United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 

Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of 

Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

NUCLEAR 

NONPROLIFERATION 

Focusing on the Highest 

Priority Radiological 

Sources Could Improve 

DOE’s Efforts to Secure 

Sources in Foreign 

Countries 

Statement of Gene Aloise, Director 

Natural Resources and Environment 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:30 p.m. EST 

Tuesday, March 13, 2007

 

GAO-07-580T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 13, 2007

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Focusing on the Highest Priority 

Radiological Sources Could Improve 

DOE’s Efforts to Secure Sources in 

Foreign Countries 

Highlights of GAO-07-580T, a testimony 

to the Subcommittee on Oversight of 

Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-580T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise, 

(202) 512-3841, aloisee@gao.gov . 

Following the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, U.S. and 

international experts raised

concerns that unsecured 

radiological sources posed a 

significant security threat to the

United States and the international

community. If certain types of 

these sources were obtained by

terrorists, they could be used to

produce a radiological dispersion

device, or dirty bomb. In response, 

the Department of Energy (DOE)

established the International 

Radiological Threat Reduction 

Program to identify, recover, and

secure vulnerable, high-risk 

radiological sources.

GAO was asked to (1) assess DOE’s 

progress in securing sources in 

foreign countries, (2) identify 

DOE’s current and planned

program costs, and (3) determine 

the extent to which DOE has 

coordinated its efforts with other 

federal agencies and with

international organizations, such as 

the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA). In January 2007, 

GAO issued a report— Nuclear 

Nonproliferation: DOE’s 

International Radiological Threat 

Reduction Program Needs to 

Focus Future Efforts on Securing 

the Highest Priority Radiological 

Sources, (GAO-07-282)—that

addressed these matters. 

To carry out its work, GAO

reviewed DOE policies, plans and 

budgets; observed installed 

physical security upgrades; and 

interviewed senior DOE, 

Department of State (State), and

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) officials. 

While DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain 

radiological sources in more than 40 countries, many of the highest-risk 

sources remain unsecured. For example, more than 700 radioisotope 

thermoelectric generators (RTG) remain operational or abandoned across 

Russia, representing the largest unsecured quantity of radioactivity in the 

world. Each of these devices has activity levels ranging from 25,000 to 

250,000 curies of strontium-90—similar to the amount of such material 

released from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident. In addition, only 4 of 

20 waste storage facilities in Russia and Ukraine have been secured. 

In 2003, when DOE decided to broaden the scope of the program beyond the 

former Soviet Union, it also expanded the types of sites that required 

security upgrades to include hospitals and oncology clinics. In contrast to 

higher priority sources, such as RTGs, these facilities operate teletherapy 

machines that generally contain a single cobalt-60 source ranging from about 

1,000 to 10,000 curies. As of September 30, 2006, almost 70 percent of all 

sites secured by DOE’s program were hospitals and oncology clinics. 

Moreover, DOE has not developed a plan to ensure that countries receiving 

security upgrades will be able to sustain them over the long-term. 

Since 2002, DOE has spent about $108 million to implement its program. 

Funding for the program has steadily declined as DOE has placed a higher 

priority on securing special nuclear material, such as plutonium and highly 

enriched uranium. 

Finally, although DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC, these 

efforts have been inconsistent. For example, DOE chose not to transfer $5

million of its fiscal year 2004 appropriation to NRC for international 

regulatory activities, causing friction between the agencies. In addition, 

GAO found that critical gaps in information-sharing between DOE and IAEA

have impeded DOE’s ability to target the most vulnerable sites in IAEA 

member states for security improvements. 

In its recent report, GAO made recommendations to the Secretary of Energy

and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration to (1) 

limit the number of hospitals and clinics containing radiological sources that 

receive security upgrades to only those deemed the highest risk; (2) 

accelerate efforts to remove as many RTGs in Russia as practicable; and (3) 

develop a long-term sustainability plan for security upgrades. In addition, 

GAO asked Congress to consider providing NRC with authority and a direct 

appropriation to conduct regulatory development activities to help improve 

other countries’ security over sources. DOE said that our recommendations 

were helpful and would further strengthen its program. NRC said it would 

work closely with relevant executive branch agencies and IAEA if Congress

acts upon GAO’s matter for consideration. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the actions the 

Department of Energy (DOE) has taken to secure radiological sources in

foreign countries. Specifically, my remarks are based on the report we are 

issuing today—Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s International 

Radiological Threat Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts 

on Securing the Highest Priority Radiological Sources, which was 

prepared at the request of this subcommittee.1

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and 

international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological sources 

were vulnerable to theft and posed a significant security threat to the 

United States and the international community. If certain types of these 

sources were obtained by terrorists, they could be used to produce a 

simple and crude but potentially dangerous weapon—known as a 

radiological dispersion device, or dirty bomb. 

In 2001, a congressional report directed DOE to address the threat posed 

by dirty bombs. In response, the National Nuclear Security Administration

(NNSA)

2

 established the Radiological Threat Reduction Task Force to 

identify, recover, and secure vulnerable, high-risk radiological sources. 

This effort was focused in countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) 

because DOE determined this region had the greatest number of 

vulnerable sources. In 2003, at the direction of the Secretary of Energy, 

DOE expanded the scope of the program to secure sealed sources 

worldwide, ultimately establishing the International Radiological Threat 

Reduction (IRTR) Program. The program’s primary objective is to protect 

U.S. national security interests by (1) implementing rapid physical security

upgrades at vulnerable sites containing radioactive sources; (2) locating,

recovering, and consolidating lost or abandoned high-risk radioactive 

sources; and (3) supporting the development of the infrastructure 

necessary to sustain security enhancements and supporting regulatory 

controls, including the development of regional partnerships to leverage 

international resources. 

 1

GAO-07-282. 

2

NNSA is a separately organized agency within DOE that was created by the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65 (2000), with 

responsibility for the nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors 

programs. 

Page 1 GAO-07-580T 
The Department of State (State) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) also fund efforts to secure radiological sources in other countries, 

though on a much smaller scale than DOE. State, among other things, 

provides the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with funds to 

conduct training, workshops, and advisory missions to improve member 

states’ radiological source security practices and procedures. NRC has 

provided guidance on the development of programs in Armenia, Georgia, 

and Kazakhstan to improve nuclear regulatory controls over radiological 

sources, including establishing radiological source inventories and 

promoting the development of laws, rules, and regulations governing 

controls over this material. 

In this context, you asked us to (1) assess the progress DOE has made in 

implementing its program to help other countries secure their sealed 

radiological sources, (2) identify DOE’s current and planned program 

costs, and (3) determine the extent to which DOE has coordinated its 

efforts with other federal agencies and with international organizations, 

such as IAEA and the European Commission. In conducting our review, 

we analyzed DOE’s IRTR program documentation, including project work 

plans for each country and program activity; strategic plans; and internal 

briefings. We supplemented the documentation with interviews with 

senior level DOE officials responsible for implementing the IRTR program. 

We also visited four countries—Russia, Lithuania, Poland and Georgia—

representing about 35 percent of overall DOE program expenditures, 

observed physical security upgrades implemented by DOE’s program, and 

met with host government officials in each country. We reviewed budget 

documents detailing IRTR program expenditures and determined the 

program’s total carryover of unspent and unobligated funds. Finally, we 

met with senior officials at State, NRC, IAEA and the European 

Commission. We performed our review in Washington, D.C., and other 

locations, from November 2005 to December 2006 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain 

radiological sources in more than 40 countries and achieved some 

noteworthy accomplishments, including the removal of cobalt-60 and

cesium-137 sources from a poorly protected nuclear waste repository in 

Chechnya. However, many of the highest-risk and most dangerous sources 

remain unsecured. For example, hundreds of large devices known as 

radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG) remain operational or 

abandoned in Russia. Each of these devices has activity levels ranging 

from 25,000 to 250,000 curies of strontium-90—similar to the amount of 

In summary 

Page 2 GAO-07-580T 
strontium-90 released from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in 

1986.

3

 In addition, security upgrades at a majority of waste storage 

facilities—which can individually store up to 3 million curies of material—

located primarily in Russia and Ukraine, have not been completed. 

Moreover, in 2003, when DOE decided to broaden the program’s scope 

beyond the former Soviet Union, it also expanded the types of sites that 

required security upgrades to include medical facilities operating 

teletherapy machines which are used to provide radiation treatment to 

cancer patients. These machines generally contain a single cobalt-60 

radiological source ranging from about 1,000 to 10,000 curies. As a result, 

as of September 2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were hospitals 

and oncology clinics. In the view of several DOE national laboratory and 

security specialists responsible for implementing the program, DOE 

installed security upgrades at so many of these facilities primarily because 

the upgrades are relatively modest in scope and cost. 

In addition, DOE has also experienced a number of challenges, such as, 

problems with foreign contractor performance and lack of adequate

physical infrastructure to support security upgrades, which impeded 

program implementation; caused project delays; and in some extreme 

cases, prevented DOE from initiating projects at all. Finally, DOE has not 

developed a plan to ensure that countries receiving security upgrades will 

be able to sustain them over the long term. This is particularly 

problematic, since we identified numerous problems with the maintenance 

of DOE-funded security equipment and storage facilities during our site 

visits. 

Regarding program costs, as of August 31, 2006, DOE had spent 

approximately $108 million to secure radiological sources worldwide. A 

majority of this money—$68 million—was spent to (1) physically secure 

sites; (2) locate, recover, and dispose of lost or abandoned sources; and 

(3) help countries draft laws and regulations to increase security and 

accounting of sources. In addition, DOE provided $13.5 million to IAEA to 

support activities to strengthen controls over radiological sources in IAEA 

member states and spent $26.5 million on program planning activities such 

as, developing program guidance documents, hiring private consultants, 

and conducting studies. DOE officials told us that securing radiological

 3

A curie is a unit of measurement of radioactivity. In modern nuclear physics, it is defined 

as the amount of substance in which 37 billion atoms per second undergo radiological 

disintegration. In the international system of units, the becquerel is the preferred unit of 

radioactivity. One curie equals 3.7 x 1010 becquerels. 

Page 3 GAO-07-580T 
sources in other countries is a lower priority than securing more 

dangerous nuclear materials, such as plutonium and highly enriched 

uranium (HEU). As a result, recent budget allotments for radiological

security activities were reduced. Consequently, DOE program officials are

concerned that the agency may be unable to meet outstanding contractual 

commitments to maintain the more than $40 million in security upgrades 

already installed. 

Concerning coordination between DOE, State and NRC, efforts have 

improved since we reported on this matter in 2003.4

 Specifically, DOE has 

involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat reduction 

activities more often and has increased information-sharing with the 

agencies. However, DOE has not always integrated its nuclear regulatory 

infrastructure development efforts with these agencies efficiently. For 

example, DOE and NRC disagreed about whether, as directed by the 

Senate Appropriations Committee, DOE should have transferred $5 million 

from its fiscal year 2004 appropriation to NRC for the purpose of 

strengthening international regulatory controls over radiological sources. 

Ultimately, DOE did not transfer the funds, causing friction between the 

agencies. Finally, DOE has improved coordination with IAEA to 

strengthen controls over other countries’ radiological sources and has 

developed bilateral and multilateral partnerships with IAEA member states 

to improve their regulatory infrastructures. However, significant gaps in 

information-sharing between DOE and IAEA have impeded DOE’s ability 

to target the most vulnerable sites for security improvements. 

To help ensure that DOE’s future efforts focus on securing the highest 

priority sources, our report recommends that the Secretary of Energy and 

the Administrator of the NNSA, among other things, (1) limit the number 

of hospitals and clinics containing radiological sources that receive

security upgrades to only those deemed the highest risk; (2) accelerate 

efforts to remove as many RTGs in Russia as practicable; and (3) develop a 

long-term sustainability plan for security upgrades that includes, among 

other things, future resources required to implement such a plan. 

Additionally, we asked that the Congress consider providing NRC with the 

authority and a direct appropriation to conduct international regulatory 

infrastructure development activities. DOE said that our recommendations 

 4

GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to Control 

Sealed Radiological Sources Need Strengthening, GAO-03-638 (Washington, D.C.: May 16,

2003). 

Page 4 GAO-07-580T 
were helpful and would further strengthen its program. NRC said it would 

work closely with relevant executive branch agencies and IAEA if 

Congress acts upon our matter for consideration. 

The small size, portability and potential value of sealed radiological 

sources make them vulnerable to misuse, improper disposal and theft. 

According to IAEA, the confirmed reports of illicit trafficking in 

radiological materials have increased since 2002. For example, in 2004, 

about 60 percent of the cases involved radiological materials, some of 

which are considered by U.S. government and IAEA as attractive for the 

development of a dirty bomb. Although experts generally believe that a 

dirty bomb could result in a limited number of deaths, it could, however, 

have severe economic consequences. Depending on the type, amount, and 

form, the dispersed radiological material could cause radiation sickness 

for people nearby and produce serious economic, psychological and social 

disruption associated with the evacuation and subsequent cleanup of the 

contaminated area. Although no dirty bombs have been detonated, in the 

mid-1990s, Chechen separatists placed a canister containing cesium-137 in

a Moscow park. While the device was not detonated and no radiological

material was dispersed, the incident demonstrated that terrorists have the

capability and willingness to use radiological sources as weapons of 

terror. 

Background 

A 2004 study by the National Defense University noted that the economic

impact on a major populated area from a successful dirty bomb attack is 

likely to equal and perhaps exceed that of the September 11, 2001, attacks 

on New York City and Washington, D.C. According to another study, the 

economic consequences of detonating a series of dirty bombs at U.S. 

ports, for example, would result in an estimated $58 billion in losses to the 

U.S. economy. The potential impacts of a dirty bomb attack could also 

produce significant health consequences. In 2002, the Federation of 

American Scientists concluded that an americium radiological source 

combined with one pound of explosives would result in medical 

supervision and monitoring required for the entire population of an area 10 

times larger than the initial blast. 

Page 5 GAO-07-580T 
As of September 30, 2006, DOE had secured 368 sites that contained 

radiological sources in more than 40 countries. The agency’s efforts 

included the removal of cobalt-60 and cesium-137 sources from a poorly 

protected nuclear waste repository in Chechnya; construction of storage 

facilities in Uzbekistan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Georgia in order to 

consolidate sources and strengthen their long-term protection; and the 

installation of physical security upgrades at 21 sites containing 

radiological sources in Greece prior to the 2004 Olympics. However, 

despite these achievements, a majority of sites secured do not represent 

the highest-risk or the most vulnerable sources, and many of the most 

dangerous sources remain unsecured, particularly in Russia. 

DOE Has Installed 

Physical Security 

Upgrades at Hundreds 

of Sites Worldwide, 

but Many Dangerous 

Radiological Sources 

Have Not Been 

Secured 

In 2003, when DOE decided to broaden the program beyond the former 

Soviet Union, it expanded the types of sites that required security 

upgrades to include medical facilities that contained lower priority 

sources. For example, of the total sites completed, 256—or about 70 

percent—were hospitals and oncology clinics operating teletherapy 

machines which generally contain a single cobalt-60 source ranging from 

about 1,000 to 10,000 curies. In contrast, only 4 of 20 waste storage sites 

across Russia and Ukraine have been secured. According to DOE, these 

waste storage facilities are the most vulnerable in the world and pose a 

significant risk, because of the large quantities of radioactive sources 

currently housed at each site. 

Officials from three of the four recipient countries we visited raised 

concerns about DOE’s focus on securing so many medical facilities and 

Russian officials told us that radiological sources in hospitals did not pose 

a risk comparable to that of RTGs or lost or abandoned sources. In 

addition, several national laboratory officials and security specialists 

responsible for implementing DOE’s program told us that although 

progress had been made in securing radiological sources, the agency had

focused too much attention on securing medical facilities at the expense 

of other higher-priority sites, such as waste storage facilities and RTGs. In 

their view, DOE installed security upgrades at so many of these facilities 

primarily because the upgrades were relatively modest in scope and cost. 

For example, a typical suite of security upgrades at a medical facility costs 

between $10,000 and $20,000, depending on the size of the site, whereas 

the average cost to remove and replace an RTG in the Far East region of 

Russia is about $72,000 in 2006 dollars. 

To track program progress, DOE has relied upon an indicator that uses as 

its primary metric, the number of sites that have been upgraded, or “sites 

secured.” Although DOE has compiled and tracked accomplishments such 

Page 6 GAO-07-580T 
as the amount of curies secured, the number of countries to receive 

regulatory assistance, and the number of orphan sources recovered, 

multiple national laboratory officials and security specialists told us that 

completing upgrades at medical facilities served to demonstrate rapid 

program progress because the upgrades are completed relatively quickly. 

DOE’s program director said that the number of sites completed 

demonstrated conclusively that work has been done and represented the 

best available measurement. However, Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory officials told us that this 

particular measurement did not demonstrate how the program is reducing 

threats posed to U.S. national security interests. In their view, this 

measurement is one-dimensional and does not adequately distinguish 

lower-priority sites from higher-priority sites. 

Furthermore, although numerous medical facilities have been secured, 

more than 700 RTGs remain operational or abandoned in Russia, 

representing several million curies of unsecured radioactive material. 

Almost 100 of these are located along the Baltic coastal line and, according 

to Russian officials, should be removed as soon as possible because of 

their accessibility and proximity to large population centers. As of 

September 30, 2006, DOE had funded the removal of about 13 percent of 

all RTGs located in Russia’s inventory. 

According to DOE and Russian officials, RTG removal is complex and 

DOE has faced a number of challenges. First, no comprehensive inventory

of RTGs exists, and, as a result, the actual number of these devices is 

unknown. Second, RTGs contain sources with high levels of radioactivity, 

and their removal requires specialized containers for their transport and 

facilities with adequate storage capacity. Finally, future RTG removal 

efforts will depend on finding a viable, alternative energy source to replace 

power supplied by radiological sources contained in RTGs. DOE has 

equipped a select number of RTGs with alarm systems that are remotely 

monitored as an interim measure to help reduce the risk posed by RTGs 

that have not yet been removed. 

Additionally, although IAEA officials told us that transportation of highrisk radiological sources is the most vulnerable part of the nuclear and 

radiological supply chain, DOE determined that source transport is 

generally outside the scope of the program and did not pursue 

transportation security-related projects with the majority of countries 

participating in the IRTR program. However, in every country we visited, 

host country officials identified the transportation of sources as a critical 

vulnerability and a priority for security upgrades. 

Page 7 GAO-07-580T 
DOE also experienced numerous challenges that impeded program 

implementation, specifically problems with foreign contractor

performance and inadequate physical infrastructure. Some examples we 

found of poor contactor performance included 

• steel security doors to a room containing radiological sources installed 

with the hinges on the outside, 

• security manuals and procedures for newly installed equipment provided 

in English instead of the native language, and 

• hospital staff that had not been trained by the contractor on operation of 

the alarm systems. 

In terms of physical infrastructure, some countries lacked reliable 

electricity, a backup power source, or telecommunications at sites 

containing radiological sources. As a result, frequent power outages 

diminished the detection capability of security alarms installed, and 

backup sources of power were unavailable to operate the security alarms 

and security lighting. DOE officials said that various combinations of these 

and other impediments resulted in delays implementing security upgrades

in about 75 percent of all countries participating in the program. 

Finally, we were especially concerned to find that DOE had not developed 

a plan to ensure that countries receiving security upgrades will be able to 

sustain them over the long term, particularly in light of the number of 

problems with the maintenance of DOE-funded security equipment and 

storage facilities we identified during our site visits. For example, we 

visited an oncology clinic and observed that the security cable used to 

secure a teletherapy machine’s cobalt-60 source had been broken for 

almost a month. This cable, according to a DOE physical protection 

specialist, was the most important security feature because it triggered an

alarm directly connected to the teletherapy machine’s “head,” which 

contains the radiological source. We also observed a storage facility 

containing RTGs and a seed irradiator— which has thousands of curies of 

a cesium-137 source—with several large openings in the roof and a broken 

motion detection device at a research facility containing a 22,000 curie 

irradiator. According to the foreign contractor, because of the high level of 

radioactivity present, the device had been disabled at least three times 

since the equipment was installed about a year earlier. 

DOE’s current sustainability plan consists of a 3-year warranty on newly 

installed security equipment and preventative maintenance contracts, as 

Page 8 GAO-07-580T 
well as providing training on newly installed equipment for operational 

staff at the sites. However, DOE has not formulated a long-term plan that 

identifies, among other things, how host countries will financially continue 

maintenance of upgrades following DOE warranty expiration. DOE 

officials responsible for program implementation said that they were 

uncertain that security upgrades installed would be sustained by countries 

once DOE assistance was no longer available. In fact, our analysis showed

that these officials had confidence that the security upgrades would be 

sustained in only 25 percent of the countries. 

As of August 31, 2006, DOE had spent about $108 million to implement the 

IRTR program. The majority of program expenditures—$68 million—was 

spent to (1) physically secure sites containing radiological sources; (2) 

locate, recover, and dispose of lost or abandoned sources; and (3) help 

countries draft laws and regulations to increase security and accounting of 

sources. DOE also provided $13.5 million to IAEA to support activities to 

strengthen controls over radiological sources in IAEA member states. 

However, one-fourth of the total budget—about $26.5 million—was spent 

on program planning activities not directly attributed to a specific country. 

DOE also carried over almost $23 million in unspent or unobligated funds

for the IRTR program from previous years. Moreover, the program 

consistently carried over a substantial uncosted balance each fiscal year 

throughout the life of the program. Specifically, for fiscal years 2003 

through 2005, the program carried over uncosted funds totaling $27.4 

million, $34.1 million, and $22.4 million, respectively. 

Physical security upgrades accounted for DOE’s largest program 

expenditure—almost $43 million. The majority of these upgrades were 

installed at hospitals and oncology clinics. DOE also funded upgrades at 

other types of facilities that utilize or store radiological sources and 

materials, including waste storage facilities, commercial and industrial 

facilities, and other research institutes. The types of upgrades installed 

varied, but standard equipment packages consisted mostly of hardened 

windows and doors; motion sensors and alarms; access control systems, 

such as coded keypads or swipe card entry; security cameras; and video

monitoring. Costs of physical security upgrades also included 3-year 

warranty contracts that covered maintenance costs, such as the cost of 

remote monitoring and spare parts. 

DOE also spent $23 million to provide countries with radiation detection 

equipment and training to locate and recover lost or abandoned 

radiological sources and secure them in interim or permanent storage 

DOE Has Spent about 

$108 Million to Secure 

Radiological Sources 

Worldwide, but 

Future Program 

Funding Is Uncertain 

Page 9 GAO-07-580T 
facilities. More than 80 percent of these expenditures were spent in 

Russia—about $19 million. These funds were spent primarily to provide 

countries with (1) standard packages of equipment, such as hand-held 

radiation detection monitors and characterization instruments to properly 

identify recovered sources; (2) training workshops on the appropriate use 

of the equipment; and (3) physical security upgrades at some facilities 

storing recovered or disposed sources. 

While DOE assistance was spread among 49 countries, Russia received the 

largest amount, $33 million, nearly one-third of total program 

expenditures. The 13 other former Soviet Union countries received a total

of about $11 million. By comparison, DOE spent significantly less outside 

the former Soviet Union, and expenditures in these countries were both 

modest by comparison and disproportionately spent in the United States 

by DOE’s national laboratories for labor, travel, equipment and overhead

costs.5

 For example, the 35 non-FSU countries participating in DOE’s 

program received a total of about $17 million, or just 28 percent of total 

country-specific expenditures.6

 Furthermore, two-thirds of funds allocated 

for activities in these countries were spent in the United States. 

Since 2003, DOE has significantly decreased IRTR program funding and 

according to a senior DOE official, future funding will be redirected to,

among other things, securing special nuclear material, such as plutonium 

and highly enriched uranium. Future anticipated reductions in funding for 

the IRTR program will have significant implications for the amount of 

sources that can be secured in other countries and may jeopardize DOE’s 

ability to meet outstanding contractual commitments for the more than 

$40 million in security upgrades already installed. Additionally, according 

to DOE officials, the agency plans to seek international contributions to 

secure radiological sources in other countries to offset anticipated 

shortfalls in funding. 

 5

DOE noted that some of the FSU countries that received DOE assistance had 

comparatively larger infrastructure problems than that of several non-FSU countries and,

in some cases, higher labor rates; and therefore, project implementation costs in the FSU 

countries were proportionally higher. 

6

Of the $107.7 million in total program expenditures, $61.7 million could be traced to 

specific country-related expenditures.

Page 10 GAO-07-580T 
In recent years, DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC to 

secure radiological sources worldwide, involved State and NRC in its 

international radiological threat reduction activities more often, and 

increased information-sharing with the agencies. For example, these 

agencies worked together successfully to implement a State-led effort to 

create the Iraq Radiological Source Regulatory Authority. This effort 

included providing equipment, training, technical assistance, and funding 

to help the new agency assume increased responsibility for establishing 

radiological source regulations and procedures consistent with 

international standards.7

However, DOE has not always integrated its efforts efficiently, and 

coordinated efforts among the agencies have been inconsistent. In 

particular, DOE, State, and NRC have differed on funding and

implementation of regulatory infrastructure development activities in 

other countries. For example, in May 2003, NRC’s Office of International

Programs sought $5 million in appropriated funds to assist its regulatory 

counterparts in countries of the Former Soviet Union and central and 

eastern Europe to, among other things, enhance existing laws, rules, and 

regulations governing the use of radiological sources. NRC officials noted

they made the request in part because the biggest challenge the agency has 

faced has been identifying adequate, reliable, and predictable funding to 

support international assistance activities. In July 2003, the Senate 

Appropriations Committee directed DOE to make $5 million out of certain

amounts appropriated to NNSA available to NRC for bilateral and 

international efforts to strengthen regulatory controls over radioactive 

sources that are at the greatest risk of being used in a dirty bomb attack. 

However, DOE did not do so because, according to DOE officials, the 

provision directing them to transfer the funds did not appear in the final 

conference report and was not included in the appropriation legislation.

In addition, within the agency, DOE has not adequately coordinated the 

activities of multiple programs responsible for securing radiological and 

nuclear materials in other countries, which, at times, has resulted in 

conflicting or overlapping efforts. Specifically, we found 

Coordination with 

State and NRC Has 

Improved, but 

Coordination 

Problems Worldwide 

Have Impacted DOE’s

Ability to Target the 

Most Vulnerable Sites 

for Security 

Improvements

 7

For more information on U.S. efforts to secure radiological sources in Iraq, see 

Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate Its Source Recovery Efforts and 

Apply Lessons Learned to Future Recovery Missions, GAO-05-672 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 7, 2005). 

Page 11 GAO-07-580T 
• a lack of effective integration between different programs addressing 

multiple threat reduction activities at the same sites, 

• confusion among host country officials because of multiple visits to the 

same country by different components of the same program, and 

• limited information-sharing between international source security and 

recovery of U.S.-origin sources in order to better leverage DOE resources. 

With respect to international organizations, DOE has improved 

coordination with IAEA to strengthen controls over other countries’ 

radiological sources and has developed bilateral and multilateral 

partnerships with IAEA member states to improve their regulatory 

infrastructures. However, significant gaps in information-sharing between 

DOE and IAEA have impacted DOE’s ability to target the most vulnerable 

sites for security improvements. For example, IAEA has not shared with 

DOE the countries that IAEA considers the most in need of security 

assistance. In addition, although DOE funds IAEA appraisal missions to 

assess the weaknesses in radioactive source security in IAEA member 

states, IAEA does not provide DOE with the findings of these missions 

because member state information is considered country-sensitive and 

confidential.

Finally, we found that little coordination exists between DOE and the 

European Commission. Although, the Commission has coordinated with 

IAEA to provide assistance to selected European countries to improve 

control over radiological sources, Commission officials told us that no 

formal communication exists with the United States on matters related to

radioactive source security assistance. As a result, each the United States

and the Commission are largely unaware of the specific sites and locations

the other is securing, and whether recipient countries are receiving too

little or too much assistance. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to

respond to any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee 

may have. 

Page 12 GAO-07-580T 
For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202) 

512-3841 or at aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Erika D. Carter, Nancy Crothers, Glen Levis, Mehrunisa

Qayyum, and Jim Shafer also made key contributions to this statement. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 13 GAO-07-580T 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER