Technical Report 02-5 July 2002

Espionage Against the United States by American Citizens 1947-2001 

Katherine L. Herbig 

Martin F. Wiskoff 

TRW Systems 

Released by 

James A. Riedel 

Director 

Defense Personnel Security Research Center 

99 Pacific Street, Building 455-E 

Monterey, CA 93940-2497 

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved 

OMB No. 0704-0188 

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 

instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 

information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for 

reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-

0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other 

provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently 

valid OMB control number. 

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 

1. REPORT DATE (DDMMYYYY)

 July 2002 

2. REPORT TYPE

 Technical 

3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 

1947 - 2001 

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 

5b. GRANT NUMBER 

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

 Espionage Against the United States by American Citizens 1947-2001

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 

5d. PROJECT NUMBER 

5e. TASK NUMBER 

6. AUTHOR(S) 

 Katherine L. Herbig, Ph.D. 

 Martin F. Wiskoff, Ph.D. 

 

 

 

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 

 Defense Personnel Security Research Center 

 99 Pacific Street, Bldg. 455-E 

 Monterey, CA 93940-2497

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 

 REPORT NUMBER 

 PERSEREC-TR 02-5 

10. SPONSORING/MONITORíS 

 ACRONYM(S) 

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 

 Defense Personnel Security Research Center 

 99 Pacific Street, Bldg. 455-E 

 Monterey, CA 93940-2497

11. SPONSORING/MONITORíS 

 REPORT NUMBER(S) 

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 

 Unclassified 

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 

14. ABSTRACT 

Analyses of 150 cases of espionage against the United States by American citizens between 1947 and 2001 provide 

detailed data on the demographic and employment characteristics of American spies, on the means and methods they 

used to commit espionage, on their motivations, and on the consequences they suffered. Collected materials on the cases 

supplement the analyses conducted with a database that allows comparison of groups and the identification of trends. 

Factors highlighted include changes in espionage by Americans since the end of the Cold War and the impact of 

globalization and networked information systems on the practice of espionage. 

15. SUBJECT TERMS 

Espionage Spying 

Counterintelligence Personnel Security Investigation 

Personnel Security Adjudication

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 

 Unclassified 

19a. NAME OF REPONSIBLE PERSON 

 James A. Riedel, Director 

a. REPORT 

Unclassified 

b. ABSTRACT 

Unclassified 

c. THIS PAGE 

Unclassified 

17. LIMITATION 

 OF ABSTRACT 

18. NUMBER 

 OF PAGES 

19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

 831-657-3000 

 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98) 

 Prescribed by ANSI td. Z39.18 

v 

Preface

In a 1985 report, Keeping the Nation's Secrets, the Stilwell Commission expressed grave 

concern over the increase in espionage by Americans reported in the 1980s. It pointed to a dearth 

of research on espionage and on personnel security that could have guided the Commission's 

deliberations. The Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) was established in 

1986 to provide policy-makers with such research. As part of its broader research agenda, 

PERSEREC constructed a database that permits analysis of espionage against the United States 

by its own citizens. This report updates and extends an initial PERSEREC report on the results of 

that analysis. Suzanne Wood and Martin Wiskoff authored the initial report, published in 1992 

and entitled Americans Who Spied Against Their Country Since World War II. 

The PERSEREC espionage database is based on open source information. We have 

continued to add cases to the database since 1992, and it now includes cases that date from 1947 

through 2001, plus one unusual case that began in 1942. We maintain a separate database of 

cases of espionage by Americans that date from the period before and during World War II and 

the immediate post-war period. 

The espionage database we discuss in this report consists of information collected and 

derived from unclassified sources on the personal and job characteristics of 150 individuals, and 

on the characteristics of the acts of espionage or attempted espionage they committed. Our 

analysis begins with the personal characteristics of Americans who spied, including employment 

and clearance status, how and when the espionage was carried out, and consequences these 

individuals suffered. In the second section of analysis, we compare cases by the length of their 

espionage. Subsequent sections compare military offenders with civilians, and volunteers with 

recruits, and if the individual was recruited, whether by a foreign intelligence service or by 

family or friends. A fifth section compares motivations for espionage in the various time periods 

and how motives have changed over time. Additional sections compare lone spies with those 

who worked with partners or in groups, and characteristics of American female spies. 

In the Results and Discussion section, we next apply some of our analytical findings on 

espionage to various aspects of the personnel security system, including the criteria for personnel 

security that are expressed in the federal Adjudicative Guidelines, patterns in espionage that 

could be used to improve the security clearance system, and applications to security awareness 

issues, including co-worker reporting and position vulnerability assessment. The last sections 

explore trends in the number of Americans actively spying over the last half-century and the 

recipients of their information, changes in espionage by Americans since the collapse of the 

Soviet Union in 1991, and two key trends that are affecting espionage in the post-Cold War 

period. 

These results will be useful to Department of Defense (DoD) policy-makers in framing 

security countermeasures and security policy. It will also assist DoD component specialists who 

conduct counterintelligence and security countermeasures education, training, and security 
vi 

awareness programs for their respective services. Individuals in government, the news media, 

and in academia who wish to better understand trends and themes in espionage by American 

citizens will be interested in the analyses based on the espionage database. 

James A. Riedel 

Director 
vii 

Acknowledgements

 We wish to extend special thanks to Susan Hagan, who located and researched many 

additional cases that were included in the espionage database. Susan also revised the structure of 

the database to incorporate new variables, ran multiple series of analyses to update tables and 

figures for this revision, and wrote the first draft of this updated report. 
viii 
ix 

Executive Summary 

Introduction 

PERSEREC developed an unclassified database of Americans involved in espionage 

against the United States since 1945, and in 1992 published a report on it entitled Americans 

Who Spied Against Their Country Since World War II. The goal of the original project was to 

analyze the cases in terms of themes and trends that would further our understanding of the 

phenomenon of espionage. 

Since 1992, further instances of espionage by American citizens have come to light, and 

we have continued to enter them into an espionage database. An updated analysis incorporating 

recent cases seemed useful. In this update we redefined the parameter of the database and of the 

report to include only Cold War cases, and we created a separate database with cases from the 

era of World War II. The date of the beginning of the Cold War is debatable, so we chose a 

starting point in the late 1940s for the database discussed in this report; this allowed us to include 

cases of espionage from the late 1940s that resembled those in the 1950s, and to exclude cases 

that were more like those in the war years. This study covers the time period 1947 through 2001. 

Our databases continue to be based on open source materials. In the espionage database 

we have included 150 individuals who were convicted or prosecuted for espionage or for 

attempting to commit espionage, or for whom clear evidence of espionage exists, even though 

for various reasons they were not convicted. This latter category includes people who defected 

before they were prosecuted, those who died or committed suicide before they could be 

prosecuted, and those who plea-bargained for lesser charges or who were given immunity from 

prosecution. 

This unclassified study, like its predecessor in 1992, deals with individuals whose names 

and cases surfaced in open source materials. It is impossible to know how many more spies have 

been identified but whose cases remain classified, how many were identified but not prosecuted 

(often to prevent the release of information in open court), how many spied in the past and were 

not identified, or how many are spying at present and remain unidentified. Unfortunately for the 

student of espionage, government records include more cases of espionage than are described 

here, but access to these is classified and restricted to the relatively small, cleared community. 

This database represents the information that is publicly available; it is an open source subset of 

the larger universe of all espionage committed by American citizens. 

Background 

We discuss two issues as background for our analysis of espionage. We briefly 

summarize the 20th century history of espionage by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

(USSR) against the United States, because the USSR has been the main market for information 

from American spies. We then survey the shifting policies of the federal government on public 

prosecution of espionage, because these shifts in policy have directly affected the incidence of 

known cases in various periods of time during and after the Cold War. We cannot hope to make 
x 

accurate statements about the incidence of espionage without taking into account the prosecution 

policies that were in effect. 

Approach 

Five categories of information were gathered in PERSERECís espionage database: 

biographic attributes, employment and related security clearance characteristics, details of the act 

of espionage itself, motivations, and consequences. Frequencies were figured on available data 

for the entire group of cases. In addition to the presentation of basic demographic data, various 

comparisons were made: (a) spies intercepted the first time they attempted espionage vs. those 

who transmitted information, (b) uniformed military vs. civilian spies, (c) spies who volunteered 

vs. those who were recruited, (d) motivations to commit espionage and how they changed over 

time, (e) lone spies vs. those with partners or in groups, (f) female spies, and (g) spies from the 

1990s vs. earlier periods of time. 

These analyses on espionage were then applied to several personnel security issues, 

including the following: the criteria for personnel security as expressed in the federal 

Adjudicative Guidelines; insights from the analyses of espionage that could be used to improve 

the security clearance system; and issues in security awareness, including co-worker reporting 

and position vulnerability assessment. The last parts of the Results and Discussion section 

discuss trends in the number of Americans actively spying over the last half-century and the 

recipients of their information, an exploration of changes in espionage by Americans since the 

collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and two key trends that are shaping espionage in the postCold War period. 

Appendix A lists the names of the 150 cases and presents selected variables from the 

database. Cross-tabulations were performed to refine some of the issues discussed in the report, 

and these appear in Appendix B. 

Summary of Findings 

This summary includes only major findings, which are supplemented with others and presented 

in more detail in the body of the report. 

Background 

From its founding in 1917, the Soviet Union conducted a determined espionage program 

in the United States that attempted to recruit American citizens to spy for the Soviets. 

From several dozen spies in the 1930s, the number of Americans committing espionage 

for the Soviets grew during World War II to several hundred; then these numbers sharply 

declined in the early Cold War years just at the time when public concern focused on the 

loyalties of government employees. 

Between 1950 and 1975, most cases of espionage by Americans that were prosecuted 

were members of the military services or civilians employed by the military. 
xi 

A shift in policies on prosecuting espionage by Americans in the mid-to-late 1970s, and 

the enactment of new laws including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 

and the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), were responsible in part for the 

threefold increase in espionage cases made public in the 1980s. 

Personal Attributes 

Most American spies have been white males younger than 30. 

Almost half (46%) of known American spies had only a high school education or less. 

Employment and Clearance 

Almost equal numbers of civilians and members of the military have spied: 77 civilians 

and 73 military. 

A majority of military spies have come from the upper enlisted ranks. 

Over the period from 1947 through 2001, twice as many Americans volunteered to 

commit espionage as were recruited into it. 

Among civilian spies, one-fourth have been employees of government contractors. 

One-fourth of American spies held no security clearance when they began espionage. 

However, this statement includes a variety of scenarios, including persons who had had 

access to classified information previously and who relied on memory; persons who 

stockpiled documents before they lost access; persons who relied on a relationship with a 

cleared person for access to information; persons who stole classified information; and 

persons who offered unclassified information deemed sensitive enough to warrant 

prosecution for espionage. 

Patterns in the Act of Espionage 

Most espionage by Americans has been short-lived and poorly paid. Almost half of 

American spies received nothing for the risks they took in espionage, usually because 

they were quickly intercepted before they could transmit information. Over the 50-year 

period, only four individuals may have received $1 million or more. Regardless of 

payment, there have been instances of long-term espionage that did serious damage to 

U.S. interests. 

One-fourth of known Americans who tried to commit espionage were intercepted before 

they could transmit information and were apprehended in the attempt; only one-fifth of 

known cases lasted 5 years or longer. 
xii 

Three-fourths of these cases of interception of espionage by Americans occurred during 

the 1980s, making this less the ìdecade of the spy,î as has been claimed, so much as the 

ìdecade of the unsuccessful spy.î 

Of the 39 cases in which the individual was intercepted before the passing of information, 

37 were offering Department of Defense information. 

In each decade between 1950 and 1990, the rate of Americans beginning to spy exceeded 

the rate of those arrested; only in the 1990s did the rate of those caught exceed the rate 

who began, when two per year began to spy while three per year were caught. 

Among those Americans recruited into espionage by a foreign intelligence service, all but 

one individual succeeded in transmitting information. 

Ten of the 11 American women who spied worked as the accomplices or partners of men. 

The number of Americans currently known to have attempted or committed espionage 

peaked at 35 in 1985, but since then the number per year has been declining to pre-1980s 

levels. 

Americans who succeeded in transmitting information were older, better educated, more 

often civilians, and more likely to be married than those who were interrupted in an 

attempt at spying. The most ìsuccessful,î defined by a public impression of the damage 

they inflicted and the duration of their espionage, came from most of the civilian agencies 

and military services. They included persons who reflected the full range of access to 

classified information from the highest security clearance down to no clearance at all. 

Among these most ìsuccessfulî spies, those widely known include: Aldrich Ames (CIA), 

Christopher Boyce (contractor employee) and Andrew Lee (uncleared civilian), Jeffrey 

Carney (active duty Air Force), Larry Wu-tai Chin (CIA), Clyde Conrad and the 

members of his ring (active duty Army), James Hall (active duty Army), Robert Hanssen 

(FBI), James Harper (uncleared civilian) and Ruby Schuler (contractor employee), 

Ronald Pelton (NSA), Earl Pitts (FBI), Jonathan Pollard (civilian Navy employee), and 

John Walker, Jr. and the members of his ring (active duty Navy). 

Motivations 

Americans most consistently have cited money as the dominant motive for espionage, 

and over time money has increased in predominance among motives. 

Of individuals who professed a single motive for espionage, one-fourth of civilians but 

three-fourths of members of the military claimed that they had spied for money. 

Among volunteer spies, disgruntlement with the workplace was cited as a significant 

motive: nearly one-fifth of volunteers with a single motive said they had spied from 

disgruntlement. 
xiii 

Foreign Attachments 

Among the 150 American spies, 83% were native born, while 17% were naturalized 

citizens. This represents four times the proportion of naturalized citizens in the U.S. 

population as a whole. (According to the 2000 decennial census, naturalized citizens were 

3.8% of the population) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). 

Of American spies who had foreign attachments (defined as relatives living overseas or 

non-U.S. citizens living here, emotional ties of relationship or professional ties to such 

individuals, or business connections abroad), two-fifths were recruited by a foreign 

intelligence service, compared to the group who did not have foreign attachments in 

which 6 % were recruited by foreign intelligence. This reinforces concern that foreign 

attachments represent security vulnerabilities. 

Among American spies, naturalized citizens were more likely to be recruited by a foreign 

intelligence service than native-born Americans; among those who were naturalized, 46% 

were recruited by foreign intelligence while 42% volunteered. Native-born American 

spies were more likely to volunteer to commit espionage, since only 17% were recruited 

by foreign intelligence while 68% volunteered. Similar small proportions of naturalized 

and native-born citizens were recruited by a friend or family member (naturalized=12%, 

native-born=15%). 

Applications to the Personnel Security System 

Most known American spies (80%) demonstrated one or more conditions or behaviors of 

security concern defined in the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for 

Access to Classified Information. However, given the incidence of these issues among the 

cleared population and the relative rarity of espionage, these factors cannot by themselves 

predict espionage. 

One-fourth of known American spies experienced a personal life crisis (such as a divorce, 

death of someone close, or a love affair gone awry) in the months before they decided to 

attempt espionage. 

Very few people apply for access to classified information intending to commit 

espionage; optimal use of personnel security resources for countering espionage would 

focus more on periodic reevaluation and continuing assessment of experienced cleared 

personnel. 

Personnel security vetting is not designed to identify ongoing espionage and it has not 

done so: at least six Americans were screened and then maintained their security 

clearances during periods when they were also committing espionage. 

Reports of behaviors of security concern or personal crises by co-workers have led to the 

apprehension of some American spies, but reluctance to report these issues has also 

allowed other spies to persist in their crimes. 
xiv 

Changes in Espionage by Americans Since the End of the Cold War 

The Soviet Union has predominated as the recipient of information from American spies, 

but 17 other countries have also been willing recipients. 

Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, some 20 Americans have attempted or committed 

espionage, but characteristics of American spies have changed. Compared to earlier 

cohorts, Americans who began spying during the 1990s have been: 

Older, with a median age of 39, 

More demographically heterogeneous, with more women and more ethnic 

minorities, 

More often civilian, with twice as many government employees and twice as 

many contractors, 

More ìsuccessful,î with four-fifths passing information, 

More likely to volunteer to commit espionage, with a 70% rate of volunteering 

that parallels the rate of volunteering in the 1980s, 

More likely to hold lower-level security clearances or no clearance, 

More likely to be naturalized citizens, 

More likely to have foreign attachments, with half of the individuals having 

foreign attachments, 

More likely to cite divided loyalties as their single motive for espionage, with half 

of the cases citing divided loyalties. 

Trends Affecting Espionage in the Future: Globalization and Information Transmission 

Globalization is rapidly creating new international conditions based on global economics 

that will affect the allegiance of citizens. This development assures that economic 

espionage will become more important, as dual use technologies blur the distinction 

between national defense and industrial applications. 

Globalization will demand a new understanding of the meaning of loyalty to the nation 

and how espionage intersects with loyalty. 

The current revolution in information and communications technologies is changing the 

scope and practice of espionage: spiesí methods of collection, synthesis, and transmission 

of information are shifting to take advantage of opportunities in these new technologies. 
xv 

Table of Contents

Introduction____________________________________________________________1 

Review of Other Research on Espionage ____________________________________2 

Background ____________________________________________________________5

The Practice of Soviet Espionage in the United States______________________5 

The Shifting Policy on Prosecution of Espionage _________________________6 

Methodology __________________________________________________________12 

Sources _________________________________________________________12 

Criteria for What Constitutes Espionage in This Study ____________________12 

Selection and Coding of Variables in the Database _______________________14 

Analytical Approach in This Study____________________________________15 

Results and Discussion __________________________________________________16 

Overview of Basic Characteristics of American Espionage Offenders ________16 

Comparison of Those Intercepted with Those Who Transmitted Information___24 

Intercepted on First Attempt ___________________________________26 

Transmitted Information ______________________________________27 

Comparison of Military and Civilian Spies _____________________________30 

Civilian Spies ______________________________________________31 

Military Spies ______________________________________________32 

Comparison of Volunteers and Recruited Spies __________________________33 

Volunteers_________________________________________________35 

Recruited by Family or Friends ________________________________36 

Recruited by a Foreign Intelligence Service_______________________37 

Comparison of Motivations _________________________________________39 

Money ____________________________________________________40 

Divided loyalties ____________________________________________42 

Disgruntlement _____________________________________________42 

Ingratiation ________________________________________________43 

Coercion __________________________________________________43 

Thrill Seeking and Ego-Boosting _______________________________44 

Recognition________________________________________________44 

Comparison of Lone Spies, Pairs, and Groups ___________________________46 

Lone Spies_________________________________________________48 

Spies in Pairs_______________________________________________48 

Spies in Groups_____________________________________________49 
xvi 

Espionage by American Women _____________________________________50 

Applications to the Personnel Security System ______________________________52 

Violations of Personnel Security Standards _____________________________52 

The Impact of Personal Problems_____________________________________54 

Potential Improvements to the Personnel Security System _________________56 

Clearance Granting Procedures_________________________________56 

Security Awareness: Co-worker Responsibilities___________________58 

Position Vulnerability Assessment ______________________________59 

Tendencies in the Incidence and the Recipients of Espionage __________________60 

The Prevalence of Spies ____________________________________________61 

The Nationalities of Recipients ______________________________________62 

Trends in American Espionage Since the End of the Cold War ________________65 

The Impact of Globalization on Espionage _____________________________70 

The Impact of New Information Structures on Espionage__________________72 

Summary _____________________________________________________________75 

References ____________________________________________________________81 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Names and Selected Variables for Cases Included in the Study ___ A-1 

Appendix B: Cross-Tabulations _________________________________________B-1 

Length of Espionage_________________________________________B-3 

Civilian and Military Spies____________________________________B-6 

Volunteer or Recruit_________________________________________B-8 

List of Tables

 1. Personal Attributes ___________________________________________________17 

 2. Employment and Clearance ____________________________________________18 

 3. Patterns in the Act of Espionage ________________________________________20 

 4. Consequences _______________________________________________________23 

 5. Comparison of Those Intercepted with Those Who Transmitted Information _____24 

 6. 39 Intercepted Espionage Cases _________________________________________26 

 7. Espionage in U.S. Military Services _____________________________________28 
xvii 

 8. Comparison of Military and Civilian Spies ________________________________30 

 9. Comparison of Volunteers and Recruited Spies_____________________________33 

10. Motivations _________________________________________________________39 

11. Comparison of Lone Spies, Pairs, and Groups of Spies _______________________46 

12. Spy Pairs ___________________________________________________________48 

13. Groups of Spies______________________________________________________49 

14. American Women Spies _______________________________________________50 

15. Examples of Potential Issues of Security Concern ___________________________53 

16. Nationalities of Recipients or Intended Recipients of Information ______________62 

17. Nationalities of Non-Soviet Bloc Recipients Over Time ______________________64 

18. Comparison of Espionage Begun in Three Periods 1947-79, 1980-89, 

 and 1990-2001 ____________________________________________________65 

Tables in the Appendices 

B.1 Length of Espionage by Gender________________________________________B-3 

B.2 Length of Espionage by Age Espionage Began____________________________B-3 

B.3 Length of Espionage by Volunteer or Source of Recruitment_________________B-4 

B.4 Length of Espionage by Agencies Owning the Information __________________B-5 

B.5 Decade Began by Length of Espionage __________________________________B-5 

B.6 Civilian or Uniformed Military by Age Espionage Began ___________________B-6 

B.7 Civilian or Uniformed Military by Volunteer or Source of Recruitment ________B-6 

B.8 Civilian or Uniformed Military by Length of Espionage_____________________B-7 

B.9 Civilian or Uniformed Military by Occupational Category___________________B-7 

B.10 Civilian or Uniformed Military by Security Clearance Level ________________B-7 
xviii 

B.11 Circumstances of Individuals with No Security Clearance, by Whether the Cleared 

Person Was Civilian or Uniformed Military __________________________B-8 

B.12 Volunteer or Source of Recruitment by Educational Level __________________B-9 

B.13 Volunteer or Source of Recruitment by Occupational Category ______________B-9 

B.14 Volunteer or Source of Recruitment by Citizenship ______________________B-10 

B.15 Volunteer or Source of Recruitment by Foreign Attachments_______________B-10 

B.16 Volunteer or Source of Recruitment by Agencies Owning Information _______B-11 

B.17 Volunteer or Source of Recruitment by Motivations______________________B-11 

B.18 Volunteer or Source of Recruitment by Decade Espionage Began ___________B-12 

List of Figures 

1. Motivations for Espionage ______________________________________________45 

2. Known Spies Active in Each Year, 1950 Through 2001 _______________________61 

3. Recipients of Espionage from American Spies ______________________________63 
1 

Introduction

The gathering of information by intelligence agents, especially in wartime, is an age-old 

strategy for gaining superiority over rivals. Intelligence officers, working for government 

intelligence agencies, advance their nationís interests by gathering information. Among their best 

sources are citizens of rival nations who give or sell them information they seek. Acts of 

espionage like these betray the obligation, implicit in citizenship, to support the nation and avoid 

helping those who would harm it. This report examines a small group of U.S. citizens who 

betrayed their country in this way, by providing or attempting to provide classified or sensitive 

national defense information to foreign powers. 

The context of this study is the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union 

and the post-Cold War period, from roughly 1947 to 2001. By passing nuclear secrets to the 

Soviets during and soon after World War II, American spies helped to set the terms of the early 

Cold War as a competition between nuclear powers. Once the USSR collapsed in 1991, some 

American spies who were in place persisted and worked for the Russians, and since 1991 others 

have taken up the work for a variety of new masters in the current global contest for information. 

Obviously, the main adversary during the time period of our study was the Soviet Union, with its 

determined worldwide espionage program and the Eastern Bloc countries it dominated, but there 

have been other adversaries as well. 

In response to an alarming number of espionage cases by Americans in the early 1980s, 

in 1985 Congress established the Stilwell Commission to investigate this phenomenon of 

espionage that suddenly seemed to be mushrooming. It directed the commission to review and 

evaluate security policies and procedures in the Department of Defense, and to identify 

weaknesses in the Department's security programs. Among other suggestions, the Stilwell 

Commission recommended that research be conducted in the area of personnel security so that 

policy-makers could have data on which to base new policy initiatives (DoD Security Review 

Commission, 1985). The Defense Personnel Security Research Center, PERSEREC, was 

established in 1986 for this purpose. 

As one of PERSEREC's initial research efforts, we began to compile an espionage 

database on Americans involved with espionage against the United States since World War II. 

We compiled the database from publicly available sources, in order to allow the widest possible 

dissemination of information to policy-makers and to others within and outside the government 

who would be interested in understanding trends and themes in espionage. Along with building 

the database, we began to collect open source literature on American spy cases. These files have 

grown steadily with press clippings and articles, scholarly and journalistic treatments of cases, 

and, where available, documentary sources such as affidavits, interviews with spies, and other 

materials. The database allows the analysis of characteristics and trends across the cases; 

studying details of the cases in the files forces us to confront the particularities and the historical 

context of a case. 

The initial publication based on the espionage database, entitled Americans Who Spied 

Against Their Country Since World War II (Wood and Wiskoff, 1992), reported analyses and 

trends from cases that were then included in the database between 1945 and 1991. In the decade 
2 

since that report was published, additional cases of espionage have occurred and have been 

entered in the database. For this updated report we have redefined the time frame to span the 

years 1947 to 2001, excluding cases from World War II and immediately thereafter, in order to 

sharpen the focus on the Cold War and its aftermath. Various events can be identified as the start 

of the Cold War, but we chose a starting date of 1947, with the conjunction in 1947 of three 

crucial elements of American policy: the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the National 

Security Act. This date allowed us to include several espionage cases by Americans from the 

later 1940s that were more like those in the 1950s than like earlier wartime cases. We have also 

developed additional variables that capture a wider range of data. These changes, and the 

additions to the espionage database and case files, have all prompted the need for an updated, 

expanded revision of the 1991 report based on the latest data. 

Review of Other Research on Espionage 

There has been no shortage of journalistic and biographical writing about individual or 

groups of American spies and their personal stories (e.g., Adams, 1995; Barker, 1996; Barron, 

1987; Blitzer, 1989; Blum, 1987; Costello, 1988; Earley, 1988, 1997; Headley & Hoffman, 

1989; Henderson, 1988; Kessler, 1990; Kneece, 1986; Lindsey, 1979; Maas, 1995; Nizer, 1973; 

Radosh & Milton, 1983; Tanenhaus, 1997; Weiner, Johnston, & Lewis, 1995; Wise, 1988, 

1995). Some cases have attracted widespread media attention; others that may have been equally 

damaging have not. 

Numerous books have attempted to paint broad-brush pictures of the development of 

espionage in recent history. Some of these focused on particular periods, or emphasized the 

implications of revelations in 1995 of the closely-held secret Venona project (e.g., Adams, 1995; 

Albright & Kunstel, 1997; Allen & Polmar, 1988; Andrew & Gordievsky, 1991; Andrew & 

Mitrokhin, 1999; Corson, Trento, & Trento, 1989; De Gramont, 1962; Haynes & Klehr, 1999; 

Kessler, 1988; Knightley, 1986; Lamphere & Shachtman, 1986; Morse, 1995; Palmer, 1977; 

Pincher, 1988; Seth, 1961; Weinstein & Vassiliev, 1999; West, 1964; West & Tsarev, 1999). 

While these works provided biographical detail, historical context, and illustrations of espionage, 

they did not attempt to summarize information or to generalize across cases. 

Another common category of writing on espionage is the compilation of case histories or 

brief summaries of cases into a collection (e.g., Recent Espionage Cases, 1999; Dobson & 

Payne, 1984; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1987; Maldon Institute, 1986; Nash, 1997; Naval 

Investigative Service Command, n.d.; OíToole, 1988; Polmar & Allen, 1997; Rafalko, n.d.). 

These useful compilations described each case, implicitly inviting the reader to compare them, 

but made little effort to organize the material within a framework or to compare and contrast 

them with each other. Although there is much to learn from the life and actions of the individual 

spy, it is important to supplement case histories by aggregating information across cases, where 

patterns and trends among cases may emerge. 

Among unclassified sources, we found five previous attempts in the literature on 

espionage to perform simple statistical analysis across cases, not including the 1992 version of 

the present report. Three of the five sources appeared in 1988, three years after the exposure of 
3 

the Walker spy ring touched off a flurry of attempts to explain espionage, including initial work 

on this database. 

The first study, The Espionage Threat, produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency 

(Jepson, 1988), looked at 54 cases involving persons affiliated with the Department of Defense 

who were convicted of espionage, conspiracy to commit espionage, or of related unauthorized 

possession or passage of classified information. The cases dated from 1945 to December 1987. 

Jepson developed a chart comparing the individuals in his cohort on variables including: duty 

assignment, age, education, marital status, years of federal service, dates of espionage, foreign 

intelligence agencies involved, motivation, whether the person volunteered or was recruited, area 

of operation, payments, methods of operation, how the person was discovered, materials 

compromised, and penalty. He provided tables of frequencies for nine of his variables. Jepson 

found that 63% of the spies in his study committed espionage for money; all the individuals in 

his study were male; half had high school diplomas and one-fourth held college degrees; half 

were married; one-third of his subjects began spying before the age of 26; and 30% had close ties 

to other countries, such as a foreign spouse. The relatively small number of cases he considered 

limited this otherwise suggestive study, and not all of the cases he included matched our 

definition of espionage. His case studies did offer useful biographical data on the individuals and 

demonstrated the promise of doing further analysis across cases. 

The U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations published a report entitled Volunteers

(Crawford, 1988) that focused on Air Force cases. It abstracted the lives and espionage careers of 

23 Air Force personnel who spied or attempted to spy between 1947 and 1988. The author tried 

to determine if there were common characteristics that could be used by counterintelligence 

personnel to identify and neutralize espionage agents. In addition to the case histories, eight 

variables were presented as tables: age when espionage began, years of federal service, foreign 

influence, career fields, education, motivation, recruitment method, and amount of money 

received for espionage. Crawford concluded that there were no absolute characteristics that could 

be used to profile potential spies. He suggested that many individuals apparently resorted to 

espionage simply because the opportunity presented itself, not because they were much different 

than other Air Force personnel. Like Jepsonís report for DIA, this study provided excellent 

information on the cases it discussed. One limitation was the fact that it dealt only with Air Force 

personnel. 

The third work that attempted simple cross-case analysis was Sandia's report, Profile of 

Espionage Penetration, for the Department of Energy (Brown, 1988). This study reviewed 111 

cases of espionage against the United States or its allies between 1950 and 1987. Of these, 92 

were cases of American citizens prosecuted for espionage. Like Crawford, Brown sought to 

determine a profile of the potential spy that could be useful for counterintelligence. The study 

examined several variables, paying detailed attention to motivation. Motivations were grouped 

into the following categories: revenge, greed, sense of adventure (ego), divided loyalties, 

national pride, emotional or romantic involvement, disloyalty, entrapment and fear (blackmail, 

coercion). The study found a 70% rate of volunteering for espionage and the following 
4 

commonalities among cases: spies appeared to be more intelligent than average; they usually 

committed espionage for money; they were frequently obsessed with espionage matters and often 

involved with intelligence professions; and they often displayed serious character flaws. Among 

military spies, young people who turned to espionage often entered the service with problems, 

found they could not satisfy their material needs on low pay, might be assigned to geographical 

regions where they were vulnerable to recruitment, and had access to classified materials. For 

our purposes, the study was limited because few actual data were presented to substantiate the 

findings. 

Fourthly, a 1997 journal article by Stan A. Taylor and Daniel Snow entitled ìCold War 

Spies: Why They Spied and How They Got Caught,î briefly described an excellent study of 139 

cases from 1935 through 1996 (Intelligence and National Security, 12(2) April 1997). Taylor 

and Snow collected information from unclassified sources on 40 variables for their 139 cases. In 

this article they discussed only two aspects of their findings: motivations for espionage, and how 

spies were caught. Citing examples from cases, they suggested that money, divided loyalties, 

disgruntlement, and ingratiation were the four main motives for espionage, but that fantasy, ego, 

and kinship have been important as well in some cases. In their discussion of shifts in 

government policies, laws, and methods of counterintelligence, Taylor and Snow provided an 

especially useful overview of developments since 1978, when the passage of the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act changed the counterintelligence ground rules. The authors noted 

that this legislation put new teeth into counterintelligence, resulting in more arrests and more 

convictions for espionage, and hence, more cases. In an appendix table they listed their cases by 

name and gave information on seven of their variables: motivation, dates began and ended 

espionage, duration, whether civilian or military, employer, and rank. 

Finally, investigators in an interagency research project named Project SLAMMER 

conducted interviews with convicted spies to collect information on personal characteristics of 

espionage offenders. Between 1983 and 1998 interviewers spoke with convicted spies, often in 

prison, and with some of their friends, co-workers, and family members. They also administered 

psychological tests to many of the interviewees. Using a lengthy interview protocol, researchers 

asked questions meant to increase knowledge about personality factors common among spies and 

situational factors that may have influenced them. Unfortunately, design flaws and procedural 

inconsistencies devalued the results of this effort. These flaws included posing different types 

and numbers of questions to subjects, inconsistent interview conditions between subjects, and 

lack of rigorous definitions of terms; hence the project has been suspended. (Zuravin, 1998) 

This brief survey of the literature demonstrated that although there were various 

unclassified studies presenting information on espionage and the spy population, each was 

incomplete in some way and limited by its focus or its methodology. An unclassified database 

that included as many cases of espionage by American citizens on which information is 

available, and that excluded espionage by non-Americans, would improve the applicability of the 

research on espionage by Americans. Compilation of this database allowed us to do the 

following analyses and helped generate questions for further research. We believe such analyses 

contribute to a more comprehensive picture of espionage. 
5 

Background

The Practice of Soviet Espionage in the United States 

Espionage has been one of the defining interactions between the United States and the 

USSR since the Soviet Union emerged from the Russian revolution in 1917. From Czarist Russia 

the Bolsheviks inherited a long, well-developed tradition of espionage against internal as well as 

external enemies. Operatives arrived in the United States seeking information soon after the 

Bolshevik revolution of 1917. Typically, they focused on infiltrating ÈmigrÈ groups to protect the 

fledgling Soviet state from counterrevolution, but they also sought economic and industrial data 

about America, and they laid a groundwork of committed agents on which to develop sources 

within the federal government. Once the United States recognized the USSR in 1934, the Soviets 

used their new diplomatic cover to facilitate collecting intelligence and making contacts with 

Americans. Starting in 1935, several groups of well-placed Americans gradually drifted into 

service as Soviet agents. Harold Ware, Alger Hiss, Morris Cohen, and Whittaker Chambers, 

among others, began their careers as spies for the Soviets in the mid-to-late 1930s. Most of these 

secretly joined or at least had connections to the American Communist Party, in whose study 

groups they moved from debating Marxism to passing along information in active support of the 

international Communist movement (Haynes and Klehr, 1999). 

 These American agents often acted from idealistic calculations about a world order so 

drastically changed by subsequent events that now it is difficult to recapture that vanished time. 

The severe worldwide depression of the 1930s and the rise of militant fascism in Europe shook 

the complacency of many about capitalismís merits, and led progressive-minded Americans to 

take a friendly interest in the Soviet ìexperiment.î As a result, membership in the American 

Communist Party grew seven-fold during the Great Depression. Before Stalinís paranoia, purges, 

and murderous campaigns against the Russian people were documented in the West, before 

Communist theories were publicly discredited by decades of failure and opportunism, it was 

possible for idealistic Americans in the grip of ìromantic anti-fascismî to see the USSR as the 

worldís best remaining hope (Isserman, 2000). 

The entry of the United States into the war at the end of 1941 marked the end of the first 

small-scale phase of espionage by the Soviets in this country, and the development of expanded 

and centralized professional agent networks. The Soviet Union became the United Statesí ally in 

the European theatre, and American perceptions of the Communist state made an abrupt if 

temporary about-face. From disapproval, Americans now found themselves urged to admire the 

stalwart Russian people and the heroic Red Army that was holding Hitler on the Eastern Front. 

Wartime cooperation between these uneasy allies allowed Soviet intelligence to dig into the 

burgeoning bureaucracy in Washington, where its recruits swelled from dozens in the late 1930s 

to several hundred during the war. According to transcripts of Soviet wartime cables deciphered 

by the National Security Agency (NSA) in the Venona project, codenames of some 350 

cooperating Americans appear in Soviet wartime cable traffic. The finest hour for Soviet 

intelligence gathering during the war came with the penetration of the secret Manhattan project 

by the atom spy ring, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Klaus Fuchs, and their associates (Weinstein 

and Vassilev, 1999; Haynes and Klehr, 1999). 
6 

 As quickly as Soviet espionage in the United States expanded during the war years, 

almost as quickly it began to shrink, starting in 1945 with the defection to the FBI of Elizabeth 

Bentley and her offer to name names. Her revelations were followed by the defection of Igor 

Sergeievitch Gouzenko, a cipher clerk in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. He defected to the 

Canadians in September 1945 with Soviet cipher codes that, when shared with Washington, 

allowed the NSA to make real progress deciphering their large collection of intercepted Soviet 

cables accumulated during the war years. NSA decoded and deciphered parts of the Venona

intercepts from 1946 through the 1970s, although the project remained secret until 1995 (Benson 

& Warner, 1996). Evidence in these intercepts led to the arrest of Fuchs in Britain and, from 

there, to the apprehension of the Rosenbergs and their accomplices. The conviction of Harry 

Gold in 1950, the Rosenberg and Sobell trials in 1951, the perjury convictions of Alger Hiss and 

William Remington, and the two trials of Judith Coplon fueled Senator Joseph McCarthy's claim 

that spies riddled the American government. His campaign to root out all Communist 

sympathizers in and out of government, cynical though it was, focused national attention in the 

early 1950s on the issue of loyalty and the possibility of betrayal by oneís fellow-citizens. One 

result was Executive Order 10450, ìSecurity Requirements for Government Employees,î issued 

by President Eisenhower in 1953, which outlined the federal personnel security policies that 

remain the basic mandate for personnel security into the present. 

The Shifting Policy on Prosecution of Espionage 

In the period between 1950 and 1977, newspapers described a few cases of espionage by 

Americans every year or two. Then suddenly in the late 1970s, the incidence of espionage 

convictions made public increased noticeably, and during the 1980s the pace of reported 

espionage prosecutions exploded into what one observer termed an ìespionage plague.î 

Suddenly, it seemed lots of Americans were willing to spy for the Soviets. Several factors shaped 

this perception and the more complicated reality behind it. There is a certain baseline of 

espionage going on that authorities recognize, but for which too little evidence is available to 

meet the standards demanded to prosecute. The effectiveness of counterintelligence measures has 

varied over time, and they have steadily improved. The perception of a plague also reflected a 

political decision taken in the late 1970s to make spying known by prosecuting espionage. 

Prosecution of espionage has been reluctant in some periods; in others it has been 

diligent. Decisions to prosecute depended on an evaluation of the risks and benefits in doing so: 

the potential risk from discussing secrets in open court versus the potential benefit from publicly 

punishing this type of crime. Shifting prosecution policy on espionage is the main factor, though 

not the only factor, in the apparent peaks and valleys of spying by Americans over time, and it 

obscures the actual incidence of such espionage. It is important to understand that these policy 

shifts worked behind the headlines to shape the public impression that there has been a rising tide 

of espionage over time that peaked in the 1980s. This background also reminds us that it has 

been incidents of espionage that have usually prompted the milestone changes in federal laws 

and policies aimed at countering this crime. 
7 

The slow, hard-won decoding and interpretation of the Venona transcripts in the 1950s 

confirmed to federal authorities that indeed many Americans had participated in the Soviet 

espionage offensive during the war years of the mid-1940s. Many of those spies were identified. 

Some were prosecuted, some cooperated in exchange for light sentences, others fled overseas, 

and others were able to stonewall the FBI and get off. Only a handful of American citizens were 

convicted of espionage during the 1950s because during that period the federal government often 

chose to ìease outî or ìneutralizeî wartime spies and new cases rather than to prosecute them. 

An important example of how stonewalling about wartime espionage was possible in the 

early 1950s was the case of William Weisband, who had spied for the Soviets throughout the 

1940s and had used his position as an Army officer at NSA to gather information about 

communications secrets for the Soviets.1

 It was Weisband who revealed the existence of the 

Venona project to the Soviets in 1946, thereby warning them that NSA could read some of their 

cable traffic. 

The FBI eventually identified Weisband in 1953 (in an ironic turnabout, he was identified 

through the Venona intercepts, the program he had betrayed), but he refused to admit his guilt. 

Since the very existence of the Venona intercepts remained highly classified and the cables could 

not be referenced as the source that had led to Weisbandís identification, without evidence that 

they were willing to discuss in open court, prosecutors backed off. Weisband spent only a year in 

jail for contempt of court, effectively getting away with long-term, very damaging espionage 

(Haynes & Klehr, 1999; Dobbs, 1996b; Briscoe, 2000). 

Another of the wartime figures who volunteered to spy for the Soviets and who later 

escaped prosecution during the early Cold War was a young Harvard physicist named Theodore 

Hall. The American public learned of his espionage only in 1996 from Venona materials released 

by NSA. In 1943, Hall had passed atom bomb secrets to the Soviets to prevent an atomic 

monopoly for the United States, which he feared would lead to destabilizing hegemony. The FBI 

investigated him in the early 1950s but, uncertain of their evidence and unwilling to reveal 

Venona, they declined to prosecute. Hall left the country and lived out the rest of a long, 

comfortable life in Cambridge, England (Albright and Kunstel, 1997; Dobbs, 1996a). 

These investigations of wartime espionage bridged the period between the end of the 

world war and the beginning of nuclear competition during the early years of the Cold War. In 

this study we did not include atom bomb spies such as the Rosenbergs, or Weisband and Hall in 

order to focus on the issues of bi-polar competition defined by the Cold War, but there was no 

sharp break dividing these periods. In the 1950s the FBI was busy finishing up wartime spy cases 

while at the same time it was responding to new, Cold War cases. 

Most of the cases prosecuted between 1950 and 1965 involved military men and military 

settings: 10 were serving members of the military and four others were civilians who worked for 

one of the military services overseas. Only five of the 22 individuals in this 15-year period were 

 

1

 Weisband is not included in the espionage database because his espionage focused on the war and post-war years. 
8 

civilians from intelligence agencies: Irvin Scarbeck, who worked for the State Department, and 

four individuals from NSA, Joseph Petersen, Bernon Mitchell, William Martin, and Victor 

Hamilton, a disgruntled former employee (Rafalko, n.d.[Scarbeck]; Polmar & Allen, 1997 

[Petersen]; Bamford, 1982 [Martin and Mitchell]; Hiatt, 1992 [Hamilton]). 

These findings reflect the impact of two factors: During this period the KGB 

concentrated its recruiting of spies on Department of Defense personnel stationed overseas; and 

in 1954 the CIA and the Justice Department signed a secret agreement that allowed the CIA 

alone to decide, should one of its agents be accused of a crime, including espionage, whether or 

not to refer the agent to the Justice Department for investigation. The CIAís decision to refer 

depended on whether in their judgment publicity about the matter would damage national 

security (Bell, 1982). Not surprisingly, few cases of espionage by intelligence agents surfaced 

under this policy. 

Between 1966 and 1975, our database records that 11 cases of espionage by Americans 

were prosecuted. Continuing the earlier military focus into this period of espionage, 9 of them 

came before military courts. According to materials in Volume 3 of the useful three-volume 

compilation of documents and case summaries edited by Frank J. Rafalko, the intelligence 

contest during this period of Cold War with the Soviets revolved in part around the hot war in 

Vietnam. Along with the military conflict and eventual defeat of American forces in South 

Vietnam, it was a time of domestic protest and turmoil in the United States over the war. Two 

administrations, under Presidents Johnson and Nixon, encouraged the FBI to undertake domestic 

surveillance and disruptive activities against anti-war and civil rights groups, and these activities 

took resources away from FBI counterintelligence, leaving fewer agents and less time to 

investigate spies. The CIA also strayed into controversial areas in a program that traced possible 

foreign influences on domestic groups that opposed government policies. These domestic 

programs distracted attention from the ongoing Soviet intelligence gathering (Rafalko, n.d.). 

The Justice Department during these years agreed with the position taken by the 

intelligence agencies: that prosecuting spies did more harm than good because it was likely to 

invite retaliation against American agents abroad; it ruined intelligence agents as assets for future 

use; and it revealed to our adversaries what we knew and did not know (Bell, 1982). The 

preferred approach was to identify and quietly neutralize spies in order to control the loss of 

secrets and to avoid the admission of failure that a spy represents (Tyler, 1985). 

Three of the 11 cases of American espionage from this period (1966 through 1975) 

reflect this approach: in two Air Force cases individuals received immunity from prosecution for 

their cooperation. A third spy, Norman Rees, agreed to become a double agent for the FBI after 

the bureau uncovered his unusually long career, which ran from 1942 to 1971, as an industrial 

spy for the Soviets. Warned in 1975 that the press was about to print stories revealing his identity 

as a spy, Rees committed suicide. How many other cases were handled in ways that were not 

reported in open sources we do not know (Blau, 1976). 
9 

The secret agreement between the CIA and the Justice Department on prosecution of 

espionage by CIA employees, which was renewed in 1960 and again in 1964, was still in effect 

in 1975, when the Rockefeller Commission stumbled onto its existence while investigating the 

intelligence agencies. In February 1976, President Ford ended the secret agreement by executive 

order, and in effect this opened up the first real possibility of prosecuting intelligence agency 

employees for their crimes, including espionage (Bell, 1982; Allen and Polmar, 1988). 

A confluence of espionage cases in the mid-1970s and shifts of administration between 

the Nixon, Ford, and Carter presidencies markedly changed the federal policy on prosecuting 

espionage. Early in 1977 the Carter administration, prodded by Attorney General Griffin Bell, 

took a new position on espionage prosecution. In 1975 and 1976 Congress had scrutinized the 

intelligence agencies and the FBI in a series of investigations into illegal surveillance and 

harassment of American citizens, and new regulations had been enacted that tightened up on the 

abuses they found. Wire-tapping without a court order was a main focus of complaint, raising 

questions about a citizenís rights, under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as 

opposed to the nationís interests in protecting its secrets. Reflecting the skepticism of the times 

about some of the intelligence communityís positions that seemed self-serving, Bell questioned 

the typical disinclination to prosecute spies. In a later interview he explained that ìÖthe 

intelligence community had come to believe that every time you prosecuted a spy you would 

lose the secret, and that it was better public policyóthe best of two evilsóto let the spy go and 

keep the secret. But I had the idea that you could prosecute these cases without losing the secret 

(quoted in Tyler, 1985, p. 4).î 

The only American espionage case to surface from the Vietnam conflict gave Bell a 

chance to test whether he could prosecute espionage without ìlosing the secret.î Ronald 

Humphrey, employed at the U.S. Information Agency, was arrested early in 1978 after an 

investigation of his friend, David Truong, a politically well-connected immigrant from Vietnam, 

determined he had classified State Department cables in his apartment. Using a courier, Truong 

had been sending secret information he got from Humphrey to the North Vietnamese delegation 

at the Paris peace talks. The investigation of Humphrey broke new ground when the FBI 

installed its first hidden television bug in his workplace to watch him removing documents (Bell, 

1982). 

When confronted, Humphrey claimed he had supplied this information hoping to 

influence Vietnamese officials to release his common-law wife and her four children from 

communist Vietnam (McAllister, 1978; Dickey & Seaberry, 1978). The CIA opposed 

prosecuting Truong and Humphrey for espionage because, unknown to Truong, the courier he 

had been employing was a double agent for the CIA. If she testified in open court, the agency 

would lose her valuable insider information about the Vietnamese government. Nevertheless, the 

Justice Department did prosecute Humphrey and Truong for espionage, the courier did testify, 

and Humphrey and Truong each received a 15-year prison sentence (Bell, 1982). 
10 

Another turning point during 1977 and 1978, a period when conflicting interests over 

espionage prosecution coalesced, was the case of William Kampiles. Neither the CIA nor the 

Department of Defense wanted Kampiles prosecuted, and the fight over this issue shaped the 

approach that was emerging toward spy prosecutions.2

Kampiles was 23 years old and worked at the CIA as a trainee from March to November, 

1977. In his job as a watch officer, he routed intelligence reports around the world. Kampiles 

resigned in disappointment after he received a poor evaluation that dimmed his chance to 

become a field agent; he took a Top Secret manual for the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite from 

his shelf on his way out the door. This satellite represented the most sophisticated American 

surveillance technology then in operation. Kampiles sold the manual to a Soviet military attachÈ 

in Greece for a mere $3,000, and then he wrote to the CIA portraying his actions as a double 

agent ploy. Eventually he confessed to selling the manual from spite. Kampilesí trial did little for 

the agencyís public image, since it revealed laxness in handling of classified materials. A search 

showed that Kampilesí pilfered copy was only one of 13 manuals for the KH-11 missing at the 

agency (Sheppard, Jr., 1978; Associated Press, 1978). 

The Defense Department argued against even admitting the existence of the KH-11 

satellite in open court, much less introducing the manual itself as evidence. Several of the 

procedures first worked out during the Kampiles trial, including limited viewing of secret 

evidence by only the judge, the attorneys, and the jury, and closed hearings on specific sensitive 

issues, would be incorporated into new legislation on espionage prosecution (Bell, 1982.) 

Congress adopted two new laws in an effort to balance the conflicting but legitimate 

interests of both intelligence gathering and law enforcement. First, it passed the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978. FISA established a secret court of seven U.S. 

District Court judges who meet monthly to hear Justice Department applications for various 

types of surveillance (among them telephone wiretaps, television surveillance, vehicle tracking 

transmitters, and radio transmission interceptions) for gathering foreign intelligence that may or 

may not find espionage by U.S. citizens. Under usual procedures for investigating and 

prosecuting criminals, these methods of surveillance would be deemed unconstitutional searches 

or seizures, so FISA required the Attorney General to certify that the ìprimary purposeî of the 

proposed wiretap was to listen in on a foreign spy or terroristócounterintelligence, not criminal 

prosecution. This line is a fine one, since a successful counterintelligence operation might result 

in a criminal trial for espionage. Each year since its enactment more applications have been 

submitted to the FISA court; from 319 requests in 1980 the number has climbed to 1012 in 2000 

(Tyler, 1985; Federation of American Scientists, 2001). So far the FISA court has approved all 

but one application.3

 

2

 Bell dealt with several other important espionage cases early in his career as Attorney General, including Edwin 

Moore in December 1976 (Moore had been a CIA employee), and defense contractor employee Christopher Boyce 

and his accomplice Andrew Daulton Lee in 1978. 

3

 Recent legislation passed as the U.S.A Patriot Act, December 2001, in response to the campaign against terrorism, 

shifts many of the responsibilities between agencies and blurs distinctions between the FBI, the CIA, and the 

Department of Justice that were set up under FISA. See Jim McGee, ìAn Intelligence Giant in the Making,î The 

Washington Post (November 4, 2001), p. A04. 
11 

FISA procedures have noticeably strengthened counterespionage tools and therefore they 

have contributed to more arrests and convictions. Later amendments to the law have added 

physical entry and searches to the procedures covered by the special FISA jurisdiction. Starting 

in the late 1970s, the exposure of secrets in the course of investigating their potential 

compromise during preparation of a prosecution has been limited to the seven FISA judges (who 

are given rigorous background investigations), and a selected set of Justice Department attorneys 

who handle such cases. The assurance that secrets will be protected has encouraged agencies to 

pursue and prosecute spies (General Accounting Office, 2001).4

A second law, the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) of 1980, extended this 

protection of secrets from the development of a prosecution into the courtroom itself. CIPA 

institutionalized procedures first used during the 1977 espionage trial of Christopher Boyce. 

Boyce and his childhood friend, Andrew Daulton Lee, sold classified information to the Soviets. 

Boyce stole documents from a secure vault where he worked as a defense contractor employee 

for TRW; Lee flew to Mexico City and sold them. Boyceís attorney made veiled threats (these 

kind of threats came to be called ìgreymailî) to reveal the content of the classified information in 

open court as a ploy to get a plea bargain (Lindsey, 1977a; Lindsey, 1977b). In response, the trial 

judge held closed hearings to review the materials himself, and decided these particular 

documents were irrelevant to the defense case. CIPA allows this type of private evidentiary 

hearings, and it also permits a judge to protect the content of classified materials by introducing 

summaries of the materials instead of the full texts (Serrill, 1984). 

These laws, and the reversal in attitude on the part of the government to prosecute rather 

than to neutralize spies, made possible the torrent of espionage prosecutions that swept through 

the 1980s. More counterespionage agents were hired who could take advantage of the new laws: 

the Reagan administration claimed that between 1981 and 1985 personnel devoted to 

counterespionage had doubled (Morganthau, et al., 1985). Technological means of surveillance 

improved steadily in these years as well, adding to the ability of agents to successfully track and 

monitor suspects during investigations. 

Sixty-two Americans were arrested for espionage-related crimes during the 1980s, 

ranging from David Barnett, a CIA agent, in August 1980 to Zoltan Szabo and Thomas Mortati, 

the mastermind and a minor accomplice in the Conrad ring, in May and December of 1989 

(Taubman, 1980 [Barnett]; Herrington, 1999 [Szabo and Mortati]). The public outcry over the 

increased numbers of spy cases in the mid-1980s has since led to repeated investigations and 

efforts to improve the security of classified information and the procedures for granting security 

clearances, and to reduce the number of people with access: the number of security clearances 

granted in the Department of Defense dropped from 4.3 million in 1985 to 2.1 million in 2000 

(Department of Defense, 2001). Under the FISA and CIPA procedures, espionage prosecutions 

 

4

 However, a pattern of difficulties in coordinating FBI investigations of possible espionage with DOJ prosecutions 

of espionage has apparently developed since 1978 when FISA was enacted. The Wen Ho Lee investigation 

prompted a thorough investigation of this issue; the report is scathing about the ìdysfunctionalî relations between 

the DOJ Criminal Division and the FBI. See George Lardner, Jr., ìReport Criticizes Stumbling Block Between FBI 

Espionage Prosecutors,î The Washington Post (December 13, 2001), p A03. 
12 

have continued aggressively during and after the 1990s, netting some of the most serious cases in 

the history of espionage by Americans, including Aldrich Ames in 1994, Earl Pitts in 1997, and 

Robert Hanssen in 2001. 

 

Methodology

Sources

We used newspaper and magazine accounts, biographies, general published works on 

espionage, and collections of case histories compiled by other researchers. We consulted on-line 

research tools such as Lexis-Nexis, on-line database search engines, and the Federal Research 

Division of the Library of Congress for additional leads on information about the more obscure 

cases. We checked for certain missing information in the classified investigative files of several 

federal agencies, but we maintained only unclassified information in the database. 

Criteria for What Constitutes Espionage in This Study 

The target population in this study was American citizens involved in espionage between 

roughly 1947 and 2001 on which unclassified, public sources of information were available. The 

database was first designed to investigate espionage starting from the end of World War II. 

Recently, in light of the many cases revealed in the Venona project, we moved cases in which 

espionage began before or during the war into a separate database, and we now include here only a 

few cases that began in the 1940s, either because they resembled the early Cold War cases or, in 

the case of Norman Rees, because uniquely he spied for the Soviets from the 1940s into the early 

1970s. However, ìinvolved in espionageî is not a straightforward matter. To commit espionage, 

one must take several steps: procure National Defense Information (NDI) (NDI is defined in the 

espionage statute in United States Code Title 18, starting in section 793), which is usually but not 

necessarily classified, either by stealing it oneself or by prevailing on an accomplice with access 

to steal it; then make contact with a recipient of the information; and lastly, transfer the 

information to the recipient. 

Included in the database are not only instances of espionage convictions, but also cases of 

attempted and intended espionagein which the person was caught before completing all the 

stepsthat would not result in conviction for espionage. Individuals in these cases were 

sometimes indicted for lesser crimes, or if they were indicted for espionage, the indictment may 

have been plea-bargained down to lesser charges in exchange for information, or from lack of 

evidence, or to protect counterintelligence methods. Lesser charges typically include conspiracy 

to communicate national defense information to a foreign government, or acting as an agent of a 

foreign government, or theft of government property, or conspiracy to gather information 

knowing it would be useful to a foreign government, or even simple mishandling of classified 

documents. 

Therefore, the research strategy here was not to start from the consequences of the crime, 

looking for anyone convicted of espionage, but instead from the charges, the investigation, and 

the evidence of intention, and to make judgments on whether the person was trying to convey 

information to the detriment of his or her country, or was simply careless with security. 
13 

 Some cases that are listed in other espionage studies did not demonstrate intent or 

attempt to commit espionage, so we excluded them from our database. For example, individuals 

found with classified documents who were convicted of security violations, but for whom there 

was no evidence of attempted or intended espionage, were excluded. Admittedly, after the fact it 

is difficult to be certain what individuals intended, and they may not even know themselves. 

The initial report in 1992 was based on a database that then included 117 individuals. We 

added 33 cases that were either more recent or for which data previously had been unavailable. 

There are currently 150 individuals in PERSERECís espionage database. Appendix A lists their 

names, when they began spying, their dates of arrest, organizational affiliation, intended or 

actual recipient of their information, and whether they were volunteers or recruits. 

Three of the original operative criteria for inclusion in the database were also followed in 

this later version. They are: 

1. Individuals convicted of espionage or conspiracy to commit espionage, or for 

attempting espionage, or for admitting that they intended to commit espionage 

(114 individuals), 

2. Individuals prosecuted for espionage but who committed suicide before the trial 

or sentencing could be completed (4 individuals), 

3. Individuals for whom clear evidence of espionage (actual or attempted) existed, 

even though they were not prosecuted. This category included cases involving 

defections, deaths at early stages in an investigation, and those administratively 

processed (e.g., allowed to retire, given immunity, discharged from the military) 

(14 individuals). 

For this updated report we included a fourth criterion in the research that reflects the fact of pleabargaining to lesser charges by defendants: 

4. Clear evidence of actual or attempted espionage, indicted under espionage 

charges, but prosecuted for an offense other than espionage (18 individuals). 

The 150 cases include individuals with and without security clearances, unemployed as 

well as employed people, and native born as well as naturalized citizens of the United States. 

They include people in government service, military officers and enlisted personnel, civilian 

contractors, and others working in a variety of jobs unrelated to the government. Data are current 

as of September 2001. Two individuals, Brian P. Regan and Ana Belen Montes, who have been 

arrested recently but were not yet sentenced at this writing, are not included in the database 

analyses, but based on our files we refer to them in the text. As new cases of espionage emerge, 

they will be added to the database. 
14 

Selection and Coding of Variables in the Database 

Five categories of information were gathered: biographical, employment and security 

clearance, the act of espionage, motivation, and consequences. Within these categories, we 

selected variables that would be available from open sources and would provide a rich array of 

background data on spies. Included were personal and demographic information, aspects of the 

individualís job environment, their access to classified information, how they first got involved 

with espionage, how their careers as spies evolved, and how those careers ended. Information 

was collected on whether they volunteered or were recruited and by whom; on their motivations 

for committing espionage; and details on their indictment, conviction, and sentence. Some 

variables were included for identification and documentary purposes only and were not used for 

analysis. Some were qualifying descriptors for other variables, e.g., foreign relative qualifier

provides details about the previous variable, foreign relative, which is just coded Yes, No or 

Unknown. 

Variables added to the database since the 1992 report provided us with more detail on 

personal and employment histories. The new variables include information on antisocial 

behaviors, criminal histories, life-changing personal events, security clearance details, financial 

irresponsibility, unexplained affluence, and foreign relatives. By collecting information on these 

variables where it is available, we hope to better document two factors: observable behaviors that 

violated suitability standards for security clearances; and life events, or ìtriggers,î that could 

make someone vulnerable to recruitment or desperate enough to undertake espionage. 

For most of the variables, data are available for all or many of the 150 spies. However, 

for some of these recent variables dealing with suitability and personal vulnerabilities, public 

sources yield less complete data. Variables for which some data are missing due to the difficulty 

of obtaining information from open source literature, and for which confidence in their 

applicability across cases therefore should be somewhat lower, include: immoderate alcohol or 

illegal drug use, loyalty indicators, life status changes, antisocial behaviors, deception on 

clearance applications, unexplained affluence, foreign relatives, sexual preference, and payment 

received. 

Variables that are subject to change over time were coded according to their status at the 

time when espionage began. For example, marital status was coded according to whether the 

individual was married, separated, divorced, or single when they started spying. Likewise, we 

coded job organization according to the organization for which the individual worked when he 

or she first got into espionage, and included a modifier field to track subsequent employment 

history. 

The following coding procedures were used when data shaded into uncertainty. 

Individuals were only coded as being immoderate users of alcohol or users of illegal drugs if we 

had definitive information from open sources; likewise, we coded them as having foreign 

relatives only on definitive information, not inferences. It is possible that there were more spies 

who would have been placed into those categories but for whom data were missing. 
15 

On the variable sexual preference, we coded individuals as heterosexual if they were 

married, divorced or separated, or if they were single and there was evidence they were 

interested in heterosexual relationships. They were coded as ìunknownî if they were single and 

there was no indication of either heterosexual or homosexual relationships, or in cases where 

homosexuality was merely alleged. Thus in 34 cases sexual preference was coded as Unknown. 

For the variable payment received, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to know 

precisely how much a spy was paid. In many cases the amounts reported in open sources only 

reflect the U.S. government's best guess as to the amount received based largely on what could 

be proved in a court of law. The period of time covered by this report is 50 years, and the value 

of the dollar has changed radically during that period. While it would have been technically 

possible to convert all amounts spies are said to have received over the past 50 years into current 

dollar values, this would only compound the initial inaccuracy of the best guesses. Accordingly, 

monies supposedly received are reported in the original dollar amounts and then analyzed in 

broad groupings. 

Analytical Approach in This Study 

We contend that based on what we know from available data, there is no ìtypical spy,î 

and therefore there is no set of characteristics that could be used to ìprofileî a spy. This study 

does not try to produce a profile. Instead, the data presented in this study should lead to a better 

understanding of espionage. Espionage is a rare crime, and the most appropriate analytical 

approach to it is to use simple descriptive statistics, i.e., frequencies of single variables and cross 

tabulations of several variables. 

 In the analyses for this study, frequencies were first calculated on data for the basic 

characteristics of espionage within the categories of personal attributes. Then the variables were 

explored in terms of these issues: 

 

Whether individuals who were intercepted before they passed information differed 

from those who did pass information. For those who were not intercepted and who 

thus did complete an act of espionage, the length of an espionage career was coded 

into three categories: espionage lasted less than 1 year, espionage lasted 1-4.9 years, or 

espionage lasted for 5 years or more. People who completed an act of espionage were 

dubbed ìsuccessfulî spies, only in the sense that they did succeed in passing 

information. 

Whether uniformed military differed from civilian spies. 

Whether individuals differed by how they came into espionage. This was coded into 

three categories: volunteers, those recruited by family or friends, and those recruited 

by a foreign intelligence service. 

Whether American spies have differed over time in terms of the motivations that led 

them to commit espionage. 
16 

Whether American spies who committed espionage alone differed from those who 

worked with a partner or from those who worked as part of a group. 

Whether American female spies were distinctive. 

Thus the following Results and Discussion section reports results of our database analyses, 

supplemented with research and illustrations from our files, in a series of sections. In the first 

section, we present an overview of basic characteristics such as personal attributes, employment 

and clearance status, qualities of the act of espionage, and consequences these individuals 

suffered. In the second section we compare cases by the length of their espionage. The third 

section compares military offenders with civilians. The fourth section compares cases by 

whether people volunteered or were recruited, and if they were recruited, whether by a foreign 

intelligence service or by family or friends. In the fifth section we compare motivations for 

espionage in the various time periods and how prevalence of various motives have changed over 

time. In the sixth section we compare lone spies with those who worked with partners or in 

groups. In the seventh section we consider characteristics of the American female spies. 

In the final sections of the Results and Discussion, we apply some of our findings on 

espionage to various aspects of the personnel security system, including the criteria for personnel 

security that are expressed in the federal Adjudicative Guidelines; patterns we find in espionage 

that could be used to improve the security clearance system; and security awareness issues in 

relation to our findings, including co-worker reporting and position vulnerability assessment. 

The last sections offer trends in the number of Americans spying over the last half-century and 

trends in the recipients for whom they worked. 

Results and Discussion 

In these analyses, we first report results in tables. The text accompanying the tables draws 

attention to highlights of the results, rather than describing all of the results. Discussion is 

integrated into each section, and includes implications, examples of illustrative cases, and other 

considerations. Examples and illustrations are drawn from the available information in 

PERSERECís files on individuals in the database. For a listing of the names of cases included, 

see Appendix A.

Overview of Basic Characteristics of American Espionage Offenders 

This section presents data on basic characteristics of the 150 cases in the database. Table 

1 reports some of the personal attributes. Percentages in this and in all the subsequent tables are 

based on the number of known cases for each variable. 
17 

Table 1 

Personal Attributes

Characteristics n % 

Gender (n=150) 

Male 

Female 

 

 139 93 

 11 7 

Race/Ethnicity (n=141) 

White 

Black 

Hispanic 

Others 

 118 84 

 9 6 

 7 5 

 7 5 

Age when espionage began (n=147) 

Less than 20 

20 to 29 

30 to 39 

40 or more 

 

 9 6 

59 40 

40 27 

39 27 

 

Education, in years (n=133) 

10 years 

12 years 

14 years 

16 years 

18 years 

 9 7 

52 39 

26 20 

27 20 

19 14 

Martial status when espionage began 

(n=140) 

Married 

Single 

Separated or divorced 

80 57 

46 33 

14 10

Sexual preference (n=116) 

Heterosexual 

Homosexual 

 110 95 

 6 5 

Citizenship (n=148) 

Born in U.S. 

Naturalized 

 122 83 

26 17 

Had foreign attachments (n=150) 

Yes 

No or unknown 

66 44 

84 56 

As Table 1 shows, most American spies have been men; only 7% were women. Most 

were white, 84%, and almost half were young, 29 years old or less. Seen as a whole, espionage 

by Americans has been a young white manís crime. Of those for whom we know the level of 

their education, almost half had only a high school education or less, but one-fifth had earned 
18 

bachelorís degrees and 13% held graduate degrees. More than half were married when they 

began espionage, and the group was overwhelmingly heterosexual; 95% of the 116 cases for 

which sexual preference can be documented were heterosexual. (Table 14 presents patterns in the 

espionage of women spies.) 

All the individuals in the database were American citizens, since this was one of the 

criteria for inclusion: 83% were native born, while 17% were naturalized citizens. This 

represents four times the proportion of naturalized citizens in the U.S. population as a whole, in 

which, according the 2000 decennial census, naturalized citizens were 3.8% of the population 

(U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). Given this higher proportion of naturalized foreign-born citizens in 

the espionage database, it is not surprising that 44% of the group as a whole had what we have 

called ìforeign attachments.î These attachments included close family relatives living abroad, 

emotional ties to persons such as fiancÈes or friends who were foreign born, or regular business 

or professional relationships with persons living overseas. 

Table 2 

Employment and Clearance

Characteristics n % 

Civilian or uniformed military (n=150) 

Civilian 

Uniformed military 

 77 51 

 73 49

Rank of uniformed military (n=67) 

E1 ñE3 

E4 ñE6 

E7 ñ WO 

Officer 

 13 19 

 34 51 

 13 19 

 7 11 

Type of employment during espionage (n=148) 

Uniformed military 

Civil servant 

Government contractor 

Job unrelated 

 73 49 

 27 18 

 35 24 

 13 9

Occupational field when espionage began (n=148) 

Communications/intelligence 

General/technical 

Scientific/professional 

Functional support/administrative 

Miscellaneous 

 49 33 

 38 26 

 26 18 

 24 16 

 11 7

Security clearance when espionage began (n=141) 

Top secret SCI 

Top secret 

Secret 

Confidential 

None held during espionage 

 21 15 

 50 35 

 29 21 

 4 3 

 37 26 
19 

Table 2 demonstrates that the 150 individuals in the database were almost evenly divided 

between civilians and uniformed military: 77 civilians and 73 military personnel. Instances of 

military espionage clustered in the E4-E6 ranks (34 cases), which comprised half of those for 

whom rank is known. The number of young military personnel equaled that of the more 

experienced E7s and warrant officers, with 13 in each group, and there were seven serving 

military officers: two Navy, two Army, and three Air Force officers. 

Among civilians, government contractors made up nearly one quarter of all cases, and 

this was the largest category of civilians. Civil servants constituted 18% of all cases, while in 9% 

of the cases an individualís current employment was unrelated to his or her espionage. In these 

latter cases, the person typically attempted to sell information from memory, relying on access in 

previous employment, or worked with others who did have access to sensitive information. Not 

surprisingly, given the increasing reliance on technologies of all kinds and the types of 

information most sought by intelligence services, one-third of persons in the database worked in 

communications or intelligence fields, and another quarter worked in general or technical fields. 

Half of the individuals for whom we know their level of security clearance held either 

Top Secret or Top Secret SCI clearances, which we would expect, since these clearances grant 

access to highly sensitive information valued by intelligence adversaries. What is more 

unexpected is the number of persons spying without a security clearance. 

One-quarter of the individuals in the database held no security clearance. Many of these 

acted as accomplices of persons who did have clearances. Some passively but knowingly 

enjoyed the fruits of a spouseís spying, such as Rosario Ames or Anne Pollard; others like James 

Durwood Harper, took advantage of a spouseís clearance to convince her to siphon materials 

from her bossís office safe that he could sell (Miller & Pincus, 1994 [Rosario Ames, Anne 

Pollard]; Witt, 1985 [Harper]). Thirteen individuals relied on the clearances of friends or 

colleagues for access, including Andrew Daulton Lee who served as courier for his friend 

Christopher Boyce. Boyceís high-level clearance in 1977 gave him, but not Lee, access to 

salable information in the government contractorís vault where he worked. Ten years later in 

1987, Kurt Stand exploited the access of his willing partner, a government lawyer named 

Therese Squillacote (Rawitch, 1977 [Lee and Boyce]; Masters, 1998a [Stand, Squillacote]). 

Individuals without current access to classified information found various ways to 

commit espionage. Eight individuals in the database sold information based on their earlier 

cleared access after they no longer held a clearance. Some of these stockpiled documents for 

later sale after they retired, such as Edwin Moore, a disgruntled CIA officer who tried to sell his 

stash to the Soviets in 1976 (Meyers, 1977). Others relied on their memories to divulge classified 

operations they had witnessed. These included David Barnett, a former CIA officer who detailed 

to the Soviets in 1980 the agencyís collection methods in Indonesia on Soviet weapons systems, 

and Ronald Pelton, a retired NSA analyst, who relied on his excellent memory to reveal highly 

sensitive NSA projects in oral debriefings by the KGB (Taubman, 1980 [Barnett]; Brumley, 

1986 [Pelton]). 
20 

Five people stole classified materials outright, such as the recent case of Timothy Smith 

in April 2000, who swiped computer disks from a shipboard desk (Skolnik, 2000). One 

individual, Edward O. Buchanan, admitted in 1985 that he entered the Air Force planning to sell 

classified information, but he was caught in his maneuvers before his clearance was approved 

(Crawford, 1988). Finally, seven individuals have been prosecuted for espionage or attempted 

espionage who did not hold security clearances and did not sell classified information. What they 

sold or passed to foreign intelligence was deemed sensitive enough to the national defense to 

justify being treated as espionage. These cases include Norman Rees, who passed industrial 

intelligence related to the American oil industry from 1942 to 1975, and Albert Sombolay, who 

was charged with betraying troop dispositions during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 (Blau, 

1976 [Rees]; Associated Press, 1991; Thompson, 1991 [Sombolay]). 

Table 3 

Patterns in the Act of Espionage

Characteristics n %

Duration (n=150) 

Intercepted 39 26 

Less than 1 year 30 20 

1 to 4.9 years 49 33 

5 or more years 32 21 

Volunteer or recruit (n=148) 

Volunteer 94 64 

Recruit 54 36 

Intercepted or passed information (n=150) 

Intercepted 39 26 

Passed information 111 74 

Method used to begin espionage (n=141) 

Contact foreign agent 21 15 

Contact foreign embassy 50 35 

Go-between 9 7 

Other methods 7 5 

Recruited 54 38 

Location where espionage began (n=147) 

Outside the U.S. 50 34 

U.S. east coast 58 39 

U.S. west coast 22 15 

U.S. other locations 17 12 
21 

Characteristics n %

Location where espionage began, outside U.S. (n=50) 

Western Europe 33 66 

Asia and Southeast Asia 10 20 

Eastern Europe 3 6 

Africa 2 4 

Middle East 1 2 

South America 1 2 

Countries or regions that received information (n=109) 

Soviet Union/Russia 57 52 

Eastern Bloc other than Soviet Union 22 20 

Asia and Southeast Asia 11 10 

Central or South America 7 6 

Middle East 6 6 

Western Europe 3 3 

Africa 3 3 

Decade espionage began (n=150) 

1940s 5 3 

1950s 12 8 

1960s 22 15 

1970s 26 17 

1980s 64 43 

1990s 20 13 

2000s 1 <1 

Decade espionage ended (n=150) 

1940s 1 <1 

1950s 6 4 

1960s 22 15 

1970s 17 11 

1980s 65 44 

1990s 35 23 

2000s 4 3 

Table 3 suggests that when we consider duration of espionage by Americans, it appears 

that espionage is typically a risky and a short-lived crime. One quarter of all cases were 

intercepted before they passed information, and only one-fifth of the cases persisted five years or 

more. Americans were twice as likely to volunteer to spy than they were to be recruited: 64% 

volunteered compared to 36% who were recruited. Of those who volunteered, one-third got in 

touch with a foreign embassy as their method of initiating contact with a foreign intelligence 

service, and another 15% contacted a foreign intelligence agent directly as, for example, Robert 

Hanssen did in 1985 when he mailed his initial offer to the home of a Soviet embassy official. 

(Risen, 2001) The east coast of the United States has served as the most common location for 

initiating American espionage, nearly 40% of the cases, which reflects the concentration there of 

federal government and military offices and facilities, the major intelligence agencies, many 

industrial facilities, and the embassies and other facilities of foreign countries. 
22 

Of the one-third of all cases in the database that were initiated outside the United States, 

66% of those began in Western European countries and another 20% began in Asia or Southeast 

Asia. Of the 109 instances in which we know the country that received information from an 

American spy, half of these went to the former Soviet Union and another one-fifth went to other 

countries in the former Soviet bloc. This documents the long contest between the United States 

and the USSR during the Cold War, which is the context for most of our cases. More surprising 

is the global ubiquity of the remaining instances. 

Neutral or friendly countries in every region of the world, from Asia to Africa, the 

Middle East to Central America, including some of our close allies in Western Europe, have 

bought or received sensitive information from American citizens: South Africa, Egypt, El 

Salvador, Ghana, Liberia, Russia, Israel, Philippines, Ecuador, France, Japan, Greece, 

Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, and in the case of an American intelligence 

officer sending classified photographs to a British defense publication, the United Kingdom. 

Since our database represents the subset of espionage by American citizens that has been 

discussed in open source literature, we can report only the number of Americans we know about 

who were spying at a given point in time. There may have been many spies that were not 

identified, and others whose files remain classified. Other factors, including the shifting policies 

on prosecutions for espionage and what methods of surveillance and counterintelligence were 

being used or were legally permissible at a given point, have affected the number of arrests for 

espionage and their prosecution. Given these limitations, inferences from these cases about the 

prevalence of espionage at various points in time are tentative. Looking at the decade in which 

an individual began espionage, these cases show a rate of beginning to spy at about one per year 

in the 1950s (we excluded all but three cases that began before 1950 in order to focus on the 

Cold War context), a rate that increased to about two per year through the 1960s and 1970s, after 

which the number of cases exploded in the 1980s to six per year, when 65 individuals, 44% of 

our total, started spying or attempted to start. The rate of starting espionage then dropped back in 

the 1990s to the earlier rate of two per year, although additional cases may come to light that 

would increase that rate. 

On the other hand, looking at the decade in which individuals ended their espionage 

(whether by arrest, suicide, plea bargain, defection, or some other outcome) suggests an equally 

pronounced concentration of cases in the 1980s, but an increased rate of cases that were brought 

to a close in the 1990s. The rate of ending espionage cases was only one every other year in the 

1950s; it increased to two per year in the 1960s, dropped off to about one per year in the 1970s, 

and then exploded to six per year, or 44% of the total, in the 1980s. (The 65 individuals who 

began espionage in the 1980s are not all the same people whose espionage ended during that 

period, but some of them were the same, since this group does include the larger number of 

intercepted volunteers in that decade.) For the 12 years from 1990 through 2001, 37 individuals 

have had espionage careers stopped, which is one-fourth of the cases in the database. 
23 

Table 4 

Consequences

Characteristics n % 

Payment (n=64)a

$50 ñ 999 

$1,000 ñ 9,999 

$10,000 ñ 99,999 

$100,000 ñ 999,999 

$1 million or more 

10 

15 

23 

12 

4 

16 

23 

36 

19 

 6 

Initial sentence in years (n=130)b

 .1 ñ 4.9 yrs 

 5 ñ 9.9 yrs 

10 ñ 19.9 

20 ñ 29.9 yrs 

30 ñ 39.9 

40 yrs 

life in prison 

29 

29 

27 

14 

11 

3 

17 

22 

22 

21 

11 

9 

2 

13 

Outcomes other than prison sentence (n=20) 

Defected 

Granted immunity from prosecution 

Suicide 

Allowed to retire 

Died 

Exchanged 

7 

5 

4 

2 

1 

1 

35 

25 

20 

 10 

5 

5 

a Payment is reported only for individuals who did pass information; 28 individuals who did pass 

information received no payment for their act. 

b Sentence is reported only for those sentenced to prison; 20 individuals had other outcomes.

From the consequences experienced by the 150 individuals in the database, looking at 

Table 4, we can assert that on average espionage does not pay well. In 19 cases we do not know 

what the individuals were paid. Excluding the 39 other people who were intercepted before they 

passed information and who therefore received nothing, there were also 28 individuals who did 

pass information, or participated in its passage, and yet seem to have received nothing in 

payment for their crime. Reasons for this varied: for 7 of these 28 people it is unclear why they 

apparently received nothing; 9 individuals did not act for money but rather for ideological 

commitments of various kinds; 3 people spied for other objectives, such as favors from a 

government in the case of Michael Allen, or a more prestigious job in Samuel Morisonís case 

(Associated Press, 1986 [Allen]; Valentine, 1984 [Morison]). Five people spied to help family 

members or friends as, for example, Ronald Humphrey did in 1976 when he sold documents to 

Viet Nam for information on his common law Vietnamese wife who was trapped there; one 

person in this group, Irvin Scarbeck, was blackmailed after a foreign intelligence service set him 

up with a woman and photographed him (Seaberry & Mansfield, 1978 [Humphrey and Truong]; 

DeGramont, 1962 [Scarbeck]). Adding this group of 28 to the 39 interceptions in the database 

gave us 67 people, or 45% of the total, who apparently received nothing for risking the serious 

crime of espionage. 
24 

The most common monetary reward for the 64 persons in the database who are known to 

have been paid was between $10,000 and $100,000; one-fourth of these individuals were paid in 

this range. Ten persons received between $50 and $1000 for espionage. Fifteen were paid 

between $1000 and $10,000, and 12 received between $100,000 and $1 million. Only 4 people 

may have made the big money, $1 million or more: Aldrich Ames, Larry Wu-tai Chin, Clyde 

Conrad, and possibly John Walker, Jr. (Pincus, 1994 [Ames]; Shenon, 1985 [Chin]; Ostrow & 

Jehl, 1990 [Conrad]; New York Times Service, 1987 [Walker ring].5

Prison sentences for espionage or attempted espionage varied depending on factors such 

as the importance of the information lost, the length of time of the spying, the venue of the trial 

(military court martials have tended to mete out longer sentences), the then-current policies of 

the federal government on espionage prosecution, the context of the time (e.g., wartime or peace, 

chilly Cold War or dÈtente), and the then-current relationship of the United States with the 

country that received the information (some were neutrals or allies of the U.S.). Of the 130 

whose prison sentences we know, 65% spent 20 years or less in prison for espionage: nearly 

equal numbers spent 1 to 5, 5 to 10, and 10 to 20 years there. Three received 40-year sentences, 

and 17 were initially sentenced to life in prison. Three of these life sentences were reduced in 

later court proceedings to 10 years, to 27 years, and in the case of George Gessner, to no prison 

sentence at all (Rafalko, n.d.). 

Comparison of Those Intercepted with Those Who Transmitted Information 

We compared the group of those who were intercepted on their first attempt at espionage 

(that is, discovered before or during an attempt before information could be passed) with the 

group of those who did transmit information at least once, to determine if there were differences 

between the groups. Cases of attempted espionage were included in our analysis because of our 

interest in how and why people choose an act of betrayal; those who made the choice for 

espionage but then did not succeed at it are part of the larger universe of trust betrayers. Table 5 

reports only the key differences, in percentages or medians, to facilitate comparison between the 

two groups. Each group is discussed in turn. 

Table 5 

Comparison of Those Intercepted with Those Who Transmitted Information

Characteristics Intercepted (n=39) Transmitted (n=111) 

Gender (n=150) 100% male 90% male 

10% female 

Race or ethnic group (n=143) 100% white 80% white 

20% non-white 

 

5 John J. OíConnor disputes the $1 million figure for Walker in favor of $350,000 in ìTV View; American spies in 

pursuit of the American Dream,î New York Times, February 4, 1990.
25 

Characteristics Intercepted (n=39) Transmitted (n=111) 

Median age when espionage 

began, in years (n=147) 

24 years 34 years 

Median education when 

espionage began, in years 

(n=133) 

12 years 14 years 

Marital status when espionage 

began (n=140) 

69% single 

31% married 

34% single 

66% married 

Military or civilian (n=150) 70% military 

30% civilian 

41% military 

59% civilian 

Military rank (n=67) 92% E6 or lower 

8% E7 or higher 

57% E6 or lower 

43% E7 or higher 

Major job category (n=148) 55% general/technical 36% communication/intelligence 

Security clearance (n=141) 78% Secret, Confidential, or none 

22% TS or TS/SCI 

40% Secret, Confidential or none 

60% TS or TS/SCI 

Native or naturalized citizenship 

(n=148) 

92% native 

8% naturalized 

79% native 

 21% naturalized 

Foreign attachments (n=150) 18% had foreign attachments 

82% no foreign attachments 

53% had foreign attachments 

47% no foreign attachments 

Where espionage began (n=146) 87% US 

13% foreign location 

59% US 

41% foreign location 

Volunteer or recruit (n=148) 92% volunteer 

8% recruit 

53% volunteer 

47% recruit 

Decade began (n=150) 74% 1980s 

8% 1990s 

32% 1980s 

14% 1990s 

Decade ended (n=150) 74% 1980s 

8% 1990s 

32% 1980s 

29% 1990s 

Length of initial sentence 

(n=129) 

42% 5 years or less 

37% more than 5 and less than 20 

21% 20 or more years 

28% 5 years or less 

31% more than 5 and less than 20 

41% 20 or more years 

Motivation Single motive: 67% (n=26) 

Money 21 

Divided loyalties 1 

Disgruntlement 2 

Thrills 1 

Ingratiation 1 

Multiple motives: 33% (n=13) 

Money 13 

Divided loyalties 1 

Disgruntlement 10 

Thrills 2 

Single motive: 52% (n=58) 

Money 26 

Divided loyalties 12 

Disgruntlement 9 

Ingratiation 6 

Coercion 

Thrills 1 

Multiple motives: 48% (n=53) 

Money 44 

Disgruntlement 21 

Divided loyalties 19 

Thrills 13 

Recognition 6 

Coercion 5 
26 

 

Intercepted on First Attempt 

Table 5 shows that all 39 of those intercepted were young white males. The median age 

for this group was 24 years and the median level of education was 12 years, a high school 

graduate. Two-thirds were single, including as single those who were separated or divorced. 

Seventy percent were members of the military, almost all at ranks of E6 or lower. Half of those 

intercepted worked in general or technical 

occupational fields such as military 

instructor, driver, crewman, repairman, 

food service worker, guard, laboratory 

technician, medical assistant, paralegal, or 

machinist, which reflects their level of 

education, their military experience, and 

their age. Given the types of work that the 

majority of these individuals did, it also 

follows that three-fourths of them held 

lower-level security clearances, at the 

Secret or Confidential level, and that 10 of 

these had no clearance at all. Most (37 of 

39) were DoD cases, either themselves 

members of the military or civilians with 

friends who had DoD access. 

 Most of the interceptions (87%) 

took place in the United States, not 

overseas. Four-fifths of these individuals 

did not have known foreign attachments, 

such as foreign-born parents, fiancÈes, or 

spouses, and almost all (92%) of those 

intercepted had been born in the United 

States. 

 In a strongly consistent finding, 

92% of those intercepted (36 of 39) had 

volunteered to commit espionage. Only 3 

individuals, John Haeger, Dale Irene, and 

Otto Gilbert, had been recruited, two by 

friends and Gilbert by an intelligence 

service. Many of the intercepted 

volunteers acted impulsively and with 

little thought to potential complications 

they could encounter. Some knew nothing 

about how the embassies of hostile 

powers, such as the Soviet Embassy, are 

routinely monitored by the FBI; another, 

Table 6 

39 Intercepted Espionage Cases 

 Name Date of Attempt Affiliation 

Mueller, Gustav 49/10/00 Air Force 

French, George 57/04/05 Air Force 

Wine, Edward 68/08/21 Navy 

Grunden, Oliver 73/09/28 Air Force 

Moore, Edwin 76/12/22 Civilian 

Madsen, Lee 79/07/26 Navy 

Murphy, Michael 81/06/00 Navy 

Baba, Stephen 81/09/01 Navy 

Gilbert, Otto 82/04/17 Civilian 

Horton, Brian 82/06/00 Navy 

Slavens, Brian 82/08/31 Marine 

Ellis, Robert 83/02/09 Navy 

Wold, Hans 83/05/00 Navy 

Slatten, Charles 84/02/00 Army 

Cordrey, Robert 84/04/12 Marine 

Irene, Dale 84/08/12 Civilian 

Cavanagh, Thomas 84/12/00 Civilian 

Wolff, Jay 84/12/15 Civilian 

Hawkins, Stephen 85/00/00 Navy 

Buchanan, Edward 85/05/06 Air Force 

Pizzo, Francis 85/08/11 Civilian 

Tobias, Michael 85/08/11 Navy 

Tobias, Bruce 85/08/12 Civilian 

Ott, Bruce 86/01/09 Air Force 

Haguewood, Robert 86/02/00 Navy 

Davies, Allen 86/09/22 Civilian 

Richardson, Daniel 88/01/00 Army 

Kunkle, Craig 88/12/00 Civilian 

Graf, Ronald 89/00/00 Navy 

King, Donald 89/00/00 Navy 

Wilmoth, James 89/02/00 Navy 

Wolf, Ronald 89/03/00 Civilian 

Brown, Russell 89/04/00 Navy 

Haeger, John 89/10/00 Navy 

Schoof, Charles 89/10/00 Navy 

Anzalone, Charles 90/11/00 Marine 

Charlton, John 93/07/00 Civilian 

Lessenthien, Kurt 96/00/00 Navy 

Smith, Timothy 00/04/07 Civilian 
27 

Michael Tobias, U.S. Navy, telephoned the U.S. Secret Service to extort money from them by 

selling back the cryptographic code cards he had stolen―wouldnít the Secret Service be the 

appropriate agency to deal in secrets? (Associated Press, 1988). The lack of sophistication or 

forethought in most of these cases demonstrated the youth and inexperience of the perpetrators. 

Table 6 lists the names, dates of attempted espionage, and affiliations of the 39 

individuals who were intercepted. Although each decade between 1950 and 2000 included 

several instances of interceptions, three-fourths of these cases clustered in the 1980s. The run of 

easily caught volunteers trying to sell secrets in the 1980s challenged American law enforcement 

and counterintelligence with sheer numbers; the apparently sudden outbreak of espionage was 

widely discussed in the press and provoked much soul searching about the moral character of 

Americans, especially the young (Harrington, 1988; Tuchman, 1987). 

 

As we might expect in cases in which no information changed hands, almost half of these 

individuals received light initial sentences. Forty-two percent got five years or less, and ten 

individuals served sentences of three years or less. On the other hand, these cases demonstrate 

that attempted espionage can be taken very seriously and punished accordingly: one-third of 

those who were intercepted received sentences of more than 5 and less than 20 years, and onefifth were sent to prison for 20 years or more. 

Most intercepted spies said that they did it for money. Of those with a single motive, 80% 

(21 of 26) tried to commit espionage for the money. All of those with multiple motives (13 of 

13) included money as one of their motives. While some who were intercepted displayed other 

common motives, notably disgruntlement with work life, money was clearly the primary motive 

in this group of cases. 

Transmitted Information 

The 111 individuals in the database who transmitted information varied more than those 

who were intercepted, as can be seen in Table 5. Those who did pass information included men 

and women, whites and blacks, Asians and Hispanics; all of the women (11 of 111) and all of the 

non-whites (21 of 111 in the database) succeeded in transmitting information. Persons in this 

group tended to be older and better educated. They had a median age of 34, compared to 24 for 

the intercepted group, and they had a median of two additional years of education. Whereas twothirds of intercepted individuals were single, two-thirds of those who succeeded in passing 

information were married. 

Three-fifths of the group that did pass information were civilians, compared to the 70% 

of those intercepted who were members of the military. The ìsuccessfulî spies included almost 

all those who worked in intelligence agencies (all but one instance). The military personnel who 

did transmit information tended to be at higher ranks than those intercepted; in the successful 

group were 5 of the 7 officers and all 13 of those at ranks from E7 through warrant officers. 

More members of the Air Force and the Army have actually transmitted information than have 

members of the Navy, as Table 7 below shows. All but 2 of the 26 Army personnel who 

attempted espionage did pass information, as did 13 of the 18 Air Force members. 
28 

Table 7 

Espionage in U.S. Military Services

Military Service Intercepted Transmitted 

 n % n % 

Navy 17 68 8 32 

Air Force 5 28 13 72 

Army 2 8 24 92 

Occupations among ìsuccessfulî spies varied more than among those who were 

intercepted; the largest occupational category among those who passed information was the onethird who worked in communications or intelligence fields. Those who passed information also 

held higher-level security clearances than did those intercepted: three-fifths of those who 

succeeded had Top Secret or SCI clearances. 

One of the major differences between those who were intercepted and those who 

transmitted information is the number of naturalized citizens and their foreign attachments. Onefifth of those who passed information were naturalized citizens. Half of the ìsuccessfulî spies 

had family, emotional, or business ties to persons born or living overseas, compared to slightly 

less than one-fifth of those who were intercepted. There have been instances of Americans with 

foreign attachments who used these connections in their espionage, such as Leslie Payne who 

used his German wife in 1974 to deliver documents to the East Germans, or Zoltan Szabo, a 

Hungarian-born naturalized citizen of the U.S. and founder of the Conrad spy ring in Europe, 

who employed two Hungarian doctors as couriers to move NATO secrets to the Hungarian 

intelligence service in the 1970s (Associated Press, 1977a [Payne]; Gerth, 1989 [Szabo]). 

On the other hand, for many spies with foreign attachments, these ties had no direct 

impact on their espionage. Foreign attachments are common in the United States, and persons in 

the military or in an intelligence service who live overseas often do marry or develop other ties 

of business or friendship with locals. These patterns do not imply that having foreign 

attachments makes an individual less trustworthy or more susceptible to espionage, but they may 

make the person more vulnerable to recruitment. Some attachments have provided a hook for 

coercion of Americans into espionage; for example, in the 1975 case of Ronald Humphrey, his 

concern for his Vietnamese wife gave the Soviets this advantage over him (Seaberry & 

Mansfield, 1978). A second factor that may be at play (though it is difficult to say which is cause 

and which is effect) is that people with foreign experience tend to take a more cosmopolitan, less 

nationalistic outlook that may broaden, and thus also multiply, their allegiances (Heuer & 

Herbig, 2001). 

Three times as many ìsuccessfulî spies began their espionage in a foreign location 

compared to those who were intercepted. In part this reflects the typical overseas assignments of 

intelligence officers, all but one of whom were in the ìsuccessfulî group. Being stationed 

overseas puts an individual in relatively easier contact with foreign intelligence services, either to 

volunteer to work for them or to be groomed and recruited into espionage by their recruiters. Of 

the 50 cases of espionage by Americans that began in locations outside the United States, 45 did 

transmit information. 
29 

A second major difference between those intercepted and those who transmitted 

information is in the numbers of volunteers versus recruits. Whereas less than 10% of those 

intercepted had been recruited, almost half of those who ìsucceededî at espionage were recruits. 

Recruits discussed here include both those brought into espionage by a foreign intelligence 

service and those brought in by family or friends. The relative ìsuccessî of recruits reflects the 

evaluation procedures often exercised by recruiters trying to discern promising candidates. 

Recruiters have been known to take some time assessing persons who seem to need money and 

to target those who are also well placed for their access to the most desirable secrets. 

For example, Clyde Conrad recalled that his own recruitment by two Hungarian 

intelligence operatives in a German gasthaus was the culmination of a cautious assessment of 

him by his friend, Zoltan Szabo: 

As the three men dined and drank, Szabo and Kercsik popped the question without great 

fanfare. Their business was providing classified information to the Hungarian Military 

Intelligence Service, and Conrad had been evaluated as a potential bright star who would 

do well in the enterprise. What did he think? 

Conrad recalled how surprised the two men were at his unhesitating agreement to sign up 

for the enterpriseÖAfter lunch, Szabo and Kercsik informed him that Budapest desired 

an immediate demonstration of his sincerity and commitment. Within minutesÖ[they] 

arrived at the Rose Barracks headquarters of the division. Clyde strode boldly into the G3 Plans section and stole a pile of documents. It had been that simple. Sandor [Kercsik] 

promptly transported the haul to Budapest, where the Center declared its satisfaction with 

the take (Herrington, 1999). 

Supporting the notion that being recruited tends to support ìsuccessî in espionage is the finding 

that of the 54 individuals in the database who were recruited, 51 ìsucceededî at espionage by 

passing information. 

Initial prison sentences meted out to Americans who passed information were longer than 

for those for only attempted espionage. Those who received light sentences of 5 years or less 

comprised two-fifths of those intercepted, but one quarter of those who passed information. 

More of those who had been intercepted were sentenced to periods of between 5 and 20 years 

than were ìsuccessfulî spies (37% for those intercepted, 31% for ìsuccessfulî), which seems 

somewhat counterintuitive until one considers that the factor of damage from espionage is often 

weighed by judges in sentencing. Only in the longest prison term category, 20 years to life in 

prison, did people who transmitted information receive longer initial sentences (21% for those 

intercepted, 41% for ìsuccessfulî). 

The stated motives of those who transmitted information also varied more than did those 

who attempted espionage but were intercepted. Whereas four-fifths of individuals who had been 

intercepted and who claimed only one motive tried to commit espionage for money, money 

motivated only half of the ìsuccessfulî spies with a single motive. The next most frequent single 

motives were divided loyalties and disgruntlement (divided loyalties 21% and disgruntlement 

16%). Among ìsuccessfulî offenders with multiple motives, money came first, again followed 
30 

by disgruntlement and divided loyalties. We coded homeland identification or ethnic group 

fellow-feeling as divided loyalties in the database, since it was impossible to disentangle 

competing national commitments from adherence to causes or philosophies, such as 

Communism, that also have cultural overtones. Disgruntlement almost always refers to tensions 

or resentments in the workplace, or to disappointment with a career. 

Comparison of Military and Civilian Spies 

We compared the 73 members of the uniformed military with the 77 civilians in the 

database. Unlike the previous comparison, in this section we make no distinction between those 

who were intercepted and ìsuccessfulî spies. Table 8 summarizes this comparison. We discuss 

characteristics of the civilian group first, followed by those of the military group. 

Table 8 

Comparison of Military and Civilian Spies

Characteristics Civilian (n=77) Military (n=73) 

Gender 87% male 

13% female 

99% male 

 1% female 

Median age (n=147) 39 years 25 years 

Median education (n=133) 16 years 12 years 

Marital status (n=140) 39% single 

61% married 

46% single 

54% married 

Intercepted or transmitted 

(n=150) 

16% intercepted 

84% transmitted 

37% intercepted 

63% transmitted 

Major occupational categories 

(n=148) 

30% 

communications/intelligence 

30% scientific/professional 

39% general/technical 

38% 

communications/intelligence 

Security clearance (n=141) 51% Secret, Confidential, or 

none 

49% TS or TS/SCI 

48% Secret, Confidential, or 

none 

52% TS or TS/SCI 

Native or naturalized citizenship 

(n=148) 

74% native 

26% naturalized 

92% native 

 8% naturalized 

Foreign attachments (n=150) 52% had foreign attachments 

48% no foreign attachments 

36% had foreign attachments 

64% no foreign attachments 

Volunteer or recruit (n=148) 57% volunteer 

43% recruited 

71% volunteer 

29% recruited 
31 

Characteristics Civilian (n=77) Military (n=73) 

Where espionage began (n=146) 80% U.S. 

20% foreign location 

51% U.S. 

49% foreign location 

Decade began (n=150) 40% 1980s 47% 1980s 

Decade ended (n=150) 44% 1980s 51% 1980s 

Length of initial sentence 

(n=130) 

38% 5 years or less 

36% more than 5 and less than 

 20 years 

26% 20 or more years 

26% 5 years or less 

31% more than 5 and less than 

 20 years 

43% 20 or more years 

Motivation Single motive: 45% (n=35) 

Money 9 

Divided loyalties 11 

Disgruntlement 6 

Coercion 2 

Ingratiation 7 

Multiple motives: 55% (n=42) 

Money 36 

Divided loyalties 16 

Disgruntlement 18 

Thrills 8 

Ingratiation 13 

Coercion 3 

Recognition 6 

Single motive: 67% (n=49) 

Money 38 

Divided loyalties 2 

Disgruntlement 5 

Coercion 2 

Thrills, 2 

Multiple motives: 33% (n=24) 

Money 21 

Divided loyalties 4 

Disgruntlement 13 

Thrills 8 

Ingratiation 6 

Coercion 2 

Civilian Spies 

Table 8 shows that 10 of the 11 female spies in the database were civilians, along with 67 

civilian males. The median age for civilians was 39 years of age. They had a median level of 

education of 16 years. Three-fifths of them were married when they began their espionage. 

Civilians tended to succeed at espionage: only 16% were intercepted, while 84% 

transmitted information. Civilian spies tended to work in one of two occupational categories, 

with 30% in either scientific or professional fields, and 30% in communications or intelligence. 

Half of the civilians held high-level security clearances, Top Secret or SCI, while the other half 

held lower clearances or none at all. More than one-third of the civilians in the espionage 

database had no security clearance and relied on others for access to information. 

One quarter of the civilian group were naturalized citizens, and half of the civilians had 

foreign attachments. Four-fifths of civilians began their espionage in the United States. Civilians 

were likely targets for recruitment, since 43% of civilians had been recruited. Initial sentences 

for civilian spies were weighted toward the lighter sentences. Two-fifths of civilians received 

sentences of 5 years or less, almost two-fifths got more than 5 but less than 20 years, and one 

quarter were sentenced to 20 or more years in prison. 
32 

Publicly available data suggests that more spying began and ended in the decade of the 

1980s than in other periods of time: among civilians, 40% began spying in the 1980s and 44% 

were caught during that decade (though these were often not the same persons.) Money was the 

most commonly cited motive of civilian spies: in more than four-fifths of the civilian cases with 

multiple motives, money was one of the motivations. Civilians also spied for a variety of other 

reasons. Among civilians with a single motive, only one-fourth spied for money alone. Divided 

loyalties motivated more civilians with a single motive (30%) than did money. An example of a 

civilian who spied from a competing allegiance and who took no money for his actions was 

Thomas Dolce, a civilian research analyst at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. Dolce 

admitted passing at least 40 secret-level documents to South African military attaches between 

1979 and 1983 because, he explained, he supported the long-term interests of South Africa and 

intended to live there. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison and a $5,000 fine for his espionage 

(Valentine, 1988). 

After divided loyalties and money, disgruntlement was the next most common civilian 

motive. An example was an ex-NSA analyst named Victor Hamilton. An immigrant to the 

United States from Palestine, Hamilton changed his last name from Hindali. He attended 

American University in Beirut, and became a naturalized US citizen in the 1950s. He worked at 

NSA using his language skills to do code breaking in the Middle Eastern section starting in 1957. 

Two years later he was dismissed from NSA for mental problems. He told people at the time that 

he would get revenge, and in 1962 he disappeared into the Soviet Embassy in Prague, then went 

on to Moscow in 1963. An article in Izvestia that year claimed he had asked for asylum, and that 

he had told the Soviets all he could about NSA's interceptions of communications between Arab 

countries and their UN missions. Hamilton spent the rest of his life in Soviet mental hospitals 

until he was discovered there in 1992 by investigators from the Ark project, a private group who 

were searching for missing Americans in Russia (Hiatt, 1992; Blumenthal, 2001). 

Military Spies 

All but one of the military spies were male, the exception being Kelly Church Warren, an 

Army private recruited into the Conrad spy ring (Walters, 1997). Median age of military spies 

was 25, which is 14 years younger than the median age of civilians. The median level of 

education for the military was 12 years, or high school graduate, 4 years less than the median for 

civilians. Thus members of the military who attempted espionage were much younger and had 

received less education than their civilian counterparts. 

More than one-third (37%) of military spies were intercepted before they could pass 

information, and most of those intercepted were the younger, more junior ranks of military 

personnel, with 10 individuals at E1 through E3 rank and 14 at E4 or E5 rank. Nearly equal 

percentages, roughly two-fifths, of military spies worked in general or technical occupations and 

in communications or intelligence fields. The proportions of those with lower-level security 

clearances or no clearance at all mirrored those of the civilians. Fewer military spies had 

naturalized American citizenship than did civilians: 92% of military were native born, as 

opposed to 74% of civilians. Not surprisingly, fewer military than civilians had foreign 

attachments as well. 
33 

More military spies volunteered to commit espionage than did civilians: 71% of the 

military compared to 57% civilians. Reflecting tours of duty overseas for many in the military 

and the relative ease of initiating espionage on foreign soil, half the military spies began their 

espionage from a foreign location, as opposed to one-fifth of the civilian spies. Like civilians, the 

bulk of military espionage cases began and ended in the 1980s or 1990s, with slightly higher 

percentages of military focused in those decades. Military spies as a group got stiffer prison 

sentences than did civilians: one-fourth of military spies got 5 years or less, 31% received more 

than 5 but less than 20 years, and 43% got 20 years or more, compared to 26% of the civilians 

with the longest sentences. 

Money dominated the motivations of military spies. Three-fourths of those with a single 

motive spied for money, and 21 of the 24 individuals with multiple motives included money as a 

motive. Divided loyalties rarely motivated military spies; disgruntlement or coercion 

occasionally did, and some members of the military sought thrills from their espionage. 

Comparison of Volunteers and Recruited Spies 

Cases in the database of those who volunteered to commit espionage were compared with 

those who were recruited by family or friends and those who were recruited by a foreign 

intelligence service. Table 9 summarizes characteristics of these three groups. For two of the 

cases, we do not know the source of the individualís recruitment, so the total of cases in this 

comparison is 148. Volunteers are discussed first, then each of the other two groups in turn. 

Table 9 

Comparison of Volunteers and Recruited Spies

Characteristics Volunteers (n=94) Recruited by Family or 

Friend (n=22) 

Recruited by a Foreign 

Intelligence Service (n=32) 

Gender (n=148) 97% male 

 3% female 

68% male 

32% female 

97% male 

 3% female 

Median age (n=145) 30 years 26 years 38 years 

Median education 

(n=131) 

12 years 14 years 14 years 

Marital status (n=139) 51% single 

49% married 

50% single 

50% married 

20% single 

80% married 

Military or civilian 

(n=148) 

53% military 

47% civilian 

41% military 

59% civilian 

38% military 

62% civilian 

Military rank (n=66) 83% E6 or lower 

17% E7 or higher 

63% E6 or lower 

37% E7 or higher 

33% E6 or lower 

67% E7 or higher 

Intercepted or 

transmitted (n=148) 

38% intercepted 

62% transmitted 

 9% intercepted 

91% transmitted 

 3% intercepted 

97% transmitted 
34 

Characteristics Volunteers (n=94) Recruited by Family or 

Friend (n=22) 

Recruited by a Foreign 

Intelligence Service (n=32) 

Major occupational 

categories (n=148) 

40% communications/ 

intelligence 

27% general/technical 

27% functional support/ 

administration 

42% scientific/professional 

Security clearance 

(n=140) 

53% Secret, Confidential, 

or none 

47% TS or TS/SCI 

35% Secret, Confidential, 

or none 

65% TS or TS/SCI 

52% Secret, Confidential, or 

none 

48% TS or TS/SCI 

Native or naturalized 

citizenship (n=146) 

88% native 

12% naturalized 

86% native 

14% naturalized 

62% native 

38% naturalized 

Foreign attachments 

(n=148) 

33% had foreign 

attachments 

67% no foreign 

attachments 

32% had foreign 

attachments 

68% no foreign 

attachments 

84% had foreign attachments 

16% no foreign attachments 

Where espionage 

began (n=145) 

75% U.S. 

25% foreign location 

64% U.S. 

36% foreign location 

47% U.S. 

53% foreign location 

Decade began (n=148) 48% 1980s 59% 1980s 19% 1960s 

25% 1970s 

22% 1980s 

19% 1990s 

Decade ended (n=148) 47% 1980s 

21% 1990s 

41% 1980s 

41% 1990s 

28% 1960s 

38% 1980s 

13% 1990s 

Length of initial 

sentence (n=129) 

33% 5 years or less 

32% more than 5 and 

less than 20 

35% 20 or more years 

35% 5 years or less 

25% more than 5 and less 

than 20 

40% 20 or more years 

30% 5 years or less 

40% more than 5 and less 

than 20 

30% 20 or more years 

Motivation (n=148) Single motive: 54% 

(n=51) 

Money 30 

Divided loyalties 8 

Disgruntlement 9 

Thrills 2 

Ingratiation 2 

Multiple motives: 46% 

(n=43) 

Money 37 

Divided loyalties 10 

Disgruntlement 28 

Thrills 11 

Ingratiation 9 

Recognition 4 

Single motive:55 % (n=12) 

Money 6 

Disgruntlement 1 

Ingratiation 5 

Multiple motives: 45% 

(n=10) 

Money 9 

Divided loyalties 4 

Thrills 1 

Ingratiation 7 

Coercion 1 

Recognition 1 

Single motive: 66 % (n=21) 

Money 11 

Divided loyalties 5 

Disgruntlement 1 

Coercion 4 

Multiple motives: 34 % 

(n=11) 

Money 10 

Divided loyalties 5 

Disgruntlement 3 

Thrills 4 

Ingratiation 2 

Coercion 3 

Recognition 1 
35 

Volunteers

As Table 9 demonstrates, almost two-thirds of the individuals in the database volunteered 

to commit espionage. All but three of the 94 volunteers were male, with a median age of 30 and 

a median education of high school graduate. Slightly more volunteers were military than were 

civilians (53% military and 47% civilian). Of the military volunteers, most came from the junior 

ranks, with four-fifths at E6 grade or lower. 

The largest group, two-fifths of the volunteers, worked in communications or intelligence 

fields. Examples from this group of volunteer spies include Joseph Helmich, an Army warrant 

officer who spied for the Soviets for four years, from 1963 to 1967, giving up cryptography, 

manuals, and rotors for coding machines during the Vietnam War; or William Kampiles, an 

unhappy CIA employee who got back at what he felt were the agencyís slights by selling the 

manual for an intelligence satellite; or Robert Kim, a civilian computer specialist working for the 

Office of Naval Intelligence in 1996, who mailed classified information on the Far East and on 

tracking systems to a South Korean agent (Jaynes, 1981 [Helmich]; OíToole & Babcock, 1978 

[Kampiles]; Masters, 1997 [Kim]). 

Helmich, Kampiles, and Kim had at least one thing in common: they did transmit 

classified information to a foreign nationís intelligence service, as did 62% of the volunteers in 

the database. This gives the group of volunteer spies a rate of 38% intercepted in their attempts at 

espionage. Several factors tend to explain the troubles of volunteer spies. Many suffered from 

ignorance about the methods of espionage, and from overconfidence in their abilities, and so ran 

afoul of official surveillance or were reported to the FBI by those around them who observed 

their actions. Their schemes reflected a youthful inexperience, since overall they were much 

younger than volunteers who succeeded, with a median age of 24, as opposed to a median for 

ìsuccessfulî volunteers of 35. Thirdly, volunteers who failed were somewhat more likely to try 

espionage on their own: 72% went solo on their spying, while among volunteers who 

ìsucceededî 62% worked alone. Volunteering alone may mean taking the risk of drawing 

attention to oneself by making initial contact with a buyer, usually a foreign intelligence 

operative or diplomatic official. 

Most volunteers were native-born Americans (88%), only one-third of them had foreign 

attachments, and three-fourths volunteered from locations within the United States. Half of the 

71 volunteers spied from places on the east coast. Almost half of all the volunteers, 48%, began 

espionage during the 1980s and an equal proportion were caught in the 1980s. However, another 

20% of volunteers were caught in the 1990s, making the recent decade another notable period of 

counterintelligence actions. 

One-third of volunteers received the lightest initial sentences of 5 years or less; another 

third received 5 to 20 years, and a final third of them received 20 or more years. Motivation for 

volunteers as a group also did not differ significantly from recruits. Money motivated volunteers 

most often, since almost 60% of those with a single motive spied for money and four-fifths of 

those with multiple motives included money as a motive, but a variety of the other typical 

motives drove some volunteers to espionage, including divided loyalties, ingratiation, thrills, and 
36 

especially disgruntlement. Significant among volunteers with multiple motives were the 65% 

that included disgruntlement as one of their motives. 

Recruited by Family or Friends

Among spies recruited by a friend or family member, one-third were female. This 

contrasts with the other two groups compared in Table 9 that were each 97% male. This finding 

adds to the impression that for women, pressure by or a desire to please persons close to them is 

a significant pattern in their espionage. 

Individuals recruited by persons close to them were the youngest of the three groups; they 

had a median age of 26, which is four years younger than the median for volunteers and 12 years 

younger than the median for recruits by an intelligence service. Their median for education, 14 

years, paralleled those recruited by intelligence services. Those recruited by family or friends 

were somewhat more likely to be civilians (three-fifths civilian versus two-fifths military). 

Among the military, two-thirds came from the lower military ranks, E6 or lower. 

Most of the spies recruited by family or friends did transmit information. Nine-tenths of 

this group ìsucceededî in espionage by passing information. They had the involvement of those 

who had recruited them into the act to help them along with coaching and experienced advice, 

and this support showed in the results. Of the 18 cases in which the recruiter is known, the 

recruiters of half of those recruited by family or friends, 9 persons, had themselves been 

recruited, while the other half were volunteers. An example of a volunteer who in turn recruited a 

friend of his was Robert Lee Johnson, a Army sergeant stationed in West Berlin, who in 1953 

crossed to East Berlin and offered to defect after he had been passed over for promotion. The 

KGB convinced him his revenge would be sweeter if he returned to his job and supplied them 

with classified information. Johnson soon proved to have more initiative than the KGB wanted in 

their spies, for he angered his handlers by recruiting a friend and fellow Army sergeant, James 

Allen Mintkenbaugh, on his own. The Soviets readily accepted Mintkenbaugh, however, after 

they found out he was homosexual; in the military culture of the mid-1950s, this sexual 

orientation often led to alienation and the desire for revenge, and they urged Mintkenbaugh to 

ìspotî other like-minded prospects for them. 

Johnson and Mintkenbaugh spied for the Soviets in various jobs in and out of the Army 

from 1953 through 1964, but only in 1962 did Johnson hit pay dirt with a job that allowed him to 

pass seriously damaging information. He began working in the Armed Forces Courier Center 

outside Paris, where he could rifle the sealed pouches being flown to various U.S. commands 

throughout Europe. The KGB taught him sophisticated tradecraft and monitored him closely as 

Johnson stole the pouches from a triple-locked vault and delivered them to the Soviets to keep 

overnight; they copied the documents, re-sealed the pouches, and had Johnson return them to the 

vault. No one ever discovered that these documents had been compromised. 

Johnsonís German-born wife, also spying for the KGB, suffered a mental collapse in 

1964. She went to the FBI and confessed her espionage, also implicating Johnson and 
37 

Mintkenbaugh.6 Johnson was sentenced to 25 years in prison, but he did not live to serve out his 

prison term. In May 1972 his son, a Vietnam veteran, visited his father in his cell in Lewisburg 

Federal Penitentiary and stabbed Johnson to death. (Barron, 1974; Rafalko, n.d.) 

Individuals recruited by those close to them most often worked in general or technical 

occupations or in functional support or administrative roles. Two-thirds of them held TS or 

TS/SCI security clearances, the highest proportion of high-level clearances of the three groups. 

Among the 13 individuals with TS or TS/SCI clearances, 10 were recruited by persons with no 

access to classified information who were clearly capitalizing on their contact; these cases 

include Sahag Dedeyan who spied for his cousin, a KGB recruit; Philip Seldon who spied for a 

friend working for Philippine intelligence; and George Trofimoff who spied for 40 years for his 

boyhood stepbrother, a Russian Orthodox archbishop and a KGB agent (Asbury, 1975 

[Dedeyan]; Hall, 1996 [Seldon]; Pressley, 2001 [Trofimoff]). The three other recruits with TS 

clearances who were brought into espionage by family or friendsóArthur Walker, Michael 

Walker, and Jerry Whitworthóspied for John Walker, Jr., mastermind of the Walker spy ring. 

John Walker feared his long career as a volunteer spy would end when he retired from the Navy 

in the mid-1970s to avoid a reinvestigation of his security clearance, and he hedged his bets by 

recruiting others around him with access to classified materials: first his best friend, then his 

brother and his son (Barron, 1987 [Walker, Jr.]. 

The group of those recruited by family or friends were like the volunteers in the 

proportions of native and naturalized citizens (86% native) and foreign attachments (one-third 

had such attachments). One-third began espionage in a foreign location (half of these being 

members of the Conrad spy ring in West Germany). Three-fifths began spying in the 1980s, and 

two-fifths also were caught in the 1980s, but another two-fifths were caught in the 1990s. 

Slightly more of those recruited by family or friends received long sentences for their 

espionage: 40% got 20 or more years in prison, compared to 35% of volunteers and 30% of those 

recruited by a foreign intelligence service. Money again proved the most tempting lure: for half 

of those with a single motive it was money they wanted, as it was for 9 out of 10 with multiple 

motives. However, as expected, ingratiation played a significant part in motivations in this 

group: 5 of the 12 with a single motive sought to ingratiate themselves with their recruiter, and 

for 7 of 10 with multiple motives ingratiation was one of their motives. 

Recruited by a Foreign Intelligence Service

The 32 individuals recruited by a foreign intelligence service to commit espionage 

against the United States were almost all male (31 of 32), middle-aged (median age of 38), and 

married (four-fifths married). Two-thirds were civilians, and of the 12 members of the military, 9 

came from ranks of E6 or higher, including three officers. This would suggest that seasoned, 

more experienced people who are well placed to supply information might be more vulnerable to 

 

6

 Wives who report their spouseís espionage are one response by relatives to learning about espionage, but others 

knew and delayed or never did report it. In addition to Johnson, John Walker, Jr., Robert Lipka, and Michael 

Souther were turned in by their wives, sometimes decades after the spying began. On the other hand, Robert 

Hanssenís wife knew about his spying in 1981 and did not turn him in, allowing him to continue helping the Soviets 

and then the Russians for fifteen years. 
38 

development and recruitment by foreign intelligence services. 

As Table 9 shows, all but one of these 32 recruits transmitted information, which gave 

this group a 97% ìsuccessî rate. Like the other group of recruits, they benefited from the 

ongoing support, and in many cases, the training of their recruiters. Yeoman First Class Nelson 

Drummond, for example, was recruited into espionage by a Soviet ìspotterî while stationed in 

London in 1958. The man approached Drummond on the street while he walked home from 

work and struck up a conversation. The intelligence agent quickly demonstrated that he already 

knew a lot about Drummond, especially that the Navy man was chronically in debt and could use 

the ₤250 he offered him. The handler kept in steady contact with Drummond when he transferred 

back to the United States, providing a Minox camera that he could use to photograph classified 

documents he handled as a clerk in the Mobile Electronics Technical Unit in Newport, R.I. 

Drummond spied for the Soviets for five years, and received a sentence of life in prison after a 

trial in 1963 (Rafalko, n.d.). 

Those recruited by foreign intelligence services differed from the other two groups 

because the largest occupational category for this group was scientific or professional fields 

(42%), which suggests that access to information in these occupations has been highly prized by 

foreign intelligence services, and may reflect the accessibility of persons in these fields to 

assessment. Not surprisingly in a database focused on the Cold War, 30 of the 32 recruits by a 

foreign intelligence service in the database spied for the Soviet Bloc, half for the Soviet Union 

itself, half for Eastern European or Cuban intelligence services, which would as a matter of 

course share their take with the Soviets. Only two recruits, Larry Wu-tai Chin, who spied for the 

Peopleís Republic of China for 33 years, and Joseph Brown, who supplied information to a 

Philippine government official, worked outside the Soviet orbit (Shenon, 1985 [Chin]; Branigan, 

1993 [Joseph Brown]. 

Recruits by foreign intelligence services had more foreign connections than did the other 

two groups: almost forty percent were naturalized citizens, 84% had foreign attachments 

(defined to include relatives, emotional commitments, or business and professional ties), and 

more than half began espionage from foreign locations. In at least one-fourth of these cases, the 

foreign ties did influence the espionage, providing motives for assisting another country, such as 

Chinís long spying career for the Peopleís Republic, entrÈe for implied blackmail such as the 

Hungariansí offer to Jamos Szolka to make life easier for his mother in Hungary, or professional 

duties to a homelandís intelligence collection such as Karl Koecherís work as a CIA mole for 

Czechoslovakia, or Nilo Hernandezís efforts to collect information in south Florida for Cuba. 

(Halloran, 1985 [Szmolka was a double agent for the FBI against the spy Otto Gilbert]; Raab, 

1985 [Koecher]; Rosenberg, 2000 [Hernandez]). In a nation settled by immigrants, such as the 

United States, many citizens do have ties of birth or interest abroad; in professions such as 

intelligence collection and analysis it is those who can speak and read other languages and who 

have knowledge of the cultures and conditions of other countries that are most needed. The 

patterns in a group of 32 spies, a tiny subset of the millions of Americans who have had access to 

classified or sensitive information since 1950, does not cast doubt on the future reliability of 

citizens with foreign connections. These patterns do suggest that such citizens may be more 

likely than others to be targeted for recruitment attempts. 
39 

Unlike the other two groups, the majority of recruits by foreign intelligence services did 

not begin spying in the 1980s. Almost half of the volunteers started spying in the 1980s, and 

more than half (60%) of recruits by family or friends launched into espionage in the 1980s, but 

those recruited by an intelligence service began spying in roughly equal cohorts in each decade 

of the 1960s, 70s, 80s, and 90s. The decade in which their espionage ended was almost as varied 

for these recruits, with most of them being apprehended in the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s. 

Whatever was prompting the wave of espionage in the 1980s in the United States, it does not 

seem to have shaped the recruitment efforts of foreign intelligence, largely by the Soviet Union 

is this period, which kept up a steady pressure and enjoyed a certain number of ìsuccessesî and 

failures among American citizens in each decade. 

Most individuals in this group (40%) received prison sentences in the middle range of 5 

to 20 years; half of the rest received less time, half received more. Like the other two groups, 

money motivated these recruits as well: it motivated half of those with a single motive and was 

one of several motives for 10 of the 11 with multiple motives. Divided loyalties and coercion 

(often based on foreign attachments) were somewhat more likely to motivate individuals in this 

group. Two-fifths of those with a single motive spied for divided loyalties or coercion, and 8 of 

the 11 persons with multiple motives included divided loyalties or coercion among their motives. 

Comparison of Motivations 

In considering the elusive issue of motivation for espionage, distinctions were made if an 

individual appeared to have had a single motive or multiple motives. If a person had more than 

one motive, we tried to determine which was primary and to rank them in importance. Given the 

public, usually journalistic sources of this information, and the notorious fact that self-described 

motives shift when viewed in retrospect by an offender, we cannot claim as much certainty as we 

would like about the motives for espionage attributed to any particular case. Available 

information about why these 150 American citizens committed espionage was analyzed, and we 

describe patterns and trends in the data. 

Table 10 

Motivations (n=237) 

Motivations Sole Motive Primary among 

Multiple Motives 

Combined Sole and 

Primary Motives 

Secondary 

Motives a

 n % n % n % n % 

Money 47 56 37 56 84 56 20 23 

Divided loyalties 13 16 12 18 25 17 8 9 

Disgruntlement 11 13 9 13 20 13 22 25 

Ingratiation 7 8 7 11 14 10 12 14 

Coercion 4 5 1 2 5 3 3 3 

Thrills 2 2 2 1 16 19 

Recognition 0 0 0 6 7 

Total 84 100 66 100 150 100 87 100 

a Based on information available in open sources, 72 individuals had 2 motives and 15 of those had 3 motives; of 

the 150 persons in the database, 48% had two or more motives. 
40 

Money 

The summary of motivations in Table 10 reinforces what was noted in the previous 

sections comparing various groups: that American spies have claimed that money has been their 

prime motive for espionage. The primacy of money as a motive is already a common observation 

in studies of espionage. For 84 of the individuals in the database with a single motive, 47 of them 

(56%) spied for money. Among those with multiple motives, money was the primary motive in 

37 of 66 cases; adding these strongest money motives together gives 84 of the 150 cases, or 56%, 

motivated by money. An additional 20 cases included money as a secondary motive in cases 

with more than one motivation. Considered as a proportion of all the cases in which money 

appeared as one or more of the motives, 104 of 150 cases (69%) included money, 

However, the quest for money varied among the groups we compared. Among those who 

were intercepted before they could pass information, 87% of their motives (34 of 39) were 

money if sole, primary, or secondary motives are considered together. Among those who 

transmitted information, the combined total of money motives was 63% (70 of 111). Fifty-eight 

percent (45 of 77) of all the motives of civilian offenders were money, but money comprised 

four-fifths of the motives of military spies (59 of 73). On the other hand, between volunteers and 

those recruited into espionage, money accounted for similar proportions of the motives of each 

group: i.e., about 70%. 

If we only consider those spies whose single motive was money, perhaps the most 

mercenary of the cases, the differences among groups are more pronounced: four-fifths of those 

who were intercepted only sought money, while half of those who transmitted information did so 

solely for money. One-quarter of the civilian offenders spied for the money alone, but threequarters of the military spies did so. Almost three-fifths of volunteers committed espionage only 

for money, but just half of those recruited into espionage, whether by family or friends or by a 

foreign intelligence service, did so only for the money. These patterns suggest a generalization: 

underpaid people (or those who merely perceive themselves to be underpaid), often those in 

lower ranks of the military, who have access to information that others will pay for, may well try 

to cash in on this asset, but the odds are that they can be intercepted. 

Some people spied for money because they needed it to pay off debts or to get themselves 

out of some other fix, while others did so from greed. We coded ìneed or greedî variables and 

the type of financial pressures or luxury purchases reported for our cases where these details 

were available. Data are missing in many of these cases, but of the 84 cases in which money was 

either the sole or the primary motive, we have some data on 64 of them. 

Half of these cases involved indebtedness. Being in debt or having a history of 

insolvency, bankruptcy, or late payments is a major component of the ìfinancial considerationsî 

scrutinized in a background investigation for a security clearance; finances comprise one the 13 

Adjudicative Guidelines that apply (DSS, 2001). The first FBI agent indicted for espionage, 

Richard Miller, was an example of someone whose debts led him into espionage. Picked up in 

1984 by a Russian couple who were KGB talent spotters, Miller was struggling to keep up the 

mortgage payments on the house where he lived with his wife and eight children. He used his 

access as an FBI counterintelligence officer to pass classified documents to his handlers in 
41 

exchange for $50,000 in gold, additional sums in cash, and the sexual favors of the female agent. 

For his espionage Miller served 13 years in prison (Deutsch, 1985). 

Similarly, to extricate himself from his debts, Airman Bruce Ott contacted the Soviet 

consulate in San Francisco in 1986 with an offer to sell various classified documents. He tried to 

pass documents that included the tactical doctrine manual for a reconnaissance aircraft, to FBI 

agents he thought were Soviets. According to a friend, Ott was ìa spendthrift who bounced 

checks, overused his credit cards, had his car repossessed, and was in such financial trouble on 

his honeymoon that his wife footed the entire billî (Kell, 1986). At his trial, his lawyer described 

Ott as someone who ìÖdesperately turned to spying in an attempt to release himself from debt 

pressures.î Ott was sentenced by a court martial to 25 years in prison (Rafalko, n.d.). 

One-fifth of the 64 cases in which the type of money motive is known involved greed. 

Ronald Hoffman was an example of industrial espionage in which greed led to his compromise 

of classified information. Hoffman worked as a rocket scientist for Science Applications, Inc. in 

Los Angeles through the 1980s, where he helped develop computer programs that analyzed the 

contrails of rockets to determine how they would affect satellites. He complained that his 

employer never paid him what he felt he was worth. In 1986 he started his own company, Plume 

Technologies, on the side and began to market versions of classified research to various Japanese 

companies. He received over $600,000 from these companies. Hoffman was convicted of illegal 

export of technology that had classified military application. He was sentenced to 2 years and 6 

months in prison and fined $250,000 (U.S.A v. Hoffman, 1994). 

A military example of espionage for greed was Air Force Sergeant Herbert 

Boeckenhaupt, arrested for espionage in 1967. For 4 years starting in 1963, Boeckenhaupt 

communicated cryptographic data including code cards to his Soviet handler. The KGB trained 

him to write on pressure sensitive paper, produce filmstrips, and service dead drops. He bought a 

series of vehicles with his money, favoring Avanti sports cars. Driving his flashy cars, he also 

illustrated the tendency of people who spy for money to spend it in noticeable ways. Half of the 

84 spies for whom money was the sole or primary motive bought expensive items that seemed 

beyond their means: 6 bought new homes that they could not afford on their incomes, 14 bought 

new vehicles, and 20 spent money lavishly enough on other things that it was noticed by others 

around them (Rafalko, n.d.). 

Even if an individual begins to spy from one motive, such as an ideological commitment 

or a desire to get revenge, having money is so convenient and so pleasurable that it becomes 

addictive. Foreign intelligence services know this well, which is why agent handlers urge their 

operatives to induce new spies to take money as soon as possible, even if at first the fledgling 

spy professes not to care about money (Romerstein & Levchenko, 1989; Askilenko, 2001). One 

long-running instance of money sustaining other initial motives was the Chinese Communist 

recruitment of Larry Wu-tai Chin. When still an idealistic college student in the 1940s in China, 

it appears he began to work for the Communists. After his recruitment he worked for the U.S. 

Army in wartime China; then in 1952 he joined the CIA and worked at Langley, Virginia. He 

became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1965. He smuggled secret and top-secret documents out of 

the agency for years and flew to various cities around the world to hand it off to Chinese 

couriers. Chin supplemented his CIA salary with the payments for his espionage, and by 
42 

investing them in real estate parlayed them into a fortune. Convicted in February 1986, Chin 

committed suicide in his cell a few weeks later before he could be debriefed or sentenced 

(Marcus, 1985; Murphy, 1986). Seventeen individuals in the database admitted that their initial 

motives shifted as their espionage progressed, so that it became money that kept them at it. 

Divided Loyalties

Roughly one-fifth of the individuals in the database had divided loyalties7

 as one of their 

motives for espionage. It was the sole motive in 16% of the cases, and primary among multiple 

motives in another 18%. We have defined divided loyalties broadly, however, to include not only 

the typical Communist ideologue such as Karl Koecher or Kurt Stand, but individuals with 

intellectual or emotional commitments to another country through cultural affinity as well, such 

as Mrs. ìAhadiî who spied for Egypt after the attacks on that country by Israel in the Yom 

Kippur War; Thomas Dolce who offered information to South African intelligence; Joseph 

Santosí recent attempts to spy for Cuba as part of a loosely organized ring of Cuban agents; 

Douglas Tsou who wrote to Taiwanese officials offering to help by sending them classified 

information; or Robert Kim who sent documents to a South Korean naval attache. (Crawford, 

D.J., 1988 [Ahadi]; Valentine, 1988; Kidwell, 2000 [Santos]; Zook, 1991 [Tsou]; Masters 1997b 

[Kim]). As one would expect, in more than half of these instances of a motive involving a 

competing allegiance, the person volunteered to spy (18 of 33 cases), and 11 other individuals, 

one-third of the cases, were recruited by foreign intelligence. Most American spies with divided 

loyalties, 27 out of 33, were civilians. Most spies whose motives included divided loyalties also 

ìsucceededî at espionage by passing information; only two, Otto Gilbert and Charles Anzalone, 

were intercepted in their attempts (Halloran, 1985 [Gilbert]; Tessler, 1991a [Anzalone]). 

Disgruntlement

This motive for espionage usually refers back to the workplace, where disappointment, 

anger, frustration, or alienation can arise from interactions among co-workers or between 

employees and supervisors. Overall, disgruntlement motivated 13% of those in the database with 

single motives and it was the primary among multiple motives in another 13% of the cases. 

Roughly similar levels of disgruntlement are apparent among our comparison groups: 

disgruntlement motivated between 8 and 15% of the intercepted as well as those who transmitted 

information. Civilian and military cases show disgruntlement at these levels as well. Only those 

who volunteered to commit espionage showed more disgruntlement. Eighteen percent of 

volunteers with a single motive were disgruntled, but among volunteers with multiple motives, 

65% of their motives included disgruntlement (28 of 43). 

Feelings of disgruntlement often lead to efforts to get revenge, and espionage can be seen 

as one way to get back at the offending individual, organization, or at the whole government they 

represent. Examples include a former Air Force Sergeant, Allen John Davies, who was separated 

from active military service for poor performance in 1984 and who then went to work for Ford 

Aerospace in Palo Alto, California. Two years later he contacted the Soviet consulate in San 

 

7

 In the report published in 1992 the motive was termed ìideology,î and referred to commitment to a competing 

political or economic system such as Communism. As more cases since 1992 involve commitment to a competing 

national or ethnic loyalty, the conception of this motive was broadened to encompass various divided loyalties. 
43 

Francisco and offered to provide them with information on U.S. Air Force reconnaissance. When 

arrested, he said he had acted ìÖout of revenge because of the unfair way he was treated while 

in the Air Force.î He received a 5-year prison sentence in August 1987 for his attempted 

espionage (Thornton, 1986). 

 A more serious example was Earl Edwin Pitts, the second FBI counterintelligence agent 

arrested for espionage. From the New York FBI field office where he was assigned in July 1987, 

Pitts offered to supply the KGB with information. He met at least nine times with his Soviet 

handler, Alexandr Karpov, over the next five years and passed him Secret level documents, 

including a compilation of all Soviet agents in the United States known to the FBI. In 1992, upon 

the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pitts (like Robert Hanssen, his fellow-FBI spy) broke off 

contact with the Russians and continued in his FBI career, ironically moving into personnel 

security and security education. Karpov became a double agent for the FBI in the mid-1990s and 

fingered Pitts, and the FBI ran a sting operation to gather evidence against Pitts. He was 

sentenced to 27 years in prison by a judge who lectured him on his ìegregious abuse of trust.î To 

explain his motives for espionage, Pitts pointed to various grievances against the FBI, especially 

his disgruntlement with having been transferred in 1987 to the expensive New York field office 

where (again like Hanssen) he ìÖdidnít have enough money to live comfortablyî (Masters, 

1997a). 

Ingratiation

The desire to please someone else motivated seven individuals as their sole motive and 

another seven people as the primary of multiple motives. This was about 10% of the cases in the 

database. In 12 cases ingratiation was a secondary motive. Most of those who spied to help 

someone out ìsucceededî in their spying; only 2 of the 14 cases failed to transmit information, 

both of them ineffectual members of the Michael Tobias conspiracy. Four among this group of 

14 volunteered, and one was recruited by foreign intelligence, the hapless Clayton Lonetree, 

Marine sentry recruited by the KGB in Moscow through his Soviet girlfriend. In an example of 

espionage by ingratiation undertaken for foreign relatives, Ronald Humphrey, who worked for 

the U.S. Information Agency, in 1975 gave Top Secret state department documents to a 

Vietnamese friend who passed them on to the North Vietnamese delegation at the Paris peace 

talks. Humphrey was trying to get his common-law wife and her four children released from 

Vietnam where they had been trapped as the Vietnam War ended. Humphrey received 15 years 

in prison (Barker, 1996 [Lonetree]; Seaberry & Mansfield, 1978 [Humphrey]). 

Coercion

Being forced to commit espionage was not a common pattern among individuals in the 

database. Four people were coerced by foreign intelligence into espionage as their sole motive, 

and for another individual coercion was the primary among multiple motives. For three others, 

coercion was a secondary motive. Four were the victims of blackmail, and one, Svetlana 

Tumanova, was forced to cooperate through threats against her relatives in the Soviet Union. 

Most of these instances date from the 1950s and 60s, the latest occurring in 1978. 
44 

Thrill Seeking and Ego-Boosting

Some individuals find espionage a thrilling enterprise, one that allows them to enact 

fantasies of secret lives and heroic deeds they have read about in spy novels. Often these are also 

persons who demonstrate their cleverness to themselves by secretly putting espionage over on 

others who have not recognized the spyís abilities. For 18 persons in the database, the thrill of 

espionage and the related ego-boost of getting away with something, was one of their motives for 

engaging in it, but it was the sole motive only for two. 

The most extreme example of this motivation was the case of Christopher Cooke, an Air 

Force lieutenant, who in June 1980 began contacting the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C. 

offering to provide classified information. For almost a year Cooke continued to call and to visit 

the embassy, bringing photos of documents or handwritten notes of classified information. 

However, what he really wanted was for the Soviets to use the codenames, drop sites, and other 

spy tradecraft he proposed to them: for example, he wanted to be called ìScorpion.î The 

embassy personnel evaluated Cooke as an unlikely prospect as a spy and repeatedly rebuffed 

him, and he grew frustrated with how difficult it seemed to be to interest the Soviets in his offers 

of espionage. Arrested and interviewed, Cooke admitted that espionage fascinated him and that 

the ìthought of committing espionage was ever on my mind.î To determine who else might be 

working with Cooke (it turned out no one was), investigators made offers of immunity from 

prosecution during the investigation, and despite later attempts to get around the immunity, an 

appeals court ruled that Cooke could not be prosecuted for his espionage. He simply resigned his 

commission in 1982 and returned to civilian life (Crawford, D.J, 1988; Getler, 1981; Green & 

Miller, 1982.) 

Robert Hanssen, FBI spy arrested in February 2001, pled guilty and received a life 

sentence. His motivations are not yet clear to observers who have been struck by the apparent 

contradictions between his straight-laced private life, his counterintelligence profession, and his 

20-year espionage career. The thrill of successfully maintaining a secret life parallel to his 

professional FBI career, and thereby demonstrating that his competence surpassed his 

colleagues, may turn out to be an important part of the explanation for Hanssenís motives, along 

with an early fascination with spying (Vise, 2002; Eggen, 2001b). 

Recognition

Six persons in the database had secondary motives to achieve recognition, approval, or 

ego-enhancing attention from those to whom they provided information. While this was not a 

primary motive, it added to the constellation of reasons they decided to start spying. So, for 

example, Michael Peri, a 22-year-old Army electronics warfare specialist serving in Germany in 

1989, suddenly gave in to an impulse to flee to East Germany with military secrets. He 

voluntarily returned after one week, explaining that he felt overworked and underappreciated in 

his job. When the attentions of the East Germans wore thin, Peri returned to face a 30-year 

sentence (Rafalko, n.d.). 
45 

Figure 1 Motivations for Espionage 

The preceding charts depict in graphic form changes in the incidence of all motives for 

espionage over the decades. They focus on motives when a person first made the decision to 

Figure 1. Motivations for Espionage 

1950s: 20 Motives

Disgruntlement

15%

Coercion

10%

Thrills

5%

Money

35%

Divided 

Loyalties

25%

Ingratiation

10%

1960s: 29 Motives

Divided 

Loyalties

14%

Money

44%

Thrills

7%

Coercion

7%

Disgruntlement

28%

1970s: 47 Motives

Disgruntlement

15%

Coercion

4%

Thrills

17%

Money

44%

Divided 

Loyalties

11%

Ingratiation

9%

1980s: 106 Motives

Ingratiation

12%

Divided 

Loyalties

8%

Coercion

1%

Thrills

6%

Money

52%

Recognition

4%

Disgruntlement

17%

1990s: 33 Motives

Ingratiation

21%

Divided 

Loyalties

31%

Coercion

3%

Thrills

3%

Money

21% Recognition

6%

Disgruntlement

15%
46 

commit espionage, not what kept the person spying or how his or her motives shifted with 

experience. We combined the few cases we included in the database that began in the late 1940s 

with those that began in the 1950s because they resembled in motives and issues those that date 

from the early Cold War. Among motives of individuals in this earliest group of cases, one-third 

of the motives were money and one-quarter were divided loyalties. 

Among the cases from the 1960s money grew slightly in importance; divided loyalties 

shrank slightly; almost twice as many people, compared to the previous decade, cited 

disgruntlement as one their motives; and ingratiation temporarily disappeared as a motive. 

During the 1970s disgruntlement declined to 15% of all motives again, ingratiation reappeared, 

and thrill-seeking increased noticeably as a motive. Money and divided loyalties remained at 

about the same levels, with money still the most prominent motive cited. 

In the 1980s divided loyalties continued its gradual downward trend over the past three 

decades, while money became even more important, constituting over half of the motives cited 

during the 1980s. Coercion shrank, while ingratiation increased slightly, and recognition 

appeared for the first time as a motive for espionage. 

Motives in the 1990s shifted noticeably again. Money declined to half its proportion of 

total motives compared to the previous decade; ingratiation almost doubled; and divided loyalties 

increased almost fourfold. Since we include homeland ties in the category of divided loyalties as 

well as commitment to ideologies, this increase reflects the trend during the 1990s toward more 

international interaction and thus more foreign connections. Recognition continued as a minor 

motive and disgruntlement stayed at around 15% of the motives. 

Comparison of Lone Spies, Pairs, and Groups 

The 150 individuals in the espionage database were compared by whether they acted 

alone, in a pair, or in a group of three or more, to see if distinctive patterns characterized 

espionage among the three groups. Table 11 summarizes these findings. 

Table 11 

Comparison of Lone Spies, Pairs, and Groups of Spies 

Lone spies Spies in pairs Spies in groups 

Characteristics n % n % n % 

Number (n = 150) 86 57 39 26 25 17 

Gender (n = 150) 

Male 

 Female

85 99 

 1 1 

32 82 

 7 18 

22 88 

 3 12 

Volunteer or recruit 

(n = 148) 

 Volunteer 

 Recruit 

62 74 

22 26 

22 56 

17 44 

10 40 

15 60 

Intercepted or passed 

information (n = 150) 

 Intercepted 

 Passed information 

27 31 

59 69 

 7 18 

32 82 

 5 20 

20 80 
47 

Civilian or military 

(n = 150) 

 Civilian 

 Military 

41 48 

45 52 

24 62 

15 38 

12 48 

13 52 

Source of recruitment 

(n = 54) 

 Foreign Intelligence 

 Family 

 Friend 

20 91 

 

 2 9 

 7 41 

 4 24 

 6 35 

 5 33 

 2 13 

 8 54 

Length of espionage 

(n = 111) 

 Less than 1 yr 

 1 to 4.9 yrs 

 5 or more yrs 

23 39 

20 34 

16 27 

 6 18 

19 60 

 7 22 

 1 5 

10 50 

 9 45 

Length of sentence 

(n = 129) 

 .1 to 4.9 yrs 

 5 to 9.9 yrs 

 10 to 19.9 yrs 

 20 to 29.9 yrs 

 30 to 40.0 yrs 

 life in prison 

17 24 

16 22 

14 20 

 6 8 

 9 13 

 9 13 

 6 18 

 9 28 

 6 18 

 4 12 

 4 12 

 4 12 

 5 20 

 4 16 

 7 28 

 4 16 

 1 4 

 4 16 

Location espionage began 

(n = 147) 

 East Coast of U.S. 

 Outside the U.S. 

 West Coast of U.S. 

 Other U.S. locations 

29 35 

28 33 

13 16 

13 16 

19 33 

13 33 

 5 13 

 2 5 

10 36 

 9 36 

 4 16 

 2 8 

Motivation (n = 237) Single motive: 51% 

(n= 44 individuals) 

Money 24 

Divided loyalties 6 

Disgruntlement 7 

Thrills 2 

Ingratiation 1 

Coercion 4 

Multiple motives: 49% 

(n=42 individuals) 

Money 35 

Divided loyalties 13 

Disgruntlement 26 

Thrills 9 

Ingratiation 8 

Coercion 2 

Recognition 4 

Single motive: 64% 

(n=25 individuals) 

Money 13 

Divided loyalties 4 

Disgruntlement 3 

Ingratiation 5 

Thrills 0 

Coercion 0 

Multiple motives: 36% 

(n=14 individuals) 

Money 12 

Divided loyalties 3 

Disgruntlement 4 

Thrills 5 

Ingratiation 7 

Coercion 1 

Recognition 2 

Single motive: 60% 

(n=15 individuals) 

Money 10 

Divided loyalties 3 

Disgruntlement 1 

Ingratiation 1 

Thrills 0 

Coercion 0 

Multiple motives: 40% 

(n=10 individuals) 

Money 10 

Divided loyalties 4 

Disgruntlement 1 

Thrills 2 

Ingratiation 4 

Coercion 1 

Recognition 0 
48 

Lone Spies 

More than half of the individuals in the database (57%) acted alone. All except one of 

these 86 spies were male, most (74%) volunteered to commit espionage, and almost one-third of 

them were intercepted on the first attempt. This record suggests that espionage by lone spies is a 

high-risk gamble. Of those that did pass information, two-fifths spied for less than one year 

before they were caught; another third spied for 

between 1 and 5 years, and slightly more than a 

fourth (27%) had espionage careers of more than 

5 years. 

Of the 22 lone spies who were recruited 

into espionage, 20 were recruited by a foreign 

intelligence service, while friends recruited the 

other two. One-fourth of lone spies received 

sentences of less than 5 years, which reflects the 

relatively high number of persons who were 

intercepted among this group, as does the fact 

that this group includes 14 of the 20 persons who 

did not receive prison sentences for espionage 

because they were discharged, granted immunity, 

committed suicide, or defected. As has been 

noted among all the various groupings we have 

considered, most lone spies were motivated to 

risk espionage for money. Distinctive among the 

motives of lone spies was a higher proportion of 

disgruntlement and thrill-seeking. 

Spies in Pairs 

As shown in Table 12, thirty-nine 

individuals acted as one of a pair in their 

espionage. Of this group, 24 had partners who 

were American citizens and therefore both 

members of the pair are in the espionage 

database; 15 worked with partners who were not 

indicted for espionage or who were not American 

citizens. Foreign partners are not in the database 

as case records, although usually their names are 

identified. Pairs engaged in various patterns of 

interaction: 16 of these individuals served as ringleaders, 13 were equal partners with their 

compatriots, 8 were active accomplices who participated in the espionage but did not initiate it, 

and 2 were passive accomplices who benefited or knew about their spouseís spying but did not 

actively participate. 

Among the 39 individuals with partners, 7 were women, making up 17% of pairs. Most 

Table 12 

Spy Pairs 

Each of the following 12 spy pairs is included in 

the espionage database: 

Ames, Aldrich and Ames, Rosario 

Baynes, Virginia and Brown, Joseph 

Boyce, Christopher and Lee, Andrew 

Brown, Russell and Wilmoth, James 

Graf, Ronald and King, Donald 

Haeger, John and Schoof, Charles 

Harper, James and Schuler, Ruby 

Harris, Ulysses and Safford, Leonard 

Johnson, Robert and Mintkenbaugh, James 

Martin, William and Mitchell, Bernon 

Pollard, Jonathan and Pollard, Anne 

Ponger, Kurt and Verber, Otto 

The following 15 individuals are included in the 

database as part of a pair, but their partners are 

not included, either because the partner was not 

indicted for the espionage or because the partner 

was a foreign national. 

Ahadi (pseudonym) 

Cascio, Guiseppe Jones, Geneva 

Dedeyan, Sahag Koecher, Karl 

Dubberstein, Waldo Kota, Subrahmanyam 

Faget, Mariano Payne, Leslie 

Garcia, Wilfredo Petersen, Joseph 

Hall, James Scranage, Sharon 

Humphrey, Ronald Wine, Edward 
49 

of the women in the database, 7 of the 11 women, worked as part of a pair. Slightly more than 

half of the pairs, 56%, volunteered to commit espionage. Fourfifths of those in pairs did pass information, a higher ìsuccessî 

rate than for lone spies, reflecting the support a partner 

provides. More civilians than military spied with partners 

(62%), while for lone spies as well as for spies in groups, this 

pattern was reversed, since slightly more than half of each 

group were members of the military. 

Among the 18 individuals who worked with partners 

and who were recruited, 10 were recruited by a person close to 

them, either a family member or a friend, as one might expect 

in a proposed partnership, while 8 were recruited by a foreign 

intelligence service. Money motivated the majority of these 

spies, but ingratiation was a more prominent motive for pairs 

than it was for either lone spies or groups: among pairs, 5 of 

the 25 persons who had a single motive committed espionage 

to ingratiate themselves with the partner, and ingratiation was 

one of the motives among 7 of the 14 with multiple motives. 

Espionage by pairs persisted somewhat longer than it did for 

the spies who worked alone: three-fifths of those who had a 

partner spied between 1 and 5 years, and another fifth spied 

for more than 5 years. Those with partners also received 

slightly longer prison sentences than did lone spies, with the 

largest proportion of pairs sentenced to between 5 and 10 

years. 

Spies in Groups

Twenty-five individuals committed espionage as part of 

a group of three or more persons. In four of these groups 

(Lipka, Mira, Slatten, and the Cuban ìRed Avispaî), an 

American citizen worked with others who were not Americans 

and who therefore are not in the espionage database. Table 13 

lists the groups of spies. 

Groups organized themselves in various configurations, 

but usually one person took initiative or exerted influence over 

the others and became the ringleader. Eight of the 25 have 

been identified as ringleaders; 14 others were accomplices 

actively involved in the conspiracy to commit espionage, and 

three (Irene, Mortati, and Bruce Tobias) served as passive 

accomplices who knowingly cooperated in the scheme. 

Most of the spies in groups were male, 22 of 25 individuals. Reflecting a higher 

proportion of accomplices recruited into groups, three-fifths were recruits compared to two-fifths 

Table 13 

Groups of Spies 

The Conrad ring 

Clyde Conrad, ringleader 

Zoltan Szabo 

Roderick Ramsay 

Jeffrey Rondeau 

Jeffrey Gregory 

Tomas Mortati 

Kelly Warren 

The Walker ring 

John Walker, Jr., ringleader 

Jerry Whitworth 

Arthur Walker 

Michael Walker 

The Stand ring 

Kurt Stand, ringleader 

Theresa Squillacote 

James Clark 

The Tobias/Pizzo ring 

Michael Tobias and 

Francis Pizzo, ringleaders 

Bruce Tobias 

Dale Irene 

The “Red Avispa” ring 

[A Cuban national, ringleader] 

Joseph Santos 

Alejandro Alonso 

Linda Hernandez 

Nilo Hernandez 

The Mira ring 

Francis Mira, ringleader 

[2 West German nationals] 

The Lipka ring 

Robert Lipka, ringleader 

[3 Soviet nationals] 

The Slatten ring 

Charles Slatten, ringleader 

[1 foreign national, 1 

unindicted co-conspirator] 
50 

who volunteered. Groups achieved the high ìsuccessî rate at espionage that pairs did, with fourfifths of each cohort transmitting information. Naturalized citizenship was not a distinguishing 

characteristic of any of the three groups; roughly four-fifths of lone spies, pairs and groups were 

native born citizens while one-fifth of each had been naturalized. Of the 17 individuals recruited 

into a group, a friend brought more than half into espionage. 

Groups proved even more long-lasting at espionage than did pairs: 45% of spies in 

groups persisted for more 

than 5 years (compared to 

22% of those in pairs), half of 

those in groups spied for 

between 1 and 5 years (while 

60% of pairs lasted that 

long), and only 5% of those 

in groups were caught in less 

than one year (compared to 

18% of those in pairs and 

39% of lone spies). Spies in 

groups also received the 

longest prison sentences, 

although the difference 

between the three groups is 

not large. Money was the stated motivation for most of the spies in groups. 

Espionage by American Women 

Table 14 lists the 11 American women in the espionage database. Only one of them, 

Svetlana Tumanova, committed espionage alone. According to the U.S. Army, she was coerced 

into it in West Germany by the KGB, which threatened her family living in the USSR. The other 

ten women spied as the accomplices of men, 7 in pairs and 3 in groups. Maria del Rosario Ames 

and Anne Henderson Pollard were married to spies and were accused of knowingly profiting from 

or having participated in a peripheral way in their crime (Miller & Pincus, 1994).8

 Six of the 

women stole documents for collaborators who instigated the espionage schemes: Mrs. ìAhadi,î 

Schuler, Scranage, Warren, Baynes, and Jones. (Crawford, 1988 [ìAhadiî]; Witt, 1985 [Schuler]; 

Murphy, 1985 [Scranage]; Walters, 1997 [Warren]; OíHarrow, Jr., 1992 [Baynes]; Cummings, 

1994b [Jones]). Only Hernandez and Squillacote worked as partners rather than as subordinates 

 

8

 The legal outcome for women married to spies varies widely depending on how complicit in the crime the women 

were and on the goals of the prosecutor. Based on what can be learned from open sources, some women, like Anne 

Pollard, were prosecuted and sent to prison for their involvement (in Pollardís case, for receiving embezzled 

government propertyódocumentsóand for being an accessory after the fact of possession of classified documents), 

while others such as Hana Koecher were offered immunity from prosecution. This despite evidence that she had 

been a trained and participating intelligence agent along with her husband Karl. Other wives who knew about their 

spouseís espionage and delayed telling the authorities for years, such as Barbara Walker, were not prosecuted. 

Barbara Walker escaped all charges after she eventually went to the FBI in spite of her history of accompanying her 

husband to dead drops. 

Table 14 

American Women Spies

Name Date Began Espionage Type of Involvement

Ahadi [a pseudonym] 1967 active accomplice 

Tumanova, Svetlana 1978 acted alone 

Schuler, Ruby 1979 active accomplice 

Squillacote, Theresa 1980 active accomplice 

Scranage, Sharon 1983 active accomplice 

Pollard, Anne 1985 passive accomplice 

Warren, Kelly 1986 active accomplice 

Baynes, Virginia 1990 active accomplice 

Jones, Geneva 1991 active accomplice 

Ames, Rosario 1992 passive accomplice 

Hernandez, Linda 1994 active accomplice
51 

(Rosenberg, 2000 [Hernandez]; Masters, 1998a). None of the 11 women was intercepted, which 

is not surprising since all but one enjoyed the advice, support, and guidance of their partners or 

recruiters. Taking the initiative in spying was not these womenís pattern. 

 Women spies demonstrate few distinctive biographical or employment patterns. They 

range across most variables in ways similar to their male counterparts, including their age when 

espionage began, the agency owning the information, the decade and location they began, 

payment, and sentence. In motive and in the proportion of volunteers or recruits, however, they 

do they differ from men. Among the seven women with a single motive, only one spied solely for 

money. Three did so for divided loyalties, two to ingratiate themselves with their partners, and 

one, Tumanova, from coercion. For the four with multiple motives, money was one of the 

motives for three of them, but for two of them ingratiation was also a motive. The greater role of 

ingratiation for women is supported by the higher proportion of women recruited by those close 

to them as opposed to women volunteers or women recruited by an intelligence service: 7 of the 

11 women were recruited either by friends or lovers (Baynes, Scranage, Squillacote, Schuler, and 

Warren), or by husbands (Ames, Pollard); three women volunteered (Mrs. ìAhadi,î Hernandez, 

and Jones). 

One of the more damaging cases of espionage by women was Ruby Louise Schulerís 

personally disastrous affair with James Durwood Harper starting in 1979. Harper recognized 

Schulerís vulnerability and made the most of it. She had reached at a low point in her life, as a 

divorced alcoholic bitter about her treatment at work. She seized the bargain Harper offered. She 

would let him into her bossís office on evenings and weekends to photocopy Secret documents 

from the safe; Harper would take care of her and marry her to prevent their having to testify 

against each other. As an executive secretary for the director of Systems Control, Inc., Schuler 

could give her lover access to the sensitive projects and plans of a respected Silicon Valley 

defense contractor, which Harper sold to Polish intelligence for at least $250,000. As her 

alcoholism worsened with her apprehension, Schuler went on sick leave in 1982, losing her 

access to the safe. Harper then coldly ignored his ìwifeî and began seeing another woman; 

Schuler drank herself to death 3 months before Harper was arrested for their espionage (Witt, 

1985). 

Sharon Scranage, a CIA clerk on an overseas tour of duty in Ghana, fell into a different 

ìhoney trapî when she began an affair with Michael Soussoudis, an undercover intelligence agent 

and a cousin of the ruler of Ghana. Scranage gave her lover the names of CIA agents in Ghana 

and passed agency cables to him, including details of a coup planned by dissidents in Ghana, until 

her arrest for espionage in July 1985 (Murphy, 1985). 

Kelly Church Warren, the only female military spy, joined the Clyde Conrad spy ring 

while serving as an Army clerk for the 8th Infantry Division in West Germany in the mid-1980s. 

She agreed to be one of Conradís paid accomplices after his retirement from the Army removed 

his profitable access to classified documents and he began to recruit paid sources. Warren agreed 

to let Conrad copy and sell the 8th Infantryís counterattack plans in case of a Soviet invasion of 

Europe. Conrad sold the plans to the Hungarian intelligence service, which passed them to the 

Soviets. For this betrayal Warren received a 25-year prison sentence (Walters, 1997; Reuters, 

1999). 
52 

Applications to the Personnel Security System 

As demonstrated in the numerous examples discussed herein, espionage is one of the 

ultimate failures of a personnel security system designed to ensure security. In the following 

sections these findings on espionage are applied to various aspects of the personnel security 

system. First, we consider the criteria for personnel security vetting that are expressed in the 

federal Adjudicative Guidelines and ask the question: Among spies who, by definition, are 

violators of the national trust, how common were the behaviors that are assumed to indicate 

potential untrustworthiness? Second, we discuss applications for the security clearance system in 

the patterns in espionage and suggest ways to shift the emphases of scrutiny to groups more 

vulnerable to temptations to spy. Thirdly, we consider security awareness issues in light of our 

findings, especially co-worker reporting and position vulnerability assessment. 

Violations of Personnel Security Standards 

Many of the individuals in the espionage database engaged in behaviors that violated the 

criteria for being granted an initial security clearance and for maintaining that clearance and 

access eligibility. These criteria are defined in Department of Defense Regulation 5200.2R 

(Personnel Security Program Regulation, Jan. 1987 as amended), in Executive Order 12968 

approved in 1995 and implemented in 1997 as Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining 

Eligibility for Access to Classified Information, and endorsed by the Director of Central 

Intelligence Directive No. 6/4 (ìPersonnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing 

Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmental Information,î July 1998). As mandated in 

these regulations and directives, there are 13 guidelines that personnel security adjudicators must 

consider before granting a security clearance to any civilian or military employee or contractor 

across any agency of the federal government. The guidelines define issues of concern that raise 

questions about a personís reliability and judgment to be entrusted with classified information. 

The 13 guidelines cover: 

Alcohol Consumption 

Allegiance to the United States 

Criminal Conduct 

Drug Involvement 

Emotional, Mental and Personality Disorders 

Financial Considerations 

Foreign Influence 

Foreign Preference 

Misuse of Information Technology Systems 

Outside Activities 

Personal Conduct 

Security Violations 

Sexual Behavior 

 

Among the 150 individuals in the espionage database, 80% were observed to exhibit one 
53 

or more of the behaviors or conditions that could violate the criteria in the Adjudicative 

Guidelines. This would seem to support a nexus between these personnel security standards and 

the eventual resort to a betrayal of trust in espionage. However, these observations are drawn 

from coverage of incidents of espionage in the public media over a 50-year period. We cannot 

determine the extent to which a high rate of questionable behaviors among these 150 persons, 

and whether the behaviors were so serious they could not have been mitigated, differ from the 

rate and seriousness of such behaviors found in the broader cleared population, or in the 

population at large, at the various points in time when incidents of spying occurred. As we know 

from investigations done to evaluate continuing access to classified information, some cleared 

personnel do indulge in various questionable behaviors, yet few commit espionage. Indulgence 

in one or more of these behaviors while enjoying the access of a security clearance does not 

predict that a person will commit espionage, but it does call into question the personís judgment 

and reliability; such indulgence is ìsecurity-relevant.î 

We coded instances of potential violations of personnel security criteria in these 150 

espionage cases, but lack of full information about our cases prevents our claiming that because a 

security-relevant behavior is not mentioned in our sources that it was not present. Serious 

espionage cases earn intense media scrutiny and provide many personal details about the suspect; 

the media treatment of obscure cases provides very few details. Data in this area are inevitably 

incomplete and underreport the incidence of problem behaviors. The data in Table 15 

demonstrate that many spies also did violate the criteria for security-relevant behaviors and 

conditions outlined in the Adjudicative Guidelines. 

Table 15 

Examples of Potential Issues of Security Concern a (n=150) 

Security-Relevant Issues Yes No or Unknown 

n % n % 

Foreign attachments 66 44 84 56 

Debts that generated willingness to sell data 58 39 92 61 

Illegal drug use 40 27 110 73 

Immoderate alcohol use 40 27 110 73 

Allegiance to a country or cause other than the U.S. 30 20 120 80 

Increased spending inconsistent with known income 

 level 27 18 123 82 

Gambling 13 9 137 91 

Criminal acts against property or persons, or both 11 7 139 93 

a On these variables, which were coded ìyes,î ìno,î or ìunknown,î unknown was combined with no; typically this 

type of information is not mentioned in the sources unless the behaviors had direct relevance to the espionage case, 

so not having been mentioned, or unknown, does not assure us the behavior was absent (n=150).

In some instances these problem behaviors related directly to an individualís espionage. 

Jonathan Pollard was an example of someone who spied in part because of his commitment to 

another nationís welfare. He grew up in a family that worried openly about the survival of the 

state of Israel, which is not an uncommon concern among American Jewish households. ìJayís 

admiration for Israel was forged at homeÖHis parents were committed supporters of Israelî 

(Galloway, 1989). These attitudes left a lasting imprint on Pollard, who later said, ìIsrael was 
54 

with me every waking moment ever since I can remember. The first flag I remember was the 

Israeli flag. It was the first flag I could identify.î He favored stories of brave Israelis fighting for 

liberty and ìgrew up vowing to emigrate to Israel and become a hero himselfî (Friedman, 1989). 

Many Americans wholeheartedly support Israel without becoming spies for the Israelis, but in 

Pollardís case, exposure to these views apparently did influence his decision in 1984 to use the 

access his position at the Naval Investigative Service gave him to sell highly classified 

information to the Israeli intelligence service. 

A pattern of willingness to break the law was illustrated by those individuals in the 

database who, despite past criminal records, nevertheless gained security clearances that they 

used for espionage. One of the most damaging of American spies, John Walker, Jr., illustrated 

this pattern. When Walker entered the U.S. Navy in the 1960s, it was not unusual for teenaged 

delinquents to be offered the choice of military service or jail time. Walker chose the U.S. Navy. 

However, his youthful convictions for burglary accurately predicted his cavalier attitude toward 

the property of others. After a few years in the military as a Navy radar man, he began to steal 

and sell to the Soviets cryptographic key codes and other classified documents in his care, 

persisting in this profitable enterprise for 17 years (Isikoff, 1990). 

Roderick Ramsay was a second example of a spy who had entered military service with a 

previous history of criminal behavior. The same year that he enlisted in the U.S. Army, he had 

already robbed a bank in Vermont and attempted to break into the safe of a hospital security 

office where he worked (Allen and Polmar, 1988). In 1983 he was sent to Germany, where he 

began spying for Clyde Lee Conrad as a part of the spy ring centered in the U.S. Army 8th

Infantry Division. From Ramsay the Soviets purchased Top Secret NATO plans for the defense 

of Europe and the dispositions of NATO nuclear weapons, a stunning breach of security. He 

received 36 years in prison for his espionage (Ostrow & Jehl, 1990; Lewis, 1990; Herrington, 

1999).

 

Our open sources identified 40 spies with alcohol problems and another 40 who used 

illegal drugs; 15 of these individuals, 37%, did both. Thus for roughly one-fourth of the cases in 

the database, indulgence in one or both kinds of substance abuse was obvious enough to be 

described in the press. It is likely that there were others who undertook their substance abuse 

with more discretion. For some spies drugs or alcohol were integral aspects of their espionage. 

Ramsayís drug habit, for example, created a need for cash that made working for Conradís 

espionage operation attractive; Ramsay in turn paid two of his recruits, Jeffrey Rondeau and 

Jeffrey Gregory, largely in marijuana and hashish (Herrington, 1999). Andrew Daulton Leeís 

occupation before he began dabbling in espionage was dealing in drugs, and he used the money 

he got from spying with Christopher Boyce to further his drug business (Lindsey, 1979). Edward 

Lee Howardís history of drug use and his increasingly heavy alcohol abuse finally came to the 

attention of the CIA after he failed his polygraph test. Fired from his promised CIA career as a 

case officer in Moscow, Howard took revenge on the agency with espionage, then escaped FBI 

surveillance in 1985 and defected to the Soviet Union (Wise, 1988). 

The Impact of Personal Problems 

Clinical interview studies of espionage offenders have noted a pattern in which personal 
55 

disruptions or crises often precede an individualís decision to commit espionage, and have 

speculated that if help or timely intervention had been offered, the crime might have been 

averted (Wood & Fischer, 2002). We attempted to document this pattern in the cases in the 

espionage database by coding instances of various upsets and life crises if these occurred 

coincident to or shortly before an espionage attempt. These crises included the death or terminal 

illness of a close friend or member of the family, separation or divorce, lengthy physical 

separation from spouse, reported marital discord, a recent engagement or marriage, a new love 

relationship, an extramarital affair, or relocation. Coverage in press accounts of espionage of 

these personal episodes is probably even less systematic than are the behaviors targeted by the 

Adjudicative Guidelines, but if they were mentioned, these data were collected. We found that 41 

of the 150 individuals (27%) had experienced one or more of these events in the months before 

attempting espionage. This could be evidence of a pattern, but we will need to tie these data to 

details in these cases to make the claim that disruptive life events can trigger decisions to spy. It 

is quite likely that many of the 109 persons for whom such incidents were not recorded also 

experienced such events, since in a given 8-month period, most people do face unexpected ups 

and downs in life that could provoke disastrous decisions. 

For some individuals with access to valuable information, these personal crises seem to 

precipitate their decision to spy, or more likely, they were part of a confluence of factors. 

Looking back, some described their experience in terms that highlighted their emotional fragility 

and reduced ability to make reasonable decisions. Jeffrey Carney, for example, struggled with 

distress after he came to realize his homosexuality while serving as a sergeant in the U.S. Air 

Force. Carney was stationed in Berlin in 1983 and held SCI access. Although he did not dare to 

talk openly about his homosexuality, he wanted his co-workers to know how unhappy and 

alienated he felt in a setting he knew was disdainful toward his sexual orientation. He is quoted 

as confiding to friends, ìI have problems. I hurt. I donít want to be here, and I donít know if Iím 

going to hurt myself or not.î He told his supervisors he did not want the responsibility of access 

to classified information, saying ìI donít want this job anymore. You need to take my clearance.î 

Instead of pulling the clearance of someone it would not be easy to replace, his supervisors 

recommended psychiatric counseling for him, but that did not help. Carney began crossing the 

Berlin wall and spending time with East German agentsówho were careful to show him the 

caring acceptance and involvement he craved. He returned to his Air Force job to help these new 

friends, and for the next 6 years they collected highly classified information from him (ìTurning 

a Blind Eye to Spies,î 1994). 

When Thomas Cavanaghís life seemed to be falling apart in 1984, he turned to espionage 

as a way out of the box he felt trapped him. An engineer for Northrop Corporation with access to 

classified documents on Stealth technology, Cavanaghís marriage failed and the financial 

consequences hit him with demands he could not meet; his debts mounted. The 5-year periodic 

reinvestigation for his security clearance was coming up soon and he feared that when 

investigators found out about his debts, the government would revoke his clearance and he 

would lose his job and his income. To keep his classified access and his job, and not thinking 

very clearly, Cavanagh tried to prevent one imagined chain of disasters by initiating another; he 

offered to sell classified documents to the Soviets. Intercepted by the FBI and convicted of 

espionage in 1984, Cavanagh was sentenced to two life terms in prison (Winokur, 1987; 

Dawson, 1985). 
56 

Potential Improvements to the Personnel Security System 

In response to the national outcry over the spate of espionage cases in the 1980s, the 

Defense Department reduced the number of persons holding security clearances from a high of 

4.3 million in 1985 to 2.1 million as of 2000. Over the past 15 years, repeated commissions and 

panels have identified improvements needed in the system and have recommended changes, and 

numerous changes have been adopted (Personnel Security Investigations Process Review Team, 

2000). After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, cutbacks in federal staff and snags in the 

introduction of a new computer system at the Defense Security Service generated a daunting 

backlog in background investigations in the Department of Defense. Efforts to decide how to 

solve the backlog crisis have focused attention on what remains to be done to improve the 

personnel security system. This study of espionage holds implications for these efforts. 

 Clearance Granting Procedures 

Initial vetting is the first filter the system puts in place to identify and disqualify persons 

who do not meet the criteria for a security clearance. Our data on espionage indicate that initial 

vetting is indeed necessary, particularly for certain subgroups from which persons likely to 

attempt espionage come, such as young military personnel. It is important that young military 

applicants continue to be carefully evaluated on all the criteria listed in the DoD regulation 

5200.2R and the Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/4. This is especially true for 

financial criteria: research indicates that personal finances are a constant problem among junior 

military personnel and, as patterns in the findings from the espionage database show, debt, greed, 

and financial mismanagement in a youthful population create serious temptations for those with 

security clearances (Tiemeyer, Wardynski, & Buddin, 1999; Luther, Garman, et al., 1997). 

Currently the system devotes many of its resources to screening for initial clearances in 

an effort to eliminate persons who might be risks for security violation. Trustworthy and reliable 

personnel make good employees, and initial screening provides an ancillary benefit in that it vets 

for employment suitability at the same time it gauges potential security risk. As we noted above 

in our discussion about those spies whom we know in retrospect also may have violated the 

criteria in the Adjudicative Guidelines before or during their espionage, those criteria define 

issues of security relevance in general, not a narrow focus on preventing espionage. With a few 

exceptions, most people do not apply for a security clearance intending to spy; they come to that 

decision later based on opportunity, need, and their life circumstances at the time. A better 

allocation of the personnel security systemís resources for countering espionage would expend 

more of them on periodic reevaluation of cleared individuals and on continuous monitoring. 

Putting more resources into ongoing monitoring recognizes the lesson espionage cases typically 

teach, which is that people change, and actions that would have been unthinkable at one time or 

in one context become attractive, even inevitable, in another. 

Our findings demonstrate that risk of losing the most critical information to espionage 

comes not from young low-ranking individuals, but from those who have held positions of trust 

for some years. These more damaging and ìsuccessfulî spies are generally older, better 

educated, married, more often recruited into espionage, with longer-term employment histories 

and, if military, are senior enlisted personnel. Despite the risk these trusted people represent, the 
57 

personnel security system invests most heavily in vetting initial applicants, rather than in the 

continuing assessment that would screen for the higher-risk offender. Research on continuing 

evaluation programs in the military services (Bosshardt, DuBois, & Crawford, 1991) has shown 

that continuing assessment programs are moderately effective, but would be improved by better 

monitoring mechanisms, random reinvestigations instead of predictable ones, and targeting 

resources on those exposed to high-risk information. Over the decade since this major research 

on continuing assessment was done, one line of attempted improvement has been identifying 

cleared individuals with significant personal problems and offering them help through Employee 

Assistance Programs as a means of reducing the probability that they will resort to espionage 

(Wood & Fischer, 2002). 

A program called the Automated Continuing Evaluation System (ACES), under 

development at the Defense Personnel Security Research Center, promises to improve continuing 

assessment of cleared personnel by structuring a better monitoring mechanism. Whereas the 

present system requires full-scale reinvestigations for all personnel holding high-level clearances 

who have not been investigated for 5 years, under ACES computerized security-related 

information (e.g., criminal history, foreign travel, and credit database files) would be checked for 

each cleared person on an on-going basis. Full-scale reinvestigations in individual cases could be 

triggered at any time based upon the results of the electronic checks, or if monitoring showed no 

need, they might never be initiated. Findings indicate that once implemented, ACES is likely to 

detect some serious issue cases (persons whose records include potential violations of the 

standards in the Adjudicative Guidelines) that are being missed with the current system of regular 

5-year reinvestigations, because individuals quit before their periodic reinvestigations are 

initiated. Consequently, ACES may detect more serious issue cases than the present system, and 

it may detect them sooner and at less cost than the current periodic reinvestigation approach 

(Timm, 2001). 

Another finding with implications for the personnel security system is that a number of 

people continued or actually began espionage after leaving the job that provided them access. 

While it would be difficult to track or monitor individuals once they leave a job or an agency, at 

least the type of automated financial checks that ACES will provide could be conducted, with the 

individualís permission, for some period after an individual leaves employment, especially for 

those who have had access to highly sensitive information. Continued monitoring of financial 

and travel histories for a given period after individuals leave sensitive positions, for example, 

could pinpoint unexplained affluence from a sudden espionage windfall, or pick up debts that 

might force a knowledgeable person to offer information from his memory for sale, or note 

patterns of travel that raise questions. 

A second resource allocation issue that our findings address involves the allocation of 

resources for vetting among the various levels of security clearance. Most resources now are 

devoted to persons applying for Top Secret or higher access. Applicants for these types of 

clearance receive more extensive background investigations including personal interviews, and 

their clearances are reevaluated at least at 5-year intervals rather than at 10-year or 15-year 

periods. Yet of the cleared individuals included in the espionage database, 33 spies (more than 

one-fifth of the total) possessed no higher than Confidential or Secret clearances. Among these 

were spies such as William Bell, Robert Thompson, and Ruby Schuler, whose espionage caused 
58 

considerable damage to the United States. While it would not be feasible to devote the same 

amount of money and effort to screening these lower clearances as goes toward the higher access 

clearances, at a minimum a more comprehensive financial screening and past criminal history for 

Confidential and Secret clearances should be performed. Using capabilities to do automated data 

mining, it is now possible to expand automated credit checking to identify some initial applicants 

even for lower access with a risk profile for espionage. Current policy debate over whether to 

devote the additional resources to screen Secret level clearances with ACES along with Top 

Secret clearances demonstrates the relevance of this finding. 

The vetting procedures for a security clearance focus on the applicantís background, past 

activities, and experiences, to generate information that serves as the basis of an educated 

judgment on the likelihood the person will be trustworthy and reliable. These procedures are not 

designed to identify spies, and when put to the test they have not done so. At least six individuals 

in the espionage database were screened and granted or retained security clearances while they 

were actively engaged in espionage. Example include James Clark, who had been spying as part 

of the Stand ring for 10 years when in 1986 he lied about his 20-year involvement in radical and 

Communist groups on his application for a clearance as a government contractor. He received a 

Secret clearance. Later he shifted to a job as a civilian analyst for the Army, and in 1992 the 

Army reaffirmed his clearance (Masters, 1998; Weiner, 1997). Sergeant Clyde Conrad began 

spying for Zoltan Szabo in 1975, and his Top Secret clearance was reaffirmed in 1978 after the 

obligatory periodic reinvestigation failed to question Conradís apparent unexplained affluence or 

to note his habit of working late by himself in the classified vault (Roth, 1988). David Boone, an 

Army cryptanalyst, walked into the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C. and volunteered to spy 

in 1988. During his reinvestigation for a Top Secret clearance in 1990, investigators noted his 

debts and revoked his access; this provoked Boone to resign from the Army in 1991. His 

espionage, however, remained unsuspected until 1998, when the FBI ran a successful sting 

against him (U.S. District Court, 1998). Warrant Officer James Hall passed two periodic 

reinvestigations of his Top Secret clearance while selling classified documents to the Soviet and 

East German intelligence services. Despite a lavish lifestyle and the conflicting stories he told to 

explain it, his clearance was reaffirmed twice and he spied for seven years9

 (Rafalko, n.d.; 

Wilson, 1989; Engelberg, 1989). Catching a spy is a counterintelligence task that asks different 

questions and uses different procedures from those of clearance screening. These instances 

caution us that a background investigation as currently structured will probably not identify a 

competent spy. 

 Security Awareness: Co-Worker Responsibilities 

Programs that explain the requirements of handling classified materials and the 

responsibilities of holding a clearance are the workhorses of the security system; often they are 

underappreciated and underfunded, yet they play an essential role by keeping security issues 

salient to those with access. In daily work settings, an awareness of security requirements has 

prompted co-workers of suspected spies to report inappropriate behavior, and this in turn has 

resulted in the apprehension of several individuals. Michael Allenís co-workers and supervisors 

noticed various security infractions that over time made them suspicious. In 1986 Allen was 

 

9

 The other two individuals who were committing espionage while they applied for and were granted a security 

clearance were Theresa Squillacote and Glenn Souther. 
59 

working as a civilian clerk for the Navy in the Philippines. Retired from the Navy in 1972, in 

addition to his day job, he had developed businesses in the Philippines including a used car 

dealership, a bar, and a cockfighting ring. Apparently to advance these interests, Allen 

photocopied and passed classified U.S. intelligence reports to Philippine intelligence. His coworkers at Cubi Point Naval Air Station noticed his excessive photocopying, his boasting about 

involvements with foreign agents, his story about buying a stolen car and having its 

identification altered, his flashing around credentials that falsely claimed he was an agent of the 

Philippine police, and his penchant for freely spending a lot of money. Adding things up, they 

reported their concerns to the Naval Investigative Service, whose agents videotaped Allen 

copying classified documents and stuffing them into his clothes. Allen received 8 years in prison 

and a $10,000 fine for his espionage (Sylvest, 1988; Weintraub, 1986; Associated Press, 1986) 

In two other instancesó Samuel Morison and Jonathan Pollardóco-workers noticed and 

raised questions about cleared employeesí security violations, such as their interest in classified 

materials not related to work, the removal of documents to take them home, and patterns of 

suspicious photocopying. Morisonís colleagues noticed his ìnosinessî about issues not related to 

his work, and when he sent copies of classified naval photographs of a Soviet carrier to a British 

defense magazine in 1984, they knew who to suggest had done it. Morison hoped for an editorís 

position with the publication (Lardner, Jr., 1985). Pollard allowed Israeli intelligence agents to 

copy stacks of classified reports that he brought out to them, but his own ìinsatiable appetite for 

documents outside his field of interestî provoked the initial tips from co-workers that focused 

suspicion on him (The New York Times, 1987). 

On the other hand, some spies claimed that co-workers could easily have realized what 

they were doing but did not act. Often people refused to question a colleagueís activities no 

matter how blatant they seemed in retrospect. Jeffrey Carney recounted from prison how he had 

taken ìa huge document and another huge document with me, went across the hall into an 

unsecured room, laid the documents out on the table, secured everything, and had my camera 

ready, and started photographing. I was walked in on two times while I was photographing. My 

face went red as a beet because my blood pressure was unbelievable, and the people went, ëOh, 

excuse me, I didnít know you were busy,í and they turned around and walked out.î As Arthur 

Walker noted from his cell, ìa lot of people just tend to mind their own businessî (Stein, 1994). 

One of the several governing statements of federal policy on security responsibilities for 

cleared personnel, Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information, states that 

ìEmployees are encouraged and expected to report any information that raises doubts as to 

whether another employeeís continued eligibility for access to classified information is clearly 

consistent with the national security.î This expectation cuts across the strong disinclination in 

American culture to ìratî on a peer, as well as across the determination to mind oneís own 

business as the best way to get along with co-workers. Security managers strive to temper these 

feelings and to convince cleared employees of the rare but actual fact of espionage in the 

workplace by telling and dramatizing stories of instances of it. A related issue security managers 

face involves convincing employees to draw official attention to cleared co-workers whose 

personal crises threaten to evolve into security risks. As discussed above, some spiesí crises 

seemed to trigger a plunge into espionage as the only way they could see to resolve their 

problems. Co-workers often know about the personal disarray in a colleagueís life, but the 
60 

decision to tell security about a peerís problems, and risk the person losing a clearance or even a 

job, is difficult. This ambivalence can be seen in the results of a respected national public 

opinion poll that asked respondents if they thought people should report a co-workerís security 

violations. The poll found that respondents were evenly divided between those who would report 

a co-worker immediately, and those who would speak to the person, offering them a chance to 

improve, without reporting them (Wood, 2002). The hopes pinned on federal Employee 

Assistance programs as a way out of this quandary, since these programs allow a troubled 

employee to be referred for professional help before the troubles escalate, have so far been 

undercut by lack of trust in assurances of confidentiality by a government program (Wood & 

Fischer, 2002). 

 Position Vulnerability Assessment 

Our findings support the suggestion that much of the risk of espionage is associated with 

the type and location of the job a person fills. Some jobs present more opportunity for espionage 

than others, and evaluating jobs on a scale of their potential for espionage allows needed finetuning of counterespionage measures. The personnel security system shows a persistent 

preference for assessment of the person rather than the position. (See Parker and Wiskoff, 

ìTemperament Constructs Related to Betrayal of Trust,î 1991, for a review of the literatures on 

trust betrayal and potential personality factors in espionage.) Concentrating exclusively on 

individuals and on the qualities that could make them susceptible to spying ignores the 

differential risks associated with factors we see in the espionage database such as overseas 

assignments, certain occupations, or rank. For example, after the 1986 scandal at the U.S. 

Embassy in Moscow, where Marine Sergeant Clayton Lonetree provided classified information 

to the Soviets, the U.S. Marine Corps reevaluated the position of Marine security guard and 

changed its assignment procedures. Instead of assigning inexperienced guards to Eastern Bloc 

posts as had been their policy, after 1986 the Marines only sent those with previous embassy 

experience to these sensitive posts (Wiskoff, et al., 1989). 

A rare example of analysis on how to assess position vulnerability is the study of 

positions with SCI access by Kent S. Crawford and Michael J. Bosshardt, ìAssessment of 

Position Factors that Increase Vulnerability to Espionageî (1993). The authors generated a list 

of possible vulnerability factors and asked intelligence specialists to validate them; professionals 

then ranked the most robust factors. Their results are suggestive: informants ranked the four most 

serious vulnerabilities as the sensitivity of classified information, the degree of contact with 

foreign nationals, the frequency of access to classified information, and the threat from foreign 

intelligence at that location. Crawford and Bosshardt then explored and ranked factors that 

security managers could not do much about and those they could more easily change. Further 

research following up on this work would assist the counterintelligence community to think 

about espionage risk in terms of positions as well as people. 

 

Tendencies in the Incidence and the Recipients of Espionage 

Our data support some generalizations about the number of known American spies 

operating at given points in time and about which nations were paying them for information. In 
61 

the following section we will consider these data and the tendencies they suggest, based on 

comparisons across all the cases in the espionage database. 

The Prevalence of Spies 

The public perception in the mid-1980s that espionage was becoming disturbingly 

common was not unfounded; among the cases that were publicly discussed, there were more 

American spies active in the 1980s than in other periods of time before or since. 

1

3 2

5

8

11

9

121212 13 14

24

20

18

26

35

31

28

26 25

21

19 18 17

15

11

9 10

7

9 8 9 10

12

7

10

8

12 11

16

10

8

6

4 4 4 5 5 5 4

16

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

 

Figure 2 Known Spies Active in Each Year, 1950 through 2001

Figure 2 shows the number of American citizens actively spying in each year between 

1950 and 2001, when FBI agent Robert Hanssen was arrested in February. The chart was 

constructed by comparing the date on which a spy began espionage with the date on which he or 

she ended the espionage, not when the person was arrested since that might be months or even 

years after they stopped. Interceptions were counted once in the year in which they occurred, 

while a spy with a long-running career such as Larry Wu-tai Chin was counted as active in each 

year from 1952 through 1985 when he was apprehended. Someone who stopped spying and later 

started again was counted as active only in the years during which he or she was operating. 

The chart documents that starting in 1975 and continuing until 1990, more Americans 

were known to be spying and trying to spy than in earlier or later periods. The peak came in 

1985, with 35 active or attempted spies. This suggests that the outrage focused on ìthe year of 

the spyî in 1985 was not misplaced. As we noted above, what was different about espionage in 

the 1980s was the increase in inept, easily caught espionage attempts by young military men: 

three-fourths of the interceptions took place during the 1980s. On the other hand, starting in the 
62 

late 1970ís, the government abruptly reversed its approach to prosecution for espionage and 

began to make public examples of spies that were apprehended. So we simply know about more 

espionage cases starting in 1977 and when the FISA and CIPA legislation passed a few years 

later. A question worth further study is whether all the publicity about spying in the mid-1980s, 

and the thorough press coverage given to lucrative spy cases such as John Walker, Jr.ís ring, did 

not deter espionage but actually encouraged readers to give spying a try. A ìcopycatî 

phenomenon in espionage has been suggested but has yet to be demonstrated (Pincus, 2001). 

The Nationalities of Recipients 

In addition to changes over time in the number of Americans spying, the countries for 

which they spied changed as the Cold War waxed and then waned and died. Table 16 shows the 

incidence of espionage cases by the nationality of the recipient, or intended recipient, of the 

information and the relationship of these nations to the United States at the time of the 

espionage. 

Table 16 

Nationalities of Recipients or Intended Recipients of Information (n=149) 

Nationality of Recipient n % 

 

Adversarial to the U.S. at the time of espionage 

Soviet Union 84 56 

East Germany 12 8 

Hungary 7 5 

Czechoslovakia 6 4 

China 5 3 

Poland 4 3 

Cuba 5 3 

Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Vietnam (1 each) 4 3 

Subtotal: adversarial powers 127 85 

Neutral or friendly to the U.S. at the time of espionage 

South Africa 2 1 

Israel 2 1 

Philippines 3 2 

Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Ghana, Greece, Japan, Jordan, Liberia, 

Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, United Kingdom a 

(1 each) 

15 10 

Subtotal: neutral or friendly powers 22 15 

 

Total 149 100 

Note. Eight individuals supplied information to two persons representing two different countries, and for 9 

individuals the nationalities of their recipients or intended recipients are unknown (149 recipients) 

a It is arguable that the case of Samuel Morisonís sharing of classified photographs with a British publication, Jane’s 

Defence Weekly, and mishandling classified documents by taking them home, does not represent espionage against 

the U.S. by the U.K. 
63 

As one would expect during the Cold War, in espionage undertaken in a contest between 

adversaries, in most cases American spies have helped countries hostile to the United States, 

with our Cold War opponent, the Soviet Union, the predominant recipient. As a matter of course 

Eastern bloc countries and Soviet allies funneled information they received from American 

agents to the Soviet Union, so we are justified in thinking of the Soviets as the eventual 

recipients through these various intermediaries. 

15

21 22

54

7

1 0

2 2 3

1 1 2

9 9

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s

Decade Espionage Began

Number of Cases

Soviet Bloc

Other Adversarial Countries

Neutral or Friendly 

Countries

Figure 3 Recipients of Espionage from American Spies

Figure 3 depicts the trend over time of the recipients of American espionage, and the 

predominance of Soviet Bloc countries during this Cold War period is obvious. More surprising 

is the range of neutral and friendly powers that have availed themselves of help from American 

spies by taking classified information from the United States. Seventeen different neutral or 

friendly nations have received information from American spies, suggesting that the model of 

espionage as a contest between adversaries is too simpleóthe usefulness of information denied 

to all but trusted insiders has made it too attractive even for allies to pass up. 
64 

Table 17 

Nationalities of Non-Soviet Bloc Recipients Over Time 

Period of Time Nationality Date Espionage Began 

 

1942-1975 3 cases 

 

Netherlands 

China 

Egypt 

1948 

1952 

1967 

1976-1980 3 cases Libya 

Greece 

South Africa 

1977 

1977 

1979 

1981-1990 13 cases South Africa 

Ghana 

Israel (2 cases) 

China (3 cases) 

United Kingdom 

Philippines (3 cases) 

Taiwan 

Japan 

1981 

1983 

1984, 1985 

1984, 1985, 1985 

1984 

1986, 1990, 1990 

1986 

1986 

1990-2000 13 cases Jordan 

Iraq 

Liberia 

Ecuador 

Cuba (5 cases) 

Saudi Arabia 

El Salvador 

China 

South Korea 

1990 

1990 

1991 

1991 

1992, 1994, 1994, 1994, 

1999 

1992 

1992 

1996 

1996 

 

Table 17 demonstrates a tendency over time to a widening circle of interested buyers of 

information from American spies. During the first three decades covered by the espionage 

database there were only three instances of espionage directed to non-Soviet bloc recipients. 

Three more cases occurred over the next five years: from 1976 through 1980, three Americans 

spied for the non-Soviet bloc countries of Libya, Greece, and South Africa. Between 1981 and 

1990 there were 13 instances, a sudden increase that reflects the accelerating pace of 

globalization with its interconnectedness between nations and peoples both for good and for ill. 

Noteworthy developments included the interest of Asian countries in American information, 

including 3 individuals who spied for China, 3 for the Philippines, and one spy each for Taiwan 

and Japan. During the following decade, between 1990 and 2001, globalization continued to 

expand its reach, with new recipients from South American and Middle Eastern nations joining 

Asian buyers of American secrets. The Gulf War in 1991 brought with it espionage for Jordan, 

Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Cuba stepped up its persistent seeking after American information during 

the 1990s, sending American-born agents with family ties in Cuba as well as Cuban-born agents 

to collect data for the Cuban intelligence service. Five American citizens have been convicted of 

espionage for Cuba since 1995, along with nine Cuban-born agents who were part of a south 

Florida spy ring called the ìRed Avispa [Wasp]î (Smikle, 1999). 
65 

Trends in American Espionage Since the End of the Cold War 

The analyses reported in the previous sections of this paper have included all 150 

espionage cases that occurred across the five decades since 1950. The publication of the initial 

version of the study of PERSERECís espionage database in May 1992 nearly coincided with the 

collapse of the USSR in November 1991; this coincidence meant that no post-Cold War cases 

were included in the initial version. The end of the Cold War did not mean the end of espionage 

by Americans, but it seems to have brought changes in the practice of this crime. In this section 

we will compare Americans who began spying during the Cold War, 1947-1989, with those who 

began in 1990 and thereafter while the USSR was in its last months and then after its demise. In 

this table we have also broken out the decade of the 1980s of the Cold War to highlight several 

anomalies in that period. 

Table 18 

Comparison of Espionage Begun in the Three Periods 1947-79, 1980-1989, and 1990-2001

Characteristics Began 1947-1979 Began 1980-1989 Began 1990-2001 

n=65 % n=65 % n=20 % 

Gender (n=150) 

Male 

Female 

 62 95 

 3 5 

 60 92 

 5 8 

 

 17 85 

 3 15 

Race or ethnic group (n=143) 

 White 

Black 

Asian 

Native American 

Hispanic 

unknown 

 59 91 

 5 8 

 1 2 

 0 

 0 

 0 

 54 83 

 2 3 

 2 3 

 1 2 

 2 3 

 4 6 

 9 45 

 2 10 

 1 5 

 0 

 5 25 

 3 15 

Sexual preference (n=116) 

Heterosexual 

Homosexual 

Unknown 

 52 80 

 4 6 

 7 11 

 45 69 

 2 3 

 18 28 

 11 55 

 0 

 9 45 

Median age when espionage began, in 

years (n=147) 31 25 39 

Marital status when espionage began 

(n=140) 

Married 

Single 

Separated or divorced 

Unknown 

 45 69 

 16 25 

 4 6 

 27 42 

 25 38 

 8 12 

 5 8 

 8 40 

 5 25 

 2 10 

 5 25 
66 

Characteristics Began 1947-1979 Began 1980-1989 Began 1990-2001 

n=65 % n=65 % n=20 % 

Military or civilian (n=150) 

 Civilian 

Military 

Army 

Navy 

AF 

Marines 

 31 48 

 34 52 

 15 44 

 6 18 

 13 38 

 0 

 31 48 

 34 52 

 

 9 26 

 17 50 

 5 15 

 3 9 

 15 75 

 5 25 

 

 2 40 

 2 40 

 0 

 1 20 

Military rank (n=67) 

E1 ñE3 

E4 ñE6 

E7 ñ WO 

Officer 

unknown

 3 8 

 16 47

 10 29 

 4 12 

 1 3 

 10 29 

 16 47 

 3 9 

 2 6 

 3 9 

 0 

 3 60 

 0 

 1 20 

 1 20 

Intercepted or passed information 

(n=150) 

Intercepted 

Passed information 

 6 9 

 59 91 

 29 45 

 36 55 

 4 20 

 16 80 

Duration (n=150) 

Intercepted 

Less than 1 year 

1 to 4.9 years 

5 or more years 

 6 9 

 14 22 

 23 35 

 22 34 

 29 45 

 10 15 

 17 26 

 9 14 

 4 20 

 6 30 

 9 45 

 1 5 

Major occupational category (n=148) 

Communications/intelligence 

General/technical 

Scientific/professional 

Functional support or 

administrative 

Miscellaneous 

unknown 

 25 38 

 10 15 

 5 23 

 12 19 

 

 3 5 

 20 31 

 22 34 

 9 14 

 9 14 

 

 4 6 

 1 2 

 4 20 

 6 30 

 2 10 

 3 15 

 

 4 20 

 1 5 

Security clearance (n=141) 

Confidential 

Secret 

Top secret 

Top secret SCI 

None held during espionage 

unknown 

 1 2 

 10 15 

 28 43 

 10 15 

 11 17 

 5 8 

 3 4 

 14 22 

 18 28 

 9 14 

 18 28 

 3 4 

 0 

 5 25 

 4 20 

 2 10 

 8 40 

 1 5 

Type of employment during espionage 

(n=148) 

Uniformed military 

Civil servant 

Government contractor 

Job unrelated 

unknown 

 34 52 

 14 22 

 7 11 

 10 15 

 34 52 

 12 18 

 7 11 

 12 18 

 5 25 

 8 40 

 5 25 

 0 

 2 10 
67 

Characteristics Began 1947-1979 Began 1980-1989 Began 1990-2001 

n=65 % n=65 % n=20 % 

Native or naturalized citizenship 

(n=148) 

Native 

Naturalized 

unknown 

 52 80 

 13 20 

 56 86 

 8 12 

 1 2 

 14 70 

 5 25 

 1 5 

Had foreign attachments (n=150) 

Yes 

No 

 34 52 

 31 48 

 21 32 

 44 68 

 11 55 

 9 45 

Where espionage began (n=147) 

US west coast 

US east coast 

US other 

Foreign 

Unknown 

 5 8 

 26 40 

 5 8 

 27 42 

 2 3 

 15 23 

 21 32 

 11 17 

 17 26 

 1 2 

 2 10 

 11 55 

 1 5 

 6 30 

Volunteer or recruit (n=148) 

Volunteer 

 Recruit 

unknown 

 34 52 

 30 46 

 1 2 

 46 71 

 19 29 

 14 70 

 5 25 

 1 5 

Decade began (n=150) 

1940s 

1950s 

1960s 

1970s 

1980s 

1990s 

2000s 

 5 8 

 12 18 

 22 34 

 26 40 

 0 

 0 

 0 

 

 65 100 

 19 95 

 1 5 

Decade ended (n=150) 

1940s 

1950s 

1960s 

1970s 

1980s 

1990s 

2000s 

 1 2 

 6 9 

 24 37 

 17 26 

 13 20 

 3 5 

 1 2 

 58 89 

 7 11 18 90 

 2 10 

Motivation (237 total motives) 

[n=number of individuals] 

Single motive: (n= 43) 

Money 20 

Divided loyalties 7 

Disgruntlement 7 

Thrills 1 

Ingratiation 4 

Coercion 4 

50 Multiple motives: 

(n=22) 

Money 20 

Divided loyalties 7 

Disgruntlement 10 

Thrills 9 

Ingratiation 2 

Coercion 2 

Single motive: (n= 

31) 

Money 26 

Divided loyalties 1 

Disgruntlement 2 

Thrills 1 

Ingratiation 1 

 Coercion 0 

78 Multiple motives: 

(n=34) 

Money 30 

Divided loyalties 8 

Disgruntlement 17 

Thrills 6 

 Ingratiation 12 

 Coercion 1 

 Recognition 4 

Single motive: (n= 

10) 

Money 1 

Divided loyalties 5 

Disgruntlement 2 

Thrills 0 

Ingratiation 2 

Coercion 0 

 25 Multiple 

motives: (n=10) 

Money 7 

Divided loyalties 5 

Disgruntlement 4 

Thrills 1 

Ingratiation 5 

Coercion 1 

Recognition 2 
68 

Demographically, the 20 Americans who began spying in the 1990s reflect some of the 

population and social trends of the decade: the aging of the baby boom generation, more 

participation by women and ethnic minorities, fewer people choosing marriage, and a shrinking 

military force offset by increased contracting from the private sector for services by the federal 

government. American spies of the 1990s have been older, with a median age of 39, than either 

of the earlier two groups (which had median ages of 31 for those who began espionage between 

1947 and 1979, and 25 for those in the 1980s). They include a larger proportion of women 

(15%), of racial and ethnic minorities, notably the 25% who were Hispanic Americans, and a 

lower proportion of married persons. Given that for almost half of the individuals who began 

spying since 1990 sexual preference is unknown, these data do not support statements about 

trends in sexual preference. 

 

Whereas roughly half of each of the two earlier cohorts of American spies had been 

members of the military, three quarters of the spies in the 1990s have been civilians. Compared 

to the two earlier periods, the group in the 1990s had twice the proportion of civilian government 

employees (40%) and twice the proportion of government contractors (25%). Among the 

military spies, the proportions from each of the various military services has shifted over time: 

between 1947 and 1979 the largest proportions of spies came from the Army (44%) and the Air 

Force (38%), with the Navy a distant third with 18%. During the 1980s the proportion of Navy 

spies shot up to 50% of the military spies, while Army and Air Force spies declined. Three cases 

of espionage by Marines occurred in the 1980s, roughly 10% of the military cases. In the 1990s 

the number of military spies, at 5 cases (2 Army, 2 Navy, and 1 Marine), is too small to suggest a 

trend except to demonstrate that military espionage has declined compared to that by civilians. 

The proportion of interceptions increased dramatically in the 1980s when there was an 

influx into espionage of young, inexperienced military personnel: from a rate of roughly 10% 

interceptions between 1947 and 1979, the rate climbed to 45% in the 1980s. Spies in the 1990s 

have been much more ìsuccessfulî at avoiding interception and passing information: only 20% 

have been intercepted in the 1990s, which means that four-fifths of them have passed 

information to foreign powers. 

Duration of espionage also points to the 1980s as an anomaly compared to the earlier and 

later periods. Between 1947 and 1979, one-third of spies persisted in espionage for between one 

and five years, and another one-third persisted for more than 5 years. During the 1980s, 60% of 

the spies were either intercepted immediately or caught in less than one year. Spies in the 1990s 

have been more evenly distributed in duration, but few cases have been long-running: half have 

either been intercepted or caught within 1 year, 45% persisted between 1 and 5 years, and only 

one case lasted more than 5 years. 

The decline in the relative importance of recruiting noted in the 1980s has continued into 

the 1990s. Between 1947 and 1979 the proportion of volunteers to recruits was fairly closely 

balanced, with 52% volunteers and 46% recruits. This changed in the 1980s, as Americans 

volunteering to commit espionage became the norm: during that decade 71% volunteered versus 

29% who were recruited. In the 1990s this pattern persists, with 70% volunteering and 25% 

recruited. 
69 

The level of security clearance held by Americans who commit espionage is a factor that 

demonstrates counterintuitive trends. Confidential disappears as a clearance level in espionage 

cases in the 1990s as this designation for clearance has fallen into disuse. Secret level clearances 

among spies show a steady proportionate increase over time, and constitute one-fourth of the 

cases in the 1990s, while the proportion of Top Secret clearances declined from 43% in the 

earliest period, to 28% in the 1980s, and to 20% in the 1990s. On the other hand, espionage by 

persons holding no security clearance at the time they began spying increased over time, from 

17% of the cases between 1947 and 1979, to 28% in the 1980s, and to a surprising 40% of the 

cases in the 1990s. In seven of the 20 cases during the 1990s, the individuals held no security 

clearances. These include four recent cases of Americans of Cuban descent: Alejandro Alonso, 

Linda and Nilo Hernandez, and Joseph Santos, and three other instances: Douglas Groat, who 

offered to sell information after he left his job at the CIA; Joseph Brown, who used the access to 

classified information of a friend, Virginia Baynes; and Albert Sombolay, who sold unclassified 

but sensitive information on troop dispositions and equipment during the Gulf War. 

The trend in the proportion of naturalized citizens involved in espionage shows a dip 

during the 1980s followed by a rise to a slightly larger percentage in the 1990s. Between 1947 

and 1979, one-fifth of individuals in the espionage database held naturalized citizenship. During 

the 1980s the percentage of naturalized citizens fell to 12%, reflecting the influx into espionage 

in that decade of young military personnel who are predominately native born. In the 1990s 25% 

of American spies were naturalized citizens. The proportion of individuals with foreign 

attachments follows this same pattern. From an almost even split between 1947 to 1979, with 

roughly half of American spies having foreign attachments and half having none, the percentage 

of those with foreign attachments declined during the 1980s to one-third, then rose during the 

1990s to 55% with foreign attachments. 

Although they constitute a statistically small group of 20 people, American spies in the 

1990s would seem to reflect demographic changes in the United States that are bringing into the 

country larger numbers of foreign-born residents, while at the same time naturalization rates are 

declining. Citing data from the U.S. Census Bureau, one observer of these remarkable trends 

notes that: 

The current level of immigration is unprecedented in American history, with the 1990s 

witnessing the largest influx of immigrants in national historyÖ [and a] proportional 

decrease in naturalization rates among foreign born immigrantsÖ.[Between 1970 to 

2000], the number of naturalized citizens expanded by 71 percent (from 6.2 million to 

10.6 million), while the number of non-citizens increased by 401 percent (from 3.5 

million to 17.8 million) (Krause, 2002). 

Comparing the motivations given for espionage over these three time periods reinforces 

this pattern of a falling impact of foreign-born and foreign attachments in the 1980s, and then a 

rising impact in the 1990s. Considering those individuals who gave a single motive for their 

espionage, between 1947 and 1979 almost half of these American spies (47%) cited the most 

common motive, money; in the 1980s that figure rose to 84% who said money had motivated 

them. Only 10% of American spies in the 1990s claimed money as their motive, but 50% cited 

divided loyalties. For the earlier cohorts with a single motive, divided loyalties had been much 
70 

less important: among spies between 1947 and 1979, 16% held divided loyalties, while for those 

in the 1980s only one individual, 3%, held divided loyalties. Because these trends from the 

espionage database in naturalized citizenship, foreign attachments, and motivation by divided 

loyalties are consistent and striking for the cases in the recent past, we explored more deeply the 

impact these trends could have on issues of national allegiance. The trends we see in espionage 

during the 1990s reflect two developments that are redefining the current and the future 

relationship of the nation and the world: a global economy, and an international information 

marketplace. 

The Impact of Globalization on Espionage 

Economics on an international scale has been developing steadily over the 20th century 

and has accelerated over the last 20 years. Numerous analyses have tried to describe this farreaching change and to grasp what its implications will be. It is a trend that is so large and so 

pervasive that it is difficult to mentally step away from it to get the perspective needed to see its 

implications. It affects international politics, finance, military relations, demographicsófew 

dimensions of life will be untouched by this trend. There is no doubt that globalization now has 

and in the future will have many implications for espionage and for the conduct of 

counterespionage (Friedman, 2000). 

Typically espionage is framed as a contest between adversaries. This concept developed 

along with the nation state, which is a defined territory under a sovereign power that controls that 

territory. In this model, information about the nation state ìbelongsî to the state, is protected by 

the state if possible, and may be of lively interest to an opponent. Military forces protect the 

sovereignty of the government and maintain the territorial integrity of the nation state; in some 

instances, they enlarge that territory at the expense of adjacent nation states. In this model, 

citizens of the nation who commit espionage endanger that state when they give or sell its 

information to another state that uses it for its own advantage. This act betrays the loyalty 

implicitly demanded of citizens of the nation state in exchange for the benefits provided to them 

(protection, stability, infrastructure, legal systems, etc.) by the sovereign and his or her military 

forces. 

Few of these descriptive statements about espionage among nation states fit a world 

integrating into a global economy. Analysts now argue that international power rests less on 

territorial hegemony or military power, and more on how successfully a nationís citizens 

participate in the global economy (Treverton, 2001). In the global economy a nationís success 

depends more on capitalizing on the free exchange of peoples and ideas from around the world, 

on using governmentís legitimacy to convene and negotiate among international competitors 

rather than dominating over them, and on using to best advantage the growing international 

power of private actors such as corporations, banks, and independent agencies. In this context, 

the very meaning and responsibilities of the term ìcitizenî would change: if everyone 

participates in a single global economy, does loyalty flow not toward the sovereign of a territory, 

but rather toward our fellow professionals, to those in our industry, or to our stockholders 

scattered around the world? (Pink, 2001; Roberts, 2001). 
71 

Geneva Jones was an example of an American confused about international loyalties. 

She accepted a secretarial position at the State Department in 1990 and moved from her sheltered 

life in Augusta, GA, to Washington, D.C., where she felt ìdazzled by an international city 

teeming with African immigrants anxious about the fate of their motherlandî (Cummings, 

1994a). Jones realized that ìWhere I come from in Georgia, we donít get any news about 

AfricaÖ I didnít know anything about Africa, about being of African descent.î According to 

court records, as Jones became more interested in her own African heritage, at first she began 

stealing embassy cables for her private reading. She told FBI agents she felt the media and the 

government did not provide a balanced portrait of Africa, and so she needed the cables ìto learn 

about the Africa she was discovering.î Jones further rationalized her activities by saying, ìAnd, I 

think, my overall objective was, you know, for the informationÖ to help my people some kind 

of way by putting information out on Africaî (Cummings, 1994a). In response to her growing 

passion about Africa and for a West African journalist named Dominic Ntube, Jones began 

stealing classified State Department and CIA documents relating to Africa and passing them to 

Ntube and his friends and associates. Arrested in 1993, she received a 3-year prison sentence for 

unlawful communication of defense information (Brown, 1993; Cummings, 1994b). 

Nations spying on other nations have usually targeted economic information as well as 

military secrets. Economic data has been sought especially by less advanced nations looking for 

short cuts to industrial and technological development. The Soviet Union, chronically lagging 

behind the West in industrial development, refined economic espionage into an art in its effort to 

catch up. In a global economy, this type of economic espionage becomes imperative. Information 

about economic matters will become increasingly valuable. Already specialists in ìcorporate 

intelligenceî spy on each otherís innovations in the ìwarfareî of business (Mason, 2001). The 

line between governmentís defense secrets that can be classified and industryís corporate secrets 

is becoming ever more confused, as ìdual use technologiesî (those that have both military and 

commercial applications) become the norm with development coordinated between private and 

governmental entities. Ronald Hoffmanís private sale of classified technology developed for the 

military by a contractor is one example of a growing trend (Schweizer, 1992). One can project 

that military secrets will continue to be valuable and therefore protected, but the types of 

information salient to a nationís defense will broaden into the economic sphere and outward into 

other spheres of life where information is difficult to safeguard. 

Internationally, the process of recognizing friends and identifying opponents who would 

send spies against the state is changed in a global economy. Already espionage by allies is not 

uncommon, and with the disappearance of the bi-polar international system of the Cold War, 

potential buyers of advantageous information proliferate. One commentator predicts, ìthe victors 

in global economic warfare will form regional economic alliances that will share information and 

together strengthen their collectiveóand individualóeconomic powerî (Melton, n.d.). The 

shape of such alliances is still emerging, but one characteristic already apparent in them is that 

they are temporary and they shift as the best advantage shifts, not necessarily staying with 

historic commitments or values. The cautious cooperation between the U.S. and Russia in the 

campaign against terrorists in Afghanistan, as of January 2002, is a startling instance of this 

trend. 
72 

Among the global flow of workers moving between countries for better jobs and 

corporations moving to countries where labor can be bought more cheaply, the usual 

immigration controls such as weighted quotas make less sense. Already guest workers in some 

European nations, not eligible for full citizenship, have lived several generations in a resentful 

limbo of non-nationality. As the millennium turned, more than half the engineering PhDís in the 

United States were granted to foreign students, and persons from other nations dominated many 

of the sciences, mathematics, and computing in American universities (Loeb, 1999). More of the 

nations of the world are allowing persons born on their soil to retain nationality when they 

naturalize in another country, becoming ìdual citizensî (Spiro, 2000; Renshon, 2001). How does 

the nation state, now facing espionage from many quarters, minimize its vulnerability from 

divided or diluted loyalties if ever more of its citizens come from other nations, maintain foreign 

attachments, and view life in any particular nation as merely a temporary stay until something 

better opens up elsewhere around the world? The traditional concept of national allegiance, born 

in an era of nation state politics, breaks down in a global economy. 

Since allegiance is an important cornerstone of personnel security policy, reconceptualizing it in ways that will still be relevant for the future is an urgent task. The many 

Americans who protested even while they spied that they were still loyal citizens, and that their 

espionage was just another business deal, are pointing analysts to the fact that espionage cannot 

be analyzed in the old nationalistic terms. Earl Pitts ìconsidered himself an intense patriot,î and 

after his conviction for espionage wrote to his wife from prison that ì ëI think I always stood up 

for the people of this countryÖíî despite passing secrets to the KGB and then the SVRR for 

years (Brenner, 1997). Citizens like Pitts embody a trend in allegiance that will become more 

challenging in a global economy. 

The Impact of New Information Structures on Espionage 

Among known cases, there have been five individuals who sought to transfer information 

electronically during their espionage, plus Brian Regan who was not included in our analyses 

because the case is not yet decided. The six cases began as early as 1979 with Robert Hanssen, 

but they all ended between February 1989 and August 2001. Most of these individuals were 

actively spying during the 1990s, and like many Americans, they were taking advantage of the 

transformation of information management occurring around them. 

As information technology evolved, the spyís methods have evolved with it. When 

information was oral, spies memorized and recited secrets. When rulers wrote down their most 

precious plans, spies stole the papers and took them to the enemy. When photography and 

microforms and xerography and facsimile technologies transformed information management 

over the 20th century, spies learned to use cameras and microdots and the photocopy machine in 

the hallway, and then mailed or FedExíd their haul. Over the last two decades, automated 

information technologies, computers, networks of computers, and the global Internet have again 

transformed the use and therefore also the theft of information. From recent espionage cases, we 

can foresee rapidly changing trends in the collection, transmission, and application of 

information. 
73 

Satellite surveillance as an intelligence source is some three decades old and has become 

so sophisticated through infrared camera, radar, and advanced sensing lenses that resolutions in 

images is approaching one inch in diameter (Melton, n.d.). Satellites that monitor 

communications of all types use speech recognition software and artificial intelligence routines 

to sift and analyze billions of wireless transmissions. Data-mining programs under development 

can convert intercepted audio signals into readable, searchable text that can then be searched 

with another program in a language different from the text (Greene, 2001). These expensive 

collection and analysis methods generate intelligence that other nations without these capabilities 

want and seek through espionage. It is more cost effective for a nation lacking these means of 

surveillance to pay an insider spy at government agencies for information collected with 

satellites and analyzed by supercomputers than to duplicate these collectors themselves. 

With these capabilities comes vulnerability to both espionage and sabotage. In one 

commentatorís summary of American reliance on space-based capabilities, 

With the new information-based society, the United States depends on an intricate and 

fragile web of telecommunications networks: Telephones, cell phones, fax and Internet, 

news and entertainment, commerce and trade, banking and financial markets, and just 

about everything else that requires the transmission of information also requires the use 

of satellites and space (Waller, 2002). 

The Internet changes everything. Its charm and utility for the researcher is in the vast 

amount and breadth of open source information that is accessible and organized immediately by 

an Internet browser. Opportunities to communicate with persons around the world allow instant 

exchange of information and viewpoints unimaginable only a few years ago. Spies appreciate 

these capabilities as well. Much of what espionage agents want to collect can actually be found 

or confirmed from mere open source materials, and as economic data becomes more important in 

a global economy the value of these materials will rise. High-speed Internet access, networked 

computers that share information quickly, and the large-scale computer power to analyze 

enormous amounts of data allow searching, storing, compiling, and then instantaneously 

transmitting information anywhere in the world at minimal cost. Government agencies rely on 

restricted computer networks to access and share classified information, and these become 

attractive targets for insider spies with systems skills. Having accessed, sifted, and collected 

information, by using the Internet spies can with relative ease and safety make connections with 

potential buyers of that information. 

For example, Brian Regan is a former Air Force master sergeant working as a contractor 

at NRO who was recently arrested for espionage and as of this writing has not yet been tried. He 

is accused of downloading classified information from a secure intelligence network and 

contacting potential buyers over the Internet while he sat at computers in branch public libraries 

(Masters, 2001). No longer do spies need to chew up their papers or hide microfilms in 

pumpkins; electronic transmissions are invisible, difficult to trace, and challenging to monitor. 

Messages can be encrypted with commercial software, such as the encrypted offers of classified 

information Brian Regan is accused of sending to Iraq, Libya, and China, or as Robert Hanssen 

did in his encrypted letters to the Russian SVRR; they can be hidden in innocuous transmissions, 
74 

embedded in other documents or even in the files of photos or audio signals (Margasak, 2002 

[Regan]; McGeary, et al, 2001 [Hanssen]). 

Developments are underway in cyber warfare techniques and cyber defense of 

information systems infrastructures that capitalize on these systems, creating a new arena of 

international competition. International hacking into computer systems both to steal information 

and to disrupt the targetís systems has provoked the U.S. government to investigate and to 

respond to various incidents. New federal agencies are at work to defend the nationís 

information systems from attack and to develop an offensive ability (Bridis, 2001). One example 

of this trend is the capability that already exists to unleash through the Internet ìcyber-agents,î 

stealthy search programs that surreptitiously look through the targeted computers of other people 

and help themselves to secretsóthe computer becomes the spy (Melton, n.d.). 

Robert Hanssenís espionage career illustrates how automated information systems are 

likely to become the spyís best friend in the years to come. When he first began spying in 1979 

by contacting the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence agency, Hanssen had already 

demonstrated his talent for the technical details of computer systems and data managementó 

skills that were still esoteric at that time. His assignment in the New York FBI field office was to 

help install a new automated counterintelligence database to track foreign agents at the United 

Nations and the embassies. Hanssen had access to and used the FBIís automated case databases, 

its counterintelligence databases, and as he moved through assignments in the Bureau, he gained 

access to information from other intelligence agenciesí databases, including some at NSA, CIA, 

and the State Department (Cooper & Garvey, 2001). He demonstrated his facility with computers 

to a skeptical supervisor in 1991 when he hacked into the agentís desktop computer to make his 

point that the FBIís system was vulnerable (Johnston & Risen, 2001). To check if the FBI 

suspected his espionage, starting in 1997 Hanssen regularly searched the Bureauís Electronic 

Case File using variations of his own name as keywords, looking for clues that he was under 

investigation (U.S. District Court, 2001). Clearly, he knew how to use a computer. 

Hanssen collected information for the Soviets and after the collapse of the USSR, for the 

Russians, by browsing through databases and downloading files onto coded computer diskettes. 

He then left packets of documents and diskettes at various dead drops using coded messages to 

communicate with his handlers. He may have compromised some 6,000 pages of highly 

classified documents. He told the Soviets how the United States was intercepting their satellite 

transmissions; he gave them collection schedules for ìsensors on classified U.S. surveillance 

ships, aircraft, and satellites.î In addition to betraying the identities of several agents who were 

later executed, Hanssen revealed the secret tunnel under the Soviet embassy used to monitor 

communications, passed along plans for response to nuclear attack, detailed the FBIís 

counterintelligence methods, and shared the U.S. intelligence communityís assessments of 

Soviet and Russian capabilities (Eggen, 2001). He tried to take advantage of electronic means of 

transmission and do away with the risky exposure of dead drops in the local parks. First he 

proposed to the Soviets that he would set up an office protected against electronic eavesdropping 

where he could communicate directly with his handlers over the computer ìspecially equipped 

with certain advanced technologyî (U.S. District Court, 2001). When that scheme came to 

nothing, he suggested they make use of the wireless Internet technology built into his Palm III 

hand-held computer. ìSuch a device might even serve for rapid transmittal of substantial material 
75 

in digital form,î he assured the Russians in June 2000 (U.S. District Court, 2001). Hanssenís 

espionage based on his information systems expertise was both long-term and serious. Although 

the governmentís damage assessment is not completed, press accounts now label Hanssen ìone 

of Moscowís most important spies inside American intelligence during the last years of the Cold 

Warî (Risen, 2001). 

Summary 

This summary synthesizes major findings from these analyses on espionage by 

Americans during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. 

Background 

From its founding in 1917, the Soviet Union conducted a determined espionage program 

in the United States that attempted to recruit American citizens to spy for the Soviets. 

From several dozen spies in the 1930s, the number of Americans committing espionage 

for the Soviets grew during World War II to several hundred; then these numbers sharply 

declined in the early Cold War years just at the time when public concern focused on the 

loyalties of government employees. 

Between 1950 and 1975, most cases of espionage by Americans that were prosecuted 

were members of the military services or civilians employed by the military. 

A shift in policies on prosecuting espionage by Americans in the mid-to-late 1970s, and 

the enactment of new laws, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 

and the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), were responsible in part for the 

threefold increase in espionage cases made public in the 1980s. 

Personal Attributes 

Most American spies have been white males younger than 30. 

Almost half (46%) of known American spies had only a high school education or less. 

Employment and Clearance 

Almost equal numbers of civilians and members of the military have spied: 77 civilians 

and 73 military. 

A majority of military spies have come from the upper enlisted ranks. 

Over the period from 1947 through 2001, twice as many Americans volunteered to 

commit espionage as were recruited into it. 
76 

Among civilian spies, one-fourth have been employees of government contractors. 

One-fourth of American spies held no security clearance when they began espionage. 

However, this statement includes a variety of scenarios, including persons who had had 

access to classified information previously and who relied on memory; persons who 

stockpiled documents before they lost access; persons who relied on a relationship with a 

cleared person for access to information; persons who stole classified information; and 

persons who offered unclassified information deemed sensitive enough to warrant 

prosecution for espionage. 

Patterns in the Act of Espionage 

Most espionage by Americans has been short-lived and poorly paid. Almost half of 

American spies received nothing for the risks they took in espionage, usually because 

they were quickly intercepted before they could transmit information. Over the 50-year 

period, only 4 individuals may have received $1 million or more. Regardless of payment, 

there have been instances of long-term espionage that did serious damage to U.S. 

interests. 

One-fourth of known Americans who tried to commit espionage were intercepted before 

they could transmit information and apprehended in the attempt; only one-fifth of known 

cases lasted 5 years or longer. 

Three-fourths of these cases of interception of espionage by Americans occurred during 

the 1980s, making this less the ìdecade of the spy,î as has been claimed, so much as the 

ìdecade of the unsuccessful spy.î 

Of the 39 cases in which the individual was intercepted before the passing of information, 

37 were offering Department of Defense information. 

In each decade between 1950 and 1990, the rate of Americans beginning to spy exceeded 

the rate of those arrested; only in the 1990s did the rate of those caught exceed the rate 

who began, when 2 per year began to spy while 3 per year were caught. 

Among those Americans recruited into espionage by a foreign intelligence service, all but 

one individual succeeded in transmitting information. 

Ten of the 11 American women who spied worked as the accomplices or partners of men. 

The number of Americans currently known to have attempted or committed espionage 

peaked at 35 in 1985, but since then the number per year has been declining to pre-1980s 

levels. 

Americans who succeeded in transmitting information were older, better educated, more 
77 

often civilians, and more likely to be married than those who were interrupted in an 

attempt at spying. The most ìsuccessful,î defined by a public impression of the damage 

they inflicted and the duration of their espionage, came from most of the civilian agencies 

and military services. They included persons who reflected the full range of access to 

classified information from the highest security clearance down to no clearance at all. 

Among these most ìsuccessfulî spies, those widely known include: Aldrich Ames (CIA), 

Christopher Boyce (contractor employee) and Andrew Lee (uncleared civilian), Jeffrey 

Carney (active duty Air Force), Larry Wu-tai Chin (CIA), Clyde Conrad and the 

members of his ring (active duty Army), James Hall (active duty Army), Robert Hanssen 

(FBI), James Harper (uncleared civilian) and Ruby Schuler (contractor employee), 

Ronald Pelton (NSA), Earl Pitts (FBI), Jonathan Pollard (civilian Navy employee), and 

John Walker, Jr., and the members of his ring (active duty Navy). 

Motivations 

Americans most consistently have cited money as the dominant motive for espionage, 

and over time money has increased in predominance among motives. 

Of individuals who professed a single motive for espionage, one-fourth of civilians but 

three-fourths of members of the military claimed that they had spied for money. 

Among volunteer spies, disgruntlement with the workplace was cited as a significant 

motive: nearly one-fifth of volunteers with a single motive said they had spied from 

disgruntlement. 

Foreign Attachments 

Among the 150 American spies, 83% were native born, while 17% were naturalized 

citizens. This represents four times the proportion of naturalized citizens in the U.S. 

population as a whole. (According to the 2000 decennial census, naturalized citizens were 

3.8% of the population.) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). 

Of American spies who had foreign attachments (defined as relatives living overseas or 

non-U.S. citizens living here, emotional ties of relationship or professional ties to such 

individuals, or business connections abroad), two-fifths were recruited by a foreign 

intelligence service, compared to the group who did not have foreign attachments in 

which 6 percent were recruited by foreign intelligence. This reinforces concern that 

foreign attachments represent security vulnerabilities. 

Among American spies, naturalized citizens were more likely to be recruited by a foreign 

intelligence service than native-born Americans; among those who were naturalized, 46% 

were recruited by foreign intelligence while 42% volunteered. Native-born American 

spies were more likely to volunteer to commit espionage, since only 17% were recruited 

by foreign intelligence while 68% volunteered. Similar small proportions of naturalized 

and native-born citizens were recruited by a friend or family member (naturalized=12%, 

native-born=15%). 
78 

Applications to the Personnel Security System 

Most known American spies (80%) demonstrated one or more conditions or behaviors of 

security concern defined in the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for 

Access the Classified Information, but given the incidence of these issues among the 

cleared population and the relative rarity of espionage, these factors cannot by themselves 

predict espionage. 

One-fourth of known American spies experienced a personal life crisis (such as a divorce, 

death or someone close, or love affair) in the months before they decided to attempt 

espionage. 

Very few people apply for access to classified information intending to commit 

espionage; optimal use of personnel security resources for countering espionage would 

focus more on periodic reevaluation and continuing assessment of experienced cleared 

personnel. 

Personnel security vetting is not designed to and has not identified ongoing espionage: at 

least 5 Americans were screened and then maintained their security clearances during 

periods when they were also committing espionage. 

Reports of behaviors of security concern or personal crises by co-workers have led to the 

apprehension of some American spies, but reluctance to report these issues has also 

allowed other spies to persist in their crimes. 

Changes in Espionage by Americans Since the End of the Cold War 

The Soviet Union has predominated as the recipient of information from American spies, 

but 17 other countries have also been willing recipients, 

Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, some 20 Americans have attempted or committed 

espionage, but characteristics of American spies have changed. Compared to earlier 

cohorts, Americans who began spying during the 1990s have been: 

Older, with a median age of 39, 

More demographically heterogeneous, with more women and more ethnic 

minorities, 

More often civilian, with twice as many government employees and twice as 

many contractors, 

More successful, with four-fifths passing information, 

More likely to volunteer to commit espionage, with a 70% rate of volunteering 
79 

that parallels the rate of volunteering in the 1980s, 

More likely to hold lower-level security clearances or no clearance, 

More likely to be naturalized citizens, 

More likely to have foreign attachments, with half of the individuals having 

foreign attachments, 

More likely to cite divided loyalties as their single motive for espionage, with half 

of the cases citing divided loyalties. 

Trends Affecting Espionage in the Future: Globalization and Information Transmission 

Globalization is rapidly creating new international conditions based on global economics 

that will affect the allegiance of citizens. This development assures that economic 

espionage will become more important, as dual use technologies blur the distinction 

between national defense and industrial applications. 

Globalization will demand a new understanding of the meaning of loyalty to the nation 

and how espionage intersects with loyalty. 

The current revolution in information and communications technologies is changing the 

scope and practice of espionage: spiesí methods of collection, synthesis, and transmission 

of information are shifting to take advantage of opportunities in these new technologies. 
80 
81 

References 

Adams, J. (1995). Sellout: Aldrich Ames and the corruption of CIA. New York: Viking. 

 

Albright, J., & Kunstel, M. (1997). Bombshell: The secret story of America’s unknown 

atomic spy conspiracy. New York: Times Books. [Theodore Hall] 

Allen, T. B., & Polmar, N. (1988). Merchants of treason. New York: Delacorte. 

Andrew, C., & Gordievsky, O. (1991). The KGB: The inside story. New York: Harper 

Collins. 

Andrew, C., & Mitrokhin, V. (1999). The sword and the shield: The Mitrokhin archive 

and the secret history of the KGB. New York: Basic Books. 

Askilenko, V. (2001). Personal communication. Shepherdstown, WV: Seminar on PostCold War Espionage. 

Asbury, E. E. (1975, June 28). Information Bank Abstracts. New York: The New York 

Times: Abstracts. [Sahag K. Dedeyan]

Associated Press. (1977a, July 20). [Leslie Payne] 

Associated Press. (1977b, December 9). [Edwin Moore] 

Associated Press. (1978, November 18). Ex-C.I.A. employee convicted for sale of secret 

to Soviet. The New York Times. [William Kampiles] 

Associated Press. (1986, December 14). Report: Ex-sailor is talking about stealing, 

selling data. 

Associated Press. (1988, January 7). Conviction is upheld in Navy code-card thefts. San 

Diego Union. [Tobias ring] 

Associated Press. (1991, December 3). U.S. Soldier convicted as a spy in Gulf War. The 

New York Times. [Albert Sombolay] 

Bamford, J. (1982). The Puzzle Palace. New York: Penguin. 

Barker, R. (1996). Dancing with the devil. Sex, espionage and the U.S. Marines: The 

Clayton Lonetree story. New York: Ivy Books. 

Barron, J. (1974). KGB: The secret work of Soviet secret agents. New York: The Readers 

Digest Press. 

Barron, J. (1987). Breaking the ring: The bizarre case of the Walker family spy ring. 
82 

New York: Houghton Mifflin. 

Bell, G. (1982). Taking care of the law. New York: William Morrow. 

Benson, R. L. & Warner, M. (Eds.). (1996). VENONA: Soviet Espionage and American 

Response, 1939-1957. Washington, D.C.: National Security Agency/Central Intelligence 

Agency. 

Blau, E. (1976, March 1). Ex-Mobil oil engineer linked to Soviet spying is called 

suicide. The New York Times. [Norman Rees] 

Blitzer, W. (1989). Territory of lies: The exclusive story of Jonathan Jay Pollard. New 

York: Harper & Row. 

Blum, H. (1987). I pledge allegiance. The true story of the Walkers: An American spy 

family. New York: Simon & Schuster. 

Blumenthal, R. (2001, February 23). Spy drama survivor watches as story unfolds. The 

New York Times. [Victor Hamilton] 

Bosshardt, M. J., Dubois, D. A., & Crawford, K. S. (1991). Continuing assessment of 

cleared personnel in the military services: Report 4 – System issues and program effectiveness. 

Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center. 

Branigan, W. (1993, January 6). Spy charge played down by official: American allegedly 

aided Philippines. The Washington Post. [Joseph Brown] 

Brenner, M. (1997, September 21). A traitorís life: Why Earl Pitts betrayed his country. 

The Washington Post Magazine.

Bridis, T. (2001, June 27). Net espionage rekindles tensions as U.S. tries to identify 

hackers. Wall Street Journal. 

Briscoe, D. (2000, June 30). NSA: Spy crippled U.S. intelligence before Korean war. 

Associated Press. [William Weisband] 

Brown, D. L. (1993, August 7). Editorís arrest surprises Cameroonian community. The 

Washington Post. [Geneva Jones] 

Brown, G. B. (1988). Profile of espionage penetration. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia 

National Laboratories. 

Brumley, B. (1986, June 7). Despite conviction, Pelton case illustrates difficulty in 

prosecuting spies. Associated Press. [Ronald Pelton] 

Chu, H. (1996, April 29). Would-be spy feared demise of Western Civ: driven by a 
83 

tortured psyche, engineer John Charleton sold U.S. secrets to save ìEuropean, Christianî world. 

Los Angeles Times. 

Cooper, R.T., & Garvey, M. (2001, February 27). Spy suspect: In the end, a soul lost and 

lonely. Los Angeles Times. [Robert Hanssen] 

Corson, W. R., Trento, S.B., & Trento, J.J. (1989). Widows: 4 American spies. The wives 

they left behind and the crippling of American intelligence. New York: Crown. 

Costello, J. (1988). Mask of treachery: Spies, lies and betrayal. New York: Warner. 

Crawford, D. J. (1988). Volunteers: The betrayal of national defense secrets by Air 

Force traitors. Washington, DC: HQ, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Directorate of 

Counterintelligence. 

Crawford, K. S., & Wiskoff, M. F. (1988). Screening enlisted accessions for sensitive 

military jobs. (Technical Report PERS-TR-89-001). Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel 

Security Research and Education Center. 

Crawford, K.S., & Bosshardt, M.J. (1993). Assessment of position factors that increase 

vulnerability to espionage (PERS-TR-94-001). Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security 

Research Center. 

Cummings, J. (1994a, June 19). Digging into African roots drew ex-Georgian into web of 

espionage. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution. [Geneva Jones] 

Cummings, J. (1994b, September 13). Federal worker sentenced: Stealing U.S. files 

brings prison term, Ga. woman gets 5-year sentence. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution.

[Geneva Jones] 

Dawson, A. (1985, February 26). Guilty plea planned in Northrop spy case; Defendant 

wants to avoid trial. Orange County, CA: The Register. [Thomas Cavanagh] 

Defense Security Services (DSS). (2001, September 10). Personnel Security 

Investigations Manual. DSS-20-1-M. FOUO. 

De Gramont, S. (1962). The secret war: The story of international espionage since 

World War II. New York: Putnam. 

Deutsch, L. (1985, August 7). Miller called easy prey for Soviet agents. Los Angeles 

Times. [Richard Miller] 

Dickey, C. & Seaberry, J. (1978). FBI continues spy case investigation. The Washington 

Post. [Ronald Humphrey] 
84 

Dobbs, M. (1996a, March 4-10). Code name Mlad: The ìcrime of the centuryî is not yet 

closed. The Washington Post National Weekly Edition [Theodore Hall]. 

Dobbs, M. (1996b, October 19). The man who picked the lock: American linguistís 

breaking of Soviet wartime code led to unmasking of agents, Rosenberg convictions. The 

Washington Post. [William Weisband] 

Dobson, C., & Payne, R. (1984). The dictionary of espionage. London: Harrap. 

Department of Defense. (2000, April). Data based on Defense Clearance and 

Investigations Index (DCII). Monterey, CA: Defense Manpower Data Center. 

Department of Defense Security Review Commission. (1985). Keeping the nation's 

secrets: A report to the Secretary of Defense by the Commission to Review DoD Security 

Policies and Practices. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

Earley, P. (1988). Family of spies: Inside the John Walker spy ring. New York: 

Bantam Books. 

Eggen, D. (2001a, July 7). Damage done by Hanssen still being assessed: Some consider 

harm as great as Amesís. The Washington Post. [Robert Hanssen] 

Eggen, D. (2001b, July 10). With Hanssen, a few clues, but no solution to the mystery: 

former FBI colleagues, others search for his motives for spying. The Washington Post.

Engelberg, S. (1989, July 19). Jury hears tale of spy who did it out of greed. The New 

York Times. [James Hall] 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (1987). Espionage cases: 1983 to 1986. Washington, 

DC: Author. (For Official Use Only) 

Federation of American Scientists. (2001, May 2). FISA activity reaches all time high. 

Secrecy News, pp. 3-4. 

Friedman, T. (2000). The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: Anchor Books. 

Friedman, R. I. (1989, October 26). The secret agent. The New York Review of Books, pp. 

8ñ12. 

Galloway, P. (1989, May 19). Spy left out in the cold. Jonathan Pollard traded dreams of 

heroism for a life sentence. The Chicago Tribune. 

Gerth, J. (1989, March 10). Ex-U.S. sergeantís spy case is said to grow in seriousness. 

The New York Times. [Zoltan Szabo] 
85 

General Accounting Office. (2001). FBI intelligence investigations (GAO-01-780). 

Washington, DC: Author. 

Getler, M. (1981, June 2). Spying charge eyed against missile officer. The Washington 

Post. [Christopher Cooke] 

Green F., & Miller, B. (1982, February 23). All charges Cooke faced are dismissed. 

Richmond, VA Times-Dispatch. [Christopher Cooke] 

Greene, V.G. (2001, June 3). CIA patching Echelon shortcomings. The Washington Post. 

Hall, C.W. (1996, November 9). Ex-Pentagon worker given 2 years for passing secrets. 

The Washington Post. [Phillip Seldon] 

Halloran, R. (1985, June 18). Overtures to soldiers to spy for Soviet bloc said to rise. The 

New York Times. [Otto Gilbert] 

Harrington, W. (1988, January 4-10). Has truth gone out of style? Washington Post 

National Weekly Edition, pp. 1-2 

Haynes, J. E., & Klehr, H. (1999). Venona. Decoding Soviet espionage in America. New 

Haven: Yale University Press. 

Headley, L., & Hoffman, W. H. (1989). The court-martial of Clayton Lonetree. New 

York: Henry Holt & Co. 

Henderson, B. R. (1988). Pollard: The spy's story. New York: Alpha. [Jonathan Pollard] 

Herrington, S. A. (1999). Traitors among us. Inside the spycatcher’s world. Novato, CA: 

Presidio. 

Heuer, R.J., Jr., & Herbig, K.L. (2001). Espionage by the numbers: A statistical 

overview. Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center. 

Hiatt, F. (1992, June 19). U.S. team starts search for POWs in Russia; Reported sighting 

of American prompts trip to Arctic camps; No evidence at 1st stop. The Washington Post. [Victor 

Hamilton]

Holthaus, D. (1991, December 7). Anatomy of a spy: when dream soured, immigrant fell 

into plot. Cincinnati Post. [Albert Sombolay] 

Isikoff, M. (1990, June 9). Accused spy robbed bank in Vermont, agent testifies. The 

Washington Post. [Roderick Ramsay] 

Isserman, M. (October 2000). Disloyalty as a principle: Why Communists spied. Foreign 

Service Journal, pp. 29-38. 
86 

Jaynes, G. (1981, September 24). Generals testify in espionage case. The New York 

Times. [Joseph Helmich] 

Jepson, L. P. (1988). The espionage threat. Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence 

Agency. 

Johnson, D., & Risen, J. (2001, February 23). U.S. had evidence of espionage, but F.B.I. 

failed to inspect itself. The New York Times. [Robert Hanssen] 

Kell, G. (1986, July 31). Alleged AF spy ìglad it was over.î Sacramento Bee [Bruce Ott] 

Kessler, R. (1988). Spy vs. spy: Stalking Soviet spies in America. New York: Scribner's. 

Kessler, R. (1990). The spy in the Russian Club. New York: Scribner's. [Glenn Souther] 

Kidwell, D. (2000, February 3). Contrite Cuban spy couple sentenced. Miami Herald.

[Joseph and Amarylis Santos] 

Kneece, J. (1986). Family treason: The Walker spy ring. Toronto: Paperjacks. 

Knightley, P. (1986). The second oldest profession: Spies and spying in the twentieth 

century. New York: Norton. 

Krause, M. (2002, April). Divided National Loyalties: A Primer for Personnel Security 

Staff. Washington, D.C.: The Personnel Security Research Managersí Research Program. 

Lamphere, R. J., & Shachtman, T. (1986). The FBI-KGB war: A special agent's story. 

New York: Random House. 

Lardner, Jr., G. (1985, December 5). Morison given 2 years for leaking spy photos; 

Prison a necessary deterrent, judge says. The Washington Post. [Samuel Morison] 

Lardner, Jr., G. (2001, December 13). Report criticizes stumbling block between FBI 

espionage prosecutors. The Washington Post. 

Lewis, N. A. (1990, June 9). Ex-sergeant charged with role in selling secrets to Warsaw 

Pact. The New York Times. [Roderick Ramsay] 

Lindsey, R. (1977a, April 13). Alleged spy for Soviet linked to C.I.S. contractor. The 

New York Times. [Christopher Boyce] 

Lindsey, R. (1977b, April 18). Trial for espionage has unusual quirks. The New York 

Times. [Christopher Boyce] 
87 

Lindsey, R. (1979). The falcon and the snowman. New York: Simon & Schuster. 

[Christopher Boyce and Andrew Lee] 

Loeb, V. (1999, November 25). Espionage stir alienating foreign scientists in U.S.: 

Critics of distrust fear a brain drain. The Washington Post.

Luther, R. K., Garman, E. T., Leech, I. E., Griffitt, L., & Gilroy, T. (1997). Scope and 

impact of personal financial management difficulties of service members in the department of 

the Navy. Scanton, PA: Military Family Institute, Marywood University. 

Maas, P. (1995). Killer spy: The inside story of the FBI’s pursuit and capture of Aldrich 

Ames, America’s deadliest spy. New York: Warner Books. 

Maldon Institute. (1986). America's espionage epidemic. Washington, DC: Author. 

Marcus, R. (1985, November 28). Accused spy used Hong Kong banks; FBI agent says 

Chin was guest of honor at 1982 Peking banquet. The Washington Post. [Larry Wu-tai Chin] 

Margasak, L. (2002, February 25). Trial date set for ex-sergeant accused of spying. 

Associated Press. [Brian Regan] 

Mason, A. (2001, May 24). The business of spying. CBS Evening News. Retrieved on 

May 25, 2001 at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/05/24/eveningnews. 

Masters, B.A. (1997, May 6). Alleged spy for South Korea plead guilty on lesser charges, 

sources say. The Washington Post. [Robert Kim] 

Masters, B.A. (1997a, June 24). Ex-FBI agent gets 27 years for passing secrets to 

Moscow. The Washington Post. [Edwin Pitts] 

Masters, B. A. (1997b, July 12). More unequal justice: Va. Man sentenced to 9 years in 

spy case; prosecutors say former Navy employee gave information to S. Korea. The Washington 

Post. [Robert Kim] 

Masters, B.A. (1998, June 4). Falls Church man pleads guilty to passing secrets to East 

Germany. The Washington Post. [James Clark] 

Masters, B.A. (1998a, October 24). Jury rejects entrapment defense, convicts D.C. couple 

of spying. The Washington Post. [Kurt Stand, Theresa Squillacote, James Clark] 

Masters, B.A. (2001, October 24). Spy suspect had missile site coordinates. The 

Washington Post. [Brian Regan] 

McAllister, B. (1978, February 3). Accused manís spouse says Vietnam holds son 

hostage. The Washington Post. [Ronald Humphrey] 
88 

McGeary, J., Calabresi, M., Shannon, E., & Sieger, M. (2001, March 5). The FBI spy. 

Time Magazine. [Robert Hanssen] 

McGee, J. (2001, November 4). An intelligence giant in the making: Anti-terrorism law 

likely to bring domestic apparatus of unprecedented scope. The Washington Post.

Melton, H. K. (n.d.). Spies in the digital age. Retrieved February 20, 2001 from 

http:/www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/experience/spies/melton.essay/. 

Meyers, R. (1977, May 5). Moore guilty of trying to sell CIA files. The Washington 

Post. [Edwin Moore] 

Miller, B., & Pincus, W. (1994, April 22). Wife in spy case cites ìconfusionî in 

interview. The Washington Post. [Rosario Ames] 

Morganthau, T., Willenson, K., Walcott, J., & Kubic, M. J. (1985, December 9). An 

epidemic of spies. Newsweek, p. 9. 

 

Morse, G. P. (1995). America twice betrayed: Reversing 50 years of government 

security failure. Silver Springs, MD: Bartleby Press. 

Murphy, C. (1986, February 22). Chinese spy Chin apparently kills self. The Washington 

Post. [Larry Wu-tai Chin] 

Murphy, C. (1985, September 28). Ex-clerk pleads guilty to leaking data in Ghana; U.S. 

drops 15 counts against former CIA employee. The Washington Post. [Sharon Scranage] 

Nash, J. R. (1997). Spies. A narrative encyclopedia of American intelligence and 

espionage: From the revolutionary war to present. New York: M. Evans & Company. 

Naval Investigative Service Command. (n.d.) Espionage. Washington, DC: Author. 

New York Times Service. (1987, January 13.) Jury to probe Walker money, links to him. 

[John Walker, Jr.] 

New York Times, The. (1987, March 6). The wages of espionage. The New York Times

[Jonathan Pollard].

Nizer, L. (1973). The implosion conspiracy. New York: Doubleday. 

OíConnor J. J. (1990, February 4). TV view; American spies in pursuit of the American 

dream. The New York Times.

Ostrow, R., & Jehl, D. (1990, June 8). FBI arrests ex-G.I. charged with spying for East 

Bloc. Los Angeles Times. [Roderick Ramsay, Clyde Conrad, Zoltan Szabo] 
89 

OíHarrow, Jr., R. (1992, December 29). Man stepping off plane at Dulles is arrested on 

espionage charges. The Washington Post. [Virginia Baynes and Joseph Brown] 

OíToole, G.J.A. (1988). The encyclopedia of American intelligence and espionage: From 

the revolutionary war to the present. New York: Facts on File. 

OíToole, T., & Babcock, C. H., (1978, August 23). CIA ìBig Birdî satellite manual was 

allegedly sold to Soviets. The Washington Post. [William Kampiles] 

Palmer, R. (1977). The making of a spy. London: Aldus. 

Parker, J. P., & Wiskoff, M. F. (December 1991). Temperament constructs related to 

betrayal of trust. Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research and Education Center. 

Personnel Security Investigations Process Review Team. (2000, October 31). An 

assessment of the Department of Defense personnel security program. Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (For Official Use Only). 

Pincher, C. (1988). Traitors. New York: Penguin. 

Pincus, W. (1994, December 27). Ames says CIA does not believe he has told all. 

Washington Post. [Aldrich Ames] 

Pincus, W. (2001, April 2-8). Dangerous liaisons: After an alleged spy has been caught, 

thereís a tendency for other spies to get braver. The Washington Post National Weekly Edition.

Pink, D. (2001, July 11). Free agent nation. The Washington Post.

Polmar, N., & Allen, T. B., (1997). Spy book: The encyclopedia of espionage. New York: 

Random House. [Joseph Petersen] 

Pressley, S.A. (2001, June 27). Jury convicts Army officer of espionage for Soviets. The 

Washington Post. [George Trofimoff] 

Radosh, R., & Milton, J. (1983, 1997). The Rosenberg file. New Haven: Yale University 

Press. 

Raab, S. (1985). Intrigue and countercharges mark case of purported spies. The New York 

Times. [Karl Koecher] 

Rafalko, F. J., (Ed.). (n.d.). A counterintelligence reader, 3 volumes. Post-World War II 

to closing the 20th century, vol. 3. Washington, D.C.: National Counterintelligence Center. 

Rawitch, R. (1977, September 13). An obsession for redemption. Los Angeles Times.

[Andrew Lee and Christopher Boyce] 
90 

Recent espionage cases: Summaries and sources. (September 1999). Monterey, CA: 

Security Research Center: Author. 

Reuters Limited. (1999, February 13). Former U.S. Army clerk gets 25 years in spy case. 

Tampa, Fl: Tampa Tribune [Kelly Warren]. 

Risen, J. (2001, February 22). Spy handler bedeviled U.S. in earlier case. The New York 

Times. [Robert Hanssen] 

Risen, J. (2001, August 8). Spy in F.B.I. is said to have given secrets to 2 Soviet 

agencies. The New York Times. [Robert Hanssen] 

Renshon, S. (2001, October). Dual citizenship and American national identity. 

Washington D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies. 

Roberts, R. (2001, July 11). The new face of loyalty: In an age of free agents and 

divorce, we are true to ourselves. The Washington Post.

Romerstein, H., & Levchenko S. (1989). The KGB against the "Main Enemy": How the 

Soviet Intelligence Service Operates against the U.S. Lexington, MA: Lexington. 

Rosenberg, C. (2000, February 24). Confessed Cuban spies sentenced to seven years. 

Miami Herald. [Nilo and Linda Hernandez]

Roth, M. (1988, September 12). Once a good solider; now an accused spy. Army Times, 

pp. 14-16. [Clyde Conrad] 

Schweizer, P. (1992, June 27). Espionage now takes aim at industrial targets. St 

Petersburg, FL: St. Petersburg Times [Ronald Hoffman]. 

Seaberry, J., & Mansfield, S. (1978, July 8). Two sentenced to 15 years as Vietnam spies. 

The Washington Post. [Ronald Humphrey] 

Serrill, M. S. (1984, November 19). The perilous game of trying spies: Balancing the 

claims of justice and secrecy. Time, pp. 24-26.

Seth, R. (1961). Anatomy of spying. London: Arthur Barker. 

Sheppard, Jr., N. (1978, November 12). Spy trial focusing on security in C.I.A. The New 

York Times. [William Kampiles] 

Shenon, P. (1985, November 10). China reported to have gotten top U.S. secrets. The 

New York Times. 
91 

Skolnik, S. (2000, April 14). Seaman admits stealing defense secrets, FBI says. Seattle 

Post-Intelligencer. [Timothy Smith] 

Smikle, P. (1999, May 26). U.S. politics: U.S. moves against Cuban intelligence agents. 

Miami, FL: Inter Press Service. 

Spiro, P. J. (2000, October). Multinationals among us: The rise of dual citizenship. 

Foreign Service Journal. 

Stein, J. (1994, July 6). Intelligence committees could write a mole manual. Seattle PostIntelligencer. 

Sylvest, R. A. (1988). Summary of the Michael Hahn Allen espionage investigation. 

Naval Intelligence Bulletin, Spring/Summer. Suitland, MD: Naval Intelligence Command. 

Tanenhaus, S. (1997) Whittaker Chambers. New York: Random House. 

Taubman, P. (1980, October 30). Ex-agent of C.I.A. pleads guilty to selling data to 

Soviet Union. The New York Times. [David Barnett] 

Taylor, S. A., & Snow, D. (April 1997). Cold War spies: Why they spied and how they 

got caught. Intelligence and National Security, 12(2), pp. 101-123. 

Tessler, R. (1991a, May 2). Video of hotel meeting shown at spy trial; Court-martial: 

Marine told purported Soviet agent that he is half Indian and resents Americaís treatment of 

Indians. Los Angeles Times. [Charles Anzalone] 

Tessler, R. (1991b, May 4). Marine guilty in spying case; court-martial: corporal gets 

15 years in prison after being convicted of attempted espionage for the Soviets. Los Angeles 

Times. [Charles Anzalone] 

Thompson, M. (1991, December 4). Army spy sentenced to 34 years. Huntsville (AL) 

Times. [Albert Sombolay] 

Thornton, M. (1986, October 28). FBI arrests ex-Airman on espionage charges; 

Californian allegedly tried to deliver secrets to agent posing as Soviet official. The Washington 

Post. [Allen Davies] 

Tiemeyer, P., Wardynski, C., & Buddin, R. (1999). Financial management problems 

among enlisted personnel. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. 

Timm, H. (2001). Estimated impact of the proposed automated continuing evaluation 

system (ACES) on personnel security effectiveness: A preliminary feasibility assessment. 

Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center. 
92 

Treverton, G. F., (2001). Intelligence and the Market State. Studies in Intelligence, 10 

(Winter-Spring). 

Tuchman, B. (1987, September 20). A nation in decline? The New York Times Magazine, 

pp. 52, 142 

Turning a blind eye to spies; excerpts from government report on why spies are not 

discovered by co-workers. (1994). Harper’s Magazine. 289, pp. 17-32. [Jeffrey Carney] 

Tyler, P.E. (1985, November 30). Record year puts spy-catchers in spotlight; Renewed 

emphasis placed on prosecution as counterintelligence failings surface. The Washington Post.

U.S. Census Bureau. (2000). Current population survey. Washington, DC: Author. 

United States of America v. David Sheldon Boone. (October 1998). Affidavit in Support 

of Criminal Complaint, Arrest Warrant, and Search Warrants. Alexandria, VA: U.S. District 

Court for Eastern District of Virginia. 

United States of America v. Robert Philip Hanssen. (February 2001). Affidavit in 

Support of Criminal Complaint, Arrest Warrant, and Search Warrants. Alexandria, VA: U.S. 

District Court for Eastern District of Virginia. 

United States of America v. Ronald J. Hoffman. (1994). (10 F. 3d 808; U.S. app. Lexis 

36265). Pasadena CA: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 

Valentine, P.W. (1984, October 3). Navy analyst arrested in photo sale. The Washington 

Post. [Samuel Morison] 

Valentine, P.W. (1988, October 13). Spy for S. Africa called reserved; MD neighbors 

recall bespectacled man sometimes wore toupee. The Washington Post. [Thomas Dolce] 

Vise, D. A. (2002). The bureau and the mole. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press. 

[Robert Hanssen] 

Waller, J. M. (2002, February 4). A wartime window of opportunity. Insight Magazine. 

Walters, N. (1997, July 29). Federal agents still tracking members of the ë80s Army spy 

ring. Raleigh, NC: The News and Observer. [Kelly Warren] 

Weiner, T., Johnson, D., & Lewis, N. A. (1996). Betrayal: The story of Aldrich Ames, an 

American spy. New York: Random House. 

Weiner, T. (1997, October 7). Ex-campus radicals held in spy case. The New York Times. 

[Kurt Stand, Theresa Squillacote] 
93 

Weintraub, D.M. (1986, December 12). Ex-Navy man held on spy charges. Los Angeles 

Times. [Michael Allen] 

Weinstein, A., & Vassiliev, A. (1999). The haunted wood: Soviet espionage in America. 

New York: Random House. 

West, N., & Tsarev, O. (1999). The crown jewels; The British secrets at the heart of the 

KGB archives. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 

West, R. (1964). The new meaning of treason. New York: Viking. 

Wilson, G.C. (1989, March 10). Given 40 years, spy cites ìfeeling of betrayalÖto the 

bone.î The Washington Post. [James Hall] 

Winokur, S. (1987, June 21). Traitor in our midst. San Francisco Examiner. [Thomas 

Cavanagh] 

Witt, L. (1985, December 8). Treason made easy; In Californiaís glitzy Silicon Valley, 

the profit motive justifies everything. Chicago Tribune. [Ruby Schuler] 

Wiskoff, M. F., Parker, J. P., Sherman, F., & Zimmerman, R.A. (1989). Predicting school 

and job performance of Marine security guards (PERS-TR-90-003). Monterey, CA: Defense 

Personnel Security Research and Education Center. 

 Wiskoff, M. F., & Fitz, C. C. (1990). The Defense Investigative Service's issue case data 

base: Analysis of issue types and clearance adjudication. Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel 

Security Research and Education Center. 

Wood, S. (2002). Public Opinion on Selected National Security Issues: 1994-2000. 

Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research and Education Center. 

 Wood, S., & Fischer, L. (2002). Cleared DoD employees at risk - Report 2. A study of 

barriers to seeking help. Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center. 

 Wood, S., & Wiskoff, M.F. (1992). Americans who spied against their country since 

World War II. Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center. 

 Wise, D. (1988). The spy who got away. New York: Random House. [Edward Howard] 

 Zook, J. (1991, October 5). Ex-FBI translator found guilty in espionage case. The 

Houston Chronicle. [Douglas Tsou] 

Zuravin, S. J. (1998). Espionage: An assessment of Project Slammer and 

recommendations for further study. FBI National Security Division: Strategic 

Analysis/Espionage Unit. 
94 
A-1 

Appendix A 

Names and Selected Variables for Cases Included in the Study

 
A-2 
A-3 

Names and Selected Variables for Cases Included in the Study 

Surname Given Name Affiliation 

Date Espionage Began

Date of Arrest 

Volunteer or 

Recruit Recipient C

Ahadi (pseudonym) Air Force Civilian 67/00/00 69/00/00 V Egypt Allen Michael Hahn Navy Civilian 86/00/00 86/12/04 V Philippines Alonso Alejandro M. Civilian 94/00/00 98/09/10 V Cuba Ames Aldrich Hazen CIA 85/04/00 94/02/21 V Soviet Unio

Ames Maria del Rosario Civilian 92/00/00 94/02/21 R Soviet Unio

Anzalone Charles Lee Francis Marine Enlisted 90/11/00 91/02/13 V Soviet UnioBaba Stephen Anthony Navy Officer 81/09/01 81/10/09 V South Africa Barnett David Henry CIA 76/10/00 80/03/18 V Soviet UnioBaynes Virginia Jean CIA 90/00/00 92/00/00 R Philippines Bell William Holden Gov Contractor 78/10/00 81/06/24 R Poland Boeckenhaupt Herbert William Air Force Enlisted 65/06/00 66/10/24 V Soviet UnioBoone David Sheldon Army Enlisted 88/00/00 98/10/10 V Soviet UnioBorger Harold Noah Army Civilian 59/10/00 61/03/03 R East GermanBoyce Christopher John Gov Contractor 75/05/10 77/01/16 V Soviet UnioBronson (pseudonym) Air Force Enlisted 77/10/00 78/00/00 V Soviet UnioBrown Joseph Garfield CIA 90/00/00 92/12/27 R Philippines Brown Russell Paul Navy Enlisted 89/04/00 89/07/25 V Soviet UnioBuchanan Edward Owen Air Force Enlisted 85/05/06 85/05/17 V East GermanButenko John William Gov Contractor 63/04/21 63/10/29 R Soviet UnioCarney Jeffrey Martin Air Force Enlisted 83/04/00 91/04/22 V East GermanCascio Guiseppe Air Force Enlisted 52/00/00 52/09/21 V North Korea Cavanagh Thomas Patrick Gov Contractor 84/12/00 84/12/18 V Soviet UnioCharlton John Douglas Navy Civilian 93/07/00 95/05/00 V France 
A-4 

Surname Given Name Affiliation 

Date Espionage Began 

Date of Arrest 

Volunteer or Recruit Recipient C

Chin Larry Wu-Tai CIA 52/00/00 85/11/22 R China Clark James Gov Contractor 76/00/00 97/10/04 R East GermanConrad Clyde Lee Army Enlisted 74/00/00 88/08/23 R Hungary and Cooke Christopher Michael Air Force Officer 80/12/23 81/05/05 V Soviet UnioCordrey Robert Ernest Marine Enlisted 84/04/12 84/05/16 V Soviet UnioDavies Allen John Air Force Civilian 86/09/22 86/10/27 V Soviet UnioDeChamplain Raymond George Air Force Enlisted 71/06/05 71/07/02 R Soviet UnioDedeyan Sahag Katcher Gov Contractor 73/03/00 75/06/27 R Soviet UnioDolce Thomas Joseph Army Civilian 79/00/00 88/04/16 V South Africa Drummond Nelson Cornelious Navy Enlisted 58/00/00 62/09/28 R Soviet UnioDubberstein Waldo Herman DIA 77/00/00 79/0000 R Libya Dunlap Jack Edward Army at NSA 58/00/00 63/0000 V Soviet UnioEllis Robert Wade Navy Enlisted 83/02/09 83/02/09 V Soviet UnioFaget Mariano INS 99/00/00 00/02/17 R Cuba French George Holmes Air Force Officer 57/04/05 57/04/06 V Soviet UnioGarcia Wilfredo Navy Enlisted 85/00/00 87/00/00 R Unknown Gessner George John Army Enlisted 60/12/07 61/01/00 V Soviet UnioGilbert Otto Attila Army Civilian 82/04/17 82/04/17 R Hungary Graf Ronald Dean Navy Enlisted 89/00/00 89/03/03 V Unknown Gregory Jeffrey Eugene Army Enlisted 84/03/00 93/04/29 R Hungary and Groat Douglas CIA 97/03/24 98/04/01 V Unknown Grunden Oliver Everett Air Force Enlisted 73/09/28 73/11/02 V Soviet UnioHaeger John Joseph Navy Enlisted 89/10/00 89/12/01 R Soviet UnioHaguewood Robert Dean Navy Enlisted 86/02/00 86/03/04 V Unknown Hall James William III Army Enlisted 82/12/00 88/12/21 V East GermanHamilton Frederick Christopher DIA 91/02/00 92/00/00 V Ecuador 
A-5 

Surname Given Name Affiliation 

Date Espionage Began

Date of Arrest 

Volunteer or 

Recruit Recipient C

Hamilton Victor Norris NSA 62/00/00 63/0000 V Soviet UnioHanssen Robert Philip FBI 79/00/00 01/02/18 V Soviet UnioHarper James Durward Jr. Gov Contractor 75/00/00 83/10/15 R Poland Harris Ulysses Leonard Army Enlisted 67/02/08 67/08/25 V Soviet UnioHawkins Stephen Dwayne Navy Enlisted 85/00/00 85/08/07 V Unknown Helmich Joseph George Jr. Army Enlisted 63/00/00 81/07/15 V Soviet UnioHernandez Linda Civilian 94/00/00 98/09/10 V Cuba Hernandez Nilo Civilian 92/00/00 98/09/12 R Cuba Hoffman Ronald Joshua Gov Contractor 86/09/09 90/06/15 V Japan Horton Brian Patrick Navy Enlisted 82/06/00 82/09/30 V Soviet UnioHoward Edward Lee CIA 84/09/00 85/0000 V Soviet UnioHumphrey Ronald Louis State Dept 76/00/00 78/01/31 V Vietnam Irene Dale Vern Civilian 84/08/12 84/08/23 R Soviet UnioJeffries Randy Miles Gov Contractor 85/12/14 85/12/20 V Soviet UnioJenott Eric O. Army Enlisted 96/00/00 96/06/26 V China Johnson Robert Lee Army Enlisted 53/02/00 65/04/05 V Soviet UnioJones Geneva CIA 91/00/00 93/08/03 V Liberia Kampiles William Peter CIA 78/02/00 78/08/17 V Soviet UnioKauffman Joseph Patrick Air Force Officer 60/09/00 61/12/00 R East GermanKim Robert Chaegon Navy Civilian 96/04/00 96/09/24 V South Korea King Donald Wayne Navy Enlisted 89/00/00 80/30/03 V Unknown Koecher Karel Frantisek CIA 73/02/00 84/11/27 R CzechoslovaKota Subrahmanyam Gov Contractor 85/00/00 95/10/18 R Soviet UnioKunkle Craig Dee Navy Civilian 88/12/00 89/01/10 V Soviet UnioLalas Steven J. Army Enlisted 77/00/00 93/05/03 Unknown Greece Ledbetter Gary Lee Navy Enlisted 67/04/00 67/05/00 R Soviet Unio
A-6 

Surname Given Name Affiliation 

Date Espionage Began

Date of Arrest 

Volunteer or 

Recruit Recipient C

Lee Andrew Daulton Civilian 75/05/18 77/01/17 V Soviet UnioLee Peter Hoong-Yee Gov Contractor 85/00/00 97/00/00 V China Lessenthien Kurt G. Navy Enlisted 96/00/00 96/04/22 V Russia Lipka Robert Stephan Army Enlisted at NSA 65/09/00 96/02/23 V Soviet UnioLonetree Clayton John Marine Enlisted 84/00/00 86/12/00 R Soviet UnioMadsen Lee Eugene Navy Enlisted 79/07/26 79/08/14 V Unknown Martin William Hamilton NSA 60/08/00 61/00/00 V Soviet UnioMiller Richard William FBI 84/05/00 84/10/03 R Soviet UnioMintkenbaugh James Allen Army Enlisted 53/06/00 65/04/05 R Soviet UnioMira Francisco de Asis Air Force Enlisted 82/05/00 83/03/25 V Soviet UnioMitchell Bernon Ferguson NSA 60/08/00 61/00/00 V Soviet UnioMoore Edwin Gibbons II CIA 76/12/22 76/12/22 V Soviet UnioMorison Samuel Loring Navy Civilian 84/07/00 84/10/01 V United KingMortati Thomas Army Civilian 81/00/00 89/12/01 R Hungary Mueller Gustav Adolph Air Force Enlisted 49/10/00 49/10/00 V Soviet UnioMurphy Michael Richard Navy Enlisted 81/06/00 81/00/00 V Soviet UnioNesbitt Frank Arnold Air Force Civilian 89/09/00 89/10/14 R Soviet UnioNicholson Harold James CIA 94/06/27 96/11/16 V Soviet UnioOtt Bruce Damian Air Force Enlisted 86/01/09 86/02/22 V Soviet UnioPayne Leslie Joseph Army Enlisted 74/00/00 74/10/00 V East GermanPelton Ronald William NSA 80/01/15 85/11/25 V Soviet UnioPeri Michael Anthony Army Enlisted 89/02/20 89/03/04 V East GermanPerkins Walter Thomas Air Force Enlisted 68/12/00 71/10/21 R Soviet UnioPetersen Joseph Sidney Jr. NSA 48/03/01 54/10/09 V Netherlands Pickering Jeffrey Loring Navy Enlisted 82/00/00 83/00/00 V Soviet UnioPitts Earl Edwin FBI 87/07/00 96/12/18 V Soviet Unio
A-7 

Surname Given Name Affiliation 

Date Espionage Began

Date of Arrest 

Volunteer or 

Recruit Recipient C

Pizzo Francis Xavier II Navy Civilian 85/08/11 85/08/13 V Soviet UnioPollard Anne Henderson Civilian 85/11/00 85/11/22 R Israel and CPollard Jonathan Jay Navy Civilian 84/06/00 85/11/21 V Israel and CPonger Kurt Leopold Army Civilian 49/06/15 53/01/14 R Soviet UnioRamsay Roderick James Army Enlisted 83/09/00 90/06/07 R Hungary and Rees Norman John Gov Contractor 42/00/00 71/00/00 V Soviet UnioRhodes Roy Adair Army Enlisted 51/12/00 57/06/00 R Soviet UnioRichardson Daniel Walter Army Enlisted 88/01/00 88/01/14 V Soviet UnioRohrer Glenn Roy Army Enlisted 58/00/00 65/00/00 R CzechoslovaRondeau Jeffrey Stephen Army Enlisted 85/00/00 92/10/22 R Hungary and Safford Leonard Jenkins Army Enlisted 67/02/08 67/08/25 V Soviet UnioSantos Joseph Civilian 94/00/00 98/09/10 V Cuba Sattler James Frederick Gov Contractor 67/00/00 74/00/00 R East GermanScarbeck Irvin Chambers State Dept 60/12/22 61/06/13 R Poland Schoof Charles Edward Navy Enlisted 89/10/00 89/12/01 V Soviet UnioSchuler Ruby Louise Gov Contractor 79/05/01 83/00/00 R Poland Schwartz Michael Stephen Navy Officer 92/11/00 96/00/00 Unknown Saudi ArabiScranage Sharon Marie CIA 83/12/00 85/07/11 R Ghana Seldon P. Phillip Tyler CIA 92/11/00 96/00/00 R El Salvador Slatten Charles Dale Army Enlisted 84/02/00 84/04/14 V Soviet UnioSlavens Brian Everett Marine Enlisted 82/08/31 82/09/04 V Soviet UnioSmith Richard Craig Civilian 81/00/00 84/05/04 V Soviet UnioSmith Timothy Steven Navy Civilian 00/04/07 00/04/07 V Unknown Sombolay Albert T. Army Enlisted 90/12/00 91/03/29 V Jordan and ISouther Glenn Michael Navy Civilian 80/00/00 86/00/00 V Soviet UnioSquillacote Theresa M. DoD Civilian 80/00/00 97/10/07 R East German
A-8 

Surname Given Name Affiliation 

Date Espionage Began

Date of Arrest 

Volunteer or 

Recruit Recipient C

Stand Kurt Allen Civilian 72/00/00 97/10/04 R East GermanSzabo Zoltan Army Officer 67/00/00 89/05/21 R Hungary Thompson Robert Glenn Air Force Enlisted 57/06/00 65/00/00 V Soviet UnioTobias Bruce Edward Navy Civilian 85/08/12 85/08/23 V Soviet UnioTobias Michael Timothy Navy Enlisted 85/08/11 85/08/13 V Soviet UnioTrofimoff George Army Civilian 69/00/00 00/06/14 R Soviet UnioTsou Douglas S. FBI 86/03/00 88/02/09 V Taiwan Tumanova Svetlana Army Civilian 78/00/00 87/09/28 R Soviet UnioVerber Otto Army Civilian 49/06/15 53/01/14 R Soviet UnioWalker Arthur James Gov Contractor 81/00/00 85/05/29 R Soviet UnioWalker John Anthony Jr. Navy Enlisted 68/01/00 85/05/20 V Soviet UnioWalker Michael Lance Navy Enlisted 83/09/00 85/05/22 R Soviet UnioWalton (pseudonym) Air Force Enlisted 64/00/00 72/00/00 V Soviet UnioWarren Kelly Therese Army Enlisted 86/00/00 97/07/10 R East GermanWesson (pseudonym) Air Force Enlisted 60/00/00 63/00/00 R Soviet UnioWhalen William Henry Army Officer 59/12/00 66/07/12 R Soviet UnioWhitworth Jerry Alfred Navy Enlisted 75/02/00 85/06/03 R Soviet UnioWilmoth James Rodney Navy Enlisted 89/02/00 89/07/25 V Soviet UnioWine Edward Hilledon Navy Enlisted 68/08/21 68/09/29 V Soviet UnioWold Hans Palmer Navy Enlisted 83/05/00 83/07/21 V Soviet UnioWolf Ronald Craig Air Force Civilian 89/03/00 89/05/05 V Soviet UnioWolff Jay Clyde Navy Civilian 84/12/15 84/12/15 V Unknown Wood James David Air Force Enlisted 73/03/07 73/07/21 V Soviet Unio
B-1 

Appendix B

Cross-Tabulations 
B-2 
B-3 

Cross-Tabulations 

We cross-tabulated many of the variables in the espionage database in 2 by 2 tables to see 

what comparisons of interest emerged. In simplified form, some of these results have been 

reported in tables in the previous sections of this report. Here we discuss cross-tabulations that 

elaborate on or further amplify patterns already noted in the comparisons made earlier. 

Length of Espionage 

We have already compared those intercepted on their first attempt at espionage with 

those who did transmit information. In this section we added categories to refine the length of 

espionage, and cross-tabulated them with other variables. 

Table B.1 

Length of Espionage by Gender 

Length of Espionage Men Women Total 

 n % n % n % 

Intercepted 39 28 0 39 26 

< 1 year 29 21 1 9 30 20 

1 ñ 4.9 years 41 29 8 73 49 33 

5+ years 30 22 2 18 32 21 

Total 139 100 11 100 150 100 

In Table B.1 we see that whereas espionage by men was fairly evenly distributed among 

the four time categories, from intercepted to spying for five years or more, womenís espionage 

lasted longer. If persistence in espionage is a measure of ìsuccess,î these women, though 

admittedly only a small group of 11 people, achieved ìsuccessî by spying longer than men. Two 

of these 11 women, Rosario Ames and Anne Pollard, were witting spouses of men who did the 

espionage and who, while benefiting from it, participated only peripherally. The typical length of 

an espionage career for both men and women is between one and five years, but while less than 

one-third of men spied for that range of time, almost three-fourths of the women did so. 

Table B.2 

Length of Espionage by Age Espionage Began a (n=147) 

Length of Espionage 

Age Began Intercepted < 1 year 1 – 4.9 years 5+ years 

 n % n % n % n % 

Less than 20 

years 

6 16 0 0 1 2 2 6 

20 to 29 years 21 55 10 33 13 28 15 47 

30 to 39 years 6 16 11 37 13 28 11 34 

40 or more years 5 13 9 30 20 42 4 13 

Total 38 100 30 100 47 100 32 100 

 

Median age 27 35 36 29 

a For 3 individuals age is unknown, n=147.
B-4 

 Table B.2 provides more detail on the age when espionage was first attempted. The 

youthfulness characteristic of those intercepted is evident: over half of those intercepted were in 

their 20s. On the other hand, so were almost half (47%) of most ìsuccessfulî group, those who 

spied for more than five years. The largest group of older spies, those more than 40 years of age, 

persisted in espionage between one and five years. 

Examples of older but no wiser spies include John Charlton, who was a 60-year-old 

engineer in 1993 when he began trying to sell classified documents that outlined secret Navy 

stealth and anti-submarine projects. Charlton had retired in 1989 from Lockheed Corporation but 

he was unhappy with the company, so he took along drawings and plans of the secret projects he 

had worked on as a contractor. Plagued by grandiose illusions all his life, it frustrated Charleton 

that authorities did not realize the world-saving potential of his projects, so he offered them to 

various NATO countries. Caught in an FBI sting, he pleaded guilty and served two years in 

prison and paid a $50,000 fine (Chu, 1996). Another retiree with mental instability, Edwin 

Moore II, retired from the CIA in 1973 taking stacks of classified documents with him. He was 

arrested in 1976 at age 56 when he tossed a bundle of documents and a note over the wall of the 

residence for Soviet embassy staff. A Soviet staff member, fearing the packet was a bomb, 

turned it over unopened to the Washington D.C. police. Moore had taken ten boxes of documents 

from the Agency, and he had waited three years before trying to make contact with a buyer. 

Arrested at the drop site he had specified, Moore received a 15-year sentence for his attempted 

espionage (Meyers, 1977; Associated Press, 1977b). 

Table B.3 

Length of Espionage by Volunteer or Source of Recruitment a (n=148)

 Length of Espionage 

Volunteer or Source of 

Recruitment Intercepted < 1 year 1 to 4.9 years 5+ years Total 

 n % n % n % n % n % 

Volunteer 36 93 20 67 25 52 13 43 94 64

Recruited by foreign intelligence 1 2 7 23 11 23 13 40 32 21

Recruited by friend or family 2 5 3 10 12 25 5 17 22 15

Total 39 100 30 100 48 100 31 100 148 100

a For 2 individuals the source of recruitment in unknown, n=148.

Table B.3 reinforces the point that volunteering to commit espionage tends to be riskier 

than being recruited. All but 3 of the 36 individuals who were intercepted were volunteers, as 

were two-thirds of those whose espionage careers lasted less than one year. Some volunteers 

overcame the risks and persisted: half of those who spied one to five years were volunteers, and 

volunteers were 43% of those who spied for five years or longer. Yet two-fifths of those who 

spied longest had been recruited by a foreign intelligence service. 
B-5 

Table B.4 

Length of Espionage by Agencies Owning the Information a (n=146)

 Length of Espionage 

Agencies Owning the Information Intercepted < 1 year 1–4.9 years 5+ years Total 

n % n % n % n % n % 

Military services (military and civilians) 37 95 18 60 22 48 16 53 94 64 

Intelligence agencies 1 3 3 10 13 29 5 16 22 15 

Department of Defense contractors 1 3 4 13 6 13 3 10 13 9 

Department of Defense 2 6 2 1 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 2 7 2 6 4 3 

Department of State 1 3 2 4 1 3 4 3 

Immigration Naturalization Service 1 2 1 <1 

More than one federal agency 2 7 2 4 2 6 6 4 

Total 39 100 30 100 46 100 31 100 146 100 

a For 4 individuals the agency owning the information they sold or attempted to sell is unknown n=146.

 Table B.4 shows that the military services predominate among government agencies in 

losing information to espionage. Members of the military and civilian employees working for the 

military make up the largest group in every category of length of espionage: they are all but 2 of 

those intercepted, and between one-half and three-fifths of the other three categories. This 

reflects the fact that of the roughly 3 million security clearances active in 2000 in the U.S., 

persons employed in the Department of Defense held 2.1 million clearances. 

Table B.5 

Decade Began by Length of Espionage (n=150) 

1940s 

& 50s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Length of 

Espionage 

n % n % n % n % n % n % 

Intercepted 2 12 1 5 3 11 29 45 3 15 1 100 

Less than 1 year 1 6 7 32 6 23 10 16 6 30 0 

1 to 4.9 years 7 41 8 36 8 31 16 25 10 50 0 

5 or more years 7 41 6 27 9 35 9 14 1 5 0 

Total 17 100 22 100 26 100 64 100 20 100 1 100 

 In Table B.5 we can trace the relative length of espionage careers in different periods of 

time. In the earliest cases, those few that we have included that began in the late 1940s and those 

in the 1950s, most of the individuals spied for at least a year. Over subsequent decades the 

proportion of short-term cases, those who were intercepted and those whose espionage lasted less 

than one year, increased to a peak in the 1980s. In that period almost half of the individuals who 

attempted espionage were intercepted. Rather than the catchphrase that pegs the 1980s as ìthe 

decade of the spy,î one might call it ìthe decade of the unsuccessful spy.î Of the 64 individuals 

who tried to commit espionage during that decade, 45% were intercepted and another 16% 

persisted less than one year, a combined cluster of short-term spies unmatched in other decades. 

Of the total of 39 persons who were intercepted, three-fourths of them were caught during the 

1980s. 
B-6 

Civilian and Military Spies

Comparisons of interest between civilians and military spies that were made in general terms in 

Part 3 were extended with additional details in these cross-tabulations. 

Table B.6 

Civilian or Uniformed Military by Age Espionage Began a (n=147) 

Age Began Civilian Military 

n % n % 

Less than 20 years 2 3 7 10 

20 to 29 years 18 24 41 57 

30 to 39 years 22 29 19 26 

40 or more years 33 44 5 7 

Total 75 100 72 100 

 

Median age began 39 25 

a For 3 individuals the age at which they began espionage is unknown, n=147.

 Table B.6 reinforces the point made previously that military spies have tended to be 

younger than civilians. This reflects the relatively young age of most enlisted military personnel 

and the fact that among military spies, most are the young men at lower military ranks. Among 

civilians, on the other hand, 44% were 40 or older when they began spying. 

Table B.7 

Civilian or Uniformed Military by Volunteer or Source of Recruitment a (n=148) 

 Civilian Military Total

Volunteer or Source of Recruitment n % n % n % 

Volunteers 43 57 51 71 94 63 

Recruited by foreign intelligence 20 26 12 17 32 22 

Recruited by friend or family 13 17 9 12 22 15 

Total 76 100 72 100 148 100 

a For 2 individuals whether they were recruited or volunteered is unknown, n=148. 

 In Table B.7 the proportions of volunteers and recruits among civilians and members of 

the military are elaborated from the simple comparison made earlier to include the categories of 

the recruiters, either a foreign intelligence service or family or friend. For both civilian and 

military, more individuals were recruited by an intelligence service than by someone close to 

them. The most striking finding in the table remains the higher proportion of military volunteers 

compared to civilians. 
B-7 

Table B.8 

Civilian or Uniformed Military by Length of Espionage (n=150)

Length of Espionage Civilian Military Total 

n % n % n % 

Intercepted 12 16 27 37 39 26 

Less than 1 year 15 19 15 21 30 20 

1 to 4.9 years 32 42 17 23 49 33 

5+ years 18 23 14 19 32 21 

Total 77 100 73 100 150 100 

 Differences between civilians and military spies in the length of their espionage careers 

are detailed in Table B.8. Military espionage was shorter because twice as many military spies 

were intercepted compared to civilians. The largest proportion of civilians, two-fifths, continued 

their spying between one and five years before being caught. Roughly one-fifth of both groups 

lasted five or more years. 

Table B.9 

Civilian or Uniformed Military by Occupational Category a (n=148) 

Occupational Category Civilian Military Total 

n % n % n % 

General/technical 10 13 28 39 38 26 

Communications/intelligence 22 29 27 37 49 33 

Functional support/administration 12 16 12 17 24 16 

Scientific/professional 22 29 4 6 25 17 

Miscellaneous 10 13 1 1 11 8 

Total 76 100 72 100 148 100 

a For 2 individuals the occupational category is unknown, n=148. 

 Table B.9 documents differences in the occupations of civilians who spied compared to 

members of the military. For the military the greatest vulnerabilities came from persons in 

general and technical jobs, which often require access to classified information even though they 

do not require broad education, and secondly in the communications and intelligence fields. For 

civilians the communications and intelligence areas were also most important, but scientific and 

professional occupations were second, while they were less common among military spies. 

Table B.10 

Civilian or Uniformed Military by Security Clearance Level a (n=141) 

Clearance Level Civilian Military Total 

n % n % n % 

None 29 39 8 12 37 26 

Confidential or Secret 9 12 24 36 33 23 

Top secret 21 29 29 43 50 36 

Top secret SCI 15 20 6 9 21 15 

Total 74 100 67 100 141 100 

a For 9 individuals the clearance they held is unknown, n=141. 

 
B-8 

Table B.10 shows differences between civilian and military spies in levels of security 

clearances held. The largest group among civilians held no clearance at all: their various 

circumstances are detailed in Table B.11. Most military spies held Top Secret clearance, with 

relatively few having access to Special Compartmented Information (SCI). Almost three times as 

many military spies held lower level clearances, Confidential or Secret, than did civilians. 

Table B.11 

Circumstances of Individuals with No Security Clearance, 

by Whether the Cleared Person Was Civilian or Uniformed Military (n=37) 

Circumstances Civilian Military Total 

 n % n % n % 

Spouse of cleared person: active participant 1 4 1 3 

Spouse of cleared person: passive participant 2 7 2 5 

Accomplice of cleared person 8 30 4 40 12 32 

Reliance on a past clearance 8 30 8 22 

Reliance on stolen information 2 7 4 40 6 16 

Planned to use pending clearance 1 10 1 3 

Passed sensitive but unclassified information 6 22 1 10 7 19 

Total 27 100 10 100 37 100 

 Table B.11 summarizes the various circumstances in which individuals committed 

espionage while holding no security clearance themselves, and compares those who were 

civilians with members of the military. These cases demonstrate several patterns. In one pattern, 

the person was an active or passive accomplice of someone with a clearance who had access to 

information of interest. In a second pattern, the individual relied on his or her memory or on 

stolen materials from past access to valuable information. Four people simply stole classified 

information to which they did not have legal access, and one person admitted that he entered the 

U.S. Air Force planning to sell information once he got a clearance, but he was caught before he 

could act. One-fifth of these 37 individuals with no security clearance themselves were 

prosecuted for attempting to sell or provide information that was not in fact classified, but was 

deemed sensitive defense information. 

For example, Albert Sombolay, a native of Zaire who became an American citizen in 

1978, joined the U.S. Army in 1985. In December 1990 from his post in Germany he contacted 

the Jordanian and Iraqi embassies offering to support the ìArab cause.î Sombolay passed troop 

dispositions and examples of chemical warfare gear then being used in the Desert Shield 

campaign to the enemy, and offered to videotape useful information from Saudi Arabia once he 

was sent there. Arrested and tried by military court martial in Germany, Sombolay was sentenced 

to 34 years at hard labor (Holthaus, 1991; Thompson, 1991). 

Volunteer or Recruit

In these cross-tabulations we extended the comparisons made earlier of those who 

volunteered with those who were recruited to include the two different categories of recruits. 
B-9 

Table B.12 

Volunteer or Source of Recruitment by Educational Level a (n=131) 

Volunteers 

Recruited by 

foreign intelligence 

Recruited by 

friend or family 

Years of education n % n % n % 

10 Less than high school 9 10 0 0 

12 High school graduate 38 43 8 30 5 31 

14 Some college 11 13 9 33 6 38 

16 Bachelors degree 17 19 8 30 1 6 

18 Masters or Ph.D. 13 15 2 7 4 25 

Total 88 100 27 100 16 100 

Median 12 years 14 years 14 years 

a Education level is unknown for 17 individuals, and for two individuals the recruitment source is unknown, n=131. 

Table B.12 reinforces the finding that volunteers were less educated (in part because they 

were also younger) than recruits. Half of volunteers were high school graduates or less, while in 

both groups of recruits one-third were educated only through high school. Four of those who 

allowed themselves to be recruited by someone close to them held advanced degrees. 

Table B.13 

Volunteer or Source of Recruitment by Occupational Category a (n=146) 

Volunteers 

Recruited by 

foreign 

intelligence 

Recruited by 

friend or 

family 

Occupational category n % n % n % 

General/technical 27 29 4 13 6 27 

Communications/intelligence 37 40 7 23 4 18 

Functional Support/administration 12 13 6 19 6 27 

Scientific/professional 9 9 13 42 4 18 

Miscellaneous 8 9 1 3 2 10 

Total 93 100 31 100 22 100 

a For 2 individuals the occupational category is unknown, and for 2 others the source of recruitment if unknown, 

n=146 

Table B.13 summarizes further detail on the occupational categories of volunteers and 

recruits. Among volunteers, two-fifths clustered in communications and intelligence fields. 

Foreign intelligence services took the most recruits from scientific and professional areas. Those 

recruited by a family member or a friend came from various occupations with no particular 

cluster in any one area. 
B-10 

Table B.14 

Volunteer or Source of Recruitment by Citizenship a (n=146) 

Volunteer or Source of Recruitment Native Naturalized 

 n % n % 

Volunteers 82 68 11 42 

Recruited by foreign intelligence 20 17 12 46 

Recruited by friend or family 18 15 3 12 

Total 120 100 26 100 

a For two individuals citizenship is unknown, and for two other individuals whether they were recruited or 

volunteered is unknown, n=146.

Table B.14 revisits the question of vulnerability to recruitment by naturalized citizens. In 

Table 9 above we considered the proportions of volunteers and the two groups of recruits who 

were either native or naturalized citizens. Here we consider the proportions of native-born or 

naturalized citizens who were volunteers or recruits. Among the native-born citizens, 68% 

volunteered to commit espionage, compared to 42% of the naturalized citizens who volunteered. 

Almost half of the naturalized citizens were recruited by foreign intelligence services, compared 

to 17% of the native-born citizens. Family or friends recruited comparable proportions of each 

group. 

Table B.15 

Volunteer or Source of Recruitment by Foreign Attachments a (n=148) 

Foreign attachments 

 Yes No 

Volunteer or source of recruitment n % n % 

Volunteered 31 48 63 76 

Recruited by foreign intelligence 27 41 5 6 

Recruited by friend or family 7 11 15 18 

Total 65 100 83 100 

a Foreign attachments are defined as persons to whom the individual is assumed to have an emotional attachment, 

including spouse or intended spouse, parents, or immediate family members, or friends or professional or business 

associates, who are not U.S. citizens and who may or may not be living outside the U.S.; for 2 individuals who 

were recruited, the source of recruitment is unknown, n=148. 

Table B.15 considers whether those individuals with foreign attachments were more 

likely to volunteer or to be recruited, and by whom. Almost half (48%) of those with foreign 

attachments volunteered to commit espionage; slightly more than half were recruited. Most 

striking is the finding that among those with foreign attachments, two-fifths had been recruited 

by a foreign intelligence service, compared to 6% of those who did not have such attachments. 

This reinforces the point that people with ties abroad may well be more vulnerable to 

recruitment. Standards of judgment for granting security clearances, notably the Adjudicative 

Guidelines, reflect this concern: three of the 13 guidelines assess foreign attachments and 

involvements of various kinds. 
B-11 

Table B.16 

Volunteer or Source of Recruitment by Agencies Owning Information a (n=144)

Agencies Owning Information 

Volunteer Recruited by 

Foreign 

Intelligence 

Recruited by 

Family or Friend 

n % n % n % 

Military services (military and 

civilians) 63 69 17 55 12 55 

Intelligence agencies 15 17 3 10 4 18 

DoD contractors 7 8 4 13 3 13 

DoD agencies 0 1 3 0 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 3 3 1 3 0 

Department of State 1 1 2 6 1 5 

Immigration and Naturalization 

Service 0 1 3 0 

More than one federal agency 2 2 2 6 2 9 

Total 91 100 31 100 22 100 

a For 4 individuals the agency owning the information is unknown, and for 2 individuals whether they 

volunteered or were recruited is unknown, and thus the source of recruitment, if any, is also unknown for 

those 2, n=144. 

Table B.16 compares the sources of information among the groups of volunteers and 

recruits. Seventy percent of the volunteers offered information that belonged to the military 

departments, while for the two groups of recruits ownership was more equally distributed. 

Slightly more than half of those recruited either by a foreign intelligence service or by family or 

friend betrayed information from the military. Foreign intelligence services sampled from the 

greatest variety of sources of classified information. 

Table B.17 

Volunteer or Source of Recruitment by Motivations a (n=234) 

Volunteer 

Recruited by 

 foreign 

intelligence 

Recruited by 

friend or 

family Motivation n % n % n % 

Money 67 44 21 43 15 43 

Divided loyalties 18 12 10 21 4 11 

Disgruntlement or revenge 37 25 4 8 1 3 

Thrills or excitement 13 9 4 8 1 3 

Ingratiation 11 7 2 4 12 34 

Coercion 0 7 14 1 3 

Recognition 4 3 1 2 1 3 

Total 150 100 49 100 35 100 

a For 2 individuals whether they volunteered or were recruited is unknown, and thus the source of recruitment, if 

any, for them is also unknown, and these 2 individuals had 3 motives between them which are not reflected in this 

table. This table includes individuals with multiple motivations.

 Table B.17 summarizes the multiple motivations held by individuals in the espionage 

database by whether the person volunteered or was recruited, and by whom. Money motivated 

nearly identical proportions, about 44%, of each of the three groups. In addition to money, the 
B-12 

second-largest proportion points to motives that were most characteristic of each group: for 

volunteers that issue was disgruntlement; for individuals recruited by a foreign intelligence 

service that issue was divided loyalties, followed next in importance by coercion; for those 

recruited by family or friend, that motive was ingratiation. These clusters suggest that an attempt 

to focus security countermeasures on the type of vulnerability one could suspect from these 

patterns could be an effective strategy. For example, among individuals with access to highly 

classified information in a workplace, realizing that volunteering to spy is a potential outlet for 

people who are demoralized or resentful, management should redouble efforts to maintain a 

cohesive work environment. 

Table B.18 

Volunteer or Source of Recruitment by Decade Espionage Began a (n=148) 

 

Volunteer 

 Recruited by 

foreign intelligence 

 Recruited by friend 

or family 

Decade began n % n % n % 

1940 ñ 1949 3 3 2 6 0 

1950 ñ 1959 5 5 6 19 1 5 

1960 ñ 1969 13 14 8 25 1 5 

1970 ñ 1979 14 15 7 22 5 22 

1980 ñ 1989 45 48 6 19 13 59 

1990 ñ 1999 13 14 3 9 2 9 

2000 ñ present 1 1 0 0 

Total 94 100 32 100 22 100 

a For 2 individuals whether they volunteered or were recruited is unknown, and thus the source of recruitment, if 

any, is also unknown for those 2, n=148.

 In Table B.18 the numbers of individuals who began espionage in a given decade are 

summarized by whether the person volunteered or was recruited. A threefold increase in the 

number of volunteers from the 1950s to the 1960s, to roughly 15 spies per decade, was the level 

maintained through the 1970s and during the 1990s, but in the 1980s that rate increased threefold 

again to 45 volunteers. Spies recruited by family or friends show a similar pattern, peaking 

sharply during the 1980s at almost 60%. The numbers of spies recruited by a foreign intelligence 

service, on the other hand, was fairly steady at 6 to 8 persons per decade through the 1950s, 60s, 

70, and 80s. Only 3 Americans are known from public sources to have begun spying because 

they were recruited by a foreign intelligence service during the 1990s, but with the passage of 

time others may come to light. 
B-13