S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 6 

Lessons Learned From 9/11: 

DNA Identification in 

Mass Fatality Incidents 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA

I N I T IA T I V E

www.DNA.gov 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

810 Seventh Street N.W. 

Washington, DC 20531 

Alberto R. Gonzales 

Attorney General 

Regina B. Schofield 

Assistant Attorney General 

Glenn R. Schmitt 

Acting Director, National Institute of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

Partnerships for Safer Communities 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov 
Lessons Learned From 9/11: 

DNA Identification in 

Mass Fatality Incidents 

SEPTEMBER 2006 

National Institute of Justice 

This document is not intended to create, and may not be relied upon to 

create, any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any 

party in any matter civil or criminal. 

The opinions, factual and other findings, conclusions, or recommendations 

in this publication represent the points of view of a majority of the KADAP 

members and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the 

U.S. Department of Justice. 

NCJ 214781 
Preface


On September 11, 2001, 2,792 people 

were killed in terrorist attacks on the 

World Trade Center (WTC) in New York 

City. The number of victims, the condition of their 

remains, and the duration of the recovery effort 

made the identification of the victims the most 

difficult ever undertaken by the forensic community in this country. 

In response to this need, the National Institute of 

Justice (NIJ), the research, development, and 

evaluation agency of the U.S. Department of 

Justice, brought together a group of experts to 

provide advice and support throughout the 

identification effort. Called the Kinship and Data 

Analysis Panel (KADAP), the group made recommendations on new forensic technologies, tools, 

policies, and procedures to help identify those 

who perished in the WTC attack. 

This report contains the KADAP’s “lessons 

learned,” particularly regarding DNA protocols, 

laboratory techniques, and statistical approaches, 

in the DNA identification of WTC victims. It is 

written primarily for the Nation’s forensic laboratory directors and other officials who may be 

responsible for organizing and managing the DNA 

identification response to a mass fatality incident. 

Although New York City’s mass disaster plan on 

9/11 contained lessons learned from the 1993 

terrorist bombing of the WTC, it did not contain 

policies or procedures for identifying mass disaster victims through DNA analysis. Had this been 

part of the city’s plan in 2001, many of the issues 

that arose after the attacks could have been more 

quickly resolved. 

PRESIDENT’S

INITIATIVE

This report discusses the incorporation of DNA 

identification into a mass fatality disaster plan, 

including how to: 

■	 Establish laboratory policies and procedures, 

including the creation of sample collection 

documents. 

■	 Assess the magnitude of an identification 

effort, and identify and acquire resources to 

respond. 

■ Identify reference and kinship samples. 

■ Create a comprehensive laboratory management plan, including technology management 

and quality assurance. 

■ Establish lines of communication between 

agencies, departments, victims’ families, and 

the press. 

Although this report does not address every 

aspect of a mass fatality DNA identification effort, 

it does stress intentional testing redundancy as a 

way to monitor a system’s effectiveness. The 

report also discusses how decisions made in the 

first 48 hours after a mass fatality event shape 

the scope of the identification effort. 

Designed to augment another NIJ publication, 

Mass Fatality Incidents: A Guide for Human 

Forensic Identification (http://www.ojp.usdoj. 

gov/nij/pubs-sum/199758.htm), this guide will 

help the Nation’s forensic laboratories—whether 

called upon to identify victims of a major natural 

disaster, transportation accident, or terrorist 

attack—prepare for a mass fatality incident. 

DNA iii 
Message From the Director


Nothing in the history of mass fatality 

events prepared America’s forensic 

community for the task of identifying 

those who perished when terrorists attacked the 

World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City on 

September 11, 2001. For the Nation’s forensic laboratories, the primary lesson of this monumental 

identification effort is clear: every jurisdiction— 

large and small, urban and rural—should have a 

plan for identifying mass disaster victims through 

DNA analysis. 

This report was prepared by the Kinship and Data 

Analysis Panel (KADAP), a multidisciplinary group 

of outstanding scientists that the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) assembled to offer advice in 

the identification of those who died in the WTC. 

The report contains guidance for forensic laboratory directors on developing a mass fatality DNA 

identification plan. It should become an essential 

resource used by forensic laboratory directors 

and senior public safety officials at all levels of 

government. 

Even before this report was published, NIJ used 

the work of the KADAP to assist officials involved 

in identifying the victims of the Southeast Asia 

tsunami (December 2004) and of Hurricane Katrina (August 2005), a disaster that revealed how 

any State or municipality can be overwhelmed by 

the operational requirements of responding to a 

mass fatality event. All of these events demonstrate that it is only through planning, training, 

PRESIDENT’S

INITIATIVE

and assessment of the capabilities of our public 

forensic laboratories that laboratory directors— 

and the policymakers who support them—can 

prepare for a mass fatality event. But such preparation is essential to ensure that our public 

resources are used as efficiently as possible. 

The importance of such preparedness was again 

demonstrated only 2 months after the 9/11 

attacks when, on November 12, 2001, American 

Airlines flight 587 crashed in Queens, New York, 

killing 265 people. Because of the administrative 

and analytical processes that were in place for the 

WTC identification effort, New York City’s Office 

of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) did not 

have to restructure its laboratory to handle the 

identifications of the airline crash victims. 

Historically, such a major identification response 

would have taken at least 3 months and even that 

would have been considered rapid. But because 

the OCME was prepared, all of the victims of the 

American Airlines crash—the second largest 

single-event transportation mass fatality in U.S. 

history—were identified within 1 month. 

The challenges that accompany any large-scale 

DNA identification effort are substantial. Therefore, I encourage every jurisdiction to carefully 

consider the guidance in this report. The families 

of the victims of the next mass fatality disaster— 

indeed, the entire Nation—will need their public 

officials to be prepared. This guide will help us 

accomplish that mission. 

Glenn R. Schmitt 

Acting Director, National Institute of Justice 

DNA v 
Acknowledgments


The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) is 

grateful for the support of the many 

people who were involved in this project, 

from the creation and empanelment of the 

Kinship and Data Analysis Panel (KADAP) through 

the development of this report. 

The idea of a panel of experts to advise New York 

City officials in the identification of victims of the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the 

World Trade Center (WTC) originated with Inspector W. Mark Dale, Director of Forensic Services 

for the New York State Police Department. Realizing that the number of victims and the condition 

of their remains would require his laboratory to 

enter uncharted territory, Inspector Dale asked 

NIJ to create a “brain trust” of independent 

scientists to offer guidance in this monumental 

effort. 

NIJ thanks the organizations that supported their 

designee’s participation on the KADAP. The 

National Institutes of Health’s (NIH’s) Human 

Genome Research Institute and the National Center for Biotechnology Informatics provided several 

KADAP members whose expertise became the 

bedrock of the Panel’s deliberations. We especially thank Dr. Francis Collins and Dr. David Lipman 

for identifying potential KADAP members, and 

for their steadfast support throughout the victim 

identification process. We also thank Dr. Celia 

Hooper Kozlowski, from NIH’s Office of the 

Director, for her guidance on NIH programs that 

became extraordinary resources throughout the 

identification effort. 

NIJ also thanks the Armed Forces Institute of 

Pathology DNA Identification Laboratory (AFDIL), 

Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Carleton University, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Indiana 

University School of Medicine, Johns Hopkins 

University Center for Inherited Disease Research, 

the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 

New York State Department of Health, the University 

of Central Florida, the University of North Texas 

PRESIDENT’S

INITIATIVE

Health Science Center, and Yale University School 

of Medicine for supporting the investment of time 

and energy by their Panel representatives. We 

appreciate, too, that colleagues of KADAP members in those institutions often took on the 

responsibility of additional work so that the 

KADAP members could provide guidance on the 

identification of WTC victims. 

Early in the process, the Panel’s understanding 

about collection procedures and specific “Ground 

Zero” issues was greatly aided by then-Deputy 

Commissioner of the New York City Police 

Department, Maureen Casey, who attended 

KADAP meetings on behalf of Commissioner 

Howard Safir. 

The New York State Police Forensic Services Division made the initial KADAP meetings a priority, 

despite many new responsibilities that the Division had for organizing victim reference samples. 

Many people—from the private and public 

sectors—provided testimony to the Panel that 

resulted in the KADAP recommendations. Early 

demonstrations of matching software, developed 

for other mass fatality situations, were an important contribution. We thank, in particular, Ed 

Huffine, Fuad Suljetovic, and Adnan Rizvic, with 

the International Commission on Missing Persons 

in Bosnia; Jodi Irwin, with AFDIL; and Benoît 

Leclair, with Myriad Genetics, who received permission from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 

to share a special computer program that was 

used in the WTC identification effort. [Note: All 

affiliations mentioned in this report reflect the 

person’s affiliation at the time that the WTC identification effort was ongoing.] 

The KADAP also received presentations on genetic systems that were considered for the WTC 

identification effort. New York City’s Office of the 

Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) and the New 

York State Police (NYSP) received assistance from 

some of these companies through funding by the 

DNA vii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

Federal Emergency Management Agency. As the 

identification of victims progressed, the KADAP 

received peer-review assistance from many 

experts, including Joyce deJong (Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams), Terri Melton 

(Mitotyping Technologies), Kevin Miller (Federal 

Bureau of Investigation), Walther Parson (Institute 

for Legal Medicine in Austria), Alan Scott (Johns 

Hopkins University’s Institute of Genetic Medicine), George Sensabaugh, Jr. (University of California, Berkeley, School of Public Health), Brion 

Smith and James Ross (AFDIL), and Matthew 

Thomas (DNAPrint). 

Finally, NIJ is grateful to the OCME and NYSP 

scientists and, most importantly, to the KADAP 

members themselves. From the beginning of this 

extraordinary effort, these individuals worked as a 

seamless unit, identifying, analyzing, and crafting 

never-before-attempted approaches to victim 

identification through DNA analysis. The Panel’s 

rigorous, thoughtful, and creative work—including 

important recommendations on mini-STR testing, 

statistical approaches to composite or “virtual” 

DNA profiles, and the creation of quality assurance safeguards—will have a profound impact far 

into the future on the identification of human 

remains. 

Kinship and Data Analysis Panel* 

Joan E. Bailey-Wilson, Ph.D. 

Inherited Disease Research Branch 

National Human Genome Research Institute 

National Institutes of Health 

Baltimore, MD 

Jack Ballantyne, Ph.D. 

University of Central Florida 

Department of Chemistry 

Orlando, FL 

Howard Baum, Ph.D. 

Office of the Chief Medical Examiner 

New York, NY 

Frederick R. Bieber, Ph.D. 

Brigham and Women’s Hospital 

Harvard Medical School 

Boston, MA 

Les Biesecker, M.D. 

National Human Genome Research Institute 

National Institutes of Health, 

Bethesda, MD 

Charles Brenner, Ph.D. 

University of California, Berkeley 

School of Public Health 

Oakland, CA 

Bruce Budowle, Ph.D. 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Laboratory Division 

Quantico, VA 

P. Michael Conneally, Ph.D. 

Indiana University School of Medicine 

Department of Medical and Molecular Genetics 

Indianapolis, IN 

John Butler, Ph.D. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Gaithersburg, MD 

George R. Carmody, Ph.D. 

Carleton University 

Ottawa, Ontario, Canada 

W. Mark Dale, MBA 

Northeast Regional Forensic Institute 

University at Albany, State University of New York 

Albany, NY 

Barry Duceman, Ph.D. 

New York State Police 

Forensic Investigation Center 

Albany, NY 

Arthur J. Eisenberg, Ph.D. 

DNA Identity Laboratory 

Department of Pathology and Anatomy 

University of North Texas Health Science Center 

Fort Worth, TX 

Kenneth K. Kidd, Ph.D. 

Yale University School of Medicine 

Department of Genetics 

New Haven, CT 

Lisa Forman, Ph.D. 

National Institute of Justice 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Washington, D.C. 

PRESIDENT’S

viii DNA

INITIATIVE
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

Benoît Leclair, Ph.D. 

Myriad Genetic Laboratories, Inc. 

Salt Lake City, UT 

Steve Niezgoda, MBA 

Technical Consultant, National Institute of Justice 

Niezgoda Consulting 

Bristow, VA 

Elizabeth Pugh, Ph.D. 

Johns Hopkins University 

Center for Inherited Disease Research 

Baltimore, MD 

Robert Shaler, Ph.D. 

Office of the Chief Medical Examiner 

New York, NY 

Stephen Sherry, Ph.D. 

National Center for Biotechnology Information 

National Library of Medicine 

National Institutes of Health 

Bethesda, MD 

Amanda Sozer, Ph.D. 

Technical Consultant, National Institute of Justice 

DNA Technology Consulting Services, LLC 

Fairfax Station, VA 

Thomas J. Parsons, Ph.D. 

Department of Defense DNA Registry 

Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory 

Armed Forces Institute of Pathology 

Rockville, MD 

Anne Walsh, Ph.D. 

Biggs Laboratory 

Wadsworth Center 

New York State Department of Health 

Albany, NY 

* This information reflects each panel member’s 

professional affiliation during the time that the 

majority of the KADAP’s work was performed. 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA ix 

INITIATIVE
Contents 

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1


2 How DNA Is Used to Make Identifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5


3 Before the Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9


4 Major Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13


How important is DNA to the identification effort? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 


Will every person or every fragment be identified? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13


What is the minimum fragment size that will be identified? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14


How difficult will it be to identify everyone? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14


How long will the recovery effort last? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15


Assuming funding, can the laboratory do the work? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16


What is the funding source? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19


5 Managing Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21


6 Project Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 


Project Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25


Project Structure: Centralized vs. Decentralized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26


Special Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30


Project Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30


External Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31


Human Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33


7 Media Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37


8 Family Coordination and Liaison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 


The Family-Laboratory Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42


Collecting Reference Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42


Family-Laboratory Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 


9 Information Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 


Sample Accessioning/Laboratory Information Management System Requirements . . . . . . . 49 


Quality Control Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 


Matching and Statistics Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 


Sharing Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54


Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 


Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 


10 Sample Tracking and Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 


PRESIDENT’S

DNA xi 

INITIATIVE
CONTENTS 

11 Sample Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63


Sample Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63


Sample Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64


Short Tandem Repeat DNA Amplification and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64


Alternative Testing Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65


12 Statistical and Other Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 


Statistical Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68


Open vs. Closed Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 


Non-DNA Data (“Metadata”) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68


Fragmented Remains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69


Kinship Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69


Administrative and Technical Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70


13 Procurement and Vendor Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 


Ordering Supplies and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71


Outsourcing Sample Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71


Consultants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72


Vendor Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 


14 Quality Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 


Intentional Redundancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75


Multiple Test and Software Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76


Exhibits 

Exhibit 1: Potential Sources of DNA Reference Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6


Exhibit 2: Federal Agency Roles in Responding to a Mass Fatality Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 


Exhibit 3: Key Variables in Assessing Laboratory Workload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16


Exhibit 4: Estimated DNA Analysis Workload Worksheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 


Exhibit 5: Laboratory Director’s Constituents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 


Exhibit 6: Information Provided to the Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 


Exhibit 7: Major Project Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 


Exhibit 8: Modified Daisy-Chain Workflow in a Decentralized Laboratory Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 


Exhibit 9: Hub-and-Spoke Workflow in a Decentralized Laboratory Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 


Exhibit 10: Project Manager Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 


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xii DNA

INITIATIVE
CONTENTS 

Exhibit 11: Organizations Involved in a Mass Fatality DNA Identification Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32


Exhibit 12: Staffing Requirements Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 


Exhibit 13: Relationship Between Laboratory and Victims’ Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 


Exhibit 14: Information Technology in a DNA Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 


Exhibit 15: Reconciling Case Numbers With Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 


Exhibit 16: Additional Capabilities Requiring Laboratory Information Management System Support . . . 52 


Exhibit 17: Searching Mass Fatality Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 


Exhibit 18: Integrating Processes in Multiple DNA Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 


Exhibit 19: How the Event Is Treated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 


Exhibit 20: Types of Samples From the World Trade Center Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 


Exhibit 21: DNA Profiles by Sample Type From the World Trade Center Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 


Appendixes 

Appendix A: Recommendations of the Kinship and Data Analysis Panel (KADAP) to the 

Office of the Chief Medical Examiner of New York City During the World Trade 

Center DNA Identification Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 


Appendix B: Sample Personal Items Submission Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87


Appendix C: Sample Family and/or Donor Reference Collection Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 


Appendix D: Sample Family Tree Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95


Appendix E: Guidelines for Family and/or Donor Reference Collection Kit Components and Oral Swab 


Collection Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 


Appendix F: Issues to Consider When Outsourcing Reference Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101


Appendix G: Identifying Victims Using DNA: A Guide for Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105


Appendix H: Sample Analysis: An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135


Appendix I: Additional References on Statistical Issues in DNA Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139


PRESIDENT’S

DNA xiii 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 1 

Introduction 

DNA analysis is the gold standard for identification of human remains from mass disasters. Particularly in the absence of 

traditional anthropological and other physical 

characteristics, forensic DNA typing allows for 

identification of any biological sample and the 

association of body parts, as long as sufficient 

DNA can be recovered from the samples. This is 

true even when the victim’s remains are fragmented and the DNA is degraded. While many 

effective laboratory protocols are available for 

DNA analysis, the analytical portion is only one 

part of the identification process. 

Special attention is required for: 

■	 Sample collection, preservation, shipping, 

and storage. 

■	 Tracking and chain of custody issues. 

■	 Clean, secure laboratory facilities. 

■	 Quality assurance and quality control practices. 

■	 Managing the work. 

■	 DNA extraction and typing. 

■	 Interpretation of results. 

■	 Automation. 

■	 Use of software for sample tracking and 

data management. 

■	 Use of an advisory panel of experts. 

■	 Public education and communication. 

■	 Privacy issues. 

Developing strategies that address these features 

of DNA identification will facilitate the identification process. As many of the features described 

in this report for DNA typing of mass disaster 

human remains are the same as those for missing persons cases, it may be possible to invest in 

and coordinate with missing persons identification efforts. Thus, the infrastructure for a mass 

PRESIDENT’S

INITIATIVE

disaster identification process could be in place 

and only surge capacity would need to be 

addressed in the event of a mass disaster. 

Although this report deals with the identification 

of human remains through DNA analysis, other 

methods—including anthropology, dental records, 

tattoos—should be used in a mass fatality identification effort whenever possible. In fact, some of 

these identification modalities are so uniquely 

identifying that they may eliminate the need for 

the more labor-intensive DNA analysis, or at least 

minimize the need for reanalysis. (An extensive 

overview of forensic identification beyond DNA 

analysis can be found in Mass Fatality Incidents: 

A Guide for Human Forensic Identification, 

U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute 

of Justice, June 2005, NCJ 199758. The report 

is available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/ 

pubs-sum/199758.htm.) 

Lessons Learned From 9/11: DNA Identification 

in Mass Fatality Incidents is not a substitute for 

a comprehensive mass fatality response plan. 

Although the concepts explored in this report 

should be considered in a laboratory’s mass disaster plan, the document provides only a general 

framework. The recommendations do not represent the only correct course of action and may 

not be feasible in all circumstances; details 

regarding implementation should be based on a 

laboratory’s need, culture, and resources. In no 

case should this report be considered a legal 

mandate or policy directive. 

After a mass fatality event, it is the job of the 

medical examiner to identify the victims so that 

death certificates can be issued. When DNA 

analysis is part of the identification process, the 

laboratory must ensure that: 

■ Victim, reference, and kinship samples are 

accessioned into the laboratory system and 

documented by proper chain of custody. 

DNA 1 
CHAPTER 1 

■	 DNA is extracted and genotyped, and that 

analysis of the genotype data, including matching and statistics, is performed. 

■	 Samples are reaccessioned and accounted for, 

if they have been outsourced. 

■	 Final administrative review—comparing the 

DNA results to non-DNA metadata—is conducted and, if necessary, reconciled. [Note: 

Metadata for a kinship sample, for example, 

include the kin’s name, biological relationship 

to the victim, and when and where the sample 

was collected.] 

This report addresses all these phases of a mass 

fatality DNA identification effort. It is organized by 

specific areas of management responsibility for 

the laboratory manager or director. During the 

World Trade Center DNA identification effort, 

many of the most critical management decisions 

were made within the first 48 hours following the 

terrorist attacks. This report examines many of 

these issues, and contains several sample forms 

that may be helpful. The report can be downloaded 

at http://www.massfatality.dna.gov. To order a hard 

copy or CD–ROM of the report, call 1-800–851–3420 

or visit http://www.massfatality.dna.gov. 

Throughout the report, members of the Kinship 

and Data Analysis Panel share some of their personal thoughts; please note that they are speaking for themselves, not on behalf of their 

employer. 

The following self-assessment may help a laboratory consider whether it is ready to handle the 

identification of victims in a mass fatality incident. 

It may be helpful to complete the checklist using 

various numbers of samples. 

PRESIDENT’S

2 DNA

INITIATIVE
INTRODUCTION 

Is the Laboratory Prepared to Handle a Mass Fatality? 

Number of victims _________ 

Number of victim samples _________ 

Number of personal items _________ 

Number of kin _________ 

Whom will the laboratory be reporting to? 

Who is responsible for funding the DNA identification effort? 

How will the victim samples be collected and 

tracked? 

How will the samples get to the laboratory? 

How many family reference collection kits are 

immediately available? What modifications to the 

kits may need to be made? 

Are there written instructions for kin reference 

sample collection? 

How will the collection of reference samples be 

coordinated locally, nationally, and internationally? 

How will the personal reference samples and 

elimination samples be scheduled and collected? 

Is there an adequate accessioning area to receive 

all samples? 

Are there procedures to handle incomplete or 

missing data? 

Is there a laboratory information management 

system (LIMS) in place to track cases, including 

victim and reference samples? 

Can cases be combined or separated in the 

LIMS? 

How will a victim be defined (as a case)? 

Is there adequate staffing for each of the 

following? 

■ Collection 

■ Accessioning 

■ Extraction 

■ Amplification 

■ Analysis 

■ Interpretation 

■ Reporting 

■ Quality control 

■ Family relations 

■ Media relations 

■ New personnel 

Is there sufficient space for the victim and reference samples? Are the areas separate? 

Will the testing be done in-house or will some of 

the samples be outsourced? 

If samples will be outsourced, are contracts in 

place that can be modified? 

What modifications need to be made specific to 

the mass fatality? For example, how will the data 

be reported? 

Will an advisory group be needed to provide 

technical support and to assist the laboratory in 

making major decisions? 

Are there adequate extraction procedures and 

robotics to handle the volume? Do the parameters need to be changed for victim samples? 

Can additional reagents be purchased from the 

same lot number already used by the laboratory? 

Can the mass fatality identification effort be 

handled without purchasing additional equipment? Does the laboratory have the capacity? 

If the lab does not have the capacity, are there 

procedures and policies in place to acquire 

equipment and consumables rapidly? 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 3 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 1 

How will the generated profiles be stored?


How will the matching take place?


Is there a mechanism to review the supporting


metadata for accuracy?


Is there a checklist in place?


How will reports be generated?


How will reports be issued? 


How will remains and personal items be returned


to the families? How will this be documented?


Does the laboratory have the financial resources 

to handle the identification effort? 

Can the laboratory handle a backlog of its normal 

casework while it works on the identification 

effort? If so, how big can the backlog get? 

Does the laboratory have kinship analysis 

software? 

Is there a policy to handle the situation in which 

the genetic relationship is not consistent with the 

biological relationship reported by the family? 

Does the laboratory have a relationship with a 

bioethicist? 

Other____________________________________ 

PRESIDENT’S

4 DNA

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 2 

How DNA Is Used to Make Identifications 

DNA analysis has a number of advantages over other identification methods and is a critical tool in 

associating severely fragmented remains, such as those that resulted from the World Trade Center (WTC) 

attacks, with victims. It is important for a laboratory to have a plan in place for using this forensic 

technique in a high volume situation. 

I

n the United States, the medical examiner or 

coroner generally has the statutory responsibility and authority to identify the deceased 

and issue a death certificate. (Future references 

in this report to “ME” include medical examiners 

and coroners.) The ME must decide whether the 

forensic information available—based on judgments about a variety of data—justifies declaring 

an identification and signing a death certificate. 

The consequences of a misidentification can have 

emotional and legal ramifications well beyond a 

specific case. 

DNA is the newest of several methods or techniques used to identify victims of a mass fatality 

incident. Other methods of identification include 

recognition and comparison of distinguishable 

physical attributes (e.g., birthmarks, tattoos, 

medical implants, clothing and jewelry), forensic 

anthropology, fingerprints, odontology, and radiology. Ideally, all of the data, which may include 

DNA analysis, are considered before the ME 

issues a death certificate. 

DNA profiling has advantages over traditional 

identification methods in some mass fatality 

situations. When sufficient quantities of typable 

DNA and informative reference samples exist, 

DNA profiling can be uniquely identifying. DNA 

analysis can be used even when recovered 

human remains are quite small. Often, DNA 

analysis is the only technique for reassociating 

severely fragmented remains with victims. 

However, DNA identification testing requires 

more time, effort, and specialized, skilled personnel than some of the traditional identification 

tools. Mass fatalities with intact bodies may not 

need DNA to make most of the identifications. 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA identifications are 

5 

made by comparing DNA 

profiles from human remains 

to DNA profiles from reference samples. There are 

several potential sources of 

reference samples: (1) personal items used by the 

victim (e.g., toothbrush, 

hairbrush, razor) and banked 

samples from the victim 

(e.g., banked sperm or 

archival biopsy tissues 

stored in a medical facility); 

(2) biological relatives of the 

victim (i.e., “blood kin”); and 

(3) human remains previously identified through other 

modalities or other fragmented remains already 

typed by DNA. Exhibit 1 

describes potential sources 

of reference samples for DNA comparisons. 

The number of identifications that can be made 

using DNA analysis depends on the availability 

(number) and quality of the human remains and 

reference samples. 

Often, there are severe limitations with remains 

or reference samples. For example, environmentally harsh conditions at the incident site may 

limit the quantity of typable DNA recoverable 

from human remains. There may be a paucity of 

personal items. For example, airline passengers 

often travel with their toothbrushes and 

hairbrushes, and these items may be lost or 

destroyed in an airline disaster. Kinship samples 

may be unavailable or scarce because the victim 

Having preserved bloodstains 

from some of the firefighters’ 

medical files led to several 

identifications. In an apparent 

mixup at the blood bank, 

however, one of the exemplars was not from any of the 

firefighters. We discovered 

this while analyzing DNA 

from firefighters’ wives and 

children. In this case, it was 

certainly beneficial to perform 

kinship analysis on the exemplars before trying to match 

them to victims. 

Robert Shaler 

DNA

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 2 

Exhibit 1: Potential Sources of DNA Reference Samples 

Source Description Comments 

Personal items (also 

known as direct references) 

Biological samples include blood stain cards, 

blood stored for elective surgery, pathology 

samples, semen samples, and extracted or 

“lost” (adult or baby) teeth. 

Personal use items include hairbrushes, 

toothbrushes, razors, unwashed undergarments, and used personal hygiene items 

(e.g., sanitary napkins). 

Personal items are the most precious of 

all samples (including human remains) 

because they are so scarce. 

Personal items allow for the simplest 

type of DNA matching: direct comparison. However, sole use by only the 

victim can be difficult to ensure. Before 

reporting an identification, the lab must 

verify that the DNA from the personal 

item belongs to the victim. This is done 

either administratively or through DNA 

interpretation. 

Personal items require forensic analysis 

conditions (extraction, quantitation, etc.). 

Biological relatives (kin)	 Samples are collected from biological 

relatives. 

Kinship samples are typically collected using 

buccal swabs. 

The relatives’ biological relationship to 

the victim largely determines the utility 

of the sample (e.g., parents provide 

better reference samples than cousins). 

Distant relatives can be useful if there 

are many of these types of relatives in 

kinship analysis, but the analysis of the 

pedigree can become very difficult. 

Although biologically unrelated to the 

victim, the surviving parent of a missing 

person’s biological child can assist in 

determining an identification. 

Sometimes the relative does not know his 

or her true relationship (if any) to the victim. The lab must verify (administratively 

or through DNA interpretation) the relationship before reporting an identification. 

If collected properly, kinship samples 

provide an abundant quantity of DNA. 

Previously identified 

human remains 

Human remains identified using other modalities. For example, DNA from a torso identified 

through a medical examination or a unique 

tattoo may be used as a reference sample to 

identify other remains fragments; or wellcharacterized DNA profiles from other fragments may be useful to associate samples. 

Like personal items, previously identified 

remains can be directly matched to 

unknown samples. 

Single teeth have proven to be unreliable 

reference samples because they are 

easily misidentified through non-DNA 

modalities. 

PRESIDENT’S

6 DNA

INITIATIVE
HOW DNA IS USED TO MAKE IDENTIFICA TIONS 

had few living biological relatives or because the 

relatives are unable or choose not to participate 

in the identification effort. In the case of airline 

disasters, families often travel together, further 

limiting the availability of known kinship samples. 

Finally, public perception and expectation may 

play a role in deciding whether DNA testing will 

be used to make identifications. All of these factors must be considered when assessing the usefulness of DNA analysis for a particular incident. 

Before a mass fatality incident occurs, laboratories 

should develop a plan for extraction procedures, 

alternate analytical methods for challenging 

samples, automation for handling high-volume 

analyses, and expert system software to interpret 

results. One of the critical steps in this process is 

the creation of a chain-of-custody documentation 

system for all materials collected at the scene. 

This is important not only for scene reconstruction 

and quality control, but also in the event of any 

subsequent legal proceeding; as in any situation 

with potential criminal implications, the proper 

collection and preservation of samples—using the 

best forensic practices—is important. In addition, 

improper preservation methods can lead to the 

loss of typable DNA, compromising the ability to 

make an identification. 

It is also important to plan for the preparation and 

storage of a high volume of reference samples, 

including samples from family members and 

other sources, such as personal items (if sufficient quantities of DNA can be recovered from 

these items and their sole use by the victim is 

assured). Cellular material for use as a potential 

reference sample may be derived from items 

such as hair, stamps, envelopes, toothbrushes, 

and razors. However, the use of personal items 

for reference samples can be problematic 

because the quantity of DNA that can be isolated 

is often minimal. In addition, ensuring before 

testing that only the victim used the item can be 

difficult. If personal items are used, it is best to 

collect several samples 

because some will undoubtedly be better suited for 

analysis than others. Also, 

some samples may need to 

be divided for separate analysis and quality control. 

While a step-by-step discussion of DNA analysis is likely 

to be too rudimentary for 

most laboratory directors, it 

may offer useful information 

for families, family assistance 

coordinators, policymakers, 

reporters, and others who 

require a basic explanation of 

the issues faced by a laboratory that is responding to a 

mass fatality incident. Therefore, such an overview—at 

the mid-technical level—has 

been included as appendix H 

to this report, including a discussion of the following 

areas and how these were 

handled in the WTC DNA 

identification response: 

■	 DNA extraction. 

■	 DNA amplification and 

analysis, including short 

tandem repeat (STR) 

analysis and alternative 

testing methods, such as 

mitochondrial DNA 

I knew we were facing 

enormous management challenges.The notion that we 

were to reassociate potentially hundreds of thousands of 

remains—let alone identify 

them by comparing their 

profiles to perhaps tens of 

thousands of kin and effects 

profiles—was beyond daunting. For it to work, we needed 

to build a national scientific 

consensus for the methods 

that would be developed to 

identify the World Trade 

Center victims.We needed 

human geneticists, statisticians, bioethicists, forensic 

DNA scientists/managers, 

genetic researchers, information technologists, database 

managers, and program 

managers—and we needed 

them fast. Developing the 

KADAP early in the process 

helped in the management of 

this enormous undertaking. 

W. Mark Dale 

(mtDNA) analysis, repositioning primers, and 

single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) analysis. 

■	 Making the identification. 

Some laboratory directors also may be interested 

in further reading on the statistical issues involved 

in making identifications through DNA analysis; 

additional references have been included as 

appendix I. 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 7 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 3 

Before the Incident 

Decisions made by the laboratory director during first 48 hours following a mass fatality incident are 

crucial to the efficiency and overall success of the DNA identification effort. Asking—and answering—the 

questions posed in this chapter will guide a laboratory director in preparing a response plan. 

The hours and days immediately following a 

mass fatality incident are inevitably chaotic. The laboratory director must simultaneously address a number of issues, including 

responding to the diverse requests from elected 

officials, government agencies, the media, the 

victims’ families, and the laboratory staff. Despite 

these competing pressures, the laboratory director 

must recognize that the decisions made during 

the first 48 hours will largely determine the efficiency and efficacy of the DNA identification effort. 

This point cannot be overemphasized. In fact, 

some hasty or reactive decisions made during the 

initial hours after the 9/11 attacks caused management obstacles that spanned the life of the project. The best strategy for avoiding reactive 

management decisions is to prepare a DNA identification response plan before an incident occurs, 

and the best mass fatality response plans—which 

anticipate a potential forensic DNA identification 

effort—consider the humanitarian, scientific, 

information technology, and political factors, as 

well as staffing and resource requirements that 

will be necessary to mount a response. The 

laboratory’s mass fatality response plan should 

dovetail with the plans of other agencies and 

departments, especially the ME’s office. 

Several useful processes and procedures may 

already exist in a forensic laboratory. For example, 

process mapping can be useful in improving and 

expanding a laboratory’s capabilities, and this 

management tool would also benefit the implementation of a mass fatality response plan. 

The following questions should be considered 

when formulating a mass fatality response plan 

for a forensic laboratory: 

PRESIDENT’S

9 

ment, and funding to 

support the effort? 

■ How will the DNA identification effort be funded? 

■ What agencies/departments will interact with 

the laboratory? Who are 

the points of contact? 

■ Which agencies/departments will be in charge of 

specific activities—for 

example, collecting reference samples, collecting 

disaster samples, administration of funding? 

■ What activities will the 

laboratory director be 

responsible for, and what 

activities can other agencies or departments 

assume responsibility 

for? 

■ How and when will the 

laboratory director assess 

the degree to which samples are compromised 

(e.g., fragmentation, commingling, degradation)? What metrics will be used to make the 

assessment? 

Nothing in the history of 

mass fatality events prepared 

the forensic community for 

the complexity of the World 

Trade Center identification 

effort.The number of victims, 

the extent of remains fragmentation and deterioration, 

and the challenge of matching victims to relatives—the 

demands were tremendous. 

These circumstances drove 

forward forensic technological 

development that was aimed 

at extracting maximal genotypic information from highly 

compromised samples and 

matching the extracted data 

to genotypes derived from 

references.Without this concerted effort, the number of 

identified victims would have 

been much lower. 

Benoît Leclair 

■ Are there sufficient 

people, resources, equipDNA

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 3 

■	 How, when, and by 

whom will reference One of the early decisions samples be collected? in the World Trade Center 

identification effort was to ■ How will additional 

try to identify every sample. equipment and supplies 

be made available in a 

Because of the extensive timely manner? 

fragmentation of the remains, 

■	 How will staff and this gave us the best chance resources be reorganized 

of identifying as many miss-	 to handle the ongoing 

ing as possible.	 casework and the 

increased casework due Robert Shaler to the mass fatality 

incident? 

■	 Who will be the point of contact with the 

media? 

■	 Will the laboratory outsource DNA testing? 

Which testing? To whom? 

■	 What metrics will be used to describe progress 

in the DNA identification effort to family members, elected officials, and the media? 

■	 What are the information technology (“informatics”) needs for hardware, software, and 

technical support? How will those needs be 

met? 

In addition to having a mass fatality response 

plan, laboratories can mitigate the impact of 

increased demands on capacity and, often, capabilities by creating tools in advance. Appendixes B 

through G are samples of such tools—sample 

collection forms, sample biological collection kit 

specifications, issues to consider when outsourcing 

to another laboratory, and a DNA information 

brochure for the families of victims—that may be 

helpful to laboratory directors. These resources 

are discussed in detail in other chapters of the 

report. 

Laboratory directors who are responding to a 

mass fatality incident may need to consider using 

human resources from other agencies. The 

Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory 

(AFDIL), Disaster Mortuary Operational Response 

Teams (DMORT), and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are three Federal agencies that often assist Federal, State, and local 

jurisdictions in the initial phases of a mass fatality 

incident response. Exhibit 2 describes these 

agencies and their roles. It is important that the 

laboratory maintain an updated chain of command 

and contact information for these Federal 

resources. 

PRESIDENT’S

10 DNA

INITIATIVE
BEFORE THE INCIDENT 

Exhibit 2: Federal Agency Roles in Responding to a Mass Fatality Incident 

Organization Role 

AFDIL 

(Armed Forces DNA 

Identification Laboratory) 

AFDIL frequently is called on to support Federal, State, and local jurisdictions in mass 

fatality incidents. 

Title 10 of the U.S. Code authorizes AFDIL to participate in mass fatality incidents 

determined to be under Federal jurisdiction. The Armed Forces Medical Examiner is 

directed to conduct investigations to determine cause and manner of death for the 

Department of Defense (DoD) and other Government agencies. The ME can direct 

AFDIL to provide DNA identification services. Upon approval, AFDIL also can provide 

DNA identification services in non-Federal incidents. The National Transportation Safety 

Board and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have standing memorandums of agreement with DoD, stating that AFDIL will provide DNA identification services for their 

agencies in mass fatality incidents. 

DMORT 

(Disaster Mortuary 

Operational Response 

Teams) 

DMORT provides assistance at the disaster site for incidents that exceed the capabilities of State and local agencies. DMORT is part of the U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services. Requests for DMORT support are made through the State/local 

department requesting the Federal assistance. From www.dmort.org: “[DMORT] is a 

Federal Level Response team designed to provide mortuary assistance in the case of a 

mass fatality incident or cemetery-related incident. We work under the local jurisdictional authorities such as Coroner/Medical Examiners, Law Enforcement, and Emergency Managers.” 

DMORT does not conduct DNA analysis, but it will collect DNA specimens from human 

remains. 

FEMA 

(Federal Emergency 

Management Agency) 

FEMA provides funding for the DNA identification effort, provided the incident meets 

its criteria for a disaster. From www.fema.gov: “The Stafford Act . . . requires that ‘All 

requests for a declaration by the President that a major disaster or emergency exists 

shall be made by the Governor [chief executive] of the affected State’ . . . As part of the 

request, the Governor must note that the State’s emergency plan has been implemented and the situation is of such severity and magnitude that the response is beyond 

State and local capability and Stafford Act assistance is necessary. The Governor shall 

furnish information on the nature and amount of State and local resources that have 

been or will be committed to alleviating the results of the disaster, provide an estimate 

of the amount and severity of damage and the impact on the private and public sector, 

and provide an estimate of the type and amount of assistance needed under the 

Stafford Act.” 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 11 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 4 

Major Decisions 

Once the parameters of a mass fatality DNA identification program are set by the policymakers, the 

laboratory director will be responsible for determining the nature and extent of the laboratory’s response. 

It is important for the laboratory director to answer (with input from all agencies and departments that are 

likely to be involved) the questions presented in this chapter—and to keep in mind that these issues are 

interrelated. For example, the duration of the recovery effort can affect the quality and type of samples, 

which in turn may affect the number of DNA tests that may be needed to generate a profile. 

The medical examiner’s primary goal in 

most situations will be to identify the 

victims and issue death certificates. In a 

natural disaster, the effort is largely humanitarian, 

including identifying the victims so that their 

remains (and necessary documentation) can be 

returned to their families. However, when a mass 

fatality results from criminal activity, the identification effort has humanitarian and investigative 

components. In a criminal matter, the ME may 

expand the goals to include identifying the perpetrators and assisting with the law enforcement 

investigation. 

How important is DNA to the 

identification effort? 

The degree to which human remains are fragmented or degraded determines the value of 

DNA analysis in the identification process. Intact, 

large body parts lend themselves to identification 

by less costly methods, such as X-ray, dental 

examination, and fingerprints. However, DNA 

analysis is the only viable method for identifying 

severely fragmented or degraded remains. Even 

when whole bodies are recovered, DNA analysis 

still may be the best approach when materials 

that are necessary for other modalities—for 

example, dental records or verified body identification by friends or relatives—are unavailable. 

Remains often are identified by multiple methods, 

which may or may not include DNA. For example, 

only approximately 25 percent of the identificaPRESIDENT’S

DNA 13 

tions of airline crash victims 

are generally made by DNA 

exclusively. 

Will every person or 

every fragment be 

identified? 

The answer to the question 

of whether every victim or 

every fragment of remains 

will be identified frames the 

scope of the DNA identification effort. Obviously, intact 

bodies will require fewer 

DNA tests than fragmented 

remains, although decomposing bodies may not easily 

yield full profiles. 

For example, in an airplane crash with 50 victims, 

in which each victim’s remains are fragmented 

into 100 pieces, the identification effort undoubtedly would end sooner if the goal is to identify 

each victim, rather than each fragment of human 

remains. Everyone—the public, the policymakers, 

and the laboratory personnel—needs to 

understand the answer to the important question: 

“When are we finished?” 

If the policy is to identify all of the victims, DNA 

analysis would stop as soon as the last victim 

is identified—which means that some human 

There were two reasons that 

we were able to complete the 

265 victim identifications from 

American Airlines flight 587 in 

just 6 weeks. First, the infrastructure was already in place 

because of the World Trade 

Center identification effort and 

there was no extra ramp-up 

time needed in the laboratory. 

Second, our goal with respect 

to the airline crash was to 

identify all the victims rather 

than all the remains, so we 

knew when our job was over. 

Howard Baum 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 4 

remains may never be analyzed or returned to the 

families. However, when the goal of the effort is 

the attempted identification of all fragments, the 

work of the laboratory likely will be greater. 

It is important to consider that, if a mass fatality 

incident is so large and devastating that it affects 

the psyche of a community, a country, or the 

world, the scope of the identification effort may 

be broadened to help 

acknowledge the breadth 

of the emotional ramifications. After the 9/11 attacks, 

DNA analysis can be the most for example, the Mayor of 

reliable and robust of the New York City directed the 

identification modalities. Office of the Chief Medical 

Although it may be a second	 Examiner to do everything 

humanly possible to identify

choice to dental and finger-	 every fragment of human 

print analysis when such evi-	 remains. This policy resulted 

dence exists, DNA evidence	 in new DNA analysis techstill should be collected in	 niques and approaches; any 

case dental and fingerprint	 biological fragments that 

could not be identified were 

records are not available. preserved for potential 

Robert Shaler analysis with future 

technologies. 

The absence of policies guiding the number of 

DNA tests that will be attempted on severely 

compromised samples can have enormous consequences. In planning for a future mass fatality, 

policymakers should consider the impact on the 

public if technologies at the time are insufficient 

to obtain DNA profiles on all remains. Lessons 

learned from the World Trade Center (WTC) 

identification effort suggest that policymakers 

need to understand that the broadest testing 

scale can add years to a DNA identification effort. 

What is the minimum fragment size 

that will be identified? 

Policies also need to be established at the beginning of the effort that define “minimum fragment 

size” for DNA testing. A policy that has as a goal 

“all remains tested” may mean that many fragments may fail to yield results. In this situation, 

the DNA effort would take longer and be more 

costly—and, although families would be more 

likely to receive more of their loved one’s 

remains, they may be unprepared for the fragmentary condition of the remains or the length of 

time it takes to identify them. 

Decisions must be made regarding the minimum 

fragment size on which identifications will be 

attempted, the number of attempts that will be 

made to identify each fragment, and the statistical threshold that must be met before results are 

conveyed to the ME. These decisions are fundamental to a laboratory’s strategic planning. Planning—including preliminary meetings between 

the laboratory director, the forensic anthropology 

staff, and the ME—is critical, because it allows 

each entity to understand the perspective of the 

others in the emotionally charged environment 

following a mass fatality incident. 

From the laboratory director’s perspective, the 

minimum fragment size—typically, 1 to 10 

centimeters—should be based on three criteria: 

(1) maximizing the probability that all victims are 

identified; 

(2) recognizing the emotional needs of the 

victims’ families and friends; and 

(3) providing forensically relevant information. 

Defining the acceptable minimum fragment size 

affects every aspect of the identification effort: 

how remains are collected at the incident site, 

how they are processed in the morgue, the number of samples that ultimately appear on the DNA 

analyst’s workbench, and the likelihood of a successful DNA profile. 

How difficult will it be to 

identify everyone? 

The laboratory must make a preliminary decision 

regarding the DNA technologies that will be used. 

For example, can all identifications be made with 

standard forensic Short Tandem Repeat (STR) 

markers? Will mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) play a 

role and, if so, to what degree will the ME rely on 

mtDNA results to make an identification? Longer 

recovery efforts usually result in more DNA 

degradation, and this, in turn, affects marker 

choices. Also, the decision to expand marker 

sets beyond those typically used by the forensic 

PRESIDENT’S

14 DNA

INITIATIVE
MAJOR DECISIONS 

laboratory will be driven by environmental 

conditions at the incident site and the resulting 

DNA degradation, and by the scope and duration 

of the DNA effort. 

Whether an incident is “closed” or “open” has a 

significant impact on the statistical options for 

making DNA identifications (see chapter 12, 

Statistical and Other Issues. In a “closed” incident, the laboratory director should determine 

whether a list of victims is available—for example, 

in an airline disaster, the passenger manifest. 

Although it is important to keep in mind that the 

manifest might be incomplete or incorrect, the 

majority of the victims would still be known. 

An “open” incident is one in which the number of 

victims—or their identities—is largely unknown. 

After the WTC attacks, for example, the final list 

of victims was not determined until months later, 

and even then, officials believed that there were 

up to 20 additional, unknown victims. It should 

also be kept in mind that open incidents are 

prime candidates for insurance fraud. There are 

people who may try to file fraudulent life insurance claims. In the WTC attacks, for example, a 

police investigation was performed with respect 

to every reported victim, and cases of fraud were 

still being uncovered more than 6 months after 

September 11, 2001. 

It is possible for a closed incident to become 

open. If a plane crashes into a neighborhood, 

for example, the victims on the ground would 

change a typical “closed” event to “open,” 

because it would not be known who was on 

the ground. 

How long will the recovery 

effort last? 

In addition to policies defining minimum fragment 

sizes and the number of retestings to obtain data 

that meets statistical thresholds, the location and 

size of a mass fatality incident largely determines 

the duration of the recovery effort and the DNA 

identification of victims. Remains from an airline 

crash on land generally are collected in about 2 

weeks. In contrast, remains from the WTC were 

collected over a 10-month period. The end of 

remains recovery may prompt a decision about 

how much longer the laboratory will continue to perform 

the DNA analysis. 

Generally, remains are 

processed as they are 

accessioned into the 

morgue. In cases with a 

large number of victims 

and/or fragmented remains, 

it usually is not possible to 

collect all the remains 

before the identification 

process begins—although 

waiting until all samples have been collected and 

coordinated may be better (more effective and 

efficient) from the DNA analyst’s perspective. 

However, this likely will not be an acceptable 

approach, because the public, including the victims’ families and public officials, may expect the 

identification effort to begin at once and proceed 

rapidly. 

The degree of fragmentation 

should determine the minimum fragment size. Because 

of the extreme fragmentation 

of remains of World Trade Center victims, the minimum was 

approximately the size of a 

thumb. 

Robert Shaler 

Two basic metrics for estimating a laboratory’s 

workload are the number of samples received per 

month, and the number of months in the recovery effort. In addition, the public, the press, policymakers, and victim advocacy groups may have 

expectations of the duration of the recovery and 

identification processes. In airline disasters, for 

example, people may expect the entire process— 

from collecting samples at the disaster site to 

making identifications in the laboratory—to be 

completed within 1 to 3 months. The public also 

may expect the laboratory to complete its work 

within 1 month of receiving the last sample from 

the incident site. Chapters 7 and 8 of this report 

provide tools for understanding and responding to 

these expectations. 

In addition to considering 

the human remains, the laboratory also must consider 

the reference samples. People concerned with finding 

their loved ones want to 

respond quickly, so personal 

items and biological references may begin arriving at 

the laboratory very shortly 

after the incident. If no plan 

exists prior to a mass fatality 

incident for collecting 

You have no control over the 

condition of the remains, so 

setting criteria about what 

you will and won’t test 

becomes an important framework that allows the identification process to move 

forward. 

Jack Ballantyne 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 15 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 4 

reference samples—and sending them in 

“batches” to the laboratory—Federal, State, or 

local first-response agencies may help set up 

family assistance centers. The number of batches 

and how frequently they are sent to the laboratory 

will depend on the efficiency and duration of 

the reference collection process. In turn, the 

accuracy and completeness of information associated with the reference samples depend on the 

collection plan. 

Assuming funding, can the 

laboratory do the work? 

After considering the role that DNA will play in an 

identification effort, the type(s) of DNA analysis 

needed, and the duration of the recovery effort, 

the laboratory must determine the analytical 

processes. Ultimately, it must be decided 

whether a laboratory has sufficient capability and 

capacity to do the work. To assess this, several 

key variables—described in exhibit 3—should be 

considered. 

Exhibit 3: Key Variables in Assessing Laboratory Workload 

Variable Description 

Number of victims 

Number of recoverable 

fragments 

Percentage of samples 

to be reworked 

Number of personal 

items per victim 

Percentage of personal 

items to be reworked 

Personal items quality 

control samples 

Number of kinship 

samples 

Generally, this is a straightforward estimate in the case of airline disasters that do not 

involve populated areas because the laboratory has access to the passenger manifest 

(although babies may not be included on the manifest). This estimate is more difficult 

for incidents that take place in office buildings, stadiums, etc. because the number and 

identity of victims are not known until long after the incident occurs. 

It is important to distinguish between the degree of fragmentation and the number 

of recoverable fragments. In the World Trade Center incident, there was an incredible 

degree of fragmentation, with an average of only seven recovered fragments for each 

victim. 

Based on historical data, there are approximately five to eight fragments recovered per 

victim in airline disasters. Therefore, for general planning purposes, 10 would be a good 

estimate to use. 

Some percentage of samples will need to be reanalyzed before they yield usable DNA 

profiles; 20 percent is a conservative estimate. 

An estimate of the number of personal items will be provided for each victim. Historically, this is between five and eight. Note that usually not all of the items collected are 

analyzed; there should be a process to identify those items most likely to yield useful 

results. 

Some percentage of personal items will not yield usable DNA profiles. Historically, 20 

percent is a good estimate. When this occurs, the items are either reanalyzed or one of 

the other personal items is analyzed. 

The laboratory should be prepared to reanalyze some percentage of all personal items 

samples as a quality control mechanism; 5 percent is common practice. 

Historically, three or four relatives per victim is a reliable estimate of the number of 

kinship samples. Note that buccal swabs nearly always produce complete DNA profiles, 

so it is not necessary to estimate rework. 

PRESIDENT’S

16 DNA

INITIATIVE
MAJOR DECISIONS 

Exhibit 4, an Estimated DNA Analysis Workload 

Worksheet, can be used to help predict the labor 

and material resources required for the DNA 

analysis. 

Currently, most forensic DNA laboratories are 

proficient in STR analysis, proven to be a powerful 

tool in many mass fatality incidents since the 

1990s. For example, DNA identifications in three 

airline disasters—Swiss International Air Lines 

flight 111 (September 2, 1998), Alaska Airlines 

flight 261 (January 31, 2000), and American 

Airlines flight 587 (November 12, 2001)—were 

made exclusively with STRs; no other technologies were needed to identify every victim. 

STRs are particularly informative on wellpreserved soft tissue and bone samples. Analysis 

of the compromised remains after the WTC 

attacks demonstrated that STRs also work with 

Exhibit 4: Estimated DNA Analysis Workload Worksheet 

Human Remains 

1.	 Enter the estimated number of victims. ______________ 

2. 	Enter the estimated average fragmentation per victim. 

(For airline disasters, this value usually ranges between 

five and eight; ten is a conservative estimate.) ______________ 

3. 	 Expected number of human remains to analyze. 

Multiply lines 1 and 2. ______________ 

4. 	 Total number of human remains to analyze, including rework. 

Multiply line 3 by the number 1.2. ______________ 

Personal Items 

5. 	Enter the estimated number of personal items collected 

per victim (typically between five and eight). ______________ 

6. 	 Expected number of personal items to collect, store, and track. 

Multiply lines 1 and 5. ______________ 

7. Enter the estimated number of personal items to be analyzed 

per victim (typically between two and four). ______________ 

8. 	 Expected number of personal items to analyze. 

Multiply lines 1 and 7. ______________ 

9. 	 Total number of personal items to analyze, including rework and 

quality control. 

Multiply line 8 by the number 1.25.	 ______________ 

Kinship Samples 

10. Enter the estimated number of biological relatives per victim 

(typically between three and four). ______________ 

11. Expected number of kinship swabs to analyze. 

Multiply lines 1 and 10. ______________ 

12. Expected number of kinship swabs to collect, store, and track. 

Multiply line 11 by the number of swabs collected (between two and six). ______________ 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 17 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 4 

degraded tissue and bone fragments if the DNA 

extraction process is optimized. However, STRs 

alone are often not sufficient for identification 

when samples are severely compromised. In 

those situations, additional methods—such as 

mtDNA sequencing or Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNP)—are likely to be necessary to 

generate sufficient genetic markers to reach a 

statistical threshold. 

The DNA identification 

response to a mass fatality 

One of the important deci- incident demands forensic 

sions that must be made casework skills and highwithin the first 48 hours of a throughput genotyping or 

mass disaster event concerns databasing, whether from 

the establishment of family the public and/or private 

sectors. Because there are 

assistance centers.This is differences between STR 

extremely important, because genotyping for medical or 

the manner in which personal research purposes, laboraeffects and kin samples are tories that can perform 

collected affects the efficacy high-quality clinical or 

research STR genotyping of the entire identification should be used only after 

effort. careful consideration. 

Robert Shaler 

DNA from human remains 

in a mass fatality incident— 

and personal reference sample items—are 

collected from many different sources, each 

requiring chain-of-custody protocols not typically 

used by clinical or research laboratories. To 

increase the probability of obtaining full profiles 

from the personal effects samples, DNA should 

be extracted using forensic casework extraction 

protocols. Likewise, full polymerase chain reaction (PCR) volumes usually are necessary to 

develop complete profiles from the victim 

samples. 

On the other hand, kinship samples are more 

uniform and lend themselves to standardized 

high-throughput processes that are used 

(although perhaps with different protocols) by 

forensic databasing laboratories and some 

nonforensic genotyping laboratories. Forensic 

databasing laboratories often have sophisticated 

information technologies for tracking samples and 

avoiding mixups. In addition, forensic databasing 

laboratories often are more experienced than 

forensic casework laboratories with outsourcing 

work to private laboratories. 

Depending on the mass fatality event, kinship 

samples, for example, might be analyzed by highthroughput clinical laboratories that are willing to 

implement appropriate protocols (assuming that 

the kin are those of the victims, not kin of those 

suspected of being perpetrators of the mass disaster). This procedure focuses the most rigorous 

forensic protocols on the limited and compromised victim samples. And, although mass fatalities from natural disasters may fall outside the 

parameters of a forensic investigation, laboratory 

directors and MEs should weigh all potential 

issues before departing from chain-of-custody 

and other forensic procedures. 

However, most mass fatality events likely will 

require a forensic approach for at least some of 

the samples. In these instances, as previously 

noted, laboratories that can perform high-quality 

clinical or research STR genotyping will have to 

modify their protocols and analysis methods. For 

example, clinical and research laboratories may 

not typically use the same (or any) molecular 

ladders as size standards for allelic interpretation. 

It is important to ensure that all laboratories 

involved in the DNA analyses use protocols that 

permit standardized evaluations of victim profiles. 

Standard STR forensic DNA marker analysis is 

based on well-established and comprehensive 

procedures that enable profile frequencies to be 

calculated from existing and well-validated databases. 

Culture and practices can vary among forensic 

and nonforensic laboratories. If they are not 

addressed at the beginning of a mass fatality 

DNA identification effort, these differences can 

lead to communication problems. A laboratory 

director also should keep in mind that some 

terms—“acceptable molecular ladder,” “acceptable positive and negative controls,” and “standard reaction volume,” for example—may need to 

be fully defined when a nonforensic vendor laboratory is used. 

In addition to the actual DNA analysis, the laboratory may also be responsible for some of the 

following activities: 

■	 Sample accessioning and tracking. 

■	 Making identifications and resolving metadata 

problems. 

■	 Quality control. 

PRESIDENT’S

18 DNA

INITIATIVE
MAJOR DECISIONS 

■ Interacting with families and the media. 

■ Long-term sample storage. 

If these activities are overlooked during the development of a mass fatality plan, resource shortfalls 

likely will occur. 

Generally, after a DNA profile is generated, it 

should take about the same time to evaluate the 

data for an identification as it takes in a paternity/ 

biological relationship case analysis. [Note: 

Although more than a quarter of a million parentage tests are performed annually in the United 

States, biological relationship testing, such as 

paternity analysis, is rarely performed in forensic 

laboratories. Because many of the laboratories 

that perform such tests use some of the same 

STR loci that are used by U.S. crime laboratories, 

it may be prudent to consult with experts in 

parentage testing when preparing a mass fatality 

response plan. The American Association of Blood 

Banks is responsible for accrediting the Nation’s 

parentage-testing laboratories.] 

The laboratory director must consider the impact 

of a mass fatality incident response on the laboratory’s primary mission. Capacity issues must be 

addressed in the context of routine, crime scene 

casework or, in the case of a databasing laboratory, convicted offender analyses. As resources are 

redirected to a mass fatality identification effort, 

backlog and turnaround times are likely to 

increase for regular casework. Even though local 

police and officers of the court may support the 

laboratory’s role in the mass fatality incident 

response, they may still expect their cases to be 

completed in a timely manner. Plans for managing 

both a mass fatality incident response and routine 

casework should be developed before the need 

arises. 

The duration of the recovery effort also has major 

implications for a laboratory’s capacity. A rapid 

recovery effort (1 to 3 months) creates a spike in 

the laboratory’s workload; however, because of 

the short duration of such a response, the laboratory may be able to quickly recover. Also, local law 

enforcement professionals and officers of the 

courts may be more tolerant of delays if they 

occur for only a short period of time. 

With respect to more lengthy recovery efforts, 

the arrival of samples may be uneven, and the 

laboratory may be able to absorb the additional 

workload without affecting turnaround time on 

routine casework. However, a prolonged DNA 

identification effort may drain people and 

resources—and good planning can help mitigate 

disruption if a laboratory receives a large number 

of samples over an extended period of time. 

What is the funding source? 

It would be rare for a State or local forensic 

laboratory to have sufficient funding to cover the 

expenses associated with DNA testing in a mass 

fatality incident response. The Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) is the primary 

source of Federal funding for mass fatality incidents; see chapter 3, Before the Incident, for a 

discussion of FEMA assistance. 

Usually, FEMA is prepared to support new 

equipment purchases. Laboratory directors may 

already have equipment lists as part of their 

normal budgetary responsibilities—and it saves 

time to have those lists scaled-up and updated for 

presentation to FEMA as quickly as possible. 

If the response is to be funded out of State or 

local budgets (or both), without additional Federal 

support, there may be more stringent limitations 

on equipment purchases or resources to enhance 

DNA analysis capabilities. In this situation, decisions about minimum fragment size and retesting 

policies also will be influenced by fiscal restraints. 

Laboratory managers will need to make sure that 

the ME is aware of the fiscal impact on the ability 

to make identifications. 

The agency responsible for an identification effort 

(for example, the National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB) in an airline crash, the ME, or the 

laboratory director) may—after evaluating the 

issues of capacity, capability, mission, and funding—decide that the project is not feasible for the 

State or local laboratory. In that case, other 

resources may be sought; for example, the NTSB 

may request assistance from the Armed Forces 

DNA Identification Laboratory (see chapter 3, 

Before the Incident). 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 19 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 5 

Managing Expectations 

A laboratory director is likely to encounter unique management challenges in a mass fatality incident. 

Uncertainty, ambiguity, and stress are the hallmarks of the early stages of a mass fatality incident 

response. Also, a laboratory director will encounter new constituents: the victims’ families, public 

officials, the media, and the general public all will have expectations about the technology of DNA 

analysis and the timeline for DNA-based identifications. 

Alaboratory director who is faced with 

responding to a mass fatality incident will 

encounter a host of new constituents, 

in addition to the laboratory’s traditional constituents; exhibit 5 describes the constituents 

that a laboratory director may serve during a 

mass fatality incident response. 

Although these constituencies seek the same 

outcome—the maximum number of identifications and the maximum quantity of remains accurately returned to the family—their priorities may 

not be the same as the laboratory’s. For example, 

elected officials may focus on the speed of the 

identification process, whereas the laboratory’s 

primary focus may be on the quality of the collection and analysis processes. Although these goals 

are not mutually exclusive, they may occasionally 

clash. 

The media, which play an important role in 

keeping the public informed, can place additional 

demands on the laboratory director. During the 

World Trade Center (WTC) identification project, 

the laboratory was able to decrease media 

demands by widely disseminating routine information. The laboratory director’s challenge is to 

strike a balance among the constituencies and be 

prepared for the high-pressure environment that 

is spawned by a mass fatality event. 

The laboratory director must lead the staff 

through these challenges while continuing to 

ensure that the laboratory meets its charge of traditional casework and databasing. Because it is 

impossible to predict all the challenges of a mass 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 21 

fatality response, flexibility is 

a critical quality for the laboratory director. 

As discussed in chapter 3, 

the first hours after a mass 

fatality incident are critical. 

If requested to do so by the 

ME, the laboratory director 

must be prepared to provide 

realistic timelines and 

information about the DNA 

identification effort to the 

families, public officials, and 

the media. This important 

contribution may require a 

higher level of assertiveness 

and exposure than is customary for a laboratory director, requiring conversations with government officials on strategic 

planning of the disaster response. However, no 

matter how unfamiliar or uncomfortable this role 

may be, only the laboratory director can accurately explain what is needed to ensure the most 

successful DNA identification effort possible. 

The laboratory director should assume that the 

public, including public officials and the media, 

knows little about the realities of DNA identification analysis, popular television shows notwithstanding. The public will have to be educated in 

order to develop realistic expectations about the 

speed and power of DNA testing. The public must 

be encouraged to understand that the nature and 

scope of a mass fatality disaster can affect the 

laboratory’s ability to make DNA identifications, 

including the fact that some of the victims and 

A number of variables affect 

the identifications that can be 

made in any mass disaster 

event. For example, it may 

not be possible to obtain 

family reference samples or 

a victim’s personal effects, 

there may be no biological 

offspring, or the condition of 

the remains may preclude 

successful DNA typing. 

Robert Shaler 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 5 

Exhibit 5: Laboratory Director’s Constituents 

Constituency Constituency’s Goals Laboratory Director’s Goals 

Victims’ families 

and friends 

Receive rapid and accurate identification of 

loved one. Support during the grieving 

process. 

Be available as an information source to 

explain the DNA identification process. 

Provide data and statistics to demonstrate the progress of the identification 

effort. 

Public officials Restore order as quickly as possible. 

Reassure citizens by being responsive 

and sympathetic. Promptly and accurately 

respond to questions from the public and 

the media. 

Be available as an information source 

to explain the DNA identification 

process. Provide data and statistics 

to demonstrate the progress of the 

identification effort. Manage expectations regarding the speed and accuracy 

of identifications. 

Media Rapidly report on the status of all aspects of 

the event, including the DNA identification 

process. 

Be available as an information source to 

explain the DNA identification process. 

Provide data and statistics to demonstrate the progress of the identification 

effort. Manage expectations regarding 

the speed and number of identifications. 

Law enforcement Secure the incident site. Support the investigation of the mass fatality incident (if 

applicable) while continuing to support the 

investigation of routine cases. 

Impart clear information about sample 

collection and preservation. Delineate 

responsibilities and roles of laboratory 

staff and law enforcement officers for 

maximum efficiency and integrity of sample collection. 

Laboratory staff Support the identification effort while 

continuing routine casework. 

Educate and orient the staff to the challenges unique to a mass fatality incident. 

Avoid burnout and long-term emotional 

effects on staff. 

some of the remains may not be identified. In 

mass fatality incidents, fragments may be collected and analyzed, but never identified. A laboratory 

director’s effort to frame realistic expectations 

and candidly discuss issues such as the limitations of the technologies can limit disappointments in the future. 

The laboratory director can help officials and the 

public understand the identification process by 

collecting, monitoring, and reporting key facts and 

metrics. Frequent status updates to stakeholders 

can save the laboratory time by reducing the 

need to respond to ad hoc requests for information. Exhibit 6 lists the types of information that 

were provided during the WTC response. 

The public’s ultimate measure of the laboratory’s 

performance is the number of victims identified. 

The importance of educating constituencies 

about the many steps in the analytical process is 

critical to reducing unrealistic expectations. Raising awareness that DNA testing takes longer— 

sometimes much longer—than depicted in 

television dramas is an important message. Using 

metrics such as the number of samples received 

PRESIDENT’S

22 DNA

INITIATIVE
MANAGING EXPECT A TIONS 

Exhibit 6: Information Provided to the Public 

Metric Description 

Number of victim 

samples received 

Number of samples 

analyzed from victims 

Number of samples 

analyzed from reference 

samples 

Number of victims 

identified 

Number of victims 

identified by DNA only 

Number of remains 

reassociated with 

victims 

The number of human remains samples collected at the incident site and submitted to 

the DNA laboratory in a specified timeframe (e.g., twice daily, daily, weekly). 

The number of human remains samples that have been analyzed. Combined with the 

number of samples received, this metric provides transparency into the laboratory’s 

backlog and shows how well the laboratory is keeping pace with the recovery effort. 

The public should be aware that there are several analytical steps involved in the 

identification of a victim. This metric could be divided into several steps—extraction, 

quantitation (if used), etc.— to highlight the laboratory’s workloads. 

This metric shows that, in addition to often-damaged samples from the disaster site, 

the laboratory has many other samples to analyze before a reliable identification can 

be made. 

The number of victims that have been identified by any modality. 

The number of victims that have been identified exclusively by DNA. 

Eventually, the number of fragmented human remains associated with specific victims 

may become an important metric. Such a metric can be used to estimate the longitudinal efficacy of the effort and help determine when the DNA identification effort ends. 

and the number of samples analyzed, the laboratory director can help convey the complexity and 

time requirements of DNA analysis. Activity 

metrics can demonstrate that the laboratory is 

working hard and that seemingly low numbers of 

identifications may be attributable to factors such 

as the quality of the DNA from the remains or the 

availability of appropriate reference samples. 

The laboratory director should initiate discussions 

with those responsible for disseminating information on what metrics will be used to describe the 

laboratory’s progress. Without this direction, 

people unfamiliar with forensic DNA identification 

testing will use their own perceptions to measure 

progress and success. This could result in the laboratory being unjustly criticized about the speed 

and number of identifications—and this, in turn, 

can create a credibility gap when laboratory directors and their supervisors are asked to explain 

seeming “delays” or “deficiencies” in results and 

reports. Therefore, it is 

incumbent on the laboratory 

director to educate the various constituencies regarding 

what DNA information can 

and cannot reasonably be 

provided and why. To the 

extent possible, the laboratory director also should determine the frequency and 

duration of progress reports. 

Ideally, periodic status 

reports will be automatically 

generated by the Laboratory Information 

Management System (LIMS). 

Although the vast majority of victim identifications will be properly made and reported, a 

prudent laboratory director will be mindful of the 

potential for civil action—over issues such as 

misidentification, release of information, control 

Mass fatality events are all 

about people. If the public 

and the families are not kept 

informed of the identification 

effort, they will lose faith in 

and respect for the agency 

that is performing the work. 

Robert Shaler 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 23 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 5 

of remains, intellectual 

property—against a laboraSpeed versus accuracy will tory that is responding to a 

always be a tightrope in the mass fatality incident. It 

identification of victims of a 

would be prudent for the 

mass fatality event. Striking laboratory director to work 

closely with the agency’s the balance was one of the contracting officers and 

greatest challenges in the attorne

ys on issues such as 

World Trade Center effort. contracts, intellectual propPressure to establish working erty rights, and privacy 

guidelines for the rapid issues, including the 

reporting of results, while creation of a next-of-kin 

maintaining a high threshold release policy. to reduce the probability of Advance planning allows 

misidentifications, was a the laboratory director to 

constant concern—a concern design safeguards, like 

that should be paramount ensuring appropriate samthroughout an identification	 ple collection processes 

and preparing an informat­ effort. ics framework that can 

Thomas Parsons 

avoid sample mixups. And, 

since a mass fatality incident response may have a measurable impact 

on a laboratory’s capabilities and capacity, the 

response plan should contain a procedure for 

informing—and updating—superiors on this 

issue. Faced with the reality that backlogs and turnaround times may suffer during a mass fatality 

incident response, a laboratory director should 

be prepared to: (1) request additional resources 

(including people and equipment) early and often, 

and (2) justify requests with estimations of time 

delays should additional resources not be forthcoming. The laboratory director will need to use numerous 

skills to organize and manage a mass fatality incident response. Flexibility, innovation, and creativity 

likely will be demanded. Mass fatality incidents 

intensify the routine pressures faced by laboratories and often expose the laboratory to heightened scrutiny. 

PRESIDENT’S

24 DNA

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 6 

Project Management 

After a laboratory has considered the issues discussed in chapter 4 (Major Decisions) and is prepared to 

assume responsibility for the identification effort, significant personnel issues must be resolved. For a 

variety of reasons—including staff morale, public expectations, and economic demands—the response to 

a mass fatality incident should be handled as a separate project rather than as a part of the laboratory’s 

standard operations. 

Most laboratory directors come up from 

the “bench,” rather than from a management background. Skills in technical troubleshooting, case management, molecular 

biology, and population statistics are important in 

the day-to-day running of a forensic laboratory. 

Managing a mass fatality identification effort, 

however, requires these skills and more. A Guide 

to the Project Management Book of Knowledge 

(Newton Square, PA: Project Management Institute, 2004) offers this important guidance for a 

laboratory director who must respond to a mass 

fatality incident: 

Organizations perform work. Work generally 

involves either operations or projects, 

although the two may overlap. Operations and 

projects share many characteristics; for example they are: 

■ Performed by people. 

■ Constrained by limited resources. 

■ Planned, executed, and controlled. 

Operations and projects differ primarily in that 

operations are ongoing and repetitive while 

projects are temporary and unique. A project 

can thus be defined in terms of its distinctive 

characteristics—a project is a temporary 

endeavor undertaken to create a unique product or service. Temporary means that every 

project has a definite beginning and definite 

end. Unique means that the product or service is different in some distinguishing way 

from all similar products or services. 

PRESIDENT’S

These definitions of “projects” versus “operations” suggest an important principle: a mass 

fatality incident DNA identification requires constant and diligent project management. The laboratory director (or designee; see Project Manager, 

below) must assess what controls are needed in 

project planning and project execution. For example, the areas of communications, risk management, and integration with non-DNA disciplines 

are often overlooked. 

Project Functions 

Exhibit 7 depicts the major functions—or 

disciplines—associated with a mass fatality incident response. In a large response, each function 

may require a full-time resource; in the response 

to a smaller incident, one person may be able to 

fill multiple roles. Regardless of the size of the 

incident, however, each of these functions should 

be considered during development of a project 

management plan. [Note: Many of these functions are discussed in other chapters of this 

report.] 

Project functions can be defined as follows: 

Project Management ensures that all functions 

work in concert to provide accurate identifications 

as rapidly as possible within budgetary constraints. 

Sample Accessioning and Tracking consists of 

accessioning remains and reference samples, 

ensuring chain-of-custody documentation, and 

managing the flow of samples and data within the 

laboratory and among outsourced laboratories. 

DNA 25 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 6 

Exhibit 7: Major Project Functions 

Information 

Technology and 

Informatics 

Project Management 

Sample Accessioning 

and Tracking Sample Analysis Identification 

Management Quality Control 

Human Resources Media Relations Family Coordination Procurement 

Sample Analysis means performing DNA tests 

on remains and reference samples. 

Identification Management has two parts: 

(1) making identifications by matching remains 

and reference samples and (2) reviewing the 

metadata—information from all sources linked to 

a particular sample—associated with the reference samples to ensure they were correctly 

associated with the putative victim. 

Quality Control refers to the processes and procedures that a laboratory uses to detect and avoid 

mistakes. Quality control also ensures that there 

are no discrepancies between DNA analysis and 

other modalities (i.e., that the metadata can be 

reconciled when a conflict occurs). 

Information Technology (IT) and Informatics 

includes the software and hardware that supports 

the identification effort. 

Human Resources focuses on meeting the 

needs of the staff, volunteers, and consultants 

who are working on the response effort. 

Media Relations involves interacting with the 

press and establishing how and when information 

is released to the media. 

Family Coordination encompasses educating 

families, collecting the reference samples and 

family data necessary to identify victims, and 

providing information to the families. 

Procurement involves ensuring that the correct 

equipment, supplies, and services are available to 

the response in a timely manner. 

Project Structure: 

Centralized vs. Decentralized 

A centralized project structure, where all samples 

are accessioned and analyzed by a single laboratory, is the most common paradigm for sample 

receipt and analysis. The term “centralized” does 

not necessarily imply a specific physical location 

or software/hardware architecture. 

PRESIDENT’S

26 DNA

INITIATIVE
PROJECT MANAGEMENT 

In a decentralized project structure, more than 

one laboratory is involved. The laboratory that is 

ultimately responsible for the mass fatality incident response is called the managing laboratory, 

and other participating laboratories are referred to 

as partner laboratories. 

Since a mass fatality DNA identification effort 

most likely would be added to a laboratory’s 

casework, a decentralized structure can be more 

efficient if good information technology support 

exists. For example, in a decentralized structure, 

the human remains samples might be analyzed 

by one laboratory and the reference samples by 

another. Both laboratories would analyze samples 

independently, leveraging their respective 

strengths, and the overall response undoubtedly 

would be faster because the laboratories would 

be working simultaneously. 

However, for a decentralized model to work well, 

there must be a mechanism for centralized data 

management so that the managing laboratory and 

the partner laboratory/laboratories can view information and communicate about data, regardless 

of where they are collected or analyzed. It is 

especially critical that the managing laboratory 

have as close to real-time access as possible to 

all data—including DNA profiles, chain-of-custody 

documentation, and metadata—that is associated 

with the mass fatality incident response, because 

the managing laboratory has the ultimate responsibility for making comprehensive and frequent 

updates to the families, public officials, the media, 

and the public. [Note: For example, metadata for a 

victim’s toothbrush include the name of the 

victim, and when and by whom it was provided.] 

Sample accessioning and sample storage can be 

decentralized as long as each partner laboratory 

ensures that all of the metadata are accessible by 

the managing laboratory. The physical samples 

can be stored at partner laboratories, as well. 

However, if a partner laboratory disengages from 

the response effort, all of its samples must be 

shipped to the managing laboratory under appropriate chain-of-custody procedures. 

It is important to consider the administrative 

review portion of the identification process when 

deciding between a centralized or decentralized 

project structure. In a decentralized plan, if the 

managing laboratory needs to examine the physical item (e.g., toothbrush, hairbrush), the partner 

PRESIDENT’S

laboratory must be prepared to pull the physical 

item from evidence storage and send it to the 

managing laboratory or be prepared to provide 

digital images that can be accessed electronically. 

Sample analysis readily lends itself to a decentralized structure. A managing laboratory can divide 

the workload in several different ways: by DNA 

technology, by sample type, or some by combination thereof. For example, bone fragments might 

be shipped to one laboratory for STR and mtDNA 

analyses, whereas tissue samples would be 

analyzed in-house. Or partner laboratories might 

receive entire samples or extracted DNA from the 

managing laboratory. 

Because the managing 

laboratory has the ultimate 

responsibility for maintaining The Office of the Chief 

the chain of custody for sam- Medical Examiner (OCME) 

ples, extracts, and data, it is partnered with other laboraimportant to recognize the tories in the World Trade 

management challenges presented by these aspects of a Center identification effort. 

mass fatality identification The OCME was in the maneffort. Samples, extracts, agement role—with ultimate 

and data may be shipped to responsibility for making the 

and from the managing labo- victim identifications—and 

ratory individually or collec- also performed retesting of tively, at different times and 

in different batches. Multiple the remains and secondary 

extracts and multiple DNA testing of family samples and 

profiles (data) might be personal effects. However, the 

derived from a single sam- primary testing of bones and 

ple, and the laboratory’s tissues and the initial testing 

sample tracking system of family and reference sammust be able to document 

and certify the chain of cus- ples was contracted to outtody for each one. The sam- side laboratories with 

ple tracking system must specialized experience. 

collect data associated with Robert Shaler 

all physical transfers, including what was sent, where it 

was sent, when it was sent, when it was 

received, and by whom. The managing laboratory 

uses this information to document the chain of 

custody and to provide status updates to the 

public. 

In a decentralized structure with multiple partner 

laboratories, the managing laboratory must 

decide how samples, extracts, and data will 

move among the partners. There are two basic 

approaches: the daisy-chain model and the 

DNA 27

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 6 

Exhibit 8: Modified Daisy-Chain Workflow in a Decentralized Laboratory Structure 

Partner 

Analysis 

Laboratory #2 

Partner analysis laboratories 

receive extracted DNA from 

the extracting laboratory, 

conduct analysis, and return 

the data and any remaining 

extract to the managing 

laboratory. 

Managing laboratory sends 

extracted or unextracted 

samples to the extracting 

laboratory, then receives 

data from all laboratories. 

Extracted DNA

and Data 

Managing 

Laboratory 

Samples 

Extracted DNA 

Extraction laboratory 

responsible for logistics 

with the analysis laboratories. Extracted DNA 

Extracted DNA and Data 

Extracted DNA and Data 

Partner 

Analysis 

Laboratory #1 

Partner 

Extracting 

Laboratory 

hub-and-spoke model. Both were used in different 

aspects of the World Trade Center (WTC) DNA 

identification project. 

In the daisy-chain model, samples (or extracts) are 

shipped to the first partner laboratory, which 

ships extracts to the second partner laboratory, 

which ships extracts to the third partner laboratory, and so on. A major drawback to daisy-chaining 

is that the managing laboratory does not physically control the flow of samples and extracts among 

partner laboratories, which can make it difficult to 

locate missing samples and ensure proper chainof-custody documentation. 

When the managing laboratory has a partner 

laboratory perform DNA extraction, the daisychain model can become very convoluted. Exhibit 

8 depicts the flow of samples, extracts, and data 

in a modified daisy-chain structure that would 

occur when the managing laboratory sends samples to the first partner laboratory for extraction 

and analysis. In this example, the first laboratory 

extracts a sufficient quantity of DNA for the two 

other partner laboratories and ships the extracts 

to them. Partner laboratories return leftover 

extracts and data to the managing laboratory. 

It is important to note that the daisy-chain model 

requires compatible informatics and hardware 

systems and shared data transfer protocols so 

that all parties are sharing information. 

In the hub-and-spoke model (see exhibit 9), the 

managing laboratory centralizes the control and 

movement of samples, extracts, and data among 

partner laboratories. Although it is a simpler 

model than the daisy-chain for tracking chain of 

custody, locating missing samples, and identifying missing data, there are some limitations. The 

major disadvantage of a hub-and-spoke structure 

(in addition to time delays) is that samples or 

extracts must be packaged and shipped multiple 

times, which could result in repeated freezing and 

thawing, potentially decreasing the quality of the 

PRESIDENT’S

28 DNA

INITIATIVE
PROJECT MANAGEMENT 

Exhibit 9: Hub-and-Spoke Workflow in a Decentralized Laboratory Structure 

Extracting 

Laboratory 

Partner 

Analysis 

Laboratory #1 

Managing laboratory is 

responsible for logistics 

and sample tracking. 

from the managing laboratory, plates, conduct analysis, and 

creates as many extraction return the data and any 

Unextracted Sample

Extracted DNA and Data 

Extracted DNA 

Managing 

Laboratory 

Remaining Extract

and Data 

Extraction partner laboratory Partner laboratories receive 

receives unextracted samples extracted DNA in microtiter 

plates as needed, analyzes data, 

and returns plates and data to 

the managing laboratory. 

Partner 

Analysis 

Laboratory #2 Extracted DNA Extracted DNA and Data

remaining extract. 

DNA in the samples. For example, the managing 

laboratory sends a batch of samples to the partner laboratory for extraction. When the managing 

laboratory receives the extracts back from the 

partner laboratory, it must open the package and 

verify the contents, then repackage the contents 

and ship them to the second partner laboratory. 

This doubles the work as compared with a daisychain structure. However, in a hub-and-spoke 

structure, the managing laboratory has a higher 

level of control and the possibility of miscommunication between partner laboratories is reduced. 

Because of the types of samples in a mass fatality incident (e.g., bone fragments, tissue, personal 

items, kinship swabs) and the numerous DNA 

technologies (short tandem repeats, mitochondrial 

DNA, single nucleotide polymorphisms, etc.), a 

decentralized structure is often necessary. Moreover, it may be prudent to create different workflow mechanisms for different types of samples. 

For example, kinship samples may be processed 

using a daisy-chain model, whereas disaster 

samples may be better handled using a hub-andspoke system. Regardless of which project structure is used, however, it is safe to assume that 

the greater the number of partners, the greater 

the management complexity. 

Identification management is one function that 

should never be decentralized. The managing laboratory is responsible for setting the parameters 

for DNA identifications and resolving conflicts 

with other identification modalities. The managing 

laboratory also acts as the single point of contact 

for the victims’ families, public officials, and the 

media on identification-related matters. Thus, 

it is critical that all data—metadata and DNA 

profiles—be provided to the managing laboratory. 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 29 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 6 

Special Requests 

In the World Trade Center Although requests for speidentification effort, both the cial sample handling may 

fire and the police depart-	 disrupt efficient sample 

ments frequently asked the	 processing, such interruptions are inevitable in the Office of the Chief Medical 

aftermath of a mass fatality Examiner (OCME) to repriori-	

event. The laboratory direc­ tize testing of victims’	 tor should plan for these 

remains. Although it was contingencies and conimportant to keep the testing struct a separate process 

queue intact to disrupt the to handle expedited 

work flow as little as possible, requests. The first 72 hours 

after a major incident will the OCME honored a number be emotionally charged, of these requests.When this	 with the possibility of many 

happened, the testing proc-	 urgent requests that the 

ess, including the assignment	 laboratory perform 

of personnel, was affected.	 immediate DNA analyses. 

Requests for expedited 

Robert Shaler	 analyses may also occur 

later in the identification 

effort, if new remains are 

recovered or more useful personal items or 

kinship references become available. In the WTC 

DNA identification project, the laboratory frequently received instructions to collect and 

analyze reference samples and search the DNA 

profiles against the accumulated profiles of 

tested victim remains within 24 hours or less. 

Without a process in place for handling such 

expedited requests, interruptions will affect 

efficient and orderly sample throughput. 

Project Manager 

One of the most serious misjudgments a laboratory director can make is failing to recognize the 

importance of project management. Experience 

gained during the WTC DNA identification effort, 

followed shortly thereafter by the crash of American Airlines flight 587 in Queens, New York, 

showed how crucial it is to avoid the natural 

tendency to manage a mass fatality incident 

response as simply another operational activity. 

To meet the challenge of maintaining ongoing 

forensic casework while also responding to a 

mass fatality incident, a laboratory director should 

consider appointing a separate project manager 

to ensure that the response is appropriately 

executed. If the laboratory director assumes the 

project manager role, other responsibilities may 

have to be delegated. This can be an effective 

solution if the day-to-day operational duties associated with casework or offender analyses can be 

transferred to other staff. If the laboratory director 

is unable to delegate some of his or her other 

responsibilities, a dedicated project manager 

should be appointed for the mass fatality incident 

project. 

The ideal project manager is someone who 

understands all facets of a mass fatality incident 

response. It often is difficult, however, to find 

someone with this exact skill set. At the least, the 

project manager should be familiar with all of the 

disciplines that will be brought to bear, including 

sample collection, DNA analysis, and information 

technology. In addition, the project manager 

should have experience planning and monitoring 

work and should be comfortable in a teamoriented environment. 

The project manager should work with the laboratory director to formulate a strategy for the specific mass fatality incident response. With the 

laboratory director’s consent, the project manager 

should implement the necessary policies and procedures. The project manager also is responsible 

for keeping the laboratory director apprised of the 

project’s status and for meeting regularly to discuss progress, risks, schedules, and resources. 

Even if the laboratory elects to outsource some 

of the response activities, a large project management role still exists. For example, the laboratory 

may choose to outsource the DNA analysis to one 

or more laboratories and make identifications inhouse. This structure requires a project manager 

to coordinate the movement of samples and data, 

monitor contract compliance, and ensure that sufficient resources (people, databases, computers, 

etc.) are available for the identification effort. 

Exhibit 10 describes some of the important duties 

of the project manager. 

The project manager can expect the identification 

process to have two distinct phases. The first 

phase is characterized by a large number of 

identifications made in a relatively short period 

of time. The second phase is characterized by 

fewer, more difficult, identifications made over a 

relatively long period of time. 

PRESIDENT’S

30 DNA

INITIATIVE
PROJECT MANAGEMENT 

External Relationships 

In addition to managing communication within 

the laboratory, the project manager should 

manage relationships with external organizations. 

The laboratory represents just one component of 

a mass fatality incident response. By working 

closely with other response participants, the 

project manager can improve the laboratory’s 

effectiveness and efficiency. (See Mass Fatality 

Incidents: A Guide for Human Forensic 

Identification online at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 

nij/pubs-sum/199758.htm.) 

Exhibit 10: Project Manager Duties


Duty Description


Needless to say, every organization has its own 

mission, goals, and way of conducting business. 

The project manager should work to understand 

the cultures of the various agencies and departments with which the laboratory will be working 

in the identification effort. In addition, the project 

manager should establish formal and informal 

channels for receiving and sharing information. 

For example, by building a relationship with the 

site recovery team, the project manager can gain 

insight into the volume and type of samples that 

will enter the laboratory during a particular timeframe. Exhibit 11 shows some of the organizations that may be involved in a mass fatality 

response. 

Define and manage the 

project schedule. 

Facilitate communication 

within the project team. 

Identify and manage 

risks. 

Optimize the overall 

project, not one function 

or discipline. 

The project manager is responsible for creating a schedule, assigning resources, and 

monitoring progress. Because there are so many unknowns at the beginning of a mass 

fatality incident response, it may be impossible to create a project schedule with a 

definite end date. However, the project manager should identify major tasks, create a 

precedence diagram describing the interrelationships of tasks, and establish work 

schedules for the project team. 

The project manager is responsible for ensuring that employees in each functional 

area have the information they need to plan and execute their portion of the response. 

The project manager should chair frequent, periodic (daily or weekly) meetings with 

functional-area managers and facilitate a free flow of information. Current and future 

challenges should be discussed. Decisions should be made only after considering the 

impact on each function. A classic mistake is excluding the issue of information technology from decisionmaking. 

The project manager is responsible for identifying the major risks to the project’s success. Some examples of risks include not having a particular task completed by a deadline, the laboratory information management system failing to support the mass fatality 

incident response, and sample mixups during accessioning. Risks will be unique to 

each response and undoubtedly will change as the project unfolds. One proven riskmanagement technique is to have the management team brainstorm the top 10 project 

risks, order them from highest to lowest, then identify avoidance and mitigation strategies for each. Ideally, each functional-area manager also manages his or her own top 

10 risks. 

Management theory says that the only way to optimize a large entity is to suboptimize 

its various components. Thus, the project manager should shift resources among functions, as necessary, to mitigate risk and ensure success. Even though the functionalarea managers may object to losing resources, the project manager is responsible for 

the overall success of the project. This is another reason why the project manager 

should understand all of the functional areas. 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 31 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 6 

Because we were asked to 

identify every fragment of 

human tissue, the smallest, 

most damaged samples were 

repeatedly tested. Each 

time—particularly, as we 

optimized protocols—we 

hoped to reveal a few more 

loci.The more compromised 

the sample, the more 

attempts we made to coax 

out the data. 

Robert Shaler 

Integration of the DNA 

effort in the overall 

response to a mass fatality 

disaster requires extensive 

communication between 

the laboratory and all other 

units with responsibility. 

One crucial lesson learned 

during the WTC DNA identification project is that it 

is impossible to overcommunicate during a mass 

fatality incident response. 

Aspects of DNA identification may not be understood 

by other groups that are 

involved in a mass disaster 

response; for example, 

sending a communication about collecting 

remains in clean paper—rather than plastic—bags 

could make the difference between obtaining a 

full 13-locus STR profile and a partial or failed profile. It is the project manager’s responsibility to 

ensure that the laboratory’s needs are understood 

by other response agencies. 

As individuals and groups become preoccupied 

with their own obligations during a mass fatality 

response effort, it is possible to forget that introducing a seemingly minor change in the DNA 

identification process can affect the entire effort. 

To minimize miscommunication, the project manager should establish a single point of contact in 

each group involved. Regular meetings among 

key participants should be held. And, although the 

DNA project manager may initially have to guide 

the discussion to reduce digressions, these formal lines of communication are crucial. 

The project manager should meet with the ME at 

least once a week. The meeting agenda should 

include: 

Exhibit 11: Organizations Involved in a Mass Fatality DNA Identification Response 

DNA 

Laboratory 

Medical 

Examiner/Coroner 

Investigating 

Agencies 

Victims’ 

Families 

Recovery 

Team 

DMORT 

FEMA 

Partner 

Laboratories 

Vendors 

PRESIDENT’S

32 DNA

INITIATIVE
PROJECT MANAGEMENT 

■	 Overall project status from the perspective of 

the ME and the DNA laboratory. 

■	 Sample collection, storage, and tracking issues. 

■	 Identification issues across modalities. 

■	 Information technology requirements and 

problems. 

■	 Information to be presented to the media. 

■	 Anticipated workload and possible constraints. 

Representatives of the laboratory, designated by 

the project manager, also should plan to meet 

with partner laboratories at least once a week. 

The agenda for these meetings should include: 

■	 Overall project status, including issues regarding the transfer and tracking of samples or 

extracts. 

■	 Problems and solutions regarding sample 

analyses and data. 

■	 Anticipated workload and possible constraints. 

These meetings may be more effective if they are 

conducted one on one with representatives of 

the partner laboratories or with the entire partner 

laboratory staff. Meetings with other agencies 

(e.g., Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

investigating agencies) can be less frequent, 

but also should occur regularly and have written 

agendas. 

Human Resources 

Following a mass fatality incident, consultants 

and volunteers may be called upon to supplement 

the capabilities of the laboratory. The project manager is responsible for ensuring the coordination 

of these resources. 

It is fair to assume that the DNA response to a 

mass fatality incident will require a rapid ramp-up 

of staff to support the collection, accessioning, and 

information technology processes and beginning 

sample analyses. Staffing requirements are likely 

to peak at the time that multiple processes—for 

example, sample collection, analyses, identification—occur simultaneously. After the bulk of the 

samples have been profiled, staffing needs should 

begin to taper off, with the identification analyses 

and quality control processes assuming the bulk of 

the requirements for the remainder of the project. 

PRESIDENT’S

The staffing requirements 

for the World Trade Center 

DNA identification effort followed a skewed bell-shaped 

curve (see exhibit 12). 

A laboratory responding to a 

mass fatality disaster may 

not have sufficient staff onboard for the peak times 

and may have to seek outside resources for part or all 

of the project. Typically, consultants are hired for a specific purpose or a specialized 

task. For example, the laboratory may augment its identification capability by hiring 

a specialist in genetic and 

kinship analysis to scrutinize 

complex pedigrees. Or, the 

laboratory may contract for 

specialized information technology expertise. Because most crime laboratories are part of the public sector, it usually is 

easier to hire consultants for short-term engagements. This allows contract amounts to be kept 

below procurement ceilings and can expedite the 

procurement process. 

It was virtually impossible to 

manage both routine casework and a mass fatality 

event the size of the World 

Trade Center without help.We 

immediately established disaster teams in the laboratory 

and appointed a liaison 

between the New York State 

Police and the Office of the 

Chief Medical Examiner laboratories. I kept managerial 

control of the WTC work and 

charged the deputy director 

with the daily operation of 

the laboratory. 

Robert Shaler 

Volunteers who assist in the DNA identification 

after a mass fatality incident can be professional 

or nonprofessional. Professional volunteers are 

already trained in some facet of the mass fatality 

incident response and are able to assume some 

of laboratory staff’s duties. Examples include 

Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams 

(DMORT) personnel, medical students who assist 

in the morgue by accessioning samples and cutting tissue, former employees (e.g., retirees), and 

volunteers from other laboratories. Nonprofessional volunteers—those without specialized 

training in sample collection or analysis—may be 

used to relieve laboratory personnel from some 

administrative and clerical duties. For example, 

nonprofessional volunteers might perform data 

entry or routine paperwork. Before assigning 

duties to a volunteer, the project manager should 

understand the scope of the volunteer’s commitment. Because volunteers work free of charge 

and may leave the laboratory on short notice, the 

project manager should avoid assigning missioncritical tasks to volunteers. 

DNA 33

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 6 

Exhibit 12: Staffing Requirements Over Time 

Resources 

People 

Time 

Laboratory directors should be aware of liability 

issues that might arise if consultants or volunteers are used. For example, confidentiality agreements should be signed by consultants and 

volunteers, stating that no data or information 

related to the DNA identification effort may be 

published or conveyed to the media without prior 

written consent of the laboratory director or a 

person designated by the laboratory director. 

The agreement also should state that no personal 

information should be disclosed regarding the 

victims, the state of the remains, or any other 

aspect of the incident that the consultant or volunteer learns as a result of working on the DNA 

identification effort. A comprehensive confidentiality agreement can help protect the laboratory 

from premature, unconfirmed reports and the 

victims’ loved ones from suffering the insensitive 

divulging of gruesome details. 

The project manager also shoulders the burden 

of being alert to the staff’s mental health. When 

issues concerning staff health and well-being 

arise, the project manager must immediately 

involve the laboratory director, who may request 

professional advice. One way to help maintain 

morale is to keep the staff as fully informed as 

possible. Open communication between management and staff is essential to establishing and 

maintaining high morale. In the rush to respond to 

a mass fatality incident, information-sharing with 

staff can be neglected. But, a fully informed staff 

that understands upcoming challenges and goals 

can help management anticipate problems and 

overcome obstacles. 

Laboratory workers are likely to experience a 

range of emotions throughout the DNA identification response, and, in fact, there can be a longterm emotional impact on those working on a 

mass fatality response. Laboratory personnel 

who worked on the WTC response reported 

experiencing extremely high stress levels. Laboratory directors or project managers must be alert 

to signs of burnout, depression, and other psychological reactions; they must recognize the 

need for—and be able to implement—stress 

release mechanisms. The laboratory director and 

the project manager should also make employees, consultants, and volunteers aware of available mental-health or other stress-relieving 

assistance programs. 

PRESIDENT’S

34 DNA

INITIATIVE
PROJECT MANAGEMENT 

One important difference between a mass fatality 

response and routine forensic casework is that, 

over time, laboratory staff may become intimately 

familiar with the lives of the victims. By the end 

of the response, laboratory staff is likely to know 

the name, gender, date of birth, family structure, 

and next of kin of many of the victims. Staff may 

learn if relatives are not aware that they were not 

biologically related to the victim or that some 

family members are estranged. Because of the 

nature of a mass fatality—where the suffering of 

many is shared by the community as a whole— 

laboratory staff may find themselves empathizing 

with the victims’ families, sharing their bereavement. 

There also will be additional stress on laboratory 

staff who are not assigned to the mass fatality 

response. If a laboratory must also continue to 

meet its casework and offender-processing commitments, some staff will likely need to assume 

the workload and responsibilities of colleagues 

who are assigned to the mass fatality response. 

Over time, this can lead to resentment. Some 

staff members may be unhappy about not being 

assigned to the mass fatality incident response; 

or the priority of the mass fatality incident over 

traditional casework may make them question 

their value to the laboratory. A team environment 

fostered by the laboratory director or project manager will help staff members support each other 

throughout the DNA identification effort. 

The laboratory director and the project manager 

should continually assess stress levels within the 

laboratory, bringing in experts, if necessary, to 

help with the assessment. Because of the 

demands of the work, it may 

not be easy to spot behavioral or attitudinal changes Every staff member worked 

in staff members. However, tirelessly, in the hope that 

the laboratory director and perhaps their effort would 

project manager should bring a modicum of comfort 

watch for stress-related to the victims’ despairing symptoms such as crying, 

a haggard appearance, a friends and relatives.The task 

normally calm individual was huge, and small miracles 

becoming argumentative, or were performed daily.The 

a normally extroverted indi- emotional toll on New York 

vidual becoming quiet and State Police personnel was 

withdrawn. obvious, showing in their 

In the WTC response, faces, weighing on them, but 

for example, there was they never gave up. 

an employee assistance pro- Barry Duceman 

gram available to laboratory 

personnel, in addition to the 

following assistance for all employees, consultants, and volunteers who were working on the 

recovery effort: 

■	 Sal’s Café: The Salvation Army provided free 

breakfast, lunch, and dinner to anyone working 

on the WTC project. 

■	 A national massage therapy association provided massages, including reflexology, through an 

arrangement with the city of New York. 

■	 Religious ceremonies were regularly conducted, and religious leaders of many faiths were 

available in the mortuary for families and 

workers. 

■	 Project Liberty, a group of mental health 

professionals, provided free counseling. 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 35 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 7 

Media Relations 

Because DNA technology is of such interest to the public, there are likely to be many DNA-related 

questions from the media. To minimize the potential for misunderstandings, there should be a single 

point of contact between the laboratory and the press, and laboratory staff should be instructed on how 

to respond if contacted directly by the media. Through press briefings, the laboratory director can help 

educate the public and manage expectations by providing a realistic picture of what DNA analysis can— 

and cannot—do. 

One of the roles of the media is to inform 

the public about all aspects of a mass 

fatality incident response. Although 

media attention is likely to be focused on the ME, 

who generally has final responsibility for victim 

identification, the laboratory staff may also 

receive inquiries from the media. Therefore, staff 

members should know the laboratory’s policy— 

and the policy of the authorities to which the 

laboratory reports—regarding contact with the 

press. 

The ME may ask the laboratory director (or 

another person) to interact with the media on 

DNA-related matters, or the ME may choose to 

personally handle contact with the press. However, regardless of whether media contact occurs 

through the ME or a designated media relations 

person, the laboratory must be prepared to 

support responses with accurate, consistent 

information. 

If the ME asks the laboratory director to respond 

to DNA-related press inquiries, the laboratory 

must establish policies for media access. It is 

important that all information released by the 

laboratory come from a single source, usually the 

laboratory director. When there is more than one 

point of contact with the media, information can 

appear to be contradictory or conflicting. Such 

misunderstandings can result in the loss of 

valuable time, as misinformation is corrected. 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 37 

The media may also request laboratory visits to 

observe, photograph, or film the analytical 

processes. Such exposure may benefit the public 

or the DNA effort itself, but the laboratory director 

should expect that granting such requests will 

disrupt workflow significantly. If filming in the 

laboratory is authorized, staff should be given 

ample notice. 

The following are examples of Web sites that contain information on DNA analysis and human identification. Such background information could be 

provided to the media to reduce the need for 

time-consuming on-location filming at the 

laboratory: 

■ The President’s DNA Initiative 

http://www.dna.gov/ 

Information on funding, training and assistance 

provided through the President’s DNA Initiative. Tutorials for law enforcement, lawyers, 

and judges on the use of DNA evidence in trial. 

Information on case studies and many other 

resources, organized by “audience,” including 

forensic scientists, officers and investigators, 

officers of the court, researchers, victim 

advocates, policymakers, and lawmakers. 

■ Short Tandem Repeat DNA Internet DataBase 

http://www.cstl.nist.gov/div831/strbase/ 

Tutorials and PowerPoint presentations on 

forensic DNA analysis and the technologies 

used to create profiles. 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 7 

■	 101 science.com’s DNA Tutorial 

http://www.101science.com/dna.html 

Basics of DNA analysis, including video clips; 

links to other useful sites. 

■	 DNA Interactive 

http://www.dnai.org/d/index.html 

Background information on DNA profiling, DNA 

kinship testing, and other information including 

video clips. 

■	 DNA From the Beginning 

http://www.dnaftb.org/dnaftb/ 

Interactive site that provides background 

tutorials, video clips, and photos. 

In addition, these books contain information on 

DNA profiling and statistics: 

■	 Forensic DNA Typing Biology, Technology, and 

Genetics of STR Markers, John M. Butler, 

Amsterdam: Elsevier Academic Press, 2005. 

■	 Interpreting DNA Evidence: Statistical Genetics 

for Forensic Scientists, Ian Evett and B.S. Weir, 

Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates, 1998. 

The laboratory director may have access to a 

public relations specialist who can coordinate 

contact with the media. Public relations specialists can screen media requests, supply basic 

information, and schedule interviews. However, in 

the absence of such assistance, and at the request of 

the ME, the laboratory 

director should plan on 

devoting significant time to 

media relations. 

The laboratory director 

should approach each 

media interaction with the 

goal of providing accurate, 

consistent information. 

Questions should be 

answered honestly and 

completely, without releasing sensitive or unconfirmed information. It is 

important to remember that 

information given to the 

media also goes to the victims’ families, so care must 

The Office of the Chief 

Medical Examiner had one 

spokesperson, the DNA laboratory director, who dealt 

with the press during the 

World Trade Center victim 

identification effort.We 

learned, early on, that 

because the same information can be presented in different ways—which can lead 

to different interpretations— 

it was critical to have one 

spokesperson. 

Robert Shaler 

be taken to be respectful of sensitive familyrelated issues. The performance and activity 

metrics described in chapter 5, Managing 

Expectations, should be part of status updates 

to the media. 

Briefing the media allows the laboratory director 

to educate the public and manage expectations 

by providing a realistic picture of what DNA 

analysis can—and cannot—do. For example, an 

explanation of the relationship between DNA 

results and the condition of human remains must 

be given in a way that respects grieving families. 

Through briefings with the media, the laboratory 

director can explain the limitations of DNA analysis as an identification method and can provide a 

realistic timetable for completing the DNA identification effort. The laboratory director may also 

want to raise the issue that there may be unidentified remains at the close of the effort. 

A laboratory director should also be prepared to 

answer questions such as: 

■	 How many victims have been identified? 

■	 Have you identified the terrorists? 

■	 How much time until the work is finished? Why 

is it taking so long? 

■	 Will you be able to identify everyone? How 

many victims will you be able to identify? 

Why can’t you identify all of them? 

■	 What is the condition of the remains? 

■	 Tell us about your emotional response. What is 

the mood like in the laboratory? How is your 

staff holding up under the pressure? 

Commingled remains, while a confounding issue 

for DNA testing, may be a particularly sensitive 

issue for families. Expect that the media will 

focus on new or unusual technologies, seeking 

information on their reliability, when they will be 

brought online, and how many new identifications 

they will yield. In addition, some reporters may 

want to “scoop” their competition and, because 

of this and the pressure on them to meet short 

deadlines, there often is insufficient time for a 

story to be vetted as fully as the scientific community would like. Unfortunately, some of what 

gets printed or broadcast may contain errors. If 

this happens, the gulf between perception and 

reality can create anxiety and confusion among 

the victims’ families and the general public. 

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38 DNA

INITIATIVE
MEDIA RELA TIONS 

The laboratory director can do a number of things 

to ensure that the media receive accurate information. Always state first whether the information being presented is for background or for 

attribution. Providing information “for background 

only” lets the laboratory director give more 

detailed explanations, but avoids having sentences quoted out of context. Interviewees also 

may request to review quotes that are going to 

be attributed to them, although this is not part of 

the journalistic process, and a laboratory director 

should not count on being able to review quotes. 

In addition to supplying press releases through 

normal channels, the laboratory director or public 

relations liaison may want to contact news organizations that serve the geographic regions where 

victims lived or worked, in order to “speak” more 

directly to victims’ families. Laboratory directors 

should also keep in mind that it may not be useful 

to grant an interview to every reporter who asks. 

The most efficient way for the laboratory director 

to ensure that the public has the information 

it needs—and still have time to oversee the 

project—may be to issue daily press releases 

(see chapter 5, Managing Expectations, and 

exhibit 6). The consistent and timely release of 

information also is likely to reduce requests by 

the media. It may, for example, be useful for the 

laboratory director to issue a press release when 

the following events occur: 

■	 The first remains arrive at the forensic 

laboratory. 

■	 The first DNA identification is made (which, to 

the general public, likely will signify the beginning of the DNA identification process). 

■	 The last of the remains arrive at the laboratory. 

■	 The final remains are analyzed. 

■	 New technologies are brought online. 

■	 The laboratory makes its final DNA-based 

identification. 

■	 The laboratory response effort ends. 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 39 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 8 

Family Coordination and Liaison 

Working with the families of victims of a mass fatality incident is likely to be foreign to most DNA 

laboratories. This chapter discusses the formation of a family assistance center and a family hotline and 

discusses a number of helpful forms, including the most recent version (in English and in Spanish; see 

appendix G) of the brochure on the DNA identification process that was distributed to victims’ families 

shortly after the 9/11 attacks. 

Alaboratory’s response to a mass fatality 

incident is a departure from normal criminal casework in which DNA testing generally is conducted on behalf of the State (or the 

defense)—with a law enforcement agency acting 

as the buffer between the laboratory and the victim or the victim’s family. In a mass disaster DNA 

identification effort, however, the laboratory 

becomes a gateway, rather than a buffer—with 

the laboratory working directly with families to 

collect information about victims and reference 

samples. 

Consequently, the laboratory and victims’ families 

often share a close, albeit short-term, relationship. Families become temporary stakeholders in 

the laboratory’s performance because many 

decisions made during a mass fatality incident 

response affect them profoundly. For example, 

the minimum fragment size and “when are we 

finished” decisions (see chapter 4, Major Decisions) determine how much of, and in what 

condition, a loved one’s remains will be received 

by the family. 

Depending on the extent to which the victims’ 

families are organized, they may have a strong 

voice in shaping nonscientific decisions. The 

laboratory also may receive, via elected officials, 

complaints from victims’ families. The best advice 

in these situations is that common sense should 

prevail. The needs of the families of victims of a 

mass fatality incident are, first and foremost, to 

have their loved ones identified and buried. Each 

PRESIDENT’S

family needs an official death certificate to settle 

their loved one’s estate and collect any life insurance benefits. 

Finally, families want information. Most laypeople 

do not understand forensic identification modalities, and DNA can seem especially mysterious. 

Often, families do not know why they are being 

asked to provide their loved one’s personal items 

or why the laboratory is requesting DNA samples 

from relatives. They may not understand the difference between a biological relative and someone who is called “aunt,” for example, but is not 

actually related. Laboratory directors would be 

well advised to develop a policy for dealing with a 

nonrelative who wants to provide a kinship sample. Being able to “do something” is a natural part 

of the grieving process, and the laboratory can 

always discard the sample. However, since this 

may raise false hopes, it may be best to consult 

with a bioethicist before developing a policy. 

Some families may be concerned at what they 

perceive as the government asking questions 

about their DNA or their relationship to a mass 

fatality incident victim. Also, once DNA samples 

are provided, families may not hear anything for 

days, weeks, or even months, which can cause 

additional anxiety about the government’s use of 

their DNA. The entire process can be bewildering 

and frustrating to the families of victims, which is 

even more reason for a laboratory’s policies 

regarding sample disposition, privacy, and other 

personal information concerns to be communicated clearly and respectfully. 

DNA 41 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 8 

The Family-Laboratory Relationship 

The relationship between the laboratory and the 

victims’ families can be greatly affected by the 

duration of the identification effort. Lengthy mass 

fatality incident responses require greater interaction between the laboratory and the families. 

Families will look to the laboratory to provide regular updates and explain why the process may 

seem as if it is taking so long. In DNA identification efforts that last an appreciable time, as was 

the case after the World Trade Center (WTC) 

attacks, families may organize to more effectively 

convey their needs to policymakers and other 

decisionmakers. 

There were several family 

groups that formed after the 

9/11 attacks.The largest, Give 

Your Voice, was started by a 

single family; the firefighters 

had a large family group; 

there was a family group in 

Boston and one on Staten 

Island. We made it a point to 

present the DNA story to 

these groups, and to answer 

their questions when they 

arose. 

Robert Shaler 

When a single business 

entity is involved in a mass 

fatality incident (e.g., an airline company in the case of 

an airline disaster), the company usually establishes a 

family assistance center, 

which serves as a bridge 

between the ME and the 

victims’ families. Where 

there is no single corporate 

affiliation, however, as in the 

case of the WTC attacks, 

the government may establish an entity equivalent to a 

family assistance center to 

serve as an intermediary. 

Family assistance centers 

may coordinate the collection of victim and kinship 

information and reference samples. In cases 

involving victims from foreign countries, the 

laboratory may have to work directly with foreign 

consulates. 

Family assistance centers also play a role in communicating the status of the identification effort 

to the families. Confusion can be reduced when a 

family assistance representative is brought directly into the ME’s or laboratory’s organizational 

structure and receives the same briefings as the 

laboratory staff, as well as additional tutorials on 

how DNA testing works. The family assistance 

representative can then coordinate with other 

family assistance personnel to better aid the 

families, thus allowing the laboratory to focus on 

analyses and identification. This type of collaboration between the family assistance center and 

the laboratory can improve and expedite the identification process and is most feasible when the 

family assistance center is established by an 

official agency rather than an ad hoc emergency 

group. Exhibit 13 shows the relationships 

between the laboratory and the victims’ families. 

Collecting Reference Samples 

The Victim Identification Program (VIP) is software 

developed by the Disaster Mortuary Operational 

Response Teams (DMORT), a program of the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, to collect victim information. VIP contains approximately seven 

pages of victim-related data, tailored for making 

mass fatality incident identifications. This information (primarily non-DNA-related) is gathered by 

DMORT personnel or collection center officials 

through interviews with the victims’ families. 

Although the families generally complete the 

printed VIP forms with the aid of family assistance centers, it is possible for the process—if 

well organized and well financed—to be done via 

computers. 

Currently, there are no standards that govern the 

collection of reference samples (i.e., personal 

items and kinship samples) from families. Historically, DNA laboratories have designed forms used 

in the collection process on an ad hoc basis—and, 

in some situations, forms have been designed 

on-the-fly, hours before they have been put into 

use. Appendixes B and C to this report (a sample 

Personal Items Submission Form and a sample 

Family and/or Donor Reference Collection Form) 

may be helpful. It may be important to also keep 

in mind: 

■	 Family members are under extreme stress in 

the days following a mass fatality incident, and 

their minds may be elsewhere during the collection process, causing them to inadvertently 

provide incorrect information. To avoid such 

mistakes, collection forms should be as simple 

as possible. 

■	 Every reference sample form should contain 

the following information about the victim: 

❏	 Full name, including whether they are a 

Junior, Senior, etc. 

❏	 Date of birth. 

❏	 Social Security number (if known). 

PRESIDENT’S

42 DNA

INITIATIVE
F AMIL Y COORDINA TION AND LIAISON 

Exhibit 13: Relationship Between Laboratory and Victims’ Families 

Typical Relationship Between Laboratory and Families 

Medical Examiner/Coroner 

Laboratory 

Family Assistance Center Families 

Preferred Relationship Between Laboratory and Families 

Families 

Medical Examiner/Coroner 

Laboratory 

Family

Assistance Center 

It is not uncommon for several victims in a large 

disaster to share the same name but be unrelated. Similarly, related individuals with the same 

names—cousins, for example—may be victims in 

a single event. Consistent use of the following 

guidelines will ensure that the proper reference 

samples are assigned to each victim: 

■	 Always collect the donor’s full name and date 

of birth. During times of grief, relatives may not 

realize that they are using nicknames or that a 

father’s “Bob” may be a mother’s “Robby.” 

■	 Europeans and Americans write dates differently (the standard European notation is 

DD/MM/YY). Ensure that month and day fields 

are unambiguous on collection forms. 

■	 Family members frequently transpose their 

relationship to the victim. In most cases, this is 

a result of a poorly worded question such as, 

“What is your relationship to the victim?” It is 

better to ask questions from the perspective of 

the donor. For example, “The victim is my 

___________.” or “I am the victim’s 

___________.” Also, the dates of birth of the 

donor and the victim can be used to help 

correct these mistakes. 

■	 Collect as much information as possible about 

the relevant family structure; the sample form 

found in appendix C may be a helpful guide. 

The laboratory can compare purported pedigrees from members of the same family, then 

use dates of birth and genotypes to help discern the true relationships. 

■	 Collect as much information and as many 

samples as possible. There may not be another 

opportunity. 

Generally, collection centers are staffed by members of the family assistance center, DMORT, and 

ME personnel. It is critical that the laboratory staff 

participate in the reference sample collection 

process, and it is advisable for the laboratory to 

define and control the process. Non-DNA laboratory personnel usually do not have the expertise 

to assess how kinship samples or personal items 

will contribute to the DNA identification effort. For 

example, a family member might ask, “I have a 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 43 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 8 

During the World Trade Center 

(WTC) DNA identification 

project, a software program 

that estimates whether a 

specific kinship sample will 

benefit the identification was 

explored. For example, suppose buccal swabs have been 

collected from a victim’s 

father and sister.Will collecting DNA from the victim’s 

grandson help meet the 

statistical threshold for making an identification? Charles 

H. Brenner, Ph.D., developed 

such a program to assist 

in the WTC identification 

efforts (see http://dna-view. 

com/simulate.htm). 

second cousin living overseas; should we contact 

her for a sample?” Individuals trained in DNA analysis 

and genetics must be available to respond to such 

questions and ensure that 

the most valuable samples 

(from a DNA identification 

perspective) are collected 

and analyzed. 

Traditionally, the metadata 

associated with a reference 

sample are collected on 

paper, then transferred to 

computer. Ideally, however, 

all information is entered 

directly into a database during the collection process. 

This helps reduce transcription and other data entry 

errors, such as those resulting from illegible handwriting. It would helpful, for 

example, if a specialized collection workstation 

could be constructed to streamline the collection 

procedure and guarantee greater accuracy. Features of a specialized collection workstation— 

many which are included in the software that the 

Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory 

(AFDIL) uses to collect reference samples—might 

include: 

■	 Two monitors, one oriented toward the individual performing the data entry, the other oriented toward the family member (allowing the 

family member to validate information as it is 

entered). 

■	 A device that electronically captures the 

donor’s signature; these devices are already in 

use in some retail stores. 

■	 A printer for creating copies of forms to be 

given to the donor at the end of the interview. 

■	 A barcode printer; for example, buccal swabs 

and personal items could be immediately 

barcoded for the laboratory’s sample tracking 

system. 

■	 A digital camera to photograph personal items. 

Two approaches may be used to collect reference 

samples from families: an “open house” (family 

members visit the collection center without an 

appointment during the day) and, the preferred 

approach, scheduled appointments when all 

family members are able to attend. 

The primary advantage of the open house 

approach is that family members can come and 

go according to their own schedules. However, an 

open house has drawbacks, including: 

■	 The collection site must be staffed, even when 

there is low or no demand. 

■	 It can become chaotic if many people arrive at 

the same time (e.g., lunch hour, after work). 

■	 Because members of the same family may 

arrive at different times, it can be difficult to 

ensure that specific personal items and kinship 

samples are assigned to the proper victim. This 

can occur, for example, if one family is mistakenly assigned more than one case number. 

(Note: Each victim should be assigned a unique 

case number. See chapter 9, Information 

Technology.) 

■	 There is a greater probability that family 

members will provide conflicting pedigree 

information. 

The preferred approach to collecting reference 

samples, however, is to schedule an appointment 

with an entire family unit. The primary advantage 

with this approach is that all the reference samples for a victim are collected at one time. 

Although each collection will take more time 

when an entire family is present, this approach 

decreases the chance of a sample mixup, allows 

the entire family to validate the pedigree, and 

uses laboratory staff time more efficiently. 

Regardless of the collection approach, there 

invariably are some family members who—due to 

poor health or distance, for example—are unable 

to visit the collection center. In these cases, the 

collection center must make special arrangements to visit their homes, have other agencies 

(such as law enforcement agencies or phlebotomists) collect samples, or mail collection kits 

directly to family members. (Note: This last 

method circumvents appropriate chain-of-custody 

procedures and should not be used if strict forensic protocols are in force.) 

As discussed in chapter 2, How DNA Is Used to 

Make Identifications, the number of possible 

PRESIDENT’S

44 DNA

INITIATIVE
F AMIL Y COORDINA TION AND LIAISON 

identifications depends on the condition of the 

human remains and the reference samples. After 

the laboratory develops DNA profiles for all of the 

personal items and kinship swabs, it will assess 

whether the reference samples provide sufficient 

information to identify the victim. In some cases, 

the laboratory may need additional information 

from biological relatives or personal items. 

Family-Laboratory Communications 

If directed to do so by the ME, the laboratory 

director may have to keep family members 

apprised of the identification effort, including any 

challenges that might hinder making identifications. The relationship between the victims’ families and the laboratory is a delicate one, and the 

laboratory should be prepared to clarify any 

incomplete or incorrect information and to do 

everything possible to educate the families. 

One way to educate the victims’ families—and 

the public, in general—is to provide basic information on how DNA is used in mass fatality incidents. In an effort to educate families of the 

WTC victims, for example, the National Human 

Genome Research Institute at the National Institutes of Health and the National Institute of Justice at the U.S. Department of Justice created a 

brochure, that describes the DNA identification 

process, including why reference samples are collected and how they are used. Appendix G to this 

report is the most recent version—in English and 

Spanish—of the brochure. 

The WTC response also had a toll-free “family 

hotline” to supplement the work of the family 

assistance center. The hotline was staffed primarily by medical and legal investigators who were 

fluent in English and Spanish. DNA laboratory 

personnel also were brought in to offer advice on 

kinship samples and pedigrees. The hotline 

became the primary way that family members 

were able to find out if their samples produced 

usable DNA profiles and, if necessary, to schedule an appointment to bring in additional reference samples. 

The families of WTC victims relied on the hotline 

to ensure they had done everything they could to 

help their loved one be identified. If a hotline is 

established, it would be 

important to have appropriate multilingual responders. 

DNA personnel should also 

be available to provide guidance on questions such as 

whether it would be helpful 

for a certain family member 

to provide a kinship sample. 

Individuals staffing the 

hotline should have online 

access to: 

■	 A log of contacts for each 

family, including who 

provided a reference or 

kinship sample and the 

date thereof. 

■	 The victim’s information 

(e.g., the data collected in 

the Victim Identification 

Program (VIP)). 

A lesson we learned in the 

World Trade Center identification effort was that collection 

of the kin reference sample 

had to be appropriately 

placed in their genetic context at the time they were collected or there could be great 

difficulty later on in the analyses of identification probabilities.Therefore, geneticists 

and genetic counselors 

should assist with collected 

family relationship data from 

those contributing reference 

samples in the aftermath of a 

mass casualty disaster. 

Joan Bailey-Wilson 

■	 Chain-of-custody information for reference samples, including the type 

of sample, when it was received, who donated 

it, etc. 

■	 The status of each reference sample submitted 

by the family, including whether its analysis 

yielded a useful DNA profile or when it is 

scheduled to be analyzed. 

■	 Whether the amount of reference material is 

sufficient to make an identification. 

It may be useful to assign 

particular individuals to work 

with particular families. Limiting the number of people 

with whom a victim’s family 

has to deal may facilitate 

communication, build trust, 

reduce stress on the family, 

and limit unrealistic expectations. Of course, the feasibility of this approach will 

depend on the size of the 

mass fatality incident and 

whether staff is available to 

support a hotline. 

The family brochure made it 

possible for the families of 

9/11 victims to receive reliable information about the 

DNA testing process, including what they could expect 

and the meaning of results. 

The document also has been 

used to help families of missing persons, including after 

Hurricane Katrina. 

Lisa Forman 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 45 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 8 

Depending on the duration of the response, families may form their own groups. The laboratory or 

a designee may be asked to participate in family 

group meetings. This is an opportunity to provide 

information and dispel rumors or misconceptions 

about the DNA testing processes and results. For 

example, phrases used by a DNA professional 

may be incorrectly interpreted by a layperson. The 

term “intact body” is likely to mean one thing to a 

professional and another to a victim’s loved one. 

The laboratory director also should be aware that 

For the families of missing 

persons, including the victims 

of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 

there is no such thing as 

‘closure’ or ‘moving on.’ 

Families first must do the 

hard work of grieving to get 

to a place where they intellectually accept that their loved 

one is gone; then they can 

learn how to forever hold 

them in their hearts. For 

many, the identification of 

remains helps them to get 

through the first part of this 

process so that they can do 

the harder work of the second 

part. 

Leslie Beisecker 

several groups representing 

the families may exist and 

should not assume that all 

family members receive 

information that is imparted 

at these meetings. 

Sometimes, it may be helpful for family members to 

tour the laboratory and ME 

facilities to more fully 

understand the identification processes. With 

respect to DNA analysis, 

for example, family members are likely to inquire 

about the status of 

samples they provided, 

whether those samples 

provided usable DNA profiles, and whether they can 

do anything else to assist 

the effort. The laboratory 

should be prepared to 

answer these questions. 

Finally, here are some additional lessons learned 

during the 9/11 DNA identification effort: 

■	 Some people hold negative perceptions of civil 

servants, leading them to believe, for example, 

that the laboratory is not working hard enough 

or does not have the expertise to perform the 

work. 

■	 Obtaining reference samples from a family 

member who was estranged from a victim can 

be difficult. 

■	 DNA analysis may uncover situations in which 

biological relationships are not as reported. In 

such cases, the laboratory must have a policy. 

It may be advisable to consult with a bioethicist (see http://www.bioethics.net). 

■	 If the mass fatality resulted from criminal or 

terrorist activity, family members may resist a 

mass burial that includes the remains of the 

perpetrator(s); they may not want any unidentified remains of their loved one commingled 

with the remains of the person or people who 

killed them. 

■	 One of the most painful experiences for the 

family of a victim is learning that a misidentification requires exhumation. It also can be difficult for a family to receive additional remains 

after they have buried a loved one. A laboratory 

director should be prepared to encounter a 

wide range of wishes from the victims’ families if such situations occur. 

PRESIDENT’S

46 DNA

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 9 

Information Technology 

Information technology (IT) can be one of the most overlooked aspects of a mass fatality incident 

response. This is understandable—after all, most senior laboratory managers are forensic scientists, 

not computer scientists. However, advance planning on integrating IT throughout a mass fatality DNA 

identification effort saves time, speeds identification, and improves the reliability of the testing. It is 

crucial that the project manager include IT personnel in decisions regarding sample tracking and other 

business processes. 

The archiving and management of the vast 

amount of data involved in a DNA-based 

identification of mass disaster victims is 

an enormous challenge. Because data must be 

retrieved, compared, and integrated reliably and 

efficiently, it is crucial to have sophisticated 

software. 

In June 2005, the National Institute of Justice 

published Mass Fatality Incidents: A Guide for 

Human Forensic Identification (NCJ 199758; 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/199758.htm). 

The study that resulted in the guide found that: 

The process of accumulating, reviewing, and 

interpreting DNA data is the most challenging 

step when employing DNA technology to 

identify mass fatality victims. 

Ideally, an experienced IT laboratory staff member 

should be involved in the management of a mass 

fatality DNA identification effort. IT should be the 

cornerstone of quality control, and the IT department should continually be searching for ways to 

improve work processes and turnaround time. 

For example, one way to increase productivity in a 

mass fatality identification effort is to have the 

Laboratory Information Management System 

(LIMS) produce a daily progress report for the 

media and elected officials. It is preferable to 

develop this capability before an incident occurs, 

because it is extremely difficult to achieve this 

level of IT sophistication in the midst of a mass 

fatality response. 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 47 

Exhibit 14 shows different 

functions that an IT system 

can support in a DNA laboratory. The arrows follow the 

basic flow of samples and 

data. In highly automated 

laboratories, these procedures will be monitored or 

controlled through the LIMS. 

Regardless of their level of 

automation, all laboratories 

employ these systems, in 

some form or another, during routine casework and 

offender processing. To 

effectively support a mass 

fatality incident response, 

however, some of these 

systems require special 

features. 

Prior to 9/11, mass disasters in the United States 

were relatively small in scale, allowing simple 

spreadsheet approaches to be sufficient for 

data management. However, even small-scale 

disasters require scrupulous data management. 

Although software programs exist for data management, access, and statistical analyses, the 

magnitude of the World Trade Center (WTC) 

disaster demanded enhanced capabilities. 

Our chief lesson learned in 

this arena is that, without 

validated, well-documented 

software programs to associate profiles from tens of thousands of remains with scores 

of direct and indirect reference samples, the matching 

process is untenable.The 

midst of a victim identification project is a difficult time 

to be beta-testing new versions of software. 

Stephen Sherry 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 9 

In the early stages of the 

World Trade Center identification effort—when the results 

of analyses were just beginning to arrive—we had to get 

information about the origins 

of any sample by querying 

several different computer 

systems; we often had to 

review paper records and ask 

for help from the New York 

State Police.The problem 

could only get worse, and we 

knew there had to be a better 

way to include functions in 

the LIMS beyond just tracking 

laboratory reagents and 

samples. 

Elizabeth Pugh 

Data-handling systems are 

needed to integrate any 

customized software as 

well as to provide a middleware system for connection 

and integration of different 

software components. 

Computer software must 

be able to assist with many 

functions. It must: 

■	 Organize, store, and 

retrieve diverse data. 

■	 Integrate different 

software systems. 

■	 Allow technical and 

administrative review 

of data. 

■	 Allow for annotation and 

recording of problems 

and resolutions. 

■	 Report metrics. 

■	 Track samples among 

partner laboratories. 

■	 Prioritize sample selection and review. 

■	 Generate family pedigrees and calculate 

likelihood ratios for hypothesized kinships. 

■	 Combine remains with the same profile to 

facilitate searching. 

■	 Enable profile comparisons and statistical 

calculations. 

■	 Allow for users to interact with the interpretation and evaluation of ambiguities. 

■	 Be reasonably user-friendly. 

In the WTC identification effort, the Office of the 

Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) contracted with 

a private vendor that developed software with the 

above listed requirements in mind. However, 

because the software was developed in the midst 

of the identification effort, and was not previously 

documented and validated “shelfware,” the 

majority of the kinship analyses and (initially) the 

remains matching had to be conducted using several commercially available programs. These programs were supplemented with customized 

patches developed by Kinship and Data Analysis 

Exhibit 14: Information Technology in a DNA Laboratory 

Sample 

Analysis 

Data 

Interpretation 

Quality 

Assurance 

Matching and 

Statistics 

Sample 

Accessioning 

Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS); 

either commercial or built in-house 

Commercial software created by DNA 

instrument vendors 

Software to call alleles 

Usually custom software 

CODIS; custom software 

PRESIDENT’S

48 DNA

INITIATIVE
INFORMA TION TECHNOLOGY 

Panel (KADAP) members who were deployed to 

the OCME. Without such software, the success 

of the WTC identification effort—nearly 1,600 

identifications made and nearly 20,000 remains 

profiled—would not have been possible. 

Another software tool used in the WTC identification project was from the FBI’s Combined DNA 

Index System (CODIS). Two of CODIS’ four files— 

the Missing Persons and Unidentified Human 

Remains Index (CODISmp) and the Reference 

Samples from Personal Items and Family Index— 

allow the search of DNA profiles. The use of 

mtDNA profiles as a screening system is facilitated by the introduction of the CODISmp system. 

Although designed for missing persons, the system may be used to search for DNA profiles of 

mass disaster victims. 

Sample Accessioning/LIMS 

Requirements 

All LIMS products have a sample accessioning 

capability, usually centered on a case number. 

Each case number has multiple items, or submissions, associated with it. Some LIMS may print a 

barcode that assists in chain-of-custody documentation and the creation of management or status 

reports. 

In a mass fatality incident response, human 

remains, personal items, and kinship samples 

must be accessioned. Laboratories usually retrofit 

these special requirements into their existing 

LIMS. There are a number of benefits to this 

approach, including that: 

■	 Laboratory personnel are familiar with the sample accessioning process and can avoid the 

learning curve associated with new software. 

■	 Chain of custody is documented and controlled 

using tried-and-true processes already in place. 

■	 There is no need to purchase additional 

software. 

The typical strategy for accessioning human 

remains is to assign all fragment submissions to a 

single case number. This is relatively straightforward if the LIMS allows a single case to have 

thousands of submissions (one for each remains 

sample). If the laboratory’s LIMS does not allow 

for a large number of samples to be associated 

with a case, the laboratory will want to consider 

developing a system to link the cases so that all 

samples can be associated to each other and to 

the identification effort. 

The commingling of remains presents another 

problem. For example, after a remains sample 

is accessioned and analyzed, the laboratory may 

discover that it belongs to two or more individuals. 

The DNA may show that the bone and tissue 

come from different donors, as happened in the 

WTC attacks, where remains were severely 

compacted. 

From the moment commingling is discovered, the 

laboratory will have to assign a new submission 

number to one of the items, then track both 

items separately. This principle would apply even 

if there are more than two profiles from a single 

sample—each profile would require a new submission number. Some LIMS systems may allow 

a sample to have multiple DNA profiles; regardless, both samples will have to share the initial 

chain-of-custody and accessioning information. 

Several other scenarios may further confound 

sample tracking. For example, there may be 

multiple victims from the same family, in which 

case the situation is complicated by partial profiles with overlapping genotypes or by full or 

nearly full DNA profiles from remains that are 

needed as reference samples for a related victim. 

Such difficult situations can occur and must be 

accommodated. 

The typical strategy for accessioning reference 

samples is to assign each victim a case number 

and add reference samples as submissions under 

the case. The case number is important because 

it represents the victim’s family and is used to 

group personal items and kinship samples for 

kinship matching. 

Assigning case numbers is not a complicated 

issue in a “closed” incident—for example, when 

a flight manifest contains names and addresses 

that can be tracked. During reference sample 

collection in a closed event, the family assistance 

center can review the list of victims and assign 

reference samples to the correct case number. In 

instances where victims have similar names, the 

family assistance center can ask family members 

for clarification during the collection process. 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 49 

INITIATIVE
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However, assigning case numbers in an “open” 

incident is much more complicated, and may tax 

the capabilities of the laboratory’s LIMS. Because 

there is no definitive list of victims in an open incident situation, the family assistance center—not 

knowing, for example, if there is more than one 

victim named John Smith—cannot simply assign 

case numbers to victims. This problem is exacerbated when reference samples are collected in an 

open-house forum, where members of the same 

family visit the collection center at different times. 

This also can lead to errors in the collection 

process, including variations of a victim’s name 

and perhaps even date of birth. 

Therefore, during accessioning, staff entering data 

should avoid the temptation to reconcile name variations. Rather, data should be entered exactly as 

specified on the collection form. Any necessary 

case number or victim reconciliation should occur 

after the final list of victims is established. This 

approach to accessioning 

will generate more case 

numbers than victims, but it 

will preserve all the information provided by the donors. 

We found that instituting 

quality checks throughout the 

identification process ultimately saved time and effort. 

By continually validating the 

accuracy of the data and 

results at each step in the 

analysis, we could identify 

potential issues before they 

became impediments to an 

identification. 

Amanda Sozer 

Unless care is taken when 

identifying and assigning 

case numbers to the potential victims, the laboratory 

will be forced to reconcile 

originally assigned case 

numbers with a later, more 

refined list of case numbers. Some of the originally 

assigned case numbers 

might have to be divided, 

and others might have to 

be consolidated. The most important part of a 

process that requires a regrouping of reference 

samples is preserving the original case number 

so that: 

■	 Samples do not have to be barcoded again. 

■	 New case numbers do not have to be issued to 

families. 

■	 The chain of custody is maintained. 

Exhibit 15 presents different scenarios of reconciling case numbers with victims. It is important to 

keep in mind that some LIMS products may not 

allow reconciliation of case numbers with victims. 

Exhibit 16 presents some additional capabilities 

that require LIMS support. 

If possible, the software used by the family assistance center to collect reference samples should 

interface with the laboratory’s LIMS. This avoids 

duplicate data entry and eliminates the potential 

for data-entry errors. At a minimum, the two systems should have compatible barcodes so that 

the samples do not have to be barcoded again 

during accessioning. 

Ideally, the laboratory’s LIMS will be able to: 

■	 Store the data included in the reference sample collection forms (see appendixes B, C and 

D to this report). 

■	 Capture photographs of remains samples and 

personal items and digital images of handwritten collection forms. 

■	 Store family pedigrees and allow a victim 

sample to be used as a reference sample for 

another victim, if necessary. 

■	 Allow cases to be divided and combined. 

■	 Track samples to and from multiple 

laboratories. 

■	 Track multiple testing of the same sample. 

■	 Alert the end user to discrepancies in data. 

■	 Prioritize sample testing and data analysis. 

Quality Control Software 

Software is not only a case-tracking tool. It is also 

a critical component of a DNA laboratory’s quality 

assurance and quality control programs. 

Quality metrics collected and tracked through 

software are used to refine and improve the 

laboratory’s quality assurance plan, and software 

tools often are employed as quality control mechanisms. Mass fatality incident responses have 

several, specific quality control needs: 

■	 Identify conflicting STR results. Remains 

samples and personal items may not yield 

usable DNA profiles on the first analysis 

attempt. The laboratory may choose to reanalyze these samples under altered conditions in 

the hope of producing a complete—or a more 

complete—profile. The laboratory will need to 

compare the results from each analysis to identify and resolve conflicts. 

PRESIDENT’S

50 DNA

INITIATIVE
INFORMA TION TECHNOLOGY 

Exhibit 15: Reconciling Case Numbers With Victims 

Case 1: An originally assigned 


case number maps directly 


to a victim.


Original Case 

Number 

Final Victim 

Case Number 

No additional 

work required. 

Original Case 

Number 

Final Victim 

Case Number 

Final Victim 

Case Number 

Final Victim 

Case Number 

This can occur when multiple 

victims have the same name or 

reconciliation is attempted 

during accessioning. 

More difficult to resolve from an 

IT perspective than Case 3. 

Case 2: An originally assigned 

case number contains 

reference samples for multiple 

victims. 

This can occur when family 

members report multiple Case 3: References for several variations of the victim’s name. 

originally assigned cases actually 

belong to one victim. Relatively simple to resolve 

from an IT perspective. 

Original Case 

Number 

Original Case 

Number 

Original Case 

Number 

Final Victim 

Case Number 

Original Case 

Number 

Original Case 

Number 

Original Case 

Number 

Final Victim 

Case Number 

Final Victim 

Case Number 

Final Victim 

Case Number 

This can occur when victims 

have the same name and family 

members report variations of 

the name (e.g., mixing up Jr.’s 

and Sr.’s). 

Most difficult to resolve from 

an IT perspective. 

Case 4: Combination of Cases 2 and 3. 

Original Case 

Number 

Reference samples were 

Case 5: Orphaned original collected for a nonexistent 

case number. victim. This can happen 

in “open” incidents. 

? 

Final Victim 

Case Number 

The victim has no reference 

samples. Identification can be 

made only in a “closed” incident. 

Case 6: Orphaned victim. ? 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 51 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 9 

Exhibit 16: Additional Capabilities Requiring Laboratory Information Management System Support 

LIMS Feature Description 

Support multiple DNA 

technologies. 

Allow samples to be 

tracked on multiple 

microtiter plates. 

Allow one sample to 

have multiple sample 

numbers. 

Support shipping and 

receiving samples and 

data from partner 

laboratories. 

Segregate mass fatality 

data from regular 

casework. 

Some LIMS products actually store the DNA profile associated with the sample. If the 

response employs several DNA technologies, the LIMS must support the various profile 

types (e.g., STRs, mtDNA, single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)). 

One sample may have numerous extracts. Depending on the types of DNA technology 

conducted, a sample may appear on multiple microtiter plates (e.g., STR plate, mtDNA 

plate, SNP plate, various reextraction plates). This feature is particularly important if 

extracts are shipped to partner laboratories. 

Each sample in a mass fatality response will have several different sample numbers, 

each assigned during a particular business process. These sample numbers are actually 

references into other databases. 

For example, the software used at the family assistance center will assign each sample 

a number and the laboratory’s accessioning program will assign a different number. 

Or, partner laboratories may assign their own number (and barcode) as they accession 

samples. 

The LIMS should be able to: 

■	 Build shipping manifests that contain samples or DNA extracts. 

■	 Track the sample (or microtiter plate) as it moves among partner laboratories. 

■	 Track when the DNA results and physical samples are returned. 

The laboratory most likely will want to segregate the mass-fatality data from 

regular casework data so management reports and metrics are not merged and 

can be analyzed independently. 

■	 Identify conflicting results from different 

DNA technologies. When multiple DNA technologies are used, the laboratory will need to 

review previously reported identifications to 

ensure that results from the new technologies 

are consistent. For example, a remains sample 

and a personal item may match with STRs but 

not with mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA). 

■	 Identify fortuitous matches. Partial profiles 

resulting from sample degradation are a common occurrence in mass fatality incidents. A 

partial profile may match several reference 

samples fortuitously, particularly if the matching 

algorithm allows for the possibility of allelic 

dropout. The DNA analyst must review all of the 

candidate matches and choose an appropriate 

course of action. The software should produce 

a work list that allows the DNA analyst to record 

free-text comments about each discrepancy. 

If the laboratory chooses to outsource samples to 

partner laboratories, these additional quality control tools should be considered: 

■	 Data file validation. The managing laboratory 

may want to validate the format and content of 

data files that are provided by partner laboratories. Fields that may be validated include sample names (to ensure the appropriate naming 

scheme was applied) and loci and allele values. 

■	 Blind-control verification. One method of 

monitoring quality in partner laboratories is to 

PRESIDENT’S

52 DNA

INITIATIVE
INFORMA TION TECHNOLOGY 

institute a blind-control program (see chapter 

14, Quality Control ). To partner laboratories, 

blind controls appear to be normal samples; 

however, their profiles have already been 

determined by the managing laboratory. The 

managing laboratory randomly places blind 

controls into the batches of samples (or 

microtiter plates) that are shipped to partner 

labs. The blind controls usually are renamed so 

that they are indistinguishable to the partner 

laboratories from normal samples. Then, the 

managing laboratory checks the data files that 

are produced by partner laboratories for blind 

controls and verifies them against the known 

DNA profiles. 

Matching and Statistics Software 

There are two basic approaches to DNA matching: (1) direct matching, and (2) kinship matching. 

Direct matching compares two DNA profiles to 

determine whether they come from the same 

source (“individual”). Sophisticated direct matching algorithms consider allelic dropout for nuclear 

DNA and heteroplasmy for mtDNA. Kinship 

matching, on the other hand, uses DNA profiles 

to identify biological relationships among individuals. Kinship matching should consider both allelic 

dropout (nuclear DNA) and mutations (nuclear and 

mtDNA). 

Exhibit 17 shows how mass fatality incident data 

may be searched. 

One of the primary tools for making DNA identifications is “matching software.” Currently, the 

most widely used forensic DNA matching software in the United States is the FBI’s Combined 

DNA Index System (CODIS). However, an underlying design principle of CODIS is that matches 

are rare and independent events—and, in mass 

fatality incidents, matches are neither rare nor 

independent of one another. Therefore, a laboratory director should be aware of CODIS limitations 

in a mass fatality incident response. 

CODIS is designed to rapidly search crime-scene 

DNA profiles against each other and against DNA 

profiles of known individuals. One assumption 

built into CODIS is that each profile will match 

only a tiny fraction (usually one or none) of the 

profiles in the database. In a criminal case, which 

CODIS is primarily designed to handle, the DNA 

profile obtained from a piece of evidence might 

not match any of the million-plus convictedoffender DNA profiles in the database, simply 

because that person has not previously been 

convicted of a crime that mandated collection of a 

DNA sample. 

In a mass fatality incident, however, every human 

remain likely will match several samples, including other remains or personal items. Although 

CODIS can properly identify all of the matches in 

a mass fatality incident (through pairwise comparisons), it does not aggregate similar matches, 

and, therefore, is less useful in a situation where 

Exhibit 17: Searching Mass Fatality Data 

Versus 

(compared with) Human Remains Personal Items Kinship Samples 

Human remains Use direct matching to Identify human remains Identify human remains 

identify multiple fragments by direct matching to by kinship matching. 

of the same individual. personal items. 

Personal items Identify human remains 

by direct matching to 

personal items. 

Use direct matching to 

verify that multiple 

personal items submitted 

on behalf of a single 

victim have the same 

Use kinship matching 

to verify that the 

personal items belong 

to the victim. 

DNA profiles. 

Kinship samples Identify human remains Use kinship matching to Not usually performed. 

by kinship matching. verify that the personal 

items belong to the victim. 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 53 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 9 

the goal is to assemble all potential matches 

across time and space. That said, CODIS has a 

standard data file format that is used to report 

STR data, and this common “.cmf” format was 

used in the WTC identification analyses. 

Once a potential direct or kinship match is identified, the laboratory must determine its statistical 

significance using a likelihood ratio for kinship 

matching. To declare a match as an identification, 

the computed estimates must exceed threshold 

values that are predefined for direct and kinship 

matches. The identification thresholds are determined based on the number of victims, the biological relationships of the victims, and the nature 

of the incident. This was a major focus of the 

KADAP and is addressed in chapter 12. 

Finally, the laboratory may elect to factor nongenetic data into the identification process. For 

example, human remains recovered from the 

WTC were catalogued based on their physical 

location within a two-dimensional grid superimposed on the disaster site. These data are useful when likelihood-ratio thresholds cannot be 

met due to incomplete DNA profiles. 

Sharing Information 

Information technology (IT) should be considered 

both in the context of the identification work and 

as a tool to foster communication. Many laboratories have come to appreciate the value of a LIMS 

and sophisticated DNA matching/kinship software; however, IT also can be used to enhance 

interorganizational communication. The DNA 

laboratory will need IT solutions to exchange data 

with other government or vendor laboratories that 

are participating in the mass disaster response. 

For example, the ME most likely will have a 

system that tracks the status of all identification 

modalities, and the DNA laboratory’s system(s) 

should be fully integrated so data entry is not 

duplicated. 

Mass Fatality Incidents: A Guide for Human 

Forensic Identification (www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 

nij/pubs-sum/199758.htm), recognizes some of 

these challenges: 

The difficulty of [data management] is compounded when more than one laboratory is 

involved in providing DNA results. Participating 

laboratories should affirm their mutual commitment, coordinate and track sample flow, and 

agree to use compatible software applications 

for data acquisition and interpretation. 

When multiple organizations participate in a mass 

fatality response, several types of data may need 

to be exchanged, depending on the relationship 

between the organizations. External organizations 

and systems that typically require IT interfaces 

include: 

■	 Government (partner) laboratories. 

■	 Vendor laboratories. 

■	 Sample collection agencies (e.g., first responders that collect and catalogue remains or 

collect personal items and kinship samples). 

■	 CODIS. 

■	 Mass-fatality-specific software programs (e.g., 

the Victim Identification Program (VIP), which 

is provided free of charge by the Disaster 

Mortuary Operational Response Teams). 

■	 LIMS. 

Exhibit 18 depicts business processes that will 

have to be integrated among laboratories if more 

than one laboratory is involved in the DNA identification analysis. 

To successfully build interfaces across these business processes, the IT manager should consider: 

■	 Physical connectivity between systems 

(e.g., Internet, private network, CD–ROM). 

■	 Security requirements (e.g., encryption, 

firewalls, access controls). 

■	 Data archiving. 

■	 Communication mechanisms (e.g., file transfers, enterprise messaging, database interaction); most of this type of integration in mass 

fatality identification responses has been 

accomplished through file transfers. 

■	 Data exchange formats (e.g., fields, field 

lengths, data types, relationships); data 

exchange formats are particularly challenging 

due to differences among some LIMS systems. 

■	 Compatible barcodes that allow a barcode 

applied in one laboratory to be scanned and 

read in other laboratories. 

PRESIDENT’S

54 DNA

INITIATIVE
INFORMA TION TECHNOLOGY 

Exhibit 18: Integrating Processes in Multiple DNA Laboratories 

Business Process When Integration May Be Necessary 

Sample accessioning 

Sample analysis 

Data interpretation 

Quality assurance 

Matching and statistics 

Multiple, independent computer systems are used to accession samples. All of the 

data must be accessible by the laboratory(ies) responsible for making identifications. 

The managing laboratory’s LIMS may also need to communicate with DMORT’s Victim 

Identification Program (VIP). 

One or more laboratories use the raw data produced by other laboratories to make 

its/their own allele calls. An example would be using an expert system to reanalyze 

severely degraded DNA. 

One or more laboratories review the allele calls made by other laboratories; participating laboratories produce CODIS-compatible import files for use by the managing 

laboratory. 

Multiple laboratories are participating in a single, unified quality assurance program. 

Laboratories share their final results with one another. 

Infrastructure 

Mass fatality incident responses are high-profile 

events that are scrutinized by the public, elected 

officials, and the press. In addition, the response 

can have an aggressive timetable for completing 

victim identifications, and DNA is often the primary means of identification. The systems that 

support the DNA identification effort should be 

considered “mission critical.” System downtime 

should be minimized, and robust backup and 

restore procedures should be among the first 

processes implemented. 

Volunteers or members of external organizations 

may participate in the laboratory’s disaster 

response, which means that the IT manager may 

need to provide computers and other temporary 

services (e.g., printing and e-mail) to those entities. The IT manager most likely will need a security policy that restricts access to certain aspects 

of the data by unauthorized volunteers. 

The demands placed on the IT infrastructure will 

last for the duration of the response. Because the 

DNA analysis process generates large amounts of 

data, the laboratory will need sufficient storage 

capacity to absorb the additional data produced 

during the disaster response. Dedicated IT staff 

(in-house or outsourced) may need to be provided 

as well. 

Conclusion 

Seasoned IT managers agree that building IT 

infrastructure (hardware and software) in the 

midst of a crisis is extremely difficult. Ideally, the 

laboratory will have in place the policies, processes, and network infrastructure to support a mass 

fatality incident response. 

Prior to a mass fatality identification effort, the IT 

manager’s strategic plan should: 

■	 Identify agencies and systems that may 

require electronic interfaces and prepare a way 

to implement those interfaces. 

■	 Create a procurement list of additional hardware and software to be purchased in the 

event of a mass fatality incident response, 

allowing for the fact that operating systems 

and hardware are continually changing. 

■	 Ensure laboratory personnel know how to 

use software packages before a response is 

necessary. 

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DNA 55 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 9 

■	 Ensure that the network infrastructure can be 

expanded quickly by adding new servers or 

desktop workstations. 

■	 Develop a plan for adding additional, temporary 

IT staff. 

The IT manager’s strategic objectives during a 

mass fatality incident response should be to: 

■	 Identify and control the design of interfaces to 

external systems. 

■	 Ensure that adequate access controls are in 

place for external users. 

■	 Provide reliable services. 

Finally, if the laboratory cannot avoid writing custom software code during a mass fatality incident 

response, the IT manager should attempt to limit 

such software, because the introduction of new 

programming languages, platforms, etc., during 

this time increases the complexity of management, drives up costs, and can result in unexpected consequences affecting already functional 

programs. 

PRESIDENT’S

56 DNA

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 10 

Sample Tracking and Management 

The laboratory must be prepared for an influx of samples following a mass fatality event. The physical 

location of each sample—and all other data associated with it—must be tracked through the DNA analysis 

processes. This chapter discusses important considerations in sample accessioning, naming and numbering 

schemes, handling the possibility that remains may be commingled, and work lists that can be generated 

by the LIMS to facilitate DNA identifications. 

The size and quality of the DNA from 

victims’ remains greatly affects the ability 

to obtain DNA profiles for identification 

purposes. Similarly, the availability of reference 

samples from close biological relatives or from 

personal effects can impact the ability to identify 

victim remains. In addition, the often chaotic environment at a mass disaster site can lead to sample mixups. Even when the sample collections 

are conducted by another agency, the laboratory 

manager should be directly involved in establishing guidelines for collection, handling, and preservation of all samples to ensure quality and 

accuracy throughout the process. 

Chain of custody and the origin (“provenance”) of 

collected remains are important aspects of the 

identification management process. They are also 

critical to the collection of reference samples for 

comparison with victim remains. Chain-of-custody 

practices are necessary for reference-sample attribution, even when there is no criminal investigation component to the identification effort (e.g. in 

a natural disaster), since death certificates based 

on DNA identification will always include forensic 

elements. 

Establishing the source of personal effects that 

are used as reference samples—for example, 

toothbrushes, razors, medical biopsy samples, 

clothing—can be problematic. The Kinship and 

Data Analysis Panel (KADAP) developed an informational brochure to help victims’ families understand what types of samples are helpful in 

making an identification based on DNA analysis 

(see appendix G). 

PRESIDENT’S

It is important to keep in mind that other sample 

issues can complicate the identification process. 

These include inconsistencies that may arise from 

data in the Victim Identification Program (VIP) 

forms. For example, there may be inadvertent 

reference-sample switching by bereft loved ones. 

Or, there may be name misspellings or unlinked 

nicknames (for example, Bobby vs. Bobbi vs. Bob 

vs. Rob vs. Robert) associated with the same last 

name. Inconsistent case numbering during field 

collections can also occur. These issues can 

reduce the efficiency and accuracy of the identification process. 

Family members may state with certainty that 

their missing relative was the only one to have 

contact with a personal effect that is brought in 

for DNA testing. However, mixed DNA profiles 

from toothbrushes or other personal effects 

may eliminate that reference sample as a singlesource reference. If one of the profiles on a personal effect can be attributed to another family 

member, the remaining profile may be inferred as 

the victim’s, but this situation adds uncertainty 

concerning source and missed or shared alleles 

and makes for a more complex analysis. 

Other complications—including assumed, but 

incorrect, parentage—may come to light after 

DNA testing. In some mass fatalities, such as a 

tidal wave, personal effects belonging to victims 

can be lost or contaminated at the site itself. 

Managing sample collection and tracking in a 

controlled, documented fashion is essential to 

the DNA identification process. 

DNA 57 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 10 

One of the most important decisions that a laboratory responding to a mass fatality event will 

have to make is whether to treat the incident as 

a humanitarian effort, civil incident, or criminal 

matter. This decision will drive chain-of-custody 

requirements. Exhibit 19 describes some of these 

issues. 

Most public forensic laboratories have a chain-ofcustody system in place, and generally it makes 

sense to use the existing system as a foundation 

in a mass fatality incident response, modifying 

the processes as necessary (particularly if the 

movement of samples must be tracked to and 

from multiple laboratories). It is also important to 

keep in mind when establishing documentation 

processes for tracking the provenance of samples 

that personal effects provided as reference samples can be incorrectly characterized by loved 

ones as having been used solely by the victim. It 

is not unusual for mixed DNA profiles to be found 

on shared intimate items, such as toothbrushes. 

As previously mentioned, these types of mixed 

profiles can also reveal that family members may 

have had incorrect assumptions about biological 

relationships, so it is helpful to have a policy in 

place to deal with such discoveries. 

In a transportation mass fatality event, for 

example, collecting samples can be complicated 

because people who are traveling usually have 

their personal effects with them, and these can 

Exhibit 19: How the Event Is Treated


Treat Incident As Implication


be lost or contaminated at the scene. In this case, 

additional DNA testing, such as mitochondrial 

DNA (mtDNA), may help to resolve identifications 

by grouping maternally linked victims. 

In planning for a mass fatality incident response, 

it is important to consider how samples will be 

accessioned into the laboratory. Laboratories are 

likely to maintain higher efficiency if their existing 

Laboratory Information Management System 

(LIMS) can be used for handling mass disaster 

samples. (See chapter 9 of this report for a 

discussion of LIMS systems.) When evaluating 

whether a forensic LIMS can be adapted to a 

mass fatality incident, the laboratory director 

should consider whether: 

■	 The mass fatality samples can be segregated 

from regular casework samples. (The laboratory likely will want to track casework and mass 

fatality samples and metrics separately.) 

■	 Numbering should begin with “1” or a different 

numbering sequence should be established to 

designate mass fatality incident samples as 

separate from casework samples. (It is helpful 

for mass fatality incident samples to be numbered sequentially, not mixed with routine 

casework numbers.) 

■	 The LIMS can support a single sample being 

given more than one sample number and can 

support cross-referencing multiple sample 

Humanitarian effort 

Civil matter 

Criminal matter 

Although it is important to correctly identify a sample, strict chain-of-custody procedures and documentation may not be required. This can simplify and streamline 

processes—particularly among multiple laboratories—but this scenario may require 

new sample tracking processes. 

Most mass fatality incidents have a civil component—i.e., the need to issue death certificates. Chain-of-custody procedures and documentation are required, but they are 

less stringent than for incidents considered as criminal matters. This scenario may allow 

simplification/streamlining of the sample handling processes and may (or may not) 

require new processes. 

Some mass fatality incidents (e.g., acts of terrorism) are criminal matters, and therefore, they require rigorous chain-of-custody procedures and documentation. Public 

forensic DNA laboratories currently have established chain-of-custody systems that 

can be used. 

PRESIDENT’S

58 DNA

INITIATIVE
279 

numbers. (Mass fatality incident samples often 

have several identifying numbers, analogous to 

case numbers assigned to an agency’s casework samples. In addition, when multiple laboratories assist with analysis or interpretation, 

samples likely will receive multiple identifying 

numbers, one for each laboratory. The LIMS 

should be able to accept additional sample 

numbers and cross-reference them so the 

sample can be easily queried.) 

Because of the large number of samples that may 

be accessioned in a mass fatality response, the 

laboratory may need teams of people entering 

data and checking each other’s work if the samples are not barcoded. 

SAMPLE TRACKING AND MANAGEMENT 

The laboratory also should plan on receiving many 

different types of samples, and, therefore, must 

be capable of extracting DNA from numerous 

substrates and analyzing samples with varying 

quantities of DNA. Exhibit 20, provided by the 

New York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner 

(OCME), shows the number of samples, by sample type, received during the World Trade Center 

(WTC) DNA identification effort. 

A laboratory responding to a mass fatality event 

must establish a sample-naming scheme that distinguishes personal items, kinship samples, and 

disaster samples. To limit potential sample mixups and ensure that different DNA technologies 

produce compatible results, the laboratory also 

Exhibit 20: Types of Samples From the World Trade Center Response 

Sample Type 

Dried blood stains 1


Tissue sample
 1


DNA kinship report
 2


BIOBAG
 4


Tissue
 7


Towel
 11


Fingernail scrapings/clippings
 16


Cigarette butts
 22


Bedding
 23


Prepared blood stain card
 91


Known blood sample
 113


Underwear
 195


Comb


Clothing
 328


Hair
 538


Others
 868


Razor
 1,048


Hairbrush
 1,201


Toothbrush
 2,182


Case file and documentation
 3,117


Swabs
 6,886


Extracted DNA
 23,608 

Number of Samples 

Source: Information provided by the New York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner. 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 59 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 10 

In a mass disaster event like 

the terrorist attacks on the 

World Trade Center, the commingling of remains is a real 

possibility.Tissue samples 

often yielded multiple profiles—seemingly conflicting 

results—and we soon learned 

that the most reliable results 

came from the analysis of 

bone. 

Robert Shaler 

will need to track the number and type of analysis 

performed on each sample. 

Typically, DNA laboratories 

encode information in the 

sample name or identification number. Although this 

is not optimal from an information technology (IT) perspective, it is a common 

practice in forensic DNA 

analyses, because it allows 

analysts to track analysisrelated information along 

with the sample name. 

For victim samples, data 

encoded in the sample identification number 

may include: 

■	 Identity of the laboratory (in a multilab 

response) that performed the extraction. 

■	 Identity of the laboratory (in a multilab 

response) that performed the analysis. 

■	 Extraction attempt number. 

■	 Type of DNA analysis performed (e.g., short 

tandem repeat (STR), single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP), mtDNA). 

■	 Plate number, tube number, well number, etc. 

For personal effect samples, data encoded in the 

sample name may include: 

■	 Victim identification number. 

■	 Identity of the laboratory (in a multilab 

response) that performed the extraction. 

■	 Identity of the laboratory (in a multilab 

response) that performed the analysis. 

■	 Extraction attempt number. 

■	 Type of DNA analysis performed (e.g., STR, 

SNP, mtDNA). 

■	 Plate number, tube number, well number, etc. 

For kinship samples, data encoded in the sample 

name may include: 

■	 Victim identification number. 

■	 Relationship to victim (e.g., biological mother, 

father). 

In the WTC identification effort, forensic anthropologists triaged disaster samples and decided 

which ones would undergo DNA analysis. The 

anthropologists usually were able to separate 

human from non-human remains. They attempted 

to identify commingled remains, a seemingly 

single tissue that yields multiple profiles. These 

presented some of the greatest challenges in 

managing the DNA effort. Any laboratory 

responding to a mass fatality event must identify 

the extent of commingling (i.e., determine how 

many individuals are represented in the sample), 

and then create, administratively, a subsample 

for each. 

DNA personnel should work closely with the 

anthropologists—or other professionals who are 

designated to perform the triage—to develop a 

decision tree for collecting DNA samples from 

the disaster site. Such a decision tree should 

consider these issues: 

■	 Commingling of remains—although it requires 

a different way of thinking, in many types of 

mass fatality responses, it will simplify the 

laboratory’s work to assume that remains may 

be commingled. 

■	 Whenever possible, bone or deep tissue 

should be sampled; bones are much less likely 

to yield multiple profiles than tissue. 

■	 Unless the tissue is covered by intact skin, do 

not assume that a tissue sample belongs to 

one individual. Remains that are not directly 

linked by tissue should be treated as belonging 

to separate individuals. Even when the sample 

is covered with skin, multiple DNA profiles can 

occur if the victims were in contact with each 

other. 

■	 When bone is surrounded by tissue, treat the 

tissue and bone as separate samples, and 

assign them separate sample numbers. 

The laboratory is likely to receive and analyze 

disaster samples before personal effect items or 

kinship samples. Depending on the duration of 

the recovery effort, the laboratory may not be 

able to examine all of the remains and choose 

only the samples most likely to yield DNA profiles. In an extended recovery effort, the laboratory will have to work samples as they arrive and 

not assume that “better” or “larger” samples will 

be available in the future. 

PRESIDENT’S

60 DNA

INITIATIVE
Personal items and kinship samples can be 

collected over a long period of time. Of the three 

types of samples (disaster, personal effect item, 

and kinship), personal effect items usually are 

the most precious because the DNA they yield is 

likely to be a small quantity. The best personal 

items from a DNA perspective are toothbrushes, 

razors, and hairbrushes. Saved letters, with their 

original licked stamps and envelopes may also 

provide sufficient quantities of usable DNA for 

references, but those who provide such letters 

should be made aware that the testing process 

will alter the appearance of the envelope. Exhibit 

21, provided by the OCME, depicts DNA profiles, 

by sample type, from the WTC response. 

SAMPLE TRACKING AND MANAGEMENT 

Initially, the laboratory may choose to analyze the 

most promising personal effect items, analyzing 

other items only if necessary. Kinship samples 

can be considered less precious, because they 

usually have abundant DNA and, hopefully, additional samples can be collected from victims’ 

relatives, if necessary. 

In a mass fatality incident response, the laboratory will need a strategy for managing its work. 

Although work lists may be unnecessary in a 

small laboratory for routine limited-volume testing, in a mass fatality incident, testing and verification is much more complex, requiring work lists 

to provide structure, accountability, and traceability 

in managing the data. 

Exhibit 21: DNA Profiles by Sample Type From the World Trade Center Response 

Sample Type 

Comb 14 

Hair 14 

Socks 14 

Shirt 16 

Blood 22 

Underwear 24 

Hairbrush 59 

Razor 62 

Toothbrush 101 

Other 386 

Buccal 3,504

Number of DNA Profiles 

Source: Information provided by the New York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner. 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 61 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 10 

Work lists that are automatically generated by the 

LIMS greatly facilitate fast and accurate DNA 

identifications. Since the identification process 

may change in response to additional testing 

needs, the LIMS must be flexible. It also must 

support a “comments” 

Without work lists, our efforts 

in the World Trade Center 

identification effort were 

redundant.Work lists helped 

to keep the nonintentional 

redundancy to a minimum. 

Robert Shaler 

field, where sample and 

match-specific information 

can be stored, easily identified, and viewed by laboratory personnel. 

Work lists—which should 

contain sample numbers, 

dates of previous procedures, and comments— 

also can be used to: 

(1) Notify laboratory personnel of the matching, 

identification, and reporting tasks that need to 

be performed. 

(2) Minimize duplication of effort by documenting 

completed work. 

(3) Avoid inefficient data processing that can 

occur when analysts must: 

❏ 	 Search more than one database for a 

potential match. 

❏	 Compare potential matches to identifications that have been established and 

should have been documented in the LIMS. 

❏ 	 Spend time deducing what new potential 

matches need to be processed whenever a 

new match is attempted. 

(4) Identify work volumes, allowing the laboratory 

director to assess the progress of work and 

target bottlenecks with resources. 

(5) Serve as a repository for sample information. 

By maintaining documentation of the case 

analyses, the analyst is able to identify 

processing history, and, by documenting 

each stage of matching, identification, and 

reporting with date and user information 

(in a stage field), the analyst can determine: 

❏ 	 The stage of each potential match/ 

identification. 

❏ 	 How long a potential match/identification 

has been in each stage. 

❏ 	 The last person responsible for creating 

information on the potential match/ 

identification. 

Other work lists that may be important in a mass 

fatality identification effort include: 

■	 New match between a previously untested 

remains fragment and an already tested 

remains fragment. 

■	 New potential match made with a single 

personal effect and available kin. 

■	 New potential match made with a single 

personal effect (no kin). 

■	 New potential match made with kin only. 

■	 Administrative review. 

■	 Reference rerun. 

■	 Administrative resolution. 

PRESIDENT’S

62 DNA

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 11 

Sample Analysis 

Although the Nation’s forensic laboratories generally have the policies, systems, and tools to collect, 

extract, amplify, and analyze many biological samples, most would not be able to handle the number of 

samples associated with a mass fatality event. This chapter offers an overview of processes involved in 

the DNA typing of a large number of samples in a relatively short period. See appendix H for a more 

rudimentary discussion of DNA analysis. 

Aforensic laboratory’s mass fatality plan 

should include large-scale collection and 

extraction procedures, alternate analytical 

methods for particularly challenging samples, 

automation for handling high-volume analyses, 

and quality assessment tools for interpreting 

results. The plan also should consider work and 

storage spaces, including sample accessioning 

and processing areas that have sufficient bench 

space and biological containment hoods. 

Laboratories may plan to use robotics in batch 

analysis in a mass fatality identification. In the 

World Trade Center (WTC) identification effort, 

robotics was essential in handling the quantity of 

samples. It is important for laboratory directors to 

note, however, that there is likely to be a steep 

learning curve with such new procedures. Therefore, advance planning is important. 

As was the case after the 9/11 attacks, the 

environmental conditions to which samples are 

exposed can compromise the quantity or quality 

of extractable DNA. Of course, the quality of biological samples will be incident specific, ranging 

from good quality, high molecular weight to highly 

degraded. Therefore, DNA-typing methods need 

to be robust. 

Sample Collection 

Although all components of the DNA identification process are important, sample collection may 

be the most critical and frequently overlooked. 

In the urgency to identify the victims, there may 

be little attention paid to how the remains are 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 63 

collected. Planning can have 

a great impact on the quality 

and quantity of typable 

DNA. To standardize the collection materials—which, in 

turn, will simplify the extraction process—the laboratory 

manager should be involved 

in the sample collection 

process. 

Protocols for chain-ofcustody documentation in 

collecting evidence and 

handling samples must be a 

part of a laboratory’s mass 

fatality plan. This is important not only for scene 

reconstruction and quality 

control, but also for any 

subsequent legal proceedings. As in any situation with 

potential judicial implications, it is critically important 

to use the best forensic 

practices in collecting and 

preserving samples. Improper preservation methods can lead to the loss of typable DNA and the 

potential compromise of data that is necessary 

for a positive identification. 

A mass fatality plan should provide for the collection of personal items from family members and 

others. After a mass fatality event, family members will be eager to provide samples to help 

identify a loved one. In a smaller incident, family 

reference samples may be easier to collect and 

We knew immediately that 

hundreds of environmentally 

challenged samples would not 

yield full 13-locus STR profiles 

and would therefore require 

extra laboratory effort. So, 

early on, we explored alternate, novel technologies to 

help turn samples with only 

partial profiles into those that 

would allow solid victim identifications. In doing so, we 

carefully considered issues 

regarding genetic linkage of 

markers, and also agreed that 

only methods meeting NYS 

validation standards would 

be used. 

Frederick Bieber 

INITIATIVE
C HAPTER 11

64

PRESIDENT’S

DNA

INITIATIVE

analyze than a victim’s personal items. However,

in a larger event, it may be more efficient to use

personal items for identification, assuming sufficient quantities of DNA can be recovered from a

personal effect and its sole use by the victim can

be assured. 

As noted in prior chapters of this report cellular

material can be derived from hair, stamps,

envelopes, toothbrushes, razors, and unwashed

clothing. If personal effects are used in a mass

fatality identification effort, it is advisable to collect several samples, if possible, as some will be

better suited for analysis than others. It can be

challenging to develop instructions for submission

of a victim’s personal items, including a way to

ensure that only the victim used the item. Also, it

is important to keep in mind that a family’s emotional attachment to a loved one’s personal item

may be strong. 

It also may be necessary to collect reference

samples from around the world. In this case, it

may be helpful to consult with professionals who

work at paternity testing laboratories with remote

sample collection experience. 

Three sample forms that may provide general

guidance are included with this report: Personal

Items Submission Form (appendix B), Family

and/or Donor Reference Collection Form (appendix C), and the Family Tree Form (appendix D). 

Needless to say, it should always be considered

that a personal item may contain the DNA from

someone other the victim/purported owner. That

is why the Sample Personal Items Submission

Form (appendix B) solicits detailed information

regarding everyone who may have used the item.

To prevent misidentification of remains due to the

presence on the personal item of DNA from other

contributors, the DNA profile recovered from the

personal item should, if possible, be compared to

the DNA profiles of family members to ensure

that the proper biological relationship exists

between the DNA on the personal item and the

DNA from the family members. 

Sample Storage

Work and storage space must accommodate

sample accessioning and processing, including

sufficient bench space and safety hoods. An

estimate of the number of potential samples

should be made so that sufficient storage space

can be assured (see exhibit 4). Soft tissue samples need to be stored in ultra-low-temperature

freezers. In addition to securing appropriate freezer space, additional refrigerators may be needed

to store samples during the extraction and analysis phases. If sample recovery at the disaster site

is a long-term process, tissue decomposition will

become a factor in planning for sufficient storage

space.

Depending on the conditions at the disaster site,

larger portions of tissue may be needed to compensate for degradation as time passes during

the collection process. In the case of bone, for

example, a few cubic centimeters may (under

optimal conditions) be adequate for analysis, but

an entire femur may be required in more compromised situations. Not only do larger samples

require more storage space, but extraction procedures may require modification to accommodate

larger sample sizes. 

Following the WTC attacks, other laboratories

offered to assist the Office of the Chief Medical

Examiner (OCME). Such offers are likely to occur

after any future mass fatality incident. If appropriate chain of custody, accessioning, and other

infrastructure concerns are addressed, outsourcing may be considered. Obviously, however, if

samples are sent to other laboratories at any

stage of the analysis, the same quality control

and chain-of-custody practices must be maintained (see chapter 14, Quality Control). 

Short Tandem Repeat (STR) DNA

Amplification and Analysis

In general, polymerase chain reaction (PCR)

issues in a mass fatality identification effort are

no different than in any other situation, except

for the greater number of samples. Although

different analytical approaches may eventually be

required to make identifications, it is most expedient to use familiar and well-established technologies (i.e., short tandem repeat (STR) typing) as

the method of first analysis. In fact, many disaster

samples may be wholly typable by STR analysis.
SAMPLE ANAL YSIS 

It should be remembered when performing 

extractions, however, that additional testing may 

be needed; therefore, extraction techniques that 

will accommodate other testing methods—such 

as mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) sequencing— 

should be considered. 

After extraction, the template DNA is subjected 

to PCR, which is particularly useful for analyzing 

materials that may contain degraded DNA. A typical PCR requires three steps and is based on specific annealing and extension of oligonucleotide 

primers (two per marker) that flank a defined 

target DNA segment. The template DNA to be 

amplified by the PCR is first denatured, usually by 

heating the sample to 95 degrees Centigrade. 

After denaturation, the two primers hybridize to 

the separated strands at a given locus. Primer 

annealing is accomplished by lowering the temperature to a defined point, typically between 

45–65 degrees Centigrade. The next phase in 

the PCR process, primer extension, is generally 

carried out at 72 degrees Centigrade, the temperature at which Thermus aquaticus DNA polymerase can most effectively copy the original 

template DNA by extending the primers and 

making complementary copies of the original 

template DNA. These three steps (denaturation, 

primer annealing, and primer extension) represent 

a single PCR cycle. 

Upon repeated cycles of the PCR, an exponential 

accumulation of a discrete DNA fragment containing the genetic marker of interest is achieved. 

Thus, PCR generates large amounts of specific 

DNA sequences from relatively small (picogram 

or nanogram) quantities of genomic DNA. Amplification of target sequences of DNA is primarily a 

technique to prepare the sample for typing. 

Only a limited template may be available, and 

inhibitors to PCR may further reduce the yield of 

PCR product. Efforts should be made to optimize 

the components of the PCR to overcome the 

vagaries of environmental contamination. Some 

practices used by laboratories during routine 

analyses—using reduced reaction volumes, for 

example—may not be appropriate when samples 

are compromised. A larger reaction volume may 

dilute inhibitors to the point that the PCR can be 

successful. Additional enhancements to reduce 

the impact of inhibitors, such as Bovine Serum 

Albumen, may be considered part of the protocol 

for maximizing DNA yields from compromised 

samples. 

Alternative Testing Methods 

In the WTC identification effort, the OCME relied 

on the recommendations of the Kinship and Data 

Analysis Panel (KADAP) regarding new identification methods for analyzing compromised samples. In considering 

additional typing technologies and strategies, the 

KADAP considered the 

sufficiency of extracted 

material to support all 

attempted technologies, as 

well as any quality control 

issues that might arise. The 

KADAP also considered how 

to handle the statistical 

approach using other technologies, including linkage 

The KADAP served as a model 

for scientific collaboration 

and peer review of method 

validation under the challenging and stressful conditions of 

responding to a mass fatality 

disaster. 

Anne Walsh 

and haplotype/genotype 

comparisons. 

Mitochondrial DNA Analysis. STRs reside in 

the human cell nucleus; outside the nucleus, in 

the cytoplasm, are mitochondria. Mitochondria 

are subcellular organelles that contain an extra 

chromosomal genome separate and distinct from 

the nuclear genome. Human mitochondrial DNA 

differs from nuclear DNA in that it is a closed, circular (rather than linear) molecule; it is smaller, 

consisting of approximately 16,569 base pairs; it 

is maternally inherited; it does not undergo 

recombination; and it is present in high copy number in a cell. 

The maternal inheritance and lack of recombination characteristics are particularly helpful in identifying human remains. Associations can be made 

or refuted where known maternal relatives are 

the reference sample sources, even if they are 

several generations removed from the victim. 

The primary advantage of using mtDNA (as 

opposed to nuclear DNA analysis) on compromised samples is the high copy number of 

mtDNA molecules in a cell. When the amount of 

extracted DNA is very small or degraded (as can 

be the case in mass disaster tissue samples of 

bone, teeth, and hair), an identification is more 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 65 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 11 

likely using mtDNA analysis than using the 

polymorphic markers found in nuclear DNA. 

In the WTC identification effort, a number of 

samples could not be typed sufficiently with STR 

loci to identify the source with a high degree of 

confidence. In these cases, mtDNA sequencing 

was attempted to increase the discrimination 

power. Although the extraction process for 

mtDNA typically requires a relatively clean environment, this was not possible in the WTC identification effort, due to the number of samples. 

However, reasonable precautions were taken, 

including a reduction in the number of amplification cycles (28 or 29 instead of the typical 36). 

This reduced contamination issues, although at 

the expense of the sensitivity of detection. 

Although not as informative as a battery of autosomal STR loci, a unique mitotype may be sufficient to make an identification, if the victims are 

from a closed population. The mitotype can be 

used to group individuals into smaller categories, 

narrowing the candidate pool. It may then be possible for a less informative partial STR profile to 

become a unique identifier within the mtDNA 

subcategory. Screening by mtDNA sequencing 

would be possible because of the availability of 

high-throughput analysis, coupled with software 

that automatically interprets mitotypes. 

Repositioning Primers. In the WTC identification effort, recovered DNA was often too degraded and fragmented to produce STR results with 

standard commercial STR kits. However, by repositioning the primers so that they resided closer 

to the repeat region, the amplified product (or 

amplicon) was made smaller than some of the 

fragmented DNA template molecules, thus making genetic characterization of the sample possible for more STRs than when using traditional 

typing. These STR miniplexes were invaluable for 

analyzing the more degraded samples, and, in 

fact, results were obtained for some samples at 

loci that were not typable using commercially 

available kits. 

The general assay procedure for the miniplex test 

used in the identification of WTC victims was 

similar to that used for forensically validated 

STRs. After evaluating the methods, reagents, 

and validation data, the KADAP determined 

that no additional equipment and training was 

necessary. 

Single Nucleotide Polymorphism Analysis. 

The PCR amplicon size can be further reduced by 

amplifying regions that contain a class of genetic 

markers known as single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). Although an abundant supply of 

SNPs exists for identity testing, most SNPs are 

biallelic and, therefore, not as informative for identity testing as STR loci. However, because the 

amplicon size can be reduced 60–80 base pairs in 

length, DNA that is degraded beyond the limits of 

STR typing may be typable. 

In the WTC identification effort, an SNP typing 

method was validated for the more difficult-totype samples. In fact, identifications that otherwise would not have been possible were made 

using this technology. Combining the features of 

a chip array, the primer extension assay, and 

universal tags, the multiplex assay method was 

carried out in a flat-bottom microplate, in which 

each well contained a total of 16 individual antitag 

sequences for 12 SNPs and 4 controls. (Basically, 

each PCR primer, about 45 bases long, is 

comprised of a 25-base-long segment that is 

complementary to the area immediately adjacent 

to the SNP extension site and a 20-base-long 

sequence—that is, the tag sequence—that is 

complementary to an antitag sequence attached 

to the bottom of a well.) 

Using that process, the SNP extension product 

was transferred after PCR and allowed to 

hybridize in the array of antitags. A fluorescent 

detection system allowed typing of the two possible alleles at the SNP site by comparing signals 

from fluorescent dyes used to label the two 

different allelic products in the PCR extension 

reaction. With this technology, identifications 

were made on some very compromised samples 

that otherwise would not have been possible to 

identify. 

PRESIDENT’S

66 DNA

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 12 

Statistical and Other Issues 

This chapter provides an overview of some of the statistical issues involved in making DNA-based 

identifications of victims of a mass fatality incident. Because both mathematics and policy should be 

considered when determining statistical thresholds for making an identification, a single statistical 

approach may not be sufficient for every mass fatality disaster. Issues to consider when setting policy 

for a mass fatality response would include, for example, the condition of the remains, and the existence 

and reliability of samples. Appendix I contains an extensive reference list that may assist laboratory manin making DNA-based identifications. 

When dealing with statistical issues— 

including the statistical threshold 

necessary to make a DNA-based 

identification of a victim’s remains—it is important 

that the identification policy for a particular mass 

fatality response effort be consistent with the 

goals of the effort. Decisions about the number of 

and specific loci to type, the statistical thresholds, 

and the use of outside laboratories and consultants should be made quickly (see chapter 4, 

Major Decisions). For example, in the World Trade 

Center (WTC) identification effort, the Kinship and 

Data Analysis Panel (KADAP) endorsed the decision of the New York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) to use the standard 

Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) core 13 

short tandem repeat (STR) loci, as well as the 

Amelogenin sex-typing locus used in forensic 

laboratories throughout the United States (see 

chapter 11 for more on “mini-STRs,”single 

nucleotide polymorphisms, and mitochondrial 

DNA sequencing, which also were used in the 

WTC identification effort). 

It is important to note that the identification of 

WTC victims did not require the creation of any 

new statistical approach. In fact, the statistical 

approach recommended by the KADAP and used 

by the OCME was based on two well-established 

methods. 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 67 

agers, policymakers, or public officials who desire a more indepth understanding of the use of statistics 

The first method, known as 

“direct matching,” assesses 

the probability or likelihood 

that a DNA profile from a 

victim’s remains and a profile developed from a personal item known to belong 

to a missing individual 

would share—by chance— 

the same DNA profile. The 

direct matching method is 

similar to that used in forensic genetic testing, in which 

there is an estimate of 

the strength of a match 

between a DNA profile from biological evidence 

and a profile obtained from a known reference 

sample. Direct matching was used 

in approximately two-thirds of the WTC DNA 

identifications. 

A second statistical method, called “indirect 

matching,” uses methods of formal genetic 

kinship analysis, in which a comparison is made 

of the DNA profile from a victim’s remains and 

those of biological relatives in a known kindred 

(i.e., a “family tree” or pedigree). Also called 

“kinship analysis,” this approach is similar to that 

used for parentage assignment in paternity testing, nursery mixup resolution, immigration, and 

probate disputes. Kinship analysis was necessary 

in about one-third of the DNA-based identifications of WTC victims. 

In the field of human genetic 

research, genotypes of 

relatives have been used to 

reconstruct a partial or total 

genotype for the purpose of 

gene mapping. Experience 

gained in this area proved to 

be invaluable in helping to 

identify WTC victims. 

Michael Conneally 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 12 

The KADAP spent time considering and discussing the 

population makeup of the 

World Trade Center victims, 

including the population 

substructure that might influence the posterior probability 

of an identification. In the 

end, our consensus was to 

be conservative in all calculations to guard against false 

identifications. 

George Carmody 

The theories and practices 

of statistical analyses in 

making DNA-based identifications are well developed 

and well documented. 

Before any DNA testing is 

performed, the “posterior 

probability”—that is, the 

level of confidence needed 

to make an identification— 

should be established. The 

posterior probability is 

based on the product (multiplication) of two components: a “prior probability” 

and a “likelihood ratio.” 

Prior probability is the 

chance that any remains 

sample belongs to a particular individual; typically, 

it is based only on the estimated number of 

reported missing persons (RM), which can 

change over the course of the identification 

process. In the WTC identification effort, for 

example, the number of RMs was originally much 

higher—as many as 5,000—than the final estimate of approximately 2,750, after multiple 

reports, multiple nicknames, and other victim data 

were reconciled. 

Likelihood ratio is the strength of the DNA 

evidence favoring identification. 

Statistical Threshold 

In the WTC identification effort, the statistical 

threshold (i.e., posterior probability) that was 

established before a DNA-based identification 

could be made was high: 99.9%. To attain this 

high level of confidence, the DNA laboratory targeted a likelihood ratio that, combined with the 

prior probability, met the statistical threshold. 

This likelihood ratio (L) was based on the following formula: 

1 - (1-1/L) N < p 

In this formula, N = the estimated number of 

RMs (5,000 in the WTC); and p = the defined 

acceptable chance of error (1/1,000,000). Solving 

for the likelihood ratio: 

L > 10,000,000,000 

Open vs. Closed Incidents 

Mass fatality incidents have been described as 

either an “open” system or a “closed” system. 

Open systems are those in which the number 

and identity of victims is unknown. Closed systems are those in which the number and identity 

of victims is more certain, such as in a small car 

or airplane crash. 

As noted in chapter 4, a closed system can 

become an open system. Likewise, an open 

system can approach a closed system—or even 

become a closed system—as a larger proportion 

of RMs are identified. This concept proved useful 

in the WTC identification effort. As the number of 

victims was reduced from the initial estimate of 

5,000 to approximately 2,750, the prior probability 

was accordingly increased, resulting in the 

KADAP’s recommendation that the likelihood ratio 

necessary to make a DNA-based identification be 

reduced. [Note: Gender was another factor used 

to modify the prior probability.] 

On the other hand, in a closed system, prior 

probability is increased as victims are identified, 

reducing the likelihood ratio necessary to meet 

the statistical threshold for identification. In rare 

instances (for example, in a small closed system 

in which the DNA profiles of all of the victims are 

known), it may not be necessary to establish a 

statistical threshold in order to make a DNA identification. Needless to say, DNA-based identifications are more straightforward in a closed system 

than in an open system. 

Although open-system incidents may require 

collection of family reference samples on a much 

wider scale, the general principles for DNA identification are the same. (See chapters 10 and 11 for 

a more detailed discussion of sample issues.) 

Non-DNA Data (“Metadata”) 

Data, other than DNA profiles, that are collected 

about missing persons and reference samples are 

often referred to as “metadata.” Metadata about 

family reference samples—including familymember relationships (i.e., pedigree), data about 

the missing person, and autopsy data—are compiled in case folders. Metadata, combined with 

DNA test results, are used in the identification 

process. When these two data sets (metadata 

PRESIDENT’S

68 DNA

INITIATIVE
S T A TISTICAL AND OTHER ISSUES 

and DNA test results) fail to reconcile, the cause 

of the inconsistency must be resolved. This leads 

to delays in an ultimate identification, stress for 

loved ones, and increased work for analysts. 

It is essential, therefore, that metadata management be given a high priority (see chapter 10, 

Sample Tracking and Management) and that a 

laboratory have in place a process for comparing 

data from different aspects of a DNA-based identification process. 

In rare instances, metadata can appear to contradict the results of DNA testing, even when the 

DNA results from both the remains and reference 

samples are scientifically and statistically sound. 

Of course, metadata are more subjective than 

DNA-testing results, and the process of proving 

that a personal-item or kinship sample comes 

from a specific person or family can be cumbersome. But, ensuring the accuracy of the original 

metadata obtained from victims’ families— 

including the chain of custody of personal 

effects—is crucial. 

Fragmented Remains 

The remains of mass disaster victims may be 

commingled, which can result in mixed DNA 

profiles. In a situation of scattered, degraded, or 

fragmented remains, statistical sampling models 

should be used that increase the confidence of 

the DNA-based identification. In the WTC identification effort, for example, OCME scientists, 

attempting to find a portion of a sample that was 

not mixed, often returned to the original sample 

(if it was available) and attempted to reextract and 

reanalyze the DNA. It is important to keep in 

mind, however, that although well-established 

statistical analyses for mixtures can be applied, 

these result in reduced likelihood ratios that make 

meeting the identification threshold more difficult. 

Therefore, additional testing with alternative 

markers may be needed. 

In theory, fragmented samples yielding partial 

DNA profiles could be associated based on their 

location at the disaster site. Grid coordinates, if 

available, might allow samples with overlapping 

partial profiles to be identified, particularly if the 

goal is to identify every human remain rather than 

every victim. However, even if the goal is to identify every victim, grid-coordinate methods may 

prove useful. Moreover, with appropriately conservative statistical approaches, partial DNA profiles from different remains may be combined to 

generate a composite “virtual” profile derived 

from a single victim. 

Kinship Analysis 

Kinship analysis is necessary 

when known reference samples are not available for the 

reported missing. In kinship 

analysis—well-established 

in the field of human 

genetics—close relatives 

provide DNA samples. 

Assignment of remains 

to a particular family is made 

by assessing the relative 

likelihood ratios. 

“Indirect” DNA-based identification, or kinship analysis, 

involves two steps. The first 

is a screening process, in 

which DNA profiles from the 

remains are compared with 

family reference samples. The process allows 

families to be eliminated and “candidate families” 

to be isolated. The second step determines the 

likelihood that a particular remains sample fits into 

a particular candidate family. [Note: When only 

more distant relatives are available to provide reference samples, kinship analysis cannot provide 

robust estimates of relationships.] 

Because the World Trade 

Center identification effort 

presented challenges not 

found in ordinary forensic 

work, it was not self-evident 

how to best evaluate the DNA 

data statistically.The KADAP 

discussions and recommendations were, I think, essential to reaching the final set of 

criteria. 

Kenneth Kidd 

Kinship analysis is not always successful for 

making unambiguous identifications of victim 

remains. Its limitations include difficulty in identifying remains belonging to same-sex full-siblings, 

particularly monozygotic twins. Also, close relatives are sometimes victims of the same disaster, 

and differentiating such relationships in the 

absence of very complete pedigrees may not be 

possible. It is helpful to be aware of the number 

of related victims prior to assigning identity, but 

this may not be possible in an open-system mass 

fatality event. In fact, this may be difficult even in 

a well-documented closed disaster, in which a 

high level of statistical confidence may not be 

reached without a sufficient number of close 

relatives to provide reference samples. 

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INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 12 

Generally, the more close relatives available as 

references, the better the chances for attaining 

the identification threshold. For example, when 

standard paternity trios (mother, father, child) are 

available and numerous polymorphic loci are 

typed, sufficiently high likelihood ratios typically 

result. However, if only one sibling is available to 

provide a family reference sample, it is unlikely 

that a statistical threshold for a DNA-based 

identification would be met. 

Because a personal reference item does not 

always contain sole-source DNA (or contain the 

DNA of the person to whom it is attributed), it is 

advisable to confirm direct-comparison DNA by 

indirect kinship analysis. Although it may seem 

like additional work to first examine the profile 

from the personal effect against the profiles from 

relatives to establish the fit in the pedigree, verifying the source of the DNA from the personal 

effect actually reduces the time needed to finalize 

DNA-based victim identification. When verifying 

the origin of the personal effect within the kindred 

of reference samples, the kinship analysis by 

itself does not need to meet the threshold 

requirement for identification, as it serves only 

to confirm the direct comparison to personal 

effects. 

When multiple family members—or, particularly, 

an entire family—are victims of an incident, identifying at least one of them with high confidence 

improves the ability to achieve certainty for the 

others; the caveat, here, is that same-gender 

siblings may not be distinguishable by kinship 

analysis unless direct reference samples are 

used. Although fragmented remains of same-sex 

siblings usually can be distinguished from each 

with DNA analysis, families would not be able to 

be told which remains came from which sibling 

unless direct reference samples (from one or the 

other) are used to differentiate the remains. 

Without direct references from a known personal 

effect, same-gender siblings usually cannot be 

distinguished when remains are fragmented or 

otherwise lacking in traditional anthropological 

and other phenotypic characteristics. 

Administrative and Technical 

Reviews 

Once a potential match is made between a 

remains profile and the profile from a personal 

item or a family member, a technical and administrative review of the case folder is conducted. 

The administrative review helps ensure that the 

personal reference, kinship, and remains samples 

have been identified and labeled correctly. For 

example, stress may cause family members to 

provide inaccurate information regarding reference samples. Therefore, it is important to check 

key data such as birth dates; for example, a son 

should not have a birth date before that of his 

father. Personal effects submitted to the laboratory can be verified by comparing the DNA profile 

to DNA profiles obtained from the victim’s relatives. It may not be unusual, for example, to discover that a male victim’s razor actually contains 

the DNA profile of his wife, who forgot that she 

used the razor the morning of the disaster. 

The administrative review helps ensure that each 

victim is registered in only one “case” folder. 

Partitioning reference samples across multiple 

“cases” for a single victim slows the ability of 

the laboratory to make identifications via kinship 

analysis. 

The technical review should verify all data, interpretations, and calculations. If multiple testing 

systems were used, a comparison of the results 

should be made, and any inconsistencies— 

including the possibility of contamination— 

should be resolved. 

The KADAP prepared three sample forms that 

may assist laboratory directors in preparing to 

respond to a mass fatality incident. Appendix B 

is a Personal Items Submission Form, appendix C 

is a Family and/or Donor Reference Collection 

Form, and appendix D is a Family Tree Form. 

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70 DNA

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 13 

Procurement and Vendor Management 

This chapter considers the procurement of commodities and services and the management of those 

services in a mass fatality DNA identification effort. Adequate storage for consumables and adequate 

space and utilities to support the operation of new equipment also must be ensured. 

Alaboratory that is faced with responding to 

a mass fatality incident may need to rapidly procure laboratory reagents, supplies, 

equipment, testing services, and consultants. The 

laboratory also will have to decide how to handle 

and prioritize the samples. (See chapter 4 for a discussion on determining whether an outside vendor is needed to help provide testing services.) 

Ordering Supplies and Equipment 

If some or all of the testing is to be performed 

in-house, consumables and new equipment may 

need to be purchased. It is important to review 

current contracts and standing orders, because 

procuring the same lot number of reagents and 

model of equipment currently being used may be 

helpful. 

Waiting to consider whether new equipment or 

test systems would be needed in the event of a 

mass fatality incident can impact a laboratory’s 

personnel during a difficult time. Implementing 

new protocols, procedures, and equipment— 

unless absolutely necessary for making identifications—is best not done during a mass fatality 

response. If the laboratory has a validated 

method that is adequate for processing mass 

fatality samples, it may save time to use the 

established procedure. On the other hand, 

advance planning may lead to a new method or 

piece of equipment that will help the laboratory— 

or another laboratory—should a mass fatality 

incident occur. 

The laboratory’s purchasing department can help 

ensure that procurement rules and regulations are 

followed. For example, is there a cap on what can 

be purchased without going out on bid? Will new 

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INITIATIVE

contracts need to be established? It also may be 

advisable to consult with the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) regarding procurement rules. 

Assigning someone to be responsible for placing 

orders associated with a mass fatality incident 

will help ensure receipt of the correct consumables and equipment. Adequate storage for 

consumables and adequate space and utilities to 

support the operation of new equipment also 

must be ensured. 

Outsourcing Sample Testing 

The best time to establish a good relationship 

with a vendor is during the planning phase for a 

mass fatality incident. Although outsourcing testing can be expensive—from $30–$60 for a reference buccal sample to hundreds of dollars for a 

disaster sample—it may be necessary or more 

effective to have another laboratory test some or 

all of the samples. For example, an outside laboratory may test certain sample types—family 

reference, personal items, or disaster samples— 

or a portion of the samples for quality control or 

conformation testing. An outside laboratory may 

be used for certain types of testing technologies—mitochondrial, single nucleotide polymorphism, or new technologies, for example—or for 

extraction and data analysis only. On the other 

hand, the entire testing process, from accessioning to data analysis, may be outsourced. Even in 

this situation, however, the managing laboratory 

is ultimately responsible for the quality and accuracy of the data. 

The laboratory’s contracting office can ensure 

that contracting regulations are followed, and 

DNA 71 
CHAPTER 13 

discussing this issue with a vendor in advance 

may prevent later problems. In an emergency situation, an agency may not be required to follow 

the typical, lengthy contracting procedures to 

obtain the best value but, rather, may be able to 

initiate contracts without competition. If a managing laboratory’s normal contracting process is not 

followed, however, it is very important to document the new process to reduce the potential for 

future problems. 

To assist in the response to a mass fatality incident, a laboratory may contract with a current or 

new vendor, or seek help from another government agency. If the managing laboratory is 

already contracting with a vendor whose quality is 

satisfactory, it may be advantageous to use that 

vendor to process mass fatality samples, assuming the vendor’s capabilities and capacities can 

support the laboratory’s needs. For example, 

does the vendor have the capacity (e.g., equipment and staffing) to meet throughput and 

turn-around-time requirements, even while working on other contracts? If not, is the vendor able 

and willing to interrupt its regular work to take on 

the testing of mass fatality incident samples? 

Does the vendor have experience in successfully 

typing samples from a mass fatality incident? The 

managing laboratory director needs to keep in 

mind that the volume may 

be larger and the samples 

more challenging than the 

vendor laboratory has 

previously experienced. 

Before any new technology is 

brought to bear on precious 

and irreplaceable samples like 

the victim remains in the 

World Trade Center disaster, 

validation testing must be 

performed to verify that it is 

capable of producing reliable 

results. Beyond the core issue 

of test reliability, we also 

assessed the results of new 

methods to determine their 

power to raise a profile to the 

level of an identification and 

for issues of compatibility— 

linkage—with other markers. 

John Butler 

Meeting turnaround 

requirements in the face of 

expectations from victims’ 

families, the media, and 

policymakers likely will 

pose other challenges— 

and the laboratory director 

should not be afraid to ask 

for what is needed. For 

example, if a laboratory 

director is relatively inexperienced in contracting for 

testing services, he or she 

should enlist the support 

of laboratories that have 

extensive outsourcing 

experience. See appendix 

F for a discussion of issues 

that a laboratory director may want to consider 

when outsourcing sample testing to a vendor 

laboratory. 

Government forensic laboratories may be able to 

provide assistance in a mass fatality incident identification response. Each agency that is helping in 

a mass fatality identification effort must understand its own and others’ roles and responsibilities, the scope of tasks, and the duration of 

expected services. It may be helpful to prepare a 

detailed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), 

including a project point of contact for each 

agency. 

Whether a laboratory director obtains the assistance of a private vendor laboratory or another 

government agency, it is important to review the 

testing procedures to be used. If more than one 

testing laboratory is used, for example, testing 

systems and results systems must be compatible 

with each other. 

It is also critical to address how the samples will 

be numbered and how the data will be returned 

to the managing laboratory. The software package 

that evaluates the data is vital to managing this 

data exchange, and an MOU or vendor contract 

should specify how these issues will be handled. 

Consultants 

Consultants can provide critical support to a mass 

fatality incident DNA identification response. For 

example, consultants may write or customize 

computer programs to tabulate and review data 

or to perform complex kinship analysis. 

It may save time to ask prospective consultants 

to submit a proposal in response to an RFI 

(request for information), as this may allow the 

winning proposal to be incorporated into a contract. Proposals should define the consultant’s 

roles, responsibilities, tasks, acceptance criteria 

for deliverables, timeframes, and hours and fees. 

Consultants should provide a list of references, 

and the laboratory director should ask references 

such questions as: 

■	 What did the consultant do for you? 

■	 Was the consultant responsible and of value? 

Why or why not? 

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72 DNA

INITIATIVE
PROCUREMENT AND VENDOR MANAGEMENT 

■	 What are the consultant’s strengths and 

limitations? 

■	 Would you hire the consultant again? Why or 

why not? 

Consultants typically charge by the hour, and they 

should be able to provide an estimate of fees. 

Any tasks beyond the scope of the contract 

would be reflected in invoices. The laboratory’s 

contracting office should ensure that contracting 

rules and regulations are followed when hiring a 

consultant, and an experienced consultant should 

be able to provide the necessary proposals and 

paperwork to make this a straightforward task. 

Vendor Management 

Working simultaneously with vendors, government agencies, and consultants can be challenging under the best of circumstances, but it 

becomes even more demanding when the laboratory is handling a mass fatality incident response. 

It is important to maintain open lines of communication with vendors. Regular written updates 

and status meetings are good tools. A meeting 

agenda—that is adhered to—helps keep everyone 

on track and serves as a paper trail of the project’s progress. 

It is important to retain correspondence with vendors and to maintain documentation of decisions 

affecting vendors. For example, saving e-mail 

messages is an efficient way to document 

decisions. 

It is very important for the laboratory director to 

consult with the laboratory’s contracting officer if 

the scope of work changes during the project 

because modifications to the 

contract (e.g., scope of work 

and fees) may be required. 

Working closely with the 

contracting officer during all 

stages of contract development may help to minimize 

future problems. The managing laboratory director can 

best control how tasks are 

performed when a contract 

with a vendor or consultant 

specifies needs and expectations. Although most vendors and consultants want 

to serve their clients to the 

best of their abilities, it is 

important to remember 

that vendor processes and 

approaches may conflict 

with the laboratory’s protocols. For example, a 

vendor laboratory may be most comfortable and 

experienced with a certain DNA testing procedure that is different from the method of analysis 

used by the managing laboratory. 

In the middle of a massive 

forensic and humanitarian 

effort, it’s easy to expect that 

suppliers and contractors will 

be on the same page as the 

managing laboratory. But that 

is a sure path to misunderstanding and disappointment 

on both sides. Having explicit 

contracts can help clarify 

expectations and set the 

basis for accountability that 

can curb cost overruns. 

Steve Niezgoda 

A computer consultant, for example, may want 

to add a software feature that will delay making 

identifications, even though the feature may 

improve efficiencies in the long run. To the extent 

possible, it is best to avoid becoming a beta-test 

site—having to validate a new software program 

or piece of equipment—in the middle of a mass 

fatality incident response. When working with 

outside vendors, laboratory directors would be 

well advised to remember that they are the 

“customers” and they are ultimately responsible 

for the project’s success. 

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DNA 73 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 14 

Quality Control 

Quality control can be one of the biggest challenges for a laboratory that must respond to a mass fatality 

incident. Careful monitoring is necessary to help avoid problems that can result from the increase in 

scope and volume of work. This chapter offers suggestions for monitoring quality control. 

Laboratory directors understand that quality 

management—quality assurance and quality control—is critical to reporting data in an 

accurate and timely manner. Quality assurance is 

based on policies and procedures that provide 

confidence in a laboratory’s ability to produce 

accurate DNA profiles. Quality control focuses on 

gathering and analyzing process data to determine whether the results are as expected. 

In order to assure quality, a laboratory responding 

to a mass fatality incident should make every 

effort to follow the relevant standards for sample 

testing and the analysis of DNA profiles. These 

standards may include the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s Quality Assurance Standards for 

Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories and Convicted 

Offender DNA Data-Basing Laboratories. A laboratory also may follow the American Association of 

Blood Banks’ Standards for Parentage Testing. 

However, each mass fatality incident is unique— 

and, after careful consideration and consultation 

with experts and others involved in creating standards, a laboratory may decide to modify policies 

to facilitate more rapid reporting of identifications. 

Of course, any increase in the speed of reporting 

must occur without compromising accuracy. And 

any modifications to an existing standard— 

whether made on a per-sample or ad hoc basis— 

should be fully documented and retained in a 

quality management record created specifically 

for the mass fatality incident response. 

Although every individual involved in the testing 

process is responsible for maintaining quality, at 

least one laboratory employee should be given 

the responsibility and authority to ensure that the 

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mass fatality incident samples. This quality control 

manager plays a critical role 

in ensuring that the entire 

laboratory meets the criteria 

of the quality program, particularly because errors left 

uncorrected become more 

difficult to resolve as time 

goes by. 

Intentional Redundancy 

Although unintentional redundancy can diminish 

productivity, it may be an important quality control 

measure to use a 5–10 percent redundancy when 

making DNA identifications of mass fatality victims. 

Intentional redundancy may take several forms, 

including the duplicate analysis of samples or 

using multiple software programs for confirming 

matches and kinship. Also, a second laboratory 

might perform a duplicate analysis. To accomplish 

this, two cuttings are taken—and given separate 

numbers—when the samples are prepared. 

Needless to say, care should be taken to ensure 

that duplicate cuttings are from the same sample, 

as, depending on the type of disaster incident, 

the commingling of remains may be a concern. In 

such cases, it should not be assumed, for example, that tissue samples from the same shoe are 

from the same victim. (See chapter 9, Information 

Technology, “Sample Accessioning/LIMS Requirements” for more discussion on the commingling 

of remains.) 

We developed the KADAP kinship data set to test new versions of the software.This 

quality control of “evolving 

software” allowed us to find 

“bugs” and correct them, if 

we didn’t get the results that 

we expected. 

Robert Shaler 

laboratory adheres to proper 

standards in processing the 

DNA 75 

INITIATIVE
CHAPTER 14 

Multiple Test and Software Systems 

Another useful redundancy is running multiple 

test systems, either in-house or by vendors. If 

multiple test systems are used—including different multiplex kits—the profiles from each should 

be compared. Even though there is a match in 

one system, there may be a nonmatch in another 

as a result of a mutation, testing problems, or differences in the power of exclusion. Of course, all 

discrepancies must be resolved prior to reporting 

an identification. 

Redundancy of software systems, such as multiple matching and kinship programs, may also be 

considered. In addition, the particular realities of 

each mass fatality incident may require new 

software approaches. If a program is written—or 

significantly modified—for a particular event, it 

may be advisable to run “control” data through 

another software system to ensure consistent 

results. Relying on a new version of software 

without testing it against a validation data set 

can lead to errors in identifications, especially in 

terms of finding and ordering partial profiles. In 

the World Trade Center identification effort, validation data sets were critical to ensuring that the 

continually evolving software programs were 

operating properly. 

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76 DNA

INITIATIVE
77

Appendixes

APPENDIX A 

Recommendations of the Kinship and Data Analysis Panel (KADAP) to 

the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner of New York City During the 

World Trade Center DNA Identification Effort 

The Kinship and Data Analysis Panel (KADAP), assembled to assist the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner 

of the city of New York (OCME) during the World Trade Center (WTC) DNA identification effort, prepared 

the following recommendations to help the OCME laboratory create policies and procedures specific to 

the WTC mass fatality incident. These recommendations provided a roadmap when it was necessary to 

depart from the laboratory’s usual forensic casework protocols. The KADAP’s recommendations also 

offered guidance for securing additional resources and provided assurance that sufficient peer review and 

expertise were available to support these new endeavors. 

they may be helpful to laboratories that are developing a mass fatality incident DNA identification 

members were present at every meeting. 

1st KADAP (October 18–20, 2001) 

The following recommendation sought to inform 

officials beyond the OCME, New York City Police 

Department (NYPD), and New York State Police 

(NYSP) that deviations from protocols would be 

ongoing, that the local scientists were respected 

experts in their fields, and that the KADAP was 

involved in reviewing new protocol developments. 

■ The Panel recognizes the unprecedented 

complexity of identifying the victims from the 

World Trade Center attacks. They also recognize 

the expertise of the OCME, the New York City 

Police Department (NYPD), and the NYSP. 

Given the evolving nature of this task, the 

Panel stresses that these are their initial recommendations, and they may be modified by 

OCME, NYPD, or NYSP, as they deem necessary. The panel remains available to them for 

consultation upon request. 

The use of multiple software programs presented 

numerous difficulties that had to be overcome in 

the face of the informatics needs of the WTC 

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DNA 79 

DNA identification effort and the absence of existing software programs to address the issues. The 

following recommendations were developed after 

the KADAP considered the features of all available 

software programs. 

■ No single program currently exists that meets 

all of the analytical needs for resolution of the 

WTC victims. Therefore, we recommend for 

the short term: 

❏ WTC CODIS [Combined DNA Index System] 

be used: 

— At high stringency for direct matches. 

Likelihood ratio of 1 X 1010 is sufficient to 

report identity. A 13-locus match using 

the core CODIS loci is sufficient to report 

identity. 

— At low stringency to screen for potential 

first-degree relatives (parent/offspring 

and some sibs) in order to manually 

search case-specific data for cases with 

additional potential relatives. 

These recommendations appear here in their original form, without editing. The annotations in italics offer an after-the-fact context for particular recommendations to the OCME. The KADAP’s recommendations are included as appendix A to this report because of their historical significance, and because 

response plan. The recommendations and opinions represent a consensus of the KADAP members 

(referred to in the recommendations as “the Panel”) who were present on the date indicated; not all 

INITIATIVE
APPENDIX A 

❏ DNA•VIEW be used to assess the putative 

relationship. A minimum Probability of 

Relationship of 99.9% is sufficient to report 

identity by kinship analysis. The minimum 

prior probability is 1/5000, which can be 

increased to reflect case-specific issues 

(e.g., members of service). 

■ Commercially available pedigree programs 

should be incorporated for kinship review. 

■ Middleware should immediately be developed 

to facilitate use of existing programs. 

■ A customized program, developed in a modular 

manner following the proposed process flow, 

is needed. This package should be designed to 

analyze complex relationships in a way that 

integrates validated systems when possible. 

By October 26, 2001, the mechanism needed 

to commit resources to this program will be 

identified and established by NIJ [and reported 

back] to Inspector Mark Dale. 

Because mitochondrial DNA mtDNA testing had 

received significant public attention in several 

forensic cases, stakeholder expectations for its 

use in the WTC response were high, and the 

OCME laboratory received many inquiries from 

officials regarding its use on the WTC samples. 

The KADAP was concerned that this early focus 

on mtDNA would dilute the effort to yield sufficient short tandem repeat (STR) loci in what were 

likely to be difficult samples. The Panel was concerned that this might hinder the identification 

process by adding less powerful methods of identification before all efforts to reveal unique identities had been exhausted. 

■ Mitochondrial DNA typing of victim samples 

should be used only as a last resort after additional test reanalysis and/or the use of additional forensically validated STR, Y-chromosome, or 

other nuclear markers have been used. 

■ If forensically validated systems, including 

mitochondrial data, are insufficient to resolve 

identity, research grade systems should be 

explored on a case-by-case basis. 

■ Mitochondrial DNA typing should be performed 

on all maternal lineage relative’s appropriate 

samples (e.g., buccal swabs, blood) using a 

suitable validated system on the extracts as 

provided by NYSP, Myriad Genetics, or any 

other authorized agency. 

■ Mitochondrial DNA typing should not be performed on personal effect samples until other 

appropriate approaches have been considered. 

These consensus recommendations represent a 

major step towards evaluating the complex data 

that will be generated from the World Trade 

Center terrorist attacks. 

2nd KADAP (November 20, 2001) 

With many competing agencies involved in the 

WTC effort, the KADAP offered recommendations 

about DNA-specific resource needs to reinforce 

their urgency with officials in charge of prioritization. 

■ This Panel determines that it is critical to the 

success of the WTC identification project that 

the OCME and NYSP share rapid access to the 

same data sets via immediate installation of a 

T1 line. 

■ The Panel recognizes that requests for prioritization of analyses of particular samples have 

significant implications for the overall process. 

Such requests will impede the overall progress 

of identification, increase the chances of analytical or interpretive errors, and increase costs. The 

Panel strongly urges those who make such 

requests to take all of these factors into account 

and minimize requests for prioritization. 

The confirmation of identification by DNA was 

relied upon by the Chief Medical Examiner. The 

following recommendation aided in establishing 

baseline identity estimates. 

■ The Panel has recommended that likelihood 

ratios equal to or in excess of 1010 can be 

adopted as sufficient evidence of identity. 

However, this value should not be considered 

as a necessary criterion for identification in 

all cases, and that final recommendation of 

identification can properly be based on lower 

values depending on all available information, 

as determined by the Chief Medical Examiner. 

3rd KADAP (February 21–22, 2002) 

The following recommendations considered 

and addressed sample processing issues. The 

complexity of the process is shown in the graph 

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80 DNA

INITIATIVE
RECOMMENDA TIONS 

that appears on the last page of this appendix, 

“WTC Disaster Manhattan (DM) Identification 

Process.” 

Production: 

■ The Panel believes that collaboration and information sharing between the different groups 

and agencies involved in the DNA identification 

of the WTC victims is a critical component to 

maximum identification throughput. 

■ Numerous production choke points exist as 

obstacles in meeting the goal of maximum 

identification throughput. Information management and software integration are major issues 

that need to be supported to avoid obstacles. 

The existing software programs should continue to be supported and effective software integration should be developed with appropriate 

priorities. This requires additional resources, 

including but not limited to hardware, software, 

expert systems, and personnel. 

■ In order to eliminate the most immediate 

choke points, the Panel recommends that: 

❏ OCME and NYSP each hire/contract two (2) 

additional information technology FTEs so 

that present staff experienced in the current 

process can be solely dedicated to the WTC 

effort. 

❏ OCME and NYSP each hire/contract five (5) 

additional forensic analyst FTEs to be solely 

dedicated to the WTC effort. 

Validation and Quality Control: 

■ Documented validation protocols should be 

developed and implemented for software 

programs and interfaces. 

■ Dedicated personnel and equipment should be 

made available for validation. 

■ Objective unbiased peer review is a useful 

process to implement valid systems. 

■ Appropriate test genetic data should be 

integrated into the WTC CODIS for efficient 

validation of all software. 

■ The current procedures to confirm matches 

(see attached flow chart) used by OCME and 

NYSP are appropriate. 

■ The probability of miscalling alleles that would 

lead to false inclusions is so small that it is not 

necessary to review electropherograms previously reviewed by vendor laboratories for 

uncomplicated STR cases that meet previous 

recommendations for likelihood ratios. 

Continued Testing: 

■ Successful DNA typing of all samples will not 

be possible due to conditions of the remains. 

The Panel recommends that testing of individual samples should be finite. Criteria for determining cessation of testing should be 

established. Development of a probative test 

should be investigated. 

4th KADAP (April 24–25, 2002) 

As the scope of the WTC effort evolved, and 

the complexities of data management and the 

number of partnerships increased, the KADAP 

recommended and implemented a mechanism 

to facilitate secure, rapid transfer of data and 

provided additional development of statistical 

approaches to kinship analyses. 

Recommendations: 

■ In order to facilitate data flow, the Panel recommends that a mechanism of data synchronization should be created. NCBI [National Center 

for Biotechnology Information] should host the 

secure FTP resource. The Forensic Biology Unit 

of the OCME needs Internet access with adequate bandwidth and tools for secure access. 

■ Cases involving difficult kin interpretations, 

including such things as mutations, should be 

reviewed by members of the AABB Parentage 

Testing Community to recommend disposition 

to OCME. 

■ Kinship used to confirm a personal effect 

match should be accepted at a Probability of 

Relationship of 99.9% using a Prior Probability 

of 0.5. 

In addition to making recommendations, the 

KADAP offered several statements to support 

the work of the OCME and the NYSP. 

Statements: 

■ KADAP recognizes the desire of victims’ 

relatives, public officials, and the concerned 

public for complete and accurate use of validated forensic methods for identification of those 

lost in the WTC attack. 

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DNA 81 

INITIATIVE
APPENDIX A 

■ KADAP recognizes that elected officials and 

the public must balance the above goals with 

desire for expeditious reporting of results. 

These are competing goals which must be considered carefully. 

■ KADAP recognizes that ongoing scientific and 

administrative review of all data will be needed 

to assure the accuracy of victim identifications. 

KADAP has concerns that imposed time deadlines are not in the best interest of making 

accurate or complete identifications. 

■ KADAP fully supports and endorses the efforts 

to date of the NYC OCME and NYSP in the processing of DNA from victims, personal effects 

and family members. To date, over 900 identifications have been accomplished using a combination of traditional methods and modern 

DNA technology. 

■ KADAP also recognizes that many victims may 

not be identified despite great effort by all concerned. Similarly, incomplete DNA results on 

highly degraded samples are likely to preclude 

positive identification of many of the 19,000 

remains from victims recovered to date. 

■ KADAP is fully committed to ongoing efforts to 

assist New York agencies in identification of 

victims and remains. KADAP recognizes that 

successful DNA typing of all samples will not 

be possible due to the condition of the 

remains. 

■ KADAP recommends that DNA testing of 

individual samples cannot continue indefinitely 

(i.e., beyond the limits of sample integrity and 

available technology). 

■ Statistical criteria should be reviewed and 

revised as appropriate for use in assignment of 

identity of remains yielding incomplete DNA 

profiles. 

The following recommendation was made 

because results were obtained from fewer loci 

from later samples recovered from Ground Zero. 

At the same time, the estimate of the number of 

victims became more firm, allowing statistical 

approaches similar to that of a “closed “system 

to be considered. 

Identification Rules: 

■ Compromised DM samples can be considered 

associated with samples that were previously 

matched through DNA if the LR of shared loci 

[is] >108. This is equivalent to one divided by 

the random match probability of the shared loci 

between the two profiles. 

5th KADAP (July 15–16, 2002) 

As data from fewer loci were recovered from 

more compromised samples, experimental 

methods were evaluated for application in the 

WTC effort. The following recommendations 

considered parameters for using single nucleotide 

polymorphism (SNP) methodology in this 

environment. 

Commentary and Recommendations on Use of 

Linked SNPs for Forensic Kinship Analysis of WTC 

Samples: 

1) Use of the CODIS STR loci is a wellestablished method for estimation of random 

match probability and for kinship studies. 

2) Unlike the 13 CODIS STR loci, which are 

unlinked, the 70 SNP loci studied in the KADAP 

pilot project consist of multiple haplogroups. 

Many of these SNPs are closely linked with 

each other and with the CODIS STR loci. 

3) While linkage of genetic markers, per se, may 

have no untoward effect on their use in match 

probability estimates, linkage between SNPs 

will alter the calculations used in certain 

kinship estimates. 

4) Use of inherited SNPs is very promising as 

an adjunct or substitute for STR profiling. 

A KADAP subcommittee on SNPs met on 

12 July 2002 in Washington, D.C. This subcommittee recognized the potential of the 

technique pending additional studies. 

5) KADAP recommends that the OCME of NYC 

proceed with the pilot use of the 

ORCHID/Genescreen (Dallas, TX) SNP panels 

on WTC samples in appropriate situations. 

6) Sample consumption issues must be appropriately addressed before SNP analysis proceeds. 

7) KADAP also recommends the KADAP SNP 

subcommittee pursue further statistical 

analysis of existing SNP data. 

PRESIDENT’S

82 DNA

INITIATIVE
RECOMMENDA TIONS 

6th KADAP (September 9–10, 2002) 

As time passed, a more precise list of victims 

was established. The KADAP reassessed the 

character of the WTC site a year after the attack 

and the statistical approaches that could be used. 

KADAP Recommendations Regarding Identification of WTC Victims Based on DNA Profiling: 

1) For purposes of statistical analysis of genetic 

data, KADAP recommends that the OCME 

consider the WTC as a closed population at 

this time. 

2) The size of the closed population is considered 

to be the number of persons reported missing 

(currently 2,802). 

3) Therefore, KADAP recommends that prior 

probabilities used in match estimates be based 

on either the number of: 

(a) RM [reported missing] and the gender


ratio, OR


(b) nongenetically identified RM individuals 

(of appropriate gender) plus the number 

of genetically identified individuals who 

cannot be excluded from the DNA profile 

in question. 

Operationally, KADAP recommends that the 

OCME use 3(a) above until such time as 3(b) is 

necessary to refine statistical estimates. 

Based on the assumption of a closed population 

of WTC victims and on the reduced estimate of 

the number of missing persons (from 5,000 to 

2,802), KADAP recommends reducing the 

threshold for direct matching of remains from 

a likelihood of 1x1010 to 4x109. 

Based on the gender ratio of the Reported Missing WTC victims (as of 9/10/02), the appropriate 

thresholds for direct matching of remains of 

known gender are 2x108 for females and 2x109 

for males. 

MtDNA Recommendations: 

■ KADAP recommends use of an mtDNA 

database that reflects, as closely as possible, 

the population mix of the WTC victims. The 

mtDNA from one maternal relative or positively 

identified personal item can serve as the 

reference sample for the RM. Certain relatives, 

including spouses, can be used to constitute 

the mtDNA database. Thus, when multiple 

relatives of a victim are available, mtDNA 

profiles from different maternal lineages can 

be included. 

■ KADAP recommends that the upper bound of 

the frequency estimate of an observed mtDNA 

sequence in a population should, at this time, 

be reported as: 

X/N + 1.96 ÷ (p(1-p)/N), 

where p = X/N, and where 

X = # of “matching” mtDNA sequences 

in a database of size N. 

If X = 0, then the upper bound of the 

frequency estimate = 1 – alpha(1/N) , 

where alpha = 0.05 

Additional recommendations were made as the 

SNP technology was assessed. 

SNP Recommendation 

(December, 2002) 

Based on the UHT [ultre-high throughput] SNP 

validation data provided by Orchid Biosciences in 

Dallas, Texas, the KADAP recommends that this 

technology may be used by the OCME for WTC 

specimens as a potentially useful, but research 

grade, identification technology. The KADAP 

recommends going forward with limited testing 

of WTC specimens for investigational purposes, 

proceeding in a staged approach, with continuous 

evaluation of the utility and validity of this 

technology. 

7th KADAP (January 21–22, 2003) 

As the identification effort progressed, review of 

collection issues highlighted the need to adopt 

new methods of data collection for future mass 

fatality situations. The following recommendations were made after dialogues with those 

responsible for data collection from the Disaster 

Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORT). 

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DNA 83 

INITIATIVE
APPENDIX A 

KADAP Recommendations to DMORT 

The KADAP recognizes the importance of the Victim Identification Program (VIP) as a vehicle f

or 

collecting the critical data relied upon for making 

precise identifications in mass fatality incidents. 

The VIP can be made more useful to DNA Laboratories by including additional genetic information. Therefore, KADAP respectfully offers the following recommendations: 

1) Amend the VIP form to include more comprehensive fields to assist in DNA-based identifications. The KADAP would be pleased to assist 

the DMORT committee in revision of existing forms. 

2) DMORT should consider adding one or more 

DNA identification specialists to the Family Assistance Center (FAC) teams to allow for 

timely onsite collection of kinship data and 

personal effects needed for DNA extraction/ 

profiling. 

8th KADAP (July 7–8, 2003) 

Nearly 2 years after the attack, the KADAP 

assessed the capabilities of existing technologies for the remaining and most challenging samples. This recommendation was made to help families 

and other stakeholders understand the limitations 

of existing technologies for identifying these 

remains. 

KADAP recognizes that DNA testing will not be 

successful for many samples and therefore some 

of the WTC victims will not be positively identified by STR, mtDNA or SNP testing. 

KADAP further recognizes that OCME has exhausted appropriate contemporary methods 

of DNA extraction and genotyping on recovered 

WTC biological samples. While it cannot be ruled 

out that future scientific advances may reopen 

promise for additional testing, KADAP recommends that completion of ongoing work with 

current technologies be viewed as a stopping 

point in the identification process. 

PRESIDENT’S

84 DNA

INITIATIVE
RECOMMENDA TIONS 

This Admin Review performed 

after kinships identified 

through a Disaster Screen 

If a DM sample matches

 a previously reported-out

 SP sample with sufficient

 Likelihood Ratio, 

it can be automatically 

reported out 

Administrative Reviewer 

determines one of the four 

courses of action 

Use WTC Integrated and 

NYSP BEAST 

If OCME is communicating with 

NYSP, we will not get any new 

SP or family profilies for 

identified DMs (accounting for 

time lag with processing) 

This dataflow scheme 

presumes that M-FISys will 

be regularly updated with MLI 

status on all DM#s 

CODIS Wistort data 

of anything with 

a locus: DMs, SPs, Kin. 

“All data, all the time.” 

CODIS Wistort 

format (that 

includes RM#s) 

ALL the kinship 

data 

CODIS Wistort 

ALL unreportedout, aggregated 

and orphaned 

victim profilies 

Match Admin 

Review 

(metadata is 

consistent 

with RM#) 

Report out Match 

DM matches 

multiple SPs 

Kinship Confirmation 

(DNA•View) 

Matches a single SP 

and Kin are available 

for confirmation 

NYSP Rerun SP 

Matches a single 

SP and no Kin 

available 

for confirmation 

Special Processing 

Admin Review yielded 

unexpected results 

Kinship Admin 

Review 

(metadata is 

consistent with 

RM#) 

Verify with 

Benoît KAP 

• BEAST = Sample tracking (LIMS) software 

• Benoît KAP = Benoît LeClair’s Kinship Analysis Program 

• CODIS = Combined DNA Index System (FBI) 

• CODIS Wistort = ASCII dump of data in CODIS (Peter Wistort) 

• DM = Disaster Manhattan (human remains) 

• DNA • VIEW = Integrated software package for DNA identification 

• Kin = Biologically related samples 

• M-FISys = Mass-Fatality Identification System 

• MLI = DataEase program used by OCME for all laboratory reports 

• RM = Reported missing 

• SP = Personal effect (e.g., toothbrush, hairbrush, etc) 

• WTC Integrated = Web-based software that displays data from 

 14 databases 

Electronically 

report matches 

to Medical 

Examiner 

Run 

DNA•View 

Disaster 

Screen 

Direct Match? 

Import into 

DNA•VIEW 

Additional Remains 

(Automatically sent 

from M-FISys to MLI) 

Y N 

Direct Match 

Search 

M-FISys 

Benoît 

KAP 

Review Data 

Anomalies 

CODIS 

WTC 

World Trade Center Identification Process 

2/21/02 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 85 

INITIATIVE
APPENDIX B 

Sample Personal Items Submission Form 

After a mass fatality incident, friends and family 

members will provide authorities with personal 

items that may contain a missing person’s DNA. 

The DNA profile obtained from the personal 

item(s) will be searched against the profiles 

obtained from the remains samples. To efficiently 

and effectively use DNA analysis to identify 

human remains, it is important that personal 

items be correctly identified. 

The purpose of this sample form is to help a 

laboratory: 

■ Determine who is missing. 

■ Provide information on the types of personal 

items that loved ones should submit. 

■ Identify the submitter and the items being 

submitted. 

■ Clarify what other DNA might be on the item; 

for example, if personal items of the missing 

individual are submitted, a reference sample 

from a spouse, domestic partner, or full-time 

roommate may be useful, even if no biological 

relationship exists. 

■ Begin chain-of-custody documentation for 

the items. 

■ Obtain permission from the submitter to test 

the items. 

■ Provide notification that the articles may be 

damaged or destroyed during testing. 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 87 

INITIATIVE
Personal Items Submission Form 

Missing Individual Information 

Last Name Suffix 

(Jr., Sr.) 

First Name: Middle Name Sex (circle) 

M F 

The missing person is/has been known by the 

following additional names (include maiden name) 

Date of Birth 

Year: __ __ __ __ Month: __ __ Day : __ __ 

Social Security Number 

__ __ __ -__ __-__ __ __ __ 

Submitter Information 

Last Name Suffix 

(Jr., Sr.) 

First Name Middle Name 

Telephone numbers ( in order of preference) 

1st : ( ) 2nd: ( ) 3rd: ( ) 

Home Street Address City State 

Country ZIP Code E-mail address 

I am providing a reference sample from the missing individual. 

I am the missing individual’s____________________________________________. 

(e.g., mother, father, sister, son, roommate) 

Please list the personal items below: 

Item 

Number Item Description 

Other Possible DNA Sources on Item. 

Please Explain. 

0 Example: Pink toothbrush with 

white handle My husband and I may have used the same toothbrush 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

1

_________________________________ __________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________ 

Name of Missing Individual:_______________________________________________ 

(Last, First, Middle, Suffix) 

Please note: 

If there is a possibility that there may be someone else’s DNA on a personal 

item, it is helpful to submit a biological sample from the person(s) who might 

have also used the item (reference sample). Please refer to the Sample 

Family and/or Donor Reference Collection Form. 

Items submitted should be directly attributable to the missing individual. 

o Biological samples suitable for testing include: 

Bloodstain cards (e.g., newborn screening cards [Guthrie cards] or 

cards obtained from other repositories). 

Oral swabs (e.g., from home DNA identification kits). 

Blood stored for elective surgery. 

Pathology samples (e.g., biopsy samples, PAP smears). 

Extracted teeth (baby/wisdom). 

Hair samples. 

o Personal items that might contain the missing individual’s DNA include: 

Used toothbrushes. 

Used shavers/razors. 

Unwashed undergarments and other suitable clothing items. 

Used personal hygiene items (e.g., feminine sanitary napkins). 

Other personally handled or used items (consult the testing 

laboratory for specific criteria). 

I, _______________________________________ hereby grant permission to 

(Please print or type name of submitter) 

extract and type DNA from the items listed on page 1 for the purpose of assisting in the 

identification of a missing person. I understand that in the testing process the item may 

become damaged or destroyed and may not be returned. 

(Signature of submitter) (Date) 

The items were received on ____________________at _________________________ (Date) (Collection location) 

(Collection address) 

Sample(s) received by ________________________________ __________________.

 (For testing agency use only) 
APPENDIX C 

Sample Family and/or Donor Reference Collection Form 

After a mass fatality incident, a missing person’s 

friends and family members provide identification 

information to officials who are handling the 

recovery and identification efforts. Complicated 

family structures—for example, multiple marriages, adoptions, same-sex partners—present 

challenges in collecting family relationship information. Obtaining an accurate family structure 

helps minimize gaps in information. 

The information requested in this sample form is 

quite comprehensive, including a description of 

the jewelry worn by the missing individual, dental 

history, and a list of family members who may be 

able to provide DNA samples for the kinship 

identification process. This information typically is 

stored in the Victim Identification Program (VIP), 

a database supplied by the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA). VIP is the central 

repository of all missing individual identification 

information, which can be accessed by pathologists, laboratory personnel, and medical examiners who are involved in the identification process. 

Once family members have been identified and 

documented in the VIP, DNA samples need to be 

PRESIDENT’S

INITIATIVE

collected. Collection kits—used to collect the 

family and donor reference samples to determine 

biological relationships—should be available at 

family assistance centers and can be sent to 

family members all over the world. 

The purpose of this sample form is to assist the 

laboratory in: 

■ Determining the identity of the missing 

individual. 

■ Identifying the donor of the reference sample. 

■ Clarifying the biological relationship between 

the missing individual and the donor; for 

example, if personal items from the missing 

individual are being submitted for analysis, a 

reference sample from a spouse, domestic 

partner, or full-time roommate is useful even 

if no biological relationship exists. 

■ Obtaining chain-of-custody information for the 

family reference sample. 

■ Obtaining permission to test the sample. 

■ Providing information on the best types of 

family reference samples to collect. 

DNA 91 
Family and/or Donor Reference Collection Form 

(Each donor needs to fill in a separate form and submit a separate sample for each missing person.) 

Missing Individual Information 

Last Name Suffix 

(Jr., Sr.) 

First Name Middle Name Sex (circle) 

M F 

The missing person has been known by the following additional 

names (include maiden name) 

Date of Birth 

Year __ __ __ __ Month __ __ Day __ __ 

Social Security Number or 

citizenship (if not a U.S. 

citizen) 

__ __ __ -__ __-__ __ __ __ 

Donor Information 

Last Name Suffix 

(Jr., Sr.) 

First Name Middle Name 

Telephone numbers (in order of preference) 

1st :( ) 2nd :( 3rd ) :( ) 

Home Street Address 

City State ZIP Country 

Date of Birth Sex (circle) 

M F 

E-mail address (please print) 

Year __ __ __ __ Month __ __ Day __ __ 

I am providing a family reference sample, as I am the missing individual’s _________________________ 

(e.g., mother, father, sister, son) 

Please circle your relationship to the missing individual: 

Maternal 

Grandmother

Maternal 

Grandfather

Paternal 

Grandmother

Paternal 

Grandfather

Stepfather Biological Stepmother

Mother

Biological 

Father

Half Sister Half Brother Sister Brother Half Sister Half Brother

Missing 

Individual 

Spouse #1 

Name: ________________ 

Spouse #2 

Name: ________________ 

Daughter Son Daughter Son

Other: (please specify) ________________________________________________________________ (e.g., grandchild, friend, roommate) 
_________________________________________ ________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

Name of Missing Individual:_____________________________________________________ 

(Last, First, Middle, Suffix) 

Please note: 

If personal items of the missing individual are being submitted for analysis, a biological 

reference sample from the spouse, domestic partner, or full-time roommate is useful even 

if no biological relationship exists. Please refer to the Personal Items Submission Form 

when submitting personal items. 

The biological parents and biological children are the best comparison samples for 

identification through kinship. If these samples are unavailable, samples from 

other biological relatives may be submitted. 

If a child provides a sample for parental identification, the child’s other biological parent 

should also provide a sample. 

For identification through kinship analysis: 

o	 Full siblings are preferable over half siblings. 

o	 Grandparents should provide a sample only if the mother or father cannot provide 

a sample. 

o	 Grandchildren should provide a sample only if their parent, who is related to the 

missing individual (as a son or daughter), is unavailable. 

The laboratory will assess the samples provided. The most appropriate sample(s) will be 

used to identify the missing individual. The family may be contacted if additional samples 

are needed. 

I am also a relative of the following other missing individuals:________________________________ 

I, _______________________________________ hereby grant permission to extract and type 

(Please print or type name of donor) 

my DNA for the purpose of assisting in the identification of a missing person. 

(Signature of donor or guardian if donor is a minor)	 (Date) 

The sample was collected on ___________________ at ______________________ 

(Date)	 (Collection location) 

(Collection address) 

Sample was collected by (if self-collected indicate “self”)____________________________ 
APPENDIX D 

Sample Family Tree Form 

The complexity of modern family structures (e.g., 

multiple marriages, adoptions, same-sex partners) 

can challenge the collection of family relationship 

information. The purpose of this Sample Family 

Tree Form is to help a laboratory: 

■ Determine who is missing. 

■ Identify the individual providing the 

information. 

■ Provide family relationship information. 

PRESIDENT’S

This type of form should be completed each time 

someone provides information about a missing 

individual and/or donates a sample. Because of 

the complexity of determining biological relationships, it generally is advisable to have a trained 

interviewer—such as a geneticist or genetic counselor—complete the form. 

DNA 95 

INITIATIVE
FAMILY RELATIONSHIP TREE 

Victim’s Name:_____________________________________________________________________________ 

(Last, First, Middle, Suffix) 

It is important for the DNA laboratory to correctly understand the victim’s family structure when 

using DNA to establish biological relationships and identify victims. In order to obtain an accurate 

family structure, please complete the contact information for the interviewee (the person providing 

the information on the family relationships) as well as your contact information as the interviewer. 

This form may be completed each time a new individual provides information about a potential 

victim and/or donates a sample using the family reference collection form. Using the directions 

below, please describe the family of the victim, including the interviewee, the victim, and all other 

close relatives. 

Interviewee Contact information: 

Last Name: Suffix: First Name: Middle Name: 

Telephone numbers (in order of preference): 

1st: ( ) 2nd: ( ) 3rd: ( ) 

The interviewee is the missing individual’s_________________________________________________ 

(e.g., mother, sister, son, roommate) 

Interviewer Information: 

Name: Date: 

Affiliation and address: 

Telephone numbers (in order of preference): 

1st: ( ) 2nd: ( ) 3rd: ( ) 

Directions: 

Use the box on the other side of the page to draw the family tree. 


A picture of the family should be drawn by placing the interviewee in the center, 


providing he or she is biologically related to the missing individual. 


Use circles for women and squares for men. 


Put each person’s name in the circle or square. 


In the circle or square, indicate whether the individual is living, deceased, or missing. 


Draw a line between parents and place children below the line. 


Include wives and husbands. 


Provide a narrative if you think it will be helpful. 


If the interviewee is not biologically related to the victim, indicate his or her relationship 


to the victim and draw the victim’s family structure as outlined above. 


Add comments below the box to clarify relationships as needed. 


1 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________________________________________ 

Victim’s Name:___________________________________ 

(Last, First, Middle, Suffix) 

Family Tree: 

Comments:____________________________________________________________________________ 
APPENDIX E 

Guidelines for Family and/or Donor Reference Collection Kit 

Components and Oral Swab Collection Instructions 

To obtain a properly collected and labeled sample, 

it is preferable to use a tamper-evident, presealed 

oral swab collection kit. Some laboratories may 

prefer to have the swabs air-dry for 15 minutes to 

an hour prior to placing the oral swab in the swab 

envelope. Although the process of air-drying the 

swabs may lead to a more pristine sample, the 

process of air-drying is risky and may inadvertently 

lead to a sample mixup if more than one person’s 

sample is collected at a time. The laboratory may 

also want to incorporate some type of notification 

system in which the collection location calls or 

faxes the DNA laboratory when the sample has 

been collected, alerting the DNA laboratory that 

the sample is on the way. A tamper-evident, 

presealed oral swab collection kit may contain: 

Collection instructions (See sample Oral 

Swab Collection Instructions below) 

Collection form for family reference 

sample (See Sample Family and/or Donor 

Reference Collection Form, appendix C) 

Form describing the family relationship 

(See Sample Family Tree form, appendix D) 

Pair of gloves (preferably one-size-fits-all 

Nitrile gloves) 

Sterile, cotton-tipped swabs (2–6) 

If the collection is performed correctly on a 

healthy individual, two swabs are sufficient 

to get adequate amounts of DNA for a short 

tandem repeat (STR) analysis. If extended 

testing may be required, it is preferable to 

collect six swabs. 

Fastener (optional) 

A small rubber band or twist-tie may be 

included to bind together all of the swabs 

from one individual prior to placing them in 

the swab envelope. Alternatively, a label 

may be included to secure and label the 

swabs. 

PRESIDENT’S

INITIATIVE

Swab envelope 

Once the swabs have been collected, they 

should be placed in an envelope that can be 

uniquely identified with the donor’s 

information. 

Tamper-evident, sealable bag, containing 

desiccant packet 

If mass collections are to be performed, 

inadvertent sample switches may occur if 

the swabs are allowed to air-dry in the open; 

therefore, a desiccant can be used to help 

keep the moist swab from molding. If a 

Ziploc bag is used, tamper-evident policeevidence seals can be placed on the bag. 

Mailing envelope 

A preprinted mailing envelope with an appropriate prepaid shipping label will help ensure 

that the swabs are delivered to the correct 

location. Make sure the shipping carrier 

services the area where the sample will be 

collected. Different air bills and customs 

documents may be needed if samples will 

be shipped from outside the United States. 

Oral Swab Collection Instructions 

To avoid sample mixups, identification, collection, 

and sample sealing should be performed for one 

individual at a time. Also, it would be advisable to: 

■ Have a trained individual interview the family 

member and complete a family tree. 

■ Wear gloves while collecting the sample, and 

change gloves before collecting from the next 

individual. 

■ Collect samples from one individual at a time. 

■ Verify the identity of the individual whose 

sample is being collected and confirm that the 

mouth is free of tobacco products, gum, food, 

etc., before collecting the oral swab. If necessary, have the individual rinse his or her mouth 

with water prior to collection. 

DNA 99 
APPENDIX E 

■ Have the donor fill out a Family and/or Donor 

Reference Collection form. 

■ Open the swab packages provided, being careful to not handle the cotton tip of the swabs. 

■ Remove one swab and collect the specimen by 

rubbing the swab vigorously and thoroughly on 

the inside surfaces of the cheeks and gums. 

Rub the swab up and down and back and forth 

about 10 times, while slowly turning the swab, 

so that all sides of the swab are in contact with 

the side of the cheek. 

■ Place the swab in the envelope provided. Do 

not place the swab back into the original packaging. Repeat the process with the remaining 

swabs. 

■ Identify the swab envelope with the date, the 

donor’s name, and the collector’s name. Have 

the donor sign the envelope to verify the 

information. 

■ Complete the collection information on a 

Family and/or Donor Reference Collection 

form, and verify that the donor completed 

the requested information. 

■ Seal the swab envelope. Place the swab envelope and completed Family and/or Donor Reference Collection form in the plastic bag with the 

desiccant, and place in shipping envelope. 

Maintain the sample in a cool, dry environment 

until shipment. Do not store under extreme hot 

or cold conditions. 

PRESIDENT’S

100 DNA

INITIATIVE
APPENDIX F 

Issues to Consider When Outsourcing Reference Samples 

There are many issues a laboratory director must 

consider when making the decision to send mass 

fatality samples to an outside vendor for short 

tandem repeat (STR) analysis testing. This list of 

issues is not meant to be inclusive; rather, it is 

offered as a starting point to aid in considering 

the use of a vendor laboratory to test personal 

items, reference samples, or remains samples. 

Tasks and Requirements 

■ What standards of quality assurance are 

to be met. 

■ What certification will be provided that testing 

is performed in accordance with quality assurance standards. 

■ Specific tasks (for example: “The Vendor shall 

analyze all samples for the 13 CODIS core STR 

loci plus Amelogenin—FGA, vWA, D3S1358, 

CSF1PO, TPOX, THO1, D18S51, D21S11, 

D8S1179, D7S820, D13S317, D5S818, and 

D16S539—in accordance with the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation’s NDIS [National Data 

Index System] Standards for Acceptance of 

DNA Data and the Contracting Agency/Vendor 

Testing and Reporting Guide.”) 

■ Accreditations/certifications that the vendor 

laboratory should maintain, and penalties if 

accreditation/certification is not maintained. 

■ Timeframe for analysis and reporting turnaround (for example, “x” kinship samples per 

week, etc.). 

■ External proficiency testing program(s) that the 

vendor must complete during a specific timeframe, along with terms for submitting a 

certified statement of compliance and documentation of any failed proficiency tests and 

the remediation that was done to resolve the 

issue(s). 

■ Terms regarding the individual DNA analyst’s 

compliance with a semiannual external proficiency testing program. 

PRESIDENT’S

INITIATIVE

■ Requirements that changes in the vendor’s key 

personnel (specific personnel) be approved. 

■ Protocols and procedures for making analysis 

of the samples, quality control documents, and 

validation documentation available for review, 

inspection, and monitoring, including onsite 

reviews of the vendor’s facility and records. 

■ Standard operating procedures and quality 

assurance procedures (including any changes 

made during the process) with respect to the 

receipt and analysis of samples. 

■ Terms regarding the vendor’s ability to subcontract (or prohibition against subcontracting) any 

portion of the testing or analysis of the samples to any other laboratory without prior 

written authorization. 

■ Format for processing samples (for example, 

“Whole blood in tubes that the vendor shall be 

required to stain onto cotton fabric, 903 S&S 

paper, FTA paper,” etc.; buccal swabs on a 

swab or placed on 903 S&S paper or FTA 

paper; extracted DNA; personal items (toothbrushes, hair brushes, clothing); victim bone 

and tissue, etc.) 

■ Preprinted shipping labels and shipping containers, and requirements regarding notification of when a shipping container is received, 

including notification upon discovery of any 

damage to the shipping container that would 

compromise the integrity of a sample. 

■ Chain-of-custody documentation, including, for 

example, a unique identifier on the overnight 

shipping label, sample receipt (and verification 

of seal integrity), sample transfers during processing, analysis and reporting, and return of 

the samples and resulting data. 

■ Storage of samples. 

■ Use of automated transfers (for example, use 

of a “plate fingerprinting” system to uniquely 

identify a 96-well plate, including the strategic 

placement of known controls on a 96-well 

DNA 101 
APPENDIX F 

plate in a manner that allows any plate mixup 

to be detected). 

■ Use of NDIS-approved STR analysis kits specified in the NDIS Standards for Acceptance of 

DNA Data; if applicable, use of NDIS-approved 

STR analysis platforms and expert systems. 

■ Analytical procedures (for example, using 

appropriate controls and standards on each 

gel/run/batch; each sample used in reporting 

having an acceptable extraction positive, 

extraction negative, amplification positive, 

amplification negative, and ladder associated 

with each locus, and, if a sample is rerun, all 

controls to be rerun). 

■ The manner in which data are to be reported 

(for example, genotypes to be compiled in the 

common message format for insertion into the 

FBI’s Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) 

and transmitted in electronic form (floppy disk, 

CD–ROM, a ZIP disk, secure Web site, or other 

method); cost of CD–ROM or ZIP disks and 

shipping to be included in the proposed cost 

per sample of completed analysis). 

■ Return of extraction, amplification, gel data 

sheets (including spreadsheets, original gel 

scans, and the final gray-scale/color-corrected 

gel images), and electropherogram data; return 

of instrument data collection files and files 

generated in the analysis of the samples in a 

prescribed form (CD–ROM, ZIP disk, posted to 

a secure Web site, etc.); return of samples, 

DNA extracts, amplified product, etc. 

■ Determination of when the analysis of a specimen is considered complete (for example, not 

until genotypes for all 13 CODIS core STR loci 

(plus Amelogenin) have been generated and 

accepted; requirements for when a sample 

does not yield a complete profile (for example, 

retest the sample a minimum of two times, 

altering conditions within the boundaries of the 

laboratory’s written standard operating procedures, as necessary, to produce a complete 

profile, etc.). 

■ Terms for analysis failure (requests for 

additional samples, etc.). 

■ Sample shipping responsibilities (method, 

chain-of-custody safeguards, timeliness, 

tracking, etc.). 

■ Confidentiality of samples and the results of 

testing, including handling outside inquiries. 

■ Ownership of data, materials, and 

documentation. 

■ Procedures for notification regarding problems 

in testing. 

■ Contamination quality assurance checks. 

■ Retention of testing and quality control 

records. 

■ Written weekly reports, including changes to 

management and key personnel; assessment 

of technical risks and analytical and quality 

control processes; description of analytical 

errors detected during processing and corrective action taken; customer service logs; and 

performance metrics by sample type (reference, disaster, personal items), including, for 

example: 

❏ Number of samples received. 

❏ Running total for samples received. 

❏ Number of samples reported. 

❏ Number of failed samples (for example, 

those in which no profile or an incomplete 

profile—not all 13 CODIS core loci + 

Amelogenin—was generated. 

❏ Number of samples received more than 

30 days ago, but not yet tested, analyzed, 

and reported. 

❏ Biweekly briefings. 

Deliverables and Delivery Schedule 

■ Testing, analysis, and reporting services, 

including shipping; DNA profile; quality control 

results and records; testing and chain-ofcustody documentation; data generated during 

the receipt, testing, analysis, and reporting; 

and unused samples. 

Suspension and Termination 

■ Terms for suspension or termination for 

poor performance, including quality issues, 

customer service complaints, and inability to 

meet sample throughput commitments. 

Equipment and Materials 

■ Who will furnish equipment and materials. 

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102 DNA

INITIATIVE
SAMPLE ANAL YSIS: AN OVERVIEW 

Security, Place of Performance, and Period of 

Performance 

Here is a sample vendor testing and reporting 

guide that may contain components that laboratory directors may consider when contracting with 

an outside vendor. 

(One form for each sample type: family reference, 

disaster, personal item) 

Sample Type______________________________ 

1.	 Samples will be provided to the vendor in the 

following manner: 

2. Samples will come from the following 

agencies/locations: 

3. Samples will be provided to the vendor at the 

rate of: 

4. Samples will be provided with the following 

identification, which shall be reported with the 

profile: 

5. Samples will be rejected by the vendor for 

testing for the following reasons, with the 

following course of action: 

6. No more than ___ percent of a sample shall be 

consumed by the vendor without permission. 

7. DNA shall be extracted to a final volume of 

_________ at a concentration of _________. 

8. The following DNA aliquots shall be made for 

additional testing: 

9. The vendor shall use only the following testing 

and analysis systems: 

Extraction method: 

Amplification conditions (including kit and 

amplification volume): 

Analysis platform:


Conditions for retesting if a complete profile is


not initially obtained:


10.	 Procedural changes affecting sample processing must be approved ___ days prior to the 

processing of samples. 

11.	 Manual transfer shall be allowed only during 

the following steps: 

12.	 Spiking or enriching a sample is acceptable 

___yes ___no. 

Comments: 

13.	 Vendor controls: 

a.	 Amplification positive 

Name:


When introduced:


Considered acceptable when:


Location on analysis:


Location in data files:


Acceptable results:


b. Amplification negative 

Name:


When introduced:


Considered acceptable when:


Location on analysis:


Location in data files:


Acceptable results:


c.	 Extraction positive 

Name:


When introduced:


Considered acceptable when:


Location on analysis:


Location in data files:


Acceptable results:


d. Extraction negative 

Name:


When introduced:


Considered acceptable when:


Location on analysis:


Location in data files:


Acceptable results:


Other: 

Name:


When introduced:


Considered acceptable when:


Location on analysis:


Location in data files:


Acceptable results:


A data file is defined as 

_______________________________________. 

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DNA 103 

INITIATIVE
APPENDIX F 

14. Samples with the following microvariants do c. Allelic Peaks 

not need to be retested: Stutter: 

15. Samples with trialleles shall be processed in –A: 

the following manner: Minimum allowable peak height ratio: 

16. Samples with triallelic profiles ___shall ___do 

not need to be retested. The following docu­ 20. Data reporting 

mentation shall be reported: a. Composite profiles (instances where the 

13 CODIS core loci are created from more 

17. Samples with microvariants (not on an than the minimum multiplex data file[s] 

approved list) ___shall ___do not need to be because one or more of the loci do not 

retested. The following documentation shall meet reporting criteria) ___shall ___ shall 

be reported: not be acceptable unless: 

18. Profiles exhibiting multiple contributors shall b. Nonreported samples ___ may ___shall not 

be handled in the following manner: be intermixed in reported data files. 

19. Data analysis: c. Data from all sample runs ___must 

___need not be provided. 

a. General peak characteristics 

d. Minimum and maximum number of 

The following reporting criteria apply to: reportable samples with complete profiles 

______ Samples in a single data file is: 

______ Ladders e. Minimum and maximum number of 

______ Controls samples (complete 13 locus profile) in 

a reported batch: 

______ Internal size standard 

f. The following documentation shall be 

Minimum peak height: provided/associated with the reported 

Maximum peak height: profiles: 

Shape: 

Spikes ___not allowed ___allowed under 

the following circumstances: 

g. Data and data files shall be reported in the 

following format: 

b. Internal size standard h. Data shall be reported at a frequency of: 

The following peaks are required to be 

present for reported samples: 

21. Samples shall be returned on the following 

date and in the following condition: 

Size of 245 peak (on 310) must be 22. Other: 

______________________. 

PRESIDENT’S

104 DNA

INITIATIVE
APPENDIX G 

Identifying Victims Using DNA: A Guide for Families 

This is a PDF file of a publication (English/Spanish) that can be downloaded at 

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/209493.htm; to order hard copies, call 1–800–851–3420 or 

order online at www.ncjrs.gov. 

DNA 105 

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IDENTIFYING VICTIMS USING DNA 

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INITIATIVE
APPENDIX G 

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INITIATIVE
IDENTIFYING VICTIMS USING DNA 

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INITIATIVE
APPENDIX G 

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IDENTIFYING VICTIMS USING DNA 

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INITIATIVE
APPENDIX G 

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INITIATIVE
IDENTIFYING VICTIMS USING DNA 

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INITIATIVE
APPENDIX G 

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IDENTIFYING VICTIMS USING DNA 

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INITIATIVE
APPENDIX G 

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INITIATIVE
IDENTIFYING VICTIMS USING DNA 

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INITIATIVE
APPENDIX G 

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INITIATIVE
IDENTIFYING VICTIMS USING DNA 

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INITIATIVE
IDENTIFYING VICTIMS USING DNA 

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INITIATIVE
APPENDIX G 

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INITIATIVE
IDENTIFYING VICTIMS USING DNA 

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INITIATIVE
APPENDIX G 

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INITIATIVE
IDENTIFYING VICTIMS USING DNA 

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INITIATIVE
APPENDIX G 

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INITIATIVE
IDENTIFYING VICTIMS USING DNA 

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INITIATIVE
APPENDIX G 

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IDENTIFYING VICTIMS USING DNA 

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INITIATIVE
APPENDIX G 

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INITIATIVE
IDENTIFYING VICTIMS USING DNA 

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INITIATIVE
APPENDIX G 

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INITIATIVE
IDENTIFYING VICTIMS USING DNA 

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INITIATIVE
APPENDIX G 

PRESIDENT’S

134 DNA

INITIATIVE
APPENDIX H 

Sample Analysis: An Overview 

While a step-by-step discussion of the processes 

involved in DNA typing is likely to be too rudimentary for most laboratory directors, it may offer 

useful information for family assistance coordinators, policymakers, reporters, and others who 

require a mid-level technical explanation of the 

issues faced by a forensic laboratory that is 

responding to a mass fatality incident. 

Before a mass fatality incident occurs, laboratories should develop a plan for extraction 

procedures, alternate analytical methods for 

challenging samples, automation for handling 

high-volume analyses, and expert system software to interpret results. One of the critical steps 

in this process is the creation of a chain of custody documentation system for all materials collected at the scene. This is important not only for 

scene reconstruction and quality control, but also 

in the event of any subsequent legal procedure; 

as in any situation with potential criminal implications, the proper collection and preservation of 

samples—using the best forensic practices—is 

critically important. In addition, improper preservation methods can lead to the loss of typable 

DNA, compromising the ability to make an 

identification. 

Any information that provides reliable identification is valuable. Although this report focuses 

on DNA analysis, other traditional identification 

methods (anthropology, dental records, tattoos, 

etc.) should be used whenever possible, and the 

metadata should be used in a corroborative way. 

Some of these identification assays are so 

uniquely identifying that they may eliminate the 

need for the more labor-intensive DNA analysis 

or minimize the need for reanalysis. Furthermore, 

upfront anthropological screening will be beneficial for identifying the best samples for DNA 

analysis. 

PRESIDENT’S

INITIATIVE

Sample Receipt Accessioning 

and Storage 

Once samples are collected and preserved at the 

site, they are sent to the laboratory for analysis. 

The magnitude of samples delivered to the laboratory after a mass fatality incident can be overwhelming. Receiving, accessioning, and storing 

such samples can disrupt normal laboratory practices because most crime laboratories are not 

prepared to accommodate such a surge in numbers of samples. To ensure that sample identification is reliable, the laboratory should institute a 

quality control process to accommodate the 

surge in sample receipts. If an existing Laboratory 

Information Management System (LIMS) is not 

sufficient, one should be created to handle the 

mass casualty situation. While it is possible that 

existing chain-of-custody procedures will be sufficient, this issue should be evaluated before a 

mass fatality incident occurs. 

In the event of a mass fatality incident, it is 

likely—as occurred after the World Trade Center 

(WTC) attacks—that other laboratories will offer 

assistance to the lead laboratory. If appropriate 

chain-of-custody, accessioning, and other infrastructural concerns can be addressed, some of 

the capacity problems can be shared or outsourced. If samples are sent to other laboratories 

at any stage of the analysis, the same quality 

control and chain-of-custody practices must be 

maintained. 

DNA Extraction 

The first step in the analytical process is extracting DNA from the reference and disaster samples. Successful DNA typing relies on isolating 

DNA of sufficient quantity, quality, and purity to 

yield an adequate DNA profile. DNA extraction 

protocols that overcome, remove, or dilute 

enzymatic inhibitors are the most desirable. 

DNA 135 
APPENDIX H 

The quantity and quality of DNA yielded from a 

mass fatality sample can be compromised by 

conditions specific to the event and can range 

from apparently pristine to highly degraded to 

substantially contaminated. Disaster samples and 

personal effects samples may be degraded and 

contaminated with materials that inhibit analytical 

processes, particularly for enzymatic reactions 

such as the polymerase chain reaction (PCR), an 

in vitro process that increases the amount of 

small, specific targeted sequences. 

Care should be taken to get the best quality DNA 

possible in order to maximize the number of loci 

that will be amplified. Consider an extraction 

procedure that will yield DNA suitable for mitochondrial testing or low copy number (LCN) testing. Also, it is important to keep in mind that it 

may not be apparent which test systems will be 

useful until a first round of testing is completed. 

The process for DNA extraction is laborious and 

time consuming. This can be exacerbated in a 

mass fatality identification if a large number of 

bone samples—often, the only type of sample 

available—are sent to the laboratory. Bones can 

contain substances that inhibit the PCR; therefore, inhibitory substances must be removed if 

the DNA is to be suitable for typing. In these 

cases, a laboratory may need to modify its routine 

extraction procedures to remove PCR inhibitors. 

Standard DNA extraction procedures exist for 

the types of materials that may be encountered. 

They include: (1) organic solvent, (2) column 

exchange, and (3) cation exchange resins, such as 

Chelex–100. The quality of recovered DNA will 

be limited by the quality of the sample. For some 

samples, sufficient high-molecular-weight DNA 

without chemical contaminants may be obtained. 

For others, the environmental destruction may 

have been so great that no usable DNA is available for typing. Thus, extraction methods that 

minimize the loss of DNA are the most desired. 

Short Tandem Repeat (STR) Analysis 

It is most expedient for laboratories already experienced in DNA casework to use well-known and 

well-established technologies such as short tandem repeat (STR) typing as their initial method 

of analysis—and, in fact, many disaster samples 

may be typable by STR analysis. The 13 core STR 

loci currently used in the United States and 

many other countries are composed of tandemly 

repeated DNA sequences, each of which is typically 4 or 5 base pairs in length. The number of 

alleles at the forensically employed STR loci 

typically ranges from 5 to 20. 

Amplified STR alleles are manufactured to be 

somewhat larger, up to 500 bases in length. 

Because of this, the starting (or template) DNA 

must be of sufficient quality and quantity to 

achieve full typing of all the STR loci. When DNA 

of this quality and quantity is available, STRs can 

be typed—including with the use of commercial 

kits that are available to assist in typing the multiple loci (multiplexing)—with a high degree of 

specificity and sensitivity in a relatively short time 

period. 

Electrophoresis, a process that separates charged 

molecules in an electric field, is a cornerstone in 

forensic DNA typing. For the standard forensic 

loci, the size of the PCR product for an individual 

is determined by comparison with a commercially 

available alleleic ladder. To resolve STR loci, most 

laboratories employ capillary electrophoresis, and 

the instrumentation associated with this analysis 

enables automation that allows a higher throughput analysis. 

Alternative Testing Methods 

In some mass fatality incidents, samples may be 

so compromised that alternate DNA analysis 

techniques will be needed to achieve complete 

identification. The best technologies will, of 

course, depend on the state of the art, including 

the ability to demonstrate the reliability of new 

technologies on compromised samples. Molecular biology is a dynamic field, and new analytical 

tools are always being developed. 

In the WTC response, the Office of the Chief 

Medical Examiner of New York relied on the recommendations of the Kinship and Data Analysis 

Panel (KADAP) to help explore new methods to 

further the identification of compromised samples. For example, the panel looked at whether 

there would be sufficient extracted material to 

support all attempted technologies and satisfy 

quality control inquiries that might arise. The 

KADAP also considered how to handle statistical 

PRESIDENT’S

136 DNA

INITIATIVE
issues using the additional technologies, including 

linkage and haplotype/genotype comparisons. 

Making the Identification 

In the WTC identification effort, when the DNA 

profile from a victim matched a reference sample 

or was included within a reference family pedigree, statistical significance was placed on the 

likelihood of such an occurrence. A certain 

threshold was required for assigning identity. 

(See appendix A.) 

Generally, such a quantitative assessment is 

based on the frequency of occurrence of alleles 

from major population groups, such as AfricanAmericans, Asians, Caucasians, and Hispanics. 

Once the individual frequencies of each independent genetic marker are determined, the frequencies are multiplied using the product rule to 

estimate the rarity of each of those characteristics 

occurring as a single profile. It is the combination of 

the genetic markers that enables the identification. 

When personal items are the reference samples, 

a direct comparison of the profiles is performed, 

and a random match probability is calculated for 

those samples that are considered a potential 

source. For family reconstructions, DNA profiles 

from relatives are compared with the sample 

profile (e.g., a mother and a father of a missing 

child). A likelihood ratio is generated to evaluate 

whether sufficient evidence exists to support a 

biological relationship. 

SAMPLE ANAL YSIS: AN OVERVIEW 

A large number of genetic markers are available 

for identity testing of human remains, and, by 

typing a sufficient number of these loci, identifications equivalent to uniqueness can be made readily for some, but not all, samples. Limitations 

include: 

■ Sample degradation or a sample that is too 

small to analyze, allowing only a partial DNA 

profile. This reduces the power to unequivocally identify the source of the sample. 

■ The existence of reference samples is critical 

to making an identification. Even if a mass disaster sample yields a complete DNA profile, an 

identification may not be possible if there are 

insufficient reference samples. For example, 

it may be relatively easy to identify a missing 

child when his or her biological parents and 

two siblings are typed. However, if the only 

relative available for comparison is a halfsibling, the genetic information will be far more 

limited and an identification may not be possible. Therefore, every effort should be made 

to obtain samples from as many close family 

members as possible. Personal effects enable 

direct comparisons of profiles, but at times the 

alleged source of a personal effect is questionable. Obviously, the more that is known about 

a personal item, the greater the confidence in 

using it as a reference sample. 

■ Because of the violent nature of many mass 

disasters, remains can be commingled. In such 

cases, a mixture of DNA profiles may be 

observed. The best practice is to avoid interpreting such profiles; it is better to perform a 

reextraction from the sample, if possible. 

PRESIDENT’S

DNA 137 

INITIATIVE
APPENDIX I 

Additional References on Statistical Issues in DNA Identification 

The following additional references discuss statistical issues that arise when making an identification through DNA analysis. 

Ballantyne, J. “Mass Disaster Genetics.” 

Nature Genetics 15(4) (1997): 329–331. 

Bieber, F.R. “Reckoning with the Dead.” Harvard 

Medical Alumni Bulletin 76(2) (2002): 34–37. 

Bieber, F.R. “Science and Technology of Forensic 

DNA Profiling.” Lazar, D. (ed.), DNA and the Criminal Justice System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 

2004: 23–62. 

Biesecker, L.G., Bailey-Wilson, J.E., Ballantyne, J., 

Baum, H., Bieber, F.R., Brenner, C., Budowle, B., 

Butler, J.M., Carmody, G., Conneally, P.M., Duceman, B., Eisenberg, A., Forman, L., Kidd, K.K., 

Leclair, B., Niezgoda, S., Parsons, T.J., Pugh, E., 

Shaler, R., Sherry, S.T., Sozer, A., and Walsh, A. 

“DNA Identifications After the 9/11 World Trade 

Center Attack.” Science 310 (2005): 1122–1123. 

Bing, D.H. and Bieber, F.R. “Collecting and Handling Samples for Parentage and Forensics DNABased Genetic Testing.” Current Protocols in 

Human Genetics. New York: John Wiley, 1997: 

14.2.1–14.2.6. 

Bing, D.H., Bieber, F.R., Holland, M.M., and 

Huffine, E.F. “Isolation of DNA from Forensic 

Evidence.” Current Protocols in Human Genetics. 

New York: John Wiley, 2000: 14.3.1–14.3.19 

(Supplement 26). 

Bogenhagen, D. and Clayton, D.A. “The Number 

of Mitochondrial Deoxyribonucleic Acid Genomes 

in Mouse L and Human HeLa Cells.” Journal of 

Biological Chemistry 249 (1974): 7791–7795. 

Brenner, C.H. “Symbolic Kinship Program.” 

Genetics 145(2) (1997): 535–542. 

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INITIATIVE

Brenner, C.H. and, Weir, B.S. “Issues and Strategies in the Identification of World Trade Center 

Victims.” Theoretical Population Biology 63 

(2003): 173–178. 

Brinkmann, B., Klintschar, M., Neuhuber, F., 

Huhne, J., and Rolf, B. “Mutation Rate in Human 

Microsatellites: Influence of the Structure and 

Length of the Tandem Repeat.” American Journal 

of Human Genetics 62 (1998): 1408–1415. 

Budimlija, Z.M., Prinz, M.K., Zelson-Mundorff, A., 

Wiersema, J., Bartelink, E., MacKinnon, G., 

Nazzaruolo, B.L., Estacio, S.M., Hennessey, M.J., 

and Shaler, R.C. “World Trade Center Human 

Identification Project: Experiences with Individual 

Body Identification Cases.” Croatian Medical Journal 44(3) (2003): 259–63. 

Budowle, B. “SNP Typing Strategies.” Forensic 

Science International 146 Suppl. (2004): 

S139–142. 

Budowle, B., Adamowicz, M., Aranda, X.G., 

Barna, C., Chakraborty, R., Cheswick, D., Dafoe, 

B., Eisenberg, A., Frappier, R., Gross, A.M., Ladd, 

C., Lee, H.S., Milne, S.C., Meyers, C., Prinz, M., 

Richard, M.L., Saldanha, G., Tierney, A.A., Viculis, 

L., and Krenke, B.E. “Twelve Short Tandem 

Repeat Loci Y Chromosome Haplotypes: Genetic 

Analysis on Populations Residing in North America.” Forensic Science International 150(1) (2005): 

1–15. 

Budowle, B., Baechtel, F.S., Comey, C.T., Giusti, 

A.M., and Klevan, L. “Simple Protocols for Typing 

Forensic Biological Evidence: Chemiluminescent 

Detection for Human DNA Quantitation and RFLP 

Analyses and Manual Typing of PCR Amplified 

Polymorphisms.” Electrophoresis 16(9) (1995): 

1559–1567. 

DNA 139 
APPENDIX I 

Budowle, B., Bieber, F.R., and Eisenberg, A.J. 

“Forensic Aspects of Mass Disasters: Strategic 

Considerations for DNA-Based Human Identification.” Legal Medicine (Tokyo) 7(4) (2005): 

230–243. 

Budowle, B., Chakraborty, R., Carmody, G., and 

Monson, K.L. “Source Attribution of a Forensic 

DNA Profile.” Forensic Science Communications 

2(3) (2000): http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/ 

backissu/july2000/source.htm. 

Budowle, B., Masibay, A., Anderson, S.J., Barna, 

C., Biega, L., Brenneke, S., Brown, B.L., Cramer, 

J., DeGroot, G.A., Douglas, D., Duceman, B., 

Eastman, A., Giles, R., Hamill, J., Haase, D.J., 

Janssen, D.W., Kupferschmid, T.D., Lawton, T., 

Lemire, C., Llewellyn, B., Moretti, T., Neves, J., 

Palaski, C., Schueler, S., Sgueglia, J., Sprecher, C., 

Tomsey, C., and Yet, D. “STR Primer Concordance 

Study.” Forensic Science International 124 (2001): 

47–54. 

Budowle, B., Moretti, T.R., Niezgoda, S.J., and 

Brown, B.L. “CODIS and PCR-Based Short 

Tandem Repeat Loci: Law Enforcement Tools.” 

Second European Symposium on Human 

Identification. Madison, WI: Promega Corporation, 

1998: 73–88. 

Budowle, B., Planz, J., Campbell, R., and Eisenberg, A. “SNPs and Microarray Technology in 

Forensic Genetics: Development and Application 

to Mitochondrial DNA.” Forensic Science Review 

16 (2004): 22–36. 

Budowle, B., Schutzer, S.E., Einseln, A., Kelley, 

L.C., Walsh, A.C., Smith, J.A.L., Marrone, B.L., 

Robertson, J., and Campos, J. “Building Microbial 

Forensics as a Response to Bioterrorism.” 

Science 301 (2003): 1852–1853. 

Budowle, B., Sinha, S.K., Lee, H.S., and 

Chakraborty, R. “Utilization of Y-Chromosome 

Short Tandem Report Haplotype in Forensic 

Application.” Forensic Science Review 15(2) 

(2003): 153–162. 

Budowle, B., Smith, J., Moretti, T., and DiZinno, J. 

DNA Typing Protocols: Molecular Biology and 

Forensic Analysis. Natick, MA: Eaton Publishing, 

BioTechniques Books, BioForensic Sciences 

Series, 2000. 

Budowle, B. and Sprecher, C.J. “Concordance 

Study on Population Database Samples Using the 

PowerPlexTM 16 Kit and AmpFlSTR® Profiler 

PlusTM Kit and AmpFlSTR® COfilerTM Kit.” Journal 

of Forensic Sciences, 46(3) (2001): 637–641. 

Budowle, B. and SWGMGF Members. “Quality 

Assurance Guidelines for Laboratories Performing 

Microbial Forensic Work.” Forensic Science 

Communications 5(4) (2003): http://www.fbi.gov/ 

hq/lab/fsc/backissu/oct2003/2003_10_guide01.htm. 

Budowle, B., Wilson, M.R., DiZinno, J.A., Stauffer, 

C., Fasano, M.A., Holland, M.M., and Monson, 

K.L. “Mitochondrial DNA Regions HVI and HVII 

Population Data.” Forensic Science International 

103 (1999): 23–35. 

Butler, J.M., Shen, Y., and McCord, B.R. “The 

Development of Reduced Size STR Amplicons as 

Tools for Analysis of Degraded DNA.” Journal of 

Forensic Sciences 48(5) (2003): 1054–1064. 

Campobasso, C.P., Falamingo, R., and Vinci, F. 

“Investigation of Italy’s Deadliest Building 

Collapse: Forensic Aspects of a Mass Disaster.” 

Journal of Forensic Sciences 48(3) (2003): 

635–639. 

Clayton, T.M., Whitaker, J.P., Fisher, D.L., Lee, 

D.A., Holland, M.M., Weedn, V.W., Maguire, C.N., 

DiZinno, J.A., Kimpton, C.P., and Gill, P. “Further 

Validation of a Quadruplex STR DNA Typing 

System: A Collaborative Effort to Identify Victims 

of a Mass Disaster.” Forensic Science International 76(1) (1995): 17–25. 

Clayton, T.M., Whitaker, J.P., and Maguire, C.N. 

“Identification of Bodies from the Scene of a 

Mass Disaster Using DNA Amplification and Short 

Tandem Repeat (STR) Loci.” Forensic Science 

International 76(1) (1995): 7–15. 

Collins, P.J., Hennessy, L.K., Leibelt, C.S., Roby, 

R.K., Reeder, D.J., and Foxall, P.A. “Developmental Validation of a Single-Tube Amplification of 

the 13 CODIS Loci, D2S1338, D19S433, and 

Amelogenin: The AmpFlSTR® Indentifiler® PCR 

Amplification Kit.” Journal of Forensic Sciences 

49(6) (2004): 1265–1277. 

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140 DNA

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ADDITIONAL REFERENCES 

Cooper, D.N., Smith, B.A., Cooke, H.J., Niemann, 

S., and Schmidtke, J. “An Estimate of Unique 

DNA Sequence Heterozygosity in the Human 

Genome.” Human Genetics 69 (1985): 201–205. 

Corach, D., Sala, A., Penacino, G., and Sotelo, A. 

“Mass Disasters: Rapid Molecular Screening of 

Human Remains by Means of Short Tandem 

Repeats Typing.” Electrophoresis 16(9) (1995): 

1617–1623. 

Cotton, E.A., Allsop, R.F., Guest, J.L., Frazier, R.R., 

Koumi, P., Callow, I.P., Seager, A., and Sparkes, 

R.L. “Validation of the AmpFlSTR SGM Plus System for Use in Forensic Casework.” Forensic Science International 112(2–3) (2000): 151–161. 

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INITIATIVE
APPENDIX I 

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PRESIDENT’S

142 DNA

INITIATIVE
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PRESIDENT’S

DNA 143 

INITIATIVE
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