GAO-07-610R Railroad Safety 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

March 15, 2007 

The Honorable Corrine Brown 

Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Railroads, 

 Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Railroad Safety–Responses to Posthearing Questions 

Dear Madam Chairwoman: 

This letter responds to your request that we provide responses to questions related to 

our recent testimony before your subcommittee on reauthorizing federal rail safety 

programs.1

 Our testimony discussed how the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 

(1) focuses its efforts on the highest priority risks related to train accidents in 

planning its oversight, (2) identifies safety problems on railroad systems in carrying 

out its oversight, and (3) assesses the impact of its oversight efforts on safety. This 

testimony was based on our recent report on these topics.2

 Your questions, along 

with our responses, follow. 

1. You mention that the success of many of FRA’s initiatives addressing the most 

common causes of accidents will depend on voluntary actions by the railroads. 

Why? Is FRA focusing too much on voluntary measures and not enough on 

mandating regulations? 

A number of FRA’s current safety initiatives do rely to a great extent on voluntary 

actions by the railroads. For example, the close call reporting system3

 will depend for 

its success on extensive participation by railroads. As we reported in January, one 

railroad has committed to participate in this pilot project in one rail yard, and, 

according to FRA, two others have expressed strong interest. In addition, FRA’s 

efforts to develop a model to address the problem of worker fatigue depend on the 

extent to which railroads eventually use this model to improve train crew scheduling 

practices. Also, the agency emphasizes achieving compliance from railroads 

voluntarily and takes enforcement action only in a small percentage of cases of 

 

1

GAO, Rail Safety: The Federal Railroad Administration Is Better Targeting Its Oversight, but 

Needs to Assess the Impact of Its Efforts, GAO-07-390T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2007). 2

GAO, The Federal Railroad Administration Is Taking Steps to Better Target Its Oversight, but 

Assessment of Results Is Needed to Determine Impact, GAO-07-149 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007). 3

According to FRA, a close call represents a situation in which an ongoing sequence of events was 

stopped from developing further, preventing the occurrence of potentially serious safety-related 

consequences. 
noncompliance found. We have not directly compared FRA’s emphasis on voluntary 

actions with that of other modal administrations. For example, the Federal Aviation 

Administration has emphasized partnership with industry through programs that 

allow participants, such as airlines or pilots, to self-report violations of safety

regulations and potentially mitigate or avoid civil penalties or other legal action. In 

the end, what is important is whether FRA is able to demonstrate, through the use of 

performance measures and evaluations of effectiveness, that its initiatives are 

effective in improving safety and are superior in terms of costs and benefits to other 

safety regulatory interventions. 

2. What percentage of railroad operations is FRA able to inspect each year? 

FRA estimates that it is able to inspect about 0.2 percent of railroad operations each 

year. See also the response to question 6 for a discussion of this issue and question 3 

for an approach that could extend the reach of safety efforts. 

3. You state that FRA inspections are not designed to determine how well 

railroads are managing safety risks throughout their systems. What should 

FRA and its inspectors be doing differently?

For the most part, FRA inspections determine whether railroads are complying with 

various safety standards, such as those related to track and equipment condition, and 

its inspections are targeted at locations where accidents have occurred or previous 

inspections have identified problems. A complementary approach to these 

compliance inspections is oversight of risk management, which can help to prevent 

accidents. Risk management can be described as a continuous process of 

managing—through the systematic identification, analysis, and control of risks 

associated with such hazards—the likelihood of their occurrence and their negative 

impact.4

 Oversight of risk management can provide additional assurance of safety 

beyond that provided by inspections of compliance with minimum safety standards. 

It can supplement uniform, minimum standards by encouraging or requiring 

companies to identify and address their unique safety risks. Risk management has 

been used in the private and public sectors for decades. For example, risk 

management approaches are being used for public transit and pipeline safety in the 

United States and for railroad safety in Canada, and the American Public 

Transportation Association, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration, and Transport Canada, respectively, oversee these approaches. 

While FRA has taken some steps in a limited number of areas to encourage risk 

management in the railroad industry, it does not oversee railroads’ overall approach 

for managing safety risks on their systems. 

While we believe that adopting a comprehensive approach to overseeing railroads’ 

management of safety risks can lead to improved safety, we did not recommend that 

FRA adopt such an approach. FRA is pursuing several initiatives aimed at reducing 

 4

A framework for risk management based on industry best practices and other criteria that we have

developed divides risk management into five major phases: (1) setting strategic goals and objectives,

and determining constraints; (2) assessing risks; (3) evaluating alternatives for addressing these risks;

(4) selecting the appropriate alternatives; and (5) implementing the alternatives and monitoring the 

progress made and the results achieved. See pages 35-39 of GAO-07-149 for further discussion. 

Page 2 GAO-07-610R Railroad Safety 
accident rates, and these initiatives need time to mature to demonstrate their effects. 

At the appropriate time, the agency may wish to determine whether additional 

actions are needed. 

 

4. In follow-up to some questions at the hearing, has GAO studied, determined, or 

in any way looked at whether the number of inspectors at the FRA is sufficient? 

We did not assess whether the number of FRA inspectors was sufficient, nor did we 

assess the degree to which state railroad inspections complement FRA’s inspections. 

However, we did note that the number of these inspectors is quite small compared 

with the size of the industry. (According to FRA, its inspectors inspect about 0.2 

percent of railroad operations each year.) 

As discussed both in our January 2007 report and in our testimony statement, the 

agency’s implementation of its new inspection planning approach allows it to better 

target the greatest safety risks and therefore make more effective use of its inspector 

workforce. However, the agency’s approach to conducting inspections focuses on 

determining compliance with minimum standards at specific sites visited. Oversight 

of railroads’ management of safety risks throughout their systems could provide FRA 

with a greater “reach” and understanding of safety overall. However, we did not 

recommend that FRA adopt such an approach because its current initiatives to bring 

down the train accident rate need time to demonstrate their effects. 

5. How effective is FRA’s safety program compared to the safety programs of other 

modal administrations? 

We did not attempt to compare the effectiveness of FRA’s safety program to that of 

other modal administrations. Like other modal safety administrations that we have 

reviewed—the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration, and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration, FRA is 

relatively small compared to the industry it regulates. However, there are important 

differences among industries that would require careful study as part of any 

comparison of effectiveness. For example, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration regulates about 677,000 commercial motor carriers, while FRA 

regulates fewer than 700 railroads. 

6. In your testimony, you state that FRA inspections cover only two-tenths of one 

percent all railroad operations. Is this a large enough sample to accurately 

gauge safety in the railroad industry? 

This is a difficult question to answer because it would require an assessment of not 

only the absolute number of inspections and resulting problems found, but also the 

manner in which FRA is deploying its inspectors and any deterrent effect that FRA’s 

inspections and enforcement actions might have. We are encouraged that, in 2005, 

FRA developed an overall strategy through its National Rail Safety Action Plan for 

targeting its oversight to areas of greatest risk. We believe that the action plan 

provides a reasonable framework for guiding these efforts. 

Page 3 GAO-07-610R Railroad Safety
We also concluded that FRA needs to (1) do more to measure the direct results of its 

oversight, such as the extent to which identified safety problems are corrected, and 

(2) measure the effectiveness of its enforcement program. We made 

recommendations to this effect and are looking forward to FRA’s response. Finally, 

as discussed earlier (see our response to question 3), adopting a risk management 

framework could expand the reach of FRA’s inspection and enforcement programs. 

7. In your testimony, you state that the FRA does not oversee railroads’ 

management of safety risk, while many other agencies do. Would such 

oversight improve the safety of railroad operations? Are there any models that 

the FRA should look at to implement its own program? 

See the response to question 3 for a discussion of this issue. 

8. What should the FRA do to improve its safety enforcement program? 

We found that FRA cannot demonstrate how its inspection and enforcement efforts 

are contributing to rail safety and that FRA lacks key information, such as measures 

of the direct results of these efforts, that could help it improve performance. While 

such measures are not always easy to develop, at least two other modal 

administrations within the department—the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration--have 

done so. Coupled with better measures of FRA’s direct results is the need to assess 

the effectiveness of its enforcement approach, especially its use of civil penalties, to 

understand the degree to which they contribute to improved safety outcomes and to 

determine whether it should adjust its approach to improve performance. We 

recommended that FRA (1) develop and implement direct measures of its inspection 

and enforcement programs and (2) evaluate its enforcement program to provide 

further information on the program’s results and the need for any changes to improve 

performance. 

9. Based on the small sample of railroad operations that the FRA inspects, and 

how it inspects them, do you believe that the FRA is in a position to say if the 

railroads are safe or not? 

See our response to question 6 for a discussion of this topic. 

10.In your testimony, you state that the FRA efforts to improve safety will depend 

on voluntary action by railroads. Is voluntary action sufficient to improve 

safety? 

See our response to question 1 for a discussion of this issue. 

11.States can play an important role in assisting FRA with ensuring safety along 

the rail lines. Unfortunately, FRA has been reluctant to allow states to regulate 

the railroads in order to provide a safe environment for their residents. What 

role do you feel states should play in assisting with railroad safety and 

regulation?

Page 4 GAO-07-610R Railroad Safety 
As we noted in our January 2007 report, 30 state oversight agencies participate in a 

partnership program with FRA to conduct safety oversight activities at railroads’ 

operating sites. About 160 state inspectors work with FRA to conduct inspections 

and other investigative and surveillance activities as needed. These inspectors are an 

important supplement to FRA’s 400 inspectors, since the size of the railroad industry 

is quite large. FRA officials have told us that the agency does not provide funding for 

state inspection activities (except for training and computer equipment) and 

therefore does not have authority to tell states what inspections to conduct. FRA’s 

regional offices do coordinate inspection activities with participating states in their 

region. 

Our work focused on FRA’s activities. We did not assess potential and actual states’ 

roles or FRA’s efforts to encourage state participation. If a larger role is envisioned 

for states, several questions would have to be addressed, including (1) the goals for 

state participation (e.g., increased safety levels to be achieved), (2) how federal and 

state efforts would complement each other, (3) what inspection and enforcement 

authority (e.g., to cite violations) would be allowed; and (4) who would pay for any 

increase in state inspection presence. 

- - - - - 

We are making copies of this letter available to others upon request and it will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you have any 

questions about its content, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or 

siggerudk@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and 

Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this letter. Key contributors to this 

letter were Judy Guilliams-Tapia and James Ratzenberger. 

Sincerely yours, 

Katherine A. Siggerud 

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues 

(542113) 

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