ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

Pendergast v. Meade Electric Co., 2013 IL App (1st) 121317

Appellate Court

Caption

THOMAS PENDERGAST, as Executor of the Estate of LISA

RICHTER, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MEADE ELECTRIC

COMPANY, INC., an IllinoisCorporation; THORNE ELECTRIC,INC.,

an Illinois Corporation; ECONOLITE GROUP, INC., a California

Corporation, d/b/a Econolite Group Company, Econolite Control

Products, Inc., and Econolite; ALEX P. DYCHE, Individually; and

OLSSON ROOFING COMPANY, INC., an Illinois Corporation,

Defendants-Appellants (Metro Transportation Group, Inc., an Illinois

Corporation, and Traffic Control Corporation, an Illinois Corporation,

Defendants).–ROBERT R. LEATHERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEX P.

DYCHE, Individually; OLSSON ROOFING COMPANY, INC., an

IllinoisCorporation; MEADE ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., an Illinois

Corporation; THORNE ELECTRIC, INC., an Illinois Corporation; and

ECONOLITE GROUP, INC., a California Corporation, d/b/a Econolite

Group Company, Econolite Control Products, Inc., and Econolite,

Defendants-Appellants (Traffic Control Corporation, an Illinois

Corporation; Metro Transportation Group, Inc., an Illinois Corporation;

and Thomas Pendergast, Executor of the Estate of Lisa Richter,

Deceased, Defendants).

 District & No. First District, Second Division

Docket No. 1-12-1317

Filed August 27, 2013
Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

In two actions filed in Cook County arising from a traffic accident that

occurred in Kendall County, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying a motion to transfer both cases to Kendall County based on the

doctrine of forum non conveniens, since only two of the relevant factors

favored a transfer, but due to the passage of more than 30 days from the

trial court’s order transferring third-party claims to Kendall County, the

appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider that issue.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. 10-L-4072, 10-L4075; the Hon. James N. O’Hara, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Steven E. Danekas and Catherine Basque Weiler, both of Swanson,

Martin & Bell, LLP, Francis J. Marasa, of Marasa & Lewis, Jeremiah P.

Connolly, of Bollinger Connolly Krause LLC, and Joseph B. Carini III,

of Johnson & Bell, Ltd., all of Chicago, for appellants.

Scott R. Clewis, of Law Offices of Thomas J. Popovich, PC, and Martin

Healy, Jr., David Huber, and Dennis M. Lynch, all of Healy Law Firm,

both of Chicago, for appellees.

Panel JUSTICE CONNORS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Quinn and Simon concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Following a traffic accident, plaintiff Robert Leathers initially filed a negligence action

in the circuit court of Kendall County. Lisa Richter was killed in that accident and plaintiff

Thomas Pendergast, as executor of her estate, filed a wrongful death and survival action in

the circuit court of Cook County. Leathers then voluntarily dismissed the Kendall County

action and refiled his action in Cook County, adding new defendants. Several defendants

moved to transfer both actions to Kendall County under the doctrine of forum non

conveniens. The circuit court of Cook County denied the motion. Defendants now appeal,

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arguing that the court’s decision was an abuse of discretion. They also contend that the court

abused its discretion in severing third-party claims against the County of Kendall and

transferring them back to the circuit court of Kendall County. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Lisa Richter, a resident of Oswego, Kendall County, was driving eastbound on Lewis

Street in Oswego, Kendall County, when her car collided with a truck driven by defendant

Alex Dyche of Montgomery, Kendall County, allegedly while he was in the course of his

employment with defendant Olsson Roofing Company, of neighboringKaneCounty. Richter

was killed instantly and her passenger, plaintiff Robert Leathers, who also lived in Kendall

County at the time, was injured. Shortly thereafter, Leathers filed a negligence action in

Kendall County against Dyche and Olsson.

¶ 4 Richter’s mother initially was appointed as the administrator of her estate, which was

probated in Kendall County. About a year after the accident, the probate court granted an

emergency motion to substitute Richter’s uncle, plaintiff Thomas Pendergast, as the

administrator of her estate. The same day, Pendergast, of TinleyPark, Cook County, filed the

instant lawsuit on Richter’s behalf in Cook County. Pendergast asserted wrongful death and

survival claims which pleaded negligence against defendants Meade Electric Company,

Thorne Electric, Metro Transportation Group, and Traffic Control Corporation for their

allegedly negligent design of the traffic signal system at the intersection where the accident

occurred. He also asserted negligence claims against Dyche and Olsson. Additionally,

Pendergast asserted products liability claims in negligence and strict liability against

defendant Econolite for its allegedly faulty design and manufacture of the traffic signal

equipment used at the intersection.

¶ 5 At about the same time, Leathers voluntarily dismissed his complaint in Kendall County

and refiled in Cook County. In his new lawsuit, Leathers reasserted his negligence claims

against Dyche and Olsson and added claims against Meade, Thorne, Metro Transportation

Group, and Traffic Control Corporation. He asserted the same products liability claims

against Econolite and Atlantic Scientific, which made component parts for the traffic signals.

Additionally, Leathers included a negligence claim against Richter.

¶ 6 Dyche and Olsson then filed motions to transfer both actions to Kendall County pursuant

to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. They argued that this litigation has no meaningful

connection to Cook County and that Kendall County is a more appropriate venue.

Specifically, they argued that Kendall County was more convenient for most of the parties

and that witnesses and evidence were located in or near Kendall County. The accident

occurred in Kendall County between three Kendall County residents. The two known

witnesses to the accident were residents of Kendall County and La Salle County, which is

adjacent to Kendall County. The Oswego fire department responded to the accident and

transported Leathers to a Kane County hospital. The Kendall County coroner investigated

Richter’s death. The Oswego police department investigated the accident and conducted an

accident reconstruction.

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¶ 7 Dyche and Olsson argued that although a plaintiff’s choice of venue ordinarily is entitled

to great weight, less deference is given to that decision when the plaintiff’s choice is not the

site of the accident or the county in which he resides. Thus, they argued that the accident did

not occurin Cook County; that Leathers’ choice of venue is not entitled to deference because

he does not live in Cook County; and that Pendergast is a nominal plaintiff whose residence

is immaterial for determining the appropriate venue. Additionally, they argued that Cook

County was not Leathers’ first choice of venue and is entitled to less deference.

¶ 8 Dyche and Olsson asserted that of the defendants, Meade has offices in northern Illinois,

southern Wisconsin, and northwest Indiana; Thorne is located in Carol Stream, Du Page

County; Traffic Control Corporation has offices across the Midwest, including its corporate

headquartersin Woodridge, Du Page County; and Econolite is a California corporation. They

contend that only Metro Transportation has offices in Chicago and Hoffman Estates, Cook

County, but the fact that it “merely conduct[s] business” in Cook County “does not affect the

forum non conveniens issue.”

¶ 9 Moreover, they argued that the public interest considerations weighed in favor of

litigating the case in Kendall County. They contend that Kendall County has a strong interest

in deciding this dispute, which involves injuries sustained by its residents in an accident

occurring within its boundaries, and it would be unfair to burden Cook County and its

potential jurors with resolving a case in which it has no interest. Thorne joined Dyche and

Olsson’s motion.

¶ 10 Meade also filed a motion to transfer. It admitted that its principle place of business is

in Cook County and it represented that Traffic Control Corporation “has a place of business

in” Cook County. Nevertheless, it argued that the alleged liability in this case arose out of

work it performed in Kendall County, making the latter the more appropriate venue.

Econolite joined Meade’s motion. Neither Metro Transportation Group nor Traffic Control

Corporation contested venue.

¶ 11 Leathers and Pendergast filed briefs in response, challenging transfer to Kendall County.

They each attached copies of the defendants’ forum non conveniens interrogatories and

admissions to support their arguments.

¶ 12 Dyche and Olsson filed a reply brief to which they attached plaintiffs’ answers to the

defendants’ requests for admissions and affidavits of seven potential witnesses attesting that

it would be inconvenient and burdensome for them to travel to Cook County to testifyat trial.

Meade also filed a reply brief in which it argued that it had no relationship to the accident

and that it was named as a defendant “for the sole purpose of circumventing the forum non

conveniens motion.” It attached the deposition of an employee of the Kendall County

Highway Department to support its argument.

¶ 13 At about the same time that Dyche and Olsson filed their motions to transfer, they also

filed third-partycontribution claims against the Countyof Kendall (County) in Leathers’ case

and in Pendergast’s case. The County then moved to transfer the third-party claims to the

circuit court of Kendall County pursuant to section 2-103(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure

(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-103(a) (West 2010)). It argued that section 2-103(a) required that any

action brought against a governmental corporation must be brought in the county in which

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its principal office is located.

¶ 14 Dyche and Olsson stated that they had “no grounds to object to [the County’s] motion

to transfer.” However, in the interest of judicial economy, they requested that the court either

grant their pendingmotions to transfer the entire action to the circuit court of Kendall County

or defer ruling on the County’s motion until their other motions to transfer have been

decided. In its reply brief, the County argued that the plaintiffs’ cases should be heard in

Cook County, but that the third-party claims against it should be severed and transferred to

the circuit court of Kendall County.

¶ 15 On September 8, 2011, the circuit court granted the County’s motion, severed the thirdparty claims, and transferred them to the circuit court of Kendall County. No petition for

leave to appeal was filed following entry of that order.

¶ 16 On April 5, 2012, the circuit court entered a case management order setting a date for a

status hearing on the remaining claims and also stating, “Defendants’ motions to transfer for

forum non conveniens are all denied. 14 days to propound discovery on Metro

Transportation’s motion for summary judgment. Status on pleadings and discovery.” Dyche

and Olsson, Thorne, Meade, and Econolite (collectively, defendants) filed a timely petition

for leave to appeal that order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(2) (eff. Feb. 26,

2010), which this court granted.

¶ 17 ANALYSIS

¶ 18 In Illinois, an action must be commenced in: (1) the county of residence of any defendant

who is joined in good faith; or (2) the county in which the cause of action arose. Dawdy v.

Union Pacific R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 167, 172 (2003); 735 ILCS 5/2-101 (West 2010). If more

than one appropriate forum exists, a defendant may invoke the doctrine of forum non

conveniens to determine which forum is most appropriate. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 172. The

doctrine permits the court in which the action was filed to decline jurisdiction and direct the

lawsuit to an alternative forum that the court determines can better serve the convenience of

the parties and the ends of justice. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 172.

¶ 19 In making its determination as to the appropriate forum in which the case should be tried,

the court must balance certain private and public interest factors. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 172.

Private interest factors include: the convenience of the parties; the relative ease of access to

sources of evidence; the availability of compulsory process to secure attendance of unwilling

witnesses; the cost to obtain attendance of willing witnesses; the possibility of viewing the

premises, if appropriate; and all other practical considerations that make a trial easy,

expeditious, and inexpensive. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 172. Public interest factors include: the

administrative difficulties caused by litigating cases in congested forums; the unfairness of

imposing jury duty on residents of a county with no connection to the litigation; and the

interest in having local controversies decided locally. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173.

¶ 20 Significantly, the court must also consider the plaintiff’s choice of forum. A plaintiff’s

right to select the forum is substantial and is entitled to deference. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173.

The plaintiff’s choice of forum should not be disturbed unless the factors weigh strongly in

favor of transfer. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173.

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¶ 21 However, the plaintiff’s choice of forum is not entitled to such deference in all cases.

Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173. When a plaintiff chooses to litigate his cause of action in his home

forum or in the forum in which his accident or injury occurred, it is reasonable to assume that

the forum was chosen for reasons of convenience. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173. However, when

the plaintiff is foreign to his chosen forum or the events that gave rise to the litigation did not

occur in that forum, that assumption is less reasonable and his choice is afforded less

deference. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173-74. In fact, our supreme court has said that under those

circumstances, it is instead reasonable to conclude that the plaintiff engaged in forum

shopping to suit his individual interests, which is disfavored. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 174.

¶ 22 Thus, in ruling on a motion to transfer, the circuit court must take all of these factors into

account and give each factor proper deference or weight under the circumstances. Dawdy,

207 Ill. 2d at 176 (quoting Griffith v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc., 136 Ill. 2d 101,

107-08 (1990)). The circuit court must evaluate the total circumstances of the case to

determine whetherthe balance offactors stronglyfavors dismissal. Fennell v. Illinois Central

R.R. Co., 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 17. Accordingly, the determination of a forum non conveniens

motion lies within the sound discretion of the circuit court. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 176. The

court’s decision will only be reversed if it can be shown that it “abused its discretion in

balancing the relevant factors,” meaning that no reasonable person would take the view

adopted by the court. Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 21; Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177.

¶ 23 The parties did not explicitly indicate whether the circuit court held a hearing on the

motions to transfer. In their brief, defendants represented that “the circuit court orally denied

all of the motions to transfer. The circuit court did not issue a written ruling.” Plaintiffs

represented that the circuit court denied the motions “after a full course of briefing.” Both

parties cite to the April 5, 2012, case management order, which simply states that

“[d]efendants’ motions to transfer for forum non conveniens are all denied.”

¶ 24 We ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing whetherthis court could

review the circuit court’s balancing of the public and private interest factors without a written

order or hearing transcript setting forth the mannerin which the court balanced those factors.

Our concern is that on the one hand, our supreme court recently reiterated its admonition to

circuit courts to “include all of the relevant private and public interest factors in their

analyses.” (Emphasis in original.) Fennell, 2012 IL113812, ¶ 24 (citingFirst American Bank

v. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d 511, 520-21 (2002) (urging trial courts to “leave a better record of

their analyses” when ruling on forum non conveniens motions to “allow our appellate court

to make informed decisions on Rule 306(a)(2) petitions”)). In Fennell, the circuit court

issued a written ruling containing its analysis of some, but not all, of the public and private

interest factors. Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 24. However, as defendants note, the supreme

court did not hold that omitting factors from the analysis necessarily results in reversal.

Rather, in that case, after admonishing the circuit court, it reviewed the circuit court’s

analysis of the factors that were addressed in the order and reversed the court on the merits.

Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 24.

¶ 25 On the other hand, this court long ago held that an appellant’s failure to include a

transcript of the hearing on the motion to transfer did not preclude appellate review. Walker

v. Iowa Marine Repair Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 621, 626 (1985); see also DeVries v. Bankers

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Life Co., 128 Ill. App. 3d 647, 650 (1984). The Walker court concluded:

“The fact that the trial court may have espoused certain reasons for its order not

appearing on the face of the [complaint, answer, affirmative defense, motion to transfer,

and supporting affidavits] does not support the necessity of a transcript on appeal where,

as here, the record contains everything that was presented to the judge in support of or

in opposition to the motion.” Walker, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 626.

However, this reasoning suggests that the appellate court may disregard the circuit court’s

rationale in ruling on motions to transfer and conduct an independent review of the motions

presented below, as we would do if applying de novo review. That runs counter to the wellestablished legal proposition that when reviewing a decision on a motion to transfer for

forum non conveniens, we must evaluate whether the circuit court “abused [its] discretion

in weighing the relevant considerations.” (Emphasis added.) Meyers v. Bridgeport Machines

Division of Textron, Inc., 113 Ill. 2d 112, 118 (1986) (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454

U.S. 235, 257 (1981)); see also Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 21; Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177. 

¶ 26 Although it would be beneficial to remand the matter to the circuit court with instructions

to provide its analysis of the public and private interest factors, we lack a clear directive from

the supreme court to do so. See Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 75 (Kilbride, C.J., dissenting

upon denial of rehearing) (noting that “[t]he trial court’s exercise of its discretion cannot be

reviewed adequately when several of the forum non conveniens factors are not included in

the analysis” and suggesting that remand is appropriate under these circumstances).

Accordingly, we will undertake our review of the court’s decision to deny the motion to

transfer as we have done in the past. Ammerman v. The Raymond Corp., 379 Ill. App. 3d

878, 887-88 (2008). That is, we will endeavor to analyze the factors based on the

“undisputed” facts, as defendants characterize them. Where any doubts arise due to the

incompleteness of the record, we will resolve them against defendants, who bear the burden

of presenting us with a sufficiently complete record to support their claim of error.

Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 888.

¶ 27 We begin with the presumption that a plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to deference

and must not be disturbed unless the other factors strongly favor transfer. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d

at 173. As noted above, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to somewhat less deference

if it is neither his place of residence nor the place where the injury occurred. Langenhorst v.

Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 219 Ill. 2d 430, 442-43 (2006). Here, Pendergast is a resident of

Cook County and filed his original cause of action in Cook County. Although defendants

contend that Pendergast’s status as the administrator of Richter’s estate makes him a

“nominal plaintiff” whose residence is inconsequential for purposes of honoring choice of

forum, that argument has been rejected by this court. Glass v. DOT Transportation, Inc., 393

Ill. App. 3d 829, 834 (2009).

¶ 28 Leathers was a resident of Kane County when he filed his lawsuit. Additionally, his first

choice of forum was Kendall County, where the accident occurred, which diminishes the

degree of deference accorded to him in this analysis. Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 25.

However, that does not mean his choice deserves no deference. Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d

at 885 (quoting Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 518). Indeed, Leathers only dismissed his original

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lawsuit and refiled in Cook County after Pendergast filed his action in Cook County, which

could be interpreted as forum shopping, as defendants suggest, or merely an appreciation for

judicial economy. The record does not indicate the degree to which the circuit court deferred

to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum. Consequently, we must construe this factor against

defendants and presume that on the whole, plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled to

deference. Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 888.

¶ 29 In light of that, defendants must demonstrate that the other factors stronglyfavor transfer.

Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173. This high burden comports with the supreme court’s directive that

a case should be transferred only under “exceptional circumstances when it has been shown

that the interests of justice require a trial in a more convenient forum.” (Emphasis in original

and internal quotations marks omitted.) Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 520.

¶ 30 The first private interest factor considers the convenience of the parties. Here, defendants

must show that the plaintiffs’ chosen forum is inconvenient to them and that another forum

is more convenient to all parties. Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 888. However, they cannot

assert that plaintiff’s chosen forum is inconvenient for plaintiff. Ammerman, 379 Ill. App.

3d at 889 (citing Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 448).

¶ 31 Of the defendants, Meade indicated in its answers to interrogatories that it resides in

McCook, Illinois, which is in Cook County. Metro Transportation has headquarters in Cook

County, and in the court below, several of the defendants conceded that Traffic Control is

considered a Cook County resident. Thorne is located in Du Page County. Econolite is

located in California. Dyche resides in Kendall County and Olsson is located in Kane

County. Dyche and Olsson’s president and chief executive officer, William Lynch, were the

onlydefendants who submitted affidavitsstating that Cook Countywould be an inconvenient

forum for them and Kendall County would be more convenient. However, three defendants

are residents of Cook Countyand two defendants (Metro Transportation and Traffic Control)

did not object to proceeding in Cook County. The remaining two defendants reside in

counties other than Kendall. Thus, on the whole, defendants have not demonstrated that

Kendall County is more convenient to all parties.

¶ 32 Next, we consider the relative ease of access to testimonial, documentary, and other

evidence. In their answers to interrogatories, plaintiffs identified potential witnesses who

would testify at trial. Cheryl Alexander, of Kendall County; Gary Balzarini, of La Salle

County; Brayden Dyche, of Kendall County; Leathers; and Dyche were identified as

eyewitnesses to the accident. Plaintiffs also identified six Oswego police officers, five

paramedics with the Oswego fire department, the Kendall Countycoroner, and two engineers

from Kendall Countyas potential witnesses. Additionally, Leathers indicated that he has seen

two doctors in Aurora, Illinois, and three other doctors whose locations were not identified,

for injuries he suffered in the accident. Six of these potential witnesses submitted affidavits

stating that it would be inconvenient and burdensome to travel to Cook County to testify in

this case. Nevertheless, they are amenable to compulsory process and can appear in Cook

County, notwithstanding the relatively minor expense involved in appearing to testify on a

particular day. On the other hand, defendants listed their corporate officers as people with

knowledge of this case, who reside in several different counties and California, as noted

above. Nevertheless, the preponderance of witnesses reside in or near Kendall County.

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Additionally, defendants note that the equipment at issue is stored in Kendall County,

making it easier to transport to a Kendall County courtroom. On balance, this factor weighs

in favor of transfer. See Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 178.

¶ 33 In considering the other factors that make a trial easy, expeditious and inexpensive, we

acknowledge that the accident took place in Kendall County and that, in the event that a court

later determined that it was necessary to view the accident site, it would be more convenient

for a Kendall County jury to do so. Nevertheless, the importance of these factors diminishes

where, as here, the case concerns products liability claims because “any local interest is

largely supplanted by a more general interest in resolving a claim concerning an allegedly

defective product [making] jury views of the accident site *** generally unnecessary.”

Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 886; Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 525. Pendergast and Leathers

asserted products liability claims against Econolite claiming that it negligently designed and

manufactured the traffic signal equipment used at the accident location and that it should be

strictly liable for plaintiffs’ injuries. Moreover, while also entitled to less weight, it is worth

considering that all of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys are located in Cook County and

would be required to travel to Kendall County every day to attend trial. Ammerman, 379 Ill.

App. 3d at 891. Thus, we cannot say that this factor strongly favors transfer.

¶ 34 Turning to the public interest factors, we first consider the interest in having local

controversies decided locally. As stated above, because this case involves products liability

claims, the location of the accident is less significant because defective products in the

stream of commerce can affect the residents of many counties. Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d

at 892. For the same reason, it is not unfair to impose jury duty on the residents of Cook

County because they are as likely to be affected by the allegedly faulty products at issue in

this case as Kendall County residents. Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 892. Additionally,

three of the defendants are residents of Cook County and, thus, Cook County has an interest

in deciding controversies involving its residents. Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 892. Thus,

these factors do not strongly favor transfer.

¶ 35 The final public interest factor considers the relative congestion of the two court systems.

However, this factor, “ ‘by itself, is relatively insignificant.’ ” Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d

at 892 (quoting Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 181). Nevertheless, defendants submitted caseload

statistics showing that Cook County is a more congested venue than Kendall County. In

2009, Kendall County had less than 10,000 cases pending whereas Cook County had over

925,000, which favors transfer to Kendall County.

¶ 36 We reiterate that we lack anyinformation about how the circuit court balanced the private

and public interest factors on the whole. However, in light of the fact that only two of the six

factors could possibly be said to favor transfer to Kendall County, any reasonable person

would conclude that defendants have failed to satisfy their burden of showing that the factors

strongly favor transfer. See Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173. Nor would any reasonable person

conclude that these circumstances are so exceptional that the interests of justice require

transfer to Kendall County. See Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 520. Accordingly, we cannot say that

the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the motion. Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 21;

Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177.

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¶ 37 Defendants also argue on appeal that the circuit court abused its discretion when it

severed the third-party claims against the County and transferred them to the circuit court of

Kendall County,while retaining jurisdiction over the remaining claims. This argument comes

notwithstanding defendants’ representation in the circuit court that they had “no grounds to

object to [the County’s] motion to transfer.” Nevertheless, we lack jurisdiction to review

defendants’ argument. Appeals taken from orders granting or denying motions to transfer

must be filed within 30 days of entry of that order. Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(c)(1) (eff. Feb. 26,

2010). The time limit for filing a petition for leave to appeal is jurisdictional. Kemner v.

Monsanto Co., 112 Ill. 2d 223, 236 (1986). The circuit court granted the County’s motion

to transfer for forum non conveniens and entered its order on September 8, 2011. No petition

for leave to appeal was filed within 30 days of that order. The petition for leave to appeal in

this case was filed on March 7, 2012, well beyond the 30-day period allowed to file a petition

addressing the court’s September 8, 2011, ruling. Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction

to consider that issue.

¶ 38 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court denying transfer

pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

¶ 39 Affirmed.

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