U.S. Department of Energy 

Office of Inspector General 

Office of Audit Services 

Audit Report 

The Department's Wildland Fire 

Planning and Preparation Efforts 

DOE/IG-0760 March 2007 
Department of Energy 

Washington, DC 20585 

March 6, 2007 

MEMORANDUM FOR THESECREJARY 

FROM: 

Inspector General 

SUBJECT: INFORMATION: Audit Report on "The Department's 

Wildland Fire Planning and Preparation Efforts" 

BACKGROUND 

The Department of Energy complex includes thousands of acres of what is commonly 

referred to as wildlands. In these areas, due to the often dry weather conditions, 

wildland fires are a natural process that play an important role in the health of arid 

ecosystems. While they may be a natural phenomenon, such fires can cause 

catastrophic damage to Federal facilities and surrounding communities. In 2000, the 

Department experienced several large wildland fires which threatened the safety of 

Department personnel, facilities, and equipment at the Los Alamos National 

Laboratory, Hanford Site, and Idaho National Laboratory. These fires burned over 

2 12,000 acres of Department land, resulting in fire-related costs totaling almost $1 30 

million at Los Alamos alone. 

In response, the Department initiated a review of the adequacy of its fire safety 

programs and emergency management capabilities. The Initial Joirlt Review of 

Wildland Fire Safety at DOE Sites (Initial Joint Review) made a number of 

recommendations for improvement that were to be implemented in time for the 2001 

wildland fire season. The Department also adopted the 2001 Federal Wildland Fire 

Managenlent Policy aid Iinplernenting Actions, which requires sites to develop a riskbased approach to fire management, identify detailed strategies for fuels management, 

and conduct other preparedness activities. This audit was initiated to determine 

whether the Department had taken action to identify possible hazards associated with 

and mitigate the impacts of wildland fires. 

RESULTS OF AUDIT 

Three sites included in our review - Los Alamos National Laboratory, Idaho National 

Laboratory, and the Nevada Test Site - had made a number of improvements in this 

area. However, essential wildland fire mitigation activities involving the assessment 

and removal of vegetation and the maintenance of roads had either not been 

performed or were not completely effective. For example: 

At Los Alamos National Laboratory, vegetation thinning - a critical activity 

necessary to remove fuel and prevent fires such as those that spread from tree 

top to tree top during the 2000 Cerro Grande fire - had not been performed for 

1,300 acres of canyons; 
Vegetation surrounding the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project - a 

facility key to the Idaho National Laboratory's transuranic waste processing 

and disposal program - had not been adequately removed; and, 

Roads necessary for protecting utilities, establishing fire breaks, and providing 

access for firefighters and equipment at the Nevada Test Site had not been 

upgraded or maintained as required. 

We found that contractor officials did not always adhere to established wildland fire 

planning and mitigation guidance. In particular, contractors had not used risk-based 

principles to prioritize mitigation efforts and had either omitted or not adequately 

considered a number of other items specified in Federal policy, Departmental 

guidance, and the Initial Joint Review when developing their fire protection plans. In 

addition, Federal officials had not always actively monitored contractor wildland fire 

protection programs, coordinated protective efforts, or validated the effectiveness of 

contractor fire mitigation activities. Without improvements in these areas, the three 

sites remain at a higher than necessary risk of damage to property and facilities - and 

possible injury of employees and members of the public - from wildland fires. 

Our review disclosed that the Department had substantially strengthened its 

preparedness activities since the 2000 wildland fire season. In particular, it had 

acquired additional equipment for firefighters, and a number of sites had implemented 

enhanced training courses for firefighters and continued to place an emphasis on 

firefighter and human safety. Even though these and other site-level actions represent 

a significant improvement, a number of problems remained. Additional actions are 

necessary to improve preparedness measures and to reduce the risk associated with 

wildland fire recurrence. Given the reality of the impact of the series of fires in 2000 

and the fact that the Western states were struck with a number of fires in 2006, we 

made several recommendations designed to help the Department improve the 

effectiveness of its wildland fire program. 

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Offices of Nuclear 

Energy (NE) and Health, Safety and Security (HSS) each commented on the draft 

report. All agreed, at least in part, with the report's recommendations, and 

management's planned actions are responsive to the recommendations. In particular, 

NNSA officials agreed to ensure that a risk-based approach is utilized, mitigation 

activities are considered, and resource allocation decisions are evaluated. They added 

that they would coordinate with their own environment, safety and health element to 

ensure these wildland fire management requirements are implemented. NE, through 

its Idaho Operations Office, and HSS concurred with the report's recommendations in 

their entirety. Both NNSA and NE indicated some disagreement with the 

representations made regarding their individual sites. To address management 

concerns, we held discussions with program officials and modified our report where 

appropriate. Management's comments and our responses are summarized in the 

report. 
cc: Deputy Secretary 

Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration 

Under Secretary of Energy 

Chief of Staff 
REPORT ON WILDLAND FIRE PLANNING AND PREPARATION 

EFFORTS 

TABLE OF 

CONTENTS 

Site-Level Wildland Fire Planning and Preparation

Details of Finding ..............................................................................................1 

Recommendations and Comments.....................................................................7 

Appendices 

1. Objective, Scope, and Methodology..........................................................11 

2 Prior Reports ..............................................................................................13 

3. Management Comments ............................................................................15 
SITE-LEVEL WILDLAND FIRE PLANNING AND PREPARATION

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Page 1 Details of Finding 

Mitigation and All three of the field sites we reviewed had not fully 

Maintenance Activities completed mitigation activities designed to reduce 

 the impact from wildland fire. Specifically, while the 

Department of Energy (Department) had taken a number of 

actions to reduce the threats posed by wildland fires, fuel 

management activities such as the removal and 

maintenance of vegetation and roads necessary for 

firefighting were not always adequate. 

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Despite specific experience with the serious consequences 

associated with wildland fires, Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (Los Alamos) had not completed all necessary 

preparedness and fire mitigation activities. A number of 

mitigation activities had been planned, but not completed. 

Most notably, although identified in the site's 2005 fire 

management plan as critical to preventing devastating fires 

such as those that spread from tree top to tree top during the 

Cerro Grande fire, vegetation thinning that would provide 

fire breaks for 1,300 acres of the site's canyons had not 

been completed. The removal of vegetation to reinforce an 

important fire break between the site and the Bandelier 

National Monument – the ignition point for the Cerro 

Grande fire – had also not been completed as planned. 

According to National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) officials, more than 10,000 acres of heavily 

forested land have been treated and other important 

firebreaks, such as facility defensible space, had been 

created. As noted in site plans, however, removal of 

vegetation in general, and particularly for the canyons we 

identified, could have helped reduce the spread of fires and 

decrease the danger to firefighters. The site's efforts, even 

though substantial, covered only about one-third of the 

acreage requiring mitigation in Fiscal Year (FY) 2005. 

Nevada Test Site

Similarly, while the Nevada Test Site (Nevada) identified 

mitigation activities necessary to protect power lines and 

site roads from wildland fire, not all of these activities were 

actually completed. For example, although identified as a 

high risk fire danger, Nevada did not perform vegetation 
 

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Page 2 Details of Finding

removal necessary to reduce the risk of fire damage to 

certain power and communication lines prior to the 2002 

wildland fire season. During 2002, a fire occurred in the 

areas previously identified as high risk, resulting in the loss 

of about 1.7 miles of power and communication lines that 

had to be rebuilt at a cost of $585,000 according to site 

officials. After the 2002 fire, again after another fire in 

2005, and even though specifically cited as deficiencies in 

Nevada's vegetation assessments, the site still did not 

complete needed vegetation removal or upgrade certain 

roads. 

According to Nevada's planning documents and a 

contractor fire department official, Nevada also does not 

plan to complete all planned mitigation activities in 2006. 

Adequate maintenance of vegetation adjacent to utilities 

and repair or upgrade of roads – as demonstrated by the 

damage sustained during the 2002 and 2005 fires as well as 

conclusions drawn in annual vegetation assessments – is 

critical because it reduces fuel sources, provides access for 

responders, and establishes fire breaks and defensible space 

(cleared area surrounding an improved property) in which 

responders may operate. 

Although not all identified activities were completed, 

Nevada officials described some positive actions taken 

after their major fires. For example, site heavy equipment 

operators are now trained and are capable of improving 

remote roads during a wildland fire event. The Fire 

Department has also enhanced its response capabilities with 

all terrain vehicles that include fire suppression systems. 

Idaho National Laboratory

The Idaho National Laboratory (Idaho) also had not 

ensured that vegetation removal activities were performed 

for roadsides and areas surrounding a major facility. As 

confirmed by local officials, many of the 26 wildland fires 

that occurred at Idaho from 2001 to 2005 could have been 

prevented by a regular roadside mowing program at the 

start of the wildland fire season. According to site-level 

fire plans and site officials, had roadside mowing occurred 

on a regular basis, the likelihood of major fires would have 

been reduced. While Idaho officials acknowledged that 

roadside mowing should have been performed on a regular 

basis by the State of Idaho, at the time of our audit, we 

noted that only limited action had been taken to interact 
 

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Page 3 Details of Finding

with State officials to increase mowing frequency. 

Vegetation surrounding the Advanced Mixed Waste 

Treatment Project – a facility key to Idaho's transuranic 

waste processing and disposal program – also had not been 

adequately removed. Despite repeated findings of noncompliance by the Idaho Operations Office, defensible 

space around this $618 million facility had not been 

adequately maintained. 

 

Site officials told us that one possible action – offering to 

reimburse the State all or in part for mowing activities – 

had not been taken. Subsequent to our discussions, Idaho 

was able to negotiate such an arrangement, although 

mowing was conducted much later in the fire season than 

would be desirable. In order to be fully effective, State 

roadside mowing activities should be conducted at the same 

time as other mowing activities. 

Monitoring and These problems occurred, at least in part, because 

Planning Activities contractor officials did not adhere to established wildland 

fire planning and mitigation guidance. In particular, 

contractors had not used risk-based principles to prioritize 

mitigation efforts and had either omitted or not adequately 

considered a number of other items specified in Federal 

policy, Departmental guidance, and the Initial Joint Review 

when developing their fire protection plans. In addition, 

Federal officials had not always actively monitored 

contractor wildland fire protection programs, coordinated 

protective efforts, or validated the effectiveness of 

contractor fire mitigation activities. 

Implementation of Wildland Fire Management Policies

Although specified by Department guidance and considered 

one of the principal tenants of the 2001 Federal Wildland 

Fire Management Policy, a comprehensive risk-based 

evaluation of mitigation activities and the potential 

consequences of not completing them had not been 

performed by any of the three sites reviewed. As noted in 

the Federal policy, risk management should be a foundation 

for all fire management activities, and that risks must be 

understood, analyzed, communicated, and managed as they 

relate to the cost of either doing or not doing a particular 

activity. While sites had identified certain activities as 

high-risk or critical or had made some subjective 

engineering decisions on a case-by-case basis, they had not 
 

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Page 4 Details of Finding

completed a formal risk assessment and had not developed 

a prioritized list of mitigation activities. Site officials were 

not specifically aware of a requirement to do so. 

A number of specific items – some integral to a risk-based 

approach to wildland fire management – addressed in 

Federal policy, Departmental guidance, and the Initial Joint 

Review had also not been adequately considered or had 

been completely omitted from the site-level plans. For 

example: 

• Neither Nevada nor Idaho had developed a longterm list of activities and associated budget 

requirements. Such planning is important because 

not all activities are annual and recurring, and longterm planning ensures that such activities are 

adequately considered. In contrast, Los Alamos had 

identified long-term activities including the 

requirement to update land cover information once 

every five years. 

• Neither Los Alamos nor Idaho planned to update 

their Fire Plans for FY 2006. Los Alamos officials 

told us that resources were not available to update 

the plan, while Idaho officials stated that other 

priorities had taken precedence. 

• Neither Nevada nor Idaho had evaluated the 

possibility of using prescribed burns to control and 

manage excess vegetation at the time of our review. 

Nevada, however, was able to communicate the 

rationale for not including this strategy in their 

mitigation activities during discussions we held 

with them. To their credit, Nevada officials 

subsequently incorporated details into the Fire Plan 

during a 2006 update. While Idaho could 

communicate their rationale for a similar 

conclusion, incorporation of details continues to be 

lacking in their Fire Plan. Such consideration is 

important because prescribed burning is cited as one 

of the primary methods of vegetation management 

in Federal policy. While this approach to fire 

management requires detailed planning and close 

attention, Federal guidance indicates that these 

burns can help prevent the quick spread of fires and 

reduce future mitigation costs. The Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory had taken 
 

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Page 5 Details of Finding

advantage of this technique and had conducted 

prescribed burns for the past several decades at its 

7,000 acre remote Explosive Test Facility. 

• Our review of hazard and fire protection 

assessments also disclosed that sites had not 

evaluated or documented the unique ancillary 

hazards from wildland fires at their locations. 

Although sites had conducted extensive evaluations 

of the direct impacts of wildland fire such as the 

potential for the flames to reach and ignite facilities 

and other assets, the Initial Joint Review noted that 

evaluation and documentation of the potential 

ancillary hazards is critical to identifying unique 

challenges associated with wildland fires such as 

smoke intrusion that can adversely affect facilities' 

support systems even when the fire is not in the 

immediate vicinity. While an analysis that 

considered these particular risks had been 

performed for the Advanced Mixed Waste 

Treatment Facility at Idaho, officials told us that it 

was completed as part of an Operational Readiness 

Review and was not used for wildland fire 

preparation and planning. They went on to say that 

similar analyses had not been conducted at other 

Idaho facilities. 

• Not all sites had included wildland fire and response 

capabilities in their fire safety and emergency 

management self-assessments. The inclusion of 

these areas, even though specifically recommended 

by the Initial Joint Review, had not been performed 

for Idaho and Los Alamos. 

• Los Alamos also had not performed needed updates 

to its Land Cover Map database. This database 

provides important information about fuel 

conditions and was proven to be a critical 

component of the protective strategy during the 

Cerro Grande fire when it was used to model fire 

behavior and devise response strategies. It also 

provides the basis for determining needed 

vegetation reduction activities. 
 

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Page 6 Details of Finding

While contractor officials told us that, in many instances, 

they had not completed necessary planning or mitigation 

activities because of a lack of resources, we noted that their 

very lack of planning – in particular the lack of a risk-based 

and prioritized remediation schedule – most likely 

exacerbated or contributed to their inability to obtain 

funding. Fire protection officials indicated that mitigation 

efforts had to compete with many other programs funded 

through site overhead assessments such as building 

maintenance and procurement, and that once the needs of 

those programs were considered, insufficient funds 

remained to address all needed protective activities. 

Although not a certainty, had officials developed a 

prioritized schedule of mitigation needs – citing the risk of 

not completing the needed work – they may have been 

better positioned to have obtained funding necessary to 

address the most critical vulnerabilities. 

Monitoring, Validation, and Coordination 

of Mitigation Activities

Although required by the Secretarial directive announcing 

adoption of the 2001 Federal Wildland Fire Management 

Policy and Implementing Actions by the Department, 

federal officials at the sites visited had not always reviewed 

and approved contractor fire plans or mitigation activities 

for adequacy. Even though this directive had been issued 

in 2003, officials at each of the sites told us that they were 

not aware of the requirement for Federal officials to review 

contractor plans for sufficiency. This lack of knowledge 

may have been attributable to the fact that the direction to 

comply with the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy 

was never formally incorporated into Departmental 

directives. 

Wildland Fire Without comprehensive wildland fire planning, the 

Risks Department's field sites risk catastrophic damage from 

events similar to the fires of 2000. In that year alone, these 

types of fires burned over 212,000 acres of Department 

land at three sites and resulted in fire-related costs totaling 

almost $130 million at Los Alamos alone. The Department 

maintains hundreds of thousands of acres that are 

susceptible to wildland fire, and these types of fires remain 

a constant threat during the wildland fire season. While 

this threat cannot be completely eliminated, certain 
 

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Page 7 Recommendations and Comments

enhancements to the Department's wildland fire protection 

strategies could provide increased protection for the 

Department's assets, as well as the health and safety of its 

workers and the public. 

As demonstrated by recent statistics, the risk of 

catastrophic damage to the nation at large from wildland 

fires continues to increase. From January through the 

beginning of November 2006, wildland fires had consumed 

over 9,000,000 acres across the country. The average 

acreage burned by wildland fires from 2000 through 2005 

amounted to about 73 percent greater than experienced 

during the 1990s. The threat continues to grow, with the 

Federal government spending about $1.5 billion in FY 

2006 fighting wildland fires at various facilities and 

locations across the country. Comparatively, the Federal 

government had spent about $900 million in each of the 

two previous years. Experts have predicted that 

catastrophic damage from wildland fires probably will 

continue to increase until an adequate long-term Federal 

response is implemented. 

RECOMMENDATIONS To ensure that wildland fire management is consistently 

applied, we recommend that the Chief Health, Safety and 

Security Officer: 

1. Ensure that the Federal Wildland Fire Management 

Policy is specifically incorporated into 

Departmental directives. 

To help reduce the risks associated with wildland fires, we 

recommend that the Administrator, NNSA, and the 

Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, in coordination 

with the Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer, require 

that site Federal fire protection officials: 

2. Ensure that contractors utilize a risk-based 

approach, including prioritized mitigation activities, 

when preparing Fire Plans; 

3. Ensure that contractor-prepared Fire Plans 

incorporate or specifically consider planning 

elements or mitigation activities discussed in the 

Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy as 

required by Department guidance; 
 

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Page 8 Recommendations and Comments

4. After plans are updated and risk-based principles 

have been employed, evaluate resource allocation 

decisions to ensure that critical mitigation or 

prevention activities are adequately funded; and, 

5. Review and approve Fire Plans and verify that 

vegetation removal activities have been conducted 

as planned. 

MANAGEMENT The NNSA and the Offices of Nuclear Energy and Health, 

REACTION Safety and Security each provided comments on this report. 

All agreed, at least in part, with the recommendations made 

in the report. 

NNSA officials agreed to ensure that a risk-based approach 

is utilized, mitigation activities are considered, and 

resource allocation decisions are evaluated. They added 

that they would coordinate with their own environment, 

safety and health element to ensure these wildland fire 

management requirements are implemented. However, 

they disagreed with some of the specific details contained 

in the report. In particular, they indicated that the 

information on the 1,300 acres of canyon at Los Alamos 

was not presented in context and that the acreage cited 

represented only a small percentage of the potential threat 

at that site. In addition, NNSA stated that they do evaluate 

and document unique hazards and consequences presented 

by wildland fires; use risk-based techniques to prioritize 

mitigation efforts by means of engineering assessments of 

risk; and, have plans to complete additional remediation 

work prior to the onset of critical fire weather in FY 2007. 

Finally, NNSA indicated that, in order to recognize the 

requirements of the Federal Wildland Fire Management 

Policy, it should be incorporated into Departmental fire 

protection directives. 

The Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), through its Idaho 

Operations Office, concurred with the recommendations 

and presented a list of proposed actions and completion 

dates for all of the recommendations. However, NE did not 

agree with all of the information pertaining to the Idaho 

site. In supplemental comments, the Idaho Operations 

Office cited a demonstrated ability to effectively manage 

the risk of large wildland fires throughout the 1990s that 
 

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Page 9 Comments

resulted in no injuries, damage to structures, or significant 

operational interruptions. Further, the Idaho Operations 

Office asserted that, as a result of program improvements 

made since 2000, the Idaho wildland fire management 

program is based on comprehensive elements identified in 

the Federal policy and Department guidance. 

The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) agreed 

with the audit's overall conclusion and advised that they 

will coordinate with appropriate program offices to support 

implementation of the draft audit report's 

recommendations. 

AUDITOR Comments from each of the three organizations 

RESPONSE acknowledge that some changes are needed to improve 

wildland fire management and management's planned 

actions are responsive to the report's recommendations. In 

particular, NNSA and NE agreed to utilize risk-based 

approaches to fire management, conduct mitigation 

activities as appropriate, and evaluate resource allocation 

decisions as necessary. Additionally, HSS agreed to 

coordinate these activities with program offices. Our 

specific comments related to the objections raised by 

NNSA and NE are detailed below. 

With respect to NNSA's comment that we did not present 

our findings at Los Alamos in context, we made revisions 

to the report to more fully describe mitigation activities 

already conducted and noted that the 1,300 acres we cited 

had been identified as a critical mitigation activity for site 

protection. While work at Los Alamos has been 

substantial, it has not, as noted in our report, been 

completed and may not have focused on the most critical 

mitigation activities. During FY 2005, Los Alamos 

completed mitigation of only about one-third of the acreage 

contained in site-level plans. In FY 2006, even fewer 

mitigation activities received adequate attention. These 

areas where mitigation efforts were not completed include 

the 1,300 acres of canyons and the critical fire break cited 

in the report. 

In addition, we recognize the effort NNSA has put forth to 

evaluate the risks, hazards, and consequences of wildland 

fires; however, the activities cited by NNSA in their 

comments, as confirmed by one of NNSA's fire protection 

officials, are conducted on an individual basis – such as on 

an individual facility basis – were subjective in nature, and 
 

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Page 10 Comments

not documented. This type of analysis is not sufficient to 

meet the requirements of the Federal policy for a 

comprehensive risk assessment of all mitigation activities. 

According to the Initial Joint Review, unique ancillary 

analyses should be included in hazard and fire protection 

assessments. In conducting our review, we analyzed these 

documents for each site visited and did not find evidence of 

such analyses. Additionally, absent completion of the risk 

assessment required by the Federal policy, Los Alamos 

cannot demonstrate the relative importance of the work 

conducted in comparison to activities not performed. 

Finally, while we agree that Idaho has demonstrated an 

ability to respond to large wildland fires in the past and has 

implemented some program improvements since 2000, our 

audit identified situations where Idaho has had an increased 

exposure to damage from wildland fires. For example, in 

2004 and 2005, the Idaho Operations Office conducted 

oversight reviews that identified excessive vegetation in 

several areas of the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment 

Facility, and an Operations Office official orally confirmed 

that certain vegetation removal activities still had not been 

performed at the time of our site visit. Further, our report 

identifies instances where Idaho is not in compliance with 

the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and DOE G 

450.1-4. Specifically, Idaho had not: (1) performed a 

comprehensive risk-based evaluation of mitigation 

activities and the potential consequences of not completing 

them; (2) developed a list of long-term mitigation activities 

and associated budget requirements; (3) updated their Fire 

Plans for FY 2006; and, (4) documented the rationale for 

using or not using prescribed burns in the Fire Plan. 

Management's comments are included in their entirety in 

Appendix 3 and have been incorporated into the body of 

the report where appropriate.
Appendix 1 

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Page 11 Objective, Scope, and Methodology

OBJECTIVE The objective of our audit was to determine whether the 

Department had taken action to identify possible hazards 

and mitigate the potential impacts of wildland fires. 

. 

SCOPE The audit was performed between September 2005 and 

December 2006. We conducted work at Headquarters in 

Washington, D.C., and Germantown, MD; Idaho National 

Laboratory in Idaho Falls, ID; Los Alamos National 

Laboratory in Los Alamos, NM; and, the Nevada Test Site 

near Mercury, NV. 

METHODOLOGY To accomplish our audit objective, we: 

• Reviewed regulations and policies and procedures 

relevant to the Department of Energy's wildland fire 

program; 

• Reviewed site specific guidance and policies and 

procedures; 

• Held discussions with Headquarters program 

officials regarding wildland fire at Department sites; 

• Held a discussion with officials from the 

Government Accountability Office about work they 

have conducted related to the Federal government's 

implementation of wildland fire programs; 

• Held discussions with officials from the Idaho 

Operations Office, and the Los Alamos and Nevada 

Site Offices regarding wildland fire programs in 

place at Department sites; 

• Held discussions with officials from the Idaho and 

Los Alamos National Laboratories, and the Nevada 

Test Site and reviewed relevant documentation 

regarding their planning and mitigation activities for 

wildland fires;
Appendix 1 (continued) 

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Page 12 Objective, Scope, and Methodology

• Reviewed site specific planning documents, 

analyses, and reports of fire damages and response 

evaluations; 

• Participated in site tours to examine mitigation 

activities and vegetation conditions; 

• Held a discussion with Office of Independent 

Oversight officials that participated in the 2000 

Initial Joint Review, and reviewed field site 

responses, implementation plans, and results related 

to the Review; and, 

• Reviewed historical wildland fire information from 

the National Interagency Fire Center. 

The audit was conducted in accordance with generally 

accepted Government auditing standards for performance 

audits and included tests of internal controls and 

compliance with laws and regulations to the extent 

necessary to satisfy the audit objective. Additionally, we 

assessed performance measures established under the 

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. While 

specific performance measures concerning the wildland fire 

program did not exist, performance in this regard was 

measured as an element under environment, safety, and 

health performance. Because our review was limited, it 

would not necessarily disclose all internal control 

deficiencies that may have existed at the time of our audit. 

We did not use computer processed data during the review; 

therefore, we did not test for data reliability. 

We held an exit conference with officials from the Offices 

of Health, Safety and Security and Nuclear Energy, as well 

as, representatives from the Idaho Operations Office on 

February 28, 2007. NNSA elected to waive the exit 

conference.
Appendix 2 

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Page 13 Prior Reports

PRIOR REPORTS

Government Accountability Office

• Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but Challenges 

Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy (GAO-05-147, January 2005). This 

review found that the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and land 

management agencies in the Department of the Interior have made important progress 

in responding to wildland fires. These agencies had adopted various national strategy 

documents addressing the need to reduce wildland fire risks; established priorities for 

protecting communities in the wildland-urban interface; and increased efforts and 

amounts of funding committed to addressing wildland fire problems. However, none 

of these documents constituted a cohesive strategy that explicitly identified the longterm options and related funding needed to reduce fuels in national forests and 

rangelands and to respond to wildland fire threats. Both the agencies and the Congress 

need a comprehensive assessment of the fuel reduction options and related funding 

needs to determine the most effective and affordable long-term approach for 

addressing wildland fire problems. 

• Wildland Fire Management: Additional Actions Required to Better Identify and 

Prioritize Lands Needing Fuels Reduction (GAO-03-805, August 2003). The review 

found that the Forest Service and Interior had identified three categories of land for 

fuels reduction: (1) lands with excess fuels buildup; (2) lands in the wildland-urban 

interface where federal lands surround or are adjacent to urban development and 

communities; and, (3) lands where vegetation grows rapidly and requires regular 

maintenance treatments to prevent excess fuels buildup. However, the agencies had 

not yet reliably estimated the amount or identified the location of these lands. Local 

land management units prioritized lands for fuels reduction using a variety of methods, 

including professional judgment and ranking systems. Prioritization methods varied, 

in part, because the Forest Service and Interior had not issued specific national 

guidance on prioritization. Without specific national guidance on prioritization, it was 

difficult for the Forest Service and Interior to ensure that the highest priority fuels 

reduction projects nationwide were being implemented. 

• Wildland Fire Management: Improved Planning Will Help Agencies Better Identify 

Fire-Fighting Preparedness Needs (GAO-02-158, March 2002). The Forest Service 

and Interior had not effectively determined the amount of personnel and equipment 

needed to respond to and suppress wildland fires. Although the agencies had acquired 

considerably more personnel and equipment than were available in 2000, they had not 

acquired all of the resources needed to implement the new strategy. Also, despite 
Appendix 2 (continued) 

___________________________________________________________________ 

Page 14 Prior Reports

having received substantial additional funding, the two agencies had not yet developed 

performance measures. The Forest Service simply measured the amount of firefighting resources it will be able to devote to fire-fighting at each location, regardless 

of risk. Without results-oriented performance measures, it was difficult to hold the 

Forest Service accountable for the results it achieves. Further, the Forest Service and 

the Interior agencies used different methods to report fire-fighting personnel costs - an 

approach that was not in keeping with policies requiring coordination and consistency 

across all aspects of fire management, including accounting for fire-related costs.
Appendix 3 

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Page 15 Management Comments 
Appendix 3 (continued) 

___________________________________________________________________ 

Page 16 Management Comments 
Appendix 3 (continued) 

___________________________________________________________________ 

Page 17 Management Comments 
Appendix 3 (continued) 

___________________________________________________________________ 

Page 18 Management Comments 
Appendix 3 (continued) 

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Page 19 Management Comments 
IG Report No. DOE/IG-0760

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ATTN: Customer Relations 

If you wish to discuss this report or your comments with a staff member of the Office of 

Inspector General, please contact Judy Garland-Smith (202) 586-7828. 
The Office of Inspector General wants to make the distribution of its reports as customer friendly 

and cost effective as possible. Therefore, this report will be available electronically through the 

Internet at the following address: 

U.S. Department of Energy Office of Inspector General Home Page 

http://www.ig.energy.gov

Your comments would be appreciated and can be provided on the Customer Response Form.