# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed February 6, 2019. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearin g.

________________ No. 3D17-2676 Lower Tribunal No. 14-21488

________________ 

### Nelson Alvarez-Reyes, Appellant,

vs. 

### Idia Fernandez-Gil, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Valeri e R. Manno Schurr, Judge. Law Offices of Kenneth M. Kaplan and Kenneth M. Kaplan, for ap pellant. Nancy A. Hass, P.A., and Nancy A. Hass (Fort Lauderdale), for appellee.

Before EMAS, C.J., and SALTER and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
PER CURIAM.2 Nelson Alvarez-Reyes appeals a final judgment of dissolution o f his marriage to Idia Fernandez-Gil. We affirm. The record contains competent substantial evidence to support t he trial court’s determinations regarding Alvarez-Reyes’ voluntary underemployme nt and imputation of income. See Coch ran v. Cochran , 819 So . 2d 863, 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding: “It is well settled that a trial court, who has made a finding that a party is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, may properly impute income to that party based upon that party’ s demonstrated earning capacit y”) (quoting Arouza v. Arouza, 670 So. 2d 69, 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)); Gillette v. G illette, 226 So. 3d 958, 961 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (describing the two-step process: “First, the court must conclude the termination of income was voluntary. Second, ‘the court must determine whether the subsequent unemployment resulted from the spouse’s pursuit of his own interests or through less than diligent and bona fid e efforts to find employment paying income at a level equal to or better than tha t formerly received’”) (internal citations omitted); Manfre v. Manfre, 18 9 So. 3d 197, 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); Smith v. Smith, 737 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1st DC A 1999) (noting: “A trial court can impute income where a spouse has failed to u se his or her best efforts to earn income” and “we shall not disturb any [such] ru ling that is supported by the evidence and satisfies the general test of reasonablenes s”). See also Mata v. Mata, 185 So. 3d 1271, 1272-73 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (noting: “The Florida Supreme3 Court and other district courts have suggested that a presumpti on arises from a spouse’s historical earnings that supports a finding the spouse can continue to earn the same amount, absent evidence to the contrary”) (internal ci tations omitted); Maddux v. Maddux, 495 So. 2d 863, 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (hold ing: “Where a former husband has an ability to earn if he so desires, the tri al judge may impute an income to the husband according to what he could earn by the us e of his best efforts to gain employment equal to his capabilities, and on that basis enter an award of alimony as if the husband were in fact earning the income so im puted). We likewise affirm the trial court’s award of permanent periodi c alimony to Fernandez-Gil, which we review for an abuse of discretion. Can akaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla. 1980) (holding: “Permanent periodic alimony is used to provide the needs and the necessities of life to a former spous e as they have been established by the marriage of the parties. The two primary el ements to be considered when determining permanent periodic alimony are the needs of one spouse for the funds and the ability of the other spouse to pro vide the necessary funds.”) The final judgment evidences that the trial court tho ughtfully considered and addressed each of the statutory factors enumerated in secti on 61.08(2)(a)-(j), Florida Statutes (2017), weighed Fernandez-Gil’s need and Alvar ez-Reyes’ ability4 to pay, and articulated the bases for its determinations. We f ind no abuse of discretion. 1
Affirmed.

1 We find no merit in the other issues raised on appeal and affi rm without further discussion.