Through the Lens of 

Cultural Awareness: 

A Primer for US Armed Forces 

Deploying to Arab and Middle 

Eastern Countries

William D. Wunderle

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
Cover photo courtesy of US Army. Photo by TSgt Jeremy T. Lock, 22 June 2006. 
Through the Lens of 

Cultural Awareness: 

A Primer for US Armed Forces 

Deploying to Arab and Middle 

Eastern Countries

William D. Wunderle

LTC, US Army

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publications Data

Wunderle, William D., 1962-

 Through the lens of cultural awareness : a primer for U.S. Armed Forces 

deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern countries / William D. Wunderle.

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references.

 1. United States--Armed Forces--Foreign service--Middle East--

Handbooks, manuals, etc. 2. Military art and science--Cross-cultural 

studies. 3. Arab countries--Social life and customs. 4. National 

characteristics, Arab. 5. Cultural awareness--Study and teaching--United 

States. I. Title. II. Title: Primer for U.S. Armed Forces deploying to Arab 

and Middle Eastern countries. 

 UA26.A2W37 2006

 335.4--dc22

 2006038175

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800

Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

ISBN 0-16-077466-7
iii

Foreword

This Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Special Study is unique in that 

it focuses more on culture than on history. The CSI objective, however, 

remains unchanged—to provide manuscript length historical studies relevant to the leaders of an Army at War. We are, therefore, pleased to offer 

Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US Armed Forces 

Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries by Lieutenant Colonel 

(LTC) William D. Wunderle.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of the Long War, as the 

Global War on Terrorism is now known, is the cultural environment in 

which it is being fought. In truth, however, the US Army has routinely 

operated in unfamiliar cultural environments throughout its long history. 

The conditions in the Middle East today may be the most difficult in a very 

long time, and the Army is making tremendous efforts to become more 

effective. Among the key points the author makes in this study is the need 

for leaders to understand how culture affects military operations.

This work also represents a slight departure from the norm for historical studies from CSI. As noted, it is not purely a work of history. This 

study goes beyond our normal practice of offering insights from the past as 

it offers specific policy prescriptions for tomorrow. LTC Wunderle briefly 

touches on some of the historical roots of Iraqi and Middle Eastern culture, but he focuses primarily on cultural conditions in Iraq today. He also 

presents ideas for modifying a number of the US Army’s military decisionmaking processes and training programs.

Given the need for rapid action during wartime, we felt this departure 

from the historical craft was justified and were eager to accept this manuscript, written while the author was completing an academic fellowship 

for the Army, for publication. We at CSI believe this Special Study will 

contribute significantly to the Army as it conducts operations in the Long 

War. CSI—The Past is Prologue!

Timothy R. Reese

Colonel, Armor

Director, Combat Studies Institute

v

Preface

Conducting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and projecting 

United States (US) influence worldwide has meant an increasing number 

of US diplomats and military forces are assigned to locations around the 

world, some of which have not previously had a significant US presence. 

In the current security environment, understanding foreign cultures and 

societies has become a national priority. Cultural understanding is necessary both to defeat adversaries and to work successfully with allies. As 

indicated by recent experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia, understanding Islamic cultures is particularly important. This document defines 

a way US military leaders can prepare for and conduct military operations through the lens of cultural awareness. It provides a method for helping military commanders, staffs, and trainers engage successfully in any 

type of operation with an emphasis on postconflict stability operations. It 

also suggests modifications to the traditional intelligence preparation of 

the battlefield (IPB) and the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) to 

address the analytical difficulties posed by the conduct of military operations within and among different cultures.

Initially, this research was undertaken to support military training conducted at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the National 

Training Center (NTC). In its final form, however, this research will serve 

to inform additional studies as well as projects, conferences, and training conducted throughout the Department of Defense (DOD), Department 

of State (DOS), and miscellaneous intelligence agencies. This study will 

be of interest to US Armed Forces and intelligence community personnel 

planning for or conducting operations in Arab and Middle East countries. 

It will also be of interest to any armed forces, law enforcement, or intelligence community personnel that need to assess the intentions, motivations, and decisionmaking styles of persons from other cultures.

vii

Acknowledgments

Several people were integral to the successful completion of this project by providing information and guidance throughout the research effort. 

In particular, I would like to extend a special note of thanks to Kristin 

Leuschner from the RAND Corporation, who was able to take my briefing 

slides and disparate notes and combine them into a well-formulated, congruent document while offering valuable suggestions and improvements. I 

would also like to thank Tom Szayna for his professional advice, mentorship, and tireless efforts in reviewing this research as it progressed.

Likewise, I appreciate receiving input from Bruce Hoffman, Eric 

Larson, and Scott Gerwehr, also from the RAND Corporation, who each 

provided professional advice, friendship, and an initial review of this 

research; the staff of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language 

Center; Major Ben Connable of the USMC Cultural Awareness Working 

Group; and the staff of the Combat Studies Institute—especially Ms. Betty 

Weigand, whose final edits and layout made this book a reality. In addition, a number of my Arab and Islamic friends and colleagues were instrumental in verifying this research; at their request, I have not included their 

names. I am additionally indebted to the formal reviewers of this project 

for their constructive criticism and comments.

Finally, I want thank my wife, Vicki, a Middle East specialist in her 

own right, who provided valuable research assistance, editorial comments, and reviews—this document would not have been possible without 

her support. Please note that I am solely responsible for all omissions or 

mistakes.

ix

Contents

Page

Foreword ................................................................................................iii

Preface .....................................................................................................v

Acknowledgments ................................................................................. vii

Chapter 1. Introduction .......................................................................... 1

Why Culture Matters ........................................................... 2

Cultural Awareness in Current Military Training and 

Doctrine ............................................................................3

Purpose and Organization .................................................... 5

2. A Conceptual Model for Understanding Culture ................ 9

Culture and Cultural Awareness Defined ............................ 9

A Conceptual Model for Developing Cultural Awareness..11

Cultural Influences ...................................................... 13

Cultural Variations ...................................................... 13

Cultural Manifestations .............................................. 18

Using the Cultural Awareness Model to Understand 

Cultures .......................................................................18

3. A Primer for Understanding Arabic Culture ..................... 23

Cultural Influences ............................................................ 24

History and Foreign Heritage ............................................ 25

Islam and the Role of Religion .......................................... 27

Background ................................................................. 28

Islamic Views of War .................................................. 30

The Tribal System ............................................................. 31

The Arabic Language ........................................................ 35

Cultural Variations ............................................................. 36

Behaviors .................................................................... 36

Values .......................................................................... 38

Cognition .................................................................... 41

Cultural Manifestations ..................................................... 41

Case Study: Iraq ................................................................ 44

Conclusion ......................................................................... 50

4. Incorporating Cultural Awareness into US Military 

Training and Doctrine ....................................................57

The Need for Cultural Awareness in Training 

and Doctrine ...................................................................57
x

Page

Integrating Cultural Awareness into Military Training .....61

Training Initiatives Currently Underway .....................62

Additional Changes Needed to Standardize 

Cultural Awareness Training Across the Army .........63

Integrating Cultural Awareness into Military Doctrine .....65

The Need for Cultural Awareness in IntelligenceGathering .................................................................66

Changes Needed to Integrate Cultural Awareness 

into IPB Doctrine .....................................................71

Changes Needed in the Deliberative Planning 

Process and Execution Phase ...................................78

Conclusion .........................................................................81

5. Summary and Conclusions ................................................87

The Way Ahead .................................................................88

About the Author ...................................................................................89

Glossary ................................................................................................91

Bibliography .........................................................................................95

Appendix A. Cultural Factors in US Joint and Army Doctrine .......103

B. The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence ............................... 115

C. Preparing for Negotiations in the Middle East ...........121

D. The Implications of Cultural Factors for US 

Operations in Somalia ................................................133

Figures

1. Cultural awareness pyramid ............................................................11

2. Taxonomy of culture .......................................................................12

3. Levels of context sensitivity inherent to various cultures ..............15

4. Taxonomy of Middle Eastern culture .............................................24

5. The Arab World ...............................................................................26

6. Arabic tribal system ........................................................................32

7. Arabic tribal structure compared to civil structure .........................34

8. How values can provide a cultural lens for understanding .............38

9. Cultural awareness and expectation management ..........................58

10. Changes in training and doctrine required to achieve cultural 

competence .....................................................................................60

11. Training considerations and the pyramid of cultural awareness .....62

12. Evaluating intelligence support to IO during OIF ..........................68
xi

Page

13. Deliberate planning process modified to incorporate cultural 

intelligence factors .........................................................................80

14. Implications of culture at the strategic, operational, and 

tactical levels of war .......................................................................82

15. US negotiators’ global report card ................................................128

Tables

1. Dimensions of Cultural Variance ....................................................19

2. The Five Pillars of Islam .................................................................29

3. Prominent Cultural Manifestations in Arabic Culture ....................42

4. The Cultural Gap Between the Middle East and the United 

States ..................................................................................................44

5. Shift in Operations that Must Take Place During SASO.................71

6. Recommended Additions to Doctrine to Achieve Cultural 

Intelligence .....................................................................................72

7. Cultural Intelligence Categories .....................................................73

8. Cultural Intelligence Factors that Should be Better Addressed 

in Doctrine ......................................................................................74

9. Steps in Analyzing the Adversary’s Decisionmaking System ........76

10. Example of a Modified IPB ............................................................78

11. Summary of Recommendations ......................................................88

12. The Impact of Culture on Negotiation .......................................... 123



Chapter 1

Introduction

Projection of United States (US) influence around the world has 

brought an increasing number of US military forces into foreign lands. 

As recent experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and other locations 

demonstrate, an understanding of foreign cultures and societies has 

become a national priority. Military leaders have long understood that 

knowledge of the adversary is critical to operational success. Cultural 

awareness is an increasingly important component of this knowledge; 

indeed, the more unconventional the adversary (and the more diverse 

from US cultural norms), the more important it is for the US military to 

understand the adversary’s society and underlying cultural dynamics as 

a means of ensuring operational success.1 Cultural awareness can reduce 

battlefield friction and the fog of war. It can improve the military’s ability 

to accomplish its mission by providing insight into the intent of the 

groups in the battlespace, thus allowing military leaders to outthink and 

outmaneuver them. An understanding of cultures and societies is also critical 

to postconflict stability and support operations (SASO), peacekeeping, 

and nationbuilding, all of which require close and sometimes long-term 

interaction between people of other cultures and US soldiers. In addition, 

the success of US military operations calls for American soldiers to become 

experts in not only the culture of their adversaries, but also in the culture of 

their allies, civilian counterparts, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 

international organizations, and others.

Despite the growing awareness among national leaders of the need to 

include cultural awareness as part of military operations, battle preparations 

as well as military training and doctrine neglect the role of culture and 

religion. Cultural awareness is not currently included as part of foreign 

language training, and the cultural training provided to soldiers prior to 

deployment tends to be overly simplistic, typically focusing on lists of 

do’s and don’ts without providing a context for cultural understanding. 

Current US joint doctrine does not stress consideration of any type of 

cultural awareness and competence factors during the deliberate planning 

process. Intelligence gathering also neglects culture.

This document addresses these gaps by presenting a methodology 

to help members of the US Armed Forces understand foreign cultures, 

including the ways culture can influence how people think and act. In 

addition, it provides a conceptual model that can be applied in understanding 

any culture and illustrates the use of this model with a Middle Eastern case 

study, including examples from Iraq.


Why Culture Matters

Cultural factors have been a critical, yet mostly unexamined, aspect 

of missions conducted in Africa and the Middle East since the end of the 

first Gulf War in 1991. Cultural factors played an important, but usually 

unacknowledged, role in shaping the scope of the United States’ humanitarian intervention in Somalia during the 1990s.2

 Today, with much of the 

US military either in Iraq, returning from Iraq, or getting ready to go to 

Iraq, cultural awareness seems to be almost a basic requirement for success on the battlefield (including psychological operations, information 

and influence operations, effects-based operations, strategic communications, and civil affairs) and in postconflict operations. Lessons from recent 

and ongoing operations have demonstrated the need for improved cultural knowledge and foreign language capability among US forces, with 

an emphasis on languages reflective of the post-Cold-War threat. (These 

include Albanian, Arabic, Chinese, Dari, Hindi, Kurdish, Pashto, PersianFarsi, Russian, Serbian-Croatian, Turkish, and Urdu.)3

 Cultural awareness 

could become even more important in the future due to the persistence of 

nationalism and social traditionalism in some regions of the world and the 

potential for continuing cultural and religious tensions.

The following examples illustrate what can happen when military 

operations do not consider cultural awareness.

A lack of cultural awareness among American forces has led to an 

increase in animosity among many Iraqis and contributed to a negative 

image of the US military. American forces in Iraq have engaged in the 

practice of destroying the houses of suspected insurgents without judicial 

due process. Such actions have resonated among the local population due 

to similar tactics used by the Israeli military in the occupied territories of 

the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Soldiers have also shown ignorance of 

Islamic religious practice. For example, “Iraqis arrested by US troops have 

had their heads forced to the ground, a position forbidden by Islam except 

during prayers. This action offends detainees as well as bystanders . . . the 

military has enough to worry about without alienating the local population.”4

 Tactics such as these might bestow short-term tactical advantages 

and might appear to be effective measures, but can undermine the longterm US goals for building stability in the region.

Difficulty in understanding the interrelationship between religion 

and politics has contributed to power imbalances in Iraq. A failure to 

understand the dynamics of tribalism and the role of tribal leaders (who 

are often competing with other governing and administrative structures 

such as town councils and local police), has led some American units 
to disproportionately empower tribal structures, and others to virtually 

ignore them. In addition, American forces entering Iraq with Kuwaiti 

translators encountered an unexpected negative Iraqi response due to 

animosity between Iraqis and Kuwaitis, of which many Americans were 

unaware. Tribal rivalries have also come into play due to the need for 

US forces to rely heavily on locally hired translators, some of whom 

may cause interference with US objectives and operations or even gain a 

disproportionate influence.5

A lack of cultural awareness appears to have affected military operations. A commander from 3d Infantry Division observed: “I had perfect 

situational awareness. What I lacked was cultural awareness. I knew where 

every enemy tank was dug in on the outskirts of Tallil. Only problem was, 

my soldiers had to fight fanatics charging on foot or in pickups and firing 

AK47s and RPGs. Great technical intelligence. . . . Wrong enemy.”6

Understanding an adversary requires more than intelligence from 

three-letter agencies and satellite photos; it requires an understanding of 

their interests, habits, intentions, beliefs, social organizations, and political symbols—in other words, their culture.7

 An American soldier can liken 

culture to a minefield: dangerous ground that, if not breached, must be 

navigated with caution, understanding, and respect. Cultural interpretation, 

competence, and adaptation are prerequisites for achieving a win-win relationship in any military operation. Operational commanders who do not 

consider the role of culture during mission planning and execution invite 

unintended and unforeseen consequences, and even mission failure.8

Cultural Awareness in Current Military Training and Doctrine

There is a growing recognition of the need for cultural awareness 

in US military battle preparations as well as training and doctrine. In a 

letter to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld dated 21 October 2003, 

Congressman Ike Skelton, the Ranking Democrat on the House Armed 

Services Committee wrote: “[If] we had better understood the Iraqi culture 

and mindset, our war plans would have been even better than they were, 

[and] the plan for the post-war period and all of its challenges would have 

been far better . . . we must improve our cultural awareness . . . to inform 

the policy process. Our policies would benefit from this not only in Iraq, 

but . . . elsewhere, where we will have long-term strategic relationships and 

potential military challenges for many years to come.” In response, Secretary 

Rumsfeld released a memorandum stating that “foreign language skill and 

regional expertise are essential enabling capabilities for DOD activities in 

the transition to and from hostilities.” This memorandum further stipulates 

that not only will the Secretaries of the Military Departments reshape the 
forces to “provide stabilization and reconstruction capabilities . . . capable 

of operating in a range of cultures and languages,” but further tasks the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) 

to develop metrics to evaluate and report individual and unit capabilities 

and readiness in the areas of foreign language speakers and personnel with 

regional and cultural expertise.9

In a recent self-assessment, the Department of Defense (DOD) rated 

itself as “inadequate” in its culture and language preparation to conduct 

missions throughout the spectrum of operations.10 In a similar assessment 

conducted by the combatant commands, Pacific Command (PACOM) rated 

itself as “generally inadequate,” while European Command (EUCOM) 

and Central Command (CENTCOM) each rated itself as “inadequate” in 

knowledge of societal, cultural, tribal structure, economy, infrastructure, 

evolving threats, and number of in-house specialists in its respective area 

of responsibility (AOR).11

Lessons from recent operations indicate that improvements are needed 

in “institutional preparation in language, as well as political, ideological, 

and cultural training.”12 At the Defense Language Institute Foreign 

Language Center (DLIFLC),13 the US military’s premier language-training 

center, culture is not currently part of the curriculum despite clear guidance 

from the Defense Foreign Language Program as described by the National 

Security Agency (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).14

Some DLIFLC faculty feel that teaching culture as part of language training 

is too difficult or too controversial. It has sometimes been considered too 

“politically sensitive and there are too many conflicting or extremist views 

which preclude anything beyond a cursory look at culture.”15

Too often, the cultural training that does exist is overly simplistic, 

focusing mostly on points of etiquette such as not to use the left hand or to 

show the bottoms of the feet.16 While these behavioral guidelines can be 

useful, they do not go nearly far enough, nor do they provide soldiers with 

an adequate understanding of the reasons behind these directives. Indeed, 

in some cases, soldiers trying to follow these rules focus more on avoiding 

offending someone than they focus on their mission.

Moreover, behavioral guidelines do not assist soldiers in developing 

the critical thinking skills needed to understand how culture might influence 

an operation. According to USMC research,17 soldiers and leaders need to 

be able to use their understanding of other cultures to answer questions 

such as:

• What is my adversary thinking and why?

• What are my friends thinking and why?
• What will they do if I take action X and why?

• How are cultural factors influencing my operations?

• How can I make others do what I want them to do?

Soldiers need cultural knowledge that can be strategically applied when 

needed.

Thorough guidelines for developing cultural awareness are missing 

from training and doctrine. Programs for training cultural awareness are not 

found in any US military training manual or doctrinal publication, and only 

a few civilian publications come close to meeting the cultural awareness 

training needs of American soldiers operating overseas.18 While country 

studies and other textbook-like materials and briefings provide useful 

means of obtaining basic facts and data on a particular country or region, 

they are not sufficient to describe the relevant cultural aspects of particular 

societies. Current US joint doctrine does not stress consideration of any 

type of cultural awareness and competence factors during the deliberate 

planning process. Cultural factors addressed in joint doctrine typically 

occur in reference to working with coalition partners and not to the ways in 

which cultural factors could affect enemy reaction and impact the selected 

course of action (COA).19 Although US joint doctrine acknowledges that 

cultural differences among coalition partners may impact the mission, it 

does not consider the impact of culture on internal mission planning. Even 

today, there is limited US doctrine on how to advise and train foreign 

forces. This is significant given the priority and importance of training 

Iraqi security forces and the fact that the training of foreign forces differs 

significantly from the training provided to US forces. Furthermore, current 

US joint doctrine does not provide commanders with a comprehensive 

and structured approach for incorporating cultural considerations into the 

operational planning process. Such an approach is necessary to mitigate 

possible negative impacts on plan execution and operational success.

Purpose and Organization

As this introduction has suggested, military commanders and staffs at all 

levels must address cultural awareness as an important operational planning 

factor to eliminate errors that may lead to unforeseen consequences and 

ultimately mission failure. Culture must become a formal part of soldiers’ 

training. This document presents recommendations for incorporating 

a cultural framework into military planning, training, and doctrine and 

presents a conceptual model to help members of the US Armed Forces 

understand foreign cultures and the ways culture can influence peoples’ 

thoughts and actions.
Because of the importance of Iraq and Middle Eastern culture in the 

current security environment, the case study creates a sort of primer on 

Middle Eastern culture. This case study can be used as a cross-cultural 

guide for members of the US Armed Forces who are living in an Arab 

country, those who may be deployed to an Arab country, those who may 

encounter Arabs, and those who are interested in the behaviors of Arabs. 

The conceptual framework and cultural analyses presented are drawn from 

relevant scholarly literature and personal observations and experience. The 

section on Middle Eastern culture also draws on interviews and discussions 

with dozens of native Arabs from throughout the Middle East and North 

Africa.20

Any attempt to describe the motives and values of an entire population 

is risky because it can lead to generalizations that are not always true. An 

understanding of culture involves the perspectives and interpretations of 

the observer, which can cause some traits and behaviors to be emphasized 

over others.21 Do not interpret anything in this document as a value 

judgment—this document aims to describe cultural differences, not to 

judge them.

The remainder of this document is organized in four chapters. Chapter 

2 presents a conceptual framework for developing cultural awareness, 

and chapter 3 applies this framework to Middle Eastern culture, including 

a discussion of Iraq. Chapter 4 discusses ways to integrate cultural 

awareness into training and doctrine, and chapter 5 presents the summary 

and conclusion.
Notes

1. Conference Description, International Conference on Adversary Cultural Knowledge and National Security, 30 November—2 December 2004, The 

Sheraton Hotel, Crystal City, VA (Office of Naval Research, 27 April 2004), 1.

2. The implications of cultural factors for US operations in Somalia are discussed in appendix D. While the primary focus of this manuscript is on the Middle 

East in general and Iraq specifically, US and UN operations in Somalia provide 

additional insights into the role of cultural awareness.

3. Charles S. Abell, “Testimony Before the House Armed Services 

Committee Subcommittee on Total Force,” United States House of Representatives, 

24 March 2004.

4. Ike Skelton and Jim Cooper, “You’re Not from Around Here, Are You?” 

Joint Forces Quarterly, vol. 36, December 2004, 12–16.

5. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), “Chapter 2: Civil Military 

Operations—Civil Affairs, Topic C: Cultural Issues in Iraq,” in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF), CAAT II Initial Impressions Report (IIR) No. 04-13 (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, May 2004).

6. Steve Israel and Robert Scales, “Iraq Proves It: Military Needs Better 

Intel,” New York Daily News, 7 January 2004.

7. Montgomery McFate, “Does Culture Matter? The Military Utility of 

Cultural Knowledge,” Joint Forces Quarterly, vol. 38, 2005, 43; see also Robert 

H. Scales, Jr., USA (Ret), “Army Transformation: Implications for the Future,” 

Testimony Before the US House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, 

14 and 15 July 2004.

8. Calvin F. Swain, Jr., The Operational Planning Factors of Culture and 

Religion (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 13 May 2003), 1.

9. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Defense Capabilities to and from 

Hostilities,” 8 October 2004. Other current legislation and policies governing this 

issue include Department of Defense, “Military Support for Stability, Security, 

Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” Directive Number 3000.05, 

28 November 2005; Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

Memorandum on “Defense Language Institute Abbreviated Course,” 27 October 

2003, calls for the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) 

to develop a compressed course to be administered through Mobile Training 

Teams (MTTs) to unit installations and provide on-site training; Under Secretary 

of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Statement of Work number DASW01-03-

T-0124 seeks to transform the way language is valued, developed, and employed 

within the Department of Defense; Assistant Secretaries of the Army, Navy, 

and Air Force Memorandum on “Defense Language Transformation” (undated) 

recommends consultation with combatant commanders to identify real-world 

problems experienced as a result of scarce knowledge among military personnel of foreign languages and cultures; DA G-3 message on “Defense Language 

Institute Abbreviated Arabic Course,” November 2003, seeks input from all the 

services on their need for cultural familiarization and foreign language training; 
and Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff Memorandum on “Defense Language Institute 

Abbreviated Course,” 5 December 2003, documents Service’s agreement that a 

language and culture course is warranted.

10. Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study, “Transition to and from 

Hostilities,” September 2004, 12.

11. Ibid., 25.

12. CALL (2004).

13. With over 1,300 faculty and 3,800 students, the Defense Language 

Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) is the world’s largest foreign 

language school and the military’s primary source of language instruction. 

DLIFLC has more faculty teaching DOD’s five highest enrollment languages 

than all US students graduating in those languages nationwide. It is an institution 

whose product—a language qualified graduate—is critical to global US military 

operations.

14. Kenneth L. Sampson, “Instilling Passion for Language: Strategies and 

Techniques,” in Dialog on Language Instruction, vol. 13, nos. 1 and 2 (Presidio 

of Monterey: Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, 1999), 74.

15. Based on correspondence between a senior administrator at DLIFLC and 

the author.

16. Even today, after years of experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, this type 

of cultural training is still prevalent in the US Army’s training centers. See Office 

of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, “Arab Cultural Awareness: 58 Fact 

Sheets,” TRADOC DCSINT Handbook No. 2 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army 

Training and Doctrine Command, 7 February 2005).

17. Ben Connable and Art Speyer, “Cultural Awareness for Military 

Operations,” Concepts and Proposals: USMC Cultural Awareness Working Group

(HQMC and MCIA, February 2005).

18. For example, Glen Fisher, Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception 

in International Relations, 2d edition (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, Inc., 

1997); Margaret K. (Omar) Nydell, Understanding Arabs: A Guide for Westerners, 

3d edition (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, Inc., 2002); and Raphael Patai, 

The Arab Mind (Hatherleigh Press, May 2002) are three books that military leaders at all levels might consult before deploying to the Middle East.

19. See Appendix A, “Cultural Factors in US Joint and Army Doctrine.”

20. These interviews took place over a number of years through the author’s 

personal and professional contacts. The evidence is based on casual conversation 

and much of the evidence is anecdotal.

21. Nydell (2002), x–xii.


Chapter 2

A Conceptual Model for Understanding Culture

This chapter provides formal definitions of culture and cultural awareness and then presents a three-part conceptual model to address cultural 

awareness in military operations. Culture might be considered the “human 

terrain” of warfare, and it is a key terrain. Understanding and being able 

to apply cultural concepts on the battlefield can make or break mission accomplishment. Success on the battlefield—and in peacekeeping, 

nationbuilding, and other noncombat operations—results from the ability 

of leaders to understand the human terrain and to think and adapt faster 

than the enemy, and from the ability of soldiers to make their way successfully in an environment of uncertainty, ambiguity, and unfamiliarity.1

Culture and Cultural Awareness Defined

The formal definitions of the terms “culture” and “cultural awareness” 

follow:

Culture: A shared set of traditions, belief systems, and behaviors.2

Culture is shaped by many factors, including history, religion, ethnic identity, language, and nationality. Culture evolves in response to various pressures and influences and is learned through socialization; it is not inherent. 

In short, a culture provides a lens through which its members see and 

understand the world.

In a military context, think of culture as simply another element of terrain, parallel to geographic terrain. Just as a hill or saddle affect a soldier’s 

ability to maneuver, so can religion, perceptions, and language help military planners find centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, and assist 

in campaign planning and the proper allocation of resources.

Cultural Awareness: The ability to recognize and understand the 

effects of culture on people’s values and behaviors. In the military context, 

cultural awareness can be defined as the “cognizance of cultural terrain 

for military operations and the connections between culture and warfighting.”3

 Cultural awareness implies an understanding of the need to consider 

cultural terrain in military operations, a knowledge of which cultural factors are important for a given situation and why, and a specified level of 

understanding for a target culture.

At an elementary level, cultural awareness is information, the meaning 

humans assign to what they know about a culture. A principal task involved 

in acquiring cultural awareness is to collect cultural information and 

transform it by adding progressively greater meaning as understanding 
10

deepens. Levels of understanding can be conceptualized as a kind of 

“cognitive hierarchy”:4

• Data. Data is the lowest level of information on the cognitive hierarchy. Data consist of unprocessed signals communicated between 

any nodes in an information system, or sensings from the environment detected through human, mechanical, or electronic means.

• Information. In the context of the cognitive hierarchy, information 

is data that have been processed to provide further meaning.

• Knowledge. In the context of the cognitive hierarchy, knowledge is 

information analyzed to provide meaning and value, or evaluated 

as to implications for the operation.

• Understanding. In the context of the cognitive hierarchy, understanding is knowledge that has been synthesized and had judgment 

applied to it in a specific situation to allow for comprehension of 

a situation’s inner relationships.

To understand and apply cultural awareness to a military context, use 

the levels in the cognitive hierarchy. The pyramid in figure 1 is a graphic 

representation of cultural awareness applied to the cognitive hierarchy.5

Because information gives structure and shape to military operations 

and the battlespace, such a model of cultural awareness can be used as 

a framework for training, planning, and executing military operations. 

Commanders and staffs can then give meaning to and gain understanding 

of the events and conditions in which they make decisions and conduct 

operations.

Figure 1 illustrates the point that cultural awareness is not a “do/don’t 

do” kind of knowledge, but one that provides various levels of capabilities 

for understanding cultures (through a cultural lens) and applying one’s 

understanding to the situation at hand. These capabilities are conceptualized 

as levels in the pyramid, because military personnel with different levels 

and types of responsibilities (commanders versus soldiers) require different 

levels of cultural awareness. An explanation of the levels follows:

• Cultural Consideration (“How and Why”) is the incorporation of 

generic cultural concepts in common military training—knowing 

how and why to study culture and where to find cultural factors 

and expertise.

• Cultural Knowledge (Specific Training) is exposure to the recent 

history of a target culture. It includes basic cultural issues such as 

significant groups, actors, leaders, and dynamics, as well as cultural niceties and survival language skills.
11

• Cultural Understanding (Advanced Training) refers to a deeper 

awareness of the specific culture that allows general insight into 

thought processes, motivating factors, and other issues that directly 

support the military decisionmaking process.

• Cultural Competence (Decisionmaking and Cultural Intelligence) 

is the fusion of cultural understanding with cultural intelligence 

that allows focused insight into military planning and decisionmaking for current and future military operations.6

 Cultural competence implies insight into the intentions of specific actors and 

groups. (Chapter 4 further develops this concept.)

It is important to note that there is no single solution to apply at all 

echelons—one “size” of cultural awareness does not fit all. The level of 

understanding required at different echelons will vary according to the 

specific needs of the mission.

A Conceptual Model for Developing Cultural Awareness

Now that key definitions have been established, figure 2 shows a model 

for understanding culture and developing cultural awareness.7

Figure 1. Cultural awareness pyramid.

Decisionmaking and

Cultural Intelligence

Advanced Training

Specific Training

Competence

Decisionmakers

Understanding

Key Personnel

Knowledge

Focused or Predeployment e

Information/Consideration

All personnel

“How and Why”

+PLUS

+PLUS

+PLUS

Cultural Awareness

Data and Technical Information
12

The three main components that define culture are cultural influences, 

cultural variations, and cultural manifestations. Understanding each of 

these is important to the development of cultural awareness.

• Cultural influences are major social or institutional factors, such 

as heritage, religion, traditions, and language that bind people 

together. Of particular importance is a culture’s heritage or history, 

which can be critical in defining the culture’s ethnic and national 

identity. What is most critical in terms of influence is typically not 

the factual history of a country or region, but the group’s collective 

memory and interpretation of that past. This becomes an inherited 

remembrance that is passed from one generation to the next.

• Cultural variations include styles of behavior, values, and ways 

of thinking that are common to a culture. Behaviors are the outward, observable artifacts of a culture. They consist of the language, social rules, customs, structures, and institutions of a given 

culture. Values are principles that members of a culture use to 

evaluate alternatives or consequences in decisionmaking. Ways 

of thinking, or cognition, refer to preference-based strategies and 

processes used in decisionmaking, perception, and knowledge representation of a given culture. It is “the mental process of knowing, including aspects such as awareness, perception, reasoning, 

and judgment.”8

Figure 2. Taxonomy of culture.

Cul u al Influences

•History and Foreign

Heritage

•Social Organization

•Traditions

•Lang age

Cultural Influences

•History and Foreign

Heritage

•Social Organization

•Traditions

•Language

Cultural

Manifestations

•Planning Style

•View of Authority

•Negotiation

Styles

•Willingness to

compromise

•Risk Avoidance

•Time to Decision

•Etc...

Cultural

Manifestations

•Planning Style

•View of Authority

•Negotiation

Styles

•Willingness to

Compromise

•Risk Avoidance

•Time to Decision

•Etc.

The “What”

ral Variation

Behaviors

•Context Sensitivity

Values

•Individualism vs.

Collectivism

•Power Distance

•Formality vs. informality

•Uncertainty Avoidance

•Relationship vs. Deal Focus

•Long-term vs. Short term

orientation

•Time Orientation

Cognition

•Reasoning Styles

Cultural Variations

Behaviors

•Context Sensitivity

Values

•Individualism vs.

Collectivism

•Power Distance

•Formality vs. Informality

•Uncertainty Avoidance

•Relationship vs. Deal Focus

•Long-term vs. Short-term

Orientation

•Time Orientation

Cognition

•Reasoning Styles

The “Why”
13

• Cultural manifestations are the concrete displays of a culture’s 

thought and behavior, whether through its members’ view of 

authority, negotiation style, willingness to compromise, embracing of risk, or some other form.

In a sense, cultural influences and variations explain why the culture 

is the way it is. Cultural manifestations, on the other hand, refer to what

one encounters in the culture. These concepts are discussed in more detail 

below.

Cultural Influences

Embedded in larger networks of social structures and historical forces, 

cultures help shape concrete behaviors and thought processes. As such, 

cultural influences such as religion or history can help define a culture and 

establish a context for understanding a culture whether or not every individual in the culture is personally affected by these influences.

The history and foreign heritage of a given area may provide a worldview that reflects and supports the social, political, and economic organization, which can offer some guidance to the values that are likely to 

characterize the cultures within that region. Likewise, religion addresses 

not only the formal structure of religions within a culture, but also the 

role that religion and spirituality play in a culture. The nature of religious 

beliefs within a culture reflects and supports social structures and cultural 

values.9

Note that these influences are not absolute, but instead reflect tendencies within cultures. These characteristics are generalizations that are not 

applicable to all community members, but nonetheless can influence the 

way people think and behave. Within any given culture, there is likely to 

be variation among different people in terms of the weight these influences 

have on individuals (for example, some individuals may be very nationalistic, others may be less so).

Cultural Variations

Social science researchers have identified a set of universal traits 

that can define variations within a culture. The researchers further divide 

cultural variations into three broad categories: behaviors, values, and 

cognition.10

Behaviors

Behaviors are the outward, observable artifacts of a culture. They 

consist of the language, social rules, customs, structures, and institutions 

of a given culture and include:
14

• Languages, customs, dress, religion.

• Language styles, including the degree of context sensitivity; that 

is, the extent to which language emphasizes surrounding circumstances (or context) and makes use of body language.

• Personal space or the physical region or space around an individual that is considered taboo (to varying degrees) for another 

individual to enter.

The following is a detailed discussion of the latter two concepts.

Context Sensitivity. Benjamin Whorf, a linguistic anthropologist at 

Yale University in the 1930s, argued that the content of a language is 

directly related to the content of a culture and the structure of a language 

is directly related to the structure of a culture.11 The result of this process 

is many different views by speakers of different languages. Language is 

not simply a way of voicing ideas, but is the very thing that shapes those 

ideas. In other words, a person cannot think outside the confines of his or 

her language, and the language used can influence the way a person sees 

the world. Conversely, the way a person sees the world can also influence 

the kind of language he or she uses. Understanding of a particular culture, 

therefore, requires an understanding of the context in which that group 

communicates.

There are two types of communication: low-context and high-context. 

In low-context communications, the meaning of what is said is, for the 

most part, explicit in the words spoken—words alone provide most of the 

meaning. While there can be some variation in the meaning of a particular 

phrase or sentence, this variation does not range widely according to context. 

In high-context communications, however, meaning is implicit rather than 

explicit in the language. This means that words can be understood only 

within a given situation or context, and that nonverbal communications 

take on greater importance in interpreting what is meant. For example, 

the Arabic language is a high-context language, which means that what is 

“not said” may be more important than what is said. Context sensitivity is 

important because the surrounding circumstances determine the meaning 

of the words spoken. Figure 3 categorizes various cultures according to the 

level of context sensitivity inherent to the culture’s language.

Personal Space. The importance of body language, especially the role 

of gestures and eye contact, also varies among cultures. Social scientists 

conclude that only about 7 percent of the emotional meaning of a message 

is communicated by words that are spoken, while 38 percent of the 

meaning is paralinguistic (the way the words are said), and 55 percent 

of the meaning is delivered by the use of gestures, posture, and facial 
15

expressions.12 In cultures where body language plays a key role, feelings 

and emotional responses are generally based not so much on what another 

person says, but on what another person does.

Values

Values are the principles for evaluating alternatives or consequences 

in decisionmaking and constitute the base judgments of what is considered 

good or bad within a culture.13 These values can be used to provide a lens 

through which an individual of a particular culture sees the world.

Geert Hofstede, an influential theorist on the practical aspects of cultural 

differences at the national level, describes five dimensions through which 

all cultures can be described.14 These cultural dimensions are related to the 

basic problems with which all human societies must cope: individualism, 

power distance, uncertainty avoidance, relationship focus versus deal 

focus, and long-term versus short-term time orientation.15 Included are 

three additional cultural variations specifically relevant to Arabic culture: 

time orientation, formality, and context sensitivity.16

Individualism versus Collectivism. Individualism refers to cultures 

in which people see themselves first as individuals and believe that their 

Figure 3. Levels of context sensitivity inherent to various cultures.

High Context: Meaning

Implicit Languages

Low Context: Meaning

Explicit in Language

Surrounding

Information

Necessary for

Understanding

Swiss

Germans

Scandinavians

North Americans

Arabs

French

Italians

Latin Americans

British

Japanese

Surrounding

Information

Necessary for

Understanding
16

own interests take priority, while collectivism refers to societies in which 

individuals identify primarily as members of the group and believe that the 

group’s interests take priority. Individualists are described as people who 

look after themselves and their immediate family only, while collectivists 

belong to groups, families, clans, or organizations, which look after them 

in exchange for loyalty.17

In individualist cultures, adults are expected to take care of themselves 

and to succeed more or less on their own. American culture provides an 

example of individualism. Once children grow up, they are expected to 

leave the parents and live on their own, and they often do not assume 

the responsibility of taking care of their parents. Similarly, Americans in 

general, and especially military leaders, tend to place great value on the 

contributions of the individual toward the success of an organization.

Power Distance. Power distance is a measure of human inequality in 

a group or organization. Power distance can be defined as “the extent to 

which the less powerful members of society accept and expect that power 

is distributed unequally.”18 High power distance suggests that the followers 

as well as leaders endorse the society’s level of inequality.

In low-power-distance countries, individuals prefer a consultative 

type of leader who takes subordinates’ suggestions into consideration 

when making a decision. In high-power-distance countries, subordinates 

tend to be perceived as afraid and follow their superiors’ decisions without 

question.19 A low-power-distance culture tends to view everyone as equal, 

and people tend to respect the individual. A high-power-distance culture 

tends to be more concerned with status and tends to accept inequality in 

power and authority.

Formality versus Informality. Related to the concept of power distance 

is the level of formality or informality in a culture. Formal cultures attach 

considerable importance to tradition, ceremony, social rules, and rank, 

while informal cultures do not. Formal cultures tend to be structured 

hierarchically, and individuals within the culture are very aware of their 

status within that hierarchy. In informal cultures, people tend to be viewed 

equally.

Uncertainty Avoidance. Uncertainty avoidance refers to the value an 

individual attaches to perceived risk—the extent to which an individual 

experiences uncertainty as stressful and therefore tries to avoid it. Uncertainty avoidance provides a gauge of a culture’s tolerance for ambiguity 

and indicates the extent to which a culture encourages its members to feel 

either uncomfortable or comfortable in unfamiliar, unstructured situations 

that are novel, unknown, surprising, or different. Uncertainty-avoiding 
17

cultures try to minimize the occurrence of such situations through strict 

laws and rules, safety and security measures, and, on the philosophical 

and religious level, through a belief in absolute truth—“there can only be 

one Truth and we have it.”20 In contrast, uncertainty-accepting cultures are 

more tolerant of opinions different from the norm.

Uncertainty avoidance is closely related to the dual concepts of honor 

and saving face. Simply stated, saving face means that neither party in a 

given interaction should suffer embarrassment, which is itself often the 

result of uncertainty or ambiguity.

Relationship Focus versus Deal Focus. This concept refers to 

the importance of personal relationships in conducting business and 

negotiations. In relationship-focused cultures, people prefer to do business 

with friends, family, and persons well known to them. They always want 

to know their business partners very well before talking business. In these 

cultures, relationships are based on trust, and networking is essential for 

doing business. Individualist cultures tend to be deal-focused, which 

means they are more focused on the qualities of the deal itself rather than 

the person or organization offering it. Deal-focused cultures are relatively 

open to doing business with strangers. In these cultures, business and 

personal relationships are seen as entirely separate.

Long-Term versus Short-Term Time Orientation. Long-term 

orientation is defined as the fostering of virtues oriented toward future 

rewards, especially perseverance and thrift. Short-term orientation, in 

contrast, seeks to foster virtues related to the past and present, especially 

respect for tradition, preservation of “face,” and the fulfillment of social 

obligations.21

Time orientation refers to the extent members of a culture are focused 

on the past, present, or future in making decisions. Some cultures are very 

time-conscious and precise in making and keeping appointments, while 

others are more casual. In addition, some cultures tend to favor longer, 

slower deliberations, while others prefer to “get down to business.”

Cognition

Cognition refers to the different processes used for problem solving, 

decisionmaking, perception, and knowledge representation of a given 

culture. It can be described as “the mental process of knowing, including 

aspects such as awareness, perception, reasoning, and judgment,” and can 

help explain what modes of reasoning and argumentation characterize a 

culture, how members of a particular culture organize their thoughts about 

the world, and how they tend to explain behavior.22
18

A given culture can usually be characterized according to the dominant 

mode of reasoning used. There are three main reasoning styles:23

• Dialectical reasoning. Whether options are delineated to show 

their differences, or whether those options are merged to maintain 

possibly contradictory perspectives.

• Hypothetical reasoning. Whether the individual uses imagined 

circumstances to show implications of actions, or whether the 

individual grounds the analysis in context and experience.

• Counterfactual reasoning. Whether the individual uses counterfactual (untrue, explicitly opposite of what is known to be true) 

circumstances to show implications of actions.

Perception and attribution describe how people perceive objects in a 

scene as relating to other objects in that scene and how people of different 

cultures attribute causality across cultures, respectively.

Cultural Manifestations

The third component of the taxonomy of culture is cultural 

manifestations—specific features of a culture that display the effect of 

cultural influences and variations. In other words, manifestations are those 

behaviors, speech patterns, and attitudes that are seen on the surface. If 

one responds to unfamiliar or unusual cultural manifestations without 

understanding the cultural influences and variations that helped create them, 

one can have a hard time taking a strategic approach to another culture. 

Therefore, it is important to identify common cultural manifestations and 

to understand the full cultural context in which these emerged.

Using the Cultural Awareness Model to Understand Cultures

The model just described can be applied to understand key features of 

different cultures with which the US military may be involved. Indeed, the 

model can be applied across the spectrum of the strategic, operational, and 

tactical levels of war.

Table 1 represents a summary of the model along with the relevant 

definitions, which can serve to establish baselines in applying the conceptual 

model for cultural awareness to understanding Arab and Middle Eastern 

culture.

As noted earlier, cultural awareness is needed not just during war, but 

in the entire range of operations in which the US military can be engaged, 

including coordination, peacekeeping, and nationbuilding.

The next chapter applies this model to Middle Eastern cultures, followed by a short case study from Iraq.
19

Table 1. Dimensions of Cultural Variance

Behaviors Languages, Customs,

Dress, Religion

The normal definitions for these.

Personal Space The region around an individual, within which it is

considered taboo (to varying degrees) for another

individual to enter.

The outward,

observable

artifacts

(including

structures and

institutions of a

culture)

Context Sensitivity The degree to which a culture emphasizes the

surrounding circumstances or context in its

communications (e.g., by making extensive use of

body language).

Values Power Distance The acceptable difference of power between a

superior and a subordinate.

Uncertainty Avoidance The value an individual attaches to a perceived risk;

how much an individual experiences uncertainty as

stressful, and how much he or she avoids it.

Time Orientation The extent to which an individual is focused on the

past, present, or future in making decisions.

Individualism The extent to which people in a culture see

themselves first as individuals and believe that their

own interests take priority.

Formality The extent to which a culture attaches importance to

tradition, ceremony, social rules, and rank.

The base

judgments of

good and bad

common to a

culture

Relationship Focus vs.

Deal Focus

The importance of personal relationships in

conducting business and negotiations.

Cognition Dialectical Reasoning Whether options are delineated to show their

differences, or whether those options are merged to

maintain possibly contradictory perspectives.

Hypothetical Reasoning Whether the individual uses hypothetical (imagined)

circumstances to show implications of actions, or

grounding analysis in context and experience.

Counterfactual

Reasoning

Whether the individual uses counterfactual (untrue,

explicitly opposite what is known to be true)

circumstances to show implications of actions.

Perception The tendency for people to perceive objects in a scene

as relating to other objects in that scene.

The preference

based strategies 

used in 

decisionmaking,

and

perception,

knowledge

representation

Attribution How people of different cultures attribute causality

across cultures.
20

Notes

1. Ben Connable and Art Speyer, “Cultural Awareness for Military 

Operations,” Concepts and Proposals: USMC Cultural Awareness Working Group

(HWMC and MCIA, February 2005).

2. William D. Wunderle, “Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: Planning 

Requirements in Wielding the Instruments of National Power,” Warfighters: 

Operational Realities (RAND Technology and Applied Sciences Group Seminar, 

17 November 2004). Of course there are many uses of the term “culture” in 

military and social science literature. To cite just one example, Department of 

Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, 12 

April 2001 (as amended through 31 August 2005), defines “culture” as “A feature 

of the terrain that has been constructed by man. Included are such items as roads, 

buildings, and canals; boundary lines; and, in a broad sense, all names and legends 

on a map.”

3. Connable and Speyer (2005).

4. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 6-0, Mission Command: 

Command and Control of Army Forces (Washington, DC: Department of the 

Army, August 2003), B-1 and B-2.

5. This model was adapted from Connable and Speyer (2005) and modified 

to be congruent with the cognitive hierarchy found in FM 6-0, appendix B.

6. Connable and Speyer (2005).

7. Adapted from Carl Arthur Solberg, Culture and Industrial Buyer 

Behavior: The Arab Experience (Dijon, France, September 2002).

8. Definition online at <http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q= 

cognition> (as of 2 March 2006).

9. Benjamin Karney, Marcia Ellison, Heather Gregg, Sabrina Pagano, 

William Wunderle, and Scott Gerwehr, A Framework to Analyze Cross-Cultural 

Diversity for Intelligence Tradecraft (unpublished RAND research, 2006).

10. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Urban Sunrise,” Final 

Technical Report (Veridian/General Dynamics, February 2004), 137.

11. Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality (Cambridge, MA: 

MIT Press, 1964).

12. Albert Mehrabian, Nonverbal Communication (Chicago: AldineAtherton, 1972).

13. This slide is adopted from Helen Altman Klein and Gary Klein, “Cultural 

Lens: Seeing Through the Eyes of the Adversary,” presented at the 9th CGF&BR 

Conference, 16–18 May 2000.

14. Geert Hofstede, “National Cultures Revisited,” Behavior Science 

Research, vol. 18, 1983, 285–305.

15. Hofstede developed these ideas based on a research project of national 

cultural differences across subsidiaries of a multinational corporation (IBM) in 64 

countries. Subsequent studies by others covered students in 23 countries, elites 

in 19 countries, commercial airline pilots in 23 countries, up-market consumers 

in 15 countries, and civil service managers in 14 countries. These studies 
21

together identified and validated five independent dimensions of national culture 

differences.

16. Formulations of these cultural dimensions were heavily influenced 

but are partially at variance with the views expressed by Geert Hofstede. Ernst 

Cassirer’s “Circle of Humanity” also influenced my views. Cassirer’s “Circle of 

Humanity” has six categories: Science, Language, History, Religion, Art, and 

Myth. Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 

1944), 68.

17. Glen Fisher, International Negotiation: A Cross-Cultural Perspective

(Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, Inc., 1980), 130.

18. Geert Hofstede, “A Summary of My Ideas About National Cultural 

Differences,” online at <http://feweb.uvt.nl/center/hofstede/page3.htm> (as of 2 

March 2006).

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Karney, and others, A Framework to Analyze Cross-Cultural Diversity 

for Intelligence Tradecraft.

23. Richard E. Nisbett and Ara Norenzayan, Stevens’ Handbook of 

Experimental Psychology, 3d edition, D.L. Medin editor (New York: John Wiley 

& Sons, Inc., 2002).

23

Chapter 3

A Primer for Understanding Arabic Culture

This chapter applies the conceptual model for cultural awareness and 

serves as a primer for understanding key components of Arabic culture as 

related to the three areas of cultural awareness: cultural influences, cultural 

variations, and cultural manifestations. It is important to remember that 

these three concepts interact with each other. To achieve mission success, 

members of the US military need to understand these concepts and their 

relationship to the reactions of adversaries and allies, ways of receiving 

information, and decisionmaking processes. Because of the breadth of 

nationalities and people included in the term “Arabic culture,” this chapter 

also includes some examples concerning Iraq.

According to Habib Hassan Touma,1 “The essence of Arabian culture 

is wrapped up in ‘the Arabic language . . ., Islam . . ., Tradition.’” And 

thus “An Arab, in the modern sense of the word, is one who is a national 

of an Arab state, has command of the Arabic language, and possesses 

a fundamental knowledge of Arabian tradition, that is, of the manners, 

customs, and political and social systems of the culture.”2

Because any attempt to define “Arabic culture” can be problematic, 

three general factors assist in determining whether to consider someone 

an Arab or not. First is the political factor—whether the person lives in a 

country that is a member of the Arab League.3 The second is the linguistic 

factor—whether the person’s mother tongue is Arabic. The third is the 

genealogical factor—whether the person can trace his or her ancestry back 

to the original inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula. While different groups 

assess the relative importance of these factors differently, most people 

consider themselves Arabs because of the overlap of the above factors 

rather than just one factor. For example, not many people would consider 

themselves Arab based on the political definition without the linguistic 

one; thus, Kurds or Berbers usually identify themselves as non-Arab. 

Furthermore, Arab nationalism declares that Arabs are united in a shared 

history, culture, and language. Arab nationalists believe that Arab identity 

encompasses more than outward physical characteristics, race, or religion. 

A related ideology, Pan-Arabism, calls for all Arab lands to unite as one 

state or sovereign political entity.

Figure 4 provides a taxonomy of Arabic culture and can serve as an 

overview of the three main components of cultural awareness as they are 

relevant to Arabic culture.4
24

Cultural Influences

As discussed earlier, culture is, among other things, a shared set of 

traditions, belief systems, and behaviors shaped by history, religion, ethnic 

identity, language, and nationality. The success of many postconflict 

operations depends on the ability of the US military to interpret and adapt 

to foreign cultures.5

While a countless number of variables influence Arabic culture, four 

major cultural influences will be discussed:

•	 Arab history and heritage.

•	 Islam and the role of religion.

•	 Tribal functions.

•	 Language.

Understanding these factors, however, is only the starting point to becoming culturally competent. To determine what is different about Arabic 

culture or any culture, US military planners must be able to understand, 

analyze, and then incorporate cultural influences in a way that will enable 

them to ask the right questions during the mission analysis process. (See 

chapter 4.)

Figure 4. Taxonomy of Middle Eastern culture.

Cultural Influences

• History and Foreign

Heritage

• Islam and the Islamic

View of War

• Tribal Traditions

• Language

Cultural

Manifestations

• Wasta

• Planning

• Nepotism

• Authority

• Suspicion

• Delegation

• Bargaining

• Sycophancy

• Consultation

• Compromise

• Participation

• Risk Avoidance

• Time to Decision

• Fatalism

• Negotiation

Styles

• Etc.

The “Why” The “What”

Cultural Variations

Behaviors

• Context Sensitivity

Values

•Individualism vs.

Collectivism

•Power Distance

• Formality vs. Informality

• Uncertainty Avoidance

• Relationship vs. Deal Focus

• Long-term vs. Short-term

Orientation

•Time Orientation

Cognition

• Reasoning Styles
25

History and Foreign Heritage6

Wars and conflicts can play a large role in a culture’s self-identification. 

History is critical to both ethnic and national identity; most importantly, 

however, is not the factual history of a country or region, but the culture’s 

dominant interpretation of that history and collective memory of the past. 

Because both the Ottoman Empire and later the French, Italian, and British 

rule influenced the cultural identity of the Arab world, the attitudes the 

Arabs developed under foreign rule are important to an understanding of 

Arabic culture.

Arab nationalists believe Arabs are united in a shared history, culture, 

and language. The notion of collective memory is important with regard to 

Arabic culture. With the formation of the Arab League in 1946, an official 

definition of “Arab” was put forth: “An Arab is a person whose language 

is Arabic, who lives in an Arabic speaking country, who is in sympathy 

with the aspirations of the Arabic speaking peoples.”7 Thus, one key concept within Arabic culture is the notion that such a culture truly does exist 

across national boundaries and regions, bringing together people of various ethnicities and origins.

The precursors of modern-day Arabs were Semitic people, originally 

from the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding territories, who spoke an early 

version of Arabic. After adoption of Islam by Arabs (570–632), both Islam 

and the Arabic language spread across Northern Africa so many North 

African peoples also assimilated as Arabs.8 The modern Arab homeland 

stretches some 5,000 miles from the Atlantic coast of northern Africa in 

the west to the Sahel in the south, and covers an area of 5.25 million square 

miles (see figure 5).9

The Arab world straddles two continents, a position that has made 

it one of the world’s most strategic regions. The Arabian Peninsula and 

the Gulf Region have a distinct strategic location in the southwest corner 

of Asia. The Arabian Peninsula is at the crossroads of Asia, Europe, and 

Africa. Being surrounded by important international waterways (the 

Hormuz Strait—the gateway to the Arabian Gulf, the Bab Al Mandab Strait, 

the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea), the Arabian Peninsula enjoys a strategic 

position in terms of communications and transportation. From an economic 

point of view, the Arabian Peninsula is home to the largest producers and 

exporters of oil, the main source of energy for the industrialized world. 

Currently, the Arabian Peninsula houses over 65 percent of the world’s oil 

reserves, and Gulf countries produce 33 percent of the world’s oil. Because 

of its communication, transport, and economical importance as well as 

its strategic depth, the Arabian Peninsula, and Saudi Arabia specifically, 
26

will continue to be strategically important to the United States for the 

foreseeable future.10

While Arabs inhabit much of the Middle East and northern Africa, 

there are some countries in the Middle East, such as Turkey and Iran, whose 

populations are not predominantly Arabic. Iran is mainly a Persian culture, 

and most Iranians speak Farsi. Other countries, such as Egypt, Libya, and 

Morocco, have mixed Arab and other North African populations.

Awareness of and pride in the historic status of the Arab Empire has 

led some Arabs to mirror the attitudes developed in the wake of cultural 

dominance and to display an attitude of cultural superiority. The Arab 

Empire was established during the Middle Ages and lasted more than 750 

years, covering an area from the Atlantic Coast to India. Because of this, 

nationalistically inclined Arabs emphasize the culture’s historic achievements and greatness and regard other cultures with either lenience or suspicion, depending on the culture in focus. Arabs’ belief in the superiority 

of their own culture contrasts strongly with their economic and political 

dependence on Western technology.11

Language, ethnicity, and religion are the major components binding 

the Arab world together. While the most important element of what constitutes an “Arab” is culture, language is also important. Arabic is spoken 

throughout the Middle East and is a vital element of a shared cultural identity. Ethnicity is next, and Arabs from all Arabic lands recognize each other 

ethnically. In terms of national origin, Arab nationalists view Arabs as one 

people and advocate the establishment of one pan-Arabic state. Finally, 

Figure 5. The Arab world.
27

although religion plays an important role in the Arab world, Islam is a less 

important factor in the cultural identity of the region than are language and 

ethnicity. Indeed, many Arabs remain adherents of other faiths.

The attitudes of the Arabs developed under foreign rule should also be 

considered. Most of the Arab-inhabited lands were a part of the Ottoman 

Empire until the Early Modern period. Later, French, Italian, and British 

ruled over Arab-inhabited territories leading to a greater differentiation 

among the Arabs. For example, “The defeat of the Arab Caliph and the 

ascendance of the non-Arab Ottoman Empire (1412–1918) helped institutionalize autocracy.” In the Middle East during French and British rule, 

different parts of the former Arab Empire were isolated from each other, 

leading to “clannish attitudes and inward mentality.”12

Islam and the Role of Religion

While a number of Arab and Middle Eastern countries are tolerant of 

religions outside of Islam, there are some basic attitudes toward religion 

that the US military need to be aware of to understand the influence of 

religion on Arab behavior.

Although not all Arabs are religious, Islam still has an overwhelming 

influence over almost every aspect of everyday life in the Middle East.

It is important to keep in mind that not all Arabs are religiously devout. 

However, as a whole, Middle Eastern societies tend to be less secular than 

Western societies, and even those who are not religious will experience the 

effects of Islam on a regular basis.

Islam is perceived as providing a common identity for people of many 

nations. Arabs in general do not think in terms of a combined ethnic or 

territorial identity, but in terms of genealogies and religion. For those of 

the Muslim faith in particular, religion provides a unifying force that transcends national boundaries. Bernard Lewis best articulates this attitude 

in his premise that “in the Western world, the basic unit of human organization is the nation . . . virtually synonymous with country. Muslims, 

however, tend to see not a nation subdivided into religious groups, but a 

religion subdivided into nations.”13 Lewis further explains that these attitudes may reflect the fact that many of the Middle East states today are 

relatively new entities.

Because of the central role of religion, many Arabs, particularly those 

of the Muslim faith, tend to believe there should be no separation of church 

and state in the Middle East. This is because “in the early centuries of 

the Muslim era, the Islamic community was one state under one ruler.”14

Muhammad (the founder of Islam) was simultaneously a prophet, a 
28

pluralistic leader and ruler, a warrior, a statesman, a teacher, and a spiritual 

leader. Thus, it is an unquestioned assumption that schools should teach 

religion and governments should promote religion. This strong reliance on 

religion, belief in God, and acknowledgment of God’s power can manifest 

itself in a sense of fatalism (discussed further in Cultural Manifestations 

below), the belief that some things depend on God’s will and, as a result, 

people cannot and should not try to control all events.15

Background

Because Islam plays a pervasive role in Arab countries, it can be useful to understand some of the basic tenets behind this religion.16 Islam, the 

faith of the vast majority of Arabs, is not so much a religion as a form of 

life. It is the focal point of Arab society and provides a pattern for personal 

and social conduct for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, permeating their 

culture at every level—political, social, economic, as well as private. Most 

Muslims accept that the rules and norms expounded in the Quran are the 

result of the Prophet Mohammed’s revelations and are, therefore, regarded 

as sacred and recognized as laws and absolute demands.

Islam arose in the early seventh century in the city of Mecca in presentday Saudi Arabia. It developed from both the Judeo-Christian tradition 

and the cultural values of the nomadic Bedouin tribes of Arabia. Since that 

time, Islam has dominated the culture of the Arab world.

Islam literally means submission to the will of God. A Muslim, therefore, is one who has submitted himself to Allah and who acknowledges 

Muhammad as His Prophet. Muslims consider the Prophet Muhammad 

to be the last in a series of prophets, which included Abraham, Moses, 

and Jesus, to whom God revealed His Divine Message. Islamic tradition 

takes into account the doctrines of both Judaism and Christianity, both of 

which preceded it. For example, Muslims believe, as do both Jews and 

Christians, in one God and in an afterlife. Islam also acknowledges Jews 

and Christians as the “people of the Book,” meaning the Bible, and has 

granted them privileged status from the early days of the Islamic empire 

into modern times. This is one reason other religions have survived 

throughout the Arab world, even during periods of severe cultural and 

religious repression.

An understanding of the role of Islam in the Arab world requires an 

understanding of the basic tenets of the faith. The teachings of Islam are 

found in the holy book called the Quran, which Muslims hold to be the 

immutable word of God. The Quran provides Muslims with everything 

they need to know to lead a good and pious life. It is viewed as the unrivaled 

source of authority in almost all aspects of individual and group living. 
29

The Quran was revealed to Muhammad in classical Arabic.

The “hadith,” the traditions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad 

and his companions, complements the Quran. Together, they form the 

basis for the “Sunnah,” or path, for devout Muslims to follow. Sunnah is 

the totality of the deeds, sayings, and approval of the Prophet on details 

of community life. The Quran and the Sunnah are the foundations of the 

“Sharia,” or Islamic law. Both sources are indispensable. One cannot practice Islam without consulting both of them. In many Islamic countries, 

the Sharia provides the basis for judgment and punishment in some or all 

areas of life.

Islamic acts of devotion and worship are expressed in the Five Pillars 

of Islam. These involve not only profession of faith, but also recognition 

of God in all aspects of human conduct. The five pillars of Islam are summarized in table 2.

Sunni and Shiite sects. While the Islamic community throughout the 

world is united by the two essential beliefs in the oneness of God and the 

Table 2. The Five Pillars of Islam

The “Shahada” or belief. The Shahada means believing and repeating

that “There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of

God.”

“Salat” or praying. Prayers are performed five times a day–at dawn,

noon, late afternoon, sunset, and night. There is no set hour for prayers.

The times for prayers vary with the movement of the sun during the 

seasons.

“Zakat” i.e., tithing or charity. Muslims are required to provide a

portion of their personal wealth to help the less fortunate. The accepted

standard is for a Muslim to provide 2.5 percent of his or her personal

wealth as zakat and it is usually paid at the end of the month of

Ramadan. It must be understood that giving money to the less fortunate

is seen as a privilege and that there is no disgrace in receiving money

through zakat.

“Sawm” or fasting. Each year, during the month of Ramadan, adult

Muslims are expected to fast between dawn and sunset. Fasting

includes abstaining from eating, drinking, smoking, and sexual relations.

The “Hajj” or pilgrimage. Hajj is the pilgrimage to Mecca. All Muslims

are expected to make the Hajj once in a lifetime, if financially and

physically able to travel.
30

divine mission of His Prophet, there developed shortly after Muhammad’s 

death a debate within the Islamic community over who should succeed the 

Prophet as leader of the faithful. This debate split the community into two 

major sects: Sunni and Shiite.

The Sunnis felt that the successor or caliph (from khalifa, Arabic for 

successor) should be chosen as other Arab leaders had been selected in the 

past, by consensus or election. They supported the succession of the first 

four caliphs, often referred to as the “rightly guided.” All were companions of the Prophet Muhammad.

The Shiites believe that the succession should be through the Prophet’s 

bloodline and that Muhammad had chosen his cousin and son-in-law, Ali, 

as his spiritual and secular heir. This faction is referred to as “Shia Ali” 

(partisans of Ali), or “Shiites.” In 680 AD, Ali’s son, Hussein, the Prophet’s 

grandson, led a small rebellion against the ruling Sunni caliph. They were 

massacred in the battle of Karbala (located in present day Iraq).

Shia and Sunni are the two major branches of Muslims and comprise 

80 to 85 percent of all Muslims. The major differences between these two 

groups are not necessarily in beliefs and religious law, which are the same 

for both groups, but rather in practice and political theory. Additionally, 

lesser sects include the Ismailis, Alevis/Alawites, and Druze, which originate in political and doctrinal differences in the community. One mystical 

sect that encompasses both Sunnis and Shias is Sufiism. Sufis are individuals who believe in the need to go beyond formal religious practices and 

find means to commune directly with Allah. It is important to remember, 

however, that Muslims are in basic agreement on fundamental issues in all 

of these sects because they all draw on the Quran and its body of Islamic 

Law.

The Muslim calendar is lunar and shifts in relation to the solar calendar. Just as Christians count years starting with the year of Jesus’ birth, 

Muslims count years beginning with Muhammad’s move from Mecca to 

Medina in 622 AD. Muslim years are labeled as A.H., Anno Hegirae, or 

“year of the Hijra.” Major Muslim festivals include Id al-Fitr (the FastBreaking Festival, celebrated at the end of Ramadan) and Id al-Adha (the 

Festival of Sacrifice, the commemoration of Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Ishmail which takes place during the month of pilgrimage). Finally, 

like Christians, Muslims believe in a Day of Judgment, when righteous 

souls will go to heaven and wrongdoers will go to hell.

Islamic Views of War

Throughout history, religion has been an effective tool for leaders to 

mobilize support for political wars. Most major faiths include teachings 
31

that simultaneously condemn violence and war and promote them as 

morally necessary for ultimate survival. Today, religion continues to play 

a significant role in shaping political groups and continues to be a source 

of hostility between states.17 However, different religions have varying 

standards for justifying war. Therefore, it is critical for current military 

leaders and planners to have an understanding of the potential role of 

Islam in justifying violent actions and the corresponding political reasons 

for conflict.

Islamic law sets clear guidelines as to when war is ethically right 

and how such wars are to be conducted. Islamic law permits war under 

the following three conditions: in self-defense, in defense of Islam when 

other nations have attacked an Islamic state, or, in cases when another 

state is oppressing its own Muslims. The idea of unlimited conflict with 

no rules or boundaries is against all Islamic principals. A precept of Islam 

is to “Fight in the cause of God against those who fight you, but do not 

transgress limits. God does not love transgressors.”18

In accordance with Islam, war is to be conducted with discipline, 

using a minimum of force to avoid injuring noncombatants. The Quran 

emphasizes that war should be fought only for noble causes without 

seeking any earthly reward: “Those who readily fight in the cause of God 

are those who forsake this world in favor of the Hereafter. Whoever fights 

in the cause of God, then gets killed or attains victory, we will surely grant 

him a great recompense.”19

The killing of noncombatants or of prisoners of war is strictly forbidden. 

This is tantamount to murdering innocent lives, which leads to punishment 

in hell. Additionally, Muslims are forbidden to attack wounded soldiers 

who have ceased fighting. Muhammad, Islam’s holy prophet, states in 

the Quran that defeated enemies should be made prisoners rather than be 

executed.

A good example of an ideal Muslim conduct of war is the capture of 

Jerusalem by Saladin in 1187. Although Christians had violated a number 

of holy Muslim places, Saladin20 had prohibited acts of vengeance. His 

army was so disciplined that there were no combat-related deaths or 

violence after the city surrendered. The residents were taken prisoner, but 

their ransom was set at a token amount.21

The Tribal System

Another strong cultural influence in the Arabic world comes from the 

tribal system. Arabic culture has strong collectivist features. Within Arab 

culture, the group takes precedence over the individual. Loyalty to the 
32

group is highly valued and responsibility is considered to fall on the group 

in its entirety rather than on any particular individual. Distant cousins, 

neighbors, and friends can develop bonds as strong as any bond between 

close family members. Because of the primacy of the group, obligations of 

group members to one another are wide, varied, and powerful.22

In this context, the tribal system gives unique advantages to a tribe’s 

members. It is every member’s duty to look after the interests of their 

fellow tribe, clan, or family members. All relations and loyalties in the 

tribal system are concentrated on the family. Tribalism has become, along 

with Arabism and Islam, a major ingredient of Arab and Middle East 

identity. Understanding the role of the tribe and the different members of 

the tribe is key to analyzing Arab behavior. The tribal system of Arabic 

cultures is shown in figure 6.

Most tribal groupings revolve around old cores and occupy the same 

regions in the Middle East; certain surnames reveal the area or tribe from 

Figure 6. Arabic tribal system.

Abu Tribe

Subtribe Saeed

Clan Hamad

Khazzal

Branch

Family
33

which a family originates. Arabic names recognize five levels of a tribe. 

In fact, an Arab’s full name can help identify the person’s family, branch, 

clan, subtribe, and greater tribe. This system is an extension of the security 

net that each tribe has constructed around its members.23 The left side of the 

diagram refers to the tribal level, while the right side is an example of the 

family name associated with the subtribe, clan, and branch, respectively.

The first level in the system is the tribe itself, which consists of several 

subtribes. Historically, the extended family has been the center of daily 

activities. The extended family, in turn, consists of clans, each with its own 

extended families. The subtribe is composed of a number of extended families tracing themselves back to one patrilineal father. Loyalty follows first 

the father’s family, then the mother’s family, then anyone within the greater 

tribe, then nationality or religion, other Arabs, and finally Westerners.

The subtribe has traditionally constituted the main unit of defense. 

The tribe consists of four to six subtribes, which are traced to a real or 

fictional ancestor. The tribe’s activities are mainly political, consisting of 

managing relations with other tribes and governments. At this level, the 

tribe is led by a sheik and advised by a council.

Furthermore, a tribe may be part of a confederation of tribes that is 

governed by a sheik who, in these cases, is tremendously powerful. The 

power in this system is extremely centralized and is an extension of the 

security net that each tribe has constructed around its members. The tribe 

provides its members with an identity, a sense of security, and a blueprint 

for the resolution of conflicts, but everyday behavior is pragmatic and 

adaptive to specific situations.24

Tribal versus other forms of leadership. The understanding of both 

tribal and religious structures is essential because they are often in competition with other governing and administrative structures, such as town 

councils and local police. In a given town or village, there can be multiple 

forms of authority, including tribal leaders, elected councils, and prominent 

and educated citizens, as well as former and newly appointed leaders and 

religious leaders. (Figure 7 compares levels of tribal and civil authority.)

Arab culture favors centralization of authority. Superiors expect subordinates to be submissive and obedient. At the heart of the tribal system 

is a democratic process of consultation with elders and, in some cases, the 

ability of tribesmen to challenge the sheikh.

Projecting a paternal image, leaders securely occupy the top of the 

pyramid of authority. However, various kinds of leaders—tribal, religious, 

and civil—may share authority either in a complementary or competitive 
34

way. One must understand who has the power in a tribal society—formally 

and informally. Should a military leader go to a civil administrator, a religious cleric, a tribal leader, or the sheikh to get something done? Making 

the right decision is important because if he goes to the wrong person to 

get something done, not only could he have empowered the wrong person, 

but he also might have offended any number of others in the process. The 

answer will be situation dependent and will vary based on the problem and 

the situation. Failure to recognize the different sources of authority can 

disrupt existing governance and resolution structures and can lead to an 

erosion of coalition effectiveness.

At the local level, tribal authority plays an important role. The authority of the tribal sheiks traditionally stems from both personal influence and 

largess as well as from nobility of lineage.

25 Arab tribal leaders wish to 

maintain a higher status for themselves and their tribes based on their tribal 

or clan nobility, strength, reputation, or wealth. Tribal leaders, however, 

have limited authority within certain parameters, such as settling minor 

disputes. Tribal leaders tend to be masters of self-interest and survival, and 

therefore, may fail to represent the interests of their people. Because of 

this, while tribal leaders may have no positive influences on society, they 

are capable of significant negative influence.26

The religious hierarchies claim a higher status due to their relationship to Islam. The tribal system of the Shia is different from that of the 

Sunni in that the Shia sheiks often had to share power with the Sadah—

holy men—and the Ulema. Titles and roles vary between Sunni and Shia.

Figure 7. Arabic tribal structure compared to civil structure.

President

Township Director

(Head of a Small Town)

Civil Structure

Sheikh of Sheikhs

(Head of Major Tribe)

Sheikh

(Head of Subtribe)

Head of Clan

Tribal Structure

Governor

(Head of a Governorate)

Mayor

(Head of a District)
35

For the most part, the Sunnis adhere to the traditional tribal power 

structure. Sunnis have no formal clerical hierarchy and choose their leaders 

by consensus or appointment. Their key religious figures include Imams—

primarily prayer leaders—and Qadis, who are judges of Islamic law. 

Unlike the Sunni, the Shia has an evolved religious hierarchy that includes 

Ayatollahs, Mullahs, and Ulema. Among the Shia tribes, leadership was 

confined to one lineage. In practice, however, nobility often turned out to 

be a function of the success of the leader in defending the tribal lands and 

managing and resolving intratribal conflicts. Contemporary tribal authority largely stems from the fact that the former regimes delegated it to them. 

Tribal influence is derived from personal attributes, such as generosity, 

honor, and the ability to deal with government officials.

Governors, mayors, and police are modestly influential within the 

community. Civil administrators and elected officials are looked on as 

civil servants and are expected to serve citizens and maintain civil functions within their area. In Iraq, because Baath Party ties largely determined 

their influence in the past, civil administrators and elected officials are not 

always highly respected.

The Arabic Language

Understanding some key points about the Arabic language is 

necessary to gain insight into the Arabic culture. For Arab and Middle 

Eastern countries, the Arabic language reinforces one’s identity and is 

both a symbol and substance of group cohesion. It influences how a person 

perceives the world and expresses reality.27 Arabic is one of four major 

languages used in the Middle East today, the others being Turkish, Farsi, 

and English, the last of which has replaced French as the primary second 

language of the educated elite.

The native language of 220 million people and the official language of 

more than 21 countries throughout the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa 

is Arabic. As the language of Islam, it affects more than one billion people 

in the Islamic world. In 1973, it was named the sixth official language of the 

United Nations and a working language in the Organization of African Unity. 

It is the fourth most widely spoken language in the world after Mandarin 

Chinese, English, and Spanish. Furthermore, Arabic has recently been 

reinstated as a second tongue in Iran, Pakistan, and the southern part of the 

Philippines. Besides Arabic, over ten languages retain the Arabic script—the 

most prominent being Urdu, Persian, Pashto, Kurdish, and Sindhi.28

Arabic has both written and spoken forms; to be literate, Arabs must 

be able to read and write Arabic and speak their local dialect. Modern 

Standard Arabic, also known as Classical Arabic, is the standard written 
36

language. This is the same across all countries and regions in which Arabic 

is used. Although not commonly used in daily speech, Modern Standard 

Arabic is used in formal discussion, speeches, and news broadcasts. Much 

more common in everyday speech is the use of either Formal Spoken Arabic 

or one of several dialects. There are five predominant dialects: Egyptian, 

Levantine (Syria, Lebanon), Peninsular (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the 

Gulf States), Magrebi (Morocco, Tunisia), and Iraqi. These are typically 

used in conversation only and are not used for written communication. 

Formal Spoken Arabic is a combination of Modern Standard Arabic and 

one of the dialects. People use it to converse with Arabs whose dialect is 

different from their own.29

Although the Arabic language can take different forms, according to 

whether it is written or spoken or depending on the region, the Arabic language is a unifying force that serves to reinforce cultural identity across 

regions and national boundaries. Arabic is both a symbol and a substance 

of group cohesion. Primarily because Arabic is the language of the Quran, 

Arabs believe it was chosen by God and therefore is superior to other 

languages. Indeed, rather than adopt some other sort of religious symbol 

(e.g., a cross or star of David), Islam uses the written word of God in the 

form of calligraphy as a symbol of the religion. As such, Arabs have considerable respect for both written and spoken Arabic. In fact, “some pious 

people feel that anything written in Arabic should be burned when no longer needed or at least not left on the street to be walked on or used to wrap 

things because the name of God probably appears somewhere.”30

Thus, according to James Coffman, a person “who studies and thinks 

in Arabic will develop distinct historical and cultural references, cognitive 

approaches, attitudes and styles of reasoning.”31 Because of this, every 

Arab government, regardless of its political or social character, uses the 

symbolic power of the Arab language in its drive toward national modernization, authentication, and uniformization. Understanding the importance 

of the Arabic language in the study of Middle East and Arab culture is 

essential to mission success.

Cultural Variations

The second set of cultural factors in the model describes cultural 

variations. As described in the previous chapter, these traits can be divided 

into three broad categories: behaviors, values, and cognition.32 (Examples 

from Iraq are incorporated into the discussion where appropriate.)

Behaviors

As discussed earlier, some languages have a high degree of context 
37

sensitivity: the meaning of words can vary significantly according to 

context. The Arabic language tends to be highly context-sensitive; that 

is, the meaning of what is said must be interpreted through context rather 

than words alone. One can take the written word of bin Laden, give it to 

15 native Arab speakers, and get 15 different translations. Comprehension 

depends on understanding what bin Laden said with respect to any historical 

allusions he may have referred to. In cultures with high context-sensitivity, 

written language can be particularly difficult to decipher because so much 

of the interpretation of language typically depends on aspects of the spoken 

context that are not available with written words alone, such as what the 

speaker’s eyes are doing while he talks and what his body movements 

are.

The Arabic language ranks second only to Japanese in terms of its sensitivity to context. For example, the Arabic word “harem” can refer to the 

“living quarters reserved for wives and concubines and female relatives 

in a Muslim household.”33 This definition provides one accurate meaning 

of the term, however in Arabic, the word “harem” can have several meanings based on the context of its use. It can also mean taboo, sacred, wife, 

prohibited, interdicted, or sanctuary.34 Context allows one word to have 

many often-conflicting meanings. A man’s wife is sacred to him but taboo 

to others. Many other words in Arabic have multiple, complex meanings 

that can be understood only in context. The same word in Arabic can mean 

push or pull or negotiate. If one person is standing in front of another, the 

two people can be said to be “pulling together” in dialogue, or “repelling 

each other”; the “correct” meaning can be determined only according to 

context.

Communication with speakers of Arabic requires the ability to “read” 

beyond what is being said in words, and to understand nonverbal communications. Space orientation differs across cultures. Attitudes toward 

physical space have to do with territory, divisions between private and 

public, comfortable personal distance, comfort or lack of comfort with 

physical touch and contact, and expectations about where and how contact 

will take place.35 When communicating with Arabs, one must pay attention 

to body language, eye movements, and hand gestures. Many dimensions 

of nonverbal communication can contradict, emphasize, or serve as a substitute for verbal messages.

In addition, the Arabs’ sense of “personal space” differs significantly 

from that of Americans. In the United States, people conduct face-to-face 

business exchanges at a distance of about 5 feet, which is within the socalled “social zone.” In the Middle East, however, Arabs tend to stand 
38

much closer, often less than 1 foot apart. Americans tend to unconsciously 

back away from such close contact and in doing so risk offending their 

counterparts. Because social behavior is culture-dependent, competent 

planners must become familiar with the role-related behaviors of a particular culture. Arab men are also more likely than Americans to touch 

each other when talking, and it is not unusual for a man to take another 

man’s hand when talking or to kiss or hug another man when meeting. 

Many Americans find these gestures unusual and feel uncomfortable if 

they occur. However, to work effectively with Arabs, it can be useful to 

become accustomed to the Arabic sense of personal space, especially to 

win respect.

Values

Values are principles for evaluating alternatives or consequences in 

decisionmaking and establish a basis for judgments of good and bad within 

a culture. As illustrated in figure 8, the values found in Arabic culture can 

be used to provide a lens through which to see the world as a member of 

that culture sees it.36

Collectivism. Those in Middle Eastern cultures will go to great lengths 

to reach decisions through consensus, where every participating member, 

Figure 8. How values can provide a cultural lens for understanding.

Collectivism

High-power Distance

Formality

Uncertainty Avoidance

Relationship Focus

ShortSlow

term Orientation

-time Orientation
39

not just a majority, is able to agree. In collective societies, everybody 

belongs to a certain group. This group protects its members and expects 

their loyalty as return. Arab societies are collectivist. Instead of asserting 

their separateness and privacy as independent individuals, Arabs tend to 

interact as members of a group, whether family, clan, village, neighborhood, tribe, etc. Group norms guide individual behavior and, in general, 

Arabs display a high need for social approval. Originality and independence of judgment are not valued as highly as teamwork. As the Arabic 

saying goes, “a nail standing out will be hammered down.” Shaming is 

the primary instrument through which Arab society enforces conformity. 

The group often determines a person’s identity, status, and prospects for 

success in life. As a result, Arabs are subjected to immense family and 

community pressures, and they will often sacrifice a few individuals for 

the good of the many. The influence of collectivism in the Middle East can 

help to explain why so many are willing to sacrifice their lives for the good 

of the “in-group.”

High-power Distance. As described in the previous chapter, power 

distance can be defined as “the extent to which the less powerful members 

of society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally.”37 In a 

high-power distance culture, people are more concerned with status and 

tend to accept inequality in power and authority. Arabic society tends to be 

a very high-power distance culture. A common Arabic saying reflects this: 

“The eye cannot rise above the eyebrow,” meaning the eye cannot change 

its position in life. Because Arabs tend to accept inequality as a fact, those 

on the bottom of the hierarchy may not show a lot of movement or initiative to change their lot. This, in turn, can inhibit out-of-the-box thinking 

and individual initiative.

Formality. The business culture found in most of the Arab world is 

formal. While Middle Eastern cultures do not equate formality with coldness, Arabs typically value respect and take a more formal approach than 

do Americans to business dealings and negotiations. Respect in business is 

important even when dealing with an adversary. Arab hospitality dictates 

that when an adversary is invited into one’s home, the host is responsible 

for his safety. Failing to provide adequate hospitality will result in a loss 

of face.

Arabs are title and rank conscious and they know US Army hierarchy 

and rank structure. It is important, therefore, for US military personnel 

working in the Middle East to call their counterparts by title and family 

names unless specifically asked to do otherwise. Americans should try 

to convey an attitude of propriety and decorum through both verbal and 
40

nonverbal clues. Formality appears to be related to power distance. Formal 

cultures tend to have high-power distance in their organizations, while 

informal cultures are more likely to be low-power distance countries.

Uncertainty Avoidance. Arabic people typically try to avoid uncertainty and risk in their daily activities. Uncertainty-avoiding cultures try 

to minimize the possibility of risk through strict laws and rules, safety and 

security measures, and, on the philosophical and religious level, through a 

belief in absolute truth. In such cultures, the concepts of honor and “saving 

face” can be very important. These concepts can make it difficult for Arabs 

to say “no” to a request because to do so would be impolite. Thus, they are 

reluctant to offend others—even if they intentionally mislead them. Thus, 

a “yes” to an Arab might mean, “Yes, I understand you,” rather than “yes, 

I agree.” Because of this, it is essential to be able to read between the lines 

because what is left unsaid or unwritten may be just as important as what 

is said or written.

Relationship Focus. The Arab world is a strong relationship-focused 

culture—the relationship is what is important. Relationship-focused people prefer to do business with friends, families, and persons well known 

to them. For Arabs, business is personal. In a relationship-focused culture, 

it is important to understand the patterns for building relationships and to 

take time to establish trust and friendship. Understanding this is essential 

to mission success in the Middle East. To get things done for the long term, 

US military leaders and other personnel must spend time gaining credibility and building relationships.38 A foreigner cannot expect to go in, say 

these things need to happen tomorrow, and then be surprised when all does 

not go well. Focusing on relationships means taking time to have tea, talk 

about the weather, discuss families and the latest soccer scores, and build 

a relationship. US rotation policies can be problematic because they make 

relationship building more difficult. When dealing with Arabs, one must 

go slow to achieve lasting success.

Short-term Orientation. Arabs tend to have what can be called a shortterm orientation, meaning they tend to foster virtues oriented toward future 

rewards, particularly perseverance and thrift. As noted earlier, the concept 

of honor and the preservation of face is an exceptionally strong element in 

Middle Eastern cultures. When an Arab feels that something is threatening his personal dignity, he may be obliged to deny it, even in the face of 

facts to the contrary. Arabs will rarely admit to errors if doing so will cause 

them to lose face. “To Arabs, honor is more important than facts.”39 An 

Arabic saying epitomizes this ideal: “Honor cannot be returned from harm 

until blood is spilled.” The saying means that revenge is a necessary and 
41

value-sustained cultural difference that sanctions and even honors the idea 

of an “eye for an eye.”40 The military must understand this when dealing 

with Arab counterparts.

Slow-time Orientation. In the Middle East, time orientation, also called 

polycronic orientation, tends to appear slow by American standards. In 

slow-time cultures, multiple tasks are handled at the same time, and time 

is subordinate to interpersonal relations.41 As discussed earlier, the Arabic 

language is past-oriented—the perfect verb form is past tense masculine, 

and provides little linguistic structure for talking about the future, which 

“is not man’s concern but that of the Divine.”42 For example, Americans 

are very time conscious and very precise about appointments, while Arab 

cultures tend to be more casual about time. If an Arab host arranges a 

meeting at 1500, he most likely means “Inshallah” (Arabic for “If God 

wills, as God pleases”); in other words, the appointment is not precise.

Cognition

The third form of cultural variation is cognition: preference-based 

strategies used in the decisionmaking, perception, and knowledge representation of a given culture. Arabic processes of cognition mean that 

Middle East concepts of reality and truth may be different from their US 

counterparts. What individuals are willing to accept as a normal part of 

reality is a complex result of personality, beliefs, cultural environment, 

and life history. Perception of reality will influence social cohesion, 

industriousness, views of conflict and forgiveness, charity toward others, 

attachment to material comforts, capacity for suffering, and willingness to 

die for a cause. Truth, on the other hand, is tied to subjective experience, 

sources of knowledge, and local interpretation. It is an objective fact rather 

than an independent variable. Even though foreign counterparts may come 

to the same conclusions as Americans do, they may use a different process 

to reach that conclusion. One must understand how Middle East cultures 

make decisions—how they come to conclusions.43

Cultural Manifestations

The third part of the cultural awareness model is manifestations: the 

ways in which cultural influences and variations are visible in a culture. 

Table 3 provides an overview of some key cultural manifestations seen in 

Arabic culture. A brief explanation is provided for each item. Since most 

of these manifestations are familiar, this chapter includes a detailed discussion only of two of the more unfamiliar and complicated concepts: wasta 

and fatalism. (Appendix C addresses Middle East negotiation styles.)
42

Table 3. Prominent Cultural Manifestations in Arabic Culture

*

H.S. Atiyyah, “Research note: Research in Arab Countries” (published in 

Arabic). See also Carl Arthur Solberg, Culture and Industrial Buyer Behavior: 

The Arab Experience (Dijon, France, September 2002).

Manifestation Brief Explanation

Wasta Wasta encompasses anything from networking and lobbying

to nepotism, bribing, and corruption. There are two forms of

wasta: mediation and intercession (to achieve a benefit).

Planning Research on Arab management practices asserts that planning--

although being seen as an important element by managers--

receives only scant resources and time. Managers instead spend

their time assigning work duties to their subordinates and

supervising and monitoring their performance.*

Nepotism Favoritism is typically granted to relatives or close friends

without regard to their merit. Nepotism usually takes the form

of employing relatives or appointing them to high office.

Deference to

Authority

Arab culture favors centralization of authority. Subordinates are

expected to be submission and obedient to their superiors.

Suspicion Arabs, in general, are very “conspiracy-theory-oriented.” A

conspiracy theory defies an official or dominant understanding

of events under the claim that those events are not natural

occurrences, but the result of manipulations by two or more

individuals or various secretive powers.

Tendency to

delegate

The role of leaders is to spend their time assigning work duties to

their subordinates and supervising and monitoring their performance.*

Consultation At the heart of the tribal system is a fairly democratic process

of consultation with the tribal elders and sheikhs.

Tendency to

seek

compromise

Those in Middle Eastern cultures will go to great lengths to reach

decisions through consensus, wherein every participating

member, not just a majority, is able to agree.

Participation At the heart of the tribal system is a fairly democratic process of

consultation with elders and, in some cases, the ability of

tribesmen to challenge the sheikh.

Risk

Avoidance

Risk avoidance deals with a society’s tolerance for uncertainty

and ambiguity. Arabs tend to feel threatened by uncertainty 

and ambiguity, and thus try to avoid these situations.

Fatalism A prominent philosophical doctrine in the Middle East holds

that all events are predetermined in advance for all time and

that human beings are powerless to change them.

Negotiation

Style

Negotiation style helps display a culture’s thought and behavior,

its willingness to take compromise and embrace risk.

Sycophancy There can be a tendency for some subordinates to behave with

servile flattery or the fawning behavior of a sycophant.
43

Wasta. Many activities in Arabic culture depend on wasta, i.e., a 

mediator or connection. Simply put, wasta refers to third parties who can 

influence the outcome of events. Wasta can mean personal influence, networking, prestige and political power, and influence peddling all rolled 

into one. Wasta has a central face-saving function that is important in collectivist, honor-based, tribal societies. Historically, wasta was associated 

with conflict resolution. Today, however, its main goal has changed from 

defusing tribal conflict to acquiring economic benefits. Patrons who once 

helped their followers for prestige, now seek monetary rewards. In many 

places in the Middle East, it is conventional wisdom to use local intermediaries “to expedite the processing of official documents, for such a person 

understands what is needed beyond technical requirements of the law: the 

function of gifts, flattery, and reciprocal favors to move things through the 

bureaucratic mill.”44 While wasta is considered a form of “humanizing 

bureaucracy,” it makes life miserable for conscientious officials trying to 

live by the law who are called on to break the law to help a family or tribal 

member. Understanding wasta is critical to decisionmaking in the Middle 

East, “for wasta pervades the culture of all Arab countries and is a force in 

every significant decision. Wasta is a way of life.”45

Fatalism. Arabic culture tends toward fatalism, the belief that people are powerless to control events. Fatalism is the belief that God is the 

“direct and ultimate control of all that happens. If something goes wrong, 

people can absolve themselves of blame or can justify doing nothing to 

make improvements or changes by assigning the cause to God’s will.”46

Significant events of the past still bring strong emotions and are very relevant in Arabic society. Because of this, anything that will happen beyond 

now is in God’s hands. Fatalism can influence many aspects of Middle 

Eastern life, including whether or not to keep appointments. As noted earlier, for most Arabs, setting a specific time to meet does not necessarily 

constitute an appointment and no disrespect is meant if they fail to keep 

that appointment. While the concept of fatalism is more prevalent among 

more traditional Arabs than the educated elite, foreigners, who are very 

likely to encounter Arab fatalism in some form or another, still should 

understand this concept. 

As the US leaders and soldiers consider how to win the hearts and 

minds of the people in the Arab Middle East, they can gain some useful 

insights by comparing aspects of US and Arabic culture. (Table 4 summarizes some of the key differences between Arab and US culture.) As military leaders begin the process of planning military operations, they ought 

to think first about their own purposes and culture and then undertake a 

more intensive and holistic analysis of the culture or set of cultures to be 
44

addressed. In doing this, it is important for Americans to understand where 

US culture sits on the cultural continuum. Following is a case study on 

Iraq. The framework focuses on overall group patterns of perception and 

reasoning versus trying to predict individual actions and behaviors.

Case Study: Iraq

This subsection contains a discussion of prominent cultural factors 

relevant to US military operations in Iraq. (For a discussion of the role of 

culture in US operations in Somalia, please see appendix D.)

For the most part, Iraqis are Arab, and, as such, have many if not 

all of the same influences and values outlined throughout this chapter. 

This section highlights some Arabic cultural influences that have been 

particularly prominent in Iraq. Iraqi heritage, religion, and tribal structure 

in particular have been key cultural influences. Iraqis tend to think of 

themselves as survivors. They have endured decades of brutal dictatorship 

and survived years of international sanctions compounded by a poor 

economy. To survive has sometimes meant a reliance on and acceptance 

Table 4. The Cultural Gap Between the Middle East and the United States

C Middle East United States ontext Sensitivity: Cultures that emphasize the surrounding

circumstances (or context), make extensive use of body

language, and take the time to build relationships and

Middle East United States Formality: Cultures that attach considerable importance to

tradition, ceremony, social rules, and rank.

T United States Middle East ime Orientation: Cultures that perceive time as a scarce

resource and that tend to be impatient.

L United States Middle East on-g-Term Orientation: Cultures that maintain a

long-term perspective.

U Middle East United States ncertainty Avoidance: Cultures in which people want

predictable and certain futures.

R Middle East United States elationship Focus vs Deal Focus : Refers to the importance

of personal relationships in conducting business and

United States Middle East Individualism: Cultures in which people see themselves first

as individuals and believe that their own interests take priority.

Middle East United States Power Distance: Cultures in which decisions are made by the

boss simply because he or she is the boss.

Value Higher Lower

negotiations.

establish trust.
45

of smuggling, crime, and corruption—subversive social traits that were 

encouraged by Saddam.47

Iraqis also have little sense that they are part of a cohesive society. 

At the conclusion of major combat operations (MCO) in Iraq, Iraqi civil 

structure was in disarray. Those who had government jobs were now 

unemployed. Because no one paid taxes, there was no investment in the 

community. The police were focused on survival of the regime; therefore, 

law enforcement was weak or, in many cases, nonexistent. Because of this, 

there was little or no trust in the government, and society defaulted to a 

collective tribal system.48

Heritage. Understanding the context of the military theater of operations requires comprehension of some fundamentals about Iraq’s history 

and geography. The following is a brief synopsis of Iraq’s history.49

History. Iraq covers 437,072 square kilometers and has a population 

of 24.7 million, 40 percent of whom are younger than 14 years old. Known 

as the cradle of civilization, Iraq’s history dates back to 2500 BC. Iraq was 

part of the Ottoman Empire until 1914 when World War II broke out and 

the Empire aligned with Germany and lost. The Alliance, led by Great 

Britain, won the war and, at the end of the war had more than one million 

men in the Arab Middle East. At the end of the war, Great Britain drew 

a new map of Iraq that was not based on naturally occurring and longstanding cultural groupings, but on what would be best for its interests 

in Iraqi oil. The British wanted to create a system that would protect the 

interests of Western oil companies in the Middle East.

Today, Iraq is composed of three provinces separated by both natural and physical boundaries and historically distinct cultures tied to three 

dominant religious identities: Mosul in the North (Kurds), Baghdad in 

the Center (Sunnis), and Basra in the South (Shiites). The Shiites believe 

a direct blood descendant of Mohammad should lead Muslims, whereas 

the Sunnis do not. The country is also home to many tribal chiefs: Jews, 

Christians, and Azeris who contribute to a very diverse and fractious population, all seeking to rise to the top and take control of the country.

Iraq’s Baath Party was founded in Syria by two teachers educated in 

France and began as a force to combat British and French domination 

in Iraq and to foster Arab unity and freedom. The Party came to power 

in Iraq in 1968 and retained power until its demise in April 2003. The 

Party adopted a mild form of socialism. Under Saddam Hussein, the Party 

embarked on a program to eradicate illiteracy; build hospitals, schools, and 

universities; and played an important role in liberating women and establishing a secular government. At the same time, Saddam ruled ruthlessly 
46

and practiced strict authoritarian control to keep the country together and 

to cement and protect his power.

As a state, Iraq is still relatively young but it does not have a single 

cultural identity. It was founded through political and diplomatic maneuvering and held together by an authoritarian and secular government. 

Throughout its history, Iraq has been a battleground among tribal, ethnic, 

religious, and national forces and remains a hotbed of social tensions. In 

the Muslim world, Iraq has been the center of conflict between the Sunnis 

in Turkey and the Shiites in Iran.50 Today the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites 

continue to vie for power.

Attitudes toward Foreigners. Iraq’s history, as well as the history 

of Islam itself, has caused the people to view foreigners, particularly 

Westerners, with a certain level of mistrust. Given that Iraq’s history has 

been fraught with invasion and control by outsiders, one could predict with 

relative certainty that outsiders would not be trusted. A common sentiment 

among Iraqis is that the United States went into Iraq for its own economic 

interests and not for the greater welfare of the Iraqi people.

This mistrust colors the meaning and implications of nearly every 

event that occurs in the region—especially events that surround US policy 

and military actions. The average Iraqi does not understand why the same 

military that expelled Iraq from Kuwait in a 100-hour war in Operation 

DESERT STORM, destroyed the Taliban, and overthrew Saddam Hussein, 

cannot provide security or restore electrical power. Many people suspected 

that the United States was intentionally keeping the power off.

To understand Iraqis’ views of the United States, one must look at it 

through their eyes. What is the history of invasion and occupation in Iraq? 

Since the Middle Ages, the Muslims, Greeks, Mongols, Ottomans, British, 

and Iranians have invaded Iraq. To the people of Iraq, no matter whether 

US operations in Iraq are officially labeled liberation or occupation, the 

average Iraqi considers Americans to be occupiers. The Iraqis’ shared history, experiences, and myths will influence their perspectives of what will 

happen next, despite telling them anything different.

Furthermore, Iraqis are still not certain what the future holds for them. 

Many Iraqis, especially those in the South, are wary of trusting the United 

States. Again, one needs only look at the past to see why. In late February 

1991, when the Iraqi Army was retreating from Kuwait, the first President 

Bush encouraged Iraqis to rise up against Saddam, implying that America 

would back a rebellion. American support did not materialize and the intifada was viciously suppressed.51 Today the United States is asking the 

Iraqi people to expose themselves and rise up again to assist the Coalition 
47

in defeating the insurgency. However, they remain afraid and are uncertain 

what the outcome will be. A lack of trust remains.

Tribal and Family Influences. Iraqis place trust in family, tribal, and 

village ties. Outsiders are distrusted and their motivations suspect. Given 

the in-group nature of Iraq’s culture, as well as Iraq’s porous borders and 

history of invasion, it would be predictable that small cells of terrorists or 

extremists might go undetected or ignored because the Iraqi people are 

focused on their own in-groups that tend to keep to themselves.

Tribalism has become, along with Arabism and Islam, a major ingredient of Iraqi identity. Tribes also play something of a unifying role in contemporary Iraq. Many encompass Sunni and Shia sections. Even Saddam 

Hussein’s Al-bu Nasir tribe has a Shia branch in the Najaf area. Tribal 

loyalty among Iraqi Arabs is far from complete, but when combined with 

repression and social and economic benefits, Saddam Hussein’s tribal policy created a strong bond among the Arab tribes and the regime.52

In the past, Sunni Arabs, as the ruling elite, have tried to balance and 

reconcile Iraqi nationalism and a broader pan-Arabism. However, a panArab ideology, by its very nature, precludes a separate Shia identity and 

by definition excludes the Kurds. A divide-and-rule strategy accompanied 

these efforts, which discouraged contacts between the Shia and the Kurds. 

The geographic location of the Sunnis in the center of the country facilitated this approach. In addition to benefiting from the current political 

hierarchy in Iraq, Sunni Arabs tend to support the regime, even if only 

because it represents a bulwark against possible Shia or Kurdish power.

53

In Iraq, the tribal system in most of the Shia Arab south is different 

from that of the Sunni Arab center-north in that the Shia sheiks often had 

to share power with the sadah—holy men—and the ulema. Historically, 

the clerical leadership of the community, a strong source of leadership, has 

been systematically assassinated or executed by the regime. As a result, 

the Shia religious establishment has been greatly weakened.54 While there 

remains a strong Iranian influence today, most Shias remain independent.

Tribes in Iraq are a reality and should be dealt with from a position of 

understanding of their roles and power. Failure to do so can result in their 

gaining disproportionate power to the exclusion of educated Iraqis and 

those not affiliated with the more powerful tribes. Because of the Iraqis’ 

experiences with the Baathist regime’s totalitarianism in the past, there 

will always be some tension between tribal traditions and the civil administrators and elected officials. In later years, the regime grafted tribal traditions, such as blood money and honor killings, onto the legal system, and 

has respected tribal customs when prosecuting criminal cases. Americans’ 
48

failure to understand the role of tribalism in Iraq has led some units to 

empower certain tribal structures disproportionately, while virtually ignoring others.55

Religion. We have already discussed the importance of religion in the 

Middle East. In Iraq, it is necessary not only to understand Islam, but the 

unique versions of Islam that exist in the different areas of Iraq and the 

role that each plays.56 Muslim religious holidays can have practical implications for US operations in Iraq. Coalition forces operating in Iraq face 

a number of Muslim religious holidays. The Hajj and Ashura are particularly noteworthy not only because of their religious significance, but also 

because they involve the cross-border movements of thousands of people. 

For instance, in 2003, forces throughout Iraq had to deal with roughly 

70,000 pilgrims going to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj. The majority of the 

pilgrims took an overland route through the Western Desert (Anbar province), drove into Saudi Arabia, and were transported by air from Kuwait 

City. This involved gaining country clearance into Kuwait and obtaining 

visas from Saudi Arabia. The pilgrimage affected tactical-level maneuver, and Civil Affairs (CA) units were faced with the need to establish a 

temporary camp in Safwan for 32,000 pilgrims who were awaiting Saudi 

visas. The actions of CA forces involved erecting tents, providing food 

and water, and coordinating directly with the Red Crescent.

Ashura is a Shia religious holiday that involves the movement of tens 

of thousands of Shias from Iran and Iraq to Najaf and Karbala (central 

Iraq). Like the Hajj, Ashura is an annual event that is considered a religious requirement. The prevention of pilgrims from fulfilling either the 

rituals of the Hajj or Ashura will have negative national and international 

consequences. Consequently, it is critical that CA forces be properly educated to advise commanders on the importance of providing security, support, and passage to Muslims for pilgrimages. It is noteworthy to mention 

that this is not limited to Iraq. Coalition forces operating in Afghanistan 

have similarly had to take measures to facilitate the movement of pilgrims 

to the Hajj.57

Self-Identification. Instead of asserting their separateness and privacy as independent individuals, Iraqi Arabs tend to interact as members 

of a group—family, clan, village, neighborhood, tribe, etc. Group norms 

guide individual behavior and Iraqi Arabs display a high need for social 

approval. Shaming is the primary instrument with which Iraqi Arab society enforces conformity. The group often determines a person’s identity, 

status, and prospects for success in life. As a result, Iraqi Arabs are subjected to immense family and community pressures.58
49

An Arab identifies first with his family, then his extended family, 

his village, and his tribe, followed by his country and his religious sect. 

Religious identification may vary from very weak to very strong, based on 

an individual’s personal views of religion. Look at the names Arabs 

use . . . bin Laden means “son of Laden.” Abu Nidal means “father of 

Nidal.” Thus, even Arabic names reflect their strong family and tribal ties. 

This is not to say there are no problems. There are intra- and intertribal 

conflicts. Like any other society, they vie for power and there are many 

subsects and clans all with their own agendas. There are natural tensions 

and problems that occur in groups like these. They pick their tribal leaders 

by consensus, and the tribal leaders lead by consensus. That is democracy 

at the grass-roots level. Once a tribal leader is in power, he is the ruler 

and, when he dies or moves out, they pick someone else to represent them. 

Iraqis, in fact, understand basic democratic concepts at the lower levels.

Power Distance. Iraq is a relatively high-power distance country 

where authority is accepted and people wait for those in authority to act on 

their behalf. In general, the Iraqi people mistrust outsiders and will wait to 

see what their leaders think and will look to them for direction. This means 

that communications from outsiders are more effective if targeted messages are directed at the multiple leaders who battle amongst themselves 

for power.

Grass roots’ organizing is not the norm in Iraq. Therefore, it could be 

predicted that in the aftermath of the war, the Iraqis would not be quick to 

self-organize following the toppling of Saddam Hussein. Many Iraqis look 

to strong religious leaders to provide authority and direction. They try to 

find one who can lead them and will rally around this leader, looking to the 

strength of the leader to pull them through tough times and into a position 

of group dominance. The murder or death of a religious leader will typically provoke strong negative reaction among this population and could be 

expected to cause a backlash.

Because of the important role played by leaders, direct appeals to the 

Iraqi people are typically of limited effectiveness. As a result, the marginal 

effectiveness of US propaganda appealing directly to the people with flyers and radio broadcasts should not have come as a surprise. Indeed, as US 

military leaders formulate themes and messages for an Arabic population, 

they must realize that if the people are not inclined to take the initiative 

to change things—even for the better, then military-influenced operations 

might not have much impact on the common people.

Counterfactual Thinking. In Iraq, the pattern of thinking is based 

on the analysis of past events through the eye of experience. Given that 
50

Iraq’s history has been fraught with invasion and control by outsiders, one 

could expect certainty that outsiders would not be trusted. Iraq is a country 

renowned as the cradle of civilization, yet is now beholden to outsiders for 

the basic necessities of life and the competence needed to manage in the 

modern world.59 How is this collective past experience remembered and 

institutionalized among the people? A common sentiment among Iraqis is 

that the United States went into Iraq for its own economic interests and 

not for the greater welfare of the Iraqi people. Therefore, it is especially 

important for US soldiers to maintain a positive image if the United States 

hopes to gain the acceptance of the people, particularly because of the 

major role played by honor and shame in Iraqi culture.

Fatalism and Collectivism. Iraq’s religious history has led to a pattern 

of belief rooted in fatalism. There is a general acceptance of circumstances, 

a belief that people have little control over what happens to them and they 

must accept the fate handed to them by God. Islamic fatalism means an 

acceptance of death. Fatalism leads to a tendency to accept circumstances 

and wait for them to change rather than try to control them actively. Iraq 

is also a collectivist, or group-oriented, culture. Fatalism combined with 

collectivism could lead to a willingness to sacrifice individual life for the 

good of the in-group. It is likely the US forces on the ground have a difficult time understanding why Iraqis might passively accept their circumstances rather than take action in their own hands. Muslims believe in fate, 

but how much they do to change that fate can be used to get them to help 

themselves. There is an old Arabic saying, “Tie your camel and leave the 

rest up to God.” The United States has to convince them that we need 

them to do their part by “tying the camel.”

Competition. There is inherent competition among different subgroups 

in Iraq originating in religious and historical roots and natural geographic 

boundaries. Competition for resources and power is likely to continue and 

intensify when there is a power void.

Conclusion

Success on the battlefield results from the ability of leaders to understand the human terrain and think and adapt faster than the enemy, and 

from the ability of soldiers to make their way successfully in an environment of uncertainty, ambiguity, and unfamiliarity. Cultural awareness is 

the ability to recognize and understand the effects of culture on people’s 

values and behaviors, and implies an understanding of the need to consider 

cultural terrain in military operations, a knowledge of which cultural factors are important for a given situation and why, and a specified level of 

understanding for a target culture.
51

As such, this chapter demonstrates a methodology for understanding 

key components of Arabic culture as related to the three areas of cultural 

awareness: cultural influences, cultural variations, and cultural manifestations. It also provides a way for American soldiers and leaders to understand how cultural awareness can be used to influence military operations. 

In addition, this chapter shows how the conceptual model for cultural 

awareness could be adapted to the Middle East and applied it specifically 

to Iraq. (Appendix C uses the model to understand Middle East negotiation styles and assist in preparing soldiers to conduct negotiations in the 

Middle East. Appendix D uses the model to shed light on the implications 

of culture for US operations in Somalia.)

The next chapter considers ways to incorporate the cultural awareness 

model in US military training and doctrine.
52

Notes

1. Habib Hassan Touma was a composer and musicologist and compiled a 

number of authoritative books on Arab music in his lifetime. Dr.Touma died in 

1998.

2. Habib Hassan Touma, The Music of the Arabs, new expanded edition, 

trans. Laurie Schwartz (Portland, OR: Amadeus Press, 1996), xviii.

3. Arab League is the informal name of the League of Arab States, a voluntary association of independent countries whose peoples are mainly Arabic speaking. Its stated purposes are to strengthen ties among the member states, coordinate 

their policies, and promote their common interests. The Arab League was founded 

in Cairo in 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan 

(Jordan as of 1950), and Yemen. Member countries include Algeria, Bahrain, 

Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, 

Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, 

United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Other countries of interest include Armenia, 

Bosnia, Chechenya, Eritrea, Iran, Israel, Kurdistan, Turkey, and Western Sahara. 

See also www.arableagueonline.org.

4. Adapted from Carl Arthur Solberg, Culture and the Industrial Buyer 

Behavior: The Arab Experience (Dijon, France, September 2002).

5. See Appendix B, “The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence.”

6. For a more in-depth overview of the Arabic people and the Middle East, 

see Bernard Lewis, The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years (New 

York: Scribner, 1995).

7. Dictionary.LaborLawTalk.com, search word “Arab,” online at <http://

encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/Arab> (as of 23 August 2005).

8. The foundation of Islam by the Prophet Muhammad and the Islamization 

of Arabia during his lifetime marked the beginning of the large-scale Arab expansion outside the Arabian Peninsula and the Syrian Desert. See Raphael Patai, The 

Arab Mind (Catherleigh Press, May 2002), 13.

9. Middle East News & World Report, Introduction to the Arab World, 

online at <http://www.middleeastnews.com/intoarab101.html> (as of 29 March 

2005).

10. Silas R. Johnson, Jr., “United States Military Training Mission: A 

Paradigm for Regional Security,” The DISAM Journal, Summer 2001. For an 

overview of US strategic interests in the Middle East as well as a discussion of US 

plans for increasing stability in the region, see Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the Middle East (Washington, 

DC: Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, May 1995). 

See also Anthony H. Cordesman, US Strategic Interests in the Middle East and 

the Process of Regional Change (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, 1 August 1996).

11. M.M. Ahmed, International Marketing and Purchasing of Projects: 

Interactions and Paradoxes—A Study of Finnish Project Exports to the 

Arab Countries (Helsingfors: Swedish School of Economics and Business 
53

Administration, 1993). See also Middle East News & World Report, Introduction 

to the Arab World.

12. P. Hitti, The Arabs: A Short History (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 

1985).

13. Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, Holy War and Unholy Terror, Modern 

Library Edition (New York: Random House, Inc., 2003), xx–xxi.

14. Ibid., xxi.

15. Margaret K. (Omar) Mydell, Understanding Arabs: A Guide for 

Westerners, 3d edition (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, Inc., 2002), 25.

16. This section was influenced by LTC Russell B. Crumrine, “The Middle 

East and North Africa: A Cultural Guide for Security Assistance Personnel,” The 

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), June 2000, 4–8. 

For a more definitive analysis of the role of Islam in Middle East and Arabic 

society, see Lewis (2003).

17. Calvin F. Swari, Jr., The Operational Planning Factors of Culture and 

Religion (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 13 May 2003), 3.

18. Quran 2:190.

19. Quran 4:74.

20. Salah al-Din Yusuf (Saladin) was a great Muslim leader who united and 

led the Muslim world. In 1187, he recaptured Jerusalem for the Muslims after 

defeating the King of Jerusalem at the Battle of Hattin near the Lake of Galilee. 

When his soldiers entered the city of Jerusalem, they were not allowed to kill 

civilians, rob people, or damage the city.

21. BBC, Islam, Religion & Ethics, online at <www.bbc.co.uk/religion/

ethics/war> (as of 27 April 2004).

22. John Pike, “Societal Framework,” GlobalSecurity.org 2000–2005, online 

at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/society.htm> (as of 4 April 

2005).

23. For a more in-depth analysis of the tribal system, specifically in Iraq, see 

William S. McCallister, “The Iraq Insurgency: Anatomy of a Tribal Rebellion,” 

online at <http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_3/mac/> (as of 21 March 

2004).

24. Pike, “Societal Framework.”

25. Ibid.

26. Ben Connable and Art Speyer, “Cultural Awareness for Military 

Operations,” Concepts and Proposals: USMC Cultural Awareness Working Group

(HQMC and MCIA, February 2005).

27. James Coffman, “Does the Arabic Language Encourage Radical Islam?” 

Middle East Quarterly, December 1995, online at <http://www.meforum.org/

pf.php?id=276> (as of 23 February 2006).

28. Habeeb Salloum, “The Odyssey of the Arabic Language and its Script,” 

online at <http://www.alhewar.com/habeeb_salloum_arabic_language.htm> (as 

of 19 February 2005).

29. Margaret K. (Omar) Nydell, Understanding Arabs: A Guide for 

Westerners, 3d edition (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press Inc., 2002), 117.
54

30. Ibid.

31. Coffman (1995).

32. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Urban Sunrise,” Final 

Technical Report (Veridian/General Dynamics, February 2004), 137.

33. WordReference.com English Dictionary, search term “harem,” online at 

<http://www.wordreference.com/definition/harem> (as of 2 March 2006).

34. Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Arabic, J.M. Cowan, editor, 4th 

edition (Ithaca, NY: Spoken Language Services, 1994), 201.

35. Michelle LeBaron, “Culture-Based Negotiation Styles,” July 2003, 

online at <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/culture_negotiation/> (as of 

2 March 2006).

36. This slide is adapted from Helen Altman Klein and Gary Klein, “Cultural 

Lens: Seeing Through the Eyes of the Adversary,” presented at the 9th CGF&BR 

Conference, 16–18 May 2000.

37. Geert Holstede, “A Summary of My Ideas About National Cultural 

Differences,” online at <http://feweb.uvt.nl/center/hofstede/page3.htm> (as of 23 

February 2006).

38. For example, the author was stationed in Saudi Arabia for 2 years. It took 

him 6 months of his first year there just to understand his role, the environment, 

and to learn his way around. It took him the next 6 months to establish solid 

relationships with his Saudi counterparts. It was only during the author’s second 

year that things really began to happen. Because of the established relationships 

with his counterparts at the Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA), he was 

able to plan and execute an unprecedented, joint Saudi—US airborne operation 

[see Matthew J. Yandura, “Allies Train, Jump Together,” Soldiers Magazine, 

October 2002, 43; online at <http://www4.army.mil/soldiers/archive/oct2002/

pdfs/postmarks.pdf> (as of 2 March 2006)]. If the author had only been there a 

year, this could not have happened.

39. Nydell (2002), 45.

40. Glen Fisher, International Negotiation: A Cross-Cultural Perspective

(Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, Inc., 1980), 177.

41. The concept of polycronic and monochronic cultures was introduced by 

E.T. Hall in The Dance of Life: The Other Dimension of Time (New York: Anchor 

Press, 1989).

42. Fisher (1980), 130.

43. See Patai (2002).

44. Fisher (1980), 103.

45. Robert B. Cunningham and Yasin K. Sarayrah, Wasta: The Hidden Force 

in Middle Eastern Society (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993).

46. Nydell (2002), 44.

47. Connable and Speyer (2005).

48. Ibid.

49. Much of this section was adapted from Defense Advanced Research 

Project Agency (2004), 126–127.
55

50. For a detailed analysis of the history of Iraq from the Middle Ages to 

the 21st century, see Helen Chapin Metz, “Iraq: Historical Setting,” Library of 

Congress Country Study, May 1988.

51. Intifada is an Arabic word for shaking, uprising, or insurrection. This 

word usually refers to the Arabic resistance to Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip 

and the West Bank of the Jordan, especially intense from 1987 to 1990.

52. Pike, “Societal Framework.”

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), “Chapter 2: Civil Military 

Operations—Civil Affairs, Topic C: Cultural Issues in Iraq,” in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF), CAAT II Initial Impressions Report (IIR) No. 04-13 (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, May 2004). Online at 

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_04-13_chap01-

c.htm> (as of 28 February 2006).

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Pike, “Societal Framework.”

59. Glen Fisher, Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in International 

Relations, 2d edition (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, Inc., 1997), 72.

57

Chapter 4

Incorporating Cultural Awareness into US 

Military Training and Doctrine

Culture might be the best guide to understanding the intentions of 

both adversaries and allies on the battlefield. The cultural awareness 

model discussed here provides a means of acquiring knowledge of foreign 

cultures on the battlefield. However, to incorporate such understanding 

on the battlefield, training and doctrine must first include it. This chapter 

explains how to expand the cultural awareness model through a process of 

building cultural understanding and cultural competence. As explained in 

chapter 2 (see figure 1), cultural understanding is a higher level of cultural 

awareness that includes insights into the thought processes, motivating 

factors, and other issues that directly support the military decisionmaking 

process. Cultural competence is the highest level of cultural awareness, 

representing the fusion of cultural understanding with cultural intelligence 

to allow for focused insight into planning and decisionmaking for current 

and future military operations.1 Cultural competence can be achieved only 

with adequate cultural intelligence—intelligence gathering that actively 

seeks information on the adversary’s culture and the influences of this culture on decisionmaking. An intelligence-gathering process that considers 

cultural factors in a way that provides an effective basis for military planning is needed to support military operations. The chapter begins by defining the need for greater cultural awareness in training and doctrine. It then 

discusses some recommendations, as well as ongoing initiatives currently 

underway, to incorporate cultural awareness into US military doctrine and 

training.

The Need for Cultural Awareness in Training and Doctrine

The goal of providing soldiers and leaders with adequate preparation 

and an appropriate level of expectations before they enter the battlespace 

drives the need to incorporate cultural awareness into military training and 

doctrine. Such preparation will help personnel avoid the kinds of confusion and disappointment that can occur. Incorporating cultural awareness 

into training and doctrine will not eliminate the need to adjust and learn in 

the field, but it can help soldiers and leaders manage their expectations as 

they enter into an operation and allow for a more gradual “cultural learning curve.”

A notional illustration of how cultural awareness training can help 

manage expectations is shown in figure 9.2 In the figure, the level of 

soldiers’ expectations is shown on the y-axis, while the level of cultural 

awareness and understanding is depicted on the x-axis.
58

The U-shaped line depicts the slope of expectations experienced by 

many soldiers in Iraq who did not receive much if any prior training relevant to cultural awareness. Soldiers’ initial exuberance and idealism, 

coupled with little to no cultural awareness, left many feeling disappointed and confused. Without prior understanding of key cultural factors, many soldiers initially drew conclusions about Iraqi culture based 

on their own cultural frame of reference, that is, assuming that Iraqis had 

attitudes, expectations, needs, and behavioral patterns similar to those of 

Americans. This process is called “mirror imaging” and is a common syndrome among people working outside their own familiar environment.3

As soldiers became aware of the significant differences between American 

and Iraqi culture, the result for many was frustration, anger, and “culture 

shock.” Culture shock is a term used to describe the anxiety and physical 

and emotional discomfort that can occur when a person moves to an unfamiliar environment.

Over time, the vast majority of soldiers have learned to moderate their 

expectations, managing to cope, and, eventually for some, gaining cultural 

understanding. However, in the meantime, many have lost productivity.4

Moreover, the frustration and anger that result from false expectations and 

culture shock can contribute to mission failure. False expectations, such 

as those depicted in the figure, are a symptom of poor training, and only a 

dedicated training program in cultural awareness can overcome them.

Figure 9. Cultural awareness and expectation management.

Deploy Half-Way Redeploy

E

x

p

e

ctatio

n

s

Exuberance /

Idealism / Mirror Imaging

Cultural

Understanding

Cultural

Awareness

No Cultural Training

Disappointment/

Confusion

Frustration/

Anger

Mission Failure?

Coping/

Learning

Awareness / Understanding

Expectation Management

• Steep learning curve = mistakes

• Frustration destroys relationships

• Training achieves awareness
59

The potential impact of cultural awareness training is indicated by the 

gently sloping upward curve, which shows the process through which soldiers deploy with a certain level of cultural awareness, thus lowering their 

expectations to a more realistic level. Gradually, these expectations might 

rise slightly as the soldiers gain true cultural understanding. This curve 

is gradual, however, producing no jolting disappointments or reversals 

of expectations. By adapting to a different sense of cultural logic before 

deployment, soldiers are less likely to perceive foreign behaviors as capricious and unpredictable. As a result, soldiers can experience less anxiety 

and can better cope with the unfamiliar.5 Training that incorporates the 

cultural awareness model can facilitate this adaptation.

Cultural awareness gained in peacetime supports not only decisive 

combat operations, but stability and reconstruction operations as well. 

Cultural awareness is particularly important when US soldiers are involved 

in a “three-block war” in which troops are engaged in a spectrum of operations from humanitarian missions, peacekeeping and peace enforcement 

operations, to full-blown combat—possibly within the space of three city 

blocks.6 Entering a foreign culture with proper training and preparation 

will help soldiers navigate through these complexities.

To successfully wage a “three-block war,” soldiers must be able 

to transition between its three elements as smoothly and seamlessly as 

possible—through the lens of cultural awareness. To do this, military 

leaders need an understanding of situational awareness as it relates to 

culture on the battlefield. Mission success depends on the ability to bridge 

the cultural gaps both in warfighting and in intelligence gathering.

From a military perspective, cultural intelligence provides a means 

to capture the nonmilitary elements of information that are especially 

relevant in stability and support operations. Cultural intelligence is the 

process of incorporating cultural factors in the intelligence cycle and the 

estimate analysis to support the commander’s decisionmaking process. 

Cultural intelligence is not a separate intelligence discipline, but a fused 

product of all-source analysis. Cultural intelligence data is collected primarily through human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence 

(SIGINT), but can come from any source regarding the social, political, 

and economic aspects of governments and civil populations, their demographics, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.7

 While 

some aspects of cultural intelligence fall specifically within the realm of 

intelligence collection and production, commanders, by using a baseline 

of cultural awareness, can direct the collection of appropriate raw cultural 

data that is then processed with other data (geographic, military, technical, 
60

and so forth). The focus of cultural intelligence must be at the tactical level 

to provide the greatest direct benefit to the soldier in combat.

Below is a discussion of some strategies for integrating cultural awareness into military training and operations.8

 First is a look at the training of 

soldiers and leaders through professional military education (PME) and 

AOR-specific predeployment training at the unit level. Then it considers 

how cultural awareness can be integrated into Army doctrine to facilitate 

planning and decisionmaking processes, specifically with regard to the 

intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the commander’s estimate 

and the deliberate planning process (at the operational level), and the military decisionmaking process (at the tactical level).

Figure 10 provides an overview of the changes required. The model 

shows pathways to integrate systematically cultural considerations—horizontally and vertically—into US military training and operations.

The incorporation of cultural factors into military training and doctrine can support effects-based operations (EBO), which can be described 

Figure 10. Changes in training and doctrine required to achieve 

cultural competence.

CCuultltuurreeFFaaccttoorreeddinIntotoDDecei

csiisoionn

m-aking for Effects -Based Operations -Based Operations

Culture Factored IPB

Collecting Cultural Information

Culture in All-Source Analysis

Incorporate into Unit Training

Incorporate into Staff Planning

AOR Specific Cultural Studies

Cultural Support to Commander

Train to Study Culture / PME

Focused Intel Training

CCuullttuurraallAAwwaarreenneessss CCuull

ttuurraallIInntteelllliiggeennccee

CCuul

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ddeerraat

t

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61

as offensive, defensive, stability and support operations planned and 

executed to achieve the commander’s desired effect on a threat element, 

civil leader (tribal, ethnic, or governmental), or population group. “EBO 

achieves the commander’s desired effect through the synchronized, sequential, or simultaneous application of leadership, maneuver, firepower, and 

information.”9

Integrating Cultural Awareness into Military Training

In today’s operational environment, especially that of stability and 

reconstruction operations, military leaders must understand the actors who 

can affect their operations. These actors include enemy forces, insurgent 

forces, noncompliant forces, the civil population, local leaders, and 

others.10 Commanders can no longer plan military operations against a 

military force and not consider the second- and third-order effects that such 

military actions will have on the civil population and the local leaders with 

whom they seek favorable relations. Soldiers require cultural knowledge 

to assist with on-the-ground decisionmaking. Such awareness will further 

enable the United States not only to win the tactical fight, but the overall 

campaign as well.

Soldiers and leaders can acquire the necessary cultural understanding through training that incorporates the kinds of cultural awareness lessons described in chapters 2 and 3. As described in the cultural awareness 

model in chapter 2, the US military needs to know what influences a given 

culture, what the cultural variations are in terms of behaviors and values, 

and how these influences and variations manifest themselves in outward 

behaviors. Chapter 3 illustrated how these elements come into play in 

Middle Eastern culture, particularly in Iraq.

Figure 11 represents a modification of the cultural awareness pyramid (introduced in chapter 2) to illustrate how different kinds of training 

are needed to provide different levels of cultural awareness, and to support soldiers during various stages of the training-deployment-operations 

cycle.

As indicated by the figure, soldiers require cultural competence to support operations. Cultural competence results from the intimate knowledge 

of an adversary’s (or ally’s) motivation, intent, will, and tactical methods. 

The US military needs soldiers (and Marines) who can deal with a diversity 

of peoples and cultures, tolerate ambiguity, take initiative, and ask questions.11 US soldiers “must notice small differences and pick up nuances, 

developing the sensitivity to see key indicators.”12 Only by understanding 

an enemy’s thought process can better-educated analyses be conducted 
62

of potential actions and reactions. The process of acquiring cultural competence must begin long before deployment. This preparation will allow 

leaders to think and adapt faster than the enemy, and allow soldiers to 

thrive in an environment of uncertainty, ambiguity, and unfamiliar cultural 

circumstances.13

Training Initiatives Currently Underway

Changes to incorporate cultural awareness into military training are 

already underway at the installation level, at training centers, and in select 

PME courses. Many military leaders are taking the initiative and using the 

limited resources available to teach and integrate cultural awareness in 

their predeployment training.

Since mid-2003, JRTCs and NTCs have offered an Iraq- or 

Afghanistan-focused block of instruction that includes “engagement” or 

negotiation training, media training, and cultural awareness training to the 

key leadership of its rotating units. Many Active and Reserve Component 

Figure 11. Training considerations and the pyramid of cultural awareness.

Decisionmaking and

Cultural Intelligence

Advanced Training

Specific Training

Competence

Decisionmakers

Understanding

Key Personnel

Knowledge

Focused or Predeployment

Consideration

All Personnel

“How and Why”

Timeline

ONGOING TNG

DEPLOYMENT

OPERATIONS

+PLUS

+PLUS

+PLUS

Cultural Awareness: Graphic Representation
63

leaders have modified their predeployment training, and enlisted the help 

of local colleges and universities to provide native Arabic speakers and 

subject matter experts to provide cultural training to their soldiers. The 

Command and General Staff College teaches courses specifically designed 

for field grade officers deploying to Afghanistan or Iraq. Additionally, a 

number of Active Component divisions (especially those scheduled to 

return to Iraq or Afghanistan) have invited subject matter experts and 

Foreign Area Officers from JRTC, Defense Language Institute (DLI), and 

the institutional Army to visit their installations to teach cultural awareness 

to soldiers.

Additional Changes Needed to Standardize Cultural Awareness 

Training Across the Army

Beyond the initiatives already underway, the Army needs additional 

changes above the local level to formalize and standardize cultural 

awareness training. Cultural awareness must be formally integrated 

into PME courses and the Noncommissioned Officer Education System 

(NCOES). Recognizing the inherent shortfalls of cultural competence 

within the force, the Army has recently begun to study ways to formalize 

the integration of Arabic and Islamic cultural awareness into its PME 

system. In April 2005, the Commanding General (CG), Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC), outlined the requirement for “leaders who 

can understand and apply knowledge of cultures” to facilitate the creation 

of agile and joint expeditionary capable forces. He established broad, 

overarching guidance that recognizes “cultural training as a Common 

Core for all levels of PME and directed an emphasis on the instruction 

in all NCOES and company-grade officer PME courses.” This directive 

describes learning objectives for Arab and Islamic cultural training at every 

level of PME for officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers 

(NCOs), and further directs the Commander, Combined Arms Center 

(CAC) and Fort Leavenworth, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to publish 

implementation guidance to “establish broad, over-arching guidance on 

culture training to all TRADOC schools.” This guidance lists the “key 

tenets of the Arab World” that must be addressed through cultural training 

for leaders, respective of their specific roles and responsibilities.14 These 

include:

• Geography.

• History.

• Religious composition.

• Political structures.
64

• Islam (history, tenets, major branches, and the role of Islam in 

Arab politics).

• Arab/Islamic customs and social norms (verbal/nonverbal communications, etiquette, and roles of gender in society).

• Governance and laws (secular, religious, and tribal).15

By incorporating cultural awareness training into the institutional 

Army through changes to PME, NCOES, combat training centers, and 

doctrine, the Army is on its way to developing leaders with the ability to 

provide Joint Task Force (JTF) and Combined Force Land Component 

Command (CFLCC) commanders and staffs with accurate assessments of 

the local military, political, religious, and commercial situation.16

The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program should be expanded to ensure 

a sufficient number of military officers are trained in this area. In addition, 

the US military must ensure an adequate number of military officers are 

trained as Foreign Area Officers (FAOs). FAOs are commissioned officers 

from all services who have regional expertise, language competency, and 

political-military awareness. FAOs serve as attachés or security assistance 

officers at US embassies, to implement US national security strategy, 

often as the sole DOD representative in country. FAOs may also serve on 

joint staffs to provide a regional and cultural perspective for planning and 

execution of military operations and to advise senior leaders.17

In a September 2004 Proceedings article, retired General Robert 

Scales discusses building military capacity for what he describes as 

“Culture-Centric Warfare,” through “a cadre of global scouts, well 

educated, with a penchant for languages and a comfort with strange and 

distant places.”18 As warriors who provide focused regional expertise to 

the joint warfighter, Army FAOs are today’s “global scouts” and are at the 

heart of this culture-centric issue. Through their training and in-country 

experience, Army FAOs “have knowledge of political-military affairs; 

have familiarity with the political, cultural, sociological, economic, 

and geographic factors of the countries and regions in which they are 

stationed; and have professional proficiency in one or more of the 

dominant languages in their regions of expertise.”19 Today, Army FAOs 

operate decisively in uncertain environments, often independently, and 

serve as valuable force multipliers to commanders and senior leaders 

from the tactical to the strategic level.

In the past, FAOs were not deemed as essential as they are today. 

Field grade officers who performed nonoperational missions with the 

State Department as attachés and political-military officers or served in 

security cooperation roles were not held in the same esteem as those who 
65

served in multiple battalion- and brigade-level assignments. As a result, 

FAO promotion rates were consistently below the averages; therefore, the 

Army has continued to face shortages of qualified FAOs.

To rectify this situation and meet the evolving need for more FAOs 

in the Army and throughout the military, in April 2005, Deputy Secretary 

of Defense Paul Wolfowitz reissued DOD Directive 1315.17, Military 

Department Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs. In doing so, he states:

To achieve national security objectives and success 

in current and future operations, including the War on 

Terrorism, the US Armed Forces shall be prepared to 

conduct military operations in a variety of conditions 

around the world. The Combatant Commands shall have 

the requisite warfighting capabilities to achieve success 

on the nonlinear battlefields of the future. These critical 

warfighting capabilities include foreign language proficiency and detailed knowledge of the regions of the 

world gained through in-depth study and personal experience. Additionally, these capabilities facilitate close and 

continuous military-diplomatic interaction with foreign 

governments and, in particular, with their defense and 

military establishments, which is essential to developing 

and maintaining constructive mutually supportive, bilateral and multilateral military activities and relationships 

across the range of operations.20

To maintain a sufficient number of FAOs in both the Active and Reserve 

Components, Wolfowitz asked the secretaries of the military departments 

to develop a detailed action plan that includes training the number of military officers required to meet their FAO needs and provides both a viable 

career path and the opportunity for FAO promotion into the general officer 

ranks.21 The Army FAO program will continue to evolve along with the 

rest of the Army and the world in which the US military operates. An 

improved FAO program can significantly contribute to the planning and 

execution of transitions to and from hostilities, as well as support DOD 

plans to improve HUMINT capabilities and strategic communications.

Integrating Cultural Awareness into Military Doctrine

Army doctrine describes how the Army intends to fight. It reflects the 

“fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof 

guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative, but 

requires judgment in application.”22 As described earlier, US joint doctrine acknowledges that cultural differences among coalition partners may 
66

impact the mission. However, current Army doctrine does not consider 

the impact of culture on internal mission planning, nor does it provide its 

commanders with a comprehensive and structured approach to cultural 

considerations in the operational planning process.

The development of Army doctrine is determined by the operational 

concept formed by historical experience; military theory; and political, 

economic, and other factors that influence National Security and Military 

Strategies. Lessons learned from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

(OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) indicate that improvements are required in “institutional preparation in language, as well as 

political, ideological, and cultural training”; culture has begun to receive 

some attention in military doctrine. In these documents, culture often 

includes common elements such as beliefs, values, and religion, but also 

physical elements such as buildings and infrastructure.23 An example of 

this is evident in the June 2005 edition of FM 1, The Army, which states:

In the new security environment, cultural awareness has 

become one of the most important knowledge areas for 

Army leaders. Army leaders develop their knowledge of 

major world cultures and learn how those cultures affect 

military operations. The Army’s rich mix of soldiers’ 

backgrounds and cultures is a natural enabler of cultural 

awareness. . . . This knowledge helps them become more 

self-aware and adaptive.24

Additionally, future revisions of FM 3-0, Operations; FM 5-0, Army 

Planning and Orders Production; and FM 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency, 

will provide an increased emphasis on cultural awareness.25 This 

emphasis must go beyond cultural awareness as it refers to political and 

ideological beliefs, values, religion, language preparation, and whether 

cultural differences among coalition partners may impact the mission, 

and must incorporate cultural awareness into the intelligence preparation 

of the battlefield process, the commander’s estimate, and the military 

decisionmaking process.

The Need for Cultural Awareness in Intelligence-Gathering

One needs to understand the role of information operations (IO) 

during OIF to understand how to incorporate cultural awareness into the 

intelligence gathering process. This analysis will help identify gaps in the 

intelligence-gathering process that could be bridged by improved cultural 

awareness. We draw on an assessment conducted by LTC John Strycula, 

who served in Iraq for 12 months with the 4th Infantry Division as the deputy 

G2.26 The analysis used Army-defined criteria to assess the effectiveness 
67

of key intelligence tasks during OIF. Relevant tasks were identified using 

FM 7-15, Army Universal Task List (AUTL), which provides a standard 

doctrinal foundation and catalogue of the Army’s tactical collective tasks, 

including intelligence.

27 Criteria for assessing these activities were derived 

from FM 2-0, Intelligence, which states that “intelligence products must 

be timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive.”28 The criteria for evaluating 

intelligence support are defined as follows:

• Timeliness: Was the reporting and dissemination of the intelligence timely enough to support proactive information operations and allow quicker decisions than the adversary?

• Relevance: Was the intelligence collected and disseminated to 

support IO pertinent and applicable to the commander’s critical 

information requirements (CCIR) and IO mission planning?

• Accuracy/Sufficient Detail: Was the intelligence output accurate and with a sufficient level of fidelity to support IO planning 

at multiple levels of command?

• Predictiveness: Did the intelligence support to IO enable the 

commander and his staff to anticipate key enemy events or 

reactions and develop corresponding counteractions?

These criteria were used to provide a qualitative assessment of whether 

intelligence support during OIF was timely enough to support proactive 

IO, pertinent to the commander’s intelligence requirements, accurate with 

sufficient detail, and capable of helping the commander and staff anticipate key events. The evaluation focused on the intelligence support provided to the Combined Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) and 

the Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), but personal experiences at 

the division and brigade level also influenced the evaluations.29

The results of the analysis are shown in figure 12.30 The left-hand column of the figure details the primary intelligence support to IO tasks that 

are defined in the AUTL. The next two columns represent the evaluations 

of those tasks conducted during the major combat operations (MCO) and 

stability and support operations (SASO) phases, respectively. The final 

column provides the criteria or rationale that caused that specific task to be 

evaluated as either green (G), yellow (Y), or red (R). To further delineate 

the results of the analysis, the appraisal has been separated into MCO and 

SASO phases of the conflict. All ratings in the figure represent Strycula’s 

subjective assessment of the intelligence support to IO during OIF.

If a task was judged to satisfy all four of these criteria, then it was 

assessed to be successful and labeled green (G). However, if a task only 

accomplished three of the four criteria, it was evaluated as marginally 
68

or partially successful and coded yellow (Y). If the intelligence accomplished only two of the four criteria, then it was evaluated to be unsatisfactory and coded red (R). In addition, because accuracy is arguably the most 

important criteria of the four, this was set as the critical evaluation criteria. 

Therefore, if the intelligence was judged to be inaccurate, then regardless 

of the ratings on the other criteria, that category of intelligence support 

would be rated unsuccessful or red (R).

The first five intelligence tasks listed in figure 12 are the primary 

tasks associated with intelligence support to offensive IO. The evaluation 

seems to indicate that intelligence provided overall effective support to 

offensive IO. Knowledge of the specific e-mail addresses of Iraqi army 

commanding generals used to transmit capitulation messages is an 

example of the exceptional intelligence support to this offensive IO task.31

Also, the years of collection in support of both Operation NORTHERN 

and SOUTHERN WATCH provided vast and detailed information that 

enabled electronic attacks at both the operational and tactical levels to 

be extremely successful.32 Additionally, the 1st Information Operations 

Command (IOC) leveraged the intelligence collected during 12 years to 

Figure 12. Evaluating intelligence support to IO during OIF.

EFFECTIVE

ACCURACY

ACCURACY

ACCURACY

ACCURACY

PREDICTIVE

EFFECTIVE

PREDICTIVE

PREDICTIVE

EFFECTIVE

IDENTIFY LOCATION AND BIASES OF

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA

IDENTIFY POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS,

ATTITUDES, AND BEHAVIORS

IDENTIFY THE ADVERSARY PERCEPTION OF

THE MILITARY SITUATION

DESCRIBE ADVERSARY DECISIONMAKING

PROCESSES AND BIASES

IDENTIFY PROFILES OF KEY ADVERSARY

LEADERS

PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PSYOPS

IDENTIFY TARGETS FOR ELECTRONIC

ATTACK

IDENTIFY ENEMY COMPUTER SYSTEMS

IDENTIFY ENEMY COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

IDENTIFY ENEMY C2 NODES

G Y

R R

G G

Y R

Y R

G R

G Y

G Y

G Y

G G

UNIVERSAL TASK LIST OF INTEL SUPPORT TO IO MCO SASO WHY
69

create thorough and informative products that detailed the communication 

networks, nodes, and methods.

The next three intelligence AUTL tasks define the intelligence that 

describes the identities, propensities, and decisionmaking styles of 

the adversarial leaders. The assessment indicates that the Intelligence 

Battlefield Operating System (IBOS) struggled to satisfy these intelligence 

requirements, especially during the SASO phases of the conflict.33 The IPB 

produced by the 1st IOC in support of the MCO on Saddam’s decisionmaking system was very comprehensive, detailing all of Saddam’s closest 

advisors and their relationships and responsibilities within his decisionmaking and command and control system. It further described the key personnel and the methods of communications and command and control of 

both the Republican Guard and Regular Army forces. However, the level 

of detail and accuracy greatly decreased following the transition to phase 

IV (stability and support) operations. For example, CJTF-7 continued to 

target exclusively the original Top 55 Most Wanted Iraqis nearly 6 months 

after the end of combat operations, despite the fact that few of the original 

Most Wanted had any intelligence reporting indicating involvement in the 

insurgency. This unmodified list is a very telling example of the struggles 

the IBOS had in grasping and identifying the insurgency leadership during the SASO phase. The 1st IOC IPB products produced after the beginning of the SASO phase also demonstrated the difficulty the IBOS had in 

identifying the adversarial leaders. Furthermore, the intelligence provided 

on their decisionmaking system was limited; however, their products did 

include neutral and friendly leaders and a partial analysis of their command and control system.

The IBOS had difficulty providing information regarding the population 

demographics, attitudes, and behaviors. The intelligence required to support 

this category implies more information than the raw numbers found in the 

CIA World Fact Book; still, an understanding is needed of the effects these 

demographics and details will have on operations. This information falls 

into the category of cultural intelligence as previously defined.

In terms of the successes, it appears that the IBOS satisfied those IO 

intelligence requirements that have been historically levied on the intelligence collection system or those that were satisfied by conventional intelligence requirements. Specifically, the IBOS succeeded and even excelled 

in providing the technical intelligence support requirements to IO, such 

as identifying communications methods and nodes.34 These successes can 

also be attributed to the technical leaning of the intelligence collection 

system.
70

On the other hand, the IBOS struggled with the human or cognitive 

intelligence tasks, such as providing cultural intelligence and information 

on the adversary’s decisionmaking system.35 A review of the tasks that the 

IBOS failed to satisfy suggests problems especially with the SASO phase 

of operations, when the human, cultural, and intelligence requirements 

come to the fore. The IBOS did not emphasize the collection and identification of many of the secondary political figures and tribal leaders during 

the years before OIF. The Land Information Warfare Activity, the predecessor to 1st IOC, states that the IBOS must shift its focus from the technical requirements to the human dimension prior to the operational transition 

to SASO to facilitate the phase IV (SASO) pre-execution planning.36

Research further indicates there were two primary causes for the IBOS 

breakdowns.37 First was the poor integration of IO analysis within the 

battlestaff’s IPB process. Many of the key IO intelligence requirements 

were not identified anywhere outside of IO doctrine. This isolation of IO 

analysis and the failure to highlight its information needs during the battlestaff’s IPB process caused the IBOS to be oblivious to these requirements. 

Another cause for the IBOS failures was the lack of detailed and complete 

cultural intelligence during the IPB process and IO planning. The lack of 

cultural intelligence within the IPB process to support effective psychological and civil-military operations was identified as a deficiency in both 

the 3d Infantry and 82d Airborne Divisions’ After Actions Reports.38 Both 

stated that they needed a better understanding of the cultural, religious, 

and ethnic compositions to plan IO and predict the reactions of the population.39 This information gap and an understanding of its effects on both 

friendly and enemy operations became a problem not only for IO, but for 

the larger IPB process as well. The bottom line is that the Coalition did 

not take into consideration the possible culture reactions of the enemy, 

adversary, and neutral population. The battlestaffs focused on the tactical reactions of the enemy and did not consider the Iraqi reactions to US 

operations based on their culture.40

Probably the most notable trend illustrated by figure 12 is the overall 

decrease in the effectiveness and accuracy of intelligence support to IO 

during the SASO phase compared to the MCO phase, including poorer 

support for many of the tasks the IBOS effectively supported during the 

MCO phase, like electronic warfare suffered in the transition between 

MCO and SASO. The technical focus of the IBOS had difficulty shifting 

to understand the asymmetric and adaptive enemy in Iraq during SASO. 

Table 5 articulates the cognitive changes that must take place in the transition from major combat operations to stability operations.41
71

Ultimately, the military must shift from the physical science aspects of 

war to those of social and cognitive sciences. The latter type of war is won 

through the management of perceptions, building trust, and reading intentions.42 This is a thinking person’s game—it is the cultural phase of war. 

The United States cannot win in this environment unless it understands 

the culture.

Changes Needed to Integrate Cultural Awareness into IPB 

Doctrine

The kinds of issues identified in the previous section can be addressed 

through changes to doctrine. This section will discuss ways to expand IPB 

doctrine to include cultural factors. Table 6 shows the steps in the current 

IPB doctrine43 along with recommended additions designed to address cultural factors (indicated by a “YES” in the right-hand column).

The steps in the current doctrinal IPB process focus on a technical 

understanding of the adversary. Highlighted are the additional intelligence factors that need to be added to make the intelligence analysis more 

complete. The addition of these factors would improve intelligence support to IO and would enhance the overall IPB process by making it more 

comprehensive.

The first recommendation is to add a subparagraph specifically dedicated to the cultural intelligence factors and a discussion of their effects on 

both friendly and enemy operations. Such a paragraph was not required in 

Table 5. Shift in Operations that Must Take Place During SASO

Shortfalls Particularly Pronounced in Phase IV

Administration, information operations, and

conventional military operations

Conventional military operations

Social and Cognitive Sciences

Civil Collection, Sensing

Perception ID, Tracking

Cognitive Situational Awareness

Physical Sciences

Physical Sensing

Target ID, Tracking

Physical Situational Awareness

Locating, tracking, identifying, and

influencing minds (reason) and hearts

(emotions)

Locating, tracking, identifying, targeting, and

killing physical objects (C4ISR)

Targets: Hearts and Minds of Govt, Tribal

and Religious Leaders

Targets: Humans and Machines

Management of Perception of Civil

Government, Population--Stability

Attrition of fighting power of Military Units –

Decisive Action

Warfighting Operations Stability Operations
72

the past because the US understanding of an adversary’s culture was based 

on a view of the enemy through the former Soviet Union doctrine. Now 

as the United States continues to operate in the contemporary operating 

environment (COE), the adversaries are much more varied and adaptive in 

terms of motivation and doctrine.44

By incorporating cultural awareness into intelligence-gathering, the 

result would be “cultural intelligence,” i.e., intelligence derived from all 

sources regarding the social, political, and economic aspects of governments and civil populations, their demographics, structures, capabilities, 

organizations, people, and events. Table 7 shows the key components of 

cultural awareness.45

Table 6. Recommended Additions to Doctrine to Achieve Cultural Intelligence

Step or Substep

Need to Add to

Current Process?

Step 1: Define the Battlefield Environment

Effective in describing the characteristics of the

battlefield

Step 2: Describe the Battlefield Effects

Terrain analysis

Weather analysis

Infrastructure analysis YES

Cultural intelligence analysis YES

Other characteristics of the battlefield

Step 3: Evaluate the Threat

Update or create threat models

Identify threat capabilities

Identify threat decisionmaking system

Step 4: Determine Enemy Courses of Action

Identify enemy’s likely objectives and endstates

Identify enemy’s decision points and triggers for

those decisions

YES

Identify the full set of COAs available to the threat 

Evaluate and prioritize each course of action
73

Each of the areas in table 7 can be further developed and refined based 

on the requirements needed to inform the decisionmaking process. Table 8 

expands on the sociocultural category to define further intelligence needs 

in this area. The areas listed draw on the cultural awareness model presented in chapter 2. FM 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 

does not currently specify many of these important factors. These factors 

are also relevant for training as well.

Table 8 illustrates recommended cultural intelligence factors that 

should be added to the second step of the IPB process, helping planners 

and intelligence personnel to identify mission essential facts. A generic 

guideline like the one shown in the table can be created to identify those 

factors normally important to military operations. All of these factors 

affect the thinking and motivation of individuals or groups, and make up 

the cultural terrain of the battlespace.

Doctrine might distinguish between those aspects of culture that are 

not subject to frequent change, such as a culture’s language, history, or 

major social groups, and those that change more often, such as local power 

structures or the current issues dividing the society. Home station training 

might effectively focus on those types of information that are not likely 

to change prior to deployment. The focus in theater could be on those 

issues and aspects of culture that are subject to change over the course of 

a rotation.

Table 7. Cultural Intelligence Categories

•International

Actors,

Organizations

• Nongovernmental

Organizations

(NGOs)

• Media

Sources

and

Channels

• Media

Controllers

(Actors)

•Resources and

Production

•Commerce and

Trade

• Finance and

Transportation

• State Roles

• Foreign Roles

• Power Structure

• Population

Demographics

• Population

Culture

• State

Institutions and

Structures

• Government

Administration

(Actors)

• Political

Organizations

(Actors)

•Criminal

Organizations

• Topography

and Underlying

Terrain

•Boundaries

• Physical

Compositions

and

Neighborhoods

•Civil

Infrastructure

•Buildings

6.

External

5.

Media

4.

Economic

3.

Socio-Cultural

2.

Political

1.

Physical Setting

Intelligence derived from all sources regarding the social, political, and economic aspects of governments and civil

populations, their demographics, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.
74

Additionally, the effects and impacts that an adversary’s culture will 

have on their decisions and tactics must be incorporated into the analysis 

of the enemy. The “Other Characteristics” paragraph in the IPB manual 

shows that the analyst should consider other factors that may influence 

an operation. Unfortunately, this “Other Characteristics” paragraph does 

not currently contain any specific cultural intelligence factors or examples 

to help guide analysis and drive intelligence collection. To fully develop 

cultural intelligence and integrate it into the larger IPB process, a specific 

listing of relevant factors need to be defined to help determine what factors 

are significant. More importantly, a discussion of how these factors will 

influence friendly and adversary operations should also be included. Most 

intelligence analysts working on division and brigade combat team battlestaffs do not have a sufficient cultural or sociology background to determine the relevant factors and their effects independently. Once the list of 

the militarily relevant cultural intelligence factors has been determined, 

their effects on operations must be defined. The discussion and definitions 

Table 8. Cultural Intelligence Factors that Should be 

Better Addressed in Doctrine

•LITERACY RATES/EDUCATION LEVELS

• DIASPORAS

• SOCIAL ROLES OF POPULATION

SEGMENTS (WOMEN, ELDERS)

• CULTURAL VARIATIONS AND

MANIFESTATIONS

• COGNITIVE DOMAIN

--NEGOTIATING

--PERSISTENT, HISTORICALLY BASED

--PERCEPTIONS, OUTLOOKS,

TEMPERAMENTS

--ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR

(POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL)

• CULTURALLY SIGNIFICANT LOCATIONS

DATES, HOLIDAYS, AND EVENTS

•LANGUAGES

• HISTORY, REGION, AND NATION STATE

• RELIGIONS (BELIEFS AND INSTITUTIONS)

•SOCIAL GROUPS

--ETHNIC, RACE, TRIBAL/CLAN

--RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS

--ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIPS

--LEADERS, ELITES, FOLLOWERS

(RELIGIOUS, TRIBAL, CIVIL, BUSINESS)

--ARMED GROUPS

(PRO, NEUTRAL, INSURGENT)

• CUSTOMS, ATTITUDES, SOCIAL TABOOS

• COHESIVE AND DIVISIVE ISSUES IN THE

COMMUNITY

MANY IMPORTANT FACTORS NOT SPECIFIED IN FM 2-01.3

DESCRIBE THEIR EFFECTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

•
75

must attempt to explain the effects of cultural factors on both friendly and 

adversary operations.

The final area that needs expanded within the IPB process is a framework for analyzing the adversary’s leaders and their decisionmaking system. Step 3 of the current IPB process focuses on evaluating the threat by 

creating threat models or templates to determine the adversary’s capabilities; however, there is no mention of an analysis of the adversary’s leaders and their decisionmaking system. An analytical framework must be 

developed not only to analyze the enemy’s military leaders, but also to 

analyze adversarial, neutral, and friendly government, civilian, and military leaders. This information is essential “to get inside the target’s head 

and understanding their leadership style.”46 This is critically important as 

the United States continues to face an increasingly asymmetric and adaptive enemy. Moreover, an analysis of the decisionmaking system will further the development of estimated enemy decision points and indicators 

associated with those decisions, and help identify vulnerabilities for IO to 

exploit.

One possible construct for conducting an analysis of the adversary 

leaders and their decisionmaking system is to use this simple four-step 

process during step 3 of the IPB process, “Evaluate the Threat.” Table 9 

shows such a framework. This framework will identify who the decisionmakers are, define their decisionmaking style, describe their command 

and control system, and most importantly, identify the vulnerabilities in 

the system that the United States should exploit. This four-step analysis of 

the adversary’s decisionmaking system will ensure that a comprehensive 

view of the enemy is undertaken.

This kind of framework can guide and focus the analyst to consider all 

three information age warfare domains of conflict as defined by Admiral 

Arthur Cebrowski47 in Understanding Information Age Warfare.

48 These 

domains are the cognitive, informational, and physical. The intent is to 

develop a simple model that can be applied to a military or political leader 

during an MCO, but also be employed to analyze a tribal, religious, or 

insurgent leader in a SASO environment. It is important to develop a universal analysis model that can be equally applied across the full spectrum 

of combat so the US military does not perpetuate the decline in intelligence support to IO that was seen during OIF in the transition from MCO 

to SASO.

The first step in evaluating the adversary decisionmaking system is 

to identify the leaders and decisionmakers. It is important to realize that 

the identified leaders are not necessarily or by default the decisionmakers. 
76

This is especially true in a SASO environment where the tribal or religious 

leader may not have decisionmaking authority. A full perception of the 

leadership encompasses an understanding of the leader’s basis of power, 

sources of information, and individual and group goals and objectives. 

This step of the model is designed to analyze the cognitive domain of 

the decisionmaking system. The cognitive domain is “where perceptions, 

awareness, understanding, beliefs and values . . . and where . . . decisions 

are made. . . . This is the domain of intangibles: leadership, morale, unit 

cohesion, . . . and . . . situational awareness. . . .”49

The second step is to describe the decisionmaking style that is being 

utilized. For example, are the leader’s decisions final as in a dictatorship 

or military organization, or are decisions made by consensus as in a religious council of clerics or Ulema. This step represents an understanding 

and analysis of the informational domain of information age warfare. This 

Table 9. Steps in Analyzing the Adversary’s Decisionmaking System

• Step 1–Identify and Describe the Decisionmakers

– Who are the decisionmakers (threat, adversary, neutral)?

– What is their basis of power/leadership?

– What are their sources of information?

– What are their goals or endstates?

• Step 2–Describe the Decisionmaking Style

– What is the leaders decisionmaking style?

– Who are the subordinates of the decisionmaker?

– What is the decisionmaker’s authority?

• Step 3–Identify and Describe the Command and Control System

– Where are the command and control nodes?

– What is the method for receiving information and transmitting decisions?

– What form does the information travel?

• Step 4–Where Are the Vulnerabilities that We Can Exploit?

– What methods of IO can we use to influence?

– Where can we get inside the adversary’s decision cycle?

– What can we effect?

• The decisionmaker, his decisionmaking style, or the information?
77

knowledge is critical to identify vulnerabilities that can be exploited by 

IO. To understand further the decisionmaking style, the staff must identify 

the subordinates the leader controls and explain his authority over those 

subordinates. The informational domain is arguably the most important to 

understand to effectively plan, execute, and assess IO. In addition to being 

the most crucial, it is also probably the most difficult intelligence task to 

collect.

The third step focuses on the physical domain, particularly command 

and control issues. This domain of information age warfare focuses on 

where and how the entities transfer information. It includes defining the 

communications networks and the forms of the information.50 This aspect 

of intelligence support to IO has traditionally been a strongpoint for the 

IBOS. This again is because both the intelligence collection and analysis 

systems have been optimized to provide the technical information required 

to conduct this type of analysis. To understand fully the physical domain of 

the decisionmaking system, the IBOS must not only identify the location 

of command and control nodes, but must also identify the media and the 

specific form the information takes. This analysis step is vaguely defined 

to make the model apply to the analysis of a military commander’s command and control system or one of a tribal or clerical leader.

The final step involves determining where vulnerabilities exist that 

can be exploited. As the three domains of information age warfare are 

analyzed using this simple model, the vulnerabilities for exploitation are 

clearly exhibited, and the commander can then determine the best way 

to exploit these vulnerabilities. For example, he may decide to appeal to 

the tribal leader’s economic objectives by providing some additional work 

projects directly to the Sheik and his tribe. Alternatively, he might decide 

to approach secondary tribal leaders with a similar plan, so they can lobby 

and ultimately influence the senior tribal leader’s decision. The intent of 

this simple model is to provide a clear-cut framework to analyze the enemy’s decisionmaking system and to identify the vulnerabilities that IO can 

exploit.

Table 10 shows how cultural intelligence can be applied to the IPB 

process.51 The table shows an IPB that has been supplemented to include 

sociocultural factors in addition to the traditional areas of physical terrain, 

enemy force dispositions, and aspects of infrastructure that influence and 

constrain symmetric force-on-force combat operations.52

The addition of the factors of cultural intelligence to IPB doctrine 

would enable and facilitate a more complete analysis of the enemy, adversary, and neutral leaders in the contemporary operating environment.
78

Changes Needed in the Deliberative Planning Process and 

Execution Phase

The incorporation of cultural factors in military training and doctrine 

can support effects-based operations (EBO), which, as noted earlier, refer 

to offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations planned and executed to achieve the commander’s desired effect on a threat element, civil 

leader (tribal, ethnic, or governmental), or population group. EBO provides both a way of thinking about operations and a set of processes and Table 10. Example of a Modified IPB

T

r

a

ditio

n

al IP

B

Analytic

Elements

Terrain

Analysis

Enemy Force Infrastructure Analysis Population

Analysis

Administrative

Operations

Information

Operations

Security

Operations

Operation

Elements

Objects of

Analysis

Natural

Terrain

Enemy Force Structures (physical

and informational)

Civil

Populations,

Institutions

Civil

Populations,

Institutions

Information

Flows and

Content

Civil

Populations,

Opposition

Object of

Operations

Example

Components

TopographyHydrographyVegetationBarriers

Force StructureOrder of BattleIntentCapabilitiesTiming

BuildingsLOCsInformation channels,

nodes -telecom, media

DemographyPopulationsPerceptionsNormsDecisionmaking Style

Policy,

laws, regs

NewsSecurity

PA

CA

PSYOPCNOEWPhysical

PatrolsSearchesRaidsDirect Action

Example

Components

Battlefield (IPB)

Preparation of the

Effects- based

Operations (EBO)

Intelligence OperationsIntelligence

M

o

difie

d IP

B

Equipment

C

ultu

r

al Intellig

e

n

c

e
79

procedures designed to improve planning, execution, and assessment of 

military operations. They provide a means of bridging the cultural gap, 

and the US military must be effects-based in everything it does.53 Effectsbased planning (a component of EBO) is a rational decisionmaking model 

that analyzes an adversary by examining the relationships among an 

adversary’s political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information systems.

Deliberative Planning Process. Once the IPB process has been modified to incorporate cultural awareness factors, the deliberative planning 

process can then be adapted to incorporate cultural intelligence. Figure 

13 provides a graphical representation of the deliberate planning process 

modified to incorporate cultural intelligence factors.54

During the commander’s estimate of the situation (CES) process, 

the intelligence planner determines enemy (or adversary) capabilities, 

limitations, intentions, and potential courses of action. During the Joint 

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (JIPB), the intelligence planner, assisted by a cultural advisor or specialist (if available), must also 

gather relevant cultural and religious information. Based on the concepts 

discussed in this study, these cultural and religious factors must describe:

• The society.

• Its customs.

• Its values.

• Religious practices.

• External cultural and religious influences.

• Cultural and religious attitudes toward warfare.

• Level of religious tolerance.

• The significant historical cultural and religious tensions.

• International interactions.

• Decisionmaking styles.

The data, once collected, must be available during mission analysis 

and course of action development for consideration of its impact on plan 

execution. Planners must remember that these cultural and religious factors are likely to influence assumptions, constraints, restraints, implied 

tasks, and initial risk assessment. Cultural and religious factors contemplated during course of action development will influence actions considered to achieve mission success. Furthermore, identified negative impacts 

on feasibility, suitability, or acceptability should lead to course of action 

rejection or modification to mitigate the potential damaging effects.
80

The framework above is designed to ensure that military planners are 

aware of and consider culture and religion throughout the CES process. 

Figure 13. Deliberate planning process modified to incorporate 

cultural intelligence factors.

Mission

Analysis

IPB

Wargame

Friendly COAs

COA

Comparison

Process Products

Decision/COA

Selection

•Battlespace Effects

•Enemy COAs

•Initial Collection

•Proposed Mission

•Commander’s Planning

Guidance /Intent

•Courses of Action Develop

Friendly COAs

•Wargame

•Synch Matrix

•Refined

•Cultural/Religious Impact on

Operations

•Cultural/Religious Use as

Enemy Force Multiplier

Consider During COA Development

•Adv/Disadvantage for

each COA

•COA Selection

•Cultural/Religious Feasibility

•Cultural/Religious Acceptability

•Cultural/Religious Suitability

•Develop Cultural Rules of

Interaction

•Address Culture/Religion by

BOS/Others

Consider consequences of each COA

Analysis of COAs

Consider During COA Development

Cultural Impacts/Issues

Cultural Intelligence (From IPB)

•Dominant Religions

•Government–Secular/Religious?

•Society–Type/Religions

Relationship

•Level of Religious Tolerance

•External Cultural/Religious

Influence

Cultural Dimensions

•Determine Cultural/Religious NoGo Areas/Options

•COA Cultural Considerations–Allies/

Coalitions/Others

•Determine Cultural/Religious

Targeting Restrictions

•Determine Cultural/Religious COG

Impact

•Determine Cultural Acceptability–

Allies/Population

MDMP Should Be Modified to Better

Consider Role of Cultural Factors

•Approved COA

Consider throughout analysis/

wargaming
81

This model provides a comprehensive single-source compilation of the 

factors of cultural competence developed during the course of this study. 

The potential negative effects of culture and religion on mission planning 

and execution can be mitigated through additional staff support for the 

combatant commander, more detailed cultural rules of engagement for 

mission participants, and modification of joint doctrine to include a framework for considering culture and religion during the CES.55

Execution Phase. With regard to strategic communications during the 

execution phases of military operations, the US military must understand 

the issues in friendly, failing, and failed states. The military needs to know 

who these states are and what their leaders and citizens believe. Only then 

can the military decide whom to address, what messages to communicate, and what media to employ (i.e., themes and messages, products, programs) to design and wage country (and even area) specific information 

campaigns to support US themes and messages and de-legitimize extremism and terrorism.56

The cultural awareness model should be applied across the full spectrum of operations. Figure 14 represents a snapshot of how this model can 

be applied across the spectrum of the strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels of war. It is an example of how to think of culture and its manifestation at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.57

Using this model can help prevent “information fratricide” against the 

United States’ own objectives. This model can also assist commanders and 

staffs in defining the sphere of influence (SOI) within a designated AOR. 

The SOI defines ownership and responsibility. An SOI is a nondoctrinal 

informational term that represents a fixed relationship between military 

leaders and a target audience. Understanding SOIs can reduce “information fratricide.” Information fratricide results from employing information 

operations elements in a way that adversely affects friendly operations or 

forces in the information environment.58 By referencing this model, the 

US military can ensure that its themes and messages are congruent both 

vertically and horizontally. Furthermore, using this model ensures that the 

interagency is tied in and everyone is working toward the same ends.

Conclusion

The recommendations discussed in this chapter are designed to ensure 

that military planners are aware of and consider culture and religion 

throughout the CES process. Although cultural awareness is not the “be 

all and end all” of military planning, a thorough consideration of cultural 

factors will allow military planners to better identify and develop options 

for mitigating risk and avoid unintended problems associated with cultural 
82

ignorance. The kinds of recommendations discussed in this chapter, as well 

as the cultural awareness model as a whole, can help support improved 

planning and decisionmaking in both future combat and postconflict 

stability operations and ensure information operations consistency and 

congruency. Incorporating cultural awareness into training and doctrine is 

critical to such improvements.

Figure 14. Implications of culture at the strategic, operational, and 

tactical levels of war.

Implications/How is Feature Manifested

Dimensions of

Cultural Variance

Strategic

National/Theater mission

objectives, using

diplomatic, economic, and

military means to

accomplish goals (policy)

Operational

The organization of midlevel objectives into plans

to accomplish strategic

goals

Tactical

The implementation of

plans in terms of

observable activity “on the

ground”

Behaviors

The outward, observable

artifacts (including

structures and

institutions of a culture)

Religion

Type of government

Mass communication

(policy explanation)

Language barriers in

coalition

Planning

Social rules governing

house-to-house searches

Langauge barriers

Religious norms

Gender/age roles and rules

Social norms (shaking

hands, personal space)

In-group/out-group

Relationships/constraints

Family structure

Interpersonal

communications

Values

The base judgments of

good and bad common to

a culture

Trust formation

Risk tolerance in

uncertainty among

coalition partners

Risk tolerance in

uncertainty of slow

reconstruction effort

Consensus-building in

coalition

Speed of decisionmaking

Focus of decisionmaking

in organization

(command authority)

Risk tolerance in

uncertainty

Trust formation

Perception in risk

situations

Distribution of authority in

targets

Understanding PSYOP

Communication

Speed of decisionmaking

Consensus building

Risk tolerance in

uncertainty

Response to threats

Trust formation

Perception of risk in

situations

Negotiation dynamic

Reciprocation of acts

Face saving

Cognition

The preference based

strategies used in

decisionmaking,

perception, and

knowledge

representation

Negotiation,

argumentative styles; use

of evidence and

hypothetical reasoning to

justify policy decisions

Perception of

consequences

Negotiation styles

Argumentation styles

Causal attribution

Perception of

consequences

Negotiation styles

Augmentation styles

Causal attribution

Cultural Competence Is Needed Across All Levels of War
83

Notes

1. Ben Connable and Art Speyer, “Cultural Awareness for Military 

Operations,” Concepts and Proposals: USMC Cultural Awareness Working Group

(HQMC and MCIA, February 2005).

2. This slide was developed by Connable and Speyer (2005).

3. University of Colorado International Online Training Program on 

Intractable Conflict, “Conflict Management and Constructive Confrontation: A 

Guide to the Theory and Practice,” online at <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/

peace/index.html> (as of 24 August 2005).

4. Connable and Speyer (2005).

5. Glen Fisher, International Negotiation: A Cross-Cultural Perspective

(Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, Inc., 1980), 192.

6. The term “three-block war” was coined by General Charles Krulack, 

Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1995–99.

7. This is recognized in the 1994 version of Army Field Manual 100-23, 

Peace Operations, which states, “population distribution, ethnic backgrounds, 

languages, religious beliefs, and political loyalties of civilian personnel all emerge 

as significant components of successful intelligence collection.” Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 December 1994), 46.

8. Adapted from Connable and Speyer (2005).

9. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), “Chapter 2: Civil Military 

Operations—Civil Affairs, Topic C: Cultural Issues in Iraq,” in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF), CAAT II Initial Impressions Report (IIR) No. 04-13 (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, May 2004). Online at 

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_04-13_chap01-

c.htm> (as of 28 February 2006), 1.

10. Ibid., 1.

11. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 

Twenty-First Century (Boston, MA: Little Brown and Company, 1993), 74.

12. LTC Mark Corda, Commander, 3d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

13. Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Culture-Centric Warfare,” Proceedings, September 

2004.

14. MG Paul Eaton, “Cultural Training in Professional Military Education 

(PME) Courses Policy Guidance,” Memorandum for Commander, US Army 

Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. DOD Directive 1315.17 [Service Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs], 

dated 22 February 1997, directs all Services to have FAO programs and specifies the 

prerequisite skills required of FAOs: regionally focused graduate-level education; 

professional-level foreign language skills; and qualification in a principal military 
84

specialty. Implementation varies significantly among the Services. Generally, 

Army officers apply for the FAO program as captains with 5 to 6 years of service 

(YOS). After company-level command, officers begin training at 8 to 10 YOS. 

Each officer learns a foreign language, conducts extended in-country training 

(ICT), and earns a regionally focused graduate degree. The Army’s Career Field 

Designation (CFD) Board formally selects FAOs at their 10th YOS (as majors), 

after which they serve the remainder of their careers in FAO assignments.

18. Scales (2004).

19. DOD Directive 1315.17 (2005), 2.

20. Ibid.

21. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, “Foreign Area Officer 

Programs,” Memorandum, 28 April 2005.

22. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense 

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 

31 August 2005), online at <http://131.84.1.34/doctrine/jel/doddict/> (as of 2 

March 2006).

23. CALL (2004).

24. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 1, The Army (Washington, 

DC: Department of the Army, June 2005), 1–19.

25. The author was asked to provide input and help revise future versions 

of FM 3-0, Operations; FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, and FM 

3-07.22, Counterinsurgency.

26. John Strycula, “Assessing Information Operations in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF): Interim Progress Report,” to LTG(P) Wallace, Commander, 

Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 April 2005.

27. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 7-15, Army Universal Task 

List (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, August 2003).

28. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 2-0, Intelligence

(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, May 2004), 1-38.

29. LTC John Strycula served in Iraq for 12 months with the 4th Infantry 

Division as the deputy G2. Since December 2003, the author has traveled 

monthly to the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Leavenworth, and other 

Army installations to teach Cultural Awareness to senior military leaders and 

nearly every Brigade Combat Team that has deployed to Iraq over the last 24 

months. As a Middle East FAO, he conducted cultural awareness training at Fort 

Campbell, Fort Drum, Fort Hood, Fort Meade, The Defense Language Institute, 

and lectured at the FA 30 Information Operations Course at Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas. Furthermore, he presented his brief entitled “Through the Lens of 

Cultural Awareness: Planning Requirements for Wielding the Instruments of 

National Power” as part of RAND’s Warfighting Seminar Series in November 

2004 and has served as a Middle East cultural consultant to the University of 

Southern California’s Army-funded research center, The Institute for Creative 

Technologies.

30. See FM 7-15 (2003), 1-30. The tasks listed in the figure are derived from 

Army Task (ART) 1.4.2, “Provide Intelligence Support to Information Operations,” 
85

and are representative of the types of support intelligence is expected to perform 

in today’s contemporary operating environment.

31. 3d Infantry Division, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM After Action 

Report, December 2003, 269.

32. Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Dugan, and David Tohm, On Point: The United 

States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, 2004), 419.

33. The Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (IBOS) is described as “the 

activity to generate knowledge of and products portraying the enemy and environmental features required by a commander in planning, preparing, executing, and 

assessing operations (FM 7-15).” GlobalSecurity.org, Military—Glossary, online 

at <www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-90/glossary.htm> 

(as of 2 March 2006).

34. William D. Wunderle, “Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: 

Planning Requirements in Wielding the Instruments of National Power,” RAND 

Technology and Applied Sciences Group Seminar, Warfighters Operational 

Realities, 17 November 2004.

35. In-progress review meeting with LTG William Wallace, Commanding 

General, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 April 2005.

36. LTC Michael L. Warsocki, Land Information Warfare Activity, 

Intelligence Support to Information Operations, 1 March 2005, 33.

37. Strycula (2005).

38. 3d Infantry Division (2003), 69.

39. 82d Airborne Division, Lessons Learned by the 82d Airborne Division 

During OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, 1 May 2003, 22.

40. Wunderle (2004).

41. Adopted from Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Urban 

Sunrise,” Final Technical Report, Veridian/General Dynamics, February 2004.

42. Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Human Intel vs. Technology: Cultural Knowledge 

Important in Iraq,” Washington Times, 3 February 2005, 21.

43. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 2-01.3, Intelligence 

Preparation of the Battlefield (Draft) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 

May 2004), 1-5.

44. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Contemporary Operating 

Environment, White Paper, 2 February 2002, 4.

45. Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (2004), 137.

46. Warsocki (2005), 17.

47. Arthur K. Cebrowski served as the Director, Force Transformation and 

reported directly to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. In this role, 

Admiral Cebrowski was an advocate, focal point, and catalyst for all transformation activities related to the Department of Defense.

48. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, Richard E. Hayes, and David A. 

Signori, Understanding Information Age Warfare, DOD Command and Control 

Research Program, August 2001, 12–14. Online at <http://www.dodccrp.org/

publications/pdf/Alberts_UIAW.pdf> (as of 2 March 2006).
86

49. Ibid., 13.

50. Ibid., 12.

51. Adopted from Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (2004), 

22–23.

52. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), “Appendix A: Urban 

Terrain Analysis,” in FM 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain 

(MOUT) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 15 August 1979).

53. Steven D. Biddle, Andrew Krepinevich, and Robert Scales, “Testimony 

Before the House Committee on Armed Services on Operation Iraqi Freedom: 

Operations and Reconstruction,” 21 October 2003.

54. Calvin F. Swain, Jr., The Operational Planning Factors of Culture and 

Religion, Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 13 May 2003.

55. Ibid., 2.

56. Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study, “Transition to and from 

Hostilities,” September 2004, 22.

57. Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (2004), 141–142.

58. CALL (2004), 7.
87

Chapter 5

Summary and Conclusions

Lessons learned studies from Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq 

consistently point to a lack of cultural awareness as a major impediment to 

mission success. There is a growing awareness among America’s national 

and military leadership of the need to include cultural awareness as part 

of military operations. Cultural awareness can reduce battlefield friction 

and the fog of war, and improve the ability of leaders and US soldiers 

to accomplish the mission by providing insight into the intent of actors 

and groups in the battlespace, thus allowing the military to outthink and 

outmaneuver them. Finally, cultural awareness reduces cultural friction 

and can help the United States build rapport and prevent misunderstandings 

that detract from mission accomplishment.

However, despite the inclusion of cultural awareness and cultural 

intelligence at the Combat Training Centers, the schoolhouses (Fort 

Huachuca and Fort Leavenworth, for example), and in some military 

doctrine, to date there has been little in the way of operational knowledge 

on how to use this information once an AOR has been analyzed through a 

cultural lens. There is description, but little prescription.

Chapter 2 discussed a model that can be used to help the US military 

“operationalize” cultural awareness and intelligence in ways that are 

relevant to both combat and postconflict support operations. The key 

features of the model are:

• Cultural influences: Major social or institutional factors, such 

as heritage, religion, traditions, and language that bind people 

together.

• Cultural variations: Styles of behavior values and ways of thinking 

that are common to a culture.

• Cultural manifestations: The concrete displays of a culture’s 

thought and behavior, whether through its members’ view of 

authority, negotiation style, willingness to compromise, embracing 

of risk, etc.

This model was used to define key aspects of Middle Eastern culture, with 

specific examples from Iraq.

As described in chapter 4, the full benefit of the cultural awareness 

model can be realized only if cultural awareness is integrated into 

US military training and doctrine. Table 11 provides a summary of the 

recommendations made in chapter 4 regarding this integration.
88

The Way Ahead

While there are a number of ongoing initiatives to factor the role 

of culture and religion into operations planning and execution as well 

as military training and doctrine, the military must ensure that the sole 

focus of these efforts is not Middle East-, Iraq-, or Afghanistan-specific. 

The cultural awareness program specified in this document can apply 

across cultures and regions worldwide. Although the immediate focus is 

on Iraq, other regions, including North Korea and Iran, should also be 

areas of cultural attention. The development and maintenance of cultural 

competencies is a continuous process, and military leaders need to always 

be looking ahead and looking to understand multiple cultures at one time.

Table 11. Summary of Recommendations

Area of Interest Recommendation

Training • Ensure that cultural awareness is formally integrated

into the Professional Military Education (PME) and

Noncommissioned Officer Education System

(NCOES).

• Expand the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program to

ensure that a sufficient number of military officers

are trained in this area.

Doctrine • Add a subparagraph to IPB doctrine specifically

dedicated to the cultural intelligence factors and

discuss their effects on both friendly and enemy

operations.

• Incorporate into the intelligence analysis of the

enemy a discussion of the effects and impacts that

an adversary’s culture will have on their decisions

and tactics.

• Adapt the deliberative planning process to

incorporate cultural intelligence.

• To support strategic communications during the

execution of military operations, distinguish among

issues relevant to friendly, failing, and failed states.

• Apply the cultural awareness model across the full

spectrum of the strategic, operational, and tactical

levels of war.
89

About the Author

LTC William D. Wunderle is currently serving in the Joint Strategic 

Plans and Policy Directorate (J5) on the Joint Staff as a Political Military 

Planner with responsibility for Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian 

Authority. Prior assignments include Senior Army Fellow at the RAND 

Corporation; principal US advisor to the Saudi Arabian Ministry of 

Defense and Aviation Joint Staff; Chief of Plans, Operations Officer, 

and infantry company commander with the 82d Airborne Division at 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and Chief of Strategic Plans for US Army 

South and J3, Joint Security Brigade, Operation Safe Haven. Wunderle 

served as a consultant for the University of Southern California’s Institute 

for Creative Technologies Enhanced Learning Environments with the 

Creative Technologies (ELECT) project—a PC-based, bilateral contacttraining module that allows US Army leaders to plan and conduct a series 

of bilateral meetings. Wunderle is a nonresident associate at Georgetown’s 

Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and an adjunct instructor for the 

University of Maryland University College.

Wunderle is a graduate of the Joint and Combined Warfighting Course 

at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, and the Arabic 

Basic Course at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, 

Presidio of Monterey, California. He holds an MBA from Benedictine 

College, Atchison, Kansas; an MMAS from the School of Advanced 

Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas; and a BA from Cleveland State University, 

Cleveland, Ohio.

Wunderle has published a number of books, monographs, and articles to include Forced In, Left Out: The Airborne Division in Future 

Forcible Entry Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command 

and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1997) 

and “Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: Planning Requirements 

in Wielding the Instruments of National Power” (RAND Technology and 

Applied Sciences Group Seminar, Warfighters: Operational Realities, 17 

November 2004). His monograph Yin and Yang: The Relationship of Joint 

Vision 2010’s Concepts of Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 

School of Advanced Military Studies, 1998), was selected for further publication and distribution by the Association of the United States Army’s 

Institute of Land Warfare as part of their Contemporary Professional 

Military Writing Series.

91

Glossary

A.H. Anno Hegirae (year of the Hijra)

AOR area of responsibility

ART Army Task

AUTL Army Universal Task List

BBC British Broadcasting Company

BC Before Christ

BOS battlefield operating system

C2 command and control

C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

CA Civil Affairs

CAC Combined Arms Center

CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned

CCIR commander’s critical information requirements

CD counterdrug

CENTCOM Central Command

CES commander’s estimate of the situation

CFD Career Field Designation

CFLCC Combined Force Land Component Commander

CG Commanding General

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force

CJTF-7 Combined Joint Task Force-7

COA course of action

COE contemporary operating environment

COG center of gravity

COIN Counterinsurgency

CSS combat service support

DA Department of the Army

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Project Agency

DC District of Columbia

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DISAM Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

DLI Defense Language Institute

DLIFLC Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center

DOD Department of Defense

DoS Department of State

e.g. for example

EBO effects-based operations

EUCOM European Command

FAO Foreign Area Officer

FID foreign internal defense

FM field manual
92

G3 Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans

GWOT Global War on Terrorism

HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army

HQMC Headquarters, Marine Corps

HUMINT Human Intelligence

i.e. that is

IBOS Intelligence Battlefield Operating System

ICT in-country training

ID identification

IIR initial impressions report

IO Information Operations

IOC Information Operations Command

IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

J2 Intelligence, Joint Staff Directorate

JIPB Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

JP Joint Publication

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center

JTF Joint Task Force

KS Kansas

LEA law enforcement agencies

LNO liaison officer

LTC lieutenant colonel

LTG lieutenant general

MA Massachusetts

MCIA Marine Corps Intelligence Agency

MCO major combat operations

MDMP military decisionmaking process

ME Maine

MG major general

MODA Ministry of Defense and Aviation

MOOTW military operations other than war

MOUT military operations on urbanized terrain

MRX Mission Rehearsal Exercise

MTT Mobile Training Team

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO noncommissioned officer

NCOES noncommissioned officer education system

NGO nongovernmental organization

NSA National Security Agency

NTC National Training Center

OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

OPTEMPO operation tempo

(P) Promotable

PACOM Pacific Command
93

PIR priority intelligence requirements

PKO peacekeeping operations

PME Professional Military Education

PO peace operations

PSYOP psychological operations

RI Rhode Island

ROE rules of engagement

RPG rocket propelled grenade

SASO stability and support operations

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOI sphere of influence

SSTR Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

UN United Nations

UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

US United States

USD(P&R) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

USMC United States Marine Corps

vs versus

YOS years of service

95

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103

Appendix A

Cultural Factors in US Joint and Army Doctrine

The military has used the term culture in many different ways over 

the last decade or so as more of its operations occur in highly populated 

regions.1 Due to ongoing military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

other areas of responsibility (AORs), the terms “culture” and “cultural 

awareness” enjoy a wide use in today’s military lexicon, yet is largely 

absent in military doctrine.

Culture in Military Operations

In an attempt to define the term “culture” as it relates to military 

operations, this appendix includes a survey of military documents over the 

past several years to give a sense of the varied uses of the term “culture” 

and the limitations of those uses. Culture has begun to receive some 

attention in military doctrine, often in the context of “cultural awareness.” 

These terms, however, are not adequately defined or explained, resulting 

in a lack of precision and miscommunication with regard to their use.

A review of 26 joint publications (3,965 pages) and 21 Army field 

manuals (5,630 pages) found only 312 and 840 instances of the word 

“culture,” respectively.2 Additionally, military doctrine provides four 

conflicting definitions of culture and no definition of cultural awareness. 

The doctrinal definitions of culture are:

• JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms (approved for both DOD and NATO): A feature 

of the terrain that has been constructed by man. Included are such 

items as roads, buildings, and canals; boundary lines; and, in a 

broad sense, all names and legends on a map.

• FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures: Culture is the set of shared meanings by which people 

understand their world and make sense of their own behavior and 

that of others (paragraphs D-13 and D-14).

• FMI 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations: Culture is the 

ideology of a people or region and defines a people’s way of life 

(paragraph D-12).

• FM 22-100, Army Leadership: Culture is a group’s shared set 

of beliefs, values, and assumptions about what’s important 

(paragraphs 2-42 and 2-59).

Finally, Merriam-Webster defines culture as “the integrated pattern of 

human knowledge, belief, and behavior that depends upon man’s capacity 
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for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations. . . . The 

customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, 

or social group. The set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices 

that characterizes a company or corporation.” In these documents, culture 

often includes common elements such as beliefs, values, and religion, but 

also physical elements such as buildings and infrastructure.

Given this, chapter 2 defined culture as “a shared set of traditions, 

belief systems, and behaviors, shaped by many factors, including history, 

religion, ethnic identity, language, and nationality, that evolves in response 

to various pressures and influences and is learned through socialization; 

it is not inherent,” while cultural awareness is defined as “the ability to 

recognize and understand the effects of culture on people’s values and 

behaviors.”

To convey a sense of the treatment of culture in military doctrine, what 

follows is a survey of military documents that mention or consider culture, 

cultural intelligence, or cultural awareness.

US Joint Doctrine

Joint Publication 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to 

Military Operations (7 October 2004)—Includes mention of cultural 

differences among coalition partners in the J2 quick reaction checklist 

included in its appendix.

Joint Publication 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 

for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (24 May 2000)—

Acknowledges that the human dimension considered in IO and PSYOP 

includes culture and that the JIPB analyst should avoid cultural bias in 

evaluating proposed COAs by considering the actions in context of the 

adversary’s culture. Joint doctrine does caution that cultural differences 

among coalition partners can impact operations and those differences 

should be minimized. However, there is little mention of what a cultural 

assessment is, who is responsible for it, or how to capture cultural awareness and competence during the campaign planning process.

Joint Publication 3.0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (10 September 

2001)—States that cultural differences should be considered when conducting coalition operations. Additionally, cultural factors as an underlying factor for the war or conflict must be understood to determine the 

conditions necessary for termination. However, there is no specific mention on how to address cultural needs in terms of selecting or developing a 

course of action for the joint or coalition task force.

Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other 
105

than War (16 June 1995)—Indicates that cultural factors may be a source 

of threats during foreign internal defense (FID) operations. Also, cultural 

factors are again discussed during multinational operations as a potential 

source of conflict between coalition members. It is suggested to plan for 

additional liaison and advisory requirements.

Joint Publication 3-07.03, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

for Peace Operations (12 February 1999)—Recognizes that tactics such 

as PSYOPs and information operations requires an understanding of the 

cognitive and cultural makeup of the target, rather than just location and 

defensive capabilities. To get a message across, the sender must know 

how the receiver is going to interpret the message and respond. Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) can play a significant role in peacekeeping operations (PKO) because of their unique capabilities, training, and experience. 

SOF often has detailed regional knowledge of cultures and languages, 

as well as experience working with indigenous forces. SOF capabilities 

of PSYOP and CA are particularly important in peace operations (PO) 

for their understanding of the complexity of operating in cross-cultural 

environments.

Joint Publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations (5 

April 2000)—Recognizes that cultural differences among coalition partners can influence the effectiveness of the operation. However, JP 3-16 

takes things one step further and has three items on the Commander’s 

Checklist for Multinational Operations that require assessing cultural differences and their impact on the coalition.

Joint Publication 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning (25 

January 2002)—Mentions cultural intelligence as part of the IPB process. 

From a procedural perspective, the analysis of the adversary’s centers 

of gravity is a key step in the joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace. In the third and four steps in the JIPB process, joint force intelligence analysts identify the adversary’s COG. Conduct the analysis after 

an understanding of the broad operational environment has been obtained 

and before a detailed study of the adversary’s forces occurs. The analysis addresses the adversary’s leadership, fielded forces, resources, infrastructure, population, transportation systems, and internal and external 

relationships.

Joint Publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance 

and Procedures (13 January 1999)—This is the only joint publication 

that specifically mentions the critical importance of understanding the 

enemy’s culture. The JTF chaplain is tasked with providing an assessment 

to CJTF and staff on the cultural and religious influences on mission 
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accomplishment. JP 5-00.2 states that understanding the enemy’s and 

coalition forces cultures are vital in improving operational effectiveness 

and preventing misunderstandings. Additionally, in military operations 

other than war (MOOTW) it is important to understand the differences 

among the affected population’s culture and that of the coalition force. 

Intelligence for MOOTW should address the critical importance of culture 

and should be used to gauge the potential reactions of the local population 

in their assessments. The JTF should form a combined intelligence 

center and exchange liaison personnel to eliminate potential problems 

between coalition partners concerning language, doctrine, and operational 

intelligence requirements. Joint intelligence doctrine makes little mention 

of the importance of cultural factors.

US Army Doctrine

FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (2000)—In 

this document, culture is defined as “the social fabric of a city,” and includes 

cultural norms (food, sleep patterns, casual and close relationships, manners, and cleanliness), religious beliefs, and local government. (This may 

include nepotism, favor-trading, subtle sabotage, and indifference. While 

corruption is sometimes pervasive and institutionalized, the power of officials is primarily based on family connections, personal power base, and 

age, and only after that on education, training, and competence.)

FM 100-5, Operations (14 June 1993)—Recognizes that “Each partner in combined operations possesses a unique cultural identity, the result 

of language, values, religious systems, and economic and social outlooks. 

Nations with similar cultures are more likely to have similar aspirations. 

Further, their armed forces will face fewer obstacles to interoperability in 

a combined force structure. Nations with divergent cultural outlooks have 

to overcome greater obstacles in a coalition or alliance. Armies reflect the 

national cultures that influence the way they operate. Sources of national 

pride and cultural sensitivities will vary widely, yet the combined force 

commander must accommodate them. Differences in work ethic, standards of living, religion, and discipline affect the way nations approach 

war. Commanders cannot ignore these differences because they represent 

potential major problems. Even seemingly minor differences, such as 

dietary restrictions or officer-soldier relationships, can have a great impact. 

Commanders may have to accommodate religious holidays, prayer calls, 

and other unique cultural traditions that are important to allies” (page 

5-2).

FM 100-23, Peace Operations (30 December 1994)—Describes conducting an analysis of the local area, which includes, “ethnic backgrounds, 
107

languages, and religious beliefs; tribe, clan, and subclan loyalties . . . holiday and religious observances practiced by the local populace” (page 46). 

The manual goes on to say, “All personnel involved in peace operations 

must receive training on the customs of the local population and coalition 

partners” (page 88), but provides no guidance on how to accomplish this.

FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (8 July 1994)—

Discusses the concept of conducting an IPB for operations other than 

war. The rest of the document considers friendly forces and threats, but 

no one else. The sections on Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping 

Operations and Peace Enforcement deal with some aspects of cultural 

intelligence (though not named as such). These cultural aspects include:

• Population distribution patterns.

• Ethnic divisions.

• Religious beliefs.

• Language divisions.

• Tribe, clan, and subclan loyalties.

• Political sympathies.

• Demographics:

•• Roots of conflict.

•• Belligerents.

•• Trust.

• Outside influence: organizations and media.

FM 34-36, Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic 

Warfare Operations (30 September 1991)—Discusses the concepts 

described in this manuscript, although it does not use the same terminology relevant to the discussion of cultural intelligence. In addition to the 

normal structural and infrastructural aspects of the area of interest, the 

battle area evaluation for Special Operations Forces includes:

• Political.

• Military.

• Economic.

• Social.

• Geographic.

• Psychological.

• Cultural.

• Friendly forces.
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• Hostile forces.

• Nonbelligerent.

• Third-party forces.

For psychological operations, the battle area evaluation includes other 

cultural features:

• Ethnic, racial, social, economic, religious, linguistic groups: locations and densities.

• Stances of groups: progovernment, neutral, proinsurgent.

• Key leaders and communicators: politicians/government and 

business/clergy.

• Cohesive and divisive issues within.

• Community (e.g., attitudes toward United States).

• Literacy rates, education levels.

• Types and proportions of media.

• Consumed by community.

• Concentrations of third-country nationals in area: purpose and 

function.

Additionally, some of this information is represented as part of a 

Population Status Overlay on a map that includes the information above, 

and may include home and work places of key players and their relatives.

FM 27-100, Legal Support to Operations (1 March 2000)—Describes 

the complexity of MOOTW missions because of their impact on civilians. 

It states that “Commanders must be prepared to collect human intelligence 

concerning political, cultural, and economic factors affecting the operation; 

to conduct public affairs, civil affairs, and psychological operations; to 

provide humanitarian assistance; to develop rules of engagement (ROE) 

that protect the force without causing civilian casualties; to process 

civilian detainees; to process requests for temporary refuge or asylum; and 

to perform other tasks as the mission requires.”

FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations (20 February 

2003)—This is the most complete and up-to-date doctrinal manual in 

terms of cultural awareness. This manual provides a wide-reaching view 

of culture and its importance in operations. In particular, it deals with 

cultural differences, intelligence gathering, liaison, and negotiation. Of 

note, culture is included in the IPB process as an artifact: “The information 

gathering should focus on areas that influence people, such as cultures, 

politics, religion, economics, and related factors and any variances in 
109

affected groups of people.”3 At other times, culture also has cognitive 

connotations, “Culture shapes how people reason, what they accept as 

fact, and what principles they apply to decisionmaking.”4 Additionally, 

this manual provides one of the best views of culture and its implications 

as follows:

Clash of Cultures

1-30. Some in the non-Western world reject Western 

political and cultural values. In some instances, regimes 

that use Western political forms of government are under 

attack by ethnic, religious, and nationalist groups seeking 

to establish or reestablish their identity. As tribal, nationalist, or religious movements compete with Western models 

of government, instability can increase. This instability 

threatens not only Western interests within the state, but 

often threatens to spill across borders.5

CROSS-CULTURAL INTERACTION

1-69. Interacting with other cultures can create a significant 

challenge during stability operations and support operations. Often, adjustments in attitudes or methods must be 

made to accommodate different cultures. Ethnocentrism 

and cultural arrogance can damage relationships with 

other forces, NGOs, or indigenous populations. The welfare and perceptions of indigenous populations are often 

central to the mission during stability operations and support operations. Army forces must establish good working relations with indigenous populations. Mutual trust 

and rapport increase the chances for mission success.

1-70. Army personnel should understand the culture and 

history of the area. Historical understanding helps soldiers comprehend the society, interact with the people in 

that society, and adapt to cultural differences to facilitate 

rather than impede mission accomplishment. Historical 

and cultural understanding help to determine the range of 

actions acceptable in solving the problem at hand. With 

this in mind, soldiers must receive cultural and historical 

orientations to the people and the conflict. Civil affairs 

units produce area studies that can provide this information. Interpreters, translators, and linguists are also 

invaluable.6
110

PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

2-14. Priority intelligence requirements (PIR) in stability 

operations and support operations may differ from those in 

offensive and defensive operations. In combat operations, 

PIR focuses on the enemy’s military capability and 

intentions. However, intelligence collection in stability 

operations and support operations may adjust to the people 

and their cultures, politics, crime, religion, economics, 

and related factors, and any variances within affected 

groups of people.

2-15. Generally, in offensive and defensive operations, 

PIR are answered and targets are attacked and destroyed. 

In stability operations and support operations, collection 

and production to answer PIR may be ongoing tasks. 

For example, PIR related to treaty verification or 

force protection may continue as long as the mission 

requires.”7

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

4-83. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is a 

continuous process that includes gathering information on 

areas in which a unit might be required to operate. . . . It 

begins before deployment notification and may be based 

on open-source intelligence. When notification comes, 

having current information will reduce uncertainties 

regarding the adversaries, the environment—including the 

medical threat and terrain in a given area—and facilitate 

mission planning. Successful intelligence support during 

PO relies on continuous information collection and 

intelligence production.

4-84. Ground reconnaissance and meetings with key 

interagency, international organization, and NGO players 

are essential to IPB. The information gathering should 

focus on areas that influence people, such as cultures, 

politics, religion, economics, and related factors and any 

variances in affected groups of people.8

Intelligence, Planning, CSS, Training, and Manpower 

Support

5-36. Planning support can be one of the most effective 

means of supporting the national CD effort. Army 
111

personnel support CD planning of both LEAs and host 

nations. Understanding the supported agency or host 

nation, its culture, and its people is critical. Planning 

support provided to LEAs must consider the organization’s 

mission, current goals, structure or chain of command, 

measures of success, and even relationships with other 

government agencies or countries. Planning support 

provided to host nations is similar to that provided to 

LEAs. However, the host nation’s culture, historical 

perspectives, political climate, and economic conditions 

are considered.9

Liaison

A-87. The professional abilities of the LNO determine 

a successful liaison. Additional factors that 

contribute to successful liaisons are—

• Knowledge of the doctrine, capabilities, 

procedures, and culture of their organizations.

• Transportation.

• Language ability.

• Regional orientation.

• Communications.

• Single point of contact in the headquarters.

• In support of humanitarian assistance missions, 

functional skills and experience aligning with 

the need for medical and logistics expertise.10

Be Attuned to Cultural Differences

E-6. Actions can have different connotations to members 

of other cultures. Culture shapes how people reason, what 

they accept as fact, and what principles they apply to 

decisionmaking. Nonverbal behavior such as the symbolic 

rituals or protocols of the arrangement for a meeting also 

is important.

E-7. Negotiations can be conducted at several levels: 

negotiations among Unites States (US) agencies and 

departments; between multinational partners; between 

the military force and the United Nations (UN) agencies; 

and between the military and local leaders. In the joint, 

combined, and interagency environment, negotiations 
112

can be complex. Nonetheless, all negotiations require 

tact, diplomacy, honesty, patience, fairness, effective 

communications, cross-cultural sensitivity, and careful 

planning.11

CONSIDER CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS

E-11. There are organizational cultures within the various 

agencies and departments of the US government as 

well as the international organizations that shape the 

context of negotiations. Equally important are national 

cultural differences. The negotiating team should include 

experienced interpreters. Their understanding of the 

cultural context of terms used is invaluable. Negotiators 

need more than literal translators.

E-12. Negotiation is only one means of resolving conflict. 

Negotiators should consider indigenous conflict resolution 

techniques in selecting their approach.12
113

Notes

1. Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, “Urban Sunrise,” Final 

Technical Report, Veridian/General Dynamic, February 2004.

2. This research was conducted by Bill Lambert, Assistant Professor, 

Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, Command and General Staff 

College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

3. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), FM 3-07, Stability 

Operations and Support Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 

February 2003), 4-23.

4. Ibid., E-1.

5. Ibid., 1-10.

6. Ibid., 1-18.

7. Ibid., 2-4 and 2-5.

8. Ibid., 4-22 and 4-23.

9. Ibid., 5-9.

10. Ibid., A-17.

11. Ibid., E-1.

12. Ibid., E-2.

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Appendix B

The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence

The following notes have been expressed in commandment form for 

greater clarity and to save words. They are, however, only my personal 

conclusions, arrived at gradually while I worked in the Hejaz and now 

put on paper as stalking horses for beginners in the Arab armies. They 

are meant to apply only to Bedu; townspeople or Syrians require totally 

different treatment. They are of course not suitable to any other person’s 

need, or applicable unchanged in any particular situation. Handling Hejaz 

Arabs is an art, not a science, with exceptions and no obvious rules. At 

the same time we have a great chance there; the Sherif trusts us, and has 

given us the position (toward his Government) which the Germans wanted 

to win in Turkey. If we are tactful, we can at once retain his goodwill and 

carry out our job, but to succeed we have got to put into it all the interest 

and skill we possess.

1. Go easy for the first few weeks. A bad start is difficult to atone 

for, and the Arabs form their judgments on externals that we ignore. When 

you have reached the inner circle in a tribe, you can do as you please with 

yourself and them. 

2. Learn all you can about your Ashraf and Bedu. Get to know their 

families, clans and tribes, friends and enemies, wells, hills and roads. Do 

all this by listening and by indirect inquiry. Do not ask questions. Get to 

speak their dialect of Arabic, not yours. Until you can understand their 

allusions, avoid getting deep into conversation or you will drop bricks. Be 

a little stiff at first. 

3. In matters of business deal only with the commander of the army, 

column, or party in which you serve. Never give orders to anyone at all, 

and reserve your directions or advice for the C.O., however great the temptation (for efficiency’s sake) of dealing with his underlings. Your place is 

advisory, and your advice is due to the commander alone. Let him see that 

this is your conception of your duty, and that his is to be the sole executive 

of your joint plans. 

4. Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others when you can. Never refuse or quash 

*T.E. Lawrence, “The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence,” The Arab Bulletin 

(Cairo), vol. 60, 20 August 1917, 348, in Jeremy Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia: 

The Authorized Biography of T.E. Lawrence, New York: Atheneum, 1989, 960.
116

schemes he may put forward; but ensure that they are put forward in the 

first instance privately to you. Always approve them, and after praise modify them insensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they 

are in accord with your own opinion. When you attain this point, hold him 

to it, keep a tight grip of his ideas, and push them forward as firmly as 

possibly, but secretly, so that to one but himself (and he not too clearly) is 

aware of your pressure. 

5. Remain in touch with your leader as constantly and unobtrusively 

as you can. Live with him, that at meal times and at audiences you may be 

naturally with him in his tent. Formal visits to give advice are not as good 

as the constant dropping of ideas in casual talk. When stranger sheikhs 

come in for the first time to swear allegiance and offer service, clear out 

of the tent. If their first impression is of foreigners in the confidence of the 

Sherif, it will do the Arab cause much harm. 

6. Be shy of too close relations with the subordinates of the expedition. Continual intercourse with them will make it impossible for you to 

avoid going behind or beyond the instructions that the Arab C.O. has given 

them on your advice, and in so disclosing the weakness of his position you 

altogether destroy your own. 

7. Treat the sub-chiefs of your force quite easily and lightly. In this 

way you hold yourself above their level. Treat the leader, if a Sherif, with 

respect. He will return your manner and you and he will then be alike, and 

above the rest. Precedence is a serious matter among the Arabs, and you 

must attain it. 

8. Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. Do 

not be too intimate, too prominent, or too earnest. Avoid being identified 

too long or too often with any tribal sheikh, even if C.O. of the expedition. 

To do your work you must be above jealousies, and you lose prestige if 

you are associated with a tribe or clan, and its inevitable feuds. Sherifs are 

above all blood-feuds and local rivalries, and form the only principle of 

unity among the Arabs. Let your name therefore be coupled always with a 

Sherif’s, and share his attitude toward the tribes. When the moment comes 

for action put yourself publicly under his orders. The Bedu will then follow suit. 

9. Magnify and develop the growing conception of the Sherifs as 

the natural aristocracy of the Arabs. Intertribal jealousies make it impossible for any sheikh to attain a commanding position, and the only hope 

of union in nomad Arabs is that the Ashraf be universally acknowledged 

as the ruling class. Sherifs are half-townsmen, half-nomad, in manner and 

life, and have the instinct of command. Mere merit and money would be 
117

insufficient to obtain such recognition; but the Arab reverence for pedigree 

and the Prophet gives hope for the ultimate success of the Ashraf. 

10. Call your Sherif “Sidi” in public and in private. Call other people by their ordinary names, without title. In intimate conversation call a 

Sheikh “Abu Annad,” “Akhu Alia” or some similar by-name. 

11. The foreigner and Christian is not a popular person in Arabia. 

However friendly and informal the treatment of yourself may be, remember always that your foundations are very sandy ones. Wave a Sherif in 

front of you like a banner and hide your own mind and person. If you succeed, you will have hundreds of miles of country and thousands of men 

under your orders, and for this it is worth bartering the outward show. 

12. Cling tight to your sense of humor. You will need it every day. A 

dry irony is the most useful type, and repartee of a personal and not too 

broad character will double your influence with the chiefs. Reproof, if 

wrapped up in some smiling form, will carry further and last longer than 

the most violent speech. The power of mimicry or parody is valuable, but 

use it sparingly, for wit is more dignified than humor. Do not cause a laugh 

at a Sherif except among Sherifs. 

13. Never lay hands on an Arab; you degrade yourself. You may think 

the resultant obvious increase of outward respect a gain to you, but what 

you have really done is to build a wall between you and their inner selves. 

It is difficult to keep quiet when everything is being done wrong, but the 

less you lose your temper the greater your advantage. Also then you will 

not go mad yourself. 

14. While very difficult to drive, the Bedu are easy to lead, if: have 

the patience to bear with them. The less apparent your interferences the 

more your influence. They are willing to follow your advice and do what 

you wish, but they do not mean you or anyone else to be aware of that. It is 

only after the end of all annoyances that you find at bottom their real fund 

of goodwill. 

15. Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs 

do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to 

help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you 

think it is. 

16. If you can, without being too lavish, forestall presents to yourself. 

A well-placed gift is often most effective in winning over a suspicious 

sheikh. Never receive a present without giving a liberal return, but you 

may delay this return (while letting its ultimate certainty be known) if you 
118

require a particular service from the giver. Do not let them ask you for 

things, since their greed will then make them look upon you only as a cow 

to milk. 

17. Wear an Arab headcloth when with a tribe. Bedu have a malignant 

prejudice against the hat, and believe that our persistence in wearing it (due 

probably to British obstinacy of dictation) is founded on some immoral or 

irreligious principle. A thick headcloth forms a good protection against the 

sun, and if you wear a hat your best Arab friends will be ashamed of you 

in public. 

18. Disguise is not advisable. Except in special areas, let it be clearly 

known that you are a British officer and a Christian. At the same time, if 

you can wear Arab kit when with the tribes, you will acquire their trust and 

intimacy to a degree impossible in uniform. It is, however, dangerous and 

difficult. They make no special allowances for you when you dress like 

them. Breaches of etiquette not charged against a foreigner are not condoned to you in Arab clothes. You will be like an actor in a foreign theatre, 

playing a part day and night for months, without rest, and for an anxious 

stake. Complete success, which is when the Arabs forget your strangeness and speak naturally before you, counting you as one of themselves, 

is perhaps only attainable in character: while half-success (all that most 

of us will strive for; the other costs too much) is easier to win in British 

things, and you yourself will last longer, physically and mentally, in the 

comfort that they mean. Also then the Turks will not hang you, when you 

are caught. 

19. If you wear Arab things, wear the best. Clothes are significant 

among the tribes, and you must wear the appropriate, and appear at ease in 

them. Dress like a Sherif, if they agree to it. 

20. If you wear Arab things at all, go the whole way. Leave your 

English friends and customs on the coast, and fall back on Arab habits 

entirely. It is possible, starting thus level with them, for the European to 

beat the Arabs at their own game, for we have stronger motives for our 

action, and put more heart into it than they. If you can surpass them, you 

have taken an immense stride toward complete success, but the strain of 

living and thinking in a foreign and half-understood language, the savage 

food, strange clothes, and stranger ways, with the complete loss of privacy 

and quiet, and the impossibility of ever relaxing your watchful imitation of 

the others for months on end, provide such an added stress to the ordinary 

difficulties of dealing with the Bedu, the climate, and the Turks, that this 

road should not be chosen without serious thought. 

21. Religious discussions will be frequent. Say what you like about 
119

your own side, and avoid criticism of theirs, unless you know that the 

point is external, when you may score heavily by proving it so. With the 

Bedu, Islam is so all-pervading an element that there is little religiosity, 

little fervour, and no regard for externals. Do not think from their conduct 

that they are careless. Their conviction of the truth of their faith, and its 

share in every act and thought and principle of their daily life is so intimate 

and intense as to be unconscious, unless roused by opposition. Their religion is as much a part of nature to them as is sleep or food. 

22. Do not try to trade on what you know of fighting. The Hejaz confounds ordinary tactics. Learn the Bedu principles of war as thoroughly and 

as quickly as you can, for till you know them your advice will be no good 

to the Sherif. Unnumbered generations of tribal raids have taught them 

more about some parts of the business than we will ever know. In familiar 

conditions they fight well, but strange events cause panic. Keep your unit 

small. Their raiding parties are usually from one hundred to two hundred 

men, and if you take a crowd they only get confused. Also their sheikhs, 

while admirable company commanders, are too “set” to learn to handle 

the equivalents of battalions or regiments. Don’t attempt unusual things, 

unless they appeal to the sporting instinct Bedu have so strongly, unless 

success is obvious. If the objective is a good one (booty) they will attack 

like fiends, they are splendid scouts, their mobility gives you the advantage that will win this local war, they make proper use of their knowledge 

of the country (don’t take tribesmen to places they do not know), and the 

gazelle-hunters, who form a proportion of the better men, are great shots 

at visible targets. A sheikh from one tribe cannot give orders to men from 

another; a Sherif is necessary to command a mixed tribal force. If there 

is plunder in prospect, and the odds are at all equal, you will win. Do not 

waste Bedu attacking trenches (they will not stand casualties) or in trying 

to defend a position, for they cannot sit still without slacking. The more 

unorthodox and Arab your proceedings, the more likely you are to have 

the Turks cold, for they lack initiative and expect you to. Don’t play for 

safety. 

23. The open reason that Bedu give you for action or inaction may 

be true, but always there will be better reasons left for you to divine. You 

must find these inner reasons (they will be denied, but are none the less in 

operation) before shaping your arguments for one course or other. Allusion 

is more effective than logical exposition: they dislike concise expression. 

Their minds work just as ours do, but on different premises. There is nothing unreasonable, incomprehensible, or inscrutable in the Arab. Experience 

of them, and knowledge of their prejudices will enable you to foresee their 

attitude and possible course of action in nearly every case. 
120

24. Do not mix Bedu and Syrians, or trained men and tribesmen. You 

will get work out of neither, for they hate each other. I have never seen a 

successful combined operation, but many failures. In particular, ex-officers 

of the Turkish army, however Arab in feelings and blood and language, 

are hopeless with Bedu. They are narrow minded in tactics, unable to 

adjust themselves to irregular warfare, clumsy in Arab etiquette, swollenheaded to the extent of being incapable of politeness to a tribesman for 

more than a few minutes, impatient, and, usually, helpless without their 

troops on the road and in action. Your orders (if you were unwise enough 

to give any) would be more readily obeyed by Beduins than those of any 

Mohammedan Syrian officer. Arab townsmen and Arab tribesmen regard 

each other mutually as poor relations, and poor relations are much more 

objectionable than poor strangers. 

25. In spite of ordinary Arab example, avoid too free talk about 

women. It is as difficult a subject as religion, and their standards are so 

unlike our own that a remark, harmless in English, may appear as unrestrained to them, as some of their statements would look to us, if translated 

literally. 

26. Be as careful of your servants as of yourself. If you want a sophisticated one you will probably have to take an Egyptian, or a Sudani, and 

unless you are very lucky he will undo on trek much of the good you so 

laboriously effect. Arabs will cook rice and make coffee for you, and leave 

you if required to do unmanly work like cleaning boots or washing. They 

are only really possible if you are in Arab kit. A slave brought up in the 

Hejaz is the best servant, but there are rules against British subjects owning them, so they have to be lent to you. In any case, take with you an 

Ageyli or two when you go up country. They are the most efficient couriers in Arabia, and understand camels. 

27. The beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting study of them. Keep always on your guard; never say an unnecessary thing: watch yourself and your companions all the time: hear all 

that passes, search out what is going on beneath the surface, read their 

characters, discover their tastes and their weaknesses and keep everything 

you find out to yourself. Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests 

and no ideas except the work in hand, so that your brain is saturated with 

one thing only, and you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little 

slips that would counteract the painful work of weeks. Your success will 

be proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it. 
121

Appendix C

Preparing for Negotiations in the Middle East

Historically, the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements 

was one of the more important external relation tasks of governments. In 

fact, negotiating is regarded as the central function of diplomacy. However, 

because of increased OPTEMPO due to the Global War on Terrorism, 

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and 

other ongoing operations, the US Army now regularly participates in military operations, peacekeeping missions, and other ad hoc international 

actions that are fraught with cultural conflict potential—not only between 

foreign military personnel and local populations, but also between nationalities within the foreign forces.

One of the considerations that have arisen from this is the need to 

understand that the values of people from other organizations and nationalities will directly affect their understanding of any given situation. 

Recent experiences demonstrate that it has become commonplace during 

civil-military operations (as well as combat operations) for soldiers of all 

ranks to be involved with some sort of negotiation, dispute resolution, 

or bargaining for individual or collective advantages. This is particularly 

true in sudden, unexpected confrontational situations where action must 

be immediate and without prior preparation. Because of this, the success 

of military operations call for soldiers and leaders to exhibit expert cultural awareness and management skills in their day-to-day interactions 

and negotiations with persons from other cultures.

The term “negotiation” presupposes common interests and issues 

of conflict between the two sides. The object of bilateral negotiations is 

to resolve an issue that cannot be solved unilaterally through one’s own 

actions. Engagement in a negotiation also implies a willingness to achieve 

a compromise somewhere between one’s own maximum goal and the 

absolute minimum that one is willing to accept. The process involves 

the exchange of promises, assurances, and compromise. A negotiation 

becomes cross-cultural when the parties belong to different cultures and, 

therefore, do not share the same ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving.1

With this definition as the premise, it can be argued that in today’s US 

military operations overseas, military leaders from squad leader to flag 

officer will be required to conduct bilateral negotiations. During the 

conduct of bilateral negotiations, a balance has to be found between a 

short-term gain and establishing a long-term relationship to facilitate 

future interactions.2 Furthermore, it is important to understand that 
122

bilateral negotiations conducted during the course of military operations 

with local national authorities are often complicated by the invisible 

presence of other stakeholders at the table. Done correctly, the conclusion 

of successful negotiations will further enhance a unit’s ability to achieve 

its campaign goals, save lives, and facilitate the transition to a safe and 

secure environment.

The process of conducting bilateral negotiations involves a three-stage 

process: the prenegotiation stage, the negotiation, and, finally, the followup or postnegotiation stage. The prenegotiation phase of a bilateral negotiation is often the most critical. Each party identifies its strengths, assesses 

its interests, and works to understand the wider context of the negotiations. 

This is the phase in which it is important for a military leader to understand the cultural context in which his counterpart operates. Effective 

negotiators base their strategy and tactics on the characteristics of the situation and the people involved. A detailed course of instruction on how to 

conduct bilateral negotiations is beyond the scope of this study.3 However, 

analyzing cultural differences as they relate to negotiation is not.

The analytical framework provided earlier is useful in preparing for 

the conduct of bilateral negotiations. Again, it must be emphasized that 

there is no one right approach to negotiations. There are only effective 

and less effective approaches and these vary according to many contextual 

factors. As negotiators understand that their counterparts may see things 

very differently than themselves, they will be less likely to make negative 

judgments and more likely to make progress in negotiations.4

Countries vary on such key aspects as the amount and type of preparation for a negotiation, the relative time on task versus interpersonal 

relationships, the use of general principles versus specific details, and the 

number of people present and the extent of their influence. Although cultural stereotypes are simplistic, many of them contain elements of truth. 

For example, the United States is likely to give one negotiator complete 

control while negotiations with Middle Eastern cultures can be drawn 

out and contain many subtleties.5 As such, we will look at how Arab and 

Middle Eastern cultural variations manifest themselves in the conduct of 

bilateral negotiations.6

In an article entitled, “Ten ways that culture affects negotiating style: 

Some survey results,” Jeswald Salacuse outlined ten factors in the negotiation process that seem to be influenced by a person’s culture.7

 He further 

proposed that the culturally different responses would fall on a point on a 

continuum between two polar extremes. Salacuse’s ten factors and associated ranges of cultural responses are shown in table 12.8
123

Negotiating Goals: Contract or Relationship—Relates to the purpose or intent of the parties to the negotiation. In general, for American 

business negotiators the signing of a contract is their primary negotiating 

aim. They consider such a contract a binding agreement that outlines the 

roles, rights, and obligations of each party. In contrast, negotiators from 

Middle Eastern cultures are believed to have a more fluid view of contracts 

and, therefore, place more emphasis on establishing a sustainable business 

relationship rather than a contract. Furthermore, Middle Eastern cultures 

eschew the “Western tradition of legalism” and “prefer to leave things 

vague.”9 The importance of relationships when negotiating with most 

Middle East cultural groups cannot be underestimated. Personal relationships are founded on loyalty and reciprocity and trust between the partners 

is never feigned.

Attitude: Win/Lose or Win/Win—This is also known as distributive or integrative bargaining, respectively. With distributive bargaining, 

the parties to the negotiation see each other’s goals as incompatible and, 

therefore, believe one party can only gain at the expense of the other. With 

integrative bargaining, the parties to the negotiation consider themselves 

to have compatible goals and, therefore, assume both parties should stand 

to gain from the final agreement. All parties to a negotiation, regardless of 

cultural background, would prefer to come out ahead of the other party in 

business negotiations and the approach they bring to the negotiations is a 

factor of either their personality or their relative position of power.10

Personal Style: Formal or Informal—Relates to how negotiators 

interact with counterparts at the table. In the Middle East, while negotiators 

Table 12. The Impact of Culture on Negotiation

Risk Taking High  Low

Team Organization One Leader  Consensus

Agreement Building Bottom Up  Top Down

Agreement Form Specific  General

Emotionalism High  Low

Time Sensitivity High  Low

Communications Direct  Indirect

Personal Styles Informal  Formal

Attitude Win/Lose  Win/Win

Goal Contract  Relationship

Range of Cultural

Responses

Negotiation Factors
124

will generally insist on addressing counterparts by their titles, they tend to 

like longer, less formal sessions and are given to expressing philosophical 

statements. It is important for American negotiators to pay attention 

to these statements as they are often more important to the negotiation 

process than the technical issues of the problem.

As discussed earlier, Middle Eastern cultures are more tactile and 

allow more touching than Americans are used to. Greeting rituals fit with 

these patterns, so awareness of local norms is important for negotiators. 

Space also relates to comfort with eye contact and attributions related to 

eye contact or lack of eye contact. In Arab cultures, eye contact is a sign 

of reliability and trustworthiness. Closely related to notions of space is 

nonverbal communication. Arab culture is high context. Therefore, Arab 

negotiators attach great importance to context (history for example) and 

“make a sharp distinction between the way matters of state should be conducted and matters of commerce.”11 When communicating with Arabs, 

pay attention to body language, eye movements, and hand gestures. There 

are many dimensions of nonverbal communication that can be used to 

contradict, emphasize, or serve as a substitute for verbal messages.

Communications: Direct or Indirect—Relates to the literature’s 

claims that people from certain cultures tend to adopt direct and simple 

methods of communication while people from other cultures tend to rely 

on indirect, more complex methods. Middle East cultures rely on highcontext language and indirect communication. As such, an Arab negotiator’s reaction to proposals may only be gained by interpreting seemingly 

indefinite comments, gestures, and nonverbal signs. Furthermore, most 

Middle Easterners are reluctant to say “no” directly. This relates to the 

issue of “face” and a preferred avoidance of conflict.

Time Sensitivity: High or Low—Relates to cultural differences in 

attitudes toward time and the length of time devoted to the negotiation 

itself. Americans view time as monochronic, sequential, absolute, and 

prompt. Middle Easterners view time as polychronic, nonlinear, repetitive, and associated with events. As such, Middle Eastern cultures tend to 

favor long negotiations and slow deliberations. The reason for this is that 

most Middle Eastern negotiators have a cultural preference to establish a 

relationship before they begin the negotiations proper; that is, they do not 

have a cultural preference for long negotiations—only for developing a 

relationship—and the consensus-based decisionmaking process of Arab 

and Middle Eastern culture.

Because of their orientation to time, Arab negotiations may involve 

simultaneous occurrences of many things and the involvement of many 
125

people. The time it takes to complete an interaction is elastic and more 

important than any schedule. Arabs tend to exchange pleasantries at some 

length before getting down to business. Likewise, Arabs use silent intervals for contemplation, whereas Americans seem to have little tolerance 

for silence during negotiations. Another dimension of time relevant to 

negotiations with Arabs is the focus on past. Negotiators focused on the 

present should be mindful that others might see the past as part of the 

present.12

Emotionalism: High or Low—Relates to the differing views between 

cultures as to the appropriateness of displaying emotions, as these differing cultural norms may be brought to the negotiating table. Again, as a 

high-context culture, Arab negotiators are more likely to show emotions at 

the negotiating table than American negotiators.

Form of Agreement: General or Specific—Relates to the culturally 

specific preference for the form of written agreement the contract takes. 

Americans prefer detailed contracts that attempt to anticipate all possible 

circumstances while Middle Easterners tend to prefer an agreement in the 

form of general principles rather than detailed rules. Instead of being fixed 

and unchangeable, an agreement in the Middle East is considered relatively flexible and is symbolic of the relationship that has been established 

rather than a legal document.

Building an Agreement: Bottom Up or Top Down—Relates to the 

culturally different processes for developing agreements. Middle East 

negotiators tend to begin negotiations by establishing general principles 

as the framework on which an agreement is built—a deductive or topdown process. Americans tend to begin negotiations by first dealing with 

the details—an inductive or bottom-up process.

Team Organization: One Leader or Group Consensus—Relates to 

the culturally specific ways different groups organize themselves and how 

decisions are made within the group. In the Middle East while a negotiating team may have a designated leader who appears to have complete 

authority to decide all matters, a hidden authority rests with the group and 

decisionmaking often occurs through consensus. Therefore, negotiating 

teams may be relatively large because of the greater number of personnel involved in the decisionmaking process. This is closely related to the 

concept of power distance.

Power distance is used to describe the degree of deference and 

acceptance of unequal power between people. High power distance 

cultures are those where some people are considered superior to others 

because of their social status, gender, race, age, education, birth, personal 
126

achievements, family background, or other factors. Middle Eastern cultures 

are high power distance cultures and, therefore, are comfortable in high 

power distance situations. Because of this, Middle Eastern negotiators tend 

to be comfortable with hierarchical structures, clear authority figures, and 

using power with discretion, while at the same time remaining deferential 

to status.

Risk Taking: High or Low—Relates to research indicating certain 

cultures are more risk averse than others. Americans in general are the 

least risk averse; Middle Eastern culture is prone to avoiding uncertainty. 

Uncertainty avoidance has to do with the way national cultures relate 

to uncertainty and ambiguity, and how well they may adapt to change. 

This can affect their willingness to take risks in a negotiation—to divulge 

information, try new approaches, or tolerate uncertainties in a proposed 

course of action. Because of this, it may be difficult for outside negotiators 

to establish relationships of confidence and trust with members of these 

national cultures. Conversely, the United States has a higher tolerance for 

uncertainty, and, consequently, tends to value risk-taking, problem solving, 

flat organizational structures, and have a higher tolerance for ambiguity.13

The Concept of Face—It is important to reiterate the dual concepts 

of honor and shame in Arab and Middle Eastern cultures. “Face” refers to 

a person’s reputation and the respect in which others hold him. Arab negotiators attach high importance to creating bonds of friendship and trust 

between negotiators and respect for the honor and dignity of negotiating 

partners. To an American, losing face may be embarrassing. To an Arab, 

losing face is devastating. It is the ultimate disgrace and he will go to 

almost any length to avoid a loss of face. The concept of face must be an 

important consideration in negotiations conducted in the Middle East.

The roles and uses of translators—The use of translators is an area 

meriting improvement. Due to a lack of trained military Arabic-speaking 

linguists and contracted third country translators, US forces are reliant on 

locally hired translators. This has the potential to cause problems due to 

the disproportionate influence and bias that translators tend to wield. This 

can result in some groups being favored at the expense of others, while the 

subsequent animosity toward the translator may be directed at American 

forces. In an extreme example of this, American forces that entered Iraq 

with Kuwaiti translators encountered a negative Iraqi response stemming 

from animosity between Iraqis and Kuwaitis. Similarly, tribal and sectarian affiliations of locally hired translators may interfere with US objectives 

and operations. In short, be aware of one’s operating environment and the 

differences between the nationalities and ethnicities in the Middle East.14
127

Cultural Awareness: How Far to Adapt?

The question: How far to adapt? The answer: It depends. Cultural 

awareness is an art, not a science, and varies based on the circumstances and 

the parties involved. Some general guidelines, however, are appropriate.

First, not to cause serious offense, it is appropriate to show some 

degree of cultural sensitivity when carrying out cross-cultural negotiations. This is more than just avoiding culturally offensive actions—the 

do’s and don’ts of typical cultural briefings. It also involves preserving 

face and demonstrating respect for one’s counterpart. During a negotiation, the consequences of offending through cultural insensitivity can lead 

to impasses at best and nonnegotiated agreements (win/lose or lose/lose) 

at worst. Negotiations that fail because the negotiator was not willing to 

provide the level of respect considered appropriate by members of the 

other party cannot only lead to mission failure, but set any previous gains 

back for the unforeseeable future.15

Second, it is appropriate to “be oneself,” but with respect to the culture 

of one’s counterparts. It is not necessary or appropriate to be culturally 

subservient when conducting negotiations with members of a foreign culture. In fact, doing so may create a marked disadvantage. In other words, 

when in Rome, it may be appropriate to do as the Romans do; however, 

this does not mean that one should try to become Roman.16 The rationale 

behind this contention, especially in the Middle East, is that one’s counterpart wants to understand who you are and what type of person you are. 

As shown in figure 15, American negotiators are not generally perceived 

as being well prepared to conduct bilateral negotiations.17

These problems continue today as the US military attempts to deal 

with other cultures in the international arena. To be good negotiators, 

US military leaders must understand how Americans differ from others 

in terms of cultural traits, values, and assumptions. As a starting point, 

when communicating with people from another culture, use the following 

strategies:

• Show Respect: Withhold judgment, accepting the premise that 

attitudes held by an entire culture are probably based on sound 

reasoning. Listen carefully to what is being communicated and 

try to understand your counterpart’s feelings. Take the time to 

learn about the Middle East—its geography, its long history, 

its religion, etc. Try to speak the language. Truly knowing the 

language and culture involves far more than basic grammar and 

conversation skills. It is about credibility and building personal 
128

relationships. Knowing a foreign language can provide a personal 

and professional edge.

• Value Diversity: A person who is knowledgeable about and comfortable with different cultures will be a more effective leader and 

negotiator because he can avoid misunderstandings and tap into 

the greater variety of viewpoints that Arabs can provide.

• Communicate Clearly: To ensure that your message is understood, follow these guidelines.

•• Avoid slang, jargon, military acronyms, and other figures 

of speech.

•• Be specific and illustrate your points with concrete 

examples.

•• Provide and solicit feedback. Summarize frequently, ask 

your counterpart to paraphrase what has been said and 

encourage questions.

•• Avoid attempts at humor. Jokes do not translate well and 

are likely to be lost on your counterpart.

Figure 15. US negotiators’ global report card.

Competency Grade

B-

- D

D

• D

• D

• D

• F

• C

• B+

• AD

Competency Grade

• Preparation B-

• Synergistic approach (win-win) D

• Cultural I.Q. D

• Adapting the negotiating process to

the host country environment D

• Patience D

• Listening D

• Linguistic abilities F

• Using language that is simplistic

and accessible C

• High aspirations B+

• Personal integrity A-

• Building solid relationships D
129

•• Speak plainly and slowly—not so slowly as to appear 

condescending and choose your words carefully.

As seen during the conduct of recent military operations, situations will 

arise in which military leaders will have to conduct some sort of negotiation, formal or informal, with a person or persons from another country. To 

be successful, military leaders at all levels must be sensitive to the crosscultural dimensions of our unique operating environments. Traditionally, 

these issues have been largely ignored or not understood. The ability to 

conduct successful negotiations requires strong cross-cultural skills and is 

critical to winning the peace.
130

Notes

1. David Mitrovica, “International Negotiations,” CSEG Recorder, March 

2001, 48–50.

2. Kishan S. Rana, “Bilateral Diplomacy,” Bilateral Negotiation, 

DiploProject: Geneva and Malta, 2002, 283. See also, Kristopher Blanchard, 

“Cross-Cultural Negotiation and Decision Making,” PowerPoint briefing, North 

Central University, online as of 29 August 2005.

3. An excellent primer for conducting negotiations is Roger Fisher and 

William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, New 

York: Penguin Books, 1983. In this text, Fisher and Ury describe their four principles for effective negotiation. They explain that a good agreement is one that 

is wise and efficient and that improves the parties’ relationship. Wise agreements 

satisfy the parties’ interests and are fair and lasting. The authors’ goal is to develop 

a method for reaching good agreements. Negotiations often take the form of positional bargaining. In positional bargaining, each party opens with their position 

on an issue and the parties then bargain from their separate opening positions to 

agree on one position. Haggling over a price is a typical example of positional 

bargaining. Fisher and Ury argue that positional bargaining does not tend to produce good agreements. It is an inefficient means of reaching agreements, and the 

agreements tend to neglect the parties’ interests. It encourages stubbornness and 

so tends to harm the parties’ relationship. Principled negotiation provides a better 

way of reaching good agreements. Fisher and Ury’s process of principled negotiation can be used effectively on almost any type of dispute. Their four principles 

are (1) separate the people from the problem; (2) focus on interests rather than 

positions; (3) generate a variety of options before settling on an agreement; and 

(4) insist that the agreement be based on objective criteria.

4. Michelle LeBaron, “Culture-Based Negotiation Styles,” July 2003, 

online at <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/culture_negotiation/> (as of 

2 March 2006).

5. Mitrovica (2001), 48–50.

6. Much of this section was derived from Max Smith, “International 

Business Negotiations: A Comparison of Theory with the Perceived Reality of 

Australian Practitioners,” School of Commerce, The Flinders University of South 

Australia, Research Paper Series: 00-9, ISSN: 1441-3906, undated. Online at 

<http://www.ssn.flinders.edu.au/commerce/researchpapers/00-9.doc> (as of 2 

March 2006).

7. Jeswald W. Salacuse, “Ten Ways That Culture Affects Negotiating Style: 

Some Survey Results,” Negotiation Journal, July 1998, 223.

8. Salacuse (1998), 223.

9. Leszek Buszynski, “Negotiating Styles in the Middle East,” The 

Practicing Manager, vol. 13, no. 2, 1993, 20.

10. Smith, “International Business Negotiations.”

11. LeBaron (2003).

12. Ibid.
131

13. Ibid.

14. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), “Chapter 2: Civil Military 

Operations—Civil Affairs, Topic C: Cultural Issues in Iraq,” in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF), CAAT II Initial Impressions Report (IIR) No. 04-13 (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, May 2004).

15. Smith, International Business Negotiations.

16. Ibid.

17. Adapted from Frank L. Acuff, How to Negotiate with Anyone, Anywhere 

Around the World, new expanded ed., New York: AMACOM, 1997.

133

Appendix D

The Implications of Cultural Factors for 

US Operations in Somalia

This appendix discusses the implications of culture for US operations in 

Somalia during the 1990s. The discussion draws on the cultural awareness 

factors described in chapter 3.

US Operations in Somalia

On 24 April 1992, the United Nations Operation in Somalia 

(UNOSOM) I was established to monitor the cease-fire and to provide 

protection and security to personnel, equipment, and humanitarian assistance in Mogadishu, Somalia. In August 1992, the UNOSOM I mandate 

was changed to enable United Nations (UN) forces to protect humanitarian convoys and distribution centers throughout Somalia. As Somalia 

continued on its path toward lawlessness and anarchy, the UN Security 

Council established UNOSOM II on 26 March 1993. This new resolution 

(UNSCR 814) provided a new mandate allowing UNOSOM II forces to 

assist the Somali people in rebuilding their economic, political, and social 

infrastructure with the goal of recreating a democratic Somalia. The main 

responsibilities of UNOSOM II included monitoring the end of hostilities; 

preventing renewed violence; seizing unauthorized small arms; maintaining security at seaports, airports, and road networks required for delivery 

of humanitarian assistance; mine-clearing; and assisting with the return 

of refugees in Somalia. In February 1994, after several violent incidents 

and attacks on UN soldiers, the Security Council revised the UNOSOM 

II mandate and began withdrawing troops and reducing support to UN 

agencies, human rights organizations, and nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs). UNOSOM II completed its withdrawal on 28 March 1995.

The analysis of UNOSOM I and II provides a backdrop for understanding the importance of cultural awareness and competence as it applies to 

US adversaries and allies as well as NGOs. Although cultural misunderstandings are not the root of all problems besetting conflict, these factors 

are important and can shed insight on certain aspects of the operation.

Understanding Somali Culture

Many problems faced by the UN throughout the scope of UNOSOM 

I and II operations can be connected to a failure to understand Somali 

culture. First, misperception of the Somali clan structure and ignorance 

of the notion of “collective responsibility” led the coalition to concentrate 

its attention on Ali Mahdi and Aideed—Somalia’s main warlords. The 
134

unintended consequence of this was that UN actions actually increased 

the warlords’ degree of power and authority, which was desirable to the 

warlords but led to the marginalization of other clans, thereby upsetting 

the traditional balance of the Somali kinship system.1

The second failure relates to the difference between western linear approaches to problem solving compared to the “circular” Somali 

approach.2 This became even more crucial when the Somali “nomadic” 

concept of time was ignored in favor of the time-constrained negotiations 

imposed by the United Nations.3

The third failure was a misunderstanding of the Somali oral culture. 

Even though most of the population could not read, initial information 

operation campaigns focused on dropping leaflets instead of leveraging 

the widely available BBC radio to broadcast the aims and policies of the 

United Nations to the Somali population. These leaflets failed to get the 

message to the Somali population; moreover, widely publicized images of 

American helicopters dropping leaflets had a significant negative effect.

The fourth failure concerns the nation’s reconciliation process.4 In 

Somali society, self-motivated conflict resolution is highly valued, and 

uninvited intervention by outsiders rarely solves the problem. In contrast to the Western concept of impartiality, Somali’s see a third party as 

untrustworthy. In this environment, top-down approaches are not encouraged. Instead, the local tradition of conflict resolution draws on a variety 

of local influences and practices:

• Somali moral commonwealth (customary social code).

• Assemblies of elders (responsible for arbitrating conflicts).

• Use of elders as mediators.

• Use of open councils (involvement of women).

Understanding Coalition Cultures

Cultural awareness is not only important to understanding US 

adversaries—it is also necessary to operate effectively with US allies. 

During the UNISOM I and II operations, more than 30 nations contributed 

over 28,000 troops and military personnel. It was inevitable that cultural 

differences would arise. The three multinational task forces that were 

created faced many cultural challenges, including:

• Different views and interpretations of peacekeeping operations 

between Western, Eastern, and African nations.

• Command and control compromises, which had to meet national 

restrictions and constraints.
135

• Huge variances in logistics capabilities.

• The differing personalities of the on-scene commanders (i.e., US 

and Italian commanders) leading to the deterioration of operations 

development and tempo.

• Diverse languages, leading to poor interoperability and enhanced 

or amplified pre-existing problems.

A final difference that surfaced concerned multiple interpretations of 

the rules of engagement (ROE). US troops were more confrontational and 

more likely to use force, while the European and Australian troops were 

less confrontational and focused on using the “soft power” of dialogue and 

mediation. A lack of cultural awareness and competence in Somalia during 

the conduct of UNISOM I and II created severe tensions between the 

United States and its allies, and directly impacted the combat effectiveness 

of the mission and perhaps its ultimate failure.

Understanding Humanitarian Assistance Organizational 

Cultures

One of the most overlooked problems emerged because of cultural differences between NGOs and the military. These cultural differences, based 

on distinctly different perspectives, created mutual suspicion and contributed to an unhealthy competition between these organizations. From 

the beginning, frustrations and misunderstandings arose due to different 

perceptions of roles and missions. The military believed that its primary 

responsibility was to provide security and relegated the NGO to a supplemental role of delivering goods and services. The NGOs believed they 

had the main role of providing services to the Somalis while the military 

supported them by providing security.

Another area of misunderstanding emerged because of stereotyping. 

Many in the military felt the NGOs were disorganized, wasteful, inexperienced, liberal, antimilitary, academic, self-righteous, and incompetent 

while many in the NGOs felt the military was insensitive, inflexible, conservative, bureaucratic, and obsessive over preventing mission creep.5

The different perspectives and stereotyping reduced the effectiveness 

of the peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations on both sides 

and influenced the overall mission by affecting credibility and decreasing 

worldwide legitimacy. Criticality of the mission could not afford duplication 

of efforts. The two components must understand and complement each 

other beginning in the planning phase.
136

Notes

1. Tamara Duffey, “Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping,” 

International Peacekeeping, vol. 7, no. 1, 2000, 158.

2. Ibid., 159.

3. Ibid. Duffey states that Special Representative to Secretary General Mr. 

Sahnoun took nearly 2 months to discuss and negotiate with Somali representatives, 

which led to the Jubaland Peace Agreement. This was contrasted with Sahnoun’s 

replacement, Ismat Kittani, who was ordered out of Somali territory after 

demanding the Somalis produce a full agreement within 2 hours.

4. Ibid., 160–162.

5. Ibid., 156.
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