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THE NATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM:

IS ANTI-TERRORISM TRAINING FOR FIRST

RESPONDERS EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE?

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY 

PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, 

AND TECHNOLOGY

WITH THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, 

INTEGRATION, AND OVERSIGHT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 23, 2005

Serial No. 109–25

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania, 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California (Ex Officio) 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INTEGRATION AND OVERSIGHT

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California (Ex Officio) 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Peter King, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 

Science and Technology ....................................................................................... 1

The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency 

Preparedness, Science and Technology .............................................................. 2

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Management, Integration, 

and Oversight ....................................................................................................... 18 

The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Management, 

Integration, and Oversight: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .......... 21

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 7

The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania .................................................................................................... 30

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State Washington ................................................................................................. 25

The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of North Carolina ................................................................................................. 28

The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 31

The Honorable Michael McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 32

The Honorable Dave G. Riechert, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 34

The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress From the 

State Connecticut ................................................................................................. 27

The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Connecticut ....................................................................................................... 24

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

The Honorable Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner, Police Department, City 

of New York: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 8

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11

PANEL II 

Mr. Steven Edwards, Director, Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute, Testifying 

on behalf of: North American Fire Training Directors: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 45

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 47
Page

IV

Sheriff Patrick D. McGowan, Chairman, Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Committee, National Sheriff’s Association: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 49

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 51

Captain Jack Reall, National Fire Academy Board of Visitors: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 58

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 60

Mr. Shawn Reese, Analyst in American National Government, Government 

and Finance Division, Congressional Research Service: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 36

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 38 

Dr. Van D. Romero, Vice President, Research and Economic Development, 

New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 62

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 65

FOR THE RECORD 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS TO THE WITNESSES

Responses From Dr. Van Romero ........................................................................... 73 

Responses From Mr Raymond W. Kelly ................................................................ 75 
(1)

THE NATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM: 

IS ANTI-TERRORISM TRAINING FOR FIRST 

RESPONDERS EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE? 

Thursday, June 23, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, 

SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

WITH THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INTEGRATION, 

AND OVERSIGHT, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Peter King [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives King, Linder, Shays, Cox, Rogers, 

Pearce, Simmons, Davis, Dent, McCaul, Reichert, Pascrell, Meek, 

Thompson, Dicks, Norton, Jackson-Lee, Christensen, and 

Etheridge. 

Mr. KING. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology and the Subcommittee on Management, Integration and Oversight will come to order. The subcommittees are meeting today in joint session to hear testimony on 

the efficiency and effectiveness of the national training programs 

and terrorism training for first responders. 

Before we start, I would like to commend Bill Pascrell, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and 

Mike Rogers and Kendrick Meek, the Chairman and Ranking 

Member, respectively, of the Subcommittee on Management, Integration and Oversight for their leadership on homeland security 

issues. Let me again pay a special debt of thanks to my Ranking 

Member, Bill Pascrell, who has really gone out of his way to make 

sure this is a bipartisan, common effort as we work toward securing our homeland security. 

I especially want to thank them for the willingness to hold a 

joint hearing to examine the effectiveness of the Department of 

Homeland Security’s terrorism preparedness and training for first 

responders. 

Without a doubt, effective antiterrorism training is essential to 

success in the war on terror. It is simply imperative that our nation’s first responders, both public and private, learn to mesh the 

skills necessary to prevent, to prepare for and respond to and recover from acts of terrorism, especially those involving weapons of 
2

mass destruction. Training first responders, estimated to number 

over three million, will be a major feat. At a minimum, these first 

responders need to learn new antiterrorism protocols, procedures 

and nomenclature. 

In March 2004, for example, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

released a national incident management system, NIMS as it is 

commonly referred to, to establish standardized processes and procedures that first responders at all levels of government must use 

during emergencies involving multiple jurisdictions. To be effective, 

every first responder at all levels of government must learn a common language and set of procedures. If training every first responder with respect to NIMS isn’t daunting enough, how about 

training every first responder to use state-of-the-art radiological 

protection equipment, decontamination tanks, fire hazard suits, 

and other homeland security technologies. 

To address these and other daunting challenges, the Homeland 

Security Act and the President’s Homeland Security Directive 8 

gave the Office of Domestic Preparedness, ODP, responsibility for 

coordinating federal terrorism preparedness training of first responders. Again, this is no easy task. Besides ODP, other components of the Department of Homeland Security such as the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency and other federal departments 

and agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Health and 

Human Services and Justice offer first responder training courses. 

Is ODP effectively coordinating such training both inside and outside the departments? Presumably, with so many courses, there 

must be duplication and redundancy. What is ODP doing, if anything, about this problem? 

To further complicate this already complicated situation, many 

state and local governments, academic institutions and professional 

organizations also provide training to first responders. Because of 

this fact, ODP has entered into strategic partnerships and cooperative agreements with several of these training entities. Several of 

our witnesses can shed light on these relationships and these partnership agreements. Are the state and local academic and professional training entities working with ODP to sufficiently utilize 

their expertise? Is the current national training program training 

enough responders in a timely manner? If not, why and what can 

be done about it? 

So I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. I will now 

recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, the Ranking Member, 

Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The mission of the Department of Homeland Security to secure 

the nation from acts of terror obviously gives it primary federal jurisdiction for providing counterterrorism training to federal, state 

and local emergency responders. This is serious business. But the 

fact remains that training programs are varied and dispersed 

across the federal realm. Numerous federal agencies, among which 

are the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice and Transportation all maintain terrorism training for state 

and local personnel. Does this result in a confusing terrain for first 

responders? Well, it results in a confusing terrain for us. That does 

not say that first responders are confused. 
3

Is there potential redundancy in the patchwork of programs that 

exist? And are there diverging concentrations and variable competencies in the courses given? The National Strategy for Homeland Security issued in July 2002 states that the nation must develop interconnected and complementary homeland security systems that are reinforcing, rather than duplicative, and that ensure 

essential requirements are met. 

So thank you, Chairman King and Chairman Rogers, for holding 

the hearing on this critical issue. Today’s hearing is the beginning 

of a comprehensive review by our subcommittee on the nation’s 

varied first responder training programs. We will explore whether 

these programs are at time duplicative in nature; whether there exists a lack of coordination and possible redundancy; and ultimately 

if the programs are really a truly effective tool for emergency responders and personnel. 

We all know that our first responders, the firefighters, the law 

enforcement, EMS providers, are the first ones to arrive at the 

scene of any major incident and they are the last ones to leave, the 

last ones to leave. Have we met this necessary threshold that I 

spoke of a few moments ago? The current system of training may 

not be the best model for this goal. 

Today, we will hear from actual first responders and training 

providers at the state and local level. It is fitting that we have actual first responders before us today. I compliment our Chairman, 

and I say this in back of him as well as in front of him, because 

we have committed ourselves, this subcommittee, to listen to the 

first responders first before we act. I think that is critical, Mr. 

Chairman. We cannot have a top-heavy situation here because we 

will blow it in the Congress, no question about it. We will waste 

a lot of money doing it. 

I want to take a moment to publicly acknowledge Commissioner 

Kelly for the fine work he has done in New York City and for all 

the courtesies, Commissioner, you extended to our team when we 

came there for the day-long program in New York City. First, I 

want to thank you. We all understand that a vast array of 

vulnerabilities exist on our soil. You have spoken to that many 

times and about that many times. To simply put it, our first responders need to receive the proper training to respond to any and 

all possible disaster. 

Earlier this year, the committee approved legislation to speed up 

the flow of funding to local first responders and ensure that funding is targeted to those communities most at risk. 

So Mr. Chairman, thank you for having the hearing. I am anxious to hear from our witness. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. 

The gentleman from Alabama, Chairman of the Subcommittee on 

Management, Integration and Oversight. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Chairman King. 

First of all, I would like to join in welcoming our witnesses and 

thank them for taking time out of their busy schedules to be here 

today. 

Second, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say I appreciate the opportunity to join you in co-chairing this series of hearings in this 
4

subcommittee and the Subcommittee on Management, Integration 

and Oversight. 

Today, we will hear from some of the leading providers of terrorism preparedness training for first responders. We will discuss 

the effectiveness of Federal counterterrorism training programs 

and also hopefully discuss ideas as to how we can improve these 

programs. 

At our next meeting, we hope to talk with federal training officials themselves and learn more about their ongoing efforts to meet 

our growing training needs. The issue of first responder training is 

of special interest to me. In my home town of Anniston, Alabama 

we have the Center for Domestic Preparedness, or CDP, which is 

operated by the Department of Homeland Security. This important 

facility is one of the nation’s leading all-hazards training centers 

for dealing with weapons of mass destruction. 

Unlike many other training facilities, CDP provides first responders with hands-on specialized training, including the use of 

live agent chemical training. CDP is also a member of the National 

Domestic Preparedness Consortium. I am pleased to see one of 

CDP’s partners from the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology is with us today. 

Just down the road from the CDP is the Noble Training Center. 

This facility is also operated by DHS and is the only facility in the 

United States dedicated to training professionals to respond to natural disasters and acts of terrorism. The Noble Training Center 

trains approximately 3,000 professionals each year in subjects including radiological incidents, emergency response and disaster 

preparedness. We need to ensure that vital training centers such 

as the CDP and Noble have the support they need from Washington. 

At the same time, it is important that we coordinate these training programs to safeguard taxpayer dollars. Many Federal departments and agencies provide counterterrorism training programs. 

The Department of Homeland Security alone has at least five agencies that provide training. According to the Congressional Research 

Service, some of these training programs cover the same subject 

matter. This situation raises a number of management coordination issues which we hope to address today. 

I also hope we will hear from witnesses as to their views regarding the Department’s training and what more DHS can do to improve the coordination and delivery of these programs. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield back. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Chairman Rogers. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Meek. 

Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our witnesses also for being here, and my colleagues for their leadership in having this important joint meeting. 

I will be very brief in my opening statement because I believe 

that it is important that we hear from these first responders. 

I would ask all of our panelists, including panel I and panel II, 

to be as truthful and blunt as possible to tell us what we need to 

know versus what we may want to hear as it relates to our efforts 

to make sure you first responders get trained. The Management, 

Integration and Oversight Subcommittee is for the first time in the 
5

history of the House, compared to the last session, in a standing 

committee to make sure that we are hitting the bull’s eye or close 

to bull’s eye every time we are using federal dollars and making 

sure the department has both the motivation and the direction it 

needs to make sure that we protect every American and make sure 

every first responder has the equipment and training that they 

need to carry out their mission. 

So I look forward to hearing your testimony. I look forward to the 

members asking questions and your response to them to the best 

of your ability, to help us move in the direction we need to move 

in. We most appreciate it. 

Mr. Chairman, I will enter my opening statement and any additional comments for the record.

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KENDRICK MEEK, A REPRESENT- ATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FORIDA, AND RANKING MEMBER, SUB- COMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INTEGRATION, AND OVERSIGHT

In this joint hearing of the Management, Integration and Oversight, and the 

Emergency Preparedness Subcommittees, I want to thank both Chairman Rogers 

and Chairman King, for calling today’s hearing to look at the effectiveness and efficiency of first responder training programs administered and funded by the Department of Homeland Security. 

Fire, law enforcement, and emergency medical teams could easily find themselves 

on the front lines after a terrorist incident. They need and deserve the most effective and comprehensive training that the government can give them. We need to 

make sure that the kind of training they receive before an incident will allow them 

to save lives, restore calm, and reduce losses. I know that in Florida, first responders are an important part of holding together communities in the wake of natural 

disasters. 

I also know it is necessary to make sure taxpayer dollars are used in the most 

effective way possible. In our oversight capacity, we must make sure that that the 

hundreds of millions of dollars spent each year are spent wisely. What are taxpayers 

getting for their money? Are first responders actually getting the core competencies 

they need to respond to a terrorist attack? 

While the Department of Homeland Security has adopted standards for some 

types of first responder equipment, it has failed to create rules and regulations that 

provide the necessary and basic guidance that first responders need to make sure 

that they are able to operate effectively in the event of a terrorist incident. To carry 

out its mission of safety and security to this nation, the Department must provide 

training and support for states and local jurisdictions to prevent, plan for, and respond to terrorism. If the Department fails to give flexible, comprehensive training 

guidelines to first responders, it can’t fulfill that mission. 

Therefore, before we begin to discuss possible duplication, overlap or other inefficiencies in current training, we must first ask the basic questions: what kind of 

training is needed? Where are the millions of taxpayer dollars being spent? Are jurisdictions duplicating efforts? What can be done to streamline training? 

I want to thank the witnesses who will testify today. I look forward to hearing 

from Commissioner Kelly, who will discuss the training models used in New York 

City. I look forward to hearing from Mr. Edwards and Mr. Reall. These gentlemen 

can tell us about the training necessary to fulfill their special roles of reducing loss 

of life and lessening property destruction. And of course, as a former State Trooper, 

I look forward to hearing from Sheriff McGowan. I look forward to hearing from Mr. 

Reese of CRS. His work on training programs and the issues raised by federal efforts has provided a roadmap for this Committee. 

Again, thank you for calling this hearing and I look forward to working with you 

to find the best way to meet the important training needs of our first responders.

Mr. KING. Without objection. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chairman of the full committee, Mr. Cox. 

Mr. COX. Thank you to both Chairmen and both Ranking Members for convening this important hearing. 

I would also like to welcome and thank our witnesses for appearing today before this joint subcommittee hearing. Especially I 
6

would like to welcome Ray Kelly, who is already seated before us. 

He is the Commissioner of the New York City Policy Department. 

He has been and remains very much in the frontlines of the war 

on terrorism. I cannot think of anyone better prepared to help us 

address the questions of proper training in our battle with terrorists. 

Training is one of the Department of Homeland Security’s most 

important missions. Our nation’s first responders at all levels of 

government need targeted and effective training to develop and 

hone the specialized skills they need to fulfill their new homeland 

security responsibilities. Anything less is simply unacceptable. 

Training our nation’s first responders, however, is an enormous 

task. There are more than one million firefighters in the country; 

800,000 law enforcement officers; and another 840,000 EMTs, 

emergency medical technicians and paramedics. As a result, when 

it comes to first responder training, as well as so many other 

Homeland Security responsibilities, we have to make choices. We 

have to focus our resources in this case on training those first responders most at risk and on the most significant threats that our 

populations face. 

We also must ensure that to the maximum degree possible, terrorism preparedness training includes the prevention of terrorism. 

We must never fail to take advantage of opportunities to stop terrorists in the first place, even as we rightfully prepare for the 

worst. We also must make sure our federal house is in order when 

it comes to first responder training programs. The Homeland Security Act designates the Office for Domestic Preparedness, now the 

Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, as the primary agency for coordinating federal terrorism preparedness training. 

Unfortunately, coordinating federal antiterrorism training for 

first responders is easier said than done. At least seven federal departments, including the Department of Defense, the Department 

of Energy, the Department of Health and Human Services and the 

Department of Transportation offer hundreds of training courses. 

Even within DHS itself, the Office of State and Local Government 

Coordination and Preparedness has no monopoly on training. The 

Directorates for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, and Border and Transportation Security each train first responders. 

This patchwork of programs creates opportunities for duplication, 

inefficiency and confusion. Even with all of these federal training 

programs, state and local governments, academic institutions and 

professional organizations still provide the vast majority of training 

of first responders, including in partnership with DHS. 

I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to hearing the testimony of these 

training partners today with respect to the Department of Homeland Security’s programs. How effective are they? Is the department doing enough to leverage the existing state, regional and local 

training infrastructure? Does the department certify non-federal 

training courses in a timely manner? Are we training first responders in the most efficient way possible? 
7

I want to thank all of our witnesses for being with us today. I 

look forward to your answers to these and other questions about 

first responder antiterrorism training. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back my time. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Chairman Cox. 

The Ranking Member of the full committee, Mr. Thompson from 

Mississippi. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. King and the Ranking Member. 

I would like to welcome our witnesses to the hearing this morning. 

I am very pleased that we are holding this hearing today on first 

responder training programs. So far in Congress, this committee 

has held hearings on and approved legislation to reform the 

grantmaking process for first responder homeland security programs. Hopefully, we will soon conference that bill with the Senate 

and funding will start reaching the local levels where it is needed 

most. We now have an opportunity to conduct oversight on other 

aspects of preparing our first responders. 

Our nation’s first responders, whether they are law enforcement, 

firefighters or EMS providers, are the first line of defense in the 

war on terrorism. We must do all we can to ensure that they have 

the training necessary to prevent, prepare for and respond to acts 

of terrorism. 

Today, we hold the first of two hearings on first responder training programs. As we move forward with our oversight, we must ensure that the current training programs are meeting the needs of 

our first responders, and that the only way to do that is to listen 

to the first responder training community. There are several important issues and questions that must be raised about the current 

composition of our first responder training. We must consider 

whether existing training programs are as efficient as they should 

be in order to get the most bang for our buck. We must ensure that 

the training programs are delivering the training that is needed in 

the most proficient way possible. 

Related to the efficiency is the effectiveness of these training programs. The first responder community has existing training facilities at the state and local level. Our national training programs 

should utilize these state and local facilities to the maximum extent possible. I am very concerned about the lack of coordination 

among training programs and providers within DHS, as well as 

other federal training partners. 

A final area of concern that I have is the lack of training standards. The department has adopted several standards for equipment, but none for training. In many cases, these standards exist, 

but the department has not taken the step of adopting standards 

for training. Our witnesses today should be able to address these 

issues and shed light on where there is need for improvement in 

our national training programs for first responders. 

Our first responders must have the best training available, delivered in the most efficient manner possible. It is the least we can 

do to those who help and put their lives on the line to protect us. 

I look forward to hearing from all our witnesses. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 
8

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. 

Other members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to 

have two distinguished panels of witnesses before us today on this 

topic. Let me remind the witnesses that their entire written statements will appear in the record. We also ask that you strive to 

limit your testimony to five minutes. We will allow the entire panel 

to testify before questioning any of the witnesses. 

Our first panel today is Ray Kelly, the Commissioner of the New 

York City Police Department. It is a personal privilege to have 

Commissioner Kelly here today because I do not think anyone exemplifies the struggle of first responders in the war against terrorism than Commissioner Ray Kelly. Ray Kelly was a combat veteran of Vietnam. He is a retired Colonel in the United States Marine Corps. He was a New York City police officer for more than 

30 years. He was Under Secretary of the Treasury. He was Commissioner of Customs. He was Police Commissioner back in the 

early 1990s and then came back in as Police Commissioner in 2002, 

the first Police Commissioner in the history of New York to serve 

two nonconsecutive terms. 

Ray Kelly has I believe made the New York City Police Department a model in the fight against terrorism. As Bill Pascrell mentioned, last month the subcommittee went to New York. We spent 

a good amount of time with Commissioner Kelly both at his headquarters and also at the antiterrorism unit which is set out in one 

of the outer boroughs which is dedicated to fighting terrorism. I am 

sure Commissioner Kelly will detail much of this in his opening 

statement, but it really is I think a model for the rest of the country. 

Also if I could mention on a personal note, Commissioner Kelly 

talks about the fact, actually he does not talk about it, but his resume will list the fact that he has degrees from Manhattan College, 

St. John’s Law School. He has a master’s from NYU and a master’s 

from Harvard. What he does not mention is that he and I both attended St. Teresa’s Grammar School on 44th Street in Woodside. 

I think that the Dominican nuns probably taught him a lot more 

than they taught me, as the Ranking Member just said, obviously. 

Also on another personal note, not to overpersonalize this, but 

my father was a member of the NYPD for over 30 years. He was 

actually head of the Physical School at the New York Police Academy and one of his trainees was Ray Kelly. Again, both the Dominican nuns and my father taught Ray Kelly a lot better than I was 

ever taught, which is why he has attained so much. 

With that, let me just ask Commissioner Kelly in testifying, 

thank you for your appearance here today, Ray. It is a pleasure 

and a privilege. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND W. KELLY, COMMISSIONER, 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF NEW YORK 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you very much, Chairman King, Chairman 

Cox, Chairman Rogers, members of the subcommittees. Thank you 

for the opportunity to testify. 

I want to also take this opportunity to thank the members who 

visited New York earlier this month to see first-hand the extensive 
9

counterterrorism training and preparation the Police Department 

and New York City has undertaken. We greatly appreciated the 

time each of you spent with us and your constant support of the 

department’s efforts to defend the city. That includes the recent 

House legislation to distribute future homeland security funding 

based on risk. 

Is national antiterrorism training for first responders efficient 

and effective? That is the question posed by this hearing. Certainly, 

that training has benefited the New York City Police Department’s 

counterterrorism programs immensely. With the help of the training and expertise offered by the Department of Homeland Security, 

we have built up a powerful deterrent to terrorism. That includes 

sending our officers to the Center for Domestic Preparedness in 

your district, Chairman Rogers. In fact, they enjoy their time in 

Anniston quite a bit and we have difficulty getting them back. 

Building upon the unmatched size and experience and skill of the 

department’s own workforce, we have also expanded upon the foundation laid with DHS support to establish one of the premier 

counterterrorism training centers in the nation, in Brooklyn which 

you visited. In addition to our own corps of over 36,000 police officers, we have delivered training through that center to members of 

the New York City Fire Department, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Police Department, the New York State Police, the 

Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester and Rockland County Police, as well 

as police departments from Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, Virginia and even Canada. 

We train members of the U.S. Coast Guard and Park Police. We 

have brought in dozens of private security professionals from hotels, banks and other institutions to train them in better ways to 

protect their facilities. In all, over 130,000 training days have been 

hosted in our regional training center since 2002. 

We have also leveraged DHS support to expand the protection of 

critical infrastructure throughout the region. We have created the 

Threat Reduction and Infrastructure Protection Program, or 

TRIPS, as we call it, based upon the DHS model, and applied it to 

New York. We have divided critical infrastructure in to five categories and assigned a team of detectives to cover each one. These 

investigators visit facilities throughout the city, identifying 

vulnerabilities and developing comprehensive protection plans with 

site managers to prevent attacks. 

To help us conduct these assessments, we have enlisted the support of the Cooper Union, one of the foremost schools of engineering in the nation. Its expertise is well known and bomb blast analysis and mitigation strategies. We meet with Cooper Union experts 

routinely to help ensure that we devise the most secure solutions 

possible, which we then share with the private sector. 

In addition, with DHS support we have trained approximately 

12,000 of our officers in more advanced chemical, biological and radiological response. This critical instruction, otherwise known as 

COBRA Cohort training, was made possible thanks to close collaboration between the department and the Office of Domestic Preparedness. As a result, we were able to take immediate steps to 

better protect New York City from the imminent threat of a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction. 
10

The department’s Regional Training Center, our TRIPS program, 

and COBRA Cohort training are all prime examples of how we 

have capitalized on DHS initiatives, adopting and enhancing national training models to fit New York. The result is that New York 

City has never been better prepared to defend itself from a terrorist attack. 

Still, all of our preparations come at a steep price, about $178 

million per year to maintain our daily counterterrorism and intelligence activities. I want to emphasize these are ongoing operational costs to defend the city. In addition, there are the opportunity costs involved in our reassignment of 1,000 police officers to 

counterterrorism duties. While the federal government provides 

vital assistance for training, equipment and overtime, we still have 

huge expenses to cover. 

For example, the government allows us to redirect a portion of 

homeland security funds to offset overtime costs incurred during 

periods of national orange alert. Last year, there was a total of 111 

national orange alert days, an unusually high number, most of 

which came after the discovery that al-Qa’ida has targeted key U.S. 

financial institutions. In 2003 by comparison, there were 72 days 

of orange alert, but for the Police Department protecting a city in 

the crosshairs like New York is a year-round venture. 

Even considering an unusual year like 2004, we were still left 

with 254 days during which to maintain a high-visibility deterrent, 

mostly out of our own overtime budget. While today’s hearing is focused on training for first responders, I also believe we need to 

place equal, if not greater, funding emphasis on first preventers. 

By that, I mean additional resources for the analysts and intelligence operatives who can alert us to a terrorist attack in the making, and also our ongoing operational costs that I mentioned previously. 

Last August, the Police Department foiled a plan by hometown 

Muslim extremists to bomb the Herald Square subway station in 

midtown Manhattan. We arrested those suspects just a week before 

the Republican National Convention, with the help of a confidential 

informant we had developed in the community. We continue to put 

a lot of resources into the field to protect New York against another 

attack. In the future, I believe we will require more and better intelligence as we did in the Herald Square case to stop terrorist 

plots in the making. 

The terrorists, too, are working hard to improve their operational 

capability, and we have to stay ahead of them. Accordingly, we 

need federal funding to support a comprehensive program of developing investigative skills that includes both analytical and operational personnel, certainly for the larger U.S. cities that are being 

targeted. 

What kind of initiative would this include? As is the case with 

first responder training, we need the federal government’s expertise to train qualified intelligence analysts and investigators for the 

Police Department. We need support to sharpen our analysts’ skills 

in conducting link analysis and terrorist group identification, improving their ability to identify intelligence gaps faster and honein quickly on what we need to know. 
11

Instruction of our investigative personnel in debriefing skills. 

The Police Department with its own limited budget has already 

begun to develop these analytical and investigative capacities. We 

have hired a cadre of trained civilian intelligence analysts to take 

raw information gathered from informants and undercover agents 

in the field and translate it into valuable real-time reporting for 

our commanders. Again, we are doing all of this out of our own 

pocket right now. We want to do more of it and do it better with 

the federal government’s support and expertise. 

Some may question the federal government’s obligation to support these local activities, or even the Police Department’s right to 

carry them out. In response, I would draw an analogy to the national fight against the illegal drug trade. With so much ground to 

cover, local police agencies must play an integral part in supporting 

the effort to stem the flow of narcotics across national borders and 

into our cities. That includes the development of undercover drug 

agents and intelligence specialists. Far from competing with federal 

counterparts, these local assets are an indispensable force multiplier. We must take the same multi-pronged approach when it 

comes to rooting out terrorists. 

One final issue: The Police Department needs the ability to selfcertify the training courses we develop internally to meet the needs 

to a unique urban environment like New York. Self-certification 

would allow us to save valuable time in delivering vital new training otherwise spent on the DHS grant approval process. I want to 

emphasize that under self-certification, the department will continue to work closely with DHS and the Office of Domestic Preparedness in upholding training standards that are second to none. 

In fact, the precedent already exists in the creation of our advanced 

COBRA Cohort training curriculum. 

Defending a vast nation against terrorism is an infinitely complex challenge, yet it is one the Police Department is positioned to 

help our federal government carry out, but we must have adequate 

resources to do the job. We must have federal funding for first responders and preventers alike and the authority to expedite their 

training, and we must hurry. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I look forward to 

any questions you might have. 

[The statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]

PREPARD STATEMENT OF RAYMOND W. KELLY

Chairman King, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Pascrell, Ranking Member 

Meek and Members of the Committees, thank you for this opportunity to testify. 

Before I begin, I want to thank Chairman Cox and Chairman King for visiting 

New York recently to observe some of our facilities first hand. I would also like to 

thank them for shepherding through legislation that recently passed in the House. 

Homeland Security funding must be distributed based upon one criterion, and one 

criterion only: the risk posed by terrorism. This legislation would move Homeland 

Security Grant programs in that direction. 

In the meantime, I am encouraged that the House Committee on Appropriations 

has directed that the distribution of State Homeland Security Grants be based upon 

threat, once a minimum distribution has been allocated to each state. This, too, is 

a step in the right direction. But I would encourage the Congress to restore the almost $400 million cut that was made to homeland security money to be made available to state and local governments in the coming year. 

To turn to the topic at hand, ‘‘Is National Anti-Terrorism Training for First Responders Efficient and Effective?’’ Certainly, that training has benefited the Police 
12

Department’s counter-terrorism programs immensely. With the help of the training 

and expertise offered by the Department of Homeland Security, we have built up 

a powerful deterrent to terrorism. 

While today’s hearing is focused on training for first responders, I also believe we 

need to place equal, if not greater funding emphasis on ‘‘first preventers.’’ By that 

I mean additional resources for the analysts and intelligence operatives who can tip 

us off to a terrorist attack in the making. 

Let me start by providing some context. New York City has been the prime target 

of terrorists since the early 1990’s. In 1993, Islamic militants drove a rental truck 

packed with explosives into the basement garage of the World Trade Center, intent 

on bringing down at least one of the towers. The explosion resulted in the loss of 

innocent life, serious injury and considerable damage to a portion of the tower. Between 1993 and 2001 there were conspiracies to destroy the Holland and Lincoln 

Tunnels, the George Washington Bridge, the United Nations and the main Federal 

building in lower Manhattan, as well as a plot to bomb the subway system. The subway plot was foiled at the last minute by the New York City police officers who 

broke down the door of two Palestinians who were putting the finishing touches on 

the device. Those conspirators are in federal prison. 

After al-Qa’ida failed to bring down the Twin Towers in 1993, they waited patiently and tried again eight years later. Their philosophy is to return to the same 

place over and over, until they accomplish their evil goal. However, the threat did 

not stop when the two towers of the World Trade Center, and the many other buildings in that complex, came crashing down on September 11th. In February of 2003, 

an al-Qa’ida operative named Iyman Faris was in New York City on a mission to 

destroy the Brooklyn Bridge. He is the same man who fought alongside Osama Bin 

Laden, who engaged in a battle which included the wholesale slaughter of Russian 

prisoners, and who helped supply al-Qa’ida fighters with sleeping bags, airline tickets, cash and cell phones. Nearly two years after the destruction of the World Trade 

Center, Iyman Faris was in New York City conducting surveillance on the bridge. 

Faris abandoned his plan and reported back to his handlers that it was not possible 

to target the bridge because of our increased security measures. He, too, is presently 

serving time in federal prison. 

The highly visible security that the New York City Police Department had in 

place on the Brooklyn Bridge, in addition to the unseen protection, paid off in the 

Faris case. Faris was not the last of the militant operatives, however, actively plotting attacks against New York City since September 11th. Shortly before the Republican National Convention last year in New York City, our detectives arrested two, 

homegrown jihadists who were plotting to attack the Herald Square subway station 

at 34th Street and Sixth Avenue. We arrested those suspects with the help of a confidential informant we had developed in the community. This heavily traveled, midtown-Manhattan station sits in front of the Macy’s flagship store and is also located 

one block away from the site of the Republican National Convention at Madison 

Square Garden. These two individuals are awaiting trial. 

We continue to put a lot of resources into the field to protect New York against 

another attack. But in the future, I believe we will require intelligence like we did 

in the Herald Square case to stop terrorist plots in the making. We need federal 

funding to support a comprehensive program of intelligence capability that includes 

both analytical and operational personnel, certainly for the larger U.S. cities that 

are being targeted. What kind of initiatives would this include? 

As is the case with first responder training, we need the federal government’s expertise to train qualified intelligence analysts and operatives for the Police Department. 

We need that support in the following ways. 

One: Sharpening the analysts’ skills in conducting link analysis and terrorist 

group identification. 

Two: Improving their ability to identify intelligence gaps faster and hone in quickly on what we need to know. And, 

Three: Instruction of our investigative personnel in debriefing skills. 

The Police Department, within its limited budget, has already begun to develop 

these analytical and investigative capacities. For example, we are identifying and 

monitoring extremists who are willing to perpetrate or provide material support for 

acts of terror. We have also hired a cadre of trained civilian intelligence analysts 

to take raw information gathered from informants and undercover agents in the 

field and translate it into valuable, real-time reporting for our commanders. Again, 

we are doing all of this out of our own pockets right now. We want to do more of 

it, and do it better, with the federal government’s support and expertise. 

Some may question the government’s obligation to support these activities, or 

even the Police Department’s right to carry them out. In response, I would draw 
13

an analogy to the national fight against the illegal drug trade. With so much ground 

to cover, local police agencies must play an integral part in supporting the effort 

to stem the flow of narcotics across national borders and into our cities. That includes the development of undercover drug agents and intelligence specialists. Far 

from competing with federal counterparts, these local assets are an indispensable 

force multiplier. We must take the same multi-pronged approach when it comes to 

rooting out terrorists. 

Our measures include dedicating one thousand police officers exclusively to 

counter-terrorism duties. We created a new Counter Terrorism Bureau, the first of 

its kind for a big city police department. We assigned over 250 officers to that Bureau, including the posting of 120 detectives the Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTTF) 

with the FBI. That compares to 17 detectives assigned to the JTTF on September 

11th. 

We dramatically expanded the role of our Intelligence Division. We are conducting 

around-the-clock threat assessments, and integrating this real-time information into 

daily decisions about where to place resources and personnel. We brought in outstanding individuals from outside the Department to lead our intelligence and 

counter-terrorism functions. They have decades of CIA, counter terrorism and national security experience. 

Drawing upon the unmatched size, experience, and skill of the Police Department’s own workforce, we have also expanded upon the foundation laid with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) support to establish one of the premier counterterrorism training centers in the nation in Brooklyn, which you visited. We staffed 

that center with police officers who speak Farsi, Urdu, Arabic, and Pashto among 

other strategic languages. They help us monitor global intelligence. We also hired 

a cadre of trained civilian analysts to scrutinize and investigate intelligence data. 

We have established a new intelligence liaison program, assigning New York City 

detectives to 7 cities in 5 foreign countries to enhance our relationships with the 

police agencies of other nations. 

At home, we are engaged in extensive training, and we are conducting drills on 

a daily basis. We send our Hercules teams, comprised of specially trained officers 

with heavy weapons, to make unannounced visits to sensitive locations. They are 

there to respond to a terrorist incident and to disrupt the kind of surveillance we 

know al-Qa’ida undertakes. We also regularly conduct something we call Sampson 

drills, involving teams of up to 100 officers at a time, including snipers, who can 

be dispatched quickly to any given location in the city. 

Under Operation Nexus, our detectives meet with small business owners and suppliers who might unwittingly be used to provide material support to terrorists. They 

include businesses involved in everything from selling construction explosives, to 

laboratory equipment, scuba gear, and specialized rental equipment. We ask them 

to report any anomalies in purchases of goods and services. The Police Department 

has also held briefing sessions for various segments of the public who may come in 

contact with terrorist plotters. For example, we briefed real estate agents on exactly 

what al-Qa’ida tells its operatives to look for in renting an apartment, and with 

doormen and building security so that they can more keenly observe their surroundings. 

With the commencement of the war in Iraq, we launched a heightened security 

program called ‘‘Operation Atlas’’ to protect New York City from possible reprisal. 

Given the ongoing terrorist threat, Operation Atlas remains in place today. It brings 

together all of the core elements of the Police Department: patrol, specialized units, 

Counter Terrorism, and our Intelligence Division in a coordinated defense of New 

York City. Checkpoints are established periodically at key locations into and out of 

Manhattan. We have increased our protection of subways and commuter ferries, as 

well as critical infrastructure. 

Looking more closely at our training initiatives: we offer a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device Checkpoint (VBIED/CP) course targeted to local, state, and 

federal law enforcement. This is a four-day course designed to provide both classroom and hands-on instruction concerning vehicle borne explosive recognition. During the first phase of instruction, the student is provided with techniques and methods of proper vehicle inspection during checkpoints at high profile events and/or critical infrastructure locations. The second phase of instruction provides hands-on experience in vehicle searches. Instruction and training includes the various methods 

of explosive concealment in a variety of vehicles and proper interviewing techniques 

of occupants of suspicious vehicles. Students learn how to use technology and assets 

that are presently available. 

Our Regional Infrastructure Protection Course (RIPC) is an introductory level 

course intended to equip members of the law enforcement community with the skills 

required to deter, detect, and identify potential terrorist activity. This course also 
14

introduces the student to the principles of risk assessment (an examination of the 

vulnerabilities associated with the infrastructure of a facility), basic methods of security, and the major components of a municipality’s critical infrastructure. 

In addition to classroom instruction, two days of field exercises, which include an 

actual assessment of a facility, are conducted at the Regional Training Center. After 

assessing the facility, a written assessment is prepared and the class presents their 

findings in detail. Subcourses include the Introduction to Terrorism, Theory of Physical Security, Access Control/Biometrics/Closed Circuit Television, Fire Protection 

Systems, Heating-Ventilation-Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems, Physical Barriers, 

Utilities, and Marine Terminal and Seaport Security. 

On the other end of the spectrum, we offer a one-day Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Course. This introductory level course is intended to equip members 

of the law enforcement community with the rudimentary skill-set required to identify, detect, and prevent a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction. 

This course also introduces the officer to the concepts associated with operations 

within a hostile chemical or biological environment that result from a potential release of a weapon of mass destruction by a terrorist or a terrorist organization. 

One of the more extensive courses we provide at our Counter Terrorism Division 

Regional Training Center (RTC) is the Counter Terrorism Investigator’s course. This 

is a five-day investigations level course intended to equip members of the law enforcement community with the skills required to deter, detect, and identify potential 

terrorist activity, and when necessary, respond to a potential terrorist attack. Our 

students do not sit in a classroom all day—we provide dynamic field exercises, including simmunitions drills (the use of simulated ammunition that looks, feels and 

sounds like the ‘‘real thing’’), an ‘‘active shooter’’ scenario, room clearing, cornering 

and vehicle stops, which are conducted at our Urban Training Center. 

This training is focused on the tactics employed by terrorist organizations so that 

law enforcement personnel have the tools required to address the threat proactively 

and safely. It includes courses in Introduction to Terrorism, Domestic Terrorism, 

International Terrorism, Transnational Crime/Traditional Crimes that Fund Terrorism, Fraudulent Documents, Developing Legal Issues, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Crime Scene Preservation, Improvised Explosive Devices, Suicide Attacks/

Truck Bombs, Interview and Interrogation, Introduction to Risk Assessment, Case 

Development and Enhancement, and Cults/Fundamentalism/Extremist Behavior. 

We have provided instruction to our executive level staff including a course in 

International Terrorism and the al-Qa’ida Network. It provides an introduction to 

the methods used by a terrorist or a terrorist group, specifically focusing on the alQa’ida network, including the hierarchical structure, an introduction to the methods 

of training, funding, and gathering intelligence, the operational phases of a terrorist 

attack, and the process of target selection. This course also examines traditional 

crimes that have been identified as the means of funding terrorist organizations, including narcotics trafficking, money laundering, currency counterfeiting, tax fraud, 

coupon fraud, trademark infringement, illegal diamond/mineral smuggling, and kidnapping. Finally, the course examines the behavioral indicators and methodologies 

associated with the phenomenon of suicide attacks, including self-sacrificing 

attackers, suicide bombers, and truck bombs. Information obtained from a recent 

visit by NYPD personnel to Israel is included in the presentation. 

We have trained about 34,000 officers in Personal Protective Equipment. Many 

of those officers have been trained in one or more of our other counterterrorism 

courses. For example, about 32,000 police officers and supervisors have been trained 

in the Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS), which conforms with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and 24,000 have attended our ‘‘In-Tac’’ 

training. 

In addition to our own corps of 37,000 police officers, we have delivered training 

through our Regional Training Center in Brooklyn to members of the New York City 

Fire Department; the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Police Department; the 

New York State Police; the Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester and Rockland County Police; as well as police departments from Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, Virginia 

and even Canada. We train members of the U.S. Coast Guard and the Park Police. 

We have brought in dozens of private security professionals from hotels, banks, and 

other institutions to train them in better ways to protect their facilities. In all, over 

130,000 training days have been covered in the Regional Training Center. 

Additionally, we have leveraged DHS support to expand the protection of critical 

infrastructure throughout the region. We have created the Threat Reduction and Infrastructure Protection program, or TRIPS, based upon a DHS model, and applied 

it to New York. We have divided critical infrastructure into 5 categories, and assigned a team of detectives to cover each one. These investigators visit facilities 

throughout the City and identify any vulnerabilities. To help us conduct these as-
15

sessments we have enlisted the support of The Cooper Union, one of the foremost 

schools of engineering in the nation. We meet with their experts routinely to help 

ensure we devise the most secure solutions possible. 

In addition, with DHS support, we have trained close to 12,000 of our officers in 

more advanced chemical, biological, and radiological response. This critical instruction, otherwise known as COBRA Cohort training, was made possible thanks to 

close collaboration between the Department and the Office of Domestic Preparedness. As a result, we were able to take immediate steps to better protect New York 

City from the imminent threat of a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction. 

The Department’s Regional Training Center, our TRIPS program, and COBRA 

Cohort training are all prime examples of how we have capitalized on DHS initiatives, adopting and enhancing national training models to fit New York. The result 

is that New York City has never been better prepared to defend itself from a terrorist threat. Still, all of our preparations come at a steep price: about $176 million 

per year to maintain our daily counter-terrorism and intelligence activities. I want 

to emphasize: these are ongoing operational costs to defend the city, not to mention 

the reassignment of 1000 police officers to counter-terrorism duties. 

One final issue. The Police Department needs the ability to self-certify the training courses we develop internally to meet the needs of a unique urban environment 

like New York. Self-certification would allow us to save valuable time in delivering 

vital new training otherwise spent on the DHS grant approval process. I want to 

emphasize that under self-certification, the Department would continue to work 

closely with DHS and the Office of Domestic Preparedness in upholding training 

standards that are second to none. In fact, the precedent already exists in the creation of our advanced, COBRA Cohort Training curriculum. 

Defending a vast nation against terrorism is an infinitely complex challenge. Yet 

it is one the Police Department is perfectly positioned to help our federal government carry out. But we must have adequate resources to do the job. We must have 

federal funding for first responders and preventers alike, and the authority to expedite their training. And we must hurry. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering your 

questions.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Commissioner Kelly. 

I just have several questions. One, can you give us any more details on the question of the certification as to the assistance you are 

getting or the time which it takes for you to get the approval on 

the certifications? 

Mr. KELLY. The process now is essentially for us to give a course 

in looking for certification. We have to go through the state. We go 

to New York State. We fill out many forms. Those forms and the 

curriculum are then forwarded to the DHS Office of Domestic Preparedness. It can take a significant period of time to get that certification accomplished. 

What we are looking for is the ability, based on our expertise and 

based on the quality of trainers that we have, we would like to go 

to the state, get that authorization from the state, and then commence training without going through the Office of Domestic Preparedness process. Obviously, we leave ourselves open for inspection and reporting to DHS, but that gap or that period of time that 

it takes for us to go to DHS can be very significant and slows down 

our ability to get training out. Again, we have such a large police 

agency that that delay can be significant to us. We want the ability 

to do that training on a more localized basis so we can kind of 

spread it out and get more people in our training universe. 

Mr. KING. Commissioner, you often say that besides first response, you have to be first preventers. The level of training given 

by the federal government, now adequate would you say it is regarding first prevention as opposed to responding? 
16

Mr. KELLY. Well, I think it is minimal as far as prevention is 

concerned, but I think as far as first responders are concerned, I 

think it is good. Certainly all the reports that I receive are that the 

training is very well done. The Consortium members give very positive feedback. But as far as prevention training is concerned, it 

really is minimal. It is diffused. As I said in my prepared remarks, 

we would like to have a more direct relationship, say, with the investigative agencies that will enable to us to get some of this training, and also with intelligence-gathering agencies. I think it would 

be helpful certainly for the major cities like New York and four or 

five other large cities in the U.S. 

Mr. KING. For the record, can you tell us how many members 

there are on the NYPD? 

Mr. KELLY. How many members? 

Mr. KING. Members, yes. 

Mr. KELLY. We have an authorized strength of 37,038 police officers. Right now, we are down a little bit below 36,000. We will 

have a major hire in July to bring us up to the 37,000 number. We 

have another 15,000 civilian employees. 

Mr. KING. And you said I believe up to 1,000 focused on 

antiterrorism? 

Mr. KELLY. Correct. We have redeployed 1,000, or the full-time 

equivalent of 1,000 police officers for counterterrorism duties. They 

are in our Intelligence Division, our Counterterrorism Division. 

Plus we take significant numbers of officers from our patrol force 

every day and deploy them at key locations, sensitive locations 

throughout the city. It is a major undertaking for us. 

Mr. KING. Yesterday, I was at a briefing with Congressman Simmons which was given by the Coast Guard. I am going a little offmessage here, but can you detail your level of cooperation with the 

Coast Guard? 

Mr. KELLY. We have an excellent relationship with the Coast 

Guard. We have our personnel assigned to their Intelligence Center 

in New York. We are very close. I have a very close personal relationship with the Captain of the port. They have deployed their resources throughout New York Harbor. I do not think we could ask 

for anything more form the Coast Guard. They are very responsive. 

Anytime we need them, they are always there. They work very 

closely with our Harbor Unit. 

Mr. KING. As my time is just about up, I think I should note for 

the record the personal stake you have in this, in that literally you 

live at Ground Zero. Your apartment was severely damaged at 

Ground Zero, so you really are literally on the frontlines in every 

sense of the word. 

Mr. KELLY. I live, you are right, about one block away. We were 

out of our home for almost 3 months as a result of 9/11. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Commissioner. 

Mr. Pascrell? 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you for your service, Commissioner. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I am fascinated by your training of police officers 

in New York in Farsi, Urdu, Arabic, and Pashto. I am wondering 

if the federal agencies have assisted you in training in terms of the 

languages of the folks we have to work with, deal with, because 
17

this is part of your counter-intelligence action. You cannot have 

counter-intelligence unless you can speak the language of folks you 

are trying to watch and be careful of. Are you getting the cooperation from the federal government in this endeavor, or are you basically working on your own? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes. These are largely native speakers. In the members of the department, we have a big and diverse workforce. What 

we have done is taken individuals who claim to be able to speak 

these languages and we have tested them. We sent them to a private school. They are certified. So they are not being trained by us. 

They have the ability to speak. What we have done is stratify them 

or categorize what level they are at. We have 460 certified linguists, as we call them. We have lent them and have a memorandum of understanding with the Defense Intelligence Agency. We 

have lent them to DIA. They have been very supportive, but we do 

not receive any federal funds or federal help in this program. 

What we also have done is on our eligible list when someone 

wants to come into the department, they fill out obviously lots of 

forms. One of them is whether or not they have foreign language 

capability. If they do, we have the ability to reach down on the list 

and bring them up and appoint them ahead of other people on the 

list. We have done that as well. So we have at least 55 certified 

Arabic speakers in Pashto, Urdu, Hindi, Farsi speakers, and Chinese dialects. And we are continuing to mature that program. 

Mr. PASCRELL. One of the things that I was most fascinated with 

in New York when we examined all of your operations and looked 

at them carefully is your Counterterrorism Division. I was very impressed with Mike Sheehan and his team, understanding that your 

department is trying to sharpen its skills in terms of conducting 

link analysis as we call it with terrorist group identification. This 

is serious business. 

So the New York City Police Department has trained its personnel, some of those personnel in basically preventing these things 

from happening, God forbid, and using a word which we do not like 

to use in the Congress, ‘‘espionage.’’ I want to just have your response to the question of how, what you can tell us for the public, 

how do you see the counterterrorism that has been conducted by 

federal agencies with regard to what you are trying to do? Is there 

a cooperative link? Are you doing this on your own? And how significant do you think this is in preventing these murderers from 

having their way? 

Mr. KELLY. It is a cooperative program. We work closely with the 

FBI and with the CIA. We have over 100 investigators with the 

Joint Terrorist Task Force in New York. I just want to mention a 

little bit about Mike Sheehan, because we are very fortunate to 

have him. Mike is our Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism. 

He is a West Point graduate, a former Special Forces officer and 

a member of President Bush I and President Clinton’s national security staff. So he has done a masterful job in pulling a lot of these 

programs together. 

It is a collaborative and cooperative effort. David Cohen, who is 

our Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence, is a 35-year veteran of 

the CIA. David has brought his tremendous expertise and experience and contacts to bear on this effort. So it is collaborative. We 
18

do work with the federal authorities closely. We are not looking to 

supplant in any way what is going on. We certainly could not and 

do not want to. We look to supplement their activities. We do have 

some talented people. Again, I think the language skills that you 

mentioned are a very valuable tool for us. 

I believe it has been effective. Just the case that I mentioned before about the individuals who were plotting to blow up the Herald 

Square subway station, that case was handled by all New York investigators. Certainly, it was prosecuted federally, but our Intelligence Division had done it. So I think the program is effective. 

It is getting only more effective. In my judgment, we have brought 

in very talented analysts from the top schools, from the Kennedy 

School, from Stanford, from the Fletcher School of Diplomacy. 

These are quality people that we have doing analysis, taking information and synthesizing and putting it together. 

So I believe it is working. Again, we are doing it certainly not 

in a vacuum. We are doing it with federal authorities. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Commissioner, in conclusion, folks should know 

that you are not only protecting New York City. You are helping 

us protect this nation by work and pioneering many of the things 

that we have been talking about here. I want to thank you personally. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. KING. Chairman Rogers? 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the Chairman. 

Commissioner Kelly, you made reference earlier in your statement that many of your officers are sent to Anniston, Alabama and 

the Center for Domestic Preparedness for training and you have a 

hard time getting them back home. I can understand that. Not only 

is it beautiful, we have some great country cooking in Alabama. 

Do you know how many of your officers you send each year to 

the Center for Domestic Preparedness for training, approximately? 

Mr. KELLY. I would say we have sent at least 600. 

Mr. ROGERS. Per year? 

Mr. KELLY. No, I would say total. Again, we look at where the 

spots are. There are, as you know, different locations throughout 

the country. It depends on our availability. It depends on the availability of the responders. But I would say at least 600 cumulatively 

since those schools opened. Maybe now we are averaging about 150 

or 200 a year. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are some of the techniques that your officers 

find most appealing about training at the Center? Is there something in particular that is most effective for you and something else 

that is least effective or interesting to you? 

Mr. KELLY. The training is very well done. It is done very professionally. As you mentioned in your statement, Mr. Chairman, live 

agents are available at the facility at Anniston. I know that in New 

Mexico, I think the large explosive devices are examined closely. I 

know our bomb squad is very impressed with the training that goes 

on there. In Nevada, it seems to be more focused on perhaps dirty 

bombs or radiation challenges for us. 

So I can tell you, though, that everybody who goes, the feedback 

that I have had comes back with very high reviews of the quality 

of the training. 
19

Mr. ROGERS. You made reference in your statement to spending 

$178 million a year on training. 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir, on counterterrorism. 

Mr. ROGERS. Counterterrorism. One of the problems I have 

found, as you know, is that training at the Center for Domestic 

Preparedness, is free. They pay no tuition. The room and board is 

free. If you can send your officer or your firefighter or other first 

responder, it is free. One of the practical problems that we have 

run into as I have moved around and talked with folks in your line 

of work is, while the training is free, you still have to replace that 

officer while they are off on patrol. Many of these officers are the 

very people who are in the Guard and Reserve and are also serving 

overseas, so many of these departments are already short-handed. 

What are the costs to you to participate in these programs that 

maybe you are not having reimbursed? 

Mr. KELLY. There are certainly overtime costs. Many of the people that we send are in our emergency service unit. We would like 

to have a bigger emergency service unit. We just cannot afford to 

do it. We are down several thousand police officers from where the 

department was in 2000 because of budgetary constraints. So when 

we send people to training, we oftentimes have to backfill with an 

officer on overtime. For us being a big department, the largest in 

the country, it amounts to several million dollars over a year. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is that reimbursable? 

Mr. KELLY. No, that is not reimbursable. 

Mr. ROGERS. There are no Federal funds? 

Mr. KELLY. Not for that cost, no, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. You talked a little bit about self-certification. 

I would like to know more about what you are looking for. Is this 

a certification that you would like to get authority from ODP to do 

yourself? 

Mr. KELLY. We would like to do it in certain areas that are perhaps not trained at the Consortium level, we would like to get the 

ability to do self-certification. As I mentioned to Chairman King before, we may want to train, let’s say on surveillance techniques. We 

have people coming in from other agencies, as well as our own people, in order for us to get funding to do that we go through the 

state. We apply to the state. The state then takes our paperwork 

and sends it to the Office of Domestic Preparedness and it can be 

a long period of time. We think that certain things that we do and 

do well, that we would like to be able to certify that training and 

avoid the long delay that results from the process. 

Mr. ROGERS. These are programs outside the Consortium’s areas? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. For example at CDP, we have train-the-trainer. 

Mr. KELLY. Right. 

Mr. ROGERS. So you are talking about something separate from 

that? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes. I am talking about something separate. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thanks very much. I appreciate it. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Meek? 

Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Commissioner, thank you for your testimony. 
20

We do have a bill that we have passed already out of the House, 

which was this first responder bill, H.R. 1544. We asked the General Accounting Office to really look at are we getting what we 

need to get out of training. The Department of Homeland Security 

does not have a set curriculum to where their goals and objectives 

as they relate to overall security of the homeland. We spent about 

$180 million in first responder training in the 2005 year. Without 

a system of tracking and evaluating first responder training, I am 

trying to figure out and I know this committee would like to know, 

how do we know that we are training the men and women we need 

to train to be able to, as the Chairman speaks of, prevent, but to 

also respond? 

You have a regional training location I believe and we know that 

there is one in Alabama and there are a couple more around the 

country. Do you believe that the Department of Homeland Security 

should have training standards? That is one question. 

Two, you know that you have basic law enforcement standards 

that have to be met for an individual to be a sworn law enforcement officer. We send federal agents to Georgia to get that, and 

then they train them, specializing in their department. I would like 

to hear your response to that. 

Mr. KELLY. I believe we should have standards. The Department 

of Homeland Security should have standards and attempt to have 

a consistency in training throughout the country. I can tell you 

that we use many of the skills that our officers receive on a very 

regular basis in New York City because of the size of the city and 

the activities that go on there. So we are using a lot of the skills, 

so in a way we are able to judge the effectiveness of the training 

almost on a daily basis in New York. 

But yes, sir, I agree that there should be some consistency and 

there should be some across-the-board standards. 

Mr. MEEK. Commissioner, has the department approached you, 

the Office of Domestic Preparedness, about what they should be 

doing and how they should be training first responders throughout 

the country? Have you been a part of an advisory group with the 

department to have such a thing that you have heard of? 

Mr. KELLY. I am not aware of any formal group that performs 

that function, but we have a lot of interaction with ODP, so I believe on an informal basis there is a lot of give and take and a lot 

of discussion as to what the training should be. 

Mr. MEEK. I personally believe that this is important because as 

we start to look at the Department of Homeland Security, as we 

start to build the Department of Homeland Security, 22 legacy 

agencies coming together under one mission to protect the homeland, it is very, very important that we have outcome measures. I 

am hoping that our leadership here, even though we have sent a 

bill over to the Senate, that possibly that we can just as members 

of this committee, hearing what the Commissioner has said, to 

move forth in sending a letter to the GAO to hopefully get them 

started on giving us some direction. 

Because what they would do is go out to speak with first responders, speak with the department, talk about where we have 

duplication. Training is good, but duplication and not expanding 
21

the minds and the skills of our first responders could end up hurting us in the long run and we could very well skim over something. 

One other question as it relates to sharing and mutual aid. Is 

there any training going on here in the United States as far as you 

are concerned about how agencies of other jurisdictions can work 

together, not only in the prevention of a terrorist attack, but postterrorist attack? Do we have the kind of what you may call crosspollination among leadership of these special units to be able to respond to an attack? Have you seen or heard of, or do you provide 

that in your regional training facility? 

Mr. KELLY. On the law enforcement level, we have a lot of interaction with surrounding jurisdictions, but we are the biggest jurisdiction around and we have 8.1 million people in New York City. 

Regionally, we work with Nassau County, Suffolk County. They are 

part of our Joint Terrorist Task Force. We work with New Jersey, 

Westchester County and Bergen County on law enforcement issues. 

Now, as far as first responder and mutual aid, in the Fire Department I know they have a very active program as well. I am not 

really equipped to speak about it, but I know that that is something that they work on. But law enforcement, the regional approach is something that perhaps we need more work on in the 

New York area, but we do have a fair amount of integration on the 

Joint Terrorist Task Force and communication with the surrounding jurisdictions. 

Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Commissioner. 

Mr. KING. Chairman Cox? 

Mr. COX. Thank you very much. Again, welcome. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. COX. We really enjoyed the time that we spent with you as 

a committee up in New York City. I want to join everyone here 

once again in commending you and the city and the Mayor for all 

that you are doing in every single one of these areas. 

The training, of course, is the piece we are focused on today. I 

want to get my arms around this problem of multiple, potentially 

redundant and inconsistent training programs that are operated directly or indirectly by the federal government. What we in this 

committee look at in terms of funding levels for the federal piece 

is about $195 million a year for the training. We want to make 

sure that we are getting our money’s worth. 

I have heard you testify and respond to questions thus far that 

from your standpoint it is not efficient to always ship your people 

off to some other distant locale. You have to find a way to pay for 

their replacement, and sometimes that is overtime, so it is a very 

expensive way of doing business. I would like to explore whether 

or not there isn’t some way to tap into expertise that New York 

City already possesses or is in the process of acquiring so that the 

trainers’ concept can be taken still further and we can train a lot 

more men and women without making them all leave their duty 

posts, or at least leave the city. 

How much of that do you think that we can do? I just look at 

the FEMA compendium of federal terrorism training for state and 

local audiences. It lists over 200 courses. There has got to be a lot 

of duplication or inconsistency in there. We have the trade group, 

the Training Resources and Data Exchange focused on trying to 
22

identify those. From your standpoint, are we spending our money 

wisely or are we in some ways causing duplication and overlap and 

inefficiency by making people travel to other places and a lot of different places to get training that maybe could be consolidated? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, I think there probably is potential there for consolidation. It is difficult for me to talk about it because, as I say, 

the feedback that we have had has been all positive as far as sending people out to the Consortium schools, but most likely there is 

a possibility of consolidation as to the way you send people. 

The point that you made, Mr. Chairman, about being able to do 

some regional training, I certainly support that. I like the concept 

of training the trainers, sending the trainers back, and having us 

do it on a local level. It saves us time and it is going to enable us 

to reach more people more quickly. 

To a certain extent, we do that. We would like to do more of it. 

Any way that we can do that on perhaps on the certification level, 

where we can do even some of the core training that is going on 

in some of these other locations, I think that should be explored. 

But in terms of quality, we like the quality that we are getting at 

the Consortium schools. I want to emphasize that, but perhaps 

there is potential there for us to take that structure and do it at 

a more local level. 

Mr. COX. What has been your experience with certification, with 

trying to get your own courses certified? 

Mr. KELLY. As I said before, ultimately we can do it, but it takes 

a long time. 

Mr. COX. Specifically, have you had anything approved by DHS? 

Mr. KELLY. We have had approvals. Again, I spoke about the Cohort COBRA training which worked very well for us. We wanted 

to do that before the Republican National Convention. DHS was 

very cooperative in that regard. We had that course certified and 

they worked with us and we were able to train 12,000 of our police 

officers. COBRA stands for chemical, biological and radiological response training. We did that in a smoke environment. We did it 

with a subway car. They were very helpful in that regard, and we 

did receive federal funding to enable us to do it. That is an example 

that worked very well as far as collaboratively and cooperatively 

getting a certification done quickly. 

Mr. COX. The reason I ask this question is I am looking at data 

that tells me that there have been 23 requests to ODP for additions 

to the list of eligible federal terrorism training courses. Of those requests nationwide, thus far only three have been approved. There 

have been 115 requests for institutionalization by state administrative agencies or state training point of contacts. Of those 115 requests received for institutionalization, three have been approved. 

So I do not know why there are so many denials or so much work 

in progress, but I just want to find out from your standpoint where 

the city has a lot more that it wants to do here that it is looking 

forward to. 

Mr. KELLY. Those numbers surprise me. My belief is that we had 

several certifications that were granted, but it just took an extended period of time. So those numbers are a surprise to me. 
23

Mr. COX. I am actually happy to hear that. I am glad that this 

experience that seems to be described by these statistics is not New 

York City’s experience. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Cox. 

Mr. Thompson? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Commissioner, you gave us significant food for thought on 

how to do it right. I just wish we could get DHS to adopt the New 

York model and we would be further along. 

Do you agree that while DHS provides standards for equipment, 

that they should promulgate the standards for training? 

Mr. KELLY. I think that would be helpful. I think to a certain extent they do, but perhaps it has to be better clarified and more 

clearly published. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you see the need to have some national standard for training? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

In your experience with DHS on getting reimbursed for funds expended in whatever program, do you have any knowledge of how 

long that normally takes to get reimbursed for any eligible program 

that is under DHS? 

Mr. KELLY. Well, the reimbursement process is a protracted one. 

We have to go through the state, which is problematic as well. We 

are applying through the state. The money comes through the 

state. It is both a federal and a state issue. I think for us sometimes the money is held up with the state as well. But reimbursement seems to take sometimes a significant period. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Do you have a guesstimate of how long that normally takes? 

Mr. KELLY. I hear that from our Office of Management and 

Budget, outside of the Police Department, because the reimbursement does not come directly to the department. It comes through 

the City of New York. So I do not have a specific time, but there 

is kind of a steady lament that it takes an extended period of time 

to get reimbursed. There is a belief that there is money in the pipeline that is not spent, when in actuality what it is is money that 

just simply has not been reimbursed in a timely fashion. But that 

is what our budget people say. 

Mr. THOMPSON. One of the comments we hear quite often is that 

if cities without the resource capacity perhaps as New York, expend the money, if there is an inordinate amount of time between 

when the money comes back, it puts them in a bind. 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Obviously, New York might have enough reserve 

to make up the difference. Call the Congressman, right? I hope you 

understand my question. 

Mr. KELLY. I do. I understand it. Yes, sir. Certainly, for smaller 

cities, it can be an issue. I believe it is an issue for New York as 

well, but as I say it does not impact directly on the Police Department. It is the overall budget of the city. 

Mr. THOMPSON. To what extent have you utilized the federal 

training facilities for your department? 
24

Mr. KELLY. When you say ‘‘federal training,’’ again we talked 

about the Consortium located in Anniston, New Mexico, in Nevada, 

LSU and Texas. We send most of our people to either Anniston, 

New Mexico or to Nevada. I believe we have sent a few people, a 

small number to FLETC in Georgia, but generally speaking those 

are the facilities that are people use. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Your comment to us is that you are satisfied 

with the training they receive at those facilities? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir. I am satisfied with the quality of the training, yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Simmons? 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Commissioner. 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SIMMONS. As somebody who was born and raised in New 

York City, but then moved to Connecticut, I want to tell you what 

a great job you are doing. It makes me proud to see what the 

NYPD is doing before, during and after 9/11. I think the challenges 

you face are extraordinary, as are the challenges of probably half 

a dozen of our biggest cities, but New York in particular because 

New York is a target. New York is a city of diverse population, 

massive diverse population, so there are many challenges there. 

I want to focus on three parts of your testimony. The first part 

was your reference to first preventers as opposed to first responders. We tend to think in terms of what do we do if. That is after 

the fact. The concept of a first preventer is how do we prevent the 

incident from taking place in the first place. If we could have prevented 9/11, 3,000 people would be alive today. 

Secondly, your reference to the Intelligence Division and all the 

terrific things that your Intelligence Division is doing. I support 

that and I share the views of some of my colleagues who think that 

the New York Police Department has moved faster to respond in 

this area than certain components of our federal government. I congratulate you on that. 

And then the third piece has to do with vehicle-borne improved 

explosive devices, to which I would add ship-borne because New 

York City is surrounded by substantial bodies of water. 

What I would like to do is back up a little bit and tell you something that I did about a year ago when I was in New York City. 

I went to the New York Public Library. I know there is a lot of controversy over libraries. I went to the New York Public Library and 

asked for their records on the subway system and underground 

railroads. I discovered after a few minutes of inquiry that I could 

access very substantial documents in the New York Public Library 

detailing particularly the underground railroad system. I think 

their collection there is probably one of the best in the city, but also 

substantial engineering records and documentation on the subway 

system. 

So my question is this. New York is an old city. It is a city with 

historic structures like the Brooklyn Bridge. Many of the documents relative to those structures, which can be targets, are available to the public in public places like libraries. What mechanism 
25

do you use to tip off the Intelligence Division is somebody is accessing those records, if any? Do you have a mechanism for that at all? 

Mr. KELLY. We do not. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Should we consider that? I know this is a difficult 

question and you may want to postpone your response, but it certainly bothers me. If we are going to be first preventers, we have 

to use a little imagination to figure out what the bad guys are 

after. We know they are after the Brooklyn Bridge. That has been 

demonstrated. There may be some other targets. And then where 

are they going to learn about those targets? What I am suggesting 

is there is a lot of information publicly available in public places 

like public libraries. How do you intersect with those entities, if at 

all? 

Mr. KELLY. I guess the answer is with great difficulty. We do not, 

and again there is so much information available on the Internet 

where there really is no potential way of keeping records of who 

gets certain information. So I guess it is just the free and open society that we live in that causes us this concern. I cannot think of 

any reasonable, practical way of controlling flows of information. 

I know that we looked at information on the transit system. We 

looked at it on the Internet, I should say. We looked it up when 

this issue surfaced a few years ago, and actually, it is interesting 

you should mention, on the Brooklyn Bridge, because there is an 

awful lot of specific information that is just publicly available and 

you can get it on the Internet without going into a library, without 

someone seeing your face or presenting a card. So I think it is just 

a reality of the world that we live in. I cannot think of a practical 

way, quite frankly, of addressing it. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I will just follow on with an additional comment 

or question. As the Chairman of the Intelligence and Information 

Sharing Subcommittee, this is an issue that we wrestle with as 

well. We certainly support civil liberties and civil rights, but my 

daughter lives in Brooklyn. She crosses the bridge twice a day. I 

would hate to think that she might die because somebody got some 

details on the bridge to blow it up out of a public place and we had 

no way of knowing that. 

Information sharing, you say you are getting no money from the 

feds, at least not directly. Are you getting intelligence or other 

types of information sharing from the federal government? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, we are. We are getting it through our presence 

on the Joint Terrorism Task Force. We are getting it directly with 

the Central Intelligence Agency on appropriate matters. So we are 

sharing information. We would always like more. There is always 

that little jousting that goes around about certain issues, but generally speaking we are sharing information. I want to stress that 

it is a two-way flow. We are gathering information and we are forwarding it to the federal government as well. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you for your testimony and your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Dicks? 

Mr. DICKS. Commissioner, I want to welcome you and commend 

you on your efforts to create this Intelligence Division. When did 

this happen? When did you do it actually? 
26

Mr. KELLY. We have always had an Intelligence Division, ‘‘always’’ being for many, many years in the New York City Police Department. What we did was focus a part of the Intelligence Division on the issue of terrorism. 

Mr. DICKS. When did that happen? 

Mr. KELLY. It happened post–9/11. It happened at the beginning 

of this Administration, Mayor Bloomberg’s Administration, starting 

in January of 2002. 

Mr. DICKS. Again, how many people do you have in the 

counterterrorism part of the Intelligence Division? 

Mr. KELLY. We have a Counterterrorism Bureau which has 250 

people, and we have an Intelligence Division that has about 500 

people in it. We have in each of our precincts and subunits we have 

an intelligence officer who is part of that Intelligence Division. And 

then we have part of the Intelligence Division that focuses just on 

counterterrorism issues. 

Mr. DICKS. This has been pretty successful? In your testimony, 

you point out several situations where your people found information, acted on it, and were able to be first preventers. 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. How many other police departments? I mean, you 

know pretty much what is going on around the country. Do any 

other police departments have a similar counterterrorism entity? 

Mr. KELLY. I think similar in concept, not in size, of course. We 

are the largest police department by far in the country, but there 

are efforts in this area in other major police departments throughout the country. 

Mr. DICKS. Now, as you said, you got no money from the federal 

government in creating this counterterrorism entity. Is that correct? 

Mr. KELLY. That is correct, yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Do you think you should have gotten some support? 

Do you think that would be helpful if the federal government provided help in this area? 

Mr. KELLY. Sure. We would appreciate it, but again this is kind 

of new territory. Police departments have not done this in the past, 

so I understand there may be some lag I this regard. But I think 

it is worthy of examination for the federal government to come in 

and see where they might help. 

Mr. DICKS. I think this is a big force multiplier for our intelligence effort. I spent 8 years on the Intelligence Committee here 

in the House of Representatives and one of the things we worried 

about was the fact that down at the state and local level, you need 

to get this information, but if you do not have an entity that is out 

there working to gather this information, and I am glad you 

brought in some top intelligence people and are working on the language issues. To me, I think this is something that would help our 

entire intelligence effort in our major cities. We already have the 

Urban Areas Program, of some special concern, but it would seem 

to me that this is a way to help prevent an incident from occurring. 

There is no doubt in my mind that the FBI, the Counterterrorism 

Center, all these different entities would benefit by having your 

professional people who are in coordination with them, giving them 
27

information. It seems to me this is something we ought to really 

look at as a way to enhance our intelligence side of the equation. 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir. I agree. 

Mr. DICKS. But it gets down to money, as we found out in this 

homeland security issue. There is never enough money to do all 

these things, but this one, it seems to me, if you can prevent these 

incidents from happening, this is something that we ought to really 

seriously consider doing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. Shays from Connecticut? 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. 

Mr. Kelly, your folks during the Republican Convention did an 

awesome job. They were polite. They were courteous. They were extraordinarily competent, the firemen and-women as well. It was 

one of the more impressive times that I have felt and seen public 

officials do their job in what was a really difficult and challenging 

circumstance. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. I would like to know what you feel the public has a 

right to know and how you decide that. For instance, if you have 

been told by the federal government that there is a possible terrorist threat in your city; you have been told to look out for radiological material, that there might be a so-called ‘‘dirty’’ bomb. And 

you have been told in what venue it might occur. What responsibility do you have? How do you decide? And who decides? Does the 

Mayor decide? Do you decide? Is it a combination? 

Mr. KELLY. That is a difficult question. I think we have a bias 

towards informing the public, putting information out, but you can 

do great harm. You can make a high-regret decision, as it is called, 

by putting out information when it lacks specificity. So I think you 

have to look at the source, if you can determine the source, the 

general credibility of the threat; the specificity of the threat; and 

make a determination as to when this information goes forward. 

Ultimately, the Mayor would be the one who would make a decision on something very serious and widespread. 

Mr. SHAYS. This committee has weighed-in in I think a very constructive way. It has weighed-in in saying that the allocation of 

dollars should be based on risk and need, rather than based on 

population. You have answered obviously to the question that you 

agree. 

I would be interested if you would pass judgment on something 

else this committee weighed-in on. We basically have said that we 

want the warning system to be more than just colors; that we want 

it to be more specific; we want it to be able to say when it can 

where the risk is; and we also want there to be information provided to people as to how they might respond to that risk. I am not 

talking in great specific detail, but in other words instead of saying 

we are at code orange or we are code yellow, we want to define 

‘‘yellow’’ and we want to define ‘‘orange’’ to folks so they have a better idea of what it means. 

What is your sense of that? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, I think I would agree. The problem is that intelligence does not come in neat packages and it lacks specificity. As 
28

I say, we usually do not know the credibility of the source. So you 

get information that says something bad is going to happen. It 

lacks specificity. 

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you this, then. What is the value of telling someone that we are in code orange when they do not know 

what the heck it means? 

Mr. KELLY. Well, this is something that I think is being debated 

now by the Department of Homeland Security. I think they are trying to come up with a system that is more specific, is more helpful. 

But this was done early on, after 9/11. I think it was a valid attempt to have a system in place to alert the public and it may have 

outlived its usefulness now. I think it is an emerging belief that 

you can feel in government. But we do not have as yet, as far as 

I know, on the drawing board a system that is more effective. 

Mr. SHAYS. But what we did do more recently is we, the federal 

government in conjunction with the communities, for instance 

when we thought there was a threat to financial institutions, instead of making this broad, sweeping warning, we said financial institutions appear to be a target and we are paying closer attention 

to that. That makes sense, does it not? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes. Last August, that is what happened and I think 

that was the appropriate thing to do then. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Kelly, isn’t New York City always in code orange? 

Mr. KELLY. We are at higher level of alert. The system came in 

after we went to a higher level and we maintain that higher level, 

so it is kind of a shorthand way of saying that is what we are 

doing. But after 9/11, New York put in a lot of additional security 

and we have maintained that. So saying we are at code orange is 

a shorthand way of saying that is what we are doing. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Etheridge? 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Commissioner, thank you for being here with us this morning. 

Let me follow that one up for just a moment because I think, 

only for just a follow-up, because I think in terms of many of us 

who have been somewhat concerned about the codes because if you 

live in rural North Carolina or rural mid–America and the code 

goes up, what it tends to do, I think, and I would be interested in 

your comments, is to develop a level of cynicism. Pretty soon, people pay no attention to what the codes are because, number one, 

it does not affect them; and number two, they are not moving 

around. I think it bleeds into other areas. 

I think the example of the banking institutions or financial institutions are a good example that we probably ought to pay a lot 

more attention to as we look at this code. I would be interested in 

your additional comments on that, because you are out there where 

the rubber meets the road. 

Mr. KELLY. I agree, but the intelligence information was such 

that it focused directly on financial institutions. So you are able to 

do that. That is what I said, most of this information when it 

comes down the pike lacks specificity. In this case, we had very 

specific information focusing on financial institutions, so I think it 
29

was done in an appropriate fashion last August. I think we now 

need a more sophisticated way of doing it. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Having said about the information coming down, 

let me ask a little different way a question that was asked by Congressman Dicks a little earlier. You have talked about, and I commend you for what you are doing in New York because I do think 

New York and some of our major cities are still on a high level of 

targeting. 

You mentioned in your testimony that you would like for the federal government to support, to train qualified intelligence analysts 

and operatives for the police department. My question is this, do 

you think other cities ought to be doing some of the same things, 

and in the process of that, as you do it in New York? 

Mr. KELLY. I think major cities, large cities. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. As you do it in New York, are you sharing that 

with other jurisdictions, your fire, your rescue, the other first responders who are part of that? As you gather that data, how does 

that get to them? 

Mr. KELLY. When it is appropriate, yes we do. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. And it goes up the line to Homeland Security 

and back to you, and you share that data? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes. Yes, sir. Are you talking about intelligence information we gather? 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Yes. 

Mr. KELLY. We have a process, a system where we would go to 

the FBI or to Homeland Security when appropriate. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Okay. And then that is shared with local jurisdictions within the New York region? 

Mr. KELLY. When it is appropriate, yes, sir. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Okay. Let me shift to another question, if I may. 

You talked about, and I think it is impressive that you talk about 

training the trainer. I think that is one that I first ran into in education that works very effectively when it is followed with guidelines and procedures. Given the vastness of America and the differences from New York to other rural areas across this country, 

as people and things move, the risk to America can be different, 

but it can be the same because many of the people who wound up 

creating all the problems on 9/11 came to New York from areas 

that were not anywhere near as well-occupied as the city. 

My question is, as we provide the oversight, I would be interested in your comments on how Homeland Security overall training 

integrates with the smaller departments where you only have one, 

two, three, four, five or a lot of volunteers in some cases, because 

that is just as important in some cases to New York City where 

you have an awful lot of people in place, and a sophisticated system. To me, that is where I think a lot of our vulnerabilities still 

lie. I would be interested in your comments. 

Mr. KELLY. I think in that case, you are talking about training, 

it has to be done on the state level. The states have to make a determination as to who is appropriate in the state to receive that 

sort of training. I hear what you are saying is we need listening 

posts everywhere because any piece of information can prove of 

value gathered in North Carolina, and of value to New York, for 
30

instance. We understand that. So we need a system to get that information. 

I think to a certain extent the FBI has created that. We now 

have a Joint Terrorist Task Force component in every one of their 

offices, ever SAC office in the country, and 56 of them have a Joint 

Terrorist Task Force. They are certainly in North Carolina as well. 

But in terms of training, I think the training for that has to be 

done at a state level and the state is going to have to make a determination as to who should be involved in it because there are finite 

resources. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Etheridge. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent? 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, Mr. Commissioner. 

I am fascinated by your Intelligence Division and what you have 

done up there in New York. I guess my principal question is this. 

What is it that your detectives are doing in those cities overseas? 

I am pleased that you have them over there. What are they able 

to discover or learn that we are maybe not receiving from our federal intelligence officials who may be based overseas? I would like 

to learn a little bit more about that. 

Mr. KELLY. Again, as I said before, we are not looking to supplant anybody. We are looking to supplement. 

Mr. DENT. I understand. 

Mr. KELLY. New York, of course, has been attacked successfully 

twice in the last 12 years. We are looking for any bit of information 

we can get that gives a leg up in New York. They have gotten some 

front row seats to major investigations that are ongoing. For instance, our detective in Tel Aviv, if there is an event, a suicide 

bombing, he is there within the hour. He gives us very specific information. He works very closely with the Israeli authorities. We 

have real-time information that comes back to New York that day. 

You are not getting that from other agencies. 

In the Madrid bombing case, it took place on March 11, 2004. 

That day, we had, and it happened to be the same investigator 

from Tel Aviv, we had him in Madrid. We found out how the bombs 

had been constructed, where they were put together. We put a tactical approach in place that same day or 12 hours later around our 

transit facilities, at our subway stops for instance, to be on the 

lookout for that type of activity. 

That is the kind of real-time information that we are getting 

from our people overseas. 

Mr. KING. Will the gentleman yield for a moment? 

Commissioner Kelly, were you there before or after the FBI in 

Madrid? 

Mr. KELLY. We happened to be there that day. We dispatched 

someone that day. We also had a team there the next day from the 

U.S. that we sent. But we feel we are in the crosshairs, so as I say 

we are looking for any bit of information. These detectives, they are 

charged with the responsibility of asking the New York question. 

Is New York somehow involved directly or indirectly in the event 

that happened there or an investigation that is ongoing there? 
31

Mr. DENT. Okay. And how do you determine what cities you selected to place your detectives? 

Mr. KELLY. Obviously, we need a receptive environment. We 

need a law enforcement entity that is going to accept us and have 

us work closely with them. So that is part of it. There are certain 

locations we are concerned about, obviously Canada being our 

neighbor to the north. We have the famous case of Ahmed Ressam 

who came through the State of Washington in 1999. He was in 

Montreal and then went over there. He as the Millennium bomber. 

So Canada is an area that we look to get information from. The 

UK, we have detectives there. They have been very supportive and 

worked very, very closely with us. That is an area of concern. London looks an awful lot like New York in many ways. It has a very 

complex, big underground transit system. We want to be there. Tel 

Aviv, of course, is an area of concern to us. 

So we look at locations where we think it is going to be helpful 

for us and then we talk to those governments, and if they are receptive, then so be it. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. I do understand what 

you are doing there is supplemental, complementary to what our 

intelligence agencies are doing. I just am very, very impressed by 

your department and have been for many, many years, by the level 

of sophistication and preparedness that you have provided to the 

citizens of your city and to this country over the years. Thank you. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. KING. Ms. Jackson-Lee, a former New Yorker. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

With that spirit, I want to thank Commissioner Kelly. We have 

found opportunity to work together over a number of years in the 

capacities that you have served the nation. Might I add my appreciation for your service and the hard knocks that you have taken 

in the course of that service. There are many of us that appreciate 

very much what you are doing. 

And this hearing, let me thank the Ranking Members and the 

Chairman of this committee and as well the Ranking and Chairman of the full committee. 

I am going to offer some anecdotal stories and really going to 

focus on law enforcement. 

Mr. KING. Would the gentlelady just yield for one moment. The 

procedure we are going to follow, Mr. Rogers is going to go over 

and vote now. There is only one vote on, so we can try and keep 

the hearing going. 

The gentlelady from Texas? 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. I thank the Chairman very much. 

Texas has a unique situation, so let me pose these questions 

quickly. One, I would like just a general question of are we doing 

enough. You may have answered it, but I would like to hear, are 

we doing enough, particularly in light of the plan that we are supposed to offer about interrelatedness in terms of a plan of the first 

responders, this 2002 reported plan that the Homeland Security is 

supposed to have in terms of the interrelatedness of first responders having a plan of how they work together. 

The other question is that you spoke earlier of your wish to authorize self-certification by states in certain emergency prepared-
32

ness disciplines. If all states are able to self-certify, how would you 

address the need for coordination of a nationwide methodology? 

My last point, down on the southern border, you may have heard 

of the intense violence around Nuevo Laredo, which is on the Mexican side, and Laredo. A lot of that has to do with drug trafficking 

and drug cartels, but I always know that where there are drugs 

and money there is the potential for terrorism. So law enforcement 

that may be dealing with drugs needs to understand terrorism. 

The other component is self-law enforcement. I mean that by 

groups like the Minutemen, who are intruding themselves into the 

process that may cause some difficulties. Would you comment on 

the need for enhanced training in light of the frustration of Americans that generate the creation of groups like the Minutemen and 

do you find them necessary and effective, if we can be more effective in our training and our resources for our law enforcement and 

our firefighters, of course, who are not in the midst of fighting battles, but they are certainly in the midst of saving lives. 

Mr. KELLY. I think it is a question of resources. Having been the 

Customs Commissioner, I have some experience with the border. 

We were short of resources, certainly, when I was there and I think 

that is probably still an issue, although I think it has gone up 

somewhat in head count. There is no longer a Customs Service. 

There is Customs and Border Protection now. It has merged with 

Border Patrol. 

But I think it probably still is an issue of resources. There are 

probably not enough people down there and that is why you get the 

frustration of the public trying to get involved. I think we need a 

major investment in protecting our borders. You need the people to 

do it. There are no gimmicks involved. You need an investment in 

having sufficient resources to do it. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. And you would substitute the people for the 

Minutemen? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, absolutely. You substitute professional full-time 

employees for volunteers. 

As far as the self-certification and coordination is concerned, by 

asking for self-certification I certainly do not want to diminish the 

role of the Department of Homeland Security. That is where the coordination comes in. That is where the oversight comes in. As was 

mentioned before, national training standards are perhaps needed. 

So I think that is how you address the issue of having some overarching coordination and control of what is going on. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. With that, I yield back. 

I thank you very much. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul? 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I want to say how much I enjoyed the visit up to Ground 

Zero and the visit with you personally. I thank the Chairman for 

setting up that codel up to New York. I learned a lot about the impressive operation that you have up there, that first and foremost. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Since we have votes, I am going to get right to the 

questions. That is, I worked in the Justice Department with the 

Joint Terrorism Task Force. I know the model. I am not a believer 
33

that one size fits all in the federal government; that you can use 

a cookie cutter approach to everything across the nation. 

I want to get your thoughts on how that is operating in New 

York. I know we talked a little bit about that, the model in general; 

that there may be some elements of discussion with regard to how 

it applies in New York. 

Secondly, your coordination with the National Counterterrorism 

Center, is it working effectively and if not what needs to be done 

to make this work so that we get that information to the state and 

local level? 

Mr. KELLY. We do have coordination with the National Center. 

Again, it has been changing. It had some different configurations 

in there, but we do have coordination. We get it through the FBI. 

We also have it directly through our Intelligence Division. So I do 

not see a major issue there. We are all learning as we go along. 

I think there are certainly people of goodwill there who want to cooperate with us; see us as a value-added; that we are getting information and information should go upstream and we are doing that. 

We are working to improve that. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. And with respect to the Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces, is that model working in New York or how can that 

be improved? 

Mr. KELLY. We have a discussion up there. I think ideally we 

should have a model that looks like the Drug Enforcement Task 

Forces, where you have a marbleized approach where everyone is 

in one entity, where you have supervisors, if you recognize supervisors, they are in supervisory positions irrespective of their agencies. 

What you have now is in essence an FBI entity with members 

of the Joint Terrorist Task Force appended to it, added on in their 

own structure, unlike the Drug Enforcement Task Force where you 

have integration, where you have supervisors from various agencies supervising personnel from different agencies. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Are you talking about the HIDA program, is that 

what you are referring to? 

Mr. KELLY. HIDA is obviously information sharing, but HIDA 

does have a more integrated approach. I point to the Drug Enforcement Task Force, I think it has worked. It is a model that has 

worked for many years and works well in New York. The Joint Terrorist Task Force I think is effective, but ideally we should have 

more integration. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I think that is something that this committee 

should take a look at. I appreciate your time here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. Commissioner Kelly, if we can impose on you, I believe 

there is only one more member on our side who has question to 

ask, Sheriff Reichert, who had been the Sheriff of King County in 

the State of Washington. He went over to vote, so he can come back 

to ask questions. 

I am going to call the committee to be in recess until Chairman 

Rogers comes back, and then it will be Congressman Reichert and 

then you will be excused. 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KING. If you could just hang on for another 10 or 15 minutes. 
34

The committee stands in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROGERS. [Presiding.] If I could reconvene this. 

At this time, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington, Mr. Reichert, for any questions he may have. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, thank you for your service. I was the sheriff of King 

County in Seattle up until January 3rd, so I am missing the role 

that you play in a much larger scale. 

I have to say that I had the opportunity to attend national executive classes over my 8 years as sheriff in Seattle with some members of the New York Police Department. And I would, again, echo 

my colleague’s comments about the professionalism, commitment to 

duty and compassion they have to serve the public. And they are 

just the highest caliber people. So I thought you might appreciate 

hearing that. 

I just want to touch on a couple of quick things and not hold you 

too much longer. I know you have a busy schedule also. 

When you talk about national standards, national training standards, how do you see those standards being developed across the 

nation? What kind of a process, in your opinion, might be used to 

help develop those standards? 

Mr. KELLY. I think a process would have to be driven by the Department of Homeland Security. I don’t think it is that complicated. I think you can reach general consensus on best practices, 

but it has to be controlled and you have to have kind of a coalescing entity. And I would say Homeland Security can do that. 

You might have a conference of first responders?I think it would 

be easy to pick out the appropriate people to go to a conference like 

that. I don’t think it is difficult to do, put it that way. And I think 

you kind of know them when you see them. It is just a question 

of doing it. 

Mr. REICHERT. So you see the National Sheriffs’ Association having a role in helping to set those standards? 

Mr. KELLY. Sure. I think certainly it would be appropriate to ask 

them to participate, yes. 

Mr. REICHERT. We, in Seattle, participated in TOPOFF, which 

was quite an expensive exercise, and I know that you have participated in similar training exercises. What is the role of the federal 

government as far as their financial role, I should say. I know what 

their role is in helping to come in and develop the scenario, et 

cetera. But financially, how does it impact your police department, 

your city, your police department’s budget and do you get any financial help from the federal agencies in pulling off one of these 

exercises? 

Mr. KELLY. Well, we do not get financial help, quite frankly. Let 

me take that back. There are some. TOPOFF obviously is the major 

one mandated by Congress. We do get some money through our Office of Emergency Management to run some exercises, but we do 

a lot of our own training and a lot of our own exercises, our own 

agency exercises without any federal funding. 

So we are doing it. Would we like money? Sure, but we are still 

getting it done. But there are major exercises in New York City, 

multi-agency exercises in which we do get federal money. I think 
35

there is money from FEMA that helps in that regard. That money 

for the most part comes through our Office of Emergency Management. 

Mr. REICHERT. What percentage of your budget do you suppose 

that you now spend on homeland security efforts? 

Mr. KELLY. We spend about $178 million a year. That is our estimate for counterterrorism. That would be both overtime and 

straight time, you might say opportunity costs, salary of people 

who are doing that sort of work. We have about a $3.5 billion a 

year budget. 

Mr. REICHERT. Did the city give you an increase of $178 million 

in your budget to address these issues? 

Mr. KELLY. No, sir. 

Mr. REICHERT. I knew that would be your answer. 

[Laughter.] 

We had a similar experience in Seattle. 

So the $178 million came from somewhere. What did you have 

to give up with your Police Department? What services did you 

have to cut in order to come up with $178 million? 

Mr. KELLY. That is a good question. Obviously, if you have people 

doing a certain function, they are not doing the normal patrol function or investigative function. We are down, as a snapshot of where 

we are now in the department, we are down 5,000 police officers 

from where we were in October, 2000, plus we have this 1,000 redeployed for counterterrorism. So when you say ‘‘where does it 

come from,’’ the 5,000 of course comes from all over the organization, as the 1,000 does as well. You have fewer people on patrol, 

fewer people doing normal investigations, fewer people doing traffic 

control. 

Mr. REICHERT. So some of it is paid because of salary savings 

through the 5,000 vacancies that you have. 

Mr. KELLY. The 5,000 vacancies that we have are not vacancies. 

The headcount has been reduced, the authorized strength, but not 

by 5,000. It was reduced less than that. We have attrition, significant attrition. It is complicated, but we had a lot of hires in the 

mid–1980s. We had those hires because of layoffs in the 1970s. We 

waited until the 1980s to do it. But now you can retire in 20 years 

in the New York City Police Department, so we have historically 

consistent attrition, but it is large numbers. So we attrition down 

and we hire up. 

We have right now in the Police Academy, we have 1,700 recruits 

in our Police Academy class. They will graduate next month. We 

will hire another 1,600, well actually we are going to hire them before they graduate. So we are meeting the needs of the department 

based on a 37,038 authorized headcount. When you look back to 

October of 2000, the headcount was over 40,000. So the authorized 

headcount was reduced because of the budget problems that the 

city is facing. 

Mr. REICHERT. I have follow-up questions, but I see my time has 

expired, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Reichert. 

Mr. Kelly, thank you very much for your testimony today. It is, 

as always, a tremendous addition to the committee. 

Any further comment, Mr. Rogers? 
36

Mr. ROGERS. I would just say that the City of New York is fortunate, and our nation is fortunate, to have you in this capacity, and 

I appreciate your making the time to be here. It has been a great 

benefit to me, and I know the rest of the committee as well. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. KING. The witness is excused. Thank you. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. KING. I will call the second panel please. 

I thank each of the witnesses on panel two for being here today. 

In the interest of time, we will get right to the testimony. 

I recognize Shawn Reese, Analyst in American National Government and Government Finance Division of the Congressional Research Service. Mr. Reese? 

STATEMENT OF SHAWN REESE 

Mr. REESE. Chairman King, Chairman Rogers, and members of 

the subcommittees, I would like to thank you for this opportunity 

to appear before you today to discuss federal counterterrorism 

training. 

My summary presents a brief overview of federal 

counterterrorism training aimed at illustrating the range of such 

training offered by the federal government. My summary also presents areas that may merit oversight to assess whether such training programs are appropriate in scope or possibly redundant. I also 

have two visual aids that I think they are going to set up now to 

present, which are examples of DHS and federal government 

counterterrorism entities. It is not comprehensive. 

Federal counterterrorism training programs are varied and are 

provided by numerous federal agencies, among which are the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Health and 

Human Services, Justice, and Transportation, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Each department or agency provides 

counterterrorism training, targeting specific categories of recipients 

such as federal, state and local government personnel, emergency 

responders, and private and public critical infrastructure personnel. 

The mission of the Department of Homeland Security to secure 

the nation from terrorist attacks gives it primary federal responsibility for providing counterterrorism training to federal, state and 

local emergency responders. Additionally, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National Preparedness, requires the DHS Secretary, in coordination with appropriate federal departments and 

agencies, to establish and maintain a comprehensive national 

training program. The national program is to identify standards 

and maximize the effectiveness of existing federal preparedness 

programs. 

The Department of Homeland Security comprises numerous 

agencies, offices, institutes and partners that provide 

counterterrorism training. DHS training is provided by such facilities as the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the National 

Fire Academy, the Noble Training Center and the Emergency Management Institute. Additionally, DHS administers training programs provided by the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium and the Training Resources and Data Exchange Group. 
37

The Office for Domestic Preparedness, which has primary responsibility within DHS for preparing for potential terrorist attacks 

against the United States, is the principal DHS agency providing 

counterterrorism training to states and localities. 

Now I would like to briefly discuss possible policy questions concerning counterterrorism training for congressional oversight. In 

the evolution of counterterrorism training, a number of questions 

have arisen with regard to possible duplication of training programs. The questions and possible approaches might be of interest 

as you continue your oversight of counterterrorism training. As you 

know, CRS takes no position with respect to any of the possible approaches mentioned. 

The first question is the potential duplication of DHS training. 

Within DHS, the Office for Domestic Preparedness and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency administer training programs at 

the state and local level and at national training institutes such as 

the Emergency Management Institute and the National Fire Academy. The Office for Domestic Preparedness administers training 

through such entities as the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium. 

Some training programs offered by the Emergency Management 

Institute, the National Fire Academy and the Consortium have 

subject matter that is similar such as incident management, homeland security planning, hazardous material response, emergency 

operations and weapons of mass destruction response. Because of 

the possible similarity of the training programs, some might argue 

for the need to consolidate or coordinate training offered by DHS. 

Section six of H.R. 1544, Faster and Smarter Funding for First 

Responders, proposes an evaluation by the Government Accountability Office. If Congress were to find undesirable redundancy in 

DHS training, it could require DHS to establish a board or task 

force to review training and recommend coordination or other steps 

to reduce potential duplication. If Congress were to determine a 

need to consolidate DHS training, it could require the Department 

of Homeland Security to conduct a review of its counterterrorism 

training and develop a plan to consolidate it. This approach, however, might be seen as impractical due to the training FEMA provides state and local emergency managers that is specific to natural disasters; the specific training the National Fire Academy provides firefighters; and the training that the Office for Domestic 

Preparedness provides to law enforcement personnel. 

The second and final policy question I would like to address is 

the potential duplication of federal counterterrorism training. 

Again because of rapid evolution of training programs offered by 

different federal departments and agencies, there may be a duplication of certain types of training. For example, the Departments of 

Homeland Security and Health and Human Services and the Environmental Protection Agency all offer training related to responding to hazardous material incidents. Congress could ask the Government Accountability Office to undertake an evaluation of all federal counterterrorism training programs, similar to its request to 

GAO to evaluate DHS training. 

Finally, Congress might direct the federal departments and agencies that provide counterterrorism training to establish an inter-
38

1P.L. 107–296, Sec. 101(b). 

agency task force or board to review their training. Presently, 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 requires DHS to coordinate training with other federal departments and agencies as part 

of its administration of the national training program. This approach, however, could result in turf disputes and federal agencies 

attempting to protect training programs and the funding associated 

with them. 

In summary, federal counterterrorism training programs are varied and are provided by numerous federal agencies. Because of this, 

there may be a potential for duplication among the federal government or specifically within DHS. 

Thank you, Chairman King and Chairman Rogers. I would welcome any questions you or the subcommittee may have. 

[The statement of Mr. Reese follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHAWN REESE

Chairmen King and Rogers, and the Members of the Subcommittees, I would like 

to thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss federal 

counter-terrorism training. My statement presents a brief overview of federal 

counter-terrorism training aimed at illustrating the range of such training offered 

by the federal government. The statement also presents areas that may merit oversight to assess whether such training programs are appropriate in scope or possibly 

redundant.

Overview 

Federal counter-terrorism training programs are varied and are provided by numerous federal agencies, among which are the Departments of Defense, Energy, 

Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Transportation, and 

the Environmental Protection Agency. Each department or agency provides counterterrorism training targeted to such specific categories of recipients as federal, state, 

and local government personnel, emergency responders, and private and public critical infrastructure personnel. 

The programs train individuals to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. Some of the training programs, such as those of the Departments of 

Transportation (DOT) and Energy (DOE), and the Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA), are designed for personnel working in critical infrastructure sectors. Other 

programs, such as those of the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security (DHS), are intended for personnel who are not identified with specific critical 

infrastructure. Instead, DOD and DHS provide training for government personnel, 

emergency responders, and medical professionals who would respond to a terrorist 

attack, regardless of location or target. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provides training specifically to medical personnel, but this training is 

not targeted to specific critical infrastructure. Instead, HHS provides training that 

prepares medical personnel to respond to any disaster, but especially to terrorist attacks using biological, chemical, and radiological weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD). The Department of Justice (DOJ) provides training specifically for federal, 

state, and local law enforcement personnel. Most of these federal departments and 

agencies provide training in conjunction with private and public educational institutions, federal laboratories, and federal research and development centers. 

The mission of DHS to secure the nation from terrorist attacks gives it primary 

federal responsibility for providing counter-terrorism training to federal, state, and 

local emergency responders.1 Other departments and agencies provide counter-terrorism training, but their programs focus either on specific critical infrastructure 

sectors, such as energy and transportation, or on specific emergency responders, 

such as HHS training for medical personnel and DOJ training for law enforcement 

personnel. DHS provides training to a wide range of critical infrastructure personnel, law enforcement and other emergency responders, government (federal, 

state, and local) personnel, and medical personnel. 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive—8 (HSPD8), issued December 17, 2003, 

requires the DHS Secretary, in coordination with the HHS Secretary, the Attorney 

General, and other appropriate federal departments and agencies, and in consultation with state and local governments, to establish and maintain a comprehensive 
39

2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The Interim National Preparedness Goal

(Washington: Mar. 2005), available at [http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4420], visited June 20, 2005. 3Office of the President, Homeland Security Presidential Directive—8: National Preparedness,

(Washington: Dec. 2003), available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/

20031217–6.html], visited June 20, 2005. 4 Ibid. 

5For further information on LLIS, see [http://www.llis.gov].

6See the list later in the statement. 

7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ‘‘Working with DHS,’’ available at [http://

www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=82], visited Oct. 27, 2004. 8P.L. 107–296 (Homeland Security Act of 2002), Sec. 430(d). 

9Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, ‘‘Training Overview,’’ 

available at [http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/training.htm], visited Oct. 27, 2004. 10 Ibid. 

national training program. The national training program is to assist federal, state, 

and local governments in meeting the Interim National Preparedness Goal,2 which 

was released in March 2005.3 The national training program is to identify standards 

and maximize the effectiveness of existing federal preparedness programs. Additionally, HSPD–8 directs federal departments and agencies to include private organizations and entities in the accreditation and delivery of preparedness training.4

HSPD–8 also requires the DHS Secretary to develop and maintain a system to 

collect, analyze, and disseminate lessons learned, best practices, and information 

from exercises and training events, and establish procedures to improve national 

preparedness. DHS has developed what it calls the Lessons Learned Information 

System (LLIS), which provides best practices and information from exercises and 

training. LLIS, however, does not provide information on how training is coordinated within DHS, or among federal departments and agencies.5

Department of Homeland Security 

DHS comprises numerous agencies, offices, institutes, and partners 6 that provide 

counter-terrorism training for federal, state, and local government personnel. DHS 

training is provided at such facilities as the Federal Law Enforcement Training 

Center (FLETC), National Fire Academy (NFA), Nobel Training Center (NTC), and 

Emergency Management Institute (EMI). FLETC is an interagency law enforcement 

center that provides training for federal law enforcement agencies. The Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers EMI, NTC, and NFA training 

activities. NFA trains fire and emergency response personnel to enhance their abilities to respond to fires and related emergencies. EMI is a training program consisting of resident and non-resident courses aimed at enhancing emergency management practices. NTC is the national center for health and medical education in disaster, including acts of terrorism.7

Office for Domestic Preparedness. The Office for Domestic Preparedness 

(ODP), which has the primary responsibility within DHS for preparing for potential 

terrorist attacks against the United States,8 is the principal DHS agency providing 

counter-terrorism and WMD training to states and localities. ODP provides terrorism and WMD training through DHS training institutions and partners. ODP 

training partners include the Training and Data Exchange Group (TRADE), the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC), federal departments, and private 

and professional organizations.9

ODP training is designed to meet the varying needs of its training audiences. It 

includes reaching multiple emergency responder disciplines through training at the 

awareness, performance, planning, and management levels. ODP uses a variety of 

approaches that include traditional classroom methods, train-the-trainer, Web-based 

training, and video tele-conferencing.10

Trade. TRADE is a federal interagency group that provides training to state and 

local emergency responders and reviews member courses for consistency, avoidance 

of training duplication, and the use of up-to-date training methods. TRADE members include the following: 

• United States Fire Administration’s (USFDA) National Fire Academy (NFA); 

• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); 

• Department of Justice (DOJ); 

• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); 

• Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); 

• Department of Energy (DOE); 

• Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); 

• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); 

• Emergency Management Institute (EMI); and 
40

11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, ‘‘Training Overview,’’ available at [http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/training.htm], visited Oct. 27, 2004.

14 Aministered by the American Red Cross and funded through the Department of Defense. 

15Section 180(c) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101. 16 AL, AZ, CA, CO, GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, LA, MI, NE, NV, NM, OH, OR, SC, TN, TX, UT, 

WA, WY. 17 AL, AR, AZ, CA, CT, DE, GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, LA, MD, MI, MO, NE, NV, NJ, NM, 

NH, NY, NC, OH, OR, PA, SC, TN, TX, UT, VA, WA, WV, WY. 

• Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC).11

National Domestic Preparedness Consortium. NDPC is composed of federal 

training facilities and academic institutions which provide training to emergency responders in different locations in the United States. NDPC members include: • Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP), at Anniston, Alabama; • Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education (ACE), at Louisiana State University 

(LSU); 

• National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center (NERRTC), at the 

Texas Engineering Extension Service (TEEX), Texas A&M University (TAMU); 

• Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center (EMRTC), at New Mexico 

Institute of Mining and Technology (NMIMT); and 

• National Center for Exercise Excellence (NCEE), at Nevada Test Site 

(NTS).12

Office for Domestic Preparedness Training Partners. In addition to TRADE 

and NDPC, ODP has cooperative agreements with other federal agencies, private industry, academic institutions, and professional organizations that provide training 

to federal, state, and local emergency responders. These partners include the following: • Community Research Associates; • U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground; • International Association of Fire Fighters; • U.S. Navy’s Naval Postgraduate School; • National Sheriff’s Association; • General Physics Corporation at Pine Bluff Arsenal; • Science Applications International Corporation; • George Washington University; • Michigan State University; • International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators; and • International Association of Chiefs of Police.13

Department of Defense 

The majority of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) terrorism-related training 

courses are dedicated to military personnel. DOD’s expertise and range of training 

facilities related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, 

however, offer a limited selection of training programs that are available to nonDOD personnel. Most of these programs are intended for medical and technical personnel who could be called upon to respond and treat casualties following an incident involving CBRN weapons. Several of the training courses are provided with the 

joint sponsorship of the American Red Cross. DOD provides counter-terrorism training to non-DOD personnel at the following: • U.S. Army Medical Research Institutes for Chemical and Infectious Diseases, 

Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, and Dugway Proving Ground in Utah; 

• Clara Barton Center for Domestic Preparedness,14 U.S. Army Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas; 

• Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, in Bethesda, Maryland; and • Joint Interagency Training Center, in San Diego, California.

Department of Energy 

The Department of Energy (DOE) provides technical assistance and training to 

states for public safety officials of appropriate units of local government and Indian 

tribes through whose jurisdictions DOE plans to transport spent nuclear fuel or 

high-level radioactive waste.15 DOE’s Office of Environmental Management trains 

emergency responders for shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), and 

also provides training through the Transportation Emergency Preparedness Program (TEPP). Twenty-three states 16 have received approximately $30 million in 

training since 1988 to prepare for radioactive waste shipments to the WIPP near 

Carlsbad, New Mexico. The TEPP has provided technical assistance and training to 

emergency responders in 34 states 17 in the past two years. In FY2002, DOE pro-
41

18 U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of National Transportation, Corrine Macaluso, 

‘‘Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management,’’ memorandum, Feb. 5, 2004. 19Organizations that provide security training include professional associations, such as the 

American Water Works Association (AWWA), the Water Environment Federation (WEF), and 

the National Rural Water Association (NRWA). Congress has provided some grant funds to 

these organizations, through EPA, to support their water security training activities. 20Title IV of the Bioterrorism Act (42 U.S.C. 300i) amended the Safe Drinking Water Act to 

require each community water system serving more than 3,300 individuals to conduct an assessment of the system’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks or other intentional acts to disrupt the 

provision of a safe and reliable drinking water supply. These drinking water systems must submit a copy of the assessment to EPA. The act also requires these systems to prepare emergency 

response plans incorporating the results of the vulnerability assessments no later than six 

months after completing the assessments. All utilities covered by the act were to have completed 

vulnerability assessments by June 30, 2004. The last statutory deadline for systems to complete 

emergency response plans was December 31, 2004. 21 Because most water and wastewater utilities are municipally owned, EPA has made an effort to involve locally elected officials in first responder training courses. 22See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Futures Initiative Home Page, at [http://www.cdc.gov/futures/default.htm].

vided $5.8 million for training to the states along its major transportation corridors. 

DOE estimates that it has trained 16,200 responders since FY1999.18

Environmental Protection Agency 

To carry out its water sector responsibilities, EPA has established a Water Security Division within the Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water. This division 

works with drinking water and wastewater utilities, states, tribes, and other stakeholders to improve the security of these utilities and improve their ability to respond 

to security threats and breaches. Among its responsibilities and activities, the Water 

Security Division provides security and anti-terrorism-related technical assistance 

and training to the water sector. 

EPA’s Water Security Division generally does not perform the training itself; it 

delivers training at locations across the country through stakeholder organizations 

and other federal partners.19 EPA has sponsored training on a variety of security 

topics, including courses to help community water systems prepare vulnerability assessments and emergency response plans, as required by the Bioterrorism Act (P.L. 

107–188).20 EPA has entered into an interagency agreement with the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) within DHS, under which ODP has provided emergency 

response training for medium and large drinking water utilities, first responders, 

and local elected officials.21 To assist smaller drinking water utilities not covered 

by the Bioterrorism Act, EPA has provided funding to the National Rural Water Association to deliver security training. 

Department of Health and Human Services 

Counter-terrorism training programs supported by the Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS) are aimed at a variety of public health and health care providers, individuals who provide ancillary health services such as laboratory testing, 

and researchers who study health effects from, or countermeasures to, biological, 

chemical and radiological agents. Training programs have a variety of intended purposes, including assuring the ability to recognize and treat victims of terrorist 

events, protecting workers and others from infection or contamination while care is 

rendered, protecting critical health care assets and maintaining electronic and other 

lines of communication during catastrophic events, assuring competent laboratory 

services, and assuring that certain assets such as radioactive materials or biological 

organisms are secured against potential misuse. 

All of the HHS agencies listed below have responsibility for funding and administering specific training programs and assets.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. CDC is the agency primarily responsible for the public health response to terrorism and other public health emergencies. Most extramural training programs at CDC have been coordinated across 

centers and offices by the CDC Public Health Practice Program Office (PHPPO). 

CDC also supports intramural training of public health professionals through its 

Epidemiology Program Office (EPO). According to a reorganization called the CDC 

Futures Initiative, existing PHPPO and EPO training activities are redistributed to 

several new organizational units within CDC.22 CDC-funded training programs are 

developed and delivered in a variety of ways. CDC is entirely responsible for some 

programs. Others are developed and delivered in conjunction with state and local 

health departments and academic centers, although some are developed by these entities with CDC funding but little direct input otherwise. 
42

23For more information on education and training components of the HRSA National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program, see presentation of Teri Spear before the meeting of the 

HHS Secretary’s Council on Public Health Preparedness, May 3–4, 2004, available at [http://

www.hhs.gov/asphep/presentation/040503presentationlist.html]. 24FDA, ORAU Home Page at [http://www.fda.gov/ora/training/courselora.html]. 25Short descriptions of these programs and courses are available on a Web-accessible ‘‘law enforcement training database’’ and search engine maintained by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. 

See [http://bjatraining.aspensys.com]. 26The nonprofit law enforcement organizations include the Institute for Intergovernmental 

Research, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Oklahoma Regional Community 

Policing Institute, and SEARCH (a multi-state consortium dedicated to improving criminal justice record systems). 

Health Resources Services Administration. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), through its Bureau of Health Professions, provides support for training and placement of health care and public health workers in order 

to alleviate shortages and maldistributions of these workers. 

HRSA also administers the National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program, a program of grants to states to prepare hospitals and supporting health care 

systems to deliver coordinated and effective care to victims of terrorism and other 

public health emergencies. As part of their application for funding, states must include a written proposal for providing relevant training for hospital and health care 

personnel to assure readiness in their states.23

Following the terrorist attacks of 2001, HRSA has provided annual grants to academic institutions through a new Bioterrorism Training and Curriculum Development Program for training in recognition and treatment of diseases related to bioterrorism for health care providers in training and on the job.

Food and Drug Administration. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 

assures the safety and efficacy of human drugs and vaccines, medical devices, and 

animal drugs, and the safety of certain foods and cosmetics. 

FDA provides training for its own employees and for state, local, and tribal regulatory personnel at no cost through its Office of Regulatory Affairs ‘‘ORA University.’’ 24 Relevant training courses for terrorism preparedness include those geared 

toward implementation of new regulations for food and drug safety in the Public 

Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, P.L. 107–

188. Formats include Web-based and classroom instruction, video tele-conferences, 

and a library of training materials. 

Department of Justice 

The Department of Justice (DOJ) enforces the law to help ensure public safety 

against foreign and domestic terrorist threats, by conducting federal investigations 

and prosecutions of persons suspected of unlawful activities. DOJ also sponsors and 

provides assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies. Listed below are 

several of these training programs.25 While some of them are not directly related 

to counter-terrorism, they are listed because they may convey the knowledge and 

skills to law enforcement personnel that could advance investigations of terrorist activities and responses to terrorist incidents. Among the programs are those related 

to special weapons and tactics, criminal intelligence, money laundering, computer 

crime, and crisis response and management. Some programs are provided directly 

by DOJ entities—the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; and the National White Collar Crime Center. Others are sponsored by DOJ, through the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and provided 

by nonprofit law enforcement organizations.26 DOJ training includes: 

• State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training; 

• WMD Hazardous Material Evidence Collection; 

• Crisis Management; 

• Crisis Negotiation; 

• Law Enforcement Response to Terrorism; 

• Multi-Agency Incident Management for Law Enforcement and Fire Service; 

• Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Terrorists; 

• Terrorism and Explosive Seminars; 

• Criminal Intelligence Systems; 

• Foundations of Intelligence Analysis; 

• White Collar Crime and Terrorism; 

• Cyber and Computer Crime; and 

• Basic LAN and Advanced Internet Investigations.

Department of Transportation 
43

27 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration, ‘‘Safety and Security: 

FTA Transit Security,’’ available at [http://transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/Security/Default.asp], visited Nov. 18, 2004. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid.

Rail and bus transit systems are identified as critical infrastructure because they 

provide transportation for many Americans in densely populated urban areas and 

serve key economic, financial, and governmental centers of the nation. They move 

over 14 million passengers daily, and in one month they transport more passengers 

than U.S. airlines move in a year. Since these systems are operated in an open environment, they are high-risk, high-consequence targets for terrorists. Rail transit 

subways travel under key government buildings, business centers, and harbors.27

Rail and bus transit systems travel along fixed routes with frequent scheduled 

stops, and aviation-type passenger screening procedures may not be practical because of the large volume of daily passengers. 

Federal Transit Administration. Within the Department of Transportation, the 

Federal Transit Administration (FTA) is responsible for providing counter-terrorism 

and homeland security training to transit system personnel. FTA provides security 

guidance to transit system operators, and it has instituted a five-point security initiative to assist transit systems in preparing for and responding to terrorist attacks. 

In addition to training, FTA provides assistance to transit system agencies with onsite readiness assessments, technical assistance, and regional forums for emergency 

responders, and grants for terrorism drills.28

FTA is also working with the transit industry to identify critical, high-risk assets 

and operations and to develop security strategies for these critical assets. The strategies will address training, providing technical assistance, sharing best practices, 

and testing new security technology.29 FTA’s counter-terrorism training courses are 

available to transit system administrators, operators, managers, and emergency responders. 

Possible Questions for Congressional Oversight 

The primary stakeholders in responding to terrorist attacks, and thus the recipients of counter-terrorism training, are federal, state, and local governments; private 

and public medical systems; and critical infrastructure administrators. In the evolution of counter-terrorism training, a number of questions have arisen with regard 

to possible duplication of training programs. The questions and possible approaches 

might be of interest as you continue your oversight of federal counter-terrorism 

training. CRS takes no position with respect to any of the possible approaches listed. 

Potential Duplication of Department of Homeland Security Training.

Within DHS, ODP and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administer training programs at the state and local levels, and at national training institutes. At the national level, FEMA administers the Emergency Management Institute (EMI) and the National Fire Academy (NFA). ODP does not directly administer 

any training institute; but it provides guidance and funding to training institutes 

that are part of the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC), described 

earlier in this statement. 

Some training programs offered by EMI and NFA have subject matter similar to 

training provided by NDPC training institutes, such as incident management, homeland security planning, hazardous material incident response, emergency operations, 

and WMD response. Because of the possible similarity of these training programs 

for state and local first responders, some might argue for a need to consolidate or 

coordinate training offered by these two separate DHS agencies. 

FEMA’s firefighting training provided by the NFA, however, focuses primarily on 

the needs of local fire departments, whereas NDPC provides some training primarily 

focusing on law enforcement. Some of the training that is tailored to a specific profession such as law enforcement or firefighting would not seem to be redundant. 

Basic or introductory training such as incident management or WMD response, however, may not be specifically tailored for a single profession or type of first responder. The possible redundancy of training and the potential consolidation of 

training may be policy questions that the committee may choose to address through 

oversight of DHS’s role in providing assistance to states and localities. Possible approaches include:

Government Accountability Office (GAO) Evaluation of Training. The 

House Committee on Homeland Security could ask GAO to undertake an evaluation 

of DHS counter-terrorism training programs. The evaluation could review ODP and 

FEMA training curricula, individual courses, intended and actual trainees, and 
44

training facilities. After conducting a review of these courses, GAO might be able 

to identify any duplication of training and possible options for consolidating or coordinating this training. This option would give the committee additional tools for 

oversight of the programs. H.R. 1544 (as reported), Section 6, proposes this evaluation. This option, however, would require the committee to work with GAO to set 

a mutually acceptable scope and time for the study. 

Coordination of Department of Homeland Security Training. If the committee were to find undesirable redundancy in training programs, it could direct 

DHS to be more attentive to coordinating the counter-terrorism training programs 

administered by ODP and FEMA. DHS could possibly establish a board to review 

the ODP and FEMA training programs, and to recommend coordination or other 

steps to reduce duplication. 

Consolidation of Department of Homeland Security Training. If the committee were to find a need to consolidate DHS training programs, it could direct 

DHS, through statutory or conference language, to conduct a review of its training 

programs and develop a plan to consolidate its training. This consolidation might 

involve the removal of similar programs provided by ODP and FEMA to ensure 

there is no redundancy. If Congress did not consider this consolidation adequate to 

ensure against redundant or uncoordinated DHS training, it could also direct DHS 

to consolidate all counter-terrorism training under one agency. ODP might be directed to assume the responsibility for administering not only its training, but also 

the training FEMA provides first responders through EMI and NFA. Some would 

argue this is a logical choice since ODP is responsible for administering the funding 

to states and localities that assist them in receiving this training. This option, however, might be seen as impractical due to the training EMI provides state and local 

emergency managers that is specific to natural disasters, and the specific training 

NFA provides firefighters. FEMA historically has administered training programs 

for emergency managers and firefighters, whereas ODP has administered law enforcement focused training. 

Potential Duplication of Federal Counter-Terrorism Training. Because of 

the rapid evolution of counter-terrorism training programs offered by different federal departments and agencies, there may be a duplication of certain types of training provided to federal, state, and local government personnel, emergency responders, and critical infrastructure facility personnel. For example, DHS, HHS, and EPA 

all offer training related to responding to hazardous materials incidents. 

It is possible that training provided by DHS, DOD, DOJ, DOT, EPA, and HHS 

to first responders is not coordinated, and that a federal effort should be made to 

ensure these federal entities provide coordinated, non-duplicative training. The following possible oversight approaches might assist the committee as it continues its 

oversight effort concerning federal counter-terrorism training. 

Government Accountability Office Evaluation of Training. Congress could 

ask GAO to undertake an evaluation of all federal counter-terrorism training programs, similar to its request for a GAO evaluation of DHS training (H.R. 1544, Section 6). GAO could be asked to review individual courses, training curricula, training audiences, and training facilities. After conducting a review of these courses, 

GAO might be able to identify any duplication of training and possible alternatives 

for consolidating or coordinating this training. This option would require Congress 

to work with GAO to set a mutually acceptable scope and time for the evaluation. 

Interagency Task Force. Congress might direct, through statutory and conference language, the federal departments and agencies that provide counter-terrorism training to establish an interagency task force to review their counter-terrorism programs. Because of the lead role DHS provides in counter-terrorism training, Congress could consider directing DHS to chair the task force. Once the training has been reviewed, the task force could be directed to coordinate and consolidate 

the training as necessary. This option, however, could result in ‘‘turf’’ disputes and 

federal departments and agencies attempting to protect training programs and the 

funding associated with them.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Reese, for your testimony. 

Actually, before we go on to the other witnesses, I want to thank 

all of you for your patience in sitting here this morning. The first 

panel went on longer, then we had the vote, which also further delayed things. So I really want to tell you we do appreciate it. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Steven Edwards, Director of the 

Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute. 

Mr. Edwards? 
45

STATEMENT OF STEVEN EDWARDS 

Mr. EDWARDS. Good morning. My name is Steven Edwards. I am 

currently the Director of the Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute 

at the University of Maryland, College Park. Thank you for listening to my comments this morning, as I welcome the opportunity to 

speak before this committee. 

As an emergency services educator and trainer, the process and 

end result of preparing the nation’s first responders to deal with 

weapons of mass destruction and terrorism is paramount. Firefighters and emergency medical personnel have to be properly 

trained and equipped to deal with these emerging threats, in addition to their regular duties. The core subject matter, as well as the 

delivery system, must ensure that there is a comprehensive national strategy that best serves the general population, as well as 

the first responders. Unfortunately, this just does not exist. 

Shortly after the events of 9/11, many leaders in the fire service 

organizations and state and local fire training academies looked 

forward to working with the Office of Domestic Preparedness to receive guidance as well as national standard curriculum to ensure 

each state and locality was prepared to respond as necessary. What 

we have received to date is little or no training curriculum, minimal communication and an antiquated training delivery system. 

We sit bewildered as to why ODP would ignore established training systems at the state and local level. Prior to the events of 9/

11, ODP established a Federal Training Consortium of five schools 

to deliver terrorism response-level training. Only these selected 

schools could participate in the system and you had to be invited 

by ODP to be a part of this group. Amazingly, after 9/11 when the 

entire world changed and intense training in terrorism response to 

unprecedented levels was required, ODP kept the same system in 

place. 

An existing network of public safety training academies has 

served the needs of the nation’s first responders for decades. These 

academies are found at the state and local level and have experienced and highly qualified instructors. Each of the 50 states has 

a state fire training organization. Collectively, the state fire training academies train over 800,000 students each year in an array 

of emergency services training programs. Hundreds of millions of 

dollars in infrastructure, faculty and support personnel have been 

invested in these academies over the years. 

As an example, the Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute has 

trained emergency responders for 75 years. Imagine our dismay 

and the dismay of our entire Fire Service in our state to have such 

a system ignored by the Office of Domestic Preparedness. Last year 

in correspondence to ODP, I requested our state be allowed to 

share in and teach selected ODP terrorist and response training 

courses. This request was denied by ODP. 

Interestingly, at the same time our institute was not deemed appropriate to teach ODP courses at the local level, we were training 

the United States Secret Service on fire procedures for the protection of the President. DHS and ODP have instructed state fire 

academies they can use federal funds to develop terrorism response 

training curriculum in their own respective states. Actually, this 

makes little sense. What is needed is a comprehensive national 
46

training strategy for terrorism response training courses, not 50 

states going their own separate directions with training course material. 

Regarding the cost of programs to the taxpayer and the efficiency 

with which they are delivered by ODP, Congress should be concerned and examine more closely the ODP methodology for administering training programs. For example, the ODP Training Consortium can fly in three instructors from Texas to teach a course in 

Maryland, where I can have an instructor walk from his or her second-floor office down to our classroom at the academy and teach 

the same course if it was available. It does not take an accountant 

to figure out which method is more costly. 

The ODP method of training course delivery simply does not take 

advantage of existing training resources at the state and local 

level. My state and others attempt to deliver training courses as 

close to the students as possible and to reduce costs and increase 

flexibility with regard to class schedules. Much of the nation’s fire 

service is volunteer-based, and they need to attend training courses 

on nights and weekends since they work their regular jobs during 

the week. All state fire academies understand this and work to provide training when the audience is most available. Unfortunately 

for the hundreds of thousands of volunteers who need training, the 

ODP Consortium teaches their programs Monday to Friday during 

normal work hours. 

In February of 2005, the International Association of Fire Chiefs 

at a summit that was conducted in Washington, D.C. and attended 

by 16 major national fire and rescue associations. The summit grew 

out of frustration and concern regarding a number of issues at 

DHS. At this historic summit, five goals were agreed upon including ‘‘to ensure the most effective utilization of training resources, 

the Department of Homeland Security should be required to work 

more closely with the National Fire Academy, national fire service 

organizations providing fire service-related training, and state and 

local fire training academies regarding the use of curriculum and 

the delivery system for terrorism response training.’’

In April of 2005, the Congressional Fire Service National Advisory Council, which includes almost 50 fire service organizations, 

met and approved the summit recommendations by way of unanimous resolution. The issue of access to ODP training curriculum 

and delivery of programs is a major concern of the entire fire service within the United States. Failure to recognize the qualifications 

of state and local instructors and work with such a proven system 

is a lost opportunity. 

A partnership needs to be developed where ODP works with 

state and local training academies to delivery needed terrorism response training in a format best suited for the success of the students. The state and local training academies are structured to deliver training in an efficient manner and do this where the response personnel live and work, in conjunction with other training 

priorities. It is clear that there needs to be a better system. State 

and local fire training academies are committed to working with 

the new leadership in the Department of Homeland Security to review current terrorism response delivery systems and make im-
47

provements where warranted. We simply want our students to be 

prepared to the highest extent possible. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Edwards follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN T. EDWARDS

Good Morning, my name is Steven Edwards. I am currently the Director of the 

Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute at the University of Maryland at College Park. 

I also serve as the Chair of the Congressional Fire Service Institute National Advisory Committee, Chairman of the Board of the Safety Equipment Institute, and I 

am the immediate past President of the North American Fire Training Directors, 

among other state and local appointments. Previous to these positions I served with 

the Prince George’s County Fire Department for 25 years, retiring as Fire Chief. 

Thank you for listening to my comments this morning as I welcome the opportunity 

to speak before this committee. 

As an emergency services educator and trainer the process and the end result of 

preparing the nation’s first responders to deal with weapons of mass destruction 

and terrorism is paramount. Firefighters and emergency medical personnel have to 

be properly trained and equipped to deal with these emerging threats in addition 

to their regular duties. The course subject matter as well as the delivery system 

must ensure that there is a comprehensive national training strategy that best 

serves the general population as well as the first responders. Unfortunately, this 

just does not exist. 

Within the Department of Homeland Security training and preparedness for terrorism response has been centralized within the Office of Domestic Preparedness 

(ODP) and the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. Shortly after the events of 9-11 many of the leadership of fire service organizations and state and local fire training academies looked forward to working with 

ODP to receive guidance as well as national standard curriculum to ensure that 

each state and locality was prepared to respond if necessary. What we have received 

to date is little or no training curriculum, minimal communication, and an antiqued 

training delivery system. We sit bewildered as to why ODP would ignore established 

training systems at the state and local level. 

Prior to the events of 9–11, ODP established a federal training consortium of five 

schools to delivery terrorism response level training. Only these selected schools 

could participate in this system and you had to be invited by ODP to be a part of 

this group. Amazingly, after 9-11, when the entire world changed and intense training in terrorism response to unprecedented levels was required, ODP keep the same 

system in place. The issue is not with the training programs of the ODP consortium 

schools or the quality of what they present, which for the most part is good. The 

issue is simply that this current system is inefficient, ineffective, and does not take 

advantage of existing training systems and networks. 

America’s fire service consists of over 30,000 fire departments staffed by approximately 1.2 million career and volunteer firefighters. The fire service responds to 

over 22 million emergencies each year and provides a number of emergency services 

to the public. There is no question that in the event of a terrorism event that the 

fire service will be called upon to respond in the first critical moments and provide 

valuable life saving services. Fire departments have attempted to greatly improve 

upon their ability to respond to these types of events and have made substantial 

progress since 9-11, in spite of the inadequate attempts of ODP to provide essential 

training services on a broad scale. 

An existing network of public safety training academies has served the needs of 

the nation’s first responders for decades. These academies are found at the state 

and local level and have experienced and highly qualified instructors in fire and rescue, emergency medical services, law enforcement, corrections, and others. I will restrict my comments to fire and rescue training academies, but I know that other 

public safety disciplines share my concerns. 

Each of the fifty states has a state fire training organization. Collectively the state 

fire training academies train over 800,000 students each year in an array of emergency response training programs. Hundreds of millions of dollars in infrastructure, 

faculty and support personnel have been invested in these academies over the years. 

The state fire training academies are represented by the North American Fire 

Training Directors (NAFTD). This group meets on a regular basis to review and discuss issues of concern to them. Over the past four years nothing has been discussed 

more than the issue of how can we get ODP to work more effectively with our training systems. 
48

The Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute (MFRI), instructs over 30,000 fire, rescue, and emergency medical service students each year. Our main training facility 

is located in College Park and we have six regional training centers strategically 

located throughout the state. MFRI has over 60 full time faculty and staff and over 

600 field instructors who work on a part time basis to instruct classes as needed. 

MFRI has trained emergency responders for 75 years. Imagine our dismay and the 

dismay of the entire fire service in our state to have such a system ignored by ODP. 

Last year in correspondence to ODP, I requested that our state be allowed to share 

in and teach selected ODP terrorism response training courses. This request was 

denied by ODP. Interesting that at the same time our Institute was not deemed appropriate to teach ODP courses at the local level, we were training the U.S. Secret 

Service, in fire procedures for the protection of the President. 

State fire academies have been instructed that they can use federal funds to develop terrorism response training curriculum in their state. ODP has established a 

review system to approve these courses. Our experience has been that this system 

is burdensome and a very lengthy process. The course reviews are conducted by the 

consortium schools, which in my opinion have no incentive to encounter more 

courses that they may have to compete with. Actually, this process makes little 

sense. What is needed is a comprehensive national training strategy for terrorism 

response training courses, not fifty states going their own direction with training 

course material. ODP could learn from many other federal agencies such as the National Fire Academy, the Emergency Management Institute, and others. When they 

develop a training course it is immediately handed off to the states to teach in a 

coordinated manner, with results returned for accountability purposes. This is an 

efficient system that serves the best interest of all first responders. 

Regarding the cost of the programs to the taxpayer and the efficiency in which 

they are delivered by ODP, there are many questions. For example, the ODP training consortium can fly in three instructors from Texas to teach a course in Maryland, or I can have an instructor walk from his/her second floor office down to the 

classroom at our academy and teach the same course if it were available. It does 

not take an accountant to figure out which method is more costly. The ODP method 

of training course delivery simply does not take advantage of existing training resources at the state and local level. 

My state and others attempt to deliver training courses as close to the students 

as possible to reduce costs and to increase flexibility with regard to class schedules. 

Much of the nation’s fire service is volunteer based and they need to attend training 

courses on nights and weekends, since they work their regular job during the week. 

All state fire academies understand this and work to provide training when the audience is most available. Unfortunately for the hundreds of thousands of volunteers 

who need to be trained, the ODP consortium teaches their programs Monday to Friday during normal work hours. 

All state fire training academies keep historical records of who is trained within 

their state. It is important that these records are available for certification and legal 

purposes. Since ODP does not work with the state systems we have no way of knowing who has been trained by ODP in our various states. Better coordination on this 

issue would improve this system for the benefit of the students and have training 

records maintained in an appropriate data base. 

Most of the state fire academy curriculum and instructors meet national certification and accreditation standards reviewed and verified by independent third party 

organizations, such the National Professional Qualifications Board, the International Fire Service Accreditation Service, and the American Council on Education 

among others. I am not aware of the standard to which ODP instructors and contractors are evaluated to in order to maintain quality in their instructional process. 

In the past ODP has stated that their courses ‘‘address complex subjects and often 

require specialized facilities or equipment’’ and therefore cannot be taught at the 

state and local level. I strongly disagree with this assertion and since their system 

for qualifying instructors appears to be less than what the state and local fire training academies utilize, I do not see how they came to this conclusion. Effective in 

2004, ODP does allow state and local hazardous materials instructors to teach their 

awareness level courses without further qualification. 

In February of 2005, the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) led a 

summit that was conducted in Washington DC and attended by sixteen of the major 

national fire and rescue associations. This summit grew out of frustration and concern regarding a number of issues at DHS. At this historic summit five goals were 

agreed upon, including: 

‘‘To ensure the most effective utilization of training resources, the Department of 

Homeland Security should be required to work more closely with the National Fire 

Academy, national fire service organizations providing fire service related training, 
49

and state and local fire training academies regarding the use of curriculum and the 

delivery system for terrorism response training.’’

In April of 2005 the Congressional Fire Service Institute National Advisory Committee met and approved the summit recommendations by way of a unanimous resolution. The CFSI National Advisory Committee consists of over fifty national fire 

service related organizations. The issue of access to ODP training curriculum and 

delivery of programs is a major concern of the entire fire service within the United 

States. 

The current ODP strategy of having a few limited training schools is inefficient 

and is simply not capable of delivering training courses in large volumes. Failure 

to recognize the qualifications of state and local instructors and work with such a 

proven system is a lost opportunity. 

In April of 2005 after a meeting with Mr. Matt Mayer, Acting Director of the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness action was initiated to address some of the above noted concerns. He has agreed to develop a process whereby state and local academies, with the concurrence of their State Administrative Agency, may request standardized curriculum for courses identified by 

SLGCP for institutionalization. This is a good start, but it needs to be followed up 

on and actually implemented. The state and local fire training academies anxiously 

await review of this process. 

A partnership needs to be developed whereby ODP works with the state and local 

training academies to deliver needed terrorism response training in a format best 

suited to the success of the students. The state and local training academies are 

structured to deliver training in an efficient manner and can do this where the response personnel live and work, in conjunction with other training priorities. It is 

clear that there needs to be a better system. The state and local fire training academies are committed to work with the new leadership at the Department of Homeland Security to review the current terrorism response delivery system and make 

improvements where warranted. We simple want our students to be prepared to the 

highest extent possible.

Mr. KING. Mr. Edwards, thank you for your testimony. You have 

certainly given us something to think about. 

Now, Sheriff McGowan, Chairman of the National Sheriffs’ Association, Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee. 

Sheriff McGowan? 

STATEMENT OF PATRICK McGOWAN 

Sheriff McGowan. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, 

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear today to 

present to you an overview of the National Sheriffs’ Association 

contributions to our nation’s homeland security. 

I am Sheriff Pat McGowan, Hennepin County Sheriff from Minneapolis, Minnesota. I have been in law enforcement for over 30 

years and am currently Chair of the National Sheriffs’ Association 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee. 

NSA has been providing sheriffs and other criminal justice practitioners with resources, technical assistance, information and opportunities for professional development since its inception in 1940. 

In 1999, 2 years prior to the 9/11 attacks on our nation, the NSA, 

using funds provided by the Office for Domestic Preparedness, initiated an executive-level WMD event preparedness prevention and 

response training program. 

Since that time, NSA and ODP have developed a close working 

relationship to ensure effective training in the areas of community 

partnerships, jail evacuation and first responder training. We are 

pleased with the progress we have made in developing appropriate 

courses and greatly appreciate the outreach that ODP has undertaken to ensure that our nation’s sheriffs receive the training they 

require to protect our country and to prevent terrorist activities. 
50

I am proud to say NSA has maintained its position at the forefront of the War on Terrorism. As a result, sheriffs across the country have been able to provide training for their command staff, a 

variety of other first responders, and members of their local communities for several years. As each community and its responders 

refine their preparedness skills and their response capabilities, our 

country becomes stronger. 

Each of our programs addresses a critically important sector and 

dramatically enhances the preparedness of our citizens and emergency responders. Whether NSA conducts a course in a large urban 

area or in a small rural community, participants find that the information and training that they receive is both timely and relevant to their circumstances. 

Focus groups composed of individuals according to their knowledge and expertise provide initial guidance for course structure and 

content. Their initial input has guided the NSA as it has developed 

a framework for each course. But as the scope and direction of national security initiatives have changed, the NSA has been equally 

quick to respond. The original WMD executive course, for example, 

which focused on WMD awareness, has been completely updated 

and now focuses on managing the event. This new course focuses 

more upon prevention and preparedness, echoing the requirements 

of HSPD 8. 

NSA programs have been developed to have the maximum impact possible at both the local and national levels. The executivelevel program was our first program developed to train and prepare 

sheriffs, staff, and executives of other agencies for a WMD event. 

In the period between 1999 and 2003, this training was delivered 

to over 6,000 sheriffs and other members of the emergency response community in 38 states. Feedback on this course has been 

extremely positive. This program is unique in that it provides opportunity for law enforcement executives to examine and then modify their jurisdiction’s emergency plan in the context of the most 

up-to-date information across a broad range of subjects. 

It directs executives to identify, cultivate and document roles and 

responsibilities within their own agency and in cooperation and coordination with other first responder agencies. Executives are then 

able to identify threats, vulnerabilities and resources within their 

own jurisdictions more easily. The NSA recognized that whenever 

a WMD or terrorist incident may occur, local first responders, along 

with their citizens, will provide the initial response to this event. 

Their level of preparation will dictate the effectiveness of the initial response. Later, the degree to which citizens and responding 

agencies are able to mutually support one another will shape the 

successful outcome of any response. The NSA community partnership and awareness training develops a dynamic partnership between citizens and responding agencies. Since its first pilots were 

completed in 2003, the course has trained nearly 1,700 participants 

from jurisdictions all across our nation. This program helps to increase community awareness of the risks and hazards posed by 

weapons of mass destruction. 

The results of this program have been striking. Personnel from 

a variety of public safety agencies have started working in cooperation with citizens from all sectors, civic and business leaders, teach-
51

ers, senior citizens and representatives of the faith-based community. Thanks to these new partnerships, many potential hazards 

and new resources have been discovered. The NSA jail evacuation 

course has been designed to address the needs of small and large 

jails in rural and urban jurisdictions and to prepare them to evacuate in the event of a terrorist attack or WMD event, while at the 

same time ensuring the safety of their respective communities. 

The specific challenges posed by jail evacuations have attracted 

the attention of DHS, ODP and out nation’s sheriffs. Since 2003 

when pilots for this program were first developed, participants 

from all regions of the country have received training. Forty programs have been conducted over the past 13 months; participants 

have included officials from state and federal prisons, private detention facilities, police departments, fire and rescue and emergency managers. Thirty-two more programs are scheduled prior to 

Thanksgiving, 2005. 

The NSA First Responder Program focuses on actions required in 

the initial phase of a response, that crucial 15 to 30 minutes that 

elapses between the occurrence of the event and response by the 

first responder teams. With an emphasis on safety and teamwork, 

participants learn that actions taken in the first moments of an incident set the stage for future success or failure. This program is 

currently awaiting final approval from ODP, but a long waiting list 

has already been compiled. 

Inquiring agencies include the United States Secret Service, 

TSA, FBI, our country’s military, as well as our international law 

enforcement colleagues in Ontario and Toronto. In this course, instruction and tabletop exercises, coupled with practical exercises, 

prepare participants to train members of their own agencies. 

Members, since NSA began conducting counterterrorism training 

in 1999, we have learned many lessons. Our goal is to ensure our 

training reflects the best practices, incorporates national standards 

where appropriate, is realistic, and is flexible to address the various needs of each community. 

In conclusion, I would like to say that the National Sheriffs’ Association has always taken a leading role in providing 

counterterrorism training across the country and that we have 

been doing so long before 9-ll. The effectiveness and relevance of 

NSA training initiatives can be verified by the current demand for 

our training programs, as well as our course evaluation data. The 

continued level of interest shown by agencies and organizations 

both within the United States and from the international community further confirms our success. 

I want to thank the committee for the opportunity to be here 

today and to discuss the effectiveness of antiterrorism training and 

to share NSA’s experience and successes. I am happy to answer 

any questions that you may have. 

[The statement of Mr. McGowan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHERIFF PATRICK D. MCGOWAN

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before this distinguished panel to present to you an overview of the National 

Sheriffs’ Association’s contributions to our nation’s homeland security. 

The National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA) believes that the Office of Sheriff is one 

of our nation’s most vital institutions. Sheriffs throughout the country interact with 
52

citizens and a wide variety of other agencies, at many levels. Their influence and 

impact upon the country cannot be understated. 

There are 3,087 sheriffs across the country representing both rural and urban jurisdictions. Many of them have influence over hundreds of square miles, while others serve in very densely populated cities. 

The National Sheriffs’ Association is a non-profit organization, chartered in 1940. 

Since its inception, the organization has consistently dedicated itself to raising the 

level of professionalism among sheriffs, their deputies, and others in the field of 

criminal justice and public safety so that they may perform their jobs in the best 

possible manner, in service to the people of their communities. 

In support of that mission, NSA provides sheriffs and other criminal justice practitioners with resources, technical assistance, information, and opportunities for professional development. Through its annual conferences, NSA also provides valuable 

opportunities for networking and interacting with our fellow criminal justice professionals. The NSA is committed to the quest of continually enhancing the services 

it provides to sheriffs, law enforcement personnel, and the public safety community. 

In 1999, the NSA using funds provided by the US Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness initiated an Executive Level WMD event preparedness, prevention, and response training program. In the years that followed, 

the success of this initial course led to the development of additional programs: 

Community Partnership Training, Jail Evacuation Training, and First Responder 

Training were each conceived and designed to fill gaps in our nation’s preparedness 

training. 

Since that time, NSA and ODP have developed a close working relationship to deliver training to our Nation’s first responder community. NSA firmly believes that 

ODP’s training program is making significant inroads into the training needs of the 

first responder community, particularly the sheriffs. We are pleased with the 

progress that ODP has made in developing appropriate courses and greatly appreciate the outreach that ODP has undertaken to ensure that our Nation’s sheriffs receive the training they require to prevent terrorist activities and protecting our 

country. 

Close, open, and creative communication between ODP and the NSA has led to 

the development of programs that are well suited to the challenges facing our country. With collaboration from ODP, NSA has been able to ensure that as the nature 

of the threats evolve and change, the training offered by NSA evolves as well, allowing sheriffs the opportunity to meet those new challenges head on. 

The support of the federal government through the ODP has allowed the NSA to 

maintain its position at the forefront of the war on terror. Sheriffs across the country have been able to train their command staff, a variety of first responders, and 

members of their local community for several years. As each community and its responders refine their preparedness skills and their response capabilities, our country becomes stronger. 

There is more to be done, and the National Sheriffs’ Association is more than 

ready to take up the challenge!

BACKGROUND 

The National Sheriffs’ Association has taken a leading role in the nation’s fight 

against terrorism. The Homeland Security and Weapons of Mass Destruction programs at NSA have been designed to respond flexibly to the needs of jurisdictions 

and communities across the country. 

The programs developed by the National Sheriffs’ Association were developed in 

response to the many requests from sheriffs across the nation. The NSA recognized 

that if specific sectors of the population were adequately prepared, then a coordinated and mutually supportive response would likely occur, resulting in a more effective and efficient outcome. 

Each program addresses a critically important sector and dramatically enhances 

the preparedness of citizens and emergency responders, should a terrorist event 

occur in their community, or in a nearby community. 

Whether NSA conducts a course in a large urban area, or in a small rural community, participants find that the information and training that they receive is both 

timely and relevant to their circumstances. In an ever-changing world, we constantly need to provide new information, raise new questions, and address unique 

circumstances, if we are truly going to prepare the Nation. 

The NSA’s Homeland Security and WMD training initiatives began in April 1999 

after the association received a $250,000 grant to develop an Executive Level Training Curriculum for Sheriffs, and to conduct pilot that training in five locations. 
53

In May 2000, the Association received another $600,000 award to conduct an additional 14 training programs. In September 2001, $700,000 was awarded for the continuation of this project 

through October 2002, including funds to conduct an additional 10 WMD Incident 

Risk and Crisis Communication training sessions. In October 2002, $2 million was awarded, extending the project through September 2003. 

In January 2003, the project scope was expanded to include 3 new training programs: 

(1) Jail Evacuation Planning Program, which initially conducted 4 pilot projects. 

Predicated on the success of these pilot programs, NSA started delivering regular training in May 2004; 

(2) Community Partnerships & Awareness Program, which also conducted 4 

pilot projects and began offering trainings in May 2004. 

(3) First Responder: Train-the-Trainer Program, which is currently in the 

course development stage, with trainings anticipated to begin in June 2005. In October 2003, NSA $2 million was awarded to continue the project through September 2004. And In October 2004, $3 million was awarded for continuation of 

the WMD training programs through September 2005.

Introduction to NSA Homeland Security Training Program Initiatives 

NSA training has been developed with the practical needs of law enforcement and 

first responder agencies and personnel in mind. Focus groups, composed of individuals invited to participate, according to their knowledge and expertise, provided initial guidance for course structure and content. 

Focus group input guided the NSA as it developed a framework for each course, 

and then provided a context for its selection of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). The 

SME team was then tasked with the development of course content and delivery 

strategies. 

The NSA was often fortunate to obtain the services of SMEs, who are national 

and international leaders in their fields. And because of the expertise of these individuals, NSA has been able to provide cutting edge, up-to-the-minute information 

in such areas as Explosives and Booby Traps (First Responder Course) and NIMS 

(First Responder, Jail Evacuation, and Managing the Event—A Leadership Guide for 

All-Hazard Events) as a direct result of the caliber of SME retained by the NSA. 

Upon completion, each course draft was presented in a series of pilot programs, 

which were utilized to fine-tune program material and delivery. The programs were 

then released, and the NSA began delivering training to Sheriffs’ jurisdictions 

across the country began. 

NSA training programs have been specifically designed to provide up-to-date information to participants. They demand participation in a range of activities, bringing this new information to life, as scenarios and table-top exercises tailored for the 

host jurisdiction are undertaken in both cooperative groups and individual settings. 

Cooperative group activities encourage immediate partnering between agencies, 

and foster long-term networking within the jurisdiction. Activities designed for the 

individual demand that each participant consider the current status of their agency. 

Actions necessary to improve the prevention and response capabilities of the agency 

are then determined, laying the foundation for focused action once participants return to their agencies and communities. 

As the scope and direction of national security initiatives changes, the NSA has 

been quick to respond. The original WMD Executive Course for example, which focused on WMD awareness, has been completely updated, and now focuses on Managing the Event—A Leadership Guide for All-Hazard Events. This new course focuses more upon prevention and preparedness, echoing the requirements of HSPD 

#8. 

The Community Partnerships program has gradually reshaped itself to help 

launch Neighborhood Watch and Citizen Corps programs in communities where 

these initiatives have not yet been implemented. 

Features of the NSA Homeland Security Initiatives Training Programs 

The constituency of the National Sheriffs’ Association provides a single platform 

from which training and information initiatives may be launched across the country, 

penetrating every state, and almost all jurisdictions. The office of Sheriff serves as 

a central agency within each jurisdiction that is able to marshal the resources of 

other law enforcement and responding agencies, as well as the resources and energies of the citizens. 
54

NSA programs have been developed to have the maximum impact possible at both 

local and national levels. 

Thus, the WMD Executive Program (now Managing the Event—A Leadership 

Guide for All-Hazard Events) was developed first, in order to prepare Sheriffs, their 

command staff, and executives of other agencies for a WMD or all-hazard event. 

This broad-based program fosters organization at a local, jurisdictional level. It also 

provides each jurisdiction’s leaders with the necessary skills and knowledge to move 

their community’s prevention and response programs forward in a way that reflects 

current federal government initiatives (e.g. NIMS implementation). 

Armed with new information, our nation’s sheriffs soon began asking for additional and specialized training which would include the handling of jail inmates, 

and citizen awareness.

Managing the Event—A Leadership Guide for All-Hazard Events provides a solid 

foundation for specialized training, designed for specific enforcement and community sectors. The Jail Evacuation program, Community Partnerships program, and 

the First Responders program were the result. 

Each focused upon a sector of the overall national response plan that had thus 

far been ignored or poorly served. Each was designed to mobilize its target audience, 

leading to new levels of preparedness, new awareness directed towards prevention, 

and a new capacity for effective and efficient response in the event of an incident. 

The NSA now provides four training programs for the nation’s Sheriffs. These programs are: 

1. Managing the Incident—A Leadership Guide to All-Hazard Events 

2. Community Partnerships and Awareness 

3. Jail Evacuation 

4. First Responder Train-the-Trainer

1. Managing the Incident - A Leadership Guide to All-Hazard Events

‘‘I am enthusiastic about this program. Sheriff Oxley of Monmouth County, 

NJ should be commended for taking a proactive approach on this important 

initiative,’’ said Sheriff Ferrell.

‘‘The bottom line is cooperation and mutual aid which we will talk about 

all day. One person or one agency can’t do it all. Sheriff Oxley saw the value 

and importance up front.’’

The National Sheriffs’ Association’s WMD Executive Course was designed to prepare Sheriffs to plan, equip and train their agencies to respond effectively to a terrorist incident. In the period between 1999 and 2003, the training was delivered to 

over 6,000 Sheriffs and other members of the emergency response community, in 38 

states. 

IN 2004, the NSA and ODP agreed to completely revise the program. The result 

was Managing the Event—A Leadership Guide for All-Hazard Events. Four pilots 

of the new program have been delivered (training 225 participants), and the course 

is now scheduled for ODP review in July 2005. 

Feedback on the new course has been extremely positive, and numerous demands 

for this new course are already being received by the NSA office. 

Managing the Incident—A Leadership Guide to All-Hazard Events, focuses upon 

the needs of law enforcement executive staff. In 2004, an advisory group composed 

of Sheriffs from large and small jurisdictions convened in order to identify shortcomings in existing WMD courses. The course which evolved from this beginning 

took as its primary objective the training of law enforcement executives to recognize 

and effectively deal with terrorist and all-hazard events. 

The program is unique. It provides opportunity for law enforcement executives to 

examine and then modify their jurisdiction’s emergency plan in the context of upto-date information across a wide range of crucial subjects. 

The program includes instruction and activity-based learning whereby: 

• Participants will receive an update on the latest WMD information. This topic 

is ever-changing, and correct and timely information is crucial to effective planning and response. 

• It is important, should a terrorist or all-hazard event occur, each responding 

agency knows its duties, responsibilities, and limitations. The program allows 

executives to identify, cultivate, and document roles and responsibilities within 

their agencies, and in cooperation and coordination with other agencies, thus 

enhancing the efficiency of response. 
55

• Executives identify threats, vulnerabilities and resources within their own jurisdictions. The extent to which an agency has completed this task is the extent 

to which a successful resolution of an all-hazard or terrorist event may be obtained. 

• Communications, including media issues, are carefully studied by participants. Such subjects as, responding to the media, Public Information Officer 

(PIO) hiring and training, and communications with citizens, are introduced. 

Various activities allow participants to actively experience the demands of this 

element of an overall response, allowing them to better develop a response plan 

suitable for their jurisdiction’s requirements. 

• Gathering, analyzing and sharing information with the proper agencies is a 

vital component to the success of our nation’s ongoing war on terrorism. Managing the Incident—A Leadership Guide to All-Hazard Events provides information on these processes, and it links law enforcement executives to the nation’s 

network of intelligence agencies. 

• A regularly updated overview of the National Incident Management System 

(NIMS) as it applies to law enforcement executives responding to terrorist acts 

and all-hazards events is provided. Funding options are also discussed, making 

it possible for law enforcement executives to build upon plans with additional 

training, and crucial equipment.

2. Community Partnerships and Awareness Training 

‘‘This was very informative with regards to the ability of private citizens 

to actually assist with a WMD or just an area wide emergency.’’

The NSA recognized that, should an all-hazard or terrorist incident occur in a 

community, local first responders and local citizens will have to deal with the situation themselves. Their level of preparation will dictate the effectiveness of the initial 

response. Later, the degree to which citizens and responding agencies are able to 

mutually support one another will shape the successful outcome of an event. 

The NSA Community Partnerships and Awareness Training develops a dynamic 

partnership between citizens and responding agencies. The program also serves to 

initiate Neighborhood Watch programs in communities where the program may not 

have been activate. Other programs, such as Citizen Corps, VIPS, and CERT, are 

also introduced as important factors in each community’s overall preparedness. 

Since its first pilots were completed late in 2003, the course has trained almost 

1,700 participants from jurisdictions across the nation. 

Unique elements of the program include: • Law enforcement agencies are trained to independently continue this training 

in their jurisdictions, at future community meetings. 

• Increased community awareness of the risks and hazards posed by Weapons 

of Mass Destruction. Training intended to provide sufficient information for citizens to tentatively identify agent types, and to respond accordingly, is also provided. 

• Building of a Community Resources Database (CRD) is initiated. The CRD 

may be used as a supplement to existing local emergency databases, or which 

may serve as the primary community resource or citizen database, and may be 

utilized in the event of a terrorist attack. 

• Initiation of collaborative partnerships that can be activated in times of crisis. • Development of a community mobilization plan, to be activated in an emergency situation. 

• Practical experience of response options possible during an emergency situation via a table-top exercise. 

• Establishment of an on-going planning and training processes for community 

preparedness. 

• All course attendees receive an interactive Weapons of Mass Destruction CD, 

which may be referenced in order to broaden their knowledge, and which may 

be used at future community meetings. 

• The program initiates a community-wide Neighborhood Watch program, 

which now contains anti-terrorism training as well as anti-crime elements, 

should this program not exist already within the community. 

The results of this program have been striking. Personnel from a variety of law 

enforcement and response agencies work in cooperation with citizens representing 

a broad cross-section of the community—from civic and business leaders, to teachers 

and senior citizens, to representatives of the faith community. 

Arising from these new partnerships were hazards and resources previously unrecognized by the Sheriff’s office or other response agencies. During one program, 

for example, citizens expressed their concern over a large dam, situated in an ad-
56

joining state that would devastate their community if ruptured. The Sheriff’s office 

and other responding agencies were thus able to add this hazard to their list for 

immediate and close attention. 

At another training, a clergyman revealed that, situated below his church, there 

was a fully equipped fall-out shelter, which he was currently using for storage. The 

clergyman, it was discovered, was the only person aware of this facility, which had 

been constructed during the Cold War, and then forgotten. He offered the facility 

to the Sheriff for use as a Command Post, should it ever be required. 

3. Jail Evacuation 

Although we routinely work on evacuation plans for natural disasters, we 

have done virtually nothing in the areas covered by this class. It has opened 

my eyes to a whole new field of concern; we need to take extensive preparatory measures.’’

The NSA Jail Evacuation Course has been designed to address the needs of small 

and large jails in rural and urban jurisdictions, preparing them to evacuate in the 

event of a terrorist attack or an all-hazards event. The specific challenges posed by 

jail evacuation have attracted the attention of DHS, ODP and the nation’s Sheriffs. 

Since 2003, when pilots for the program were first delivered, 2,274 participants 

from jurisdictions in all regions of the country have received training. 40 programs 

have been conducted over the past 13 months. 62 jurisdictions, 241 counties, as well 

as officials from prisons, private detention facilities, and Police Departments, Fire 

& Rescue and Emergency managers have attended. The course has also been hosted 

by the Departments of Corrections in two states. 32 more programs are scheduled 

prior to Thanksgiving 2005. 

When examining the NSA Jail Evacuation program, it should be noted that: • This program started due to the numerous requests from sheriffs who had 

recognized the need to develop plans for evacuating inmates, staff, visitors, etc. 

from their jails in the event of an all-hazards event, or a direct attack on the 

facility, or in the event that the jail is close to a primary terrorist target. 

• Jails meet or exceed terrorist target criteria - They contain high concentrations of people, and they are the most expensive government buildings to construct. An attack or all-hazard event could kill or injure many individuals, and 

destroy or render uninhabitable a crucial facility. 

• In the event of uncontrolled mass escape or release, dangerous inmates may 

be freed to again prey upon a vulnerable civilian population. A properly prepared jail evacuation plan, developed as attendees take part in the program, 

minimizes these effects. 

• Most inmates currently housed in jails are of a pre-trial status, and therefore 

presumed innocent. Jails without an evacuation plan are vulnerable to legal 

processes which may result in massive liabilities. In the past, facilities not having planned and practiced for fires have lost large lawsuits. The outcome of this 

course is that attendees are able to develop an evacuation plan appropriate for 

the unique requirements of their own facility. 

• Captured terrorists are often detained in local jails. This taxes existing (and 

already strained) resources, and also increases the likelihood that the facility 

itself may become a target for an attack. 

• The program has also provided the first WMD and all-hazard planning and 

information material to be obtained by some jurisdictions and counties. 

Jails, and the specific challenges that evacuation of a jail presents both jail administrators and the general community, have received little attention. Currently, 

the NSA Jail Evacuation program is unique, providing essential training that prepares jail personnel to respond to a hazardous event. The safety and well-being of 

each community and its citizens are maximized by the training and planning guidelines provided by the program. 

4. First Responder 

‘‘This was one of the best classes I’ve attended in a long time.’’

The NSA First Responder Program focuses on the actions required in the initial 

phase of a response—the crucial fifteen to thirty minutes that elapses between occurrence of the event, and response by incoming emergency teams. With an emphasis on safety and teamwork, participants learn that actions taken in the first moments of a CBRNE incident set the stage for success. 

The NSA First Responder program recently completed its third and final pilot. A 

total of 79 participants from across the country, representing law enforcement personnel as well as such agencies as Fire Departments and the military, received 

training as the pilot programs were delivered. 
57

News of the effectiveness and relevance of this program has begun to spread by 

word of mouth, and the NSA office is currently receiving inquiries from a variety 

of federal and state agencies, as well as from NSA members. A waiting list is currently filling, as the program awaits final ODP review. Inquiring agencies include 

the US Secret Service, TSA (Transportation Safety Admin), FBI, the US Navy, US 

Marines, US Air Force, and an international inquiry from Canada’s Chatham Kent 

Police Service (Ontario), and the Toronto Police Service Intelligence Support. 

This course was specifically designed to rapidly and efficiently train a large number of people across the country. Course instruction and table-top exercises coupled 

with practical exercise, prepare participants to train the members of their own agency to: 

• Perform an assessment of the building and perimeter of the building. 

• Focus on potential facility security vulnerabilities, and prepare a documented 

pre-planned response. (CIRP mission folder is placed on CD for emergency use.) 

• Safely approach an incident, take command, and anticipate the needs of a 

rapidly escalating Hazmat incident using Unified Command. 

• Set perimeters, set isolation zones, communicate safe routes of travel to other 

responders, protect evidence, apprehend suspects, and begin protective actions 

and plan for rescue, mass decontamination, and staging areas. 

• Identify booby traps, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), & secondary devices. 

• Implement searches for explosive devices. 

• Identify and protect evidence for use in prosecutions. 

• Utilize NIMS-recommended strategies to respond to an all-hazard or terrorist 

event. Transfer control from one level of command to the next, up to and including a federal response. The course reviews IC100, IC200 (encouraging participants to complete online exams upon return to their agency), and required documentation of the incident at each level of command. 

• Respond to an all hazards incident, stressing areas of crowd control, perimeters, and evacuations. 

• Identify resources available through mutual aid, state and federal agencies. 

• Take care of themselves by teaching stress inoculation and reduction, which 

is a factor that may affect responders during and/or after a stressful situation 

or event. 

• Provide a resource disk with over 600 resource documents, publications, 

websites, and book titles for the trainer.

Lessons Learned 

The NSA has learned that a variety of training approaches maximize the ability 

of any community or agency to respond with efficiency and effectiveness to an allhazard event: The lessons learned may be applied by a specific training agency, or 

they may be considered by those responsible for the National Training Program. 

Lessons learned by the NSA include

1. Train trainers—If the training offered by an organization prepares participants 

to train members of their community or agency, then the effect of the training provided is compounded.

2. Develop courses that involve participants from a variety of agencies in activities 

specific to their own community’s unique circumstances. The networking that develops from such experiences can take on a life of its own, greatly enhancing the partnerships required for effective prevention and response. 

3. Specifically target training to address the needs of specific groups within law 

enforcement agencies, response agencies, and within the general community. 

4. Use membership organizations as major training partners. These organizations 

are able to readily communicate with their constituents across the nation. This provision allows for efficient notification of program availability, and it also permits a 

smooth vehicle for participant feedback. The effectiveness of the NSA’s communication machine provides a model for this approach. 

5. Develop programs using a consultative approach—Initial development should 

be characterized by focus groups composed of ultimate participant representatives. 

This maximizes the ability of course developers to provide meaningful and relevant 

training. 

6. Utilize subject matter experts well-versed in their fields. Search out leaders and 

innovators currently working in and contributing to their discipline. This ensures 

cutting edge and up-to-date content. 
58

7. Incorporate jurisdiction/agency-specific activities and exercises—This immediately enhances prevention and response capability, and contributes long- term to 

the community’s development of a viable and effective response plan.

Challenges 

The National Sheriffs’ Association recognizes the following challenges in future 

years. These include:

1. Ensuring that sufficient federal funding is continued, thereby allowing training 

of law enforcement agencies, response agencies, and the training of citizens across 

the nation, to continue uninterrupted.

2. Reflect the current federal governments drive to develop methods and approaches that encourage agencies to train, plan and work together. The NSA will 

continue to explore means by which it might continue to foster combined NSA training of such agencies as the Secret Service and military with law enforcement personnel.

3. Maintaining and strengthening the partnership between the Department of 

Homeland Security and the Office of Domestic Preparedness, and the National Sheriffs’ Association. To date, this partnership has led to the development and implementation of crucial training in jurisdictions across the country, with the end result 

being communities today are better prepared to prevent or respond to an all-hazards 

event or a terrorist attack.

Conclusion 

The National Sheriffs’ Association has taken a lead role in providing training for 

its own member sheriffs across the country. However, sheriffs’ offices have served 

as a center from which NSA programs have been delivered to a wider audience consisting of other (local, state, and federal) law enforcement agencies, other first responder agencies (such as fire departments and EMS Services), state and federal 

agencies, the military, and our civilian population. 

NSA’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee in cooperation with the NSA 

Training Division have identified specific flaws in the nation’s existing training infrastructure Where train-the-trainer was not appropriate, the NSA’s focus upon establishment of long-term projects directed towards better preparing agencies and 

communities to respond to an all-hazard event provided a powerful model for future 

course development. 

The effectiveness of NSA training initiatives to date can be clearly seen in course 

evaluation data. A further demonstration of the relevance of NSA training programs 

may be verified in the current demand for training programs being delivered across 

the country. The level of interest shown by agencies and organizations both within 

the United States, and from the international community, furthers confirms our success.

Mr. KING. Mr. McGowan, thank you for your testimony and for 

your service. 

The Chair now recognizes Captain Jack Reall of the National 

Fire Academy Board of Visitors. Captain Reall? 

STATEMENT OF JACK REALL 

Captain Reall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, committee members. 

I am Jack Reall, Captain of the Columbus, Ohio Fire Division 

and President of the Columbus Firefighters Union. I am a member 

of the National Fire Academy Board of Visitors. I have also instructed first responders in every jurisdiction represented by these 

two committees. 

I am here before you today to offer testimony on the status of 

homeland security training and its impact on my members and colleagues. DHS funding provides opportunities all over the country 

in a variety of formats. However, it is generally divided into two 

specific areas: national training facilities and state and local 

grants. National training facilities provide high-quality and high-
59

impact training opportunities, but they have some efficiency issues. 

The Noble Training Facility in Anniston, Alabama offers a unique 

training environment utilizing chemical-bioterror live agents. The 

Nevada test site utilizes radiological facilities to create real-world 

scenario-based environments that would be unfamiliar to most first 

responders. The Tunnel in West Virginia also offers environmental 

issues that have only been experienced at the World Trade Center 

and are usually not able to be recreated for training. 

Although each of these facilities and the others I did not mention 

have benefits to first responders, their impact is minimal. Why? 

Because most of the first responders do not have access to these 

facilities. Staffing concerns at home inhibit our ability to attend 

these worthwhile sessions. Even though these programs are free, 

they cause considerable costs to our jurisdictions that eliminate opportunities. Even if our firefighters and paramedics took their own 

vacation time to attend these facilities, many localities would be 

hard-pressed to allow for the leave due to the increased cost of 

staffing. Less than .05 percent of my members has participated in 

training at any of the national facilities. 

The National Fire Academy is another story. They have a longstanding relationship with the state and local training academies 

and stretch the dollars as far they possibly can. They have the 

added benefits of being able to share training development initiatives with local training academies and give a synergistic effect to 

every dollar being spent. 

However, even the National Fire Academy has drawbacks. Again, 

they have the same staffing issues as the other national facilities. 

They also focus much of their impact on the management aspect 

of the Fire Service. Not that this is bad. We are all well aware that 

effective management will result in better performance even at the 

lowest level. However, our firefighters responding every day to tens 

of thousands of emergencies nationwide need to be directly impacted by homeland security dollars. The National Fire Academy 

offers a cost-effective and useful indirect impact of these monies. 

State and local grants to provide training are also an opportunity 

for many of our first responders. However, they are not consistent 

in quality or in curriculum. Many of these courses do not meet nationally accepted criteria or consensus-based standards. Additionally, many of these grants are misadministered by state agencies, 

and without adequate intervention by the Office of Domestic Preparedness inconsistencies arise that inhibit training. 

As an example, I have instructed structural collapse rescue techniques to first responders throughout the nation and overseas. I 

have developed the curriculum and mechanism for training Ohio’s 

first responders. I utilized the same exact program for another 

state. Inconsistencies with administration of ODP and DHS funding mechanisms have caused Ohio’s state agency administering 

these funds to deny the training to first responders, while the other 

state has funded eight classes in 90 days. These inefficiencies lead 

most firefighters to believe there is no overall strategy for the effective utilization of these funds. 

It is apparent to me that the over-emphasis on grant processes 

and guidelines has caused us to get the process right, but yet lose 

the progress. My observations are that regardless of the mecha-
60

nism, too little training is making its way to the frontline firefighters and first responders. Too much emphasis is placed on special retraining programs and niche opportunities, while tens of 

thousands of firefighters continue to put their lives on the line 

every day with little or no additional training on homeland security 

issues. 

Quality and consistency of those training programs that are offered and provided through a federal funding mechanism are across 

the spectrum. Much of the state and local grants, state passthrough funding and UASI grants are over-utilized for everyday 

law enforcement operations, with little left over for other members 

of the first responder community. 

As a union president, I make an attempt to absolve the stereotype of just being the naysayer who identifies problems. I try to 

offer solutions to every problem. My recommendations are based on 

what I feel has worked for my members. The last WMD training 

that all of our firefighters participated in was the 120 Cities Training Program provided as part of the Nunn–Lugar–Domenici Act. 

Since then, we have had sporadic participation in WMD training 

for first responders. I felt this program worked because it brought 

quality, consistent, high-impact training to us. Our staffing impact 

was minimized due to the fact that our firefighters were still available should a catastrophic event occur. We also did not have to 

backfill for travel days and allocate resources for shift changes to 

allow for out-of-town training. 

This was the most effective type of training for the dollars spent. 

It is much more effective to pay for travel and lodging of a few instructors versus the travel and lodging of many students. Most 

businesses have utilized this method for training employees for 

years. This training should be administered nationally and delivered locally. This assures consistency in quality. It also allows for 

a broad overview of effectiveness of the training. 

Firefighters and other first responders nationwide would be able 

to be evaluated on the effectiveness of the training every day, rather than just an annual exercise in one area of the country involving 

a few hundred responders. By utilizing this method of training for 

the majority of the programs and opportunities also allows for a 

more quick, concise and accurate determination that funding is 

being provided to the first responder groups that need it most. 

I ask that you consider my thoughts and recommendations when 

providing direction for future funding of national training programs 

through the use of taxpayer money. Every taxpayer in the nation 

contribute to this revenue source. Therefore, every responder to 

those taxpayers should be afforded the training programs. 

Just as a side note, my state program is one of the 115 institutionalized courses that have not been approved. It has been waiting 

for quite some time. 

I appreciate the opportunity to speak to all of you. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Reall follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACK REALL

Good Morning Gentleman and Gentle ladies, 

I am Jack Reall, Captain in the Columbus, Ohio, Fire Division and President of 

the Columbus Fire Fighters Union. 
61

I am here before you today to offer testimony on the status of Homeland Security 

Training and its impact on my members and colleagues. DHS Funding provides opportunities all over the country in a variety of formats. However, it is generally divided into two specific areas; National Training Facilities and State and Local 

Grants. 

National Training Facilities provided high quality and high impact training opportunities, but they have some efficiency issues. The Noble Training Facility in Anniston, Alabama offers a unique training environment utilizing chem-bio terrorist live 

agents. The Nevada Test Site utilizes radiological facilities to create a real-world 

scenario-based environment that would be unfamiliar to most first responders. The 

Tunnel in West Virginia also offers environmental issues that have only been experienced at the World Trade Center and are usually not able to be recreated for 

training. Although each of these facilities, and the others I did not mention, has 

benefits to first-responders, their impact is minimal. Why?. . .because most of our 

first responders do not have access to these facilities. Staffing concerns at home inhibit our ability to attend these worthwhile sessions. Even though these programs 

are free, they cause considerable costs to our jurisdictions that eliminate opportunities. Even if our fire fighters took their own vacation time to attend these facilities, 

many localities would be hard pressed to allow for the leave due to increased costs 

of staffing. Less than one-half of one percent of my members has participated in 

training at any of the national facilities. 

The National Fire Academy is another story. They have a long-standing relationship with State and Local Training Academies and stretch the dollars are far as 

they possibly can. They have added benefits of being able to share training development initiatives with local training academies and give a synergistic effect to every 

dollar being spent. However, even the National Fire Academy has drawbacks. 

Again, they have the same staffing issues as the other National Facilities. They also 

focus much of their impact on the management aspect of the Fire Service. Not that 

this is bad. We all are aware that effective management will result in better performance at even the lowest level. However, our firefighters responding every day 

to tens of thousands of emergencies nationwide need to be directly impacted by our 

Homeland Security dollars. The National Fire Academy offers a cost-effective and 

useful indirect impact of these monies. 

State and Local Grants to provide training are also an opportunity for many of 

our First Responders. However, they are not consistent in quality and in curriculum. Many of these courses do not meet nationally accepted criteria or consensus-based standards. Additionally, many of these grants are mis-administered by 

State Agencies and without adequate intervention by the Office of Domestic Preparedness, inconsistencies arise that inhibit training. As an example, I have instructed Structural Collapse Rescue techniques to first responders throughout the 

Nation. I developed the curriculum and mechanism for training Ohio’s First Responders. I utilized the same exact program for another state. Inconsistencies with 

administration of ODP and DHS funding mechanisms have caused Ohio’s State 

Agency administrating these funds to deny the training to First Responders while 

the other state has funded 8 classes in 90 days. These inefficiencies lead most firefighters to believe that there is no overall strategy for the effective utilization of 

these funds. 

‘‘It is apparent to me that the overemphasis on grant processes and guidelines has 

caused us to ‘‘get the process right, yet lose the progress.’’ 

My observations are that, regardless of the mechanism, too little training is making its way to the frontline firefighters and first responders. Too much emphasis is 

placed on specialty training programs and niche opportunities, while our tens of 

thousands of firefighters continue to put their lives on the line everyday with little 

or no additional training on Homeland Security Issues. Quality and consistency of 

those training programs that are offered and provided through our Federal Funding 

mechanism are across the spectrum. Much of the State and Local Grants, State 

‘‘pass-through’’ funding and UASI grants are over utilized for everyday law enforcement operations with little left over for other members of the first responder community. 

As a Union President, I make an attempt to absolve the stereotype of just being 

the naysayer who identifies problems. I try to offer solutions to every problem. My 

recommendations are based on what I feel has worked for my members. The last 

WMD training that all of our firefighters participated in was the 120 Cities training 

provided as a part of the Nunn-Luger-Dominici Act. Since then, we have had sporadic participation in WMD training for first responders. I felt this program worked 

because it brought quality, consistent, high-impact training to us. Our staffing impact was minimized due to the fact that our firefighters were still available should 

a catastrophic event occur. We also did not have to backfill for travel days and allo-
62

cate resources for shift changes to allow for out of town training. This was the most 

effective type of training for the dollar spent. It is much more effective to pay for 

the travel and lodging of a few instructors versus the travel and lodging of many 

students. Most businesses have utilized this method for training employees for 

years. This training should be administered nationally and delivered locally. This 

assures consistency and quality. It also allows for a broad overview of the effectiveness of the training. Firefighters and other first responders nationwide would be 

able to be evaluated on the effectiveness of the training everyday, rather than just 

with an annual exercise in one area of the country involving a few hundred responders. By utilizing this method of training for the majority of the programs and opportunities also allows for a more quick, concise, and accurate determination that funding is being provided to the first responder groups that need it most. 

I ask that you consider my thoughts and recommendations when providing direction for future funding of National Training Programs through the use of taxpayer 

money. Every taxpayer in the Nation contributes to this revenue source, therefore 

every first responder to those taxpayers should be afforded these training programs. 

Thank you.

Mr. KING. Thank you very much, Captain Reall. 

And now for the purpose of introducing our next witness, I recognize the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Pearce. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I request unanimous 

consent to introduce Dr. Romero. 

Mr. KING. Without objection. 

Mr. PEARCE. I would like to introduce Dr. Romero, who is Vice 

President for Research and Economic Development at the New 

Mexico Institute for Mining and Technology. It is one of the leading 

scientific institutions in the nation and is located in the Second 

District of New Mexico, which makes it even better. 

In his capacity as Vice President, Dr. Romero oversees the university’s homeland security programs, including the Playas Training Center, the International Law Enforcement Academy, and the 

Antiterrorism Assistance Program. Dr. Romeo also leads the university’s research on explosions and incendiary devices, which explains why he has trouble getting on airlines these days. 

Dr. Romero is also the immediate past Chairman of the National 

Domestic Preparedness Consortium that coordinates first responder 

training in the area of weapons of mass destruction. The Playas 

Training Center was simply just a concept that Dr. Romeo was integrally involved in. It is a mining town that had been vacated. It 

has all the components of a regular town. 

Mr. Romero several years ago saw the potential and encouraged 

New Mexico Tech to buy that town from the mining company. Now, 

we are holding homeland security training exercises there. Just 

during Memorial Day, I had an interesting visit and watched a fullscale project there. Dr. Romero’s leadership in coordinating university expertise with the Department of Homeland Security has contributed greatly to our first federal first responder training programs. We look forward to hearing Dr. Romero’s testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. Dr. Romero? 

STATEMENT OF VAN ROMERO 

Mr. ROMERO. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Pearce, thank you very 

much. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members, members of the committee 

and my fellow colleagues, I testify before this panel today as a 

member of the community that played an active role in homeland 
63

defense issues well before there was a Department of Homeland 

Security. I currently serve as the Research Vice President at New 

Mexico Tech, which is one of our nation’s leading explosive research institutes. Prior to becoming Vice President, I was the Director of the University Explosives Research Program. During that 

time, I worked with others to initiate the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, NDPC, to coordinate first responder training in the area of weapons of mass destruction and served as the 

Chairman of the Consortium from 2001 to 2005. 

As a result of the Oklahoma City bombing, the NDPC was formally recognized by the administration and Congress. This tragic 

event illustrated that first responders needed additional preparedness to deal with WMD. NDPC was formed by incorporating the 

specific areas of expertise in WMD from each Consortium member. 

The Consortium gives the government the best and brightest researchers from top-notch research institutions. 

The concept of the NDPC is simple: train the trainer. The Consortium enhances and underpins training programs at our nation’s 

state and local levels to prepare for and respond to events of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. 

The first step taken by NDPC was to develop courses to augment 

the basic training received by first responders. Next, the Consortium began to deliver these courses to first responder communities, 

both on our campus and in their home cities. In fact since 1998, 

the Consortium is responsible for risk-based training being delivered to over 600,000 first responders from all 50 states, the District 

of Columbia and our four U.S. territories. 

These courses were developed and reviewed in coordination with 

other federal agencies including the Center for Disease Control and 

Prevention, the Department of Energy, the Department of Management Institution, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, the National Fire Academy and the Public Health Service, 

among others, all selected by the Office of Domestic Preparedness. 

This has resulted in courses that consistently receive strong positive reviews from the first responder community. 

Having been active for the past eight years, we have learned a 

number of important lessons. I would like to discuss with you a few 

of the lessons that we have learned since the formation of the 

NDPC. 

The first lesson to be learned is that education is an important 

component of training. This is vastly different from military training that is designed to prepare warfighters for known threats and 

relies on predetermined courses of action. Enemy actions are anticipated and countermeasures are practiced during training. We must 

avoid the shortcoming of training of first responders by only training them to respond to the last attack. Today’s threats require 

more education than training. If the first responders are educated 

to understand the possible threats and the ability of existing technology to deal with these threats, they have a better chance to 

modify their actions to address unforeseen attacks. 

Further, the time available for the training of first responders is 

limited compared to that of the warfighter. Currently, it is estimated that there are five million first responders that require var-
64

ious levels of counterterrorism education. The vast majority of 

these students require only a short awareness course that can be 

provided at their workplace. The NDPC has developed and instituted a model that can be scaled up to address the need to train 

five million first responders and meet the challenge. 

Second, first responder programs need to focus on prevention as 

well as response, as you have heard today. Because of events like 

9/11 and Oklahoma City, we tend to fixate on preparing first responders to respond to an event. While this is an important mission for these programs, it should not be the only mission. First responders are in the community every day and if properly trained 

they have the ability to recognize potential terrorist activity. 

For example, one first responder, a fireman, that attended an 

NDPC course on explosive devices recognized the ingredients of a 

bomb during a routine call in New Jersey. Based on his findings, 

the FBI was called in and the tenant of the apartment was taken 

into custody. This simple act may have stopped a terrorism attack. 

First responders learn these with hands-on training of the type 

that they receive today from the National Domestic Preparedness 

Consortium. I believe that through education, other examples of 

interdiction have occurred and occur every day at our ports, our 

borders and within our cities and countryside. 

Third, we must have consistent training in standards to address 

our nation’s training needs. It is vitally important that our first responders in Miami have the same basic knowledge as our first responders in Seattle. As we develop solutions to WMD problems, it 

is essential that the entire country benefit. Firemen, policemen and 

EMS personnel need to have the same basic knowledge skills. First 

responders need to plan and train together because they will respond together. Consistency is best achieved via a single source of 

training. 

Fourth, most of the training needed is at the awareness level and 

can fit into current training programs that exist for the first responder community as exemplified by those who testified with me 

today. The vast number of existing delivery mechanisms for this 

group dictates that a large number of courses are best suited to deliver the required training, hence the dilemma. To be effective, you 

need to have one consistent message, and to be efficient you need 

to have multiple sources to deliver the message. 

The Office of Domestic Preparedness, in conjunction with the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, has developed a system 

that addresses this dilemma. NDPC courses are developed via a 

rigorous review process and are required to meet standards. Instructors also are reviewed and meet the NDPC standards. Technical-level courses are delivered by subject matter experts and on 

a train-the-trainer basis. Courses at the awareness level are designed to be delivered in the field by personnel that have taken the 

technical-level courses. This ensures consistency, while providing 

multiple delivery sources. 

In my opinion, the nation can achieve first responder training 

that is both effective and efficient by establishing national standards, focusing training on response as well as prevention, minimizing the number of delivery sources for technical-level training, 

and maximizing the number of delivery sources for awareness-level 
65

training. At New Mexico Tech, we have been involved in supporting 

our nation’s defense since World War II. At that time, we developed a proximity fuse which was used to defeat suicide bombers 

that were attacking our Pacific Fleet. We used technology to beat 

suicide bombers 50 years ago and I am convinced that we can use 

technology to defeat them now. 

But developing the technology is only the first step. The technology will be useless if first responders are not trained to use it. 

An effective and efficient antiterrorism assistance program for first 

responders will ensure that we maximize our country’s resources to 

defend our homeland. 

Thank you, and I will be happy to answer any questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Romero follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. VAN ROMERO

Mr. Chairmen, Ranking Members, Members of the Committee and my fellow colleagues: 

I testify before this panel today as a member of the community who has played 

an active role in homeland defense issues well before there was a Department of 

Homeland Security. I currently serve as the Research Vice President at New Mexico 

Tech, which is one of our nation’s leading explosives research institutions. Prior to 

becoming the Research Vice President, I was the Director of the University’s Explosives Research Programs. During that time, I worked with others to initiate the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC) to coordinate First Responder 

Training in the area of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and served as the 

chairman of the consortium from 2001 to 2005. 

As a result of the Oklahoma City bombing, the NDPC was formerly recognized 

by the Administration and the Congress. This tragic event illustrated that first responders need additional preparation to deal with WMD. The NDPC was founded 

by incorporating the specific area of expertise in WMD of each member in the consortium. The consortium gives the government the best and brightest researchers 

from these top-notch research institutions. 

The concept of the NDPC is simple: train the trainers. The Consortium enhances 

and underpins training programs at the national, state and local levels to prepare 

for and respond to events of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, including Biological, Nuclear/Radiological, Incendiary, Chemical and Explosive 

(BNICE) devices. 

The first step taken by the NDPC was to develop courses to augment the basic 

training received by First Responders. Next the Consortium began to deliver these 

courses to the First Responder community, both on our campuses and in their home 

cities. In fact, since 1998 the Consortium has provided risk-based training to over 

600 hundred thousand First Responders from all 50 States, the District of Columbia 

and the four US territories. 

These courses were developed and reviewed in coordination with other federal 

agencies including the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Emergency Management Institute (EMI), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Fire Academy (NFA) 

and the Public Health Service (PHS), among others, all selected by the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP). This has resulted in courses that consistently receive 

strong, positive reviews from the First Responder Community. 

Having been active over the past eight years, we have learned a number of important lessons, and I would like to discuss with you a few of our ‘‘lessons learned’’ 

since the formation of the NDPC. 

The first lesson to be learned is that education is an important component of 

training. This is vastly different from military training that is designed to prepare 

war fighters for known threats and relies on predetermined courses of action. 

Enemy actions are anticipated and counter-measures are practiced during training. 

We must avoid a shortcoming of training for first responders by only training them 

to respond to the last attack. Today’s threats require more education than training. 

If first responders are educated to understand the possible threats and the ability 

of existing technology to deal with the threats, they have a better chance to modify 

their actions to address unforeseen attacks. 
66

Further, the time available for the training of first responders is limited compared 

to that for war fighters. Currently, it is estimated that there are five million first 

responders that require various levels of counter-terrorist education. The vast majority of these students require only a short awareness course that can be provided 

at their place of work. The NDPC has developed and instituted a model that can 

be scaled up to address the need to train five million first responders and meet that 

challenge. 

Second, First Responder programs need to focus on prevention, as well as response. Because of events like 9/11 and Oklahoma City, we tend to fixate on preparing First Responders to respond to an event. While this is an important mission 

for these programs, it should not be the only mission. First Responders are in the 

community every day and, if properly trained, have the ability to recognize potential 

terrorist activity. For example one First Responder that attended an NDPC course 

on explosive devices recognized the ingredients of a bomb during a routine call in 

New Jersey. Based on his findings, the FBI was called in and the tenant of the 

apartment was taken into custody. This simple act may have stopped a terrorist attack. First responders learn these things with hands-on training of the type they 

receive today from the NDPC. I believe that through education, other examples of 

interdiction have occurred and occur every day—at our ports, borders, within our 

cities and countryside. 

Third, we must have consistent training standards to address our national training needs. It is vitally important that our First Responders in Miami have the same 

basic knowledge as our First Responders in Seattle. As we develop solutions to 

WMD problems it is essential that the entire country benefit. Firemen, police and 

EMS personnel need to have the same basic knowledge. First Responders need to 

plan and train together because they will be responding together. Consistency is 

best achieved via a single source of training. 

Fourth, most of the training need is at the awareness level and can fit into current training programs that exist for the First Responder community as exemplified 

by those testifying with me today. The vast numbers and existing delivery mechanism for this group dictates that a large number of sources are best suited to deliver 

the required training. Hence the dilemma, to be effective you need to have one consistent message and to be efficient you need to have multiple sources delivering the 

message. 

The Office ODP in conjunction with the NDPC, has developed a system that addresses this dilemma. NDPC courses are developed via a rigorous review process 

and are required to meet standards. Instructors are also reviewed and must meet 

the NPDC standards. Technical level courses are delivered by subject matter experts 

and train the trainer based. Courses at the awareness level are designed to be delivered in the field by the personnel that have taken the Technical level courses. This 

insures consistency while providing for multiple delivery sources. 

It is my opinion the Nation can achieve First Responder training that is both effective and efficient by: 

(1) Establishing National standards for all First Responder programs; 

(2) Focusing training programs on both response and prevention; 

(3) Minimizing the number of delivery sources for technical level training; and 

(4) Maximizing the number of delivery sources for awareness level training. 

At New Mexico Tech, we have been involved in supporting our nation’s defense 

since World War II. At that time we helped develop the proximity fuse, which was 

used to defeat suicide bombers that were attacking our Pacific Fleet. We used technology to defeat suicide bombers 50 years ago and I am convinced that we can use 

technology to defeat them now. But developing the technology is only the first step. 

The technology will be useless if First Responders are not trained to use it. An efficient and effective anti-terrorism training program for First Responders will ensure 

that we maximize our country’s resources to defend our homeland. 

Thank you, I would be happy to address any questions the members may have 

on this important issue.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Dr. Romero. 

Before we start the questions, without objection I would ask that 

the charts of Mr. Reese be made a permanent part of the record. 

Mr. Meek? 

Mr. MEEK. Very quickly, because I know that we are under time 

restraints, I just want to tell our panelists we appreciate your testimony here today and that all of the information will be placed into 

the record. Like our first panel, we know that we have, some peo-
67

ple say in the country we have New York City and then we have 

the rest of the environment. Through unfortunately sacrifice and 

loss of life, New York City has gone through an experience like no 

other city. What I was speaking to in the first panel, my questions 

were mainly along the lines of what is happening in the rest of the 

universe? What is happening with all of the first responders? And 

how can you move towards uniformity? 

I have had an opportunity to go over your testimony and I heard 

you, I was in the anteroom there for a minute, when you all were 

talking about how we do need to come together. So I want to let 

you know that it did not fall on deaf ears. We have the subcommittees here that will have to carry out action. We have already in 

H.R. 1544, but we have to do more. That is just the beginning. The 

more we find duplication, prioritized money that is being spent in 

other areas of training, it will help us to be able to have the resources to do what we need to do to resolve some of the issues that 

many of you have brought to our attention. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Meek. 

I think it is really a point well taken. The more we look into 

these issues, we realize how different parts of the country have different problems. The last thing we need is duplication because 

every dollar that is spent the wrong way is really a dollar wasted 

and a dollar that could be used to save human life. 

With that, Chairman Rogers? 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Edwards, I start with you, speaking of duplication. You 

made reference in your remarks to 50 different state programs that 

you are having to deal with. What did you mean? I did not understand exactly what you were making reference to. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Each state has a state fire training organization. 

Some are attached to universities and colleges. Some are part of 

state government. Some are a freestanding board or commission 

and may work directly for the Governor’s office. But each state has 

a state fire training organization that coordinates and works with 

the local fire departments in that state to provide training. Collectively, the 50 states are training about 800,000 students per year. 

Mr. ROGERS. This is separate and apart from first responder 

training that we are providing in the Consortium of schools or Consortium of institutions like the Center for Domestic Preparedness? 

This is separate and apart from that? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Yes. These are state agencies in most cases. What 

our issue is, we would like to be able to work more closely with 

ODP and take advantage of some of that curriculum. The Consortium schools do a great job. There is no question about that. We 

use them in our state. The problem is one of capacity in the system. You cannot have five schools train the nation’s 1.2 million 

firefighters. 

Mr. ROGERS. That brings me to the second thing I wanted to 

visit. I represent a very rural, relatively poor congressional district. 

Most of the fire protection that we have, and for that matter first 

responder protection, is volunteer units. It is not practical for many 

of these people to leave their jobs and go away for a week or two 
68

weeks of training at CDP. And this goes also to Mr. Reall’s comments. 

If we were to provide funding that allowed for backfill of these 

employees, not only within sheriffs’ departments and police departments, but for other employers, do you think this would be a practical way to make sure that training is extended to these volunteer 

units? Or do we need to look at more aggressive outreach programs 

where we are sending trainers out to these volunteer units? Or is 

it the train-the-trainer concept? 

I am looking at both of you to give me a response. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Just some comments on that. I think in most 

states the system is there. We are training, and I am speaking for 

states with a fire and rescue service, not law enforcement and others, but the system is already there. The system has been in place 

for decades. The problem is there is no communication and there 

is no working relationship with ODP in the state and fire training 

academies. If there was, and like I say, we requested to share in 

the curriculum to be able to use their already-developed curriculum 

that has been paid for by the federal dollar and for work with ODP 

to tell us what instructor requirements will be necessary, what 

course requirements and how we could deliver that. We were 

turned out. I do not understand that at all. 

Mr. ROGERS. The state training programs you are making reference to are paid for with Federal dollars? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Paid for with what? 

Mr. ROGERS. Did you say the state training programs are paid 

for with Federal dollars? 

Mr. EDWARDS. No, the training courses that are developed by the 

Consortium are paid for with federal dollars. We just want to have 

access to them so we can deliver within our system and deliver 

training where the firefighters live and work. Particularly with volunteers, they cannot travel large distances to receive training programs. In the State of Maryland, we operate six regional training 

centers that are fully staffed regional training center to provide 

training out where the firefighters are at. 

We just need help with the curriculum. I have not even asked for 

any money. All I want is to be able to share the curriculum, to 

know what the requirements are, to train fire and rescue personnel 

and report that back to DHS. As an example, the National Fire 

Academy, EMI, and the NIMS curriculum, when they develop a 

course it is immediately handed-off to state and local fire handed 

off to state and local fire training academies and they teach it. 

They assist in teaching it. With ODP, they do not allow state fire 

academies to teach their curriculum. That has caused a huge problem. 

Mr. ROGERS. Captain Reall, what is the best way for us to go 

about this? Is it to backfill resources or is it more aggressive outreach and communication—the kind of communication Mr. Edwards is making reference to? 

Captain Reall. I think that there is a combination of best ways. 

If you are looking for the cheapest way, if you are looking for the 

most effective way in terms of retention, there are combinations of 

ways depending on what you consider the best way. I would say 

that a combination of those two things. A more aggressive out-
69

reach, like the Doctor said, a more aggressive outreach for those 

lower-level courses has got to be done. We are not getting that out 

there. But backfill costs to allow people to attend those special opportunities that are great, like the CDP. 

Mr. ROGERS. How effective is the train-the-trainer component of 

what we do? 

Captain Reall. It has been very effective for at least fire and 

EMS education for decades. I guess from my perspective, I am looking to fix this program for my next 15 years of my career. I am not 

at the end of it. I am in the middle of it. I have to get this fixed 

so that I do not have a problem for the rest of my career. 

Mr. ROGERS. And your number one fix would be what? What 

would you want this committee to take away from your comments? 

Captain Reall. I would like to have more cooperation between 

ODP and the training mechanisms that are out there right now, 

whether you consider it self-certification or whatever it might be, 

but I think we are all saying the same thing. We have to get that 

stuff out there to our first responders. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. Congressman Pearce? 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Romero, you discussed awareness training versus the maximizing of awareness training and minimizing technical training. 

Mr. Edwards is saying that we ignoring state and local programs. 

Can you discuss the relationship between those two concepts and 

ODP’s choices? 

Mr. ROMERO. Yes, Mr. Pearce, Mr. Chairman. 

There is, as I stated, a need to get out into the community and 

deliver at the local level the awareness-level training, but you need 

to have experts delivering that training. All of us know that first 

responders have very specific, very tough questions when they attend these classes. If we do not have people who are very knowledgeable in the training that they are delivering, they will not be 

listened to. So from the Consortium’s standpoint, we look to bring 

people from the various training academies to the Consortium 

classes and give them that expertise so that they can go back home 

and deliver a consistent message. 

Again, we have point sources for the very technical-level training, like the Center for Domestic Preparedness where you are actually exposed to real live agents. That does not occur anywhere in 

the country. So take people there, make them experts, and then let 

them go back to their home jurisdictions and train as many people 

as they can. 

Mr. PEARCE. How do you avoid other duplicities in the Consortium and its approach? 

Mr. ROMERO. The Consortium was formed to span the waterfront 

if you will with WMD. We have heard today that Nevada Test Site 

focuses on radiological and nuclear. New Mexico Tech focuses specifically on explosive devices because we are the explosive experts. 

At the Center for Domestic Preparedness, it is the chemical aspect 

of WMD. At LSU, they focus on the biological and at Texas A&M 

they focus on the coordination, command and control. 
70

So the Consortium members themselves span the waterfront to 

try and cover all aspects of WMD so that people who come to the 

courses then have all of that expertise, and again can go home and 

be the local expert. 

Mr. PEARCE. And that is the concept you are referring to, education versus training. We educate them; they then go and train. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. ROMERO. That is correct, Mr. Pearce. We make them the experts and then they go home. At New Mexico Tech when a student 

takes our course, they can actually receive two hours of college 

credit in chemical engineering that can be transferred to any university in this nation. That is the level of education that we are 

providing them. 

Mr. PEARCE. Tell me a little bit about how many people you all 

have trained at New Mexico Tech and basically how that then has 

filtered out through the nation. 

Mr. ROMERO. We currently train on the order of about 400 students a week in our courses. To date, we have trained 13,000 trainers. Those trainers in turn have gone out and trained an additional 

130,000 first responders from across the nation. So we are currently betting a multiplying factor of about 10 to 1. There is a little 

bit of a lag because as we train more and more people, it takes a 

while before their numbers start coming back to us. 

Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Edwards, do you have any comments on this 

whole line of thought we have been talking about here? 

Mr. EDWARDS. A couple of comments. One is the concept of training the trainer is very good as long as they work within a system. 

Individuals attend the Consortium classes at the school sites. Then 

they come back and we do not know who they are training. I maintain all the training records for the State of Maryland fire and rescue personnel and historical database. We have over 600,000 student records. You cannot just send someone to a 2-week course and 

send them back and have them just start training ad hoc within 

the existing system. 

That is why I am saying there needs to be better coordination 

at the state and local level with ODP to develop a partnership and 

develop a system that works for everybody, not just sending people 

to a school for 2 weeks and going back and saying they are an expert. They are most likely not an expert in that regard, and they 

need to work within a system to provide that training so it is structured and it is what the departments need and it is done in a timely and cost-effective manner. 

Mr. PEARCE. If they are not coming home as experts, are they capable at least of creating the awareness, that is the awareness that 

Dr. Romero mentioned? And is that such a big deal in your eyes, 

simply the awareness of how short we are of skills? 

Mr. EDWARDS. I guess some of them are and some of them are 

not. I know in our state, we have state statutes that you have to 

be certified to be an emergency services instructor. A lot of people 

who attend these Consortium schools are not recognized as instructors in the State of Maryland, so they can go to these courses and 

come back, but due to state law they are not allowed to teach in 

the fire and rescue environment. That is what I mean by having 

these systems work together and have the synergy of all the sys-
71

tems for the betterment of the fire and rescue service as one system, not a bunch of separate systems spread out all over the country. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. I 

thank you. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Reichert? 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I would like to take this opportunity to welcome my good 

friend Sheriff McGowan from Minnesota, actually the President of 

the major country sheriffs’ association at one time, and he and I 

were members of that organization up until last year, the National 

Sheriffs’ Association. So welcome, Sheriff. 

I agree with my colleague from Florida. We need to do a lot 

more. We passed the first responders bill last month, I think it 

was. The purpose of that is to un-jam the logjam of monies that 

have been held up for training and equipment. The training and 

equipment is all well and good, and you have talked about some 

of the pitfalls and some of the weaknesses in the training across 

the country. But there are other costs I would guess that are associated with the training that we have not even really touched on. 

I wonder, Sheriff, first if you could comment on just around the 

homeland security issue and training and the management of 

training, what are the costs to your agency? 

Sheriff McGowan. First off, every time you send somebody out to 

go to training, as was mentioned before by Commissioner Kelly, 

you have to take that person off the street. If they are holding a 

critical job or they are in a critical position, somebody has to be 

hired to backfill them. And when you backfill a person, you are 

taking him normally off of a day off for somewhere like that and 

you are paying him time-and-a-half. So you are actually spending 

in one day of training three times of what your costs are. 

Also, once we train people, I think Representative, one of the 

things that we fail to realize is how do we make use of that training when it comes back to us? That is the critical component. How 

do we make use of that? How is it going to protect our country? 

How is it going to make us safer and more responsive? That is 

where I come to is if I could ask you ladies and gentlemen for any 

assistance, please let us use money to backfill our positions where 

we are providing assistance at a federal level to help. 

I have personnel signed up to the terrorism task forces. I do not 

get reimbursement for that. That means we go without a position. 

I go without somebody to answer a rape call or a robbery call, a 

murder call, a person that is in distress. From major county sheriffs and major city chiefs, National Sheriffs’, I am sure the firefighters are the same way. Please allow us to backfill where we 

have given people to supplement the national effort. That is absolutely critical for us. 

Mr. REICHERT. I thought that might be your answer. 

Would anyone else on the panel like to address that question? I 

would assume that in the fire business, you would have the same 

experience. 

Captain Reall. I would agree with that. We are often asked how 

much of our budget goes towards homeland security. I would say 

all of it because that is what we do. It does matter if it is a fire 
72

caused by terrorist activity or natural disaster or whatever, we are 

doing it every day. We are providing intelligence to our partners 

in law enforcement. We have for years. 

I was a little bit distressed to find out that we only get intelligence back from the police commissioner when it is deemed appropriate. From our perspective, how many drug labs are shut 

down from intervention from paramedics or firefighters when they 

go to an emergency call because somebody is having trouble breathing, and then they notify the law enforcement agency. We need 

that kind of communication going back and forth. 

Mr. REICHERT. It certainly has to be a team effort. 

Just again to touch on some of the other issues associated with 

this topic, you can be trained, and I think someone made this statement, but when you come back is it worthwhile and does it apply. 

But you can also be trained and then you need to be retrained and 

you need to be updated in training. How do you manage that within your organizations? You have to manage the training records of 

your employees. Does that take additional resources and personnel? 

Anyone on the panel. 

Mr. EDWARDS. If I can just comment on that. That is a very serious issue. We train about 30,000 students a year at the Maryland 

Fire and Rescue Institute, University of Maryland. A lot of that 

training is training people who need recertification. They need to 

be kept current with skills. That is a very expensive part of our 

training program. In addition to that, with volunteer service, you 

have a lot of people who enter and leave the service, so you are 

constantly training and retraining people because you have attrition. The same is in the career service as individuals retire and you 

have to train new employees to take their place. 

The ability to train, that is why I believe their needs to be a national training strategy developed. There needs to be standard national training objectives that we can work toward. And then that 

system needs to be put out in the state and local departments for 

the training to take place in thousands of points throughout this 

country, with the results reported back in a way of not only having 

the initial training, but the recertification training with that so we 

know we are training to a certain standard and we are not just developing our own standard or each state having their own separate 

standard. We need a national standard program. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Reichert. 

Our lease on this room is about to expire. Fortunately, everyone 

has had a chance to ask their questions. I really want to thank all 

the members of the panel for your testimony. 

I would just mention to Sheriff McGowan that my understanding 

of H.R. 1534, the legislation we passed last month, does allow reimbursement for backfilling. It still has to work its way through the 

Senate. 

Sheriff McGowan. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, is that going to be 

for personnel that we put into terrorism task forces? Is that going 

to allow me to backfill my position? Because, Mr. Chairman, everything that we go to today, what Commissioner Kelly talked about 

which you spent a lot of time on, it all starts with information. You 

talked a lot about prevention earlier. Prevention starts from infor-
73

mation. That information does not come from across the pond 

somewhere else to us. It comes from within a local community. It 

is local officers establishing and knowing what is going on in their 

communities. 

We become part of an intelligence center, but for me to put people over there to ensure that we have coordination not only with 

my agency, but with other police departments, with federal agencies, with state law enforcement, we need to have that information 

center or intelligence center. If we cannot put people over there 

and get the money back for them, it is going to come to, because 

I will explain to you in my agency. 

I have about 800 men and women that work for me. I only get 

funded to 95 percent. So at any given time to meet my budget, I 

have to keep 40 vacancies. When I start subtracting out bodies 

going to different places, that is an additional vacancy that I do not 

have a man or woman to answer a call, to investigate a crime, to 

work on a prevention program at a local level. That is why, please, 

it is so critical. And from everywhere that I have been involved in 

at the national level, this is the number one concern that I hear 

from colleagues of mine around the country. 

Mr. KING. We have to end on that because of the time. It is my 

understanding of H.R. 1544 that is applies to terrorism prevention. 

Again, we will have to work that through and work closely with 

you on it as it is interpreted. 

With that, on behalf of Chairman Rogers, I want to thank all the 

members. I thank all the panelists. I especially want to thank the 

Ranking Members for their cooperation in putting this together. 

The members of the committees may have some additional questions for the witnesses. We would ask if you would respond to those 

in writing. The hearing record will be held open for 10 days. 

Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 12:57 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

FOR THE RECORD

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS TO THE WITNESSES 

DR. VAN ROMERO RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS

Congressman Pearce: We heard a lot of discussion regarding the need for ODP 

to increase its cooperation with the local jurisdictions during the testimony. From 

the Consortium view point, will this solve the problems that were discussed? 

Response from Dr. Van Romero: 

Increased cooperation and communication is always a good idea, but both cooperation and communication are two way processes. A number of the problems discussed 

have been addressed by ODP via the State Point of Contacts. It appears to me that 

there is a break between the state and local jurisdictions. For example, there was 

a lot of discussion about the lack of funds to pay for overtime when a First Responder is away at training. This is simply not true. ODP has authorized states 

to provide funds to local jurisdictions for overtime to backfill positions that are vacated due to training out of the funds ODP provides to the state. Obviously, the 

state and local jurisdictions are not coordinated on this issue. 

A concern was expressed that students that return from the Consortium courses 

do not train others. Very meticulous records are kept on the number of First Responders that are trained by participants in the Consortium courses. Some participants have trained over 1000 fellow First Responders in their home jurisdictions. 

However, it is true that there are a number of participants that never train their 

colleagues. These participants should not be sent to the Consortium courses. The se-
74

lection criterion however, is between the local jurisdiction and the State Point of 

Contacts. They need to do a better job of selecting the participants for the courses. 

It was also stated that ‘‘Unfortunately for the hundreds of thousands of volunteers 

who need to be trained, the ODP consortium teaches their programs Monday to Friday during normal work hours’’. This again is not true. Consortium courses that are 

delivered in local jurisdictions are routinely delivered during off hours and on weekends. The Consortium works with the State Point of Contacts to deliver the courses 

to their specification. If a jurisdiction wants a course delivered during off hours, all 

they have to do is work with the State Point of Contact to arrange it with the Consortium. 

I could point out other misconceptions, but that would simply be ‘‘piling on’’. The 

point is yes, there needs to be better cooperation and communication, but it appears 

that the link that most needs improvement is the link between local jurisdictions 

and the State Point of Contact. 

In reference to your letter dated July 8, 2005, below are answers to your questions 

regarding my testimony to the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science 

and Technology and the Subcommittee on Management, Integration and Oversight 

joint oversight hearing entitled ‘‘The National Training Program: Is Anti-Terrorism 

Training for First Responders Efficient and Effective?’’ on Thursday, June 23, 2005. 

Please let me know if you require additional information.

(1) What is the role of the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium 

members in the Office for Domestic Preparedness process for approving requests from States and Urban Areas to provide terrorism preparedness 

training to their personnel using homeland security grant funding? 

Response: Training allocations for resident and mobile training courses are established by ODP for each State/Territory based upon risk. The specific choice/approval of participants for resident courses and venues for mobile training is determined by the State/Territory training point of contact within the state administrative agency. If a participant cancels prior to a scheduled course, a replacement is 

chosen from a list that is pre-approved by the State/Territory training point of contact.

(2) Of fiscal year 2004 funding from the Office for Domestic Preparedness, 

what percentage has been spent by the Energetic Materials Research and 

Testing Center (EMRTC) at the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology on course materials, instructor salaries: travel costs, lodging, meals, 

administrative costs, overhead, and other costs? 

Response: Fiscal year 2004 funding was awarded effective October 1, 2004 and 

will run through September 30, 2005. Therefore, we only have actual expenditures 

for FY 2004 funds through June 2005. Below is a breakdown of these expended 

funds as requested.

10/01/2004—06/30/2005 (present).

Description ...................................................... Actual Percent of Total 

Course Materials & Training Support .......... $2,657,918.66 25.58%

Instructor Costs .............................................. 3,845,371.08 37.01%

Participant Lodging, Meals, & Air Fare ....... 3,169,019.91 30.50%

Administrative Costs ...................................... 101,963.14 0.98%

Overhead ......................................................... 564,811.58 5.44%

Equipment ....................................................... 50,150.82 0.48%

Total ................................................................ $10,389,235.19 100.00%

(3) What types of off-site training courses does EMR TC provide within 

the State and local jurisdictions, and to what extent are State, local, or private entities utilized by EMRTC to provide such mobile training? 

Response: The current ODP Homeland Security training strategy designates the 

State/Territory as the source for awareness level training. This capability is promulgated to the States/Territories via train-the-trainer programs for execution at State/

Territory designated training academies and established training venues. Trainers 

that have been to train-the-trainer Consortium courses are provided support material so they can deliver the course in their home jurisdiction utilizing local infrastructure and capabilities. 

Specialty and advanced ODP/NDPC training which requires specific equipment 

and/or facilities are delivered by NDPC instructors to the State/Territory at their 

request. Specifically, EMRTC instructors deliver specialized, advanced ‘‘mobile’’ 

training at the request of the State/Territory training point of contact within the 
75

state administrative agency. These courses are delivered at the locations specified 

by the State/Territory training point of contact. 

RAYMOND W. KELLY RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS

Question 1.: Is the New York City Police Department expected to provide 

National Incident Management System (NIMS) training to its personnel in 

time to meet the implementation deadlines during fiscal years 2005 

through 2007? How have the National Training Program and homeland security grant assistance helped in meeting NIMS requirements? What are 

the obstacles and potential solutions to training law enforcement personnel 

on new incident command procedures? 

The NYC Office of Emergency Management, with the approval of the Department 

of Homeland Security, created the Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS) 

for use by New York City in place of the National Incident Management System 

(NIMS). This system is fully compliant with the NIMS incident command structure 

in terms of roles, responsibilities, terminology and procedures. CIMS will enable 

New York City emergency response agencies to coordinate activities with federal, 

state and local agencies. In addition, CIMS recognizes the unique size, structure, 

needs and capabilities of New York City’s emergency response agencies and incorporates them into the CIMS protocol. All uniformed members of the NYPD from the 

rank of Police Officer through Bureau Chief have received one-day of CIMS training 

and NYPD will provide this training to future hires. This will meet the implementation deadlines for fiscal years 2005 and 2007. DHS grant assistance has enabled the 

City to conduct this training without impacting the Department’s daily patrol 

strength.

Question 2.: How may terrorism prevention, preparedness, and response 

training provided by the Department of Homeland Security be better designed and delivered to account for the unique needs of the New York City 

Police Department? 

Terrorism prevention, preparedness and response training provided by DHS has 

increased readiness to respond to terrorist incidents, particularly those involving a 

component. For example, NYPD has worked with the Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) to create two key training courses: The Law Enforcement Protective 

Measures (LEPM) course, which was utilized to provide Chemical, Ordinance, Biological and Radiological (COBRA) Operations-level training to approximately 12,000 

members of the NYPD and the WMD Law Enforcement Threat, Hazard Recognition 

and Emergency Actions Training (THREAT), a course that enables all NYPD 

COBRA-trained personnel to meet the annual training standards mandated by the 

Occupational Safety and health Administration (OSHA). The development of these 

courses was expedited by the full-time, on-site assignment of a CDP representative 

directly to NYPD. This CDP representative was instrumental in obtaining DHS certification for these courses, a requirement under grant funding rules. There is a 

need for a representative from the DHS Office of Domestic Preparedness (DHS/

ODP) Urban Area Security Initiative Working Group to be based in New York City 

to serve in the same role. This would enhance the ability of NYPD to develop and 

certify courses in disciplines under the control of ODP in a timely manner. It is important that training development process has the flexibility to respond quickly to 

evolving terrorist tactics and technological developments. The presence of DHS/ODP 

representatives capable of assisting NYPD in the self-certification of training 

courses will serve this important goal. 

The partners in the DHS training consortium have tremendous expertise in first 

responder training. In addition to first responder training, however, the focus of 

NYPD continues to be the development of the skill sets required to become effective 

‘‘first preventers.’’ NYPD seeks to train our personnel to identify and apprehend terrorist operatives prior to an attack, during the surveillance, planning and preparation phases. Therefore, greater focus must be placed on the development and implementation of training in disciplines such as surveillance and counter-surveillance 

techniques, the development and utilization of confidential informants, and intelligence analysis and analytical writing.

Question 3.: Which types of terrorism preparedness courses are most appropriately provided at Department of Homeland Security training centers 

as opposed to NYPD facilities? 

DHS provides many specialized training courses across the country that have 

been attended by NYPD personnel. Some of these courses are best delivered at their 

present locations. For example, the ‘‘WMD Technical Emergency Response Training’’ 

course provided at the Center for Domestic Preparedness, located in Anniston, Ala-
76

bama, and the ‘‘Response to Terrorist Bombing’’ and ‘‘Prevention and Response to 

Suicide Terrorism’’ courses provided at the Energetic Material Research and Testing 

Center, located in Socorro, New Mexico, cannot be duplicated at NYPD facilities. 

The ability to expose the student, in a controlled, tactically sound and intrinsically 

safe learning environment, to weaponized chemical agents and high yield explosive 

devices make the training experience unique to these facilities. It simply would not 

be practical to conduct this type of training within the confines of New York City. 

Training courses that are not site specific, however, could be exported to an NYPD 

facility through the ‘‘train the trainer’’ concept. Qualified NYPD instructors can be 

trained by DHS personnel at an NYPD facility. The NYPD instructors obtain certification and required training material from DHS and can then act as force multipliers by delivering the training to the general NYPD training population at an 

NYPD facility. This method has been used in the past with instructors and courses 

from the Center for Domestic Preparedness, the Bechtel Nevada WMD Training 

Program and LSU National Center for Biologic of Counter Terrorism Education. 

This system produces savings, not only in travel expenses, but also in travel time. 

This directly impacts readiness, since more members can be trained at a cost of 

fewer days off patrol. This is more cost effective and efficient and produces the ability to train large numbers of NYPD personnel. All DHS training courses that are 

not site-specific should be made available to NYPD in this manner. The on-site presence of representatives would further enhance the process and would enable the Department to rapidly certify the courses and meet the parameters and standards required to utilize DHS grant funding to deliver the training.

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