* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### REVISED SEPTEMBER 16, 2010 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-30018 Summary Calendar
DONALD C. HODGE, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant

v. EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH SHERIFF’S OF FICE; THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS FOR LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE; GREG PHARE S, In his official capacity as the Sherifffor East Baton Rouge Parish; LEONARDO DEON MOORE, Individually and official capacity as a Lieutenant with East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana USDC No. 3:08-CV-735
Before WIENER, CLEMENT, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Leonardo Deon Moore, a lieutenant in the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, arrested Donald C. Hodge, Jr. after Hodge did not comply with several verbal warnings from Lieutenant Moore and the Louisiana State United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D September 3, 2010 Lyle W. Cayce ClerkNo. 10-30018

1 Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1 993). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a) requires an appellant’s brief to contain a statement of the issues and an argument.

2 Remarkably, Hodge, an attorney, cites no authority in support of the false arrest claim.

3 Depree v. Saunders, 588 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir 2009); s ee also Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, 564 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2009).2 University football game day marshal asking him to leave the student disability accessible section in Tiger Stadium, which he did not have a ticket for. Hodge received a summonsfor remaining after being forbidden and resisting arrest, but was never prosecuted. Hodge filed suit asserting various Constitutional and Louisiana lawclaims against the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office; The Board of Supervisors for Louisiana State University; Greg Phares, Sheriff for East Baton Rouge Parish; and Lieutenant Moore. The district court dismissed all claims against the defendants or granted them summary judgment. Although Hodge names both Sheriff Phares and Lieutenant Moore as defendants on appeal, he solely briefs his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Lieutenant Moore for false arrest in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Despite our policy of liberally construing briefs of pro se litigantsand applying lessstringent standards to parties proceeding prose than to parties represented by counsel, pro se parties must still brief the issues and reasonably comply with the standards of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28. 1 Only Hodge’s false arrest claim comes close, even though he is a lawyer. 2 We consider all other claims waived, each ofwhich approached the frivolous to begin with. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and apply the same legal standards as the district court. 3 “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person wouldNo. 10-30018

4 Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).

5 Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2008).

6 See id; see also Club Retro L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 204 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The Constitutional claim of false arrest requires a showing of no probable cause.”).

7 Mesa, 543 F.3d at 269 (quotation marks omitted).

8 L A
. R EV
. STAT
. § 14:63.3(A). This court has, in an unpublished but persuasive opinion, interpreted a similar situation as giving officers probable cause under this statute. S ingleton v. St. Charles Parish Sheriff’s Dep’t, 306 F. App’x 195, 199–200 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (per curiam) (holding that a Sheriff’s deputy asking a person to leave a store and his failure todo so gave the Sheriff’s deputy probable cause toarrest). The Louisiana Supreme Court has i nterpreted the statute similarly. See State v. Ceaser, 859 So.2d 639, 644–45 (La. 2003) (holding that a defendant remaining on the premises after being ordered to leave constituted an offense in progress and gave officers probable cause to arrest). 3 have known.”4 Here, if Lieutenant Moore’s actions were “objectively reasonable under the circumstances, such that a reasonably competent officer would not have known hisactionsviolated then-existing clearly established law,” immunity attaches. 5 Hodge’s only hope is to show his arrest was without probable cause
– and that Lieutenant Mooreshould have known better. 6 “Probable cause exists when the totality ofthe facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment ofarrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.”7 Lieutenant Moore had probable cause to believe Hodge was committing the state-law c rime of Remaining After Being Forbidden. Louisiana’s criminal trespass statute provides: No person shall without authority go into or upon or remain in or upon or attempt to go intoor upon or remain in or upon any structure, watercraft, or any other movable, or immovable property, which belongs to another, including publ ic buildings and structures, ferries, and bridges, or any part, portion, or area thereof, after having been forbidden to doso, either orally or in writing

. . . by any owner, lessee, or custodian of the property or by any other authorized person. 8No. 10-30018

9 Although Hodge’s brief leaves the court to guess, in the event that he is also bringing a false arrest claim under Louisiana law, summary judgment is affirmed by our finding that Lieutenant Moore had probable cause to arrest. See Deville v. Marcantel , 567 F.3d 156, 172 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (explaining probablecausevitiatesa Louisiana falsearrest action); see also State v. Hathaway, 411 So.2d 1074, 1078–79 (La. 1982). 4 Louisiana State University authorizesgameday marshalstohandleseating and ticketing. Hodge did not possess a ticket for the student disability accessible section, and the game day marshal asked Hodge to leave the area. Hodge refused. The game day marshal then told Lieutenant Moore that Hodge would not leave and asked for help removing him from the restricted area. Lieutenant Moore told Hodge to leave the section. He would not. Hodge’s refusal after multiple requests gave Lieutenant Moore probable cause. Lieutenant Moore’s actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances and he is entitled to qualified immunity from Hodge’s Fourth Amendment-based claim. 9 AFFIRMED.