fMRI spatial images, the

signifi cant differences among the results. This is hardly surprisin

differences between the study designs. Some of the key differe

whether the subject can choose to lie or is told to do so, the stimulus 

modalities, the subjects’ motivation and emotional involvement, the 

of lie being probed, and the subject’s degree of involvement with a 

of deceit (the deceived or target individual described above). 

Potential

As a device for detecting deception, fMRI has some signifi cant d

It is not portable; the typical fMRI facility usually consists of the 

itself (including a superconducting magnet weighing 20,000 lbs or 

a magnetically shielded room, a separate control room, and an equ

fi lled with amplifi ers, power supplies, computers, and data storage d

facilities require a signifi cant capital investment. The noise level dur

is uncomfortably high (necessitating protective ear coverings), and e

minor head motion during the scan can spoil the results. Such mov

be effective countermeasures for resistant subjects. There are also 

hazards associated with MRI. Some injuries, including at least one 

occurred when metallic objects were brought into the scanning r

established safety policies) and were hurled by the intense magnetic 

magnet’s bore (where the unfortunate subject was located). Because 

fi eld can also dislodge surgically implanted ferromagnetic mater

pins or aneurysm clips, not everyone can be safely scanned by MR

pregnant women and people with claustrophobia are generally no

research purposes (Huettel, Song, and McCarthy, 2004). 

Some researchers are attempting to commercialize the res

neuroscience-based research efforts. Farwell formed the fi rm Brain F

Laboratories to promote his EEG-based technique following the te
80

approach and are, in conjunction with Cephos Corp., working to develop 

market it. Despite these start-up efforts, and the attention fMRI has attracted f

the press, its use in detecting deception is clearly still in its infancy. No cur

brain imaging test has been shown to diagnose common psychiatric disor

such as schizophrenia (Williamson, 2002). It therefore is unlikely that a beha

as complex as deception can currently be “diagnosed” with any of the exis

brain imaging techniques.

Functional Near -Infrared-Spectroscopy (fNIRS)

Functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) is a functional op

imaging modality that measures changes in the concentration of deoxygen

and oxygenated hemoglobin during functional brain activation. Brain activa

increases rCBF, which, in turn, increases regional cerebral blood oxygena

Oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin exhibit characteristic optical prope

in the visible and near-infrared light range. Because of this, concentration chan

in regional oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin during brain activa

(e.g., while a subject is engaged in a task such as lying) can be measured optic

This is done by introducing specifi c wavelengths of light at the scalp. The d

at which this light can be accurately measured is approximately two centime

below the scalp (Villringer and Chance, 1997). The ability to monitor b

function with fNIRS was demonstrated in 1993 (Hoshi and Tamura, 1993; K

et al., 1993).

Two studies have been conducted to date using fNIRS with the GKT/

(Bunce et al., 2005; Izzetoglu et al., 2002). Izzetoglu et al. (2002) found 

the level of hemoglobin oxygenation during the “lie” task was higher than 

level during the “truth” task. Bunce et al. (2005) found that inferior and mi

prefrontal cortical areas were associated with some forms of deliberate decep

These results corroborate the fi ndings of several fMRI studies of deception (G

et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2002; Loughead et al., 2004; Spence et al., 2001). It sh

be noted that there were several limitations to the Bunce et al. fNIRS study. F

only a small area of the cortex was imaged; thus, the potential activity of o

brain areas is unknown. Second, some precision in measuring rCBF was lost 

to the placement of the optodes.

Potential

fNIRS is a minimally intrusive, portable, affordable system. However, it 

only image cortex, and this is a limitation because fMRI studies have indic

that areas of the brain below two centimeters from the scalp (such as ante

cingulate cortex and superior frontal cortex) are active during deception (G

et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2002; Loughead et al., 2004; Spence et al., 2001). Wh

head fNIRS systems that would allow a greater area of the cortical surfac

be imaged are being developed; however, they are not portable. Given th
81

Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS)

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was introduced 

involves placing an electromagnetic coil on the scalp. A high-inte

is then rapidly turned on and off in the coil. This produces a power

fi eld, with a strength of about 2T, that lasts for about 100 to 200 m

The magnetic fi eld passes through the skin, soft tissue, and skull, 

an electrical current in neurons. This, in turn, causes a neuronal d

that can have observable behavioral effects, such as body movemen

production diffi culties, as well as unobservable effects, such a

temporary scotomas (blind spots) and phosphenes (perceptual fl as

The area of depolarization is limited to a depth of about two centimet

brain’s surface, because the magnetic fi eld declines logarithmically 

from the electromagnetic coil.

TMS has primarily been studied in conjunction with mo

neurological disorders, and a variety of cognitive processes (such 

memory, and emotion). To date there appears to have been only on

TMS in a deception paradigm (Lo et al., 2003). In this study, sub

respond in their imagination (i.e., not verbally) to four sets of que

TMS. These four sets of questions were divided into two types 

conditions: “Yes” or “No” (to questions such as “Are you a man?

free-form responses (to questions such as “How old are you?”). The 

asked to respond truthfully to two sets of questions and untruthfull

two sets. Motor-evoked potentials (i.e., contractions of contralate

were also recorded. The results showed increased cortical excit

subjects were generating deceptive responses. This was found in b

response conditions (i.e., Yes/No and free-form). These results suppo

of previous fMRI studies on deception (Spence et al., 2001; Lee 

Langleben et al., 2002), which showed increased cortical activity, 

the premotor areas.

Potential

TMS is a non-invasive, portable technique. There are usually 

effects from TMS, though some subjects have reported mild he

discomfort at the site of the stimulation. This pain is most likel

repetitive stimulation of peripheral facial and scalp muscles, and res

treatment with aspirin or acetaminophen. Another known adverse ef

frequency noise artifact that can cause short-term changes in heari

This can be avoided with the use of ear plugs. The most serious a

has been seizure. Although the number of individuals who have rec

unknown, it is likely in the thousands. Seizures during TMS are kn

occurred in seven individuals, including six normal subjects (Was

1996a; Pascual-Leone et al., 1993; Wasserman et al., 1996b). The ri

is related to the parameters of stimulation (magnetic intensity, pul
82

there is a growing understanding of the rTMS parameter combinations that re

in a spreading, excitatory neural response signaling an impending seizure, 

risk may limit loosely supervised use of rTMS. 

TMS will most likely be a valuable technique to the neuroscience commu

because it provides the capacity to excite or inhibit focal cortical areas, the

elucidating causal relationships between neural structures and behavior. How

its effectiveness in detecting or inhibiting deceptive responses or thoughts has 

been suffi ciently explored. Additional studies and an established record of pr

safety precautions are needed before TMS is ready for deployment.

Discussion

The review presented above clearly shows that every mechanical device 

has been used to detect deception has both positive and negative aspects. V

thermal imaging, and facial expression analysis are the only techniques that a

rapid, real-time analysis that is highly automated. However, the performanc

VSAs in detecting deception has not been shown to exceed that of the polygr

it does not even approach the accuracy of the polygraph used in conjunction w

the GKT/CIT. The performance of thermal imaging has been demonstrated in 

one peer-reviewed study. Systems for automatic analysis of facial express

have not yet been tested in a deception detection experiment.

In terms of the invasiveness of the techniques, RVSM, facial expres

analysis, eye blinks, saccades, and fi xations, voice stress analysis, and TMS 

non-invasive; the polygraph, EGG, EEG, MEG, fMRI, and fNIRS are inva

because they require physical contact; and truth serums/narcoanalysis and 

are the most invasive. In terms of portability, RVSM, facial expression anal

eye blinks, saccades, and fi xations, VSAs, truth serums/narcoanalysis, and T

are the most portable; the polygraph, EGG, thermal imaging, EEG, and fNIRS 

portable, but require more equipment; MEG, PET, and fMRI are not portable

some extent, portability is highly correlated with cost because of the equipm

required. However, the cost of technical expertise (such as that associated w

the highly portable TMS) must also be considered. 

Some of these mechanisms have proven useful for diagnostic purposes (

EGG, EEG, MEG, PET, fNIRS, and fMRI) or treatment purposes (e.g., t

serums/narcoanalysis and TMS) in a clinical setting. However, these techniq

are not devoid of potential physical side effects (e.g., TMS headaches). It sh

be noted that there may be accompanying psychological side effects as a re

of undergoing a medical procedure (such as in individuals with “white 

syndrome”), or receiving medical treatment via truth serums/narcoanalysis (s

as in individuals who recover unpleasant, repressed memories). The costs 

benefi ts of using truth serums/narcoanalysis must especially be weighed g

that there is currently no drug that produces “truth.” In conjunction with th
83

Confl icting Approaches

The most signifi cant problem is that none of these mechanica

been scientifi cally shown to be capable of accurately and reliab

deception. Of the tests used in conjunction with these mechanical 

the GKT/CIT has been shown to be reliable and based on objective 

There are two schools of thought on the approach to solving 

One, referred to as “theory fi rst,” states that there must fi rst be a soun

basis on which to design such a system. The second, referred to as “

asserts that such a system can be developed in the absence of a theo

Those who subscribe to the “theory fi rst” school of thought 

additional research is needed to assert and test hypotheses that 

lying causes measurable changes (somatic, autonomic, or neuro

not simply to establish a correlation between the act of lying a

values of, or changes in, the observed features. They state that obs

correlation, without knowledge of an underlying causal theory, req

key assumptions before the results of the research can be used fo

purposes. 

• According to the “accuracy assumption,” the pattern of featu

with deception will be present if deception is taking place. It 

that the test will in fact detect any of the possible types of 

subject may choose to use and that the test is designed to 

memorized scenarios). 

• According to the “specifi city assumption,” the pattern 

correlated with deception will be observed only if decepti

taking place. In other words, it will not be affected by one o

many other psychological or physiological processes that m

been occurring during the research study (e.g., indigestion)

be mistaken for deception. Note that the use of a correlation 

provides no guidance as to what impact, if any, a counterm

have on the accuracy or specifi city of the test. 

• According to the “sample generalization assumption,” t

a research study based on the specifi c sample of subjec

be applied to any other sample drawn from the larger p

those requiring a polygraph test. The operational sample 

individuals who are signifi cantly different in some resp

sample used to determine the original correlation (e.g., 

psychopathological syndromes, subjects from other culture

Bashore and Rapp (1993) and Iacono (2000) recommended 

efforts directed toward the further development of polygraphy be a

favor of basic research aimed toward the development of “a science 
84

Little is gained, for instance, by simply generating an increasingly 

lengthy list of correlates between specifi c psychological variables 

and additional psychophysiological measures. A scientifi c theory 

is a description of causal interrelations. Psychophysiological 

correlations are not causal. Thus, in scientifi c theories, 

psychophysiological correlations are monstrosities. (Cacioppo, 

Tassinary, and Berntson, 2000, p. 20) 

Unfortunately, without an underlying theory on which to base log

inferences, observation of a pattern correlated with deception for a given sam

of the population gives little guidance as to when the above assumptions are v

The only recourse is exhaustive testing of all of the possible combination

factors, which is clearly an impractical undertaking. 

Those who subscribe to the “system fi rst” school of thought believe 

it is possible to develop a functional and useful system without waiting for 

development of an underlying theory that is universally accepted by the scien

community. They reason it is not likely that such a theory will be developed in 

short term or that it will receive rapid peer review and acceptance by the scien

community. Rather than wait for this to come to fruition, the deception detec

community would be better served by continuing to attempt to develop a de

that works, and then later determining why the device works. 

The logic behind this school of thought comes from the process of scien

understanding, that is, the cyclic process of developing hypotheses, ma

observations, testing the hypotheses, drawing conclusions, and modifying 

hypotheses accordingly when they no longer support the dominant parad

Methods that work have been developed throughout history in medicine and o

sciences in the absence of a correct theory, or with only a marginal understan

of how and why they work. For example, when aspirin was fi rst used a cen

ago it was believed to have no effect on the heart, but it is now known that asp

benefi ts the heart, and why (Nordenberg, 1999).

Current Status

In its study of polygraphy, the National Research Cou

concluded that:

One cannot have strong confi dence in polygraph testing or any 

other technique for the physiological detection of deception 

without an adequate theoretical and scientifi c base. A solid 

theoretical and scientifi c base can give confi dence about the 

robustness of a test across examinees and settings and against 

the threat of countermeasures and can lead to its improvement 

over time. (Committee to Review the Scientifi c Evidence on the 

Polygraph, 2002, p. 3–27) 
85

Unfortunately, such an explanation will not be easy to develop an

to be available in the short term. The psychology of deception is 

fi eld, and the neural mechanisms that underlie the ability to intention

distort, or fabricate information are not yet well understood. Conseq

National Research Council is correct in stating that confi dence in a giv

will require a solid theoretical base, then a signifi cant research invest

underlying neuropsychological mechanisms of deception must be 

any practical system for detecting deception can be developed and e

Even if the National Research Council is wrong, and the “system 

of thought is correct, other problems may need to be solved before 

system for deception detection can be developed, tested, and 

deployed in the fi eld. These problems are characteristic of experi

an artifi cial laboratory setting. Such research does not typically resu

experiencing the same level of threat, motivation, stress, or fear that 

experienced by a subject in a real-world situation involving detection 

The demographics of the cohorts used in these, usually university, 

are likely to differ greatly from those of individuals of interest in th

problems make it diffi cult to use the fi ndings of laboratory research 

which to develop a practical deception detection system.

Thus, despite the polygraph’s shortcomings, there is current

technical alternative to polygraphy. After reviewing the EEG and fM

detection efforts, as well as some other psychophysiological candida

(e.g., VSA), the National Research Council concluded that “some of 

alternatives show promise, but none has yet been shown to ou

polygraph. None shows any promise of supplanting the polygraph 

purposes in the near term” (Committee to Review the Scientifi c Ev

Polygraph, 2002, p. 6–15). This does not imply that these efforts h

On the contrary, the results to date show that these approaches h

and may even be viable in some situations where their level of 

acceptable. However, much more research is needed if these tech

become operationally useful and reliable in situations that require a 

of accuracy. 
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95

Review: Observations of an Interrog

Lessons Learned and Avenues for Further R

Steven M. Kleinman, M.S. 

February 2006

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do no

offi cial policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. 

Abstract

A careful reading of the KUBARK manual is essential for anyon

in interrogation, if perhaps for no other reason than to uncover a 

of interrogation that accurately captures the fundamental nature of 

tion while also concretely establishing what it is not (i.e., a gam

two people to be won or lost). A major stumbling block to the stu

rogation, and especially to the conduct of interrogation in fi eld 

has been the all-too-common misunderstanding of the nature an

the discipline. Most observers, even those within professional ci

unfortunately been infl uenced by the media’s colorful (and artifi 

of interrogation as almost always involving hostility and the emp

force – be it physical or psychological – by the interrogator again

less, often slow-witted subject. This false assumption is belied 

trends that show the majority of sources (some estimates range 

90 percent) have provided meaningful answers to pertinent ques

sponse to direct questioning (i.e., questions posed in an essentiall

trative manner rather than in concert with an orchestrated approac

to weaken the source’s resistance).
96

Central Intelligence Agency in 1963 (and declassifi ed in 1997), has becom

icon of Cold War subterfuge and a lightning rod for those who allege that 

United States continues to employ similar coercive interrogation technique

the new confl ict of the 21st century: the Global War on Terror. In an emph

article, Alfred W. McCoy provides a sweeping review of the development of 

KUBARK manual and its disturbing legacy throughout the remaining co

of Cold War history.22 McCoy makes a compelling argument that coer

interrogation methods, such as those set forth in the KUBARK manual, c

a far-reaching negative impact on U.S. foreign policy: a premise with cri

implications for current counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.

Rather than address these geopolitical concerns, this review will con

itself exclusively with the potential for lessons learned that could be derived f

a highly controversial document. Just as important ideas for enhancing secu

practices can be elicited from a felon convicted of armed robbery, in loo

past the ignominy of KUBARK’s intended use, one can fi nd useful insights 

the dynamics of intensive intelligence interrogation that can lead to princi

applicable to current challenges.

Observations 

Interrogation: A Defi nition

There is nothing mysterious about interrogation. It consists of 

no more than obtaining needed information through responses 

to questions.23

An interrogation is not a game played by two people, one to 

become the winner and the other the loser. It is simply a method 

of obtaining correct and useful information.24

Some might argue that these defi nitions fail to distinguish interroga

from a debriefi ng. While there are far more similarities than differences betw

the two activities, what ultimately separates an interrogation from a debrie

21 The term “KUBARK” is the Central Intelligence Agency cryptonym for a counterintellig

collection operation conducted in the early 1960s. In the cryptonym system employed by the CIA

fi rst two letters (the “digraph”) may refer to a country or a specifi c clandestine or covert activity, w

the remaining word (in this instance, “BARK”) may refer to a specifi c operation or recruited sou

22 Alfred W. McCoy, “Cruel Science: CIA Torture and U.S. Foreign Policy,” The New Eng

Journal of Public Policy (Winter 2005): 209-262. 23 Central Intelligence Agency, KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation, Washington

1963, 1; available at http://www.parascope.com/articles/0397/kubark06.htm. Hereafter cite

KUBARK. 24 KUBARK, 85.
97

• Psychological Set. In the context of a debriefi ng, the debr

source have essentially committed to the primary, share

producing actionable intelligence, even though each may 

by dramatically different personal objectives. The deb

the fulfi llment of tasked intelligence collection objective

source may act out of a sense of patriotism (e.g., a le

reporting information learned while traveling abroad) or m

preferential treatment from government authorities (e.g., a 

the course of an interrogation, both parties approach the int

different — and at times widely confl icting — sets of exp

objectives. While the interrogator may share the debriefer’

obtaining actionable intelligence, he or she may expect to 

source who seeks to resist, withhold, distort, and deceive.

• Physical Setting. A legal traveler, in essence, submits volu

questioning of the debriefer, and reserves the right (in most 

end the session and depart at any time. It is therefore in th

best interest to make the experience a positive one for th

contrast, an interrogator enjoys a signifi cant degree of con

movement of the source, the duration of the encounter, a

degree of liberty available to the source (at that momen

immediate future). The interrogator has the option of lever

control over these factors — in the form of the “threat” 

detention or the “reward” of early release or expanded priv

means of infl uencing the source’s responsiveness to questio

Focus on Communist Methods of Interrogation

The intelligence service which is able to bring pertinent, mod

knowledge to bear upon its problems enjoys huge advanta

over a service which conducts its clandestine busines

eighteenth century fashion. It is true that American psycholog

have devoted somewhat more attention to Commu

interrogation techniques, particularly “brainwashing,” 

to U.S. practices. Yet they have conducted scientifi c inqu

into many subjects that are closely related to interrogation

effects of debility and isolation, the polygraph, reactions to p

and fear, hypnosis, and heightened suggestibility.26

25 Legal travelers are individuals who may lawfully travel to a foreign country 

personal, or government purposes who may be debriefed upon their return by a repr

Intelligence Community for information of intelligence interest obtained in the norm

offi cial duties or personal activities. Legal travelers are not tasked (offi cially requeste

collect information. 26 KUBARK, 2.
98

been undertaken to better prepare U.S. intelligence personnel for their impor

role in gleaning critical intelligence data from enemy prisoners and detain

The reasons for this omission remain unknown.

Operating with a dearth of research in support of offensive interroga

methodology, the writers of the KUBARK manual appear to have fo

themselves in a situation not unlike that experienced by interrogation perso

today. In essence, KUBARK’s coercive methods refl ected concepts derived f

research into hostile methods — government research carried out specifi c

to help identify effective countermeasures — and then “reverse enginee

selected principles to meet operational requirements. It is interesting to note 

the KUBARK manual (and the methods it proposes) was substantially infor

by studies conducted by Albert Biderman, a sociologist and principal investig

for an Air Force Offi ce of Scientifi c Research contract to review literature on 

stresses associated with captivity.27

In large measure, the abuses — alleged or actual — perpetrated by 

interrogation personnel since the advent of the war on terror can be expla

(albeit not defended) by the very same dynamic. With interrogation doct

refl ecting little change from the 1960s and producing few substantial succe

in the current battlespace, commanders, operators, and intelligence offi cers h

sought an alternative. In considering options, it became readily apparent that 

experts in Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) were the “only o

game in town.”

While offensive and defensive interrogation operations have much in comm

there are intractable differences. Defensive interrogation training is designe

help U.S. personnel withstand the unique stresses of all manner of exploita

— including the employment of coercive methods — to protect information 

avoid becoming pawns in an adversary’s attempt to generate useful propaga

To prepare personnel for this substantial challenge, resistance training s

to create a systematic threat environment to achieve “stress inoculation.” T

includes exposing trainees to intensive role-played interrogation scenarios

the course of many years of experience in such practical exercises, many of 

resistance instructors have become accomplished role-play interrogators.

However, there are three fundamental reasons why experience as a resista

instructor does not necessarily prepare someone for service as an intellige

interrogator. First, resistance instructors — portraying interrogators from pote

adversarial nations that have shown disregard for international convention on 

treatment of prisoners — routinely employ a wide range of coercive meth

that often fall well outside Geneva Convention guidelines. Second, altho

questioning is an important element of the role-play exercise, this activity d

27 KUBARK, 110–111. 
99

employment of resistance instructors in interrogation — whether a

or as practitioners — is an example of the proverbial attempt to pla

peg in the round hole. (NOTE: In the months after 11 September 

operations personnel, many of whom have received resistance tr

quick to request interrogation support from the SERE commun

well-entrenched memories of the skill and polish of resistance instr

intense role-play scenarios.)28

The Objective of an Interrogation: Information or Confession? 

[U]nlike a police interrogation, the [intelligence] interroga

is not aimed at causing the interrogatee to incriminate him

as a means of bringing him to trial. Admissions of complicity 

not...ends in themselves but merely preludes to the acquisi

of more information.29

While interrogations conducted to support law enforcement ob

many similarities to those designed strictly to satisfy intelligence 

there are several subtle yet important differences. The method

within each context are essentially interchangeable, with discernibl

identifi able only in nuance. At the same time, the fundamental o

be strikingly different. From a process perspective, the ultimate 

the interrogation will inform — and signifi cantly infl uence — the 

employed.

The confession that can be such a monumental achievemen

enforcement world is often of little interest to the Intelligence 

Conversely, the exhaustive detail necessary to support subsequen

analysis and production often ranges far beyond that needed to suppor

While law enforcement seeks to establish responsibility, the 

Community seeks to exploit knowledgeability. In sum, law enforcem

to understand the past; intelligence attempts to probe the future.

Other key differences must be clearly understood. Law 

offi cials must adhere to federal and state laws pertaining to rights o

(including legal representation and the right to remain silent), 

evidence, investigative parameters established by the prosecution

on the duration of custody. In contrast, the activities of intelligence 

governed by international and federal guidelines pertaining to the 

prisoners, priority intelligence requirements, the need to manage 

28 During his recall to active duty from June 2003 to January 2005, the auth

Department of Defense Senior Intelligence Offi cer for Special Survival Training. 29 KUBARK, 4–5. 
100

As noted previously, what ultimately informs the methodology emplo

to collect data from a source is, in large measure, the nature of the informa

sought. It is critical, then, to understand the vital differences between gathe

information to support a criminal case and gathering information to sup

foreign intelligence production.

Criminal Case Foreign Intelligence

Objective: Conviction Understanding

Standard: Legal Code Analytical Methodology

Limits: Rules of Evidence None30

Protections: Fifth Amendment None31

Confession: Considerable Value Relative Value32

An analysis of these critical factors would suggest that interrogators opera

in support of foreign intelligence requirements be afforded a considerably gre

degree of fl exibility than law enforcement personnel. While the two interroga

contexts have numerous areas of commonality, it is imperative that the strate

tactics, and techniques developed for each refl ect the differences between th

Without this understanding, the potential exists for signifi cant error in applica

and practice.

One explanation for this can be found in the specifi city principle. Ari

from studies in the fi eld of kinesiology (the science of human movement), 

specifi city principle suggests that the closer two activities are to one anothe

without becoming the same activity — the more practice in one will degrade s

in the other. To borrow an example from sports, the individual who plays soft

and also participates in a bowling league (activities that require vastly diffe

skill sets) would not fi nd his or her skill in one sport impaired by participa

in the other. Conversely, the individual who plays both racquetball and squ

would likely encounter diffi culties in transitioning from one activity to the o

especially in areas such as strategy, timing, and focus. It is precisely in the a

of strategy, timing, and focus that law enforcement and intelligence interroga

are critically different.

30 Any and all information collected by the U.S. Intelligence Community outside the United S

from non-U.S. Persons may be used for intelligence analytical purposes. 31 While the Constitution of the United States specifi cally protects individuals from unreaso

searches and self-incrimination, the non-U.S. Person intelligence source does not enjoy these 

protections. 32 A “confession” obtained from an intelligence source only has value to the extent that it establ

direct access to the information reported. For intelligence purposes, the other interrogatives (e.g.

how, how many, when again) are more important than confi rmation of an individual “who.”
101

be desirable in an interrogator...perhaps the four qualifi cat

of chief importance to the interrogator are 1) enough operati

training and experience to permit quick recognition of le

2) real familiarity with the language to be used; 3) exten

background knowledge about the interrogatee’s native coun

and 4) a genuine understanding of the source as a person...of 

four traits listed, a genuine insight into the source’s chara

and motives is perhaps most important but least common.33

The human intelligence (HUMINT) career fi eld has long empl

psychological testing protocols (e.g., Minnesota Multiphasic Persona

California Psychological Inventory, etc.), in conjunction with 

background investigations, in an effort to both identify those candid

inherent aptitude and/or personality profi le for a given operational 

to screen out those who would likely prove ill-suited and/or ill-equ

profession. A similar psychological screening protocol (without the 

investigation) has been employed in the SERE career fi eld in an effor

those candidates with the highest apparent probability for acting 

or abusively while interacting with students during intensive practi

For application to the interrogation discipline, a critical underpin

screening efforts is the availability of a “model” of a successful inter

it is unlikely that a properly vetted model exists.

While identifying effective methods and processes is a key el

Intelligence Science Board’s EI project mandate, designing a means 

candidates with the highest potential for success in implementing th

and processes is of equal importance. Research in this regard shou

informed by the following three considerations:

• Those in hierarchical authoritarian structures have a docume

to engage in what appears to be “acceptable” inhumane beh

others, as demonstrated in the famous “Stanford University 

(Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo, 1973).

• Dr. Howard Gardner’s seminal work on multiple intelligen

that certain people might be naturally gifted with uncom

and aptitudes in various areas, including (for EI purposes) in

intelligence (the capacity to understand the intentions, 

and desires of other people) and intrapersonal intel

capacity to understand oneself, to appreciate one’s feelin

motivations).34

33 KUBARK, 10 11. 

34 See, for example Howard Gardner, Ph.D., Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multi

(New York: BasicBooks, 1983). 
102

reliably measured remains to be seen. 

 The “Magic” of Rapport:35 The Emotional Component 

of Interrogation

One general observation is introduced now, however, because it 

is considered basic to the establishment of rapport, upon which 

the success of non-coercive interrogation depends...The skilled 

interrogator can save a great deal of time by understanding the 

emotional needs of the interrogatee. Most people confronted by 

an offi cial — and dimly powerful — representative of a foreign 

power will get down to cases much faster if made to feel, from 

the start, that they are being treated as individuals.36

Despite the impressive success achieved by interrogators who have mast

the skill of effectively establishing rapport with a source — the celebr

Luftwaffe interrogator Hanns Scharff37 providing but one well-known exam

— methods for rapport-building continue to receive relatively little attentio

current interrogation training programs. There seems to be an unfounded 

widespread presumption that all persons inherently possess the skills neces

for building rapport and therefore do not require any supplemental trainin

hone this ability. While the KUBARK manual has gained a degree of inf

through its association with coercive means, it also, in an interesting strok

irony, consistently emphasizes the value of rapport-building as an essential 

for the interrogator.

The devaluation of rapport — that is, building an operational accord w

a source — as an effective means of gaining compliance from a resistant so

is in large measure the product of the misguided public debate over the rol

interrogation in the Global War on Terror, one that seems invariably to fo

on the “ticking bomb” scenario. The point can be safely made that for e

instance where a source might have information about an imminent, catastro

terrorist event, there are hundreds (possibly thousands) of interrogations w

the information requirements are far less urgent and the opportunity exists f

35 Rapport is one of the interrogator’s most powerful tools in gaining a source’s cooperati

must be made clear that, in the context of an interrogation, the term “rapport” is not limited to the 

of friendship that builds between two individuals (although this may actually occur over the c

of an extended interrogation). For the purposes of this paper, the term will be used to imply a 

in which a degree of accord, conformity, and or/affi nity is present within a relationship. Source: 

Richardson, The Magic of Rapport (Capitola, CA: Meta Publications, 1987), 13. 36 KUBARK, 11.

37 Raymond F. Toliver, The Interrogator: The Story of Hanns Joachim Scharff, Master Interro

of the Luftwaffe (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, Ltd., 1997). 
103

to tell me what he knows?’38 rather than ‘How can I trap him in

what he knows?’” 39 Operational accord seeks to effectively, albei

the source’s cooperation and maintain that productive relationship f

possible without betraying indicators of manipulation or exploitatio

of the interrogator.

One constructive paradigm for interrogation, yet one that is rare

views it in terms of a recruitment (or even, perhaps, a seduction). Re

basic defi nition of interrogation noted at the beginning of this pap

of no more than obtaining needed information through responses 

To achieve that objective, one can “pull” (i.e., elicit compliance) o

coerce capitulation). While the former is likely to obtain informa

often exceed the interrogator’s expressed scope of interest — as the 

possesses both greater depth and breadth of knowledgeability than th

might assume — the latter will, in the best of circumstances, 

information responding to questions directly asked. Even then the 

will often be limited to the minimum necessary to satisfy the interro

Effectively establishing an operational accord with a source — e

cross-cultural setting — must become a major component of interro

and included in that problem set of necessary yet diffi cult to defi ne, 

train skills needed by all HUMINT operators. A review of studies in 

confl ict resolution and relationship-building under competitive c

(e.g., sales, counseling, negotiation, etc.) can provide a meaningful 

from which to launch original research for specifi c application in the 

context.

Reliability of Casual Observation 

Great attention has been given to the degree to which persons 

able to make judgments from casual observations regarding 

personality characteristics of another...the level of reliab

in judgments is so low that research encounters diffi cu

when it seeks to determine who makes better judgments...

interrogator is likely to overestimate his ability to judge ot

than to underestimate it, especially if he has had little o

training in modern psychology.40

The reliability of casual observations made by interrogators has t

unchallenged. Unfortunately, the fact that someone is a “trained” in

38 The term “want” in this context refers to creating conditions that make coopera

an attractive, even self-serving alternative for the source rather than a characterizatio

efforts to escape physical or psychological force. 39 KUBARK, 12. 

40 KUBARK, 12–13. 
104

While extensive and consistent experience in interrogation can off

person the opportunity to develop above-average assessment skills, this ab

is contingent upon several important factors. First, each assessment mus

subsequently evaluated to determine validity (once additional corroboratin

contradicting information is available) and the method(s) used explicitly descr

deconstructed, and recorded to defi nitively capture that cause and effect 

future study and possible employment. Second, the key processes used in a g

assessment should be examined, evaluated, and corroborated or discredited 

trained behavioral science professionals. Finally, the individual interrogator m

be suffi ciently disciplined to avoid drawing unsupported, possibly self-ser

conclusions as to his or her assessment skills. In this regard, it would be helpfu

keep in mind the caveat set forth in the KUBARK manual: An interrogation is 

a game played by two people, one to become the winner and the other the los

Assessment, in the context of interrogation, is a multi-dimensional con

The interrogator must be able to effectively — and accurately — assess a sour

emotional state, psychological set, veracity, and knowledgeability. Individ

cannot attain the ability to meet such a broad-based challenge successfull

a single, even months-long training course. Training in assessment must b

early in an interrogator’s professional preparation and be followed by continu

study, research, and practice. Although a considerable body of knowledge alre

exists in this area and could be profi tably mined for supporting techniques 

procedures, new and original studies of assessment in the unique contex

interrogation are needed. 

Analytical Support to Interrogation

The interrogator should be supported whenever possible by 

qualifi ed analysts’ review of his daily “take;” experience has 

shown that such a review will raise questions to be put and 

points to be clarifi ed and lead to a thorough coverage of the 

subject in hand.41

In prosecuting the Global War on Terror, the targets of primary inte

from both an operational and intelligence perspective are terrorism’s cri

centers of gravity: fi nancing, transportation, logistics, communications, and 

havens. Just as it would not be reasonable to expect any single analyst to b

accomplished subject matter expert in more than one (or possibly two) of th

areas, it should not be assumed that any single interrogator can be prepare

explore the full knowledgeability of sources who have information pertainin

these key target areas. It is therefore important for interrogators to have on-sc

analytical support for precisely the purposes identifi ed in the above quotation

41 KUBARK, 13.
105

systems fell short of what would be required of a world-class effor

the World War II Joint Interrogation Center at Fort Hunt, VA, inclu

analytical support annex that was shaped by, and expanded in res

specifi c needs of the interrogation cadre. As a result, interrogato

to design highly productive lines of questioning, effectively detec

deception, and often obtain compliance from prisoners as a result of t

of dominant knowledge (a graphic example of Cialdini’s authority 

persuasion42).

Interrogation centers would be well-served by the support o

analytical cell staffed with bona fi de subject matter experts and c

exploit secure information systems that would facilitate real-time ac

intelligence centers. This would have a considerable positive im

ultimate value of the intelligence products generated at the fi eld lev

historical precedent, this is clearly an eminently achievable goal.

 Psychological Assessment: Categorizing Sources by Personality 

The number of systems devised for categorizing human be

is large, and most of them are of dubious validity.43

Every interrogator knows that a real understanding of 

individual is worth far more than a thorough knowledge of 

or that pigeon-hole to which he has been consigned. And 

interrogation purposes, the ways in which he differs from 

abstract type may be more signifi cant than the ways in w

he conforms.44

The pursuit of a valid means of quickly and accurately assessi

psychological set — presumably with the objective of identifyin

for expeditiously obtaining compliance in the form of meaningfu

pertinent questions — has been something of a search for the Holy 

world of interrogation. This quest raises three fundamental question

• Is it possible to conduct a meaningful psychological ass

resistant source?

• Would such an assessment provide substantial assist

interrogation of that source?

• Would the administration of such testing violate governing 

standards of ethics?

42 Robert B. Cialdini, Ph.D., Infl uence: The Psychology of Persuasion (New York: 

1993), 208-236. 43 KUBARK, 19.

44 KUBARK, 20.
106

intriguing possibilities. As the quotations above indicate, the KUBARK ma

appears to dismiss the potential of in-depth assessment, noting that an interrog

“does not dispose of the time or personnel to probe the depths of each sour

individuality.”45 Instead, it suggests some form of categorizing sources b

on observations made in early rounds of interrogation. Even then, the manu

quick to emphasize that this method, “like other interrogation aids, [is] a sch

of categories [that] is useful only if recognized for what it is — a set of labels 

facilitate communication but are not the same as the persons thus labeled.”46

In contrast, at least one account would appear to support the concept 

formal program for assessing sources. According to Orrin DeForest, a 

intelligence offi cer and interrogator during the Vietnam War, psycholog

testing was employed with signifi cant success. The test, based on work condu

by Dr. John Gittinger, sought to measure IQ in addition to three other compon

of personality refl ected in demonstrated propensities toward Externalizin

Internalizing, Regulation or Flexibility, and Role Adaptivity or Role Uniformi

This test was administered to the interrogator and interpreter staff (and use

design tailored training programs and subsequent assignments) as well as to 

Vietcong undergoing interrogation. According to DeForest’s account, this 

proved consistently effective and a valuable supplemental tool used in conjunc

with other creative systems for interrogation.48

Perhaps the most important role psychological testing can play in interroga

is as a means for enhancing communication and accord between two peo

anything beyond this would be an unexpected windfall. If a current or emer

testing protocol would prove valid in accurately measuring a relevant compo

of the source’s personality — and thereby assisting the interrogator to desig

effective means of approach — it would offer an important alternative that c

help stem the trend of default to coercion that has occurred too often in the co

of dealing with a resistant high-value source.

Screening: Overlooking a Critical Phase of the Exploitation Process

The purpose of screening is to provide the interrogator, in 

advance, with a reading on the type and characteristics of the 

interrogatee...even a preliminary estimate, if valid, can be a 

boon to the interrogator because it will permit him to start with 

45 KUBARK, 20.

46 KUBARK, 20.

47 Orrin DeForest, Slow Burn: The Rise and Bitter Fall of American Intelligence in Vietnam 

York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 62-65. 48 Some observers might fi nd it curious that a source would voluntarily submit to psycholo

testing, yet this is precisely what occurred. This seemingly inexplicable compliance may be a r

of a “conditioned refl ex” to completing the ubiquitous paperwork intractably associated with mil

paramilitary service. 
107

An estimate of whether the interrogatee will be coopera

or recalcitrant is essential to planning because very diffe

methods are used in dealing with these two types. I

recommended that screening be conducted whenever perso

and facilities permit.49

In strategic and operational settings, where depth and accuracy o

take precedence over timeliness, screening is a critical compo

overall interrogation process. Every effort must be made not only 

knowledgeability and cooperation of the source, but — of suprem

— to vet the individual in a manner that provides the interrogator 

degree of confi dence in the source’s identity.

This point, while seemingly obvious, has proven anything but 

of current interrogation operations. From the detention center in Gua

Cuba, to Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, to various interrogation fac

reports abound of prisoners held in detention and interrogated at le

of mistaken identifi cation. Several factors contribute to this unfortun

including diffi culties in transcribing names from Arabic, Pashto, a

English; classic cross-cultural misunderstandings; and a high-thr

environment that leads many to err on the side of capture rather than 

Whatever the causative factor, properly conducted screenin

can make a signifi cant contribution on two important fronts. F

counterinsurgency perspective, false identifi cation and internment 

an already tenuous relationship between an occupying power and th

population. The false imprisonment of even a single individual 

profound shift in the insurgent/counterinsurgent dynamic as evid

French experience in Indochina and Algeria and the U.S. experienc

and Iraq. Each instance of mistaken imprisonment, especially if it in

form of mistreatment, shifts those who previously supported the fore

toward a more neutral position, those who formerly were neutral m

support the insurgents, and the insurgents may adopt a more milita

one made all the more robust by a sudden infl ux of new supporters an

This untoward cascading effect can be relatively simple to preven

establishment of a vigorous screening program that systematically 

innocent while identifying those of genuine intelligence interest.

Second, from an interrogation perspective, a proper screening 

to ensure the effi cient allocation of available assets — interrogators

and analysts — to those sources with the greatest potential knowled

one historical example, the U.S. strategic interrogation program in 

World War II (MIS-Y) employed a multi-tiered screening process 

49 KUBARK, 30–33. 
108

Theater, and upon disembarkation in the United States. Only those prisoners 

had been assessed as being of the highest value were ultimately interrogate

the Fort Hunt Joint Interrogation Center. Ahead of its time in managerial acu

MIS-Y effectively used the “80/20” principle to better focus its consider

resources on that small segment of the EPW population able to meet the m

pressing intelligence information requirements of the war effort.

The later stages of the screening process were informed by guidelines 

methods taught by MIS-Y personnel. The last stage almost always included d

examination by MIS-Y interrogators before fi nal determination of the EP

status. In this regard, it is important to note that the MIS-Y personnel involve

the screening process were experienced interrogators. In contrast, the KUBA

manual recommends that “screening should be conducted by interviewers, 

interrogators.”50

Chess in the Real World

No two interrogations are the same. Every interrogation is 

shaped defi nitively by the personality of the source — and 

of the interrogator, because interrogation is an intensely 

interpersonal process. The whole purpose of screening and a 

major purpose of the fi rst stage of interrogation are to probe 

the strengths and weaknesses of the subject. Only when these 

have been established and understood does it become possible 

to plan realistically.51

Building upon the fundamental defi nition of interrogation noted previo

the KUBARK manual provides a conceptual perspective on interrogation — 

of an “intensely interpersonal process” — that offers invaluable clues in 

search for relevant supporting research and methodologies. Social scientists h

rigorously studied other intensely interpersonal processes — counseling 

therapy, negotiation, sales, confl ict mediation, and even formal debate, to n

but a few. Within the myriad studies investigating the dynamics involved in th

activities, one is likely to uncover concepts with direct application to interroga

and/or useful protocols for designing studies on the interrogation process.

The KUBARK manual also challenges interrogators to view each sourc

unique, therefore requiring judicious planning and a fl exible approach tailore

that individual’s specifi c strengths and weaknesses. This is especially impor

for those interrogators who run default programs comprising a limited a

of approaches that have worked well in the past on a dramatically diffe

50 KUBARK, 30.

51 KUBARK, 38.
109

little-understood culture and linguistic background. While a studie

of culture is important in planning for the exploitation of a given 

newfound understanding can also cause the interrogator to catch onl

overtones and miss the individual nuances that would prove critic

compliance.

The effort to build a useful model of the interrogation proces

with a conceptual framework. Important components of that fra

fl exibility, individuality, and constant adaptability. Inherent in th

philosophy is the requirement to search for general trends and indiv

commonalities and unique differences.

Ultimately, the successful model must generate an effective 

successful performance in keeping with the Law of Requisite Variet

drawn from the study of cybernetics with remarkable application t

of interrogation.52 Cybernetic theory suggests that in the competi

two processes within a closed system, the one with greater varie

will be successful. Applying the Law of Requisite Variety to the c

interrogation, the individual with the larger number of available 

strategies, behaviors, etc.) should prevail. It is therefore of great im

the interrogator always have at least one more method of leveraging 

than the source has for resisting.53

Saving Face: Helping the Source to Concede

Another key to the successful interrogation of the resis

source is the provision of an acceptable rationalization 

yielding. As regression proceeds, almost all resisters feel 

growing internal stress that results from wanting simultaneo

to conceal and divulge...To escape the mounting tension, 

source may grasp at any face-saving reason for complian

any explanation which will placate both his own conscie

and the possible wrath of former superiors and associat

he is returned to [his place of origin]. It is the business of 

interrogator to provide the right rationalization at the right 

Here too the importance of understanding the interrogate

evident; the right rationalization must be an excuse or rea

that is tailored to the source’s personality.54

52 Essentially, the Law of Requisite Variety states that the greater the va

available to a control system, the larger the variety of perturbations (i.e.

its control) for which it is able to compensate. (Source: Principia Cyberne

http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/REQVAR.html ) 53 Richardson, The Magic of Rapport, 15-17. 54 KUBARK, 41.
110

diffi cult (and unattractive) as possible for the source to resist and/or make it as 

(and attractive) as possible for the source to cooperate. Choice of the compo

upon which to focus is driven by both individual and contextual factors. W

regard to the former, the interrogator must judiciously select the strategy 

presents the greatest promise of success given a specifi c source — a decision b

on extended observation and assessment. At the same time, the choice of stra

should enable the interrogator to most effectively leverage his or her pers

strengths, professional experience, skills in the range of interrogation tradec

and language ability. Concurrently, a number of circumstantial variables m

be assiduously considered, to include the time available for the interrogation 

series of interrogations), the nature of the existing information requirements

physical setting, and the operational/intelligence information available about 

source, his organization, and activities. The calculus involved represents a su

of the KUBARK concept noted above.

From a social science perspective, this dynamic suggests the possib

of several behavioral theories at work, including approach/avoidance (Le

1935)55 and bind-strain (Milgram, 1974).56 Exploration of these two theories 

perhaps others) might explain, at least in part, the compliance-resistance dilem

facing the source, and uncover methods for shaping the source’s behavior.

The Alternative Question57 methodology frequently employed in 

enforcement interrogations specifi cally seeks to present the source with w

the KUBARK manual describes as an “acceptable rationalization for yield

Offering an attractive option other than outright confession to a heinous cr

the alternative question allows the source to “save face” by agreeing with 

interrogator’s characterization of the criminal behavior as inherently positiv

intent or objective.58

While often effective in eliciting a confession, the alternative ques

method may be problematic when it comes to collecting intelligence informa

In presenting a source with two possible “alternatives” (e.g., “Did you plan to 

C4 or Semtex as the explosive in that device?”), the interrogator runs the ris

55 As fi rst described by Dr. Kurt Lewin, approach-avoidance confl ict results from the stre

simultaneous attraction to and repulsion by the same goal. 56 In Dr. Stanley Milgram’s Model of Obedience, individuals may bind to an authority fi 

through reinforcing acts of obedience (and thereby externalize responsibility for specifi c acts), ye

encounter role strain when that obedient behavior becomes uncomfortable (e.g., when the acts vi

the individual’s personal moral values or when bringing harm to another contradicts the individ

self-image). 57 An alternative question is a question that presents two or more possible answers and presupp

that only one is true. 58 An example of an alternative question might be, “Did you start the fi re at your company bec

you wanted to hurt people or as a way of calling attention to the fact that your contributions t

company have been consistently ignored for many years and you felt you had no other options avai

to you?” Regardless of how an individual responds, there is an admission of guilt. 
111

knowledge, without the benefi t of clues or restrictions contained in 

 A Systematic Approach to Interrogation: More Than the 

Sum of Its Parts

Therefore, it is wrong to open [an] interrogation experimen

intending to abandon unfruitful approaches one by one u

a sound method is discovered by chance. The failures of 

interrogator, his painful retreats from blind alleys, bolster 

confi dence of the source and increase his ability to resist. W

the interrogator is struggling to learn from the subject the f

that should have been established before the interroga

started, the subject is learning more and more about 

interrogator.59

This passage contains an exceptionally important warning, 

interrogator must always keep in mind: while the interrogator is w

listening to) the source, the source is watching (and listening to) the 

The interrogator often enters the interrogation with two distinc

First, sources may be suffering from the shock of capture that und

psychological and emotional stability (often causing them to say a

against their own interests). Second, while a long-serving intelli

may have the experience of dozens of interrogations behind him 

often the source’s maiden voyage into this uncertain territory. The 

can quickly surrender these advantages, however, by approachin

in a hesitant, indecisive manner. This false start can be largely avo

careful planning.

The MIS-Y interrogators of the Joint Interrogation Center routi

six hours in preparation for every hour spent in the actual interr

prisoner. Their approaches, including alternatives, were carefully 

the basis of extensive observation and assessment of the source. In

of pertinent military, technical, economic, and/or political material

interrogators to demonstrate a solid understanding of the topics r

the interrogation (contributing to the development of Cialdini’s aut

They were similarly prepared to question the source systematically, 

ability to consistently and logically follow up on new avenues of in

unfolded. Not only did this disciplined operating procedure enhan

and breadth of the information collected, but it also facilitated a stro

control over the source. Opportunities for the prisoner to gain confi de

miscues of an ill-prepared interrogator were rare.

59 KUBARK, 42.
112

desired would be threatening or damaging in any way to the 

interests of the interrogatee.60

Resistance to questioning is the primary barrier to entry in the contex

interrogation. The challenge to the interrogator is to manage resistance effecti

while systematically working to overcome it.

As an interrogator explores a given source’s range of knowledgeability

or she must be judicious in framing questions while concomitantly concea

the true focus of intelligence interest. One productive approach is to concent

initially on areas that do not appear to provoke concern, and therefore resista

on the part of the source. This requires shrewd questioning by the interrog

In essence, shrewd questioning demands that the interrogator carefully cons

the possible range of answers and responses (emotional and/or psychologica

question may elicit before it is asked, and selectively postpone asking the m

provocative questions until later in the process.

Posing potentially provocative questions in the course of developing rapp

accord with a source (or doing so too quickly after such an operational relation

has been established) can seriously — and at times irreversibly — underm

that cooperative relationship. In addition, drawing upon Cialdini’s concep

the consistency principle,61 it is important to avoid creating a situation where 

source has the opportunity to formally assume a resistance posture either by w

or deed. If allowed to do so, Cialdini’s research would suggest that the so

might be under additional self-induced pressure to remain consistent in his or 

defi ance.62

 Capturing the Advantages of Technology: Monitoring Interrogations

Arrangements are usually made to record the interrogation, 

transmit it to another room, or do both. Most experienced 

interrogators do not like to take notes. Not being saddled with 

this chore leaves them free to concentrate on what sources say, 

how they say it, and what else they do while talking or listening. 

Another reason for avoiding note-taking is that it distracts and 

sometimes worries the interrogatee. In the course of several 

sessions conducted without note-taking, the subject is likely to 

fall into the comfortable illusion that he is not talking for the 

record.63

60 KUBARK, 44.

61 The consistency principle suggests that if individuals make an expressed commitment — 

word or by action — toward a goal or idea, they are more likely to honor that commitment. 62 Cialdini, 57–113.

63 KUBARK, 46. 
113

faithfully incorporated in formal reporting. In a bygone era, taking n

only realistic option. The information age, however, which makes a

array of technical devices available to surreptitiously capture the 

images of an interrogation, presents the interrogator with a host 

options that yield signifi cant operational benefi ts.

As noted above, the simple act of taking notes provides the s

graphic reminder of the interrogator’s primary goal — the collection 

intelligence — despite the well-orchestrated approaches designed to 

intent. In addition, when the interrogator appears to make note only 

pertaining to certain topics, this not only transmits to the source an 

what is important to the interrogator, but also strongly hints at what th

does and does not know.

There are myriad reasons to employ monitoring, audiovisual re

transcription technology to relieve the interrogator of this count

burden, from the ability to accurately capture the information pro

source to the opportunity to carefully analyze the source’s behavi

providing a visual record of events to guard against the mistreatmen

(and unfounded allegations of prisoner abuse). In contrast, there 

compelling reason for interrogators not to avail themselves of th

(where available). The promise of technology, in the form of fi el

recording equipment and well-designed, well-equipped, long-term 

facilities, should be expeditiously embraced. The return on inves

likely be extraordinary. 
114

to function at two levels. He is trying to do two seemingly 

contradictory things at once: achieve rapport with the subject 

but remain an essentially detached observer. Or he may project 

himself to the resistant interrogatee as powerful and ominous (in 

order to eradicate resistance and create the necessary conditions 

for rapport) while remaining wholly uncommitted at the deeper 

level, noting the signifi cance of the subject’s reactions and the 

effectiveness of his own performance. Poor interrogators often 

confuse this bi-level functioning with role-playing, but there 

is a vital difference. The interrogator who merely pretends, in 

his surface performance, to feel a given emotion or to hold a 

given attitude toward the source is likely to be unconvincing; 

the source quickly senses the deception.64

Once again, the KUBARK manual eloquently captures the essence of 

internal dynamic of the accomplished interrogator. Reaching this state of alm

unconscious competence requires a consistent regimen of training, experie

refl ection, and peer review that can take years.

A likely factor driving the progressive “dumbing down” of interrogation 

interrogation training in the United States has been the ubiquitous treatment o

craft in movies and Hollywood. Viewers are treated to endless examples of 

calculating, quick-witted interrogator who can rapidly assess the vulnerabilitie

the source/prisoner and instantaneously devise and orchestrate an approach 

almost immediately leverages compliance. Of course, what the viewer does 

see (or, therefore, remember) is that these fi ve-minute long vignettes are caref

scripted and repeatedly rehearsed. The actors do not deal with a constant c

of unknowns, nor are they asked to remain joined in the intense interpers

exchange for hours, perhaps days, on end. It is critical that this artifi cial and o

unrealistic view of interrogation not be allowed to infl uence doctrine for the 

world.

Pressures and the Non-Coercive Interrogation Model

The term non-coercive is used...to denote methods of 

interrogation that are not based upon the coercion of an unwilling 

subject through the employment of superior force originating 

outside himself. However, the non-coercive interrogation is 

not conducted without pressure. On the contrary, the goal is to 

generate maximum pressure, or at least as much as is needed 

to induce compliance. The difference is that the pressure is 

64 KUBARK, 48. 
115

The concept of “pressure” is an elusive one to capture in a man

universal acceptance. For this reason, the term itself has played a 

misunderstood role with respect to allegations of prisoner mistreatm

be illustrated in the following recurring scenario:

A senior commander, whose forces have engaged a challen

insurgent adversary, rightfully seeks to gain every avail

advantage, including that possible through timely and tail

intelligence gathered from recently captured detain

Interrogators, diligently employing the U.S. Army tac

interrogation model—one designed for a more conventi

military paradigm—encounter diffi culties in obtaining 

desired intelligence information from suspected terro

captured insurgents, and other high-value detainees. In 

highly charged environment, commanders direct interroga

to “increase the pressure” on the prisoners without additi

guidance as to how that order might be acted upon. Opera

without advanced training in the needed interroga

tradecraft and lacking guidance from doctrine tailored to 

circumstances, some interrogators (the majority of wh

are young and relatively inexperienced) interpret the orde

“increase the pressure” as meaning anything from extending 

length of interrogations to pushing (and at times exceeding) 

envelope of accepted methods. In a small number of cases, 

interpreted as meaning increased physicality.

In the context of an interrogation, myriad environmental factors 

pressure (i.e., stress) within an individual. At the same time, it is imp

the KUBARK manual suggests — not to overlook the infl uence of 

self-induced pressures. For the purposes of this paper, self-induced p

be defi ned as those resulting from an individual’s interpretation of

response to, events, both real and imagined. Understanding this 

challenge for the interrogator is to skillfully (and carefully) man

of pressure in a manner that moves the interrogation toward it

objectives.

Nonetheless, pressure is an exceedingly diffi cult quality 

accurately, especially on the exclusive basis of external observatio

degrees of diffi culty are introduced by the cultural and linguistic ba

almost always present in an interrogation setting, individual response

current levels of physical and emotional health, and time held in dete

this complex matrix, interrogators fi nd themselves walking a v

65 KUBARK, 52. 
116

part of the source. 

If the application and management of pressure are inherent components o

interrogation process, interrogators require a far more sophisticated understan

of the dynamics involved and more useful methods for accurately identifying 

measuring that pressure. Cross-cultural studies are of great interest in this re

as an interrogator must, at the very least, appreciate the culturally based press

a given source will likely encounter as he or she decides whether to coopera

resist.

Deconstructing Resistance

Most resistant interrogatees block off access to signifi cant 

[intelligence] in their possession for one or more of four reasons. 

The fi rst is a specifi c negative reaction to the interrogator...The 

second cause is that some sources are resistant “by nature”— 

i.e., by early conditioning — to any compliance with authority. 

The third is that the subject believes that the information sought 

will be damaging or incriminating for him personally, that 

cooperation with the interrogator will have consequences more 

painful for him than the results of non-cooperation. The fourth 

is ideological resistance. The source has identifi ed himself with 

a cause, a political movement or organization...Regardless of 

his attitude toward the interrogator, his own personality, and 

his fears for the future, the person who is deeply devoted to 

a hostile cause will ordinarily prove strongly resistant under 

interrogation.66

“If you know your enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the re

of a hundred battles. But, if you know yourself but not the enemy, for e

victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.” This timeless observation from 

renowned strategist Sun Tzu is as true in the interrogation room as it is on 

battlefi eld. An interrogator acting upon this counsel would be reasonably expe

to spend considerable time in identifying and deconstructing the source’s resis

posture and strategies. Unfortunately, current interrogation training — and 

the subsequent interrogation processes employed in the fi eld — fail to in

suffi cient time and energy in this important area.

Sales professionals and clandestine case offi cers are well-schooled 

identifying areas of resistance and quickly designing a strategy for overcom

that resistance. The interrogator must be similarly skilled. And while resista

66 KUBARK, 53–54. 
117

The KUBARK manual correctly notes the substantial role 

affi liation and commitment can play in a source’s resistance post

instances (e.g., Al Qaeda), the source may be a product of years of fu

religious schooling (e.g., the madrassas), where intense, rote learn

students’ minds with selected passages from spiritual texts. In the c

training, they have embraced the “belief” that their cause is divi

(which can place the interrogator on the side of “evil”). The inability t

this resistance posture remains a major hurdle in the current war 

The development of a useful counterstrategy will need to be inform

understanding of the target cultures, ideologies, and languages to be 

effective.67

While much of the resistance posed by sources is ad hoc in 

cannot overlook the role of formalized resistance training. As the 

Qaeda Manual attests, that organization has compiled a systema

strategy for employment by operatives taken into custody.68 The im

training is revealed in certain consistencies in the behaviors of 

Guantanamo Bay that suggest the use of resistance strategies (e.

abuse, repetitive recitations of religious passages, etc.). Even then, 

for interrogators is not inconsequential. First, interrogators must c

source is actually employing a systematic resistance strategy. Secon

identify the components of that strategy. Finally, they must devise 

counterstrategy.

To address the concept of resistance meaningfully requires a b

subject matter experts. Behavioral scientists can assist in developing 

identifying personality-driven factors. Cultural, political, and theolo

are needed to better understand the signifi cant environmental co

play. Accomplished linguists might assist in clarifying where appare

might actually be the result of misunderstood questions (or ans

specialists — experts in designing and teaching resistance strateg

be an invaluable resource in helping to recognize, confi rm, and de

resistance strategies encountered by interrogators. Finally, it migh

wealth of resources to correctly assess if a source’s failure to answ

question is the result of defi ance or poor knowledgeability.

67 In the author’s recent discussion of this challenging scenario with a SERE ps

emerged the novel idea of applying deprogramming methods used in the U.S. and 

“rescue” individuals from the destructive infl uence of religious cults. 68 A document described as an Al Qaeda training manual was disc

Manchester (England) Metropolitan Police Department in the course of a raid 

a suspected Al Qaeda operative. The manual was located on a computer hard 

the site, in a fi le labeled “the military series” relating to the “Declaration of 

http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf )
118

Skilled interrogators, for example, listen closely to voices and 

learn a great deal from them. An interrogation is not merely a 

verbal performance; it is a vocal performance, and the voice 

projects tension, fear, a dislike of certain topics, and other 

useful pieces of information. It is also helpful to watch the 

subject’s mouth, which is as a rule much more revealing than 

his eyes. Gestures and postures tell a story. If a subject normally 

gesticulates broadly at times and is at other times physically 

relaxed but at some point sits stiffl y motionless, his posture 

is likely to be the physical image of his mental tension. The 

interrogator should make a mental note of the topic that caused 

such a reaction.69

The role of nonverbal cues in the communication process is almost univers

recognized. Some researchers (Mehrabian, 1971) have suggested that as muc

90% of communication is transmitted via nonverbal channels (i.e., gestures, v

modalities, etc.). At the same time, the underlying meaning of specifi c phys

gestures and vocal qualities seems subject to passionate debate. Crossing 

arms means he is closed and defi ant! Her posture of leaning forward indic

she is listening and engaged in the idea being presented to her. While the so

science literature is fi lled with numerous — and often confl icting — studie

nonverbal communication, professionals who work in the interpersonal con

(e.g., counselors, salespersons, interrogators, etc.) often rely heavily upon t

understanding of nonverbal behavior to complete their work.

At a fundamental level, the process of “reading” body language is not un

that used in a polygraph examination. The critical fi rst step is to establish a base

for the person being examined. Just as people show individual variation in bl

pressure and heart rate, people similarly exhibit dramatically different gestures 

voice infl ections to supplement their verbal communications. Familial, regi

and cultural background can have a signifi cant infl uence on an individu

repertoire of nonverbal behaviors. At the same time, some researchers, m

notably Desmond Morris, suggest there are a number of gestures that consiste

communicate the same message across cultural and linguistic boundaries.70

Parallel Worlds: Inside and Outside the Interrogation Room

The history of interrogation is full of confessions and other selfincriminations that were in essence the result of a substitution 

of the interrogation world for the world outside. In other words, 

69 KUBARK, 54–55.

70 See, for example, Desmond Morris, Manwatching: A Field Guide to Human Behavior (197

Bodytalk: The Meaning of Human Gestures (1995). 
119

the dynamic relationship between them. As [the] interroga

goes on, the subject tends increasingly to divulge or withh

in accordance with the values of the interrogation world ra

than those of the outside world.71

Inside the interrogation room, the principals (interrogator 

maneuver through two primary, interdependent spheres: the phy

and the psychological set. While the source can only realistically 

latter, the skillful interrogator can actively manipulate both of these 

manner designed to achieve the overarching goal of obtaining sourc

In the effort to induce the source to respond meaningfully to pertin

the underlying strategy set forth in the KUBARK manual is syst

separate the source from anchors of the “outside world” and reset 

value system to those of the “interrogation world.”

Perhaps the most important understanding for the interrog

from this concept is that forecasting events within the interro

is problematic if the prediction is based on trends in the outside 

excellent example of this conundrum is provided by Orrin DeForest

during the Vietnam War. Common sense would deem it unlikely th

would willingly complete a written psychological examination (e

that would subsequently be used in formulating an effective means 

that prisoner). Yet that is precisely what repeatedly occurred.

This opens up tremendous possibilities for creativity on the 

interrogator. Employing Cialdini’s principle of social proof, for 

interrogator could convince the source that every one of his co-d

cooperated fully with the interrogator (who, operating under the 

interrogation world, can assume the persona of the helpful interv

though experience in the outside world tells the source that his col

disciplined soldiers committed to the cause, as the outside world “fa

does his confi dence in the assumptions made there. 

The most important point to be made in this observation is tha

the interrogation room can range widely from that of the outside 

involved in the quest for new and better strategies for educing info

remain ever cognizant of this unique phenomenon.

Reconnaissance: Maintaining an Outcome-Orientation

Two dangers are especially likely to appear during 

reconnaissance. Up to this point, the interrogator 

not continued a line of questioning when resistance 

71 KUBARK, 57–58. 
120

resist this tendency. If he succumbs to it, and becomes engaged 

in a battle of wits, he may not be able to accomplish the task at 

hand. The second temptation to avoid is the natural inclination 

to resort prematurely to ruses and coercive techniques in order 

to settle the matter then and there. The basic purpose of the 

reconnaissance is to determine the kind and degree of pressure 

that will be needed in the third stage. The interrogator should 

reserve his fi re-power until he knows what he is up against.72

This passage suggests two very important guidelines for the interrogator. F

the approach to any source must be measured, systematic, and always outc

oriented. What this means is that the interrogator should understand the ph

nature of interrogation, that “victories” sought early can result in later “failu

and that — and this is of critical importance — one’s ego should be checke

the door. The outcome-oriented approach facilitates a more reasoned, objec

interrogation process, with the goal of obtaining actionable intelligence b

primary. In contrast, how the source ultimately views the interrogator (e.g

omnipotent, incompetent, clever, a genius, a dunce, etc.) is of little long-t

importance.

The second point refers back to the observations on the dual natur

interrogation. The interrogator must constantly manage the internal-exte

reference dynamic in a manner that best supports the approach(es) b

employed. The interrogator is present, interacting with the source, and app

to respond (believably so) in appropriate ways to the unfolding events. At 

same time, the interrogator checks his or her natural emotional responses (

sympathetic feelings for the source’s plight, anger at the source’s insults, 

and replaces them with fabricated responses — accompanied by nonverbal 

consistent with the response — that move the interrogation process toward 

desired outcome.

As noted earlier, SERE instructors are required to complete a psycholog

examination and interview prior to working directly with students in resista

role-play exercises. The objective is to screen out those who appear to pre

a signifi cant potential for abusing their authority. Psychological screening 

interrogators might incorporate a similar fi ltering mechanism that would

example, attempt to screen out candidates who demonstrate low levels of 

control. Although the now-famous Zimbardo experiment has shown that e

apparently healthy, stable individuals can succumb to the authoritarian infl ue

of power, this should not stand in the way of further research to iden

personality traits, belief systems, and/or values that might enable an organiza

72 KUBARK, 60. 
121

In sum, the interrogation process can be an emotionally charged, h

activity that requires a considerable degree of self-control — 

by strategic thought and action — on the part of the interrogator

challenges set before the interrogator strongly underscore the impor

systematic screening and selection process, 2) comprehensive initial 

training, and 3) continuous assessment of the interrogator (incl

assessment) as well as that of the team. 

Question Design: Tools of the Trade

Debriefi ng questions should usually be couched to provo

positive answer and should be specifi c. The questioner sho

not accept a blanket negative without probing. For example

question “Do you know anything about Plant X?”is likelie

draw a negative answer than, “Do you have any friends 

work at Plant X?”or “Can you describe its interior?”73

Planning, preparation, approaches, rapport-building, detection 

and subject matter expertise are all key elements of the overall 

process. In a real sense, however, each of these is but a support

the art of effective questioning. Going back to the fundamental 

interrogation set forth previously (“it consists of no more than obta

information through responses to questions”), it becomes readily 

the entire effort hinges upon the ability of the interrogator to met

meaningful questions of the source.

Of all the skills required of the accomplished interrogator, n

important than mastery of interrogatives. Rudyard Kipling went s

heart of the matter when he observed, “I kept six honest serving-men 

me all I knew); their names are what and why and when and how an

who.”74 These six questions provide the basic tools of the trade th

the skilled interrogator to expertly probe a source’s knowledge w

precision while adroitly disguising intent.

Research in the social sciences, communication theory, and li

uncovered a number of useful understandings about the potential p

designed questions that could have immediate application in interrog

changes in syntax, for example, have shown to greatly enhance th

power of a given question (Davis and Knowles, 1999). Additio

required to assess the effect of such questioning techniques throu

cultural fi lter.

73 KUBARK, 62.

74 From Rudyard Kipling’s Just So Stories.
122

of any topic was acquired fi rst hand, learned indirectly, or 

represents merely an assumption. If the information was 

obtained indirectly, the identities of sub-sources and related 

information about the channel are needed. If statements rest on 

assumptions, the facts upon which the conclusions are based 

are necessary to the evaluation.75

One of the weaknesses attributed specifi cally to human intelligence 

especially to interrogation) is the questionable reliability of the informa

provided by a source. “Prisoners often lie!” is the oft-repeated mantra cha

by those who have ardently embraced the technical side of intelligence gathe

(while overlooking the numerous examples of how camoufl age, concealment, 

deception or spoofi ng have successfully fooled imagery and signals intellige

analysts, respectively). Nonetheless, reliability is a critical factor in the hu

intelligence equation.

Simply stated, source reliability can be broken down into two catego

veracity and knowledgeability. Veracity refers to the truthfulness of the sou

while knowledgeability refers to the scope of fi rst-hand information a so

possesses. Although two fundamentally different concepts, they can, at ti

become interwoven.

• A source may tell the interrogator the truth about the topics raise

the course of the interrogation. The source may, however, have a w

range of knowledgeability than he or she has allowed to become kn

Essentially, the source has told the truth...just not the whole truth.

• Conversely, a source may tell the interrogator more than he or she re

knows. In an effort to secure some real or imagined form of recipro

from the interrogator, the source speaks truthfully about all he or 

knows...and then some. This “extra” may be the product of specula

imagination, and/or fabrication.

• The end game of deception, then, occurs in two primary ways: 1) 

source might purposefully falsify information and/or 2) the source m

withhold known information on specifi c topics. While there are un

dangers inherent in each of these scenarios, both could lead to corru

data being reported as intelligence information.

In addition to systematic questioning techniques and subject-matter exper

assessing the veracity and knowledgeability of the source requires that 

interrogator have a third critical skill: detecting deception. Scientifi c (and popu

literature abounds with studies of how, why, and when people deceive. Searc

for reliable indicators, researchers have focused on body movements (e.g., m

75 KUBARK, 62. 
123

analysis). While many individuals — including interrogators — a

of their ability to effectively and consistently detect deception, mo

to clearly describe the set of behaviors that provided that insight. F

studies indicate that these individuals’ confi dence in their lie-catch

not substantiated by performance in controlled conditions.

Although numerous studies have investigated the ability of one 

reliably identify another’s efforts to deceive, these studies have be

almost exclusively in the safe environment of laboratory conditi

“deceiver,” there really are no signifi cant consequences involved if 

“caught.” As a result, there is minimal stress involved, yet most theo

that it is stress that causes the psycho-physical changes that, in turn, a

by external cues (e.g., stereotypical grooming behaviors).

The Strategy of Non-Coercive Interrogation

If source resistance is encountered during screening or du

the opening or reconnaissance phases of the interrogation, 

coercive methods of sapping opposition and strengthening 

tendency to yield and to cooperate may be applied. Altho

these methods appear here in an approximate order of increa

pressure, it should not be inferred that each is to be tried u

the key fi ts the lock. On the contrary, a large part of the skill 

the success of the experienced interrogator lies in his abili

match method to source. The use of unsuccessful techniques 

of itself increase the interrogatee’s will and ability to resist

The effectiveness of most of the non-coercive techniques depe

upon their unsettling effect. The interrogation situation i

itself disturbing to most people encountering it for the fi rst 

The aim is to enhance this effect, to disrupt radically the fam

emotional and psychological associations of the subject. W

this aim is achieved, resistance is seriously impaired.

77

The KUBARK manual offers a broad array of useful insig

interrogation process — insights gleaned from extensive real-worl

While the coercive approaches are rightfully rejected, it is clear the 

offi cers and behavioral scientists who contributed to this manual spent 

time studying and refl ecting upon their craft. It is up to the current 

practitioners to sort through this treatise to uncover the invaluable ta

76 KUBARK, 65.

77 KUBARK, 65-66. 
124

fashion, thinking, as a chess master must, several steps ahead of the interrog

This is where the aforementioned Law of Requisite Variety comes into play, as 

interrogator always maintains at least one more method of obtaining complia

— be it a new line of questioning, an alternative approach, or a well-crafted 

(see below) — than the source has means of resisting. But, as the manual st

employing those options in a confused, ill-conceived manner will only “incr

the interrogatee’s will and ability to resist.”

The KUBARK manual offers specifi c techniques (i.e., approaches) for us

a non-coercive interrogation setting. Several of these have potential for applica

in current intelligence collection operations.

Going Next Door

Occasionally the information needed from a recalcitrant 

interrogatee is obtainable from a willing source...[t]he labor 

of extracting the truth from an unwilling interrogatee should 

be undertaken only if the same information is not more easily 

obtainable elsewhere....

78

One of the fallacies of interrogation — and one that continues to b

signifi cant factor in driving the use of coercive techniques — is the concept 

every detainee is a unique, invaluable, and irreplaceable source of intellige

information and therefore must be leveraged into compliance. As with 

“ticking nuclear bomb” scenario so often cited in the debate over just how 

U.S. interrogators should go to force a source to cooperate, such instances 

extremely rare. Nonetheless, there is almost a default pattern wherein the 

of greatest resistance is taken with a recalcitrant source rather than taking 

more strategic route of seeking the same information from a more accessible 

compliant source.

This common miscue is based on two fundamental errors in judgment. 

fi rst is an ego-based error. While persistence is a critical characteristic of m

successful interrogators, the most accomplished among them focus their fi 

resources (e.g., time and energy) on the challenges that present the most attrac

risk/gain ratio. After spending suffi cient time to establish that the sour

resistance posture will be a signifi cant hurdle, the wise interrogator quickly 

himself/herself, in keeping with the KUBARK manual guidance quoted ab

“Where else can I obtain the information I need?” Such prudent interroga

are not driven by the need to demonstrate their skill in overcoming a partic

source’s line of resistance; rather, they are driven by the intractable need to ob

the desired information from whatever source is liable to offer it up.

78 KUBARK, 66.
125

Resistance is the direct product of several key factors: training, lif

personality, commitment to a cause, deep-seated feelings about the 

and/or his country of origin, and even anger at the manner in which t

been treated since capture. Any one of these can lead the truck driver 

already compromised route he was to drive during an operation more 

a less-motivated nuclear engineer will protect the key to disabling 

dispersal device.79

Nobody Loves You

An interrogatee who is withholding items of no gr

consequence to himself may sometimes be persuaded to tal

the simple tactic of pointing out that to date all of the informa

about his case has come from persons other than himself. 

interrogator wants to be fair. He recognizes that some of 

denouncers may have been biased or malicious...the so

owes it to himself to be sure that the interrogator hears 

sides of the story.80

(See observations under next heading.)

Joint Suspects

If two or more interrogation sources are suspected of j

complicity in acts directed against U.S. security, they sho

be separated immediately. If time permits, it may be a g

idea (depending upon the psychological assessment of both

postpone interrogation for about a week. Any anxious inqu

from either can be met with a knowing grin and some such r

as, “We’ll get to you in due time. There’s no hurry now.”81

The primary difference between these two approaches is that i

source is presented with evidence — largely implicit — that oth

unknown (to the source), and as yet unseen detainees have provided 

that refl ects negatively upon him, while in the second scenario the 

refers directly to damaging information gathered from other detain

the source.

Leveraging one source against another is a common police tacti

idea of the classic “prisoner’s dilemma”) and is especially useful w

79 A radioactive dispersal device is often referred to in the media and in popul

“dirty bomb.” 80 KUBARK, 67. 

81 KUBARK, 70.
126

The wedge thus placed, in conjunction with time and careful orchestration, 

be effective in eliciting progressively more information independently from e

source.

The All-Seeing Eye

The interrogator who already knows part of the story explains 

to the source that the purpose of the questioning is not to gain 

information; the interrogator knows everything already. His 

real purpose is to test the sincerity (reliability, honor, etc.) of 

the source. The interrogator then asks a few questions to which 

he knows the answers. If the subject lies, he is informed fi rmly 

and dispassionately that he has lied. By skilled manipulation of 

the known, the questioner can convince a naïve subject that all 

his secrets are out and that further resistance would be not only 

pointless but dangerous.82

Similar to the We Know All approach outlined in U.S. Army Field Ma

34-52, the All-Seeing Eye has proven consistently effective with a broad a

of sources.83 While simple in concept, as with other effective approaches, 

underlying dynamic can be far more complex. In this instance, two fundame

activities occur to render it effective in obtaining compliance from a resis

source.

First, Cialdini’s authority principle plays an important part in this appro

The source, convinced that the interrogator knows as much as (perhaps more t

he does, sees little to be gained from protecting information of such appare

little value, especially if he anticipates that the consequences of withhol

such information are undesirable. Second, recalling the premise that two of 

interrogator’s primary objectives are to increase the stress the source internal

about the consequences of resistance while simultaneously reducing 

internalized stress over the prospect of cooperating, this approach systematic

targets the latter. By maintaining this approach over time, the interrogator is 

to introduce a new and perhaps unexpected factor in the source’s resista

cooperation calculus.

Ivan Is a Dope

It may be useful to point out to a hostile [source] that the cover 

story was ill-contrived, that the other service botched the job, 

82 KUBARK, 67.

83 The author refers to this approach as “The Exquisite Ruse,” and has used it with great eff

interrogation operations conducted during Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT STORM, and IR

FREEDOM. 
127

and intelligence.84

This approach also leverages the psychological and emotio

between aforementioned values outside the interrogation room and 

the interrogation room. By using this approach effectively, the 

continues to separate the source from his or her external anchors. In 

that anchor is a belief in the parent service’s skill in managing cove

protect the source operationally. This has direct application to the int

suspected terrorists, not only as it relates to cover support, but also 

briefi ngs, operational planning, and equipment provided to the sou

her sponsoring organization.

A key element of systematic interrogation is systematic innov

than assume that the approaches outlined in U.S. Army Field Manu

the limit of their repertoire of tactics, interrogators should view thos

as only the very beginning. The drafters of the KUBARK manual d

the value to be found in the ability to adapt to new challenges, desig

strategies, identify through practical experience what appears to 

work well, and share these novel concepts with other interrogators

clearinghouse for new interrogation tactics, techniques, and proce

— a means of capturing and widely disseminating the experience an

operators in the fi eld — it is quite probable that the art of interro

currently be taught and practiced in a signifi cantly different and far m

fashion. 

The Need to Communicate

...continued questioning about lofty topics that the so

knows nothing about may pave the way for the extractio

information at lower levels...complaints that he knows not

of such matters are met by fl at insistence that he does know

would have to know, that even the most stupid men in his posi

know...after the process has continued long enough, the so

was asked a question to which he did know the answer. Num

of [former] American [POWs] have mentioned “the tremend

feeling of relief you get when [the interrogator] fi nally asks 

something you can answer...I know it seems strange now, b

was positively grateful to them when they switched to a top

knew something about.”85

84 KUBARK, 72. 

85 KUBARK, 75.
128

circumstances do not place them in a position where they felt pressure to dec

(“falsify”) or purposely withhold (“conceal”) information. As reported by 

POWs who were subjected to this manner of questioning during the Ko

War, however, it often proved true that the inability to answer questions cre

tremendous pressure and, as the quotation above illustrates, the opportunity fi n

to address questions within the scope of their experience and knowledgeab

proved a welcome relief. The need to communicate is surprisingly powerful, 

more powerful still under traumatic circumstances.

Cialdini provides another perspective that may be a relevant factor at pla

this approach. In his rejection-then-retreat scenario, when one asks for somet

diffi cult (a request that might often be denied) and then asks for something 

demanding, the compliance rate for the lesser demand is higher when the dem

is preceded by the more diffi cult demand than when the questions are aske

isolation.86 In the context of interrogation, a source may be reluctant to ans

sweeping questions about organizational plans and intentions, but, in cont

may be less guarded about lower-level details. Although declining to ans

questions about strategic-level topics, the source may feel less pressure to k

from answering questions about tactical-level topics.

Taking into account Cialdini’s consistency principle (i.e., people tend to 

in a manner consistent with formal, public statements made or positions ta

previously),87 this strategy would probably work more effectively when 

interrogator asks the strategic-level question, but, sensing hesitation on the pa

the source, withdraws it before the source has the chance to resist. If allowe

formally assume a resistance posture, the pressure to remain consistent with 

decision may have a greater infl uence than the relief gained from being abl

respond to a question with which the source is more comfortable.

What internal dialogue takes place within a source in response to var

approaches? Can Cialdini’s principles of persuasion explain, at least in part, 

a given approach elicits compliance from a source? Do certain trends in beha

in the interrogation room prove valid in a suffi cient number of cases that they 

be routinely employed with a high degree of probability of ultimately pro

effective? The review of available literature strongly suggests that these cri

questions, and others, have not been satisfactorily addressed with regard to 

traditional approaches and other tactics, techniques, and procedures still b

employed. The move to the next generation of strategies for educing informa

depends on research that can uncover the answer to these questions. Once 

has been accomplished, ineffective methods can be eliminated from the trai

curricula and replaced by innovative strategies complete with a valid descrip

of the underlying factors that are essential to success.

86 Cialdini, 36–51.

87 Cialdini, 57–113. 
129

to confound the expectations and conditioned reactions of 

interrogatee. He is accustomed to a world that makes sens

least to him: a world of continuity and logic, a predictable w

He clings to this world to reinforce his identity and power

resistance. The confusion technique is designed not onl

obliterate the familiar, but to replace it with the weird...as 

process continues, day after day as necessary, the subject be

to try to make sense of the situation, which becomes men

intolerable...he is likely to make signifi cant admissions, or e

to pour out his story.

88

SERE psychologists have identifi ed the inability to effectiv

near-term events as a major stressor in the detention environment. 

accustomed to having a reasonable degree of control over their 

enables them to make accurate predictions about basic events such 

go to sleep, when they wake up, when they eat, and when they use 

addition, if they fi nd themselves encountering unpleasant circumsta

annoying neighbor, a time-wasting work associate, etc.), it is nor

their power to escape those stressful situations at will (or least minim

spent engaged with the unattractive individual). In detention, avoid

be an option.

The KUBARK principle described in the passage above sug

interrogator is able to generate a signifi cant degree of pressure on a so

the purposeful creation of confusing circumstances that effectively 

source’s ability to make predictions. In effect, the source strugg

familiar logic to the chain of events, the nature of the interactions, an

the exchanges with the interrogator. As the struggle proves unsucces

of stress can dramatically rise to an exceptionally uncomfortable lev

to the KUBARK manual, sources may offer up information to the in

an effort to overtly introduce “sense” to their chaotic circumstances. 

that information, the source has recaptured a degree of comforting p

From the source’s perspective, the experience of being d

interrogated would seem to have inherent elements of disorder an

The effect this has on a given source (negative or positive) would 

to be directly correlated with each source’s need for order and leve

discomfort with ambiguity. While the literature on Communist 

interrogation frequently references the value of confusion in obtainin

it is less clear as it applies to obtaining relevant, accurate informa

additional study is warranted on the effects of confusion as well as 

rapidly assessing a source’s tolerance for disorder and ambiguity. 

88 KUBARK, 76. 
130

All coercive techniques are designed to induce regression...the 

result of external pressures of suffi cient intensity is the loss of 

those defenses most recently acquired by civilized man: “the 

capacity to carry out the highest creative activities, to meet 

new, challenging, and complex situations, to deal with trying 

interpersonal relations, and to cope with repeated frustrations. 

Relatively small degrees of homeostatic derangements, fatigue, 

pain, sleep loss, or anxiety may impair these functions.” As a 

result, “most people who are exposed to coercive procedures 

will talk and usually reveal some information that they might 

not have revealed otherwise.”89

The deprivation of stimuli induces regression by depriving the 

subject’s mind of contact with an outer world and thus forcing 

it in upon itself. At the same time, the calculated provision of 

stimuli during interrogation tends to make the regressed subject 

view the interrogator as a father-fi gure. The result, normally, is a 

strengthening of the subject’s tendencies toward compliance.90

Listening to the post-9/11 debate over guidelines for the interrogatio

terrorist suspects, one could easily conclude that coercive methods are not 

effective, but also substantially more effective than non-coercive method

obtaining actionable intelligence from resistant sources. Even those oppose

the use of coercive methods fail to challenge this premise, exclusively focu

their arguments instead on the legal and moral issues at stake.

Those issues aside, from a geopolitical perspective alone, a judic

risk/gain assessment of this course of action is of critical importance, as 

consequences are considerable. This was dramatically illustrated by the 

American demonstrations throughout the Muslim world in response to revelat

of the abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Ironically, while those risks are 

exceptionally diffi cult to ascertain, the potential for gain is arguably problem

since the scientifi c community has never established that coercive interroga

methods are an effective means of obtaining reliable intelligence informa

In essence, there seems to be an unsubstantiated assumption that “complia

carries the same connotation as “meaningful cooperation” (i.e., a source indu

to provide accurate, relevant information of potential intelligence value).91

89 KUBARK, 83.

90 KUBARK, 90. 

91 Claims from some members of the operational community as to the alleged effectivene

coercive methods in educing meaningful information from resistant sources are, at best, anecdo

nature and would be, in the author’s view, unlikely to withstand the rigors of sound scientifi c inq
131

during the Korean confl ict. The psychologist Martin Orne, writing in 

that:

[C]onditions of interrogation are sometimes conducive to 

a regression on the part of the source. The interrogator can 

exercise complete control of the source’s physical being 

— his primitive needs such as elimination, eating, and 

sleeping, and even bodily postures. He is also in a position 

to reward or punish any predetermined activity on the part 

of the captive. This tends to create a situation where the 

individual feels unable to observe any control over himself

This extreme loss of control is handled in a variety of ways

one of which is regression to a childlike state of dependenc

on and identifi cation with the aggressor...some prisoners 

adopt a cooperative role because of the need to reassure 

themselves that they retain some control over their behavio

in the coercive situation. Complying “voluntarily” for such 

cases is less threatening, and may be regarded by them as l

shameful, than losing control completely over their actions

Assuming for a moment that this regression dynamic accurately 

underlying process that leads a once-resistant source toward com

use of interrogation techniques to bring about regression still raises 

key questions:

1. What precise means are required to obtain this end?

2. What are the overarching management and operational requ

orchestrating such a process?

3. Is the length of time required for the regression to occur rea

enough to render it a useful method of obtaining time-sensi

intelligence?

4. What are the long-term effects of the regression experience

5. Are individuals subjected to this condition profoundly chan

6. Is their emotional and psychological stability signifi cantly h

that treatment is required to address — and reverse — the c

7. What are the legal and moral issues involved?

92 Martin T. Orne, “The Potential Uses of Hypnosis in Interrogation,” in The 

Human Behavior, ed. Albert D. Biderman and Herbert Zimmer (New York: John Wile

1961), 206. Hereafter referred to as The Manipulation of Human Behavior. 93 Two additional important points with respect to regression warrant further c

given individual’s response to circumstances designed specifi cally to cause regre

reliably predicted in advance. Second, regression in general receives far less profess

as a psychological concept today than was true in the 1950–1960 timeframe. 
132

9g

on the treatment of U.S. personnel held captive in adversarial hands

10. Would the use of forced regression as a sanctioned method of 

exploitation be viewed as being consistent with long-standing U.S. 

values and military traditions?

11. The above considerations notwithstanding, does the use of regressio

consistently produce reliable, actionable intelligence information?

In The Manipulation of Human Behavior, Biderman decried the fact tha

1961, the “dearth of sober information on interrogation has had the unfortu

consequence of facilitating the exploitation of United States prisoners of wa

Communist captors.”94 While he was specifi cally addressing a research shor

that undermined training in the resistance to interrogation for U.S. mili

personnel, the same observation remains essentially true over 40 years later w

regard to the paucity of relevant information on effective tactics, techniques, 

procedures for the interrogation of adversarial detainees under U.S. control.

 Obstacles to Meaningful Intelligence: The Negative Effects of Coercion

[T]he response to coercion typically contains “at least three 

important elements: debility, dependency, and dread.”95

“[A]mong the American POWs pressured by the Chinese 

Communists, the DDD syndrome in its full-blown form 

constituted a state of discomfort that was well-nigh intolerable.” 

If the debility-dependency-dread state is unduly prolonged, 

however, the [source] may sink into a defensive apathy from 

which it is hard to arouse him.96

Psychologists and others who write about physical or 

psychological duress frequently object that under suffi cient 

pressure subjects usually yield but that their ability to recall 

and communicate information accurately is as impaired as the 

will to resist.97

...a strong fear of anything vague or unknown induces regression, 

whereas the materialization of the fear, the infl iction of some 

form of punishment, is likely to come as a relief. The subject 

fi nds that he can hold out, and his resistances are strengthened. 

94 Albert Biderman, “Introduction – Manipulations of Human Behavior,” in The Manipulati

Human Behavior, 4. 95 KUBARK, 83.

96 KUBARK, 84.

97 KUBARK, 84.
133

As these passages from the KUBARK manual suggest, the ve

which coercive methods undermine the source’s resistance postu

concomitantly degrade his ability to report the intelligence info

possess in a valid, comprehensive fashion. There would, then, ap

very fi ne line that the interrogator would need to walk deftly as he u

force to cause the source to yield to questioning, but not so much as t

source’s ability to answer those questions meaningfully.

In examining this complex issue, it is important to keep clearly 

interrogations take place in real-world settings, without the contr

in the safety of the institutional research environment. Managi

internalized pressure experienced by a source subjected to coerc

most defi nitely neither a science nor a precise art. The pressure inte

overseers would seek to measure is an elusive entity, one that can on

by highly subjective standards. Levels of pressure introduced by coer

as with torture in general, are often in the eye of the beholder as illu

following passage from Phoenix and the Birds of Prey, an account 

Phoenix, conducted during the Vietnam War:

Some people defi ne torture as the infl iction of severe physi

on a defenseless person. I defi ne torture as the infl iction of a

on a defenseless individual because deciding which activitie

severe pain is an excessively complicated and imprecise b

(Original italics)99

The KUBARK manual offers unique and exceptional insig

complex challenges of educing information from a resistant source 

coercive means. While it addresses the use of coercive methods, it a

how those methods may prove ultimately counterproductive. Althou

for its discussion of coercion, the KUBARK manual does not por

methods as a necessary — or even viable — means of effecti

information.

Shock of Capture: A Strategic Infl ection Point in an Interrogatio

The manner and timing of arrest can contribute 

substantially to the interrogator’s purposes. “What w

aim to do is to ensure that the manner of arrest achiev

if possible, surprise, and the maximum amount of men

discomfort in order to catch the suspect off balance an

to deprive him of the initiative.”100

98 KUBARK, 90–91. 

99 Mark Moyer, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute P

100 KUBARK, 85. 
134

less to do with the nature of the intelligence sought than with exploiting a un

window of vulnerability in the detention experience.

Only a small percentage of military personnel, and a much smaller percen

of terrorists and insurgents, have been exposed to resistance training that inclu

the stress-inoculation of intensive practical exercises. As a result, the trauma 

the perceived chaos of capture — the so-called “shock of capture” — and in

detention will likely prove profoundly unsettling and cause detainees to do and 

things against their interest that, upon refl ection under more stable circumstan

they would not do or say. In most instances, newly captured detainees expec

worst in terms of treatment at the hands of the enemy and only later draw stren

from the realization that they will not be killed or brutally tortured. By exploi

this initial period of overwhelming confusion, the well-trained and prep

interrogator may be able to obtain useful information through the immed

questioning of a source.

The shock of capture phenomenon is not necessarily limited to the in

point of detention. Every time the detainee is transferred to new surroundings 

new cell, a different wing of the current holding facility, or an entirely new fac

— a measure of shock of capture will likely occur. The detainee can be prese

with a strange setting, a different routine, new guards, and a fresh interrogator. 

rules of engagement in effect at the previous place of confi nement may no lo

apply in the new facility. The trauma born of confusion, ambiguity, and nega

expectations can produce a new period of capture shock that an interrogator 

strategically exploit.

A creative and often effective strategy for profi ting from the shock of cap

phenomenon is to use a dislocation of expectations approach. For exam

anticipating mistreatment in the hands of the “infi dels,” the detainee may s

himself for the worst, preparing mentally to respond to harsh approaches, abu

language, and a blatant disregard for personal and cultural preferences. With s

hardened expectations, the detainee may be ill prepared to encounter some

who affords him better treatment and demonstrates an impressive understan

of his culture and language. Without a clear strategy at the ready for resisting 

unexpected turn of events, the source may fi nd himself — similar to the situa

described above — responding to questions that he might choose to ignor

outright refuse to answer later on. 

Interrogation is both an art and a science, with the proportion attrib

to each diffi cult to determine precisely. In many instances, a “principle

interrogation (i.e., a concept or method that has proven consistently applic

in a variety of circumstances) may have an equally true obverse. The KUBA

manual emphasizes the importance of conducting early “reconnaissance” 

source: screening and initial interrogation sessions designed exclusively to as

personality, to identify strengths, and to probe for weaknesses. Only after this 
135

The shock of capture phenomenon, by contrast, suggests 

instances where a brief window of opportunity presents itself for th

to question the source with little or no preliminary assessment. This 

also proven effective.

Which method is better? If research were able to provide a 

or to point to a protocol that could assist an interrogator in makin

call on a consistent basis, this would then become an element o

interrogation process that could be moved from the category of “art” 

Until then, the selection of an approach for dealing with newly deta

remains not unlike the artist’s selection of paint from a palette fi lled 

of attractive hues...the appropriateness of the selection largely refl e

of the artist.

The Challenge of Apathy

Little is gained if confi nement merely replaces one rou

with another. Prisoners who lead monotonously unvaried l

“cease to care about their utterances, dress, and cleanli

They become dulled, apathetic, and depressed.” And ap

can be a very effective defense against interrogation.101

Little is known about the duration of confi nement calcul

to make a subject shift from anxiety, coupled with a de

for sensory stimuli and human companionship, to a pas

apathetic acceptance of isolation and ultimate pleasure in 

negative state. Undoubtedly, the rate of change is determ

almost entirely by the psychological characteristics of 

individual.102

Once again, this observation demonstrates the unique challen

management: a challenge made even more complex by the introductio

measures. Perhaps the principle to be drawn here is that the interrog

the advantage of physical setting (i.e., confi nement, routine, move

advantage...but only to a point. The prolonged effort to infl uence p

set by controlling the physical setting can quickly and unexpect

counterproductive when, as in the scenario cited above, the sou

existence and distant hope of release cause him to view his circumst

his life, his future, and the prospects for change — with apathy.

This brings up a larger point about the fundamental nature of int

either a “push” or “pull” (“control” or “rapport”) phenomenon. In th

101 KUBARK, 86. 102 KUBARK, 87.
136

change in the source’s daily activities; or introduce physicality into the interac

The myriad forms of coercive methods essentially attempt to obtain capitula

in this manner.

By contrast, the “pull” approach views interrogation as not unlik

recruitment. The interrogator, having invested suffi cient time in assessing 

source’s personality and — most important — that which the source va

seeks to introduce internal, “moving toward” pressure. When this is de

accomplished, the interrogator presents the source with an attractive goal 

freedom, better treatment, communication with family) that appears to be wi

the source’s sphere of infl uence through cooperative behavior. In essence, 

source comes to recognize — through implicit or explicit communication f

the interrogator — that the source’s actions can achieve these goals. For 

interrogator, the challenge is to ensure that the path to the source’s objectives 

lead directly through the accomplishment of the interrogator’s own objective

a recruitment, this might mean that to achieve the source’s goal (e.g., removing 

autocratic regime currently ruling his country, sending his children to colleg

the United States, etc.), the source would need to help the case offi cer by agre

to serve as an agent reporting on specifi c targets of intelligence interest. In 

interrogation, the line between the source and his or her goal (e.g., early rele

runs directly through the interrogator’s objective (i.e., actionable intelligenc

priority information requirements).

While a dearth of evidence exists regarding the effi cacy of either the “push

“pull” model of interrogation, there are two important considerations, one rela

to time intensity and the other to the scope of information. Both approaches 

likely to be time-intensive (despite the seemingly popular belief that coer

measures are more likely to produce the desired intelligence in time to resolve 

“ticking time-bomb” scenario). But in the best of circumstances, it is anticip

that the control model would obtain information only in direct response to 

specifi c questions posed. In contrast, the “rapport” model is more likely to ob

not only similar kinds of information, but also additional information within 

scope of the source’s knowledgeability that was not necessarily addressed by 

interrogator. In the former, the source seeks minimal fulfi llment of requirem

to move away from the pressure of control; in the latter, the source is more pr

to provide satisfaction of requirements and additional self-initiated reportin

enhance rapport...and expedite movement toward objectives.

The Effects of Isolation

“The symptoms most commonly produced by isolation are 

superstition, intense love of any other living thing, perceiving 

inanimate objects as alive, hallucinations, and delusions.” 

The apparent reason for these effects is that a person cut 

off from external stimuli turns his awareness inward, upon 
137

The stated objective of using isolation in the context of an interr

to infl ict punishment, but to leverage the source into compliance, a s

the source is willing to answer pertinent questions on areas within 

the source’s knowledgeability and direct access. Given the followin

of interrogation, drawn from U.S. Army Field Manual 34-52, 

Interrogation, obtaining source compliance would appear to be a c

the overall process.

Interrogation is the process of questioning a source t

maximum amount of usable information. The goal of any in

to obtain reliable information in a lawful manner, in a mini

and to satisfy intelligence requirements of any echelon of 

(Emphasis added)

Since holding detainees under specifi c conditions of isolation fo

period of time appears to produce compliance — the willingness t

questioning — and since compliance is a key step in the interrog

logic would therefore suggest that isolation would be an effective 

technique. The problem arises when one introduces an additional, i

element to the concept of compliance. Given that the objective of an 

as set forth in FM 34-52, is to obtain usable and reliable informat

lawful manner), compliance means not just the willingness to answ

but also the ability.

Hinkle, whose medical studies serve as a major reference cited in t

manual, raises fundamental questions about the ability of a source 

extended isolation to provide meaningful, coherent answers in re

interrogator’s questions. He observed that “Any attempt to produ

behavior by procedures which produce...disturbances of homeos

sleep deprivation, isolation, discomfort, or disturbing emotional state

it the hazard of producing inaccuracy and unreliability.”105 (Empha

Much of the Cold War-era research on Communist methods of 

sanctioned by the U.S. Government was conducted to obtain a better u

of, and therefore an enhanced ability to withstand, coercive interroga

Therefore, emphasis on the subject’s vulnerability to complia

techniques overshadowed the concept of the source’s ability to repor

103 KUBARK, 88. 104 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Intelligence And Interrogation Handboo

The Lyons Press, 2005), 8. 105 Lawrence E. Hinkle, Jr., “The Physiological State of the Interrogation Subj

Brain Function,” in The Manipulation of Human Behavior, 43.
138

standards for the treatment of prisoners as set forth in international accords 

U.S. Federal statutes. In this alone, it fails one criterion of interrogation note

FM 34-52: lawfulness.

From a purely operational perspective, the effects of isolation can truly 

double-edged sword. Isolation, especially in the initial stages of an interroga

is a fundamental strategy designed to prevent a source from collaborating w

other detainees (e.g., coordinating an overarching “story”) as well as f

drawing emotional and psychological strength from time spent in the comp

of associates. This notwithstanding, the literature also suggests that effect

isolation can signifi cantly and negatively impact the ability of the source to re

information accurately. Given that source veracity and the reliability of HUM

source reporting have long been viewed as problematic within the Intellige

Community, long-term isolation of sources appears unlikely to produce us

data.

The Interrogator’s Checklist

The KUBARK manual sets forth an Interrogator’s Checklist of 

questions (although several have been deleted for security reasons) that w

be exceptionally useful in guiding the interrogator through all phases of 

interrogation process. With an uncommon degree of both depth and breadth

questions are arranged sequentially, enabling the interrogator not only to caref

consider a broad range of complex factors involved in an extended interroga

but also to evaluate the results of the interrogation objectively. This latter as

would foster the type of refl ection necessary to continually improve knowle

skills and abilities.

The checklist includes several questions that are particularly notewo

It asks the interrogator, for instance, to consider whether the interrogatio

even necessary or if the information requirements could be satisfi ed thro

other, overt sources (the “Going Next Door” approach cited previously). 

checklist reminds the interrogator of the importance of rapport, asking if it 

been established properly during the opening phase of the interrogation. If 

interrogator anticipates that the source will be resistant, it directs the interrogat

focus to the source of that resistance (e.g., fear, political convictions, stubborn

etc.).107

Intelligence analysts have described the changing tactics and strate

employed by terrorists and insurgents as indicative of a learning organiza

106 This is an especially important observation to recall as individuals from the SERE comm

contribute to the study of educing information from resistant sources. As with the research studie

support them, SERE training and practical exercises focus on issues pertaining to compliance r

than information reporting reliability. 107 KUBARK, 105–109. 
139

the unique requirements of educing information in response to curre

challenges to the national security interests of the United States.

Bibliographic Reference

The KUBARK manual includes an extensive bibliography, 

number of references produced by the notable researchers Biderma

Also included are several military documents pertaining to interrogati

at Fort Holabird, the former center for military HUMINT operational 

security reasons, a number of references have been excised complete

only by the remaining entry number in the bibliography).

Findings

A careful examination of the KUBARK manual yields 

potentially valuable concepts that either have the potential fo

application in the development of a next generation of tactics, tec

procedures for educing information or that warrant further study 

professionals. While most of these have been identifi ed previ

additional observations — some of which cross over two or more 

addressed earlier — merit specifi c comment.

• A theme that recurs in the KUBARK manual is that int

defi ned both by its intensely interpersonal nature and intrac

by the unique personalities of both the interrogator and the 

observation suggests both an important avenue of research 

notable caution. In describing interrogation as an “interper

it offers social scientists an important sense of how to ap

least initially — this complex activity. At the same time, it s

a reminder that, in many important ways, each interrogat

and therefore one must be cautious in trying to apply a strat

that would prove effective in each case.

• Because interrogation is a complex process, practitioners 

interrogation require extensive training and progressive

experience to meet current and emerging operational require

the moment of capture, the value of a given source’s know

begins to degrade as the gap in direct access to the in

intelligence interest widens and memory for detail dim

windows of opportunity to gather information in respon

intelligence requirements are fi nite, especially those involvin

targets. In the course of an interrogation, errors in strate

planning, and actions are in many instances irreversible.

• In seeking to identify an effective protocol for selecting a

cadre of interrogators who would ultimately be able to perfor

the Intelligence Community might derive value from review
140

reference dynamic as executed by high-performing individuals w

the objective of designing methods for developing and enhancing 

necessary supporting skills and strategies.

• The study of nonverbal communication highlights a central theme in 

Educing Information study: How do we know what we know? Given 

the search for timely, accurate, and responsive intelligence informa

from a source can be easily corrupted by the misreading of a si

gesture or voice infl ection, the importance of this avenue of rese

cannot be overstated.
141

What We Do, and What We Can Learn 

Law Enforcement Experiences

Ariel Neuman

Daniel Salinas-Serrano

Harvard Law School

April 2005

Conducted under the supervision of Professor Philip Heyma

108 Completion of this paper would have been impossible without the invaluable a

support of many individuals. First, we thank Harvard Law School professor Philip H

Robert Fein, and Secret Service Agent (Ret.) Bryan Vossekuil for their invaluable and 

support, counsel, and advice throughout. Our countless meetings and conversations h

research and shape ideas without which our efforts would have come to a screeching 

also indebted to Supervisory Special Agent Brian Boetig, of the Federal Bureau of In

Law Enforcement Communication Unit, and the rest of the helpful staff at the FBI A

Quantico, Virginia, for making our visit there an informative one. Likewise, our resea

been signifi cantly undermined without the incalculable assistance and hospitality of M

Deputy Assistant Director of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service Training Acad

rest of the staff at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. 

would like to thank Daniel J. Coleman, Deputy Superintendent and Commander of th

Unit of the Boston Police Department, Colin Sturgeon, Detective Superintendent of t

Service of Northern Ireland, and Lieutenant Albert F. Pierce, Jr., MIT Police Departm

their incomparable experience and perspectives on the topic of custodial interrogation

mistakes or omissions contained in this paper are the sole responsibility of its authors
142

This report explores both the literature and practice related to interrog

of suspects in custody, focusing almost exclusively – as the literature 

practice do – on eliciting confessions to crimes. The theoretical liter

lays the groundwork for interrogation practice by identifying the rea

why suspects do or do not confess to crimes, while empirical fi ndings 

point factors associated with admissions and denials. Almost all man

on interrogation techniques cover the same aspects of successful int

gation as the seminal Reid Technique: (1) characteristics/qualifi catio

the interrogator; (2) pre-interrogation fact gathering and analysis; (3

interrogation setting; (4) pre-interrogation interview and rapport-b

ing; (5) analysis of behavioral symptoms; (6) interrogation of the sus

(7) detection of deceit; and (8) securing the confession. A compariso

theory and technique reveals that the interrogation techniques advoc

in the literature take little account of the factors that the empirical rese

shows might affect a suspect’s willingness to confess, and provide litt

no guidance to varying approaches for different types of suspects.

Against this background, the report next reviews training and practi

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Law Enforcement T

ing Center, and the Homicide Division of the Boston Police Departm

as well as the personal experience of a senior detective in the MIT 

lice Department. Findings indicate that federal and local organiza

provide little training specifi cally on interrogation; moreover, agen

do not collect data to establish whether their operatives actually a

the training they do receive, nor to evaluate the effectiveness of di

ent interrogation approaches. Law enforcement offi cers report that in

personality traits and on-the-job learning, rather than formal instru

or guidelines, determine success as an interrogator.

The authors also interviewed senior offi cials in Northern Ireland to 

termine how practices in other countries differ from those in the Un

States. A detective superintendent of the Police Service of Northern 

land noted that rules recently adopted in Great Britain almost prec

confessions by suspects; instead, interrogation is viewed as a part o

information-gathering process. 
143

Introduction

This paper has three primary purposes. First, it reviews the litera

on the topic of interrogation to offer an organized and cohesive s

available knowledge on the topic. Second, it seeks to present an ove

several domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies handle interro

in training and practice. Finally, the paper attempts to frame questio

study and to discern some potential lessons to be learned from law 

for current and future terrorism-related situations in which interrog

be a relevant component.

This paper, like the project that sponsored it, does not attempt t

approaches to custodial interrogation, or to present groundbreaking p

insights into this investigative tool. The scope of the paper is further l

subject matter it covers. It is decidedly not a general study on all po

and issues of police interviewing; instead, it focuses on situations 

generally to Inbau, Reid, Buckley, and Jayne’s defi nition of interr

accusatory questioning of a suspect involving active persuasion tha

controlled environment when an investigator is reasonably certain o

guilt, for the purpose of learning the truth.”109 Thus, interviews 

and victims are outside the purview of this project; the paper dea

interrogations of suspects who are in custody or otherwise in an 

controlled by the interrogators. Similarly, although there is a vast 

relevant to custodial interrogations, analysis of the relevant legal pr

rules is beyond the scope of this project. Finally, even though Inbau 

as many other authors, suggest that the goal of an interrogation may 

109 Fred Inbau et al., Criminal Interrogations and Confessions, 4th ed. (Sudbury

Bartlett Publishers, 2004), 5–6.

reduce the effectiveness of interrogations. In fact, videotaping sho

both the practice and outcome of interrogations by providing a 

the courts and allowing supervisors to review and if necessary 

practices of their staffs.

The effectiveness of standard interrogation techniques has never 

dated by empirical research. Moreover, techniques designed to obt

sions to crimes may have only limited relevance to preventive inv

of terrorist-related activities. The authors recommend further re

dressing both issues, and also suggest that the United States cons

ing the practice of providing intensive training to a select group 

sionals who would then conduct all interrogations.
144

To these ends, the paper is divided into three parts. Part I provides a survey 

review of the literature on interrogations. Section 1 focuses on the theoretical 

psychological literature about interrogations and confessions. Section 2 pres

and analyzes the empirical data available to support the theoretical approaches 

models. Section 3 surveys the practical literature on interrogations, covering 

major techniques and practical manuals on the subject. Section 4 briefl y descr

how an interrogation can “go wrong,” and Section 5 discusses the extent to w

the practical literature takes the empirical data into account.

Part II presents a survey of law enforcement training and practice with res

to interrogation. Sections 6, 7, and 8 review the Federal Bureau of Investiga

(FBI), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), and the Bo

Police Department Homicide Division, respectively. Section 9 presents a 

study of the training and practices of one very experienced U.S. interrogator, w

Section 10 examines practices in other countries, specifi cally Great Britain 

Israel. Section 11 then presents a survey of the arguments, issues, and pract

related to the video-recording of interrogations, and Section 12 attempts to 

all of the practices together and compare them to the empirical and prac

literature presented in Part I.

Finally, in Part III, we offer some general conclusions and recommendat

for further study and research. Most important, we present some thoughts ab

the relationship between, and applicability of, law enforcement interroga

techniques and practices to the current terrorism problem.

PART I. LITERATURE REVIEW

Section 1. Theoretical Approaches to Confessions

Incriminating statements and confession in the context of a crim

investigation usually entail serious consequences, ranging from reputational 

fi nancial penalties to deprivation of liberty or life.111 Nonetheless, a substan

number of interrogations yield a confession or some sort of incrimina

statement. This section explores the possible explanations for this phenome

offered by the psychological literature on interrogation and confessions.

110 Compare Inbau (noting that interrogation is best conceived as the psychological und

of deception) with R. Leo, “Inside the Interrogation Room,” The Journal of Criminal Law 

Criminology 86, no. 2 (Winter 1996), 279 (assuming that an interrogation is successful whe

suspect provides the detective with at least some incriminating information) and Gisli H. Gudjon

The Psychology of Interrogation and Confessions: A Handbook (New York: Wiley, 2003), 2 (st

that interrogations, like interviews, are a way of gathering information for use in further enquirie

are normally associated with criminal suspects). 111 Gudjonsson, p. 115.
145

y ff g

Generally, the severity of the potential sanction is directly propor

seriousness of the offense and, as mentioned above, may inclu

sanctions, deprivation of liberty, and even the death penalty. Add

mere possibility of having a criminal record may be a powerful inh

for fi rst-time offenders.113 Second, Gudjonsson points to reputatio

as a factor that may inhibit suspects from confessing.114 He sugg

higher the person’s standing in the community, the greater his or h

to confess.115 Third, Gudjonsson notes that an individual’s resistanc

him or herself what he or she has done may also hinder confessions

more reprehensible the offense, the more likely offenders are to ex

when interrogated.117 Fourth and somewhat related, a subject’s desir

or her family and friends ignorant about the crime may also affe

willingness to confess.118 Finally, fear of retaliation, whether real 

may infl uence a subject’s decision.119 In this context, a suspect m

others by confessing to a crime and, fearing retaliation, may thus refu

Indeed, Gudjonsson notes that in some cases the fear of retaliation m

than the fear of legal sanctions.120

Theoretical Models of Confession

A review of the available literature on interrogations and confes

various theoretical explanations of why suspects confess duri

interrogations. The following models examine confessions fr

perspectives and, taken together, provide important insights into the 

The Reid Model

Drawing on the nine steps of interrogation devised by Inbau 

provides a theoretical-psychological model for the so-called Reid 

This model conceives of an interrogation as the psychological 

deception.123 According to Jayne, in the context of criminal interrogat

can be defi ned as “a selected behavior of distorting or denying the 

112 Id. 113 Id. 114 Id., p. 116. 115 Id. 116 Id. 117 Id. 118 Id., p. 116. 119 Id. 120 Id. 121 Id., p. 117. 122 Brian C. Jayne, “The Psychological Principles of Criminal Interrogation,” in F

al., Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 3rd edition (Baltimore, MD: Williams an

327-347. For a full explanation of the practical aspects of the Reid Technique, see dis

123 Jayne, p. 327.
146

“real” and “personal.”126 Real consequences generally involve fi nancial pena

or the loss of freedom or life, while personal consequences involve low

self-esteem and damaged integrity and reputation.127 According to the m

successful deception is reinforced in accordance with operant conditio

principles whereby undetected lying is rewarding and increases the chance

further lying.128

However, successful socialization teaches individuals that it is wron

lie, which in many people brings about internal confl icts comprising feel

of frustration and anxiety.129 The model predicts that the increased level

anxiety associated with lying induce a person to confess.130 The level of anx

is assumed to increase linearly from omission to evasion to blatant denia

Jayne notes that subjects may try to reduce anxiety through body movemen

physical activities, which work by displacement or distraction.132 Addition

the mind attempts to reduce anxiety through “a series of hypothetical constr

called defense mechanisms,” which operate within the individual by distortin

denying reality.133 The two main defense mechanisms relevant to interrogation 

rationalization and projection.

134 Rationalization is the “act of redescribing w

a person does in such a way as to avoid any responsibility for the consequen

of his behavior.”135 Through the second defense mechanism, projection, a sub

“shifts the blame for his own thoughts or actions onto another person, place

thing” (e.g., the victim, alcohol use, etc.).136 Although, as noted, the defe

mechanisms of projection and rationalization function by distorting or den

reality, this “does not mean that the individual loses touch with reality; reality 

merely been redefi ned.”137

According to the Reid Model, a suspect confesses when the perce

consequences of a confession are more desirable than the anxiety gener

by the deception.138 The basic tenet of the model is that the interrogator 

psychologically manipulate both the perceived consequences of confes

124 Id. 125 Id. 126 Id. 127 Id., p. 328. 128 Id. 129 Id., p. 329. 130 Id. 131 Id., p. 330. 132 Id. 133 Id., 331. 134 Id. 135 Id. 136 Id. 137 Id. 138 Id., p. 332.
147

internal anxiety associated with his deception.”140 Jayne identifi e

concepts relevant to the interrogator’s manipulation of the subject

of consequences and anxiety: expectancy, persuasion, and belief.

14

refers to “a want or goal perceived as desirable or inevitable.” At th

interrogation deceptive subjects expect that, if they confess, the cons

they perceive them at that time) are inevitable, and that the most d

would be not to confess.142 Persuasion is “a form of communication 

listener’s attitudes, beliefs, or perceptions are changed.”143 Persuasio

expectancies, i.e., a suspect’s view of what is desirable.144 Belief, in 

vehicle of persuasion,” in that a suspect’s beliefs are not fact and 

subject to interpretation and external infl uence.145 In this context, an 

must strive to “change the suspect’s perception of the consequences 

or the suspect’s perception of the anxiety associated with deception b

the subject’s beliefs.146

According to the model, there are four essential criteria for 

suspect’s expectancies and beliefs in order to garner a confession. 

• First, the subject must perceive the interrogator as a cre

of information.147 According to Jayne, credibility is based 

knowledge, and demeanor.148

• Second, the interrogator must develop insight into the subj

and weaknesses.149 It is particularly important that the 

assess the consequences that the suspect is trying to avoid b

evaluate the suspect’s ability to tolerate anxiety.150

• Third, the subject must internalize the interrogator’s sugges

this will change expectancies if the individual can be led 

the interrogator’s message.151 This involves a three-stage pr

• First, the suspect must comprehend the interrogator’s ideas 

139 Id. 140 Id. 141 Id., p. 333. 142 Id. 143 Id. 144 Id. 145 Id. 146 Id. 147 Id., p. 334. 148 Id. 149 Id., p. 334-335. 150 Id., p. 335. 151 Id. 152 Id., p. 336. 153 Id.
148

, pg

suggestions (believing).155 This last point underscores the importanc

of suggestibility in the confession process: the more suggestible the 

suspect, the easier it is, theoretically, to obtain a confession.156

• Finally, the interrogator must constantly monitor the subject’s feedb

to determine whether or not the subject accepts the theme, whether 

subject’s anxiety should be intensifi ed, or if the timing of the presenta

of an alternative question is right.157

In this context, Jayne suggests several manipulative ploys that interroga

can use to reduce the perceived consequences of confessing and increase 

perceived anxiety associated with deception. According to Jayne, perce

consequences are generally reduced through the development of the

that employ rationalization and/or projection.

158 As defense mechani

rationalization and projection reduce anxiety by altering the suspect’s percept

of the likely consequences of self-incriminating admissions.159 Jayne notes 

these two mechanisms are most effective in reducing the perceptions concer

“real” consequences, whereas using sympathy and compassion as ploys is relati

more effective in overcoming inhibitions about the perceptions of “perso

consequences.160 Similarly, Jayne notes that anxiety must be independe

increased without increasing perceived consequences.161 Statements or act

intended to increase anxiety “must be directed at the suspect’s perceptio

himself within the interrogation environment.”162 Ultimately, the success of 

interrogation depends on the extent to which the interrogator is successfu

identifying psychological vulnerabilities, exploiting them to alter the suspe

belief system and perceptions of the consequences of making self-incrimina

admissions, and persuading him to accept the interrogator’s version of 

“truth.”

As explained in detail in Section 3, Jayne’s psychological model 

been incorporated into a comprehensive interrogation technique, the R

Technique, which has been described as the “most infl uential practical man

on interrogation.163 According to Gudjonsson, the Reid Technique rests on 

following basic assumptions:164

154 Id. 155 Id., p. 337. 156 See interrogative suggestibility discussion below. 157 Jayne, see note 122, p. 340. 158 Id. 159 Id. 160 Id., p. 341. 161 Id., p. 342. 162 Id., p. 343. 163 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 11. 164 Id.
149

g

ordinarily not give a confession unless they are inter

an extended period of time in private, using persuasiv

comprising trickery, deceit and psychological manipulation

• To break down resistance, interrogators will need to emplo

that normally would be seen as unethical by the public.

Given these assumptions, Gudjonsson notes that the techniqu

based on two processes:165

1. Breaking down denials and resistance, and

2. Increasing the suspect’s desire to confess.

More specifi cally, the Reid Technique employs two main p

strategies throughout its nine steps of interrogation: maxim

minimization.

166 Maximization involves frightening suspects into a c

exaggerating the strength of evidence against them and the seriou

offense.167 Minimization, in contrast, involves tricking suspects into 

of security and thus into confessing by offering sympathy, providin

excuses, partly blaming the victim or circumstances for the alleged 

minimizing the seriousness of the charges.168

Gudjonsson argues that the techniques advocated by Inbau and h

are practically and ethically problematic because they are inhere

insofar as they communicate implicit threats and promises to 

Although it is outside the purview of this paper, we note that Gudjo

criticism of the Reid Technique and its underlying psychological 

their coercive nature yields a far greater proportion of false confes

tolerable. This criticism and concern over false confessions has be

other psychologists and experts in interrogations and confessions.170

The authors of the Reid Technique counter that the criticisms are 

at actual law enforcement practice and misuse of the technique. A

the John E. Reid and Associates offi cial website, “the goal of the 

process is to develop the truth. It is not a process designed to obtain 

by any means from any suspect.”171 The authors assert that by f

165 Id. 166 Id., p. 21. 167 Id. 168 Id. 169 Id. 170 For further criticism of the Reid Technique, see R. Leo and R.J. Ofshe, “The C

False Confessions: Deprivation of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age o

Interrogation,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 88, no. 2 (1998), 429-496. 171 John E. Reid and Associates, Defending the Reid Technique of Interrogation, at 

com/educational_info/critictechniquedefend.html, accessed 13 March 2005.
150

Decision-Making Model 

Hilgendorf and Irving have suggested an alternative concept of interrogat

and confessions.173 Their model provides a framework for analyzing 

circumstances in which any particular confession was made in terms of 

decision-making task of the suspect, the information with which he is prov

the social pressures which are brought to bear on him, and the physical chara

of the interrogation.”174 It conceptualizes interrogation as a complicated 

demanding decision-making process.175 The subject of an interrogation must m

many choices, some of which include whether to speak or remain silent; whe

to make self-incriminating admissions or a confession; whether to tell the t

part of the truth, or lie; how to answer the questions asked by the interrogator; 

what attitude to adopt toward the police.176

Hilgendorf and Irving’s model predicts that subjects will seek to make 

best possible choice among the courses of action available by choosing “

course for which the product of (1) the probability of occurrence and (2) 

value to him (or utility) of the consequences, is largest.”177 The subject’s ac

will have consequences for him or her: criminal charges may be fi led; he or 

may be detained; the police may check the information provided for accu

and truthfulness.178 Thus, he or she will attempt to evaluate the probabilitie

each consequence’s occurrence, and his or her decision about how to act wil

a “result of some balancing of the likelihood of various consequences in rela

to their utilities for him [or her].”179 Consequently, an interrogation subje

decisions are determined by:

• Perceptions of the available courses of action.

• Perceptions concerning the probabilities of the likely occurrenc

various consequences attached to these courses of action.

• The utility values or gains attached to these courses of action.

Hilgendorf and Irving make clear that the subject’s decision makin

governed not by the objective probabilities that given consequences may o

but by the subjective probabilities of their occurrence.180 In other words, decis

172 Id. 173 E.L. Hilgendorf and B. Irving, “A Decision-Making Model of Confessions,” in Psycholo

Legal Contexts: Applications and Limitations, M.A. Lloyd-Bostock, ed. (London, UK: Macm

1981), 67-84. 174 Id., p. 81. 175 Id., p. 69. 176 Id. 177 Id. 178 Id. 179 Id., p. 70. 180 Id., p. 71. 
151

Hilgendorf and Irving argue that threats and inducements, even 

and implicit, can markedly infl uence the suspect’s decision to confe

the perceived power the police have over the situation and the appare

of their words. Similarly, they point to a number of social, psych

environmental factors that can affect or seriously impair the suspe

making during police interrogation. The most salient factors 

Gudjonsson are as follows:181

• The police can manipulate the social and self-approval util

suspect’s feelings of competence and self-esteem) during 

in order to infl uence his decision-making.

• The interrogators can manipulate the suspect’s perceptions 

outcome concerning a given course of action. For example, 

can minimize the seriousness of the offense.

• Interrogators can impair the suspect’s ability to cope with 

processing and decision-making through various mean

psychological and environmental manipulation.

Hilgendorf and Irving conclude that, given the interrogator’s 

authority, the interrogation situation puts strong pressure on susp

excessive emphasis in their decision making on the approval or d

the interrogator, and to be extremely sensitive to all communication

and non-verbal, that they receive from the interrogator.182 Physical 

supports and facilitates these pressures, and the effect becomes more 

the longer the detention lasts. The combined effect of these pressu

forms of environmental and situational stress inherent in custodial i

can adversely affect “effi cient performance on the complex decision

confronting interrogation subjects.183

Psychoanalytic Model

Gudjonsson points out that this model rests upon the assumpt

feeling of guilt is the fundamental cause of confessions.”184 Based 

concepts of the id and ego, Reik’s work attempts to show that the 

compulsion to confess plays a seminal role in crime.185 Accordin

confession is “an attempt at reconciliation that the superego undert

to settle the quarrel between the ego and the id.”186 Thus, a confess

serves the role of relieving people of the overwhelming feeling of gui

181 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 122. 182 Hilgendorf and Irving, see note 173, p. 81. 183 Id. 184 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 122. 185 Theodor Reik, The Compulsion to Confess: On the Psychoanalysis of Crime 

translated by Katherine Jones (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1959). 186 Id., p. 216.
152

which is experienced as oppressive and depressing.187 The confession reli

the individual from the guilt, producing important cathartic effects. Howeve

Gudjonsson points out, the model remains controversial at best, as its foundati

theses have limited acceptance in the scientifi c community.188

Interaction Process Model

This model proposes that, regardless of a suspect’s actual involvement 

crime, the interaction among three main sets of factors determines the individu

initial response to an allegation and the eventual outcome of an interrogatio

These sets of factors are:190

• Background characteristics of the suspect and offense

• Contextual characteristics of the case

• Interrogator’s questioning techniques

The fi rst set of factors includes the suspect’s age, sex, and criminal his

as well as the type and severity of the offense under investigation.191 The sec

set encompasses the strength of the available evidence against the suspect 

the suspect’s access to legal advice.192 According to the model, the interrogat

questioning techniques are infl uenced by his beliefs about and attitudes toward 

characteristics of the suspect and the case, which in turn affect the suspect’s in

response to an allegation.193 The suspect’s subsequent and fi nal responses du

questioning will be determined by his calculation of the relative advantage

response change (i.e., from an initial denial to an admission), brought abou

the interrogator’s reaction to the suspect’s initial response.194

After analyzing 1,000 cases in which suspects were interviewed by po

offi cers in England, Moston, Stephenson, and Williamson suggested that po

interviewing techniques played a relatively minor role in infl uencing confess

for two main reasons.195 First, most admissions were freely volunteered at the ou

of interviews, and those suspects who denied an accusation at the outset typic

maintained this denial throughout, even in the face of seemingly incontrovert

proof of guilt.196 Second, the authors found that police interviewing skills w

187 E. Berggren, The Psychology of Confessions (Leiden, The Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1975). 188 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 122. 189 Stephen Moston, “From Denial to Admission in Police Questioning of Suspects,” in Psych

Law and Criminal Justice, Graham Davies et al. eds. (UK: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), 92. 190 Id. 191 Id. 192 Id. 193 Id. 194 Id. 195 S. Moston et al., “The Effects of Case Characteristics on Suspect Behaviour During P

Questioning, British Journal of Criminology 32 (1992), 23-40. 196 Moston, see note 195, p. 92. 
153

Interrogation as Dialogue

An alternate and less traditional view conceives of interrogation 

between suspect and interrogator, “characterized by an adversaria

This model places great importance on understanding how the inte

into the scheme of critical dialogues in which individuals engage 

as to allow interrogators to overcome hurdles encountered in the 

process and to give them ideas of how to move the dialogue forw

moments.

Although Walton suggests that the interrogation is a form of 

seeking dialogue, he recognizes that “to conduct an interrogation 

a persuasion dialogue, or a normal information-seeking dialogue, 

in argumentation that is inappropriate, and even useless for this 

Moreover, unlike a traditional critical conversation, broken into stage

participants decide when to move from one stage to the next, the 

interrogation (formative, preparatory, argumentation, and closing) “p

the agreement of both parties, but by the unilateral choices of the int

Indeed, “interrogation is a type of asymmetrical dialogue in which on

to be very powerful and the other party tends to be very passive.”2

this, Walton argues that “the questioner must use tricky techniqu

results.”203 Walton’s recommendations for the questioner include t

friendly and cooperative, even sympathetic to the respondent;” 

patient, and give plenty of time for answers;” 3) “be methodical, an

of questions that have been previously prepared;” 4) “repeat questi

not yet been answered;” and 5) have the interrogation “go on for a lo

period of time.”204

Within the context of interrogation as dialogue, Walton then 

number of argumentation techniques that may be used in interro

fi rst suggested technique is “the easiest way out,” whereby the inter

to “wear the respondent down, and then inform him that if [he] jus

or give[s] [the interrogator] the desired information, then [his] p

be over.”205 Similarly, the interrogator can use “the only way ou

whereby he or she makes the conditions “unbearable for the respo

197 Id. 198 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 124. 199 Douglas Walton, “The Interrogation as a Type of Dialogue,” Journal of Pragm

(December 2003), 1771-1802. 200 Id., p. 1798. 201 Id. 202 Id., p. 1799. 203 Id., p. 1778. 204 Id. 205 Id., p. 1784.
154

were questioning a child.”207 Walton also points to other techniques such as 

of hypnosis, catching the subject off guard, fostering the belief that the suspe

not being interrogated, misrepresenting the law, distorting the seriousness of 

offense, using threats, leading the suspect to believe that the interrogators alre

know everything, and sympathizing with the subject.208

According to Walton, understanding the rules of dialogue that interroga

participants follow, whether consciously or unconsciously, should, in theory, 

the interrogator understand both his approaches and responses to the suspec

well as the suspect’s various approaches and responses during the course of 

interview. This would allow the interrogator to adjust, take unexpected tacks, 

generally conduct a more successful interrogation. Walton formulates ten rule

questioner (“proponent”) and suspect (“respondent”) in the interrogation dialo

assuming “that the respondent does not want to give out the information, or at l

all of it, but wants to appear compliant by taking part in the dialogue.”209 Ta

Walton’s assumptions, the “rules” of the interrogation dialogue for questioner 

suspect are:210

1. The respondent needs to take care not to inadvertently say 

something that might give out the information he wants to 

conceal, or to allow the proponent to infer it;

2. The proponent may coerce the respondent to reveal the 

information through threats or sanctions, but only by the means 

allowed;

3. The proponent needs to pose questions to the respondent, and 

these questions can, and often should be, leading, loaded, and 

deceptive;

4. The respondent should answer in formulations that are vague, 

ambiguous, misleading, or confusing, if that will help serve his 

ends;

5. The proponent should probe critically into the respondent’s 

prior replies, and try to use them to extract information;

6. The respondent should take care to try to be consistent in his 

replies and in the commitments that can be inferred from them;

7. If the proponent fi nds inconsistencies in the respondent’s 

commitments, or implausible statements, or statements that are 

206 Id., p. 1785. 207 Id. 208 Id., p. 1785-86. 209 Id., p. 1780. 210 Id.
155

8. If the proponent extracts the information she wants from 

respondent, then she has achieved her goal and the dialo

concludes in her favor;

9. If the proponent terminates the interrogation without get

the information she wants, and the respondent preserves 

interests, the dialogue concludes in the respondent’s favor;

10. The two parties can use any arguments, even ones consid

irrelevant or fallacious from the viewpoint of a critical discus

to achieve their ends.

Walton also points out that “appeals to fear and threats hav

known to be powerfully effective arguments,”211 and that the “logica

character of such threats does not diminish their effectiveness in the 

dialogue.212 Of course, if the suspect/respondent is totally unrespons

rules have little application, and one must turn to the Reid Techn

techniques explored in this paper in order to obtain information from 

Cognitive-Behavioral Model 

Mainly espoused by Gudjonsson, the cognitive-behavioral 

confessions as resulting from “the existence of a particular relation

the suspect, the environment and signifi cant others within that env

It suggests that it is helpful to look at the “antecedents” and “cons

confessing behavior within the framework of behavioral analysis.214 

are the kinds of events occurring prior to interrogation that may trigge

the confession.215 Consequences refer to the effects of a confession 

upon the subject. There are two major types: short term and long t

term consequences occur within minutes or hours of the suspect

while long-term consequences manifest themselves within days, w

or years of the confession.217 The types of consequences depend on t

circumstances of the case and the psychological characteristics of t

concerned.218

As explained below, antecedents and consequences are 

terms of social, emotional, cognitive, situational and physiologi

Though these are discussed in greater detail below, the following Tab

211 Id., p. 1788. 212 Id. 213 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 124. 214 Id. 215 Id., p. 125. 216 Id. 217 Id. 218 Id. 219 Id.
156

Antecedents Consequences

Short-Term Long-Term

Social

 Isolation; police 

pressure

Police approval/praise Disapproval

Emotional

 Distress

Feelings of relief Feelings of guilt, sham

Cognitive

 “The police know I 

did it.”

 “The truth will come 

out in the end.”

 “Perhaps I did do it 

but I can’t 

 remember it.”

“It’s good to get it off my 

chest.”

“My solicitor will sort it 

out.”

“How could I have done 

such a dreadful thing?”

“What is going to happ

to me now?”

“This is very

 serious.”’

“I’m now certain I had 

nothing to do with it.”

Situational:

 Nature of the arrest:

 Confi nement?

 Solicitor present?

 Caution understood?

 Familiarity with 

police procedures?

Charged, allowed access 

to a solicitor

Judicial proceedings

Physiological

 Aroused physical 

state, inhibitions 

reduced by alcohol 

or drugs; drug 

 withdrawal

Arousal reduction Arousal returns to bas

level

The antecedents and consequences of confessions.220

Source: The authors.

220 Id.
157

y 

g

place great emphasis on isolating the suspect from any external infl ue

reduce his or her willingness to confess.222 The second kind of soc

police pressure, relates to the nature of the interrogation itself.223 As 

by the Reid Model described above, the social process and interac

interrogator and subject is an important factor in obtaining a confe

context, the immediate consequence of confessing is social reinf

the police interrogators, who might praise the subject for cooper

owning up to what he or she has done.224 Additionally, the subject ma

access to visitors such as family members and, in some cases, ma

to go home.225 The long-term consequences commonly involve the 

having to come to terms with social disapproval from the media an

public.226

Emotional Events

Being arrested and brought to a police station is an undoubte

event. Generally, suspects can be expected to experience considera

anxiety and distress, caused mainly by the uncertainty of the situa

of what will happen at the station, the fear of being locked in a cell

of the consequences regarding the offense.227 There are two distin

experiences relevant to confessions: guilt and shame.228 Shame is bes

degrading, humiliating experience, and it often accompanies a sense o

In contrast, guilt is associated with some real or imagined past trans

is inconsistent with the person’s internalized values and standards.2

feeling of guilt motivates people to confess, a feeling of shame ha

effect.231 After confessing, suspects may experience a sense o

relief as the immediate pressure is lifted and they have greater ce

their immediate future.232 However, at the prospect that the subjec

commission of the crime will become known, a feeling of shame so

in or becomes exacerbated.233

221 Id., p. 126. 222 Id. 223 Id. 224 Id. 225 Id. 226 Id. 227 Id. 228 Id. 229 Id. 230 Id. 231 Id. 232 Id. 233 Id., p. 127. 
158

p, pgpg g

situation.234 According to Gudjonsson, it is important to remember that 

suspect’s behavior during the interrogation is likely to be more infl uenced 

his or her perceptions, interpretations, and assumptions about what is happe

than by the actual behavior of the police/interrogators.235 One possible cogni

antecedent to a confession occurs when the suspect perceives the evidence aga

him as being strong; he is more likely to confess if he believes there is no p

in denying the offense.236 Another possible cognitive factor involves susp

“talking themselves into confessing” if they believe the interrogator will not re

until he has obtained a confession, or if they believe that the police have suffi c

evidence to prove that they committed the offense.237 An innocent person’s f

that the truth will eventually come out through the criminal justice system 

also facilitate a (false) confession.238 Finally, innocent suspects who begi

doubt their own recollection of events in the face of pressing interrogation 

eventually yield to the suggestions of the interrogator and come to believe 

they committed the crime.239

The immediate cognitive consequences of confessing may relate to thou

associated with the easing of the pressure.240 For some suspects, espec

innocent ones, the belief that their legal representative will sort everything 

may predominate.241 On the other hand, suspects who mistakenly accept g

because of confusion about their recollection and acceptance of the interrogat

suggestions may come to wonder how they could have committed such a d

and have no recollection of it.242 Eventually, after their confusion subsides, 

may again become fully convinced that they had nothing to do with the crim

which they previously confessed.243

Situational Events

These factors are potentially infi nite. As Gudjonsson points out, 

circumstances of the suspect’s arrest (e.g., being arrested suddenly in the e

hours of the morning) may affect the suspect’s ability to cope with the subseq

interrogation.”244 Similarly, the time and conditions of confi nement prio

interrogation may affect the subject’s performance: “being locked up in a po

cell for several hours or days may ‘soften up’ subjects (i.e., weaken their resista

234 Id. 235 Id. 236 Id. 237 Id. 238 Id. 239 Id. 240 Id. 241 Id. 242 Id. 243 Id. 244 Id.
159

The immediate situational consequence commonly associated with 

is that the suspect is charged with the offense.247 The long-term co

possible prosecution and judicial proceedings.248

Physiological Events

The physiological antecedent to a confession is “heightened ar

includes increased heart rate, blood pressure, rate and irregularity o

and perspiration.”249 These occur because “suspects are commonly 

worried and frightened.”250 Once the suspect has confessed, “there i

a sharp reduction in his level of physiological and subjective arous

greater certainty about the immediate future.”251 Arousal may then 

normal level, though Gudjonsson notes that uncertainty about the pe

or prosecution “may lead to an increased subjective and physiolo

arousal.”252

Interrogative Suggestibility

Some experts, led by Gudjonsson and Clark, have dedicated 

research to the application of suggestibility in police interrogation.253 

suggestibility is central to the social-psychological model described 

are two main theoretical approaches to interrogative suggestibility: t

differences approach and the experimental approach.

254 Althoug

different perspectives, the models complement each other.255 The form

is best illustrated by the work of Gudjonsson and Clark256 and the 

work of Schooler and Loftus.257 The experimental approach places 

“understanding the conditions under which leading questions are lik

the verbal accounts of witnesses.”258 Thus, interrogative suggestibil

as being “mediated by a central cognitive mechanism, referred to a

245 Id., p. 127-128. 246 Id., p. 128. 247 Id. 248 Id. 249 Id. 250 Id. 251 Id. 252 Id. 253 Gisli H. Gudjonsson, “The Application of Interrogative Suggestibility to Poli

in Human Suggestibility, John F. Schumaker, ed. (UK: Routledge, 1991), 279-288. 254 Id., p. 279. 255 Id., p. 279. 256 Gisli H. Gudjonsson and N. Clark, “Suggestibility in Police Interrogation: A Soci

Model,” Social Behaviour 1 (1986), 83-104. 257 J.W. Schooler and E.F. Loftus, “Individual Differences and Experimentation: 

Approaches to Interrogative Suggestibility,” Social Behaviour 1 (1986), 105-12. 258 Gudjonsson, see note 253, p. 279.
160

On the other hand, the individual differences approach “has spe

applicability to police interrogation and views suggestibility as being depen

upon the coping strategies that people can generate and implement w

confronted with the uncertainty and expectations of the interrogative situation

The model tries to “explain individual differences in suggestibility,” and its m

premise is that “people vary considerably in their reactions to police interroga

even when the conditions of the situation are similar.”262 Gudjonsson and C

defi ne interrogative suggestibility as “the extent to which, within a clo

social interaction, people come to accept the messages communicated du

formal questioning, as the result of which their subsequent behavioral respo

is affected.”263 Thus, the defi nition implies the following fi ve interrel

components:264

• A closed social interaction between interrogator and subject.

• A questioning procedure that involves two or more participants.

• A suggestive stimulus.

• Acceptance of the suggestive stimulus.

• A behavioral response to indicate whether or not the suggestio

accepted.

Given these characteristics, Gudjonsson argues that interrogative suggestib

differs from other types of suggestibility in four respects:265

• It involves questioning procedures within a closed social interaction

• The questions asked deal mainly with past experiences and ev

recollections, and remembered states of knowledge, as opposed 

traditional types of suggestibility, which are primarily concerned w

motor and sensory experiences of the immediate situation.

• It has a strong component of uncertainty related to the cogn

processing capacity of the individual.

• It typically involves a highly stressful situation with impo

consequences for the person being interviewed.

Thus understood, the Gudjonsson model is “essentially a social-psycholog

model, where interrogative suggestibility is construed as arising throug

particular relationship between the person, the environment, and signifi 

259 Id. 260 Id. 261 Id. 262 Id. 263 Id., p. 280. 264 Id. 265 Id., p. 280-281.
161

responded to a question or a series of questions, intended to strength

feedback)] or modify [(negative feedback)] subsequent responses o

[or suspect].”267 The interrogator can communicate feedback both i

explicitly.268 Repeated questioning is one example of implicit negativ

Implicit positive feedback may consist of providing refreshmen

sympathy to the subject after he or she begins to give desired an

interrogator’s questions.270 Explicit negative feedback, on the other h

of open statements by the interrogator to the effect that he or she th

interviewee has made a mistake or is lying.271 Similarly, an interroga

explicit positive feedback by using responses like “good,” “that’s right

are getting somewhere” to reinforce wanted or accepted answers by t

Gudjonsson argues that feedback, and especially negative feedbac

“dramatic effects upon the subsequent behavior of an interviewee.”27

that negative feedback has two distinct effects: “it (a) makes intervie

or shift their previous answers, and (b) heightens their responsiven

leading questions.”274

As mentioned above, Gudjonsson’s model states that 

suggestibility is “dependent upon the coping strategies that 

generate and implement when dealing with the uncertainty and ex

interrogation.”275 According to Gudjonsson, the three necessary pre

the process of suggestibility are uncertainty, interpersonal trust, an

of success.

276

The uncertainty derives from the fact that the subject doe

for certain the right answer to a question and is therefore potent

suggestion.277 This may occur, for example, when the subject’s mem

event is incomplete or nonexistent.278 According to Gudjonsson, subj

be described as suggestible when they “privately accept the sugge

or at least believe it to be plausible.”279 Thus, suggestible subjects 

from compliant ones, who “accept a suggestion contained in a lead

266 Id., p. 281. 267 Id.. 268 Id. 269 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 350. 270 Id. 271 Id. 272 Id. 273 Id., p. 350-51. 274 Id., p. 351. 275 Gudjonsson, see note 253, p. 281. 276 Id. 277 Id. 278 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 348. 279 Id.
162

Interpersonal trust is important because, to yield to suggestion, the sub

must believe “that the interrogator’s intentions are genuine and that there i

trickery involved in the questioning.”281 According to Gudjonsson, interview

who are suspicious of the interrogator’s intentions “will be reluctant to ac

suggestions offered, even under conditions of increased uncertainty.”282 Fin

Gudjonsson points out that although uncertainty and interpersonal trust 

necessary to make people yield to suggestion they are not suffi cient, becaus

uncertain subject can answer with “don’t know,” “not sure,” or “can’t recall

Consequently, it is important that the interrogator communicate, either impli

or explicitly, an expectation of success about the subject’s performance: the 

is to make the subject feel that he or she should be able, and indeed is expecte

provide a defi nite answer to the interrogator’s questions.284

Ultimately, the model predicts that “most people are open to sugges

when the necessary conditions of uncertainty, interpersonal trust and heighte

expectations are present.”285 From these predictions, it can be hypothes

that “the three components, uncertainty, interpersonal trust, and expectat

can be manipulated by the interrogator to alter the subject’s susceptib

to suggestion.”286 Similarly, it can be theorized that “people who enter 

interrogation with a suspicious cognitive set (e.g., those who do not trust 

police or are suspicious of them) are less suggestible than those with a trus

cognitive set.”287 Gudjonsson also hypothesizes that “people with poor mem

recollection and low intelligence are generally more suggestible than those w

high cognitive capabilities,” and that suggestibility is “related to such variable

low self-esteem, lack of assertiveness, and anxiety.”288

Gudjonsson developed a suggestibility scale to test his interroga

suggestibility model and the hypotheses derived from it. The Gudjon

Suggestibility Scale can be used “to assess the individual’s responses to ‘lea

questions’ and ‘negative feedback’ instructions when being asked to repo

factual event from recall.”289 The scale employs a narrative paragraph descri

a fi ctitious mugging, which is read aloud to the subjects. They are then as

to report all they can recall about the story, after which each person is as

20 specifi c questions, 15 of which are subtly misleading. After answering 

20 questions the person is told that he or she has made a number of errors, 

280 Id. 281 Id., p. 349. 282 Id. 283 Id., p. 350. 284 Id. 285 Gudjonsson, see note 253, p. 282. 286 Id. 287 Id. 288 Id. 289 Id., p. 283.
163

as “yield.” “Yield” and “shift” are typically added together to m

suggestibility.”290 According to Gudjonsson, two studies have show

possible to manipulate the expectations of the subjects (as described 

to interrogation in order to reduce or enhance suggestibility.”291

In Gudjonsson and Hilton’s study, a signifi cant difference in 

was found between three groups of people who were given differen

about their expected performance.292 One group of people (the “Hig

group”) was told that they were expected to remember most of the s

defi nite answers to all the questions. The second group was given no 

about their expected performance. The third group (the “Low expect

was told that they were not expected to fi nd a defi nite answer to all 

The most important implication of this fi nding for police interrog

interrogators “should be aware that certain expectations communicat

prior to or during the interview can markedly affect the accuracy of th

obtained.”293 Gudjonsson also has noted that interrogative sugg

signifi cantly related to the coping strategies that subjects report usin

test.”294 According to his fi ndings, subjects who proved most sugges

to use ‘avoidance’ coping during the interrogation.”295 Gudjonsson n

means that they failed “to evaluate each question critically and gave a

seemed plausible and consistent with the external cues provided.”2

non-suggestible subjects “were able to adopt a critical analysis of 

which facilitated the accuracy of their answers.”297

Section 2. Empirical Findings

Most of the recent empirical studies on confessions have been 

England.298 With the exception of the 1996 study by Richard Leo dis

most of the U.S. studies date back to the 1960s and have largely 

studying the effects of the Miranda ruling on the frequency with w

waive their rights and confess.

How Often Do Suspects Confess?

Research shows that many suspects interrogated at police sta

to the crime of which they are accused and that a further prop

290 Id., p. 283. 291 Id., p. 284. 292 Gisli H. Gudjonsson and M. Hilton, “The Effects of Instructional Manipulation 

Suggestibility,” Social Behaviour 4 (1989), 189-93. 293 Gudjonsson, see note 253, p. 285. 294 Id. 295 Id. 296 Id. 297 Id. 298 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 130.
164

of the denials change to confessions. However, there is no empirical evide

to support this claim.300 In contrast to claims by Inbau et al., British rese

indicates that a confession or admission typically occurs at the beginning o

interview and the suspect usually sticks to his chosen position throughout 

interview regardless of the technique used.301 The table below lists British 

U.S. studies that represent the available data on confession rates in both count

Because Richard Leo’s 1996 study stands as the only U.S. study of its kind s

the 1960s, we will discuss it in further detail below.

Study Country Type ofData Sample

Confession/ 

admission 

(%)

Propor

having 

advice 

Baldwin and 

McConville England Crown 

Court fi les 282 76 N/A

Cassell and

Hayman USA Survey 173 42 N/A

Irving England Observational 60 62 10

Irving and 

McKenzie England Observational 68 (1986) 65 29

68 (1987) 46 31

Leo USA Observational 182 42 N/A

Mitchell England Crown Court 

fi les 394 71 N/A

Moston and

Stephenson England Questionnaire 558 59 14

Moston,

Stephenson, 

Williamson

England Taped

interviews 1067 42 41

Neubauer USA Case fi les 248 47 N/A

Pearse et

 al. England Taped

interviews 161 58 56

A

299 Id.,133. 300 Id. 301 Id.
165

(%)

a

Phillips 

and 

Brown

England

Police 

documents/ 

questionnaires

4250 55 3

Softley England Observational 187 61 9

Zander England Crown Court

fi les 282 76 N

KLM

Proportion of suspects who confess or make admission

Source: The authors; data compiled from references shown seq

in box below.

J. Baldwin and M. McConville, Confessions in Crown Court Trials

Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 5 

Her Majesty’s Stationery Offi ce (HMSO), 1980).

P.G. Cassell and B.S. Hayman, “Police Interrogation In the 1990s: 

Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda”, in The Miran

Justice and Policing, R.A. Leo and G.C. Thomas III, eds. 

MA: Northeastern University Press, 1998), 222-235.

B. Irving, Police Interrogation. A Case Study of Current Practice, R

Studies No. 2 (London: HMSO, 1980).

B. Irving and I.K. McKenzie, Police Interrogation: The Effects of t

and Criminal Evidence Act (London: The Police Foundati

R. Leo, “Inside the Interrogation Room,” The Journal of Criminal 

Criminology, 86, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 266-303.

B. Mitchell, “Confessions and Police Interrogations of Suspects,” C

Law Review (September 1983), 596-604.

S.J. Moston and G.M. Stephenson, “Predictors of Suspect and Inter

Behaviour During Police Questioning,” in Psychology and 

International Perspectives, F. Loesel et al. eds. (UK: Walt

Gruyter, 1992), 212-218.

S. Moston et al., “The Effects of Case Characteristics on Suspect B

during Police Questioning,” British Journal of Criminolog

(1992): 23-40.

302 Id., 137
166

J. Pearse et al., “Police Interviewing and Psychological Vulnerabilities: 

Predicting the Likelihood of a Confession,” Journal of Community 

and Applied Social Psychology 8, no. 1 (1998), 1-21.

C. Phillips and D. Brown, Entry into the Criminal Justice System: A Survey 

Police Arrests and their Outcomes, Home Offi ce Research Study n

185 (London: HMSO, 1998).

P. Softley, Police Interrogation. An Observational Study in Four Police 

Stations, Home Offi ce Research Study no. 61(London: HMSO, 198

M. Zander, “The Investigation of Crime: A Study of Cases Tried at the Old 

Bailey,” Criminal Law Review (1979), 203-219.

Even a cursory study of these data makes clear that the admission/confes

rate is substantially (about 15%) lower in the United States than in Engl

However, Gudjonsson cautions against drawing any conclusions from this disp

for several reasons. First, he notes that generalizations from the available 

may be unwise given “the scarcity of recent studies in the United States and 

relatively low number of cases evaluated in each study.”303 Second, differen

between England and the United States in confession rates “may relate to 

greater impact of the Miranda rules on the confession rate than the restrict

imposed on British law enforcement.”304 Third, Gudjonsson suggests that m

English legal representatives at police stations might be “passive and ineffectu

their role.”305 Finally, he notes that confession rate differences across nations “

be related to cultural factors infl uencing both police and suspects.”306 Addition

it should be noted that the data cited in Table 2 for the most recent U.S. s

(Leo, 1996) do not include suspects who made incriminating statements sh

an admission or confession. As explained below, inclusion of these fi gures w

dramatically alter the results.

Richard Leo’s 1996 study of interrogation practices in the United St

involved nine months of observational work inside a major urban po

department in the United States, where he contemporaneously observed 

interrogations involving 45 different detectives.307 Leo also viewed 30 videota

custodial interrogations performed by a second police department, and ano

30 videotaped interrogations performed by a third.308 Generally, Leo sough

303 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 139. 304 Id., 139-40. 305 Id., 140. 306 Id. 307 Leo, see note 110, p. 268. 308 Id.
167

coding sheet.309 Leo noted that interrogations could yield four possib

(1) the suspect provided no information to the police that he or sh

incriminating; (2) the suspect (intentionally or not) provided some inf

police considered incriminating, but did not directly admit to any of 

of the crime; (3) the suspect admitted to some, but not all, of the ele

crime; and (4) the suspect provided a full confession.310 The table be

the data from Leo’s study.

Subject’s Response to Interrogation Frequency (%)

No incriminating statement 35.71

Incriminating statement 22.53

Partial admission 17.58

Full confession 24.18

Outcome of interrogations in the United States.311

Contrary to other authors such as Gudjonsson, who limit th

confessions and/or admissions, Leo operated under the assump

interrogation is successful “when the suspect provides the detective 

some incriminating information.”312 Taking this assumption as 

studies reveal that “almost two-thirds (64.29%) of the interrogations 

produced a successful result.”313

However, that a substantial proportion of suspects subjected to 

end up confessing says nothing about the reasons behind those con

next section attempts to shed some empirical light on why suspects 

Factors Associated with Admissions and Denials

Background Characteristics of the Suspect

Studies suggest that certain types of subjects are more likely 

make incriminating admissions than others. The more salient factor

1. Age: Age is often considered an indirect measure of maturi

mature suspects usually cope better with the unfamiliarity and dema

interrogation than less mature suspects.314 Gudjonsson notes that

309 Id. 310 Id. 311 As noted in the text, Table 3 contains the data from Leo’s study, and is adapte

note 110, 280. 312 Leo, p. 280. 313 Id. 314 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 141.
168

interrogation compared with 18.2% of older suspects.316 A 1980 British s

found that 53% of suspects over 21 years of age made confessions, comp

to 68% of those below the age of 21.317 Studies in 1989318 and 1998319 foun

difference of 10.8% and 8%, respectively, between confession rates of juven

and adults. Gudjonsson draws two interpretations from these fi ndings: 1) 

younger the suspect, the easier it is to obtain a confession from him or her, an

there appears to be no clear cut-off point with regard to age, i.e., suspects do 

seem to reach a ceiling of resistance after a certain age.320

The literature reveals several factors that could be responsible for 

phenomenon. First, it might be that, due to greater life experience, older susp

are better equipped psychologically to cope with the demand characteristic

the interrogative situation.321 Another possible explanation is that older susp

are more likely to understand and assert their legal rights during interrogatio

Finally, Gudjonsson suggests that temperamental differences related to age 

also be important.323 For example, factors such as neuroticism and impulsiven

which may make some suspects confess more readily than others, are negati

correlated with age.324 Another potential factor is that adolescents fi nd nega

feedback and interrogative pressure from interrogators more diffi cult to r

than adults.325

However, the literature does not universally demonstrate this correla

between age and willingness to confess. In a study of 248 criminal defendan

Prairie City, California, Neubauer found no signifi cant difference in confes

rates between minors (16–20 years old) and adults (21 years and older

Similarly, Leo did not fi nd age to be “signifi cantly related to the likelihoo

obtaining incriminating information from the suspect.”327

315 Id. 316 L.S. Leiken, “Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda,” 47 D

Law Journal 1 (1970), 19-20. 317 P. Softley, Police Interrogation. An Observational Study in Four Police Stations, Home O

Research Study no. 61(London: HMSO, 1980). 318 R. Leng et al., Discretion to Charge and Prosecute, Report to the Economic and Social Res

Council (UK: 1989). 319 C. Phillips and D. Brown, Entry into the Criminal Justice System: A Survey of Police Arre

and their Outcomes, Home Offi ce Research Study no. 185 (London: HMSO, 1998). 320 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 142. 321 Leiken, see note 319, p. 19-21. 322 J. Baldwin and M. McConville, Confessions in Crown Court Trials, Royal Commissio

Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 5 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Offi ce (HMSO), 1

p. 195. 323 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 142 324 Id. 325 Id. 326 W. Neubauer, “Confessions in Prairie City: Some Causes and Effects,” Journal of Crimin

Law and Criminology 65 (1974), 104.. 327 Leo, see note 110, p. 291.
169

and denials.329 Similarly, Leo found no signifi cant relationship bet

and likelihood of confession or self-incrimination.330 On the other h

researcher found a signifi cant gender difference, with females con

commonly than males (73% admission rate of females versus 52% o

3. Ethnic Differences: Phillips and Brown found that admiss

whites, blacks and Asians were 58, 48 and 44% respectively.332 Inte

study also refl ected that black and Asian detainees were signifi cantl

than whites to request legal advice. Even when the analysis accou

variable, a signifi cant difference remained between the confession r

and white detainees. However, Leo found no signifi cant relationship 

and likelihood of confession.333

4. Mental State and Psychological Factors: Although the d

Gudjonsson has concluded that the only psychological/mental sta

predicts a confession is when suspects admitted to having consum

drug 24 hours prior to their arrest.334

5. Previous Convictions and Confessions: Gudjonsson notes that 

have had several previous convictions are expected to be (a) more li

and assert their legal rights; (b) more familiar with the probable con

making self-incriminating admissions and confessions; and (c) more 

the police environment and interrogations.335 Consistent with these 

Leo found that suspects with a previous felony record were four time

to invoke their Miranda rights than suspects without previous c

Invocation of Mirada rights, in turn, implies the termination of 

Consistently, Neubauer found that suspects with previous convictio

likely to confess to the alleged offense than fi rst offenders.337 Ho

studies have found no signifi cant relationship between previous con

the rate of confessions.338

328 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 143. 329 See Moston, note 195; also see J. Pearse et al., “Police Interviewing and Psych

Vulnerabilities: Predicting the Likelihood of a Confession,” Journal of Community an

Social Psychology 8, no. 1 (1998). 330 Leo, see note 110, p. 291. 331 Phillips and Brown, see note 322, p. 105. 332 Id. 333 Leo, see note 110, p. 291. 334 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 144. 335 Id. 336 Leo, see note 110, p. 286. 337 Neubauer, see note 326, p. 103. 338 See Leiken, note 316; Phillips and Brown, note 319; M. Zander, “The Investig

A Study of Cases Tried at the Old Bailey,” Criminal Law Review (1979), 203-219.
170

pp, y p

from confessing.339 Thus, it might be theorized that the type and seriousnes

the offense, as detailed below, of which a particular suspect is accused m

infl uence his or her willingness to confess.

1. Type of Offense: Neubauer found that suspects interrogated ab

property offenses confessed more often (56%) than suspects of violent offe

(32%).340 Mitchell found consistently that suspects confessed more readil

property offenses (76%) than to violent offenses (64%). Neubauer argues 

the main reason for the greater number of confessions among alleged prop

offenders relates to the nature of the evidence that the police have at the tim

interrogation.341 In property offenses there is more often forensic evidence lin

the suspect with the offense, which gives interrogators more persuasive evide

to convince suspects that denials are futile.342 However, Moston, Stephenson 

Williamson found no signifi cant differences in confession rates between offe

types.343 Leo’s fi ndings also “do not support [Neubauer’s] argument that t

is a signifi cant relationship between the type of crime and the likelihoo

confession.”344

2. Seriousness of the Offense: A number of studies have shown that susp

confess less readily to serious than to non-serious offenses.345 Gudjonsson po

out that the relative lack of incentive among suspects to confess to serious cri

may sometimes be compensated for by the fact that the more serious the crime

longer suspects tend to be interrogated and the larger the number of interroga

tactics utilized.346

Contextual Characteristics

1. Access to Legal Advice: Gudjonsson notes that despite evidence 

receiving legal advice infl uences the confession rate, access to an attorney d

not appear to reduce the overall confession rate.347 In other words, even wi

high proportion of suspects being provided legal advice, suspects still confes

more than half of all cases. However, the presence of legal counsel is an impor

predictor as to whether or not a particular suspect will confess.348 For exam

Moston, Stephenson and Williamson (1992) found that over 50% of those 

received no legal advice confessed, in contrast to less than 30% of those who 

339 Gudjonsson, see note 110 p. 146. 340 Neubauer, see note 326, p. 104. 341 Id., p. 106 342 Id. 343 Moston, see note 195. 344 Leo, see note 110, p. 292. 345 See R. Evans, The Conduct of Police Interviews with Juveniles, Royal Commission on 

Criminal Justice Research Report no. 8 (London: HMSO 1993). 346 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 147-148. 347 Id., p. 150. 348 Id.
171

leads to access to an attorney and the automatic termination of 

Even though invoking Miranda is a potentially powerful tool fo

avoid interrogation and, thus, confession or self-incrimination, Le

78.29% of his sample chose to waive their Miranda rights, while 2

to terminate questioning.350 

2. Strength of the Evidence: The Moston, Stephenson and Will

provides the strongest support for the theory that the strength of the evi

a suspect is the best predictor of the likelihood of a confession.351 

were rare (less than 10% of cases) and denials common (77% of cas

evidence against the suspect was weak.352 On the other hand, when 

was strong confessions were common (67% of cases) and denia

(16% of cases).353 However, Leo’s fi ndings do not corroborate the th

strength of the evidence prior to questioning “exert[s] a statistical

effect on the likelihood that the suspect will provide incriminating 

during interrogation.”354 

3. Interrogation Techniques: Evidence shows that the more seriou

the more police use persuasive techniques to break down resista

study of 156 videotaped interrogations, Gudjonsson found open-end

in 98% of the interviews, and leading questions in 73% of the sample

common techniques of persuasion were the introduction of allegation

suspect, seen in 74% of the cases, and challenges to a lie or an incon

in 20% of the interviews.357 Other types of challenges, emphasis on th

of the offense, and psychological manipulation were individually 

than 8% of the cases.358 Ultimately, 53% of the suspects in Gudjon

made a full confession or a self-incriminating admission (i.e., an 

involvement in the offense, but minimizing intent or role).359 In 97% 

confession or admission occurred in the fi rst interview.360

349 Moston, see note 195. 350 Leo, see note 110, p. 276. 351 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 150. See also M.L. Wald et al., “Interrogations in 

The impact of Miranda,” Yale Law Journal 76, no. 1519 (1967) (fi nding that suspects 

signifi cantly more likely to provide incriminating information during interrogation th

evidence against them prior to questioning). 352 Moston, see note 195. 353 Id. 354 Leo, see note 110, p. 292. 355 See Evans, note 345; B. Irving and I.K. McKenzie Police Interrogation: The E

Police and Criminal Evidence Act (London: The Police Foundation, 1989). 356 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 69. 357 Id. 358 Id. 359 Id., p. 70. 360 Id.
172

study, interrogators employed a median of 5 and a mean of 5.62 tactics 

interrogation, yet used some tactics more than others.362 The twelve tactics m

commonly used by interrogators were the following (with the percentage of c

where the tactic was used in parentheses):363

• Appeal to suspect’s self-interest (88%).

• Confront suspect with existing evidence of guilt (85%).

• Undermine suspect’s confi dence in denial of guilt (43%).

• Identify contradictions in suspect’s story (42%).

• Use Behavioral Analysis Interview questions (40%).

• Appeal to the importance of cooperation (37%).

• Offer moral justifi cation/psychological excuses (34%).

• Confront suspect with false evidence of guilt (30%).

• Use praise or fl attery (30%).

• Appeal to the detective’s expertise/authority (29%).

• Appeal to the suspect’s conscience (23%).

• Minimize the moral seriousness of the offense (22%).

Leo’s fi ndings reveal that, of these tactics, the four most effectiv

eliciting a confession, admission, or incriminating statement were (a) appea

to the suspect’s conscience (97% success rate), (b) identifying and pointing 

contradictions in the suspect’s denial and story (91% success rate), (c) u

praise or fl attery (91% success rate), and (d) offering moral justifi cation

psychological excuses for the crime (90% success rate).364

4. Length of Interrogation: As noted above, Leo found that the length of 

interrogation, along with the number of interrogation techniques used, was 

only statistically signifi cant indicator of the likelihood of obtaining incrimina

information through a confession.365 Leo’s fi ndings refl ect that the lo

interrogators interrogate suspects “the more likely they are to wear the sus

down and elicit incriminating statements.”366 Successful interrogations were 

times more likely to last more than one hour than unsuccessful ones (36% vs. 

361 Leo, see note 110, p. 292. The other variable was length of the interrogation, discussed be

362 Id., p. 277. 363 Id., p. 278. 364 Id., p. 294. 365 Id., p. 292. 366 Id.
173

By contrast, Gudjonsson has concluded that only three varia

predict a confession: use of illicit drugs, prison experience, and pr

attorney/solicitor.368 Illicit drug use prior to the interrogation predicted 

making a confession, while the other two variables were associated 

making a denial.369 Gudjonsson found that the odds of a suspect’s con

more than three times greater if that suspect had reported using a

within 24 hours of his or her arrest.370 On the other hand, Gudjonsso

that the odds of suspects’ not confessing were four times higher for a 

had a legal representative.371 With regard to prior prison experience, t

of a denial was twice as great in cases where the suspect had alr

prison.372 According to Gudjonsson’s study, the greatest likelihood 

making a confession occurred when there was no solicitor present an

had consumed illicit drugs within 24 hours of arrest and had not been 

prison.373 The likelihood of a confession occurring under those circum

92%, in contrast to the average confession rate of 58% for the entire 

Gudjonsson’s Self-Report Studies

One distinct method for evaluating why suspects confess dur

interrogations is to systematically ask suspects questions about 

them confess.375 Gudjonsson has twice administered such question

in Northern Ireland and another in Iceland.376 These studies re

“facilitative” factors and one “inhibitory” factor for confessions

facilitative factor, external pressure to confess, is associated wit

police interrogation techniques, police behavior, and fear of confi ne

of being confi ned was rated as a very important reason for the confe

20% of the cases,379 while fear of the police or threats of violence 

important in only 5% of cases.380 Police pressure and persuasion w

very important in about 20% of cases.381 The second facilitative fa

pressure to confess, is associated with the suspect’s feelings of gu

crime and the consequent need to relieve him/herself of the guilt by c

367 Id., p. 297. 368 Gudjonsson,see note 110, p. 70. 369 Id. 370 Id. , p. 70-71. 371 Id., p. 71. 372 Id. 373 Id. 374 Id. 375 Id., p. 140. 376 Id., p. 152. 377 Id. 378 Id., p. 153. 379 Id. 380 Id. 381 Id. 382 Id. 
174

that they had confessed because they strongly believed at the time that the po

would be able to prove they had committed the crime.384 Gudjonsson ident

fear of the consequences of confessing as an inhibitory factor.385 Of the t

facilitative factors, Gudjonsson concluded that the single greatest incentiv

confess related to the strength of the evidence against the suspect.386

Section 3. Interrogation Techniques in the Literatur

Turning from the theoretical and empirical literature to the practical, there 

numerous guides available to the public concerning interrogation techniques. 

majority of interrogation manuals, or “how-to” texts, are produced in the Un

States and are generally based on the practical experience of interrogators.387 

most infl uential of these practical interrogation manuals is Criminal Interroga

and Confessions, written by Inbau, Reid, Buckley, and Jayne.388 It is also perh

the most comprehensive, unifi ed approach to interrogation, laying out an ov

schema for the entire interaction with the suspect. Inbau et al. take over 600 p

to describe the stages and requirements of a successful interrogation accordin

the Reid Technique. The Reid Technique was originally developed in the 19

and 1950s by John E. Reid and the text has continually evolved since then, 

the fourth and most recent edition published in 2004.389 Other classic texts inc

Royal and Schutt’s The Gentle Art of Interviewing and Interrogation, as 

as Aubry and Caputo’s Criminal Interrogation. A newer text that seems t

garnering some attention is Stan Walters’s Kinesic Interview and Interroga

These, combined with a number of other, lesser known “how-to” guides, pro

a basic outline of successful interrogation. To some degree, almost all cover 

same aspects of the successful interrogation: 1) characteristics/qualifi cat

of the interrogator; 2) pre-interrogation fact gathering and analysis; 3) 

interrogation setting; 4) pre-interrogation interview and rapport-building

analysis of behavioral symptoms; 6) interrogation of the suspect; 7) detectio

deceit; and 8) securing the confession. 

While some criticize the Reid Technique and most of the other avail

interrogation guides as relying too heavily on overly coercive persua

methods,390 those critics also acknowledge that some persuasion pressur

necessary, since most suspects are reluctant to admit their crimes or often e

383 Id. 384 Id. 385 Id., p. 152. 386 Id., p. 157. 387 Id., p. 7. 388 Id. 389 Inbau, see note 109, p. ix. 390 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 7.
175

power to ask questions, control over the suspect’s freedom of m

access to the outside world).”392

Interrogators generally use persuasive methods to convince 

“their best interests are served by a confession.”393 Some of the avail

recommend strategies of deception, including concealment of po

while trying to obtain a confession or admission, misrepresentation 

or seriousness of the offense during interrogation, and even trick

presenting the suspect with false evidence of guilt.394 Gudjonsson arg

that “the risk of false confessions is very real when psychologically 

and deceptive techniques are employed.”395 Thus, interrogators mus

these dangers. They should also recognize the three general classe

that are relevant to police interrogations, so that they can both unde

suspect is experiencing and manipulate the stressors as needed:

• Stress caused by the physical environment at the police stat

• Stress caused by confi nement and isolation from peers; and 

• Stress caused by the suspect’s submission to authority.396

The following subsections summarize the various sug

interrogation techniques provided by the classic texts for each of the 

mentioned above. The selected sources view interrogation as a me

secure confessions and gather accurate information in a legal and et

However, any such summary can only scratch the surface of “how-to

contain hundreds of pages each. Nonetheless, we attempt to draw to

areas on which the authorities basically agree, as well as to point ou

most salient suggestions made by each author in the various areas. 

discussion on the Reid Technique, as it is the most widely used and a

in many instances seems to be the basis for the other techniques as w

Characteristics/Qualifi cations of the Interrogator

All authorities agree that not just anyone can be a successful in

takes an intense dedication to the art of interrogation, years of pract

and certain personality characteristics, only some of which can be le

391 Id., p. 8. 392 Id., p. 25. 393 Id., p. 8. 394 Id. 395 Id., p. 9. 396 Id.,p. 26. 397 Most of the discussion will refer to the interrogator and subject/suspect as “he.

accommodate the texts which almost uniformly use “he,” and of course is not mean

way that either party must be male.
176

index of suspicion” are both important attributes, as is “an intense interest” in 

fi eld of interrogation.400 An interrogator should supplement this intense inte

with continual study of “behavior analysis, related areas of psychology 

psychopathology, as well as interrogation techniques. He should understand 

to conduct a proper interrogation and be able to explain...the underlying conc

involved at each stage of the interrogation process.”401 An awareness of the l

regulations surrounding interrogation is also indispensable.402 Because 

individual will perform the roles of both interrogator and interviewer, the aut

suggest that the interrogator needs all of the characteristics of a good intervie

a friendly, personable, nonjudgmental, and objective manner; a genuine curio

and concern about other people; the ability to separate the suspect from the cr

comfort in asking questions; an “easygoing confi dence;” and the ability to 

good listener.403 Beyond this, the interrogator should also have “the ability to 

aside any personal feelings” about the suspect, the ability to control his emot

in all situations, comfort with “using persuasive tactics that may be consid

morally offensive,” and the ability to project confi dence in both himself and 

path of the investigation and interrogation.404 Finally, the Reid Technique requ

that the interrogator be a “skilled communicator,” with the “ability to monit

subject’s behavior and respond effectively to the dynamics of the situation.”4

The other texts hew closely to the Reid requirements. Aubry and Caputo; Au

Royal and Schutt, and Walters echo and fl esh out some of the Reid requirem

For instance, they suggest that the interrogator “must be possessed with a str

desire to become a skilled and competent interrogator[,] and this desire mus

channeled into efforts which will culminate in capability.”406 He must be confi 

and comfortable in his own skin;407 “a hesitant manner, fi dgeting around in 

chair, stuttering and stammering, the use of profanity or vulgarity, and sim

mannerisms would all be considered objectionable.”408 He must be personable 

able to relate to and get along well with others from all backgrounds.409 He shoul

intelligent and well-educated, and have an interest in and understanding of hu

nature.410 Indeed, Walters writes that the best interrogators are those “who h

398 Inbau, see note 109, p. 65. 399 Id., p. 66-67 400 Id. p. 66 401 Id., p. 66. 402 Id., p. 66. 403 Id., p. 66-67, 79. 404 Id., p. 78-79. 405 Id., p. 79. 406 Arthur S. Aubry, Jr. and Rudolph R. Caputo, Criminal Interrogation, 40 (1965). 407 Id., p. 40-57, 150; Robert F. Royal, Steven R. Schutt, The Gentle Art of Interviewing 

Interrogation: A Professional Manual and Guide (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976), 6

408 Aubry and Caputo, see note 406, p. 57. 409 Royal and Schutt, see note 407, p. 65-67. 410 Aubry and Caputo, see note 406, p. 41; Royal and Schutt, see note 407, p. 67.
177

fi eld investigation, an “apprenticeship” as an interrogator with cont

and review, as well as studies in psychology, physiology, criminolo

and basic physical sciences, literature, and English composition cour

however, concedes that a more realistic expectation is a high sch

and at least fi ve years of police experience, with at least two of th

bona fi de investigative duties of criminal violations, preferably as a 

Plainclothesman.”413 

Finally, the other texts point out that excellent acting abil

requirement.414 The interrogator must convey numerous emotio

affecting his judgment or revealing any personal emotion about the s

must] project sincerity” to conduct an interrogation successfully.4

“have developed the skill to play ‘the game’ in the interview room an

assume any other personality.”416 The interrogator must not only be 

also be capable of conveying infi nite patience so that the suspect 

interrogation will go on indefi nitely.418

Pre-Interrogation Fact-Gathering and Analysis

All of the authorities agree that a thorough investigation 

of the facts is essential to a successful interrogation. “An interr

be considered as the highlight and the fi nal act of the investigatio

preceded it.”419 The Reid Technique’s “fact analysis” provides a goo

the type and extent of investigation and fact-gathering that is requi

interrogation. According to the Reid Technique, when possible, the 

should conduct as much of the investigation as possible for himse

not merely read the reports of others.420 This is not a minor or eas

Reid Technique (and many of the other texts) requires that the inter

information on:

• The offense itself (including the legal nature of the offen

and the exact amount and nature of the loss; date, time, 

the occurrence in accurate detail; description of the crime 

the crime scene itself; the way in which the crime appears 

committed and known details of its commission; possible m

commission; incriminating factors regarding a particular su

411 Stan B. Walters, Principles of Kinesic Interview and Interrogation (UK: CRC 

412 Aubry and Caputo, see note 406, p. 51. 413 Id. p. 51. 414 Id., p. 44; Royal and Schutt, see note 407, p. 65-66. 415 Id. 416 Walters, see note 411, p. xi. 417 Inbau, see note 109, p. 66. 418 Aubry and Caputo, see note 406, p. 60. 419 Id., p. 148. 420 Inbau, see note 109, p. 12.
178

investigation (such as hostile or cooperative); relationship to vi

or crime scene; incriminating facts or possible motives; alibi or o

statements that the suspect related to investigators; religious or frate

affi liations or prejudices; home environment; social attitudes in gen

hobbies; sexual interests or deviations, but only if directly relevant to 

investigation; abilities or opportunities to commit the offense); and

• The victim or victims (including, for companies or other institut

attitudes and practices toward employees and public; fi nancial sta

and for persons, nature of injury or harm and details thereof; age, 

marital status, and family responsibilities; social attitudes regar

race, nationality, religion, etc.; gang affi liation; fi nancial and so

circumstances; physical and mental characteristics; sexual interest

deviations, but only if directly relevant to the investigation; black

potentialities).421

The investigative techniques that should be employed in gathering 

information are beyond the purview of this paper, but it should be suffi cien

note that gathering all of this information is no small task. In addition, all of 

authors repeatedly stress the importance of this stage to ensure proper prepara

for a successful interrogation.

The Interrogation Setting

Each of the authorities focuses on the physical set-up and con

construction for the interrogation. The Reid Technique suggests that “the princ

psychological factor contributing to a successful interview or interrogatio

privacy — being alone with the person during questioning.”422 This is based 

the psychological premise that we, as humans, are more comfortable revea

secrets to only one person at a time.423 Second only to privacy, according to 

Reid Technique, is the need to minimize reminders of consequences by remo

police paraphernalia from both the room and the interrogator’s person.424 Bey

this, the Reid Technique provides suggestions on, among other things, selec

proper décor (“remove all distractions”), lighting (“good, but not excessiv

glaring, illumination of the suspect’s face”), noise level (as low as possi

and even arrangement of chairs (“investigator and subject should be separ

by about four to fi ve feet and should directly face each other, without . . . 

other object between them”).425 All of these are meant to create an environm

that the authors suggest will be conducive to eliciting responsiveness from 

421 Id., p. 20-21. 422 Id., p. 51. 423 Id. 424 Id., p. 56. 425 Id., p. 58-59.
179

themselves for later involvement by observing the suspect’s beha

the interrogator from false accusations of misconduct, and allows o

the suspect when he is left alone in the room, both to evaluate his be

prevent self-infl icted violence.428

Establishing a sense of privacy through the set-up of the interrog

the fi rst recommendation of almost all authors.429 “The removal of f

atmosphere, when combined with the illusion of remoteness, with q

the lack of sound and noise, and with privacy; can have a sudden

effect upon the composure of the individual who has just come from 

hustle and bustle of Headquarters.”430 Moreover, most authors 

psychological premise that it is easier to confi de in or confess a 

other person.431

Aubry goes on to write that there must be a reception room 

interrogation room where observers can be situated, and the only co

system between the two rooms should be a two-way buzzer, wit

button in the interrogation room out of the suspect’s view.432 “A state 

with an absolute minimum of sound also serves a useful purpose 

withdraw the suspect from his environment.”433 Like the Reid Tech

also suggest the removal of all formal restraining agents and evid

suspect is in police custody, such as uniforms or shields.434 In add

suggests that the physical surroundings be “plain and simple,” 

neutral shade of off-white, and with no windows that might “serve 

distraction and as a convenient psychological crutch upon which the 

lean to his own advantage.”435 Unlike the Reid Technique, Aubry 

against the one-way mirror because it cannot be easily explained,436 

using a small picture on the wall to conceal the mirror.437 In addition

using a sound and video recording mechanism, so long as it can be 

alerting or distracting the suspect.438

426 Id., p. 51. 427 Id., p. 59. 428 Id. 429 See, e.g., Aubry and Caputo, note 406, p. 66. 430 Id. 431 Inbau, see note 109, p. 51; Aubry and Caputo, see note 406, p. 65. 432 Aubry and Caputo, see note 406, p. 63-65. 433 Id., p. 65. 434 Id., p. 66. 435 Id., p. 66, 67. 436 Id., p. 67. 437 Id., p. 68. 438 Id., p. 71-72.
180

gppp,

well as to learn information about the suspect that will help in the conduc

the interrogation.439 The interview, which should last 30 to 45 minutes an

conducted with “only one investigator interacting with the subject,”440 sh

be non-accusatory and designed to gather information, may be conducted e

during an investigation and in a variety of environments, is free fl owing 

relatively unstructured, and should be documented in written notes taken by 

investigator.441 Like the preparatory investigation, the interview is designe

elicit information about the offense itself, the suspect or suspects, and the victi

victims.442 More important, however, is building rapport, defi ned as “a relation

marked by conformity.”443 The goals of building rapport at the beginning of 

interview are: 1) give the suspect an opportunity to evaluate the investig

and ideally “conclude that the investigator is professional, nonjudgmental, 

knowledgeable;” 2) allow the investigator to make an initial assessment of 

suspect, such as his “communications skills, general nervous tension, nor

level of eye contact, and a behavioral baseline;” and 3) allow the investig

to establish a “question-and-answer pattern” for the interaction.444 At the s

time, “efforts to establish rapport should appear natural and unassuming” so 

suspect does not become “suspicious of the investigator’s motives.”445 Small 

works for some suspects, while simply establishing the suspect’s backgro

information and personal history may be enough for others.446

All authorities agree on the importance of this initial interview, with its 

purpose of gathering information and building rapport. Indeed, accordin

Aubry, “nearly all interrogations which eventually fail for whatever given rea

have actually failed during the fi rst few moments of the questioning procedure

Royal and Schutt write that “resistance to the disclosure of [such] informatio

considerably increased if the interviewer is a total stranger, or if something is 

done to establish a friendly and trusting attitude on the part of the suspect.”44

build that rapport, they suggest the following techniques:

1. Identify yourself.

2. Begin the discussion by commenting on a topic of apparent 

interest to the subject.

439 Inbau, see note 109, p. 9. 440 John E. Reid and Associates, Defending the Reid Technique of Interrogation, at http://www

com/educational_info/critictechniquedefend.html, accessed 13 March 2005. 441 Inbau, see note 109, p. 5-6. 442 Id., p. 20-21. 443 Id., p. 93. 444 Id. 445 Id. 446 Id., p. 93-94. 447 Aubry and Caputo, see note 406, p. 148. 448 Royal and Schutt, see note 407, p. 61.
181

4. Keep conversation informal and easy.

5. Display pleasant emotional responses and avoid unplea

expressions.

6. Urge the subject, but never try to hurry him.

7. Do not ask questions that lead a witness or subject to bel

you are suspicious of him, either by composition of the ques

or by method of asking.

8. Appear interested and sympathetic to his problems.

9. Do not begin the interview or interrogation until the sub

appears to be quite friendly and cooperative.

10. Try to re-establish rapport at any time during the questionin

the subject appears to become reserved or hostile.”449

Also important in building rapport is conveying the desired 

interviewer to the suspect. The interviewer must appear sympath

impartial, empathetic, and fi rm, all at the same time.450

Aubry emphasizes the importance of even the investigator’s entr

that “he must [enter] with an intangible air which adds up to confi denc

in himself, and confi dence in his ability to carry out a successful inte

must exude this air of confi dence.”451 To build rapport while mainta

of confi dence, Aubry suggests the following techniques to be used 

phase of the interview/interrogation:

1. Have the suspect identify himself.

2. Use only the suspect’s fi rst or last name, and never use “Mr

3. The interrogator should insist that the suspect call him “

as this “aids the interrogator in securing and maintaining 

psychological advantage over the subject.”

4. The interrogator should approach the suspect with “an a

resolution and fi rmness” but not “be so forbidding that 

subject quickly makes up his mind that the interrogator is 

to get him at all costs.’”

5. The investigator must quickly size up the suspect, “rapidly 

effi ciently analyzing the personality, temperament, and m

up of the subject.”

449 Id., p. 61-62. 450 Id., p. 65-66. 451 Aubry and Caputo, see note 406, p. 150.
182

Similarly, Vrij suggests that during the interview, the investigator must av

guilt assumption and belief perseverance,” must be open-minded and fl ex

should establish rapport, and should provide little information about the cas

avoid making it easier for the suspect to lie or come up with explanations.453

Types of Questions for the Interview

As a complement to the various interview techniques, it is helpful to cons

the types of questions that an investigator should ask. Most of the author

agree on this aspect, which is laid out most clearly by Dillon in his work on 

Practice of Questioning. He classifi es several types of questions used during 

various stages of the interrogation. According to him, the questions should 

prepared beforehand and written down on paper (though no other author m

this suggestion, as it would seem to inhibit fl exibility).454 The questions, accor

to Dillon, should be asked in the following order, by type:

1. Opening questions – used at the start of the interview and 

designed to “get the respondent talking,” these should be yes-no 

questions that are easy to answer and are not about the crime;

2. Free narrative questions – the investigator names a topic 

and asks the suspect to tell what he knows about it, allowing 

the suspect to describe a topic in his own words while the 

investigator listens without interrupting;

3. Direct questions – follows up on narrative questions by asking 

about specifi c items while avoiding value-laden terms such as 

“murder,” “rape,” etc. The investigator should order his questions 

A) from the general to the specifi c, and B) from the known to 

the unknown;

4. Cross-questioning – questions designed to check and verify 

one answer against another, delving into problematic (i.e., 

contradictory or ambiguous) answers; the suspect is asked to 

repeat his statements “by means of questions asked in different 

ways and in no special order;”

5. Review questions – used to confi rm previous answers, repeating 

the information and asking ‘Is that correct?’ and ‘What else?’455

452 Id., p. 151-162. 453 Aldert Vrij, ‘“We Will Protect Your Wife and Child, but Only If You Confess’: P

Interrogations in England and the Netherlands,” in Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Ju

Psychological Perspectives on Criminal Systems, Peter J. van Koppen and Steven D. Penrod

(New York: Plenum, 2003), 57-79. 454 J. T. Dillon, The Practice of Questioning (London: Routledge, 1990), 82. 455 Id. p. 85-91.
183

guard may be down.457

Reviewing Dillon’s fi ve forms of questions, Walton warns the 

“to be aware of value-laden terms that occur in questions.”458 While h

the use of so-called loaded questions (“a question that contains pre

such that when the respondent gives any direct answer to the question 

certain assumptions that are at issue and that are damaging to his in

interrogator must recognize when he is using these types of questi

the suggestive terms in the question are “incorporated into the m

witness” the interrogator understands what is happening.459 At the sa

loaded question is a key component of the Reid Technique’s Step 7 

an alternative question,” see discussion below), thus showing the u

questions in the interrogation setting. Indeed, Walton recognizes 

complex questions should be used “provided that they come in the 

questioning in a dialogue sequence.”460

Royal and Schutt echo this advice in their thoughts on the 

characteristics of good question construction:

1. Make the questions short and confi ned to one topic;

2. Make the questions clear and easily understood;

3. Avoid the use of frightening or super-realistic words; suc

confession, murder, forger, dope addict, embezzler, etc. 

milder terms;

4. Use precise questions. A precise question is one that calls f

specifi c or an exact answer. It limits the requested answer 

defi nite item of information;

5. Use discerning questions. Discerning questions are quest

designed to produce information directly bearing on the m

under discussion. They are questions that discriminate betw

what is relevant and what is irrelevant.461

Behavior Symptom Analysis

Behavior Symptom Analysis (BSA) involves evaluation o

paralinguistic, and nonverbal channels of communication to iden

guilty and/or deceptive suspects.462 BSA can be considered merely 

456 Id., p. 90. 457 Id. 458 Walton, see note 199, p. 1791. 459 Id. 460 Id. 461 Royal and Schutt, see note 407, p. 32-33. 462 Inbau, see note 109, p. 125.
184

In essence, BSA evaluates a suspect’s answers to interview questions no

their substance but for the manner in which the answers are given. Part of 

purpose of BSA is to determine whether to move from the interview stage to 

interrogation stage. The Reid Technique offers several basic principles desig

to enable the investigator to conduct effective BSA:

1. Recognize that there are no unique behaviors associated 

with truthfulness or deception.

2. Evaluate all three channels of communication 

simultaneously.

3. Evaluate paralinguistic and nonverbal behaviors in the 

context of the subject’s verbal message.

4. Evaluate the preponderance of behaviors occurring 

throughout the interview.

5. Establish the subject’s normal behavioral patterns.463

These basic principles are then combined with the following generalizat

about the correlation between truthfulness/deceptiveness and a suspect’s attitu

when answering questions:

Truthful Suspect Deceptive Suspect

Spontaneous Guarded

Sincere (“openly expresses Insincere (“may come across 

appropriate emotional states”) as phony”)

Helpful (“will openly discuss Unhelpful (“reluctant to talk a

possible suspects and motives possible suspects or people who

and may speculate on how could be eliminated from suspic

the crime may have ...may offer explanations...[or] 

been committed”) take the position that no 

 crime was committed”)

Concerned (displays “a serious Unconcerned (“nonchalant and 

manner and pays close attention downplay[s] the signifi cance of

to the interviewer’s questions”) being a suspect...may engage

 in levity or answer questions

 inappropriately”)

Cooperative Uncooperative464

463 Id., p. 125-127. 464 Id., p. 128-130.
185

noting that they come with a warning to the investigator. The authors 

“exceedingly important — indeed critical — that a suspect’s behavi

are assessed in accordance with the following guidelines:

• Look for deviation from the suspect’s normal behavior...On

behavior has been established, subsequent changes that oc

suspect is questioned about the crime will become signifi ca

• Evaluate all behavioral indications on the basis of whe

(timing) and how often they occur (consistency).

• To be reliable indicators of truth or deception, behavioral ch

occur immediately in response to questions or simultaneo

suspect’s answers. Furthermore, similar behavior responses 

on a consistent basis whenever the same subject matter is d

BSA is unique in several respects, the most important being 

on using the baseline approach to behavior evaluation. Also uniqu

Technique’s emphasis on using BSA at a specifi c stage of the 

process. Aspects of BSA correlate with overall detection of decepti

by other texts, but the Reid Technique uses a specifi c method at thi

interrogation — indeed, before the interrogation has actually begu

determine whether or not to move into the interrogation stage. Th

below elaborates on other authors’ general prescriptions for detecti

during an interrogation.

Kinesic Analysis

The only other interrogation system that uses a similar pre-

approach is the Kinesic Interrogation Technique. The process is ca

Kinesic Analysis Phase (PKAP) and involves similar analysis of beha

deception, discomfort, or unusual sensitivity.467 Indeed, PKAP and 

similar as to constitute basically the same technique. Like BSA, PK

behavior related to verbal quality, verbal content, and nonverba

During this phase the interrogator also develops a profi le of the su

allows him to use a tailored interrogation approach for that subject.4

The basic principles of Kinesic Analysis Phase are striking

those of BSA:

1. No single behavior, by itself, proves anything.

465 Id., p. 130-153. 466 Id., p. 153 (emphasis in original). 467 Walters, see note 411, p. 1-3. 468 See generally, Walters, note 411. 469 Id., p. 2.
186

3. The interviewer must establish what is normal or baseline 

behavior for each subject and then look for changes from the 

normal baseline.

This is done by asking non-threatening questions and observing 

the suspect’s unstressed behavior.

4. These observed changes in the subject’s baseline behaviors are 

diagnosed in clusters, not individually.

5. Behaviors must be timely (i.e., they must occur within three to 

fi ve seconds of when the stress-provoking question is asked).

6. The subjects are watching interrogators while interrogators are 

watching them.

7. Kinesic interviewing is not as reliable with some groups as with 

the general population.470

The PKAP indicators of deception are also extremely similar to those li

in the BSA, and cover a range of behavioral and verbal responses.471 As in 

Reid Technique, it is only after this analysis — PKAP — and a determination 

the suspect is either being deceptive or is responding to stimuli inappropria

that the investigator moves into the interrogation stage.472

Interrogating the Suspect

“The interview and interrogation are distinctly different procedures, usu

separated by several minutes.”473 Once the investigator decides to shift f

interviewing to interrogation, the Reid Technique advises investigators to 

approximately four feet directly in front of the suspect” at the beginning; “rem

seated and refrain from pacing around the room;” “avoid creating the impres

that the investigator is seeking a confession or conviction;” “keep paper and pe

out of sight during the interrogation;” “not use realistic words such as ‘mur

‘rape,’ ‘strangle,’ ‘stab,’ or ‘steal,’ except in certain situations;” “treat the sus

with decency and respect, regardless of the nature of the offense;” “not handcu

shackle the suspect during the interrogation;” “not be armed;” and “recognize 

in everyone there is some good, however slight it might be.”474 These suggest

are based on both practical necessities and psychological principles; for insta

the authors recommend not being armed not only because the suspect might s

the weapon in close quarters, but also because the interrogator should appro

470 Id., p. 8. 471 Id. , p. 18-138. 472 Id., p. 2. 473 John E. Reid and Associates, Defending the Reid Technique of Interrogation, at http://www

com/educational_info/critictechniquedefend.html, accessed 13 March 2005. 474 Inbau, see note 109, p. 79-84.
187

The Reid Technique

The heart of the Reid Technique is a nine-step approach to inter

steps provide an over-arching schema that can be used to guide the 

through the interrogation process. It gives the interrogator signposts a

structure the interrogation in what the authors believe is an effective 

Reid Technique authors emphasize that not all of the steps are approp

interrogation, and that the order in which the steps are presented is n

— the investigator should carefully observe the suspect’s responses a

questioning accordingly.476 Indeed, the authors suggest that differen

are needed for the “emotional offender” and the “nonemotional offen

requires tactics and techniques based on a sympathetic approach (

of understanding and compassion with regard to the commission o

as well as the suspect’s present diffi culty”), while the latter requir

analysis approach” (appeals to “common sense and reason”).477

The text provides both a brief and in-depth analysis of the nin

we attempt to condense that information into an even briefer introd

nine steps, with a recommendation to consult the text for a deeper u

of the Reid Technique. 

Step 1 – Direct, Positive Confrontation

The interrogator confronts the suspect, asserting that he is “con

the person who committed the offense.”478 The suspect’s verbal a

response at this point will determine much of how the interrogation 

in any event the interrogator also now offers a compelling reason fo

to tell the truth.479

Step 2 – Theme Development

“The investigator expresses a supposition [called a theme] abo

for the crime’s commission, whereby the suspect should be offere

moral excuse for having committed the offense.”480 The investi

“present to the suspect, in a monologue, reasons and excuses which 

legally) excuse the suspect’s behavior...The themes do not plant new 

deceptive suspect’s mind, but allow the suspect to feel more comfo

about his crime by allowing him to reduce the perceived consequenc

with it — both real consequences (those affecting his freedom o

and personal consequences (those affecting the suspect’s self-este

475 Id., p. 83. 476 Id., p. 212. 477 Id., p. 210. 478 Id. 479 Id. 480 Id. 481 John E. Reid and Associates, see note 473.
188

approaches lists several of the themes that an interrogator might cons

employing at this stage. Theme development is based on the argument that 

order to persuade the suspect to tell the truth, it is essential to reinforce their 

rationalizations for committing the crime versus focusing their attention on 

possible consequences.”483 However, “at no time should the suspect be told 

if he committed the crime for an understandable reason that the consequen

would be less.”484

Step 3 – Handling Denials

At this point the interrogator takes steps to discourage denials that the sus

may embark upon, and returns to the “moral excuse theme” of Step 2.485 This s

is also important because, “depending on the nature and persistence of the deni

the interrogator “may become convinced of the suspect’s actual innocence

secondary role.486 In general, according to the authors, an innocent person will 

allow the denials to be cut off, while a guilty individual will eventually “sub

to the investigator’s return to a theme.”487 Thus, the investigator should cut 

the denials, discourage them, evaluate the suspect’s responses for indication

truthfulness, and attempt to return to the selected themes.488

Step 4 – Overcoming Objections

The guilty suspect, according to the authors, will now offer “reasons as to 

he would not or could not commit the crime.”489 Instead of attempting to stop 

suspect from voicing objections, as is done with denials, the interrogator sho

indulge the objections and then overcome them.490 The technique is compare

that of a car salesman, with the interrogator “selling the suspect on the ide

telling the truth” and turning the objections around by incorporating them in 

interrogation theme.491 The interrogator must recognize the objection, reward 

acting as though the statement were expected and by not arguing with the susp

and then turn the objection around by reversing the signifi cance of the objec

pointing out the drawbacks if the objection was untruthful, and returning to 

interrogation theme.492

482 Inbau, see note 109, p. 213. 483 John E. Reid and Associates, see note 473. 484 Id. 485 Inbau, see note 109, p. 213. 486 Id., p. 305. 487 Id., p. 213. 488 Id., p. 305-330. 489 Id., p. 213. 490 Id., p. 331. 491 Id., p. 333. 492 Id., p. 333-336.
189

ggy gy gy p

tell the truth is “to psychologically withdraw from the interrogatio

the investigator’s theme;” according to the authors, innocent susp

withdraw.493 In order to procure and retain the withdrawn suspect’s 

interrogator should move his chair closer to the suspect, establish 

eye contact, use visual aids, and use hypothetical questions since 

conditioned to respond to questions.”494

Step 6 – Handling the Suspect’s Passive Mood

After the interrogator has gained the subject’s attention in Step 

suspect now becomes “reticent and quiet,” often adopting a defi an

at the same time becoming more willing to listen.495 The interro

now start to distill the possible reasons for the crime presented in th

concentrate on the core of the selected theme.496 This approach is s

by urging and advising the suspect to tell the truth, moving closer, an

to display understanding and sympathy.497

Step 7 – Presenting an Alternative Question

The interrogator now “offers the guilty suspect the opportu

telling the truth by making a single admission.”498 The Reid Techni

that it is unrealistic “to expect a suspect to suddenly break down 

complete truth about his crime; [instead] it is often necessary 

suspect to initially make a fi rst admission of guilt and then attemp

the full confession.”499 The alternative question “presents to the sus

between two explanations” for the crime, one much more attractive 

acceptable.500 At the same time, the alternative question is “loaded”; 

the alternative explanation, the suspect also acknowledges having c

crime — the single admission that now leads to confession.501 S

this step as forcing the suspect to incriminate himself, but the Rei

point out that “the suspect always has a third choice, which is to sa

alternative is true.”502 An example of an appropriate alternative que

you plan this out months in advance, or did it pretty much happen o

493 Id., p. 338. 494 Id., p. 338-345. 495 Id., p. 345. 496 Id., p. 346. 497 Id., p. 347-348. 498 Id., p. 353. 499 John E. Reid and Associates, Selecting the Proper Alternative Questions, Mon

Tips, September 2004, athttp://www.reid.com/educational_info/r_tips.html?serial=10

9&print=[print], accessed 13 March 2005. 500 Inbau, see note 109, p. 353. 501 Id. 502 John E. Reid and Associates, Defending the Reid Technique of Interrogation, at 

com/educational_info/critictechniquedefend.html, accessed 13 March 2005.
190

was it just manslaughter, where it happened [sic] on the spur of the moment?

Step 8 – Having the Suspect Orally Relate Various Details of 

the Offense

Even after the suspect admits guilt by accepting one of the choices prese

in the alternative question, it still takes great effort, according to the author

draw out the rest of the details.505 Once the suspect makes the initial admis

the interrogator should move quickly toward eliciting further admissions, 

through a “statement of reinforcement” and then through questions that cal

longer responses and avoid emotionally charged terminology.506

Step 9 – Converting an Oral Confession into a Written Confession 

See discussion below.

Royal and Schutt

Other authors make suggestions that are remarkably similar to the nine-

Reid Technique. However, few lay their approaches out in a similar step-by-

process that constantly moves forward toward the goal of eliciting a confessio

information. Royal and Schutt come closest to an overarching schema when 

suggest the following steps to a successful interrogation:

Undermine Suspect’s Confi dence of Success 

The interrogator should “demonstrate the futility of [the suspect’s] posi

by “blocking all non-cooperative avenues of escape.” The interrogator m

detect deception, overcome alibis, and emphasize “the quality and quantit

incriminating evidence and other information derogatory to the subject.”50

essence, the authors recommend a verbal “trap.”508

Offer the Suspect a Mutually Acceptable Solution

“Try to convince the suspect that: 1. He is confronted with a pers

emergency; 2. Since he cannot escape, he must fi nd a way out; 3. No avail

solution will be pleasant; 4. Your proposal [will] result in less unpleasantness 

any of the other solutions.”509

503 Id. 504 John E. Reid and Associates, see note 502. 505 Inbau, see note 109, p. 365-66. 506 Id., 366-67. 507 Royal and Schutt, see note 407, p. 119. 508 Id.,p. 120. 509 Id., p. 121.
191

y g 

the hands of the interrogator” — if the interrogator has conveye

sincerity, and sympathy.510

Encourage Acquiescence and Pursue Indicators of Complianc

At the fi rst signs that a suspect is responding to the interrogator’

the interrogator should “begin to diminish other confession-inhibitin

promote incentives to confess” through theme development such as t

by Reid (discounting fear, minimization, etc.).511

Consolidate Accomplishments

“When a criminal violator does submit and agrees to cooper

should be immediately consolidated and rendered as irreversible as 

Aubry

Aubry takes a far less standardized approach to the interrogation 

indeed presents no schema for it. Instead, Aubry’s text lists the variou

and then discusses the utility of each. Like the other authors, he 

interrogation techniques “depend upon the subject’s degree of im

participation in the crime; the facts pertinent to his apprehension

and type of evidence that links him with the crime; and the manner 

participated in the crime.”513

Aubry begins by listing what he calls the various interrogatio

and explaining their respective utility. These are:

1. Direct approach – best “where the guilt of the subject 

reasonably certain;”

2. Indirect approach – best “where the degree of guilt is in

something less than reasonable certitude;” 

3. Emotional approach – depends on the personal qualities o

— religious, emotional, etc.;

4. Subterfuge – “a very effective approach,” but should on

the guilt of the suspect is “reasonably certain,” the “so-ca

approaches have been tried and have failed,” and the interro

skilled and experienced in interrogation.514

The variations on these broad approaches mirror many of the th

Reid Technique suggests in Step 2, and include:

510 Id., p. 122. 511 Id. 512 Id., p. 128. 513 Aubry and Caputo, see note 406, p. 91. 514 Id., p. 75-77.
192

 - Only Human to Have Acted 

 That Way”

- Kindness - Helpful

- Friendliness - Extenuation

- Mitigation - Shifting the Blame

- “Hot and Cold” - Lessening the Degree of Guilt

- Magnifying the Degree of Guilt - Minimizing the Consequences

- The “Fait Accompli” - Bluffi ng

- The Stern, Business-like Approach - Compounding Falsehoods

- Pretense of Physical Evidence - Repetition of One Theme

- Mental Relief Through Having - Perseverance 

Told the Truth

- Appeals to Decency and Honor - “What’s Your Side of the Story

- Tearing Down and Building Up - “Just Tell the Truth.”515

Each of these approaches and variations is explained in detail in Cha

5 of the Aubry text. Aubry then lists several “general” interrogation techniq

including:

• Crumble defenses by establishing motive, premeditation, capability 

opportunity of and to [sic] commit the crime. 

• Establish and demonstrate intent. 

• Hammer away at the subject hard and persistently. 

• Nibble off little pieces of the interrogation cake. Concentrate on cru

don’t bite off pieces too big to chew.

• Ask concise, brief questions, trim off all extra words. Be specifi c

exact. Ask questions that can be answered by simple yes or no. Prac

and seek for economy of words. 

• Do not ask questions which request or invite the expression o

opinion. 

• Avoid leading questions as well as opinion questions because both t

are weak and ineffective techniques; leading questions are, in a se

“unfair to the subject.” 516

Aubry fi nally presents a list of specifi c interrogation techniques, with an en

chapter then devoted to the type of suspect with which each may be succes

The specifi c techniques include: 

515 Id., p. 75. 516 Id., p. 104.
193

• Calm and Matter-of-Fact 

• Don’t Be Shocked Whatever the Provocation 

• Let the Subject Tell His Story

• Let the Subject Tell a Few Lies

• A Waste of Your Time and My Time

• You’re Just Hurting Your Loved Ones

• Proven Lies So Tell the Truth

• Hammer at Right and Wrong

• How About Your Conscience?

• Establishing Motives

• Hate to Be in Your Shoes

• Things Look Awfully Bad for You

• Confusion by False Incidents

• Confession of Co-Defendant; and the Genuine Confession5

In many ways these lists mirror the type of theme developm

of the Reid Technique. Aubry leaves the impression, however, tha

attempts to describe which approach or technique to use with whic

interrogator will only be able to choose the appropriate method a

experience. In that sense, Aubry’s list of specifi c interrogation tec

the end more descriptive than prescriptive. Indeed, as Aubry notes, “

(should) be adapted to the type, character, and general background 

being interrogated; the known facts, events and incidents of the crim

been committed; and the type, kind, nature and extent of the phys

available.”518 Because Aubry does not present an overarching sch

interrogation like that of the Reid Technique, his presentation is mo

understanding the possible dynamics at play in an interrogation th

the interrogator through the process.

Kinesic Interrogation

Like the other techniques, Kinesic Interrogation recognizes that th

“cannot depend on a singular, standardized approach to the interro

applied to all deceptive subjects.”519 The Kinesic Interrogation P

the Reid Technique, a continuation of the initial interview. First the 

makes the “interrogation attack,” confronting the suspect with the ac

517 Id., p. 105. 518 Id., p. 75. 519 Walters, see note 411, p. 2.
194

is expected to react with one of several “ego defense mechanisms” — de

displacement, intellectualization, rationalization, minimization, etc. — tha

uses to defend against the initial accusation. 522 The interrogator must then “dis

each mechanism in turn.523 The interrogator is able to do this by identifying 

suspect’s “subconscious miscues” — verbalizations of the suspect’s inte

monologue.524 The interrogator then appropriates those miscues (though not w

for word), incorporating them into his questions so as to match the suspect’s s

of mind.525

It is at this point that the interrogator can “make the fi nal push” f

confession.526 Walters sets several rules and prescriptions for this stage:

1. An interrogator should never engage in any behavior which 

would force even the truthful subject to confess.

2. A false confession is most likely to have been obtained from a 

subject who is mentally defi cient.

3. An interrogator will fi nd that most subjects are prepared to 

blame alcohol or drugs for their behavior.

4. A successful attack on denial requires that the interrogator 

review real or circumstantial evidence with the subject every 3 

to 5 minutes.

5. A successful practical Kinesic Interrogation requires the 

appropriate assessment and attack of the subject’s primary 

dominant personality (i.e., introverted or extroverted, as well as 

subtypes of extrovert). 

6. A successful practical Kinesic Interrogation requires the 

interrogator to correctly identify and respond to the subject’s 

fi ve basic stress-response states (anger, depression, denial, 

bargaining, acceptance). These progress in turn and the 

interrogator should shift techniques as each state arises.

7. Once the subject begins to break in small areas, the interrogator 

should begin to attack with reality-based comments.527

520 Id., p. 209. 521 Id., p. 216-217. 522 Id., p. 208. 523 Id., p. 210. 524 Id., p. 210-211. 525 Id., p. 211. 526 Id. 527 Id., p. 211-217.
195

pypppg

so-called good cop/bad cop technique (“GC/BC”). While there are f

studies of specifi c techniques, GC/BC has generated unique interest

interviewed criminal interrogators and bill collectors, identifying fi 

on GC/BC (the formal term they use is “emotional contrast strategi

use to convey “a mix of expressed positive and negative emotion

wield infl uence over target persons.”528

1. Sequential good cop, bad cop

The suspect is fi rst exposed to an interrogator who “consiste

displays either positive or negative emotion,” and then 

second interrogator who displays a “contrasting demeanor

Anecdotal evidence suggests that beginning with a displa

negative emotions accentuates the suspect’s appreciation of 

subsequent, more civilized approach.530

2. Simultaneous good cop, bad cop 

The suspect is exposed to two interrogators, each displa

either positive or negative emotions.531 Interrogators may 

only present different demeanors to the suspect, but also cr

perceptual contrast by arguing with each other in front” of 

suspect about what type of treatment he deserved.532

3. One person playing both roles

A single interrogator “vividly displays” both emotions to a ta

person, alternating “between displaying a harsh, deman

demeanor and a pleasant, friendly demeanor.”533 The diffi c

with this approach is that each demeanor “must appear gen

if the interrogator wishes to wield infl uence.”534

4. Good cop in contrast to hypothetical bad cop

The interrogator “playing the good cop role communicate

the [suspect] that if he or she does not comply with the g

528 Anat Rafaeli et al., “Emotional Contrast Strategies as Means of Social Infl 

from Criminal Interrogators and Bill Collectors,” The Academy of Management Jo

(December 1991), 749-775, 752; in each variation, “good cop” refers to roles convey

supportive feelings such as warmth, friendliness, approval, respect, empathy, and 

“bad cop” refers to conveying negative and unsupportive emotions such as coldness, d

of respect, and hostility (758). 529 Id., p. 761. 530 Id. 531 Id., p. 762. 532 Id. 533 Id., p. 762. 534 Id., p. 762-763.
196

but the threat should be clear.536

5. Good cop in contrast to expectations of bad cop

The interrogator presents himself as warm and friendly to a 

suspect “who expects to encounter coldness and hostility;” 

this has the effect of “amplify[ing] the construed positiveness 

of the” interrogator.537 This technique is most successful with 

those suspects who seemed scared, anxious, or suspicious of 

the interrogator.538

The strategy behind each of the variations was the same: “create a percep

contrast for [the] targets, which is proposed to accentuate the constr

positiveness of displayed positive emotions and the construed negative

of displayed negative emotions” in order to induce compliance in the targe

According to Rafaeli et al., three mechanisms came into play that made GC

successful. First, the “accentuated anxiety” with which the suspect may resp

to the bad cop leads to “accentuated relief” in response to good cops.540 As a re

suspects may comply with the good cop’s requests to escape from the anxiet

fear they feel during interactions with bad cops or expect to feel during fu

interactions.541

Second, the GC/BC contrast accentuates the suspect’s perception that 

good cop is kind and helpful, resulting in pressure “to reciprocate the kind

by complying with the good cop’s wishes.”542 This occurs because the “actu

hypothetical contrasting unpleasant person” creates the impression that the g

cop’s positive feelings are “especially unusual and pronounced.”543

Third, because the suspect develops “accentuated feelings of relief in respo

to [the] good cop,” and (it is hoped) comes to believe he is kind and helpfu

feeling of trust develops.544 Once the suspect believes that the good cop is trut

and “truly concerned for [the suspect’s] well-being,” it becomes easier for 

interrogator to convince the suspect that compliance is in his own best intere

In essence, all fi ve variations, as well as the three identifi ed mechani

rely on building rapport between the good cop and the suspect, much like 

535 Id., p. 763. 536 Id. 537 Id., p. 764. 538 Id. 539 Id., p. 752. 540 Id., p. 764. 541 Id. 542 Id., p. 764-765. 543 Id. 544 Id., p. 765. 545 Id.
197

or perceived bad cop. However, the analysis of the GC/BC techniqu

window into the workings of rapport-building, and re-emphasizes it

in any successful interrogation.

Detecting Deception

The text describing the Reid Technique does not go beyond BS

suggestions on detecting deception. However, BSA is an integrat

analysis that can be incorporated at all stages of the interview/

encounter (see discussion above). Similarly, the Kinesic approach 

PKAP, which also can and should be integrated into the entire 

proceeding (see discussion above).

Traditional lie detection has focused on verbal and nonverbal co

At various points, behaviors that were thought to indicate deceit h

speech hesitation, speech errors, changes in pitch of voice, changes i

frequency of pauses, pause durations, gaze, smiling, blinking, self-m

(e.g., scratching), illustration with hands and arms, hand and fi ng

without the arms, leg and foot movements, head movements, trunk 

and shifting positions.546 For instance, in 1965, Aubry listed “fl ushin

of skin,” “pulse rate increase or decrease,” and even “licking of the 

a generous list of indicators of deception.547 Obviously, many of the

are exhibited by individuals in everyday conversation, and some ev

others as supposed signs of deception.

In a survey of the empirical studies on behaviors exhibited duri

Vrij has accumulated several results that will be useful to the interroga

for deception. The studies, when taken together in a meta-analysi

inconclusive for the exhibited behavior, and in fact only three gener

be found.

Verbal Characteristics

1. Liars tend to have a higher-pitched voice than truth-tell

caused by stress), but the difference is so small as to be de

with sophisticated equipment.548

2. Liars seem to pause for longer when they speak than do tru

Non-vocal Characteristics

1. Liars tend to move their arms, hands, fi ngers, feet, and l

truth-tellers.

546 Alberet Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: The Psychology of Lying and the 

Professional Practice (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2000), 33. 547 Aubry and Caputo, see note 406, p. 123-134. 548 Vrij, see note 546, p. 32-33. 549 Id., p. 33.
198

analysis demonstrates that although “observers expect liars to show nerv

behaviour and behaviours which indicate intense thinking,” this is not the 

for the majority of liars.551 Thus, “people are usually poor at detecting lies w

they pay attention to someone’s behaviour.”552

Vrij does concede, as Inbau et al. argue, that experimental studies may no

the most conducive to actually observing deceptive behavior; as he notes, it 

be that the subjects “simply [are] not nervous enough during these experiments

Moreover, in the majority of the studies the lie-catchers are college stud

who volunteer for the studies.554 In a meta-analysis of those studies that u

professional lie-catchers as observers, however, the professionals did no b

than the college students.555 One might also suggest that in the real world, w

suspects are motivated to prevaricate for fear of losing their freedom, cer

indicators of deception would be more obviously on display. However, not eno

empirical studies of deception detection have been carried out in the fi eld to k

whether extra motivation to lie will increase indicative behaviors. Fortunately 

interrogators, “it is possible to improve people’s ability to detect lies.”556 Stu

using various training procedures all revealed limited improvements in the ab

to detect deceit, although, surprisingly, the studies show students benefi ting m

from the training than did police offi cers.557 Vrij speculates that police offi 

may have scored lower because they did not believe the information they w

being taught.558

In the end, Vrij concludes that the best hopes for lie detection are foun

observing both emotional expressions and those behaviors infl uenced by con

complexity (latency period, speech errors, speech hesitations, hand, arm, foot 

leg movements).559 He gives interrogators several “Guidelines for the Detec

of Deception via Behavioural Cues:”

1. Lies may only be detectable via non-verbal cues if the liar experie

fear, guilt or excitement (or any other emotion), or if the lie is diffi cu

fabricate.

2. It is important to pay attention to mismatches between speech con

and non-verbal behaviour, and to try to explain those mismatches. K

550 Id., p. 38. 551 Id. 552 Id., p. 57. 553 Id., p. 39. 554 Id., p. 74. 555 Id., p. 75. 556 Id., p. 95. 557 Id., p. 94-95. 558 Id., p. 95. 559 Id., p. 97.
199

3. Attention should be directed towards deviations from a pers

or usual patterns of behaviour, if these are known. The ex

such deviations should be established. Each deviation may 

the person is lying, but do not disregard other explanatio

deviations.

4. The judgement of untruthfulness should only be made w

possible explanations have been negated.

5. A person suspected of deception should be encouraged to 

necessary to negate the alternative options regarding a perso

Moreover, the more a liar talks, the more likely it is that t

fi nally give their lies away via verbal and/or non-verbal 

continuously have to pay attention to both speech content an

behaviour). 

6. There are stereotyped ideas about cues to deception (such as g

fi dgeting, and so on), which research has shown to be unrelia

of deception. The actual indicators are listed in Chapter 2 [s

above]. These can be a guide, but bear in mind that not e

exhibit these cues during deception, and the presence of su

indicate deception, but does not do so in every case.560

Based on his research, Vrij identifi es the “seven aspects [that] 

a good liar: i) being well prepared; (ii) being original; (iii) thinking 

being eloquent; (v) having a good memory; (vi) not experiencing fe

guilt of duping, delight while lying; and (vii) being good at acting.”5

the interrogator can recognize these character aspects, he can at leas

suspect who will be better at lying, and thus can search more closel

the occurrence of deception. Indeed, Vrij lays out guidelines for the 

who must overcome the good liar’s deceit and detect the deceptions

1. Be suspicious; 

2. Be probing;

3. Do not reveal important information;

4. Be informed;

5. Ask liars to repeat what they have said before;

6. Watch and listen carefully and abandon stereotypes;

7. Compare liars’ behavior with their natural behavior.562

Ultimately, Vrij comes to a similar conclusion as that implied 

used in the Reid Technique: observe the baseline behavior of the susp

560 Id., p. 98, Box 3.3. 561 Id., p. 210. 562 Id., p. 222-225.
200

Securing the Confession

Step 9 of the Reid Technique covers “Converting an Oral Confession 

a Written Confession.” The authors recommend several techniques that lea

confessions that will stand up both to the legal and practical requirements of 

judicial system: the use of readable and understandable language, avoidanc

leading questions (if the confession is a question-and-answer type), use of 

confessor’s own language, inclusion of personal history, inclusion of intenti

errors for correction by the confessor, a reading and signing of the confes

with witnesses, only one written confession, and confi nement of the confes

to one crime.563 Aubry recommends similar steps with no material variation

Because there seems to be consensus on this point, Inbau et al.’s text can s

alone without further discussion.

Section 4. How an Interrogation Can “Go Wrong”

Finally, it is worth considering how an interrogation can “go wrong.” 

interrogation that has gone wrong is one that either elicits false information 

the interrogator believes is true, or that has negative, long-term effects on 

suspect or societal perceptions of law enforcement. Gudjonsson identifi es sev

ways an interrogation can “go wrong,” many of which echo the warnings of In

et al., Aubry, and Royal and Schutt’s guidelines for interrogation:

• False confessions due to coercion, 

• Inadmissible confessions,

• Coerced confessions resulting in resentment, 

• Coercion resulting in post-traumatic stress disorder, 

• Undermining public confi dence, and

• “Boomerang Effect.” 565

False confessions may result where interrogators assume the suspect is gu

either by approaching the interrogation with pre-set assumptions or placing 

much blind faith in their ability to detect deception.566 “The greater the pres

during interrogation, the greater the likelihood of false confessions.”567 Of co

a false confession is not only useless, but also actually harms the investigation

the real perpetrator remains free and the investigation is closed. In addition, o

word emerges of overly coercive interrogation techniques, public confi de

563 Inbau, see note 109, p. 377-389. 564 Aubry and Caputo, see note 406, p. 195-207. 565 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 34-36. 566 Id., p. 34. 567 Id. 
201

Coercive and manipulative interrogation techniques may not o

false confessions, but the confessions, even if true, may also be in

obtained in violation of legal standards. An additional, unintended 

of an overly coercive interrogation is possible long-lasting res

bitterness among offenders.569 Gudjonsson points to the additional 

post-traumatic stress disorder in especially coercive interrogations

studies directly support such a relationship.570

Lastly, the so-called “boomerang effect” may occur when su

would have confessed in their own time refuse to do so when they 

being rushed or unfairly treated.”571 The other possible boomerang 

eventual retraction of a confession by a suspect who confessed 

coercive conditions.572

Section 5. Theory vs. Technique in the Literat

The interrogation techniques advocated in the literature can 

part be characterized as one-size-fi ts-all. They take little account o

that the empirical research shows might affect a suspect’s willingne

and provide little or no variation for different types of suspects. Wh

technical guides point out that no single interrogation technique wor

suspect, and indeed that every suspect is different, for the most part 

little guidance on how to adjust interrogation techniques for suspect

ages, cultures, ethnicities, and criminal history, for crimes of greate

or for cases in which the interrogator has stronger evidence. The only 

of the texts cite as prompting confession is the length of the interroga

that seems to apply across the board and need not be adjusted for a

suspect. Despite the variations discussed below, on the whole an 

exposed only to the “how-to” guides would have little sense of a nee

techniques learned in the texts when confronting different types of s

All of the texts account for seriousness of the offense and str

evidence, but only in indirect fashion. Reid and the other techn

one degree or another, based on exploiting guilt, which for mos

proportional to the seriousness of the offense. While developing 

overcoming objections, interrogators are certain to use the seriou

offense as part of their “selling” of the idea of confession. At the sa

use of minimization refl ects the empirical fi ndings that the more 

offense is perceived, the less likely it is that the suspect will confe

interrogators will also use the strength of the evidence to convince 

568 Id., p. 36. 569 Id., p. 35. 570 Id. 571 Id., p. 36. 572 Id. 
202

the interrogator should adjust if the crime is more or less serious, or the evide

stronger or weaker; they make few, if any, explicit recommendations for how 

use these factors to elicit a confession in different situations.

Aubry draws the most distinctions among various types of suspects. L

the authors of the other texts, Aubry assumes that the basic structure of 

interrogation translates equally from suspect to suspect, and only the spe

approach within that structure should be altered. As previously noted, he lays 

specifi c interrogation techniques (e.g., The Singleness of Purpose, The Busin

like Attitude, Calm and Matter-of-Fact, etc.) and attempts to identify the typ

suspect for which each should be used. While the prescriptions do seem to 

into account the confession factors that the empirical studies found statistic

signifi cant, they do so in a haphazard way that does not seem useful for 

interrogator in the fi eld. Instead of suggesting adjustments to be made based 

the various factors, Aubry instead seeks to prescribe a single technique for w

he apparently considers a comprehensive list of the types of suspects one m

encounter. The interrogator is left to memorize the various techniques and 

circumstances in which they apply, instead of learning how to adjust techniq

for specifi c confession factors. Thus, if an interrogator were to encounter a sus

of a different sort than those listed, Aubry’s text would not help him to a

techniques to that suspect.

The Reid Technique attempts to account for some of the confession fac

but ultimately fails to provide a guide on adjusting interrogation techniques 

the various statistically signifi cant factors leading to confession. Like the o

texts, the Reid Technique assumes that the basic structure of the interroga

— rapport-building, theme development, alternative question, etc. — will w

across the board for a variety of suspects, regardless of the specifi c characteri

of the individual. Only within that structure does the Reid text offer s

adjustments to make, and then only in one particular area: for emotional 

non-emotional offenders, who require either a sympathetic or factual anal

approach, respectively.573 However, it should be noted that empirical studies h

not identifi ed the emotionalism of the suspect as a factor that affects a suspe

willingness to confess. At the same time, while such differentiation may 

useful, it is also very basic. According to the empirical research, age, me

state, and previous convictions/confessions are the characteristics that m

affect a suspect’s likelihood of confession. While the emotional/non-emoti

dichotomy may refl ect some of those factors, one cannot assume that they 

so across the board. Moreover, the non-emotional young offender may requi

different approach than the non-emotional middle-aged offender, yet the Reid 

makes no such distinction. Like the Aubry text, the Reid Technique gives 

few specifi c prescriptions for how to adjust interrogation techniques in respo

573 Inbau, see note 109, p. 210.
203

Although all the texts caution interrogators to remember that 

is an individual with his or her own unique traits, such generalized 

are practically worthless and are not refl ected in the main thrust 

Beyond the factors discussed above, the texts do not provide interr

shifts in tactics based on the traits that affect confession.574 Indeed

even acknowledge the statistically signifi cant confession factors in 

manner. Moreover, even when they do note that some factors m

interrogations (for example, Walters cautions interrogators to conside

among cultures when attempting to detect deception), they rarely di

techniques that should be tailored to the suspect. Instead, they give 

only general tactics without telling them how to adjust the techn

critical confession factors.

Finally, although the previously discussed Leo study has li

the four techniques he identifi es as most successful in obtaining 

(appealing to the suspect’s conscience, identifying and pointing out c

in the suspect’s denial and story, using praise or fl attery, and of

justifi cations or psychological excuses for the crime) are the same 

to techniques advocated in other literature. Since the texts all were w

the Leo study, it does not appear that they were based on any empi

the fi eld — indeed, they make no claims that they are. However, if L

it seems that the techniques they advocated are indeed among the mo

An important caution, of course, is that Leo’s study was conducte

precinct, with only Leo himself coding the interrogation techniqu

Moreover, we do not know the specifi c characteristics of the sus

interrogations Leo observed, and thus do not know if important adj

necessary for success with suspects of varying characteristics.

Ultimately, empirical studies may show that there is no need 

the techniques advocated in the literature on the basis of the variou

factors. Perhaps the Reid Technique in its basic form works as we

young, Latino and white, etc. However, as of now there is no proo

the case. At this juncture, we simply cannot say whether the tech

literature are effective across the board, or whether the confession fa

statistically signifi cant call for adjustments that the texts do not incl

574 The Royal and Schutt and Walters texts do not provide for adjustments based on 

characteristics. They instead generally point out that the interrogator should be awa

among suspects and should take those into account.
204

practices of various law enforcement organizations. While not an exhaus

survey of all such organizations, the information provides a window into trai

available to federal, state, and city law enforcement offi cers in the United St

Additionally, to offer some comparative perspective, we provide an overview 

interrogation training and practices in Great Britain and Israel. 

Section 6. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI 

Academy at Quantico, Virginia)575

The FBI Academy provides training to all future FBI agents. The new a

training consists of 17 weeks of instruction totaling 643.5 hours. As part of 

training program, the FBI offers 15 classes, totaling 69 hours, on interview

and interrogation. Of this program, 9 classes are devoted to interrogation, tota

27 hours of training. The interrogation curriculum covers, if only gener

interrogation theory and practice. The training also offers two practical exerc

on interrogation, each lasting about 25–50 minutes. Finally, the training p

constant attention to the documentation and forms that agents must complete 

fi le in connection with interrogations. According to FBI Academy staff, this 

element of the training — necessary fi lings and documentation — represen

substantial portion of the time and attention allocated to interrogation train

Four hours of training about detection of deception are also included in 

aforementioned 69 hours of general interview/interrogation training. 

According to literature provided to trainees, “a successful interroga

results in a guilty or involved criminal suspect’s making a confession or admit

participation in an illegal activity.”576 However, this avowed goal of obtai

confessions is downplayed by other staff members of the FBI Academy, 

clarify that interrogation is best conceived of as a means to lower resistanc

telling the truth. FBI Academy staff add that entering an interrogation with 

sole goal of obtaining a confession means setting oneself up for failure. What

the ultimate objective, the FBI has adopted what it calls the Direct Accusa

Approach as its chosen method of interrogation. This approach, whose elem

are described below, closely tracks the Reid Technique, with the major differe

being that the FBI’s approach relies on confronting the suspect with the evide

available to motivate a confession.

Like Reid, the FBI training teaches agents to conduct a pre-interroga

interview. The FBI offers its agents the following eight-step process to g

them through the interview, which are the same steps followed in interview

witnesses and victims:

575 Unless otherwise referenced, the information in this section is derived from a visit to the Fe

Bureau of Investigation Academy, Quantico, Virginia, 8-9 March 2005. Our host during the visi

Brian Boetig, Supervisory Special Agent in the Bureau’s Law Enforcement Communication Uni

576 D. Vessel, Conducting Successful Interrogations (Quantico, VA: Interviewing and Interrog

Law Enforcement Communication Unit, FBI Academy, revised 14 October 2004), 70.
205

2. Introduction: Agents introduce themselves to the suspect 

explain to him/her the nature of the interview.

3. Rapport Building: As is explained below, rapport buildin

the cornerstone of the FBI’s entire interview/interroga

process. During this stage, investigators attempt to build a g

relationship with subjects. 

4. Questioning: The agent asks the subject questions following w

the FBI calls a deductive funnel. This method of questio

starts with open-ended questions meant to foster narration 

the part of the subject, followed by more closed questions s

as indicator questions, identifi cation questions, multiple ch

questions, and leading (yes or no) questions.

5. Verifi cation: Having concluded the questioning, the a

reviews everything the suspect has told him/her for accu

and further recall.

6. Catch all: The agent allows the suspect to add anything he

considers relevant or absent from his/her prior statements.

7. Departure: If the suspect will not be interrogated, arre

or otherwise detained after the interview, the agent m

arrangements for future contact. 

8. Critique: The agent evaluates the information obtained in l

of the interview goals.

Though seemingly rigid, FBI Academy staff emphasized that t

approach is meant as a roadmap rather than a strict list, and should b

the situation requires. 

FBI training emphasizes the importance of a non-accusatory pre-

interview for a number of reasons. First, the interview provides 

with a behavioral baseline against which to evaluate the suspect’

behavior and responses (both verbal and non-verbal) during the co

interrogation. Second, it provides investigators with the suspect’s v

events, which could later be used during interrogation to point out c

or lies. Finally, FBI staff noted that the pre-interrogation interview 

the fi rst contact between interrogator and suspect and, given its no

nature, offers a fertile opportunity to begin establishing rapport with 

After the pre-interrogation interview, the agents transition in

interrogation, which, as mentioned above, follows the Bureau’s Dire

Approach. Though not formulated as a strict step-based process, the 
206

Enforcement Training Center (FLETC; see below), this direct accusation is m

to present a picture of overwhelming certainty that the authorities know of 

suspect’s involvement in the crime. Conversely, this step sets the FBI’s appro

apart from the Reid Technique, which does not advocate such direct presenta

of the evidence in the interrogator’s possession. 

As might be expected, suspects usually meet these direct accusations w

denials; in fact, a suspect’s failure to deny involvement is treated as a str

indicator of guilt. FBI training teaches agents to cut off or stop the suspe

denials by interrupting and preventing any additional attempts at denial, 

underscores that a guilty suspect’s denials will weaken as the accusat

continue, while an innocent suspect’s will normally grow in frequency 

intensity. FBI training literature notes that an effective way to cut off den

“involves interrogators repeatedly acknowledging the subject’s participation in 

crimes while questioning only their motivations for committing the acts.”578 

training literature alerts future agents to the possibility that guilty suspects 

offer protests, or reasons for their innocence, in response to the direct accusat

after denials have failed. Because these protests usually have some factual b

and can be defended comfortably by the suspect, FBI training urges agent

redirect and incorporate them into the following step, rather than attemptin

refute them. 

During the third step, interrogators engage in what practically amounts 

dialogue through which they present themes and arguments meant to persu

the suspect to confess. In essence, this theme-building step depends on the t

basic tools of rationalization, projection, and minimization to achieve its e

This is consistent with the Reid Technique and the training provided to o

federal law enforcement agencies in FLETC. The interrogator derives the the

and opportunities to rationalize, project, and minimize from a combinatio

information provided by the suspect during the pre-interrogation interview 

interrogation, and from the interrogator’s own general personal experienc

relation to human behavior. FBI training literature notes that “the chance

obtaining a confession increase 25 percent for every hour (up to 4 hours

interrogation.”579 Consequently, interrogators are encouraged to have eno

themes and arguments to fi ll three to four hours of monologue. Throughout t

monologue, interrogators should seek to prevent the suspect’s mental withdra

which is often a response to the failure of their denials and protests. One sugge

tactic to prevent the suspect’s mental withdrawal is to move closer to him 

use his name to gain the suspect’s attention. Additionally, as the interrog

rationalizes, projects, and minimizes as part of his interrogation monologue

577 Id., p. 73. 578 Id. 579 Id., p. 74.
207

their themes to a succinct concept and proceed to the next step. 

The last step in the FBI’s Direct Accusation Approach is the 

of a bad/good option. This step of the FBI’s method is identical to 

7, “Presenting an Alternative Question.” By offering the suspect tw

committing the crime, one of which would be unacceptable to the 

interrogator gives the suspect an opportunity to make an admission. 

are instructed to suggest that the suspect’s actions were based on the “

rather than the bad, to ask the suspect to confi rm this suggestion

confi rmed, to begin eliciting the confession. On the other hand, if the 

to take up the good/bad option, interrogators should spend more time 

projecting and minimizing, and offering the suspect reasons to con

is clear that the interrogation process cannot depend solely on a stric

but must be fl exible enough to adapt to the particular interrogator

hand. It is equally clear that the FBI method of interrogation is ex

intensive, and requires prolonged interactions between suspect and in

work properly. Consequently, the Direct Accusation Approach migh

for time-constrained situations, such as a “ticking bomb” scenario.

With regard to detecting deception, future FBI agents are not t

for any specifi c physical or verbal signs of deception, since the

be inaccurate and misleading. Instead, trainees are taught to con

of behavior and note the context in which these behaviors arise. 

students are urged to compare these behaviors with the baseline beh

by the subject in the non-accusatory pre-interrogation interview. 

deception is thus taught not as a determinative tool but as a means o

interview along and providing interrogators with clues to topics and 

if probed more deeply, might bring suspects closer to a confession.

According to the FBI Academy, rapport is the key element i

people to talk, be it during a non-accusatory pre-interrogation 

an interrogation. As such, it is central to the Direct Accusation A

an interrogator be able not only to establish rapport with a suspec

maintain it throughout the interrogation. However, FBI instructors m

establishing and maintaining rapport is the most diffi cult skill to te

through a standard training program. Building rapport takes time an

prompting at least one instructor to recommend that his students attem

with as many unknown people as possible during their free time. 

FBI instructors suggested that many of the interpersonal skills 

build and maintain rapport might be innate, and thus highly depe

individual abilities of students. To paraphrase one instructor, rapport 

and constant dance between interrogator and suspect. This dance p

information obtained through the pre-interrogation interview, c

experience, and general, sometimes intuitive, knowledge of human 

nature. It is common for agents to mistake rapport for facile chi
208

a general matter, FBI instructors mentioned that an effective interrogator is 

who has strong communication, listening, and interpersonal skills, approa

interrogations with patience, and can pay close, simultaneous attention to the f

of the case as well as to external and internal factors during the interrogation

As may be gleaned from the information above, and as was confi rmed 

FBI Academy staff, FBI training in interviewing and interrogation is delibera

general. This occurs by design rather than chance. The new agent trai

is meant to provide individuals who, as a general rule, have had no prev

law enforcement experience with the tools necessary to become compe

criminal investigators in a relatively short time frame. Given the broad rang

experiences and skills each trainee brings to the program, training is there

designed to reach what instructors referred to as the lowest common denomin

As an illustration, one FBI instructor noted that he must tailor his training 

24-year-old ex-employee of an Internet company who has spent the last 4 yea

his life working in a cubicle without any signifi cant interpersonal contact. T

the training is designed to provide only the skills absolutely necessary to 

competent criminal investigator. 

In theory, this problem could be remedied by future, more detailed trai

on specialized and complex subjects such as interrogation. However, contin

education, also known as “in-training services,” is sparse, and what littl

available is optional and usually offered by independent contractors such as R

and Associates.580 The most instructors can do is provide a bibliography of bo

and articles on interrogation for further reading to guide future agents in t

voluntary learning process. Consequently, with the exception of those who ob

additional interrogation training on their own initiative, most FBI agents rely 

on their general FBI Academy training.

Like their counterparts at FLETC, FBI instructors admitted that it is unc

how much of the training agents actually apply in their interrogations, or 

well they implement the techniques they employ. One instructor noted tha

believed only 25–30% of agents follow what they learn during their interroga

training. FBI Academy instructors and directors have recognized this as a ser

shortcoming and agreed that it is a pressing issue that requires future researc

To complicate matters further, the FBI, like all other law enforcem

agencies we interviewed, lacks data as to the effi cacy of the interroga

techniques it teaches. Although the instructors have a comprehensive knowle

and understanding of the literature and empirical studies, no systematic, empir

580 The scarcity of training is even more evident at the state and city police department levels. 

their experience in dealing with and training police offi cers from around the country and the w

through the FBI’s National Academy, instructors underscored the fact that most police departm

offer absolutely no formal interrogation training whatsoever. This observation is consistent wit

own contact with the Boston Police Department and the Massachusetts State Police.
209

and evaluative function, allowing them to learn from their mistakes 

monitor what agents actually do in the fi eld.

Section 7. Federal Law Enforcement Training 

(FLETC)581

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) provid

agents in 81 different federal agencies. It covers all federal criminal 

(18–11 job series federal employees) except those in the FBI, Drug 

Administration (DEA), and U.S. Postal Service. It is designed to provid

who have no law enforcement experience with the tools necessar

beginning criminal investigators; the specifi c skill-sets needed fo

agency are then taught by that agency. It has a basic curriculum 

all agents and then offers more advanced or specialized training 

either through “add-on” programs for the specifi c agencies or thr

contractors. The FLETC basic curriculum must be approved by all ag

reviewed regularly on the basis of feedback from the students and th

FLETC’s primary training in the area of custodial interroga

in the basic Criminal Investigator Training Program (CITP). The 

CITP’s interview/interrogation curriculum is a 10-hour lecture 

“Interviewing for Law Enforcement Offi cers/Criminal Investigators

offers the course in 6- and 12-hour versions covering more or l

aspects of interview procedures. The individual agencies choose 

most appropriate for their agents, and the 10-hour version is mo

selected. The course is designed to “provide Federal criminal 

(regardless of agency or position description) with foundational 

skills using proven questioning techniques coupled with an awarenes

behavioral responses. Emphasis is placed on planning the interview

questions and following the fi ve steps of the law enforcement inte

the 15 objectives of the course, two focus on interrogation: #14: 

apply planning considerations for a confrontational interview, and 

and apply the confrontational interview technique. These objective

through a two-hour lecture class. Although FLETC uses the term 

the confrontational interview basically amounts to an interrogatio

designed to elicit a confession from a party whom the agents believ

The confrontational interview may or may not be conducted with t

custody, depending on the agents’ preferences for the particular situ

581 Unless otherwise referenced, the information in this section is derived from a vi

Law Enforcement Training Center at Glynco, Georgia, 12-13 April 2005. Our host dur

Mark Fallon, Deputy Assistant Director of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. 582 Syllabus, Interviewing for Law Enforcement Offi cers/Criminal Investigators, 

#4162, August. 2004. 583 The confrontational interview will hereinafter be referred to as an interrogati

and to distinguish it from other interviews.
210

varies somewhat by agency, but those participating in the CITP Confrontati

Interview Practical Exercise spend four hours in the session, with each stu

conducting an interrogation and receiving personalized feedback for ab

an hour of that time. In addition, FLETC offers courses in basic interview

communication in interviewing, response analysis, cognitive interview

technique, multiple suspect elimination technique (through interviews), 

interviewing, advanced investigative interviewing, and other suspect interv

techniques. The goal behind this varied program is not to tie the students 

particular regimen, but instead to give them basic interview and interroga

tools that they can use fl exibly in the fi eld.

However, FLETC does provide its students with an overarching sch

for the interview/interrogation process that closely tracks both the Reid Sch

techniques and the FBI’s Direct Accusation Approach, though not necessaril

design. The goal of any interview or interrogation, according to FLETC, i

elicit useful, truthful information. In an interrogation, the goal is to elicit a trut

confession or at least a detailed lie that can be used in a later interrogatio

prosecution. The major distinguishing feature of the technique taught by FLE

is the detailed presentation of the evidence to the suspect, a tactic advocated by 

FBI, but rejected by the Reid Technique. According to FLETC, because the ag

trained at the Center generally deal with more sophisticated suspects than do 

police, it is virtually impossible to get them to confess without showing them 

evidence. Thus, as discussed below, FLETC trains its agents to make a monolo

presentation of the evidence to the suspect as part of the interrogation. 

Before starting the interrogation, FLETC students are taught to pre

a topical outline. The outline, meant to be used both in the practical exerc

in class and in the fi eld as preparation for actual interviews and interrogat

should include the following areas:

1. Interview/Interrogation Site

2. Objectives of the Interview/Interrogation

3. Purpose Statements (to be given to suspect)

4. Rapport Areas

5. General Questions

6. Possible Themes

7. Choice Questions

The topical outline not only prepares the agents for the encounter, 

also forces them to examine their preceding research and identify gaps in t

information. For instance, if they cannot write down a few areas where they 

be able to establish rapport, they in theory have not learned enough about t

suspect. The outline is meant to be used as a guide throughout the encounter w

the suspect, but agents are taught that they should be ready to throw it out if 

interrogation veers off in a different direction than expected.
211

is meant to be used in all federal law enforcement interviews, bu

application in an interrogation. For instance, to pass the CITP Co

Interview Practical Exercise, the students must “demonstrate comp

principles and use of skills competencies for the following:

• Introduction

• Self

• Partner

• Suspect

• Purpose

• Credentials

• Rapport

• Properly Established

• Properly Maintained

• Questions

• General Questions

• Case Presentation — Monologue (Factual Presenta

and Choice Questions)

• Recognize and Utilize Suspect’s Nonverbal Behav

• Demonstrate Effective Personal Nonverbal Behav

• Appropriate Use of Pauses

• Summary

• Acknowledge Suspect’s Cooperation

• Summarize Main Points from Notes

• Closing

• Acknowledge Suspect’s Cooperation

• Contact Information — Primary, Secondary, Susp

The case presentation step mirrors the FBI and Reid interrogatio

with the students taught the following: present the evidence they h

that implicates the suspects and thus overwhelm them with the 

their guilt; present the themes of rationalization, projection, and m

as appropriate; and then present a “choice question.” The empha

students’/agents’ doing all the talking in this phase of the interroga

taught to cut off and overcome objections to avoid an argumentat

that would threaten to ruin the interrogation. FLETC instructors d

584 Syllabus, CITP Confrontational Interview Practical Exercise, FLETC Course # 

2005.
212

presented to the suspect are the same as those recommended by most of 

texts and the FBI, although FLETC focuses only on the major three (rationa

project, minimize). In exactly the same manner as Reid’s Step 7, “Presen

an Alternative Question” (see discussion above), this section of the interroga

ends with the agent’s posing a question that posits a “good” and “bad” rea

for committing the crime, thus offering the suspect two choices, both of w

would constitute an admission of guilt. The students are discouraged from u

trickery or deceit during the monologue, both because FLETC instructors bel

that more sophisticated suspects will see through it and because they believe 

suspects will closely watch the investigators, who might present some of the 

indicators of deception that they are trained to look for in the suspect and 

“tip their hand.”

According to the instructors, the most diffi cult skill to teach is rap

building, mainly because not enough time is available to spend on the sub

Moreover, many instructors believed that some of the necessary traits of a g

rapport-builder are innate, while others can be taught. Because the classes 

designed for a wide variety of students, the instructors must again teach to 

lowest common denominator. For instance, some students have a natural ab

to establish rapport with almost anyone, while others engage in forced small 

that makes the suspect uncomfortable and wary. Thus, like the Boston Po

Department (see discussion below), the instructors attempt to teach the stud

to establish rapport through an appearance of confi dence and professionalism, 

through the types of questions asked. If the agents are able to engage in small 

that is ideal, but they are taught not to force the rapport through such techniq

Instructors also try to focus on so-called “rapport-busters,” meaning question

statements that break the rapport that has been established by sending a diffe

message than that established in the rapport-building stage (e.g., “We’re her

ask you a few questions.”). As part of that effort, and especially in the advan

interview classes and “add-on” programs conducted for specifi c agencies, FLE

instructors attempt to refi ne the agents’ questioning skills by emphasizing the 

of narrative questions, as well as direct and precise questions. In addition, FLE

emphasizes a constant focus on creating an impression of confi dence, patie

and persistence as a necessary component of a successful interview. Ind

according to one instructor, confi dence is the key to a successful interrogatio

The students are also taught the basics of detecting deception. Accordin

the FLETC instructors the teaching here closely follows the literature. Stud

are not generally taught to look for any specifi c physical or verbal signal

deception, but to focus on nonverbal, verbal, and symbolic communications 

occur in clusters as the result of stimuli presented in the form of question

evidence by the investigator. Students are taught to consider the culture of 

subject (although they are not taught the ways in which members of a partic

culture might respond to a particular stimulus), to look for clusters of beha
213

speech presented by the subject, and that their ability to detect d

grow with experience.

As noted, because 81 agencies are involved in setting the cur

because each lecture class contains either 24 or 48 students, the in

that they must teach to the lowest common denominator. At the sam

of the instructors echo the belief of other law enforcement personne

way to learn is by doing and thus they place particular emphasis on 

exercises. The exercises use role-players hired from the local com

are as realistic as possible. They are conducted in mock-up offi 

settings to give them a realistic feel, and the students are allowed 

furniture as they see fi t. In addition, the scenarios for the various in

somewhat tailored to the specifi c agency for which the student will 

Secret Service agent may face a scenario involving counterfeit cur

are currently 16 different scenarios in use, each with a detailed cas

of potential violations, and various pieces of evidence. The instru

corner of the room and silently observes the interview, while came

record the interactions from several angles. Generally one student t

of primary interrogator, with the other student acting as the seconda

notes, follows up with any additional questions, presents the sum

rare cases jumps in to take over the primary role if the other agent 

of the interrogation. After the practical exercise is complete, the stu

individualized feedback from the instructor in the room. In addition, 

opportunity to review the videotape of the interrogation and critiqu

(critiques that, according to one instructor, are usually harsher than th

by the instructors). This allows for teaching at various levels based 

students’ needs, as opposed to the one-size-fi ts-all approach of the l

The training provided by FLETC through the CITP and the ot

covers only the minimum requirements to be a competent federal law 

agent. The individual agencies then conduct “add-on” courses, e

home facilities or through FLETC or private contractors. FLETC 

advanced courses in interviewing and interrogation techniques. T

are generally available to more senior agents from the various a

voluntary basis, and are taught either by FLETC instructors or, m

outside contractors. The major contractor for many years was the 

though recently FLETC has begun to use Wicklander-Zulawski an

Wicklander-Zulawski, however, teaches the Reid approach as w

special license.

The FLETC instructors indicate that they do not know how 

training provided in CITP and the other programs actually mak

street.” The only opportunity that instructors have to evaluate the effi 

programs (other than survey feedback from the students and agen

when former students return to FLETC for advanced training. At t
214

basic training program. Moreover, FLETC conducts no systematic review 

the students who do return for advanced training, and therefore only anecd

evidence of the success of the initial training program is available. Even then 

students who return for advanced training are generally a self-selected group 

is likely to be more interested in interrogation techniques — and thus more li

to have retained the initial training.

In addition, as with all of the other law enforcement training programs, t

has been no systematic, empirical study of the effi cacy of the techniques tau

at FLETC; it appears that most of the support for the techniques comes f

anecdotal evidence. This is in part because, without videotaping interrogat

it is impossible to determine what techniques are actually used in the fi 

The FLETC instructors, noting the number of studies on British interroga

techniques, indicated that they would welcome videotaping of interrogation

determine what is and is not working, and also to establish how much of t

training even makes it to the street, regardless of effi cacy.

Section 8. Boston Police Department — Homicide 

Division585

The Boston Police Department conforms to the general trend among l

law enforcement organizations, focusing its training on the procedural aspec

interrogation. The offi cers and detectives receive very little, if any, formal trai

on interrogation techniques. The majority of the interrogation training that d

occur is through the Reid School, which is offered as an option to detectives, m

of whom do not choose to participate. The department has no formal manua

interrogation techniques, not even for divisions such as the homicide unit. De

Superintendent Daniel Coleman, who is currently in charge of the homicide 

is putting together a protocol and checklist for interrogation techniques. 

This situation can be contrasted with the issuance of guidelines 

extensive training that immediately followed the decision in Commonwe

v. DiGiambattista,

586 which requires electronic recording of all interrogat

conducted in Massachusetts and threatens a jury instruction that casts do

on police procedures if no such recording is made. The difference results f

the department’s primary goal, which is to solve cases and obtain convict

which in turn leads to an emphasis on the procedures necessary to protect susp

constitutional rights, avoid suppression of evidence and suspect statements, 

thus create the easiest path for a jury to convict. The detectives we intervie

noted that the procedures and training in place regarding interrogation 

not geared toward training interrogators to elicit statements, but instead 

585 Unless otherwise referenced, the information in this section is derived from interviews 

Deputy Superintendent Daniel Coleman of the Boston Police Department, who is also Command

BPD’s Homicide Unit, conducted on 11 and 21 March 2005. 586 442 Mass. 423 (2004).
215

Superintendent Coleman reports that when he moved from a unif

investigational unit he received no additional formalized training

reports that 90% of a successful interrogation is based on intuitio

only be developed through experience, on-the-job training, and men

At the same time, the department uses many of the genera

advocated by the Reid School and others. They focus heavily o

thorough pre-interrogation investigations. Detectives stress the im

gathering all of the information on the suspect, victim, crime scene

entering the interrogation room. In addition, they try not to co

interrogation without a clear sense of their goals and objectives. L

law enforcement personnel interviewed, Boston detectives believe 

rapport and conveying empathy are the keys to a successful interr

homicide detectives dress in suits every day, are clean-shaven, an

building that one described as looking like an “insurance offi ce”; 

importance of removing the suspect from the police station envir

setting contains very few reminders that the suspect is in police cus

offi cers remove all signals that could remind suspects of the con

their actions. The interview/interrogation room is a small, plain roo

a whiteboard on the wall and a few chairs and a desk. The room h

mirror that “no one uses” because a) any time the door opens to the r

observers, the people standing behind the mirror can be seen, and b) 

knows what the mirror is and asks to have the blinds closed.

However, the detectives report that the theme-development strate

by the Reid Technique does not work with most of the suspects th

They postulate that this is because the strategy is based on the ide

feel guilty when they commit crimes, but many of the suspects 

division encounters feel little, if any, remorse for their crimes, are 

jail, and are mainly concerned with protecting themselves from r

the street. Instead, the detectives fi nd that, after establishing rapp

kindness and professionalism (as opposed to false friendship), a str

no-nonsense presentation of the situation and evidence is the best 

secure a confession. 

Despite the lack of formalized training, there is a genera

interrogations conducted in the homicide division. The detectives b

procedural requirements. When the suspect is brought in, usually f

police precinct, the detective lets him know that he is under arrest 

him of the charges. He advises the suspect of his right to a teleph

587 Supervisors in the BPD further believe that even the small amount of interro

training that is provided is only somewhat useful, because it must be adapted for 

cultures, and experiences of the trainees, resulting in a tendency to teach to the 

denominator. 
216

the interrogation recorded, the detective re-reads the Miranda rights while 

tape is recording. Even if the suspect declines to have the encounter recor

the detectives are trained to get at least the declination on tape. Accordin

Coleman, over 80% of suspects in general waive their Miranda rights, while 

about 30% of murder suspects do so.

Once the procedural requirements are met, the interrogator moves to rap

building. The rapport is built less on false friendship than on empathy, kindn

and professionalism. The straightforward techniques used by the departm

include dressing in a suit and tie to let the suspect know that the detectives 

“not your average cops” and that they mean business; shaking hands with e

suspect (also giving the detective an opportunity to examine the hands); spea

courteously and professionally, avoiding use of the suspect’s “lingo”; keeping 

conversation friendly, casual, and not overly offi cial; offering the use of the ph

in a casual manner (e.g., “Do you want to let someone know where you are 

that you are okay?”); and offering food and drink. The detectives believe that 

approach is effective with homicide suspects because most of them unders

the situation they are in; moreover, suspects will only cooperate if they bel

the detective is not hiding anything from them, and can immediately spot attem

to downplay or minimize the crime and will respond in kind by “playing” w

the interrogator.

Once rapport has been established, detectives prefer not to use tricker

deceit, though they are allowed to do so under Massachusetts law. Accor

to them, beyond just being “wrong” this is also ineffective, since it insults 

suspect’s intelligence and can often be exposed; it also is one of the interroga

tactics that they say can most easily lead to false confessions. At the same t

they do recommend using trickery to induce lies. This would include, for exam

asking a suspect who has just mentioned a certain road about the tollbooth 

the road, knowing full well that there is no tollbooth on the road and tryin

catch the suspect in a lie. However, the detectives report rarely, if ever, ma

up evidence, witnesses, or statements that do not actually exist. At the same t

they are careful not to give the suspect any information he does not already h

saying that the entire interrogation procedure is “like a poker game.” This is d

both to keep the suspect from knowing what the detective knows and to pre

the suspect from appropriating the information for possible false confessions

The more experienced detectives argue that anyone who goes into 

interrogation looking for a confession is inexperienced and “an idiot.” S

an approach leads to bias in the interrogation room, where what is neede

objectivity. The goal of an interrogation should be to gather information, and 

can often be as useful in an eventual prosecution as a confession. The detec

should look for information that can advance the rest of the investiga

including information that the suspect does not realize might be useful for 

investigation and prosecution, such as whether he is right-handed or left-han
217

There is no formalized mechanism for supervision of, or 

interrogations conducted by the detectives in the homicide unit. Ins

Superintendent Coleman or his deputies sometimes take home th

of interrogations and listen for problems, providing feedback 

Feedback is usually given only if a problem is noted, and even t

the more experienced detectives fi nd it diffi cult to change their wa

also sends his detectives to court to listen to suppression motions a

District Attorney’s offi ce so that they become aware of potential p

interrogation procedures. However, these motions are usually ba

procedural issues instead of the actual interrogation techniques. S

detectives often go to court to hear cross-examinations of detectiv

division, as well as closing arguments in cases handled by their div

can understand the questions and tactics used by defense attorne

identify possible problem areas in their interrogations. The detecti

one of the most important skills for an interrogator, now that inter

recorded, is to be able to explain his techniques to a jury so that the 

does not appear overly coercive or tainted.

Generally the Boston Police Department does not videotape its in

the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decision, like most statu

decisions on the subject, only requires “electronic” recording. Prior to 

the Boston Police Department would conduct the full interrogatio

confession, and only then start the tape to obtain a recording of 

confession. Deputy Superintendent Coleman noted that he initi

the requirement that all interrogations be taped because he was afr

police and suspects would act differently, that the positive dynamic

through rapport-building would be diminished, and that generally th

recording equipment would inhibit interrogations. His view is slow

as he sees the results of taping. While not fully convinced, the det

that taping interrogations offers numerous benefi ts, but they regard 

as a wholly different matter. Most agree that videotaping would a

and review, and Coleman says that certain basic tenets of interroga

taught more easily through the videotaping of interrogations. 

At the same time, Coleman worries that because under Massachu

suspect would have to be informed that he is being videotaped, the 

would be inhibited, less rapport would be established, and less inf

fewer confessions would be obtained. Part of the worry, especially 

with gang members and similar criminals, is that because the tapes are 

suspects will be less likely to talk for fear that the tape might get bac

where retaliation for cooperating with the police has spiked in recen

the country. Nonetheless, the detectives recognize that, in general, 

departments and agencies have had positive experiences with the vid

see them as the inevitable next stage in interrogation requirements.
218

of Technology (MIT) Police Department and formerly with the Massachu

Metropolitan Police and the Massachusetts State Police, reports a similar his

Pierce has been a police offi cer since 1978, working in various units and 

forces on violent crimes, white collar offenses, homicides, and more. Mos

his career has been spent in one capacity or another as part of the Massachu

State Police, though he spent a signifi cant portion of his time working on spe

assignment with the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Offi ce. Although 

has taken classes all over the country on various policing techniques, inclu

interrogation, the Massachusetts State Police Department does not seem to h

any type of comprehensive training in interrogation techniques. Some in-ser

training exists, though this is provided mostly by outside experts (e.g., from 

Reid School) brought in to lecture, and once in a while by more senior mem

of the department. The basic Police Academy training provided little, if 

information on interrogation techniques, although, as Pierce notes, this is bec

most police offi cers are not involved in conducting interrogations.

Instead, like most other law enforcement offi cials, Pierce reports tha

learned most interrogation techniques on the job. Pierce also notes that all of 

classes in the world are not nearly as useful as the skills learned in the fi eld. 

opinion should not be taken lightly, as he has participated in various interroga

training programs, including those provided by the Reid School and the N

Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts State Police Departments, as well as var

national academies. According to Pierce, if a young detective is lucky enoug

be partnered with an experienced, successful mentor, that mentor will be the m

useful source of interrogation training. As a corollary, one must assume that if 

partner is not helpful or is inexperienced, young detectives will have to learn 

techniques on their own. At the same time, the fi rst thing Pierce did when he 

over the MIT Police Department was send all of the detectives to the Reid Sch

for what he referred to as Interview and Interrogation 101.

Echoing the literature, Pierce argues that it takes very special skills to 

a good interviewer/interrogator. Most important among the characteristics 

good interrogator are a true liking of people, an ability to get along with pe

of all backgrounds, comfort in talking to people, and knowledge of how to d

In addition, anyone who wants to be a successful interrogator needs to be a g

actor: to convey sympathy, empathy, and other emotions that the interrogator d

not really feel. As a young detective, Pierce would often just sit outside or in 

with his partner and observe and speak with people so that he could learn th

skills and improve on whatever innate abilities he already possessed. He rep

that this was one of the most useful techniques he found to build up knowledg

how people act and react in various settings. Finally, Pierce notes that the ab

588 Unless otherwise referenced, the information in this section is derived from an interview 

Lieutenant Albert F. Pierce Jr. of the MIT Police Department, formerly of the Massachusetts 

Police, on 5 April 2005.
219

Pierce argues that interrogation techniques must be individual

the interrogator and the suspect and are very case-specifi c. Some of 

he identifi ed included the crime committed, the suspect’s education 

formal and within the judicial system — the suspect’s economic and 

etc. At the same time, no matter with whom one is dealing or wh

person committed, the single most important aspect of the interrogati

to Pierce, is to establish rapport and the appearance of friendship. 

mainly to create an environment conducive to a successful interroga

to maintain the suspect’s constitutional rights while minimizing th

that the suspect will ask for an attorney.

The typical interrogation in which Pierce is involved proceeds a

1. Conduct the pre-interrogation investigation — gather as muc

as possible about the suspect, the crime scene, the victim, e

2. Go through Miranda and other procedural requirements.

3. Build rapport:

a. Leave the suspect alone in a room and observe 

nervousness, fear, etc., through a two-way mirror 

in the door to the room.

b. Approach with only a few detectives.

 Pierce reports no standard procedure, but never m

 than three, and usually two so that one can do the 

 questioning and another can take notes.

c. Begin talking, offer a smoke, food, and/or drink. 

by “going for the throat” with a direct accusation 

overwhelm with evidence.

d. Have a two-way conversation and get to a comfo

the suspect.

e. Only at this point move to discussion about the cri

Once Pierce moves into harder questioning of the suspect, the pro

to break down to some degree in that there is no one path to follow. Ge

ended questions are used to keep suspects talking, to keep them off 

avoid conveying any information to them. Depending on the suspect

as those discussed in the Reid Technique (minimization, rationalizati

be appropriate. All, however, require sympathy and empathy accord

who indicates that he may be using theme development without bein

aware of it. Indeed, he reports that the most successful interrogato
220

Pierce believes quite strongly that a good interrogator can sense decep

There are so-called “body-language schools” that teach techniques that Pi

fi nds effective. More importantly, however, is the ability simply to read pe

and he argues that in real-world situations it is easy to pick up obvious signals 

a suspect is lying if one has good people skills. At the same time, he believes 

sometimes useful for an interrogator to use trickery and deceit, such as telling 

suspect that the authorities have evidence, phone records, witnesses, or statem

that do not really exist. While one must be careful in using this technique, Pi

says that it is highly successful when appropriately used. Nonetheless, he rep

that he never lies about the consequences of confession and tries to avoid 

subject altogether, instead telling the suspect that he is just the fact-fi nder 

writes the story, and that what happens to the suspect is in the hands of the co

Until the recent SJC decision, the Massachusetts State Police did not 

electronic recording of any kind. Pierce contends that if they had done so 

would have had easier, smoother, and more successful results in court 

convictions). While noting that the presence of the recording devices does af

the privacy of the interrogation, Pierce argues that the benefi ts outweigh the c

Like Coleman, he fi nds it imperative that the detective be able to explain e

technique used through the interrogation so that it does not appear overly coer

to a court or jury. In addition, he believes that recording the interrogations w

aid in training; one of his chief complaints about the training he received is 

it involved too much sitting in the classroom listening to lectures and not eno

observation and role-playing.

Section 10. Interrogation Practices in Other Countr

Interrogation in Great Britain

General Background

Until the early 1990s, there was no national training on interrogation off

to British police offi cers.589 Though the fi rst and most recognized interroga

manual produced in Britain590 was heavily infl uenced by the Reid Technique, i

not meet with much enthusiasm and does not appear to have had much impac

police training and practice.591 According to Gudjonsson, the implicit rejectio

Reid-based approaches to interrogation in Britain might be due to a combina

of factors, including judicial decisions in cases involving oppressive po

interrogation, research into false confessions and psychological vulnerability, 

changes in police practice following the introduction of the Police and Crim

Evidence Act of 1984 (PACE) and the Codes of Practice for police offi cers, w

589 Gudjonsson, see note 111, p. 38. 590 J. Walkley, Police Interrogation: A Handbook for Investigators (London: Police Re

Publication, 1987). 591 Gudjonsson, see note 110, p. 52.
221

Currently, Britain has a set of national guidelines on interv

witnesses and suspects, composed of fi ve distinct parts (correspo

acronym “PEACE”):

Preparation and Planning: Interviewers are taught to prop

and plan for the interview and formulate aims and objectiv

Engage and Explain: Rapport is established with the subjec

engage the person in conversation.

Account: Offi cers are taught two methods of eliciting an 

the interviewee:

• Cognitive Interview: used with cooperative suspects an

• Conversation Management: recommended when co

insuffi cient for the cognitive interview techniques to w

Closure: The offi cer summarizes the main points from the i

provides the suspect with the opportunity to correct or add 

Evaluate: Once the interview is fi nished, the information g

be evaluated in the context of its impact on the investigatio

The PEACE approach was based on the idea of providing offi 

ethical foundation for police questioning.594 It focuses on informat

rather than obtaining confessions, and it relies on non-coercive 

and accurate recording of the interview to achieve its goals.595 Offi 

“oppressive” questioning would be in breach of the national guideline

presumably fi nd judges less willing to admit into evidence stateme

through those means.596

It is useful to note that an overwhelming proportion of sch

research on interrogation comes from Great Britain. This is mostly b

requires that all interrogations conducted in Great Britain be vi

These recordings, in turn, allow for more research and study opport

Detective Superintendent Colin Sturgeon: A Practitioner’s Per

Detective Superintendent Sturgeon of the Police Service of Nor

has vast experience with interrogations both in typical law enfo

terrorism-related investigations. During our conversation, he offere

592 Id. 593 Id., p. 53. 594 Id. 595 Id., p. 54. 596 Id. 597 The information in this section is derived from a discussion with Detective 

Colin Sturgeon of the Police Service of Northern Ireland during his spring 2005 visit 

School.
222

inducing cramps through prolonged stances in certain positions. Superinten

Sturgeon noted that although these techniques proved quite successful in gai

intelligence they also alienated a vast proportion of the population and g

terrorists a broader base of support from which to operate. Eventually, out

about these coercive interrogation techniques led to signifi cant legal reform

the shape of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) and the relevant Co

of Practice.

As mentioned above, PACE and its Codes of Conduct forbid interroga

to deceive subjects or to employ any sort of trickery to gain information f

them. Similarly, interrogators may not use psychological ploys common to 

Reid Technique, such as rationalization, projection, and minimization. In gen

the interrogator may not offer or suggest any reason to a suspect as to why 

she should confess, but may tell a suspect that his or her cooperation woul

formally made known to the judge. It is relevant to note that these restriction

interrogation tactics apply with equal force to ordinary criminal investigat

and terrorism-related investigations. 

Superintendent Sturgeon noted that these legal restrictions on interroga

have made it impossible to secure a confession or incriminating admission f

a suspect. In fact, he went so far as to say that he cannot recall ever obtaini

confession as a product of interrogation. Even though British law has attem

to bridge this gap by eliminating the right of a suspect to remain quiet du

interrogation by allowing a judge to infer guilt from the suspect’s silence, Sturg

noted that judges rarely, if ever, exercise this discretion against suspects.

As a consequence of the legal restrictions imposed on interrogators in Bri

and their resultant inability to garner confessions, interrogations are now see

another step in the investigation process. According to Superintendent Sturg

the PEACE method of interrogation described above conforms well to the vie

interrogations as a step in a broader investigation, and thus transforms the go

interrogation from obtaining confessions to securing information to advance 

investigation. In this context, Sturgeon highlighted the importance of thoro

preparation prior to beginning the interrogation. This preparation include

interview coordinator, whose job it is to read every document relevant to 

person to be interrogated and to outline the topics that the interrogation sh

cover. The interrogation itself is conducted by two interrogators: the “lead,” 

is responsible for asking the questions, and the “sweeper,” who covers anyt

left out by the lead. Sturgeon made clear that the Engage and Explain portio

the PEACE method relies heavily on rapport, which he described as being b

on the concepts of reciprocity and respect. This last point is signifi cant in 

Superintendent Sturgeon sees the process of establishing rapport not as an atte

to engage in insincere chit-chat with a suspect, but as an opportunity to treat 

or her humanely and with respect so as to foster some sense of reciprocity in 

encounter. 
223

recorded. However, British law allows for recorders to be turne

suspect’s request.

Section 11. Videotaping Interrogations: The 

Practice

Law enforcement offi cials around the country are currently deba

or not videotaping of custodial interrogations should be require

recording of interviews and interrogations, when feasible, has been 

judicial opinion in Alaska since 1985598 and in Minnesota since 1994

neither specifi es videotaping. Illinois recently passed a statute requiri

recording, when feasible, of all custodial interrogations of suspects

of Columbia statute requires it for all suspects in violent or dangero

and a Maine statute requires electronic recording of interrogation

crimes.602 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently rul

it would not require electronic recordings of interrogations, where su

did not take place “the defendant is entitled (on request) to a jur

advising that the State’s highest court has expressed a preferen

interrogations be recorded whenever practicable, and cautioning 

because of the absence of any recording of the interrogation in the 

them, they should weigh evidence of the defendant’s alleged sta

great caution and care.”603 As noted previously, this has led to all i

conducted in Massachusetts being recorded whenever feasible.604 Va

legislative proposals are currently or have previously been before 

around the country, including in New York City, Maryland, Connec

and Missouri.605

Electronic recording of interviews is quite common in other 

noted, Great Britain has required it since 1984.606 Australian poli

record their interrogations where feasible, and in federal prosecu

a contemporaneous recording cannot be made, the law requires 

598 Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska.1985). 599 State v. Scales, 518 N.W. 2d 587 (Minn.1994). 600 725 ILCS 5 § 103-2.1, effective 18 July 2005. 601 D.C. ST § 5-133.20, effective 4 April 2003. 602 Maine LD 891. 603 Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 447-48 (2004). 604 Interview with Boston Police Department Deputy Superintendent Dan Colema

(11 March 2005) [hereinafter Coleman Interview]. 605 See Report on the Electronic Recording of Police Interrogations, submitte

American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section and the New York County Lawy

(2002), 9, at http://www.reid.com/pdfs/NYlegalarticleonvideotaping.pdf, for a non-

access 22 April 2005) [hereinafter Report] 606 Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984.
224

A 1993 study, conducted before many of the statutes previously mentio

were adopted, found that only 16% of police agencies in the United States ove

and one-third in jurisdictions with populations over 50,000, videotaped intervi

interrogations, and confessions, and that the most common circumstance in w

a videotape was made was following the confession.608 “During this process

investigator would recap the interrogation in the presence of the suspect 

continue with the formal confession being recorded.”609 This study repo

that 82% of respondents said that the number of defense claims of impr

interrogation techniques remained the same or decreased once videota

of confessions began.610 At the same time, 60% of respondents “reported 

signifi cant difference between a suspect’s willingness to tell the truth whethe

not the conversation was videotaped.”611 Inbau et al. argue, however, that th

results are meaningless because the study did not include data on whether 

agencies videotaped the entire interrogation or only the confession that resu

after a successful interrogation conducted in a private setting.612

Anecdotal evidence suggests that, since the 1993 study, many police agen

around the country have adopted videotaping procedures, either because 

required by local ordinances or through voluntary adoption programs.613 

Lauderdale, Miami, Denver, Tulsa, San Diego, Kankakee County, and DuP

County are among the many localities that have begun videotaping interrogation

Most of these agencies seem to report positive experiences with the procedur

Indeed, a 2004 study of 238 police and sheriff’s departments that volunt

videotaped interrogations found that “[v]irtually every offi cer with whom 

authors of the report on the study] spoke, having given custodial recordings 

was enthusiastically in favor of the practice.”616 Noted benefi ts included redu

defense motions to suppress statements, more guilty pleas, better evidence 

use at trial, increased public confi dence, and use as an interrogation-techn

teaching tool for detectives.617 In addition, the study found that recording did 

inhibit rapport-building and did not result in suspects’ refusing to cooperat

607 See Australia’s Third Report under the International Covenant on Civil and Political R

March 1987 – December 1995, Art. 14 Par. 816. 608 Inbau, see note 109, 393-395, and Report, 6, both citing W. Geller, Videotaping Interroga

and Confessions, National Institute of Justice Research in Brief (March 1993). 609 Inbau, see note 109, p. 395. 610 Id., p. 394. 611 Id., citing W. Geller. 612 Id., p. 394. 613 Coleman Interview; see also; “Police to Tape Suspects’ ‘Quizzings,’” South Florida Sun Sen

1 February 2003, 1B; “Will the Senate seek justice?,” Chicago Tribune, Editorial, 4 March 2003

614 “Will the Senate seek justice?,” 12. 615 Id. 616 Thomas P. Sullivan, Police Experiences with Recording Custodial Interrogations, present

Northwestern School of Law’s Center on Wrongful Convictions, Summer 2004, 6, at http://www

northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/documents/SullivanReport.pdf, accessed 4 March 2005. 617 Id., 6-12, p. 16
225

The authors of the Reid Technique, however, continue to argu

suspects are less likely to tell the truth and/or confess if they are e

recorded.619 In addition, they believe that videotaping interroga

ultimately harm investigations and especially prosecutions.620 T

that unless the videotaping can be done surreptitiously (which 

states that require two-party consent for electronic recording), the 

a video recording device, or simply the knowledge that the sessio

taped, would undermine the sense of privacy that is a prerequisite to 

Reid Technique interrogation.621 They point to a study by one of 

who surveyed investigators in Alaska and Minnesota and found t

recording device was never visible the investigators obtained an 82

rate as opposed to a 43% rate when the device was visible.622 This, 

the foremost reason not to require videotaping of interrogations.

Inbau et al. acknowledge that videotaping interrogations may 

doubts as to the trustworthiness or voluntariness of the confessi

the investigator’s memory while testifying, and defend agains

of improper interrogation tactics.623 They do not mention the po

videotaping will help in training interrogators. Ultimately, the autho

the costs of videotaping outweigh the benefi ts. They point to the 

“numerous occurrences where a defense expert would offer the opinio

on analysis of the videotaped interrogation, the defendant’s will ap

overcome, or that in the defendant’s mind he perceived a promise of 

threat to his well-being (even though none was stated).”624 They also 

requirement for videotaping is too great a burden for police and pros

already have a diffi cult time maintaining the integrity of all pieces 

Defense attorneys could unfairly exploit the possibilities of the elec

failing, portions of the recording fading or being lost due to mech

gaps because of the need to change a tape, the loss of the tape, inadve

of the tape, or the unavailability of electronic recording in a particul

place doubts about the entire circumstances surrounding the interro

minds of the judge and jury.625

Aubry, however, writes unequivocally that a “requirement for the 

room [is] an adequate and effi cient sound and tape recording sy

continues: “motion picture records...are exceedingly valuable” 

618 Id., 19-20 619 Inbau, see note 109, p. 397. 620 Id., p. 393-397. 621 Id., p. 397. 622 Id., n.23 623 Id., p. 394. 624 Id., p. 396. 625 Id., p. 396-397. 626 Aubry and Caputo, see note 406, p. 71.
226

secured in conformity with legal safeguards.”628 He mentions no down

to the recording of interrogations, though he does suggest that the recor

devices be hidden, perhaps indicating he would agree with some of Inbau et 

concerns if the suspect were made aware that he is being recorded. Similarly

American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section and the New York Co

Lawyers’ Association argue that it is “time the practice of videotaping comp

interrogations is mandated in all state and federal jurisdictions.”629 Concerns ab

false confession frame their argument: worries that as interrogators convin

suspect that confession is rational and appropriate they may convince the inno

individual to confess as well.630

Despite Inbau et al.’s arguments, the videotaping of interrogations is com

to be seen as a positive development by both law enforcement and the defe

bar. The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers supports the prac

as “a simple procedure that would deter human rights violations, reduce 

risk of wrongful convictions due to false confessions, and greatly enhance 

truth-seeking process by resolving factual disputes concerning interrogation

Law enforcement personnel — even those who initially opposed taping — 

beginning to recognize it as an effective means of countering false allegation

misconduct and confi rming the testimony of the police offi cers at a time w

juries have increasing mistrust of police testimony.632 They also see the tape

an important training tool in three respects: fi rst, they allow supervisors to rev

and give feedback on the interrogations; second, they enable the individ

conducting the interrogations to critique themselves; and third, because the t

will be shown to juries, the interrogators will have to be able to explain — 

thus better understand — the techniques they use to elicit confessions (e.g., th

development, presentation of alternative questions, etc.).633

Section 12. Summary: Interrogation Literature vs. L

Enforcement Practice

Like the practical literature on which it is based, the interrogation trai

provided by the U.S. law enforcement organizations consulted for this p

generally fails to incorporate the factors that, according to empirical rese

might affect a suspect’s willingness to confess, and provides little or no trai

627 Id., p. 72. 628 Id. 629 Report, p. 2. 630 Report, p. 3-4. 631 National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, NACDL Federal Legislative Prior

2004, at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/Legislation/Priorities?opendocument, accessed 16 

2005. 632 Coleman Interview. 633 Id.
227

to adjust one’s interrogation techniques for suspects of different a

ethnicities, and criminal history, or for crimes of greater seriousnes

which the interrogator has stronger evidence. The only confession fac

agencies seemed to focus on is length of the interrogation. Consiste

empirical study, discussed above, the FBI training literature and the 

the FBI Academy noted that the length of interrogation was a determ

in obtaining a confession or incriminating information from the susp

Similarly, both FLETC and the FBI take account of the serio

offense and the strength of the evidence against the suspect in the

indirectly. As noted, these two factors appear to be statistically 

predicting the likelihood of a confession. Like the Reid Technique 

they draw so heavily, FBI and FLETC training make use of theme 

based on rationalization, projection, and minimization. These tac

center on manipulating the suspects’ perception of the seriousness 

they have committed. In addition, FBI and FLETC rely heavily on 

of the evidence to convince the suspect that denial is futile and the

option but to confess. Consequently, the stronger the evidence, the m

this FBI and FLETC interrogation step will be. These modifi cation

Technique notwithstanding, the agencies do not, for the most part, 

techniques that the interrogator should adjust if the crime is more o

or the evidence stronger or weaker; they give few, if any, explicit pre

how to use these factors to elicit a confession in different situations

As noted, those offi cers and agents who do receive some 

training learn tactics that closely track those advocated in most of 

The emphasis in all programs is on investigating the case thorou

interrogation, projecting an air of confi dence and fairness, and b

sort of rapport with the suspect. However, practice diverges from 

in two seminal respects: interrogator qualifi cations and, in the cas

and FLETC, the importance of confronting the suspect with the evid

him. 

Although the literature recommends that only highly skille

educated, and specialized individuals be chosen as interrogators, 

that, for the most part, interrogations are conducted by law enforcem

of widely divergent educations and experience levels. Our researc

no U.S. law enforcement agencies or departments that have a dedic

interrogators to use in their counterterrorism investigations. Interro

law enforcement agencies and departments are not required to have an

training or education beyond that required to fulfi ll the general req

their respective training courses. In some of the federal agencies, i

are conducted by whichever team of agents happens to be inve

case, regardless of experience or expertise. In police departments it 

interrogations are conducted by detectives, who are by defi nition more 
228

Both the FBI and FLETC teach trainees to present suspects directly w

the evidence linking them to the crime. The literature generally shies a

from such an approach. Although Reid’s Step 1 involves direct, confrontati

accusation, it does not appear to advocate the exhaustive presentation of evide

taught by the FBI and FLETC. However, law enforcement personnel repeat

observed that unless the authorities present the evidence in a comprehensive 

more sophisticated suspects will have no reason to confess. In an argument 

appears a logical extension of Reid, they noted that theme presentation is use

unless the suspects truly believe that they will be prosecuted and convicted. 

Boston Police Department’s experience with gang members seems to be sim

especially because detectives note the lack of guilt or remorse among susp

At the same time, the literature does suggest that with this type of more rati

(as opposed to emotional) suspect, a straightforward presentation is appropr

However, as opposed to the qualifi ed application of this technique advocate

the literature, FBI and FLETC training prescribes the presentation of evidenc

all suspects, regardless of their personality traits.

The reliance on presentation of evidence by law enforcement perso

points to an underlying factor in Reid and its variations that no one — ei

in the literature or among those conducting interrogations — seems to dis

directly: fear. Although the literature, the training, and the discussions with 

enforcement personnel heavily emphasize rapport-building as the main too

interrogators, it appears that without some underlying fear interrogations 

rarely succeed. It seems that, in practice, law enforcement personnel rely on 

of prosecution and conviction as the major motivator for a confession. Perhaps 

is not mentioned explicitly because it is such a basic assumption, but it is w

noting that rapport-building alone, at least in the opinion of many interroga

trainers, does not seem to convince suspects to confess unless they have s

underlying fear of the consequences of refusal to cooperate. 

Because of its importance both in the literature and in practice, rapport-buil

should be carefully examined for what it is and what it is not. Inexperien

trainees, and those who only read the classic texts, seem to understand rap

building as an attempt to establish what almost constitutes a friendship betw

interrogator and suspect. This view encourages chit-chat and small talk in esse

to build a relationship based on good will. The rapport-building encourage

experienced practitioners is more often based on respect for the interrogator 

on professionalism. Hence the Boston homicide investigators dress in suits 

shake hands with the suspects, and FBI instructors state that they try to be 

of the few decent people with whom the suspect has interacted in his lifetime

practice, attempts to build rapport based on friendship and good will are o

perceived as forced and false, and, thus, it is more useful simply to treat the sus

as an equal human being. Some texts note that many suspects will be immedia
229

Another important point of tension between literature and pract

concept of the purported goal of an interrogation. While the practi

counsels against entering an interrogation with the sole purpose o

confession — advice that is echoed by instructors during training 

the psychological studies related to interrogations focus on confess

confession-inducing factors. The individual interrogation technique

programs implicitly reinforce this focus by urging prolonged i

and psychological ploys meant to undo deception and obtain 

Although the literature occasionally refers to incriminating stateme

enforcement offi cers often referred to the value of obtaining a detaile

an interrogation, most attention focuses on obtaining a detailed conf

suspect to bolster the chances of a future conviction.

Currently, those law enforcement agencies and department

interrogation techniques train their offi cers and agents in tactics that h

proven successful through any empirical studies. Neither the FBI no

ever studied the effi cacy of its techniques in garnering confessions or 

statements. Generally the agencies use variations of the Reid T

subcontract the training to the Reid School or its spin-off, Wicklan

Although the Reid School claims an 80% confession rate for those 

techniques, no independent, empirical study has confi rmed those nu

the dearth of empirical evidence to support the agencies’ training an

it seems that reliance on them is based mostly on the reputation 

approach and on anecdotal evidence of its utility. Another explanat

the institutional inertia characteristic of most large government age

the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies. 

As noted, one reason why only anecdotal information exists on 

of the Reid Technique and its variations is because very little, if a

actual interrogations is conducted in the fi eld in the United States. 

in Section 11, unlike in Britain, most U.S. interrogations are still no

Even in the minority of jurisdictions that now mandate electron

most law enforcement agencies use audiotapes instead of videos. M

found no evidence that superiors systematically observe interrogatio

by offi cers and agents; instead, it appears that those personnel 

receive training in interrogation are then sent into the fi eld with littl

supervision, and learn the majority of their skills on the job and, if t

from more experienced offi cers or agents. Even the most formaliz

like those at the FBI and FLETC, do not follow up with their students 

the utility of the techniques taught or whether those techniques are a

used in the fi eld. There has not even been a comprehensive attem

evidence through surveys of, or self-reports by, the interrogators and

At the same time, it appears that those agencies and departm

Reid or its variations, such as the FBI and FLETC, are a step ah
230

because most offi cers will never conduct interrogations, and those who 

become detectives or other investigators are almost never required to rec

additional training in this area. Reid and other outside courses are someti

offered as options to those who want them, requiring the offi cers or agents to 

the initiative to pursue such training. Some individuals, such as Lieutenant Pi

take advantage of the opportunities. However, although we hypothesize 

anecdotal evidence suggests) that the majority of investigators do not partici

in such voluntary training, there has been no empirical study to determine 

actual percentage of senior offi cers who are trained in interrogation techniq

through such voluntary programs. Such training may be somewhat superfl u

however, as many senior law enforcement personnel develop and use many of 

techniques used in Reid and its variations on their own. Deputy Superinten

Coleman argues that Reid does not offer anything that people with brains, pe

skills, and some experience could not fi gure out on their own. He and ot

note that senior investigators may not be able to identify the various steps of 

interrogation but generally use the same approaches: thorough pre-interroga

investigation, rapport-building, and some sort of theme presentation. How

everyone seems to know an investigator who uses ineffective techniques (

trying to overwhelm the suspect with the evidence), which suggests that, tho

intuitive to some, these tactics do not necessarily fl ow from pure logic.

In sum, the few law enforcement agencies consulted for this project 

provide any training on interrogation at all do so through very general progr

Like the practical literature upon which they are based, the training programs 

to account for, or recommend adjustments in response to, the various confes

inducing factors identifi ed by available empirical research. The training tak

“one-size-fi ts-all” approach and fails to instruct interrogators on how, or whe

to adapt the techniques to differences in age, ethnicity, or culture of the sus

seriousness of the offense, or strength of the available evidence. Aside from 

dearth of nuance, there is no available evidence to evaluate whether the techniq

upon which training is based actually yield favorable results in practice. Non

the agencies we contacted had any idea of whether the training they offered 

in fact implemented by agents and, if it was, whether it worked. 

PART III: RECOMMENDATIONS AND 

IMPLICATIONS

FOR TERRORISM

Section 13. Recommendations for Future Research

Further theoretical and empirical independent study is needed in the follow

areas: 
231

through those techniques.

2. Whether law enforcement agents actually apply the interrog

they receive; 

3. Whether particularly effective techniques and systems for 

truthful information and confessions exist in other countrie

 - Compare U.S. interrogation data with data on 

techniques and results in Britain, Japan, Israel, and Au

4. Whether the effectiveness and applicability of interrogatio

employed by U.S. law enforcement agencies, and the theori

them, remain constant across cultures; and

5. Whether it would be feasible and effective to resort to a de

of specially trained interrogators as opposed, or in additio

all criminal investigators on interrogation. 

Such studies will be extremely diffi cult until U.S. law 

organizations begin to videotape all of the interrogations they conduc

availability of videotapes would allow for feedback and constructive 

superiors, thereby breaking bad habits before they take root. Similarly

would encourage supervisors at various agencies and departments t

regular observations of the interrogations conducted by their perso

offer feedback on their performance.634

Section 14. Implications for Investigation and 

Prevention of Terrorism

Interrogation will likely play a seminal role in the prevention and 

of terrorist threats and incidents. It would therefore be useful to eva

organizations dealing with terrorism can learn anything from current 

practices used by law enforcement agencies. In this context, this s

questions and issues to be pondered and evaluated by more exp

qualifi ed individuals. 

At the outset we note that, despite claiming the contrary, 

literature on interrogations and the related training provided by law 

agencies are generally geared toward obtaining a confession. In 

ordinary law enforcement investigations, which are predominantly 

preeminently concerned with obtaining a conviction, a preventi

investigation has the sole objective of preventing an attack, and is 

of intelligence collection and interrogation. Although the literature 

refers to incriminating statements, and law enforcement offi cers o

the value of obtaining a detailed lie through an interrogation, it is 

634 Additional study on the effects of videotaping on the interrogations being tape

useful.
232

to evaluate a given lie, or even to judge whether a suspect is lying at all during 

interrogation. Consequently, this potential difference in goals must underlie 

assessment of the value of law enforcement interrogation practices in preven

terrorism. Similarly, all current law enforcement techniques operate under 

assumption that confessions obtained must meet certain legal and evident

requirements. Some adjustment might be needed in purely preventive situat

or when legal requirements are inapplicable.

It is diffi cult to arrive at any fi xed conclusions about the applicability of 

enforcement interrogation techniques to the terrorism context because we 

not know whether they in fact are effective. As mentioned in Section 13, m

research is needed into the actual effectiveness of law enforcement interroga

techniques, since individual agencies keep no statistics on confessions or 

data on other measures of interrogation success. Even if the techniques pr

effective, we would still have to evaluate whether they would be equally effec

in the terrorism context in particular. Although law enforcement agents w

experience in both regular law enforcement and terrorism investigations h

noted that current techniques work well in both contexts, they also recog

that their effectiveness largely depends on having vast amounts of tim

devote to the investigation and interrogation. Thus, current law enforcem

interrogation techniques have little applicability to a ticking-bomb, or otherw

time-constrained, investigation scenario. Additionally, other aspects ende

to the terrorism phenomenon must be taken into account when evaluating 

relevance of law enforcement interrogation techniques to that arena. For exam

current interrogation techniques and training programs make no mention 

or consider adjustments for, the possibility that suspects have been traine

counter-interrogation techniques. Such training is common practice for terr

organizations and must be taken into account when fashioning interroga

techniques to be used with terrorism suspects.

Another feature that might make both the literature and law enforcem

techniques diffi cult to adopt in the terrorism prevention context is the conspicu

omission of any cultural adaptation. All psychological literature and interroga

techniques seem either to ignore the potential impact of culture on the outcom

an interrogation or to assume that it does not matter. Because the current terr

threat is so intricately tied to culture and religion, failing to study the im

of those factors on the effi cacy of interrogation techniques seems like a gla

oversight. Additionally, cultural awareness and adaptation would appear to 

central elements of the rapport-building upon which the current techniques rel

heavily. Though by no means an exhaustive list, areas for possible study inc

whether culture in fact is a statistically signifi cant predictor of the outcom

interrogations, and, if so, whether shame-based approaches to interrogation w

better among certain cultures than fear- or guilt-based approaches. To this 

it may be worth bringing together interrogation experts from around the w
233

Finally, a note on interrogator training and qualifi cations. A

literature and training agencies agree that not everyone can be 

interrogator, the prevailing approach in practice is to train everyone

to having a dedicated cadre of interrogators. Given the heterogene

the group of people who become law enforcement agents, the few 

offer any training do so at a basic and general level, catering to the low

denominator. A different approach — employing a group of highly 

specially trained interrogators in a counterterrorism squad and ent

with terrorism-related interrogations — would not be unprecedente

enforcement. Many police departments and federal law enforcem

have highly trained and dedicated personnel whose sole, or primary, r

is to act as hostage negotiators during a hostage crisis. Given the p

and behavioral complexity of interrogations in general, and the 

terrorism-related interrogations in particular, we think it prudent to 

possibility of adopting such a model and insist on better trained a

interrogators.

235

Critical Challenges in Developing a N

Educing Information Paradigm

Steven M. Kleinman, M.S.

February 2006

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do no

offi cial policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. 

Abstract

The art of educing information comprises both process and co

pending upon the circumstances, the former may unfold as inher

ple or incredibly complex (e.g., the interrogation of a cooperativ

source or of a source who is resistant and deceptive), while the l

be surprisingly easy or agonizingly diffi cult (e.g., an interrogati

cuses on the location of a terrorist training camp or one that inv

deconstruction of a complex international fi nancial network). G

broad spectrum of possibilities within just these two variables, th

permutations in outcome are essentially infi nite. As a result, id

the essential barriers to success can be an exceptionally vexing c

Introduction

All intelligence products must be based on data that h

been evaluated for technical error, misperception, and hos

efforts to deceive.635

A preliminary examination of the challenges inherent in dev

managing an effective program for educing information (EI) identifi 

array of barriers to success. However, systematic examination of the

educing information from uncooperative sources shows that they b

to three general categories:

1. Linguistic/Cultural Barriers to Success

2. Scientifi c/Technical/Subject Matter Barriers to Success

3. Interpersonal/Intrapersonal Barriers to Success

635 Captain William S. Brei, USAF, Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Lo

Joint Military Intelligence College Occasional Paper Number Two, Washington, DC, 
236

are the packets of information we use to transfer ideas, feelings, and fact

others. To borrow from the lexicon of information technology, “expression is 

push function of communications.” At the same time, words shape an individu

perceptions of the external world. In the pull mode of communications, 

serve as the data points upon which an internal map is generated. While th

maps appear very real — and very accurate — to an individual, as the produ

interpretation they may refl ect only a partially correct representation of a g

experience.

Just as an individual with a limited vocabulary might experience profo

challenges in expressing themselves and interpreting the rich world aro

them, a similar phenomenon often occurs in the context of an interrogation

intelligence offi cer constrained by the inability to effectively express (i.e., p

questions) and interpret (i.e., understand the source’s responses) is likely to 

ineffective in exploring the intelligence potential of a given source. This i

sum, the linguistic barrier to success. While reasonably simple in concept, it 

cast an insidious shadow across all EI activities. 

EI operations, by defi nition, are uniquely language intensive. It is thro

words that the interrogator explores a source’s knowledgeability and the natur

any resistance; it is through words that the source reveals scope of knowledg

well as the logic and methods of a resistance posture; and it is through words 

the interrogator seeks to persuade the source and elicit cooperation. Clearly, s

a complex and dynamic exchange cannot be effectively accomplished thro

a barrier of limited language skills. For the United States, which continue

struggle with a signifi cant shortfall in its foreign language capability, this ba

can be signifi cant. 

The U.S. Foreign Language Gap

The U.S. government has established a relatively straightforward m

of evaluating levels of foreign language profi ciency. The scale currently in 

ranges from a value of 1, termed “Elementary” (“suffi cient capability to sa

basic survival needs and minimum courtesy and travel requirements”) to a v

of 5, termed “Functionally Native” (“able to use the language at a functional l

equivalent to a highly articulate, well-educated native speaker”).636 It is impor

to note that this scale refl ects an exponential rather than an incremental incr

in profi ciency. U.S. government research has demonstrated, for example, th

Level 3 speaker could perform as much as four times more productively th

speaker at Level 2.637

636 Technically, the scale begins at “0” (“no measurable skill). 637 U.S. General Accounting Offi ce, Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Need

Correct Staffi ng and Profi ciency Shortfalls (Washington, DC: GPO, January 2002), 5. Cited here

as GAO, Foreign Languages.
237

bring the student to Level 2 on the profi ciency scale, termed “Limi

capability (“suffi cient capability to meet routine social demands an

requirements; can deal with concrete topics in past, present, and f

Given the exponential nature of this profi ciency scale, it should 

surprise that substantial training and fi eld experience are necessary f

to progress to higher levels of profi ciency.

To support EI operations adequately, a linguist-interrogator or 

must be able to function at Level 4 — “Advanced Professional” (“a

language fl uently and accurately on all levels normally pertinent to 

needs; has range of language skills necessary for persuasion, neg

counseling”).638 How quickly might U.S. foreign language training ce

a functional linguist of this quality? According to Dr. Richard Brech

the National Foreign Language Center, a student would require a

6,000 hours of study to reach Level 3 or 4 profi ciency in Arabic — 

relevant strategic language in the current war on terror.639

In recent years, the National Security Agency (NSA) chan

standing policy on the competence expected of its linguists. To fulfi 

operational responsibilities, linguists must attain a Level 3 or 4. As 

this is a signifi cant qualitative advance from the previously acceptabl

of Level 2. In a similar vein, the Central Intelligence Agency has expre

for interpreters to function at Level 4 (or higher), specifi cally to “un

intricacies of vernacular speech: colloquialisms, slang, and multiple 

Linguist-Interrogators vs. the Use of Interpreters

To overcome the linguistic barrier to success, an interrogato

possess near-native-level mastery of the source’s language or be 

interpreter with the requisite level of ability. While the former woul

most attractive option under ideal circumstances, it may not be po

real-world constraints. Identifying the best approach in this critical 

a major challenge in planning for the training of interrogators to 

strategic requirements. 

The set of countries, organizations, and personalities that 

substantial threats to U.S. national security interests is geographi

linguistically — diverse. Given the complexity involved in educing 

from uncooperative sources and the time-intensive nature of fore

training outlined above, the diffi culty of developing (through both 

638 GAO, Foreign Language, 5. 639 Richard Brecht, Ph.D., “The Language Crisis in the Wa

address to the Eisenhower Institute, Washington, DC, 24 October 

http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/democracy/homelandsecurity/Whit

accessed 15 November 2005. Cited hereafter as Brecht, 2002 Eisenhower Institute pr

640 Brecht, 2002 Eisenhower Institute presentation.
238

To make matters worse, the strategic-linguistic landscape changes consta

In 1991, for example, the focus of U.S. strategic interests shifted dramatically f

the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to the Middle East. Against this backd

the United States simultaneously faced challenges from narco-traffi c

(requiring primarily Spanish language resources), the rise of China as a regi

power (requiring Mandarin, Cantonese, and a host of lesser-known dialects), 

a continuation of the decades-long surveillance and containment of an ultima

nuclear-capable North Korea. This raises a critical question: Is it even poss

to train the number of operationally skilled and experienced, language-cap

interrogators needed to meet such an incredible breadth of threats? If not, w

role should interpreters play in helping to meet such a vexing challenge? 

advantages of language-qualifi ed interrogators over the use of interpreters in 

interrogation arena are undeniable. To reap these advantages, considerable e

must go into overcoming the disadvantages noted in the following box. 

Assessing the Net Value of Using Language-Qualifi ed 

Interrogators Rather Than Interpreters

Advantages

• More effective use of time

• Ability to recognize and understand nuance of language (including 

impact of nonverbal behaviors)

• Avoids need to hire foreign nationals, which introduces 

security concerns

• More capable of establishing rapport with a source

• Removes time delay inherent in interpretation that can signifi cantly 

impact the orchestration of specifi c approaches

• Interrogators have greater confi dence in their ability to properly 

orchestrate a given approach (that is, they are able to ensure attenti

to all components of verbal communication)

• Words, tonality/emphasis, and body language are consistent 

with the intended message
239

Disadvantages

• High cost of recruiting, training, and managing a large cad

interrogators (exacerbated by the uncertainties over what 

might be required to meet future operational requirements

• Native or near-native language capabilities — notoriously 

diffi cult to acquire —required to support current and 

anticipated national security interests 

• Frequent fi eld exercises (designed to mirror challenging, 

real-world operations) required to avoid loss of labile skil

In looking for models that could help inform U.S. EI policy in 

is diffi cult to fi nd another country that faces anywhere near the sa

diversifi ed, and always-changing linguistic capabilities challeng

example, while offering intriguing examples of best practices from an E

has consistently faced an enemy that, with the exception of Iran, s

South Korea, another country that has effectively and systematica

information from captured enemy personnel, continues to face an a

North Korea) with which it shares a native language. By way of c

when considering only the Global War on Terrorism (ignoring, for the 

possibility of a simultaneous major regional confl ict), the United Sta

a veritable Tower of Babel (see the list on the next page). It is imper

U.S. chart a course for resolving these imposing linguistic challenge
240

Central Asian Languages

 • Afghanistan

 −Dari, Pashto, Tajik, Uzbek

 • Uzbekistan

−Uzbek

 • Turkmenistan

−Turkmen

 • Pakistan

−Pashto, Urdu, Baluchi

 • India

−Hindi, Urdu, Punjabi

Southeast Asian Languages

 • Philippines

−Tagalog, Tausug, Cebuano, Illocano

 • Indonesia

−Indonesian/Javanese

 • Malaysia

−Malay

 Source: Clifford Porter, Asymmetrical Warfare, Transformation, and Foreign 

Language Capability (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, March 2002), 4-6. URL: 

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/porter.pdf. 

As the effort to create the next generation of EI professionals moves forw

decisionmakers must carefully address the following fundamental questions:

• Is it feasible to build a cadre of highly capable interrogators who als

command near-native fl uency in the required languages?

• How prepared are military and civilian government personnel system

to train an interrogator in operational methodology, and also in a 

language that has no immediate operational requirement?

• Is it possible to develop a recognized and suffi ciently compensated 

career fi eld for professional interpreters who have been specifi cally 

trained to support interrogation operations?

Clifford Porter, Command Historian at the Defense Language Institute, be

to address these questions as he examines options available for the U.S. mili

to acquire and employ foreign language capabilities. On the basis of his exten

experience in developing and managing Defense Department foreign langu
241

Military-Educated Linguists

Advantages: 

• Deployable U.S. military personnel

• Top Secret/Secret clearance

• Many are careerists or join other agencies after the military (e

NSA)

• After career, are available for service as contractors or in Res

Components

Disadvantages: 

• Lead time to educate new linguists to the requisite skill level

• Takes time to build experience and sustain capabilities

• Military personnel system does not adequately support the re

of skilled linguists (i.e., compensation, promotions, etc.)

Reserve Component Linguists

Advantages: 

• Deployable U.S. military personnel

• Top Secret/Secret clearance

• Many are careerists or join other agencies after the military (e

NSA)

Disadvantages:

• Lead time to plan and educate new linguists: 6 to 18 months

• Takes time to build experience and sustain capabilities

• Poorly supported by personnel system

• Insuffi cient time allotted to maintain/enhance language skills

641 Modifi ed from Porter, Asymmetrical Warfare, Transformation, and Fo

Capability, 12–14.
242

y

Advantages

• May have clearances

• Can be available on short notice for common languages

• Do not need to manage their careers

Disadvantages: Varying Quality

• Lack of quality translates into intelligence gaps

• Support affected by money, danger, etc. (may quit or strike)

• Without oversight, can be high cost and/or low quality

• Possible labor disputes: Berlitz strike in 1967 Vietnamese program

• Noncombatants and only some have clearances

• Not long-term solution for foreign language capability

Contractors – Native

Advantages: 

• Available for local languages and dialects

• Do not need to manage their careers

Disadvantages: 

• Lack of quality translates into intelligence gaps

• Often different political agenda and varying degrees of translation 

accuracy 

• Opportunity for enemy intelligence penetration

• Monopoly over information

• Can quit over money, danger, politics, etc.

• Noncombatants without clearances

• Not long-term solution for foreign language capability
243

Advantages:

• Available on short notice for local languages and dialects

• Shorter training pipeline

• Experience in language from birth

• Knowledge of culture

Disadvantages:

• Varying literacy levels in English and/or target language

• Lack of quality translates into intelligence gaps

• May not qualify for clearances

• Not enough volunteers of military age/fi tness literate in target 

 * Porter uses the term “heritage-speaker” to describe individuals w

foreign language skills were attained through having been born and 

abroad and/or growing up in a family where a language other than 

was spoken.

Translation Using Computer Technology

Advantages: 

• Powerful tool for educated and experienced linguists

• Powerful tool for experienced educators

• Powerful potential for sustaining linguists in the fi eld

Disadvantages: 

• Machine translation is inaccurate

• Programming is time consuming and costly 

• Programming fails with low-literacy languages (e.g., Pashtu 

or Baluchi)

• Easily fooled by code terminology

• Cannot teach, must be used by experienced educator

- Reliant on programming by experienced linguist

- Cannot replace humans

Porter also notes that the U.S. has never had suffi cient fore

capabilities to meet wartime requirements. He recommends cre
244

Culture + Language = Tools for Building Operational Accord

One of an interrogator’s primary objectives is to establish a leve

operational accord with a source. Operational accord can be defi ned a

relationship orchestrated by an interrogator with a source that is marked b

degree of conformity and/or affi nity and is based on a sense of understandin

and perhaps even guarded appreciation for, respective concerns, intentions, 

desired outcomes.643

While often diffi cult to identify within the complex and (at least initia

adversarial relationship between an interrogator and a source, success in gai

meaningful information of potential intelligence value is the product of an acc

the interrogator asks questions and the source provides constructive answ

Operational accord refl ects a calculated effort to gain and maintain the sour

cooperation long enough to satisfy existing intelligence requirements w

effectively concealing acts on the part of the interrogator that might appear to 

source as manipulative or exploitive.644

Establishing an accord of this nature can be extraordinarily diffi cult, w

the process made even more problematic by the linguistic/cultural barrier. 

interrogator who seeks to create an operational accord but who harbors cult

myopia faces a diffi cult path. Conversely, an interrogator whose efforts 

supplemented by what has recently been termed “cultural intelligence” 

conscientiously seek to build a bridge that systematically incorporates knowle

of the source’s culture. Perhaps the interrogator’s version of the Golden R

might best be expressed as “Do unto others as they would have you do u

them.”

In many respects, the Global War on Terror contains seeds of Huntingt

“Clash of Civilizations.”645 Fortunately, the legacy of 20th-century confl ict prov

some powerful illustrations of U.S. forces demonstrating a positive, proac

approach to turning former enemies into allies. During World War II, the Un

642 Porter, Asymmetrical Warfare, Transformation, and Foreign Language 

Capability, 15. 643 Jerry Richardson, The Magic of Rapport (Capitola, CA: Meta Publications, 1987), 13. 644 The term “rapport” has been commonly used to describe an approach that employs cu

linguistic, and interpersonal skills to establish a non-adversarial, productive relationship bet

interrogator and source. The term “operational accord” also incorporates such an approach while 

encompassing a broader array of productive, intelligence-generating relationships. Further, “rap

in the context of interrogation, has been so widely misused and misunderstood in recent years th

value as a relevant descriptive term is questionable. 645 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 

York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” theory in international rela

posits that the primary sources of confl ict today are fundamental differences in culture, exacerbat

the processes of globalization that bring major civilizations into unprecedented contact. Huntin

divides the world’s cultures into seven civilizations: Western, Latin American, Confucian, Japa

Islamic, Hindu, and Slavic-Orthodox.
245

Imperial Japan was an entirely different story. Few U.S. citizens 

had traveled to Japan or possessed even a superfi cial understandi

dramatically different culture. Similarly, other than a small numb

missionaries, businessmen, and fi rst-generation Japanese immigrants 

people perceived the Japanese language as essentially impenetrabl

the challenge in 1941 was not unlike that facing America in the ear

new century, where an understanding of Islamic culture and the Ara

is as rare as understanding of Japan’s in the 1940s. Cultural-linguist

success were skillfully surmounted through education, innovative thi

effi cient exploitation of an overlooked (and widely shunned) resour

or second-generation Japanese Americans.646 Cultural intelligence (

referred to as such at the time) proved a critical factor, a point U

eloquently illustrated in The Anguish of Surrender:

In the fi rst years of [World War II], American interrogators fo

that some [Japanese] POWs remained entirely uncoopera

sullen, and arrogant, but that even they often came aroun

talking more freely when the interrogators had enough tim

spend with them. Almost invariably, POWs reacted favor

to the good medical treatment and ample food they rece

Americans realized that interrogating an enemy with such to

different cultural background had to be learned through 

and error. Preconceptions had to be abandoned along the 

for new ideas that showed greater promise.647 (Italics added

Cultural Context: Knowing the Enemy

Sun Tzu is perhaps best known for his aphorism on preparing fo

you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result 

battles.”648 Too often, it seems, such timeless concepts are forgotten u

the breach...and the cost can be staggering. As revelations of th

had transpired at Abu Ghraib reached the public, many U.S. citize

grasp the Arab world’s seemingly disproportionate emotional resp

actions — especially the mistreatment of prisoners in a manner that c

overtones. Cultural values and traditions play no small role in det

646 In February 1942, pursuant to President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 900

citizens of Japanese ancestry were moved to internment camps for the duration of 

small number of the thousands of Nisei volunteers for military service during the w

for acceptance into the demanding U.S. Army and U.S. Navy language programs. 

subsequently assigned intelligence duties involving translation and interpretation, in

to interrogation operations within the United States and at deployed locations 

Pacifi c Theater. 

647 Ulrich Straus, The Anguish of Surrender: Japanese POWs of World War 

University of Washington Press, 2003), 131-32. 648 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (New York: Delacorte Press, 1983), ed. James Clavel
246

Friedman:

Sexual humiliation of Arabs as a means of extracting information 

had been practiced before — by the Ottoman Turks. As some 

societies treat women who are raped, Arab society holds the 

victim of sexual torture responsible for their fate. So taking 

pictures of sexual humiliation was a perfect tool of blackmail. 

Like a woman in nineteenth-century Sicily who had been raped, 

the revelation of sexual abuse could be worse than the abuse 

itself. No fi ngernails were pulled, but the spirit was broken. It 

was an effective means of non-physical torture.649

Whether the interrogator’s objective is to establish operational acc

psychologically intimidate, emotionally provoke, or infer guilt, the attempt 

fail if it is not orchestrated in a manner that is culturally meaningful to the targ

these efforts. One cannot “know the enemy” without understanding his cultu

Breaking The Cultural Barrier — Shaping “Logical” Appeals to the 

Source’s Belief Structure

In this heading the word “logical” is enclosed in quotation marks to denot

unique application in the context of interrogation: specifi cally, its use to conv

a reluctant source of the merits of an interrogator’s appeal. The logic used by 

interrogator is not constrained by convention; rather, its purpose is to presen

apparently logical explanation — or rationalization — for the source to capitu

An (admittedly simple) example would be as follows:

Interrogator: You have told me before — several times — that 

you believe in God. And we both agree that God would condemn 

acts that result in the deaths of innocent people, especially 

women and children. If you truly believe in God as you have 

said, then it is imperative that you tell me about Al Qaeda’s next 

target so that you and I, two believers in God, can work together 

to prevent the tragic deaths of so many innocent people.

Resistance instructors refer to such an approach as “circular logic” 

caution against underestimating the persuasive potential of this tactic. Emplo

this ruse in the context of interrogating a follower of Islam, however, can 

problematic if not informed by the necessary cultural intelligence. Given 

important differences in beliefs about the role of God in matters both prosaic 

profound, interrogators unfamiliar with Islam must be cautious in the use 

circular logic approach that incorporates analogous examples of, for example, r

and wrong, to persuade a source to provide information (e.g., on an impen

649 George Friedman, America’s Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Bet

America and Its Enemies (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 327-8.
247

the source, the source may perceive the potential outcome of the ev

inshallah... in the hands of God.

Scientific/Technical Barriers

The rationale behind the preemptive invasion of Iraq cent

country’s suspected research and development programs involving 

mass destruction (WMD). The actual use of nuclear, biological, a

materials — from weaponizing the unstable substances to the desig

delivery systems — involves exceptionally sophisticated activities

educing relevant information from sources with the scientifi c a

expertise to support such programs requires an equally sophisticated 

combination of applicable technical knowledge on the part of the inte

the requisite technical vocabulary (in both English and the target lan

part of the interrogator and/or the interpreter. 

Centers of Gravity in the Global War on Terrorism

As we approach the challenge of collecting technical intelligen

take into account that the nature of the information sought about 

is as varied as the adversaries themselves. However, several cons

within this fog of war. One of these constants is the need to correctly 

understand the enemy’s center(s) of gravity. This was a fundamenta

strategy espoused by Carl von Clausewitz, who defi ned a center of g

hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.”650

For the purposes of this paper, it is important to note that cent

in contemporary warfare often relate to technology. Therefore, interr

approach the task of educing information with suffi cient technical c

fully explore and exploit a given source’s knowledgeability.

To use the current war on terror as an example, terrorism’s cent

include the ability to communicate, move, transport items, secure 

obtain fi nancial support, and develop expertise in weapons an

Examining just two of these — communications and fi nancing — 

the importance of this subset of technical barriers to success.

The information revolution, which has spawned an unprece

of options for communicating across town and across the globe, 

double-edged sword in prosecuting the Global War on Terror. Wir

networks, the Internet, and advanced encryption systems have m

worldwide, real-time intelligence gathering and support to militar

At the same time, the use of this technology — including cellula

650 Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classic Strategic Thought (London: Frank 

54.
248

relies ever more heavily upon the ability to communicate effectively and cove

whether that communication involves tactical direction within an operational 

or a call to action delivered across the globe, it becomes critical for an interrog

to possess the requisite technical expertise to effectively exploit a detain

knowledge in this vital area.

In a similar fashion, fi nancing terrorism involves far more than sim

securing money for weapons and recruits. As terrorist attacks become m

complex (consider 11 September), the costs involved become substantial.653 

ability to move large sums of money through a global system — which is 

more open to scrutiny by law enforcement and intelligence agencies after dec

of money laundering by international organized crime — poses challenge

the terrorist. Because terrorist organizations use both cutting-edge techno

and ancient means of fi nancing (e.g., Hawala, the underground, trust-b

banking system that facilitates the movement of money without a trailing re

of transactions), it is exceedingly diffi cult to identify the funding that supp

terrorism against the complex background of global fi nance. An interrogator 

lacks an understanding of how money moves across international bounda

how currencies are transformed into digital equivalents, the nature of nati

and international reporting requirements, constantly evolving money launde

schemes, and the system of Hawala, will have little ability to leverage the poten

intelligence value of a well-placed, knowledgeable source.

As challenging as these examples might be, greater challenges lie in poss

future confl ict scenarios involving near-peer competitors (e.g., China). 

technical intelligence requirements for such a confl ict would be far more com

— and far more critical to the war effort — than in any previous conventi

confl ict. With this in mind, the need to prepare for and overcome the techn

barriers to educing information becomes self-evident. 

The Challenge of Technical Support to Interrogation

Technical barriers involve far more than the nature of the intellige

gathered: of equal importance is the role of technology in how intelligenc

651 The Subscriber Identity Module contains a small microprocessor that stores information 

the phone, including the telephone number, and identifi es that phone to a given network (i.e., net

permissions). Pre-paid SIM cards may be inserted into a phone and used on a one-time or limited 

which, along with encryption technology, makes it diffi cult to trace a call to an individual. 652 Steganography involves the insertion of a hidden message within an image or text. Alth

a centuries-old practice, the advent of digital communications has presented enormous potenti

employing steganography to support covert communications. 653 The 9/11 Commission Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U

States notes that Al Qaeda operatives spent between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduc

attacks. Questions about the source of sizable short-trade actions targeting U.S. airline compan

the days before September 11 remain unanswered. There has been speculation that Al Qaeda-re

entities employed this strategy to exploit the fi nancial windfall that was almost certain to occur 

the hijackings, thereby funding the training and logistic support required to enable the attack. 
249

developing, and fi elding technologies in support of interrogation op

In this context, the search for certainty through technology h

to place unwarranted reliance on the accuracy of the polygraph

enforcement agencies and intelligence services around the world rout

the polygraph,654 it is certainly not the panacea some might suggest

and culture-driven factors continue to present signifi cant challenges. 

will the person who views lying to the enemy as an acceptable, even 

provide the same physiological cues that the polygraph examiner m

read as deception? 

While additional research into this and other technical means 

deception (e.g., voice stress analysis) should continue, other potentia

of technology also merit further examination. Audio monitoring 

throughout the course of their detention became de rigueur durin

II. Both the U.S. strategic interrogation program (MIS-Y) at Fort H

the British MI-5 interrogation program at Latchmere House (Cam

heavily upon extensive recording of conversations among prisoners. 

of conversations with cellmates, even highly disciplined German ge

and Abwehr intelligence operatives routinely disclosed informati

had carefully withheld from their interrogator. Twenty-fi rst centu

technology could facilitate an unprecedented level of surreptitiou

video monitoring of detainees on a 24/7 basis.

The monitoring (and recording) of interrogations constitutes a b

role for technology. The potential value of such recordings is consid

• They relieve the interrogator of the burden of note-takin

also undermine efforts to elicit cooperation from a source b

constant reminder of the true nature of the exchange).

• They offer the opportunity to systematically observe 

psychophysical cues relating to deception.

• They provide the most accurate and comprehensive means 

any and all information of intelligence value presented by t

• They can be an invaluable tool for preventing abusive co

part of interrogators as well as in investigating allegation

mistreatment.

• They can offer an unparalleled vehicle for developing the s

of new interrogators. 

Despite the advent of behavioral science consultation team

interrogation has unnecessarily remained an individual pursuit. 

654 Committee to Review the Scientifi c Evidence on the Polygraph, National Rese

The Polygraph and Lie Detection (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 
250

interrogator to obtain unprecedented real-time information from member

the support team without physically leaving the interrogation room. Behavi

technical, cultural, and linguistic data and clarifi cations — provided in a man

and at a pace tailored to the unique information needs and individual proces

capabilities of the interrogator — could signifi cantly enhance the interrogat

ability to systematically explore a source’s full scope of knowledgeability w

reducing the potential for disrupting a productive line of inquiry that even a s

break might cause.

Other promising areas of technical support for educing information are fa

recognition software (a potentially powerful screening tool) and video record

that can be analyzed for microexpressions (psychophysical cues that may o

so rapidly that they are routinely missed by casual observation).655 Blood t

that precisely identify the geographic origins of the food recently consume

a source could help to corroborate or disprove a source’s statements regar

recent travel or claimed whereabouts. 

Unlocking the considerable potential of EI operations in the context of fu

confl icts requires a thoughtful reassessment of the role science and technology 

play in this effort. A reasonable fi rst step would be to form a team of specia

drawn from the fi elds of interrogation operations, scientifi c and techn

intelligence analysis, HUMINT technical support teams, and communication

identify a judicious way ahead. 

Interpersonal/Intrapersonal Barriers656

Know how to analyze a man. The alertness of the examiner 

is matched against the reserve of the examined. But great 

judgment is called for, to take the measure of another. It is far 

more important to know the composition, and the properties of 

men, than those of herbs and stones. This is the most delicate 

of the occupations in life: for the metals are known by their 

ring, and men by what they speak; words show forth the mind 

of man; yet more, his works. To this end the greatest caution is 

necessary, the clearest observation, the subtlest understanding, 

and the most critical judgment.657

655 See, for example, Paul Ekman, Telling Lies (New York: W.W. Norton and Co.: 1992). 656 The interpersonal/intrapersonal barrier to success suggests obvious areas of further explor

from a behavioral science perspective; however, these will be addressed here only peripherally. A 

in-depth examination of those factors—with recommendations for specifi c areas of inquiry—w

left to the cadre of credentialed behavioral scientists involved in this EI study. Instead, the a

drawing upon his professional, operational, and academic background, limits his comments t

equally vital areas of strategy and tradecraft. 657 Balthasar Gracian, The Art of Worldly Wisdom: A Collection of Aphorisms (Boston, 

Shambala Publications, 1993), 250.
251

and intelligence report writing, the process of interrogation can b

distilled to its underlying dynamic: a controlled exchange of inform

an interpersonal and an intrapersonal level. In the context of an 

each side possesses information of interest to the other, and that inf

be strategically disclosed at a time and a pace designed specifi cally t

achievement of intended outcomes.

For the interrogator, the intended outcome is primarily th

collection of timely, accurate, and comprehensive intelligence info

the source, however, the intended outcome may vary dramatically f

to detainee. While one source may seek exclusively to stymie the col

useful information by the adversary (i.e., the interrogator) as part o

fi ght for “the cause,” another may ultimately wish to provide in

return for specifi c actions/rewards/treatment (e.g., promise of expe

help in overthrowing a tyrant, better treatment for himself and/or h

etc.). The source’s intended outcome will, in large measure, determ

at which information is offered as well as both the quality and qu

information.658

During this dynamic exchange, each side also manages a s

information comprising data that can be divided into three primar

what is known, what is believed to be true (suspected), and what 

guessed. The interrogation itself involves a carefully controlled 

statements of fact and statements of supposition, liberally interspe

array of bluffs, feints, and ploys. This “move/counter-move” activ

likened to the game of chess. A more accurate analogy, however, 

ancient Chinese game of Go, where the number of possible combinat

positions is estimated to be approximately 10 to the 750th power

interrogations — like Go — feature an assortment of recurring s

through experience, can be quickly recognized and effectively addre

Systems Approach

To engage successfully in this exchange of information, an inter

possess a well-developed “talent” (whether it be an innate attribute

of operational training, or some combination of the two) for systems 

658 A behavioral/cognitive approach to the interpersonal/intrapersonal barrier wo

critical and potentially revealing questions with respect to this “controlled exchange 

Such an inquiry might explore both the interrogator’s mental construct and emotion

he or she approaches the interrogation as well as examine how these states might be 

interaction and/or over time as the operational relationship unfolds. A similar analy

source might yield important insights. 659 An important advantage that falls to the interrogator is the product of exper

interrogator may participate in — and be able to learn from — literally hundreds of in

source will have little personal experience to draw from, and none at all during the ini

session.
252

Fundamental training in interrogation views the process as a series of disc

events (e.g., approaches, questioning, termination, and bridging). Syst

thinking, by contrast, requires the interrogator to adopt a perceptual framew

that goes beyond a focus on discrete events to one that can rapidly identify patt

and the confl uence of events that generate those patterns. This approach ena

the interrogator to skillfully engage the patterns of action and reaction in w

that will “enhance or improve the situation without creating new and diffe

problems elsewhere.”661 While the systems approach provides a uniquely hel

framework for managing complex interactions, its ultimate value rests in 

ability to help propel events toward a specifi c outcome.

Whether or not the participants pay conscious attention662 to the underl

dynamic, each word and every action brings with it a cascade of possible alter

scenarios. Extrapolating from studies of the application of complexity th

to intelligence analysis, it can be said that within the context of interroga

“[i]ndividual agents within the network are constantly reassessing their n

preferences and the degree to which they will compromise to bond with o

agents.”663 The degree of compromise in this vein may include, among m

others, acquiescence, understanding, withdrawal, defi ance, or cooperation.

The Overriding Objective

Educing information from a source and negotiating the terms of agreem

between two countries are arguably the micro- and macro-manifestations of 

same interpersonal dynamic. Despite potentially dramatic differences in the sc

of interests, the number of participants involved, and the gravity of the outc

many of the fundamental principles involved apply in either context. Th

especially true with respect to the importance of intended outcomes. Profe

Roger Fisher, founder of the Harvard Negotiation Project, offers a powe

insight into this important factor, observing, “[t]ime and again, those invo

in an international confl ict — or in any confl ict — fail to convert their goal 

a decision they would like an adversary to make. Although we often thin

ourselves as attempting to infl uence an adversary, we rarely think out just w

kind of decision our side might reasonably expect of the other.”664

660 Joseph O’Connor and Ian McDermott, The Art of Systems Thinking (London: Tho

1997). x. 661 O’Connor and McDermott, The Art of Systems Thinking, x. 662 Understanding — and preparing for — the intrinsic rules of engagement in this dynamic cr

a window of opportunity for the interrogator to enhance the probability of achieving his or her 

intended outcome rather than that of the source. This should be included as a fundamental objecti

third generation interrogator training. 663 Michael F. Beech, Lt Col, USA, Observing Al Qaeda through the Lens of Complexity Th

Recommendations for the National Strategy to Defeat Terrorism, Strategy Research Paper (Ca

Barracks: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, July 2004), 5. 664 Roger Fisher, Beyond Machiavelli (New York: Penguin Books USA, Inc, 1994), 95.
253

planning and execution of educing strategies will revolve.

Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that the problems encou

course of interrogations conducted at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib

Air Base have, at least in part, resulted from efforts to educe infor

resistant sources in the absence of an operationally relevant, cle

strategic outcome to effectively drive the process. Several factors ha

contributed to the systemic failure to establish such important guidepo

planning, shortfalls in technical, operational, cultural or linguistic k

even frustration resulting from the high-pressure demands of comba

A well-designed intended outcome would enable the interroga

thoughtful approach plan. In the context of interrogation, the inten

performs two vital functions:

• It should provide the interrogator with suffi cient focus to e

make rational decisions when presented with unexpecte

and

• It should ensure the approach plan and subsequent executio

will have — and maintain — internal consistency.

In an exhaustive study of the radical yet highly successful Blitzk

employed by the German Army during World War II, Colonel John 

Air Force fi ghter pilot and strategist, identifi ed the concept of Sch

one of the key enabling principles. Schwerpunkt can be described 

that provides “focus and direction to the operation.”665 The profoun

of this principle is illustrated by its central role in the famed Toyot

System, cited by many as arguably the most effi cient automotive m

system in the world. For Toyota, Schwerpunkt can be defi ned as “s

time it takes to convert customer orders into vehicle deliveries.” 

precisely defi ned point of focus, every member of the production t

top manager to the worker on the assembly line — is armed with 

unambiguous standard upon which to base his or her actions.666

Focus — Schwerpunkt — for educing information would si

the development of interrogation approaches, their implementatio

importantly, the decision-making of each interrogator working in 

high-pressure, sometimes chaotic operational environment. This 

empower the individual interrogator not only to glean intelligence 

from a knowledgeable source more effectively, but also to do so 

consistent with legal, moral, and operational guidelines. In searchin

a Schwerpunkt for the U.S. approach to educing information, it migh

665 Chet Richards, Certain to Win (Philadelphia, PA: Xlibris Publishing, 2004), 5

666 Richards, Certain to Win, 124. 
254

The second consideration, internal consistency, refers to an interroga

approach plan and questioning methodology that progress logically towa

pre-defi ned objective. Each action builds upon the last and sets the stage for 

next. By contrast, an interrogation in which themes and/or participants consta

change in a scramble to identify a productive approach would refl ect a lac

internal consistency. Internal consistency suggests far more than a begin

and an end state (although these are important factors): it requires an exquis

detailed, yet highly accommodating, map of the course to follow between th

two points. Admittedly, the complexity of any interaction between two individ

makes it unlikely that every nuance, challenge, or turn of events can be realistic

anticipated. Nonetheless, an exhaustive planning effort will (1) enable 

interrogator (or, better, interrogation team) to gain some measure of knowle

expertise in the areas that are likely to surface, (2) lead to the development o

overarching strategy (as well as tactics to deal with an array of possible tang

or diversions), and (3) make it possible to devise an acceptable alternative sh

intractable defi ance be encountered.668

One fi nal note is warranted with respect to “focus.” For the interrog

effective focus implies not only a disciplined centering on the goals and object

of the interrogation effort, but also a simultaneous awareness and considera

of the source’s goals and objectives. Too often, interrogators intensely 

aggressively pursue their operational agenda without suffi ciently acknowled

that the source, too, has an agenda. In essence, the interpersonal barrier challen

the interrogator to skillfully assume multiple roles in the perceptual posi

paradigm that comprises fi rst, second, and third positions:

First Position – From the fi rst position, the interrogator views 

the exchange from his or her point of view. This is a common 

perceptual perspective and the one naturally assumed by most 

individuals.

Second Position – Assuming the second position involves 

an effort to view the exchange from the source’s point of 

view. This involves not only a consideration of the source’s 

feelings, desires, fears, hopes, etc., but also — and of equal 

importance — how the source might view the interrogator’s 

approach (i.e., as compelling, helpful, threatening, etc.). From 

667 United Kingdom Public Record Offi ce, Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies (Richmond

Public Record Offi ce, 2000), 109. Truth in the shortest possible time” was the objective establishe

the World War II MI-5 interrogation program known as Camp 020, which targeted suspected Ab

(German intelligence) spies. This Schwerpunkt was based on the operational consideration that “

information in time is worth an encyclopedia out of date.” 668 In negotiation theory, this is referred to as a Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agree

(BATNA). 
255

Third Position – In assuming the third position, the interrog

seeks to become an independent observer of the excha

From this perspective, the interrogator is able to assess s

important concerns as proxemics,669 similarities and differe

in body language, and leveraging the physical setting in sup

of the interrogation’s objectives.670 The third position 

also be of exceptional value in the effort to objectively ga

progress toward an intended outcome. Finally, adopting 

perceptual framework can be a benefi cial strategy for crea

the sense of emotional distance necessary when tempers 

and the exchange becomes personal. In negotiation theory, 

is known as “going to the balcony.”671

Incorporating the concept of perceptual positions into the 

strategy requires the interrogator to think — and act — on several 

time. Disregarding the source’s interests can lead to unexpected an

inexplicable areas of disagreement and even outright defi ance

regularly shifting among the three perceptual positions can enable th

to maintain a progressive, adaptable, proactive approach plan, one 

the overarching focus and enhanced by internal consistency. Fish

advocate the value of such a paradigm from his observations of 

negotiations:

After sketching out how the choice appears to the other side 

then creating an action plan to improve the situation, we nee

focus next on how our action plan might become reality...

fail to translate our plan into an action that someone could 

tomorrow. It is time to turn a general idea into a questio

be presented to the other side. What are some of the spe

decisions that we might want and might reasonably expe

decision-nmaker on the other side to make. Instead of sim

confronting them with a problem, we should identify on

more specifi c actions that we would like them to take to 

with that problem.672

669 The study of the cultural, behavioral, and sociological aspects of spatial di

individuals. 670 The intrepid interrogator is mindful of the impact of the physical setting on th

set of the source (i.e., does the location, confi guration, temperature, furnishings, and 

support or detract from the chosen theme). 671 See William Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating Your Way from Confrontation 

(New York: Bantam Books, 1993). 672 Fisher, Beyond Machiavelli, 95–96.
256

pgy y y (

presentation) into the real world, where they invariably encountered a ubiqui

and implacable foe: chaos. This chaos — also known by the Clausewitzian te

“fog of war” and “friction” — is unavoidable and, in many cases, unpredict

Incisive strategy, however, can ameliorate and even overcome fog and frictio

Chaos and ambiguity are the handmaidens of confl ict. These two forces ap

to remain omnipresent across the entire spectrum of confl ict, from mane

warfare on the battlefi eld to negotiations between multinational corporat

Rather than wish them away — or, worse yet, pretend to ignore their existe

— the prudent strategist anticipates and, where possible, seeks to employ t

as an advantage over a less agile adversary. Such an approach is as valid in 

interrogation room as it is in other fi elds of battle.

The interpersonal/intrapersonal barrier to success introduces unique form

chaos and ambiguity that an interrogator who wants to educe information fro

reluctant source must recognize, understand, and address. The following are b

few examples of the intractable factors that can generate chaos and ambiguit

the course of an extended interrogation process:673

• The inherent complexity of personalities

• The role of changing, incompatible expectations

• The infl uence of life experience

• Tactics and strategies of formal resistance training

• Rapidly changing operating environment

• Rapidly changing intelligence requirements

• Introducing new and/or additional sources into the process

• Removing sources from the process. 

A judicious assumption in this context is that the individual (interrogato

source) who demonstrates greater skill and adaptability in consistently respon

to chaos and ambiguity, in an environment often characterized by a smog of dat

will ultimately prevail. If this is true, an overarching strategy for successf

navigating the confl ict is essential. Fortunately, such a strategy exists...and 

easily be tailored for application to the context of interrogation.

673 Given the nature of chaos and ambiguity it would be practically impossible to establ

truly comprehensive list of such factors. Also, the examples above were limited to those releva

the Interpersonal/Intrapersonal Barrier to Success. The Linguistic/Cultural and Scientifi c/Tech

Barriers to Success generate a host of additional factors that can similarly create chaos and ambi

674 Similar to Clausewitz’s fog of war, the smog of data represents the friction and sensory ove

encountered by decisionmakers at all levels as they encounter the unprecedented volume of intellig

information generated by the modern U.S. Intelligence Community. 
257

py, gy g 

rests on understanding how to employ ambiguity to one’s advantag

viewing it as something to be rigidly avoided. In Certain to Win, C

captures the true meaning of ambiguity in a manner that has direct a

educing information from resistant sources:

Ambiguity is a terrible thing, much more effective as a stra

than deception, with which it is often confused. Deceptio

correctly described as a tactic: If you are deceived, you wi

surprised when you discover the truth, and it is possible 

you will be led to do some things, perhaps even fatal things, 

you would not have done if you had realized the truth earlie

can be an extremely effective tactic, even though your abilit

function as a thinking human being is not at risk. This is exa

what you can attack and destroy using ambiguity. There i

confl ict, however, between ambiguity and deception, since 

fi rst provides the environment for the second. If something v

such as life is at stake, losing track of a deadly threat in the 

of ambiguity can quickly lead to confusion, panic, and te

which in turn will cause the decision-making of the less a

party to break down.675

Strategy, by defi nition, involves the effective marshalling 

resources in a manner that will achieve a purposeful outcome. The 

of strategy routinely involves the application and reapplication of re

each subsequent application being at levels equal to, greater than

the original) in response to changes in the operating environment 

battlefi eld, marketplace, or interrogation room. Ultimately this con

of action/reaction will end when a pre-determined end-state has b

Boyd, the fi ghter pilot-turned master strategist, brilliantly captured 

of strategy as a:

mental tapestry of changing intentions for harmonizing and 

focusing our efforts as a basis for realizing some aim or 

purpose in an unfolding and often unforeseen world of man

bewildering events and many contending interests.676

Current interrogation training falls painfully short in this respe

the freeform methods necessary to meet the changing nature of the ch

sources from different cultures, varying language requirements, rap

intelligence requirements, shifting alliances and adversaries, etc.), 

fi eld experience too often encourages (and rewards) a rigid adheren

Current and emerging EI requirements can be met only with an 

675 Richards, Certain to Win, 67. 676 Richards, 84.
258

fast transients”).

The ability to learn and adapt requires the interrogator to possess two cri

qualities. These should permeate the methods employed and inform the deci

making cycle. The fi rst is sensory acuity. This implies having suffi cient situati

and interpersonal awareness to recognize, understand, and make contextual se

of what is occurring. More specifi cally, it is the ability to make rapid — 

accurate — assessments of cause and effect. This might take the form of noti

a rise in the intensity of stress-induced grooming behaviors when the sourc

asked questions about certain topics (e.g., the location of a training base ab

which the source claims to have no knowledge) and an absence of those s

behaviors when he/she is asked questions about other matters. The second cri

quality is fl exibility. Flexibility — in behavior, in strategy, in choice of phys

setting — ultimately means an ability to change what one is doing. The succes

interrogator can quickly and purposefully change an approach plan to fi t 

source rather than the other way around (which, curiously, is a more comm

phenomenon than one might expect). Flexibility is the interrogator’s key all

the struggle against chaos and ambiguity. 

 Competitive Decision-Making: Applying Boyd’s OODA Loop to 

Educing Information

Reduced to its essential nature, an interrogation can be defi ned a

competition between two decision-making cycles. Within this context, elem

such as adaptability, speed, sensory acuity and fl exibility are critical factors, w

success accruing to the party that possesses and employs them more effecti

The strategy of Observe—Orient—Decide—Act (the OODA Loop) origin

by Colonel Boyd exquisitely captures these elements and provides a un

framework for their systematic, outcome-oriented orchestration. The un

nature of this dynamic is concisely described as follows:677

Knowledge of the strategic environment is the fi rst priority. 

Secondly, one must be able to interact with the environment 

and those within it appropriately. You must be able to observe 

and orient yourself in such a way that you can indeed survive 

and prosper by shaping the environment where possible to your 

own ends, by adapting to it where you must. Doing so requires 

a complex set of relationships that involve both isolation and 

interaction. Knowing when each is appropriate is critical to 

your success. In OODA Loop fashion, one must continually 

observe, orient, decide and act in order to achieve and maintain 

677 In the context of Boyd’s decision-making cycle, “knowledge of the strategic environment

be used interchangeably with “sensory acuity,” while “the ability to interact with the environmen

those within it appropriately” essentially implies the same meaning as “fl exibility.” 
259

of “Boyd’s Way.” Rapidity of action or reaction is require

maintain or regain initiative. Variety is required so one is 

predictable, so there is no pattern recognition for a foe to a

him to know of your actions in advance and thus plan to de

them. Harmony is the fi t with the environment and ot

operating in it. Initiative – taking charge of your own desti

is required if one is to master circumstances rather than 

mastered by them. All of course, would be focused on attai

the specifi ed objective that is implicit in this discussion.678

The specifi ed objective noted in this passage is a key to the foc

previously. Focus rests upon several, mutually supportive objecti

together, inform the OODA cycle. One fundamental objective, or 

of the OODA strategy would have consistent and adaptable applic

EI process regardless of the circumstances (i.e., source, setting

requirements, etc.), and that is: Diminish the adversary’s capacity for 

action, or deny him the opportunity to survive on his own terms.679

The OODA Loop and Educing Information

In considering how to apply the OODA Loop strateg

graphically below) to the challenge of educing information from an 

source, the logical fi rst step is to examine each phase of the o

individually.

678 Grant T. Hammond, “The Essential Boyd,” Web-Only Essay, 

http://www.belisarius.com/modern_business_strategy/hammond/essential_boyd.htm, 

15 January 2006. 679 In the context of educing information, the term “survival” refers to the ability 

— interrogator or source — to achieve his or her specifi ed outcomes. For the interrog

mean the collection of accurate, timely, and comprehensive information. For the so

mean effective resistance or negotiating an attractive trade of information for a desir

release, better conditions, etc.). 
260

The OODA Loop. Source: Defense and the National Interest, U

http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/bazin_ooda.pdf, accessed 16 November 2006.

Observation: Observation involves gathering information via the sen

Although made possible by the physiological mechanisms of sight, sound, to

taste, and smell, effective observation is informed by experience, training, 

even intuition. Astute observation is a product of acute situational awaren

An experienced interrogator, by virtue of possessing the so-called “trained e

might note a subtle gesture that a less experienced observer might miss. Bo

research suggests that observations are both informed and infl uenced by imp

guidance and control; unfolding circumstances; outside information; and unfol

interaction with the environment. In a similar vein, observation systematic

collects and organizes tonality, word choice, gestures, analogies, metaphors, 

myriad other “observables” in a manner that enables the interrogator to m

effectively to the next phase.

Example of Observation: The source readily answers non-pertinent 

questions, seems to interact without hesitation with both the interrogator 

and the interpreter, and appears to be cooperative. However, when 

pertinent questions are posed about the location of weapons caches, 

the source shows observable changes in posture, speech, and ability to 

understand.

Orientation: Orientation involves the considered analysis and synthesi

the information gathered during the observation phase. Critical to the transi

from observation to orientation is the presence of the sensory acuity descr

previously. Sensory acuity helps shape the mental construct necessary 

effectively approach the challenge and aids in answering the important ques

“What does this mean?” Orientation is enhanced through continuous refi nem
261

Example of Orientation: Observable changes when answering 

questions open the possibility of conscious resistance. Additional qu

research into known information about the source, and consulta

cultural and technical subject matter experts, suggest the source 

knowledge but is constrained by concerns about the personal con

of cooperation. Examples of the personal consequences of co

include guilt over the betrayal of colleagues, discomfort over f

appearing weak, and fear of retribution if cooperation is discover

Decision: Informed by both observation and orientation, one mu

the effective course of action. In the context of educing information

has two aspects: (1) what can and should be done and (2) what ca

not be done. In the case of the former, the decision to act resembles 

choosing the correct implement for the job from a toolbox. By 

decision regarding what actions not to take resembles the craftsman

with legal, environmental, and safety professionals before begin

Knowledge, the refi nement of skills, perspective, the Law of Req

(see footnote52 above), and the range of available options are major 

decision-making phase.

Example of Decision: On the basis of observation and orient

interrogator considers a range of options shaped by time, ta

temperament. Time refers to the amount of time available for th

of one or a series of interrogations. Tactics refers to the approach 

and strategies that are appropriate given an assessment of not 

source’s strengths and weaknesses, but also those of the interrogat

temperament refers to the selection of a lead interrogator who bes

the demographic, technical, and linguistic profi le of the source.

Action: Action is the actual physical manifestation of the decisi

action (i.e., interrogation) begins, action is governed by the Schw

truth in the shortest possible time)
262

source. The initial and followon interrogations are characterized by logica

progression, internal consistency, and adaptability. The interrogator seek

to move through the OODA decisionmaking cycle more rapidly than the 

source, ultimately enabling the interrogator to enter and infl uence/contro

the source’s decisionmaking cycle. In doing so, the interrogator limits the 

source’s options, shapes his responses, and fi nally reduces/removes hi

ability to “survive” (i.e., effectively conceal, deceive, or resist).

The strategy described above involves a continuous cycle of observa

orientation, decision, and action, with each phase informed directly or indire

by the others. Decisions, for example, provide direct feedback to observat

while actions indirectly inform orientation through the observation phase. 

operating objective is to secure and maintain the greatest degree of freedom 

action; the desired end state is survival.680

In unlocking the potential of any strategy, including that of the OODA L

an intimate understanding of the precepts must lead to their correct applicatio

an environment defi ned by time, space, and mass. To navigate the OODA m

in a manner that enables dominance of the environment — and an adver

— Boyd emphasized the need to operate with a skillful combination of rapi

variety, harmony, and initiative:

• Rapidity: Rapidity of action and reaction is essential to gain, main

and/or regain the initiative. Speed in correct decision-making 

corresponding action is critical.

• Variety: Variety – in thought and action — is required so that one is n

predictable. Variety in action prevents the adversary from recogni

patterns of action with any degree of confi dence. This, in turn, mak

impossible for the adversary to anticipate actions and craft strategie

defeat them.

• Harmony: Harmony refers to fi tting or blending into the operati

environment. In educing information, a great deal can be learned f

the principles of the martial art Aikido, which places great emph

on blending with (i.e., moving with rather than struggling against

adversary’s energy. In doing so, one creates the opportunity to su

yet profoundly infl uence the movement and resulting decisions o

adversary without a costly investment of energy and resources.

680 Survival in this context implies the continued viability of the educing effort. In essence

employment of this strategy enables the interrogator to create — and take advantage of — opportu

to elicit information of relevant and timely intelligence value from a knowledgeable, albeit res

source.
263

by them.

Although Boyd’s strategy began to take shape with his experie

combat during the Korean War, its application nonetheless remains u

time or technology. It incorporates principles espoused by the strate

over 2,500 years ago as well as those set forth by the laws of ther

Variations on this strategic theme have demonstrated their effi 

battlefi elds of World War II and in the lethality of the renowned 

Japanese swordsman Miyamoto Musashi. In the following passa

author of the classic treatise on strategy, The Book of Five Rings, su

forth much of what every interrogator needs to successfully educe 

from resistant sources: 

[Y]ou determine [the] opponent’s traditions, observe [their

character, fi nd out [their] strengths and weaknesses, maneu

in ways contrary to the opponent’s expectations, determine 

opponent’s highs and lows, ascertain rhythms in between, a

make the fi rst move; this is essential.681

Concluding Observations

[I]t is a paradox of the twenty-fi rst century that

this age of technological wonders, the threats to our l

wealth, and order are fundamentally, crudely human. We 

diagram bunkers, bombs, and entire armies, but we falte

understanding the human soul. Nor will the human heart fi t 

our templates. Love, fear, hatred, not machines, are the 

of which wars are made, whether we speak of terrorist jih

campaigns of ethnic cleansing, or conventional offensives (

do not underestimate the deadly power of love, whether 

toward a god, a people, a clan, fl ag, or an individual.)682

Educing Information in the Last (or Current) War

With much of the nation’s military, intelligence, and internal secu

currently focused on the Global War on Terror and the insurgency 

effort to reexamine doctrine and methods for educing informatio

easily — and mistakenly — narrowed to applications within these 

Although those who use terrorist and insurgent tactics have dem

unprecedented mastery of leading-edge technologies, the scope and c

681 Miyamoto Musashi, The Book of Five Rings, translated by Thomas Cleary (Lon

Publications, Inc., 2003), 56. 682 Ralph Peters, Beyond Terror (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002), 19
264

The challenge of educing information from uncooperative sou

cannot be overstated, but neither can the requirement for acquiring timely 

accurate intelligence information that can only be obtained from human sou

Sun Tzu’s observation continues to ring true in today’s geopolitical environm

What enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike 

and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary 

men is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be 

elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from 

experience, nor by any deductive calculation.

Knowledge of the enemy’s disposition can only be obtained 

from other men.683 (Original italics)

Toward a Third Generation in Educing Information

The effort to collect intelligence information from resistant sources 

be traced back to antiquity. A review of the strategies and objectives invo

suggests a sluggish evolution through just two doctrinal generations.

Through most of recorded history, prevailing political powers emplo

fi rst generation strategies that relied heavily on physical force. In this era, 

fundamental objective of terrorizing — and thereby controlling — ta

populations frequently took precedence over the collection of operationally us

information.

The second generation of educing information emerged in the closing y

of World War I, when the British director of military intelligence began to exam

in earnest the need to obtain timely and reliable information from prisoner

war. From that beginning, the strategic interrogation programs developed 

the German, British, and U.S. militaries during World War II established

unprecedented fashion, that a potential treasure trove of information can 

obtained from a systematic, outcome-oriented approach to interrogation 

relied far more on fi nesse than on force.

As the impetus for building on this promising beginning began to fade sho

after the conclusion of World War II, the experience of U.S. soldiers held pris

during the Cold War — especially during the Korean and Vietnam confl ic

gave rise to a new emphasis on designing strategies for resisting coercive meth

of interrogation. As a result, the preponderance of U.S. government-sanctio

interrogation research focused on deconstructing coercive methods. The objec

was to develop defensive strategies that would protect U.S. servicemen who fa

the possibility of being held in foreign governmental detention and where 

would be subject to prolonged exploitation.

683 Sun Tzu, 77–78.
265

upon the legacy of World War II strategic interrogation operat

contemporary interrogation doctrine and training curricula were devel

the benefi t of formal studies of the potential effi cacy of offensive in

methods. In sum, a considerable portion of “what we know” about 

— including approach methodology, the detection of deception, and 

language — is in fact largely unsubstantiated. Thus, when the Gl

Terror focused us anew on devising offensive interrogation methods

was at times adulterated by the principles of coercive interrogation 

studies of Communist methodologies. As this war has continued

the employment of coercive methods by U.S. interrogators has a

alarming frequency.

The opportunity currently presents itself to make a transition 

generation of educing information. The strategies that will form th

for the third generation of doctrine and practice for educing info

be driven by the need to overcome the barriers outlined in this pap

should be characterized by the following considerations: 

• Methods will be consistent with long-standing U.S. leg

traditions.

• Formal research will, whenever possible, seek to demonstra

of methods in an operational setting.

• Institutions will recognize that the complexity of c

interrogation is on par with those of clandestine collection 

• Standards of conduct and formal vetting programs will b

to limit recruitment to those individuals best suited to dea

complexities and ambiguities of interrogation.

• The long-term examination of selected high-value sources w

under exacting standards and be subject to appropriate over

• Rigorous requirements for initial and ongoing trai

accompanied by an unambiguous standard of ethics 

practices, will introduce a new level of professionalism into 

interrogation discipline.

The barriers to success in educing information, while formid

insurmountable. That these barriers still confront us refl ects not ne

complexity of the barriers per se, but rather the absence of a system

address them. In this regard, the words of Colin Powell, former Chai

684 The Joint Forces Command of the Department of Defense has labeled interrog

conducted for the purpose of collecting intelligence from foreign sources offensi

whereas resistance to interrogation is referred to as defensive interrogation.
266
267

Exploring Ideas to Aid Information Ed

Daniel L. Shapiro, Ph.D.685

Harvard University

February 2006

Abstract

Information eduction can be viewed as a complex set of neg

Government offi cials have information needs, and sources have 

tion they can disclose. The challenge is to determine how the go

can negotiate most effectively for that information. This report 

negotiation concepts that might assist the information educer.

The Field of Negotiation

Brief Background 

The negotiation fi eld offers little in the way of direct resea

challenge of educing information (EI) in an interrogation context. H

worth noting that the current fi eld of negotiation theory, like that of E

necessity and has largely been tested in the trenches of practice. Gam

analyses of negotiation, such as Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling’s 

of Confl ict, sought to curb escalating tensions in the Cold War. I

negotiation, typifi ed by the Harvard Negotiation Project’s 1981 G

was developed in the context of the project’s negotiations in the Ira

confl ict, with guerrilla forces in Central and South America, and 

Palestinian confl ict. Walton and McKersie’s seminal negotiation res

was developed to reduce contentious labor negotiations. The nego

of Mary Parker Follett evolved from dissatisfaction with the way 

dealt with difference (Follett, 1942). Scientifi c research in negotiat

a more recent development, but tends to confi rm earlier, practice-

(Thompson and Leonardelli, 2004). 

685 Dr. Shapiro is Associate Director of the Harvard Negotiation Project and o

Harvard Law School and Harvard Medical School. The author wishes to thank Ro

Rowe, Elizabeth Tippet, Roger Fisher, and the blind reviewers who offered feedb

drafts of this report.
268

successful adaptation and use by an information educer. That being said, 

report is clearly exploratory. Although the author has consulted with experts in 

fi eld of information eduction and was trained by the New York Police Departm

in hostage negotiation, his areas of expertise are negotiation, confl ict resolu

and psychology, not EI. Thus, he leaves it to the judgment and creative thinkin

national security offi cials to consider how the following ideas might be usef

applied or adapted to EI.

Why Negotiations Fail

There are at least four major reasons why parties fail to reach a satisfac

outcome even when such an outcome is possible. First, they commonly ass

that negotiation involves a “fi xed pie,” in which any gain by one party is a 

for the other. This assumption can quickly turn an interaction into an advers

contest and can constrain the parties’ ability to explore creative ways of satisf

their interests. Second, many negotiators fail to use the most effi cient mean

divide the “pie” and obtain their portion. Typically, each party tries to persu

the other via a battle of wills, which often leads to stalemate. Third, negotia

often communicate a proposal — even a promising one — in a way that 

to maximize the likelihood that the other party will agree. Finally, nega

emotions — anger, shame, embarrassment, anxiety, or others — can impede 

negotiation.

This report summarizes strategies that address each of these common ca

of negotiation failure: 

1. Assumption of “fi xed pie?” Use methods that expand the pie.

2. Ineffi cient means? Choose an effi cient process to divide the pie.

3. Poor framing? Craft a “yesable proposition.”

4. Emotions getting in the way? Improve the relationship with the other 

— without giving in.

Expanding the Pie

Until the early 1980s, most popular negotiation texts considered negotia

a win-lose game, in which every gain made by one side comes at the expe

of the other. Negotiation was generally seen as “positional bargaining,” w

representatives of each side would state their position, concede only stubbornl

demonstrate a greater willingness than the other side to walk from the negotia

table. Negotiation scholars such as Roger Fisher and Robert McKersie recogn

however, that the pie need not be fi xed. In most situations, the potential exis

create opportunities for mutual gain (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991; Walton 

McKersie, 1991).

Seeking mutual gains is not simply an act of compassion toward the o

party: it is a wise move of self-interest. One of the most important revelation

game theory is that parties who seek to gain solely at the expense of the other 
269

partner in order to get a better deal for himself, both are convicted

defects, the other is convicted. If both stay silent, both are acquitted

the best strategy in a multi-round version of this dilemma, research

a computer tournament and invited experts to submit a strategy. 

strategy was “tit-for-tat” (Axelrod 1984), which instructed the comp

by cooperating but to respond in kind if the other side defected. I

adversarial context, conditional cooperation best served each ind

interest.

Similarly, in negotiation, seeking to expand the pie can serve th

of both parties. Economic theory describes the relationship betwe

and joint interest using the “Pareto curve” (Raiffa, 1982), illustrate

page, where the y axis represents party A’s satisfaction with the out

x axis represents party B’s satisfaction. In a traditional bargaining sit

B each present an opening position that exclusively serves their o

(denoted by the circles labeled “A’s Position” and “B’s Position”)

agree to compromise by cutting their demands in half, they end up a

at outcome Z, but outcome Z is suboptimal. If A and B had investi

gains, they could have reached an agreement lying in the grey r

either or both would have been individually better off than at Z. The 

graphic represents the limit on mutual gains. Any outcome lying on 

a “Pareto-optimal outcome” — an agreement that cannot be impro

either party without disadvantaging the other.
270

The Pareto Curve. Source: Roger Fisher and Bruce Patton, “The Pareto Fron

in Workbook for the Program of Instruction for Lawyers at Harvard Law Sc

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Negotiation Project, 2006), 36.

Despite these insights of economists and game theoreticians, negotia

might persist and ask (with good reason): Why care about the other’s intere

There are several reasons:

1. A focus on mutual gains increases the incentive to cooperate (Fisher 

Shapiro, 2005). Parties will be less likely to cooperate if they do not 

it as being in their interest to cooperate: why help the enemy?

2. Mutual gains increase the likelihood that future interactions wil

constructive (Axelrod, 1984). Parties will be less likely to cooperat

the future if they have memories of feeling deceived or mistreated by 

other party.

3. An adversarial stance makes stalemate more likely. If parties assume 

the confl ict is a win-lose situation, each is likely to stick to a posi

As egos and negative emotions become increasingly involved, stalem

becomes a likely and stable outcome (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 19

4. “Mutual gains” does not mean giving in to the demands of the other 

Pareto-optimal outcomes do not focus on each party’s stated posi

such as whether or not to give information, but on underlying inter

such as why the source does not want to give information. 
271

true in negotiations that involve multiple issues, both quantitative an

issues (e.g., desire for respect), and an interest in establishing a g

relationship.

Negotiation theory (e.g., Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991; Walton a

1965) offers several strategies for expanding the pie.

Look beneath Positions for Interests

Positions are rigid solutions to the problems at hand (e.g., the U

should immediately withdraw all of its troops from Iraq). Interests ar

wants those things (e.g., to prevent U.S. soldiers from being killed, to 

to focus on other international threats). 

In a negotiation, understanding the other side’s interests enhanc

of a negotiator to persuade the other side. When one understands w

side cares about, one can develop options that address these interest

do not confl ict with one’s own interests. What is stopping them from 

What do they care about? What do they want? Why? The author

in consulting for high-level governmental negotiators suggests that 

fail to consider the other side’s interests suffi ciently, thus reducing t

infl uence their counterparts.

At fi rst glance, an EI context would appear to be a purely positio

One side wants to gain information; the other does not want to di

each side has a more complex set of interests defi ning why each 

the information. Interests for a source might include religious bel

not to lose face within an organization, or fear of being ostraciz

community, and peers. Interests for an educer might include nati

reputation in the local community, locating additional sources, relat

governments, and precedent. Distinguishing between positions and 

reveal potential sources of value creation. 

Invent Options for Mutual Gain

Once parties understand each other’s interests, they can inven

mutual gain. Even where a value-creating option will not directly be

interests, it increases the likelihood that the other side will accept ou

Consider the recent confl ict between Peru and Ecuador. The t

disagreed over boundary issues and engaged in what the U.S. State 

called the “oldest armed confl ict in the Western Hemisphere”: 

686 Seven elements of negotiation comprise the essence of both hard bargaining an

negotiation. These seven elements also form the basis of several of our negotiatio

Harvard Negotiation Project. The “Seven Elements” are a manageable number of rob

one can use to prepare, conduct, and evaluate a negotiation. See the appendix for a de

element and its contours in both hard bargaining and interest-based negotiation.
272

The Harvard Negotiation Project worked closely with President J

Mahuad as he negotiated a resolution to the dispute (see Fisher and Shapiro, 20

A joint working group consisting of offi cials from both governments gener

an option that adequately addressed each side’s primary interests. The conte

land would become an international park under the ownership of Ecuador 

the sovereignty of Peru. No economic, political, or military activity could 

conducted on the land without the agreement of both governments. This op

allowed each party to reach a satisfactory resolution without giving in.

Identify Trade-offs

In a negotiation, differences are not always bad. Parties can look for diffe

valuation of issues and trade accordingly. In its simplest form, if one person l

oranges more than apples, and the other likes apples more than oranges, a sim

transfer of goods can maximize joint gains. 

Parties can create contingency agreements to capitalize on difference

risk, expectations, and the like. (“If A happens, Party Y will do B and Par

will do C.”) Differences in the forecast of future events, for example, need 

become stumbling blocks for agreement. Rather than fi ght over whose foreca

correct, parties can incorporate contingencies for each possible outcome into 

agreement. Contingency agreements also can be effective if parties have diffe

time preference or attitudes toward risk.

Unbundle One Issue into Many

If parties focus on a single issue, the negotiation risks becoming a distributi

contest. Negotiation research suggests that one way to avoid a distributional con

is to “unbundle issues,” transforming a single-issue, fi xed-pie negotiation in

multi-issue negotiation where mutual gains can be reached (Lax and Sebe

1986; Thompson, 2005). For the educer, the question boils down to: How m

the educer add new issues, unbundle issues, or otherwise expand the numbe

issues under discussion? What else does the source care about? How might th

matters be incorporated into the current discussion? Putting more issues that 

source cares about on the table may give the source more incentive to cooper

Similarly, multiple simultaneous offers can serve to break a dead

(Bazerman and Neale, 1992; Kelley and Schenitzki, 1972). The offers shoul

be of equal value to the offering party to improve the likelihood of meeting o

own objectives without making concessions. Each offer should cover mult

issues to avoid the problem of sequential, tit-for-tat, haggling. All offers sh

be made at the same time, which allows the offering party to observe the o

party’s reaction, learn more about the other’s interests, and, if an offer is accep

reach a Pareto-optimal outcome.
273

py 

may state an option that goes against their interests and the other pa

them to the “offer.” Thus, the interest-based negotiator separates in

deciding: both sides agree that no commitments will be made until a 

is formalized. The fi rst task is to understand interests and invent optio

gain. At this stage, nothing is a commitment. Then, once a full set 

generated, parties can refi ne options to best meet the interests of eac

For example, the negotiation process used at the 1978 C

negotiations involved a clear separation between inventing and 

mediator, the United States circulated numerous versions of a draft 

each side for review. Neither side was asked to make a commitment 

draft, when the United States determined that this was the best propo

be produced under the circumstances.

Dividing the Pie

No matter how much value parties create, they must still divi

obtain what they want — whether that means land, money, or (in th

educer) information. The negotiation literature offers a number of 

increasing one’s share of the distributional pie. These strategies can b

two categories: 1) moves that can be made at the negotiation table; 

away from the table (i.e., actions that can be taken independent of th

Each of these moves can infl uence the power dynamics of the negot

Some strategies presented here might be rightly categorized as 

tactics” designed to get one’s way at the other’s expense (Rubin, Pr

1994). These strategies can provide an immediate distributional pay

also increase the risk of damaging a relationship, escalating a confl 

in stalemate (Axelrod, 1984; Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994). Thus

tactics work best when only one issue is at stake, the issue is quantifi 

quality of the relationship is unimportant (Shapiro, 2000).

Strategic Moves at the Negotiation Table

Strategic moves at the negotiation table are actions intended 

the distribution of the pie. Three such moves include drawing on 

legitimacy, using “gamesmanship,” and making threats.

Drawing on Standards of Legitimacy

Negotiations often turn into a battle of wills. Each side tak

and demands that the other concede. This tends to lead to adversa

stalemate, or failed negotiation — even when agreement was reason

for each side.

By drawing on “standards of legitimacy” (Fisher, Ury, and P

negotiators can improve their power to persuade and reduce the ri
274

practice, precedent, or the like. Rather than state “you must concede to 

demands,” a negotiator would offer standards of legitimacy — persuasive to e

negotiator — for choosing one option over another. In the context of EI, stand

of legitimacy might be drawn from religious, cultural, social, or related sourc

Using Gamesmanship

The point of gamesmanship is to “ruffl e the feathers” of decisionma

throwing them off guard and making them increasingly willing to yield (Ru

Pruitt, and Kim, 1994). Two such tactics include (1) changing or confu

the tempo of the discussion and (2) fostering a decisionmaker’s feeling

incompetence, fl uster, or personal doubt. In a classic book on gamesman

Potter writes about a tennis player who, after being served two or three 

running, ties his shoelace in a prolonged manner, blows his nose for an exten

period, and wipes all signs of sweat off his forehead (Potter, 1948). This s

tactic can, of course, be used in complicated negotiations. 

The key to gamesmanship is to keep the decisionmaker blind to one’s 

intentions (Potter, 1948). The moment the manipulation becomes transpa

it becomes much less tactically promising. Thus, Potter wisely advises 

gamesperson to “shield” his or her behavior behind a clear situational rational

the tennis example, the goal would be for the opponent to believe that the cha

in his or her fortune was due not to the change in the game’s tempo, but to 

player’s change of racket or a variation in the wind.

Making Threats

Threats are messages about what we intend to do if the other person does 

comply with our demand. The general structure of a threat is: “Unless you d

I will hurt you.”

Threats are appealing for several reasons (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994). F

they impose no cost on the party making the threat. Indeed, as Thomas Schel

pointed out, where brute force may cause resistance in others, the threat of s

force may succeed (1966). Second, threats have been experimentally show

work — often better than promises. Experimental evidence suggests that thr

are a credible form of infl uence (e.g., see Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993; Rubin 

Brown, 1975). Third, a threat can be withdrawn without incurring cost. A pe

who withdraws a promise may be looked upon as untrustworthy, but a person 

withdraws a threat can be seen as humane. (In either case, however, judgm

still may be made about the person’s credibility.)

At the same time, threats carry one great risk: the counterthreat. A threat te

to elicit reciprocal action in the other person. As early as 1960, experime

research showed that threats lead to increased suspicion, resentment, and dis

in turn making counterthreats more likely (Deutsch and Krauss, 1960).
275

ppyy, 

signifi cantly enhance a negotiator’s power. Two such moves includ

one’s “BATNA” and making irrevocable commitments.

Improving Your BATNA

Negotiation power is largely defi ned by the strength of one’s a

negotiating. If negotiations with a counterpart should fail, what is one

alternative? The best alternative is known as the BATNA — Best Alt

Negotiated Agreement (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991). The better o

the more power one has in a negotiation. It becomes easier to n

confi dence, or to walk away from the negotiation without feeling co

other party’s demands. 

Negotiators can improve their BATNA by thinking carefully 

by brainstorming possible alternatives. Ultimately, a negotiator ma

his or her BATNA is not especially strong, an important realizati

the negotiator additional incentive to negotiate carefully and effecti

accommodating more than would generally be wise.

Making an educated guess about the other side’s BATNA can hel

understand how strongly motivated the other party will be to reach 

their BATNA is poor, they might be amenable to many options. If the

strong, they might decide to stand fi rm to reap maximal concession

parties overestimate their BATNA; to improve leverage in this type o

negotiator might cast doubt on the strength of the other’s BATNA.

Negotiators often use time pressure to infl uence the behavior of 

yet this is only persuasive if the other party’s BATNA would wor

deadline passes. If the BATNA is strong, time pressure is minimal

Negotiators who use time pressure would also be well advised to ke

BATNA in mind, since a deadline for the other is also a deadline for 

Making Irrevocable Commitments

Threats suggest a future action that one might take if the oth

not comply with one’s demands. In contrast, an irrevocable commitm

an action that we have already begun (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 199

being hurt by the action, the other party must change behavior. S

the hypothetical example of two drivers speeding toward one anoth

of “chicken,” each testing who will swerve off the road fi rst. A drive

the steering wheel out the window in full view of the other, thu

irrevocable commitment (Schelling, 1960). 

With an irrevocable commitment, the locus of control shifts fr

to the respondent, who now has the ability to stop an unwelcom

happening. For this reason, it is advisable that an educer using 

commitments actually have some way of reversing them, since it is q
276

Crafting a “Yesable Proposition”

Even when a negotiator has developed a good proposal that creates value 

distributes that value effectively, parties can fail to reach agreement becaus

the manner in which the proposal is framed.

The Power of Framing

Framing can have a subtle but powerful impact on how the other 

perceives a proposal. For example, studies have found that negotiators instru

to “minimize losses” rather than “maximize gains” were less likely to m

concessions, reach agreement, and view the resulting agreement as fair (Bazer

Magliozzi, and Neale, 1985; Neale and Northcraft, 1986; Neale, Huber, 

Northcraft, 1987). 

The context in which a decision is framed can also affect how it is percei

One study found that participants would be willing to walk two blocks to 

$30 on a $70 watch, but not willing to walk that same distance to save $30 o

$800 camera (Russo and Schoemaker 1989). Thirty dollars seems like a great 

of money when compared to $70, but like a drop in the bucket when comp

to $800. 

The identity of the person making the offer also infl uences its receptio

study by Bazerman and Neale found that participants would be willing to 

more for a bottle of beer they were told came from a fancy resort than for exa

the same bottle supposedly from a run-down grocery store. Participants assu

that the grocery store beer “is an obvious rip-off” (1992). Thus, it is importan

consider both who presents the offer and how it is presented.

Framing a “Yesable” Proposition

Ultimately, the question to ask is: What proposal would give the other 

an option they might accept? The choice would have to address their inter

suffi ciently, be realistic, and be operational. By having a good sense of the o

party’s interests and BATNA, a negotiator can craft such an offer, which is ca

a “yesable proposition” (Fisher, Kopelman, and Schneider, 1994): it requires 

a “yes” in response. 

Rather than confronting the other party with a problem, a yesable proposi

gives them an appealing offer. Consider a simple example. President Lyn

Johnson instructed his staff to attach a proposal, and a set of boxes for him 

check “yes,” “no,” or “see me,” to any memo that crossed his desk. John

understood the idea behind a yesable proposition: he required his staff to b

him not only a problem, but also a suggestion for what could be done.

Two tools are useful in developing a yesable proposition: the Curre

Perceived Choice chart and the Target Future Choice chart.
277

gpy 

Kopelman, and Schneider, 1994). Using the chart, negotiators can c

they are trying to infl uence, what decisions the other person faces, 

and cons of the decision from that person’s perspective. For exam

below illustrates how Iraqi President Saddam Hussein might have 

choices about whether or not to withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwai

the chart makes clear, there were good reasons why he refused. 

agree with his motivation and behavior is another issue altogether.)

Case: Saddam Hussein, Early February 

“Shall I now say I will withdraw from Kuwait?”

Consequences if I say YES Consequences if I say NO

– The bombing may continue + I stand up to the United S

– The blockade may continue + I keep my options ope

terms from the U.N

– I yield to a U.S. ultimatum + I can fi ght indefi nitely a

outlast the United States

– Israel may still attack as retaliation 

for the Scud missile

+ I can always agree later

– I look weak + I look strong

– I lose credibility in the Arab world + I am a hero to many Arab

– The United States will make new 

demands such as compensate Kuwait, 

compensate hostages, destroy Iraqi 

military, change the regime, accept 

war crimes trial

+ I can continue to defy W

by creating more oil spill

the Gulf on fi re

– I may be hanged as a war criminal + Dying a martyr is better t

war criminal

BUT

– The war and blockade ma

Currently Perceived Choice Chart. Source: Derived by the autho

Fisher and others, “How Do You End a War?,” The Boston Globe, 8 F

Because negotiators rarely represent only their individual in

must consider not only how the other side will perceive a particular 

also how their constituencies would view the outcome (Mnookin

Tulumello, 2000). Even seemingly irrational actors such as Saddam 

to constituents. Framing a proposal in a way that allows the other 
278

Target Future Choice Chart (TFC)

A related tool, the Target Future Choice (TFC) chart, can help to identify 

the other side might perceive a proposal in order to accept it. To derive su

target future choice, the negotiator must work backwards, initially defi ning 

consequences believed to be necessary for the decision maker to say yes ra

than no (Fisher, Kopelman, and Schneider, 1994). The table below illustrates 

basic elements of a persuasive target future choice.

General Example

“Shall I now accept the X plan?”

Consequences if I say YES Consequences if I say NO

+ My personal standing is secure – I will be subjected to some criticis

+ I can easily justify the decision to my 

constituents

– The problem will not go away

+ I will not be seen as backing down – It is likely to get worse

+ The action is reasonably consistent 

 with our principles and 

 past statements

– I will miss a fading opportunity

+ It will not set a bad precedent

+ All things considered, it is a

 constructive step for dealing 

 with this problem

+ We still keep many of our future 

options open

BUT

– Some hardliners will criticize me

BUT

+ Some hardliners will no doubt 

 support me

Future Target Choice of a Decision Maker. Source: Roger Fisher and ot

Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Confl ict (Boston: Harvard Unive

Press, 1994), 58. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

A well-framed offer allows the decision maker to understand both the ben

of accepting the proposal immediately and the costs of inaction (for instance

a result of missing a deadline by which the offer had to be accepted). An o

can be made more appealing if it is partially implemented from the outset. 

salespeople use this technique all the time when they offer a customer a car 

hand him or her the keys to hold.
279

communication. Negative emotions are often products of an adversa

structure between parties. In recent years, researchers have made sign

in understanding the structure of negotiating relationships and how t

relationships to enable Pareto-optimal outcomes. As a result, neg

new tools to elicit emotions that can serve their negotiating purpose

One major advance has been to link the concepts of identity and 

In any negotiating relationship, people care about their perceived i

vis their negotiating counterpart (i.e., “what I think others think about 

sense, a negotiator’s identity is largely relational (Shapiro, 2002): pe

differently with different people. In a relationship with an aggress

negotiator may feel tense and resentful, and thus act in certain way

other person. In a relationship with a soft-spoken person, that same ne

feel emotions of connection and act in ways that support the relat

insight — that the structure of the interaction shapes each negotia

— has important practical consequences.

One’s Relational Identity Can Constrain or Facilitate a Goo

One’s negotiating purpose is not always served by one’s “relati

(Shapiro, 2002). Nor is one’s negotiating purpose always served by 

emotional, cognitive, and behavioral consequences for each party. 

may fail to speak up when it would be wise to do so, or may act mo

than suits his or her interests.

By understanding the dimensions that comprise relational identit

can better calibrate behavior to best serve their negotiating pu

“relational identity” consists of two main dimensions: autonomy a

(see Shapiro 2002 for a review of research on these dimensions). 

the freedom to make a decision without that decision’s being imp

and Nunley, 1992; Fisher and Shapiro, 2005). Research suggests tha

autonomy leads to resistance, negative emotions, and a lack of 

(Brehm, 1966; Fisher and Shapiro, 2005). One explanation for 

resist disclosing information is that they feel that demands to revea

impinge upon their autonomy. Affi liation is a sense of personal co

opposite of rejection. A party who feels rejected is likely to resist 

The feeling of rejection, in fact, stimulates the same part of the brai

pain (Eisenberger, N., Lieberman, M., and Williams, K., 2003), w

explain why trivial acts of exclusion often elicit strong emotional re

the excluded party. Conversely, a positive affi liation tends to stimu

emotions and mutual cooperation. 

Capitalizing on People’s Emotional Reactions

Research suggests that positive emotions have particular 

negotiation (See Fisher and Shapiro, 2005). They improve the lik

Pareto-optimal agreement; they expand people’s ability to trust 
280

How can a negotiator capitalize on the power of emotions? In the book Bey

Reason: Using Emotions as You Negotiate, Fisher and Shapiro offer fi ve “

concerns” that can be used to stimulate positive emotions: autonomy, affi lia

appreciation, status, and role. These fi ve core concerns represent a prac

expansion of the relational identity framework discussed above. Each con

can be used to build rapport and stimulate positive emotions, thus encoura

cooperative behavior. The actions that correlate with each core concern are

simple form: (1) respect the other’s autonomy, (2) build affi liation, (3) exp

appreciation, (4) acknowledge status where merited, and (5) help parties b

a fulfi lling role. A signifi cant amount of research has substantiated each of th

actions (e.g., see Fisher and Shapiro, 2005).

Using Emotions Does Not Mean Acquiescing

Some people argue that enlisting positive emotions into a negotiation 

put a negotiator at a disadvantage. Common fears are that the negotiator will 

weak and submissive or will be more inclined to “give in” to the demands of 

other party. These are serious concerns. However, these problems are redu

signifi cantly for the skilled negotiator who uses not only emotions, but also 

tools of reasoning to make wise decisions. For example, the skilled negoti

will not agree to a decision that departs from some standard of legitimacy

discussed earlier in this paper.

Summary

This paper provides an overview of some of the key strategic approache

negotiation that an information educer might adapt for use: expanding the 

dividing the pie, framing an offer, and improving the negotiating relation

The author leaves open the question of tailoring these strategies to the challen

circumstances of information eduction and would welcome the opportunit

explore such topics with experts in the fi eld.
281

Contrasting Approaches to Negotiation: Adversarial vs. Inter

ELEMENT ADVERSARIAL INTEREST-BASED

Alternatives Threaten to infl ict pain 

“Talk, or else!”

Improve your Best Al

a Negotiated 

Agreement (BATNA)

Weaken their BATNA

“You have a c

like to talk o

things with y

I’ve got a co

just outside t

waiting to go 

route. I don’

It’s your cho

Interests Debate over positions

“I will not tell 

you anything.” 

“Yes, you will!”

Look beneath position

interests 

“What’s holdi

back from gi

information?

Options Bargain over two 

options: whether or not 

the source will tell you 

information

Invent multiple option

evaluating them 

Legitimacy Battle of wills

“Tell us what 

you know.”

“No.”

“We demand 

you tell us.”

“NO!”

Persuade on the basis 

standards of legitimac

The basic me

“There are le

reasons why 

reveal inform

us...”

(Continued on next page)
282

an effi cient process, who are th

relevant people to include, and 

what is our desired product? T

what can we realistically and 

practically commit?

Commitments Talk at one another

“We will tell you 

what to tell us. 

And you had 

better tell us!”

Talk with one another

What questions can 

we ask to learn more? 

How can we ask open 

questions rather than 

presumptive, closedended questions?

Relationship Treat one another as 

adversaries 

From educer’s 

perspective: 

Interrogator vs. 

accused

From source’s 

perspective: 

harasser vs. 

victim

Treat one another as joint 

problem solvers

“We have a shared 

problem. Let’s think 

through how to deal 

with this. The more 

we are able to work 

together, the sooner 

both of us can go hom
283

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285

Practical Concepts and Tools 

M.P. Rowe, Ph.D.

February 2006

Abstract

Negotiation theory represents a systematic way of thinking by whi

understand and plan for all human interactions – including educin

tion (EI). This paper offers basic tools from negotiation theory f

discussion by those concerned with EI. We briefl y present sever

ideas: a discussion of different possible strategies for EI, a brief di

the sources of power available to educers and sources, and then s

about preparation for EI. (Educers may already be using the idea

here.)

This paper offers standard ideas generated by individuals who hav

experience in diffi cult interpersonal negotiations but no experie

Our overview of one way to think about preparing for EI includes

• Taking note of the relevant parties whose interests are at stak

• Discovering – or at least developing working hypotheses a

tangible and intangible interests of each party;

• Evaluating the sources of power available to each side in EI; 

• Developing relevant options for interrogation and “fallback” 

• Planning strategy, style, and sequencing of tactics with the E

• Planning the role of each member of a team (for example, 

preliminary assessment, interrogation, analysis behind the scene

tion of data into and from the relevant intelligence community da

going evaluation and guidance to educers and to the users of in

and collection of records that can be analyzed for improved know

practice).
286

as a negotiation.

Negotiation includes personal and professional interactions — for exam

one can theoretically even “negotiate with oneself.” Applying the tool

negotiation theory can make almost all human interactions more effective. 

offer some standard ideas in negotiation theory to those concerned with edu

information (EI), in the hope that these tools may help in eliciting useful 

accurate information from a source.

687

Negotiation theory encompasses far more than the tools presented h

Other aspects that might also be pursued include the role of emotions, the ro

“constituencies” on each side, the use of coalitions by each side, the use of imp

and explicit threats, the theory and practice of “sequencing” tactics, etc. 

Little, if any, operationally useful negotiation literature relates to edu

information from uncooperative sources. EI “negotiations” in any case fall out

the usual purview of negotiations experts. Parties involved in EI may have 

different interests, sets of knowledge or lack of knowledge, and perception

what is important and even what is real: in short, wide differences in cultur

well as language. The interaction may involve one or more translators. In s

cases even the identity and fi rst language of a source may be unknown. Each 

may be away from home and under great stress. Sources may be highly dissim

which may add to the challenge of building expertise in EI. The pattern

power and powerlessness of each of the parties in EI interactions, as identifi e

“negotiations” terms below, may appear unusual for both parties. (As an exam

a detained source may seem “powerless,” but a source who is prepared to com

suicide has a very powerful last resort or “fallback” position. In addition, if 

need for information is very urgent and the United States has a tight deadline

U.S. interrogator has less negotiating power.)

The contributors to this paper have extensive experience with the th

and practice of negotiation, but no actual experience or fi rsthand knowledg

U.S. interrogation practices and activities. This paper therefore simply of

ideas from negotiation theory and experience for possible discussion by pe

concerned with EI activities and EI research. 

The paper does not prescribe any one “negotiation strategy” for EI. It 

forth a “negotiations way of thinking” about EI: a way of thinking that, in 

considers many strategies. (This way of thinking may — or may not — h

been used intuitively by individuals in intelligence, military, or law enforcem

communities who conduct interviews and interrogations with detained perso

We present some standard tools in negotiation theory and then apply them to 

687 We will use the term “sources” (or “detainees”) to indicate persons from whom informati

sought, and use male pronouns on the assumption that most are male.
287

This paper addresses three imperatives, each discussed in a sep

• Consider Multiple Strategies: It would appear that U.S. int

preparing to use more than one “strategy” in EI. A single 

trying physically to force a source to talk or trying only to buy 

is not likely to be effective in negotiations. Tactics and stra

developed uniquely for each source, with a menu or sequen

relevant to that person, rather than “trying” tactics on an unp

This section lays out a way of thinking about strategies.

• Analyze Sources of Power: Analysis of the “sources of po

to each party in negotiations” may be helpful. As ment

sources may have considerable, sometimes unanticipated, p

negotiation. The United States, however, may be able to d

in EI, for example, by pulling together many sources of inf

preparation and expertise in interrogation, by building cr

even by “recruitment” of sources who can provide informa

• Prepare, Prepare, Prepare — for Each Source: In this sec

the theoretical ideas presented earlier. Negotiation theory su

would be important for an educer to learn as much as poss

specifi c information needed by the United States, and also th

relevant persons on the U.S. side, and 2) the individual sou

knowledge and sensibilities, and how he might contribute, a

his individual interests. The interests of each side will inclu

and intangibles. 

Strategies in Negotiation

To lay the groundwork for thinking about negotiation and EI, 

range of negotiation strategies. Some of these strategies are intende

others are punitive. Positive strategies include both competition and 

(which is a search for “joint gains”). Punitive strategies, on the other 

injury to another person or intend injury to oneself. The distinction 

for EI. The goal of EI is to get accurate and useful information 

interests, which may often be possible with “positive” strategies. Th

goal of negative strategies is to injure the other party, which is not th

Positive Strategies

Negotiation theory has traditionally included a scheme of 

strategies for conduct of interpersonal and business interactions: 

collaboration, accommodation, compromise, and avoidance. W

strategies “positive” because none is specifi cally intended to harm an

In teaching about negotiations, these strategies are often introduced w

(imaginary) situation in which two persons, A and B, are fi ghting 

orange. Both take the “position” that they must have the whole or
288

The graph is labeled to represent the perspective of person A. At 

competition point, A gets the whole orange. At A’s accommodation point, B 

the whole orange. (A’s accommodation point would be B’s competition poi

the graph were labeled from the perspective of B). The orange is split equ

between the two at the compromise point (see dotted lines showing how muc

the orange goes to A and how much to B). 

To illustrate the meaning of the collaboration point, the story change

illustrate that two people may not actually want exactly the same thing. We 

now told that A in fact wanted the orange peel for a cake, and B wanted 

juice of the orange; therefore, both could get all of what they wanted once 

dropped their positions and discovered their real “interests.” In negotiation th

the word “interests” has come to mean the whole set of tangibles and intangi

that an individual actually wants in an interaction. Interests are both short-t

and long-term in nature, and they may also change in the course of a negotia

It is rare for two sides to consider only “one and the same” interest, so ther

often room for some degree of collaboration. Collaboration may work for b

whether they like each other or not.

Tangibles

Negotiation strategies are often wrongly presumed to be only about “tang

things” of value, often discussed as a “pie.” (Will I try to take the whole pie? 

I expand the pie by fi nding things in addition to the pie on the table — things 

688 The fi rst and second graphs which follow are adapted from the work of Kenneth W. Thom

“Confl ict and Confl ict Management,” in the Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psycholo

ed. Marvin Dunnette (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976). The specifi c construction of these graphs 

the adaptation included as the third graph are the work of the present author. The seminal work o

strategies in negotiations that underlies the presentation in this paper is that of R.E. Walton and R

McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction Syste

(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).
289

or losing things.

Intangibles

In fact many negotiations are about respect, information, th

“heard,” expertise, access to friends or colleagues, the long-term re

person or country, etc. The interaction between the negotiators itself o

— for good or ill — an intangible “part of” a negotiation. For exam

may feel respected or disrespected in a way that infl uences the outc

encounter and over the long term. In an EI case, the educer could pos

more cooperation by invoking intangibles, and can certainly make m

by arousing more hatred. (The educer could make the situation wors

term, with one source, or in the long term, with everyone who ident

source.)

It follows that in planning an EI strategy negotiators might also 

their style. Because negotiators may exhibit a style that is interprete

than they intend, this topic requires planning as well as training, s

and practice as a negotiations professional. 

One might sometimes plan a style that is not the same as the 

example, the negotiator might feel very unfriendly toward a give

decide to treat the person with “strategic” or “purposeful” respect. 

training in negotiations emphasizes the importance of preparin

strategically in a way that conveys respect (or behaving in a way tha

as respectful), which is seen as an “intangible” interest of likely 

recipient and one that the negotiator can offer at little or no cost.

It is in fact hard to imagine circumstances where it is theoretic

plan to humiliate a source, at least if there is ever to be more than one 

that person. Negotiation theory and practice suggest that deliberate 

is a potent cause of destructive and vengeful motivations and behav

individual source and for all those who identify with him. Thus, ev

strategy is that of “forcing” a source, or putting him in fear, it do

that it is wise to do so disrespectfully or in a manner calculated 

him. Humiliation is not the same as forcing someone to do something

suggests that humiliation causes many people to develop deeper rag

than physical pain does. Before considering authorization of hum

tactic in EI, it would be worthwhile to fi nd out if any convincing resea

attests to the effectiveness of this tactic. 

Interests vs. Positions

The story of the orange illustrates the reality that the “interests

people, as opposed to their “positions,” may differ in ways that permit 

solutions that benefi t both A and B more than the results of pure com

another example, A and B might each present the same initial “posi
290

to occupy the house until September 5, they can fi nd a collaborative solution 

is better for both of them than a June 1 purchase and sale. Each has the securit

an agreement that the house will be sold (or available), and each will be hap

during the summer. Each has gained something tangible and something intang

whether they like or dislike each other.

On the graph below, the dotted line box includes solutions that are better 

a compromise for both A and B in a negotiation between them. These inc

possible trade-offs between things that A wants and some different things th

wants. Collaborative solutions, where there are “joint gains,” depend on A an

wanting somewhat different things so that the negotiation need not be a zero 

(win-lose) game. Most human interactions are not a zero sum (win-lose) g

indeed not a “game” at all. In the realm of EI, for example, the United St

wants information. There may be tangibles or intangibles of interest to the so

that would permit a trade for information, whether we like or despise this per

Moving Among the Positive Strategies

Negotiation theory suggests that A may interact with B in any — and o

all — of fi ve ways in any one negotiation. Much of negotiation theory 

considerable research have focused on these fi ve strategies, sometimes lookin

them separately (e.g., Getting to Yes or Win All You Can). However, there are 

few negotiations where one would choose — or even be able — to employ 

one strategy. Most well-planned negotiations include a mix of strategies.

Most negotiations involve elements of competition (I want to stake out 

requirements early here and I may demand a bit extra for “bargaining roo

some collaboration (I would like to hear your interests and see if there is s

way to meet them), some avoidance (Some confl icts are not worth thinking ab

at least not right now), some accommodation (I am happy just to let you h

what you want on that point) and a good deal of compromise (At the end of 

day, let us just split the difference). Much theoretical work in negotiation cen

on managing the important tension between competition and collaboration (D
291

In most negotiations, as in most human interactions, it is impo

the ability to move back and forth from collaborative phases to comp

and vice versa. The circumstances in which one might rationally pu

competitive strategy would be: 

• One knows one will never see the other person, or anyone fro

again, and

• One believes that it is actually possible to meet one’s own in

only competitive tactics, in one interaction or time period, 

• There is nothing else that might later be gained in future inte

the person or his “tribe.”

These circumstances are rare. In real life one usually sees the 

again, or one sees his fellow countrymen. It is rare to have no long-t

and to obtain all of what one wants in one interaction. Pure (win-lose

on its own is usually not “rational”; one needs to be able to combi

among strategies.

We can look at the task of EI through this lens. The purpose 

one party — the United States — to gain accurate and useful infor

the other party — the source. If the source does not want to give 

this information (a point that the interrogator cannot know before th

begins) then this EI appears to be a competitive situation. It mig

be possible to begin with some compromise elements, for examp

fi rst about matters that are relatively easy for the source to discu

the source might be willing to give information that does not thre

interests — an accommodative possibility on his part that should 

early and throughout the process of EI. And we have just begun the 

May there be something to trade, such as creature comforts, the c

of the EI, “respectful listening,” or plans for release? Are there la

collaborative possibilities involving the source’s family, friends, or 

Can the United States possibly recruit this source for the future?

We will not know unless we begin to learn the relevant interests 

— a task which is required for all strategies. Some information abou

of the source may be available from a central database. Learning th

a source on the spot is most likely to happen through a process tha

theory calls “building trust” or “relationship.” In the context of E

mean building a “strategically useful connection,” credibility, and 

perhaps by members of the EI team as well as by the individual edu

Negative Strategies

The practice of negotiation can also involve negative strat

include the intention to injure the other person. U.S. interests in EI 
292

Dealing with the possibility that an individual source intends harm to 

United States is particularly complicated, in part because we do not know w

a specifi c person intends until we design and implement a plan to fi nd out — 

until the person acts. But even where the source is focused on harming the Un

States, it does not follow that a reciprocal, negative strategy on the part of 

United States will be an effective way to acquire useful information from him

There has been little research on how to convince an individual B, who wi

to injure A, to become willing to collaborate (especially when B is willin

accept or even seek injury to himself). Convincing a person to relinquish veng

interests, or to override the desire for revenge, is diffi cult. This is in part bec

the wish to injure often derives from intangibles, and especially from perce

humiliation. (My people and I have been humiliated. The United States is a si

state that must be brought to its knees. God wishes me to take revenge on 

enemies.) 

Tangible losses can sometimes be dealt with more easily, by providing tang

incentives to cooperate. If someone is “tangibly” harmed (I hit his car) it ma

relatively easy to negotiate a restitution with money. If someone is emotion

harmed, or believes that someone close to him has been harmed or humiliated

path to dealing with that person’s “real interests” may be more complicated, a

may be impossible to “buy him off” with money or creature comforts.

In addition, much of negotiations research has dealt with “tangible thing

positive value,” whereas wanting to injure someone or a nation is an intang

(hard to see, understand, label, discuss, and quantify) and lies in a negative z

Thus, convincing a vengeful person to cooperate may require a change of atti

on his part, all the way from very negative to positive, and may call for offe

intangibles of value. The next fi gure illustrates this graphically:
293

before capture). This would make it all the more important for the U

to use trained educers who could plan (with their team) strategies t

as effective as possible in changing some of the source’s views a

information. Part of this plan might involve offering intangibles to 

things better and at least not make them worse. 

Sources of Power in Negotiation Theory

Different theorists have compiled slightly different lists of “sour

in negotiation, but they are all short lists. That is, there is only a fi n

kinds of negotiation power. Some sources of power explored in th

associated with potential collaboration: building respect or at least cre

charisma and moral authority effectively, and offering rewards. Som

power are associated with competition: taking away alternative opti

other person, using sanctions, and employing commitment power 

in the negotiation until the source gives in). Some are associated w

strategies: the use of force or putting someone in fear, extreme use of 

power, and attempts to deprive the other person of any alternative o

Many questions about the ethics of negotiation relate to uses o

people disagree profoundly about when and how various sources of p

be used. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the ethical issu

with respect to all controversial EI methods it would seem reason

to know if any of the controversial methods can be proven to be m

compared with other methods, in eliciting accurate and useful info

known use of any sources of power in EI, especially in cross-cultu

therefore be studied for short- and long-term effectiveness.

Legitimate Authority

Legitimate or positional authority recognized by the other 

commonly acknowledged form of power. However, in EI, a de

not recognize his captor as a legitimate authority for the purpose

information or for any other purpose. He might see a relevant religi

a source of legitimate authority, which may hurt the interests of the 

if the leader speaks against the United States, or might help if a relev

leader were to condemn terrorism. A detainee might also recognize a

placed detainee as a legitimate authority, which may hurt the interests 

States, or might conceivably be used to help the process of EI if that h

source became willing to cooperate. In order to sow doubt in the min

about previous beliefs it might be helpful to consider any possibl

authority” that might help to persuade him to share information.

An attempt to presume “legitimate authority” can be used agains

of the United States. For example, if sources believe they are being h
294

Rewards and Sanctions

Rewards and sanctions are used very commonly, and in many contexts

sources of power in eliciting information. In EI, many tangible and intang

rewards and sanctions could be explored, from the beginning to the end of th

process. These might include rewards and sanctions that affect the condition

detention, the reputation and status of the source, positive and negative effect

the source’s family and friends, and respect for religion. 

In negotiation theory, and in many cultures, an important element of rew

relates to reciprocity. We know that many people expect a concession to 

reciprocated by some other concession: if we offer something the other pe

“should” reciprocate, and vice versa. Thus, if the source offers information 

educer “should” consider reciprocity. EI might therefore include planning 

reciprocal rewards (and sanctions). For example, the process of negotia

itself might be seen as a ”reward” to the source — a positive gesture that c

little or nothing. It could begin with apparently small tangibles and intangib

where will the EI discussion take place? Will there be food, and time for relig

observance? How will the discussions be conducted? And, especially, could th

points be negotiated with the source in a manner that might, in and of itself, 

to build some credibility, some “connection,” and a sense of “strategic respec

Force, and Threats of Force

Interrogators around the world have used force, and threats of force

sources of power, probably achieving occasional short-term and long-term g

The use of force by the United States may also have caused short and long-t

damage to U.S. interests and credibility, some of which may not be known. 

Negotiation theory would suggest that threats should be planned strategic

threats should be appropriate to the task, appropriately timed, and believabl

would seem that the use of force or threats of force might best be used onl

part of careful strategic planning, with careful attention to possible positive 

negative consequences — for getting accurate and useful information, and for 

long-term interests of the United States. It is hoped that any such use woul

evaluated for effectiveness.

EI may be an unusually diffi cult task to accomplish by physical forc

appears easier to stop someone by force from talking than to compel speec

especially accurate and truthful speech. (The nature of the “negotiation” of for

someone to talk is inherently problematic, unless the interrogator knows eno

facts to know when the source is lying or that his information is inaccurate.) 

Using force, with the intent to stop the use of force if and when a sourc

willing to talk, might present diffi culties for both parties in understanding wha

other party may do. How would the educer know when to stop? What does the 

of force do to the judgment of the person who uses it? On the other side, a so
295

In fact, the interrogator who uses physical force may lack bel

any other strategy. The very nature of the use of physical force w

undermine the likelihood of useful connection with a source beyond t

sessions. It might also increase a source’s hatred of the United State

in suicide or willingness to be killed. So-called “restrained forcin

worthy of study in EI.

The fear of injury, and implicit and explicit threats of the use of 

a source or his family and friends, could also be problematic. (Puttin

fear may be interpreted as intending harm, even though it may in fac

as an alternative to actual harm.) However, careful research might s

is sometimes effective.

Sources may have received training to resist EI, but the tr

not necessarily “take hold” immediately after capture, espec

unsophisticated captive. There may be a period after capture when 

and/or disorientation (keeping someone “off base”) might lead a so

to talk. A source might even be able to save face among his peers if h

claim that he was immediately in great fear of injury. (Educers m

using “good cop/bad cop” [or, more accurately, “bad cop/good cop”

those who have just been captured.) 

Educers must remember that the use of physical force again

especially forms of coercion that are claimed to be illegal — may 

against the United States. For example, others might then fi nd it easi

our own troops. 

Information Power

Accurate information, especially information about the real 

knowledge of the specifi c source, appears essential in every strategy. 

require checking of educed information for accuracy and usefulness

power may be the most important source of power in EI.

Negotiation theory suggests that it is vital for educers to lear

things about the individual source before interrogation so that th

a strategy and the uses of various forms of power. For example, 

available from a central database, or “intake” members of the EI te

able to learn something about the interests of a source (theory sug

real “negotiation” with the source will begin at the fi rst meeting 

member of the team). Negotiation practice would also suggest the i

(seen or unseen) observers and analysts available to peruse the res

interrogation session — in part to integrate what is learned, in p

established ethical guidelines, in part to monitor effectiveness, a

prepare for the next EI session. 
296

therefore another issue that deserves further study. Bluffi ng and decei

(the source) are two classic topics of negotiation theory that EI research c

evaluate. Another topic deserving study is any past use of imparting informa

or misinformation to a source who was set free.

In thinking about EI, one would imagine getting information from a so

to send to some central agency where the information can be combined w

information from other sources. A negotiations theorist would also assume 

information should continuously come to the educer from other agencies to k

improving the EI process. 

Negotiation theory has for decades examined the pivotal role of 

“constituencies” behind the parties. How information is communicated f

the EI team to the fi nal user, and from the intelligence community that coll

many sources of information back to the EI team, would therefore seem to b

important topic for review. How information is communicated (if at all) am

the source and fellow detainees and fellow countrymen would also be impor

if this could be studied. 

Information power is of course widely used against the interests of 

United States, for example, if terrorists effectively prepare sources to resis

tactics. Sources may also plan, or be instructed, to use misinformation aga

U.S. interests.

Expertise

Expertise, especially expertise in the language, values, culture, way

thinking and interests of the source and his people, would seem essential 

source of power. For example, such expertise is probably vital to the abilit

convey respect for the source’s religious beliefs. To change somebody’s m

about giving information — in negotiation theory, moving his point of resista

to giving information — the educer may need to “sow doubt” in the source’s m

as to the validity of his views about talking. An EI team also would need expe

about the beliefs of a source to assess the effectiveness of various EI tactic

persuading sources to give useful information.

Expertise in the process of EI will be vital to plan and implement a co

of action appropriate to each source. Expertise and preparation in resisting 

may also be widely used against U.S. interests, and educers should there

understand the techniques that might be used. 

Elegant Solutions

Elegant solutions are a source of power in which a negotiator who has c

to understand the real interests of a source or a group of sources crafts d

in which certain information may be exchanged for certain benefi ts — deal

which the source and the United States can both say “yes.” For example the 
297

build a certain kind of credibility; namely, that the United States c

to honor the deal.) 

Commitment Power

Commitment power is the power of persistence in negotiation. I

form, it means that the interrogator will never relent, in the hope th

will “give up,” cede control over his life, and then provide informati

hope, all ye who enter here.) Commitment power may sometimes be 

appear effective, in getting people to say something, but it carries wit

downside: taking away options from people may also incite rage, 

and a permanent rejection of more positive tactics that might later b

is one of the many reasons to consider negotiating over apparently 

such as where and how EI sessions will be conducted, in order to 

source’s pain of feeling that he has lost control over his life. It migh

educer to “let up” sometimes in an interrogation, and just to listen.) P

speaking, some uses of commitment power might also pose legal d

the United States. 

Commitment power can of course also be used against the in

United States. For example, a source may simply refuse to speak, or 

someone to kill him. The source who uses commitment power again

may at the least incite weariness, acute frustration, and rage.

There is a classic negotiations question about dealing with 

use of commitment power: how to help the other person, or onese

commitment, or change one’s position, without losing face. This wo

be an essential element of EI — how to help the source give informa

save face. It could also happen that the educing team fails badly in 

but the negotiation must continue. How might the United States pro

losing face? 

As noted above, one possible way for a source not to lose face is 

able to convince his peers that he was in extreme fear. (It does not f

need actually have been injured.) However, there is also a classic list o

which includes discovery of “new facts,” a change in the “rules,” 

new “authority,” or the appointment of a new negotiator. These m

occasionally be useful if an educer needs to reposition the discuss

“new facts hitherto unknown to the source,” or to declare that some 

has changed “due to new orders,” or to send in a new interrogator (f

extraneous reasons but actually to improve the “chemistry” betwee

source). 

Another classic method to help a source save face is simply 

previous commitment as if it had never existed. For example, the 

behave as though the source had never taken an oath that he would n
298

all these weeks to tell me X, for the sake of our relationship — if I have to tel

boss I have failed, I will be in serious trouble.”) and for the educer then to g

something of value to the source, “because of our relationship.”

Relationship Power

Emotions, like all sources of power, can play positive or negative roles w

respect to the interests of the United States. Making enemies, especially needle

may worsen the situation of the United States with the individual source 

with his countrymen. In fact, educers should always consider the possibilitie

building some “chemistry” or a “strategic connection.” In this mode the ed

would think of “recruiting” the source. Establishing some minimum res

between educer and source would likely be a prerequisite for elegant solut

and deals and also for recruiting agents, changing the mind of the occasi

source, building an atmosphere where sources let down their guard with pe

planted in their midst, and so on.

Negotiation theorists and experienced interrogators could be misunderst

when they use terms such as “relationship,” “trust,” “interpersonal chemis

“positive emotions,” or “rapport.” These terms seem to imply making friends w

an enemy. Nevertheless, the “strategic connection” between a particular so

and a particular interrogator is likely to be essential to effective EI. Strat

respect and building credibility may be important, especially in those cases w

there could be some on-going interactions or where saving face for the sourc

the United States is at issue. Believability is important for the use of reward

threats.

Moral Authority and Charisma

Moral authority and charisma are important sources of power in the pre

confl ict with terrorists. Consistently and effectively conveying respect for 

customs and religion of a source might on occasion be a prerequisite to sow

doubt in the source’s political belief system. As noted previously, moral autho

may also be used with great effect against the interests of the United State

recruit people willing to use violence, persuade sources not to speak, and so 

Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) or “Fallback 

Position”

Having a BATNA is a source of power, and the lack of a BATNA is a sourc

weakness, in the present confl ict. The fallback position for each side is “What 

happen if this negotiation does not succeed?” Beliefs about “what we will d

this does not work” would defi ne both the U.S. resistance point (where we w

give up trying to educe information from a specifi c person) and the resista

point of the source (when he might decide to give information, or alternati

seek to commit suicide, suffer injury that would prevent him from talking

provoke his being injured or killed). To shift the resistance point — to change 

source’s mind about talking — the interrogator would wish to sow doubt in 
299

In an emergency situation there might be very little time to t

someone’s mind; in trying to educe information against a tight 

“ticking bomb” scenario) the United States would have no fallback 

negotiations terms, the BATNA power of the source would be great a

United States correspondingly weak. Alternatives in this situation w

on knowing or guessing what matters to the individual and using tha

according to a strategic plan. In such a situation it might be especia

to focus on the goal (obtaining accurate and useful information) 

“distractions” as the wish to vent frustration or punish the source. 

In the war against terrorism any person willing and able to co

would have a near-perfect BATNA — the strongest in the world in 

use of force. The United States would need to build a fallback posi

the face of detainees’ willingness and ability to commit suicide, m

of power might yet be effective if there were time to use them: 

mobilizing any imam who opposes the use of violence or citing a fa

so, applying rewards and sanctions judiciously, instituting a tenaci

term effort to win friends for the United States, and “building co

careful long-term plan to gain — and deserve — moral authority).

For Effectiveness: Prepare, Prepare, Prepare

Several basic tasks seem essential for effectiveness in every stra

negotiation: 

• Taking note of the relevant parties whose interests are at st

• Discovering – or at least developing working hypotheses 

tangible and intangible interests of each party;

• Evaluating the sources of power available to each side in E

• Developing relevant options for interrogation, and “fallbac

• Planning strategy, style, and sequencing of tactics with the 

• Planning the role of each team member (for example

preliminary assessment, interrogation, analysis behind 

integration of data into and from the relevant intelligenc

database, on-going evaluation and guidance to educers, an

information, and collection of records that can be analyzed 

knowledge and practice).

The fi rst two tasks need special care.
300

g 

the short-term and long-term goals of the United States. The short-term inter

are to obtain as much useful and accurate information as possible, as fas

possible. Longer-term interests could include improving the image of the cou

the possibility of sowing doubt in the mind of a potential enemy, the importa

of planting information in a person or a group who will be released, and 

possibility of recruiting a secret agent or source. 

It may not be a simple task for the U.S. side to understand the var

interests of the different people involved, let alone build a coherent or effectiv

team. However, planning and preparing a team approach for each source w

be important. 

As an example, one party whose interests are at stake is the U.S. interrog

In a given EI situation the interests of the United States are not necessarily 

same as those of the educer(s). Imagine an untrained, frustrated interrogator 

is angry with “terrorists,” loathes his or her job in a detainee camp, and f

great pressure to “get results.” This person, or the EI team, might have an inte

in “taking it out” on a source in a way that will not be in the short- or long-t

interests of the United States. A poorly trained interrogator or one who l

self-discipline might try to show off to co-workers in unfortunate ways, with

understanding the possible damage to U.S. interests. An interrogator who 

just arrived on the scene might not know what he or she needs to unders

about U.S. operational goals, and might therefore act according to his or her 

interests.

There might also be multiple agencies, or agents from multiple count

interested in information from one source. It may sometimes be helpful, as 

of a thoughtful strategic plan, for different people to try to educe informa

from the same source, together or separately. However, theory suggests 

the presence of known observers and multiple parties is likely to change 

dynamics of a negotiation. Multiple educers could also be quite damaging — 

presence of more than one educer or educer team might make any of the pa

less cooperative. The involvement of more than one educer might someti

interfere with establishment of a “connection” with a source. Planning the r

of each member of the EI team would seem essential. 

Preparing with Respect to the Interests of the Source

What are the interests of the source and relevant persons who support 

source and/or his position? The characteristics of each individual source migh

important. Some sources may not be bitter enemies of the United States. S

may not know anything of value. Some may be willing to trade (for example, 

might trade information for reputation, family benefi ts, money, or something 

of value). Some may be affected emotionally in predictable ways, for goo

for ill, by the way they are treated. Some might be “turned” and become wil

to provide information because of an interest in freedom and opportunity 

themselves and family members. Some might occasionally want their viewp
301

understanding the training methods may indicate ways of sowing 

training.

Another reason to know the interests of a source is to und

negotiation theory refers to as a “resistance point”: a point at whic

changes his mind in an important way about dealing with the educe

be the point at which the source will stop dealing with his captors a

alternatives, such as trying to injure himself seriously, persuade som

injure him, or commit suicide. A source might have a resistance point 

kind; that is, a point at which the source will decide to share — or ap

— important information. The educer would obviously benefi t from 

this latter resistance point in order to try to move it toward coop

educer might endeavor to lower the resistance point by causing t

doubt his own assessments, either about the United States or about h

To identify something to trade the educer would need to kn

source would value: for example, changing aspects of the EI session

of custody, contacts with family, or time of release. EI interactions m

numerous opportunities to offer something of value — tangible or 

that involves little or no cost to U.S. interests. And if the source accep

of value, this might also mean that he now might stand to lose som

were to stop being helpful.

Few sources would be unique: each belongs to a religious grou

group, and an ethnic culture. He may belong to an extended fam

interacts with an individual source may be, de facto, part of a 

“negotiation” with all the others in his immediate group, and pot

all the people around the world who identify with the source. Me

source’s ethnic or religious group may also be at the site of the negot

means the question of “negotiating with the constituency” is close 

willingness of a source to give information might depend in impor

the attitudes of a group of sources and might require that the source 

from other sources. Alternatively, a group of sources might include 

different backgrounds whose interests at least initially differ. Suc

among the sources might advance U.S. interests if the United States c

a coalition with one or another group.

The Need for Research about Negotiations and 

The founders of modern-day negotiation theory, Walton an

developed their theory by studying records of negotiations.689 This 

could easily be extended to EI. Existing records of EI sessions, inclu

689 Richard Walton and Robert McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negot

Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1965). 
302

analyzed in negotiation terms. 

Perhaps the most important reason for establishing an on-going rese

team would be not just to evaluate tactics “today,” or in a single time pe

but for continuous improvement of EI. Further study seems especially impor

with respect to cross-cultural interactions; for example, building a strat

connection and credibility and understanding success in identifying and chan

the resistance points of sources. Gender, nationality and religion of educer 

source would seem especially important in cross-cultural interactions. 

Many different areas of negotiation theory may be important. For exam

research could:

• Investigate coalition theory, and the importance of the “constituen

behind the educer and the source, to help U.S. educers who are pa

an extended intelligence community work with sources who are part 

group or come from different groups; 

• Examine the effects of having a team of educers in the room in compar

to having one person conduct the negotiation;

• Study well-known tactics such as “good cop/bad cop” and “restra

forcing”;

• Track the sequencing of imparting information to a source to test 

accuracy of information provided by a source;

• Evaluate the usefulness of planting information and misinforma

and 

• Track the use of information, from the EI team to fi nal user, and f

central databases to the EI team.

EI practitioners might explore the possibility of bringing together a 

negotiations theorists who have analyzed hundreds of negotiations to prepa

protocol for analysis of records. They might either obtain clearances or train anal

with security clearances to study old EI records from a negotiation perspec

By the same token, it might be useful to bring negotiations experts together w

EI experts simply to discuss best practices and continuous improvement.
303

Eduction Practices

Paul Lehner, Ph.D.

The MITRE Corporation

November 2005

Abstract

Eduction practices are methods, techniques, procedures, strate

employed as part of interviews and interrogations to draw out in

from subjects, some of whom may initially be unwilling to prov

mation. Obviously educed information can provide an important 

HUMINT. Surprisingly, the last forty years have seen almost no 

research examining eduction practices. Rather, our current kno

based on feedback and lessons learned from fi eld experience. T

rogation approaches” taught in standard interrogation training (e

Field Manual 34-52) have remained largely unchanged since W

II.

This paper argues two points: fi rst, that scientifi c investigation of 

practices is needed to supplement lessons learned from fi eld e

and second, that various research venues are available to exam

practices. Research approaches could include both retrospective 

of data about past interrogations (including those that used harsh 

and new studies that relate different eduction practices to the v

formation obtained.

Need for Scientific Investigation of Eduction P

As noted above, current knowledge of eduction practices 

experience. However, considerable historical and scientifi c evide

that expertise and experience provide an insuffi cient basis for det

effectiveness of practices when experts subjectively evaluate their o

To illustrate, consider the case of a procedure to alleviate psychia

that emerged from the medical community in the 1930s. According 

study, 121 out of 133 patients either “improved” or “improved so

another 153 patients improved, while 73 remained the same or got w

basis of these encouraging results the procedure gained in popularity

until the late 1960s to treat thousands of patients. The pioneer of t

received the 1949 Nobel prize in medicine. The procedure? Lobotom
304

downward a few minutes later. He then repeats the incision on 

the other side of the brain.... The patient is given only local 

anesthetic at the temples — the brain itself is insensitive—and 

the doctors encourage him to talk, sing, recite poems or prayers. 

When his replies to questions show that his mind is thoroughly 

disoriented, the doctors know that they have cut deep enough 

into his brain.690

How could this procedure receive rave reviews? Apparently, the fl aw 

these early studies was simply that physicians who provided these treatments 

rated the results. We know of no evidence to suggest that these physicians w

intentionally biased or deceitful; or that they had anything other than the 

interest of their patients at heart.

For a more contemporary example, consider the presumed ability of 

enforcement interrogators to evaluate their subjects. Professional interroga

view nonverbal cues as important for detecting deception. Such cues include l

of eye contact; movement of legs, feet, head and trunk; shifting body positi

“covering gestures” such as a hand over the mouth while talking; ear tugging

All of these have been tested; none is substantiated as an indicator of deceptio

A similar result occurs when interrogators are asked to determine (on the b

of case summaries and interrogation videotapes) whether a confession is tru

false. Most studies show that trained and untrained evaluators (e.g., police offi 

and college students) are equally poor at distinguishing between the confess

of guilty and innocent study subjects, even when viewing videotaped intervi

from law enforcement situations. Often, however, law enforcement perso

have more confi dence in their abilities than untrained subjects — even tho

their detection capabilities are no better.692

Associated with such examples is an extensive scientifi c literature on hu

judgment. We will not review this literature here, but simply note that the exam

noted above should not be considered atypical.693 Natural human judgment bi

such as the Law of Small Numbers (the tendency to jump to conclusions on 

basis of too little data) and the Confi rmation bias (the tendency to underweigh

ignore evidence inconsistent with current beliefs), are very strong. These bi

690 This description of the history of lobotomy was drawn from R. Dawes, House of Cards: 

Psychology and Psychotherapy Built on Myth (New York, The Free Press, 1994). 691 Research on detection deception is summarized in G. Hazlett, “Detection of Deception Res

Review,” prepared under the auspices of this ISB study. 692 See S. M. Kassin, Meissner, and R. J. Norwick, ”I’d Know a False Confession If I Saw O

A Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators. Law and Human Behavior, 

(2005), 211-227. 693 For review of this research see R. Hastie, and R. Dawes, Rational Choice in an Unce

World: The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publica

2001).
305

These fi ndings have a clear implication for the assessment 

practices: it is imprudent to base assessment only on the subject

of interrogators. Interrogators are professionals, and are certainl

to providing the most honest evaluations they can. However, unle

greatly from other experts, their judgments and memories will be bi

of the effectiveness of the practices they employ. Information glean

experience constitutes a critical source of knowledge, and without q

of the lessons learned from such experiences are valid. But, equ

question, many are invalid. Which is which? Only objective, scien

can help to distinguish between them. 

Feasibility of Scientific Investigation of E

Practices 

Researchers have substantial opportunity to investigate educ

scientifi cally in ways that pose no ethical or political problems. Th

below outline some alternative study designs for these scientifi c inv

Venue 1: Objective Analysis of Contemporary Interrogation

As noted above, considerable evidence indicates that experts 

effectiveness of their own practices. This occurs particularly when e

receive frequent, objective feedback on the results of their practices 

the circumstance in which interrogators usually fi nd themselves. A

know whether or not a subject “talked,” they do not receive substan

on the accuracy or usefulness of the information educed. This can ca

because a subject who has decided to feign cooperation would pro

to “reveal” two types of information: information that is accurate bu

information that appears useful, but is inaccurate. 

Solving this problem requires independent, objective assess

information educed. Fortunately, straightforward approaches exist 

such assessments. In essence, analysts should rate the usefulne

and timeliness of the information distributed from interrogation

objectivity, the analysts performing these ratings should not know 

of the information. Furthermore, these ratings should be delayed u

actions taken to follow up on the educed information are complete

694 For a concrete example to which the reader can relate, have you ever see

basketball player on a “hot streak,” “in the zone,” etc.? In fact, you haven’t. A det

shooting behavior in almost every venue imaginable has yet to fi nd a single professi

exhibits streaks beyond chance. The chance of making the next shot is simply ind

results of recent previous shots. In fact, shooting behavior is maximally inconsiste

streak” hypothesis. Nevertheless, anyone who watches a game, including those of us 

statistics, “sees” streaks. The hot streaks are completely obvious and completely illus
306

Objective feedback would provide a wealth of information about educ

practices. At a minimum, the accuracy, usefulness, and timeliness of the edu

information could be correlated with:

Eduction strategy. Objective feedback may shed light on the effectiveness 

of different strategies. It would certainly provide data for an objective 

inquiry into claims about the effectiveness of alternative approaches to 

eduction, such as building rapport, use of coercion and stress, indirect 

eduction using stooges, etc.

Interrogator characteristics. Interrogators with certain backgrounds 

or training may be especially effective. It may also be that certain 

interrogators are simply better. If researchers can establish, objectively, 

that some interrogators are better than others, they can begin to investigate 

the defi ning characteristics of better interrogators.

Interrogator assessments. Can interrogators actually distinguish between 

subjects who cooperate and those who feign cooperation? It is important 

to understand the extent to which, in general, one can rely on the EI 

practitioners themselves to predict the value of the information they 

distribute. 

Subject characteristics/behaviors. Different subjects react differently, 

and collecting data that relates subject characteristics to EI results will 

offer considerable guidance for future EI.

Field testing of new methods. Of course, as new eduction methods are 

introduced into the fi eld, the objective assessment of interrogation results 

would also provide objective feedback about the effectiveness of the new 

methods. 

Venue 2: Objective Analysis of Historical Interrogations

Consider the following (paraphrased) claims:

“The initial goal of an interrogation is to break the subjects’ will. Once 

is accomplished, the subjects will tell you everything they know.”

“Torture is a poor interrogation technique. The information you obtain f

the subject is unreliable.”

Researchers cannot ethically investigate claims such as these by conduc

experiments, either in an academic setting with students as subjects or w

detainees in U.S. custody. However, they may be able to evaluate these cla

by drawing on the considerable historical data available. A principal data so

would be historical POW records and post-detainment debriefi ngs. Unfortuna

torture-based methods were commonly practiced against U.S. POWs, so a we

of such data exists.
307

verbal descriptions, the eduction practices employed. This 

should be completed before the records that will be part of 

formal analysis are examined.

Step 2: Partition each record into three sets of statements 

 S1: Statements about the eduction practices employed

 S2: Statements about the information educed

 S3: Statements not related to either method or information.

To the extent possible, the timing of the S1 and S2 statem

should be noted to indicate when the event occurred. With P

data such timing information will be approximate at best (

“This happened during the fi rst few months after I was capture

but it will still be useful.

Step 3: Analyze S1 statements and apply the criteria in Step 

determine the eduction practices employed. This assessment m

be performed by individuals who were not involved in Step 

Step 4 below. This will ensure that knowledge of the informa

educed does not infl uence the determination of the met

employed.

Step 4: Analyze the S2 statements. This should be done by 

analyst or historian who is asked to rate information statem

for accuracy, usefulness, and completeness. Step 4 must als

executed by people who were not involved in Steps 2 or 3.

Step 5: Analyze the statistical correlation between the educ

practices employed and the accuracy, usefulness, and complete

of the information educed. The person performing the statis

analysis need not be informed of the content of the S1 and 

statements.

Using these data sets and analysis procedures, it should be po

some of the claims about the effi cacy of eduction practices that the 

does not now employ. For example, the claim that subjects can be “bro

that subjects will reach a point where they will simply “tell all.” The 

assessments resulting from Step 4 may shed considerable light 

this is true. Similarly, the claim that torture results in unreliable in

equally testable, provided we have an independent evaluation of the 

educed.695

While an objective analysis of historical data is unlikely to gener

results on many questions of interest, it will provide some scientifi c 

the validity of claims about coercive techniques. These data should 

695 We believe it may be possible to acquire North Vietnamese records of POW in
308

, p() g y

training under conditions that are made as stressful as practical. They provid

excellent subject pool for investigating eduction practices involving stress: b

practices intended to induce stress and methods that do not induce stress but 

lead to results that differ from those obtained under non-stress conditions.

Unlike the objective analyses described above, research with stud

undergoing SERE training provides an opportunity for controlled experimenta

where the effect of an EI practice can be carefully separated from other varia

This will be particularly useful for evaluating individual techniques intende

have immediate impact or results, such as detection of deception, interpreta

of behaviors, behavioral tricks, etc. 

However, since the SERE program only lasts a few weeks, research w

SERE students would not help in assessing practices based on building cer

longer term relationships with the subject. For example, the general claim 

rapport-based approaches are superior to coercive methods cannot be teste

this setting.

Venue 4: Experiments with Other Military Personnel

Eduction practices that do not involve coercion or stress could be teste

the general military population. Experiments with military personnel would 

particularly appropriate for research on practices whose effectiveness depend

the subject’s ignorance of the specifi cs of the technique. For example, subj

could defeat questioning strategies that derive information from what a sub

does not say, or the manner in which a subject responds to a question, if they k

which behaviors the interrogators were seeking. 

Venue 5: University Research 

While ethical or secrecy concerns preclude university research on s

practices, many eduction practices are entirely benign and open. Research 

new and innovative approaches to educing information could and should proc

in a traditional university setting. Indeed, as some of the reviews in this study h

documented, a wealth of ideas and approaches have already been investigate

this setting.696

Venue 6: Research with Foreign Personnel 

The extent to which culture and language infl uence the effi cacy of var

eduction practices remains an open question. It is not at all clear, for exam

whether any behavioral indicators of deception cross cultural boundaries. As 

techniques are developed, researchers must test them with people from div

696 In particular, see G. Hazlett, “Detection of Deception Research Review,” and R. B

“Approaching Truth: Behavioral Science Lessons on Educing Information from Human Sources,” 

prepared under the auspices of this ISB study.
309

to U.S. culture, so the ability to generalize from this research ma

Opportunities to perform fi eld tests with subjects under U.S. cus

sparse. This suggests a need to develop cooperative research arrang

other nations to engage in this research in their university and per

settings. 

Summary of Venues

The table below summarizes this discussion by showing how d

of eduction practices can be investigated in different venues. Educt

vary by whether they seek tactical, short-term results (e.g., immed

deception) or strategic, long-term results (e.g., build rapport). Th

according to the degree of coercion employed or stress induced. 

shows, the different venues are appropriate for examining different 

eduction practices.

No Stress Low Stress Moderate

 Stress

Tactical/

short-term

results

University

Research;

Military

Research;

Foreign

Research

Military 

Research;

SERE Students;

Contemporary

Interrogations

SERE

Students

Strategic/

long-term

results

University

Research;

Military

Research;

Foreign

Research

Contemporary

Interrogations

POW 

Records

Research venues appropriate for different types of eduction 

Source: The author.

Taken together, the diversity of research venues suggests tha

have substantial opportunities to assess scientifi cally many, if no

eduction practices that the United States might employ. They can 

substantial retrospective scientifi c inquiries into practices the Unite

not employ. 
310

for determining the effectiveness of eduction practices. A program of scien

research on eduction practices is both necessary and highly feasible. Researc

have diverse venues available to investigate eduction practices. Such a rese

program should combine experimental research with a substantial effor

perform independent and objective analyses of specifi c interrogation results.
311

Theresa Dillon

The MITRE Corporation

February 2006

This selected, annotated bibliography accompanies the Intelligen

Board Study on Educing Information. It includes the most usefu

English covering the theory, research and pragmatics of interrog

the past 50 years. Deception detection, persuasion, and complianc

as well as legal and military doctrine are not covered in this biblio

Interrogation Best Practices

Biderman, A. D. (1960). “Social Psychological Needs and ‘Involunt

Behavior As Illustrated by Compliance in Interrogation.” S

(2), 120-147. 

 Drawing on a study of former Korean War U.S. Air Force P

Biderman presents a social-psychological framework to ex

prisoners yield during interrogation, with emphasis on the i

of most POWs to remain silent during interrogation. Silenc

inconsistent with the prisoners’ need to maintain a viable so

and positive self-esteem. Also considered are the effects of 

hostility and guilt.

Bowden, M. (2003). “The Dark Art of Interrogation.” The Atlantic M

October, 51-76. http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200310/bo

[Accessed 5/8/2006] 

 Bowden provides an in-depth account of the debate over to

via case studies and interviews. The author traces the histor

U.S. interrogation and presents best practices as reported b

interrogators from Israel’s General Security Service, the Ne

Police Department, and the CIA.

Johnson, W. R. (1986). “Tricks of the Trade: Counterintelligence Int

The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintell

103-113. 
312

hard cases involving sociopaths, veterans of torture and professiona

intelligence offi cers.

Lelyveld, J. (2005). “Interrogating Ourselves.” New York Times Magazine, 12 

June. 

 This essay reviews legal issues surrounding “torture lite.” The autho

reports on interviews with high-profi le interrogators about best 

practices in interrogation; reviews the Kennedy School and Harvard 

Law School project that proposes legislating standards for the 

application of torture lite; and examines what the United States can 

learn from interrogation practices in Israel.

Meltzer, M. L. (1958). Power and Resistance in Interrogation. DTIC – 

AD220464. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Medical 

Center. Distribution authorized to U.S. government agencies and the

contractors. 

 Meltzer examines different types of power employed by interrogator

including reward power, coercive power, expert power, attraction po

and legitimate power. Citing supporting research studies, the author 

details when each approach should be used and the psychological 

forces at work.

Moran, S. F. (1944). Suggestions for Japanese Interpreters Based on Work in 

Field. San Francisco: Division Intelligence Section, Headquarters, F

Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force. The original source document 

located at the Alfred M. Gray Research Center (USMC Archives) of 

Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia. Link:

http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/MCRCweb/

 This letter report by Marine Major Sherwood Moran highlights the 

importance of attitude and language skills for a successful interprete

He rejects strong-arm tactics in favor of rapport building. Interpreter

should exhibit sincerity and sympathy and be good salesmen. Idiom

language skills and cultural knowledge are also recommended. Havi

spent 40 years in Japan as a missionary prior to WWII, Moran draw

his knowledge of language and culture in this timeless report.

Stanton, G. (1995). “Defense against Communist Interrogation Organizations

In H. B. Westerfi eld (ed), Inside the CIA’s Private World: Declassifi e

Articles from the Agency’s Internal Journal, 1955-1992. New Haven

CT: Yale University Press, 415-436. 
313

expect and how to behave at each stage from arrest to inter

also describes arguments and tactics used to make suspecte

and suggests effective resistance strategies.

Toliver, R. F., and Scharff, H. J. (1978). The Interrogator: The Story 

Joachim Scharff, Master Interrogator of The Luftwaffe. Fal

Aero Publishers.

 During World War II, Hanns Scharff served as master interr

the Luftwaffe. He questioned captured U.S. fi ghter pilots o

Eighth and Ninth Air Forces. Through analysis of pocket li

fi les on pilots and squadrons, and transcripts of radio comm

Scharff could convince a captured pilot that he already kne

After the offi cial interview ended, Scharff would induce sol

reveal military secrets through conversation rather than coe

technique included befriending the captured pilots and show

for rank. 

Zimmer, H., and Meltzer, M. L. (1957). An Annotated Bibliography 

Relevant to the Interrogation Process. DTIC – AD220465. Washing

Georgetown University Medical Center. Distribution authorized to U

government agencies and their contractors. 

 Covering the fi elds of psychology, sociology, anthropology

psychiatry, and medicine, this bibliography, published in 19

together unclassifi ed scientifi c literature related to the inter

process. Complete with abstracts, the bibliography is broke

into the following sections: interpersonal observation and e

deception and the accuracy of reported information; comm

and interaction between two persons; communication and i

methodology; authority and its internalization; reactions to 

pressures; manipulation of the source’s conscious controls; 

compliance, conformity, and conversion; morale in combat 

captivity; and the group as a source of support or confl ict fo

individual.

Interrogation Case Studies

Bond, M. (2004). “The Enforcer.” New Scientist, 20 November. 

 Michael Koubi worked for Shin Bet, Israel’s security servic

years and was its chief interrogator from 1987 to 1993. In t

Koubi discusses best practices and provides details on the i

of Sheikh Yassin, the former leader of the Palestinian group 
314

Palestinian woman about her interrogation by Koubi after she was 

arrested while trying to smuggle sensitive photographs across the 

border. She describes the techniques Koubi used to try to get her to t

Hoffman, B. (2002). “A Nasty Business.” The Atlantic Monthly, 289 (1), Janu

49-52. 

 A terrorism expert, Hoffman illustrates the complexity of gathering 

human intelligence from insurgents. He uses the Battle of Algiers an

Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka as case studies.

Mackey, C., and Miller, G. (2004). The Interrogators: Inside the Secret War 

against Al Qaeda. New York: Little, Brown.

 In this memoir, a senior interrogator details the U.S. Army interroga

operation, including interrogation training at Fort Huachuca, langua

training at the Defense Language Institute, and deployment as an 

interrogator in Afghanistan. This narrative covers interrogation 

strategies and case studies; collection priorities and fi ndings; report 

writing and analysis; and the relationships between military intellige

services, and domestic and foreign civil intelligence agencies. The 

motivations of detainees from different ethnic groups are also exami

Pribbenow, M. L. (2004). “The Man in the Snow White Cell.” Studies 

 in Intelligence, 48 (1).

http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol48no1/article06.html 

[Accessed 5/8/2006] 

 Nguyen Tai, the most senior North Vietnamese offi cer captured in th

Vietnam War, was interrogated by both the U.S. and South Vietname

using a variety of strategies. He spent the last three years in a white 

cell, lit around the clock by bright lights, and kept at cold temperatu

This case study provides a history of Tai’s capture and interrogation 

well as his remarkable strength in concealing his knowledge of Nort

Vietnamese operations.

Pryor, F. L. (1994/1995). “On Reading My Stasi Files.” National Interest, Wi

 From 1959 through 1961 the author lived in West Berlin, writing his 

doctoral dissertation for Yale University on the foreign trade system 

the Soviet bloc, using East Germany as a case study. While traveling 

East Berlin, he was arrested and charged with espionage and release

fi ve months later. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Stasi fi les beca

open. The author reviews his fi les, examining the motives of the Sta

and the methods used in his interrogation.
315

 Saar, an army linguist deployed for six months at Guantana

Camp Delta, shares his experiences of working in both the 

Detainee Operations Group (JDOG) and the Joint Intelligen

(JIG) from December 2002 to June 2003. With the JDOG, h

an Arabic translator on the cell blocks, translating between 

and the military police (MP), medics and psych teams. Wit

he supported interrogators from the U.S. Army, civilian int

agencies, and civilian contracting fi rms. Problems include a 

command structure, training gaps, morale issues, and intra- 

group hostilities. He describes treatment of the detainees by 

organization of detainees on the cell blocks, and what happ

interrogation room.

Van de Velde, J. R. (2005). Camp Chaos: U.S. Counterterrorism Ope

at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. International Journal of Intellig

Counterintelligence, 18, 538-548. 

 The author, who had been stationed at Guantanamo Bay (G

as both a naval intelligence offi cer and later as a contractor

the GTMO operation and highlights its shortcomings. Whil

SOUTHCOM is in charge at GTMO, the camp falls victim 

competing interests of the CIA, the FBI and the DoD. GTM

plagued by an ill-defi ned mission and the lack of standard p

for producing and distributing intelligence products. The in

that is gathered is not properly analyzed or viewed in a larg

Military interrogators are reservists who spend only 6-8 mo

camp. They tend to clash with civilian contractors with lon

duty and higher pay. 

Zagorin, A., and Duffy, M. (2005). “Inside the Interrogation of Deta

Time Magazine, 165, 25, 20 June. 

 Based on secret interrogation logs, this article details the in

of Guantanamo Bay Detainee 063, Mohammed al-Qahtani

thought to be the 20th hijacker in the Sept. 11 attacks.

Interrogation Policies, Practices and Research

Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination and Exploitation of Americ

and Civilian Prisoners, 84th Congress, 2nd Sess. (1956).

 These 1956 U.S. Senate subcommittee hearings delve into 

interrogation and indoctrination of U.S. prisoners of war. T

a good review of Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps resea
316

Biderman, A. D. (1956). Communist Techniques of Coercive Interrogation. 

DTIC – AD0098908. Randolph Air Force Base: Offi ce for Social 

Science Programs, Air Force Personnel and Training Research 

Center. Distribution authorized to U.S. government agencies and the

contractors. 

 This report describes the coercive techniques employed by the 

Communists to undermine resistance and induce compliance. 

Techniques include isolation; monopolization of attention; induced 

debilitation and exhaustion; cultivation of anxiety and despair; 

alternating punishments and rewards; demonstrating “omnipotence” 

and “omniscience” of the captor; degradation; and enforcing trivial 

and absurd demands. Physical violence and torture are not an essent

part of the Communist repertoire. The author also comments on the 

effectiveness of self-infl icted pain and ideological appeals, as well a

the role of “mind reform” in inducing compliance.

Biderman, A. D. (1957). “Communist Attempts to Elicit False Confessions fr

Air Force Prisoners of War.” Bulletin NY Academy of Medicine 33 (9

616–625. 

 Based on research on repatriated U.S. Air Force POWs captured 

in Korea, Biderman’s article describes how Communists shaped 

compliance and elicited false confessions. The objective of the 

Communists was not merely to get the captor to confess to certain 

acts but, rather, to behave as if he actually committed the confessed 

crimes. Two useful charts are provided, one outlining the eight coerc

methods used by the Communists, including their effects and specifi 

forms, and another detailing the range of POW behaviors in respons

coercion, from complete resistance to complete compliance.

Biderman, A. D., and Zimmer, H. (1961). The Manipulation of Human Behav

 NewYork; London: John Wiley.

 This out-of-print book reviews scientifi c knowledge in the fi eld of 

interrogation, focusing on attempts to elicit factual information from 

an unwilling subject. It includes the following papers: Lawrence 

E. Hinkle Jr., “The physiological state of the interrogation subject 

as it affects brain function”; Philip E. Kubzansky, “The effects of 

reduced environmental stimulation on human behavior: A review”; 

Louis A. Gottschalk, “The use of drugs in interrogation”; R. C. Dav

“Physiological responses as a means of evaluating information” (this 

chapter deals with the polygraph); Dr. Martin T. Orne, “The potentia
317

Biderman, A. D. (1963). An Annotated Bibliography on Prisoner In

Compliance and Resistance. DTIC – AD670999. Washingt

Bureau of Social Science Research. 

 This bibliography contains about 200 items from the unclas

literature that appeared in 1953–1963 on prisoner interroga

compliance and resistance.

Blagrove, M. (1996). “Effects of Length of Sleep Deprivation on Int

Suggestibility.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Appl

59. 

 Blagrove investigates whether loss of sleep can cause peop

acquiesce to leading questions as well as change their answ

subsequent interviews. In this study, subjects listened to tw

stories and later, after one or two nights without sleep, answ

leading questions on information not contained in the storie

Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale, a standard measure of int

suggestibility, participants were scored on how many affi rm

answers they gave to leading questions and on how often th

answers after negative feedback. The study reveals that slee

individuals are more suggestible than control groups, due t

cognitive ability and the motivation to acquiesce.

Cunningham, C. (1972). “International Interrogation Techniques.” J

Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies 117 (3)

 Cunningham, former Senior Psychologist, POW Intelligenc

Ministry of Defence, discusses the object of interrogation a

the three methods of interrogation: direct, indirect, and clan

This article was written in response to the UK’s 1972 Parke

which recommends authorized procedures for the interroga

suspected terrorists.
318

 This brief chapter provides an overview of research on sensory 

deprivation and overload by reviewing the major studies and fi nding

since the 1950s. The practical application of sensory research to a 

variety of domains is discussed.

Hinkle Jr, L. E., and Wolff, H. G. (1956). “Communist Interrogation and 

Indoctrination of ‘Enemies of the States’.” AMA Archives of Neurolo

and Psychiatry 78, 115–174. 

 This comprehensive report provides a detailed analysis of the structu

and practices of the Russian KGB and the state police in Communis

China in the 1950s. On the basis of input from fi eld experts, the stud

of former Communist prisoners, and published literature, Wolff and 

Hinkle provide a window into Communist arrest and interrogation 

systems from investigation to “trial.”

Hoare, O. (ed). (2000). Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies: The Offi cial Hist

of MI5’s Wartime Interrogation Centre. Richmond, Surrey: Public 

Record Offi ce (UK). Originally published in 1947 as TOP SECRET 

R. W. G. Stephens and titled, “A Digest of Ham.”

 This book captures MI5’s offi cial history of Camp 020, Britain’s 

WWII spy prison. The introduction reviews the events that led to 

the establishment of Camp 020, including the public hysteria over a 

supposed Fifth Column of German agents working behind Western 

lines; outlines the organization of WWII British intelligence service

and paints a picture of Lieutenant-Colonel R.W.G. “Tin Eye” Stephe

Commandant of Camp 020. Volume One deals with interrogation 

techniques, trends in enemy espionage, and the various phases of Ca

020’s development. Volume Two provides case histories, including h

agents were “broken” and the resulting intelligence yield.

Kleinman, S. M. (2002). The History of MIS-Y: U.S. Strategic Interrogation 

during World War II. Unpublished master’s thesis, DTIC Document 

ADA447589. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College. 

 This thesis captures the essence of the MIS-Y strategic interrogation 

program and the challenges of obtaining intelligence through the 

interrogation of German prisoners-of-war in support of the Allied w

effort. MIS-Y operated from 1942–1945 at Fort Hunt near Washingt

D.C., and was a carefully guarded secret. This study examines the 

key elements of the MIS-Y strategic interrogation mission, including 
319

Lifton, R. J. (1956). “‘Thought Reform’ of Western Civilians in Chi

Communist Prisons.” Psychiatry 19, 173–195. 

 Lifton, formerly a psychiatrist at Walter Reed Medical Insti

interviewed Western civilians released from Chinese Comm

prisons in 1955 and 1956. In this account, he provides a wi

Chinese penal “thought reform,” citing the experiences of i

prisoners. Chinese Communist “thought reform” seeks to a

identity, establish guilt, and create internal confl ict. The int

demands more and more information and the prisoner deve

increasing need to meet those demands. The struggle contin

in the cell where “reformed” cellmates harass the prisoner. 

prisoner has reached the “breaking point,” captors adopt a p

leniency or calculated kindness that rewards cooperation. C

his interrogators, the prisoner gives in to the compulsion to 

to real and fantasized actions, ultimately writing a well-cra

confession. With reeducation, the prisoner spends most of h

hours in study group sessions transferring his guilt for conf

to major elements of his identity. He begins to interpret his 

as evil and completely identifi es with the aggressor. Lifton 

that the Chinese Communist prison is “probably the most t

controlled and manipulated group environment that has eve

MacDonald, H. (2005). “How to Interrogate Terrorists.” City Journa

http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID

Accessed 5/8/2006. 

 This controversial piece discusses the consequences of the 

scandal for military interrogation practices and defends the 

techniques. Case studies from Afghanistan and Guantanam

interviews with interrogators are included.

Mayer, J. (2005, 14 February). “Outsourcing Torture.” The New Yor

 The United States established an “extraordinary rendition” 

transfer terror suspects to foreign countries for interrogatio

documents the rendition program’s history, identifi es shortc

provides case studies.
320

[Accessed 5/8/2006] 

 This lengthy essay provides a history of the CIA’s psychological 

interrogation methods over the past fi fty years from secret research i

coercion and human consciousness in the 1950s and 1960s to renew

interest in CIA techniques after September 11. It surveys the MKUlt

project, CIA’s mind-control research program, profi ling major effort

and researchers. It includes case studies of the dissemination of CIA 

methods to Uruguay, Iran, and the Philippines. Finally, it examines 

the record of the Bush administration and recent U.S. policy on hars

interrogation.

McGuffi n, J. (1981). The Guineapigs. 2nd ed. San Francisco: Minuteman Pre

http://www.irishresistancebooks.com/guineapigs/guineapigs.htm. 

Accessed 5/8/2006. 

 This book documents the British Army’s use of sensory deprivation 

torture on fourteen Irish political prisoners in 1971. First published 

in 1974, this book sold out on its fi rst print run and was then abruptl

taken off the market following pressure from the British Governmen

The updated 1984 second edition is now out of print and available 

online only.

Merton, V., and Kinscherff, R. (1981). The Court-Martial of Bobby Garwood

Coercive Persuasion and the “Culpable Mind.” Garrison, NY: Hasti

Center Report, 5-8. 

 This article examines the court martial of Bobby Garwood, a POW w

collaborated with the Vietnamese after indoctrination. Merton addre

learned helplessness and the victim’s identifi cation with the aggresso

and poses the question whether coercive persuasion is a valid defens

Piper Jr, A. (1993). “‘Truth Serum’ and ‘Recovered Memories’ of Sexual Abu

A Review of the Evidence.” Journal of Psychiatry and Law 21 (4), 

447–471. 

 This article outlines the amytal interview process and reviews the 

literature on the accuracy of information obtained while a subject is 

sedated with amytal. Studies reveal the following weaknesses in the 

of amytal as an interview tool: increased patient suggestibility; abili

to lie during sedation; possibility of induced hypnosis; and disturban

in mental process that can result in unreliable information.
321

 The polygraph test is used to investigate specifi c incidents 

screening. The Control Question Test (CQT) and the Guilty 

Test (GKT), two distinct types of polygraph, are reviewed. 

examines the validity and utility of the CQT and the GKT i

scenarios.

Schein, E. H. (1961). Coercive Persuasion: A Socio-Psychological A

the “Brainwashing” of American Civilian Prisoners by the 

Communists. New York: W. W. Norton.

 Between 1950 and 1953, the Chinese Communists impriso

civilians who were later repatriated with altered attitudes, v

beliefs brought about through thought reform. The Chinese 

emphasized confessions for rehabilitation and reform and r

coercive persuasion. In this book, the behavior changes of 

of these U.S. prisoners are examined from a socio-psycholo

viewpoint. The historical and political context of the Chine

reform program and the relevant psychological, physiologi

psychiatric, and sociological theories at work are outlined.

Straus, U. (2003). “The Interrogations.” In The Anguish of Surrende

POWs of World War II. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 116

 Japan indoctrinated soldiers with the belief that death was b

the dishonor of becoming a POW. With the shame of captu

POWs were without a country and held no hopes of returni

Cultural norms regulate the giving and receiving of favors 

society. Americans did not simply spare the lives of the Jap

they also gave the prisoners cigarettes, food, and medical tr

The POWs, in return, gave answers to seemingly innocuou

Humane treatment combined with knowledge of Japanese c

and language was effective in getting POWs to talk. In add

describing the psychology of the Japanese POW of WWII, 

documents the use of Nisei (second-generation U.S. Japane

and reviews both tactical battlefi eld interrogations and inter

at Camp Tracy, a secret facility focused on technical and st

information gathering.

Weinstein, H. (1988). “Supply and Demand.” In Father, Son and CIA

Formac Publishing Co. http://www.serendipity.li/cia/c99.ht

Accessed 5/8/2006. 
322

research programs and scientists involved.

Winter, A. (2005). “The Making of ‘Truth Serum’.” Bulletin of the History of 

Medicine 79, 500-533. 

 This essay gives a history of “truth serums” such as scopolamine, 

focusing on the social and cultural forces that led to their acceptance 

the 1920s and 1930s. Mesmerism and hypnotism set the stage for be

in a confessional state. Psychology, as an emerging discipline, was 

vulnerable to unproven ideas, including the reliability and permanen

of memory. The general public, concerned about crime and corruptio

and swayed by the power of scientifi c discovery, was eager to embra

“truth serums” as scientifi cally sound.

Wolff, H. G. (1960). “Every Man Has His Breaking Point.” Military Medicin

85-104. 

 This report debates whether every man has a breaking point and 

examines U.S. government policies on POW behavior. It reports on 

the frequency of collaboration and resistance in the WWI, WWII, 

and the Korean War. It discusses why prisoners talk and compares 

combat-related breaking points to psychological POW breaking poin

In addition, it highlights the role of character and commitment to 

resistance behavior.

Interrogation as Dialogue

Walton, D. (2003). “The Interrogation as a Type of Dialogue.” Journal 

of Pragmatics 35, 1771-1802. http://io.uwinnipeg.ca/~walton/

papers%20in%20pdf/03interrogationdialogue.pdf. Accessed 5/8/200

 This analysis examines the methods and techniques of argumentatio

that are used in interrogation. Interrogation is classifi ed as a hybrid 

type of dialogue employing both deliberation and information-seeki

Characterized by both deception and coercion, it is asymmetric in 

nature as one party has power and the other is passive. A normative 

model of interrogation is presented.
323

, ()f py p

Research Report 339-4, DTIC – AD257325. Washington, D

of Social Science Research. 

 The behavior of captives depends in large measure upon th

conceptions of what social roles are appropriate to the unfa

situations they encounter. These situations are also shaped 

ways by cultural conceptions of the captor regarding the sta

captives. This report reviews some of the historical and trad

elements of the cultures of captor and captives that have im

direct effects on these role conceptions. The report was pre

of a critical review of studies of prisoners of war, concentra

prisoners, and political prisoners.

Biderman, A. D., Heller, B. S., and Epstein, P. (1961). A Selected Bi

on Captivity Behavior. DTIC – AD253964. Washington, D

Social Science Research. Distribution authorized to U.S. go

agencies and their contractors. 

 This bibliography lists over 600 titles focused on the extrem

deprivational captivity experienced by U.S. POWs during t

War. It was prepared to accompany a report titled The relev

social sciences of knowledge derived from studies of stressf

written by Biderman and Schein.

Farber, I. E., Harlow, H. F., and West, L. J. (1957). “Brainwashing, C

and DDD (Debility, Dependency and Dread).” Sociometry 

285. 

 The authors examine the states of debility, dependency, and 

(DDD) that POWs were subjected to in Korea. Debility wa

conditions such as semi-starvation, fatigue, and disease. Th

control of the POW’s basic needs created dependency. Dre

marked by the POW’s intense fear and anxiety. Some of th

principles explaining the effects of DDD derive from instru

learning and classical conditioning. DDD alters self-concep

results in the primitivization of thinking. The intermittent n

of DDD served to keep hope alive. POWs get much-needed 

communication through interrogation and indoctrination se

authors conclude that resistance to the consequences of DD

of degree and may be modifi ed by physical health and initi

albeit not indefi nitely.
324

 This short report notes the deprivations of captivity, their possible 

effects on brain function, and the implications for POW and captors

Hunger, pain, signals of danger, and other sensory input are, of 

themselves, not toxic to the brain. Instead, it is the reaction of the 

individual to these inputs that can affect brain function. By contrast, 

isolation, sleep deprivation, and fatigue are intrinsically adverse 

to brain function and the individual’s reaction is only one factor in 

determining how long these effects can be withstood. The author 

cautions, however, that disturbed brain function does not allow an 

interrogator to extract information at will.

Obedience to Authority

Haney, C., Banks, C., and Zimbardo, P. G. (1973). A Study of Prisoners and 

Guards in a Simulated Prison. Naval Research Reviews. Accessed 

5/8/2006.

 The infamous Stanford Prison Experiment simulated a prison 

environment with college students divided into groups of guards and 

prisoners. Participants conformed to assigned role types, with guard

exhibiting aggressive behavior and prisoners acting submissive and 

docile. This study provides insights into the power of social context

infl uence behavior.

Milgram, S. (1963). “Behavioral Study of Obedience.” Journal of Abnormal 

Social Psychology 67, 371-378.

 In this classic study on obedience, 40 subjects were instructed to 

administer increasing levels of shock to a volunteer victim in the 

context of an experiment on learning and memory. Without knowing 

that the shock generator was a fake, 26 out of the 40 subjects obeyed 

the experimenter’s commands to the end, ultimately delivering the 

highest level of shock available. Milgram’s experiment reveals that 

individual who is commanded to obey by a legitimate authority usua

complies.
325

j, ()ygy f g

Handbook. John Wiley and Sons.

 Gudjonsson, an expert on false confession, examines variou

of investigative interviewing and highlights the accuracy an

completeness of the information gathered during police int

This book covers the theoretical, research, and practical asp

interrogation and confession in the United States and Britai

addition, it addresses reasons why suspects confess, false c

and suggestibility, as well as English and U.S. law regardin

confessions.

Inbau, F. E., Reid, J. E., Buckley, J. P., and Jayne, B. C. (2004). Crim

Interrogation and Confessions. 4th ed. Boston: Jones and B

Publishers.

 First published in 1962, this book is the classic text for the 

Technique, the standard U.S. law enforcement approach to 

and interrogation.

Kassin, S. M. (2005). “On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Inn

Innocents at Risk?” American Psychologist 60 (3), 215-228

 Confession evidence plays a part in 15% to 25% of wrongf

convictions. What causes innocent people to make false co

In pre-interrogation interviews, investigators make judgme

guilt that infl uence the entire interrogation process. Innocen

waive their Miranda rights in the belief that their innocence 

exonerate them and are subjected to coercive interrogation 

elicit confession. Police, judges, and juries cannot distingui

uncorroborated true and false confessions. The author prop

to current interrogation practices including videotaping inte

as a means of protecting innocent suspects.

Kassin, S. M., and Gudjonsson, G. H. (2004). “The Psychology of C

A Review of the Literature and Issues.” Psychological Scie

Public Interest, 5 (2), 33-67. 

 This comprehensive literature review surveys major researc

confession. It examines the pre-interrogation interview; the 

Miranda; modern police interrogation methods; the problem 

confessions; and the consequences of confession evidence. 

discusses detection of deception, social infl uences, why peo

their Miranda rights, and why people confess. 
326

 Over the past 50 years, methods of police interrogation have shifted 

from the use of physical coercion to psychological deception. Coerc

interrogation, or the “third degree,” is characterized by physical 

violence, torture, duress and threats of harm. Deceptive interrogation 

includes misrepresenting the interrogation as an interview; downpla

the seriousness of offenses; playing sympathetic roles to manipulate 

suspects; offering psychological excuses or moral justifi cations for 

actions; making promises; concealing the interrogator’s identity; and 

fabricating evidence. Leo describes and explains the changes in poli

interrogation as driven by police professionalization, changing publi

attitudes, and court-driven legal doctrine. 

Leo, R. A. (1996). “Inside the Interrogation Room.” The Journal of Criminal 

Law and Criminology 86 (2), 266-303. 

 Based on fi eldwork involving 182 cases, this study describes and 

analyzes police interrogation practices in the U.S. criminal justice 

system. Findings indicate that the number of interrogation tactics 

employed and the length of the interrogation contribute to successfu

interrogation. The most successful tactics include appealing to the 

suspect’s conscience; identifying contradictions in the suspect’s 

story; using praise or fl attery; and offering moral justifi cations or 

psychological excuses. Successful interrogations are defi ned as thos

interrogations that elicit incriminating information from suspects.

Ofshe, R. J. (1989). “Coerced Confessions: The Logic of Seemingly Irrationa

Action.” Cultic Studies Journal 6 (1), 1-15. 

 An expert in false confessions, Ofshe uses the case study of Tom 

Sawyer, a man coerced into confessing to murdering his neighbor 

in 1986, to illustrate how police can manipulate certain vulnerable 

suspects into confessing to and even believing they have committed 

crimes of which they have no memory and which evidence proves th

could not have committed. 

Ofshe, R. J., and Leo, R. A. (1997). “The Social Psychology of Police 

Interrogation: The Theory and Classifi cation of True and False 

Confessions.” Studies in Law, Politics and Society 16, 189-251. 

 Ofshe and Leo, leading researchers in false confession, present a soc

psychological model of police interrogation that describes both tacti

that interrogators use to infl uence the interrogation and factors that 
327

The Torture Debate

Arrigo, J. M. (2004). “A Utilitarian Argument against Torture Interro

of Terrorists.” Science and Engineering Ethics 10 (3), 543-

earlier version of this paper presented at the Joint Services 

on Professional Ethics is available online at: http://www.us

jscope/JSCOPE03/Arrigo03.html. Accessed 5/8/2006.

 Drawing from criminology, organizational theory, social ps

the historical record, and interviews with military professio

author explores the potential of an offi cial U.S. program of 

interrogation of suspected terrorists from a practical viewp

models of how torture interrogation leads to truth are exam

the animal instinct model, suspects give up information to 

or death, with the prototype here being the “ticking bomb” 

The cognitive failure model maintains that, due to physiolo

psychological stress, suspects are unable to maintain decep

comply with the interrogator. This model is associated with 

of fanatics, martyrs, and heroes. To obtain reliable informa

processing model analyzes a large amount of data from ind

torture interrogation of many detainees. The dragnet interro

terrorist suspects and their associates employs this model. T

highlights special institutional requirements of and major h

to each model and outlines the societal and political costs o

interrogation. 

Casebeer, W. D. (2003). “Torture Interrogation of Terrorists: A The

Exceptions” (With Notes, Cautions, and Warnings). Paper p

the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, Sprin

30-31 January. http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE03/C

html. Accessed 5/8/2006. 

 When is it morally permissible to engage in torture interrog

The author attempts to answer this question using the three 

tools of moral analysis: utilitarianism, deontology, and virt

Walzer’s “Supreme Emergency” doctrine is applied to the j

of torture interrogation. The author concludes that while to

be permissible in certain theoretical circumstances, these ci

will never arise in practice.
328

 In response to the McCain amendment, this essay debates not wheth

torture is permissible, but when. The real argument should be what 

constitutes legal exceptions to a torture ban. Although torture may n

provide reliable information, it may be useful in some situations and 

should not be taken off the table. According to the author, we may b

morally compelled to torture in a ticking bomb scenario and with lo

fuse, high value terrorists such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

Rejali, D. (2004, 18 June). “Torture’s Dark Allure.” Salon. http://archive.salo

com/opinion/feature/2004/06/18/torture_1/index.html Accessed 

5/8/2006. 

 Rejali argues that torture during interrogation does not yield better 

information. He discusses the nature of pain in the context of torture

the effects of torture on the torturer, the incremental nature of brutal

and the reliability of information gleaned through torture.

Rejali, D. (2004, 21 June). “Does Torture Work?” Salon. http://www.salon.

com/opinion/feature/2004/06/21/torture_algiers/index.html Accesse

5/8/2006. 

 An expert on torture, Rejali debunks the claim that the Battle of Alg

was won through the use of torture. He argues that the French won t

Battle of Algiers through force, not by superior intelligence gathered 

by torture. He also outlines and counters arguments made by torture 

apologists.

Sullivan, A. (2005, 19 December). “The Abolition of Torture: Saving the Uni

States from a Totalitarian Future.” The New Republic. 

 Sullivan responds to Charles Krauthammer’s essay condoning tortur

in certain scenarios. By legally sanctioning torture, U.S. values are 

undermined and our relationship with foreign countries as well as 

our ability to get actionable intelligence is jeopardized. Once allowe

torture cannot be contained. 
329

A

Abu Ghraib, 130, 245, 253, 319

Accuracy, 4, 17, 19, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 46, 65-68, 70, 71, 73, 82, 83, 

137, 150, 163, 205, 231, 242, 248, 295, 302, 305, 307, 313, 320, 325

Affi liation, 117, 178, 279, 314

Agility, 257

All-seeing eye approach, 126

Alternative question methodology, 110, 111, 148, 183, 189, 190, 202

224

Ambiguity, 102, 129, 134, 256, 258

Appreciation, 195, 244, 280

Approach avoidance, 22, 110

Army Field Manual 34-52, 6, 18, 126, 127, 303 

Attitudes, 21, 22, 29, 33, 37, 47, 64, 107, 114, 116, 147, 150, 152, 17

193, 202, 272, 292, 301, 312, 321, 326

Authority, 23, 36, 110, 116, 120, 151, 172, 175, 293, 297-299, 313, 3

Authority principle, 105, 112, 126

Autonomy, 279, 280

B

Barriers to success, 3, 6, 115, 235, 236, 244, 247, 248, 250, 265

BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement), 254, 275, 27

299

Behavioral indicators, 5, 45, 46, 52, 308

Behavioral science, 1, 3, 4, 10, 17-19, 104, 249

Behavioral symptoms, 142, 174

Behavioral cues, 47, 48, 113

Biderman, Albert D., 33, 98, 132, 139, 311, 316, 317, 323

Bind-strain theory, 110

Body language (see Body movements)

Body movements, 47, 68, 118, 122, 146, 213, 220, 238, 255, 265

Book of Five Rings, 263

Boston Police Department, 142, 144, 212, 214, 217, 228, 230

Boyd, Colonel John, USAF, 253, 257, 258, 263

Brain activation patterns (see Electroencephalography (EEG)) 

Breaking point, 30, 319, 322

Bush Administration, 320
330

p g, 

Case study, 144, 218, 314

Casual empiricism, 10, 11

Centers of gravity, 104, 247

Chaos, 134, 256, 258

CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 5, 75, 96, 106, 237, 311, 315, 320, 322

Cialdini, Robert B., 23, 105, 112, 119, 126, 128

Circular logic, 246

CITP (see Criminal Investigator Training Program)

Clash of Civilizations, 244

Classes, 204, 212, 218

Coercion or coercive methods, 9-14, 19, 24-27, 35, 36, 96, 98, 102, 106, 114, 

120, 123, 124, 130-133, 136, 137, 149, 174, 200, 201, 221, 222, 264, 306-309

313, 316, 320-322, 325, 326

Coleman, Daniel, 214-217, 220, 230

Commitment (see also Irrevocable Commitments), 24,25, 36, 54,117, 125, 15

273, 275, 282, 293, 297, 322

Communications (see also Non-verbal Communication), 13, 19-21, 26, 34, 3

45, 46, 48, 104, 106, 118, 121, 136, 140, 147, 151, 177, 180, 183-185, 197, 2

210, 212, 236, 238, 247-250, 255, 279, 280, 313, 323

Compliance, 17, 20, 22, 24, 25, 33, 35-37, 102, 103, 105, 109, 110, 114, 116, 

119, 124, 126, 128-131, 137, 191, 196, 313, 316, 317

Confession (see also Oral Confession; Securing the Confession), 5, 6, 18, 39, 

99, 100, 110, 111, 118, 142, 144, 145-152, 155-159, 163-175, 183, 186-191, 

194, 200-204, 207, 209, 210, 212, 215-217, 220, 222, 224, 225, 227-232, 256

304, 316, 319, 321

Confi dence (see also Interviewer Confi dence), 16, 47, 49, 85, 107, 111, 112, 

123, 172, 176, 181, 190, 200, 212, 224, 227, 238, 262, 275, 304

Confi rmation bias, 304

Confusion, pressure caused by, 29, 129, 134

Consistency (see also Consistency principle and Internal consistency), 24, 36

171, 185, 253-255, 262

Consistency principle (see also Consistency and Internal consistency), 112, 1

Consultation teams, 249, 261

Contentious tactics, 273

Contingency agreement, 272

Controlled exchange of information, 250, 251

Cooperate, 1, 13, 
331

y, 

Culture, 15, 17, 23, 35, 36, 51, 52, 68, 84, 109, 117, 134, 201, 203, 2

230-232, 243-246, 248, 257, 286, 294, 296, 301, 308, 309, 312, 321

D

Debility, 32, 37, 97, 130, 132, 137, 323, 324

Deceit, 79, 142, 149, 174, 197-199, 212, 216, 220

Deception, 3, 5, 27, 45-53, 63-85, 114, 121-123, 145-148, 175, 184-

197-204, 207, 212, 213, 220, 221, 229, 249, 257, 265, 296, 304, 308

313, 322, 325-327

Decision-making cycles, 257, 258

Deconstructing, 116, 264, 104, 117, 235, 264

Deforest, Orrin, 106, 119

Denials, 5, 22, 142, 145-149, 152, 164, 167-173, 188, 194, 203, 206

Dislocation of expectations, 134

Dividing the pie, 273, 280

Duress (see also Debility)

E

Educement, 1-7, 10, 12, 17-28, 31-39, 46, 119, 128, 133, 139, 140, 2

248, 252, 253, 257, 258, 264-267, 271-275, 282, 285-302, 305-308

EEG (see Electroencephalography (EEG))

EGG (see Electrogastrogram (EGG))

Electroencephalography (EEG), 34, 46, 75, 76, 80, 82, 85

Electrogastrogram (EGG) 64, 66, 67, 82

Emotions, 102, 176, 177, 195, 196, 218, 268, 270, 279280, 286, 298

ERP (see Event-Related Potential (ERP))

Event-Related Potential (ERP), 75, 76

Expectancy effects, 49

Eye blinks, 64, 66, 67, 69-71, 77, 82

Eye contact, 48, 180, 189, 304

F

Facial expressions (see also Microfacial expressions), 48, 64, 68-70

Fact-gathering, 177

Fatigue (see Debility)

FBI (see Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI))
332

g(), , , , , , 9, 

315

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), 142, 144, 206, 208-214

227-229

Fisher, Roger, 268, 270, 271, 277, 278, 280

Fixations, 64, 69-71, 82

Fixed pie, 268, 272

FLETC (see Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)), 

Flexibility, 100, 106, 109, 182, 258

fMRI (see Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)) 

fNIRS (see Functional Near Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS))

Focus, 49, 100, 110, 112, 252-255, 257, 259, 270-272

Follett, Mary Parker, 267

Foreign language, 15, 101, 110, 117, 134, 200, 236-247, 257, 286, 296, 308, 

314, 321

Framing, 112, 143, 268, 276, 277, 280

Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), (see Magnetic Resonance 

Imaging (MRI))

Functional Near Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS), 80-82

G

Game theory, 268

Gamesmanship, 273, 274

Gaze aversion, 48, 199

Gender, 169, 302

Geneva Convention, 11, 74, 98

Gestures, 47, 48, 69, 118, 140, 260, 304

Getting to YES, 267, 290

Going next door approach, 124, 138

Good cop / bad cop, 29, 195, 196, 295, 302

Great Britain, 142, 144, 204, 220, 221, 223

Guantanamo, 3, 107, 117, 253, 315, 319

H

Harmony, 259, 262

Harvard Negotiation Project, 252, 267, 271

Hawala, 248

Heart rate, 46, 65, 67, 118, 159, 249
333

gg, 

How-to guides, 174

Human Intelligence (HUMINT), 1, 8, 18, 45, 52, 101-103, 122, 138

303, 314

HUMINT (see Human Intelligence (HUMINT))

Huntington, Samuel P., 244

I

Initiative, 133, 259, 262, 263

Innocent, 50, 66, 108, 158, 188, 189, 206, 226, 246, 304, 325

Intended outcome, 251-255

Interests, 21-24, 36, 68, 103, 155, 172, 175, 237-239, 252, 255, 267

285-301, 304, 315

Internal consistency, 253-255, 262

Interpersonal intelligence, 101

Interpreters, 52, 108, 237, 247, 260, 312

Interrogation (see Interrogation approaches ; Kinesic Interrogation ; 

British Interrogation Techniques; Pre-interrogation ; Strategic interr

and Tactical interrogation) 

Interrogation approaches, 6, 9, 142

Intimidation, 10, 11

Intrapersonal intelligence, 101

Ireland, 142, 173, 221, 222

Irrevocable commitments, 275

Isolation, effects of, 97, 135-138, 156, 157, 175, 258, 316, 324

Israel, 12, 15, 53, 144, 204, 231, 239, 267, 277, 311-313

Israel High Court of Justice, 12

Ivan is a dope approach, 126

K

Kinesic analysis and interrogation, 174, 185, 186, 193, 194, 197

Knowing the enemy, 245

Knowledgeability, 99, 103-105, 107, 108, 112, 117, 122, 125, 128, 1

236, 247, 250

Kreimer, Seth, 

KUBARK, 
334

), , , , , , , , , 

Law of requisite variety, 109, 124, 261

Law of Small Numbers, 304

Legal traveler, 97

Likeability, 23

Lobotomy, 303, 304

Logical appeals, 246

Loudness, 49

M

Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), 46, 53, 75, 77-82, 85

Magnetoencephalography (MEG), 75-77, 82

Maximization, 149

McCain Amendment, 13, 328

McCoy, Alfred W., 96, 320

McKersie, Robert, 267, 268, 271, 301

MEG (see Magnetoencephalography (MEG))

Memory, 31, 32, 34, 50, 76, 77, 79, 81, 139, 161, 162, 183, 199, 225, 322, 32

326

Microfacial expressions, 51

Minimization, 149, 191, 194, 201, 206, 211, 219, 222, 227

Miranda, 163, 165, 166, 169, 171, 216, 219, 325

MIS-Y, 3, 108, 111, 249, 318

Monitoring, 46, 48, 49, 113, 249

Motivation, 22, 24, 25, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 36, 50, 52, 79, 85, 97, 101, 102, 12

146, 157, 198, 202, 204, 206, 207, 227, 228, 275, 277, 289, 297, 301, 314, 31

MRI (see Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI))

Multiple simultaneous offers, 272

Musashi, Miyamoto, 263

Mutual gains, 268-273 

N

Narcoanalysis, 64, 73, 82, 83

Negotiation (see also Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)

Camp David negotiation; Harvard Negotiation Project and Hostage negotiatio

Hostage negotiation; and Seven Elements of Negotiation), 4, 6, 20, 36, 103, 1

233, 237, 252-256, 259, 267-302

Neurolinguistic Programming (NLP), 26, 27, 36
335

y ypp, 

Non-coercive method or model, 102, 114, 123, 124, 130, 221, 265

Non-verbal cues or communication, 47, 49, 51, 118, 120, 140, 151, 

197-199, 205, 207, 211, 212, 238, 304

Non-vocal (see Nonverbal cues or communication)

Nutritional Deprivation (see Debility)

O

Objections, 188, 189, 201, 211

Objective analysis, 305-307

OODA Loop, 258-262

Operational accord, 103, 244

Oral confession (see also Confession), 190, 200

Outcomes, 27, 29, 33, 119, 120, 143, 151, 152, 167, 232, 235, 244, 2

264, 268-272, 277, 279, 289

P

PACE (see Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 (PACE))

Pain, 25, 33, 34, 35, 37, 68, 81, 97, 116, 130, 133, 135, 279, 281, 28

324, 327, 328

Paradoxical Intention, 30

Paralinguistic cues, 47, 49, 51, 183, 184

Pareto curve, 269, 270, 272, 279

Pauses, 49, 70, 197, 211

PEACE - British interrogation technique, 221, 222

Perception, 15,21,25, 31, 34, 48, 76, 147-151, 158, 174, 196, 200, 2

Perceptual positions, 75, 115, 195, 196, 254, 255

Personality characteristics, 11, 24, 49, 101, 103, 105, 106, 108, 110, 

120, 125, 134, 136, 142, 175, 177, 181, 194, 228, 249

Persuasion (see also Subliminal persuasion), 5, 17, 21, 23, 25-28, 35

128, 143, 147, 153, 171, 173, 174, 237, 311, 320, 321

PET (see Positron Emission Tomography (PET))

Physical setting, 97, 110, 119, 135, 255, 258

Pierce, Albert F., Jr., 141, 218-221, 230

Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 (PACE), 

Polygraph, 5, 52, 63-68, 71-73, 75, 78, 82-85, 97, 118, 123, 248, 24

Porter, Clifford F., 240-243

Positional bargaining, 268, 271
336

gpy (), , , , 

Posture, 47, 69, 112, 116-118, 124, 128, 131, 133, 189, 236, 260

Pre-interrogation, 185

Pressure, 11, 13, 25, 26, 28, 32, 35, 36, 112, 114, 116, 118, 120, 123, 128-133

136, 150, 151, 156-159, 168, 173, 174, 196, 200, 253, 275, 300, 313

Prisoner’s dilemma, 125, 269

Profi ciency, 236-238

Prosecution, 99, 159, 210, 216, 217, 223, 225, 228

Psychological assessment, 105, 125

Psychological set, 97, 104, 105, 119, 135, 255

Psychophysiological measures, 66, 84

Pupillary dilation, 48

Q

question design, 121

R

Radar Vital Signs Monitor (RVSM), 64, 67, 68, 102

Rapidity, 259, 262

Rapport, 22, 26, 27, 102, 112, 114, 120, 121, 135-138, 142, 174, 180-182, 19

196, 197, 202, 205-212, 215-222, 225-232, 238, 280, 298, 306, 308, 309, 312

Reality monitoring, 48, 49

Reciprocity, 13-15, 24, 36, 122, 222, 294

Recording, 48, 67, 70, 76, 77, 113, 144, 179, 209, 214, 216, 217, 220-229, 24

250

Regression, 109, 130-132

Regulatory depletion, 30

Reid Model or Technique, 142, 145-148, 155, 157, 164, 174-180, 183-193, 1

199-206, 210, 215, 219-222, 225, 227, 229, 231, 325

Rejection-then-retreat scenario, 128

Relational identity, 279, 280

Rendition, 3, 319

Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS), 82

Research venues, 6, 303, 309

Reserve component, 241

Resistance, 2, 17, 19, 25, 26, 28-33, 35-37, 52, 95, 98, 99, 110, 112, 114-117, 

119, 120, 123-129, 132-134, 138, 145, 149, 158, 168, 171, 180, 204, 236, 246

256, 261, 274, 279, 296, 298, 301, 302, 308, 312, 313, 316, 317, 322, 323
337

, , , 

rTMS (see Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS))

Rule of law, 11-13

RVSM (see Radar Vital Signs Monitor (RVSM))

S

Saccades, 64, 69-71, 82

Sampling, 50, 51

Scharff, Hanns, 102, 313

Schelling, Thomas, 267, 274, 275

Schwerpunkt (see also Focus), 253

Screening, 52, 66, 75, 85, 101, 107, 118-123, 134, 250, 319, 321

Securing the confession, 142, 174, 200

Sensory acuity, 258, 260

Sensory Deprivation, 32, 34, 37, 222, 318, 320

SERE (see Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE))

Setting, 37, 39, 45, 47, 50, 63, 67, 73, 74, 83, 85, 97, 103, 107, 110, 

124, 133-135, 142, 174, 178, 183, 213, 215, 218, 224, 255, 258, 259

306, 308, 309

Seven Elements of Negotiation, 271

Shock of capture, 111, 133-135

Shock the conscience, 12

Situational awareness, 260

Skin conductance, 46, 66, 75, 76

Sleep Deprivation, 32, 37, 137, 317, 324

Social biases, 49

Social proof principle, 119

Social Validation, 24, 36

Specifi city principle, 100

Speech rate, 197

Stalemate, 268, 270, 273

Standards of legitimacy, 273, 274, 281

Starvation (see Debility)

Statement Validity Assessment, 48, 49

Status, 23, 24, 74, 84, 108, 178, 219, 280, 294, 323

Strategic interrogation, 9, 108, 134, 249, 264, 265, 318

Strategic-linguistic landscape, 238
, , 9, , , , , , , , , , 9, 9, , , , 9, 

151, 157, 160, 175, 186, 194, 197, 258, 286, 306, 308, 309, 318, 319, 323, 32

Sturgeon, Colin, 221-223

Subjective evaluation, 303

Subliminal Persuasion, 26, 27

Suggestibility, 34, 97, 148, 159-163, 317, 320, 325

Sun Tzu, 116, 245, 263, 264

Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE), 2, 98, 99, 101, 117, 120, 1

308, 309

Systems approach or thinking, 251, 252

T

Tactical interrogation, 9, 115, 134

Target future choice chart, 276, 278

Technical intelligence, 247, 248, 250

Technology, 1, 46, 52, 53, 66-75, 78, 81, 113, 243, 247-250, 263, 264

Terrorism, 4, 6-15, 18, 45, 46, 54, 74, 103, 104, 115, 117, 127, 130, 134, 138, 

143, 144, 221, 222, 227, 230-235, 239, 247-249, 252, 263, 296, 298-300, 314

315, 317, 319, 327, 328

Thermal imaging or photography, 46, 64, 72, 73, 82

Threats, 9, 10, 15, 17, 18, 25, 28, 29, 66, 85, 97, 98, 107, 127, 149, 154, 155, 

196, 225, 231, 232, 237, 257, 263, 271, 273-275, 281, 286, 294, 295, 298, 32

Ticking bomb scenario, 9, 103, 207, 232, 299, 327, 328

TMS (see Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS))

Torture, 9-14, 33, 35, 133, 134, 246, 306, 307, 311, 312, 316, 319, 320, 326

Tradeoffs, 7, 16, 272, 290

Training, 2-4, 6, 11, 18, 22, 26, 30, 45, 47, 53, 54, 82, 98-106, 114-117, 121, 

126, 128, 132, 134, 139-144, 177, 198, 204-209, 213-220, 225-235, 237-239, 

240, 251, 252, 256-261, 265, 289, 295, 301, 303, 306, 308, 314-316, 319

Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), 75, 81-83

Trickery (see Deceit) 

Truth serums, 63, 64, 73, 74, 82, 83, 322

Types of questions, 182, 183, 212

U

Uncertainty, 49, 157, 159-162
339

, , 

Videotaping, 69-71, 143, 144, 179, 214, 217, 221, 223-226, 229, 231

304, 325

Voice pitch/tension, 49

Voice Stress Analysis (VSA), 49, 64, 71, 72, 82, 123, 249

VSA (see Voice Stress Analysis (VSA))

W

Walzer, Michael, 327

War crimes, 14, 277

Y

Yesable proposition, 268, 276