SAND 2006-0432 

Unlimited Release 

Printed February 2006 

Fissile Materials Control in South Asia: 

Regional Analyses and Potential 

Confidence Building Measures 

Gaurav Rajen 

Michael Vannoni 

Regional Security and Multilateral Affairs Department 

International Security Programs 

 Sandia National Laboratories 

Albuquerque, NM 87185 

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 

Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated 

by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin 

Company, for the United States Department of 

Energy under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. 
Fissile Material Control in South Asia 

2 

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This report was prepared by Sandia National Laboratories 

Albuquerque, NM 87185 and Livermore, CA 94550 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

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Fissile Materials Control in South Asia: Regional 

Analyses and Potential Confidence Building Measures 

ABSTRACT 

This paper surveys Indian and Pakistani academic and official statements on the control 

of fissile material production. As most published writings in India and Pakistan on this 

subject deal with the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), the paper presents a review 

of the two countries’ positions on the FMCT. Until its May 1998 nuclear weapon tests, 

India’s position had been to oppose the FMCT negotiations in the Conference on 

Disarmament (CD). India now supports FMCT negotiations that are restricted to 

controlling future production, with no linkages to existing stocks. In contrast, Pakistan is 

concerned about the disparities of fissile material stocks between India and Pakistan and 

has argued in the CD that a future FMCT should include existing stockpiles. India and 

Pakistan face a quandary regarding the FMCT. On one hand, both countries have the 

expectation that participation in the ongoing FMCT negotiations and a successful 

conclusion of the negotiations in a binding treaty could lessen their nuclear isolation. On 

the other hand, domestic elements in India and Pakistan also view the FMCT as an 

attempt by the United States to cap their weapon capabilities in relation to the five states 

that are recognized as legitimately possessing nuclear weapons in the Treaty on the 

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In 2004, India and Pakistan initiated direct 

bilateral negotiations in an array of security topics (including nuclear). An interim goal of 

the negotiations is to implement a series of nuclear confidence-building measures 

(CBMs). India and Pakistan might, therefore, consider regional approaches for fissile 

material production control. This paper presents concepts for regional CBMs related to 

fissile material production control. A discussion of the role that international institutions 

might play in facilitating India-Pakistan engagement is also presented. 
Fissile Material Control in South Asia 

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Cooperative Monitoring Center 

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Abbreviations and Acronyms 

BARC Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (India) 

CBM confidence building measures 

CD Conference on Disarmament 

CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 

FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 

MMS Materials Monitoring System 

NAIS National Institute for Advanced Studies (India) 

NPT Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US) 

PINSTECH Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science & Technology 

UN United Nations 

UNGA United Nations General Assembly
Fissile Material Control in South Asia 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ 7

1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 9 

2. FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY ISSUES: A CRITIQUE ...................... 9 

3. FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN.................... 10 

4. OFFICIAL POSITIONS OF PAKISTAN AND INDIA ON THE FMCT............... 12 

5. THE VIEWS OF REGIONAL ANALYSTS ON THE FMCT ................................ 13 

5.1 Survey of Indian Analysts .........................................................14 

5.2 Survey of Pakistani Analysts....................................................................... 16 

6. PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL INITIATIVES IN FISSILE MATERIAL 

CONTROL................................................................................................................ 16 

7. INDIA-PAKISTAN DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR-RELATED CONFIDENCE 

BUILDING MEASURES......................................................................................... 17 

8. TRANSPARENCY, VERIFICATION AND POTENTIAL CONFIDENCE 

BUILDING MEASURES......................................................................................... 18 

8.1 Controls on Fissile Material Production.................................................... 19 

8.2 Transparency in Existing Fissile Material Stocks...................................... 19 

9. CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................................... 21

APPENDIX A: RELEVANT DEFINITIONS OF FISSILE MATERIALS.................... 23 

LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 1: The PARR-1 research reactor at PINSTECH................................................... 11 

Figure 2: The CIRUS (right) and the DHRUVA (left) research reactors at BARC ........ 12 

LIST OF TABLES 

Table 1: A chronology of fissile material production activities in Pakistan and India... 11 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This paper surveys Indian and Pakistani academic and official statements on the control 

of fissile material production. As most published writings in India and Pakistan on this 

subject deal with the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), the paper presents a review 

of the two countries’ positions on the FMCT, as expressed in official statements and 

writings by regional analysts. Against this backdrop, various options for regional 

progress in fissile material production control are discussed. 

India and Pakistan face a quandary related to the future Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 

(FMCT) being negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). On the one hand, 

both countries have the expectations that participation in the ongoing FMCT negotiations 

and a successful conclusion of the negotiations in a binding treaty could lessen their 

nuclear isolation. On the other hand, elements in India and Pakistan also view the FMCT 

as an attempt by the United States (US) to cap their weapon capabilities in relation to the 

five states that are recognized as legitimately possessing nuclear weapons in the Treaty 

on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Pakistan also fears that the FMCT 

might solidify India’s current lead in quantities of fissile material stocks. 

Key aspects of Pakistan’s official position on the FMCT in the CD negotiations are: 

• Existing stocks of fissile materials must be “progressively reduced” and 

eventually eliminated. 

• There should be a schedule for the transfer of stockpiles into civilian use with 

verification (transfers must first be made by the states with the largest stockpiles). 

• All caps on future stocks must be accompanied by a reduction in asymmetries of 

existing stocks. 

A key aspect of India’s official position and where the Indian position differs most 

markedly from Pakistan’s is that existing stocks must be excluded from the scope of the 

FMCT. 

A summary of key Indian analysts’ views on the FMCT is: 

• The FMCT is a ploy by the US and others to bring under safeguards many of 

India’s un-safeguarded facilities. 

• The FMCT will forever restrict India to second-class power status by freezing 

disparities with the five nuclear weapons states. 

• The FMCT will never confer any “special” nuclear weapon power status and 

never legitimize India’s possession of weapons. 

• If India does sign, it should use its leverage to wrest benefits. 

A summary of key Pakistani analysts’ views on the FMCT is: 

• The FMCT (if stocks are excluded) would freeze disparities with India. 

• The US is attempting to use economic pressure to force Pakistan to give up fissile 

materials production (even voluntarily). 

• The FMCT does not serve the strategic interests of Pakistan. 
Fissile Material Control in South Asia 

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• Pakistan should only consider signing after its own stocks are sufficient. 

As current multilateral negotiations on the FMCT are stalled, India and Pakistan may 

well be disposed towards a regional approach to fissile material control. In 2004, India 

and Pakistan initiated a process of exploring nuclear-related confidence building 

measures (CBM). This process provides a window of opportunity for the two countries to 

consider bilateral CBMs related to fissile materials production control. 

The crux of creating a South Asian fissile materials control accord will be political. How 

should a political climate be created that might allow regional initiatives on fissile 

materials control to move forward? We believe that limited technology demonstrations 

through short-term experiments might be a factor in influencing political, policy, and 

decision-makers in India and Pakistan to understand that fissile materials control can be 

effectively and verifiably monitored. 

The Materials Monitoring System (MMS) developed at Sandia National Laboratories is 

one of the possible technological systems that could be demonstrated at select sites (mock 

or real) in India and Pakistan. The MMS is capable of supporting a variety of sensors and 

video equipment, and of operating in a multitude of configurations and modes. Example 

monitoring and verification technologies to be demonstrated could involve seals and tags, 

video cameras, etc. The MMS uses a flexible hierarchical architecture to allow near realtime, secure data acquisition and display at any location worldwide. 

In many cases, cooperation with Indian and Pakistani nuclear scientists is restricted for 

US agencies by law and existing sanctions. However, interactions between US, Indian 

and Pakistani professional societies might be a way to start dialogue, as long as the 

interactions comply with all applicable laws. For example, the Institute of Nuclear 

Materials Management could work with the Pakistani Nuclear Society and the Indian 

Nuclear Society to arrange workshops that could promote discussions of fissile material 

production control issues. 

India and Pakistan have fairly divergent views on the scope of a future FMCT. Pakistan 

wants existing stocks included, while India is for the capping of future production. The 

two countries do, however, have an ongoing bilateral dialogue on creating nuclear-related 

CBMs. The nuclear CBM dialogue provides a framework in which to discuss bilateral 

verification-related experiments or test beds. Third parties could help facilitate such 

projects. 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

9 

Fissile Materials Control in South Asia: Regional 

Analyses and Potential Confidence Building Measures 

1. INTRODUCTION 

This paper surveys Indian and Pakistani academic and official statements on the control 

of fissile material production. As most published writings in India and Pakistan on this 

subject deal with the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), the paper presents a review 

of the two countries’ positions on the FMCT, as expressed in official statements and 

writings by regional analysts. Against this backdrop, various options for regional 

progress in fissile material production control are discussed. 

India and Pakistan face a quandary related to the future Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 

(FMCT) being negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). On the one hand, 

both countries have the expectation that participation in the ongoing FMCT negotiations 

and a successful conclusion of the negotiations in a binding treaty could lessen their 

nuclear isolation. On the other hand, domestic elements in both India and Pakistan also 

view the FMCT as an attempt by the United States to cap their weapon capabilities in 

relation to the five nuclear weapon states that are recognized in the NPT. Pakistan also 

fears that the FMCT might solidify India’s current lead in quantities of fissile material 

stocks. 

Current quantities of fissile material stocks in these two countries are not very well 

known. The Institute for Science and International Security has made some detailed 

estimates.[1] It is clear from this study that India has larger stocks of plutonium that are 

probably in the hundreds of kilograms. Pakistan is suspected to have smaller stocks of 

plutonium, but larger stocks than India of highly enriched uranium. What is clear is that 

both countries have an extensive infrastructure for fissile materials production. They have 

well-developed nuclear energy programs, including power and research reactors. 

2. FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY ISSUES: A CRITIQUE 

The scope of the FMCT regarding existing stocks of fissile materials is unclear. Possible 

outcomes include the following:

• The treaty will deal completely with all existing stocks. 

• The treaty will deal only partially with some kinds of existing stocks. 

• The treaty will only provide guidance on eliminating stocks, such as in its 

preamble. 

• The treaty will exclude existing stocks and only cap future production. 

The definition of what should be considered a fissile material is also unclear. Appendix A 

presents various definitions of “fissile” materials used in international law and by India 

 

[1] Institute for Science and International Security, Global Fissile Material Inventories, Chapter IX, 

“Estimates of Unirradiated Fissile Material in De Facto Nuclear Weapon States,” June 2004 available at 

http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/de_facto_states.html 
Fissile Material Control in South Asia 

10 

and Pakistan. These definitions are not synonymous, and will need to be reconciled in a 

future FMCT. Another key issue is how much transparency countries will be expected to 

provide. Monitoring and verification procedures will therefore need to be negotiated. All 

of these issues will concern India and Pakistan considerably, given the fact that many of 

their nuclear facilities are outside the scope of International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) safeguards. 

Kathleen Bailey of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories in the US has 

provided a critique of any proposed FMCT.[2] She writes: “A key issue is that current 

technologies do not allow for effective verification of a fissile materials cutoff. Equally 

important, the cutoff has the potential to damage the [Non-proliferation Treaty] by 

creating a new, less restrictive arms control accord that other nations may eventually 

prefer. There are other costs as well. International diplomatic energies will be sapped. 

The costs of inspections and other verification activities – activities that will offer little 

assurance that cheating is not under way – will be high. In summary, the costs of the 

fissile materials cutoff appear to outweigh the benefits.” 

Both India and Pakistan are acutely aware of the difficulties inherent in implementing 

any proposed FMCT. There is little trust between these two countries. They will demand 

stringent verification procedures if either is to ever acquiesce to a cutoff. Both countries 

will likely continue to maintain civilian uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing 

facilities.[3] Therefore, they will be faced with the risk that production of fissile materials 

for civilian fuel cycle purposes might be used to mask production of fissile materials for 

weapons manufacture. 

The FMCT might also serve to legitimize existing stocks of fissile materials that India 

and Pakistan possess. If existing stockpiles are not covered, both countries would 

therefore legitimately possess fissile materials stocks that are applicable to building 

nuclear weapons. However, a verifiable cutoff would effectively cap their nuclear 

weapons programs. 

3. FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 

Pakistan and India have a long history of seeking to produce fissile materials. Table 1 

presents a chronology of important events related to fissile materials production in both 

countries. Given the long history and extensive infrastructure existing in both countries 

related to fissile materials production, verification of any sort of a future fissile materials 

control accord (whether regional or global) will be problematic. 

 

[2] Kathleen Bailey, A Critique of the Fissile Materials Cutoff Proposal, Director’s Series on Proliferation, 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California, 1995, UCRL-LR-114070-8, pp 55-62. 

[3] India has a unique nuclear fuel cycle planned that will involve the reprocessing of spent fuel from fast 

breeder reactors and the production of considerable quantities of U-233 (a fissile material capable of being 

used in weapons). Currently, Pakistan’s research and power generation reactors use fuel supplied from 

foreign sources under IAEA safeguards. However, in the future, Pakistan could produce its own lowenrichment civilian reactor fuel. 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

11 

Table 1: A Chronology of Fissile Materials Production Activities in Pakistan and India[4]

Country Activity Year started 

or estimated 

completion 

Pakistan Uranium discovered at Dera Ghazi Khan 1963 

 5 MWt research reactor at PINSTECH (PARR-1) 1965 

 Nuclear weapons program begins 1972 

 Uranium enrichment program begins 1974 

 New Labs Reprocessing Plant for plutonium reprocessing 1982 

India Uranium discovered at Jadugoda 1951 

 Criticality of CIRUS research reactor 1960 

 Nuclear weapons program begins 1964 

 Uranium enrichment program begins at Trombay (pilotscale) 1985 

 Plutonium reprocessing plant established at BARC 1964 

 Plutonium reprocessing plant established at Tarapur 1977 

 Plutonium reprocessing plants under construction at Indira 

Gandhi Center for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam 

2008 

Figure 1: The PARR-1 research reactor at PINSTECH 

 

[4] These dates are taken from a variety of sources, primarily from the web sites of the Indian and Pakistani 

Atomic Energy Commissions, and George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global 

Proliferation, (University of California Press, Berkeley, USA: 1999). Information was also obtained from 

an article by Mansoor Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear History – Separating Myth from Reality” published on 

PakDef Forums: http://www.pakdef.info/forum/showthread.php?t=6278. 
Fissile Material Control in South Asia 

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Figure 2: The CIRUS (right) and the DHRUVA (left) research reactors at BARC 

4. OFFICIAL POSITIONS OF PAKISTAN AND INDIA ON THE FMCT 

Pakistan’s Ambassador to the CD, Munir Akram, stated on July 30, 1998, that there is a 

“wide disparity in fissile stockpiles of India and Pakistan,” and that the FMCT should not 

freeze this disparity. 

Key aspects of Pakistan’s position are: 

• Existing stocks of fissile materials must be “progressively reduced” and 

eventually eliminated. 

• There should be a schedule for the transfer of stockpiles into civilian use with 

verification (transfers must first be made by the states with the largest stockpiles). 

• All caps on future stocks must be accompanied by a reduction in asymmetries of 

existing stocks. 

Originally, India had linked the FMCT to time-bound global nuclear disarmament. Prime 

Minister I.K. Gujral, answering a question in the Indian Parliament in 1997, said, “India 

believes that any FMCT can be a useful and necessary step but as part and parcel of a 

negotiated phased program for the elimination of nuclear weapons.” 

In 1998, after a change of government and nuclear tests, India relaxed this condition and 

reached consensus to allow the FMCT negotiations to begin. In December 1998, speaking 

to India’s Upper House of Parliament, the Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, 

stated, “India's stand on the FMCT has remained consistent. We had supported 

multilateral negotiations on this subject leading to a non-discriminatory treaty which will 

prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. What we are advocating 

is a treaty which will control future production and not stockpiles. There is no question of 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

13 

bringing the stockpiles within the scope of FMCT. As far as a unilateral moratorium on 

fissile material production is concerned, it is not possible for India to agree to it.”[5]

Brahma Chellaney, a noted Indian strategic affairs analyst, has discussed this change in 

India’s official position regarding the FMCT.[6] He quotes the official Indian government 

statement issued after the May 1998 nuclear tests: "India remains committed to a speedy 

process of nuclear disarmament leading to total and global elimination of nuclear 

weapons. Our adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological 

Weapons Convention is evidence of our commitment to any global disarmament regime 

which is non-discriminatory and verifiable. We shall also be happy to participate in the 

negotiations for the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Geneva-based 

Conference on Disarmament". As described by Chellaney, “The (May 1998) statement 

signified a major shift in the Indian position on the much-despised CTBT 

[Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty] as well as the FMCT. India abruptly changed 

its position on these two arms-control measures at the center of U.S. non-proliferation 

diplomacy.” Chellaney goes on to state, “It is remarkable that in a very short time India – 

the principal opponent of the U.S.-led non-proliferation regime – has jettisoned its 

unyielding opposition to the FMCT and CTBT. ... India also opposed the FMCT, leading 

the group of non-aligned nations to successfully block the start of negotiations because of 

the refusal of the great powers to discuss nuclear disarmament. But after its tests, India, 

without consulting its non-aligned partners, announced it would participate in the FMCT 

negotiations, forcing Pakistan and Israel to fall in line and opening the way for 

negotiations to start. India was in the group of 28 non-aligned member-states at the CD 

that had linked the start of FMCT talks to the ‘immediate and concurrent commencement 

of negotiations and early conclusion of’, among other things, a binding non-use 

convention and a treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons. India reckons that by the time 

an FMCT is negotiated and takes effect, it would have produced enough fissile material 

for a minimum deterrent against its two closely aligned nuclear neighbors, China and 

Pakistan.” 

Although both India and Pakistan are now committed to participating in FMCT 

negotiations, a key aspect of India’s position (and where the Indian position differs most 

markedly from Pakistan’s) is that existing stocks must be excluded from the scope of the 

FMCT. 

5. THE VIEWS OF REGIONAL ANALYSTS ON THE FMCT 

This study found that there are fewer Pakistani publications on fissile material control 

than Indian. 

 

[5] Elements of External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh's speech in Rajya Sabha on bilateral discussions 

with United States, December 16, 1998, http://www.indianembassy.org/new/js(rajyasabha).htm [6] Brahma Chellaney, “India’s Nuclear Planning Force Structure, Doctrine and Arms-Control Posture,” 

presented at the Forum of the UNESCO International School of Science for Peace on Nuclear 

Disarmament, Safe Disposal of Nuclear Materials, or New Weapons Development: Where are the National 

Laboratories Going?, Landau Network-Centro Volta, Villa Erba, Cernobbio-Como, Italy, July 1998. 

http://www.mi.infn.it/~landnet/brahma.html 
Fissile Material Control in South Asia 

14 

5.1 Survey of Indian Analysts 

In a detailed study entitled Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and Options for India, S. 

Rajagopal of the National Institute for Advanced Studies (NIAS) has explored six options 

for India, including signing a future FMCT with no conditions, not signing at all, and 

some options within this range that offer incentives to India.[7] The six options considered 

are: 

Option One: Sign the FMCT as is 

• Benefits: 

o possible slackening of technology controls and embargoes 

o prospects of better India-US bilateral relations and cooperation in the 

areas relating to security, economic development and South Asia 

stability 

o possible projection of a better image of India by P-5 (the five 

permanent members of the UN Security Council) 

Option Two: Conditionally sign the FMCT (these conditions are listed below) 

• Benefits: 

o If the treaty is prospective, it would restrict the availability of fissile 

material for weapons 

o India would be capped above Pakistan 

o India would be in a position to retain stockpiled fissile material, 

however small, which will ensure conditions of minimum deterrence 

policy are met to an extent 

Option Three: Sign the FMCT with quid pro quo 

• Benefits: 

o Removal of embargoes and controls would strengthen Indian 

economic development and help India attain global stature 

o Nuclear cooperation with the P-5 would increase transparency and 

confidence 

Option Four: Declare a moratorium on fissile material production 

• Benefits: 

o Increase pressure for global disarmament 

o Compel Pakistan to emulate; and, thus, maintain India’s lead in stocks 

o Allow easy withdrawal and renewed production of fissile material 

o The moratorium might be viewed by other countries as a concession 

by India deserving some rewards 

Option Five: Sign the CTBT and declare moratorium on fissile material production 

• Benefits: 

o Improve environment for India-US cooperation 

o Increase pressure on US to ratify CTBT 

 

[7] S. Rajagopal, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and Options for India, NIAS Working Paper WP1-99, 

National Institute of Advanced Studies, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India, 1999. 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

15 

o Increase credibility of India’s stated intentions to maintain a minimum 

nuclear deterrence 

o Domestic political advantages in removing friction regarding signing 

of the CTBT 

o Removal of sanctions 

o Compel Pakistan to emulate and increase US pressure on China to also 

follow suit 

o Moratorium easy to reverse if needed 

Option Six: Reject FMCT 

• Benefits: 

o Allow increases in weapons stockpiles 

o India will be viewed as a strong nation with an independent security 

policy 

As a part of the NIAS study, a conference of experts from academia, science, and 

research convened and voted for the option they preferred. Option Two - that India 

should sign with conditions - received the most votes. These conditions include: 

• Cut-off only prospective 

• Time-bound global nuclear disarmament 

• Limited scope 

• Discharged spent fuel to be treated as stockpile 

• Tritium to be included 

• Use for military purposes to be banned 

• Non-discriminatory verification and safeguards regime 

Other analysts based in India are more strongly opposed to fissile material controls. In a 

series of three papers, S. Chandrasekharan, with the South Asia Analysis Group, argues 

that the FMCT could constrain India’s weapons programs and could involve intrusive 

verification programs.[8] He writes that if un-safeguarded pre-existing stocks are available 

for weapons production, then this, by implication, would legitimize India’s nuclear 

weapons. However, he also feels that the US and other states would not permit giving 

India any “special” nuclear status. A summary of the views of Indian analysts surveyed 

follows: 

• The FMCT is a ploy by the US and others to bring under safeguards many of 

India’s un-safeguarded facilities. 

• The FMCT will forever restrict India to second-class power status by freezing 

disparities with the five nuclear weapons states. 

• The FMCT will never confer any “special” nuclear weapon power status and 

never legitimize India’s possession of weapons. 

• If India does sign, it should use its leverage to wrest benefits in return. 

 

[8]Chandrasekharan, S., Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and India, Parts I, II, and III, 1999 

http://www.saag.org/papers/paper38.html 
Fissile Material Control in South Asia 

16 

5.2 Survey of Pakistani Analysts 

Shireen Mazari, a noted Pakistani strategic analyst has written, “[A] compromise on the 

FMCT, in terms of the issue of stockpiles would damage Pakistan permanently.”[9] Zafar 

Jaspal in an article entitled “FMCT: Policy Option for Pakistan” states: “In fact one 

objective of the current US nonproliferation policy is to cap and eventually reverse the 

nuclear-weapon program of Pakistan. Significantly, the FMCT although considered to be 

a non-discriminatory disarmament measure, global in its reach and universal in its 

application, is so only in intent. In real terms, it does not change the status quo nor does it 

in any way reduce the gap between the haves and the have-nots. There is a big gap 

between India’s and Pakistan’s fissile material stockpiles.”[10] Retired Wing Commander 

Muhammad Irshad has also discussed Pakistan’s apprehensions regarding fissile material 

control.[11] He writes: “When Pakistan agrees to sign [the] FMCT, agreeing to stop fissile 

material production at levels many hundred times less than that of India, it would amount 

to deliberately giving the Indians a perpetual edge, an edge which our generations might 

repent.” 

These themes occur frequently in the writings of Pakistani analysts. A summary of the 

views of Pakistani analysts surveyed follows: 

• The FMCT (if stocks are excluded) would freeze disparities with India. 

• The US is attempting to use economic pressure to force Pakistan to give up fissile 

materials production (even voluntarily). 

• The FMCT does not serve the strategic interests of Pakistan. 

• Pakistan should only consider signing after its own stocks are sufficient. 

6. PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL INITIATIVES IN FISSILE MATERIAL 

CONTROL 

Despite Indian and Pakistani differences on the future scope of a FMCT, at various times 

there have been proposals made for regional South Asian initiatives on fissile material 

control. The US, as well, has proposed regional fissile material control as an option for 

India and Pakistan to consider. As described by Peter Lavoy, “Several confidencebuilding measures have been proposed for India and Pakistan: a regional cutoff of fissile 

material production, a regional nuclear test ban, safeguards on new and existing nuclear 

facilities, extension of the nuclear no-attack pledge to cover population centers, enhanced 

international security assurances, regional risk reduction centers, upgraded hotlines 

between military and political officials, and regular exchanges of military personnel. 

However, even the best ideas cannot succeed in the absence of a stable arms control 

culture.”[12]

 

[9] Shireen Mazari, “Has Pakistan Fallen in the US Tactical Trap?” 

http://www.defencejournal.com/dec98/us-tactical.htm

[10] Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “FMCT: Policy Option for Pakistan”, National Development and Security, Vol. 9, 

No. 4, Serial No. 36 (Summer 2001). 

[11] Muhammad Irshad, “Fissile Material: Fears and Compulsions”, 

http://www.defencejournal.com/jan99/fissile.htm [12] Peter Lavoy, “Nuclear Arms Control in South Asia”, p. 273, in Arrns Control: Toward the 21st Century, 

edited by Jeffrey Larsen, and Gregory Rattray, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Boulder CO) 1996. 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

17 

The Indian government has had a long-standing interest in negotiating a global ban on 

fissile material production. As reported by George Perkovich from his interviews with 

more than a dozen former high-ranking Indian officials and strategic analysts, the Indian 

government had in 1992 begun to see “the merit and perhaps the international political 

necessity of cooperating to negotiate global bans on nuclear weapons testing and 

production of fissile material for weapons”.[13] At this time, as also reported by 

Perkovich, experts such as Raja Ramanna (a former head of India’s Atomic Energy 

Commission) “believed that India could afford to place all its power reactors under IAEA 

safeguards, a move that would demonstrate India’s nuclear responsibility to the 

international community”. The recent India-US agreement on nuclear cooperation 

formalizes this approach. India has made a commitment as a part of this agreement to 

voluntarily place all of its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. A joint 

statement issued on July 18, 2005 at the end of a meeting between the Indian Prime 

Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and US President George W. Bush says that India agrees 

to “...working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material 

Cutoff Treaty.”[14] As current multilateral negotiations on the FMCT are stalled, India 

might accept a regional approach to fissile material control with Pakistan and possibly 

China. 

7. INDIA-PAKISTAN DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR-RELATED 

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES 

In 2004, India and Pakistan initiated a process of exploring nuclear-related confidence 

building measures (CBM).[15] This process provides a window of opportunity for the two 

countries to consider a bilateral CBM (such as increasing transparency regarding stocks) 

related to a future FMCT. 

Despite their disparate positions on the scope of a future FMCT, there are motivations for 

both India and Pakistan to be interested in discussing FMCT-related CBMs. India wishes 

for the FMCT to provide indirect acceptance of India’s possession of weapons-usable 

fissile materials. It also wishes to freeze its existing advantage in stocks with Pakistan. 

Pakistan, in turn, wishes to reduce its disparity in stocks with India. However, many 

international analysts have argued that the two countries are being disingenuous in their 

support for the FMCT, and that they would never bring their sensitive facilities under 

international monitoring or IAEA safeguards. If the two countries participate in bilateral 

experiments related to possible verification measures of a future FMCT, this could 

increase their credibility at the CD in relation to the negotiations which would facilitate 

the overall process. 

 

[13] George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation, (University of 

California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, USA: 1999) pg 332. 

[14] From the web site of India’s Atomic Energy Commission – http://www.dae.gov.in/jtstmt.htm 

[15] Joint Statement, Second Round of India-Pakistan Expert Level Talks on Nuclear CBMs, available on 

the web site of India’s Ministry of External Affairs, at http://meaindia.nic.in/speech/2004/12/15js04.htm 
Fissile Material Control in South Asia 

18 

Currently, the two are engaged in a process of discussing nuclear-related CBMs. This 

process is being conducted through official expert-level talks. Two rounds of talks 

occurred in 2004.[16] Key points listed in the Joint Statement issued at the end of the 

second round stated: 

• Both sides agreed to establish “a dedicated and secure hotline between the two 

Foreign Secretaries...to prevent misunderstandings and reduce risks relevant to 

nuclear issues.” 

• Both sides have reaffirmed their nuclear weapon test moratoria. 

• Both sides have made a commitment to implement the nuclear CBMs they agreed 

to in principle when they signed the 1999 Lahore Memorandum of 

Understanding. These CBMs included early notification of accidents involving 

radiation releases, and the implementation of procedures to minimize the risks of 

accidental nuclear war. 

• Both sides agreed to upgrade the existing hotline between Directors General of 

Military Operations in their respective Armies. 

This process of creating nuclear CBMs offers a window of opportunity for India and 

Pakistan to consider implementing CBMs related to fissile materials monitoring and 

control. Such CBMs could enhance their credibility in future FMCT negotiations. 

Further, both countries want to be recognized internationally as responsible possessors of 

nuclear weapons. FMCT-related CBMs, therefore, could possibly serve their interests.

8. TRANSPARENCY, VERIFICATION AND POTENTIAL CONFIDENCE 

BUILDING MEASURES 

The crux of creating a South Asian fissile materials control accord will be political. Jon 

Neuhoff and Clifford Singer examined these issues in “The Verification and Control of 

Fissile Material in South Asia”.[17] This paper, although written before the 1998 nuclear 

weapon tests, defines the problems inherent in India and Pakistan implementing CBMs 

related to fissile materials. The paper presents a survey of “... the general gamut of arms 

control verification technologies to see what problems and opportunities might be 

relevant to the South Asian context. It is argued that a number of regionally applicable 

arms control technologies exist, but an excessive emphasis on technological issues in a 

predominantly political problem would be a mistake.” 

The confidence-building measures discussed by Neuhoff and Singer cover a wide range 

of options from “one time perfunctory visits of facilities to total and complete disclosure 

of all potential weapons-related activities and stockpiles.” Potential agreements that lie 

between these two extremes are concerned with off-site monitoring, non-intrusive on-site 

monitoring, on-site monitoring with process stream sampling, and notification procedures 

and exchanges of data. 

 

[16] Ibid. 

[17] Jon Neuhoff and Clifford Singer, “The Verification and Control of Fissile Material in South Asia”, in 

Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control, Stephen P. Cohen (Ed.) (Westview 

Press, Boulder CO, 1991) pp 207-224. 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

19 

In their paper, Neuhoff and Singer define three groups of nuclear weapons related 

materials: (1) plutonium, uranium and heavy water, (2) tritium and lithium, and (3) other 

materials used with natural isotopic concentrations, such as beryllium, heavy metal 

tampers, centrifuge materials (including maraging steel and light-weight high-strength 

materials), and manufactured weapons components. For each class of materials, they 

consider what is technically feasible for confidence building measures within the South 

Asian context, control of material production, and control of existing materials. Controls 

on nuclear materials production will involve more systematic monitoring measures than 

those employed for confidence-building. 

8.1 Controls on Fissile Material Production 

Neuhoff and Singer assume that India and Pakistan will remain “disinterested for the 

foreseeable future in simply applying for extension of IAEA monitoring”. The authors 

suggest that, in the South Asian context, it would be more feasible to set an upper limit 

on the amount of fissile material which might be diverted over a specified time without 

detection rather than use the “significant quantity” defined by the IAEA. This would 

simplify the technological requirements and lessen the intrusive nature of monitoring. 

Further, they suggest monitoring plutonium production and recycling by defining a limit 

on possible plutonium production based on the total thermal power output of all known 

reactors. This suggestion has also been made in a report of a South Asia-related task force 

of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.[18] Neuhoff and Singer conclude that 

ground-based monitoring stations measuring thermal emissions would be more practical 

than remote sensing of infrared radiation from satellites. For assaying the isotopic 

concentrations of plutonium in spent fuel, they suggest non-destructive techniques 

relying on estimating the “overall burnup from the radiation spectrum emitted by the 

irradiated fuel’, in combination with “fairly extensive monitoring by scales, sealed 

cameras, inspection and record keeping.” For monitoring uranium enrichment in gas 

centrifuge facilities, the degree of access granted will determine the technical approaches 

utilized. Although problematic, access would have to be granted for the nondestructive 

assay of inputs and/or outputs, sampling and access to centrifuge rooms for visual 

inspections. 

8.2 Transparency in Existing Fissile Material Stocks 

A key measure for any future bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan or a global 

FMCT will be increased transparency in fissile material stocks. India and Pakistan could, 

therefore, consider increasing the transparency related to their current holdings. Although 

declaring all stocks is unlikely, bilateral confidence could be increased by declaring the 

quantity of civilian reactor spent fuel being produced and/or stockpiled - the fraction 

reprocessed need not be shared. The issue of validating existing fissile materials 

stockpiles is recognized by Neuhoff and Singer to be one of the most vexing problems 

due to the need for and acceptance of some level of physical access to facilities and 

stocks. Technological solutions to problems of verification exist and many of these 

technologies have been developed and implemented for several decades. A review of 

 

[18] Report of the Carnegie Task Force on Nonproliferation and South Asian Security (Washington, D.C.: 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1988). 
Fissile Material Control in South Asia 

20 

these technologies is available in reports prepared by the Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory.[19]

How could a political consensus be created that might facilitate regional initiatives on 

fissile materials control? Technology demonstrations through short-term experiments 

might be a factor in influencing political, policy, and decision-makers in India and 

Pakistan to understand that fissile materials control can be effectively and verifiably 

monitored. 

The Materials Monitoring System (MMS) developed at Sandia National Laboratories is 

one of the possible technological systems that could be demonstrated at select sites (mock 

or real) in India and Pakistan. The MMS is capable of supporting a variety of sensors and 

video equipment, and of operating in a multitude of configurations and modes. The MMS 

logs, stores, and transmits sensor information from monitored items and facilities to users 

worldwide. The system supports various sensor types (e.g. sensors operating with radio 

frequency, or hard-wired), and video systems. The MMS provides users with the 

following capabilities: “1) selecting from a list of desired sensors and video, 2) installing 

the MMS system, 3) running the system without needing to develop additional software 

to meet unique monitoring requirements, and 4) using a site configurable interface for 

data review and analysis.” [20] The MMS uses a flexible hierarchical architecture to allow 

near real-time, secure data acquisition and display at any location worldwide. Similar 

systems have been developed by other laboratories worldwide, and some have been 

implemented and/or demonstrated through various projects of the IAEA and other 

agencies. Projects using such monitoring systems could be implemented between India 

and Pakistan. 

The two countries could also work with the IAEA (or within the context of their 

membership in other international and regional nuclear cooperation organizations[21]) to 

share data and information on creating comprehensive tracking and accounting systems 

for fissile materials. 

There are options to conduct joint experiments that demonstrate various monitoring 

technologies for materials that may be declared as excess and placed under monitoring in 

the future. These could be conducted first at universities or laboratories using mock setups of empty waste containers. Monitoring and verification technologies could involve 

seals and tags, video cameras, etc. Indian and Pakistani scientists could remotely monitor 

each other’s mock sites to demonstrate for policy makers that remote cooperative 

 

[19] R.W. Perkins and N.A. Wogman, Current and Potential Technologies for the Detection of Radionuclide 

Signatures of Proliferation, (R&D Efforts), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA, DOE 

Washington D.C. (USA) Department of Energy International Safeguards Meeting, 22-23 March, 1993. 

[20] Lawrence Desonier, “SNL Material Monitoring System: Sensor Configurations and Latest 

Applications,” (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, US: 2000), SAND 2000-0361C. 

[21] An example of one such organization is the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, 

Development and Training in Nuclear Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific (RCA). The RCA is 

described in the IAEA Information Circular 167, and includes 17 Asia-Pacific countries, as well as the 

IAEA, as members. Other examples are the World Association of Nuclear Operators, and the International 

Nuclear Societies Council (the Indian Nuclear Society and the Pakistani Nuclear Society are members). 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

21 

monitoring could be a very real possibility. Many such cooperative monitoring projects 

have been done in the US and Russia using both surrogate and actual fissile materials. 

The long-term storage of fissile materials is complicated by thermal and irradiation 

effects. Some of these effects involve irradiation softening, swelling, formation of 

volumetric defects, etc.[22] It is conceivable that India and Pakistan may decide to share 

information of the safe and long-term storage of fissile materials resulting from civilian 

programs. The avoidance of accidents involving fissile materials is of great interest to 

each and information and data-sharing on the subject of safety could form the basis of a 

CBM. 

The US has an interest in the safety and security of Pakistani and Indian nuclear sites to 

prevent unauthorized access and/or the leakage of materials and components to terrorist 

organizations. Both countries’ nuclear regulatory bodies (India’s Atomic Energy 

Regulatory Board and the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Agency) have held high-level 

meetings with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and are now beginning 

discussions on future collaborative projects. Direct US involvement with national 

defense-related sites is not allowable either under US, Indian or Pakistani law. The US 

NRC and Department of Energy could, however, collaborate with India and Pakistan on 

improving the physical protection of fissile materials held at civilian nuclear facilities. 

In some cases, cooperation with Indian and Pakistani nuclear scientists is restricted for 

US agencies by law and ongoing sanctions. However, interactions between US, Indian 

and Pakistani professional societies might be a way to start dialogue, as long as the 

interactions comply with all applicable laws. For example, the Institute of Nuclear 

Materials Management could work with the Pakistani Nuclear Society and the Indian 

Nuclear Society to arrange workshops that could promote discussions of fissile material 

security and production control issues. 

9. CONCLUSIONS 

Given that current multilateral negotiations on the FMCT are stalled, India and Pakistan 

may well be disposed towards a regional approach to fissile material control. In January 

2004, India and Pakistan initiated a process of exploring nuclear-related confidence 

building measures. This process provides both a window of opportunity and a context for 

the two countries to consider bilateral measures related to fissile materials production 

control. 

The two countries have fairly divergent views on the scope of a future FMCT. Pakistan 

wants existing stocks included, while India seeks the capping of future production. The 

crux of creating a South Asian fissile materials control accord will be political. This study 

concludes that limited technology demonstrations through short-term experiments can be 

a factor in helping decision-makers in India and Pakistan to understand that fissile 

 

[22] J. Leteurtre and Y. Quere, Irradiation Effects in Fissile Materials, (North-Holland Publishing Company 

– Amsterdam: 1972). 
Fissile Material Control in South Asia 

22 

materials control can be effectively and verifiably monitored. Transparency measures 

could begin with declarations on commercial stocks. India and Pakistan might also 

collaborate on improving the physical protection of fissile materials held at commercial 

nuclear facilities. 

Third parties can play a facilitating role such projects. Interactions between international, 

US, Indian and Pakistani professional societies might be a way to start the dialogue, as 

long as the interactions comply with applicable national laws. For example, the Institute 

of Nuclear Materials Management could work with the Pakistani Nuclear Society and the 

Indian Nuclear Society to arrange workshops that could promote discussions of fissile 

material production control issues. 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

23 

APPENDIX A: RELEVANT DEFINITIONS OF FISSILE MATERIALS

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has passed a resolution that does provide 

an indication of what should be considered a “fissile material” for purposes of a future 

FMCT. The UNGA resolution 48/75-L called for negotiations of a 

“...non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable 

treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other 

nuclear explosive devices.” (emphasis added.) 

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not specifically define fissile 

material. Rather, the IAEA statutes define “nuclear material”, “special fissionable 

material” and “source material”. These definitions are: 

• Nuclear material... any source or special fissionable material as defined in 

Article XX of the IAEA Statute. 

• Special fissionable material ...plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in 

the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing any of the foregoing; and such 

other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time 

determine. 

• Source material ...uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; 

uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of 

metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing 

one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors 

shall from time to time determine; and such other material as the Board of 

Governors shall from time to time determine. 

The Indian Atomic Energy Act does define a “fissile” material as “uranium 233, uranium 

235, plutonium or any material containing these substances or any other material that 

may be declared as such by notification by the Central Government.”

At the time of writing this paper, the author has been unable to access a copy of the 

Pakistani Atomic Energy Act to determine if it contains a definition of “fissile” material. 

However, the Pakistani Nuclear Regulatory Authority Ordnance of 2000 contains a 

definition of nuclear materials, nuclear fuels, and nuclear substances: 

• Nuclear material...Nuclear fuel, including natural uranium and depleted 

uranium, capable of producing energy by self-sustaining chain process of nuclear 

fission outside a nuclear reactor, either alone or in combination with some other 

material, and Radioactive products and waste.

• Nuclear fuel...any material which is capable of producing energy by selfsustaining chain process of nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, or other nuclear 

transmutation.

• Nuclear substance... any substance or nuclear material which the Authority 

determines as being a substance or material which may be used for production of 

or use in atomic energy or for research into matters connected therewith and 

includes all substances obtained or obtainable from the soil or water by underground or surface working or from the atmosphere.
Fissile Material Control in South Asia 

24 

Distribution 

200 MS 1373 CMC Library, 6921 

1 MS 9018 Central Tech Files, 8940-2 

2 MS 0899 Technical Library, 4916