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33-959 2007

REDUCING NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL THREATS

AT THE SOURCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF 

NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 22, 2006

Serial No. 109-87

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL 

ATTACK

JOHN LINDER, Georgia, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress For the State 

of Georgia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 

Biological Attack .................................................................................................. 1

The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress For the State 

of Pennsylvania .................................................................................................... 35

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress For the 

State of Rhode Island ........................................................................................... 2

The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress For the 

State of Massachusetts ........................................................................................ 40

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress For the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 37

The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Representative in Congress For 

the District of Columbia ...................................................................................... 58

WITNESSES 

Jerry Paul, Princicpal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security

Administration, Department of Energy: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6

Frank Record, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security 

and Nonproliferation, Department of State: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15

Jack David, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Security Policy,

Department of Defense: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 22

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 25

Dr. Igor Khripunov, Associate Director, Center for International Trade and 

Security, University of Georgia: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 43

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 45

Dr. David Franz, Vice President and Chief Biological Scientist, Midwest

Research Institute: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 50

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 52

(1)

REDUCING NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL 

THREATS AT THE SOURCE 

Thursday, June 22, 2006

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF

NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in Room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Linder [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Linder, Gibbons, Dent, Langevin, Markey, Dicks and Norton. 

Mr. LINDER. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack will 

come to order. 

Today, the subcommittee meets to hear testimony on reducing 

nuclear and biological threats at their source. I want to thank our 

distinguished witnesses for appearing today. 

The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the former Soviet 

Union dramatically reduced the chances of an all-out nuclear and 

biological war with the United States. The legacy of its nuclear and 

biological weapons program, however, still has the potential of 

doing enormous harm. Unsecured nuclear material, unemployed biological weapons experts and the patchwork of administrative controls opens the door for a terrorist group to acquire that material 

or use the skills of those scientists to launch an attack on the 

United States. 

Today, this subcommittee will hear about U.S. and multilateral 

efforts to secure nuclear and biological material and redirect former 

weapon scientists into peaceful endeavor. We have no room to fail 

in this mission. 

The detonation of a nuclear device in the United States or the 

dispersal of a biological agent must be prevented, and prevention 

is best achieved at its source. Encouragement efforts being made 

through various agencies before us, bilateral projects with Russia, 

such as the various cooperative threat reduction programs, for example, are helping to secure nuclear warheads and biological 

pathogens and to stabilize employment for nuclear and biological 

experts. 

U.S. partnering with organizations like the International Atomic 

Energy Agency and the nations of the G8 must continue to take the 

lead in keeping nuclear and biological materials out of the hands 

of terrorists. Recent examples demonstrate this success, including 
2

the removal of eight nuclear weapons worth of highly enriched uranium over the last 2 years. For the past year, this effort led to the 

conversion of three research reactors from the use of highly enriched uranium—which can be used in a nuclear weapon—to the 

use of low-enriched uranium, thereby limiting the risk of theft. 

On the biological side, a U.S.-Russian collaboration led to the discovery of highly pathogenic avian flu in birds in Siberia in 2005. 

To date, the U.S. has gained access to nearly a dozen former biological weapons facilities. Securing nuclear and biological material 

is only half the weapon, though. Redirecting former weapons scientists into peaceful and productive of work and discouraging them 

from disclosing secrets to terrorist networks not only requires a coordination between governments but also the creation of an environment of awareness among scientists around the world. 

The sheer numbers of scientists with a skill set that could be 

used by terrorists could quickly overwhelm any state-sponsored 

control effort. Self-regulation and the importance of a security culture in a nuclear and biological science arena is the focus of our 

second panel of witnesses, and I look forward to hearing how Congress can encourage these effects. 

The hope through this hearing, in the testimony of our witnesses 

today, is that we can continue to pressure the international community to make good on the $20 billion pledge to prevent acts of 

terrorism using weapons of mass destruction that was made initially at the June of 2002 G8 Summit. 

With that, I now recognize my friend from Rhode Island, Mr. 

Langevin, the ranking member of this subcommittee, for any statement he would like to make. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to welcome our witnesses today, and I look forward 

to hearing their testimony certainly. 

After listening to witnesses at hearings and briefings held by this 

subcommittee, I feel that our government must move quickly to accelerate our efforts to secure nuclear and biological material at the 

source. 

Now we have learned about the relative ease with which a terrorist can build a crude nuclear device, and we must do all we can 

to prevent them from obtaining nuclear materials. We know that 

securing biological weapons and materials is much more difficult 

due to the dual nature of technology and the ability to grow a lot 

of bioweapon agent from a small amount. So I am very interested 

to hear how our efforts are proceeding on this front. 

Given the fact that a majority of fissile materials and bioweapons 

labs are located in Russia and its former republics, I would like to 

get a sense of how well we are doing in the former Soviet Union 

as well. Security of fissile materials in Russia still concerns me, especially after the National Intelligence Council reported in December of 2004 that undetected smuggling of nuclear materials has occurred at Russian weapons facilities. 

Last November, this subcommittee held a hearing at which a 

senior official from the Department of Energy stated that his Russian counterpart informed him that there were 200 cases of suspected nuclear and radiological material last year. This testimony, 

coupled with the National Intelligence Council report, doesn’t give 
3

me great confidence in the security of fissile materials abroad and 

leads me to believe that if we don’t move quickly this material will 

end up in the wrong hands. 

Now, according to the June, 2004, National Commission on Terrorist Attack report, al Qaeda continues to pursue its strategic objective of obtaining nuclear weapons. I strongly believe that nonproliferation is the best way for the U.S. to protect itself from a 

WMD attack. It is my hope that by holding these hearings, even 

though this committee does not have jurisdiction—oversight jurisdiction—we can highlight the fact that these programs are our best 

chance at securing these weapons. 

Nonengagement and threats, the strategy our government has 

taken also both with North Korea and Iran until very recently, has 

not worked. The strategy, in fact, has put our country, I believe, 

in danger, highlighted by the possibility that material from North 

Korea could each our shores—I am sorry, a missile from North 

Korea could each our shores. 

For our effort to be successful, greater funding and diplomacy 

will be needed to complete the important work in Russia and address these new situations that we now face. 

Finally, I would like to hear from our witnesses on how our government could better coordinate its nonproliferation programs. A 

GAO report issued in January of 2005 stated there was no overall 

plan that integrates the programs carried out by the Department 

of Defense and the Department of Energy. Integration is critically 

important as our government looks to expand its nonproliferation 

programs beyond Russia. 

As I have said in previous hearings, we must begin to move with 

a sense of urgency to prevent terrorists from executing a nuclear 

or biological attack on our shores, and that begins with securing 

weapons material at its source. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our 

witnesses. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LINDER. We are pleased to have two panels of distinguished 

witnesses before us today. Our first panel, I will begin with Mr. 

Jerry Paul. Mr. Paul is a Principal Deputy Administrator of the 

U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration. He has responsibility for overseeing a variety of nuclear net reduction programs, 

including the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. 

From the Department of State, we have Mr. Frank Record. Mr. 

Record is the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. He is responsible for managing a broad range of nonproliferation, counter proliferation and 

arms control functions. 

And, finally, we will hear from Mr. Jack David, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Office of the 

Secretary of Defense. His office provides direction to the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency, which implements a Cooperative Threat 

Reduction program. CTR is also known as a Nunn-Lugar program 

and has been the flagship for U.S. threat reduction for more than 

a decade. 

Let me remind the witnesses that your testimony will be part of 

the record. We would like to ask you to summarize in 5 minutes. 
4

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Paul. 

STATEMENTS OF JERRY PAUL, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY

ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, thank you for focusing on our Nation’s 

nonproliferation activities and on the work of the Department of 

Energy and providing us with this opportunity to testify today. It 

is an honor to be here. It is a pleasure to be here with my colleagues from the State Department and Department of Defense. 

In particular, I appreciate the opportunity to highlight the activities to date on the U.S.-Russian Senior Interagency Working Group 

on Nuclear Security Cooperation established by Presidents Bush 

and Putin, commonly referred to as the Bratislava Initiative. 

In the aftermath of September 11, we have intensified our efforts 

to keep nuclear materials and nuclear weapons out of the hands of 

terrorists. The NNSA has accelerated and expanded its implementation of what we call a five-pronged strategy to deny terrorists and 

states of concern the materials, the technology, and the expertise 

that would be needed to develop nuclear weapons. 

Those five prongs are: one, to account for and secure nuclear material in Russia and the former Soviet Union; two, to detect and 

prevent the movement or trafficking of weapons-grade, weapons-usable technologies and usable nuclear materials; three, to stop the 

production of new fissile material in Russia; four, to eliminate existing weapons-usable material; and, finally, number five, eliminate 

or consolidate the remaining weapons-usable nuclear material and 

radiological materials that exist throughout the remainder of the 

world. 

I should also point out that, underpinning our policy initiatives, 

we maintain a vigorous nonproliferation research and development 

program conducting applied research, development, testing and 

evaluation to produce the technologies that lead to detection systems strengthening the U.S. response to current and projected 

threats to national security worldwide. 

The R&D program is the technical base that provides our policy 

programs and operational agencies, including the Department of 

Defense, the Department of Homeland Security and the Intelligence Community, with innovative systems and technologies to 

meet the U.S. government’s nonproliferation, counter-proliferation 

and counter-terrorism mission responsibilities. The NSA invests in 

strategic and often high-risk technical solutions to detect the proliferation of WMD. 

Now, building on the above outline of our five-pronged strategy 

and our priorities, I now turn to the Bratislava Senior Interagency 

Working Group and its progress to date. 

As you know, this working group came out of the February, 2005, 

meeting in Bratislava between President Bush and President Putin 

where they, together, issued a statement outlining efforts to enhance our nuclear security cooperation. They established a Bilateral Senior Interagency Working Group co-chaired by Secretary 

Sam Bodman at the Department of Energy and also Director Sergei 

Kiriyenko of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency, or 

Rusatom, as it is more commonly known. 
5

Our expanded nuclear security cooperation for Bratislava is in 

five distinct areas: emergency response cooperation, exchanging 

best practices, focusing on security culture, collaboration on issues 

related to research reactors, and nuclear security cooperation, 

which is largely MPC&A material protection and control accountability measures. 

First, as to the emergency response, this component of the 

Bratislava Initiative envisions cooperation in enhancing emergency 

response capabilities to deal with a nuclear or radiological incident, 

including the training and development of additional technical 

methods to detect nuclear and radioactive materials involved in the 

incident. To address this, a U.S.-Russian expert working group on 

emergency response was established to review current and future 

activities in the areas of incident response and consequence management. 

The plans for next year include further discussions on nuclear incident response and consequence management methodologies, plans 

and preparations for such incidents. The group plans to move on 

from a tabletop exercise—which we have done—to a field exercise 

in Russia with experts late this year. The scenario we will focus 

on is on search and consequence management for a terrorist radiological event. 

This initiative is truly an important partnership in the global 

war on terror. In addition to preventing and responding to nuclear 

radiological incidents, both our nations really do need to be prepared to mitigate the consequences in the event of the unthinkable. 

Best practices. The idea behind this task was to have high-level 

nuclear security practitioners from both of our countries work together on common problems and to share solutions and methodologies to those problems and how to address them. 

Prior to Bratislava, the majority of our bilateral nuclear work 

had taken place really at the site or local level with security managers. But for this effort we enlisted the help of those in our organization outside our Russian cooperative programs, those who are 

actually tasked with providing and overseeing nuclear security at 

our facilities across the United States, for example. 

The countries have agreed to continue collaborating in the area 

of nuclear security best practices and have begun a dialogue on 

topics to be discussed at the next meeting, which we are planning 

for this fall. 

As for third-country consultations, both countries are reviewing 

how best to accomplish this. We think it is essential for the U.S. 

and Russia to have a common understanding of what those best 

practices are, and we have worked continually to better define 

those and come to agreement on what those best practices are and 

also share those with third countries. We are anticipating at least 

one more round of bilateral workshops before any kind of consensus can actually be reached, but we will certainly report that 

to you as it develops. 

On security culture. It is important, in addition to best practices, 

that we focus on security culture; and the joint statement says this 

when it mentions calling for the fostering of disciplined, welltrained and responsible custodians and protective forces and fully 

utilized and well-maintained security systems. The concept of secu-
6

rity culture has been the topic at many international meetings. It 

is an issue that we provide leadership on through the IAEA, and 

it is one where we feel as though we are making more and more 

progress in Russia. 

Research reactors. We are very proud of the progress that we 

have made on converting research reactors, as the Congressman 

mentioned a moment ago, three research reactors converted post 

Bratislava, two Russian design, one of U.S. design; and we continue to make good progress on converting the others on the list. 

We have worked in this area with Russia for many years, but, 

as I mentioned earlier, in order to accelerate and expedite that important work that is yet to be done we consolidated several programs under the GTRI or Global Threat Reduction Initiative in 

2004. We have made a lot of progress. The experts on both sides, 

pursuant to Bratislava, have agreed to a prioritized schedule for all 

of the remaining Russian-origin fresh fuel shipments and agreed 

that they will be completed by 2006 and, for the spent fuel shipments, by 2010. In order to meet that schedule, a joint U.S. DOERosatom technical working group will be operating under a joint 

coordinating committee with the objective of accelerating and coordinating those preparations. 

We are also working, as I mentioned earlier, on the development 

of high-density, low-enriched uranium fuels to convert the remaining reactors from high-enriched uranium. We will continue to leverage our assets at the national laboratories and throughout the 

United States complex in order to develop that work, and we feel 

good about the progress that we have made so far. 

I would also like to note that, while in these areas the work has 

been preceding for several years, Bratislava really did help to accelerate the timetable and helped us set more aggressive schedules, 

if you will, and gain enhanced Russian commitment to this important work. 

Mr. LINDER. Your time is up by about 4 and a half minutes. 

Mr. PAUL. With that, Mr. Chairman, I will simply close and look 

forward to taking questions. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Paul follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JERRY PAUL

Mr. Chairman, thank you for focusing on the nonproliferation activities of the 

U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and 

providing this opportunity to testify. In particular, I appreciate the opportunity to 

highlight our activities to date under the U.S.-Russian Senior Interagency Working 

Group on Nuclear Security Cooperation established by Presidents Bush and Putin 

at Bratislava in February of 2005 and related accomplishments. 

I will begin by briefly outlining NNSA’s overall strategy to place into context our 

work under the Senior Working Group, commonly referred to as ′′The Bratislava Initiative.′′

In the aftermath of 9/11, we have intensified our efforts to keep nuclear material 

and nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists. The NNSA has accelerated and 

expanded its implementation of a five-pronged strategy to deny terrorists and states 

of concern the materials, technology, and expertise needed to develop nuclear weapons. 

First: To account for and secure nuclear material in Russia and the former Soviet 

Union. 

To date, we have secured over 80 percent of the sites where these materials are 

stored and we are on course to finish all of our security upgrades by 2008—a full 

two years ahead of the schedule established prior to 2001. 
7

With over 95 percent of the warhead and nuclear fuels sites completed, we will 

finish our work to secure Russian Navy warhead and nuclear fuel sites in FY 2006. 

We are moving rapidly to secure all remaining 12th Main Directorate and Strategic 

Rocket Forces warhead sites on an accelerated schedule, by the end of 2008. 

Second: To detect and prevent the movement or trafficking of weapons-usable technologies and useable nuclear materials. 

Through our Second Line of Defense and Core and Megaports programs, we are 

working with other countries to install radiation detection equipment at key transit 

choke points throughout the world - such as sea ports, airports, and land border 

crossings—to improve our ability to detect movement of nuclear and radiological 

materials. 

Coordinated cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security and the State 

Department is vital to the successful implementation of this global program. Our 

staffs work together on a regular basis to streamline communication, eliminate overlaps in responsibility, and identify potential security gaps where added attention is 

necessary. 

We have installed radiation detection equipment at more than 80 border crossings 

(rail crossings, vehicle crossings, small seaports) and we have taken responsibility 

for additional radiation detection equipment at approximately 50 locations originally 

equipped by the State Department and other agencies. We have already equipped 

six Megaports—Algeciras, Bahamas, Colombo, Rotterdam, Singapore (pilot) and 

Piraeus. We expect to complete installations at one more Megaport this year, and 

are installing equipment at ten additional ports. We plan to sign new agreements 

at five additional Megaports this fiscal year. 

We are also training front-line enforcement officers worldwide, to interdict illicit 

technology transfers, and we are helping states strengthen nuclear safeguards needed to secure nuclear materials. It is critical that states take on responsibilities for 

meeting global nonproliferation responsibilities. These programs help realize that 

objective. 

Third: To stop the production of new fissile material in Russia. 

In 1997, the U.S. signed an agreement with the Russian Federation providing for 

the cessation of production of weapons-grade plutonium that could be used in nuclear weapons, expediting the shut down of Russia’s last three plutonium-producing 

nuclear reactors. In March 2003, the two governments signed an amendment to the 

agreement under which the USG would assist in providing fossil fuel plants to supply alternative energy sources thereby allowing Russia to shut down the reactors 

and cease production of new plutonium. 

We are making progress in this area. We began construction work at the first site, 

Seversk, last year and started construction at the other site, Zheleznogorsk, earlier 

this year, with expected completion dates of 2008 and 2011 respectively. 

Fourth: To eliminate existing weapons-usable material. 

More than 270 metric tons of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium (the equivalent 

of about 11,000 warheads) from dismantled weapons have been down-blended to 

low-enriched, non-weapons grade material for use in commercial power reactors pursuant to the HEU Agreement or what is often called the ′′Megatons to Megawatts′′

program. Altogether, 500 metric tons of Russia’s HEU will be converted and used 

to support civilian nuclear power here in the United States at little or no cost to 

the American taxpayer. This down-blended material accounts for 10 percent of U.S. 

electricity production. In other words, in effect one in every ten light bulbs in America is powered by material that was once contained in a Soviet nuclear warhead. 

Additionally, we are working with the Russians to eliminate 34 metric tons of 

weapons-grade plutonium in each country, enough for over 17,000 nuclear weapons, 

through our plutonium disposition programs. 

Fifth: To eliminate or consolidate the remaining weapons-useable nuclear and radiological materials that exist throughout the remainder of the world. 

In May 2004, DOE launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative—′′GTRI′′—to 

identify, secure, recover and facilitate the disposition of vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world. 

Under the GTRI program, we are converting research reactors around the world 

from highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. 

We are working with the Russian Federation to develop technologies that will enable the conversion from HEU to LEU fuel of Russian-designed research and test 

reactors in third countries. 

We signed an agreement with Russia that provides the overall legal framework 

for repatriating Russian HEU nuclear fuel from Russian-supplied research reactors 

located around the world for safe storage and disposition. To date, we have completed 12 shipments of HEU fresh and spent nuclear fuel under this program. 
8

Last fall, we took the actions necessary to extend the period during which spent 

nuclear fuel containing HEU of U.S. origin could be repatriated to the United States 

and continue to accept shipments from around the world. 

GTRI reduces the risk of radiological materials being used in a radiological dispersal device by working cooperatively with foreign counterparts to locate, recover, 

consolidate, and enhance the security of high-risk radioactive materials. To date, the 

program has completed security upgrades in more than 40 countries containing radiological sources of concern. 

We are also securing weapons expertise through joint collaboration and alternate 

infrastructure development. Through the Department’s Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (′′GIPP′′) program we are engaging former weapons experts in 

nuclear, chemical and biological weapons institutes in Russia and the Former Soviet 

Union (FSU). We often say that the proliferation threat has three elements including technology, materials, and expertise. This program addresses the third element. 

By redirecting weapons scientists to peaceful, commercially viable activities, we reduce the likelihood that these individuals will want to work with proliferators and 

reduce the likelihood that a terrorist organization will be able to recruit them. 

Underpinning these policy initiatives, we maintain a vigorous Nonproliferation 

Research and Development (R&D) Program conducting applied research, development, testing, and evaluation to produce technologies that lead to detection systems 

strengthening the U.S. response to current and projected threats to national security worldwide posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the 

diversion of special nuclear material. The R&D program is the technical base that 

provides our policy programs and operational agencies (including the Department of 

Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Intelligence community) 

with innovative systems and technologies to meet the U.S. Government’s nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and counter-terrorism mission responsibilities. 

NNSA invests in strategic and often high-risk technical solutions to detect the proliferation of WMD. 

Building on the above outline of our strategy and priorities, I now focus on the 

Senior Interagency Working Group and its progress to date. 

As you know, this working group came out of the February 2005 summit in 

Bratislava between President Bush and President Putin. Together they issued a 

joint statement outlining efforts to enhance our nuclear security cooperation. They 

established a bilateral Senior Interagency Working Group co-chaired by Secretary 

Bodman of the Department of Energy and by Director Kiriyenko of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency, or Rosatom, as it is more commonly known.

Our expanded nuclear security cooperation has five distinct areas: 

1. Emergency Response Cooperation 

2. Exchanging ′′Best Practices′′

3. Focus on ′′Security Culture′′

4. Collaboration on issues related to Research Reactors 

5. Nuclear Security Cooperation (MPC&A efforts)

Before I go into more detail on each of these areas of cooperation and what has 

been accomplished to date, I want to describe a little of the history behind the joint 

statement made in Bratislava, Slovak Republic. 

Some of the areas of cooperation that we talk about as ′′efforts under Bratislava′′

you will recognize as work we have been conducting with our Russian partners for 

several years. This includes our research reactor conversion program, our spent and 

fresh fuel repatriation program, and our nuclear security cooperation, all of which 

I noted earlier in my remarks as part of our ongoing strategy. We have also been 

collaborating with Russia for over 5 years to improve their emergency management 

infrastructure. So why announce a need to further enhance cooperation? 

Because it was important to raise our collaboration to the highest levels of Government in order to accelerate our efforts across a spectrum of activities in a well 

coordinated fashion. The President has stated that the gravest threat to the United 

States is the possibility of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. At Bratislava, Presidents Bush and Putin committed to working to enhance cooperation to counter this threat by building upon our earlier work 

and to expand, accelerate, and deepen this cooperation. 

The NNSA works directly with many agencies within the Russian Federation, 

most notably Rosatom, but also the Ministry of Defense, Rostechnadzor (which is 

analogous to our Nuclear Regulatory Commission), the Ministry of Transportation, 

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other organizations. For the most part, we can 

accomplish much at the program staff level. In order to expedite cooperation in some 

areas, however, we must engage the most senior levels of Government. Bratislava 

has given our programs more momentum - more visibility - and has enabled us to 
9

accelerate our programs in a way that allows us to work more quickly to solve some 

of these nuclear security problems. 

Additionally, we elevated the dialogue to a national level because we felt that 

would encourage Russian decision-makers to devote more of their own resources to 

nuclear security. As a result of our joint commitment to accelerate and expand cooperation, our material protection control and accounting upgrades in Russia are 

now scheduled to be complete by 2008. However, we cannot walk away and expect 

those systems will be maintained without financial support from the Government 

of Russia. It is important that the Russian Government - that is the President, the 

Presidential Administration and the Duma - appreciate the gravity of nuclear security issues and be willing to commit resources to those issues as a top priority. 

Finally, we all need to recognize that today’s Russia is not the same Russia we 

encountered in the early days of the Nunn-Lugar initiatives. This is a new Russia 

with a stronger economy, stronger leadership, and a desire to play a larger role on 

the world stage. We recognize these changes and interact with Russia as a partner: 

a partner in the war against terrorism, a partner in nonproliferation and a partner 

in nuclear security. 

Our national security demands that we continue our engagement with Russia in 

the area of nuclear security and that we continue to support programs to eliminate 

excess fissile material, convert research reactors to LEU fuel, and assist in the security of nuclear material, even as we also acknowledge Russia’s need to sustain its 

own security after we leave. Bratislava provides the opportunity to maintain our 

long-standing partnership with Russia at the same time that it provides a vehicle 

for encouraging Russian self-sustainability.

Emergency Response 

The emergency response component of the Bratislava Initiative envisioned cooperation in enhancing emergency-response capability to deal with a nuclear or radiological incident, including training and development of additional technical methods to detect nuclear and radioactive materials involved in the incident. To address 

this, a U.S. - Russian expert working group on emergency response was established 

to review current and future activities in the areas of incident response and consequence management. 

Under the Emergency Response Initiative, U.S. experts visited a Russian training 

and emergency management center in St. Petersburg. On October 18-19, 2005, Russian specialists observed a U.S. tabletop exercise in Nevada. These experts discussed approaches to responding to incidents such as the detonation of a radiological 

dispersion device, and cooperation on nuclear emergency response. 

Plans for next year include further discussions on nuclear incident response and 

consequence management methodologies, plans, and preparations for such incidents. 

The group plans to move on from the tabletop exercise to a field exercise in Russia 

with U.S. experts in late 2006. The scenario will focus on search and consequence 

management for a terrorist radiological event. 

Russia also seeks U.S. participation in training and research activities involving 

both the Rosatom Emergency Response Center in St. Petersburg, and the Ministry 

of Defense’s Emergency Response Center. The first phase of this work will be completed next year. 

This initiative is truly an important partnership in the global war on terror. In 

addition to preventing and responding to nuclear and radiological incidents, both 

our nations need to be prepared to mitigate the consequences of any such event. 

It is important to note, in addition to work under the Bratislava Initiative, we 

have also made progress with Russia to develop technical methods to detect nuclear 

and radiological materials under the Warhead Safety and Security Exchange Agreement (WSSX). WSSX provides for unclassified technical exchanges in safety and security of nuclear warheads, technologies for potential future nonproliferation and 

arms control initiatives and technologies to combat nuclear related terrorism. Several underlying detection technologies can be applied for both nonproliferation and 

counter-terrorism objectives. The collaborative projects under WSSX can leverage 

the work in nuclear weapons detection (including nuclear materials and high explosives) to support advanced technology development to combat nuclear-related terrorism.

Best Practices 

In the Bratislava Joint Statement and corresponding ′′check list,′′ the Interagency 

Working Group was charged with sharing ′′best practices′′ for the sake of improving 

nuclear security at facilities and to jointly initiate security ′′best practices′′ consultations with other countries. 

The idea behind this task was to have high-level nuclear security practitioners 

from both countries work together on common problems, and to discuss solutions 
10

and methodologies for addressing those problems. Prior to Bratislava, the majority 

of our bilateral nuclear work had taken place at the site level with local security 

managers. For this effort, we enlisted the help of those in our organization outside 

our Russian cooperative programs: those actually tasked with providing and overseeing nuclear security at our facilities across the United States. In May of last 

year, several high-ranking Russian officials came and observed the annual meeting 

of the U.S. Senior Security Managers of Hazardous Facilities. 

Additionally, a number of meetings were held at a high-level nuclear workshop 

that took place September 14-15, 2005, in Moscow. There were some 80 participants 

from both countries. From Russia, the participants included specialists from several 

Russian sites, the Ministry of Defense and Rosatom officials. The U.S. sent more 

than 20 security specialists to discuss issues ranging from protective force training, 

to oversight procedures, to technology. The U.S. presentations were well received 

and initiated good discussions. 

The countries have agreed to continue collaborating in the area of Nuclear Security Best Practices and have begun a dialogue on the topics to be discussed at the 

next meeting that should take place this fall. 

As for third-country consultations, both countries are reviewing how best to accomplish this. We believe that it is essential for the United States and Russia to 

have a common understanding of what ′′best practices′′ we would jointly share with 

third countries. We are anticipating at least one more round of bilateral workshops 

before any kind of consensus could be reached in that area.

Security Culture 

In addition to proposing a workshop on ′′best practices,′′ the Joint Statement also 

called for a workshop on Nuclear Security Culture. The statement calls for 

′′fostering disciplined, well-trained, and responsible custodians and protective forces, 

and fully utilized and well-maintained security systems.′′ The concept of ′′security 

culture′′ has been the topic of many international meetings, and the International 

Atomic Energy Agency is working to put together a paper on defining ′′security 

culture′′ and explaining the concept in depth. To fulfill this Bratislava mandate, the 

U.S. and Russia conducted a workshop in conjunction with the ′′best practices′′

workshop on September 12-13, 2005. 

The workshop used experts from the Department’s cadre of nuclear security experts. The group discussed the meaning of ′′security culture′′ and presentations were 

given on norms, regulations and documents that influence the formation of a security culture, education and training of personnel, and topics related to the ′′human 

factors′′ of nuclear security. 

After the workshop, both sides concluded that exploring the concept of ′′security 

culture′′ was a useful endeavor. We agreed to continue the dialogue under the auspices of the Joint Coordinating Committee, established under the 1999 Governmentto-Government Agreement regarding Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Material, 

Physical Protection, Control and Accounting (or the MPC&A Agreement), and that 

the progress would be reported back to the Senior Working Group. So far, the sides 

have agreed to a definition of Security Culture as ′′the assembly of characteristics, 

principles, attitudes, and behavior of individuals, organizations and institutions, 

which serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security′′ and U.S. and 

Russian Co-chairs agreed to develop principles and evaluation criteria relating to 

Security Culture by the end of 2006.

Research Reactors 

We have worked with Russia in the area of research reactors for many years. As 

mentioned earlier, in order to accentuate and expedite the important work yet to 

be done in this area, the Department consolidated several programs under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative in 2004. In particular, we have two related programs 

with Russia that became part of the Bratislava Nuclear Security initiative: the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR) and the Reduced Enrichment 

for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. The RRRFR program is designed 

to repatriate Russian-origin fresh and spent nuclear fuel from research reactors located in third countries. The U.S. has an analogous program to repatriate fresh and 

spent US fuel from reactors in third countries. The RERTR program designs and 

develops LEU fuel for use in reactors originally designed for HEU fuel. The 

Bratislava initiative commits both sides to continue to work together to achieve the 

goals of HEU minimization and repatriation of fuel from third countries. 

So far, a good deal of progress has been made. The experts on both sides agreed 

on a prioritized schedule for all remaining Russian-origin fresh fuel shipments and 

agreed that they would be completed in 2006, and that spent fuel would be completed by 2010. In order to meet that schedule, a joint U.S. DOE-Rosatom technical 

working group will operate under the Joint Coordination Committee with the objec-
11

tive of accelerating and coordinating preparations for irradiated nuclear fuel shipments. 

We’re making real progress: 2.4 kilograms of Russian-origin fuel from a research 

reactor in Salaspils, Latvia were repatriated in May 2005, and 14 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU fresh fuel from the VR-1 reactor at the Czech Technical University 

were repatriated in September 2005. Another milestone was reached this year when 

the first shipment of Russian-origin HEU spent fuel from Uzbekistan was returned 

to Russia. And, in accordance with the schedule to return U.S.-origin spent fuel 

from U.S.-designed research reactors in third countries, 210 U.S.-origin spent fuel 

assemblies from the Netherlands and 128 U.S.-origin spent fuel assemblies from 

Sweden were returned to the United States in June 2005, and 46 U.S.-origin spent 

fuel assemblies from Greece and 22 U.S. origin spent fuel assemblies from Austria 

were returned to the U.S. in December 2005. 

As I have stated, experts from the United States and Russia are working on development of high density uranium fuels that will enable conversion of the remaining reactors that cannot convert with currently qualified LEU fuels. This work will 

continue using mechanisms to allow continued collaboration, such as contracts between U.S. National Laboratories and Russian institutes, information exchange 

through the International Group of Independent Experts on Fuel Development, and 

delivery of LEU replacement fuel to third countries. 

Milestones in this program include: 

The first Russian-designed research reactor located in a third country and supplied with Russian-origin HEU fuel, the VR-1 reactor at the Czech Technical University, was successfully converted to low enriched fuel (LEU fuel) in October 2005. 

This is a significant achievement and will facilitate conversion of other Russian-designed research reactors in third countries to operate on LEU fuel. 

LEU fuel was delivered to the Tajura research reactor in Libya to replace repatriated HEU fuel and support reactor conversion in summer 2006. 

Again, I would like to reiterate that while work in these areas has been proceeding for several years, Bratislava has encouraged us to set more aggressive 

schedules and achieve Russian commitment to this important work.

Nuclear Security 

As you may know, we have a longstanding record of cooperation in material protection control and accounting, or MPC&A, programs with the Russian Federation. 

We began these programs in collaboration with the Department of Defense in 1993 

under the CTR program. It is a robust and broad program that addresses Russian 

civilian and military facilities containing both nuclear warheads and material with 

physical protection upgrades, material control and accounting upgrades, protective 

force equipment and training, and upgrades to nuclear transportation system. Additionally, the program has numerous national-level programs aimed at larger issues 

involved in nuclear security, such as developing laws and regulations, codifying 

standards for training and employment, developing a national-level accountancy system, as well as developing and training oversight bodies. 

This is a mature program. We are committed to finish the upgrades portion of 

our work at Rosatom’s material sites on which we have agreement by 2008 under 

Bratislava. 

When the Presidents committed to Bratislava, we were able, for the first time, 

to establish a ′′master plan′′ for completing our security work with the Russian Federation. Working under the auspices of established agreements, Rosatom, the Russian Ministry of Defense, the U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Department of 

Defense developed a Joint Action Plan that outlines the agreed-upon scope of work 

on upgrades to the security systems at nuclear sites in Russia (as well as for transportation of nuclear warheads slated for disposals). The detailed portions of this 

plan identify new buildings and the status of on-going cooperation for specific buildings at specific cooperation sites. The plan also includes cooperation in the areas of 

nuclear regulatory development, sustainability, secure transport, material protection, control and accounting expertise training, protective force equipment and other 

such crosscutting issues. The Joint Action Plan for Rosatom and the Russian Ministry of Defense sites includes evaluations of joint projects, specific implementation 

timeframes, and detailed milestones. These plans will be augmented with detailed 

schedules as Rosatom and the Russian Ministry of Defense nominate new areas for 

cooperative work. 

Because of the sensitive nature of the information that the U.S. side receives during the course of performing upgrades at Rosatom sites, U.S. and Russian experts 

signed a Memorandum on Procedures for the Exchange of Sensitive Information between Rosatom and the U.S. Department of Energy’s (NNSA) Office of International 

Material Protection and Cooperation in August of 2004. 
12

As I mentioned, we are in the process of completing some of the upgrades work 

at Rosatom sites and commissioned two sites last August, the Scientific Research 

Institute of Atomic Reactors (NIIAR) in Dimitrovgrad and the Research Institute of 

Scientific Instruments (NIIP) in Lytkarino. And by fall of 2006, upgrades will be 

completed at the Bochvar All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Inorganic Materials (VNIINM) and the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE). 

Working with the Ministry of Defense, we have enjoyed a good relationship. We 

have completed significant work with the Russian Navy. In the past few years we 

have also worked to secure some Strategic Rocket Force sites. Perhaps the most significant breakthrough resulting from Bratislava was that the Russian Ministry of 

Defense, the 12th Main Directorate, offered to the U.S. Departments of Energy and 

Defense, a list of sites for cooperative security upgrades. The sites in question are 

large nuclear warhead storage sites. The U.S. has reviewed those proposed sites and 

has agreed to upgrade security at fifteen of the newly proposed sites. The Department of Defense, the Department of Energy and the Ministry of Defense are all 

working together to determine what other assistance the U.S. can provide. 

In the sphere of nuclear security, both Presidents also committed in the Joint 

Statement to work together to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of 

Nuclear Material (CPPNM). I am pleased to report that through the efforts of the 

U.S., the Russian Federation and other States Parties, the CPPNM was amended 

last July. This amendment is a significant step forward for international nuclear security. It expands the scope of the Convention to cover not only nuclear material 

used for peaceful purposes in domestic use, transport and storage, but also nuclear 

facilities used for peaceful purposes. This amendment also includes new counter-terrorism provisions requiring each State Party bound by the amendment to make sabotage of a nuclear facility used for peaceful purposes, or threats to do so in order 

to compel a person or State to do or refrain from doing any act, a punishable offence 

under its national law. We will continue to work closely with Russia and other key 

partners to ensure its timely ratification, and to revise international physical protection guidance to address these new obligations. 

We will also continue to work with Russia in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to 

strengthen controls on especially dangerous nuclear technologies. As proposed by 

President Bush in 2004, we seek broad restrictions on transfers of enrichment or 

reprocessing technologies - the very technologies sought by Iran and DPRK to pursue nuclear weapons programs.

Conclusion 

The Bratislava Nuclear Security initiative allows us to expand and accelerate the 

work we have been doing in the area of nuclear security, explore some new avenues 

of cooperation, and begin a new era in our relationship with the Russian Federation. 

Bringing the issue of nuclear security to the attention of the highest levels of both 

the U.S. and Russian governments provides an immeasurable increase in focus to 

our own security. 

Just this past month, members of my staff and our colleagues in other parts of 

the U.S. Government met with our Russian counterparts here in Washington to discuss next steps in cooperation. Secretary Bodman was briefed on our activities by 

the entire delegation and is fully engaged. Prior to the working meeting, Secretary 

Bodman and Director Kiriyenko (Rosatom) spent a considerable amount of time together discussing a number of topics, most of which highlight Bratislava. 

We are moving toward the time when Russia assumes full responsibility for protecting its own warheads and material, for reducing the quantity of fissile material 

and the numbers of sites at which it is located, and invests in measures to prevent, 

respond to and mitigate nuclear or radiological incidents. This is a necessary condition of both countries’ security. Thus far, progress under the Bratislava initiative 

indicates that Russia is willing to take on that challenge, and we are proud of our 

success in helping Russia prepare to do so. Of course, we recognize there is much 

work still to be done. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to highlight this important 

Initiative. I look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Record. 

STATEMENT OF FRANK RECORD, ACTING ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND 

NONPROFLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. RECORD. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Langevin, and 

other distinguished members of the committee, I thank you for the 
13

opportunity to discuss the Department of State’s ongoing efforts to 

reduce the nuclear and biological threat at the source. 

Recently, I spoke to you about our initiatives to deter, interdict 

and prevent acquisition of nuclear and radiological material. Today’s hearing I think points at the fact that one of the best investments we can make overall as a nation is to reduce the nuclear and 

biological threat, to keep terrorists and states seeking WMD capabilities from ever acquiring those WMD and WMD-related materials, technologies and expertise in the first place. 

Meeting this challenge requires a targeted U.S. government effort; and in my detailed written statement before you, you will see 

outlined the important role played by the State Department 

through programs designed to deny terrorists and states from acquiring WMD nuclear and biological materials, technologies and expertise. 

Broadly, our efforts involve programs that address three targeted 

nuclear and biological elements of this source. They include facilities and equipment that can produce or store WMD, poorly housed 

WMD or WMD-related materials, and people with WMD expertise. 

The State Department implements programs and diplomatic initiatives to address all of these sources, but based on limited time, 

I would like to focus on just four at the moment. They include global programs to combat proliferation of WMD expertise, programs to 

engage and reconfigure former biological weapons production facilities, capacity to rapidly respond to secure or destroy WMD sources, 

and a newly launched State Department program to increase security for facilities housing dangerous pathogens outside of the 

former Soviet Union. 

As part of the State’s Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts, we 

implement the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Expertise program, NWMDE. Through this program, we seek to 

impede the proliferation of WMD expertise to terrorists and states 

of concern. 

Included within the program are three specific initiatives in the 

countries of the former Soviet Union, two which were created specifically to address biological threats. 

They include the Science Centers Program, supporting financial 

self-reliance for former Soviet WMD personnel through two centers, 

the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow and 

the Science and Technology Center in Kiev in the Ukraine. 

Second, the Bio-Chem Redirect Program, which engages former 

Soviet biological and chemical weapons personnel in collaborative 

research with U.S. experts from HHS and USDA. 

And finally, third, the Bio Industry Initiative, BII, which was 

launched after September 11th and the Anthrax attacks of 2001 

and focuses exclusively on the biological threat. 

For a minute then I want to focus on the BII Initiative. It is the 

only U.S. program dedicated to transforming former Soviet largescale biological production facilities for peaceful commercial use. 

Through this program, we also facilitate collaborations between 

global public health experts and industry to redirect former weapons personnel to sustainable, peaceful commercial work, including 

accelerating drug and vaccine development for global infectious diseases and increasing surveillance for diseases like Avian Influenza. 
14

And, Mr. Chairman, as you noted in your remarks, a BII-funded 

U.S.-Russia collaboration led to the discovery of a highly pathogenic avian flu in birds in Siberia in 2005. And I would note our 

2007 funding will allow us to build a Russian avian flu surveillance 

network as well as to reconfigure the production plans in the 

former Soviet Union. 

Our authority to engage and redirect former weapons experts is 

now global, and since 2003 we have expanded our programs to include targeted initiatives to engage former WMD scientists in Iraq 

and Libya. Our engagement efforts in Iraq and Libya are critical 

components of our work to reduce threats in the region, and we 

plan to continue to ensure integration of former WMD personnel in 

Iraq and Libya into the international peaceful community. 

I would also like to mention a word or two about the unique capabilities we have to rapidly respond to proliferation threats of this 

source through our Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, the 

NDF. The NDF reduces the WMD and WMD-terrorist threat by detecting, interdicting, destroying or securing existing weapons and 

related materials. NDF projects are designed to address unanticipated opportunities to reduce proliferation threats, including 

threats of this source, but it is an extremely important part of our 

nonproliferation toolbox, and I would be glad to give you more details. 

Also, I would like to mention briefly a newly launched program 

at State, our Biosecurity Engagement Program. I want to emphasize in this context the immense challenge posed specifically by the 

biological threat and note that dual-use biological materials, technologies and expertise that could be used to enhance WMD capabilities are widespread and readily available. 

Dangerous pathogens exist not only in freezers in the labs of the 

former Soviet Union but are naturally occurring in many parts of 

the world. Therefore, engaging in global activities to promote biological security not only involves securing repositories but involves 

programs to train laboratory and public health workers in appropriate practices for handling and transporting these dangerous 

pathogens. 

The State Department’s Biosecurity Engagement Program will 

address this important aspect of the threat at the source by engaging these biological facilities and infectious disease personnel in activities to promote biosecurity. The program will also focus on 

working with countries where terrorists are known to operate and 

which maintain growing biotechnology sectors and unsecured dangerous pathogen collections. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, through my remarks, my written 

statement and my previous testimony, I think I have outlined in 

a comprehensive way our efforts to address the threat posed by terrorists and states seeking nuclear and biological WMD capability. 

Our efforts to meet this challenge require that we look for opportunities to develop new partnerships, both public and private, and 

that we extend the efforts across the globe to defend against a 

threat. 

Looking to the future, we will continue to combine diplomacy 

with strongly created programs to build support for these international nuclear and biological security efforts. 
15

Thank you very much. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Mr. Record. 

[The statement of Mr. Record follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANCIS C. RECORD

Opening Remarks 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Langevin, and other distinguished members of 

the committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Administration’s accomplishments and ongoing efforts to reduce the nuclear and biological 

threat at the source. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the 

United States’ most urgent national security challenges, and meeting this challenge 

requires targeted efforts to ensure that materials, technologies and expertise that 

can be used to obtain or further WMD capabilities do not fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue States seeking WMD. 

Recently, I spoke to you about our initiatives to deter, interdict and prevent acquisition of nuclear and radiological material through export controls and border assistance, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and our efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. These initiatives are largely designed to interdict WMD material after it has 

been procured. Today, I would like to speak more specifically about U.S. Department of State (DOS) efforts to address the nuclear and biological threat through 

programs and diplomatic initiatives designed to deny terrorists and states from acquiring WMD capability-enhancing nuclear and biological materials, technologies, 

and expertise at their source. These include DOS programs and diplomatic efforts 

designed to address the threat of nuclear and biological terrorism at the source, including efforts to sustainably employ former weapons personnel, right-size and reconfigure former WMD facilities, secure nuclear and biological material and eliminate excess weapon materials, improve U.S.-Russia bilateral cooperation, and vigorously support relevant multilateral mechanisms that seek to secure material at the 

source such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, 

and G-8 Global Partnership activities. 

Although much of the critical work I will speak about today focuses on Eurasia, 

where the Soviet legacy has left behind a vast architecture of poorly secured nuclear 

and biological facilities and a large cadre of unemployed weapons experts, DOS is 

focusing enormous effort to work globally as we address potential sources of WMD 

materials, technologies and expertise where they are housed, including those countries and regions where terrorists are active and could more easily procure them. 

I will begin with DOS programs to engage and redirect former weapons experts, 

secure dangerous pathogens, and destroy WMD infrastructure, emphasizing areas 

where our work fills gaps and complements that of other USG agencies, primarily 

DOE and DoD. I will then address the critical diplomatic multilateral and bilateral 

efforts led by DOS to enhance success for USG programs designed to reduce threat 

at the source. 

I would also like to make you aware of the immense challenge posed by the biological threat, and to compare our efforts to secure dangerous biological material 

and prevent proliferation of biological expertise with our efforts to do the same in 

the nuclear arena. Dual-use biological materials, technologies and expertise that 

could be used to enhance WMD capabilities are widespread and readily available. 

Dangerous pathogens exist not only in freezers in labs of the former Soviet Union 

but are naturally occurring in most parts of the world. Therefore, engaging in biological security activities not only involves traditional efforts to secure repositories, 

but also involves a broader effort to train laboratory and public health workers in 

appropriate practices for handling, storing, and transporting dangerous pathogens 

and should bring together the public health and law enforcement communities. The 

USG has placed an emphasis on combating this threat at the source through programs to secure dangerous pathogens and employ weapons experts in former Soviet 

countries, where pathogens were weaponized and expertise abounds. 

This remains a critically important task, however, we are also now addressing the 

global threat posed by the expansion of dangerous pathogen collections and high 

containment facilities to work with them, particularly in regions of the world where 

terrorists are active.

Cooperative Threat Reduction 

The former Soviet states are still littered with reminders of the massive architecture of the former Soviet WMD program, including a large number of facilities that 

could serve as potential sources for terrorists and states seeking WMD. Since the 

inauguration of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program in 1992,—or as it is 

often referred to the Nunn-Lugar program—the U.S. has worked with the Russian 
16

Federation and other former Soviet states to eliminate WMD threats posed by the 

legacy of the Cold War. The U.S. has invested in efforts to reduce the proliferation 

threat posed by acquisition of materials and know-how from the vast source of poorly secured nuclear and biological materials and underemployed former WMD personnel in the former Soviet Union. Funding for these programs from FY1992 

through today has totaled more than $10 billion. 

The Department of State leads diplomatic and negotiating efforts necessary to 

conduct these programs and to provide the robust legal frameworks for their continuation, and we also implement specific programs, which complement and work 

hand-in-glove with Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Energy (DOE) 

Cooperative Threat Reduction activities. On June 16, 2006, the United States and 

the Russia Federation signed a new protocol extending the CTR umbrella agreement 

for another 7 years, and the two countries are also now finalizing a protocol for the 

plutonium disposition agreement that will resolve the long-standing issue on liability protections. The formulations in the liability protocol are also expected to facilitate a number of other nonproliferation and cooperative programs. DOS cooperative 

threat reduction programs initially focused on Eurasia, but are now addressing the 

worldwide threat.

Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise (NWMDE) 

To effectively develop WMD capability, terrorists and States seeking WMD must 

first have access to know-how and expertise. Therefore, it is critical that the USG 

engage WMD personnel in States with WMD programs and deter them from sharing 

that expertise or using it to promote proliferation. The Nonproliferation of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction Expertise (NWMDE) program is specifically designed to prevent 

the proliferation of WMD expertise to terrorists and states of concern, addressing 

a key objective of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 

and the U.S. National Security Strategy. This program has redirected $52.074 million in FY 2006, and we requested $56.2 million for FY 2007. Since its inception, 

the program has engaged more than 60,000 former weapons experts. 

Included under NWMDE are three specific programs focused in the countries of 

the former Soviet Union, two of which were created by the Congress to specifically 

address the biological threat. These efforts aim to combat the nuclear and biological 

threat at the source while also providing critical diplomatic support and policy guidance for DOE and DoD efforts.

The three DOS NWMDE programs operating in Eurasia are the Science Centers 

Program, Bio-Chem Redirect Program, and BioIndustry Initiative. While the core 

Science Centers program provides funding for the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) based in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center in 

Ukraine (STCU) and engages nuclear, chemical, biological and missile scientists, the 

other DOS redirection programs are more narrowly focused to address the biological 

and chemical proliferation threats.

Science Centers Program 

The Science Centers Program supports financial self-reliance for former Soviet 

WMD personnel through two centers - the ISTC in Moscow and the STCU in Kiev. 

In addition to funding collaborative research, the Program now also provides critical 

training for scientists to compete in the global research and development community 

in competitive grant writing, intellectual property protections, matchmaking with 

U.S. collaborators, and meeting international standards in areas such as Good Laboratory and Manufacturing Practice. The current focus area for this program provides avenues to reduce the proliferation threat over the long-term by enhancing 

self-sustainability for former weapons personnel and institutes. This includes increasing U.S. private industry participation and attracting recipient-country agencies and industry to invest their R&D funds in Science Center-managed research 

in their countries. DOS provides policy guidance and oversight for ISTC and STCU, 

through which most redirection assistance in Russia and the FSU is funded, and 

DOS also coordinates policy guidance and strategy for engagement, particularly 

with respect to biological and chemical engagement activities. DOS chairs an NSCmandated interagency roundtable, which brings together DoD, DOE and other agencies funding biological and chemical redirection activities in the former Soviet Union 

to discuss program activities and provide policy guidance.

Bio-Chem Redirect Program 

The U.S. Bio-Chem Redirect Program (BCR) has allocated more than $80 million 

since 1997 to engage scientists, engineers and technicians of the former Soviet 

Union with biological or chemical weapons expertise in collaborative research with 

U.S. experts from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), U.S. 

Department of Agriculture (USDA), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 

including funding for disease surveillance initiatives and drug and vaccine research 
17

and development in global public health priority areas (Influenza, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, Hepatitis, etc.). BCR also supports key components in U.S. global efforts to 

combat biological and chemical terrorism through research on countermeasures, 

early detection & response, antidotes, decontamination, and other critical areas. The 

current focus of this program is to prepare former Soviet biological and chemical 

weapons personnel for self-sustainability and eventual independence from USG support through capacity building; expanding engagement in Ukraine, Central Asia, 

and the Caucasus; and continuing to expand engagement of former Soviet CW personnel, some of whom receive little or no salary. Through BCR, DOS is also working 

to reduce the biological threat in countries not yet engaged by the DoD Biological 

Threat Reduction program, including regional priorities such as Tajikistan and 

Kyrgyzstan. BCR is also building on DoD’s critical effort that has destroyed the biological weapons (BW) infrastructure at Stepnogorsk, through redirection of former 

Stepnogorsk weapons personnel, including development of sustainable employment 

options.

BioIndustry Initiative 

The U.S. BioIndustry Initiative (BII) is another DOS program created specifically 

to address the biological threat at the source. BII is a unique program, through 

which DOS addresses the biological threat at its source in two major ways: first by 

redirecting weapons experts and reconfiguring former WMD facilities for peaceful 

purposes and second by engaging WMD personnel in work to accelerate drug and 

vaccine development to combat bioterrorism and other critical global public health 

threats, including avian influenza. It is important to note that BII is the only U.S. 

program dedicated to the targeted transformation of former Soviet large-scale biological production facilities for peaceful commercial use. Through BII, for the very 

first time, we are now able to address the threat posed by huge biological weapons 

production facilities, which could be a source for equipment, expertise, and materials 

necessary to make tons of weaponized disease agents. Many former BW production 

and research and development facilities throughout Russia and the FSU are now 

being reconfigured for peaceful use, and BII has forged collaborative partnerships 

with industry partnerships to aid in this effort. 

In its efforts to reconfigure former biological production facilities, BII also works 

closely with State Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) and DoD to 

eliminate WMD infrastructure. In a striking example of how DOS is reducing the 

biological threat at the source, BII has worked to reconfigure critical biological production facilities and redirect their personnel, including the Berdsk Biologics Facility, which is the largest dual-use biological production facility in Russia. Through 

these efforts we will now enable removal and destruction of BW capacity at Berdsk 

and will facilitate reconfiguration to support peaceful employment for WMD experts 

there. BII is also providing for reconfiguration and redirection of personnel at additional biological production facilities in Russia and at production facilities in Georgia and Kazakhstan, including those where DoD has engaged in enhancing biosecurity and destroying WMD infrastructure. 

BII is designed to provide former WMD experts with sustainable employment, and 

BII focuses resources on providing training to bring scientists and facilities up to 

international standards. This has included success in aiding facilities to meet international standards for Good Laboratory Practice (GLP), Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) and Association for Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory Animal 

Care (AAALAC) standards. BII has forged critical partnerships with international 

accreditation and standards groups, including AAALAC, the Regulatory Affairs Professional Society (RAPS) and others, and BII also targets significant resources toward intellectual property protection and training to further ensure sustainability 

for engaged scientists.

NWMDE-Eurasia Program Efficacy 

The importance and efficacy of these three Eurasian NWMDE initiatives is evidenced by the sobering results of a 2003 survey of Russian scientists with weapons 

expertise, which revealed that 20 percent of the respondents would consider working 

in rogue states (including North Korea, Syria, and Iran). However, the study also 

revealed that participation in western grant programs, such as the ISTC, reduced 

the likelihood that surveyed participants would consider working for such states. 

Engagement of WMD expertise in Iraq and Libya 

Since 2003, we have expanded our NWMDE program to include WMD scientists 

from Iraq and Libya. In FY 2004, we developed a targeted program to redirect 

former Iraqi WMD scientists. Despite serious security constraints, we have made 

progress in funding approximately 200 key former WMD personnel in Iraq, and 

have worked closely with the UK in these efforts. 
18

In conjunction with its decision to dismantle its WMD programs in 2004, Libya 

explicitly requested Western assistance to engage its former weapons scientists and 

identified four priority areas for engagement activities: nuclear medicine, water 

management, precision manufacturing, and environmental monitoring. These two 

efforts are critical components of our work to reduce threat in the region, and we 

plan to continue to ensure integration of former WMD personnel in Iraq and Libya 

into the international peaceful scientific community.

DOS Efforts to Increase Pathogen Security 

In addition to our efforts to engage former WMD personnel, the U.S. is also leading global efforts to combat the threat posed by potential terrorist acquisition of 

dangerous biological materials from poorly-secured laboratories that possess biological agents for legitimate public health and research activities. In addition to the 

work described in states of the former Soviet Union, the U.S. is working within the 

international community to raise awareness of the risks, to establish global standards, to assist in developing national legislation and regulations, and to assist individual facilities with upgrading security practices. 

At the initiative of the U.S., the Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention focused on this issue in 2004, highlighting national responsibilities under the Convention and United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1540 for ensuring that 

pathogens are secured. For its part, DOS is funding a project at the World Health 

Organization to develop pathogen security guidelines with global applicability. We 

are also a key player in work on pathogen security guidelines that is underway at 

the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Once these guidelines 

are ready, our intention is to urge states, relevant international organizations, and 

professional scientific groups to adopt them as the norm. In addition, we are working with the International Criminal Police Organization, INTERPOL, - and with individual nations - to ensure that countries have necessary legislation to prevent and 

punish biological weapons-related activity, including efforts by non-State actors to 

obtain dangerous pathogens. 

Important as global standards are, we are not waiting until standards are available before we begin working with states to strengthen pathogen security on a national level and at individual facilities. We are already working with several countries in Asia to raise awareness, to establish national regulations, and to upgrade 

pathogen security at individual high-priority facilities. 

To intensify these efforts, DOS is launching a new program to engage biological 

facilities and infectious disease personnel in regions where terrorists are known to 

operate. This program is called the Biosecurity Engagement Program and is designed to engage countries that maintain rapidly growing biotechnology sectors and 

unsecured dangerous pathogen collections. Through this program, we seek to work 

with countries and specific facilities to improve biosecurity and biosafety conditions 

and to improve accounting for dangerous pathogens to combat the insider threat.

Rapid Response to Reduce the WMD Threat at the Source 

Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) 

As a key complement to DOS, DoD and DOE efforts to reduce the biological and 

nuclear threat at the source through rapid response to critical needs to destroy 

WMD and WMD infrastructure worldwide, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament 

Fund (NDF) is able to address critical, immediate opportunities to reduce the WMD 

threat at the source. 

The NDF reduces the WMD and WMD-terrorist threat by detecting, interdicting, 

destroying or securing existing weapons, related materials and associated infrastructure. Congress has provided the NDF with a clear mandate to develop and execute projects to stop the proliferation of WMD, missiles and advanced conventional 

weapons. To execute this mandate, NDF maintains readiness for rapid, agile and 

flexible responses to a wide variety of situations and conditions—from removing 

WMD and associated infrastructure in Libya, right-sizing biological weapons facilities in Russia, removing fissile material in Kazakhstan, and destroying SA-3 surface-to-air missiles in Southeast Asia. 

NDF proposals span the globe, and the NDF is designed to allow for rapid responses to a wide variety of situations. Many of its projects are developed to take 

advantage of unanticipated opportunities or circumstances that might arise. For this 

reason, NDF resources are not committed to any project or region in advance. NDF 

plays an important and growing role in the war on terror, and has funded efforts 

to destroy fermentors that could be used to make large amounts of pathogens for 

biological weapons, as well as non-WMD programs for the elimination of 

MANPADS, and the destruction of heavy munitions that could be used to make Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). 
19

In some instances, NDF may provide resources to others agencies or offices it 

deems best suited to carry out the activity (e.g. MANPADS elimination). In other 

cases, the technical complexity of many projects requires the project management 

experience of NDF staff. In cases where an international agreement, MOU or implementing agreement is required, NDF must first negotiate agreement from foreign 

governments to support the activity. NDF staff then implements the project, putting 

contracts in place, personnel on the ground, and equipment on location to accomplish the project goals within the budget approved.

Combating the Nuclear Threat at the Source through Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling 

In addition to our efforts to secure nuclear and biological material, technology and 

expertise or destroy WMD infrastructure, DOS also coordinates the U.S. response 

to nuclear smuggling incidents, a responsibility that can lead to identification of and 

further security for unsecured nuclear or radiological sources. Since 9/11 we have 

strengthened this effort not only to ensure that smuggling attempts are thwarted 

and that smugglers are arrested and prosecuted, but also to make certain that the 

fissile or radioactive material involved is secured and source attribution is obtained 

when possible. Attribution through nuclear forensics can help us understand how 

and where illicitly trafficked material is diverted from and how we can secure those 

at-risk facilities. In this effort we work very closely with other agencies in the law 

enforcement and intelligence communities. 

DOS also coordinates interagency efforts to address the threat of nuclear materials smuggling at the source through a Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative. 

This initiative includes activities aimed at identifying and addressing shortcomings 

and gaps of at-risk states, including gaps in physical security and regulatory capability to enhance the security of nuclear materials that may not be covered by USG 

programs. Under this initiative, an interagency team assesses the needs of states 

identified as high risk. Then DOS engages with foreign officials to determine specific 

gaps and works with the state and other international partners to help fulfill identified needs.

DOS Diplomatic Initiatives Aimed at Improving International Efforts to Reduce the Nuclear and Biological Threat at the Source 

In parallel to the programmatic efforts implemented by DOS and by our partners 

at DoD, DOE and elsewhere in the USG, DOS also focuses several key bilateral and 

multilateral initiatives on reducing the nuclear and biological threat at the source. 

The Department’s diplomatic efforts to combat the WMD threat at the source extend to strengthening appropriate multilateral frameworks and international regimes to enforce the global obligation to ensure that materials, technologies, and expertise are not procured by terrorists or states seeking them. Stemming the proliferation of WMD requires a global effort, and we have actively sought to: support 

G-8 initiatives aimed at increasing international efforts to combat the WMD threat 

at the source, bolster the IAEA, involve and obligate more states to improve nuclear 

and biological security, combat nuclear and biological terrorism, and increase international financing of nonproliferation assistance programs designed to employ weapons experts and secure WMD materials.

G-8 Global Partnership 

The Department has led efforts for increased participation by other governments 

to meet nonproliferation and threat reduction program needs worldwide, since success is critical not only to U.S. security, but to international security. Under the G8 Global Partnership launched in 2002, G-8 leaders pledged to raise $20 billion over 

ten years to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD, with an initial focus on Russia. 

The President pledged $10 billion for assistance principally in Russia and Eurasia 

over ten years, and asked other G-7 leaders to match the U.S. contribution. So far 

the G-7, European Commission and thirteen other donor countries that have joined 

the Partnership have pledged about $7 billion for programs in Russia and Ukraine, 

and the Russian Federation has pledged about $2 billion of its own funds. 

Among our Global Partnership priorities are efforts specifically focused on reducing the nuclear and biological threats at the source, including construction of 17 facilities for dismantling nuclear submarines to secure the safe storage of reactor compartments, the safe disposition of excess weapons plutonium and other fissile materials, chemical weapons destruction, and enhancing the physical protection of active 

facilities with nuclear materials. We have also placed a strong emphasis on biological threat reduction activities through the Global Partnership and, in conjunction 

with Canada, the UK and other G-8 nations, the U.S. supports funding for Global 

Partnership initiatives to increase biological security and improve infectious disease 

surveillance. We continue to work with our partners to ensure that our pledges are 
20

turned into concrete results and that the Partnership meets its ambitious goals of 

securing weapons and materials and reducing weapons stockpiles.

G-8 Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX) 

To emphasize the importance of multilateral and multisectoral cooperation to 

combat the threat of bioterrorism, the U.S. established and hosted the initial meeting of the G-8 Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX) under the U.S. G-8 Presidency 

in 2004. BTEX is an international exchange involving foreign policy, homeland security, agriculture, health, and defense experts and was designed to strengthen G-8 

actions to prevent and respond to bioterrorism, including diplomatic initiatives to 

strengthen global expert-to-expert contacts across all of the sectors of the G-8 governments responsible for responding to the bioterrorism threat. 

As a result of the G-8 BTEX work initiated in 2004 and the workplan developed 

in 2005, G-8 nations are continuing and expanding work to: identify gaps and best 

practices in protecting the food supply from deliberate contamination; strengthen 

national and international biosurveillance capabilities; share national emergency response plans; and share methodologies for training of law enforcement and public 

health experts in forensic epidemiology. G-8 nations have also shared reviews of national legal and licensing issues that could affect the possible international sharing 

of medical countermeasures (vaccines, drugs) and have begun to identify emergency 

preparedness and response events which G-8 observers can attend. 

All of these initiatives represent important, productive steps towards harmonizing 

and coordinating G-8 and broader international efforts to defend against bioterrorism.

Materials, Protection, Control & Accounting (MPC&A) Program 

Outside the G-8 context, DOS is also engaged in other wide-ranging bilateral and 

multilateral diplomatic initiatives, which aim to control the nuclear and biological 

threat at the source. Particularly critical are diplomatic efforts that support the ability of the USG to provide upgrades and improvements to the physical protection of 

nuclear weapons and materials in Russia through DOE’s Materials, Protection, Control & Accounting (MPC&A) Program. This program provides physical security and 

accounting procedures to reduce the threat of theft of nuclear material at facilities 

where it is housed. Cooperation is a key component for the continued success of such 

USG nonproliferation programs, and our MPC&A efforts were challenged by a lack 

of access to some sensitive Russian sites. However, in recent years progress has 

been made in the area of access, with only a couple of highly sensitive sites remaining at which the U.S. government has not been able to work. We continue to work 

with our Russian colleagues to secure greater access to facilities and materials 

where nuclear warheads and nuclear material are vulnerable to potential nuclear 

terrorism. 

In fact, I am pleased to report that we made significant progress with Russia, including agreement at Bratislava last year, to develop a plan of work through 2008 

for cooperation on security upgrades of nuclear facilities and for transportation of 

nuclear warheads slated for disposal. The detailed portions of this plan identify specific buildings for cooperation and upgrades, and will also be adjusted as the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) nominates additional sites for cooperative activities. 

The Departments of Defense and Energy have already begun work to upgrade these 

sites. 

In addition, the Bratislava meeting yielded two important developments in our efforts to secure high-enriched uranium (HEU) from U.S. and Russian-designed research reactors in third countries: a plan to jointly develop low-enriched uranium 

(LEU) fuel for use in these research reactors instead of HEU and a prioritized 

timeline to return all U.S. and Russian-origin fresh and spent fuel. The agreed 

timeline calls for all remaining Russian-origin fresh fuel shipments to be completed 

by 2006 and spent HEU fuel shipments to be completed by 2010.

U.S. Support for IAEA and IAEA Additional Protocol 

The U.S. is also strongly supporting multilateral initiatives to decrease the threat 

posed by sources of nuclear and biological materials, technologies and expertise 

worldwide.DOS’s budget includes financial support to the IAEA. Since September 

11, 2001, the USG has contributed over $25 million to assist states in bolstering 

their nuclear and radiological security capabilities for civilian facilities and activities. 

Through our support for the IAEA, the U.S. works toward ensuring that States 

are held accountable for their use to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons material and technology. To that end, we are supporting universal acceptance of the 

IAEA Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol plays an important role in reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation, and promotes our goal of verifying other states’ 

compliance with their nonproliferation obligations. The greater verification role of 
21

the IAEA provided by the Additional Protocol will facilitate detection of undeclared 

nuclear activity at an earlier stage. Our global nonproliferation efforts are much 

more effective when undeclared nuclear activity and nuclear weapons programs are 

thwarted in their infancy.

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) 

While greater oversight by the IAEA contributes to our nuclear nonproliferation 

efforts to ensure that State sources of nuclear materials, technology and expertise 

do not pursue clandestine nuclear WMD programs, it is also critical that individual 

states share responsibility for combating nuclear terrorism by securing their nuclear 

materials at the source. Accordingly, the Department has sought the broadest possible participation in international agreements that obligate States to be proactive 

against proliferation and nuclear terrorism. These agreements and commitments 

strengthen nuclear security worldwide and spread the cost of improving physical nuclear security among many states, all of whom benefit from these efforts. 

To that end, the U.S. strongly supports recent progress under the 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). On July 8, 2005, in 

a culmination of eight years of USG efforts, a diplomatic conference of more than 

eighty-five States Parties to the CPPNM, meeting at the IAEA in Vienna, adopted 

by consensus an Amendment that significantly broadens the scope of the original 

Convention. The Convention was of limited scope, with physical protection obligations covering only nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international transport and storage incidental to such transport. The Amendment to the 

Convention will provide a treaty-based anchor for an international regime for the 

physical protection worldwide of nuclear material and nuclear facilities used for 

peaceful purposes.

Reducing Nuclear Threat at the Source through the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 

Concurrent with our efforts to amend the CPPNM, we have made other diplomatic strides to further combat the threat of nuclear terrorism by providing a 

framework for preventing terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons and material from State sources. In February, 2005, President Bush and Russian President 

Putin called for early adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression 

of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention), as well as the Amendment to the CPPNM. On April 13, 2005, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention was 

unanimously adopted by consensus by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. 

The Russian Federation was the first signatory when the Convention opened for signatures on September 14, 2005, and the United States, the second. Our support for 

the Nuclear Terrorism Convention continues our policy of international cooperation 

among states, which is characterized by parallel, multilateral or joint action towards 

common nonproliferation goals.

Radiological Security 

The United States has developed and pursued a proactive strategy to strengthen 

the control of radioactive sources and materials globally, particularly those sources 

that could be used to build a radioactive dispersal device or ′′dirty bomb′′. The U.S. 

strategy seeks to (1) broaden international adherence to the IAEA Code of Conduct 

on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of Conduct), a voluntary 

set of national guidelines for cradle-to-grave control of sources; (2) promote global 

implementation of the IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive 

Sources (Guidance) that is supplementary to the Code of Conduct, to ensure that 

high-risk radioactive sources are supplied only to authorized end-users in countries 

that can control them; and (3) enhance the provision of technical and regulatory assistance to developing countries. 

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the U.S. was a key player in revising the 

Code of Conduct, to enhance its security elements and effectiveness in preventing 

terrorists from obtaining radioactive material for use in a radiological dispersal device. In addition, the U.S. took the lead in developing and gaining political momentum for the import/export Guidance, the first international import and export framework for radioactive sources. The revised Code of Conduct and Guidance were approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2003 and 2004, respectively, solidifying 

their role as global standards. The U.S. has been successful in gaining high-level 

political commitments to the Code of Conduct and import/export controls in forums 

such as the 2003, 2004, and 2005 G-8 Summits; the U.S.-EU Shannon Summit; the 

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); and the Organization on Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); as well as in gaining national commitments to the 

Code of Conduct by more than 80 countries.
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Conclusion 

The programs and initiatives outlined above provide excellent opportunities for 

DOS to introduce new the technologies and ideas to combat states and terrorists attempting to achieve a biological or radiological capability. Our efforts also require 

that we look for opportunities to develop new partnerships, both public and private, 

that extend efforts across the globe to defense against this threat. 

DOS is, in particular, interested in strengthening security at WMD facilities by 

emphasizing to countries and businesses within radiological and biological industries to improve access controls by using advanced biometric technologies, improved 

cybersecurity measures to protect such facilities from hacker sabotage, and improved background checks and screening procedures to protect against the insider 

threat. 

To improve our efforts to prevent States and terrorists from acquiring WMD materials, technologies and expertise at the source, I should note that we are actively 

seeking to work in partnership with States, nongovernmental organizations, and industry in close coordination with our interagency partners. This approach allows us 

the flexibility to tailor our efforts to ensure sustainability and success for the programs we put in place, a concept emphasized by Secretary Rice in her vision of 

Transformational Diplomacy. 

Looking to the future, the Department will continue to make implementation of 

efforts to secure sources of nuclear and biological WMD materials, technologies, and 

expertise among our highest priorities. This will require improvisation and innovation to keep one step ahead of proliferators. Working with DOE , DoD, other government agencies, the private sector, relevant international organizations and other 

like-minded states, we will continue to invest heavily in keeping the world’s most 

dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world’s most dangerous people.

Mr. LINDER. Mr. David. 

STATEMENT OF JACK DAVID, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE FOR COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION AND NEGOTIATIONS POLICY 

Mr. DAVID. Chairman Linder, Congressman Langevin, members 

of the subcommittee, it is an honor and privilege to appear before 

you today; and I thank you for it. 

I come here today to describe the current status and recent developments in the Defense Department’s Cooperative Threat Reduction, or CTR, program. 

CTR fits within a broad strategic and organizational context for 

DOD known as combating WMD. In order to provide the subcommittee with insight to the broader context, I have used my prepared statement to describe it. I will focus my oral remarks more 

narrowly to address the challenges presented by fissile material security and biological weapons proliferation prevention. 

Mr. Chairman, the first point I will make about fissile material 

security is that this is principally not a responsibility assigned to 

the Department of Defense. Of course, we secure our own material 

working with the Department of Energy, which manages our nuclear stockpile. However, with respect to assistance to contributing 

to security of fissile material in other countries, DOD’s focus is on 

fissile material in weaponized form. This predominantly means security of nuclear warheads. 

I mention this because the Departments of Defense and Energy 

tend to define our different mission areas based on the threat of 

fissile material at large, which is DOE, and nuclear warheads specifically, which is DOE and DOD. The distinction is not absolute, 

as in the case of WMD border security, where both departments 

manage separate but coordinated programs to address smuggling of 

nuclear materials. However, broadly speaking, it is important to 
23

think of DOD’s CTR efforts supporting nuclear material security as 

focused primarily on warheads. 

With respect to warheads, DOD, through the CTR program, 

began addressing warhead security over a decade ago when it 

helped Kyrgyzstan, Belarus and Ukraine securely repatriate their 

warheads to Russia. The issue of warhead security continues to be 

of great concern to us, given the magnitude of the crisis that would 

be posed by a warhead gone missing. 

With the Bratislava Nuclear Security Cooperation Initiative (referred to by Mr. Paul) that Presidents Bush and Putin announced 

in February, 2005, we now are poised to complete this important 

security work at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites by 2008; 

and I might add that this is a perfect illustration of the cooperation 

and the coordination between the Department of Energy and the 

Department of Defense in dividing the work and getting it done 

right. 

This accelerated work was already under way through CTR and 

the related Department of Energy program. The work to secure 

Russia’s nuclear weapons storage site was not programmed for 

completion before 2011. What was achieved by Bratislava was Russian agreement to supply information promptly on all warhead 

sites where Moscow concluded that it needed U.S. assistance. This, 

in turn, allowed us to agree to accelerate the work. 

Russia met its commitment to provide information about warhead sites for which it could use security assistance by providing 

detailed information in June, 2005. This allowed U.S. agencies and 

the Russian government to agree on an accelerated schedule to upgrade certain of the sites by 2008, 3 years early. 

In addition to securing warhead sites, CTR also supports safe 

and secure transport of Russian warheads from areas where they 

are detached from delivery systems to long-term storage or dismantling sites. 

I need to be very clear about CTR’s warhead security work. We 

are not enhancing security of warheads attached to operational nuclear delivery systems. Rather, we are supporting Russia in its responsibility to secure its extensive warhead inventory across its 

vast and often remote array of storage facilities. 

The U.S. will be able to say by 2008 that we have done all we 

can to bring the security of Russia’s nuclear weapons up to safer 

standards. That will be a significant achievement. 

CTR activities also seek to address the threat of biological weapons. The CTR Threat Agent Detection and Response project, or 

TADR—I don’t like acronyms much—the Threat Agent Detection 

and Response project addresses the threat of poorly secured dangerous pathogens in former Soviet Union countries at the same 

time as it strengthens our ability to deal with these pathogens from 

wherever they may come. 

TADR is being implemented in Central Asian and Caucasus 

states. It is a web-based disease surveillance network that replaces 

the Soviet system of maintaining libraries of dangerous pathogens 

in numerous unsecured locations. It will be a vast improvement 

when it is fully implemented, and it is being implemented day by 

day. 
24

Through the TADR Program, we consolidate dangerous pathogen 

strains currently dispersed at various locations within a country in 

a central laboratory located in the capital city. The central laboratory that we help to construct and to design is designed to have the 

ability to characterize and securely store samples of the pathogen 

strains brought to it. 

A very important feature of this program is that the U.S. receives samples of each strain. This helps to enable us to determine 

in the future whether a disease outbreak is naturally occurring or 

a potential bioterror event. 

In 2005, we signed agreements on the Threat Assistance Detection and Reduction program with Azerbaijan and with Ukraine. 

These TADR program agreements follow others already in place 

with Georgia, with Uzbekistan and with Kazakhstan. 

The TADR project has been a key initiative for this Administration. We believe it helps meet a significant, unfilled requirement 

for the U.S. to stay abreast of and combat the global bioterror 

threat. TADR-supplied equipment and training already in place 

have been used to identify Avian Influenza in Ukraine. 

Mr. Chairman, I also would like to describe what DOD is doing 

to address the biological threat that is facing U.S. forces. Policy aspects of this issue are not dealt with by my CTR policy office, but 

by another office under my purview, my counter proliferation policy 

office. 

An important conclusion of the QDR was that the Department 

should focus on new defensive capabilities in the anticipation of a 

continued evolution of WMD threats. In response, DOD has decided 

to reallocate funding within the Chem-Bio Defense program to invest over $1.5 billion over the next 5 years to develop broad-spectrum countermeasures against advanced biological threats. Rather 

than continuing the traditional approach to developing countermeasures, which in effect resulted in one drug for one bug, DOD 

will conduct research to develop drugs that each can counter several pathogens. 

One example is the research we will be conducting to develop a 

single pharmaceutical to counter all types of viral hemorrhagic fevers, like Ebola and Marburg. Another is the effort we will make 

to develop a single pharmaceutical for all intercellular pathogens, 

like Plague. In both cases, we will be attempting to build on molecular biotechnology cutting edge technologies currently available. 

These initiatives will support combating WMD efforts in general 

but will be of particular benefit to our forces that may well be ordered to deploy to places where these fevers pose a risk. Having 

one drug that can counter many bugs will improve military effectiveness by getting forces into the theater more quickly, by protecting our forces more effectively, and complicating an adversary’s 

military calculus on the effect of his potential use of lethal pathogens against our forces. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, DOD understands that combating 

the spread of weapons of mass destruction requires thoughtful 

planning, adaptability to changing circumstances, and unwavering 

determination. These, we believe, are reflected in our new strategic 

guidance, realigned organizational structure, and in changes we 

are making to our day-to-day activities. 
25

Our commitment to success in this endeavor is absolute. Failure 

is not an option. Congress is an essential partner in this fight, and 

we look forward to continuing our work together. Thank you again 

for inviting me to testify. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Mr. David. 

[The statement of Mr. David follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACK DAVID

Chairman Linder, Congressman Langevin, Members of the Subcommittee, it is an 

honor to appear today to describe the current status and recent developments in the 

Defense Department’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, with particular 

attention to security of fissile materials and biological weapons proliferation prevention. The portions of the CTR program related to these issues are important in and 

of themselves. However, they also fit within an important broader context of DoD’s 

efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In order 

to illuminate the broader context for the subcommittee, I will use my prepared 

statement to describe the full range of DoD’s efforts to combat the proliferation of 

WMD and our plans to implement recommendations outlined in the Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR) regarding WMD. 

The missions of preventing proliferation of WMD, preventing the use of WMD and 

enabling our warfighters to continue operations in a WMD environment are not 

new. Since December 2002, when the President set forth the National Strategy to 

Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Department has taken a number of 

measures to enable us better to implement the Strategy. At the same time, while 

adapting at the strategic level, we have been carrying out the day-to-day activities—

some ongoing, some new, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)—to implement policies dictated by the Strategy.

Strategic Guidance 

At the strategic level, preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD is one of the four priorities the Department identified in the 

Quadrennial Defense Review just issued by Secretary Rumsfeld on February 6, 

2006. This is the first QDR that has devoted such attention to the threat of WMD. 

Also at the strategic level, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Peter Pace issued the 

first-ever National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction on 

February 13, 2006. Secretary Rumsfeld also endorsed the National Military Strategy 

to Combat WMD. The strategic approach of the QDR and of the National Military 

Strategy to Combat WMD is built on the ′′three pillars′′ of combating WMD identified in the 2002 National Strategy to Combat WMD: nonproliferation, 

counterproliferation and consequence management. We define these terms as follows: 

Nonproliferation—Actions to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, 

material, and expertise. 

Counterproliferation—Actions to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass 

destruction against the United States, U.S. Armed Forces, its allies, and partners. 

WMD Consequence Management—Actions taken to mitigate the effects of a WMD 

attack, or event, and to restore essential operations and services at home and 

abroad. 

The National Military Strategy to Combat WMD identifies eight military mission 

areas that support the pillars in the National Strategy: offensive operations, elimination operations, interdiction operations, active defense, passive defense, WMD 

consequence management, security cooperation and partner activities, and threat reduction cooperation. 

This strategic framework is the Department’s way of dividing the broad 

′′combating WMD′′ mission into specific, definable, manageable activities. By dividing the mission in this way, we can address it with greater focus in the budget, 

training, doctrine and policy processes.

Organizing for the Combating WMD Mission 

In addition to better defining the strategic framework to address WMD, the Department of Defense has transformed its organizational structure to better combat 

WMD. On January 6, 2005, the Secretary of Defense designated the United States 

Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as the Department’s lead for synchronizing and 

integrating combating WMD operational efforts in support of our Combatant Commanders. In this new role, STRATCOM supports other Combatant Commanders as 

they execute combating WMD operations. On January 31, 2006, the Secretary of De-
26

fense gave the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) an additional duty by appointing him Director of STRATCOM’s Combating WMD Center 

(SCC). This appointment was recommended by the QDR. It is intended to enhance 

STRATCOM’s ability to synchronize and integrate the Department’s combating 

WMD operational efforts. STRATCOM, through the SCC, is charged with identifying combating WMD requirements and advocating for them throughout the budget 

process. Secretary Rumsfeld, in his January 6, 2005 letter designating STRATCOM 

as the DoD lead for synchronizing and integrating DoD’s combating WMD efforts, 

specifically directed STRATCOM to address WMD elimination and interdiction as 

its first two missions and, in regard to each, to substantially increase our capabilities. 

Complementing the WMD assignment to STRATCOM, all DoD components have 

been directed to realign themselves to improve execution of the combating WMD 

mission. Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, for example, 

my own office realigned to create a near-single point of contact for policy support 

of the combating WMD mission. My office is now responsible for six of eight mission 

areas identified in the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD: elimination operations, interdiction operations, active defense, passive defense, security cooperation and partner activities and threat reduction cooperation. My sister office, Forces 

Policy, is responsible for the ′′offensive operations′′ mission area. The Policy Organization’s oversight of the ′′consequence management′′ mission is still being addressed. 

The goal of DoD’s recent elaborations of strategy and rearrangement of components is summed up by quoting the following words from President Bush’s January 

20, 2004, State of the Union address: ′′America is committed to keeping the world’s 

most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the most dangerous regimes.′′ To fulfill 

this commitment, the QDR directs that ′′national efforts to counter the threat posed 

by weapons of mass destruction must incorporate both preventive and responsive dimensions.′′ Preventive activities include those that: build and expand global partnerships aimed at preventing proliferation; stop WMD-related trafficking; help friendly 

governments improve controls over existing WMD; and discredit WMD as an instrument of national power. When preventive activities fail, DoD must be prepared to 

respond. DoD must be prepared to locate, secure and destroy WMD.

Preventive Dimension of Combating WMD 

The Toolkit for Preventive Activities 

With respect to the preventive dimension, we have long viewed nonproliferation 

treaties and export control regimes as integral elements of our strategy for combating WMD. These treaties and regimes include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the 

Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the 

Missile Technology Control Regime. DoD brings significant policy and technical expertise to bear on enforcement of these regimes through my office, Combating WMD 

& Negotiations Policy and through the Defense Technology Security Administration.

Interdiction 

While these regimes are important to preventing proliferation of WMD, not all 

countries are members of all regimes and many countries that are members cheat. 

WMD-related programs of countries like Iran and North Korea show the importance 

of additional measures such as interdiction. Interdiction is an essential component 

of our effort to prevent proliferation activities of both suppliers and customers. The 

threat of interdiction increases the costs for proliferators. It may even deter some 

suppliers from getting into the business of proliferation. DoD is taking steps to 

strengthen U.S. military capabilities to support interdiction. In October 2005, the 

Naval War College organized the first government-wide, classified gaming exercise 

for all U.S. agencies involved in interdiction. The U.S. Navy has improved 

shipboarding and cargo assessment by validating its new Visit Board Search and 

Seizure team capability. The Defense Intelligence Agency has established a new division for interdiction support to DoD policy makers. These steps and others being 

taken will give us an ever-improving interdiction capability.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 

Since President Bush launched the PSI in May 2003, we have worked more closely with other governments on interdiction. The PSI has encouraged the United 

States and other countries to collaborate to interdict WMD-related shipments bound 

to and from states of concern. It also has encouraged and enabled them to improve 

national capabilities supporting interdiction of WMD-related shipments. As a result, 

like-minded nations are developing a more robust arsenal of WMD interdiction tools. 

PSI participants define interdiction broadly to include military, law enforcement, 

intelligence, and diplomatic efforts to impede and stop proliferation≥-related shipments. The PSI concerns shipments by sea, air or land, as well as trans-modal ship-
27

ments. Today more than 75 countries from all regions of the world have indicated 

support for the PSI. We continue to discuss the initiative with key states in the 

areas where proliferators may operate.

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 

Mr. Chairman, Congress already is familiar with the history and details of the 

Cooperative Threat Reduction program. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 

through my office, provides policy guidance and oversight for the Cooperative Threat 

Reduction program. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency implements that guidance. The CTR program supports two of the mission areas identified by the National 

Military Strategy to Combat WMD: threat reduction cooperation and security cooperation/partner activities. The program continues to help eliminate WMD material and enhance security for permissible stocks of WMD, particularly WMD left 

over in the former Soviet Union. As the subcommittee requested, I will focus my 

testimony on recent developments in CTR, as well as on priorities for the year 

ahead. I also will highlight the nuclear security and biodefense areas in which the 

subcommittee has expressed interest. 

DoD has accomplished a great deal by means of the CTR program in fiscal years 

2005 and 2006-to-date. In this timeframe, CTR continued its WMD infrastructure 

elimination work in Russia: CTR projects destroyed 42 intercontinental missiles and 

continued work to destroy SS-24/25 mobile missiles as well as their rail- or roadmobile launchers. CTR has also continued work on the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at Shchuch’ye. The Shchuch’ye facility will provide Russia a capability 

to eliminate some 2.1 million artillery shells and rockets loaded with nerve agent. 

The shells and rockets to be destroyed are very proliferable as they easily can be 

transported. At Shchuch’ye, both the Russian-built and CTR-built main chemical 

weapons elimination buildings stand near completion. They are ready to be outfitted 

internally with chemical handling and neutralization equipment. 

Also in Russia, CTR has continued its assistance to improve the security of nuclear warheads in storage. With the President’s Bratislava Nuclear Security Cooperation Initiative of February 2005, we accelerated work that was already under 

way through CTR and a related Department of Energy program. This work was not 

programmed for completion before 2011. We now are poised to complete our security 

work at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites by 2008. 

What was achieved at Bratislava was Russian agreement to supply information 

promptly on all warhead sites where Moscow viewed U.S. assistance to be necessary. Russia met that commitment by providing detailed information in June 

2005, which allowed U.S. agencies and the Russian government to agree on an accelerated schedule to upgrade security at select sites by 2008. 

Let me be clear: the U.S. is not enhancing security of warheads attached to operational nuclear delivery systems; rather, we are supporting Russia in its responsibility to secure its extensive warhead inventory across its vast and often remote 

array of storage facilities. The U.S. will be able to say by 2008 that we have done 

all we can to bring security of Russia’s nuclear weapons up to credible standards. 

That will be a significant achievement. We needed Congressional help with this endeavor, and Congress delivered: the accelerated schedule required an additional 

$44.5 million in Fiscal Year 2006 funds, which were included in the recently enacted 

Supplemental Appropriations measure. We appreciate this support very much and 

look forward to keeping Congress updated on the progress we make implementing 

the Bratislava Initiative. 

DoD implementation of CTR programs in the past year also has addressed the 

threat of biological weapons. The CTR ′′Threat Agent Detection and Response′′ (TADR) project addresses the threat of loose dangerous pathogens in former Soviet 

Union countries at the same time as it strengthens our ability to deal with these 

pathogens should they come from another source. 

TADR is being implemented in Central Asian and Caucasus states. It is a webbased disease surveillance network that replaces the Soviet system of maintaining 

libraries of dangerous pathogens in unsecured locations. In the TADR program, we 

consolidate dangerous pathogen strains currently dispersed at numerous locations 

within a country in to a few central locations. We help to construct Central Reference Laboratories typically in the capital cities of partner countries. These are designed to have the ability to characterize and securely store collected samples of 

dangerous pathogens. A very important feature of the TADR program is that the 

U.S. receives samples of each of the collected pathogen strains. This will better enable us to determine whether a disease outbreak is naturally occurring or a potential bio-terror event. 

In 2005, we signed agreements on TADR assistance with Azerbaijan and with 

Ukraine. These TADR program agreements follow others already in place with 
28

Georgia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The TADR project has been a key initiative 

for this Administration. We believe it helps meet a significant, unfilled requirement 

for the U.S. to stay abreast of and combat the global bio-terror threat. TADR-supplied equipment and training already in place have been used to identify Avian Influenza. 

During the past year, DoD also made advances in combating WMD as a result 

of its CTR WMD border security project. This project is known as the WMD-Proliferation Prevention Initiative (PPI). The PPI was conceived early in the present 

Administration and influenced heavily by the September 11 attacks. DoD took the 

CTR program in a fundamentally new direction when it introduced PPI. Before PPI 

was introduced, the CTR program dealt with WMD only at its source. 

9/11 highlighted the need to address the threat of ′′WMD-on-the-move.′′ PPI focuses on countries that are willing to try to stop WMD on the move but lack resources to do so. In initiating PPI, DoD expanded the CTR program from simply 

helping countries to destroy WMD and related items in place to helping countries 

to build detection/interdiction capabilities. PPI is now working in Ukraine, 

Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan. We recently expanded activities in Ukraine, and signed 

key legal agreements with Kazakhstan to allow us to begin PPI projects with that 

country as well. We are focusing on Central Asian countries because of their proximity to Russia in order to create a WMD ′′safety net.′′ As successful as we hope 

the CTR PPI projects are, DoD is not limiting these combating WMD projects to 

merely supplying equipment through PPI. We are working with the Combatant 

Commands to provide training, doctrine and tactics for the equipment we help bring 

to CTR PPI partners. 

Finally, I can report that in May 2005, DoD took the initiative to extend the CTR 

program’s legal framework with Russia - over one-year ahead of expiration. We took 

this step to avoid a disruption of CTR’s important work such as occurred seven 

years ago, the last time the framework required extension. We are pleased to report 

that the extension protocol was finally signed on June 17, with acceptable terms for 

the U.S. This will allow CTR’s important work to secure and eliminate WMD and 

related infrastructure in Russia to continue uninterrupted.

International Counterproliferation Program (ICP) 

Mr. Chairman, I want to take a moment to describe DoD’s International 

Counterproliferation Program, which is a small but important element of our 

′′toolkit′′ for combating proliferation of WMD, particularly radiological material. As 

in the case of the CTR program, the ICP program is implemented by the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency. Also like the CTR program, policy matters for ICP are 

handled by my office. The March 2006 transfer of ICP from its previous home in 

the Eurasia regional office to be in my office is another example of how we are consolidating and aligning DoD policy responsibilities related to combating WMD. 

The ICP attempts to build capabilities to secure borders of participating nations 

against illicit trafficking among partner nations. The ICP works with the US Customs and Border Protection Service, the FBI, and other U.S. agencies to provide 

training that is focused specifically at the law enforcement and regulatory level. It 

is intended to make proliferation of WMD across borders much more difficult. At 

first glance, the ICP looks a lot like the new CTR border security initiative I described above. However, there are key differences in programmatics, authorities, 

and policy objectives. 

Programmatically, the ICP has always been a ′′niche′′ activity, with funding at 

$12-$15 million annually. The ICP also has not provided participating countries 

with heavy infrastructure or extensive procurement, as CTR often has and does. The 

ICP’s authorities are also more geographically flexible than those of CTR: with approval of the Secretary of Defense, the ICP can be implemented in any country in 

the world. As you know, absent Presidential approval to work elsewhere, the CTR 

program may be implemented only in countries of the Former Soviet Union. In addition, the ICP has regional objectives not present with CTR. ICP training sessions 

and other activities are conducted, to the extent possible, on a multilateral basis in 

order that partner countries can be encouraged to think about WMD border security 

as a regional challenge, not merely a national one. 

ICP is still new to my office and we are conducting a top-to-bottom review and 

revalidation of past practices. We will ensure that ICP activities are supportive of 

national strategies, coordinated with other agencies’ activities, and leveraged with 

other programs to achieve the best results possible.

Responsive Dimension of Combating WMD 

Investing for the Future 

Developing our strategies, restructuring our organizations and changing our daily 

activities will be of no avail without adequate funding for corresponding capabilities, 
29

technologies and mission areas. The autumn 2005 program/budget review undertook 

a comprehensive analysis of combating WMD funding. This analytical process was 

carried through the QDR. Beginning with the FY2006 budget submission, we added 

$2 billion to the previous $7.6 billion Fiscal Year 2006-2011 allocation for the Chemical Biological Defense Program and related infrastructure (an increase of almost 

20%). The increase in chem-bio defense funding represents a down payment toward 

elevating the policy and programmatic attention we must give this area.

Joint Task Force for Elimination 

One of the earliest lessons learned from our military operations in Iraq was that 

DoD needed a well organized, well trained force to be able to quickly and systematically locate, seize, secure, disable and safeguard an adversary’s WMD program, including sites, laboratories, materials, and associated scientists and other personnel. 

The Army’s 20th Support Command, located north of Baltimore at the Edgewood 

Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, was stood up as an Army headquarters. It is 

tasked to provide technically qualified chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and 

high-yield Explosives (CBRNE) response forces to support geographic Combatant 

Commanders. This unique organization includes the Army’s Technical Escort Battalions as well as an Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Group. While the 20th 

was not established until after Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of its units participated in the search for WMD in Iraq. 

The 20th Headquarters was activated in 2004. However, while the military units 

assigned to this headquarters are deployable, the headquarters itself cannot deploy 

today since nearly two-thirds of the staff is composed of government civilians or contractors. In the QDR process, DoD leadership approved a proposal to assign 20th 

Support Command the task of becoming a deployable headquarters that could command and control these types of operations. Establishing a joint task force for elimination is a key element of the Department’s vision, as articulated by the QDR, to 

deal with all aspects of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. The 20th 

gives us a base on which to build.

Biodefense Initiative 

Another key conclusion of the QDR was that the Department should focus on new 

defensive capabilities in anticipation of the continued evolution of WMD threats. In 

response, DoD has decided to reallocate funding within the Chem-Bio Defense program to invest over $1.5B over the next five years to develop broad-spectrum countermeasures against advanced biological threats. Rather than continuing the traditional approach to developing countermeasures—which in effect results in ′′one 

drug, one bug′′—DoD will conduct research to develop drugs that each can counter 

several pathogens. Another example is the research we will be conducting to develop 

a single pharmaceutical to counter all types of viral hemorrhagic fevers (like Ebola 

and Marburg). Another is the effort we will make to develop a single pharmaceutical 

for all ′′intracellular′′ pathogens, like Plague. In both cases, we will be leveraging 

molecular biotechnology cutting edge technologies currently available. These initiatives will support combating WMD efforts in general but will be of particular benefit 

to our forces that may well be ordered to deploy to places where these fevers pose 

a risk. Having one drug that can counter many bugs will improve military effectiveness by getting forces into the theater more quickly, protecting our forces more effectively and complicating an adversary’s military calculus on the effect of his potential use of lethal pathogens against them.

Building Partner Capacity 

More than ever before, we need partners be to be prepared for operations with 

us in a CBRN world. In 2002, the Department proposed creation of a CBRN Defense 

Battalion for NATO. This U.S. concept was endorsed by NATO defense ministers 

during the 2002 Prague Summit. Elements of a fully operational NATO CBRN Defense Battalion supported the 2004 Summer Olympics just over one year later. The 

NATO Battalion includes a CBRN joint assessment team and mobile chemical, biological and radiological laboratories; it has received personnel and capability support 

from seventeen NATO nations to date. The concept for the Battalion and the way 

it was quickly institutionalized were unprecedented at NATO. We continue to encourage strengthening of the Battalion’s capabilities and also encourage member nations to improve their own combating WMD capabilities. The Battalion will be a 

model for future collaboration as we expand counterproliferation discussions with 

other nations. 

We are aggressively pursuing the establishment of formal, regular bilateral discussions with international partners outside NATO on counterproliferation issues 

ranging from policy and operational support to detailed technical cooperation. We 

have or are establishing such bilateral working groups with countries from Europe, 

the Middle East, and Asia to respond to the use of WMD against us. Our partners 
30

in the working groups share our desire to prepare to defend against the WMD 

threat. A central goal of the bilateral working groups is to ensure that U.S. and potential coalition partners can execute combined operations in a WMD environment. 

The challenge of interoperability is significant in a conventional warfighting environment. The challenge in a WMD situation is even greater as it raises many complicating issues. For example, if our combat or transport aircraft are returning from 

an area where WMD has been employed, we need to know in advance what decontamination our allies will require in order to ensure ready access to important way 

stations and forward depots. Similar problems relate to the decontamination of 

forces—including potentially wounded personnel—who will require immediate evacuation and attention. We have launched discussions with our NATO allies as well 

with several key potential coalition partners on these and other issues we believe 

need to be resolved for combined operations in a WMD environment. 

Building partner capacity takes many forms and can include building legal capacities. In 2005, Navy, Joint Staff, General Counsel and OSD-Policy representatives 

completed three years of activity to expand legal authorities against maritime trafficking in WMD-related materials. We helped secure adoption of amendments to the 

Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Against the Safety of Maritime 

Navigation, establishing the first international standard for criminalizing maritime 

activities related to WMD as well as a comprehensive boarding regime for WMDrelated maritime shipments. Once the Amendment enters into force, after ratification by 12 member-states, we will have a new law to prosecute violators and press 

for greater vigilance against trafficking in WMD.

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, DoD understands that combating the spread of weapons of mass 

destruction requires thoughtful planning, adaptability to changing circumstances 

and unwavering determination. These, we believe, are reflected in our new strategic 

guidance, realigned organizational structure, and in changes we are making to our 

day-to-day activities. Our commitment to success in this endeavor is absolute. Failure is not an option. Congress is an essential partner in this fight, and we look forward to continuing our work together. Thank you again for inviting me to testify.

Mr. LINDER. Mr. David, can President Putin deliver on behalf of 

Ukraine or Kazakhstan? 

Mr. DAVID. Deliver on behalf of Ukraine? 

Mr. LINDER. Access, for example, to sites. Clearly, all the sites 

weren’t in Russia. 

Mr. DAVID. I think that we are working closely with Kazakhstan 

and Ukraine and the governments in those places, but I don’t know 

that, at this point in time, President Putin has very much influence 

or information to support our efforts in those two countries that we 

don’t otherwise have. 

Mr. LINDER. So the Bratislava agreement does not affect any of 

the other—

Mr. DAVID. No. 

Mr. LINDER. Since we have asked Russia for access to their sites, 

it is because are we giving them access to ours? Fort Detrick, for 

example? 

Mr. DAVID. No. In fact, we have access to their sites—when we 

have access to their sites, it is because we are in a position to provide assistance. It is for the assistance that we can provide that is 

in their interest and in our interest that they will give us access. 

This is not a program or this is not a situation like the START 

Agreement where there are mutual inspections. 

Mr. LINDER. We have more access to their nuclear sites than 

their biological sites; is that correct? 

Mr. DAVID. Yes, that is true. 

Mr. LINDER. What are we doing about the biology side of the 

equation? 

Mr. DAVID. There are five places where we assist Russia in biological sites for security. There are some limited joint research 
31

projects that we have with Russia. But, other than that, further 

U.S. support for collaborating with Russia in this way, as we do in 

Kazakhstan or we do in Azerbaijan, for example, under the CTR 

program, is prevented because Russia doesn’t want us to have access and because we don’t have an agreement in place. We can’t 

reach an agreement which will be satisfactory. 

Mr. LINDER. You said in 2008 we will be able to say we have 

done all we can. Is that because we have decided all of the sites 

are up to credible standards, or is that because the Russians have 

decided that is the end of the road? 

Mr. DAVID. The emphasis on my answer is on the word ‘‘we’’ 

have done all we can because we have done all that they have allowed to us do. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Record, what are we doing about Russia’s store 

of smallpox? 

Mr. RECORD. Well, we are engaged with them on a broad dialogue on these kind of issues through some of the programs I mentioned, and—

Mr. LINDER. Apparently, I wasn’t very clear. What are we doing 

with Russia with respect to their store of smallpox? 

Mr. RECORD. Well, sir, as I said, that is something that we have 

talked to them through our newly created programs, including the 

BII and the biological programs I mentioned. 

Mr. LINDER. And where are we? 

Mr. RECORD. Well, at this point. I can’t give you a status report. 

I would be glad to give you that for the record. 

Mr. LINDER. I would like you to do that. 

Mr. LINDER. Do we have a sense of how much they are storing? 

Mr. RECORD. I don’t—I will give that to you. 

Mr. LINDER. Do we have a sense of whether they have more 

today than they had 30 years ago or less? Because some has disappeared. 

Mr. RECORD. I will have to get that for you for the record, sir. 

Mr. LINDER. Which countries have not held up to their portion 

of the $20 billion G8 pledge? 

Mr. RECORD. Well, the pledging—as you know, I gave general 

numbers for pledging. Unfortunately, we weren’t able to get specific 

numbers for other countries in terms of their overall pledges. We have committed about, as I understand it, $3.3 billion of our 

$10 billion pledge as of fiscal year 2005; and my understanding is 

the global partnership has not formally exchanged data on actual 

obligations, so we don’t right now have numbers for the other countries, but I can go back and get more information on that. 

Mr. LINDER. Do we think it is important? 

Mr. RECORD. Yes, we do, absolutely. 

Mr. LINDER. Then why aren’t we tracking this? 

Mr. RECORD. Well, as I say, there is certain data exchange protocols you have in those countries, and it is difficult to get those information, but we can certainly go back and try and get it from 

you. 

Mr. LINDER. Didn’t the Republic make a pledge? 

Mr. RECORD. Yes, they have. 

Mr. LINDER. Did the Republic make a pledge with respect to 

amounts? 
32

Mr. RECORD. Yes, they have. 

Mr. LINDER. And we don’t know if they have done anything? 

Mr. RECORD. Well, it is hard for us to track information this way. 

Mr. LINDER. Why? 

Mr. RECORD. Because it is hard to get that information from 

them. But, as I say, I can try and go back and do that. We did 

check, sir, before the hearing, so we made those efforts, and we will 

keep trying to make those efforts. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Paul, you mentioned in your testimony the program to eliminate 34 metric tons of plutonium in Russia and the 

U.S. How far along are we? 

Mr. PAUL. That is right. It is 34 metric tons in the U.S., 34 metric tons in Russia. Each country has agreed to develop a facility to 

dispose of that material—

Mr. LINDER. Dispose of it or degrade it? 

Mr. PAUL. To ultimately dispose of it, first, by converting it into 

a mixed oxide and then irradiating it in a light water reactor, a 

regular commercial reactor. 

On the U.S. side, the MOX plant in the Savannah River site in 

South Carolina, 85 percent finished with design. We started the 

site preparation back in August, and we intend to—our schedule is 

to begin construction by the end of this year. 

On the Russian side, they are not quite as far along. There have 

been some hold-ups, more than a 2-year delay due to a dispute over 

liability issues. There is a liability protocol, an agreement that has 

been verbally agreed to, but the Russians have not yet signed. We 

are currently waiting for that signature. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you again 

for your testimony, gentlemen. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, security in Russia still 

concerns me. I think it should concern all of us. 

In a previous hearing, Davis Heisinger from the Department of 

Energy had revealed that his Russian counterpart had informed 

him that there were some 200 potential nuclear or radiological 

smuggling incidents last year. Mr. Heisinger’s testimony confirms 

the key judgment of the National Intelligence Council’s report at 

the Congress on the safety and security of Russian nuclear facilities and military forces published in 2004. This report states that 

undetected smuggling has occurred since the end of the Cold War, 

and this committee finds this information obviously very disturbing. 

Can you tell me what improvements in our nonproliferation programs are needed to reduce the number of smuggling incidents? 

And is this an issue of funding, or does the problem lie with the 

political and bureaucratic hurdles that have hindered our efforts 

with the Russians since the end of the Cold War? 

Mr. PAUL. Yes, sir. It is indeed troubling—

Mr. LANGEVIN. The question is for the panel, but we will start 

with you. 

Mr. PAUL. It is indeed troubling to us as well; and it is, of course, 

why we spend so much time and why you appropriate so many resources to help us secure those facilities. Congress and this com-
33

mittee has been very supportive of trying to secure those facilities 

by putting in place the security upgrades and the material protection control and accounting, shifting over from the systems that the 

Russians previously had that was really human centered to one 

now that is complemented by having materials accountability, 

physical protection, control. 

As to the Russian customs open reporting that there had been 

a certain number of smuggling incidents, I don’t have a lot of information about what the split is between nuclear or radiological. It 

is believed to be largely radiological. Both are troubling, of course. 

But that is why we put so much time and effort and energy into 

these programs. And even though at times we talk about how 

proud we are of our success, we also recognize that there is still 

a tremendous amount of work to be done. 

In Russia, in terms of upgrading sites, we have completed 80 percent of the material sites, 64 percent of the warhead sites, and that 

is really accelerating now in part because of Bratislava but in part 

because it took quite a while to get the access. We are finally getting the type of access that we need, and we believe that we will 

be able to complete those security upgrades by 2008. 

We, too, are constantly looking for creative ways to accomplish 

this as fast as we possibly can, but, of course, there are limitations 

in as much as we are dependent upon cooperation from them. So 

the cooperation has improved in some areas, in part because of 

President Bush and President Putin’s leadership on this, but I still 

have to state great caution, that there is still much work to be 

done. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Given the report of the National Intelligence 

Council and the detailed smuggling that they have reported on nuclear types of materials or components and given Mr. Heisinger’s 

comments and some information that he related to us from his 

counterpart, should we and can we have a much higher degree of 

confidence that that level of smuggling is not occurring anymore? 

Mr. PAUL. I think that every day that we secure another site our 

confidence in preventing those events goes up. 

Sure, we hear your concern. That is why we focus so much energy and attention on it—and have in the last 5 years and prior 

to then as well. Each time we secure a site, each time we secure 

material, each time we have some success, some progress, get more 

access, put in more protection and equipment and increase their 

training and work on sustainability, we improve or increase our 

confidence by trying to close that gap that you are referring to, that 

gap that troubles you, and it troubles me. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Isn’t it true that that work would be exponentially accelerated if adequate resources were funding these programs? 

Mr. PAUL. Certainly. To accomplish more work certainly requires 

more resources. That is why, since 2001, we have more than doubled the amount of funding placed in nuclear nonproliferation, including securing of material sites in Russia, an extraordinary, really historic increase in resources that have been dedicated to that. 

So let me just answer your question by saying yes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I, for one, don’t think we are doing nearly enough 

with respect to funding these nonproliferation programs; and until 
34

the administration, the Congress gets serious about the value of resources, we are putting our citizens and our country and indeed 

other nations of the world at great risk. 

Mr. RECORD. Let me just say a couple of words. In addition to 

the funding issues that you are highlighting, I would just like to 

say a couple of words about the process, and then maybe there is 

a feedback loop you can see in how we would approach. 

There is a Nuclear Trafficking Response Group that is in place. 

It is a state-led inter-agency body that follows up on individual 

smuggling cases and reports of these; and we have representatives 

of a wide number of agencies, law enforcement, Intelligence Community, to ensure that smuggled material is secure and, where possible, to identify the facility or country from which it was smuggled 

or diverted. And to the extent this group, this NTRG, is able to develop this actionable information, then we would share that with 

those responsible for carrying out and implementing U.S. assistance programs that are capable of addressing material protection 

and control. So those would be a loop in that so we can address 

the problem at the source from a number of cases that we are looking at. 

I also draw your attention to the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach 

Initiative, which conducts very comprehensive reviews of security 

concerns in priority countries. That is an ongoing effort both in nuclear and radioactive materials, and that is with DOE and other 

relevant agencies. So where we find gaps existing in this effort, 

what we do at State is to engage other agencies and to try to close 

those gaps in cooperation with other agencies and international donors. 

Also, the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach conducts comprehensive 

assessments of other countries’ nuclear regulatory capabilities to 

look at how they can upgrade their own efforts as well. 

Mr. DAVID. One of the problems in a cooperative program is that 

one side—in this case, our side, the United States—sometimes 

comes to feel that we haven’t gotten as much cooperation as we 

would have liked, as much responsiveness as we would have liked, 

the kind of action that we would have liked. So, a couple of years 

ago we instituted a program—I shouldn’t say a program—we instituted a method of addressing that, which was the executive review 

method. 

We have executive reviews multiple times a year in each of the 

countries in which we operate, including Russia. We sit down with 

the Russians who are in charge of their program, and we can assert our complaints, and we can find ways of resolving matters and 

moving things forward. 

Sometimes the difficulty that they have in being responsive has 

to do with their capability of advancing quickly enough. They may 

have budgetary concerns because we require them to contribute 

their own resources because it is for them, too. It is for them and 

for us, so we don’t pay the whole freight. And we want them to do 

that, and that is the right thing. So we have these discussions with 

them, and there are actions that come from those discussions, and 

we reach compromises on small things to move things forward. 

This last year I was in Russia, and we had a problem of an explosion at a particular burn facility for strategic missiles that were 
35

being destroyed. They didn’t have the funding because their budget 

cycle was different than allowed them to do it. So we worked things 

around so we provided money for a short time, and they paid us 

back later, but these things do slow up the process to a degree that 

all of us don’t like. 

Mr. LINDER. Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania wish to inquire? 

Mr. DENT. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to get back to the funding issue that Congressman 

Langevin just raised. Do you believe that the funding for nonproliferation activities is adequate at this current time? Do you feel 

that you are underfunded? Do you think you need more resources? 

Mr. David, do you want to take a crack at that? 

Mr. DAVID. I am not sure I—when you asked the question, I 

thought you were referring to the nonproliferation fund at the 

State Department—

Mr. DENT. I am sorry, I meant Mr. Record. 

Mr. RECORD. You are referring to the NDF program? 

Mr. DENT. Correct. 

Mr. RECORD. Well, at present, it has certainly been adequate. It 

is a very versatile program, as I alluded to earlier in my testimony; 

and it is able to go the full range, from disposing of manpads in 

one country to servicing their missiles in Southeast Asia. So it has 

proven to be adequate, including the new challenges. 

Mr. DENT. Earlier this week, Congress was notified by the President that insecure fissile material in Russia remains a, quote, national emergency. I assume this relates to the annual certification 

requirements to maintain the executive branch authority for implementing the various threat reductions productions, is that correct? 

Mr. RECORD. That is correct. 

Mr. DENT. And which project does this apply to specifically? 

Mr. RECORD. Well, it is a broad range. I think it is covered pretty 

well in my testimony regarding some of the key priorities that we 

have under the CTR, the dismantlement of fissile material and related efforts. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

Mr. Paul, can you tell us anything about what is going on in 

Pakistan these days? There was a problem with Dr. Khan all those 

years and his proliferation activities. What is the state of affairs 

in Pakistan with respect to the proliferation issues these days? 

Mr. RECORD. Well, we are cooperating with Pakistan, with the 

IAEA to fully investigate the Kahn network. I think that is what 

you are looking at, right? 

Mr. DENT. Correct. 

Mr. RECORD. And we welcome—the foreign ministry just indicated to us that that assistance is going to continue. We look forward to working with them. 

We understand that they released Mohammed Farouk from prison. We have withheld comment until we have a better understanding of the conditions of his release in terms of that issue. 

But it is important that all countries take steps to ensure that 

the key members of the network can no longer participate in nonproliferation-related activities. So we look to other countries to deal 

with that issue. 
36

Mr. DENT. And I guess, finally, I am encouraged to hear that 80 

percent of the sites—I think you referred to it, Mr. Paul—have 

been secured. I guess what worries me is what I don’t know and 

what material may have escaped, unknown to you or any of us. 

Could you just comment on that? All the material that has been 

secured is very important, of course, but do you have any idea of 

what is unsecured or lost or just simply unaccounted for? 

Mr. PAUL. It is a great question. Thank you, Congressman. We 

have concerns, too, about what we don’t know, but we also maintain close coordination and cooperation with the Intelligence Community to close that gap in knowledge and try to close the gap that 

the Congressman referred to between having that sense of confidence that everything is secured. I can assure you and assure the 

American people that we are doing absolutely everything we can to 

close both of those gaps. 

We do have a level of confidence about the progress that we are 

making. There is much more work to be done. 

To refer back to the question about funding—and your question 

about funding as well, sir—although the point can be made that by 

appropriating more funds you can accomplish more work, that is 

not always the case. Obviously, in a cooperative program there are 

limitations based on access and based on cooperating with another 

country whose facility we don’t control. Obviously, everyone on this 

committee recognizes that. 

What I can tell you is that, in the area of nonproliferation, in the 

last 3 years and 5 years, going all the way back to—going back to 

2005, we have had historic increases by this Congress and this administration in funding and resources dedicated to nonproliferation, more than doubling the total amount that was being spent in 

2001. And none of the programs that I referred to—the securing of 

the remainder of those sites, for example—is limited by a lack of 

funds. We are moving as fast as we can. 

At some point, more money won’t always necessarily get you a 

quicker rate. That really is the whole point of Bratislava, was to 

help us have something to manage to accelerate the timetables, 

which we have done. For example, accelerating the time frame for 

completing all of those upgrades a full 2 years, to 2008. And we are 

on schedule, on task and going to meet that deadline, a deadline 

that all of the experts who have looked at this have said is the 

soonest you could legitimately hope to get those things accomplished if properly funded, and this Congress and this administration has funded them. 

Mr. LINDER. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Does the gentleman wish to inquire? 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. Let me ask you just a couple questions. 

We talked a lot about the Cooperative Threat Reduction and the 

reduction of nuclear weapons. How have we done on chemical and 

biological weapons? Particularly with Russia, the former Soviet 

Union, how have we done in that area? 

Mr. DAVID. One of the major elements of the CTR program policy 

aspects of which my office directs for the Secretary is the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia. In that area we have built a 

chemical destruction facility—we have built part of a chemical destruction facility in Schuchye which will have the capability of de-
37

stroying tens of thousands of rounds of the most lethal nerve agent 

known to man in recent years—

Mr. DICKS. Where again was that? 

Mr. DAVID. Schuchye—that is my word for the spelling bee, Schuchye—and the total cost is capped at $1.032 billion. 

There are two buildings. The Russians are building one. We are 

building the other. And many of the support facilities are even 

more cooperative than Russia and the United States, because some 

of the other support facilities in the vicinity are being paid for with 

the support from a variety of other countries. 

The status of the project right now is that the guts of the factory—the factories are there, but the machinery and the lines and 

so forth are not ready, are not installed yet. 

Mr. DICKS. When do you think the bill—when will you have your 

initial operating capability? 

Mr. DAVID. I believe it could be 2008, but it is probably more 

likely 2009. 

Mr. DICKS. 2009, is that the—

Mr. DAVID. That is more realistic. 

Mr. DICKS. Your team is saying 2009. 

Mr. DAVID. Yes, 2009. 

Mr. DICKS. So we haven’t done anything at all in terms of disposing of chemical? 

Mr. DAVID. Actual destruction? 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. 

Mr. DAVID. Russia has disposed of almost none of its chemical 

weapons. I think Russia is up to 2 percent of its chemical weapons 

that it is obliged to destroy by 2012. Whereas the United States, 

for our own chemical weapons, have destroyed 37 percent. 

Mr. DICKS. And how much are we funding here? 

Mr. DAVID. Schuchye is $1.032 billion, I think. 

Mr. DICKS. And we are putting up all of that? 

Mr. DAVID. Russia is putting up one of the two destruction buildings; we are putting up the other one. 

Mr. DICKS. Why don’t you give us, for the record, what our piece 

is. 

Mr. DAVID. I believe it is 1.032—

Mr. DICKS. So that is our piece, all right; and then the Russians 

are separate. 

Mr. DAVID. It is part of one facility, and it is going to all work 

together. 

Mr. DICKS. What about biological weapons? I am talking about 

Russia now. 

Mr. DAVID. Biological weapons in Russia, there is very little we 

have been able to do in Russia. 

Mr. DICKS. Is that because they haven’t admitted that they have 

such weapons? 

Mr. DAVID. That is because we suspect that they may continue 

to have offensive biological programs and because we cannot reach 

agreement on the terms by which we would help secure more than 

the five facilities in Russia—biological research facilities in Russia 

that we do help to now secure. 

Mr. DAVID. That’s because we suspect that they may continue to 

have offensive biological programs, and because we cannot reach 
38

agreement on the terms by which we would help secure more than 

the five facilities in Russia—that we do help to now secure. 

Mr. DICKS. So these are two ongoing areas of concern? 

Mr. DAVID. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. We’ve done a lot with nuclear material and nuclear 

warheads. But we’re just really basically getting started here on 

these other two issues? 

Mr. DAVID. We’re not even getting started on biological. We’re 

basically—we have done a little bit. And ti doesn’t look like, in the 

near future, we’re doing very more much more. There doesn’t seem 

to be disposition on Russia’s part to want to do something cooperatively as they do with nuclear. 

Mr. DICKS. In the testimony, you talked about helping Russian 

scientists. How succesful have we been in that—of the people who 

have been involved with these programs? 

Mr. PAUL. Sir, I want to get to that question, but I wanted to 

go back to Mr. David’s—as you know, as I think I mentioned in my 

testimony, I alluded to it—we’ve, through our Biochem Redirect 

Program, I mentioned we’ve spent more than $80 million since ’97 

to engage scientists, engineers, technicians in collaborative research. So we’re trying to redirect those activities. Now, I know 

you’re trying to get a more specific weapons of concern. In the biological area, I just want to note that, in the program I also mention 

the BII. We’re working closely with our other NDF program—that 

was mentioned—and with DOD. We’re working to reduce the 

threat at the source to try and reconfigure some of the biological 

production facilities, including the Berdsk biological facility. We’re 

beginning to get access now to some of these centers. We have still 

a big problem that Mr. David has alluded to. But with this program, with DOD support and others, we’re beginning to get access. 

And we’re trying to reconfigure these facilities, put them over to civilian use, and work with the scientists. So we should—

Mr. DICKS. So these are two ongoing areas of concerns. We have 

got a lot with nuclear materials and nuclear warheads, but we are 

just really basically getting started here on these other two issues. 

We have done a little bit [and] it doesn’t look like into the near future we are doing very much more. There doesn’t seem to be a disposition on Russia’s part to want to do something cooperatively. 

In the testimony you talked about helping Russian scientists. 

How successful have we been in that of the people that have been 

involved in these programs? 

Mr. RECORD. Sir, I would just like to—I want to get to that question, but I want to go back to Mr. David, that as you know, I think 

I mentioned in the testimony, I alluded to it. We have through our 

Bio-Chem Redirect Program, we spent more than 50 million since 

1997 to engage bioengineers, technicians in collaborative efforts. 

Now I know you are trying to get to more specific weapons of concern. In the biological area I want to note that in the program I 

also mentioned the DII, where we are working closely with other 

NDF programs. We are working to reduce the threat at the source 

to try and reconfigure some of the biological production facilities, 

including the Berdsk Biologics Facility. We are beginning to get access now to some of these centers. We still have now a big problem 

that Mr. David alluded to. But with this program with the DOD 
39

we are beginning to get access [and] we are trying to reconfigure 

these facilities, put them over to surveillance use and work with 

the scientists. 

Mr. DICKS. This is in Russia? 

Mr. RECORD. Yes. We can get you more information about that 

if you want. 

Mr. DICKS. That would be great. 

What about this—the scientists now. How many in all of these 

areas, relocating them. I know we have brought some of them to 

the United States. 

Mr. RECORD. I can’t give you the figures on the relocation, but 

we have worked with I think over 60,000 scientists and technicians 

that have gotten this training and we spent I think over $269 million total in these efforts across the board. 

Mr. DICKS. This is the last point. 

Mr. DAVID. Let me add one footnote to that. It is in part because 

of the difficulty we have had with biological programs in Russia 

that we have focused local programs and the DOD DTR program, 

the CTR part that DOD does, in some of the other countries in the 

former Soviet Union. 

Mr. DICKS. You say you have worked with 60,000. How many are 

out there? How many would be possible recruits for a program like 

this? 

Mr. RECORD. I don’t think I have the number for you on that. I 

can give you the numbers. We have, as I say, two ongoing centers, 

[and] [over all] Project 1 Center in Moscow and a center in the 

Ukraine, as I mentioned, and has been in operation since the early 

1990s. And those centers are also regional houses in other countries for the former Soviet Union as well. So I think we are coming 

up to 11 countries as well. I will be glad to give that to you. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. The gentleman from Massachusetts. 

Mr. MARKEY. Pakistan continues to be a real concern about nuclear nonproliferation, about the securing of nuclear materials inside of their country, the threat that al Qaeda could gain access to 

them. There is [and] agreement that the President wants the Congress to approve to have a nuclear cooperation agreement with 

India even though it is a nonsignatory on the Nonproliferation 

Treaty, even though it does not agree to ban the production of 

fissile material inside of their country and this, even though according to the yesterday’s Indian newspapers, it will, according to 

their intelligence people, give them the capacity to make 50 nuclear 

warheads a year because it will free up their indigenous nuclear 

material for a bomb making program. 

What is your concern about the Pakistani response to this, the 

Pakistani response to us today? If this goes through, they are going 

to be forced once again to go back into the open market to obtain 

more fissile materials so they can match the Indian nuclear weapon expansion. 

Mr. RECORD. As you know, sir, we are going to start in the very 

near future a negotiation process with India, Pakistan and other 

countries in the conference’s arm in Geneva to address the fissile 

material and the Fissile Material Treaty and that is animportant 

priority for the administration. I know the Indians are expressing 
40

their support for the investigations, and that is going to be 

animportant element in our process. 

I think, as you are probably familiar, the U.S. addressed this 

issue in the process of the discussions. The Indians were not willing to cease production of the fissile material but we are hopeful 

that we can, through this treaty process, come up with a treaty 

that would stop the production limit in this way. 

Mr. MARKEY. I understand what you are saying, but since the Indians are clearly not willing to accept that as a condition for this 

transfer of nuclear material to them anit will free up 50 bombs 

worth of nuclear material to make more bombs in their country. 

Aren’t you afraid that this will put A.Q. Khan—type scientists back 

on the road so there is not a gap that develops between the Pakistanis and the Indians? Isn’t that really a real threat to our security because obviously it will have to be a clandestine program? 

Mr. RECORD. We have worked with both Pakistan and India to 

improve their nuclear export controls. We feel that—

Mr. MARKEY. I am saying that since we are going to allow India 

to keep this dual program without full scope safeguards, why would 

the Pakistanis not empower A.Q. Khan? 

Mr. RECORD. As I alluded to earlier, we are fully working with 

Pakistan to do everything possible to take steps to deal with the 

A.Q. Khan network. That is anongoing network and we have got 

good cooperation right now with Pakistan. 

Mr. MARKEY. What I am saying is that the Pakistanis are saying 

you won’t have cooperation if the India deal goes through and in 

my perspective it is kind of reckless to create a dual standard. 

Since neither country is a signatory to the nonproliferation treaty, 

one way that frees up 50 bombs worth of material a year, knowing 

that the other country has for 30 years responded to whatever the 

other one does, why would we think it wouldn’t happen again? 

Mr. RECORD. All I can say on your first point, sir, regarding 

Pakistan, we have had consultations with Pakistan and I have not 

heard that. I don’t think any of my colleagues have heard that. 

Mr. MARKEY. That is very dangerous to me, since they have told 

me that, and I don’t know why the experts inside of our government aren’t hearing something that the Pakistani officials at the 

highest level are telling me. I can’t believe you haven’t heard that. 

So none of you have heard that from any Pakistani that you have 

spoken to? 

Mr. RECORD. We had consultations with Pakistan recently. 

Mr. MARKEY. But none of you have heard that they will respond 

and ensure that there is not a nuclear bomb gap that develops between India and Pakistan if this agreement goes through? Have 

any of you heard that from them? They are talking to me but not 

to you? 

Mr. DAVID. I haven’t spoken to Pakistanis and I have—

Mr. MARKEY. You have not? 

Mr. DAVID. No. But it seems logical, in that context, if India increased its nuclear warheads, Pakistan would want to do the same 

thing, it is probably logical. The advantage of the deal we are trying to forge with India is great. It brings India into the nonproliferation world. 
41

Mr. MARKEY. The problem is, Mr. David, that the President then 

flew to Pakistan the next day. Musharraf asked him will you give 

us the same deal. Bush, the President, said no, we won’t give you 

the same deal. So the issue isn’t India. The issue is Pakistan. Talk 

to me about Pakistan. 

Mr. DAVID. Well, one thing that I can say about Pakistan that 

differentiates India from Pakistan is that Pakistan will not allow 

anyone, including the IAEA, which by the way through Director 

ElBaradei, supports the India—

Mr. MARKEY. As you know, that is false though, Mr. David. As 

you know, the Indians are not going to allow any inspections of 

their nuclear military program. 

Mr. DAVID. Of course. 

Mr. MARKEY. Only of their civilian program anneither will the 

Pakistanis. 

Mr. DAVID. And the Pakistanis will not produce A.Q. Khan to 

speak to [anyone] about the proliferation that it has been a part 

of. That is a very good sign of Pakistan’s attitude toward coming 

into a nonproliferation world and there is much to be gained by 

India coming into a nonproliferation world. There is much to be 

gained by India coming into a nonproliferation world and supporting us and working with us—

Mr. MARKEY. The issue is not India. The issue is Pakistan. If 

Pakistan is saying that they cannot allow this gap to develop, that 

puts them back into the open market again. I mean, what is the 

consequence? Have you thought about the next step? 

Mr. DAVID. As Mr. Record has said, we have hopes and some expectations that India will not produce, be producing many, many 

weapons to—

Mr. MARKEY. Their own experts in yesterday’s Indian newspapers say this will give them the capacity to build 50 additional 

nuclear weapons a year. 

Mr. DAVID. I haven’t read that paper and I read a lot of newspapers and read a lot of things. 

Mr. MARKEY. Obviously the reason they are putting the nuclear 

reactor and these other reactors aside is they want to continue to 

maintain a nuclear weapons construction program. Otherwise, they 

would have put them all under inspection, and they won’t agree to 

a fissile material ban. 

Mr. RECORD. They have indicated they want to maintain the 

credible minimum strategic deterrent. Exactly how many weapons, 

I don’t know. We would have to get into a different discussion on 

that. But yes, they have indicated—

Mr. MARKEY. They already have 40 to 50 nuclear weapons. So if 

they want to go to 200 or 300, is there any reason to believe that 

the Pakistanis won’t as well, Mr. Record? 

Mr. RECORD. I have no idea. 

Mr. MARKEY. I mean from your own personal experience over the 

last 30 years, do you believe there is a reason to believe that Pakistan won’t respond? 

Mr. RECORD. Pakistan is also very desirous of keeping a minimal 

strategic deterrent. They have told us—

Mr. MARKEY. So minimal today. 

Mr. RECORD. I don’t know how this translates into numbers. 
42

Mr. MARKEY. They are going to be looking for parity with India, 

don’t you think, Since that is what we are talking about, in terms 

of the weapons? 

Mr. RECORD. Mr. Congressman, I have no idea. I don’t know 

what the basis of that article is, what the basis of that information 

is in that article. I see your article but I don’t really have any idea 

about how many weapons that India is thinking of. 

Mr. MARKEY. The point is, Mr. Record, if we are going to supply 

all of the uranium that they will need for their civilian program, 

that will free up all of their indigenous uranium and plutonium for 

their weapons program. That is the advantage for the—if you are 

A.Q. Khan, you are sitting there and you have been tasked since 

1974 since the Indian explosion to have a clandestine nuclear program anwe haven’t arrested him, we haven’t brought him before 

the World Court, we haven’t put any pressure on Musharraf to the 

World Court to really bring this guy to justice, what makes you believe that anything is going to change and he is not or his weapons 

aren’t going to escalate once again? 

Mr. RECORD. To reiterate on that last point, we have extensive 

knowledge of that network anwe continue to learn more all the 

time. 

Mr. MARKEY. I am afraid you are going to have to learn a lot 

more about it if this Indian program goes through because the 

Pakistanis are not going to stand still and allow the Indians to 

stand still and gain an exponential advantage over them. 

Mr. RECORD. In terms of your India-Pakistan focus of your questions is that India and Pakistan have continued to make progress 

in their bilateral relationship. 

Mr. MARKEY. This is going to destabilize it. One country is signing an agreement that is going to give them American and European nuclear materials that frees up its weapons site and the Pakistanis are going to be frozen. They won’t stay frozen. Their whole 

history for 30 years, as you remember when the nuclear explosion 

went off in 1974, the coded cable that went back to the Indian presidential headquarters was the Buddha is smiling, but the next day 

the leader of Pakistan said if our people have to eat grass and 

leaves for a generation we too will have a nuclear weapon. And I 

don’t know why you think this agreement—

Mr. RECORD. There is a lot that has happened since that time. 

Mr. LINDER. We have votes, two or three votes. I want to thank 

this panel. Appreciate, thank you for being here to help us. anwe 

will recess upon the call of the Chair. 

The next panel we will take up as soon as the votes are completed. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. LINDER. The hearing will be back in order. Our second panel, 

thank you for your patience. From time to time we have to vote 

here, and we should be all right for the next hour, hour and a half. 

The second panel consists of Dr. Igor Khripunov, the Associate 

Director for the Center for International Trade and Security at the 

University of Georgia. Dr. Khripunov is an expert on Russian nuclear and biological security and is well known for his work on the 

human factor of implementation. 
43

Dr. David Franz is Vice President and Chief Biological Scientist 

at the Midwest Research Institute. Dr. Franz served in the U.S. 

Army in the Medical Research and Material Command for 23 

years. He is currently a member of the National Academy of 

Sciences Committee on International Security, and Mr. Franz will 

testify on the role in reducing biological threats. 

Let me remind the witnesses that we would like to keep your 

summary to 5 minutes. Your written statement will be made part 

of the record without objection. 

Dr. Khripunov, you may go.

STATEMENTS OF DR. IGOR KHRIPUNOV, ASSOCIATE

DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND

SECURITY, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA 

Mr. KHRIPUNOV. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been with the 

University of Georgia for 14 years and as a fellow Georgian, I 

would like to extend warm greetings to you as another Georgian 

here before me. Yes, it was very warm yesterday. As I was leaving 

Atlanta it was 89 degrees Fahrenheit. 

It is a great honor and privilege to share my thoughts and findings of my research, and the theme of my presentation is mostly 

about people. The message to the distinguished members of the 

subcommittee is that a security conscious work force should be the 

first line of defense against catastrophic terrorism. Indeed, the new 

challengers and threats in the wake of the September 11th tragic 

event have dramatically enhanced the role of the human factor in 

protecting sensitive facilities, associated infrastructure and materials at the source. 

Why? The problem is that in the asymmetric warfare that has 

become the buzzword as our adversaries move are increasingly 

characterized as highly unpredictable, nontraditional, indiscriminate in the use of any weapons and technologies, disregarding the 

value of their own human lives and relying on the support of a certain portion of the population and insider collaboration. 

This is why this new challenge requires a qualitatively different 

response from us. On our side of the asymmetric warfare we are 

developing dangerous gaps and vulnerabilities. There is a need to 

come up with a state of the art, multi-disciplinary methodology to 

prepare the workforce for actual and potential threats. 

The bottom line is in the new circumstances more than ever security equipment regulations and procedures are as good as operators, the people involved. 

What can we do? If we hope to improve the human factor, the 

so-called security culture, a cause that encompasses a set of managerial, organizational, motivational and other arrangements. Security culture can be defined as a work environment where anethic 

of security permeates the entire organization and not only guards. 

People’s behavior focuses on preventing malicious acts through critical self-assessment and aggressive efforts to identify management 

security, safety and other problems before they became dangerous 

vulnerabilities. 

One important advantage of security culture is that it enables a 

person to respond to known and unknown security risks out of 
44

careful and nurtured proactive habit rather than improvised effort 

that can deal with security culture within our organization. And 

they are facility leadership without the interest on the part of the 

leaders in enhancing security, security culture can not be achieved. 

Second, proactive policies and procedures generated by top managers. 

Three, personal performance, and one important trait of this personal performance is questioning attitude and whistleblowing. 

And four, learning and professional improvement. You cannot impose security culture. You can train people to be security conscious, 

and as they improve their qualities, you know, the progress is 

achieved. 

The basics of security culture as a uniform and overarching 

strategy can and must be applied to a number of sensitive industries. In turn, these industries will build upon them what will be 

specifically required by their unique features and characteristics. 

For example, being less physically and technologically protected in 

the nuclear industry. Bio, pharmaceutical and chemical facilities 

and associated infrastructures are much more dependent on the 

quality of their human factor; in other words, skills, motivation, 

values and performance of the work force. 

On the other hand, security culture must be promoted internationally because given the global scale of terrorism, we in the 

need are as strong as the weakest link in facility and material protection elsewhere. 

International security culture is important for corporation assistance and comparison. A valuable pioneering effort to develop a concept of nuclear security culture is on the way at the counsel of a 

doting agency. This concept has a good chance to be finalized and 

released before the end of this year, and I have been involved in 

this process from the very beginning. 

Another important landmark is a Bratislava statement on nuclear security culture that has been referred to by previous speakers. It has the whole paragraph about nuclear security culture, and 

I am very happy to say that our report regarding nuclear security 

culture in Russia was released 3 months before the Bratislava 

statement, and I want to believe that it provided a clue to those 

who worked on the Bratislava statement, and I will be happy to 

leave this report with the secretary of the subcommittee. 

What is important about security culture is that security culture 

is a prerequisite for sustainability. As we provide more equipment, 

fences and detectors you know to countries like Russia, Ukraine 

and others, without people having security culture it is very difficult to sustain this momentum, you know, after we phase out our 

active involvement and assistance. 

But several proposals that I would like to make, and I hope you 

bear with me in order to promote security culture across the board. 

First of all, establish a multi-disciplinary partnership between 

main stakeholders, regulators, industry anacademia. And I think 

problem countries should be involved in this international endeavor. My center is developing a dialogue with the American Society 

For Industrial Security hoping that we may contribute jointly in 

this interdisciplinary effort. 
45

Two, encourage technical universities to introduce elements of security culture in current and future courses. 

Three, accelerate ratification and coming into force of the amendments of the convention of physical protection of nuclear material. 

Raising the concept to the level of the international obligation 

would pressure some countries anmake them more responsive and 

accountable. 

Four, explore options for expanding the mandate of the World 

Health Organization, to include the development and promotion of 

biosecurity culture, drawing as much as reasonably possible on the 

experience of the IAEA. 

And finally, five, include in the agenda of the second review conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention an item that would 

authorize the organization for the prohibition for chemical weapons 

for—to initiate work that was and will be done by the IAEA. 

Talking about Russia, you know, we need to continue our work 

bilaterally, but international agreements, multilateral agreements 

will be a powerful vehicle to force Russia to embrace security culture. 

And one final observation. We cannot build a water tight wall to 

prevent some deadly materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. For example, weapon grade material is more controllable 

than components of radiological terrorism; in other words, dirty 

bombs and some pathogens. Hence, we need to be candid with the 

public and condition it to a higher probability of attack from the 

sources. 

Any new effort to prevent the proliferation at the source must be 

combined with efforts to prepare ordinary citizens for acts of WMD 

terrorism that are preventable. This human factor-based, balanced 

formula must include a strategy to build up a culture of resilience 

among the public as a counterpart to the security culture at the 

source. 

Resilient people bend rather than break under stressful condition 

and they return to the acceptable level of their normal psychological and social routine following misfortune. These combined efforts focusing on the people and their mindset help us fortify ourselves for the long war that confronts us. 

Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Khripunov follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. IGOR KHRIPUNOV

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other distinguished members of the Subcommittee. 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to describe my work in the area of the 

′′human factor,′′ which is becoming increasingly important as we attempt to implement effective threat-reduction programs. Simply put, the human factor emphasizes 

that the skill of security personnel are the critical element in security. Equipment 

is not enough. 

In the new strategic environment of the 21st century, ′′asymmetric warfare′′ has 

become a common buzzword. For those entrusted with protecting critical infrastructure and materials at the source, asymmetric threats imply attempts by adversaries 

to circumvent or undermine our strengths while exploiting our weaknesses using 

methods that differ significantly from traditional methods of operation. Asymmetric 

attacks employ innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons, and technologies; thus 

they demand a spectrum of protective strategies on our part. 

But no strategy, however well-conceived, can prepare the staffs of sensitive sites 

for every contingency. More than ever before, the protective force will depend on 

such professional skills and traits as situational awareness, strength of mind, men-
46

tal readiness, boldness, self-reliance, intuition, and a willingness to take risks. In 

the kind of confrontations we envision, these characteristics are imperative. They 

will help security forces at sites housing lethal materials expect the unexpected and 

react adequately under conditions of extreme stress and uncertainty.

Security Culture 

The concept of the human factor originated with a simple insight: that the best 

equipment in the world is no better than its operator. Nor can the best written directives in the world compensate for apathy or technical incompetence in the workforce. These material arrangements have little effect without trained, motivated 

human beings to make use of them. A vehicle to improve the human factor is 

′′security culture,′′ a concept that encompasses a set of managerial, organizational, 

and other arrangements. When we set out to improve security culture within an organization active in the nuclear or biotechnology complex, we set out to cultivate 

habits, attitudes, and traditions that favor security over lesser concerns. Security 

becomes second nature for personnel within such organizations. 

This type of organizational culture is tightly based on the concept of nuclear security which is defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive 

substances or their associated facilities. This definition has important and extensive 

overlaps with chemical and bio security. 

On our side of the asymmetrical-warfare equation, where dangerous gaps and 

vulnerabilities have become apparent, we can come up with a state-of-the-art multidisciplinary methodology to prepare the workforce for both actual and potential 

threats. Hence, security culture connotes not only the technical proficiency of the 

people assigned security-related duties, but also their willingness and motivation to 

follow established procedures, comply with regulations, and take the initiative when 

unforeseen circumstances arise-as they will, given the limits on human foresight 

and the inventiveness of the adversaries we face today. 

In this sense, then, a good security culture can be defined as a work environment 

where an ethic of security permeates the organization. People’s behavior focuses on 

preventing malicious acts through critical self-assessment, aggressive efforts to identify management and tactical problems, and appropriate, timely, and effective resolution of problems before they become crises. Security culture enables a person to 

respond to known and unknown security risks out of carefully nurtured and 

proactive habit rather than improvised effort. 

There are two categories of unexpected events of which we need to be aware and 

for which security culture may be an effective tool. First, a known danger whose 

timing or magnitude cannot be predicted has been dubbed a ′′known unknown.′′ Second, there are other dangers called ′′unknown unknowns.′′ Nobody is aware of these. 

Nobody will foresee them or take countermeasures until they transpire. Crashing 

fuel-filled passenger jets into the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001 

represented a striking example of an unknown unknown. 

Every organization has a security culture. (Incidentally, the same could be said 

of safety, quality, and other fields of endeavor.) The really important question is: 

Is the security culture healthy? Is it what management needs it to be, and is it improving, decaying, or remaining static? How effectively does it counteract security 

breaches and insider threats? How can it be improved? 

As we survey the world, we find numerous examples showing that a group of unscrupulous employees-typically managers colluding with lower-ranking technicianscan divert and steal valuable, sensitive, and dangerous materials from the workplace despite seemingly airtight security and anti-theft precautions. One representative case involved a criminal operation at Elektrokhimpribor, a top-secret nuclearweapons facility in Russia’s closed city of Lesnoy. Thefts of rare and expensive radioactive isotopes went on unchecked for several years because employees from all 

levels at the facility-ranging from rank-and-file workers to top management-connived among themselves, abetted by senior officials from the Ministry of Atomic Energy (the federal agency charged with overseeing security at such sites). 

Under a different set of circumstances in Pakistan, had there been a chance to 

promote security culture values throughout its national nuclear sector, some members of the workforce might have found A.Q. Khan’s shady nuclear transactions with 

proliferant entities objectionable and inconsistent with world standards, prompting 

them to blow a whistle. Ambassador Linton Brooks, administrator of the National 

Nuclear Security Administration, delivered a presentation at the Congressional 

Breakfast Club on May 19, 2006 in which he acknowledged that ′′every security system ultimately depends on the people operating it-the so-called ‘human factor.’ Motivated by greed, coercion, or debt, facility insiders may successfully divert nuclear 

materials.′′
47

Nor is the United States immune to faults in security culture that can render nuclear facilities vulnerable to terrorist and other malicious acts. On August 29, 2004, 

CBS News reported that officials from the U.S. Department of Energy had conducted an surprise inspection of security guards at a nuclear-weapons plant in Colorado, finding the facility virtually unprotected because the vast majority of the 

guards were watching the Super Bowl. The Department of Energy admitted that 

guard forces had recently left the front gates at other nuclear facilities wide open, 

and that they had failed repeatedly to respond to emergency alarms in maximumsecurity areas. Some were actually caught sleeping on the job.

Sectoral Diversity 

A concept of security culture originated within the IAEA and the nuclear sector. 

Twelve ′′fundamental principles′′ of nuclear security were developed immediately 

after the 9/11 attacks and are now codified in a series of (as-yet unratified) amendments to the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The 

basic concept and methodology of security culture continues to undergo refinement 

by the IAEA Secretariat, but it can be usefully applied to other sensitive areas, such 

as the biological and chemical sectors, in which breaches of security may hand deadly materials to terrorists, posing a threat to the public. 

Nuclear. Emerging security challenges have made it obvious that the scope of nuclear security and the associated culture need to extend beyond the traditional task 

of protecting weapons-usable material. This new, more comprehensive security culture must cover radioactive sources and spent nuclear fuel, among other hazardous 

radiological substances, while encompassing a wide variety of installations and activities. It must account not only for power and research reactors and related fuelcycle facilities, but also for waste storage sites that serve research, academic, agricultural, and industrial installations. 

Of special significance is nuclear power infrastructure. An attack on a nuclear 

power site would likely lead to serious consequences, even if little or no damage 

were done to the plant itself or to related structures. Public fears of radiation, combined with a possible massive blackout and other aggravating factors, could give rise 

to significant distress and panic. In other words, even a marginally successful terrorist attack on nuclear plant infrastructure could easily bring about a systemic disaster, characterized by a series of interconnected and disruptive events affecting 

vital societal institutions. 

In July 2005, the parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 

Material approved a series of amendments to the Convention. Among other things, 

the amendments raise the 12 fundamental principles of nuclear security to the level 

of binding obligations under international law. Although security culture is listed 

alongside principles such as threat evaluation, a graded approach, defense-in-depth, 

and quality assurance-implying coequal status-it is clear that culture stands above 

them all. It is an overarching and integrating concept without which none of the 

other fundamental principles can be successfully implemented. 

The amendments make the fundamental principles of nuclear security universal 

and binding, and they give the international community a way to hold individual 

governments accountable for their performance in this critical area. In this light, it 

is disturbing that only three countries (the Seychelles, Turkmenistan, and Bulgaria) 

have ratified the amendments almost a year after they were signed. It is clearly in 

the interest of the United States to invest time and resources in efforts to accelerate 

the ratification process, both in Congress and abroad, helping the amendments to 

the Convention enter into force at an early date. 

Chemical. Among the threats to the chemical industry and to chemical-weapons 

storage/destruction facilities are deliberate attempts to release toxic materials while 

they are in transit to or from points of storage or use; theft or diversion of chemical 

weapons or toxic materials for terrorist acts elsewhere; and sabotage that releases 

toxic contaminants, in effect using chemical installations as weapons prepositioned 

in urban areas. A multitude of industrial chemicals, though not as deadly as chemical-warfare agents, could be released in massive quantities, inflicting lethal effects 

despite their lower toxicity. 

A classified study conducted by the U.S. Army Surgeon General, dated October 

29, 2001, projected that a terrorist attack dispersing toxic chemicals in a densely 

populated area could injure or kill as many as 2.4 million people. (The Army later 

clarified its findings, noting that the estimate of 2.4 million casualties referred to 

the number of people who might request medical treatment following a large-scale 

release from a chemical manufacturing plant, in a densely populated area, under 

ideal weather conditions that lent themselves to maximum exposure.) If nothing 

else, however, this attests to the psychological impact of chemical incidents, which 

would exacerbate the actual, measurable damage to infrastructure and human 

health. 
48

What kind of substances might be released? Chlorine and phosgene are two industrial chemicals commonly transported by road and rail. They are also chemical-warfare agents, having seen widespread use in World War I. Rupturing the containers 

in which they are transported could disseminate these gases in incapacitating or lethal amounts. Organophosphate pesticides such as parathion fall into the same class 

as nerve agents. Although these pesticides are far less toxic than military-grade 

nerve agents, their effects and medical treatments are the same. In April 2005, Dr. 

Richard Falkenrath, President Bush’s deputy homeland security advisor, told the 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that, of all the 

capabilities available to terrorists in the United States today, one stands alone as 

uniquely deadly, pervasive, and susceptible to terrorist use: industrial chemicals 

such as chlorine, ammonia, phosgene, methyl bromide, hydrochloric acid, and various other acids. 

In contrast to the nuclear sector, which is made up of relatively few facilities 

equipped with costly and sophisticated protective systems, sensitive chemical plants 

number in the thousands and, generally speaking, are only lightly protected. To an 

even greater degree than in the nuclear industry, accordingly, physical protection 

in the chemical industry depends not so much on the design and condition of installed security equipment as on the attitudes, behavior, and motivation of the entire workforce. In the long run, human performance, influenced by prevailing standards of security culture, determines whether a chemical security regime succeeds or 

fails. The sheer scale of the chemical industry increasingly makes security culture, 

including the vigilance of the workforce, a key element in protecting hazardous facilities and chemicals. 

A recently released report from UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, titled Uniting 

Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/60/

825, April 27, 2006) appropriately emphasizes that:

To prevent terrorists from acquiring chemical materials, States should ensure that security at chemical plants is kept to the highest standard, and 

I urge the relevant United Nations entities to provide assistance where 

needed. A mechanism should also be developed to allow the Organization 

for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), in cooperation with other 

relevant United Nations actors, to provide necessary assistance and coordinate the response and relief operations in case of a chemical weapon attack 

or the release of chemical agents.

Indeed, the OPCW, a worldwide authority on chemical weapons, is best equipped 

to become a clearinghouse and coordinating center for chemical security culture. Its 

expertise, knowledge, and equipment can be put to use preventing, combating, and 

responding to chemical terrorism. The Chemical Weapons Convention, the document 

under which the OPCW operates, clearly provides the organization with a mandate 

not only to deal with chemical weapons narrowly construed, but also to foster security in the chemical sectors of member states. 

Biological. At biotechnology labs and pharmaceutical plants, the role of the 

human factor is even greater than in the nuclear and chemical complexes because 

of the ease with which an unscrupulous staff member could divert pathogen samples 

from their proper uses. Preventing bioterrorism requires innovative solutions specific to the nature of the threat. Biotechnology is not like nuclear technology. Soon, 

tens of thousands of laboratories worldwide will be operating in this multi-billiondollar industry. Even students working in small laboratories will be able to carry 

out gene manipulation. A minute amount of pathogens can be used to create a sizable stock of weapons-usable material. The approach to fighting the abuse of biotechnology for terrorist purposes will have more in common with measures against 

cyber-crime than with our work to control nuclear proliferation. As a result, biosecurity culture is substantively and structurally different from security culture in the 

nuclear and chemical complexes. 

There is a compelling need to forge a voluntary code of conduct for the biotech 

industry, governed by the principles of risk management, ethical values, and strict 

compliance. Personnel accountability is a major trait to be nurtured at these institutions. Members of the workforce must always bear in mind the potential consequences of the firm’s research, recognizing the repercussions that would accrue 

were their scientific endeavors misused. Because biosecurity depends so heavily on 

vigilance and on expecting the unexpected, top leaders must encourage their 

workforces to be observant and to question small discrepancies as a matter of routine. Effective biosecurity would include an oversight system for (a) the physical protection of dangerous pathogens and dual-use technologies from theft, illicit sale or 

transfer, or accidental release; (b) the implementation of security regulations; (c) 

safety training; (d) facility licensing; and (e) personnel vetting. 
49

Here again, the human factor is the key to success in biosecurity culture, even 

though it may require more effort and time to nurture. Since the dividing line between biological weapons and naturally occurring infectious diseases is blurry, the 

United States may wish to turn to the World Health Organization (WHO), encouraging that body to strengthen and diversify its involvement in this area. This would 

make the WHO the biosecurity counterpart to the IAEA and the OPCW. It would 

also enhance preparations for natural outbreaks such as bird flu. It will be necessary to focus on raising standards of biosecurity culture, both to protect the general public from naturally occurring disease and to shield our citizens against malicious acts.

Building Security Culture 

Cultures are based on a set of shared, underlying assumptions about reality. Practically speaking, this means that an organization instills tangible behaviors in the 

workforce that derive from what the organization‘s leaders assume should be most 

important. Even if the leadership makes the right assumptions and sets the right 

goals, however, culture will atrophy unless the leadership works actively and continuously to promote them throughout the organization. Without proactive leadership, the staff will simply form other assumptions based on individual staff members’ personal experiences, or even on their whims. Top managers need to lead the 

way in forging the appropriate pattern of ideas. Often underlying assumptions are 

unconsciously held and never discussed in the daily course of business. They simply 

become ′′the way we do things.′′ But a culture needs conscious attention if it is to 

thrive. 

A good security culture is founded on a healthy respect for the threat. From the 

most senior leader down to the lowliest technician, the staff needs to understand 

that security measures truly matter. This underlying conviction then permeates the 

way people work, and it drives their behavior under normal and abnormal conditions. In a facility that enjoys a healthy security culture, personnel typically display 

a deep-rooted belief that there are credible insider and outsider threats, including 

theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer, and other malicious acts, and 

that it is their duty to counteract those threats. A sense of mission goes a long way 

toward fissile-material security, as well as the security of pathogens and toxic 

chemicals. 

The next level in implanting healthy assumptions is to determine basic principles 

and values conducive to the behaviors and physical arrangements that make up a 

vibrant security culture. The necessary principles and values include honesty, integrity, and a sense of responsibility; a commitment to keeping equipment in good 

working order; obedience to procedure; a commitment to learning and process improvement; and effective leadership throughout the organizational hierarchy. These 

traits contribute to the core of security culture. 

The core consists of four major elements: (1) facility leadership, (2) proactive policies and procedures, (3) personnel performance, and (4) learning and professional 

improvement. (See Figure 1, next page.) But the main element within the facility 

is the performance of leaders. Top managers are responsible for developing and implementing a specific set of policies and procedures that bias the behavior of their 

subordinates in favor of security. Of particular importance to the core is a manager’s 

emphasis on clear roles and responsibilities, visible security policies, cyber-protection, contingency plans and drills, and personal accountability. Continuous training 

is the primary tool to get the required results. 

These desired traits are not, of course, confined to security; they are mainstays 

of healthy management practices. Conversely, a poorly managed work environment 

in which these attributes are lacking will be indifferent to efforts to achieve a high 

standard of security culture. Accordingly, any campaign to promote nuclear security 

culture-whether nationally sponsored or funded primarily through international assistance-should seek to better the overall professional culture. 

It is in U.S. national interest to take the lead in supporting and promoting security culture not only domestically but also internationally, making its basic standards universally understood, regardless of differing socioeconomic and political conditions from country to country. A uniform understanding of clearly defined standards is important for international exchanges, evaluation, and comparison. A good 

example of such highly beneficial outreach is the U.S.-Russian program on security 

culture currently implemented under the bilateral Statement on Nuclear Security 

Cooperation signed by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin at their summit meeting in Bratislava, Slovak Republic, in February 2005. Ideally, this must 

serve as a powerful tool for shaping the mindset of nuclear workforce in Russia and 

pave the way for similar efforts in other countries. 

Indeed, there is an urgent need to engage, either bilaterally or through the IAEA, 

a specific group of countries whose history, traditions, ongoing economic develop-
50

ments, and other traits complicate their ability to meet high standards of security 

culture. This group includes transitional societies, countries whose nuclear programs 

lacked or still lack transparency, countries instituting nuclear power and research 

programs from scratch, or where nuclear industry is undergoing ownership reform. 

For example, countries professing a desire to benefit from nuclear power generation, 

such as Turkey, Vietnam, Indonesia and Nigeria, need to start training a securityconscious workforce even before they design and build appropriate physical infrastructure.

Beyond the Source 

Security culture is no panacea. It cannot credibly prevent the whole spectrum of 

terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Though we stand 

a reasonably good chance of denying terrorists access to nuclear weapons and to the 

material and technologies they would need to build an improvised nuclear device 

(IND), most components for radiological terrorism or bioterrorist attacks are easily 

available and technologically simple to use. They stand out among the WMD tools 

available to terrorists both because of their ready availability and because of their 

unique capacity to inflict far-reaching physiological and psychological damage. 

Compared to nuclear weapons and INDs, radiological weapons require little technical sophistication. The probability that such weapons will be used is on the rise: 

Conventional terrorism seems to be gradually losing its attractiveness to perpetrators as public authorities take defensive precautions and ordinary citizens demonstrate more resilience in the face of its disruptive effects. From a symbolic standpoint, moreover, al Qaeda and its ilk would be tempted to use radiological weapons 

because they resemble nuclear weapons, thus conferring prestige and an image of 

prowess on their efforts and heightening anxieties among the populace targeted for 

attack. Similarly, acts of bioterrorism can be prevented and mitigated only in a limited way, but they could have long-lasting and indiscriminate effects, raising the 

specter of a global pandemic. 

Any new efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons-usable materials at the 

source must be combined with efforts to prepare ordinary citizens for acts of WMD 

terrorism that are less preventable. This balanced formula must include a strategy 

to build up a culture of resilience among the public, which after all is a primary 

target for terrorists. Resilience refers to the ability to handle disruptive challenges, 

characterized as emergencies that can result in crisis. Accordingly, resilience culture 

is an amalgam of beliefs, attitudes, approaches, behaviors, and psychology that 

helps people fare better during adversity. Resilient people bend rather than break 

under stressful conditions, and they return to some semblance of their normal psychological and social routine following misfortune. 

The challenge of terrorism demands a global response, as compassionate to victims as it is resolute in seeking out and defeating perpetrators. Security culture at 

the source, complemented by public resilience, offers a foundation for a partnership 

and strategy that will help deny terrorists their goals. Our efforts in this area will 

help us fortify ourselves for the long war that confronts us.

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Dr. Khripunov. 
51

Mr. Franz. 

STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID FRANZ, VICE PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF BIOLOGICAL SCIENTIST, MIDWEST RESEARCH INSTITUTE 

Mr. FRANZ. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Langevin, it is anon 

honor to appear before you today to address the threats at the 

source. 

I believe there are no perfect technical solutions or combination 

of solutions to the threat of bioterrorism to our Nation. The microbes needed are too readily available in nature and the tools 

needed to transform microbes into weapons are also too accessible 

to allow us to control their illicit use. The technologies, the facilities and the humans involved are too widespread and of dual use 

for our intelligence community to discover their malevolent use. As 

the technical barriers to the abuse of biology continue to fall, intent 

to harm becomes more important in the calculous. 

At this time in our history, as was just mentioned, we face three 

trends that synergize to make protecting our citizens from biological terrorism extremely difficult: One, it is a smaller world; two, we 

are in a biotechnological revolution; and three, we see a prevalence 

of asymmetry in warfare. Vast oceans and friendly neighbors are 

not enough to protect us today. Until we address intent to harm 

with biology and the factors which motivate it, we have not done 

enough for our citizens. 

The language of science is common and powerful. I believe that 

working directly with scientists internationally is integral to defense of the homeland. Doing this has numerous benefits. First, it 

builds understanding in the very community that has the tools to 

do harm. Second, it provides some transparency, not total transparency but some and a frame of reference regarding legitimate activities that are going on in biotechnology around the world. And 

three, it offers the opportunity to build some trust between and 

among scientific collaborators worldwide. 

All of these outcomes reduce the likelihood of proliferation. Although we, the U.S. government, as we heard in the previous hearing, have been engaging foreign biological scientists, particularly in 

Russia and Eurasia, since the early 1990s, I don’t believe we always grasp the importance and the value of the process that we are 

involved in. My personal experiences as a scientist-soldier and my 

active involvement in biological counterproliferation and nonproliferation programs have allowed me to make the observations 

listed more fully in my written statement. 

To summarize, however, just a few points regarding the biological threat. 

History has demonstrated that adequate transparency cannot be 

legislated, forced or enforced, or compliance assured. 

Secondly, although not always possible, a most useful approach 

in engagement has been to work in true collaborative relationships 

on mutually beneficial projects. Difficult technical problems related 

to biological safety, biological security and public health, such as 

the avian flu threat that we face today, are excellent targets for 

such collaboration. 
52

I believe that the process is often as important as the product 

that we look for in these programs. Working together on a scientific 

project and failing is at times more beneficial than succeeding 

alone. 

In the end success I believe will not be related to dollars spent 

on fences and locks and alarm systems to protect our microbes. It 

will be related to communication and trust built between humans. 

The metrics are very difficult to apply, but we must stay engaged. We must trust and where we can, we must verify as well. 

And the fourth point, this is a dangerous world. What I am talking about are soft programs. They can’t replace military strength 

and intelligence and other components of our hard power. But I believe these soft programs are complementary and actually make 

our hard power more effective. It is very important, I believe, that 

we find balance between this hard and soft power. 

As just one example in closing, I have had the opportunity to 

travel to Russia two or three times per year since 1993, first under 

the trilateral negotiations. When we started those visits and the 

negotiation to establish mill to mill agreements working across conference tables and taking part in rigid inspections, which we called 

visits but they were more like inspections, the tone was contentious 

and the progress was slow. Next under the Nunn-Lugar program 

we got American scientists involved as collaborators and saw the 

power of science as a common language. 

Earlier this month, actually just 2 weeks ago, in Moscow our National Academy Committee on International Security anArms Control met with our biological counterparts from the Russian Academy of Sciences. For the first time in all these years I saw a 

glimpse of a tipping point in the way our collaborative work is approached. At least I saw both a willingness and now I believe a capability, a financial capability as well, on the Russian side to transform our relationship from one of patronage, which is what it has 

been, to partnership, and I think this is critically important. 

The Russian example that I give is dated somewhat in this age 

of bioterrorism, and actually I think the Russian example I think 

may be the easy one. I think we are going to face more difficult 

ones. But I believe it demonstrates the importance of using our scientific soft power at the source of terror along with the hard power. 

Finding balance is always difficult, but it is so necessary. 

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to present this information 

before the committee, and I shall be happy to answer your questions. 

[The statement of Dr. Franz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID FRANZ

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members, it is an honor to appear before you today 

to address issues related to reducing proliferation of biological weapons. I am currently Vice President & Chief Biological Scientist at the Midwest Research Institute 

of Kansas City, based in Frederick, MD; Director of the National Agriculture Biosecurity Center at Kansas State University and Senior Fellow for Bioterrorism at 

the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point. I 

served on active duty in the U.S. Army from 1971 to 1998, 24 of those years in the 

U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command. I served for 11 years at the 

U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease, which I commanded before my retirement. During my tour of duty at USAMRIID, I served as Chief Inspector on three UN Special Commission biological warfare missions to Iraq and as tech-
53

nical expert on the Trilateral (US-UK-Russia) Agreement visits and negotiations 

with Russia. I have worked under the auspices of the ′′Nunn-Lugar′′ Cooperative 

Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) since 1994 and 

chaired the National Academies of Science, National Research Council committee 

which provides technical review to the CTR-supported research conducted there 

since 1998. I am also a current member of the National Academies of Science standing Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC) of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

(DTRA) and I chair the International Panel of the National Science Advisory Board 

for Biosecurity (NSABB) at the Department of Health and Human Services. The 

myriad opportunities given to me throughout my career in military medical research 

have led me to better understand and value the use of science as a common language to build relationships, understanding and transparency internationally. 

This committee has asked that I provide thoughts on reducing biological threats 

at the source. Below are my views on a number of related issues. 

There are no perfect technical solutions-or combination of solutions---to the threat 

of bioterrorism in our nation. The microbes needed are too readily available in nature and the tools needed to transform microbes into weapons also are too accessible 

to allow us to control their illicit use. The technologies, the facilities and the humans involved are too widespread and of ′′dual-use′′ for our intelligence community 

to discover their malevolent use. As the technical barriers to the abuse of biology 

fall, ‘intent’ to harm becomes more important in the calculus. At this time in our 

history, we face three trends which synergize to make protecting our citizens from 

biological terrorism extremely difficult: 1) a ‘smaller world’, 2) a biotechnological 

revolution and 3) a prevalence of asymmetry in warfare. Vast oceans and friendly 

neighbors are not enough to protect us today; until we address ‘intent’ to harm with 

biology and the factors which motivate it, we have not done enough. 

The language of science is common and powerful. I believe that working directly 

with scientists internationally is integral to defense of the homeland. Doing this has 

numerous benefits: 1) It builds understanding in the very community that has the 

tools to do harm; 2) it provides some transparency and a frame of reference regarding legitimate activities around the world and 3) it offers the opportunity to build 

trust between and among scientific collaborators worldwide. All of these outcomes 

reduce the likelihood of proliferation. Although we---the U.S. government---have 

been engaging foreign biological scientists [particularly from Russia and Eurasia] 

aggressively since the early 90s, we don’t always grasp the importance and value 

of the process. My personal experiences as a scientist-solider and my active involvement in biological counter-proliferation and non-proliferation programs have allowed 

me to make the following observations. 

Regarding the biological threat: 

1. History has demonstrated that adequate transparency cannot be legislated, forced or enforced.or compliance assured; its development can be facilitated, however, through frankness, honesty and efficiently administered 

joint science, technology and public health programs with clear goals. 

2. Human relationships among scientists and clinicians are more effective 

than technological tools or regulatory regimes in providing transparency; 

such relationships provide the added benefit of building understanding and 

even, sometimes, trust. 

3. Although not always possible, the most useful approach in engagement 

has been to work in true collaborative relationships on mutually beneficial 

projects. Difficult technical problems related to public health, such as the 

avian flu threat, are excellent targets of collaboration. These useful and 

necessary public health relationships engage, generally, the same people, 

the same technologies and the same facilities that could be used to develop 

biological weapons. 

4. Historically, the greatest value in our CTR programs has come from personal relationships, facilitated by mutual respect and the common language 

of science. Intellect, personal integrity and a sense of humor among colleagues are appreciated and respected by scientists worldwide; unfortunately, governments are often not trusted. 

5. The greatest harm in government supported, collaborative undertakings 

often results from unprofessional communications, disconnects between policy and implementation, empty promises, reward systems with moving ‘goal 

posts’ and delays in follow-through by either party. 

6. The ‘process’ is often more important than the ‘product’. In biological programs, human factors are more important in providing security than locks, 

fences or signatures on paper. Working together on a scientific project and 

failing is more beneficial than succeeding alone. In the end, success will not 
54

be related to dollars spent on fences, locks and alarm systems to protect microbes; it will be related to communication and trust built between humans. 

Metrics will be difficult to apply, but we must stay engaged. 

7. Traditional technical, bureaucratic and regulatory means of providing biological security to the U.S. will ultimately not be enough. Because of the 

unique characteristics of biology and biotechnology.and the importance of 

intent in the equation.long-term human relationships leading to whatever 

transparency we can obtain will remain a key means of reducing the threat 

to the homeland. 

8. The long-term goal of engagement should be to get the U.S. government 

out of the process of ‘supporting’ patronage programs, and to get U.S. scientists and public health personnel engaged in true collaborations with 

international colleagues on tough problems. Finding tough, common, health, 

biosafety and educational challenges is ever easier as the world shrinks. 

9. This is a dangerous world. Soft programs cannot replace military 

strength, intelligence and other components of hard power, but are complementary and actually make our hard power more effective. We must find 

‘balance’ between hard and soft power. 

10. And finally, we must ′′Trust, but verify,′′ recognizing that we must find 

new and innovative approaches to this when dealing with biology and biotechnology. 

I have had the opportunity to travel to Russia two or three times per year since 

1993. When we started, during the Trilateral negotiations and visits, working across 

conference tables and taking part in rigid inspections termed ‘visits’, the tone was 

contentious and the progress slow. I sensed we were building walls, not tearing 

them down.and we learned little about thoughts or activities on the other side of 

the table. Under the auspices of the Nunn-Lugar legislation of 1992, we slowly established scientific collaborations. First, it was a scientific welfare program designed 

to keep former weaponeers at home in Russia. Next we got American scientists involved as collaborators, and saw the power of science as a common language. Earlier 

this month in Moscow, our NAS CISAC committee met with our biological counterparts from the Russian Academy of Sciences. For the first time, I saw a glimpse 

of a ‘tipping point’ in the way our collaborative work is approached. At last, I saw 

both willingness and a capability on the Russian side to transform our relationship 

from one of patronage to partnership. (See ′′Biological Science and Biotechnology in 

Russia: Controlling Disease and Enhancing Security′′ @ www.nap.edu ). The Russian example is dated—and maybe the easy one—but I believe it demonstrates the 

importance of using our scientific soft power at the source of terror along with the 

hard. Finding balance is always difficult, but so necessary. We have had some limited additional opportunities in Iraq and Libya and, if given the opportunity, could 

use lessons learned and best practices in other countries as well. 

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to present this information before the Committee. I shall be happy to answer your questions.

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Dr. Franz. We have heard today about 

efforts to secure pathogens abroad. Are we doing enough to secure 

the facilities that hold pathogens in our own country? 

Mr. FRANZ. I believe we are. I think the Select Agent Rule of 

1997 and its subsequent beefing up after 9/11 were significant efforts. It is still, just as in other countries, it comes down to humans, as was mentioned in the first comments, and we have now 

in this country implemented surety programs or are implementing 

surety programs as well as security programs, personal liability 

programs for biology. When I was in this lab and running labs for 

the DOD, we didn’t have surety programs like you do in nuclear 

and like we did in chemical. We have those as well. So I think we 

are making a significant effort. 

Again, we need balance there. If we go too far in this country we 

are going to limit the capabilities of our biotechnology industry and 

put us behind in the world market in this area. 

Mr. LINDER. When you were at Ft. Dietrich, were there any reports of any missing pathogens or do you keep close enough account of them you so you could know that? 
55

Mr. FRANZ. We didn’t. In the old days, the rules were a lot different than they are post-9/11, but after the incident in which a 

gentleman attempted to acquire some plague from the American 

type culture collection in 1995, I believe his name was Larry 

Wayne Harris, the CDC was mandated to develop this Select Agent 

Program, and after that the rules were tightened significantly. 

There have been, as came out in the press after 10/04, after the anthrax letters, there have been—there were some false reports of 

materials missing from Ft. Dietrich. Most of those were killed samples and in almost every case I believe they were eventually recovered and found. 

Mr. LINDER. Would you care to take a shot at my question about 

Russian smallpox. 

Mr. FRANZ. Yes, sir. That is really under the auspices of the 

World Health Assembly and it is the WHO that works on that 

problem. We have been negotiating since the mid-1990s probably, 

with regard to destruction, to destroy the last of the smallpox. 

Mr. LINDER. What is your take on that? 

Mr. FRANZ. My opinion has been all along that we should not. 

Initially, primarily we were working on vaccines, drugs and 

diagnostics. We found that we had adequate models for vaccines 

and diagnostics. We found that there were cases in which there 

would be drugs that would not work against our surrogates, but 

they would work against variola, smallpox itself, so we would have 

been in a position to miss drugs. 

At this point I believe we know enough about rebuilding those 

bugs that it probably doesn’t make any difference. And if we destroy, I believe it takes away our capabilities to work with variola, 

and yet someone else in the world could rebuild the bug either from 

another orthopox virus or from scratch eventually and have it. 

Mr. LINDER. Does it startle you—I may have asked you this the 

last time you were here—to know that significant numbers of Iranian children are being vaccinated for smallpox today? 

Mr. FRANZ. I don’t have any information on that. I really don’t 

know that. 

Mr. LINDER. Dr. Khripunov, we know that the managers of these 

facilities in the past under the old Soviet Union lied on the reports 

to their supervisors as to reaching certain quotas. They over 

produce in one quarter, they would underscore their numbers so 

they could—if they under produce they would have to overscore 

their numbers and this entire culture was one of lying to superiors. 

If that was the culture, how do you change it so that they are 

living under different rules? 

Mr. KHRIPUNOV. You know, Russia is a country yet in transition, 

you know. Certainly it is a shift from one set of values and cultural 

elements to another. What is alarming is that this new set of cultural values are yet to be put into place. So while this process is 

in transition, I think this is the most difficult period to find ways 

to keep people motivated, complying with rules and regulations, 

staying away from diversion and selling, and this is why I believe 

this Blatislava statement is very, very important. I think in my 

view there is no single more important document than this 

Blatislava statement. Because it opens up ways for us to move 

ahead and think a little bit with the mindset of ordinary Russians, 
56

you know, who are custodians. Let me reveal you something that 

you may not know. 

The Blatislava statement in English has two words: Security culture should apply to custodians and protective forces. And it is 

clear because you don’t have to impose, you know, culture on military personnel. They have their own rules to operate. In the Russian text on the web site of President Putin the word ‘‘custodians’’ 

is missing. Whether it is anintentional, you know, omission or 

whether interpreters or translators didn’t know how to translate, 

you know, this word into Russian, I have no way of knowing. But 

this document, very important document, with the word 

‘‘custodians’’ missing is becoming really meaningless. And this is a 

reflection of the overall status of the mindset that it is none of our 

business. We have guards. We have soldiers. And we are just small 

people, you know, who are not very significant. So the Blatislava 

statement gives us a chance to talk about security culture. But 

what is important is that I think the United States should move 

forcefully in order to ratify the amendments to the Physical Protection Convention because by elevating, you know, security culture to 

the level of international obligation we may ask, you know, the 

Russian officials you know how you comply with that. Can we cooperate? Can we compare standards how we evaluate security culture in your country compared to other countries? So security culture is very, very important as the—I would say the first line of 

defense at this source because very much depends on the people. 

Mr. LINDER. Is there a biological equivalent to the IAEA? 

Mr. KHRIPUNOV. Unfortunately, World Health Organization is 

very cautious about assuming any security functions. But it is natural because you cannot divide—you cannot draw a very distinct 

dividing line between infectious diseases and what may be regarded as biological agents. So WHO is a natural organization, but 

it doesn’t have any security related record really to draw upon. 

Another option would be to establish, you know, a new organization that would be doing it full time concerning security, security 

culture and fighting biological terrorism. But that would undercut 

the prestige of the WHO. My choice would be to expand the mandate of the World Health Organization. 

Mr. LINDER. Your comment, Dr. Franz. 

Mr. FRANZ. There is actually a small group there run by a Dr. 

Kanisova who call these problems intentional endemics. As is mentioned, WHO doesn’t like to get involved in security anthey have 

stayed out. They prepare some reports and they have been working 

at the seven regions, WHO regions, on some joint meetings to look 

at biosafety, biosecurity, dual use issues, sort of the soft side of 

these biological terrorism issues. 

Mr. LINDER. Is there any agents on the bio side that is not dual 

use? 

Mr. FRANZ. I am sorry? 

Mr. LINDER. Is there any agent on the biological side that is not 

dual use? 

Mr. FRANZ. I think some are certainly more dual use than others. 

It is hard to abuse certain biological agents so you can sort of rank 

order them in groups or classes. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Langevin. 
57

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I appreciate them for what they have had to say. Earlier in the first 

panel I raised the issue of National Intelligence Council report that 

has detailed a number of smuggling incidents of weapons grade 

material or nuclear material or nuclear weapon components that 

have been smuggled out of Russia and the former Soviet Union. 

And in addition to that, Mr. Heisinger from the Department of Energy has also revealed that his counterpart in Russia has informed 

him that there were over 200 potential radiological smuggling incidents last year alone. Clearly the issue of proliferation is still a 

problem, that this nuclear material and components have not been 

totally secured, and it appears we have a lot to do before we say 

we are at a point where we are at security at all of these sites 

where material could be smuggled from or components could be 

smuggled from. 

My question I guess to you is, is this a function of just money 

and would it move us further on the path of securing the material 

if there were abundant resources into programs like Nunn-Lugar 

and the other programs, whether it is at State or DOE or DOD? 

And is it a problem on the other end, on the Russian side? They 

are not putting enough of their own resources or is this a just 

anissue of will and more of a political problem? 

Mr. KHRIPUNOV. You know, it should be multi-thronged approach, more funding, more transparency, severe punishment for 

people who commit such acts. But I think the most important thing 

is to promote public awareness of the threats because the public is 

becoming more and more indifferent to threats of terrorism. According to the most latest public opinion poll, the threat or concern 

of terrorism is number 8. It is preceded by unemployment, you 

know, by high cost of medical care, many other things. But ironically enough, in a country where terrific acts of terrorism were 

committed, it is number 8 because the threat perception is misplaced, mostly due to official propaganda, mostly due to lingering 

Cold War perception that threats come from NATO, that threats 

come from the United States, from the ABM system to be deployed 

in the United States. 

So what we need to do in addition to any other things, you know, 

is to help, you know, Russian NGOs promote better awareness of 

nuclear security and existing threats. No one is doing that. No one 

is briefing journalists about that. No one is working with the public 

opinion trying to share concerns and real risk perceptions. And as 

a result, there are difficulties. People are not deterred from committing horrendous acts of diversion, stealing, because they don’t 

understand and they are not under the pressure of risk perception. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do you have any comment? 

Mr. KHRIPUNOV. I would add the rules are absolutely different 

for biology than they are for nuclear and radiological. On the one 

hand, it is probably easier especially if you know what you are 

doing to take out material like biological agents because you only 

need that much, and you can’t count what you have got there. But 

on the other hand, it is less necessary to smuggle with the exception of smallpox, which is locked up in Atlanta and Kosovo. It is 

less necessary to smuggle biological agents because they are available in so many places. 
58

Mr. LANGEVIN. Is that securing the biological agents, is that just 

a function of money or are there other issues, political issues in 

terms of hammering out agreements and security? 

Mr. FRANZ. I think there was mention in the earlier hearing of 

consolidating agents in Russia. For example, what has happened 

over the years is these agents in some of these small laboratories 

have almost become currency. They realize that we would like to 

take them away, and it is like knowledge is power here. In some 

cases biological agents are power and people don’t want to give 

them up. And it is pretty hard—even though you say you consolidate them all in one laboratory from, let us say, five laboratories, 

it is hard to know you really do because all you need to do is keep 

back that much. It is—you can’t take a counter there or a measuring device and say yes we have got it all. So it is a little—biological is a little different than these other sciences. 

Mr. KHRIPUNOV. With your permission, in this nuclear field it is 

the same perception, you know. As long as you have uranium and 

plutonium in the view of the top manager you are ranked very high 

in terms of priority for funding, for other benefits. If there is a campaign to consolidate and move your stockpiles of highly enriched, 

refined plutonium away you might be marginalized as a result. So 

there is resistance to a similar move to consolidate weapon grade 

materials in Russia. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And that raises a good point and for both securing nuclear material and biological material, the various programs 

that we have in place. How do the Russians, whether it is the government or the individuals at these particular facilities, how do 

they view our involvement there? Do they look at it as interference 

and/or do they look at it as working cooperatively with them that 

we are looking to help both them and us at the same time? 

Mr. KHRIPUNOV. I would say the overall reaction by the people 

involved in this process is positive. I think what we have not yet 

evaluated accurately is the impact of the CTR on the good will of 

people because CTR projects are often implemented by Russians. 

They get money, you know, from American contractors. They learn 

how to deal with foreign counterparts. They earn money, and they 

realize that, you know, Westerners are not that dangerous, you 

know. And their intentions are beneficial, you know. And they can 

drink vodka as much as Russians if there is anoccasion to do it. 

So there is a core group of Russians with very positively, you 

know, reacting for these programs. They realize this is a window, 

a door to the West that may help them, you know, to prosper. 

But there are also nationalistic, you know, minded people who 

regard that as a threat to their own interests. Let me give you one 

example. A couple of months prior to the Blatislava statement, a 

group of retired Russians made a statement saying that Americans 

want to take all Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear material 

way out of the country. And they asked people to volunteer in patrolling the periphery of some sites to prevent Americans from 

going there and taking material out of those sites. So it was ridiculous but it was credible to some nationalistic minded people there. 

Mr. FRANZ. I think generally the same principles apply to biology. The thing I would add is it has changed and I have sort of 

watched it change over time. Early on in the 1994 and 1998 time 
59

frame it was we are happy to cooperate in any way because we 

need your money, and then they went through a phase where they 

needed our money much less and maybe didn’t cooperate as much. 

And I really believe that now we are going through a phase where 

we are working together, as I mentioned in my statement. It is 

looking more—at least in the areas I am working—a little more 

like a partnership and there is more willingness to work together 

anto share some of the financial burden, which is great if it continues. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. The gentlelady from the District wishes to inquire? 

Ms. NORTON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and I am sorry I wasn’t here 

before. I am very interested in the subject matter of this hearing 

and I find the testimony in its own way reassuring. It is because 

of the sophistication of the understanding that it imparts about the 

nature of the threats, how to deal. We live in a country where people expect to lock it up anthrow away a key and that will take care 

of it, and one of the things that is hard to prepare Americans to 

understand is that you have to—that the government and nobody 

else can protect you against every threat and to condition people 

to understand that we are dealing with something that is not totally in our control. And yet not to fear that, that means that you 

shouldn’t go about living your life as you always have. 

I hear you saying that essentially we are talking about weapons 

at least of the magnitude that could initially do some harm as 

being fairly easily accessible. Dr. Franz speaks about biological 

weapons being put easily into nature for use, malevolent or beneficial. 

Dr. Khripunov, your testimony essentially offers an analysis you 

both just talked about, the small quantities of these materials, how 

easy it is for them to transport it from one place to another. 

I am interested. I mean it—and here is my question. It seems to 

come down to delivery systems if one is interested in prevention. 

I want to know if that is true but I particularly want to know if 

it is true because of this recent report about the New York subways 

where we are told that was it al Qaeda, or whoever, called off a 

planned attack of cyanide or some other agent that is not exactly 

esoteric in the New York subways. We don’t know why. 

Ms. NORTON. It caught my attention because I represent the District of Columbia, because most of the people who use our subways, 

200,000 Federal workers, actually, are located in this region; that 

is who really use the subways. There has been very little done 

about the tunnels that these subways travel through, a great concern on the part of those who run this system, about that matter. 

So my question is, one, what hypothesis would you offer, assuming all this to be true about the New York subways, about why perhaps it was called off? Because the theories are rampant about 

that. And I would just like, from a scientific point of view, to know 

what theories you might have. And particularly, I am interested in 

whether one of the reasons might have been the delivery system 

for truly doing some harm, because the one thing we know about 

the MO, at least of al Qaeda, is they want to do great harm. I 

would be interested in anything you have to say about this recent 

so-called revelation about the New York subway. 
60

Mr. KHRIPUNOV. I am afraid I will have to give you a longer rather than shorter answer on that, and one important issue is, where 

is the threshold? Because there was not a single meaningful, you 

know, case of using weapons of mass destruction on a larger scale, 

except Tokyo, Japan. Why they haven’t done so, I think the main 

objective is to impact the public, to cause panic, to get to the front 

pages of the world media. And as they are successful in doing that 

using conventional ways of terrorism, I think they may be happy 

to stay with the conventional ways of terrorism 

As soon as people start building resilience, as soon as the media 

does not cover that on the first pages, the reaction will be, how we 

can go on to escalate and disintegrate societal institutions and impact the public? 

Here comes unconventional ways of committing acts of terrorism. 

And out of the old acts of terrorism, I would put aside as something 

long-term nuclear weapons or improvised nuclear devices. It will 

take some time for terrorists to acquire weapons or develop technological skills. 

What is more simple is what we call a dirty bomb; to acquire radioactive material, strap conventional explosives and explode it in 

a densely populated area. Why it is, I believe, more attractive to 

the minds of terrorists, you know, radiological records are intrinsically associated with nuclear weapons; it is something nuclear. It 

is associated with radiation. And we all understand that the population has what we call radio-phobia. You know, it is something 

that was built throughout the Cold War period with the bombing 

of Nagasaki, all the movies on the beach with radiation, people, 

you know, dying. 

So terrorists may be gravitating to that type of act of terrorism, 

which is simple technologically; you can acquire radiological material or sources of radiation quite easily. You can acquire explosives. 

What is needed is two persons ready to sacrifice their lives because 

of the radiation and the exposure to radiation before they explode 

that device. And the recent report of the Department of State about 

world terrorism, April 2006, saying that many expatriates who live 

in western countries declare themselves as ready to sacrifice their 

lives. So we even have people who are prepared to commit these 

acts. 

If you compare that with chemical terrorism, it is a little bit, you 

know, it is a little bit less aggressive. You know, we live in a world 

of toxic materials, and we will not be scared as much as we realize 

an act of radiological terrorism has been committed and you know, 

part of the big city is contaminated with radiation. There will be 

panic. We panic when we face the unknown, and radiation is odorless, senseless and very much misunderstood by others. 

Let me refer you to the movie, The War of the Worlds. Steven 

Spielberg, who is the director of that movie, said in an interview, 

I made this movie to show that under stressful situations and facing the unknown, that society may tend to disintegrate. And this 

is what terrorists may be after. 

Let’s take biological weapons—I understand you will not agree 

with me because this is your field—but I think biological weapons—we live with diseases, you know. We fight bird flu. We try to 
61

prevent epidemics, so they are less stressful than us facing radiation and dirty bombs. 

And then, for terrorists, you know, any pathogen, you know, any 

contamination by agents may get out of control and kill people that 

are not intended to die. With radiological weapons, it is more or 

less focused. Sorry for the long answer. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. 

Dr. FRANZ.

Mr. FRANZ. With regard to your first point about the availability 

of biological agents, I mentioned agents. And you make a good 

point about dissemination systems; that is often the hard part. 

Bugs are everywhere. Developing it into a weapon is not technically a trivial issue, so that is a good technical barrier to those 

who would harm us with them, and that is good news. 

With regard to cyanide, and all I know is what I heard briefly 

in the media, cyanide is not a biological agent, and it is not radiological. It is a chemical. We weaponized it in our old offensive 

chemical program. And it doesn’t suffer from the problems of dissemination that some of the biological agents do. A biological agent 

is a particulate; you have got to put it up in the air so people 

breathe it. It needs to be in a small particle, or it will fall out and 

not be of any danger. 

Cyanide is a vapor, so really all you would need is tanks of cyanide or chemicals that in combination would produce cyanide in 

some way in a subway system. 

Ms. NORTON. Would you smell it? 

Mr. FRANZ. Some people can smell cyanide, and some can’t. I 

happen to be able to smell cyanide. I used to work in a chemical 

plant, and I can smell it. 

Ms. NORTON. Do you have to have a Ph.D. to smell it? 

Mr. FRANZ. No, it is genetic. It is the way you are wired; some 

people can, and some can’t. 

But I would think a barrier to using cyanide in a subway system, 

for example, would be getting it into the area, you might need some 

large tanks, not real large, but you would need some tanks. And 

it would depend on the quantity that you could get down there as 

to how much area you could cover with those tubes. 

Ms. NORTON. So you doubt that that is what was in the New 

York subway system? 

Mr. FRANZ. Well, it is a reasonable one to pick. 

Ms. NORTON. Yeah, but you have to get some tanks down there. 

Mr. FRANZ. Well, they don’t have to be too large. It would be possible if you had roller bags, like people that you see travelling on 

subways all the time. So it is not a matter of getting it into the 

air within a system; it is a matter of just releasing it from a tank. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, both. 

You have been very helpful. We appreciate you sharing your 

afternoon with us, and the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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