United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

MILITARY 

PERSONNEL 

Strategic Plan Needed 

to Address Army’s 

Emerging Officer 

Accession and 

Retention Challenges 

January 2007 

GAO-07-224 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

January 2007

MILITARY PERSONNEL

Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's 

Emerging Officer Accession and 

Retention Challenges 

Highlights of GAO-07-224, a report to the 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

Accessing and retaining highquality officers in the current

environment of increasing

deployments and armed conflict 

may be two of the all volunteer

force’s greatest challenges. The

military services use three 

programs to access officer 

candidates: (1) military academies, 

(2) the Reserve Officers’ Training 

Corps (ROTC), and (3) Officer 

Candidate Schools (OCS). In 

addition to accessing new officers, 

the services must retain enough 

experienced officers to meet

current operational needs and the 

services’ transformation initiatives. 

GAO was asked to assess the 

extent to which the services are 

accessing and retaining the officers 

required to meet their needs. GAO 

also identified steps that the 

Department of Defense (DOD) and

the services have taken and the

impediments they face in

increasing officers’ foreign 

language proficiency. For this 

report, GAO examined actual

accession and retention rates for 

officers in fiscal years (FYs) 2001, 

2003, and 2005 as well as

projections for later years. Also, 

GAO reviewed documents on 

foreign language training and plans. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Army 

develop and implement a strategic 

plan to address its emerging officer 

accession and retention problems.

DOD partially concurred with 

GAO’s recommendation.

The services generally met most of their overall accession needs for newly 

commissioned officers, but the Army faces challenges accessing enough 

officers to meet its needs. The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force met their 

overall FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 officer accession needs, but are 

experiencing challenges accessing specific groups, like flight officers and 

medical professionals. Moreover, the Army did not meet its needs for 

officers in FY 2001 and FY 2003 and expects to struggle with future 

accessions. To meet its officer accession needs, the Army’s traditional 

approach has been to rely first on its ROTC and academy programs and then 

compensate for shortfalls in these programs by increasing its OCS 

accessions. Between FYs 2001 and 2005, the Army nearly doubled the 

number of OCS commissioned officers due to (1) academy and ROTC 

shortfalls,(2) decreased ROTC scholarships, and (3) a need to expand its 

officer corps. But OCS is expected to reach its capacity in FY 2007, and 

resource limitations such as housing and classroom space may prevent 

further expansion. In addition, the Army’s three accession programs are 

decentralized and do not formally coordinate with one another, making it 

difficult for the Army, using its traditional approach, to effectively manage

risks and allocate resources across programs in an integrated, strategic 

fashion. Without a strategic, integrated plan for determining overall annual 

accession goals, managing risks, and allocating resources, the Army’s ability 

to meet its future mission requirements and to transform to more 

deployable, modular units is uncertain. 

All of the services except the Army generally met their past overall officer 

retention needs. The Army, which continues to be heavily involved in 

combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, faces many retention challenges. 

For example, the Army is experiencing a shortfall of mid-level officers, such 

as majors, because it commissioned fewer officers 10 years ago due to a 

post-Cold War force reduction. It projects a shortage of 3,000 or more 

officers annually through FY 2013. While the Army is implementing and 

considering initiatives to improve officer retention, the initiatives are not 

integrated and will not affect officer retention until at least 2009 or are 

unfunded. As with its accession shortfalls, the Army does not have an 

integrated strategic plan to address its retention shortfalls. While the Army is 

most challenged in retaining officers, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force 

generally met their retention needs in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005; but each 

experienced challenges in occupational specialties such as medical officers. 

DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language 

proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome to

achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior officers. For 

example, academy and ROTC officer candidates already have demanding 

workloads and ROTC does not control curricula at host institutions. The 

services recognize these impediments and are drafting plans to implement 

DOD’s foreign language objectives. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-224.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Derek Stewart 

at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1 

Results in Brief 6

Background 9

Services Generally Met Most Accession Needs for Newly 

Commissioned Officers Despite Some Challenges, but Army 

Faces Unique Problems with Future Accessions 10 

All Services Except Army Generally Met Past Officer Retention 

Needs, but All Face Challenges Retaining Certain Officer Groups 24 

Steps Are Being Taken to Improve the Foreign Language 

Proficiency of Junior Officers, but Many Impediments Could

Slow Progress 38 

Conclusions 42

Recommendation for Executive Action 43 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 43 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 46 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 51 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 55 

Related GAO Products 56 

Tables 

Table 1: Army Commissioned Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, 

and 2005, by Commissioning Program 12 

Table 2: Marine Corps Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 

2005, by Commissioning Program 13 

Table 3: Navy Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, by 

Commissioning Program 14 

Table 4: Air Force Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, 

by Commissioning Program 15 

Table 5: Physician Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for 

Selected Years, by Service 16 

Page i GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Table 6: Physician Scholarships Awarded Compared to Service 

Goals for Selected Years, by Service 16 

Table 7: Dentist Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for 

Selected Years, by Service 17 

Table 8: Nurse Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for Selected 

Years, by Service 17 

Table 9: Percent of Officer Accessions by Race and Ethnicity for 

Each Military Service 19 

Table 10: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Army 

Commissioned Officers by Commissioning Program for 

Selected Fiscal Years and Key Retention-Related Years in 

Officers’ Careers 26 

Table 11: Army’s Projected Percentages of Overfilled and 

Underfilled Positions for Majors in Specified Specialty 

Areas in FY 2007 28 

Table 12: Service-Specific Continuation Pays and Incentives 

Awarded to Officers in FY 2005 29 

Table 13: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Marine Corps 

Commissioned Officers by Commissioning Program for 

Selected Fiscal Years and Key Retention-Related Years in 

Officers’ Careers 31 

Table 14: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Navy 

Commissioned Officers by Commissioning Program for 

Selected Fiscal Years and Key Retention-Related Years in 

Officers’ Careers 33 

Table 15: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Air Force 

Commissioned Officers by Commissioning Program for 

Selected Fiscal Years and Key Retention-Related Years in 

Officers’ Careers 34 

Table 16: Service-Specific Continuation Rates in Percent for 

African-American and White Officers for Selected Fiscal 

Years 35 

Table 17: Service-Specific Continuation Rates in Percent for 

Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Officers for Selected Fiscal 

Years 36 

Table 18: Service-Specific Continuation Rates in Percent by Gender 

for Selected Fiscal Years 37 

Table 19: Installations and Offices Where GAO Obtained 

Documentary Evidence and Officials’ Views Pertaining to 

Officer Accessions 48 

Page ii GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Table 20: Installations and Offices Where GAO Obtained 

Documentary Evidence and Officials’ Views Pertaining to 

Officer Retention 50

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOPMA Defense Officer Personnel Management Act 

FY fiscal year 

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act 

OCS Officer Candidate School 

OTS Officer Training School

OUSD (P&R) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel & Readiness 

ROTC Reserve Officers’ Training Corps 

USAFA U.S. Air Force Academy 

USMA U.S. Military Academy 

USNA U.S. Naval Academy 

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Page iii GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

January 19, 2007 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Ensuring the availability of sufficient numbers of trained, high-quality 

personnel in an environment of increasing deployments and armed 

conflict may prove to be one of the greatest personnel challenges faced by 

the U.S. military since the inception of the all volunteer force in 1973. 

Unlike the civilian sector, the military recruits, accesses, and trains all of 

its own leaders. Therefore, today’s policy decisions and efforts on officer 

recruiting influence the future availability of officers. In addition, all of the 

services must retain sufficient numbers of experienced, skilled, and 

qualified officers to meet their current and future needs. 

Before officers can be commissioned at the most junior level, candidates 

must complete training programs, some of which take up to 4 years. The 

military services use three types of programs that award commissions to 

officer candidates after they graduate from a program: (1) military 

academies, (2) Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), and (3) Officer 

Candidate School (OCS) for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps or Officer 

Training School (OTS) for the Air Force. 

• Military academies: The U.S. Military Academy (USMA), U.S. Naval 

Academy (USNA),1

 and U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) each run 4-

year programs that provide successful candidates with bachelor’s 

degrees and commissions as military officers. In addition to completing 

their academic courses, the approximately 12,000 officer candidates 

who attend the academies each year participate in rigorous military 

training activities and mandatory athletic activities. In return for their 

free education, the graduates must serve on active duty for 5 years 

after graduation. 

 1

USNA provides both Navy and Marine Corps officers. 

Page 1 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
• ROTC: The services’ ROTC units are located at civilian colleges and 

universities throughout the country, with some academic institutions 

offering ROTC from more than one service. Currently, Army ROTC is 

located at 273 academic institutions, Navy ROTC at 71, and Air Force 

ROTC at 144. Officer candidates enrolled in ROTC programs must meet 

all graduation requirements of their academic institutions and complete 

required military training to receive commissions as officers, usually 

after 4 years. All officers who received Army or Navy ROTC 

scholarships and all Air Force officers who graduated from ROTC must 

typically commit to 4 years of active duty military service after 

graduation, while Army and Navy officers who did not receive ROTC 

scholarships must serve 3 years on active duty. 

• OCS/OTS: These officer commissioning programs are designed to 

augment the services’ other commissioning programs. Because these 

programs focus only on military training, they are short, ranging from 6 

weeks (Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program) to 14 

weeks (Army OCS). Many, but not all, graduates have prior 

undergraduate degrees and are obligated to serve a minimum of 2 years 

on active duty as officers. Compared to the other services, the Marine 

Corps makes more extensive use of its OCS commissioning program. 

The general approach that the services use to meet their accession needs 

has been to first depend on the service academy and ROTC program. 

When these programs are unable to meet a service’s needs for newly 

commissioned officers, the service turns to its OCS/OTS program to bridge 

the gap. Conversely, during periods of drawdown, all of the commissioning

sources may cut back on their numbers of officer candidates, but the 

OCS/OTS program provides the most immediate means for achieving the 

downsizing. Unlike the academy and ROTC programs that take up to 4

years to produce an officer, the OCS/OTS program can quickly expand or 

retract. In addition, under Title 10, each service directly commissions 

officers with particular professional skills, like physicians, dentists, 

nurses, lawyers, and chaplains who do not need to attend the major 

commissioning programs. 

Since its enactment in 1980, the Defense Officer Personnel Management 

Act (DOPMA)2

 as codified in Title 10 of the U.S. Code has provided the 

basis for the services’ officer career management systems. The original 

 2

Pub. L. No. 96-513 (1980), codified as amended in various sections of Title 10 of the U.S. 

Code. 

Page 2 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
objectives for DOPMA were to “maintain a high-quality, numerically 

sufficient officer corps, [that] provided career opportunities that would 

attract and retain the numbers of high-caliber officers needed, [and] 

provide reasonably consistent career opportunity among the services.”3

While DOPMA and other provisions of Title 10 outline requirements for 

managing the officer corps, the services’ manpower and reserve affairs 

offices use additional types of data—including historical continuation 

rates4

 and projected changes in the services’ size and missions—to identify 

officer accession and retention needs. In addition, the services attempt to 

attract an officer corps that reflects the racial and ethnic composition of 

the United States. Finally, a new emphasis for officer training is the focus 

on foreign language and cultural skills. As outlined in the February 2006 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report and other Department of Defense 

(DOD) guidance, the department aims to develop a broader linguistic 

capability and cultural understanding, which it identified as critical in 

prevailing in the Global War on Terrorism and meeting 21st century 

challenges. 

Within the last decade, DOD has experienced both downsizing and 

increases in the size of the forces, including officers. During the 1990s, 

each service decreased its number of officers as the Cold War came to a 

close. However, post-September 11, 2001, operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan and assignments to other homeland and global commitments 

have placed strains on the all volunteer force. In recognition of the 

demands placed on the Army and Marine Corps, which have provided the

majority of forces for recent operations, Congress increased the 

authorized end strength of the Army by 30,000 since 2004 and the Marine

Corps by more than 7,000 since 2002. While these services’ OCS programs 

offer a means for increasing the numbers of newly commissioned officers 

in a relatively short period to address a change in end strength, it takes 

years to grow experienced leaders, which presents a different officer 

career management challenge—officer retention.

We have issued a number of reports that provide policymakers with 

information for making informed decisions about the all volunteer force. 

For example, in September 2005, we reported on the demographics of 

 3

H. R. No. 96-1462, at 6345 (1980).

4

Continuation rates represent the number of officers who remained in the military for an 

entire fiscal year divided by the number of officers who were also present at the beginning

of the year. 

Page 3 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
servicemembers in the active and reserve components; and in November 

2005, we reported on challenges DOD faces in recruiting and retaining 

sufficient numbers of enlisted personnel.5

 In response to your request, this 

report assesses the extent to which the services are (1) accessing the 

numbers and types of commissioned officers required to meet their needs, 

and (2) retaining the numbers and types of officers they need. We also 

identified steps that DOD and the services have taken and the 

impediments that they face as they attempt to increase foreign language

proficiency among junior officers. 

We limited the scope of our work to the four active duty DOD services: 

Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Also, we examined actual 

accession and continuation rates for fiscal years (FY) 2001, 2003, and 2005

as well as projections for FY 2006, the year when we began our work, and 

later years. FY 2001 data represented the situations present immediately 

before the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, and FY 2005 data 

represented the most recent fiscal year for which the services had 

complete data. FY 2003 data provided information on interim conditions 

and allowed us to examine the data for trends and other patterns. To 

accomplish our work, we reviewed reports, laws, and DOD-wide and 

service-specific officer management guidance—including DOPMA and 

other provision of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, defense authorization acts, the 

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and policies and directives—to gain a 

comprehensive understanding of officer recruitment, commissioning, 

training, and retention. We obtained documents and met with officials 

from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness (OUSD [P&R]), the services’ headquarters, personnel and 

manpower commands, service academies, ROTC commands, and 

OCS/OTS commands to obtain an integrated understanding of the three 

officer-related issues that we were asked to evaluate. We obtained and 

analyzed accessions and continuation data from DOD’s Defense 

Manpower Data Center, but our assessment of the data’s reliability 

identified incorrect information that was severe enough to prevent those 

 5

GAO, Military Personnel: Reporting Additional Servicemember Demographics Could 

Enhance Congressional Oversight, GAO-05-952 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2005); and

GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted Personnel 

Recruitment and Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005). 

Page 4 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
data from being used for this report.6

 As a result, we subsequently 

obtained accession and continuation information from the services. While 

we did not conduct independent analyses using the services’ databases, 

our assessment of their data’s reliability, including a review of relevant 

documentation, and a comparison of service-provided information to 

similar information from other sources and for other time periods. We 

determined that the service-provided data was sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of this report. For our assessment of officer accessions, we 

examined information showing the numbers of officers commissioned 

from the services’ officer programs during FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 for 

trends and other patterns and compared the numbers of officers produced 

to the staffing needs of the services’ occupational specialty areas. We 

found that the services determined their accession needs for each general 

category of specialty but did not develop a servicewide total accession 

goal for each year. Also, we reviewed internal service documents to 

identify potential causes and effects of staffing gaps. In our examination of 

officer retention, we performed similar analyses of quantitative 

continuation information and reviews of documents to identify patterns, 

gaps, and potential causes and effects. Our continuation analyses focused 

on four key points in officers’ careers—years 3, 4, 5, and 10—that serviceretention experts helped us to identify as when retention decisions are 

most likely to occur. Additionally, we met with a number of DOD officials, 

including representatives at the officer commissioning programs, and 

received a wide variety of reports and other documents to obtain an 

understanding of efforts to improve foreign language training. We then 

used the information to identify challenges the services face in providing 

additional training in their officer commissioning programs. We assessed 

the reliability of the data we used and determined that it was sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of our report. We conducted our review from 

September 2005 through November 2006 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I contains more detail 

on our scope and methodology. 

 6

Our assessment of the numbers of officers accessed from the various officer 

commissioning programs revealed major data reliability concerns for the information that 

we obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center. The services subsequently supplied 

us with information that showed under- and overcounts for the numbers of officers

commissioned into each service. At the extreme, the Center’s results showed that the

Marine Corps commissioned 17 officers in FY 2005; whereas the service indicated that it 

had actually commissioned 160. We, therefore, used only service-provided data in this

report. We are developing a report that further documents these data problems and 

recommends corrective action. 

Page 5 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Results in Brief The services generally met most of their overall accession needs for newly 

commissioned officers, but the Army faces challenges accessing enough 

officers to meet its future needs. Each service must commission enough 

junior officers from its major commissioning programs (academies, ROTC, 

and OCS/OTS) each year to meet the requirements of current and future 

operations while striving to maintain an officer corps that reflects the 

racial and ethnic composition of the nation’s population. The Army did not 

meet its need for newly commissioned officer in FY 2001 and 2003 because 

it did not commission enough officers in its basic branches, or specialty 

areas, such as infantry and signal officers. However, the Army did meet its 

needs in FY 2005. In contrast, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force met 

their overall FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 officer accession needs, but each 

experienced challenges accessing specific officer groups, for example, 

flight officers. The services have also struggled to access enough 

physicians, dentists, and nurses. In addition, the services have been 

challenged to access officers of racial and ethnic minorities, particularly 

African Americans and Hispanics. Moreover, the Army expects to struggle 

with future accessions. The Army’s current approach is to first focus on its 

ROTC program and academy to meet its officer accession needs, and then

compensate for accession shortfalls in these programs by increasing OCS 

accessions. However, the Army has not been accessing enough officers 

from ROTC and USMA. Army officials stated that to meet their current 

ROTC goal they need at least 31,000 participants in the program, but in FY 

2006 they had 25,100 participants in the program. Fewer Army ROTC 

participants may reflect the decrease in Army-awarded scholarships to 

officer candidates in recent years, an outcome that Army officials attribute 

to budget constraints. Additionally, USMA’s class of 2005 commissioned 

912 graduates, short of the Army’s goal of 950, while the class of 2006 

commissioned 846 graduates, missing its goal of 900 graduates. 

Commissioning shortfalls at USMA and in the Army ROTC program, as 

well as the Army’s need to expand its new officer corps, have required 

OCS to rapidly increase the number of officers it commissions. However, 

OCS is expected to reach its capacity in FY 2007, and resource limitations 

(such as housing, classroom space, and base infrastructure) may prevent

its further expansion, limiting the viability of the Army’s traditional 

approach of using OCS to compensate for shortfalls in the other officer 

accession programs. In addition, officer accession programs are 

decentralized and do not formally coordinate with one another, preventing

the Army from effectively compensating for the shortfalls in some officer 

accession programs. For example, while Army personnel officials attempt 

to ensure that any commissioning shortfalls (program outputs) are 

covered through alternative commissioning sources such as OCS, the 

Army does not coordinate its recruiting efforts (the input to these 

Page 6 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
programs) to ensure that officer accession programs meet Army needs. 

The Government Performance and Results Act of 19937

 and the Standards 

for Internal Control in the Federal Government8

 provide federal agencies

with a results-oriented framework that includes developing a strategic 

plan that incorporates overall goals, risk analysis, and resource utilization. 

A strategic plan would give the Army greater visibility over its 

decentralized accession programs and improve its ability to address 

officer shortfalls. However, the Army has not developed a strategic plan to

manage its shrinking accessions pipeline at a time when the force is 

expanding and its needs for commissioned officers are increasing. Without 

such a plan, the Army’s ability to meet future mission requirements and 

achieve its transformation initiatives is uncertain. 

All of the services except the Army generally met their past overall officer

retention needs, but each service encountered retention challenges for 

certain specialties and ranks. The Army, which continues to be heavily 

involved in ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, faces multiple 

retention challenges, particularly among junior officers who graduated 

from its academy or received ROTC scholarships. For example, USMA’s 

continuation rate in FY 2005 was 62 percent, which was 20 to 30 

percentage points lower than the other service academies’ continuation 

rates for the same fiscal year. Since officers who received ROTC 

scholarships are eligible to leave after 4 years of service and that group 

represents the largest number of officers commissioned into the Army, 

that career point had the lowest or next to the lowest continuation rate for 

Army officers in all 3 of the fiscal years that we examined. Furthermore, 

the Army is experiencing a shortfall of mid-level officers because it 

commissioned fewer officers 10 years ago due to a post-Cold War force 

reduction. While Army officials told us that the current levels of retention 

among junior officers are consistent with historical trends, the Army 

projections show that it will have a shortage of 3,000 or more officers 

annually through FY 2013 because of actions such as recent measures to 

expand the size of the Army. These shortages suggest that the Army might 

have to retain officers at higher than historical levels to address this 

shortfall. Moreover, the Army projects that it will have 83 percent of the 

majors that it needs in FY 2007, and likewise, projects that the positions 

for majors in 14 Army general specialty areas (termed branches by the 

 7

Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993). 

8

GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

Page 7 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Army) will be filled at 85 percent or less—a level that the Army terms a 

critical shortfall. While the Army has identified steps to improve officer 

retention, these will have no immediate effect on retention. For example, 

the Army has offered new officers their choice of specialty area in 

exchange for longer service commitments, but this incentive does not 

affect officers who are able to separate. The Army has not formulated a 

strategic plan to address retention issues. However, based on its analysis 

of a survey of junior officers, which identified factors that might improve 

retention, the Army is considering a menu of incentives to increase 

retention of junior captains. Despite those analyses, the Army has not 

made a final decision on these incentives and, therefore, has not approved 

the approaches or strategies needed to meet its long-term objectives, an 

essential element in a strategic plan. While the Army is challenged in 

retaining officers, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force generally met 

their retention needs in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005; and they often had 

higher continuation rates from the academies and ROTC programs. 

Although the Navy and Air Force currently have additional flexibilities in

filling positions due to their current downsizing efforts, all services faced 

retention challenges within certain officer branches or communities and 

ranks. Finally, while the services had high retention rates for African 

American and Hispanic officers, they did not do as well retaining women. 

For example, overall, the services had lower continuation rates among 

female officers when compared with male officers for the fiscal years and 

years of service studied.

DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language 

proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome to

achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior officers. 

During the last 2 years, DOD has issued overall guidance to achieve 

greater linguistic capabilities and cultural understanding among officers in

documents such as the 2005 Defense Language Transformation 

Roadmap. Two of DOD’s broad objectives include developing a recruiting 

plan for attracting university students with foreign language skills and 

requiring that junior officers complete added language training by 2013. To 

address DOD’s objectives, the Marine Corps developed a foreign language 

training plan, while the other services are still drafting their plans. In 

addition, the service academies, among other things, have requested 

additional funding and teaching positions to improve foreign language 

training. However, there are a number of impediments that could affect 

progress, including an already demanding academic workload for academy 

and ROTC officer candidates and the ROTC’s inability to control curricula 

at the colleges and universities that host ROTC units. For example, each 

service academy requires its officer candidates to complete at least 137 

Page 8 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
semester credit hours over 4 years, in contrast to the approximately 120 

credit hours required to graduate from many other colleges. Also, ROTC 

programs do not control the languages offered at the colleges where their 

officer candidates attend classes and thus cannot ensure that candidates 

are offered languages such as Arabic, Chinese, and Persian Farsi that DOD 

has deemed critical for national security. Service officials recognize these

impediments and are in the process of developing their foreign language

training plans. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary

of the Army to develop and implement a strategic plan to address current 

and projected Army officer accession and retention challenges. In its 

review of a draft of our report, DOD partially concurred with our 

recommendations. DOD’s comments and our evaluation of them are 

discussed at the end of the letter. 

For over 30 years, the United States has relied on an all volunteer force to

defend the nation at home and abroad. Before that, the nation relied on the 

draft to ensure that it had enough soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen in 

wartime. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United 

States, DOD has launched three major operations requiring significant 

numbers of military servicemembers: Operation Noble Eagle, which 

covers military operations related to homeland security; Operation 

Enduring Freedom, which includes ongoing military operations in 

Afghanistan and certain other countries; and Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

which includes ongoing military operations in Iraq and the Persian Gulf 

area. These operations have greatly increased overseas deployments. 

Moreover, they are the first long-term major overseas combat missions 

since the advent of the all volunteer force in 1973. 

Background 

To ensure that sufficient forces are available for the services to

accomplish their missions, Congress authorizes an annual year-end 

authorized personnel level for each service component. To function 

effectively, the services must, among other things, access and retain 

officers at appropriate ranks and in the occupational specialties needed to 

enable its units to contribute to the services’ missions. The services rely on

monetary and nonmonetary incentives, where needed, to meet their 

accession and retention needs. 

The careers of military officers are governed primarily by Title 10, which 

has incorporated the DOPMA legislation, giving the services the primary 

Page 9 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
authority to recruit, train, and retain officers. Title 10 specifies the active 

duty and reserve service obligations for officers who join the military: 

• graduates of the service academies must serve a minimum of 5 years on 

active duty; and up to an additional 3 years on active duty or in the 

reserves; 

• ROTC scholarship recipients must serve a minimum of 4 years on 

active duty and an additional 4 years on active duty or in the reserves; 

and 

• other types of officers have varying service obligations (for example, 

pilots must serve 6 to 8 years on active duty, depending on the type of 

aircraft, and navigators and flight officers must serve 6 years on active 

duty). 

Similarly, Title 10 authorizes the services to directly commission medical 

specialists and other professionals to meet their needs. 

The services generally met most their past needs for newly commissioned 

officers; but the Army faces some unique problems accessing enough

officers to meet its needs and has not developed a strategic plan to 

address these challenges. The Marine Corps, Navy, and the Air Force 

generally met their needs for accessing newly commissioned officers in 

FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. However, all services experienced problems 

recruiting enough medical professionals in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005; and 

most had problems accessing racial and ethnic minorities to diversify their 

officer corps. 

Services Generally 

Met Most Accession 

Needs for Newly 

Commissioned 

Officers Despite Some 

Challenges, but Army 

Faces Unique 

Problems with Future 

Accessions 

Page 10 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Our analysis of documentary evidence confirmed9 the services’ reports 

that their accession programs generally met their officer needs in selected

recent years, but each experienced some shortfalls in certain ranks and 

specialties. The services do not develop overall yearly goals for the total 

number of commissioned officers needed. Instead, they adjust the 

enrollment in OCS/OTS throughout the year to meet higher or lower than 

expected demands for newly commissioned officers by the various 

occupational specialty groups of importance to the service. The Army and 

the Marine Corps are increasing their numbers of newly commissioned 

officers because of their growing end strengths, whereas the Navy and the 

Air Force are accessing fewer officers because they are reducing their end

strengths. 

Services Generally Met 

Most Overall Accession 

Needs for Newly 

Commissioned Officers 

But Some Shortfalls Found 

for Each Service 

The Army did not meet its overall accession needs for newly 

commissioned officers in FYs 2001 and 2003, though it met its needs in 

2005. The Army has two distinct types of commissioned officers. Most 

officers are commissioned in its basic branches or specialty areas, such as

infantry or signal, and are commissioned through major accession 

programs. The second type of officers are and those who are directly 

commissioned, such as medical professionals. In FY 2001, the Army 

needed 4,100 of these officers in its basic branches and instead it 

commissioned 3,791, in FY 2003 it needed 4,500 and instead commissioned 

4,433. In FY 2005, it exceed it goal of commissioning 4,600 of and instead 

accessed 4,654 in it basic branches. 

During those years it was increasing the number of commissioned officers 

entering the service (see table 1). Specifically, the Army commissioned 

5,540 officers in FY 2001, 5,929 in FY 2003, and 6,045 in FY 2005. In each of

the examined fiscal years, the Army’s ROTC program accounted for 

around half of all newly commissioned officers, with nearly 1,000 of those 

officers being accessed annually into the Army despite not being awarded 

a scholarship. The Army increased total accessions from FY 2001 to 

FY 2005 by nearly doubling the number of officers commissioned through 

OCS. 

 9

Our confirmations of the services’ overall ability to meet their newly commissioned officer 

needs were based on our analyses of the data and other documents that the services

provided to substantiate how well they had filled the positions designated for junior 

officers in the various occupational groups. 

Page 11 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Table 1: Army Commissioned Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, by Commissioning Program 

ROTCa

Fiscal year accessed Academy

b

Scholarship Nonscholarship OCS Direct/otherc

Total

2001 930 2,017 938 752 903 5,540

2003 878 2,132 935 1,060 924 5,929

2005 954 2,069 998 1,352 672 6,045

Source: United States Army. 

a

While Army ROTC provides officers to both the active and reserve components, the information 

listed here reflects only the officers commissioned into the active duty Army from ROTC. 

b

This category includes graduates from other service academies, such as the Merchant Marine and 

Coast Guard academies, who are commissioned into the Army. 

c

This category includes direct commissioned officers such as medical professionals, chaplains, and 

lawyers, as well as interservice transfers, returns to active duty, and officers whose accession 

sources are unknown. 

Our independent review and analysis of data and other materials from the 

commissioning sources found that the Army does not recruit officers to fill 

a specific specialty, and instead, officers are placed in general specialty 

areas based on the needs of the Army. Some general specialty areas are 

more popular than others, and the Army attempts to match an officer 

candidate’s preference to the needs of the Army. However, the service’s 

needs prevail, and some officers may be placed in specialty areas outside 

of their preferences if shortfalls are present. 

In contrast, the Marine Corps met its overall accession needs for newly 

commissioned officers for the examined fiscal years, while increasing the 

number of officers it commissioned in FY 2005 (see table 2). Increasing 

accessions by 241 from FY 2003 to FY 2005 represents about an 18 percent

increase in the number of newly commissioned officers. Relative to the

other services, the Marine Corps commissioned a larger percentage of its 

officers through programs other than the academy or ROTC program. For 

example, in FY 2005, 76 percent of the Marine Corps’s newly 

commissioned officers came from OCS or other sources. However, the 

Marine Corps has also been increasing the number of officers 

commissioned from USNA. The Marine Corps does not have a separate 

ROTC program and instead, commissions officers through the Navy ROTC 

program. 

Page 12 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Table 2: Marine Corps Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, by Commissioning Program 

ROTC 

Fiscal year 

accessed Academy Scholarship Nonscholarship OCSa

Other

b

Total

2001 168 166 21 499 495 1,349

2003 178 187 10 240 705 1,320

2005 213 148 12 460 728 1,561

Source: United States Marine Corps. 

a

OCS includes Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program and Officer Candidate Course. 

b

This category does not include direct commissioned officers in the Marine Corps, though it does 

include officers commissioned through the Marine Corps’s Platoon Leader’s Class, interservice 

transfers, returns to active duty, and officers whose accession sources are unknown. The Marine 

Corps does not directly commission officers; instead, it relies on the Navy to provide it with the types 

of professionals—such as chaplains, physicians, dentists, and nurses—who receive direct 

commissions. 

Our independent review and analysis of data and other materials from the 

commissioning sources and Marine Corps headquarters identified some 

areas where the Marine Corps was challenged to access newly 

commissioned officers for some occupational specialties. While the 

Marine Corps officials stated that they were challenged in accessing 

enough naval flight officers because officer candidates were not familiar 

with the position (which involves assisting pilots with aircraft and 

weapons systems), the service still recruited the number it needed based 

upon our examination of the data. 

The Navy also reported meeting its overall needs for commissioned 

officers during FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. Since FY 2001, the total number 

of newly commissioned officers decreased from 4,784 to 3,506, a decline of 

nearly 27 percent (see table 3). A large portion of that decrease was 

accomplished by reducing the number of officers being commissioned 

through OCS, the program that can most easily and quickly be altered to

reflect changing demands for producing commissioned officers. 

Page 13 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Table 3: Navy Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, by Commissioning Program 

ROTC Fiscal year 

accessed Academy Scholarship Nonscholarship OCS Direct/othera

Total

 2001 760 670 217 1,281 1,856 4,784

2003 812 841 73 1,018 1,295 4,039

2005 749 756 69 586 1,346 3,506

Source: United States Navy. 

a

This category includes direct commissioned officers such as medical professionals, 

interservice transfers, returns to active duty, and officers whose accession sources are 

unknown. 

Despite generally meeting its overall accession needs for newly 

commissioned officers, the Navy experienced accession challenges in 

some specialty areas. Our independent review and analysis of data and 

other materials from the commissioning sources, Navy headquarters, and 

accession programs identified some areas where there were gaps between

the numbers of newly commissioned officers needed and the numbers 

supplied to specialties by some of the commissioning programs. For 

example, USNA did not meet its quota for submarine officers in FY 2005, 

but other commissioning programs were able to compensate for the 

shortfall. Like the Marine Corps, the Navy faced a challenge in accessing 

enough naval flight officers, but the Navy met its overall need for newly 

commissioned officers by shifting the number of officers sent to that 

specialty by some commissioning sources. For example, Navy ROTC met 

its goal for naval flight officers in FY 2005 but not FY 2001 and FY 2003. 

The Navy’s OCS made up the difference in those years. According to Navy

officials, some officers who may previously have gone into this specialty

because of poor eyesight have their vision surgically corrected and instead 

become pilots. 

Like the Marine Corps and the Navy, the Air Force generally met its overall

officer accession needs for FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. As with the Navy, the 

Air Force decreased the number of newly commissioned officers in 

FY 2005 (see table 4). Specifically, the Air Force commissioned over 1,000 

fewer officers in FY 2005 than it did in FY 2003, and it is working toward a

plan to have about 9,000 fewer officers servicewide by FY 2011. The recent 

decrease in the number of newly commissioned Air Force officers was 

largely accomplished by commissioning fewer officers from OTS. Overall, 

the Air Force relied on its ROTC scholarship program for most of its 

Page 14 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
officers and provided scholarships for the vast majority of the ROTC 

officer candidates. 

Table 4: Air Force Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, by Commissioning Program 

ROTC 

Fiscal year accessed Academy Scholarship Nonscholarship OTS Direct/otheraTotal

2001 890 b281 1,628 2,473 5,922

2003 996 2,211 159 1,593 1,150 6,109

2005 918 2,330 61 790 891 4,990

Source: United States Air Force. 

a

This category includes direct commissioned officers such as medical professionals, interservice 

transfers, returns to active duty, and officers whose accession sources are unknown.

b

Air Force officials stated that the original data provided to GAO for this year did not reflect the actual 

commission rates for ROTC and have asked that we not use this data. 

Despite meeting its overall needs for newly commissioned officers, the Air 

Force encountered challenges in some specialties. Our analyses and 

discussions with Air Force accessions officials identified air battle 

manager as an area where the Air Force has been challenged. USAFA 

expected to provide the Air Force with 10 air battle managers in FY 2005, 

but instead, three USAFA graduates became air battle managers. The other 

seven positions were filled by Air Force ROTC. 

All Services Had Problems 

Accessing Officers for 

Medical Occupations 

All of the services have experienced problems accessing enough medical 

professionals, including physicians, medical students, dentists, and nurses. 

The Army, Navy (which supplies the Marine Corps), and Air Force provide 

direct commissions to medical professionals entering the service. 

Physicians. All of the services had difficulties meeting their accession 

needs for physicians (see table 5) in at least 2 of the 3 fiscal years that we 

examined. The Army and the Navy achieved 91 or more percent of their 

goals in each year studied, while the Air Force achieved 47 to 65 percent of 

its goal during the same 3 years. For each year, the Air Force had a higher

goal than the other two services but accessed fewer physicians. 

Page 15 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Table 5: Physician Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for Selected Years, by Service 

Army NavyaFiscal year Air Force 

accessed Goal Accessed Percent of goal Goal Accessed Percent of goal Goal Accessed Percent of goal

2001 391 376 96 391 395 101 547 313 57

2003 389 355 91 354 338 96 663 313 47

2005 419 416 99 317 295 93 429 280 65

Source: GAO analysis of data from services’ medical personnel offices. 

a

The Navy provides medical personnel for both the Navy and Marine Corps. 

Our review of the numbers of medical students participating in the 

services’ Health Professions Scholarship Program showed that additional 

physician-accession problems may appear in future years (see table 6). 

The services set their goals for awarding the scholarships based on their 

needs for fully trained medical professionals in the future. A medical 

student who accepts a scholarship will be commissioned into a military 

service upon completion of graduate school. While each service awarded 

scholarships to a sufficient number of the medical students who began

their 4-year training in FY 2003 and will be ready for an officer commission 

upon graduation in FY 2007, the Army and Navy did not achieve their goals 

for awarding scholarships in FY 2005, and they may not access enough 

physicians in FY 2009. 

Table 6: Physician Scholarships Awarded Compared to Service Goals for Selected Years, by Service 

Army Navya Air Force Fiscal year 

training began Goal Accessed Percent of goal Goal Accessed Percent of goal Goal Accessed Percent of goal

2001 270 271 100 300 300 100 226 247 109

2003 284 319 112 290 289 100 201 225 112

2005 307 237 77 291 162 56 191 224 117

Source: GAO analysis of data from services’ medical personnel offices. 

a

The Navy provides medical personnel for both the Navy and Marine Corps. 

Dentists. Similar to the situation with physicians, the services have been 

challenged to access enough dentists in recent years (see table 7). No 

service met its goals for recruiting dentists in FYs 2001, 2003, or 2005. Both 

the Army and the Air Force, however, accessed more dentists in FY 2005 

than they had 2 years before, and the Air Force showed improvement in 

FY 2005 over their FY 2003 accessions. 

Page 16 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Table 7: Dentist Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for Selected Years, by Service 

Army NavyaFiscal year Air Force 

accessed Goal Accessed Percent of goal Goal Accessed Percent of goal Goal Accessed Percent of goal

2001 120 101 84 147 120 82 188 97 52

2003 107 98 92 145 103 71 184 123 67

2005 125 105 84 90 81 90 204 142 70

Source: GAO analysis of data from services’ medical personnel offices. 

a

The Navy provides medical personnel for both the Navy and Marine Corps. 

Nurses. All of the services have struggled to access enough nurses (see 

table 8). Although the Navy exceeded its goal for accessing nurses in 2001, 

no service achieved its goal for any other period. In FY 2005, the services 

accessed a total of 738 of the 975 nurses (about 76 percent) that they 

needed. 

Table 8: Nurse Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for Selected Years, by Service 

Army NavyaAir Force Fiscal year 

Accessed Goal Accessed Percent of goal Goal Accessed Percent of goal Goal Accessed Percent of goal

2001 333 288 86 256 274 107 349 228 65

2003 373 323 87 235 218 93 366 265 72

2005 375 312 83 243 223 92 357 203 57

Source: GAO analysis of data from services’ medical personnel offices. 

a

The Navy provides medical personnel for both the Navy and Marine Corps. 

While some service officials have stated that medical professional 

recruiting is challenging because of concerns over overseas deployments, 

other service officials told us that it is also affected by the lack of income 

parity compared to the civilian sector. As part of the John Warner National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress approved an 

increase in the recruiting bonus for fully trained physicians and dentists, 

allowed the services to detail commissioned officers to attend medical 

school, extended the authority for undergraduate student loan repayment 

for medical professionals, increased the financial benefits student may 

receive as part of the Health Professions Scholarship Program, and 

required the services to report to Congress on this program and their 

success in meeting the scholarship program’s goals.10 Another step that 

 10Pub. L. No. 109-364, §§ 536, 538, 612, and 617 (2006). 

Page 17 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
DOD has taken to reduce the medical professional shortfalls is to convert 

uniformed medical positions to positions occupied by civilian medical 

professionals.11 In addition, DOD is considering asking for legislative 

authority to shorten the service commitment for medical professionals 

from the required 8 years of service on active or reserve duty, to 

encourage more medical professionals to join the military. However, these 

efforts have not yet been funded and their effect on medical recruiting is 

uncertain. 

All Services Had Problems 

Accessing Newly 

Commissioned Officers 

from Some Racial and 

Ethnic Groups 

All services had problems accessing newly commissioned minority officers 

to meet DOD’s goal of maintaining a racially and ethnically diverse officer 

corps.12 For every service, African Americans were a smaller percentage—

by either 1 or 2 percentage points—of the accessed officers in FY 2005 

than they were in FY 2003, but the representation of Asians/Pacific 

Islanders increased between the same two periods for every service 

except the Navy (see table 9). As points of comparison, we noted in a 

September 2005 report13 that the representation of African Americans in 

the officer corps DOD-wide was about 9 percent, as was the 

representation of African Americans in the college-educated workforce. 

Therefore, the percentages shown in the table indicate that only the Army 

met or exceeded the African-American DOD-wide and college-educatedworkforce representation levels. 

 11GAO, Military Personnel: Military Departments Need to Ensure That Full Cost of

Converting Military Health Care Positions to Civilian Positions Are Reported to 

Congress, GAO-06-642 (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2006). 

12Although women constitute around one-half of the U.S. population, they constitute a 

smaller part of the services’ officer accessions. For example, in FY 2005, women 

constituted 20 percent of the officer accessions for the Army and Navy, 6 percent for the

Marine Corps, and 25 percent for the Air Force. The National Defense Authorization Acts 

for Fiscal Years 1992, 1993, and 1994 authorized DOD to permanently assign women to 

combat aircraft and combatant ships. Since 1994, DOD policy has allowed women to be

assigned to any unit except those below brigade whose primary mission is to engage in 

direct combat on the ground. A listing of the occupational specialties that exclude women 

is available in app. IV in GAO-05-952. 

13GAO-05-952. 

Page 18 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Table 9: Percent of Officer Accessions by Race and Ethnicity for Each Military Service 

Race Ethnicity

Services, by FY White

African

American

Asian/Pacific 

Islander

American

Indian/Alaskan

Native Other

a

Hispanic Non-Hispanic

2001 76 13 4 <1 7 5 95

2003 74 13 5 <1 8 6 94

Army 

2005 74 11 6 1 9 6 94

2001 81 9 5 1 5 6 94

2003 81 9 4 <1 6 6 94

Navy 

2005 80 8 4 1 7 6 94

2001 80 6 5 1 1 7 93

2003 85 5 3 1 1 6 94

Marine Corps 

2005 82 4 4 1 1 7 93

2001 78 8 3 <1 8 2 98

2003 78 6 3 <1 13 4 81b

Air Force 

2005 70 6 5 <1 20 C C

Source: GAO analysis of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force data. 

a

For the Army and the Marine Corps, “other” consists of those who declined to respond or were 

recorded as undefined. 

b

15 percent of Air Force officers did not identify themselves as either Hispanic or non-Hispanic.

c

In FY 2005, the Air Force reported that 41 percent of Air Force officers did not identify themselves as

either Hispanic or non-Hispanic. We did not report FY 2005 Air Force ethnic data because data which 

includes a 41 percent unknown figure is not sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

Similarly, recruiting Hispanic officers has presented challenges to the 

services. In FY 2005, the Marine Corps accessed a higher percentage of 

Hispanic officers than the other services. While the Air Force accessed a 

lower percentage than the other services in each of the 2 fiscal years 

reported, it doubled its percentage of newly commissioned Hispanic 

officers from FY 2001 to FY 2003. However, this percentage of Hispanic 

officers accessed is smaller than the percentage of Hispanics in the United

States at the time of the 2000 census (about 13 percent) and the 

percentage of Hispanics in the U.S. college population (about 9 percent). 

Some ambiguity is present in interpreting the findings for racial and ethnic 

groups because of the data. For example, the Air Force findings show 

large numbers of officers for whom some data were not available. Despite 

these data limitations, service officials explained that many of their 

Page 19 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
challenges relate to the need for the services to recruit minority officers 

from the military-eligible segment of the college population. Navy and Air 

Force officials stated that their officer commissioning programs have 

more stringent entrance requirements than the other services and 

emphasize mathematics and science skills needed for the high-technology 

occupations found in their services. Officials from the commissioning 

programs in each service further noted that only a small segment of the 

African-American college population meets these entrance requirements. 

Each service operates a preparatory school in association with its 

academy to increase the pool of qualified applicants to enter its academy, 

giving primary consideration to enrolling enlisted personnel, minorities, 

women, and recruited athletes.14 Moreover, all officer commissioning 

programs, particularly the service academies, must compete with colleges 

and universities that do not require a postgraduation service commitment. 

In addition, USMA officials stated that citizenship status represented a 

barrier to improving the percentage of Hispanic officers. As of the 2000 

census, 65 percent of Hispanics were U.S. citizens.15

Army Faces Some Unique 

Future Officer Accession 

Problems 

While all of the services experienced some specialty- and diversity-related 

challenges in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, based on our review the Army 

faces some future officer accession problems not shared by the other 

services and has not developed and implemented a strategic plan to 

overcome these projected shortfalls. Our review, analyses, and discussions 

with Army officials indicated that the Army may struggle to meet its future

accession needs. While all the services are contributing forces to 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is providing most of the 

forces for these operations. Other unique stressors on the Army’s 

commissioning programs include the expansion of the Army’s officer 

corps as part of the congressionally authorized 30,000-soldier increase to 

the Army end strength and the Army’s need for higher numbers of officers 

 14GAO, Military Education: DOD Needs to Align Academy Preparatory Schools’ Mission 

Statements with Overall Guidance and Establish Performance Goals, GAO-03-1017 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2003). 

15Hispanic employment in the civilian federal workforce is similarly affected by the

educational levels and citizenship status of this group. See GAO, The Federal Work Force: 

Additional Insights Could Enhance Agency Efforts Related to Hispanic Representation, 

GAO-06-832 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 2006). 

Page 20 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
as part of its ongoing transformation effort to create more modular quickly 

deployable units.16

Notwithstanding these needs for more officers, some of the Army’s 

commissioning programs are not commissioning as many officers as they 

had in past years and are commissioning less than the Army had expected.

The Army’s current approach is to first focus on its ROTC program and 

academy to meet its officer accession needs, and then compensate for 

accession shortfalls in these programs by increasing OCS accessions. 

While Army OCS is currently meeting the Army’s needs, Army ROTC and 

USMA are not. Army ROTC, for example, experienced a decline in its 

number of participants. In FY 2006, the Army calculated that 25,089 

students would participate in ROTC. In contrast, 31,765 students were 

involved in Army ROTC in FY 2003. Army officials stated that to meet their 

current mission they need at least 31,000 participants in the program. 

Moreover, the Army uses its ROTC program for commissioning both active 

and reserve officers. Although the goal is 4,500 newly commissioned 

officers (2,750 active and 1,750 reserve) from Army ROTC in both FYs 2006 

and 2007, Army officials project that the program will fall short of the goal 

by 12 percent in FY 2006 and 16 percent in FY 2007. 

Furthermore, fewer officers may be commissioned from the Army’s ROTC

program in the future because fewer scholarships have been awarded 

recently, which Army officials attribute to budget constraints. For 

example, in FY 2003, the Army ROTC program had 7,583 officer candidates 

with 4-year scholarships; in FY 2004, 7,234; in FY 2005, 6,004. Army ROTC 

officials stated that fewer 4-year scholarship recipients means fewer newly 

commissioned officers in the future, since scholarship recipients are more 

likely to complete the program and receive their commission. Army ROTC 

officials believe that while negative attitudes toward Army ROTC are 

increasing on college campuses because of opposition to operations in 

Iraq, concerns about financing their education may make ROTC 

scholarships more attractive to officer candidates.

In addition to challenges with its ROTC program, the Army has recently 

experienced difficulties commissioning officers through USMA, and 

projections for newly commissioned officers from USMA show that these 

 16GAO, Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility 

Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans, GAO-06-745 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

Page 21 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
difficulties may continue in the future. In FY 2005, USMA commissioned 

912 officers, fewer than its mission of 950 officers. Similarly, USMA’s class 

that graduated in FY 2006 commissioned 846 graduates, short of the 

Army’s goal of 900. While the number of officer candidates who 

successfully complete the 4-year program at USMA varies, according to 

USMA data 71 percent who began the program in 2002 completed it in 

2006 and received their commission. In contrast, in both FY 2001 and in 

FY 2003, 76 percent of those who began their course of study 4 years 

earlier completed the program and commissioned into the Army; and in

FY 2005, 77 percent.17 USMA officials told us that the smaller graduating 

class in FY 2006 may be the result of ongoing operations in Iraq. The class,

which will graduate in 2010, should have an additional 100 officer 

candidates to help address recent shortfalls; however, USMA officials 

indicated that facilities and staff limit additional increases. 

Commissioning shortfalls at USMA and in the Army ROTC program, as 

well as the Army’s need to expand its new officer corps, have required 

OCS to rapidly increase the number of officers it commissions; however, 

its ability to annually produce more officers is uncertain. In FY 2006, OCS 

was required to produce 1,420 officers, and in FY 2007, the Army’s goal for 

OCS is to commission 1,650 officers, more than double the number it 

produced in FY 2001. OCS program officials stated that without increases 

in resources and support such as additional housing and classroom space, 

OCS cannot produce more officers than 1,650 officers, its FY 2007 goal, 

limiting the viability of this approach. 

Additionally, the Army’s officer accession programs are decentralized18

and lack any sort of formal coordination, which prevents the Army from 

effectively balancing the results of failure in some officer accession 

programs. USMA does not directly report to the same higher-level 

command as ROTC or OCS. While ROTC and OCS both report to the same 

overall authority, they do not formally coordinate with one another or with 

 17The service academies may graduate more students than they commission into the armed 

services of the United States because they include foreign students who return home to

their own military services. 

18While the Army, Navy, and Air Force do not have a single command and control structure

for their officer commissioning programs, Headquarters Air Force created a USAFA and 

Commissioning Programs Division in 2004 to consolidate all USAFA issues and officer 

commissioning functions under one headquarters division. This division serves as a single 

point of contact for policy issues, provides a standardized direction across officer 

accession sources, and provides USAFA support and oversight. 

Page 22 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
USMA. For example, the Army does not coordinate recruiting and 

accession efforts to ensure that accession programs meet Army accessions 

goals, nor does it use risk analysis to manage resource allocations among 

the programs. USMA relies on its own full-time recruiters and Military 

Academy Liaison Officers—reservists, retirees, and alumni who meet with 

possible academy recruits and hold meetings to provide information to 

students. Officials from Army Cadet Command,19 which does not 

coordinate recruiting efforts with USMA, stated that Army ROTC has a 

limited advertising budget that focuses on print media, brochures, and 

local print media. In addition, as we previously discussed, Army ROTC has 

experienced a decrease in its scholarship funding while the Army’s needs 

for its graduates has increased, but the Army has not conducted a riskbased analysis of resource allocations to Army officer accession programs. 

Shortfalls in Army officer accessions have been compounded by the 

decentralized management structure for the officer accessions programs, 

and the Army does not have a strategic plan to overcome these challenges. 

Army personnel officials set a goal for each commissioning program. 

While those officials attempt to ensure that any commissioning shortfalls 

(program outputs) are covered by other commissioning programs such as 

OCS, the Army does not coordinate the recruiting efforts of its various 

commissioning programs (the input to these programs) to ensure that 

officer accession programs meet overall Army needs. While the Army’s has 

identified a number of options to increase officer accessions, it does not 

have a strategic plan for managing its shrinking accessions pipeline at a 

time when the force is expanding and its needs for commissioned officers 

are increasing. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 

(GPRA)

20 and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government21

provide federal agencies with a results-oriented framework that includes 

developing a strategic plan.22 According to GPRA, a strategic plan should 

include outcome-related goals and objectives. Moreover, the Standards

emphasize the need for identifying and analyzing potential risks that could 

slow progress in achieving goals. This risk assessment can form the basis 

for determining procedures for mitigating risks. The Army recognizes that

 19Army Cadet Command manages the Army ROTC program. 

20Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993). 

21GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

22GAO, Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation for 

Achieving Greater Results, GAO-04-38 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2004). 

Page 23 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
offering more scholarships could improve its ROTC program accessions 

and has proposed increasing available scholarships. However, this is not 

part of a broader strategic plan that would realign resources to better meet 

the Army’s officer accession needs and minimize risk. Without such an 

alternative, given the decentralized management of the officer accession 

programs, and without a strategic plan that identifies goals, risks, and 

resources to mitigate officer shortfalls, the Army’s ability to meet future 

mission requirements is uncertain. 

While most of the services generally met their past officer retention needs, 

the Army faces multiple retention challenges. The Army has experienced

decreased retention among officers early in their careers, particularly 

among junior officers who graduated from USMA or received ROTC 

scholarships. Moreover, the Army is experiencing a shortfall of mid-level 

officers because it commissioned fewer officers 10 years ago due to a postCold War reduction in both force size and officer accessions. Despite these 

emerging problems, the Army has not performed an analysis that would 

identify and analyze risks of near term retention problems to determine 

resource priorities. Although the other services generally met their past 

retention needs, each faces challenges retaining officers in certain ranks 

or specialties.

23 Furthermore, each of the services had high continuation 

rates among African American and Hispanic officers, but each faces 

challenges retaining female officers. 

The Army has encountered retention challenges in the last few years, but 

the other services are generally retaining sufficient numbers of officers in 

the fiscal years that we examined. 

All Services Except 

Army Generally Met 

Past Officer Retention 

Needs, but All Face 

Challenges Retaining 

Certain Officer 

Groups

Army Faces Multiple 

Retention Challenges, but 

Other Services Are 

Generally Retaining 

Enough Officers to Meet 

Their Needs 

 23The services use different terms when discussing specialties. For example, the Army uses 

branch to refer to general specialty areas, and these areas include infantry, armor, and 

transportation. In contrast, the Navy uses the term community to refer to its general 

specialty areas, which include surface warfare, submarine, and aviation. 

Page 24 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Overall, the Army has experienced decreased retention among officers 

early in their careers, particularly junior officers who graduated from 

USMA or received ROTC scholarships.24 Additionally, the Army is currently 

experiencing a shortfall of mid-level officers and has shortages within 

certain specialty areas. It is examining a number of initiatives to improve 

the retention of its officers, but these initiatives are not currently funded

or will not affect officer retention until at least FY 2009. Moreover, the 

Army does not have a strategic plan to address these retention challenges. 

Army Faces Challenges to 

Retain Officers at Junior and 

Mid-level Ranks and Certain 

Specialties 

The Army has experienced multiple retention problems in recent years for 

officers commissioned through USMA and the ROTC scholarship program 

and for some occupational specialties despite retaining lieutenants and 

captains in FY 2006 at or above its 10-year Army-wide average. Our 

comparisons of the Army continuation rates shown in table 10 to those 

presented later for each of the other services revealed that the USMA 

continuation rates of 68 percent for FY 2001 and 62 percent for FY 2005

were 20 to 30 percentage points lower than the other academies’ 

continuation rates for the same fiscal year. Caution is needed, however, 

when interpreting cross-service findings because USNA and USAFA 

produce a large number of pilots who incur additional obligations that may 

not allow many of those officers to leave until 8 or more years of service 

have been completed. Second, a comparison of the Army’s FY 2001 and 

FY 2005 continuation rates for ROTC scholarship officers showed that 

rates decreased by 3 percentage points at years 4 and 5. 

 24Our confirmation of the services’ overall ability to meet their retention needs was based 

on our analyses of the data and other documents that the services provided to substantiate 

their needs or positions to fill, the numbers of officers available in specific subgroups, and 

continuation rates for officers by accession source, as well as occupational and 

demographic subgroups. 

Page 25 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Table 10: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Army Commissioned Officers by Commissioning Program for Selected

Fiscal Years and Key Retention-Related Years in Officers’ Careers 

ROTC Fiscal year and year of

service Academy Scholarship Nonscholarship OCS Other

a

Total

2001

Year 3 95 96 86 85 90 92

Year 4 98 74 78 90 81 81

Year 5 68 85 90 97 87 84

Year 10 91 95 95 97 89 94

2003

Year 3 99 98 90 93 88 94

Year 4 98 83 90 93 84 88

Year 5 80 90 93 98 92 90

Year 10 95 96 96 96 92 95

 2005 

Year 3 98 97 87 87 90 93

Year 4 96 71 85 88 83 82

Year 5 62 82 88 94 90 81

Year 10 94 95 96 92 91 94

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

a

This category includes direct commissioned officers in the Army, interservice transfers, returns to

active duty, and officers from unknown sources. 

Our review of the continuation rates in table 10 also revealed three other 

notable patterns. First, the total continuation rate for FY 2003 was higher

than the rate for the other 2 years, reflecting the stop-loss policy25 that 

prevented officers from leaving the Army. Second, for each source and 

fiscal year, the lowest continuation rate for a commissioning source 

typically came in the first year that officers were eligible to leave the 

military—for example, year 5 for USMA and year 4 for ROTC scholarship. 

Third, since (1) the ROTC scholarship program produces more officers 

than any other commissioning source and (2) scholarship officers are 

eligible to leave the Army at year 4, that year of service had the lowest or 

 25The stop-loss policy temporarily prevents personnel from leaving the military even when

an obligation is finished. As a result, it may artificially inflate continuation rates for the 

period when the policy is in effect and artificially deflate continuation rates for the months 

after it is rescinded. 

Page 26 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
next lowest total continuation rate for all 3 of the fiscal years that we 

examined. 

The Congressional Research Service reported that Army projections show 

that its officer shortage will be approximately 3,000 line officers in 

FY 2007, grow to about 3,700 officers in FY 2008, and continue at an 

annual level of 3,000 or more through FY 2013.26 For example, the Army FY 

2008 projected shortage includes 364 lieutenant colonels, 2,554 majors, 

and 798 captains who entered in FYs 1991 through 2002. The criteria that 

the Army uses to determine its retention needs are personnel-fill rates for 

positions, based on officers’ rank and specialty. In addition to the general 

problem of not having enough officers to fill all of its positions, the Army 

is promoting some junior officers faster than it has in the recent past and 

therefore not allowing junior officers as much time to master their duties 

and responsibilities at the captain rank. For example, the Army has 

reduced the promotion time to the rank of captain (O-3) from the 

historical average of 42 months from commissioning to the current 

average of 38 months and has promoted 98 percent of eligible first 

lieutenants (O-2), which is more than the service’s goal of 90 percent. 

Likewise, the Army has reduced the promotion time to the rank of major 

(O-4) from 11 years to 10 years and has promoted 97 percent of eligible

captains to major—more than the Army’s goal. Also, the Army is 

experiencing a large shortfall at the rank of major, and the shortfall affects 

a wide range of branches. For FY 2007, the Army projects that it will have 

83 percent of the total number of majors that it needs. Table 11 shows that 

the positions for majors in 14 Army general specialty areas (termed 

branches by the Army) will be filled at 85 percent or less in FY 2007—a 

level that the Army terms a critical shortfall. 

 26The Congressional Research Service noted that the shortfall in line officers includes 

infantry, armor, air defense, aviation, field artillery, engineer, military intelligence, military 

police, chemical, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, transportation, adjutant general, and 

finance. See Congressional Research Service, Army Officer Shortages: Background and

Issues for Congress, RL33518 (Washington, D.C.: July 5, 2006). 

Page 27 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Table 11: Army’s Projected Percentages of Overfilled and Underfilled Positions for 

Majors in Specified Specialty Areas in FY 2007 

Basic branch Percent

Infantry 107

Armor 99

Finance 98

Special forces 97

Adjutant general 96

Ordnance 88

Quartermaster 86

Signal corps 84

Field artillery 79

Aviation 77

Military police 76

Chemical 75

Engineer 74

Military intelligence 73

Air defense 66

Transportation 48

Total 81

Special branch Percent

Medical doctor 99

Chaplain 91

Army nurse 86

Medical service 82

Veterinary corps 78

Judge advocate 72

Medical specialist 67

Dentist 49

Total 85

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Numerous factors may have contributed to the retention challenges facing

the Army. Among other things, Army officials noted that some of the 

shortfalls originated in the post-Cold War reduction in forces and 

accessions. Although Congress has increased the authorized end strength

of the Army by 30,000 since FY 2004 to help the Army meet its many 

Page 28 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
missions expanding the mid-level officer corps could prove problematic 

since it will require retaining proportionally more of the officers currently 

in the service, as well as overcoming the officer accession hurdles that we 

identified earlier. Unlike civilian organizations, the Army requires that 

almost all of its leaders enter at the most junior level (O-1) and earn 

promotions from within the organization. Additionally, as part of our 

September 2005 report,27 the Office of Military Personnel Policy 

acknowledged that retention may have suffered because of an improving 

civilian labor market and the high pace of operations. Army officers may 

have already completed multiple deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan 

since the Army is the service providing the majority of the personnel for 

those operations. Another reason why the Army may be having more 

difficulty than other services in retaining its officers could be related to its 

use of continuation pays and incentives. Table 12 shows that the Army 

spent less than any other service in FY 2005 on retention-related pays and 

incentives for officers.

Table 12: Service-Specific Continuation Pays and Incentives Awarded to Officers in

FY 2005 

Dollars in thousands

Service Total

Army 13,591

Marine Corps 18,707

Navy 129,273

Air Force 202,536

Source: GAO analysis of OUSD (P&R) data. 

While the Army has identified some steps that it needs to take in order to 

improve officer retention, the actions that have been implemented will 

have no immediate effect on retention. The Army has begun guaranteeing

entering officers their postcommission choice of general specialty area

(branch), installation, or the prospect of graduate school to encourage 

retention. A number of Army officers commissioned in FY 2006 took 

advantage of this initiative, and as a result, have a longer active duty 

service obligation. For example, as of May 2006, 238 academy graduates 

accepted the offer of a longer service obligation in exchange for the Army

paying for them to attend graduate school. Although the Army believes 

 27GAO-05-952. 

Page 29 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
that these initiatives will help address future retention problems, none will 

affect continuation rates until 2009 at the earliest because servicemembers 

are obligated to stay in the Army for at least 3 years. The more immediate 

retention challenge for the Army is keeping officers with 3, 4, or 5 years of 

service, as we have identified in this report. However, these officers are 

not affected by these initiatives. 

While the Army staff reported that they are exploring numerous options 

for addressing officer retention shortfalls, Army leadership has not 

identified which options will be funded and implemented. As noted earlier 

in this report, GPRA and the Standards for Internal Control in the 

Federal Government provide a basis for developing a results-oriented 

strategic plan. Moreover, GAO’s guidance for implementing a resultsoriented strategic plan highlights the importance of for ROTC scholarship 

identifying long-term goals and including the approaches or strategies 

needed to meet these goals. Without a plan to address both its accession 

and retention challenges, the Army will not have the information and tools

it needs to effectively and efficiently improve its retention of officers in 

both the near term and beyond. 

The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force generally met their retention needs 

and had higher continuation rates from their major accession programs 

than did the Army. While the Navy and Air Force are currently undergoing

force reductions that will decrease the size of their officer corps, all three 

services face officer retention challenges in certain ranks and specialties. 

Other Services Generally Met 

Their Past Retention Needs but 

Will Face Certain Retention 

Challenges in the Future 

The Marine Corps was able to meet its overall retention needs for FYs 

2001, 2003, and 2005 by generally retaining more than 9 of every 10 officers 

at the four career-continuation points that we examined. Except for the 4-

year career mark, our analysis showed that the Marine Corps’s total 

continuation rates for all 3 fiscal years typically exceeded 90 percent (see

table 13). Officers who graduated from USNA had the lowest continuation

rates at the end of their fifth year of service, coinciding with the minimum 

active duty service obligation for that commissioning source. Likewise, 

officers from ROTC scholarship programs had lower continuation rates at 

the end of year 4. For example, in FY 2003, the continuation rate was 67 

percent; and in FY 2005, it was 79 percent. 

Page 30 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Table 13: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Marine Corps Commissioned Officers by Commissioning Program for 

Selected Fiscal Years and Key Retention-Related Years in Officers’ Careers 

ROTC 

Fiscal year and year of service Academy Scholarship Nonscholarship OCSaOther

b

Total

2001

Year 3 100 c98 95 97 96

Year 4 99 85 74 87 89 88

Year 5 88 83 100 c94 96

Year 10 91 90 50 90 89 89

2003

Year 3 100 100 c96 100 98

Year 4 99 67 93 93 96 94

Year 5 94 89 97 99 96 97

Year 10 95 92 88 90 90 91

2005

Year 3 100 100 100 88 99 94

Year 4 98 79 86 83 88 85

Year 5 86 100 83 93 96 92

Year 10 93 91 100 92 91 92

Source: GAO analysis of Marine Corps data. 

a

OCS includes Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program and Officer Candidate Course. 

b

This category does not include direct commissioned officers in the Marine Corps, though it does 

include officers commissioned through the Marine Corps’s Platoon Leader’s Class, interservice 

transfers, return to active duty, other, and unknown sources. The Marine Corps does not directly

commission officers; instead, it relies on the Navy to provide it with the types of professionals—such

as physicians, dentists, and nurses—who receive direct commissions. A certain number of officers 

are included whose accession source is unknown. 

c

The Marine Corps supplied data which exceeded 100 percent, an impossibility. According to Marine 

Corps officials, they attributed this to either missing or incorrect data entered in the first year and then 

subsequently corrected in the following years. 

Page 31 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
With a few exceptions, the Marine Corps met its retention needs and was 

able to fill critical specialties and ranks. We found that the Marine Corps 

was either under or just meeting its goal for fixed wing aviators (such as 

the junior officer level for the KC-130 tactical airlift airplane commanders 

and the AV-8 Harrier attack aircraft), rotary wing officers (at the junior 

officer level for all rotary wing occupations except one), and mid-level and 

senior intelligence, administrative, and communications officers in past 

fiscal years. Additional problems were present when we examined FY 2006 

continuation data for emerging problems. Although the FY 2006 

continuation rate averaged about 92 percent—excluding the fixed and 

rotary wing communities—the Marine Corps experienced lower than 

normal retention among combat support officers (such as administrative 

and financial management officers), combat arms officers (such as 

infantry, field artillery, and tank officers) as well as communications, 

logistics, and human source intelligence officers.28 However, FY 2007

projections for these categories of jobs averaged about a 90 percent 

continuation rate, excluding fixed wing and rotary wing communities. 

While the Navy generally retained sufficient numbers of officers in FYs 

2001, 2003, and 2005, Navy officials and our independent review of 

documents revealed some areas that were not readily apparent solely by 

reviewing the continuation rates for the total Navy and officers entering 

through each commissioning program. The continuation rate among Navy 

junior officers commissioned from USNA or OCS was 90 percent or better

in years 3, 4, and 5 of service for all 3 fiscal years studied (see table 14). 

However, officers commissioned from the Navy ROTC scholarship 

program had lower continuation rates at the end of 4 and 5 years of 

service, coinciding with their minimum active duty service obligation. 

Additionally, the Navy experienced lower continuation rates among 

officers, both overall and from each of the training programs, after 10

years of service. This lower rate at the 10-year career point may be 

partially explained because pilots incur additional obligations that may not 

allow them to leave until 8 or more years of service have been completed.

 28Marine Corps retention is comprised of three categories: releases, resignations, and 

retirements. Specifically, the Marine Corps experienced an increase in resignations, thus

contributing to lower than normal retention rates among officer communities as listed 

above. 

Page 32 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Table 14: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Navy Commissioned Officers by Commissioning Program for Selected

Fiscal Years and Key Retention-Related Years in Officers’ Careers 

ROTC Fiscal year and year of

service Academy Scholarship Nonscholarship OCS Other

a Total

2001

Year 3 100 99 86 97 93 96

Year 4 99 85 96 93 89 91

Year 5 91 85 91 90 91 90

Year 10 83 79 81 86 88 85

2003

Year 3 100 98 98 97 94 97

Year 4 99 86 94 94 89 92

Year 5 91 88 95 93 92 92

Year 10 85 86 93 94 89 88

2005

Year 3 93 93 87 93 94 93

Year 4 95 85 92 92 89 90

Year 5 90 86 87 92 92 91

Year 10 91 88 88 89 90 89

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data. 

a

This category includes direct commissioned officers in the Navy, interservice transfers, returns to

active duty, and officers from unknown sources. 

The Navy’s potential future retention challenges may be eased by the 

flexibility that the Navy gains from not having to retain officers in some 

specialties at traditional rates since it is going through downsizing. 

However, our discussions with the officials who manage the Navy general 

specialty areas (termed officer communities by the Navy) and our 

independent analyses of retention documents revealed that the medical, 

dental, surface warfare, and intelligence communities are experiencing 

junior officer losses, which can later exacerbate mid-level shortfalls. 

Moreover, several managers of general specialty areas indicated that they

were concerned about using individual Navy officers (rather than Navy 

units) to augment Army and Marine Corps units. The managers were 

Page 33 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
unable to estimate the effect of such individual augmentee assignments on 

officer retention. These deployments are longer than the Navy’s traditional 

6-month deployments and sometimes occur after officers have completed

their shipboard deployment and are expecting their next assignment to be 

ashore with their families. 

Our review of documents for FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, as well as our 

discussions with Air Force officials identified no major past retention 

problems. Except for the year 3 and 4 career points in FY 2001, the Air 

Force total continuation rates were 90 percent or higher (see table 15). 

Table 15: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Air Force Commissioned Officers by Commissioning Program for 

Selected Fiscal Years and Key Retention-Related Years in Officers’ Careers 

ROTC Fiscal year and year of

service Academy Scholarship Nonscholarship OCS Other

a

Total

2001

Year 3 100 88 91 93 76 88

Year 4 89 90 93 94 85 89

Year 5 88 92 94 95 89 91

Year 10 87 92 89 91 90 90

2003

Year 3 99 90 93 96 80 92

Year 4 91 91 93 96 86 91

Year 5 93 93 93 97 90 93

Year 10 92 91 93 93 91 92

2005

Year 3 98 85 89 96 84 91

Year 4 89 89 92 96 87 91

Year 5 92 93 94 96 89 93

Year 10 96 95 95 91 89 94

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data. 

a

This category includes direct commissioned officers in the Air Force, interservice transfers, returns to

active duty, and officers from unknown sources. 

The Air Force is reducing the size of its officer corps through a planned 

downsizing. In FY 2006, the Air Force reduced its force by about 1,700 

junior officer positions. By 2011, the Air Force plans to complete an 

approximate 13 percent reduction in the number of its officers, totaling 

approximately 9,200 officers. The Air Force plans to accomplish the 

downsizing through the use of force shaping tools such as selective early 

Page 34 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
retirement, voluntary separation pay, and other measures. Despite the 

need to retain fewer officers, the Air Force anticipates shortages in three 

specialties areas—control and recovery officers who specialize in 

recovering aircrews who have abandoned their aircraft during operational 

flights, physicians, and dentists. Staffing levels for these three specialties 

are just below 85 percent. 

While All Services Had 

High Continuation Rates 

among African American 

and Hispanic Officers, 

Each Service Encountered 

Challenges Retaining 

Female Officers 

While the services did well retaining African Americans and Hispanic 

officers, they did not do as well retaining women. The services want to 

retain a diverse, experienced officer corps to reflect applicable groups in 

the nation’s population. For the fiscal years and career points that we 

examined, African American and Hispanic officers usually had higher 

continuation rates than white and non-Hispanic officers, respectively; but 

female officers more often had lower continuation rates than male 

officers. 

When we compared the continuation rate of African American officers to 

that of white officers for a specific fiscal year and career point, our 

analyses found that the services were typically retaining African 

Americans at an equal or a higher rate than whites (see table 16). At one 

extreme, 11 of the 12 comparisons (all except for the FY 2003 3-year point) 

for the Army officers showed equal or higher rates for African American 

officers. Similarly, 8 of the 12 comparisons for both the Navy and Marine 

Corps rates as well as 6 of the 12 Air Force rates showed a similar pattern. 

Table 16: Service-Specific Continuation Rates in Percent for African-American and White Officers for Selected Fiscal Years 

Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force 

Race, by year of service 2001 2003 2005 2001 2003 2005 2001 2003 2005 2001 2003 2005

African American 

 Year 3 94 93 94 95 98 94 97 96 96 84 91 93

 Year 4 88 91 87 91 95 91 89 96 90 88 91 90

 Year 5 88 91 88 89 93 93 88 97 89 93 92 88

 Year 10 94 96 96 88 94 87 92 93 85 93 94 96

White 

 Year 3 91 94 93 97 97 93 96 99 95 88 92 92

 Year 4 80 87 81 92 92 91 88 93 84 90 91 91

 Year 5 83 89 80 90 92 91 93 96 92 91 93 94

 Year 10 93 95 94 84 88 89 90 91 92 89 92 93

Source: GAO analysis of service-provided data. 

Page 35 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Likewise, our analysis showed that the services were typically retaining 

Hispanic officers better than non-Hispanic officers (see table 17). In all 12 

comparisons of the two groups of Army officers at the four career points 

in the 3 fiscal years, the continuation rates for Hispanic officers were equal

to or higher than those for non-Hispanic officers. For 9 of the 12 Navybased comparisons and 5 of the 12 Marine Corps-based comparisons, the 

same pattern was present. While the Air Force supplied information on 

Hispanics and non-Hispanic continuation rates for only FY 2005, the same 

pattern occurred for 3 of the 4 comparisons.29

Table 17: Service-Specific Continuation Rates in Percent for Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Officers for Selected Fiscal Years 

Ethnicity, by year Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force 

of service 2001 2003 2005 2001 2003 2005 2001 2003 2005 2001 2003 2005

Hispanic 

 Year 3 92 95 95 99 97 93 92 94 94 a a93

 Year 4 89 94 89 92 91 89 85 91 88 a a95

 Year 5 90 96 88 90 93 87 95 96 87 a a92

 Year 10 95 95 95 93 92 90 78 93 86 a a97

Non-Hispanic a a

 Year 3 92 94 93 96 97 93 96 99 94 a a92

 Year 4 81 88 81 91 92 90 88 93 85 a a91

 Year 5 83 89 81 90 91 91 92 96 92 a a93

 Year 10 94 95 94 84 88 89 90 91 92 a a93

Source: GAO analysis of service-provided rates. 

a

The Air Force did not supply this information because prior to 2003 the Air Force did not collect 

ethnicity information based on officers identifying themselves as either Hispanic or non-Hispanic. 

In contrast, our analyses showed that all services encountered challenges

retaining female officers. In 11 out of 12 comparisons for both the Army 

and Navy, our analysis found that male officers continued their active duty 

service at a higher rate than female officers (see table 18). For 10 of the 12 

 29In September 2005, we recommended that the services gather data on racial and ethnic 

subgroup membership in a manner that is consistent with the required procedures set forth

by the Office of Management and Budget in 1997. We further noted that in addition to

requiring that recruits provide their racial and ethnic subgroup membership using revised

categories and procedures, DOD should also determine procedures that could be used for

updating the information on servicemembers who previously provided their racial and 

ethnic subgroup membership with different subgroup categories and questions. For more 

information see, GAO-05-952.

Page 36 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Air Force-based comparisons and 6 of the 12 Marine Corps-based 

comparisons, the same pattern was present. Furthermore, each service 

generally experienced lower continuation rates among its female officers 

compared with male officers at years 3, 4, and 5 of service. For example, 

overall, the Navy had the greatest difference in continuation rates between 

male and female officers who reached years 4 and 5 of service for all fiscal 

years studied; female officers averaged at least a 9 percentage point lower 

continuation rate than male officers. Similarly, continuation rates among 

female Air Force officers averaged almost 7 percentage points lower than 

the rate for male Air Force officers; among Army female officers, almost 6 

percentage points; and among Marine Corps female officers, almost 4 

percentage points. 

Table 18: Service-Specific Continuation Rates in Percent by Gender for Selected Fiscal Years

Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force Gender, by year of

service 2001 2003 2005 2001 2003 2005 2001 2003 2005 2001 2003 2005

Female

 Year 3 92 92 92 94 96 90 89 98 99 83 89 86

 Year 4 79 82 76 84 86 80 80 89 90 85 86 84

 Year 5 79 84 78 82 83 84 87 96 83 88 87 87

 Year 10 90 93 92 91 86 88 90 92 86 90 93 88

Male

 Year 3 91 95 93 97 97 94 96 98 94 90 92 93

 Year 4 82 90 83 93 93 93 88 93 85 91 92 93

 Year 5 84 91 82 91 93 92 93 96 93 92 95 95

 Year 10 94 95 94 83 89 89 89 91 92 90 92 95

Source: GAO analysis of service-provided data. 

Retaining women may be particularly challenging in certain occupational

specialties. For example, Navy officials explained that some female 

surface warfare officers do not view service as a surface warfare officer as

compatible with family life and have much less incentive to stay in the

Navy even when offered a continuation bonus. DOD officials stated that 

the behavior of women is different than men because of family 

considerations, and they said it is not surprising that women have different

retention patterns and behavior than men. Retaining female officers at 

lower rates than male officers in these critical years may result in negative

consequences such as having a less diverse cadre of leaders. We have

previously reported that DOD has responded positively to most 

demographic changes by incorporating a number of family-friendly 

Page 37 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
benefits; however, opportunities exist to improve current benefits in this 

area.30

DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language 

proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome to

achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior officers. 

For example, to address DOD’s foreign language objectives, the service 

academies have requested additional funding and teaching positions to 

improve foreign language training for officer candidates at the academies. 

However, time demands on officer candidates, the inability to control 

foreign language curricula at ROTC colleges, hurdles in providing language

training after commissioning, and problems in maintaining language skills 

among officers pose challenges to the services in developing a broader 

linguistic capacity. 

DOD has issued guidance and the services have developed plans to 

achieve greater foreign language capabilities and cultural understanding 

among officers. In February 2005, DOD published its Defense Language 

Transformation Roadmap which stated, among other things, that postSeptember 11, 2001, military operations reinforce the reality that DOD 

needs to significantly improve its capability in emerging strategic 

languages and dialects. In July 2005, the Principal Deputy in OUSD (P&R) 

issued a memorandum that required the services’ assistant secretaries for 

manpower and reserve affairs and their deputies to develop plans to 

achieve 2 of the Roadmap’s 43 objectives: develop a recruiting plan for 

attracting university students with foreign language skills and establish a 

requirement that junior officers complete added language training by 2013. 

Specifically, the OUSD (P&R) memo stated that (1) 80 percent of junior 

officers (O-1 and O-2) will have a demonstrated proficiency in a foreign 

language by achieving Interagency Language Roundtable Level 1+ 

proficiency; and (2) 25 percent of commissioned officers (“non-foreign 

area officers”) will have a Level 2 proficiency in a strategic language other 

Steps Are Being 

Taken to Improve the 

Foreign Language 

Proficiency of Junior 

Officers, but Many 

Impediments Could 

Slow Progress 

DOD and the Services Are 

Taking Steps to Improve 

Junior Officers’ Foreign 

Language Proficiency 

 30GAO, Military Personnel: Active Duty Benefits Reflect Changing Demographics, but 

Opportunities Exist to Improve, GAO-02-935 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2002). 

Page 38 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
than Spanish or French, with related regional knowledge.31 The February 

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review went further, recommending, among 

other things, required language training for service academy and ROTC 

scholarship students and expanded immersion programs and semesterabroad study opportunities. 

In response to the 2005 OUSD (P&R) memo and the department’s language 

objectives, the Marine Corps developed a foreign language training plan 

that discussed the costs of achieving the two objectives and offered an 

alternative proposal for planning, implementing, facilitating, and 

maintaining foreign language and cultural skills of Marine officers and 

enlisted personnel. Other services are still drafting their responses to the 

OUSD (P&R) memo and DOD’s other language objectives for officers. 

In addition, the service academies have requested additional funding and 

positions to expand the foreign language training offered to their officer 

candidates. USMA already requires all its officer candidates to take two 

semesters of a language as part of their core curriculum. Beginning with 

the class that entered in 2005 and will graduate in 2009, USMA will require 

its officer candidates who select humanities or social science majors to 

add a third, and possibly a fourth, semester of foreign language study. 

USMA is also expanding its summer immersion, exchange, and semesterabroad programs in FY 2007 to give more officer candidates exposure to 

foreign languages and cultural programs. Within the next year, USNA 

plans to expand the foreign language and cultural opportunities available 

to its officer candidates by developing foreign language and regional 

studies majors, adding 12 new regional studies instructors in the political

science department, and adding 12 new language instructors in critical 

languages such as Arabic and Chinese. Starting with the class that will 

enter in 2007 and graduate in 2011, USAFA will require certain majors to 

study four semesters of a foreign language. This change will affect about 

half of the academy’s officer candidates. The rest—primarily those in 

technical majors like engineering and the sciences—will take at least two 

 31DOD assesses language capability based on a scale established by the federal Interagency

Language Roundtable. The scale has six levels—0 to 5—with 5 being the most proficient.

The Roundtable describes speaking level 1 as “elementary proficiency,” in that the

individual has a sufficient capability to satisfy basic survival needs and minimum courtesy 

and travel requirements. The Roundtable describes speaking level 2 capability as “limited 

working proficiency,” in that an individual has a sufficient capability to meet routine social 

demands and limited job requirements. A plus is assigned when proficiency substantially 

exceeds one skill level but does not fully meet the criteria for the next level capability. 

Page 39 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
semesters of foreign language, though they currently have no foreign 

language requirement. 

Impediments Could Both 

Slow the Services’ Efforts 

to Improve Foreign 

Language Proficiency for 

Junior Officers and Lead to 

Negative Recruiting 

Outcomes 

Some service officials, particularly those associated with commissioning

programs, have identified many impediments that could affect future 

progress toward the foreign language objectives identified by DOD. These 

impediments include the following: 

• Time demands on officer candidates. Some academy and ROTC 

program officials expressed concerns about adding demands on the 

officer candidates’ time by requiring more foreign language credits. 

Each academy requires its officer candidates to complete at least 137

semester credit hours, in contrast to the approximately 120 semester 

hours required to graduate from many other colleges. Reductions in 

technical coursework to compensate for increases in language

coursework could jeopardize the accreditation of technical degree 

programs at the academies. Similarly, some officer candidates in ROTC 

programs may already be required to complete more hours than their 

nonmilitary peers. At some colleges, officer candidates may be allowed 

to count their ROTC courses as electives only. Academy and ROTC 

officer candidates in engineering and other technical majors may find it 

difficult to add hours for additional foreign language requirements 

since accreditation standards already result in students in civilian 

colleges often needing 5 years to complete graduation requirements. 

• Lack of control over ROTC officer candidates’ foreign language 

curricula. While one of the objectives outlined by the Principal Deputy 

of OUSD(P&R) indicated that 25 percent of commissioned officers 

(non-foreign area officers) will have a Level 2 proficiency in a strategic 

language other than Spanish or French, ROTC programs do not have 

control over the languages offered at the colleges where their officer 

candidates attend classes. For example, out of nearly 761 host and 

partner Army ROTC colleges, the Army states that only 12 offer Arabic, 

44 offer Chinese, and 1 offers Persian Farsi, all languages deemed 

critical to U.S. national security. Even if the ROTC programs could 

influence the foreign languages offered, additional impediments 

include finding qualified instructors and adapting to annual changes to 

DOD’s list of strategic languages. Moreover, if an officer candidate in 

ROTC or one of the academies takes a language in college based on 

DOD’s needs at that time, the language may no longer be judged 

strategic later in the officer’s career. For example, DOD operations in 

the Caribbean created a need for Haitian Creole speakers in the 1990s; 

Page 40 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
however, that language may not be as strategic today because of 

changing operational needs. 

• Language training expensive after commissioning. While language

training after commissioning may appear to be an alternative step to 

help the services achieve DOD’s foreign language objectives, the 

Marine Corps identified significant costs associated with providing 

language training after commissioning. Unlike the other services, the

Marine Corps obtains the vast majority of its officers through OCS or 

other, nonacademic sources. The Marine Corps estimated that it would 

need an end strength increase of 851 officers in order to extend its 

basic 6-month school of instruction by another 6 months and achieve 

Level 1+ foreign language proficiency for 80 percent of its junior 

officers, a stated goal in the OUSD (P&R) memo. It also estimated a 

one-time $150 million cost for military construction plus $115 million 

annually: $94.1 million for additional end strength and $21 million for 

training costs. The estimates for achieving the 25 percent goal for Level 

2 proficiency totaled an additional $163 million, largely because of the 

$104 million associated with an end strength increase of 944 officers. 

• Maintaining foreign language proficiency throughout an 

officer’s career. Although DOD offers online tools for language 

maintenance, our prior work has shown the difficulties of maintaining 

foreign language capabilities.32 We noted that DOD linguists 

experienced a decline (of up to 25 percent in some cases) in foreign 

language proficiency when they were in technical training to develop

their nonlanguage skills (such as equipment operation and military 

procedures). Proficiency could decline if officers do not have an 

opportunity to use their language skills between the times when they 

complete their training and are assigned to situations where they can 

use their skills. 

Additional foreign language requirements could also have a negative effect 

on recruiting for the officer commissioning programs. Army, Marine 

Corps, and Air Force officials expressed concern that the new foreign 

language requirement may deter otherwise-qualified individuals from 

entering the military because they do not have an interest in or an aptitude 

for foreign languages. Service officials also stated that requiring additional 

academic credits for language study beyond the credits required for 

 32GAO, DOD Training: Many DOD Linguists Do Not Meet Minimum Proficiency 

Standards, GAO/NSIAD-94-191 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 1994). 

Page 41 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
military science courses could also be problematic, particularly for 

nonscholarship ROTC officer candidates who are not receiving a financial 

incentive for participating in officer training. Since at least 63 percent of 

Army’s current ROTC officer candidates are not on a ROTC scholarship, 

officials said that increasing the language requirement could make it more 

difficult to reach recruiting and accession goals as well as the objective of

having 80 percent of junior officers with a minimal foreign language

proficiency.

At the same time, our recent reports raised concerns about foreign 

language proficiency in DOD and other federal agencies such as the 

Department of State.33 Service officials recognize the impediments to 

foreign language training and are developing plans to implement DOD’s 

initiatives. Since many of these problem-identification and action-planning

efforts began in the last 2 years, it is still too early to determine how 

successful the services will be in implementing the foreign language and 

cultural goals outlined in DOD documents such the Defense Language 

Transformation Roadmap and the Quadrennial Defense Review; 

therefore, we believe that it would be premature to make any specific 

recommendations. 

While all of the services are challenged to recruit, access, and retain 

certain types of officers, the Army is facing the greatest challenge. 

Frequent deployments, an expanding overall force, and a variety of other 

factors present Army officials with an environment that has made 

accessing and retaining officers difficult using their traditional 

management approaches. Moreover, delays in addressing its officer 

accession and retention shortages could slow the service’s implementation 

of planned transformation goals, such as reorganizing its force into more 

modular and deployable units, which require more junior and mid-level 

officers than in the past. Although the Army has begun to implement some 

steps that could help with its long-term officer needs, accessing and 

retaining enough officers with the right specialties are critical issues. 

Moreover, the limited coordination among the Army’s officer accession 

programs presents another hurdle in effectively addressing attrition rates 

at USMA, student participation in ROTC, and resource constraints for 

Conclusions 

 33GAO, State Department: Targets for Hiring, Filling Vacancies Overseas Being Met, but

Gaps Remain in Hard-to-Learn Languages, GAO-04-139 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 

2003); and GAO, Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist

Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps, GAO-06-894 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 4, 2006). 

Page 42 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
OCS. Similarly, the Army has not performed an analysis that would 

identify and analyze potential risks of continuing retention problems in the 

near term in order to determine priorities for allocating its resources. 

Without a strategic plan for addressing its officer shortages, the Army’s 

ability to effectively and efficiently set goals, analyze risks, and allocate 

resources could jeopardize its ability to achieve future mission

requirements. 

In order for the Army to maintain sufficient numbers of officers at the 

needed ranks and specialties, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and implement a 

strategic plan that addresses the Army’s current and projected accession 

and retention shortfalls. Actions that should be taken in developing this 

plan should include 

• developing an overall annual accession goal to supplement specialtyspecific goals in order to facilitate better long-term planning, 

• performing an analysis to identify risks associated with accession and 

retention shortfalls and develop procedures for managing the risks, and 

• making decisions on how resources should best be allocated to balance 

near- and long-term officer shortfalls. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 

with our recommendation. DOD’s comments are included in this report as 

appendix II.

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop and 

implement a strategic plan that addresses the Army’s current and 

projected officer accession and retention shortfalls. DOD agreed that the 

Army does not have a strategic plan dedicated to current and projected 

officer accessions and retention. DOD said, however, that the Army 

performs analyses, identifies risk, develops procedures to mitigate risks, 

and performs other tasks associated with its strategy and planning process 

for officer accessions and retention. We recognize that these are important 

tasks, however they are not sufficient to correct the Army’s current and 

future officer accession and retention problems for the following reasons. 

First, as noted in our report, these tasks are fragmented, administered in a 

decentralized manner across multiple Army offices, and lack the 

integrated, long-term perspective that is needed to deal with the Army’s 

Page 43 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
current officer shortfalls and future challenges. A more strategic, 

integrated approach would allow the Army to (1) establish long-term, 

outcome-related program goals as well as integrated strategies and 

approaches to achieve these goals and (2) effectively and efficiently 

manage and allocate the resources needed to achieve these goals. Second, 

some of these tasks are not fully developed. For example, the Army’s 

procedures for mitigating risk did not address important considerations 

such as the short- and long-term consequences of not implementing the

option and an analysis of how various options could be integrated to 

maximize the Army’s efforts. Third, with regard to funding—a key element 

in strategic planning, Army officials indicated that they hope to use 

supplemental funding to address some of the challenges that we identified, 

but they also acknowledged that supplemental funding may be curtailed.

In recent reports,34 we too noted our belief that supplemental funding is 

not a reliable means for decision-makers to use in effectively and 

efficiently planning for future resource needs, weighting priorities, and 

assessing tradeoffs. Considering all of the limitations that we have 

identified in the Army’s current approach, we continue to believe that our 

recommendation has merit and that an integrated and comprehensive 

strategic plan is needed.

DOD mischaracterized our findings when it indicated our report 

(1) asserted that Army officer accessions and retention are down and 

(2) implied that recent decreases in accessions or retention have caused 

the challenges. On the contrary, our report discussed many factors that 

contributed to the Army’s officer-related staffing challenges and provided 

data that even showed, for example, an increase in accessions from 

FY 2001 to FY 2003 and FY 2005. The first table of our report showed the 

Army commissioned 6,045 in FY 2005, an increase of 505 from FY 2001 and 

an increase of 116 from FY 2003. Also, our report provides a context for 

readers to understand that these increases in accessions would still leave 

the Army short of officers because of new demands for more officers. 

Among other things, a larger officer corps is needed to lead a larger active 

duty force and the reorganization of the force into more modular and 

deployable units. With regard to retention, our report does not state that 

overall retention is down. Instead, we document retention by 

 34GAO has previously reported on DOD’s over reliance on supplemental appropriations. See

GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional

Oversight, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9, 2007) and GAO, Global War on 

Terrorism: Observations on Funding, Costs, and Future Commitments, GAO-06-885T 

(Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2006).

Page 44 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
commissioning source, occupation, and pay grade, which revealed 

shortages that were not readily apparent at the aggregate level. Our report 

shows that the Army has experienced decreased retention among officers 

early in their careers, particularly among junior officers who graduated 

from USMA or received Army ROTC scholarships. Table 11 of our report 

makes the point by showing which types of occupations were over- and 

underfilled for officers at the rank of major. We show, for example, that 

infantry (an occupational group with a large number of officer positions) 

were overfilled (107 percent), but positions in numerous other 

occupational groups such as military intelligence (73 percent) were 

underfilled. Moreover, as with accessions, as the Army grows, it will be 

required to retain officers at higher than average percentages in order to 

fill higher pay grades. 

DOD also provided technical comments that we have incorporated in this

report where appropriate. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its 

issue date. At that time we will provide copies of this report to interested 

congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make 

copies available to others upon request. This report will be available at no

charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or other members of the committee have any additional questions 

about officer recruiting, retention, or language training issues, please 

contact me at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 

the report are listed in appendix III.

Derek B. Stewart 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 45 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 46 GAO-07-224

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Scope We limited the scope of our work to the four active duty Department of 

Defense (DOD) services: Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Also, 

we examined data for fiscal years 2001, 2003, and 2005 as well as 

projections for the current year (FY 2006 when we began our work) and 

future years. FY 2001 data represented the situations present immediately 

before the terrorist events of September 11, 2001; and FY 2005 data 

represented the most recent fiscal year for which the services had 

complete data. FY 2003 data provided information on interim conditions 

and allowed us to examine the data for trends. 

To determine the extent to which the services are accessing the numbers 

and types of commissioned officers required to meet their needs, we 

reviewed laws and DOD-wide and service-specific officer-management 

guidance, including Title 10 of the U.S. Code, including provisions 

originally enacted as part of the Defense Officer Personnel Management 

Act (DOPMA), defense authorization acts, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 

Review, and policies and directives. To gain a firm background on the 

origin and evolution of the all volunteer force, we studied information in 

books1

 on the all volunteer force as well as information published by GAO, 

DOD, Congressional Research Service, Congressional Budget Office, and 

other organizations such as RAND. We reviewed documents from and 

obtained the perspectives of officials in Office Under Secretary of Defense

for Personnel and Readiness, OUSD (P&R), services’ headquarters, 

services’ personnel and manpower commands, service academies, Reserve 

Officer Training Corps commands, and Officer Candidate Schools and 

Officer Training School commands (see table 19). The documents and 

meetings with officials allowed us to obtain an integrated understanding of

recruitment and accession procedures, the availability of newly 

commissioned officers to fill positions in the military services, and 

potential causes and effects of any gaps between the numbers of officers 

available and the numbers of positions to be filled. We obtained and 

analyzed accessions and continuation data from DOD’s Defense 

Manpower Data Center, but our assessment of the data’s reliability 

identified incorrect information that was severe enough to prevent those 

Methodology 

 1

For example, Barbara A. Bicksler, Curtis L. Gilroy, and John T. Warner, eds., The AllVolunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service (Dulles, Va.: Brassey’s, Inc., 2004). 

Military Personnel
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

data from being used for this report.2 As a result, we subsequently 

obtained accession and continuation information from the services. While 

we did not conduct independent analyses using the services’ databases, we 

did assess the reliability of their data through interviews and reviewing 

relevant documentation on service-specific databases. Comparisons of 

service-provided rates with similar information from other sources—such 

as information on the number of officer commissioned from the USMA—

suggested that the service-provided rates were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of this report. Specifically, we examined information showing 

the numbers of officers commissioned from the services’ officer programs 

during FY 2001, 2003, and 2005 for trends and other patterns and 

compared the numbers of officers accessed to staffing needs. We 

performed these comparisons with consideration for the specialty, race, 

ethnicity, and gender of the officers. 

 2

Our assessment of the numbers of officers commissioned from the various training 

programs revealed major data reliability concerns for the information that we obtained 

from the Defense Manpower Data Center. The services subsequently supplied us with 

information that showed under- and overcounts for the officers commissioned in each 

service. At the extreme, the Center’s results showed that the Marine Corps commissioned 

17 officers in FY 2005; whereas the service indicated that it had actually commissioned 160. 

We, therefore, used only services-provided data in this report. 

Page 47 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Table 19: Installations and Offices Where GAO Obtained Documentary Evidence 

and Officials’ Views Pertaining to Officer Accessions

Organization Installation or office

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, 

Arlington, Virginia 

DOD 

Defense Manpower Data Center, Seaside, California 

Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Arlington, Virginia 

U.S. Army Accessions Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia 

U.S. Army Cadet Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia 

U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York

Army Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, Georgia 

Army 

Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, West Point, New York 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Arlington, Virginia 

Navy Personnel and Reserve Commands, Millington Naval Air Station, 

Tennessee 

Navy Recruiting Command, Millington Naval Air Station, Tennessee 

U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland 

Naval Education and Training Command, Pensacola Naval Air Station, 

Florida 

Naval Reserve Officer Training Command, Pensacola Naval Air 

Station, Florida

Navy 

Officer Training Command, Pensacola Naval Air Station, Florida 

Marine Corps U.S. Marine Corps Manpower Plans & Policy Division, Quantico, 

Virginia 

Office of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Commissioning Programs 

Division, Arlington, Virginia 

Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 

Arlington, Virginia 

U.S. Air Force, Medical Recruiting, Arlington, Virginia 

U.S. Air Force Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas 

U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado 

Air Force Officer Accession and Training Schools, Maxwell Air Force 

Base, Alabama 

Air Force Officer Training School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

Air Force 

Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps, Maxwell Air Force Base, 

Alabama 

Source: GAO.

To assess the extent to which the services are retaining the numbers and 

types of officers they need, we reviewed laws and DOD-wide and servicespecific policies and directives to gain a comprehensive understanding of 

Page 48 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

officer retention. To gain a firm background on officer retention, we 

examined reports and studies by GAO, DOD, Congressional Research 

Service, Congressional Budget Office, and other organizations such as 

RAND. Additionally, we met with a number of DOD officials located at the 

services’ personnel directorates to obtain an understanding of officer 

retention missions, goals, historical trends, and projected forecasts for 

each service. We worked with DOD and service officials to identify 

differences in the metrics that each service uses to assess retention 

success, and to review proposed initiatives for enhancing officer retention 

and to address downsizing efforts. We analyzed documents from and 

obtained the perspectives of officials in the services’ headquarters, 

services’ personnel and manpower commands, service academies, ROTC 

commands, and OCS/OTS commands to obtain an understanding of 

retention, specifically whether the services are retaining the total numbers 

they needed as well as the number of officers needed in specific ranks and

specialties (see table 20). We obtained and analyzed data provided by 

service headquarters on officer continuation rates at critical years in an 

officer’s service. In our calculation of continuation rates, officers were 

considered as having continued in a year if they were on the rolls on the 

first day of the fiscal year and the last day. We, in consultation with 

retention experts from the four services, chose to examine four key points 

in an officer’s career: years 3, 4, 5, and 10. Years 3, 4, and 5 reflect the 

minimum active duty service obligation for the major accession programs, 

that is, the first year an officer could leave the active duty service through 

resignation. For example, the minimum active duty service obligation is 3 

years for OCS graduates and officers who were commissioned by ROTC 

but did not receive scholarship. Officers who received an ROTC 

scholarship have an obligation to serve 4 years, and academy graduates 

must serve at least 5 years. Additionally, some officers who receive

specialized training, such as pilots, may be obligated to serve at least a 10-

year obligation or 8 years from the completion of pilot training. We also 

analyzed continuation rates for subgroup differences broken out by 

occupation, race, ethnicity, and gender. Once we identified particular 

issues of concern to the service, such as the shortages for mid-level 

officers in the Army, we explored these issues in further detail. We relied 

on rates provided by service headquarters because of our previously cited

concerns about the Defense Manpower Data Center data. Using the data

reliability-assessment procedures discussed for our accessions work, we 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliability for the purposes of 

our report. 

Page 49 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Table 20: Installations and Offices Where GAO Obtained Documentary Evidence 

and Officials’ Views Pertaining to Officer Retention

Organization Installation or office

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, 

Arlington, Virginia 

DOD 

Defense Manpower Data Center, Seaside, California 

Army Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Arlington, Virginia 

Navy Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Arlington, Virginia 

Navy Personnel and Reserve Commands, Millington Naval Air Station, 

Tennessee 

Marine Corps U.S. Marine Corps Manpower Plans & Policy Division

Air Force Office of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Force Management Branch, 

Officer Management Policy, Arlington, Virginia 

Source: GAO.

Finally, to assess the steps taken and impediments confronting the 

services in their attempts to increase foreign language proficiency among 

junior officers, we reviewed policy materials such as the Quadrennial 

Defense Review, DOD policies and directives on officer candidate training, 

curricula for the academies, DOD and service memoranda, reports by GAO 

and others, and other materials related to language acquisition and 

maintenance by military personnel and federal employees. We obtained

additional perspectives about foreign language issues in meetings with 

DOD and service officials located in OUSD (P&R), the services’ personnel 

directorates, service academies, ROTC commands, OCS/OTS commands, 

and the Defense Language Office. In each instance, we discussed the 

training programs for officer candidates, the ongoing and proposed steps 

to increase language proficiency among junior officers, and the challenges

these programs face in providing officer candidates with the foreign 

language and training they need to serve as officers. We conducted our 

review from September 2005 through November 2006 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 50 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 51 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 52 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 53 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 54 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 55 GAO-07-224

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Derek B. Stewart, (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov

In addition to the contact above, Jack E. Edwards, Assistant Director; Kurt 

A. Burgeson, Laura G. Czohara; Alissa H. Czyz; Barbara A. Gannon; 

Cynthia L. Grant; Julia C. Matta; Jean L. McSween; Bethann E. Ritter; 

Angela D. Thomas; and Adam J. Yu made key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

Military Personnel
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September 22, 2005. 

Military Education: Student and Faculty Perceptions of Student Life at 

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2003. 

Military Education: DOD Needs to Enhance Performance Goals and 

Measures to Improve Oversight of the Military Academies. GAO-03-1000. 

Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2003. 

DOD Service Academies: Problems Limit Feasibility of Graduates 

Directly Entering the Reserves. GAO/NSIAD-97-89. Washington, D.C.: 

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DOD Service Academies: Comparison of Honor and Conduct 

Adjudicatory Processes. GAO/NSIAD-95-49. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 

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DOD Service Academies: Update on Extent of Sexual Harassment. 

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1994. 

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Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1994. 

DOD Service Academies: Further Efforts Needed to Eradicate Sexual 

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DOD Service Academies: More Actions Needed to Eliminate Sexual 

Harassment. GAO/NSIAD-94-6. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 1994. 

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DOD Service Academies: Status Report on Reviews of Student 

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Service Academies: Historical Proportion of New Officers During 

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DOD Service Academies: Academy Preparatory Schools Need a Clearer 

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Naval Academy: Low Grades in Electrical Engineering Courses Surface 

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DOD Service Academies: Improved Cost and Performance Monitoring 

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(350735) Page 57 GAO-07-224 Military Personnel
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