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32-739 2007

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION’S OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE:

PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

INFORMATION SHARING, AND 

TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 14, 2006

Serial No. 109-83

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND 

TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut, Chairman 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

PETER T. KING, NEW YORK (Ex Officio) 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress For the State 

of Connecticut, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 

Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment .......................................................... 1

The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress For the State 

of California and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, 

Informaton Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment ...................................... 2

The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress For the State 

of Nevada .............................................................................................................. 16

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress For the 

State of Rhode Island ........................................................................................... 14

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress For the State 

of New York .......................................................................................................... 12

The Honorable Stevan Pearce, a Representative in Congress For the State 

of New Mexico ...................................................................................................... 18

WITNESSES 

William Gaches, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6

Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 

U.S.Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 30

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 32

(1)

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION’S OFFICE OF 

INTELLIGENCE: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES 

Wednesday, June 14, 2006

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION

SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:40 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Rob Simmons [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Simmons, Gibbons, Pearce, Lofgren, 

Lowey and Langevin. 

Mr. SIMMONS. The quorum being present, the Committee on 

Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 

Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment will come to order. Today 

the subcommittee meets to hear testimony on the Transportation 

Security Administration’s Office of Intelligence and its integration 

within the DHS intelligence enterprise. 

We will be hearing testimony from two witnesses today. Our first 

panel, we will be hearing from Mr. William B. Gaches, TSA’s Assistant Administrator for Intelligence. Welcome, Bill. Good to have 

you here. 

And our second panel, we will hear from Ms. Cathleen Berrick, 

Director of Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office. 

I thank Mr. Gaches for being here this morning, and I also want 

to thank you for hosting our visit to your facility on Monday. The 

tour provided the subcommittee with insight for a look at how your 

office carries out its mission to identify, deter, and mitigate threats 

against our Nation’s transportation infrastructure. And I look forward to continuing the discussion that we began on your role in 

protecting our Nation. 

I also look forward to hearing from you today on the roles and 

responsibilities of the TSA Office of Intelligence and its role in the 

DHS intelligence enterprise. TSA’s Office of Intelligence was created to mitigate the risk of terrorism against aviation. Formed in 

the wake of the 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 bombing over Lockerbie, 

the legacy Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence was eventually transformed into a 24/7 

operation during the Gulf War. However, the fate of the FAA’s Intelligence Office was tragically changed on September 11, 2001. 
2

Given these events, I found it very interesting and encouraging 

that one of the mantras of personnel from TSA’s Office of Intelligence is, and I quote, zero tolerance for failure; no successful attacks against U.S. transportation based on failure by TSA intelligence to warn or inform. 

The culture of TSA intelligence is emblematic of DHS itself. It 

is a culture of men and women that readily accept the responsibility to protect our Nation against the threat of terrorism. When 

I visited the office on Monday, I met a gentleman who worked for 

you, and I asked him why he chose TSA instead of the more traditional intelligence agencies like CIA or FBI, and he told me, and 

I quote, because here I am defending the homeland, unquote. 

The good men and women that work in intelligence at TSA work 

hard every day to defend us against attack. That work is important. We must ensure as a Congress and as a government that they 

have the tools and policies in place to get the job done. 

I would now like to recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee Ms. Lofgren for any statement she may have. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I am pleased we are turning our attention today 

to the Transportation Security Administration’s Office of Intelligence. The Department’s Chief Intelligence Officer Charlie Allen 

recently testified before us about one of his key goals making all 

the Departments’ intelligence offices work together. Put simply, 

Mr. Allen wants intelligence folks and TCB and to be on the same 

sheet of music when it comes to the intelligence agenda. To get 

there he needs the various intelligence offices falling under his 

leadership to share information with each other and to draw on 

each other’s expertise in order to produce unique intelligence products, products that advise the Department’s State, local, tribal, and 

private sector partners about what steps to take to protect people 

and property from terrorist attacks. 

I therefore welcome the testimony here today and look forward 

to Mr. Gaches’ testimony about the work he is doing. I look forward 

to asking both witnesses about the practical impact that TSA’s intelligence shop has on everyday Americans. Specifically, I am interested with TSA’s ongoing involvement and its impact on TSA’s Secure Flight program. 

Most Americans are well aware of news stories about senior citizens, babies, nuns and even Members of Congress being stopped at 

airports because they share the same or similar name as a terrorist 

on a watch list. In fact, a member of my own family is routinely 

stopped by certain airlines whenever he flies. I understand that 

TSA intelligence analysts are stationed at the Terrorist Screening 

Center at this very moment and are assisting in the monumental 

task of manually reviewing the tens of thousands of names included on the watch list based upon information we have recently 

received from the Department of Justice’s inspector general. However, this manual review process will take 5 or 6 years to complete. 

We simply don’t have 5 or 6 years to read through records to get 

the data right. 

A similar data problem apparently plagues TSA’s planned Secure 

Flight program. Ms. Berrick testified this past February the program, as presently envisioned, will rely upon the Terrorist Screening Center’s terrorist watch list to conduct automatic name checks 
3

to see if a passenger with an airline reservation is a terrorist or 

not. If the records on the watch list are inaccurate or incomplete, 

TSA’s intelligence analysts along with their colleagues at the Terrorist Screening Center will have to perform a manual review of 

passenger records on sometimes very short time frames in order to 

see if they can figure out who is who. The same manual review will 

be needed if the airlines that submit passenger information to secure flights somehow muck up the data during the reservations 

process. Not only will this lead to delays, but I fear it won’t protect 

us. Terrorists could game the Secure Flight system and also the 

current watch system. 

As Ms. Berrick states in her prepared testimony today, Secure 

Flight was not designed to protect people using stolen identities 

from boarding airplanes. Given the millions of veterans’ records recently stolen from the Department of Veterans Affairs complete 

with names, dates of birth and Social Security numbers, this vulnerability is a particularly serious one. Now that TSA has announced that its going back to the drawing board on Secure Flight, 

it might make sense to figure out how to address the identity theft 

problem as well as the inadequacy of name checks before getting 

too far ahead of itself. I therefore look forward to Mr. Gaches’ comments not only about the work he is doing to stand up TSA’s Office 

of Intelligence, but also how he is gearing it up to prepare for Secure Flight and to address the problems that Ms. Berrick and others at GAO have identified. 

Welcome to you both, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you very much. And as the other members 

of the subcommittee know, they have an opportunity to insert any 

opening statement for the record that they may wish to insert. 

Mr. SIMMONS. And it is a pleasure to have the distinguished gentlewoman from New York here with us this afternoon. 

Our first witness will be William Gaches, who is the Assistant 

Administrator for Intelligence, Director of Intelligence and Analysis, Transportation Security Administration. He assumed this responsibility in February of 2006 and is the senior intelligence officer for the Transportation Security Administration. 

From the year 2003 to 2004, Mr. Gaches headed the DCI’s Terrorist Threat Integration Center, Analysis and Production Department, and was responsible for managing and overseeing all of 

TTIC’s publication and analysis efforts. He is a 30-year veteran of 

the National Security Agency, has earned his BA in political 

science from Westminster College, received a master of liberal arts 

from Johns Hopkins University, and advanced certificate in American public policy from the University of Maryland in Baltimore. It 

is good to have you here. 

We will put a 5 minute light on. We have your full testimony, 

so you don’t have to read it. And if you wish to summarize in 5 

minutes, we look forward to hearing your testimony. 
4

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM GACHES, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. GACHES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Lofgren, for the kind opening comments. Members of the subcommittee, thank you for this time. It is an opportunity to talk to 

you about the Office of Intelligence at the Transportation Security 

Administration, our mission, our capabilities and some thoughts 

about how we use intelligence to help secure the transportation 

networks of America. 

As I have not appeared as a witness before this subcommittee 

prior to today, allow me to a little bit more formally introduce myself. As Chairman Simmons said, I arrived at TSA in February of 

2006. For over 31 years I served at home and abroad as an officer 

of the National Security Agency, including being the NSA production manager for counterterrorism from 2000 to 2003. 

In 2003, as Chairman Simmons pointed out, I was indeed asked 

to be one of the founding leaders of the President’s Terrorism 

Threat Integration Center, or TTIC, which later became the National Counterterrorism Center, or NCTC, and in this 2003 to 2006 

timeframe, I did, in fact, run the analytic element of those organizations. 

Along the way I became committed to the concept of team play, 

and also I became a colleague and, I dare say, a friend of Charlie 

Allen, DHS’s Chief Intelligence Officer. As I headed, I thought, 

from NCTC back to NSA, Charlie Allen asked me if I would be interested in helping TSA improve their intelligence department. For 

me, a guy who wished to be a pilot in younger years and a collegeage summer hire of a national airline, this would be too good an 

opportunity to pass up, action-oriented intelligence work coupled 

with transportation. 

Administrator Hawley and I met, and by early February I was 

an assignee at TSA headquarters, but my commitment to TSA has 

steadily grown since that time, and on Friday, 12 May, I resigned 

from NSA and the following Monday came back to work as a TSA 

officer. 

The mission of the TSA Office of Intelligence is, in fact, formally 

outlined in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 

and, in short, directs TSA to receive, assess and distribute intelligence information related to transportation security. This dynamic, multifaceted effort by TSA must be done in concert with the 

efforts of the DHS’s Chief Intelligence Officer, his staff and DHS’s 

other component intel shops. We cannot operate so independent as 

to preclude coordination and consultation with and across DHS, 

and we are, in fact, fully committed to the Secretary’s objective as 

stated before the full committee this past October by Charlie Allen 

regarding integrating the intelligence elements of the Department, 

creating a unified intelligence culture, and improving the flow and 

reporting of intelligence. 

This architecture building is, in my humble opinion, comparable 

to DOD’s joint staff model. We are in the JCS/J2, work hand in 

glove with the J2s of the combatant commanders in the field, and 

each field commander’s intel chief has their autonomy and their re-
5

sponsibilities, but one of those responsibilities is to work in concert 

with the JCS/J2 back in the Pentagon. 

The intelligence office at TSA is comprised of 99 government personnel and about 40 contractors. We operate on a budget of about 

$21 million, most of which is used to pay for salaries, IT support 

and the critical IT linkage to the field and our customers. Organizationally we have three major components: a 24-by-7 watch operation at TSA headquarters, as well as intelligence officers at TSA’s 

operation center in Herndon, Virginia; an analytic effort, which I 

view as our core purpose; and a business management team to help 

us run right and run straight. 

Many of my analysts have prior intelligence and/or law enforcement backgrounds either in the military or at agencies such as 

FBI, DIA and CIA. Our products are transportation focused, and 

we strive to issue much at the lowest classification level possible, 

frequently to include unclassified reports. 

We have two primary customer sets. First, the major transportation industries, aviation, mass transit and rail, maritime, cargo, 

highway, and pipeline; and our second primary customer is the 

operational element of TSA, almost the rest of TSA, which includes 

150 TSA Federal security directors and 40,000 transportation security officers, formerly known as screeners, supporting 450 federalized airports and associated intermodal transportation activities 

across the country, as well as 21 Federal air marshal field offices. 

Working together, we help to operationalize the intel and put it to 

work to secure our transportation networks. 

We also interface daily with and draw upon the U.S. Intelligence 

Community as well as other U.S. Government agencies. We consider all forms of intelligence as critical to our mission, and we also 

rely heavily on open-source information to include information garnered by the transportation industry, and by TSA officers in the 

field at passenger checkpoints, and by TSA’s Federal Air Marshal 

Service. 

We are not, nor should we be, construed as experts in all things 

terrorism, but we need to know where to go to get that expertise, 

then operationalize this intelligence and make it work for our customers. The intelligence analysts at TSA needs to comprehend facets of transportation and simultaneously the implications of the intelligence covering terrorists’ intentions, plans and activities. 

In conclusion, the future for the Office of Intelligence will be 

challenging, as is any Office of Intelligence engaged in the global 

war on terrorism. Our adversary is determined, learns from its 

mistakes and is flexible in many ways. We will focus on training 

our workforce and on continuing to work with DHS, the U.S. Intelligence Community, and our customers. This is a battle that cannot 

be won by one agency or even two or three. It will take a collaborative and cooperative approach across DHS and across the U.S. 

Government. As the Assistant Administrator For Intelligence at 

TSA, you have my pledge that I will do all that I can within authorities in law to ensure the safety of the United States’ transportation networks. 

Thank you for this opportunity, and I welcome your questions. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank you for that testimony. 

[The statement of Mr. Gaches follows:]
6

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM GACHES 

Good morning, Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, and members of 

the Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to speak with you about the 

Transportation Security Administration’s Office of Intelligence (OI) and its crucial 

role in assuring transportation security. OI serves the Assistant Secretary, key TSA 

staff, TSA field elements and a select, specialized set of stakeholders located mainly 

in the transportation sector. As such, its efforts complement and are coordinated 

with the broader mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Today, 

I would like to address who we are, what we do and our ongoing efforts to improve 

intelligence at TSA.

Our Mission 

The layered approach to security seeks to identify and deter threats well before 

they reach America’s airports, railways, highways, mass transit, and ports and pipelines. United States government agencies work with others around the globe to identify and disrupt terrorist activities at their source. U.S. Customs and Border Protection activities further identify potential terrorists and bar their entry into the 

United States. Federal, State, and local law enforcement work together with the FBI 

in Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the United States to identify and disrupt terrorist activities within the country. Intelligence activities are vital to the success of 

this effort and TSA’s OI is a key part of the intelligence team. 

Although many of TSA’s most visible programs, like aviation checkpoint screening, are intended to deter and physically prevent terrorists from carrying out a 

planned attack, the reality is that much of what TSA does is focused on stopping 

terrorists before they launch an attack. OI is absolutely critical to that effort because information, analyzed and shared, is the very heart of this defense. That is 

why we are working to enhance TSA’s role as an information resource to support 

our partners and stakeholders in transportation security. Our goal is to make sure 

that our government and private sector partners receive timely information from us 

and communicate directly with us so we can achieve maximum effectiveness in our 

response to terrorism and ideally in its prevention. 

OI is legislatively mandated by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 

2001 (ATSA), further revised by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. ATSA directs 

TSA to receive, assess, and distribute intelligence information related to transportation security; assess threats to transportation; develop policies, strategies, and 

plans for dealing with threats to transportation security; [and] act as the primary 

liaison for transportation security to the intelligence and law enforcement communities. . .′′

OI is the intelligence organization for TSA, providing an organic capability to review, synthesize, and analyze transportation specific intelligence. It is the only federal intelligence entity focused solely on security of the transportation sector. OI coordinates closely and shares information with other DHS components, the intelligence and the law enforcement community, other government departments and 

agencies such as DOT and FAA, and the transportation industry. To facilitate collaboration with the intelligence community and provide rapid analysis and notification of threats, this office has placed liaison officers with key intelligence community 

and law enforcement agencies across the Federal government. 

OI is critical to TSA’s overall risk-based security strategy. Its products provide a 

threat framework to prioritize security resources which is regularly used by the Federal Air Marshal Service, Federal Security Directors and the transportation industry. The office operates and maintains a twenty-four hour a day, seven days a week 

intelligence capability for TSA and, in conjunction with the Transportation Security 

Operations Center (TSOC), disseminates warnings and notifications of credible and 

imminent threats. 

In order to perform its mission, OI provides and maintains the information technology (IT) infrastructure for interfacing OI with U.S. Government classified networks. It also maintains secure electronic connectivity to over 190 TSA field elements via the Remote Access Security Program (RASP) that provides the TSA field 

with access to classified information in a timely and secure manner. 

It must be stated that TSA’s OI is one part of the team at a complex and multifunctional Department of Homeland Security. We are fully committed to the Secretary’s objective as stated before the full committee this past October by Charlie 

Allen, DHS’s Chief Intelligence Officer, of integrating the intelligence elements of 

the Department so as to create a unified intelligence culture, improving the flow of 

intelligence information both horizontally and vertically throughout the organization, and improving the reporting of intelligence information from the Department’s 

operating components and providing actionable, relevant analysis back to them. 
7

The Office of Intelligence consists of two Divisions. The Intelligence Watch and 

Outreach Division functions as a 24/7 watch, providing indications and warning information related to transportation security while fulfilling vital communication and 

liaison roles. The Current Intelligence and Assessments Division assesses current 

and emerging threats across all modes of transportation and creates products that 

are key to shaping security policy and developing and implementing countermeasures.

Intelligence Watch and Outreach 

Our Intelligence Watch and Outreach (IW&O) Division employs a cadre of experienced intelligence officers who operate and maintain a 24/7 intelligence watch capability for TSA. The essential goal of their efforts is to identify and assess the credibility of any security threat(s) to U.S. transportation, to alert OI and TSA managers 

and staff to these threats, and to support OI, TSA, and other U.S. Government organizations in their efforts to deter and prevent credible planned or actual attacks 

against U.S. transportation by providing Intelligence indications and warning support and crisis management assistance. 

To support this mission, IW&O maintains a full-time liaison officer presence at 

seven key Intelligence Community (IC) and Law Enforcement (LE) nodes including 

DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Director of National Intelligence’s 

(DNI) National Counter Terrorism Center, the FBI’s National Joint Terrorism Task 

Force, Customs and Border Protection’s National Targeting Center, the National Security Agency (NSA), the DEA-administered El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) Air 

Watch, and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). These liaison relationships facilitate the timely analysis and exchange of intelligence relating to transportation security and also provide these other entities with valuable expertise in transportation 

security as well as real time access to our experts and capabilities in the OI. 

In addition to the Headquarters Watch operation, IW&O also maintains an OI office (24/7) at TSA’s TSOC. In that capacity, it provides direct intelligence support 

to the TSOC and the Federal Air Marshal Service’s Mission Operations Center. The 

office also develops and executes all OI field support and Intelligence Operations 

outreach programs.

Current Intelligence and Assessments 

OI’s Current Intelligence and Assessments (CI&A) section is a well experienced 

group of intelligence officers whose products and programs focus on the terrorist 

threat to transportation. These professionals perform valuable functions in support 

of daily security readiness and long term strategic planning. Among their products 

are:* The Transportation Intelligence Gazette (TIG), Weekly Field Intelligence Summary (WFIS), Suspicious Incidents Report (SIR);* Specialized analytic assessments 

focused on terrorist groups, weapons, explosives, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive threats (CBRNE), modus operandi, tactics and 

trends;* Baseline modal threat assessments, updated as developing information 

warrants; and* Special reports and other products as needed to support the intelligence needs of TSA, DHS, and the intelligence and law enforcement community. 

Significantly, CI&A provides intelligence support for other TSA Assistant Administrators, notably Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM) and its 

modal general managers, Security Operations, and Law Enforcement/Federal Air 

Marshal Service. CI&A products assist these critical TSA components in assessing 

risk, to include consequence, criticality and vulnerability, and developing appropriate security programs, countermeasures, mitigation strategies and protection 

guidance. 

CI&A’s focused examination of data to identify new or unrealized threats in the 

transportation domain assists TSA leadership in understanding the strategic threat. 

Analytical products are used in the development of security policies and the setting 

of program priorities. Transportation intelligence assessments often serve as the key 

ingredient in shaping Security Directives (SDs) and Emergency Amendments (EAs) 

to stakeholders and support decisions on countermeasures. Frequently, CI&A coordinates on issues related to the National Infrastructure Protection Program (NIPP), 

National Strategy for Transportation Security (NSTS), National Planning Scenarios, 

Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment (SHIRA), Transportation Security Operational Plan (TSOP) and other similar programs. CI&A also plays a critical 

role in the development and coordination of interagency security initiatives. The Division’s Director serves as TSA’s technical advisor to the Overseas Security Advisory 

Council (OSAC) of the Department of State and directs TSA’s Chemical and Biological Task Force, which, in turn, provided countermeasures support to the TSA Pandemic Influenza Task Force. 

OI directs TSA’s Red Cell activity to identify potential vulnerabilities in the transportation system through the use of adversarial (terrorist) role playing and scenario 
8

development. All major offices of TSA participate in the Red Cells, to include TSA 

field personnel, Office of Security Operations, TSNM, OI, Internal Affairs, Information Technology, Operational Process and Technology, Office of Chief Counsel, and 

Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service. Red Cell members reflect 

TSA’s broad knowledge, expertise and ability to think creatively and outside-thebox. The purpose of the TSA Red Cell is to provide TSA leadership with threat scenarios that could affect the U.S. transportation infrastructure so that mitigation 

strategies are developed to counter these vulnerabilities. Following the presentation 

of the Red Cell scenarios to TSA senior leadership, other TSA offices conduct criticality and consequence analysis, determine appropriate counter measures and validate mitigation strategies. U.S. transportation sector representatives and industry 

stakeholders are made aware of these Red Cell scenarios which pinpoint potential 

vulnerabilities to the transportation system so that they may assist TSA in the development of mitigation strategies. 

In support of transportation stakeholders, CI&A coordinates with Information 

Sharing Analysis Centers (ISACs) to ensure awareness of and maintain a baseline 

understanding of threats to all modes of transportation. The Department, working 

with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), coordinates information and threat 

sharing for rail and transit through the Surface Transportation Information Sharing 

and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC) in partnership with the Association of American 

Railroads (AAR) and the American Public Transportation Association (APTA). As 

part of the significant partnership that has developed, TSA hosts ST-ISAC representatives at the TSOC. Similarly, CI&A, in coordination with security program 

officials at DHS, TSA, and DOT, shares threat information with highway, trucking, 

and motor carrier stakeholders through the Highway Watch program. The TSOC 

maintains a working area and supporting equipment for this program as well. 

Across the critical infrastructure sectors, including transportation, DHS is streamlining governmental organizational structure and processes to improve coordination 

and engagement with industry stakeholders. Government Coordinating Councils 

(GCCs) have been established to implement the public-private partnership envisioned by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The Transportation Sector 

GCC formed in January 2006. That council is establishing its membership and operating procedures, direct formation of modal GCCs, and facilitating outreach to 

stakeholders to foster development of equivalent Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC) 

for each of the transportation modes and the sector as a whole. Membership includes TSA as Chair, DHS, Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of Energy. GCCs in each of the modes are developing strategies, plans, and initiatives for transportation security. 

The intelligence professionals at TSA OI provide essential all-source, all modal, 

foreign and domestic transportation threat intelligence analysis capability in the 

United States Government.

The Path Forward 

The spectrum of its transportation security responsibilities, TSA seeks opportunities to enhance security posture and activities through targeted deployment of resources. In the intelligence field, OI has established a Pilot Program to enhance reporting of information obtained incidental to law enforcement and security operations, by deploying Field Intelligence Officers to a select group of airports including 

Boston, New York (JFK International Airport), Miami, Chicago (O’Hare International Airport), Los Angeles (Los Angeles International Airport), Phoenix and Dallas Fort Worth. Our goal is to improve intelligence support, coordination, and communication between TSA Headquarters, our Federal Security Directors (FSDs) and 

our modal stakeholders. After a one year trial, the Pilot Program will be evaluated. 

The Field Intelligence Officers will serve as the principal advisor to FSDs and 

their staffs on all intelligence matters. Other responsibilities will include developing 

and maintaining a working relationship with local, federal, state, and private entities responsible for transportation security, regardless of mode. It is important to 

note here that while our officers will be based at the airports, they will still interface with the security elements from the local rail, mass transit, highway, and port 

and pipeline (where applicable) modals to facilitate the sharing and exchange of relevant threat information among these modals. TSA Field Intelligence Officers will 

gather pertinent law enforcement and intelligence information and ensure it is disseminated throughout the National Intelligence Community. Law enforcement information will be vetted, validated, and formatted as Homeland Intelligence Reports 

(HIRs) by TSA’s Office of Intelligence HIR program. Upon approval, the HIRs will 

be disseminated to the Intelligence Community. 

Field Intelligence Officer core competencies will include:* delivery of intelligence 

briefings to FSDs, senior staff, airport workforce and partner agencies;* service as 
9

intelligence liaisons with applicable federal, state, and local intelligence offices;* the 

facilitation of intelligence data sharing from TSA Headquarters via the Office of Intelligence; and* submission of field intelligence reports to TSA Headquarters via the 

Office of Intelligence. 

Staffing for the Field Intelligence Officers will rely on highly competent and experienced personnel. These officers are expected to interact and coordinate with multiple levels of government and non-government personnel at each site. The Field Intelligence Officers will serve as the face of TSA’s Office of Intelligence for thousands 

of TSA employees working at the airports. 

Operational support derives from the TSA Assistant Administrator for Operations 

and the FSDs at the seven participating airports. TSA’s Office of Intelligence has 

sufficient staffing to support the Pilot Program. 

Conclusion 

TSA’s Office of Intelligence serves a select, specialized community of TSA leadership and key stakeholders. Our position within the government draws upon the expertise of experienced intelligence officers whose focus on the transportation industry provides the intelligence and law enforcement communities with valuable resources with which to prevent a terrorist attack. By providing an organic capability 

to review, synthesize, and analyze transportation specific intelligence, we make an 

absolutely critical contribution to our nation’s security which complements the efforts made in the Department as well the government as a whole. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to inform the subcommittee of our efforts. 

I would be happy to respond to any questions that you might have.

Mr. SIMMONS. In my opening statement, I referred to the TSA’s 

Office of Intelligence slogan, I guess you could say, zero tolerance 

for failure. You know, air traffic is one of those modes of transportation where somebody like myself who is inherently scared of flying wants to make sure that the takeoff, the flight, and the landing 

are done 100 percent perfectly. We don’t want 95 ercent of the 

takeoffs, the flights, and the landings to be successful, you know. 

That 5 percent of lack of success is what scares us all when it 

comes to flying. 

And certainly after 9/11, great efforts have been made by the 

U.S. Government and by TSA intelligence to improve the security 

of those flights. But in so doing, we also have to balance the privacy issues of the traveling public with efficiency issues, the efficiency of getting people through the security process and to their 

aircrafts in a timely fashion so that they don’t—they don’t miss the 

flight. 

What do you see as the principal challenges of your office, of TSA 

intelligence, and in balancing that security with that efficiency’

Mr. GACHES. The challenges that I see in that particular case, 

Mr. Chairman, would be largely surrounding first and foremost, we 

are concerned about the privacy of the American citizen, and as the 

recipient of the no fly and selectee list from the Terrorist Screening 

Center and the responsible agent for forwarding that on to the U.S. 

airlines in which they do the actual matching with oncoming passengers, we work as hard, as Ms. Lofgren pointed out, and also in 

a very manually intense system right now to try and ensure the 

privacy balanced against what we know is out there trying to work 

through our system. And it becomes very difficult because, as I 

pointed out in my oral testimony, this is an ever-changing enemy; 

this is an enemy that is becoming increasingly difficult to identify. 

This is an enemy that was not quite what it was in September of 

2001 or before that. 

So this is a constant balancing act between where we are trying 

to preserve the rights and the privacy of American citizens while 

still being able to determine where the bad person is, if you will, 
10

and how they are trying to get through whether it is the aviation 

or any other transportation system, a constant balancing act. A lot 

of training for our analysts to be witting of privacy concerns. It is 

done on an annual basis. So we are trying on many different facets 

to balance between both of those very important tasks for the office. 

Mr. SIMMONS. And I am sure you have heard of the stories about 

the little baby whose name is Osama bin Laden, or, in my case, the 

treasurer of the Connecticut Education Association whose name is 

Michael Freeman, whose name matches the name of somebody 

else, and when they get slowed down in the process, then we have 

to try to correct those holdings for those individuals. 

How efficient and how effective do you feel we have been in addressing those issues? 

Mr. GACHES. I think we have made some progress. I think we 

have a long way to go yet, in all honesty. This is a very complicated 

process, in an open hearing and unclassified. I know that you all 

are familiar with the basic tenets of how this works, the information that we receive from the TSC, how that information is fed to 

the TSC in the first place. It is a process that when you just look 

at it almost in a flow-chart fashion has room, unfortunately, for 

error just because of the complexity and the volume and the variety 

of the input of the information. 

I would certainly welcome you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking 

Member Lofgren, to TSA for a classified sort of A-to-Z review of 

this process. There are things that I would be perhaps incorrect in 

a public forum to detail about some of the checks and balances that 

we can take, and certainly don’t want to give those away in an 

open forum, but would be happy to have all of the members of this 

subcommittee visit us and have members from the TSC and from 

the National Counterterrorism Center and other parts of the community have a discussion about this entire process. I think you 

might find that very useful and helpful and also answer some of 

the questions that might be difficult to address in an open forum 

here. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I appreciate that. 

One final question. We all hear about the exceptions to the rule 

where the wrong person is identified or stopped or delayed. Am I 

correct in assuming that there have been instances where the right 

person or a person who is on a terrorist watch list has also been 

identified and either detained or otherwise questioned? 

Mr. GACHES. Absolutely. A very recent and exciting adventure 

that we took part in, actually led a few weeks ago, where through 

other sources we had six individuals, five individuals identified on 

a particular flight, and, in fact, they were on that list that we call 

the no fly List. They were bona fide flyers. They had unfortunately 

gotten onto the flight because it was coming from an overseas location, so because we knew who they were, we could confirm that. 

They were greeted accordingly and followed accordingly by law enforcement agencies to determine what they were up to, et cetera. 

And, again, wouldn’t want to go into any further detail, but I would 

say certainly several times a month we are getting positive hits on 

this system. 
11

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you. My time has expired, and I recognize 

the distinguished Ranking Member. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am wondering, Mr. Gaches, the GAO recently concluded that 

TSA’s response to the problems in Secure Flight raise more questions really than it answered. And I am wondering, they pointed 

particularly to the accuracy and completeness of the records included in the Terrorist Screening Center’s master terrorist watch 

list in the database as well as the protocols for handling airline reservation information in a way that facilitates the TSA-based Secure 

Flight automated name-checking process; and then also the role of 

TSA OI analysts in ensuring that false positive, innocent people 

are identified and then dealt with effectively. Can you address 

those GAO criticisms here in a public session? 

Mr. GACHES. Thank you for that question and the opportunity to 

make a left turn. 

Let me say in all honesty, I am clearly not the Secure Flight expert, and, in fact, it is not a direct responsibility of the Office of 

Intelligence. It is a complicated process, as you are aware, because 

of the vast number of inputs and the variety of agencies that input 

to the TSC and eventually in the case right today of the no fly and 

selectee list. 

Certainly the Secure Flight program first and foremost is being 

revamped and built from privacy up to standpoint, and our goal is 

to do it right and not do it fast. And as I think you are aware, we 

are rebaselining that program, and I am sure Cathy will have more 

words to say about that from the GAO perspective. 

I think that in the entire—if I may say that in the entire war 

on terrorism, it is difficult to always have precise information on 

the individuals that you are looking for, and the details on precise 

information, that probably should be left out of this open hearing. 

And we would welcome you again to go through in a classified session what we use criteriawise, why we encounter problems, and 

some thoughts that we have, and perhaps solicit thoughts from you 

that we should employ in making this a better and faster system, 

because clearly we do have room for improvement. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I am wondering, you mentioned in your testimony 

that you have information on a daily basis from the Intelligence 

Community. To what extent do you have connectivity with the Intelligence Community? What kind of interface do you have that 

permits the full sharing that we expect? 

Mr. GACHES. Thank you for that. 

As I mentioned, I have come out of that Intelligence Community. 

I have accrued a few friends and contacts that will still talk to me 

even in the non-IC status that I now hold. 

As you know, the TSA Office of Intelligence is not one of the formal 16 members of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Formally, 

however, let me point out perhaps one of the most critical things, 

even though it sounds somewhat elementary. 

Each morning the Administrator and I start our intel day by attending a televised secure videoconference with, I will just say, lots 

of folks talking about lots of things, and it is hosted by the National Counterterrorism Center, and Admiral Redd, Retired Admiral John Scott Redd, is the host of that. And in that forum we have 
12

the opportunity to sort of have the huddle, have the scorecard 

check, if you will. 

That doesn’t stop at that time. There are other video teleconferences then the rest of the 24-hour day involving very many of 

the same organizations, usually different sets of players, if you will. 

That is one of the best ways to keep connected. We are an active 

participant in the Interagency Intelligence Agency on Terrorism. 

We are an active participant and supplier, if you will, of liaison officers, who—I will just say from various parts of the Intelligence 

Community, and, of course, there is the thing, this network, of just 

keeping in touch with those you used to work with. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, could I ask just more in a systemic way—

systematic way, I don’t want to denigrate those informal, because 

I am sure those are very important, but I am interested, we have 

accumulated or supposed to have accumulated intelligence information, various databases, one of which is the customs enforcement 

arm, Immigration Customs Enforcement. To what extent do you 

have technology that can interface with ICE and utilize that database to inform the decisions on the terrorist watch list? And can 

you talk about specifically the computer systems and other software programs that you have? 

Mr. GACHES. I apologize. I could not very well address the computer systems of the IT connectivity between specifically ICE and 

those databases that are used in the watch list process, or even to 

the Office of Intelligence. That is clearly an area that we need to 

grow our connectivity to CBP, to ICE, and the Coast Guard is an 

area that both my Deputy and I are very interested in trying to 

move forward and bring a closer connectivity between the component intel parts of DHS as well as to DHS’s own IA central activity. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I wonder if you could follow up subsequent to this 

hearing with the details on that question. 

Mr. GACHES. Sure. I would be happy to do that. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New York. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you very much for appearing before us, and I would 

like to pursue this line of questioning because in my district, there 

have been at least five different examples of constituents that have 

contacted my office about possibly being placed on a watch list, and 

in each case, it seems as though they are a false positive and don’t 

deserve extra screening. 

One case in particular, which I think we finally sorted out, this 

person was a Peace Corps worker in Africa 20 years ago, and he 

rides first class, he rides frequently. He has an international business. He lives in Westchester County. He must have names similar 

to others on the watch list, and each case he still has to arrive several hours before he boards the plane. And I hope the most recent 

effort that my office has made will take care of this. 

But it seems to me that your intelligence office has or should 

have a central role in TSA’s current redress process, and my understanding is that innocent travelers now supply additional information about themselves to TSA to distinguish themselves from those 

on the terrorist watch list. 
13

And we want you to do your job because we understand that the 

safety and security of the public is at stake here; however, this particular case and a half dozen others that have been brought to my 

attention just seem to me to be a lack of efficiency, or that is what 

I am trying to find out. What is going on? Could you tell me the 

average amount of time it takes for an innocent traveler to clear 

his name? 

Mr. GACHES. Thank you. No, I could not, because the Office of 

Redress is the one that has those statistics and runs that activity 

where an individual who wants to fill the paperwork out and the 

forms to have their name or similar name, if you will, removed and 

clarify them as not being the party of interest, they maintain that. 

It is an entirely separate operation from me. We occasionally get 

involved, depending on the particulars of the case at hand. 

I am not familiar with the individual that you mention from 

Westchester. I would be happy to take additional information perhaps after this or through your staff and personally look into this 

on your behalf, but the general process is that the Office of Redress 

at TSA will take the information from an individual. They will return to us and to the TSC to compare that information with that 

which is held in the databases, and then we can go from there. We 

have gone to some—at some points issuing letters for individuals 

to carry to explain to the carriers. This takes—sometimes this will 

take, unfortunately, a lot of time to get the records cleared all the 

way back through the various carriers. 

Mrs. LOWEY. But, Mr. Gaches, don’t you have a voice in who 

makes the no fly list? Has the Terrorist Screening Center drawn 

the expertise of your office from making decisions? 

Mr. GACHES. In this setting I would just say that the preponderance of the no fly and selectee individuals are nominated by other 

agencies, and TSA has a limited role in doing that because this 

comes from, we will say, core intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies. We at TSA Office of Intelligence seldom—certainly 

not in the 4 months I have been there—have nominated individuals 

for either of these lists. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, one of my concerns, not just with DHS, but 

I have seen this happen with many of the agencies of government, 

is the lack of coordination, and it seems to me that we have had 

three attempts at least to put in place an automated passenger 

screening system, and if you don’t know the role and responsibilities of your people, how would the program be designed in ways 

so they are going to work together’ Because it seems that the integration of these offices should have been addressed in the planning 

stages of the program. 

Maybe you can explain how that works, and if someone is applying for redress, shouldn’t the Intelligence Office be involved’ 

Shouldn’t an intelligence analyst look at what evidence there is 

and what questions should be asked, and who else has the background and knowledge at TSA to inform the discussion of who is 

and who is not a terrorist? 

Mr. GACHES. I would again comment that our office’s purpose is 

more in the liaison with the airlines’ at the beginning. On a redress 

issue, we would have—we could help facilitate going back to the 

originator of that individual being placed on the list, and 99 per-
14

cent of the time, 99-plus percent of the time, that is not the TSA 

Office of Intelligence who nominated that person in the first place. 

So we would have to go back to the originating agency and ask 

them for further details, tell them the information that the Redress 

Office has. 

And I take your point. We could perhaps be more proactive in facilitating that between the Office of Redress and whatever element 

of the Intelligence Community or law enforcement community nominated the name in the first place. But by and large, that is not 

a role that we have had a leading role in, if you will. 

Mrs. LOWEY. My time is up, but let me just say, Mr. Chairman, 

if I may, I am concerned that we are not doing enough to examine 

these names, and if we ever reach a time where we need to focus 

our resources on an imminent threat, the terrorist list will be needlessly populated by people who pose no threat, and we will not 

have separated those individuals who should not be on the list 

from those who should; and that we are going to be overwhelmed 

by a list which is so long and unrefined that it defeats the very 

purpose of a list, which is to focus on the real threats. 

So I am concerned that there are so many of these units that 

have particular responsibilities, and I wonder about the overall coordination and what your office is actually doing to refine these 

lists, but I guess we can take that up another time unless the 

Chairman—maybe you could pardon? Okay. 

Mr. SIMMONS. We plan to have a second round of questions. I 

think the gentlelady’s comments are well taken, and I think that, 

as I understand the process both from the witness and talking to 

others, the Office of Redress goes back to the originator of the information, and in these particular instances, if TSA intelligence is 

not the originator of the information, let us say it is FBI or CIA 

or somebody else, they would not be directly involved. 

But I think what you are suggesting, which is quite correct, is 

that we have to facilitate and improve the process of cleaning up 

these lists, because if my constituent is on the list with several 

other people by his name, and one of those people is a dangerous 

person, we want to make sure that it is the dangerous person that 

is being apprehended and not everybody else. And, you know, that 

goes to the issue of trying to improve the process, and that is what 

oversight is all about. 

And now I yield to my friend from Rhode Island, the distinguished gentleman Mr. Langevin, who has been very patient. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Gaches, thank you for your testimony today. And I echo 

the sentiments and comments of many of my colleagues. We are 

concerned—we obviously want the potential terrorist watch list to 

be accurate, and the sooner we can make sure that that list is 

culled and that we have an adequate redress process, the better, 

because I don’t think there is a member in Congress that hasn’t 

had a constituent or someone they know directly that has been on 

that list and shouldn’t be because they were looking for a list—the 

list itself was looking for someone else. 

Turning to another front, though, we have heard from Chief Intelligence Officer Charlie Allen about his plans for a new Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis, and his plans to integrate the various in-
15

telligence components as a united intelligence operation. So it 

seems to me that IA must decide if it is going to be either a strategic-type operation that focuses on setting an agenda, policies, and 

representing intelligence components like your shop to the wider 

Intelligence Community, or an operational shop that is going to be 

creating its own intelligence products. 

So my question is what path is IA taking, in your view, and what 

path should it be taking, and how is IA’s approach working for 

your shop? 

And my other question would be how does TSA’s Office of Intelligence work to ensure that your analyst expertise informs what IA 

is producing, and what challenges have you encountered in this 

area? 

Mr. GACHES. Thank you, sir, for those questions. On the first—

I think that the DHS IA approach to being the strategic sort of ombudsman for the Department in having cognizance of and looking 

at the strategic assessing of issues related to the component intel 

parts is the way to go. DHS IA has to cover everything in regards 

to the homeland. I am somewhat of a specialist. I am the transportation systems or networks intel officer. I am not saying that I 

don’t care about other aspects of the terrorism problem, but that 

is where my focus really has to be, and I am much more tactical 

than the DHS IA activity in the sense that I am on the phone or 

my folks are on the phone with someone at Amtrak, someone at a 

particular airline, whatever the case may be. DHSIA, I see them, 

and I am hoping, and I think from conversations with—Charlie 

Allen sees them more of a strategic view. 

Now, we are just beginning, as I mentioned in my opening comments. This is an architecture that is a work in progress, and we 

have got some load-smoothing to do and some bumps to iron out, 

but that would be my response to the first part of your question. 

As far as how we sort of work, I think your second question, 

more almost on a day-to-day, how do we fit into IA as far as ensuring analytic conversations and collaboration, we are in no small 

part in constant contact both visibly and physically, if you will, 

with the individuals at Nebraska Avenue. Each of my modal transportation analysts have an individual or individuals IA that they 

have the ability to reach out to. We try and inform and in many 

cases coordinate on the work that we do. They are the recipients—

they, being IA, are the recipients of everything that the Office of 

Intelligence at TSA produces. So I think, you know, we are providing them everything that we are doing. We certainly have access 

to all that they produce, but I would just ask you to consider keeping in mind that we are servicing that very focused area—not 

small, not insignificant by any stretch of the imagination, but we 

are transportation focused, and DHS IA has to look across the 

gamut of things that are homeland security issues. 

So we are actually complementing each other, and as I said 

again in my opening comments, not too dissimilar from the JCS/

J2 model where if you are the J2 at the Pentagon, and you want 

to know something about what is going on in Bolivia, as an example, chances are you are going to reach out to the J2 at 

SOUTHCOM who really has some expertise and is focussing in on 
16

there, and then that relationship exists between those two, just like 

it does between Charlie Allen’s folks and myself. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Within the Department, do you believe that you 

have timely access to the accumulated DHS intelligence base’ That 

is, can you easily retrieve—I mean, manipulate information or intelligence that, for example, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, for example, has collected; and if so, by what means do you 

access this information’ Specifically which systems do you use? 

Mr. GACHES. Thank you. 

In all honesty, I don’t know the names of the systems, if you will. 

But we do have the ability to reach out and electronically obtain 

the Customs and Border Patrol reports, the ICE reports, the Coast 

Guard reports, all of the DHS components, as well as the Intelligence Community component reporting. 

Now, there are limitations. I can’t say that we have access to 100 

percent of everything that is out there. And in some respects we 

probably don’t even need access to 100 percent of everything out 

there because of our niche approach, if you will, to a lot of the 

issues. But I feel comfortable that my analysts are able to go 

through both the classified and the open source through our IT 

connectivity, which is very robust, with all of component intel parts 

of DHS, as well as with the Intelligence Community members 

themselves, and I feel fairly comfortable in the way and the speed 

with which we can do that. And that is in addition to conferences 

and meetings and just telephone conversations, and very often likeminded analysts or subject matter experts gravitate together and 

exchange information as well. 

That is sort of the informal network. So I think we have it fairly 

well covered for both informal as well as electronic connectivity. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank you. 

I see my time has expired, but, again, thank you for the answers 

to my questions, and we certainly look forward to working with you 

to make sure that this effort is as robust as possible to make sure 

the work that you are doing is maximized. Thank you. 

Mr. GACHES. Thank you. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the gentleman for his questions. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nevada. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gaches, thank you very much for being here today and for 

your testimony. 

Basically what distinguishes or differentiates TSA’s intelligence 

from Homeland Security intelligence? 

Mr. GACHES. Thank you, sir. If I may, I am assuming you mean 

specifically how do we differ from intelligence and analysis——

Mr. GIBBONS. Analytical. 

Mr. GACHES.—IA, if you will, at DHS headquarters. 

I would offer that we are very focused on transportation. That is 

our niche. That is our lane, if you want to call it, in the road. IA 

is very much looking across the board of all sorts of issues related 

to homeland security that may or may not have a transportation 

and terrorism nexus. I think we are also much more tactical in 

many respects. 

One of my goals and one of the Office of Intelligence’s goals is 

this doesn’t do us any good, this intelligence, if we can’t get it out 
17

to somebody who can use it and make a difference, whether that 

is in the industry, or whether that is an operating element of TSA, 

such as the Transportation Security officers at the airports, the 

Federal security directors located across the country, the Federal 

air marshals. Any of those thousands of people are our customers 

as well as the transportation industry folks themselves. So we are 

that short link or we are that last mile between intelligence that 

could be operationalized and be worked on by a customer to take 

a positive action, and we have done that clearly in a number of 

cases since I came on board in February; not because of me, but 

I can cite this as an example. 

I have lived through—we have informed at least three U.S. carriers about—we will just call them in an open hearing nasty situations in certain parts of the world. We were the ones who took it 

from the high classified side, worked a story down that is deliverable to the airlines in this case, explained to them the problem in 

some cases face to face, and then watched them take whatever actions they thought were appropriate. I think that is a more deliverable kind of intelligence that we are responsible to to the transportation industry of America than what I consider the IA approach, 

if you will, or focus, is very much a strategic and very much completely across the board of homeland defense. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Gaches, are you saying that homeland security 

doesn’t do transportation analysis of its intelligence? 

Mr. GACHES. Oh, no, sir, not at all. 

Mr. GIBBONS. What you are saying is you are a second set of eyes 

on the same intelligence or the same analysis that homeland security does? 

Mr. GACHES. Sir, I probably misspoke in that what I mean is lots 

of folks get the same intelligence reports wherever they are derived 

from. We at TSA will get similar or identical reports as to what 

DHS IA does and many other people within the community or in 

the U.S. Government. 

What I was trying to say was I think unlike DHS IA, who I have 

seen tends to take a more strategic across-the-board look at sometimes—a larger look at even a given subject, we are very much 

more in the tactical—tactical environment with our customer set on 

a daily basis. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Very briefly because my time is limited. From that 

standpoint, where would you suggest improvement in TSA’s analytical intelligence efforts? 

Mr. GACHES. I think that we have a lot of room to improve in 

just the taking a lot of the tactical information that we get, a lot 

of which comes from the field that TSA is in. In other words, we 

have two different reports in particular in which TSA officers, 

wherever they may be in the U.S. system, but as TSA, provides at 

least 60 percent of the information that comes into us to put those 

reports together, and I believe that we probably need to take that 

information and step back just a little bit, not too far, and start to 

look more at trends in different transportation networks; see if 

there are patterns, compare across transportation networks and see 

if there are more similarities between, say, aviation and rail activities, et cetera, still not in that larger assessment role that I see 
18

DHS IA doing, but clearly we have some room to grow in that TSA 

OI. 

Mr. GIBBONS. What keeps you awake at night, Mr. Gaches? 

Mr. GACHES. A lot of things in this business after a lot of years. 

But in all seriousness, sir, a great question. I think right now there 

are probably two things that I will sort of generalize in an open 

forum, and that is if you look at London, if you look at what has 

happened in Canada recently, the phrase comes about that we use 

‘‘home-grown,’’ and I think that is a that is a field ripe for study 

and for analysis about home-grown individuals wanting to engage 

in the terrorist activity as opposed to awaiting the next shipment, 

if you will, from an overseas location. That certainly is one thing. 

The other thing that I find very challenging, and I, in fact— Mr. 

Chairman and I were speaking about this the other day. I can’t 

find an answer, and it has to do with sometimes the lack of certain 

types of activity in this country, and you know, we sometimes wonder with what we see overseas, particularly the use of suicide 

bombers and improvised explosive devices overseas, we certainly 

wonder and stay up at night questioning about the lack of that in 

the U.S., and that is what keeps me up. Some of the things we do 

about that would best be said in a classified session at another 

time. I would be happy to take that on. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Gaches. The Chair recognizes the 

gentleman are from New Mexico, Mr. Pearce. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate the testimony and the opportunity to ask questions. 

If you were to look at the structure around the intelligence section of TSA, how far do you have to go around the director, administrator in charge, to find somebody with an intelligence background instead of, say, a lawyer or whatever? What is the management structure? 

Mr. GACHES. Specifically within TSA’

Mr. PEARCE. Yes. 

Mr. GACHES. Thank you, sir, for the question. Of course you 

know Mr. Hauley, the Administrator, is literally right above me as 

the Assistant Administrator and Director of Intel, and he is a very, 

very strong advocate of his entire staff understanding that he 

wants intel to drive a lot of the decisions, policy formulations and 

actions taken by TSA as opposed to we are just going to do it because it seems like a good idea. A very strong advocate. 

Mr. PEARCE. I didn’t ask if he is an advocate, I asked if he has 

got background. 

Mr. GACHES. I am not familiar with Mr. Hauley’s background to 

that degree. I am unaware of it. 

Mr. PEARCE. When TSA started 2, 2 1/2 years ago when they 

first arrived we were asking the same question. You could go for 

five or six layers without finding anybody but lawyers, so then the 

administration program began not to be directed so much at outcomes but in processes and legal defenses and things that really in 

my mind compromised the ability of the program to work to really 

protect the American people, and instead appeared to have processes to protect the TSA from outside intervention. 

Mr. GACHES. Sir, if I may, I have only been there for 4 months 

but my access to the Administrator is unfettered by any other As-
19

sistant Administrator or by his Principal Deputy. We start the TSA 

day off in my area of intel with all of the other assistant administrators and what we call general managers in attendance of a 

morning briefing. It is an intel briefing. 

I think there is a greatly improved presence of intel and intel 

usage by TSA in the past 4 months. I am impressed by how an organization in which I am a very, very, very small minority, gets an 

awful lot of attention from all of the elements of TSA. 

I hope that helps clarify, but I am optimistic about the way intel 

is going at TSA at this time in the administrative sense. 

Mr. PEARCE. If I were to ask the local sheriffs in my district—

I have got a very rural district, right on the southern border of the 

country—the last time they got any evidence through the channels, 

the intel channels rather than through the local news or CNN or 

Fox News, do you think that they would respond that they ever 

hear from you all, that there is any mechanism to communicate 

down to the people on the front lines? 

Mr. GACHES. Sir, I honestly don’t know about literally the local 

sheriff, but we do push our information as low as the unclassified 

level. We literally have hundreds of thousands of recipients of those 

reports that come out on a weekly basis and those are pushed down 

as far as any of the operational elements at TSA or DHS Central 

wish to, and if there is an element that is not hearing from us that 

anyone feels should, I would be more than happy to have that conversation and probably end up providing that information. 

Mr. PEARCE. I wonder, a lot of times TSA begins to contemplate 

how to respond based on projecting the threat and projecting how 

the threat is going to arrive. Do we really believe that we can 

project what the terrorists are going to think next? In other words, 

mostly we respond to what has happened in the past, so today everybody takes off their shoes because of one shoe bomber. 

They are not going to come with shoes the next time, they might 

come with a shirt or something next time. You can follow it from 

there. But even with a light touch, too, it just seems like the ability 

to project what is in the terrorist mind is really unusual. 

I see my time has expired. You can answer if the Chairman permits. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Please. 

Mr. GACHES. In an open forum I will be very careful and say 

there is a lot that we look back over our shoulder. The old adage 

that history teaches, et cetera, I think applies in this case. I think 

we are not in the clairvoyant stage, but I think we have some good 

sense about the future, and I would like to leave it in an open session at that, and I would love to have a classified hearing at greater detail. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you. 

We are prepared to do a second round if members are so interested, and, if so, I will start with a couple of questions of my own. 

You have used the word ‘‘tactical’’ as opposed to ‘‘strategic’’ in 

drawing the difference between TSA intelligence and, let’s say, INA 

at a DHS level. There has also been reference to planning and developing policies, procedures, and applying resources to the problem of the past as opposed to perhaps a current or future threat. 
20

We have put literally billions of dollars into aviation security, we 

have heard tens of thousands of people, we have got all kinds of 

equipment and policies and procedures, and anybody who travels 

in America has encountered those up close and personal. America 

is airborne, and, as a consequence, that is a legitimate area to 

focus, especially after 9/11. 

I also have concerns about Amtrak and the national passenger 

rail system, about Metro in the Northeast, and other computer rail 

systems like BART. We have got pipelines. I believe all of these different systems come within your purview in one form or another. 

Focusing specifically on rail, I serve on the Railroad Subcommittee and there is a tremendous lack of rail security personnel, whether it is Amtrak or whether it is the other systems. 

And I wonder if you could talk for a minute or so on the staffing 

that you have to focus on the rail target, if you will, and maybe 

give us a sense of what those risks are, given London, the Spain 

and Japanese experiences that we have had. 

Mr. GACHES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question. Indeed our analysts are roughly divided across the different modes. 

They are not all aviation-oriented or one mode over the other, and 

we do have a few that can go in different directions. 

Certainly the lessons of London, Madrid, and, from the nineties, 

Tokyo, have made it very clear to us that rail and mass transit are 

areas that we need a lot of attention and, in all honesty, are probably areas that we could even increase our attention in the future. 

We are trying very hard to reach out directly from the Office of 

Intelligence to the rail and mass transit industries, if you will. We 

are also utilizing other elements of TSA where there are general 

managers, if you will, as they are called for the different transportation modes to work through them. 

As I mentioned before, we have a series of reports that we issue 

on a weekly basis that talk about suspicious incidents, observations, surveillances, et cetera. Those are flowing back to all of the 

sectors, to include rail and transport. And as I also mentioned, a 

lot of that information is gathered, if you will, or observed by TSA 

individuals, but also can come to us from an Amtrak or another 

private rail company or whatever the case may be. 

Again, we are trying to keep this a fairly tactical level. This is 

not necessarily something that we are quite ready, nor probably 

will we be for some time, to go into the large, large assessment; although twice a year for each one of the modes, if you will, of transportation that I articulated in my opening comments, we do prepare a classified and unclassified assessment from what we have 

seen at the tactical level and we provide that to many people including, DHS IA who can then take it on to even a further level. 

So I think we have fairly robust effort with the rail activity. It 

is one that we are building. I certainly can’t say that it is as robust 

as aviation for some of the obvious reasons that you have articulated in our past, but we are clearly looking at that as an area of 

future concern in trying to react accordingly and increase our involvement with that sector. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you. Very briefly, you spent 30 years with 

the National Security Agency, one of the key components of the 

U.S. Intelligence Community, with the CIA, FBI, DIA, the military 
21

services and so on. TSA, as you mentioned, is not one of the 16 

members, TSA Intelligence. What motivated you to move from one 

of the 16, one of the premier, to a relatively small, relatively new, 

relatively unknown component of intelligence? 

Mr. GACHES. Thank you, sir. Small, unknown and those other 

things, that is a challenge. But in all honesty, d truly I mean this 

in all honesty and frankness, you can sit outside the DHS family 

and you can make criticism, or you can join the team and help 

make it better. I was headed back to NCTC and potentially, probably, retirement. And when Charlie said, would you have any interest in doing this, it was just too good to be true, and I couldn’t get 

down to Arlington, Virginia fast enough. 

I find it exciting, challenging, good workforce, dedicated group of 

folks where homeland focused. In those 30 years—and I mentioned 

doing counterterrorism at NSA—I spent my fair time doing other 

things that might not be homeland focused, and it is pretty rewarding to try and apply that knowledge, if I may be so bold as to say 

there is knowledge to specifically the homeland environment. It 

was an easy choice, it truly was. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the Ranking 

Member. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you. I want to get back to the terrorist 

watch list, because as has been discussed here, it is important. We 

can’t get it perfect, I think we know that. We need to do the best 

that we can. We need to probably err on the side of caution. So I 

don’t think there is disagreement on those basic points. 

On the other hand, the GAO has told us that we are—I don’t 

want to say starting over, but going through manually the entire 

list, and I think TSA and TSC is going through it, but it is going 

to take 5 or 6 years, according to GAO, to complete that. And it 

strikes me that that, therefore, means it is a never-ending task because as that review is going through manually, more information 

is going to be coming in and we will have to go through that manually. 

Have you thought about this and what we could do that might 

make that more efficient and accomplishable in the near term? 

Mr. GACHES. Not as much as I probably should, ma’am, to be 

perfectly honest. I think that there are so many entities now involved in the watch list process that it is probably time for us to 

once again sit down and examine the roles of the individual agencies, entities, and talk about this very subject of taking so much 

time to go through this list and revet it. Because you are absolutely 

correct, we will get through the list. By the time we get to the Zs 

there will be a whole new group of As, Bs and Cs. 

I have no particular straight substantive answer for you except 

the promise to look at this, to become more involved in this, and, 

as I said earlier, would really welcome the opportunity to talk to 

the subcommittee in a classified session with others who are involved in the process, because I could easily misspeak or misinform 

you by trying to address some of the areas that you have brought 

up that I think fall outside of my specific office area’s responsibility. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Let me ask, it is not just the government but it 

is all of the private sector partners that have to be aligned on one 
22

mission, which is to keep us safe; but the private sector actors are 

pretty reliant on the information we give them. And it strikes me—

I am sure you wouldn’t disagree—to the extent that we are stopping babies whose name is Osama, we are wasting our time and 

effort that should be focused on real threats, and we don’t have 

enough time to spare to divert ourselves for things that don’t work. 

I was listening to the Chairman talk about the redress committee and I think it is important from an individual’s point of 

view that if you are unable to fly and you are the wrong guy, that 

you be able to get that fixed. None of us quarrel with that. 

What has always bothered me is, once it is fixed, it is important 

not just for the individual but for the system itself so we don’t divert our efforts to things we don’t need to look at. So, for example, 

if you have Sean O’Casey on the IRA and on the watch list, a Sean 

O’Casey who is complaining that he was born in 1935 and he is not 

the real guy, somehow that information needs to get into the system so that the airlines cannot waste their time on the older Mr. 

O’Casey and be looking for the real Mr. O’Casey. 

It seems to me we don’t have enough data in the system to allow 

for the corrections itself. Have you thought strategically how to 

layer that information so that we can actually focus our efforts on 

the people we are really worried about? 

Mr. GACHES. In an open forum I will see if I can give you an answer, ma’am, that makes sense, because I agree with the premise 

that you just outlined. Because we go from the classified to the unclassified world, there is a fair amount of information that drops 

off, as you would expect when you get to the unclassified. 

I think it would be useful for intelligence officers to step back 

and see what else could be added to the, quote, unclassified world 

to make it easier to have the right person stopped, not the wrong 

person, and also not have the wrong person stopped in the future. 

I am not sure that we have even gone down that path, but as 

you spoke I think you certainly gave me an idea about dropping 

back on this and looking at what else could be done as identifiers 

of the individual besides the current paradigm, if you will, and I 

wouldn’t want to go much deeper into those elements. 

Ms. LOFGREN. We had a hearing in the last Congress on the fact 

that name checks alone were not good enough. I realize in some 

cases the intelligence—we may not have the whole rich amount of 

intelligence, and maybe that is all we have got, but that is not always the case. Just seems to me we need to build a system that 

will utilize the data that we do have, just put aside the individual’s 

interests, I don’t want to say that is not important, but in our own 

interest in keeping the country safe. And if we are going to have 

a watch list that really works, we certainly want to fine-tune that 

if we are going to use that for rail systems, anything else with a 

ticket and a name that we might expand. 

I see my time is up, but I would just like to close with a request 

for information either in writing or, if necessary, in a closed session 

about what technology is being considered by yourself to share the 

kind of information that you are receiving with our private sector 

partners in keeping us safe, that would respect the sources and yet 

get that information out. 

I thank the Chairman. 
23

Mr. SIMMONS. In response to that, I would be happy to schedule 

a follow-up meeting or briefing in a secure environment for any 

members of the subcommittee or other subcommittees of the full 

committee who are so interested. And the Chair now recognizes the 

gentlelady from New York. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again, 

Mr. Gaches. On another area, we have invested billions of dollars 

in screening passengers, and certainly the Chairman and all of us 

are happy to take off our shoes or jackets or whatever is necessary 

to go through the system. 

However, airports are allowed to issue SITA badges to those 

workers who work in the secure areas. They don’t have to go 

through the metal detectors. They work in food catering, they work 

in the mechanics of the plane. And as I understand it, in fact, it 

is a fact that they don’t have to go through the screening in most 

situations. 

Now as I understand in Europe, at the largest airports, everyone 

has to go through the screening. At LaGuardia there are over 

20,000 SITA badges that have been issued. 

Now, in addition, I think it is important to note that the background checks on workers include only criminal background checks 

and a watch list. They don’t ask for the Social Security numbers. 

So they don’t have any identification. 

We know what happened, I think it was about 2 years ago at 

JFK, there were several airport workers that were arrested for 

smuggling drugs. Could have been explosives instead of narcotics. 

Are you concerned about this and what is happening about this? 

I have to say with all fairness to Mr. Gaches, I understand you are 

there for 4 months but I have been talking about there for 4 years. 

And to me it just doesn’t make any sense. If European workers 

have to be screened and go through those metal detectors, seems 

we should be able to do it here. 

By the way, I mentioned LaGuardia, 20,000 SITA badges; San 

Francisco International, 16,536; in Las Vegas, 21,912; in Hartford 

Bradley Airport, 4,133. I am sure they are all good, hardworking 

people, but why shouldn’t everybody have to go through the metal 

detector and could you please comment what you are thinking 

about doing about it; are you concerned about it; what should be 

done about it? 

Mr. GACHES. Thank you, ma’am. The role of my office in this particular scenario that you have outlined is probably the role that 

you could really like us to be and hope that we are, and that is 

that we are pointing out similar concerns and deficiencies which I 

would like to elaborate upon in perhaps the closed session, that the 

Chairman will arrange on the no fly and selectee list issues, because there is a similar process, if you will, for transportation 

workers, the vetting process. It really would be unfair to talk about 

that. 

But what I am saying is we recognize that there is an issue with 

issuing SITA badges and we understand that there is a differentiation between a SITA worker and the public individual who goes 

through a different treatment. And we are looking at that and we 

are looking at what the threats are associated potentially, and in 

some cases real, in both those scenarios and those populations. But 
24

it would be remiss of me to go into great detail about our action 

plan or thinking in an open forum, for obvious reasons, but I would 

welcome the opportunity to walk you through that in greater detail 

at another time or in written response. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I would be delighted to follow up on this, Mr. Chairman, because it seems to me it is like installing an expensive home 

security system and leaving the back door open. We are happy to 

go through these metal detectors, but this is an issue I have been 

talking about for a long time, and you probably can’t discuss in this 

setting whether there is any security threat that could come from 

an airport worker, could you? 

Mr. GACHES. I think that would probably be remiss of me to go 

into any detail on that. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Perhaps I can give you another follow-up question. 

Is your office doing anything to analyze potential threats from a 

terrorist who could gain almost unfettered access to airports by obtaining a SITA badge, or is that for a follow-up hearing as well? 

Mr. GACHES. Yes and yes. How is that? 

Mrs. LOWEY. Maybe you can answer a follow-up question. I know 

you are only there 4 months. I am just a Member of Congress but 

I have been concerned about this for years, especially since 9/11, 

and then after what happened with the arrest at JFK with narcotics, and we know that this is a risk. Have your predecessors 

been focused on this at all, have they left you any information, or 

are you just starting from scratch and just became aware of this 

issue? 

Mr. GACHES. No, ma’am. I would say there is a good portion of 

TSA not represented by my office that worries about the issuance 

and the processes for the SITA badges specifically, and certainly 

that has been ongoing work and revisions and improvements to 

that process are being looked at and worked on. And certainly from 

an intelligence standpoint, I certainly believe that my predecessor 

was quite aware of the potential for this area and looked at that 

and compared all of the available intelligence information that 

might exist in that particular realm. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up and I will conclude. Can you give me one reason, possibility, from reviewing 

this—because this is an important issue—as to why someone with 

a SITA badge shouldn’t have to go through a metal detector, one 

possible reason? Why wouldn’t they? Why wouldn’t they give the 

benefit of the doubt to the possibility of a threat. Why should someone get a SITA badge, not have it reissued for a couple of years, 

go into a secure area, service the plane, whether it is in food, catering or mechanics, have access to that plane, when you don’t have 

their Social Security number, no one is sure that they haven’t 

passed the badge to someone else? Has anyone recommend that 

this be changed? 

Mr. GACHES. Again, ma’am, I believe that that whole process is 

being reviewed at this time; the criteria for those badges being reviewed. 

Mrs. LOWEY. How long is this review going to take? I have been 

asking for this review for the last 3 years. 

Mr. GACHES. No, ma’am. I apologize. I do not know where they 

are at in that particular review process. I do think there is a sense 
25

of urgency that has been applied to it just before my arrival, if you 

will, because clearly it was one of the first issues that I heard outside of the Intel Department of TSA being discussed about in earnest, and our role is to try and contribute some thoughts about if 

you are going to revise this, what can we the, intel folks, provide 

to you, the ones that are making the SITA policy; how would you 

improve it; what are the things you should be looking for, checking 

for? I kind of leave it at that in open session. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Chairman, perhaps Mr. Gaches could get back 

to the committee before the next hearing with some kind of time 

frame. I am still waiting for the Standards—from the Department 

of Homeland Security—for Interoperability, and I hope we don’t 

have to wait another 3, 4 years for you to conclude this evaluation. 

Good luck to you. I know you have only been there for 4 months. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the gentlelady for her questions. I agree 

with the thrust of her comments. And I think we all have that concern, that people who are badged but in and out on a regular basis, 

sail on through. From my own background and experience, food can 

be configured in many different ways, not just to eat, but to do 

other things. And so that can be an issue. Certainly issues relative 

to mechanics and maintenance are important. 

I am not convinced that Mr. Gaches’ office is the central focus for 

this activity, but I would be happy to invite him back to a closed 

session with other participants to see what the delay is and see 

what we can do to expedite it. 

Mrs. LOWEY. If I may just respond to one thing, my concern here 

is if Mr. Gaches’ office doesn’t have the responsibility, who does? 

My experience is there is a great big bureaucracy out there, and 

so if you can find the answer to that question, let us now how long 

this investigation——

Mr. SIMMONS. I think what we will probably find is that site 

managers probably have substantial discretion, whether they 

should have it or not. But I feel badly for my colleague from Nevada who has been waiting so patiently, and I now recognize him. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I will 

try to not take too long. 

I wanted to go into an issue of the area of information sharing, 

simply because over the last many years there has been a question 

not so much about agency to agency, although there still is this, 

I don’t know, obstacle between sharing when people want to take 

pride in their work product and credit for what they do, but information sharing from the Federal level down to the State and local 

level in transportation issues, whether it is airport, rail, highway, 

whatever. 

Talk to me a little bit about whether or not that information 

sharing responsibility is through the TSA or only through Homeland Security. 

Mr. GACHES. No, sir. It is a combination, and what I mean by 

that is we view that the DHS IA has a very, very strong charge 

to work with the State Homeland Security advisors and the local 

government elected officials and advisors. That does not preclude 

TSA, who is a strong participant on the transportation side, with 

two different bodies, if you will, ISACs, which are really the transportation network and private sector companies, if you will, getting 
26

together, whether it is highway or rail or aviation. And those are 

localized as well as nationalized. They are helping to push information down. 

There is also another fairly new adventure with the government 

councils in which we are trying to facilitate the pushdown of information to State and local transportation authorities, and DHS is 

working with the Homeland Security advisors; and as long as we 

are working together with DHS IA, we are trying to ensure that 

all of the appropriate State and local, be they elected or private individuals involved in transportation, are aware of some version in 

a form that is useful of threat, new developments. And I harken 

back to the report that I mentioned that we send out on a weekly 

basis on both fueled intelligence activities, as we call it, and also 

suspicious incident reporting. Those are to be shared widely 

amongst State and local, both government and private sector entities. 

I mentioned perhaps earlier that very little of this information 

should be viewed as so secret that some version of it can’t be 

shared with that furthermost point, and I am certainly interested 

in trying to solve the sheriff’s problem of your colleague, because 

every time we hear this we are going to find gaps where we are 

not quite there yet in getting that information out and down. But 

it certainly is one of the highest goals of the Office of Intelligence 

at TSA to ensure that happens and that we don’t have surprises 

at the distant end of the system, if you would. 

Mr. GIBBONS. I suppose that TSA, then, as well as Homeland Security, have their own protocols for sharing information. 

Mr. GACHES. But they are concurrent protocols in how we do that 

and we do that together. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Current, meaning? 

Mr. GACHES. The protocol is such that I believe they understand 

our role with the transportation industries and associated State 

and local transportation activities. I think we understand their 

slightly upper-level approach to the State and local government officials. And when I say ‘‘protocols,’’ concurrent is probably the 

wrong word, more ‘‘complementary,’’ so that there is coverage for 

all and not unnecessary duplication across entities from DHS Central, if you will, and from the DHS office. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Are there times you have to seek permission or authority from Homeland Security to share information vertically? 

Mr. GACHES. We have had occasions where when we have informed DHS Central that we wanted to send something out, they 

have asked if they could look at it to make it a better informed 

product. If someone can make it a better informed product at DHS 

IA, I am willing to do that. We have sent many other things out, 

including the weekly reports that I have mentioned, and there is 

no—we have to get permission to do it before we send it. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Sometimes States do undertake their own analytical fusion centers. California is doing that, I think Nevada is looking at doing something similar to that as well. Do you actually either have an individual that coordinates or is in place in those fusion centers on the State level that is either trained to look at or 

to work through your details and your information? 
27

Mr. GACHES. No, sir; we do not. DHS is working with those State 

fusion centers and Charlie Allen is working on a program, I believe, to have IA intelligence analysts deployed to those State fusion centers. TSA Office of Intelligence, as I have described, is not 

overly large; appropriately sized for what we are tackling. 

But one of the things we are going to experiment with in this 

year, in fact we started at the beginning of June, is to deploy a 

TSA Office of Intelligence analyst to six of the Federal security directors who happen to be located at airports. But they are intermodal-thinking people, if you will, and we want to see if there is 

a value in putting one of our headquarters folks out a little more 

at the pointy end of the spear, where that individual can do two 

things for us in a very rough sense: one, make sure the intelligence 

that TSA Office of Intelligence is producing is being used and being 

understood at that particular location; and, conversely, those observations, that information which is occurring in that geographic 

area where that person is assigned again to the TSA Federal Security Director, gets back into my analyst in Arlington so we can be 

better informed. 

We will weigh the pros and cons of that after trying it for 6 to 

12 months and see where we go with that in conjunction with what 

Charlie Allen is doing with his infusion of analysts to the fusion 

centers of the States. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the time you have 

given. There are certainly a number of questions I could have 

asked, but I will yield to anyone else at this point in time who 

wishes to ask further questions. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I appreciate that. Your time has expired but the 

Chair is happy to recognize the gentleman from New Mexico for his 

time. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you. I thank the gentleman for yielding expired time to me. People do that with parking meters all the time. 

If you would explain to me about how you achieve the risk-based 

security strategy—in other words, what is the quantitative measurement of that risk base, in very short form, because I have 3 or 

4 minutes’ worth of questions. How do you achieve that internally; 

how do you look and evaluate the risks? 

Mr. GACHES. I wince because it is a great question. At the same 

time it makes me nervous, I think from my background, to try and 

give you a solid answer. But let me take a shot. Any of the threats 

that we are concerned about at any given time are constantly evaluated, and our evaluation compared to others who are evaluating 

the same risk. As I mentioned earlier, lots of us receive a lot of 

those initial intel reports to sort of chew on and think about, and 

that is a good thing, actually, because you don’t want just one, if 

you will, leading the way all the time. 

So we look at the veracity of the reporting of the sourcing, et 

cetera. We do take into consideration the vulnerability of the potential target. We also take into consideration the likelihood of the scenario. 

I for one am less concerned at proving the veracity of the likelihood because people can be very inventive, and just because it 

doesn’t make sense to us doesn’t mean it hasn’t made sense to 

someone else. So it is a combination of factors that lead us to deter-
28

mine those three major areas: the sourcing, the vulnerability, and 

I would also say somewhat along the line of the likelihood of this 

being a situation that is actually capable of being executed by the 

adversary. 

You add the particulars of those together and it gives you some 

sense, at least in my opinion, of what the risk is to that potential 

target. 

Mr. PEARCE. That is fair enough. If we look at the sourcing, I 

would suspect that if we looked in Iraq and we looked at al Qaeda 

and their past actions, that might be a source. They have had a 

tendency to blow up refineries and pipelines, then we look at the 

vulnerability of the pipelines. There are major pipelines running 

out of New Mexico into California that are significant, in likelihood, 

again going back to their past actions in Iraq. 

I would suspect that TSA has not—and I don’t want to make 

statements in an open meeting—I would just think that they don’t 

get very high on your vulnerability list on your risk assessment. I 

suspect that pipelines are not in full view. And you can either confirm or say that you can’t deal with that. 

Mr. GACHES. I would say in this forum, sir, that it probably 

would be best left to a closed session. But at the same time, I do 

want to give you a sense, and it is difficult because currently we 

have concerns about pipelines, and I will be happy to give you 

those details. 

Mr. PEARCE. I appreciate that. Then we were discussing the local 

sheriffs and the sharing of information, and I will accept that there 

is probably not much percolation down there. But going to your layered approach, that is, trying to stop the threats as far away as we 

can, seems like that you would be seeking information from local 

sheriffs. In other words, the local sheriffs at a meeting told me we 

routinely have people that have brown skin and black hair that 

can’t speak a word of English or a word of Spanish. They have 

given themselves a Spanish surname, but the chance is they are 

really Arabic, and maybe Middle Eastern, coming in. And yet no 

one seems to care that they are interdicting these people and under 

the catch-and-release they are back out. 

They stopped four or five people with Middle Eastern accents recently; I mean with Middle European. They felt like they were 

probably from the Soviet Union or something around there. And it 

doesn’t seem that anybody is interested. Do you at least have an 

e-mail address where these locals out here can share information 

so that your layered approach can begin to utilize scattered, random sightings or information sources? Do you have something like 

that? 

Mr. GACHES. Sir, I would strongly recommend the connection 

there, and we do make use of this information and I am personally 

aware of it being used, if you will. That type of information, that 

scenario that you just described, really needs to be reported to the 

Border Patrol and perhaps the Customs, but particularly Border 

Patrol, because we do get reports of those crossings. 

Mr. PEARCE. They called Border Patrol and they told them they 

are busy, they would check on it tomorrow. I am telling you, the 

system has broken pretty badly on the border and it seems like at 
29

some point we would really work on passing this information up 

and down. 

I see my time has gone. Thank you very much. 

Mr. GACHES. Mr. Chairman, if I may comment, happy is perhaps 

not the right word, but I will take that concern back and the Border Patrol reaction back to CBP, because we are dependent on 

them to be the ones who are in fact gathering that information 

from the local authorities along the border and funneling that into 

a system that we at TSA can access, and see if that plays into, perhaps in this case, a pipeline issue or another transportation network issue. So I will take that on to get with CBP and hopefully 

get back to you, sir. 

Mr. PEARCE. It may be in transition, but I can tell you in the 

past there has been almost no desire for information from local law 

enforcement officers by CBP. And it begins at the interdiction of 

criminals, and if you are an illegal into Mexico and if you commit 

an illegal act, you are turned loose because the judge is not going 

to convict. In fact, they have predescribed limits for illegal drugs. 

I think it takes 120 pounds of marijuana to reach the threshold 

where the judge and the system will actually accept the complaint. 

So I am just telling you that sitting here in Washington, you may 

not know how badly the system is disrupted, for whatever purposes. It may be in the process of changing, and I have good strong 

hope that it is, because we have had just recent visits with Mr. 

Aguilar. But in the past, it has been this way, up until 2 months 

ago, when we had a last public meeting of about 30 different local 

law enforcement officers discussing these various issues, information sharing. 

Again, thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I want to thank the members of the subcommittee 

and our panelist, Mr. Gaches, for being here today. You have an 

important challenge. You have heard some very important concerns 

expressed from the podium. There will be follow-up to what we 

have discussed here. 

I hear there are going to be votes around 5 o’clock, so we want 

to get our second panel going. But at the same time, I want to encourage you, Mr. Gaches, to continue to work hard. We are trying 

to build something here. We are trying to build something that will 

serve to preserve and protect the safety and security of our citizens, and, at the same time, protect their civil liberties. And this 

is not easily done. You are charged with an important responsibility. So we wish you all the best in this endeavor and we look forward to our future interactions. And thank you very much for 

being here today. 

Mr. GACHES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ms. Lofgren, members 

of the subcommittee. And I too look forward to working with you 

in the future, hoping to answer more questions in other sessions 

at your leisure. Thank you again. 

Mr. SIMMONS. The next panel will be made up of one person, 

Cathleen A. Berrick, Director of Homeland Security and Justice, at 

the U.S. Government Accountability Office. I want to thank her for 

sitting here for several hours and thank her for her accommodation. She is a senior executive with GAO’s Homeland Security and 

Justice team, and in this position she oversees GAO’s reviews of 
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aviation and surface transportation security matters and has developed a broad knowledge of transportation security practices and related Federal policies and Federal and private sector roles and responsibilities. 

In the year 2005 she was awarded the William A. Jump Memorial Foundation’s Meritorious Award for Exemplary Achievement in 

Public Administration. Congratulations for that. She has also held 

previous positions at the Department of Defense and in the U.S. 

Postal Service. 

Welcome. We look forward to hearing your testimony. We will 

ask you to speak for 5 minutes or so. We have your written testimony for the record and we look forward to hearing what you have 

to say. 

STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, DIRECTOR,

HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. BERRICK. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Lofgren, and members of the committee for inviting me to discuss 

TSA’s Secure Flight program, a program that will match airline 

passenger information against terrorist watch lists to identify passengers who should be denied boarding or undergo additional security scrutiny prior to boarding a domestic flight. 

Secure Flight, which has not yet been fielded, represents a practical application of the use of terrorist watch lists and the impact 

that intelligence information and its use has on the traveling public. In addition to utilizing terrorist watch lists, Secure Flight will 

also be supported by intelligence analysts from TSA and the Terrorist Screening Center, who will determine whether potential 

matches to the watch list are in fact actual matches during the 

prescreening process. 

Currently, prescreening for domestic passengers is conducted by 

air carriers. Air carriers match passenger information against information contained in TSA’s no fly and selectee list, which are provided by TSA prior to passengers boarding a flight. Secure Flight 

is being developed to take over the prescreening function from air 

carriers. By taking over this function, TSA will use one common 

prescreening system for all domestic passengers, rather than each 

carrier using their own and sometimes differing systems, as is the 

case today. Secure Flight will also use an expanded terrorist watch 

list during the prescreening. 

My testimony today focuses on the development and oversight of 

Secure Flight, key factors that will influence the program’s effectiveness, and TSA’s coordination with key stakeholders who are 

critical to the program’s success. Overall, our work has found that 

TSA faces significant challenges in implementing Secure Flight, 

and that the program was at risk in not meeting its goals. Due in 

part to these issues, TSA announced in February that it was halting development of Secure Flight and was rebaselining the program. During rebaselining, TSA is reassessing the program goals, 

requirements and schedule, and these efforts are ongoing. 

Related to systems development, we found that TSA had not conducted critical activities consistent with best practices for largescale IT systems. For example, officials declared the design phase 
31

of Secure Flight complete before fully defining system requirements. 

We also found that TSA must still make key policy decisions that 

will influence the program’s effectiveness. These decisions include 

determining what passenger information air carriers will be required to collect to support name matching and how data quality 

issues with passenger and terrorist watch list information will be 

mitigated. 

These decisions will influence a number of potential matches 

against terrorist watch lists, the number of passengers who may be 

inappropriately inconvenienced during the prescreening process, 

and the ability of the program to appropriately identify individuals 

actually on the terrorist watch list. 

TSA must also determine the level of support needed from TSA’s 

Office of Intelligence and the Terrorist Screening Center to resolve 

questionable matches of passenger information to terrorist watch 

lists. 

We also found that TSA has collaborated with key stakeholders 

whose participation is critical to support Secure Flight. However, 

these stakeholders, to include the Terrorist Screening Center, have 

stated they need more information about Secure Flight requirements in order to able to support the program. 

In light of TSA’s rebaselining efforts, two air carriers we spoke 

with were moving forward with making improvement to their current passenger prescreening system because they stated they were 

unsure when or if Secure Flight will become operational. While 

these efforts may improve individual systems, the modifications 

could result in further differences that already exist among the existing air carriers systems. These differences may result in varying 

levels of effectiveness in the name-matching process against terrorist watch lists. 

Since we testified on these issues in February of 2006, in addition to rebaselining the program TSA has taken several actions to 

instill more discipline into the development of Secure Flight. We 

are encouraged by these efforts and believe TSA should not move 

forward with implementing the programs until these issues are resolved and requirements are defined. 

This concludes my opening statement. I will be happy to respond 

to any questions. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you very much for the opening statement. 

[The statement of Ms. Berrick follows:]
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Mr. SIMMONS. You heard some of the concerns that have been expressed by the subcommittee to the previous panelist and I guess 

I would be interested in your assessment of the role in the past of 

TSA Intelligence in cooperating or coordinating with the Secure 

Flight system and whether you think that role needs to be enhanced, changed in some fashion, or whether we are dealing with 

a somewhat larger problem involving different entities of TSA and 

the private carriers. 

Ms. BERRICK. Thank you. To answer your larger question, I think 

we are dealing with a larger problem that I will talk about in a 

little bit. But with respect to TSA’s Office of Intelligence role within the current prescreening process right now, air carriers are 

doing the actual matching of names against terrorist watch lists. 

If they conduct a match that is questionable, they don’t know 

whether or not this is in fact a match, they would contact intelligence analysts at TSA to look up additional information to try to 

determine this person’s identity. 

If TSA can’t make that determination, they will contact the Terrorist Screening Center and the Terrorist Screening Center would 

help them do that. So that is the intelligence analyst’s role right 

now within the current prescreening process. 

Under Secure Flight, intelligence analysts will still need to maintain that role in TSA to resolve potential matches. Although TSA 

is taking over the actual name-matching function, they will still 

run into similar situations where they might have a potential 

match, they are not certain. In those cases, we will need to utilize 

intelligence analysts within TSA to make that determination, and, 

again, if they can’t make that determination, they will have to 

work with the Terrorist Screening Center. 

But your larger question about this beyond TSA Office of Intelligence’ It is. There are some overarching issues with Secure Flight 

that need to be addressed. Some of you had asked about data quality. That is certainly one important issue both with the Terrorist 

Screening Center’s database, the no fly and selectee list, but also 

an issue with passenger data, which is the data that is being used 

to match against the Terrorist Screening Center’s database. 

There are no standards for collecting passenger data. Each air 

carrier does it a little bit differently. That greatly influences the effectiveness of the matching process. 

Another key factor that can influence how effective these 

matches are the matching algorithms or software used to conduct 

the matches. They may try to make a perfect match, as some air 

carriers do, or some will look for name permutations to try to account for misspellings in names or things along those lines. 

So all of those policy decisions have yet to be made in terms of 

what passenger data will Secure Flight use, what matching algorithms will they use; and all that has the bigger impact, I think, 

on how effective it will be. 

Mr. SIMMONS. What you are saying is that in some respect the 

approach of the carriers to the problem can affect the efficiency 

with which the system works. And let me ask you this. I fly Southwest a lot. Let’s say there is a hit. Now, do they go back through 

the system to TSA, to the analyst or to the Terrorist Screening 

Center, if an automated fashion? Is it something that is relatively 
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quick because there is connectivity, or do they use telephonic systems or other types of more cumbersome systems? Where are we 

on that respect? 

Ms. BERRICK. It depends on the individual air carrier. Some have 

better connections than others. But when there is a positive match 

either to the no fly or selectee list, the air carriers are required to 

contact TSA and let them know, and TSA in turn will contact the 

Terrorist Screening Center. So that is in place. 

Now, more often than actual matches are questionable matches, 

and in those cases the air carriers again need to contact TSA, work 

with the intelligence analyst, and depending on the carrier, that 

may be electronically, or it may be over the phone. But the more 

frequent contact is when we have these potential matches that 

need additional information from TSA on who this individual, is so 

they can clear them and let them board or take the appropriate action such as calling law enforcement. 

Mr. SIMMONS. How effective is the system if somebody buys the 

ticket at the last minute? 

Ms. BERRICK. They are still prescreened under the current process and will be under Secure Flight. It is envisioned, even at the 

last minute, they would have to get their boarding pass, and go 

through this process. In addition to this prescreen process, there 

are other layers of security, as you know, to try to protect aviation 

security. 

You mentioned buying tickets at the last minute. There are other 

procedures in place that try to augment the current prescreening 

process that would protect against some vulnerabilities. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the Ranking 

Member. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you. I appreciate your testimony and the 

report. Rebaselining, does that mean we are starting over? 

Ms. BERRICK. What TSA has told us about rebaselining --

Ms. LOFGREN. Is that a word? 

Ms. BERRICK. According to our IT folks at GAO they do believe 

it is a word, and different organizations may define it differently. 

What TSA has told us is that everything is on the table with the 

program. They may make changes, they may not. They are going 

to look at the requirements, look at their goals. 

Ms. LOFGREN. So they are starting over pretty much. The question I have is as we are starting over, it is a new opportunity to 

not make the same mistake over and over again. I was very interested in your comments about what this has been the history of 

this Department, where they rush off without figuring out what 

they are doing, and then several years later you have to start all 

over again. Waste of money, waste of time, and the Nation has 

been left unprotected. 

And it sounds like that is what has happened here again, without the IT systems being defined, you rush off and do it. Same 

thing happened with the biometrics, how we were going to have 

consistency. Everybody rushed off and we are going to have to redo 

that, I am sure ultimately, to the tune of billions of dollars. 

The data quality issues and what information is going to be included was not decided upon. And so it seems to me that if you 

could make some recommendations to us and to the Department 
59

for what could and should be included, that would be enormously 

helpful. 

We got a report in the 108th Congress, I believe, suggesting that 

names alone were never going to cut it. There needs to be more 

than just the raw name. And especially in this time of increased 

identity theft exposure, to use names alone is a huge risk, it seems 

to me. 

So I would appreciate very much if you could tell us right now 

what your recommendation would be as we start from scratch. 

That would be useful. And also if you have any information—Mr. 

Gaches has only been here a short period of time, did not know off 

the top of his head the technology questions. But do they have access, for example, to those biometrics or do they not’ Can you answer those questions? 

Ms. BERRICK. In terms of recommendations for TSA as they move 

forward with Secure Flight, the first recommendation that we have 

made to them and I would continue to make is that we support this 

rebaselining effort. We believe they need to establish a disciplined 

and rigorous development process which hasn’t been in place to 

date. And TSA has stated that they have followed an expedited 

process in order to field this program quickly. We think they need 

to slow down to define the requirements and do this more systematically. 

In terms of determining what data elements they should be using 

to support Secure Flight, we think what TSA needs to do is appropriate testing, matching different combinations of passenger data 

against the watch list to determine what results in the most effective match. TSA has done some limited testing. They have a lot 

more testing that they need to do before they can make that decision. 

And the third point I would make related to TSA moving forward 

is they need to coordinate with their stakeholders, with the Terrorist Screening Center, with Customs and Border Protection on 

how this program is going to work and how they are going to support it, and also need to make some key policy decisions that are 

going to affect this program. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Wouldn’t there be some simple things to save time’ 

For example, if you have got Sean O’Casey, the IRA guy—if the 

person before you is 7 years old, that you don’t have to go through 

a big exploration; that the baby is not who you want to stop, or the 

toddler. I mean, just some baseline things just to clear this out. 

Couldn’t we use common sense like that? 

Ms. BERRICK. TSA, Mr. Gaches was mentioning they have a redress office. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Not redress, not for the sake of the baby but for 

the sake of the rest of us; that we are not wasting our time focusing and spinning our wheels about the toddler. 

Ms. BERRICK. The quality related to the Terrorist Screening Center database is more, I believe, a TSC issue rather than it is TSA. 

TSC does have some efforts underway to try to improve the quality. 

They are doing a record-by-record review. They have some other 

things in place. 

I think it is important that they move forward. As you mention, 

that will take a while to do. In the meantime, because we are ap-
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plying these watch lists today, we want to make sure they are as 

accurate as they can be. I think the individual agencies have a responsibility to make sure they are doing this responsibly. And in 

TSA’s case, in the case of Secure Flight, I think they can do that 

by looking at the passenger data that they are getting from air carriers, what are they going to provide them, and coming up with the 

appropriate mix and software to determine what is going to result 

in the best match, while separately these data quality issues at the 

Terrorist Screening Center are being worked. 

I think they are both important. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I will just close by saying my mother always used 

to tell me, take your time and do it right, because it is actually 

quicker than doing it over and over again wrong. Thank you very 

much. 

Ms. BERRICK. Thank you. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Your mother was a very smart lady. 

Mr. SIMMONS. The chair recognizes the gentleman from New 

Mexico. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you. 

Do you know what kind of cost has been associated with the Secure Flight program up to this date? 

Ms. BERRICK. TSA hasn’t been able to identify how much money 

they have actually spent on Secure Flight and its predecessor programs. We estimate about $120, $130 million but that is an estimate. We don’t have an exact figure. TSA estimates are right in 

that ballpark, too. 

Mr. PEARCE. That is close enough. What is your measure of success? In other words, you have got to be—U.S. GAO had to be looking with some parameters to decide that the program is not reaching success. So what is your measure of success? 

Ms. BERRICK. We are looking at a lot of areas related to Secure 

Flight, and we have different criteria for each of those areas. Let 

us take systems development. We are looking at best practices for 

the development of IT systems and measuring TSA against that. 

TSA itself has their own policies for developing major IT systems, 

and we have looked at, what is their criteria for developing these 

types of systems? 

We found that, in the case of Secure Flight, they weren’t following their own systems development guidance. Instead, they had 

a rapid development approach where some activities were conducted out of sequence. They didn’t define requirements, and we 

believe that was the cause of what has resulted and some of the 

problems that they are facing right now. 

In other areas, for example in privacy and redress, we are looking to what extent they are complying with the Privacy Act, the EGovernment Act, fair information principles. So each of these areas 

we have specific criteria that we are measuring them against, and 

we are also very open with TSA on what this is. We want to help 

them be successful and are open with how we are reviewing this 

program. 

Mr. PEARCE. If we go back to that word successful, helping them 

be successful. Has anyone in the system defined success as something other than compliance’ In other words, to me, success would 

be not knocking down any airliners for a given period of time. So 
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did TSA set this as an objective evaluation that we are trying to 

set up a system that will keep us from losing an airliner due to 

bad passengers doing bad things for the next 7.2 years or something? 

Ms. BERRICK. One of the concerns we raised-- and I think your 

point gets back to requirements-- what do they ultimately want 

this program to achieve’ And we found that, over the 3 years that 

this program has been in process, the requirements have changed. 

So it hasn’t been entirely clear to us what the goals of the program 

were. 

Now, TSA is saying today that they agree with that. They know 

that they need to finalize the requirements before moving forward. 

So, I guess my short answer would be, I don’t think the goals have 

been clearly defined, and they have changed somewhat over time. 

Mr. PEARCE. If we are to just take, take the position that it is 

no aircraft losses due to passenger intervention during the next 10 

years, I mean, setting aside spelling of names, algorithms, privacy 

rights and all that jazz, which has nothing to do with keeping airliners in the air, we are trying to set up a system for expediting 

passengers. And yet we know in sleeper cells that they sometimes 

are deactivated, that humans are deactivated for a period of 10 

years, 20 years. How in the world can you have a program with all 

the right algorithms and spellings of names and all that jazz’ How 

can we do this’ I mean, it seems ludicrous that we spend the first 

hundred million dollars not even thinking that we want what we 

want to achieve, but the fact that we would go ahead and say, 

okay, just design it right, forget the fact that it can’t be done because these people that are willing to do these acts of terror are 

willing to put backpacks on their kids and stick them in the airplanes and blow them up with I mean, so how why are you suggesting to cure the algorithms when it might not be a curable question? 

Ms. BERRICK. I think that is a very good point. Secure Flight is 

just one specific program of many that TSA has implemented to ensure the security of aviation security, and it is not intended to be 

the be all, end all. There are many other security layers that TSA 

pays attention to. So I think it is appropriate to put this in the 

proper context. It is not intended to do everything. There are other 

programs in place, but I think that is a very good point, and I 

agree with that. This is just one program, and it should be viewed 

in that context. 

Mr. PEARCE. What program is set up to stop the 20-year silent 

nonparticipant and the al Qaeda cell that is waiting to just have 

his number dialed and say, today’s your day’ What program is 

there to stop that person? 

Ms. BERRICK. In addition to intelligence, TSA’s building in unpredictability into their procedures. For example, in their screening 

procedures at airports, they are making things a little bit more unpredictable, and that is geared towards the thought that terrorists 

are going to change their tactics. You may not know what the 

threat exactly is. This is another tool that they are using to try to 

get at those types of points where you can’t predict where your 

next threat is, and they have got some other efforts underway, too, 

along those lines. 
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Mr. PEARCE. Okay. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks a lot Ms. Berrick. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you for those insightful questions. The 

chair recognizes the lady from New York. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I thank you, and I thank you for your presentation 

and the new vocabulary that you are sharing with us. There was 

CAPPS I, CAPPS II, now Secure Flight. You say that you think we 

have spent about $120 to $130 million. I can think of a lot of good 

uses for $120 to $130 million. The list just gets bigger. There are 

more errors. Can you give us confidence that as a result of—this 

is called the rebaseline assessment. Can you give us confidence 

that if they are rethinking this again, will Secure Flight be any 

more successful’ What directives have you given them’ Is it worth 

even investing the $120 to $130 million’ Perhaps you can clarify for 

me why we, as appropriators, some of us are on this committee, 

should even think about $120 to $130 million when the agency 

can’t even figure out what they did with the money’ And it is puzzling to me how you who are auditing it can even find the money. 

So should we go ahead with this’ I think we are all saying this in 

different iterations because it is so puzzling. 

Ms. BERRICK. Thank you. To first relate it to the benefits of Secure Flight. You asked whether or not we should be moving forward with this. 

Mrs. LOWEY. No. No. I think it is important, but do you have any 

confidence that one strike, two strike, here we go again, that they 

are going to spend the money any better’ Just give us confidence 

with the directives that you would offer them, that this can be accomplished and at what price? 

Ms. BERRICK. Since TSA initiated their rebaselining efforts, we 

have seen some very positive steps. They brought in new leadership responsible for the program. They brought in people with information systems credentials that they didn’t always have prior to 

that. There has been a commitment from the head of TSA, Kip 

Hawley, that he really wants to do this right. He wants to slow 

down. This is an important program. He is going to build this with 

discipline and rigor. Based on hearing GAO’s concerns, Kip Hawley 

actually initiated an special review of the program, identified the 

same issues pretty much that we have identified, and that is why 

they are rebaselining the program. So in terms of the history of 

this program, I have seen very positive steps lately that are encouraging, and I am looking forward to when TSA completes this 

rebaselining effort to see how they are going to move forward, but 

I have seen some very positive actions since the rebaselining was 

announced. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Could you discuss the oversight procedures that 

have been put in place, so a year from now, you can tell us, yes, 

they have spent the money, be it— I hate even to think—$100 to 

$300 million? 

Ms. BERRICK. The fiscal year 2006 appropriation legislation requires that GAO report on Secure Flight 90 days after DHS certifies that the system has satisfied its requirements that are 

spelled out in legislation. So GAO is statutorily mandated to report 

on the program once TSA certifies that they have met these re-
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quirements. So we will be issuing report or testifying on those results at some point in the future after TSA certifies the system, 

and we are continuing to review the program based on other requests that we have gotten from various committees. So we have 

a continual presence looking at Secure Flight. After they certify the 

system, we will be reporting on it. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I have found, Mr. Chairman, that as Members of 

Congress, be it appropriators or not, we look to GAO when all else 

fails. I guess what I am trying to understand is, do you feel there 

are appropriate accounting procedures in place as the process 

moves forward’ Or are we going to have to depend on your oversight to make sure that TSA is spending the money appropriately? 

Ms. BERRICK. I think there needs to be several oversight mechanisms, and GAO is one. There are also oversight mechanisms at 

the Department of Homeland Security level. They have an investment review board where they look at these types of programs. 

They are becoming more involved in Secure Flight. That is a level 

of oversight. There are also some independent groups that are 

made up of TSA employees and private sector people that provide 

advice and counsel to TSA on the program. And in addition, there 

are often congressional hearings, oversight hearings on Secure 

Flight and related programs. Most recently before the Senate Commerce Committee in February, TSA and GAO testified on these 

same issues so. So there seems to be some various mechanisms for 

oversight, and I think it is important to have all of those as TSA 

moves forward. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Is that same oversight procedure, the same as the 

one that was in place with the CAPPS I, CAPPS II? 

Ms. BERRICK. We were—GAO specifically was mandated to look 

at CAPPS II. The requirement was a little bit different. That required us to report on the program essentially once every year. It 

wasn’t driven by when TSA certified it. So we were so essentially 

providing a status update once a year under the old legislation. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do hope we can 

get something that is tangible and that works out of this program; 

$100 to $130 million is a lot of money, and we can think of many 

uses for it. So thank you very much. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. BERRICK. Thank you. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the gentlelady from New York for her continued interest and rigorous oversight activities on these issues. 

She, like me, shares the memories of 9/11 and probably lost many 

constituents on that day. So this is something that we all have a 

deep concern for. 

I appreciate your testimony. There will be a follow up on this 

hearing. We will make an effort to pull together the TSA, the TSC 

and the CBP into one room, and bring members in and see if we 

can get our arms around this a little bit, a little bit better. 

So I thank all of my colleagues for their participation. 

I thank you, Ms. Berrick, for your testimony. Members will have 

I believe 5–10 working days to submit additional questions and 

comments for the record. And there being no further business, 

without objection the committee stands adjourned. 

Ms. BERRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
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Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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