United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the House Armed Services 

Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations

OPERATION IRAQI 

FREEDOM 

Preliminary Observations 

on Iraqi Security Forces’ 

Logistical Capabilities 

Statement of William M. Solis, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 9:00 a.m. EST 

March 9, 2007

 

GAO-07-582T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 9, 2007

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 

Preliminary Observations on Iraqi 

Highlights of GAO-07-582T, testimony Security Forces’ Logistical Capabilities 

before the House Armed Services

Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations

The National Strategy for Victory 

in Iraq, issued in November 2005, 

implies a conditions-based linkage

between the development of the 

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the 

size and shape of the U.S. presence

there. The Department of Defense

(DOD) reported to Congress in 

November 2006 that although the 

Iraqi Ministry of Defense and 

Ministry of Interior had about 

323,000 trained and equipped 

forces, there was a serious 

shortcoming for both Ministries in

the planning and executing of their 

logistics and sustainment 

requirements. According to DOD,

without a developed logistical 

system the ISF will require

continued Coalition support. 

Today’s testimony addresses (1) 

the current state of the ISF’s 

logistical capabilities, and (2) the

challenges the ISF is facing to

achieve logistical self-sufficiency. 

This testimony contains

unclassified portions of a classified 

report that was issued on March 7, 

2007. 

GAO’s preliminary observations are

based on audit work performed

from January 2006 through March 

2007. 

Although the Ministry of Defense has an approved logistics concept in place, 

the implementation of that concept has been hampered by numerous 

challenges. For example, the development of national and regional logistics 

centers has lagged behind the development of other logistics formations 

because of manpower shortages, security issues, inadequate fuel stocks, 

poor maintenance, and funding procurement issues. DOD has asked for a 

total of $339.2 million to build and develop maintenance, warehouse, and 

base support facilities at the National Depot and for $73 million to build and 

outfit 58 dining facilities on Garrison Support Units and Regional Support 

Units. Coalition logisticians have emphasized to us that the development of 

all echelons of logistics units is crucial in order for the Ministry of Defense 

to become capable of independently sustaining its forces. Furthermore, the 

policies and procedures intended to guide implementation of the logistics 

concept have not been effectively distributed. In addition, the training of 

Iraqi logisticians and mechanics has been hindered by an insufficiency in the 

supply of Arabic-literate students, of fuel needed to power generators, and of 

cadre qualified to serve as faculty at the logistics schools. Finally, 

maintenance of the vehicle fleet poses challenges because of its diversity, 

the shortage of trained mechanics, and the Ministry’s failure to budget for 

and maintain an authorized stockage level for equipment. 

As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior has not approved the draft 

logistics concept that has been proposed by the Coalition. The reason for 

this is unclear. What is clear, however, is that since the summer of 2006, the 

Ministry has experienced significant challenges in its warehousing and 

supply, and maintenance activities. For instance, in July 2006, the Coalition 

was procuring and distributing equipment, vehicles, and weapons for the 

Ministry, in addition to funding a contractor to run warehouses and 

transport supplies to the Ministry’s facilities. These challenges have 

continued, and the Ministry remains dependent on the Coalition to operate 

its warehouse system. In February, the Ministry was supposed to assume 

responsibility for running its warehouses. However, this has not happened. 

Moreover, in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental, DOD is requesting 

approximately $175 million for the construction and sustainment of Ministry 

warehouses and maintenance depots. Another example of the Ministry’s 

continuing logistical challenges is vehicle maintenance. In August 2006

Ministry personnel were unable to maintain a certain type of American truck 

supplied to the ministry by the Coalition because its personnel were unable 

to work with the vehicles’ computerized systems. In August 2006, the 

Ministry had 1,179 trucks of this type on hand. As of December 2006, Iraqi 

mechanics remained unfamiliar with these computerized systems which are

found in most of the ministry’s vehicles. Because the Iraqi National Police 

are not able to maintain their vehicles, the Coalition has let and funded a 

$130 million Baghdad Area maintenance contract to repair these vehicles. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-582T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Bill Solis, 202-

512-8365, solisw@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss issues related to the development 

of the Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) logistical capabilities. Logistics is the 

lifeblood of any military organization. It is the process of planning, 

implementing, and controlling the efficient, effective flow and storage of 

goods, services, and related information from point of origin to point of 

consumption for the purpose of conforming to operational requirements 

and the sustainment of the operations to the successful accomplishment of 

the mission or task. The components of logistics are sustainment, 

maintenance, supply, transportation, services, and health support. 

In November 2005, the National Security Council issued the National 

Strategy for Victory in Iraq, which states that the Coalition will adjust its 

“posture and approaches as conditions evolve and Iraqi capabilities grow,” 

and that Coalition troop levels in Iraq will decrease over time as the Iraqis 

take on more responsibilities for themselves. The national strategy implies 

a conditions-based linkage between the development of the ISF, including

its logistical and other support capabilities, and the size and shape of the 

U.S. presence in Iraq. Currently, much of the discussion on the size and 

shape of U.S. forces in Iraq has focused on the relationship between 

trained and equipped Iraqi Security Forces and U.S. combat brigades. 

However, Coalition and U.S. support forces are providing extensive 

combat service support to the ISF. In February 2006, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) issued its third report to Congress, Measuring Stability 

and Security in Iraq, and stated that with the generation of regular line

infantry battalions in the Iraqi Army largely completed, the focus of the 

train-and-equip program was shifting toward building combat support and 

combat service support units. In its next report to Congress, issued in May 

2006, DOD stated that more than 65 percent of personnel in the Iraqi 

Army’s support forces had been trained and equipped and that logistics 

units were continuing to increase in capability. However, in August 2006 

DOD reported that logistics capabilities continued to be an area of 

significant concern for the Iraqi Police Service, particularly with respect to

vehicle maintenance, and that extensive support to Iraqi military forces 

was being provided by Multi-National Force-Iraq. In its most recent report

to Congress, issued in November 2006, DOD stated that although the Iraqi 

Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) had about 

323,000 trained and equipped forces, the most serious shortcoming for 

both ministries’ capabilities lay in planning and executing their logistics 

and sustainment requirements. According to DOD, fiscal year 2007 is the 

“Year of Leaders and Logistics” in Iraq. In justifying much of the $5.8 

billion in its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request 

Page 1 GAO-07-582T 
and its Fiscal Year 2008 Security Forces Fund request, DOD has pointed 

out that without the funds designated for MOD and MOI logistics and 

sustainment functions the Coalition would have to continue to support the 

ISF. 

In response to the growing interest by members of Congress, we began a 

review under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct 

evaluations at his own initiative1

 in order to provide information on the 

status and challenges of developing ISF support capabilities. To determine 

the status and challenges we reviewed relevant documents, orders, 

policies, and data that we obtained from DOD, the Department of State, 

and contracting officials. We also met with and interviewed DOD officials 

and contractor representatives in the United States and made two trips to 

Iraq, in January and August of 2006. While in Iraq we met with officials 

from the Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 

Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and Multi-National 

Security Transition Command-Iraq. During our August 2006 trip, we also 

met with Iraqi Army officials and made a site visit to an Iraqi Army training

compound and Iraq’s National Depot. We determined that the data we 

have used are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. This 

work is being done in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

Our classified report, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary 

Observations on Iraqi Security Forces Support Capabilities (GAO-07-

120C), which also includes preliminary observations on the ISF’s 

intelligence and command and control capabilities, was issued on March 7, 

2007. I will be presenting here some unclassified portions of that report, 

updated with information we obtained in December 2006 and February of

2007, on the development of the ISF’s logistical capability. We will be 

conducting further, follow-on engagement work on this subject. 

Although the Ministry of Defense has an approved logistics concept in 

place, the implementation of that concept has been hampered by 

numerous challenges. For example, the development of national and 

regional logistics centers has lagged behind the development of other unitlevel logistics formations. Coalition logisticians have emphasized to us that

the development of all echelons of the logistics concept—national and 

Summary 

 1

 31 U.S.C. § 717(b)(1) (2000). 

Page 2 GAO-07-582T 
regional logistics centers and unit-level logistics formations—is crucial in 

order for MOD to become capable of independently sustaining its forces. 

Furthermore, the policies and procedures intended to guide 

implementation of the logistics concept have not been disseminated. In 

addition, the training of Iraqi logisticians and mechanics has been 

hindered by an insufficiency in the supply of Arabic-literate students, of 

fuel needed to power generators, and of Iraqis who are qualified to serve 

as faculty at the logistics schools. Finally, maintenance of the vehicle fleet

poses challenges because of the fleet’s diversity, the shortage of trained 

mechanics, and the Ministry’s failure to budget for and maintain an 

authorized stockage level for equipment. 

As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior has not approved the draft 

logistics concept that has been proposed by the Coalition. The reason for 

this is unclear. What is clear, however, is that since the summer of 2006, 

the Ministry has experienced significant challenges in its warehousing and 

supply, and maintenance activities. For instance, in July 2006, the 

Coalition was procuring and distributing equipment, vehicles, and 

weapons for the MOI, in addition to funding a contractor to run 

warehouses and transport supplies to MOI facilities. These challenges 

have continued, and the MOI remains dependent on the Coalition to 

operate its warehouse system. In February, the MOI was supposed to 

assume responsibility for running its warehouses. However, this has not 

happened. Another example of the Ministry’s continuing challenges is 

vehicle maintenance. In August 2006 MOI personnel were unable to 

maintain a certain type of American truck supplied to the Ministry by the 

Coalition because its personnel were unable to work with the vehicles’ 

computerized systems. As of August 2006, the MOI had 1,179 trucks of this 

type on hand. According to a December 2006 DOD update, Iraqi mechanics 

remain unfamiliar with the computerized systems which are found in most 

of the Ministry’s vehicles. 

In early 2005, the Ministry of Defense and Multi-National Force-Iraq 

approved a logistics concept for the Iraqi military. Inherent to the concept 

is the generation of a variety of organizations, from the ministerial to the 

unit level. The provision of logistics support at the lowest levels is 

expected to be the purview of, first, Headquarters and Services 

Companies, which provide limited health, maintenance, supply, and 

transportation support to Iraqi Army battalion, brigades, and divisions; 

and, second, Motorized Transport Regiments, which provide additional 

transportation, maintenance, and vehicle recovery support to each of the 

Iraqi Army’s infantry divisions. Midlevel logistics support is expected to

Background 

Page 3 GAO-07-582T 
come from a national depot, five Regional Support Units (RSU), and 

numerous Garrison Support Units (GSU). The national depot, located at 

Taji, provides facilities for the receipt, storage, accounting, and issue of 

most classes of supply for the Iraqi Armed Forces, as well as the 

maintenance capability to overhaul vehicles and other equipment. RSUs 

are to provide regionally focused supply, maintenance, and contract 

support for the Iraqi military, while GSUs are to provide base support for 

each Iraqi military installation. A Support Command provides command 

and control of the national depot and RSUs, while the Iraqi Joint 

Headquarters logistics staff section provides logistics input to plans and 

orders. Finally, atop the logistics structure is the Office of the Director 

General of Acquisitions, Logistics, and Infrastructure, which is expected to

direct the overall logistical capability and the acquisition of capital 

equipment, develop ministerial policies and procedures, and manage the 

budget. The envisioned end state is a comprehensive logistics system that 

will provide maintenance, supply, transportation, medical, and garrison 

support to all elements of the Iraqi military.2

According to a December 2006 Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq assessment, the Iraqi military will be self-sufficient in the 

provision of fuel, uniforms, building supplies, and life support by 

December 2007 at the latest. Additionally, the same assessment states that 

foreign military sales will be used to attain Iraqi self-sufficiency in the 

following areas: ammunition management and handling and the training of

ammunition managers and handlers; vehicle replacement and 

modernization; the purchase and stocking of repair parts and the training 

of repair parts managers; the development of the National Depot; and the

formation of a movement coordination center and shipment of supplies. 

All of these foreign military sales cases are to be promulgated between 

March and June 2007. 

According to a Coalition document, the Ministry of Interior logistics 

system envisioned by the Coalition would enable the central government 

to procure and distribute commodities; would support both the MOI’s 

federal forces (National Police and Border Forces) and the forces based in

each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (Iraqi Police Service, Facility Protection 

Service, and Fire/Civil Defense); and would assume accountability for 

items such as vehicles, weapons, and durable equipment. 

 2

 The areas of health and garrison support are not addressed in this testimony. 

Page 4 GAO-07-582T 
The Coalition has developed this draft logistics concept for the Iraqi police 

and border enforcement forces, but as of December 2006 it had not been 

approved by the Ministry of Interior. Additionally, the Ministry is working 

together to develop a centralized maintenance concept, but that was still 

in process as of December 2006. 

Ministry of Defense Has 

Approved a Logistical 

Concept, but Its 

Implementation Faces 

Numerous Challenges 

Several challenges remain in the implementation of MOD’s logistics 

system. First, the establishment of the national depot, regional support 

units, and garrison support units has lagged behind the creation of 

Headquarters and Service Companies and Motorized Transport Regiments. 

Second, the policies and procedures to facilitate implementation of the 

logistics concept have not been effectively disseminated. Third, the 

training of Iraqi logisticians has been affected by a lack of fuel, electricity,

and personnel support for the training academy. Finally, the maintenance 

of the Iraqi military’s vehicles is complicated by the diversity of MOD’s 

fleet, the lack of trained mechanics, and the failure to budget for and 

maintain an authorized stockage level for equipment. 

The creation of national and regional logistics centers has lagged behind 

that of lower echelon unit-level organizations because preference has been 

given to the generation of lower echelon logistics organizations, 

specifically Headquarters and Service Companies and Motorized Transport 

Regiments.3

 According to Coalition officials, this makes the attainment of

MOD logistical self-sufficiency problematic. For example, the 

establishment of the National Depot has been plagued by manpower 

shortages, security issues, inadequate fuel stocks, and poor maintenance. 

Coalition officials assigned to the National Depot told us in August 2006 

that the quantity of fuel delivered there since April 2006 had been below 

that needed to support routine warehouse, maintenance, and

transportation requirements. The maintenance of forklifts, vehicles, and 

generators necessary to support day-to-day operations has suffered as well 

because of a lack of spare parts, a situation exacerbated by the variety of

makes and models of equipment used by the National Depot. Additionally, 

the infrastructure at the National Depot needs to be developed. In its 

supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request, DOD has 

asked for a total of $339.2 million to build and develop maintenance, 

Underdeveloped National and 

Regional Logistics Centers and 

the Failure to Disseminate 

Policies and Procedures Hinder 

Iraqi Logistical Self-Sufficiency 

 3

 As of December 2006, 152 of 157 authorized Headquarters and Service Companies have 

been formed and 7 of 9 Motorized Transport Regiments have been transitioned to Iraqi

control. 

Page 5 GAO-07-582T 
warehouse, and base support facilities at the National Depot. According to

DOD, if these funds are not procured, the National Depot’s construction 

will be affected and the shortfall will necessitate the continued presence 

and support of Coalition forces further into the future. In the words of one 

senior Coalition logistician, what presently exists at Taji is “a depot in 

name only.”

The standing up of the Regional Support Units and Garrison Support Units 

faces similar challenges. According to a senior Coalition official with 

whom we spoke in January 2006, all 5 RSUs were to be operational by the 

end of calendar year 2006. But as of August 2006, the Ministry of Defense 

was still in the process of forming the RSUs and all 5 had significant 

shortfalls in personnel, leadership, training, and facilities. According to 

updated information we obtained in December 2006, MOD was still 

developing the RSUs and they would not be transitioned to full Iraqi 

control until June 2007. In August 2006 MOD had not yet determined the 

exact number of GSUs to be formed, and only 5 were in the process of 

being formed. Updated information obtained from DOD in December 2006

revealed that GSU development was still in an early stage, although the 

Iraqi Joint Headquarters was taking aggressive action to accelerate the 

development of 23 GSUs. According to DOD, full transition of GSUs to 

Iraqi control will not occur until late 2007. In its supplemental Fiscal Year 

2007 Security Forces Funds request, DOD has asked for $73 million to 

build and outfit 58 dining facilities on GSUs and RSUs. Without this 

funding, DOD states that those facilities might go months or years without 

use while waiting for equipment to be delivered through the Iraqi 

acquisitions systems. According to DOD, if that were to occur the 

Coalition would not be able to diminish its support. 

Coalition logisticians have emphasized to us that the development of all 

echelons of the logistics concept is crucial in order for MOD to become 

capable of independently sustaining its forces. To that end, Multi-National 

Security Transition Command-Iraq and Multi-National Force-Iraq have

developed Logistics Action Plans that include detailed event trackers and 

delineate Coalition decision points throughout the year. Overseeing 

implementation of the Logistics Action Plans is the purview of the 

Logistics Concept Implementation Committee, an entity formed in March 

2006 to develop policies and procedures and steer their implementation. 

The Logistics Concept Implementation Committee is composed of both 

Iraqi and Coalition General Officers, and it meets fortnightly. As of 

December 7, 2006, the Logistics Concept Implementation Committee had 

produced 27 policies, procedures, and plans. However, according to DOD 

officials, MOD does not have an effective process for disseminating the 

Page 6 GAO-07-582T 
policies and procedures throughout the Iraqi military. We do not know the 

reason for this. 

Providing trained officers and noncommissioned officers to fill support 

and combat service support positions throughout the Iraqi Army is the 

mission of the Iraqi Armed Service and Supply Institute (Institute). 

However, during our August 2006 visit to the Institute we found several 

problems that negatively affected its ability to fulfill its mission. One such 

problem, according to a senior Iraqi Army official from the Institute, is 

Arabic illiteracy. At least 25 percent of the students who report for each 

course, including students from the Kurdish provinces who are literate in

their own language, are turned away because they cannot read the 

required manuals, written in Arabic.4

Training of Iraqi Logisticians 

Poses Challenges 

Quality-of-life problems also hamper training. There is not enough fuel for 

the generators that provide the power necessary to run air conditioners, 

water pumps, and other life-support functions. According to an OSD 

report, the Taji RSU, which supports the Iraqi Armed Service and Supply 

Institute, was so starved for fuel that the generators were allowed to run 

only for 12 hours out of 24. During one 24-hour period, most generators 

had no fuel at all. 

Furthermore, the number of trained Iraqis is not sufficient for training the 

number of logisticians required by the Iraqi military. As of August 2006, the 

Iraqi Armed Service and Supply Institute was staffed with just over half of 

its authorized Iraqi officer instructors. Lacking the needed faculty, the 

Institute has had to operate at less than full capacity, resulting in the 

training of fewer logistics specialists for the Iraqi Army. The reasons for 

this shortage remain unclear. 

Vehicle maintenance is another challenge that MOD faces, one 

exacerbated by the heterogeneous mixture of the Ministry’s vehicular 

fleet. This diversity evolved because the fleet was assembled variously 

from vehicles left over from Saddam’s army, MOD vehicle purchases, and

vehicle gifts received from donor countries. According to an August 1, 

2006, vehicle inventory, the Iraqi Army has 6 different types of fuel trucks, 

at least 4 of which come from different manufacturers: Nissan, Ford, KrAZ 

(Ukrainian), and MAZ (Belarusian); 21 different types of light utility 

Maintenance Is Challenged by 

Diversity of Vehicle Fleet and 

Undermined by a Lack of 

Trained Mechanics and MOD 

Budgeting for Authorized 

Stockage Levels 

 4

 As a result of the literacy problem within the country, Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq has developed a literacy course. 

Page 7 GAO-07-582T 
vehicles, including vehicles manufactured by Chevrolet, Gazelle (Russian), 

Honker (Czech), Kia, Mercedes, Mitsubishi, Nissan, and UAZ (Russian); 

and 15 different types of medium cargo vehicles, including U.S. military 

2.5- and 5-ton cargo trucks. It also has vehicles manufactured by AMC, 

Ashok Leyland (Indian), GAZ (Russian), Hyundai, Kamaz (Russian), 

Nissan, and Mercedes. According to Coalition officials, obtaining repair 

parts for such a heterogeneous vehicular fleet, especially for vehicles of 

non-U.S. manufacture, is so expensive that crews have preferentially taken

needed parts from similar vehicles awaiting repair. The result is that some 

vehicles never get repaired.5

 Furthermore, vehicle maintenance in some 

Iraqi Army units is adversely affected by the low octane rating in the fuel 

they are receiving. According to an OSD report, some units in the Kirkuk 

region are receiving fuel with an octane rating of between 70 and 78. As a 

result, fuel pumps are failing and the units are forced to change fuel filters 

every 7 to 10 days. 

As an interim solution to meet the maintenance requirements of this 

diverse fleet, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq committed 

to a national maintenance contract. According to the statement of work, 

the command’s intent was to contract the services of a maintenance 

contractor to support the sustainment of the vehicles and equipment 

issued to the Iraqi Armed Forces and to assist the Iraqi Armed Forces in 

becoming self-sufficient. To facilitate the transfer of organizational and 

intermediate maintenance tasks, the designated contractor was to be 

organized to conduct on-the-job training for Iraqi personnel. However, 

Coalition officials stated that this training regimen has not yet produced 

sufficient numbers of trained Iraqi mechanics. 

The national maintenance contract’s statement of work also requires the 

contractor to determine and maintain an adequate authorized stockage 

level for all equipment repaired, the intent being to reduce the “wait time” 

for parts. Coalition officials we spoke with in August 2006 said that 

although an authorized stockage level has been completed, updated, and 

partially funded by the Coalition, MOD has not yet budgeted for 

maintaining it once the contract expires in March 2007. Coalition officials 

fear that a failure by the Iraqis to budget for and maintain the authorized 

stockage level will result in repair part shortfalls, which in turn will have a 

 5

 According to DOD’s Fiscal Year 2008 Security Forces Fund request, a portion of the

$1,043 million it has requested for equipment and transportation will be used to purchase 

common system vehicles for MOD, with an eye toward reducing the fleet to just one or two 

systems.

Page 8 GAO-07-582T 
negative impact on equipment readiness levels. In its supplemental Fiscal 

Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request, DOD has asked for $499.6 million 

to procure recommended levels of supplies initially required to meet Iraqi 

wholesale and retail authorized stockage levels for most major classes of 

supplies. If it does not receive this funding, DOD states that the Iraqis will 

require continued support from Coalition forces.

Coalition officials have remarked that the national maintenance contract is

too expensive for MOD to continue past its March 2007 end date. Coalition 

officials told us that they have presented an alternative to the national 

maintenance contract based on foreign military sales and direct vendor 

contracts to MOD. As of August 2006, MOD had taken no action with 

regard to this alternative. However, according to a DOD official, MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq has reprogrammed some of its 

funds to extend the National Maintenance Contract beyond its March 2007 

expiration date. 

Ministry of Interior Has 

Drafted a Logistics 

Concept, but It Is Not SelfSufficient in Logistics 

As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior had not approved the draft 

logistics concept that has been proposed by the Coalition. The reason for 

this is unclear. What is clear, however, is that since the summer of 2006, 

the Ministry has experienced significant challenges in its warehousing and 

supply, and maintenance activities. Because of these challenges, the 

Ministry is dependent on Coalition support for much of its logistics 

requirements. If left uncorrected, these challenges will likely prolong the 

Ministry’s dependence on Coalition support into at least fiscal year 2008. 

In December 2006, DOD reported that the MOI warehouse system consists 

of five warehouses operated by the Coalition, one that is planned for MOI 

operation in late December 2006, and several additional warehouses at the 

headquarters of both the Ministry and its Department of Border 

Enforcement. According to DOD, each of the Provincial Directors of 

Police offices is responsible for establishing its own warehouse. 

MOI’s Warehousing and Supply 

Infrastructure Requires 

Continued Coalition Support 

and Funding 

Since the summer of 2006, MOI has depended on the Coalition and 

contractors to run its warehouses and supply much of its forces. For 

example, in July 2006, not only was the Coalition procuring and 

distributing equipment, vehicles, and weapons for MOI, it was also funding 

a contractor to run the supply distribution warehouses and provide the 

transportation assets needed to get the supplies from the warehouses to 

MOI facilities. According to a Coalition assessment, this state of affairs 

was necessary because MOI’s existing logistics capabilities were being 

overwhelmed by the force the Coalition was developing for the MOI. 

Page 9 GAO-07-582T 
These challenges have continued, and MOI remains dependent on the 

Coalition to operate its warehouse system. Although MOI was supposed to 

assume responsibility for running these warehouses, this has not 

happened. In August 2006, a Coalition-funded contractor was operating six 

warehouses for MOI, and plans called for all six to transition to MOI 

control by February 2007. However, according to an update we received

from DOD in December 2006, only one of the six warehouses will be 

transitioned to Iraqi control by February 2007. The remaining five are to

continue under Coalition control until July 2007.

Moreover, it seems that MOI’s dependence on Coalition support of its 

logistics facilities will continue into fiscal year 2008. DOD states that MOI 

requires approximately $175 million from the supplemental Fiscal Year 

2007 Security Forces Fund for the construction and sustainment of 

warehouses and maintenance depots. DOD states that without this 

funding, the Ministry will be unable to sustain its warehouses, and the 

Coalition’s significant investment in the MOI vehicular fleet, comprising 

some 19,222 Coalition-supplied vehicles, will be put at risk. In addition, 

DOD is seeking funding for MOI logistics projects in the Fiscal Year 2008 

Security Forces Fund request. 

Maintenance is another area in which the MOI continues to face 

challenges. As of December 2006, the MOI had at least two different 

vehicle maintenance concepts. The first, for provincial police forces, 

directs that vehicles be maintained at the provincial level. The second, for 

the National Police, is still in development and is expected to be based on 

a military model and centered in the Baghdad area. Although MOI is 

developing a centralized vehicle maintenance concept, as of December 

2006 this concept was not complete.

MOI Is Unable to 

Independently Maintain its 

Vehicles and Equipment 

Since the summer of 2006, MOI has faced significant vehicle maintenance 

challenges. For instance, in August 2006, Coalition officials told us that in 

Baghdad alone approximately 1,600 police vehicles were inoperable. In 

addition, MOI personnel were unable to maintain a certain type of 

American truck supplied by the Coalition because its personnel were 

unable to work with the vehicles’ computerized systems. As of August 

2006, MOI had 1,179 trucks of this type on hand.

Based on our latest information, some of these challenges have persisted. 

For instance, according to a December 2006 DOD update, Iraqi mechanics 

remain unfamiliar with the computerized systems which are found in most 

of the MOI’s vehicles. Moreover, a significant component of the MOI’s 

forces, the National Police, is unable to maintain its vehicles. 

Page 10 GAO-07-582T 
Maintenance of communications equipment is another challenge that MOI 

has faced since the summer of 2006. In August 2006, Coalition officials 

stated that there was little or no sustainment for certain types of police 

radio equipment but that plans called for MOI to fund a 12-month, $4.5 

million contract for radio maintenance and training of Iraqi 

communications mechanics. The current status of this contract is unclear.

Based on recent DOD information, we believe that the Ministry’s 

maintenance challenges will keep it dependent on Coalition assistance 

into fiscal year 2008. For instance, according to Coalition officials the 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq has established the $130 

million Baghdad Area Maintenance Contract to repair National Police 

vehicles. According to Coalition officials, the contract is currently set to 

expire in mid-2007, when MOI is supposed to assume responsibility for 

maintenance of the National Police vehicle fleet. Another example is the 

$145 million DOD is requesting to build 130 maintenance facilities for MOI.

DOD states that without this infrastructure the Ministry will not be able to 

maintain its vehicle fleet. In addition, DOD is seeking funding for MOI 

logistics projects in the Fiscal Year 2008 Security Forces Fund request. 

Furthermore, DOD has requested $27 million in U.S. funding for MOI 

communications maintenance and has stated that without this money, 

MOI’s radio networks will be severely jeopardized, its first-responder 

network will degrade and become inoperable, and it will be unable to 

assume responsibility for its national command and control network. 

The Coalition has been working steadily toward the goal of transferring 

full security responsibility to the Iraqi military and police. During our trips 

to Iraq we met with scores of dedicated military, DOD civilian, and 

contractor personnel who work daily to redress the challenges we have 

pointed out in this testimony. We believe, however, that much remains to 

be done before the ISF is logistically self-sufficient. Until that happens, the 

Iraqi Security Forces will continue to be reliant on the Coalition to provide 

the support they cannot provide for themselves. According to DOD’s 

November 2006 report to Congress, the department has increasingly 

focused on addressing these challenges by partnering Iraqi logistics units 

with U.S. units and, within MOD, embedding civilian advisors to assist 

MOD officials in developing MOD’s capacity to organize, train, equip, 

sustain, and upgrade its forces. Furthermore, the Government of Iraq has 

increasingly turned to foreign military sales to execute equipment and 

sustainment cases for both MOD and MOI. However, as we have shown, 

several challenges have to be overcome in the areas of training, 

Concluding 

Observation 

Page 11 GAO-07-582T 
maintenance, and sustainment before the Iraqis can become logistically 

independent of the Coalition. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 

prepared statement. At this time, I would be happy to answer any 

questions that you may have. 

For questions regarding this testimony, please call William Solis at (202) 

512-8365. Other key contributors to this statement were Marilyn Wasleski,

Guy LoFaro, Christopher Turner, and Cheryl Weissman. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 12 GAO-07-582T 
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